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
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JOURNAL OF
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REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE UNEQUAL
SHARING OF BENEFITS: BACKGROUND TO THE DISINTE-
GRATION AND COLLAPSE OF THE EAST AFRICAN
COMMUNITY.

NGILA MWASE *

The plain fact is the world is too big and the individual nation is too small. Regional groupings are a natural occurrence.

Anonymous

The spread effects (sometimes called the spill-over effects) of an industrializing Kenya to her less developed neighbours however, tended to strengthen the satellite-periphery-centre relationship.

J. F. Rweyemamu

It is easier to negotiate if there is in each partner state a clear determination to pursue Africa's political objective of complete independence.

Mwalimu Nyerere

INTRODUCTION

One of the problems facing the developing countries is heavy dependency (technological, financial, markets, entrepreneurial etc.) on the industrialized world arising in part from a limited internal market, little, if any, sizeable industrialization, low bargaining power etc.

One of the options out of this predicament has been regional economic integration. The resultant Common Markets between partner-states with geographical proximity, but differing levels of economic development, not to mention structural and ideological differences, have brought distributional problems of benefits, with the lion's share accruing to the partner able to attract more investments i.e. with greater economies of scale, both internal and external; better infrastructure both physical and social; higher level of industrial growth etc.

Such was the case with the now defunct East African Community (E.A.C.). The unequal sharing of benefits were apparent in both the East African Community predecessors – the East African High Commission and the East African Common Services Organization, as the various Reports – the East African Royal Commission (1947), the Raisman Commission (1961) and the Phillips Commission (1967) testified.

* Ngila Mwase is on the staff of the Economic Research Bureau at the University of Dar es Salaam. A detailed analysis of the subject is contained in the author's monograph: *The Rise and Fall of the E.A. Community (TPH, forthcoming)*

2 Africa Development

The Kampala Agreement of 1964 (which was never implemented) and the Treaty for East African Cooperation (1967) were directed at solving some of these imbalances. Despite the 1967 Treaty and its devices for redressing the imbalances the dissatisfactions continued, and reached crisis situation in the mid seventies with unilateral break of its provisions, an attempt at its review, and the sudden collapse in mid – 1977.

Pre-Community Days

The East African Community predecessors were coordinated from Nairobi and the Governor of Kenya chaired the Governors' Conference and made decisions on behalf of London and the Governors.

Suffice it to pinpoint that the closer Union of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda which the (Kenya) settlers strived for was one (reminiscent of the now defunct Salisbury-dominated Central African Federation) which they would dominate and this was adversely received especially in Tanganyika (1). After independence, as internationally she strove to build a self-reliant economy, Tanzania challenged Kenya's dominance in the affairs of the Common Market, an « equalization » effort mistaken in Kenya to mean jealousy or a domineering stance (2).

States from Common Markets in search of the following benefits: (a) expansion of trade, incomes and employment due to the free movement of goods, labour and capital between states (b) greater division of labour and specialization in production, (c) greater possibilities of technological advance and innovation (d) a cheaper and more efficient transportation system (e) minimization of duplication (f) greater bargaining power etc. In East Africa, Kenya took the lion's share of these benefits and the autarchic checks might have been at the expense of growth in the region as a whole. Thus Kenya (the « White Highlands » and Nairobi in particular) with its concentration (and centralization) of « superior » economic, social and infrastructural facilities, experienced greater « spread effects »; and at independence, she was already asserting herself as « the workshop of East Africa ».

Indeed this perpetual concentration of benefits should be seen as a necessary cost of trying to build a Common Market in a capitalist setting rather than of arbitrary decision-making. To quote Amon Ksekela:

These imbalanced, exploitative, geographical relations are a fundamental characteristic of capitalist development and not, as some would have us believe, an accidental and easily compensatable accompaniment (3).

The Raisman Commission referring to difficulties in running the Common Market, reports vis-à-vis duties on agricultural products in the 1920s,

strong protests against these duties from Uganda where the predominant interest in most of the protected commodities was that of consumer rather than producer, and to a smaller extent Tanganyika also.

Differences concerning the application of tariff (and other) protection and industrial licencing, the Raisman Report noted:

emerged as the territories most dependent upon exports – Uganda and Tanganyika – have found their incomes from that source falling (or at best stagnant) instead of rising, and as Kenya has accordingly been seen to benefit, relatively, from her greater and more rapidly growing concentration of manufacturing industry and financial and commercial activity.

Worse still,

since protected industries, displacing imported goods from the East African market, have developed more strongly in Kenya than elsewhere, the loss of import duty which this development entails has fallen upon all the territories whereas the increases in revenue due to the protected industries themselves, and their stimulation of the surrounding economy, have accrued mostly to Kenya (4).

Raisman's option of fiscal compensation (i.e. redistribution of income tax benefits from Kenya) failed to physically channel resources into Tanzania and Uganda. And so did the Kampala Agreement (or Disagreement) of 1964 on planned geographical allocation of new industries. The Kenya parliament did not even ratify it.

Tanzania's trade deficit with Kenya which stood at Shs. 142/- million in 1961 had risen to Shs. 184/- million in 1964. By 1967 the inter-state trade figures were showing a trade surplus for Kenya of Shs.254.5/ million, while they showed Uganda and Tanzania with trade deficits of Shs. 59/- million and Shs. 195.5/- respectively (5). With the failure to distribute industries etc, Tanzania increasingly introduced trade restrictions; the logic of which is implicit in Mwalimu's own words:

Each of our three Governments is answerable to the people of its own country – regional loyalty has sometimes to come second in our national responsibilities (6).

R. H. Green and Ann Seidman have argued along these same lines – that economic integration can further African economic development and Pan-Africanism but should not be a substitute to the essential efforts of individual partner states to achieve development (7).

The Treaty for East African Cooperation

The inequalities, reflected in industrial imbalances and trade deficits for the less industrialized were tackled by the Phillips Commission following the Treaty signed in Kampala on 6 June 1967 establishing the Community on 1 December 1967. If neither Rome was built, nor the Treaty of Rome implemented in a day, the E.A.C., despite its comparative youth, was in some respects more advanced than the European Economic Community, having had from the outset a common external tariff, absence of internal tariff with the sole exception of transfer taxes (in the short-run), the common services etc.

In a way the Treaty called, not for equal sharing of the benefits, but for unequal sharing in favour of the economically less developed. To this end, four main devices were instituted namely:

- (a) a system of transfer taxes on manufactured goods entering inter-state trade imposable by a partner state sustaining a deficit in its trade with the other partner-states,
- (b) the East African Development Bank (EADB) with its differential investment formula (22 1/2 per cent of the funds to be invested in Kenya and 38 3/4 per cent in each of the other two partner states).
- (c) the «decentralization» of the Community institutions hiter-to concentrated in Nairobi
- (d) harmonization of fiscal and monetary incentives.

Several weaknesses of the Treaty, some of which were realized by the signatories can be spelt out:

- (a) The Treaty did not guarantee the free movement of labour among the partner states; thus making it more of a Customs Union than a Common Market
- (b) The transfer tax as an internal levy represented a selective deviation from internal free trade and therefore violated the Common Market ideal of absence of internal trade restrictions.
- (c) Despite the transfer tax and the EADB, the Treaty did not provide for any central means of industrial allocation or a common scheme of fiscal incentives,
- (d) The Treaty made little progress towards achieving a common agricultural policy. (In both (c) and (d) the intentions to do so were just stated).
- (e) While tax coordination means were established by the Treaty, there was nothing in the Treaty to prevent the three countries from having different tax systems with the exception of external tariffs and excise taxes.
- (f) The coordination of some vital matters of the Community were left to the Councils, often without specific guidelines. For example, the Economic Consultative and Planning Council was charged with the task of assisting the national

planning efforts of the partner states through consultations (Article 23) but was not given the specific task of coordinating these efforts, let alone focussing, as would be expected, on an East African Development Plan; and in the event little was done by the Council,

- (g) Other weaknesses, more or less of a political and administrative nature persisted.

Differential development levels were inherited and reinforced and were bound to attract more investments for the more developed. For instance, at independence Kenya had a railway station and workshop in Nairobi which was larger in every respect than those in Tanzania and Uganda combined. Was Kenya expected to demolish part of the station to bring herself into line with the other two countries?

The contribution of the manufacturing sub-sector to the monetary GDP at factor cost for instance rose from 4.7 per cent in 1963 to 1967 for Tanzania, from 9.7 per cent to 10.9 for Uganda and 12.9 per cent to 14.7 per cent for Kenya in the same period. These increases coupled by an unplanned Common Market (8), led to increased differential rates of industrialization, reflected in deficits in inter-state trade in manufactures. In 1962 Kenya had 76.4 per cent of all inter-territorial exports of manufactures, Uganda 20 per cent and Tanganyika a tiny 3.6 per cent (9).

Despite these imbalances (Uganda and Tanzania are among the UNCTAD's 25 least developed countries; and the latter, among Africa's 16 least developed countries) Kenya did not appear willing to «mark time».

Decentralization

The «distribution» of the Headquarters of the various organs (Tanzania: E.A.C. Headquarters and E.A. Harbours; Kenya, E.A. Railways and E.A. Airways; Uganda: E.A. Posts and Telecommunications, and East African Development Bank; did not significantly change the old pattern of sharing benefits. The Headquarters of the East African Posts and Telecommunications for example moved to Kampala, but Nairobi remained the «nerve centre» of the Corporation – with most of the installations and from where most purchases were made. The Harbours Headquarters were established in Dar es Salaam but Kenya unilaterally installed a Deputy Director-General in Mombasa who encroached on the powers of the Headquarters. Kenya (perhaps «aided» by the disparity – Mombasa served about twice as many ships as Dar es Salaam, employed about half of the 12,000 dockworkers in 1971 and its tonnage was 6,350,000 as against Dar es Salaam's 2,790,000 – spent lots of East African Harbours Corporation money on buying the most expensive equipment exclusively for Mombasa port. Whether the transfer of the Community General Fund Services (GFS) officials from

Nairobi to Arusha did for example significantly increase the demand for local products in Arusha is subject to further research work.

Theoretically the Corporations were East African property whenever they happened to be located. But certain tendencies e.g. the 1973-75 transfer of funds crisis would indicate that theory and practice were at variance. To paraphrase President Nyerere:—

When we disagree – even on matters quite outside the Treaty – it is sometimes tempting to use the accidental location of jointly owned East African property, or the necessity for unanimous agreement on Community matters, as a bargaining counter, or a pressure point (10).

Nor was the decentralization of the Railways effected as fully as envisaged in the Treaty which provided for «strong and functionally comparable Regional Railway Headquarters, including revenue and accounting services» in the capital cities, which was belatedly taken up with the aid of Canadian consultants following the 1973 crisis in the Corporation.

One interesting «decentralization» (dissolution) was the break-up of the East African Income Tax Department (Ref. Income Tax Management (Disapplication) Bill, 1973) the background of which illustrates many of the themes in this paper. Tanzania was eager to have a more progressive tax system, exemplified in the Income Tax Bill (1973) in which privileges to the elite such as marriage and children allowances were abolished, while Kenya desired to offer more attractive terms to foreign capital (and partly because her share of total monies deducted to run the General Fund Services was proportionally much bigger than either Uganda's or Tanzania's). Rather prophetically, Prof. Senteza Kajubi (Ugandan MLA) saw the split as an omen for worse things to come (11).

Inter-State Trade

The importance of inter-state trade differs among the partner states. In 1953-58 Kenya's exports to the outside world increased by 13 million pounds sterling, sales to the rest of the Common Market by 7 million pounds sterling and gross capital formation increased also by about 7 million pounds sterling, increased sales to the partner states constituted about a quarter of the total (12). The Raisman Commission estimated that «something like a third of Kenya's recent growth may have depended upon increased sales, or the prospect of increased sales, to the other two Territories» (13). In 1964, Kenya had a favourable balance of inter-state trade amounting to 290.5 million whereas Uganda and Tanzania had trade deficits of 79.1 million and 211.4 million respectively. In 1967, inter-state trade amounted to 32.8 per cent the value of Kenya's total domestic exports, and 16.3 per cent and 4.9 per cent for Uganda and Tanzania's exports respectively (14).

The launching of the Treaty in 1967 did not lead to a rapid Vine-rian internal trade expansion; indeed in 1968 and 1969, it was more or less static, and in fact less than the two immediate pre-Treaty years. Despite attempts to change this pattern, the percentage share of the market continued to increase in favour of Kenya which in 1973 had 74 per cent while Tanzania and Uganda had 16 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. In 1974, inter-state trade amounted to 1,259/- million of which Kenya accounted for 966.7/- million compared to Tanzania (217.6/- million) and Uganda (75.5/- million (15)). Uganda's imports from Kenya of goods subject to transfer tax more than doubled during 1973. Kenya's negative external trade is mainly a result of the structure and magnitude of her internal demand and production. Her enormous trade surpluses in inter-state trade helped her offset her huge deficits in her trade with the rest of the world.

Was Kenya's growth achieved at the expense of others? Would Tanzania and Uganda have been better off without the Common Market or Kenya's growth? Are there enterprises attracted to Kenya which could have gone to Tanzania or/and Uganda? Have Tanzania and Uganda suffered through buying from Kenya instead of buying from other countries? Has Kenya's growth drawn existing enterprises from the other territories?

The Raisman Commission was of the opinion that:

without the Common Market many enterprises which have established themselves in Kenya would probably not have done so, but it is even less likely that they would have established themselves in either of the other territories.

.....There are very few instances of an actual shift of economic activity from the rest of the market into Kenya; the most striking is the movement of a cigarette factory from Kampala in 1956.

But all «enjoyed rates of capital formation which, in relation to their incomes are highly credible». Tanzania and Uganda «have bought certain Kenya goods (both manufactures and agricultural products) at prices higher than those at which they could have bought them from elsewhere, and this in itself involves an obvious loss» (16).

The transfer tax aside; no duty was imposed on commodities bought from the partner-states except sales tax which was imposed by the originating country. However, because of existing laws, some products e.g. Uganda's «waragi» could not find access to the other partners without permit; otherwise inter-state trade was at least in theory quite liberalized.

Industrial Imbalance. (17)

Raisman's fiscal Commission of 1961 stated categorically that the benefits of the Common Market had been unequally distributed and recommended an improvement through a distributable pool of revenue

on equal basis (after deducting half of the pool as an independent income to the East African High Commission), a proposal which was rejected (for different reasons) by the partner states. Uganda and Tanzania wanted, not compensation (Scitovsky's or otherwise), but more economic and manufacturing activity. (18)

With the failure of the Kampala Agreement of 1964, Tanzania imposed restrictions on certain imports from both partners and later all the three agreed on a system of quotas for specified goods. With the industries of the Kampala Agreement continuing to be duplicated with much diseconomies, the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) passed an Act in 1970, whereby licensing of some scheduled industries was to be done by the East African Licensing Council at the Community level. (19)

Unfortunately, since most industries are «finishing touch», assembly or «screw driver» industries with very high import content, high surplus leakage and little local value added, the Common Market did contribute to opening up East Africa to much more effective exploitation by foreign capital. If industries were channelled through a central agency (ensuring greater cooperation than competition) «there would be», to Peter Newman (Economic Advisor to the East African Common Services Organization)

much less risk that foreign businessmen, by playing off each nation's natural anxiety to industrialize rapidly against the other's similar desires, would secure far greater concessions than are actually necessary to induce them to start operation in East Africa (20).

Suffice it to relate the importance of the industrial sector to the economics of the partner-states. In 1967, manufactured goods accounted for 5.8 per cent of the total value of Kenya's overseas exports, 8.9 per cent for Uganda and 17 per cent for Tanzania. Trade in manufactured goods accounted for 46 per cent of the total value of Uganda's inter-state exports, 50 per cent for Kenya and 35 per cent for Tanzania in 1967. In relation to the total domestic exports, both overseas and inter-state, the manufactured goods accounted for 18 per cent of the value of Tanzania's exports, 23 per cent for Kenya and 15 per cent for Uganda in 1967. (21) In 1964, out of the total value of manufactured goods exported from Kenya, some 80.2 per cent were transferred to the partner states, for Uganda the percentage was 32.9 per cent and for Tanzania 19.2 per cent. By the end of 1967, these proportions had altered mainly as a result of trade restrictions to 75.1 per cent for Kenya, 47.3 per cent for Uganda and 7.3 per cent for Tanzania. (22)

Kenya's attraction of industries should not be under-estimated. According to Sharkansky and Dresang:

Kenya is an attractive target for money. Outsiders rank it as an attractive target with the highest «absorptive capacity». This reputation stems from its relative wealth and the skills and markets which enable it to make profitable use of new funds - it offers Western oriented African capitalism in contrast to Tanzania's overtly socialist path to development. (23)

Studies had been made by the Common Market, aided by UNIDO with a view to rationalize, amongst others the textile, tyres, bicycles etc. industries for which there was wasteful duplication and over-capacity.

A policy of developing on East African basis a selected number of industries requiring the entire East African market and with «actual» and «potential» gains feasible could have been an answer to the industrial imbalance problem, and hopefully a challenge to foreign monopolies penetration and an «insurance» against the Community break-up.

Uncoordinated industrial development led to duplications, mis-allocation of resources, in-built inefficiency behind high protective tariff walls, preference for import substitution industries rather than resource-based industries etc. (24). Coordinated industrial development could have taken the following forms: (a) joint ownership of multinational projects (b) market-sharing agreements, products specialization and selective protection. Feasibility studies and earmarking of three large capital-intensive industries (namely iron and steel, chemicals and automobile assembly) which could operate under category (a) was made, but actual launching of the projects was plagued by Kenyan petty bourgeois nationalism vis-à-vis costs and benefits-sharing criteria, the location of industries etc. The EEC's common (despite its capitalist framework) ownership of iron and steel complexes and her European Atomic Energy Community (EUROTOM) has lessons to offer in this regard. But even more appropriately would be to have had each country receive a list of «Community projects» and develop them either on behalf of the Community or on its own behalf. President Nyerere in an address to the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) in February 1972 favoured the latter alternative:

.....industries of equal value could be found and allocated one to each partner state, doing this as often as it becomes possible to consider local production of this kind of manufacturing Each industry would be owned within the state concerned, and under national control, and in accordance with each nation's economic philosophy, but its products would be marketed freely throughout the three territories. (25)

Kenya, even in the Treaty Review Commission, did not move a step to allow measures which would have redressed the industrial imbalance.

The East African Development Bank.

The EADB was intended to assist industrial development in the whole of East Africa, but with a bias in favour of the less industrially developed-Tanzania and Uganda-in its loan offers, for while each partner state made an equal contribution to its funds, Article 13(c) provided that in the five years period since inception, only 22 1/2 per cent of investments should go to Kenya, while Uganda and Tanzania received 38 3/4 per cent each. (26)

The Bank's operating principle was principally to finance economically viable and technically feasible industrial projects with Cost-Benefit analysis as a key investment criterion. Theoretically at least, the bias in favour of the less privileged in loan offers was a step forward but the problem was the meagreness of the funds. What is 240/- million (or even 400/- million) (initially) for the industrial development of the whole of East Africa? Nor did the Bank achieve its supplementary role of financing projects «designed to make the economies of the partner states increasingly complementary in the industrial field». With the stress on manufacturing, industry did not include for instance some of the crucial physical infrastructure e.g. transport, which would have speeded the pace of integration of our economies and laid ground for the industrial development of the future (in which there would be no trade barriers).

In between 1969 and 1972, and despite the statutory limits, of the total commitments of Shs. 210,315,000/- million, about Shs. 46.5/- million representing 34 per cent had been invested in Uganda; and Shs. 54.7/- million and Shs. 35.2/- million representing 40 per cent and 26 per cent had been invested in Tanzania and Kenya respectively. The reduction of imbalances in this regard, presupposed the availability and priority, and the positive response by government ministries, development institutions e.g. banks to ensure sufficient flow of project proposals to sell to the Bank and the capacity to mobilize additional resource investments.

Of the 17 projects approved by 1970, ten were manufacturing, three assembly and four processing; and their selection was not influenced by backward and forward linkages with agriculture, forestry, fishing etc. Thus the financing of agriculture, ranching, building and construction, transport etc. did not fall under the umbrella of the Bank's operation, apparently being presumed to be in the realm of national institutions. We could add that perhaps just as important as the Bank's own financial commitments to projects is its ability to generate funds by attracting other interests in the projects and its possible coordination and rationalization roles.

Although agriculture is the backbone of economic activity in East Africa, it is mentioned only marginally in the Treaty where just the *intention* to seek a common agricultural policy is noted. If the huge food imports of 1973-75 (about 1,200/- million for Tanzania in 1973/74) is anything to go by, agriculture should be a key economic activity for the Bank.

The Treaty was very inexplicit vis-à-vis agriculture: it was not explicit on the aim and extent of cooperation (it just stated intentions), but it was not clear whether the end in view was free trade in agriculture or structural change. When it mentioned agriculture, it mainly referred to agricultural policy harmonization and trade, which left them rather remotely abstract. Although the Treaty did not specifically refer

to the agricultural imbalance in East Africa Article 13, by implication, recognized agricultural inequality between the partner states, and the fact that if the less developed partners were not allowed to develop their agricultural potential, then their market would largely be a preserve of Kenya.

Could these imbalances in agriculture (Kenyan agriculture is more advanced than that of Tanzania and Uganda) be used to offset the imbalance in industry? This is as much dependent on the kind of industry as on the inputs used. If agricultural raw material-based industries were developed this would be more likely. The EEC's regional policy to help «distressed areas» could have been emulated by the Community, whereby, funds preferably from a special division of the EADB could be provided to carry out feasibility studies on areas suitable for different crops, and furthermore carry out certain concrete agricultural projects at an East African level.

Transfer Tax.

The Vinerian approach to economic integration practiced in the developed world - implying stress on abolition of trade barriers, facilitated competition etc- has left much to be desired when put to test in the less developed countries because of lack of sufficient internal capital formation and therefore heavy dependency on foreign capital, poor infrastructure, lack of both actual and potential complementarity, differential levels of economic development, differential levels of economic development, different political and ideological orientation etc. In the case of East Africa, rather than complete trade liberalization, some kind of guarded protectionism, in the form of the transfer tax was introduced to raise Tanzania's competitiveness and to some extent Uganda's both of which are not able to compete with Kenya where industrial production is relatively more established.

Transfer taxes could be imposed only if a partner state was in deficit in manufactured goods with the other partners.

Kenya therefore did not qualify for this «privilege». Transfer taxes were imposed only on manufactured goods a country was producing or would produce within three months on a significant scale i.e. 15 per cent of its domestic needs or a value of output of 100,000 pound sterling. The rate of the transfer tax was on the discretion of the tax-imposing country but it could not exceed 50 per cent of the external tariff on that commodity (the Community maintained a common customs and excise tariff), and expired, unless earlier revoked, eight years after the date it was first imposed.

Thus the transfer tax was conceived as a temporary device and its working was due for review after five years and all unexpired taxes would be revoked 15 years after its launching. If a protected industry managed to export 30 per cent of its total sales to the rest of East Africa, then the transfer tax would be removed. The argument for this

regulation was presumably that an industry able to produce that much was already protected (or competitive). In such a situation, the most efficient units would expand, coupled by diversification for the less efficient, the pre-requisite being, of course, non-imposition of new trade restrictions through their state Trading Corporations or other arrangements. The transfer tax was supposed to be the only restriction on inter-community trade – but some infant industry protection was also allowed for new industries with small output.

The aim in a nutshell was to encourage (location of) industries in the protected market since imports in such a market would be more expensive and in addition such industries would be sure of a market of at least two countries, if not three; and hopefully this would not cause import demands from the partner states to be directed to non-East African sources. Although the transfer tax represented a slight departure from free «internal» trade, it was not supposed and (according to Common Market spokesmen) «has not interfered with the free flow of trade and is therefore behaving as envisaged by the signatories of the Treaty» (27). Far from introducing «other restrictions» on inter-state trade the Treaty under Article 12 provided for the removal of some restrictions previously in force. Indeed, Article 16 provided a further incentive to the flow of trade by recognizing that practices such as discriminatory purchasing e.g. giving preference to foreign goods when suitable goods of East African origin were available on comparable terms, were incompatible with the Treaty. Although under this arrangement certain Kenyan goods were subject to transfer tax in both Uganda and Tanzania and to a lesser extent Uganda's in Tanzania, the transfer tax was much less disruptive of inter-state trade than the pre-Treaty quota and quantitative restrictions.

Inter-state trade on manufactures increased between 1967 and 1970 disapproving those who maintained that transfer taxes would decrease inter-state trade in manufacturers. In absolute terms the imbalances in trade especially Kenya's surplus vis-à-vis Tanzania and Uganda were larger in 1970 than in 1967; while Uganda's surplus with Tanzania changed to a deficit (and this not necessarily because of the transfer tax but of other factors). Uganda's transfers fell because she relied on too few products, the main one – cotton fabrics were severely restricted in Tanzanian markets and to some extent there was increased production capacity in Kenya. Indeed in the aftermath of the coup, Uganda directed most of her exports to countries outside East Africa to finance the «Economic War» including and especially the procurement of military hardware.

The transfer tax had on the whole not hindered trade in East Africa. It is a different matter, however, whether it helped to correct industrial imbalance among the partner states. A Community seminar held at Makerere University, Kampala in June 1972 was of the opinion that although the transfer tax had not adversely affected the volume of

inter-state trade, it had «not achieved its primary goal or promoting new industrial development in those partner states which are less industrially developed» (28).

Why has the transfer tax failed to achieve its primary objective? We have seen its many pre-conditions and complications. The aim of the transfer tax was to foster production in Tanzania and Uganda but it was not designed, so it appears, to greatly influence the allocation of new industries in those less privileged partners. Rather, it psychologically, fostered the proliferation of numerous small and medium-sized industrial units which operated at comparatively high costs and geared, not to some of complementarity within the Common Market, but national self-sufficiency.

The aim, it seems, was to foster production that was already in existence in Tanzania and Uganda; it did not seem to foster new large scale industrial location in the less privileged countries in which it would be unprofitable to stand out a second one in East Africa. If for example, a neither Uganda nor Tanzania would be able to impose a transfer tax against its products, for the tax was imposable only if the commodity was being produced or was about to be produced to a large extent in the tax-imposing country.

This raises the question of whether the tax was so inducive or whether the situation was such that even in its absence Kenya would manufacture such goods? Industrial allocation is related to who owns the industry and hence in most cases it is beyond the control of the terms of the Treaty – more so since Kenya favours multinational corporations while the other two states are less enthusiastic.

Hence the need to find out for example whether Tanzania did establish industries for those goods which fell under the transfer tax; to see whether in Kenya and Uganda such industries suffered or whether they continued to prosper and check exactly whether there are some industries which have rose up because of the tax; if it had not done some of these things, then it should have been abolished unless Tanzania and Uganda held it for revenue purposes. (29)

Unfortunately even the revenue accruing from this source was perhaps not commensurate with Kenya's protests over transfer taxes. Net transfer tax collection amounted to Shs. 17/- million in 1970, an increase of 36 per cent over the 1969 total. Tanzania collections rose by over 7 per cent to Shs. 10.4/- million. We submit that despite its shortcomings, the tax gave the less industrialized some advantage (at least money-wise) than she would have had, had the tax been non-existent. Unfortunately this little money was not used in aiding industrialization; rather it went to the Treasury as Government finance. Only in 1975/76 did Tanzania establish a special Development Fund, financed by revenue from the transfer tax and manned by the Tanzania Investment Bank. (30)

Harmonization of Fiscal and Monetary Incentives

A pre-requisite for a Common Market with free flow of funds is definitely the existence of harmonious tax and fiscal policies. The Treaty envisaged this and enjoined the partner states to try to harmonize such policies. Economic and fiscal incentives were (and are) yet to be harmonized.

Harmonization of fiscal incentives vis-à-vis the transfer tax industries for instance would have involved giving incentives as well to enterprises which wanted to avoid transfer taxes to invest in Tanzania and would expect such investors to come since Kenya would not be allowed to impose transfer taxes: but that is only true if Kenya did not give other incentives which Tanzania did not give. Thus there was need to have some common incentives structure and/or to harmonize such incentives. More disheartening was the misinterpretation of the Treaty. Both Uganda and Tanzania had interpreted «harmonization» of fiscal incentives to mean giving preferential terms to potential investors in their own countries so as to rectify the past imbalance against them, whereas Kenya had equated «harmonization» with «uniformity» of legislation in the three countries with respect to fiscal incentives, knowing fully well that such a system would give Kenya an edge over the others!

In 1970, the Community established a working Party on Possibilities for closer Harmonization of Monetary/Fiscal and Payment policies within the EAC. (31) In its Report the working party noted that the partner states exchange control system in respect of international transactions was basically similar but differed in application to Kenya as the most liberal, while the others subjected inter-state payments to stringent exchange control. It singled out factors which had prevented a smoother flow of trade: bureaucratic procedures, trade credits, contractual commitments and state trading confinements. Of interest here is the Working Party's conclusions on the last two items especially in consideration of earlier complaints more or less directed at Tanzania. On contractual commitments, they stated:

The examination of contractual commitments was limited to the TAZARA Agreement, being the largest and most discussed area of trade and aid in the Community. On the whole the Agreement conflicts little with inter-state trade because most of what is imported from China is not available for trade within the Community. It was estimated that between 1970 and 1971 the change in level of potential trade within the Community on account of products imported from China but also produced in East Africa was no more than Shs. 18.2/-million. On the whole, the Commodity Credit Agreement may not be considered as a short-run threat to the functioning of the Common Market, and in the longer run, the completion of the railway will be of significant benefit to all three Partner states, as East African trade with Zambia will increase.

On state trading confinements they concluded.

Statistical analysis has indicated that state Trading confinement is not as serious an impediment to the smooth functioning of the Common Market as it is often believed. There are a certain number of products which have declined in inter-state trade and for which some protective or external import orientation may have developed, but the evidence is not conclusive to the extent that the Corporations can be blamed for violating the spirit or rule of the Treaty. (33)

The Financial Imbalances in the EAC Corporations and the General Fund Services

There were several ways the Corporations contributed to local economic activity: (a) differential tariffs (less on exports and more on imports etc.) to boost the economies, (b) differential rates on the domestic market-carrying certain commodities below their real costs (c) the in-built taper principle (especially for the Railways) (d) capital formation (e) employment generation (f) foreign exchange earnings (g) economies of scale (greater in the transport and communications sector due to the large size of the units involved) etc.

The Railways offered alternative transportation of low-rated commodities which could have been uneconomical for road transport to carry, Passenger fares on the Railways (even its buses) were below profit margin. There were several lines (seven in the early 1970s) running with deficits but operated because these were spread over the entire system, and/or subsidized. With individual transport systems the long-haulage would bear higher cost if fixed and variable costs were to be fully recovered. (34)

In a nutshell the E.A.C. was unable to effectively regulate the transport system in East Africa and decisions taken at national level sometimes impinged on the railways (and other Corporations) joint-service. The «differential tariff» for example was weakened by road competition; just as the Mombasa–Nairobi pipeline had an adverse effect on the business of the Railways. For although in the final years each Region was responsible for its own financial performance, they were required to submit funds in excess of operational costs to the Nairobi Headquarters. (35)

There have been complaints that railway engines that had been declared scrap in Kenya were sent for use in Tanzania; that Railway authorities always looked first at Kenya (eg. in the provision of diesel locomotives, which were for many years a preserve of the Mombasa–Nairobi line). There was also the «over-development» of the railways in Kenya (at one time even the feasibility of electifying the Nairobi–Mombasa line was being envisaged). (36)

Nor were such complaints limited to the Railways.

The Harbours Corporation exhibited much inherited (and reinforced)

inequality. Despite Dar es Salaam's growth especially following Rhodesia's UDI and the increased traffic to Zambia, Mombasa still handled more traffic than all Tanzanian coastal ports combined together in 1973 (Dar es Salaam: 214,000 tons; Tanga: 280,000 tons; Mtwara: 170,000 tons; as against Mombasa's 6,724,000 tons), and this of necessity affected investments (relatively) in favour of Kenya. This unequal access to benefits was sometimes open and deliberate. Witness Kenya's unauthorized withdrawal of the corporation's funds at Mombasa. (37)

Unlike the Railways, the East African Airways did not subsidize traffic as such; but the airline undertook certain domestic flights whose route profitability might not have been necessarily attractive. The E.A.A. Act provided for the operation of scheduled services within East Africa (operated whether there was full or partial load). In the opinion of Kenya, Tanzania benefitted more from this subsidization in that it was a larger country and operated internal routes which were not economical.

The money raised in Tanzania and Uganda, whether from domestic or international flights was not necessarily spent in those Regions, but it went to Nairobi to offset Headquarters expenditure, training and workshop maintenance which were concentrated there. In other words, if you took the revenue, knocked off operating expenditures, and capital undertakings (none of significance in the 1970s except putting up terminals in Dar es Salaam and Kampala) the rest was transferred (at least before the transfer of funds crisis) to Nairobi to meet E.A.A. commitments.

The East African Airways earned more from international flights taking off from Tanzania than they spent in the country, whether inter-territorial subsidization is at par is an open question, but a closer look at the movement of funds indicated that Kenya might in fact have benefited more. Kenya got a lot of indirect benefits. To take one example, the E.A.A. international flights were profitable and tended to boost tourism from which Kenya benefited at Tanzania's expense.

Indeed there were indications especially in early 1969 and in 1972 of powerful magnates among the local bourgeoisie and foreign capitalists in Kenya pressurizing the Kenya Government to withdraw from the East African Airways and establish her own «national» intervention of President Kenyatta (with Mwalimu Nyerere's influence) which could, as it did, materialize at a later date. (38)

Like the Railways, the East African Posts and Telecommunications tariffs were not established on a cost-oriented basis. The distribution of projects was such that a certain element of arbitrary allocation was involved. (39) The EAP&T's distribution of capital development expenditure, like the Harbours did not take into account regional contribution to gross earnings of the Corporations. At least before the transfer of funds crisis arose, the Headquarters would call for money from whichever source had it and allocate it to whichever Region was in demand, with the result that there was a certain element of inter-territorial subsidization which was then absorbed into the entire system.

The question of the phasing of the projects (for the sooner the better) is also important: allocations by EAP&T in rural trunk lines and exchanges, for example, in the Corporation's seven year Plan (1973-79) were as follows: Kenya 3.6 per cent, Tanzania 35.6 per cent and Uganda 27.6 per cent. The pattern of expenditure in the first two years (receipts) were: Kenya 43 per cent, Tanzania 40 per cent and Uganda 17 per cent. (40)

The Transfer of Funds Crisis (1973-75)

Before the transfer of funds problem started with the East African Railways Corporation in 1973, the agreement, under Article 25 of the Treaty was that all surplus funds not required by the Corporations should be remitted to Headquarters for Recurrent and Development Expenditure. Then a stage was reached when Kenya thought that because they had revenue-generating Corporations within their territories eg. Harbours (Mombasa), E.A.A., EAP&T etc. they would lose if they sent out all this money. They decided to stop the transfers and Tanzania and Uganda retaliated. On the surface the problem essentially involved foreign exchange. At the end of 1974, Kenya had a foreign exchange deficit of Shs. 1,000/- million, and she claimed that she was using her foreign exchange to run the E.A.C. Corporations. Kenya then stopped making remittances to the Headquarters of the Corporations and said that unless there was a basic reason for the transfers, which the headquarters should justify, the funds should not be transferred.

Kenya might explain her non-remittance to Kampala to fears of reckless spending by the military authorities for instance; but neither did they send the funds on behalf of EAP&T to crown Agents in London. The IBRD that had invested heavily in the Corporations pressed and a joint Finance and Communications Council meeting was held in Arusha in July 1974. The meeting devised the «pro-rata» formula of transferring funds and provided for the remittance of funds from the regions of the corporations to the headquarters in accordance with the needs of such headquarters (salaries, loan servicing, foreign obligations etc.). The funds so transferred would be the surplus balances of each region, arrived at after deducting the monthly working balances and overhead costs of the regions. The corporations were supposed to call for these surpluses in the ratio of the surpluses, so that the region with more surpluses paid more to the corporation. After three months, Kenya said the formula overtaxed her unduly! The foreign exchange problem notwithstanding, common ownership of the corporations entailed that a region earning more ought to at least pay more.

The IBRD intervened again in January 1975, and the Mtei Committee (41) was formed. It found that Kenya was not bearing much of the costs of running the headquarters as she claimed, and in addition it set out the manner of sharing such costs.

The immediate reaction to the Mtei Report was vacillation (on the part of Uganda and Tanzania) amidst insistence that if you get more, pay more. Kenya stressed that in order to minimize the inter-state transfers, the activities of the headquarters should be scaled down. It was clear this was an attempt to fight for more and more decentralization, both with an ulterior motive as exemplified by her stand on future financing of the capital development programmes and external obligations of the corporations which Kenya argued should be financed by the Regions, and not the Headquarters as hitherto had been the case. This was unacceptable to the other two partner-states: in the past the E.A.C. invested more in Kenya – the latter now wanted Tanzania for example to develop Dar es Salaam port alone while Mombasa was developed by all the partner-states.

Was the root cause of the problem foreign exchange really? If a region assumed its own responsibility in external loan servicing for example, it would still pay foreign exchange, the only difference being that now it paid overseas straight instead of the headquarters. A piecemeal solution (which would ensure to some extent that a dishonest partner did not receive the transferred funds and refuse to transfer herself) would have been transferred between corporations within the regions eg. Harbours (Mombasa) would have transferred to the E.A.A. Headquarters in Nairobi instead of transferring to the Harbours Headquarters in Dar es Salaam, and to reciprocate E.A.A. (Tanzania Region) would transfer to the Harbours Headquarters in Dar es Salaam and so on. But with such an arrangement (assuming such transfers were at par) we would not be running the corporations as entities in themselves. Indeed once a departure was made from the principle of the Region with more surplus paying more, even the non-surplus generating ones could be told to pay more (with the Treasuries' subsidization perhaps)!

Then came the call, first by Kenya, of the need to review the Treaty, which was accepted by the Authority. Uganda and Tanzania (the latter had been prepared to discuss the Mtei Report on the development programmes and loan servicing issues) now argued for a return to the July 1974 pro-rata financing of the corporations transfer formula, and shelve everything else until a review of the whole Treaty was made. Kenya insisted that this review (of the mechanism of financing the headquarters) be done there and then on the basis of the Mtei Report (an obvious attempt to exploit the fact that the Mtei Report did not touch such issues as the development programmes and loan servicing) for which Kenya wanted to go into it alone! (42) Meanwhile the corporations were almost paralysed, with development programmes at standstill, except where the region was still liquid e.g. Harbours (Mombasa) where the region had kept shs. 120/-million in a «secret» account while the Corporation as a whole was so much in the red that an East African Legislative Assembly Select Committee was appointed to probe the matter.(43)

The figures below illustrate many of the contentions made above and in particular expose as a lie the Kenyan claim of its carrying the foreign exchange burden of financing the corporations (42)

TABLE I: Net Results of Operations (Surplus (+), Deficit (-) Shillings Million)

KENYA	GFS	EAAC	EAHC	EARC	EAP&T EX	TOTAL
1973	+ 12.93	-105.45	+53.31	+35.22	+150.93	+146.94
1974	+ 16.02	- 78.32	+173.37	+29.07	+141.82	+281.96
TANZANIA						
1973	+ 9.12	+115.08	-38.50	+100.68	+ 82.09	+268.47
1974	+ 5.23	+152.21	-31.43	+116.89	+ 90.56	+323.46
UGANDA						
1973	+ 4.08	+100.26	- 0.66	+ 53.95	- 64.37	+ 93.26
1974	+ 6.65	+134.85	- 0.56	+ 38.58	-127.12	+ 52.40
TOTAL						
1973	+ 26.13	+ 109.89	+14.15	+189.85	+168.65	+508.67
1974	+ 27.90	+ 208.74	+141.38	+184.54	+105.26	+667.82

Notes: (a) Based on difference between Gross Operating Revenue and Gross Operating Expenditure

(b) Headquarters figures are included in the Region where they are located.

Source: Mtei Committee Report op.cit.

Differential contribution by the Partner States.

After the abolition of the Income Tax Department, a differential interim formula was used for the financing of the GFS i.e. Kenya 48 per cent, Tanzania 32 per cent and Uganda 20 per cent. Available data show that the Shs. 518.6 million surplus realized by the E.A.C. Corporations in 1973, Shs. 284.5/- million or 55 per cent was realized from operations in the Tanzania region. The corresponding figures for Kenya and Uganda were Shs. 185/- million (36 per cent) and Shs. 47.6/- million (9 per cent) respectively. In 1974, Shs. 286.8/- million or 51 per cent surplus was the contribution of the Tanzania region to the total surplus of Shs. 756.6/- million.

Tanzania's Finance Minister, put it in better perspective in his 1975/76 Budget speech:

Comparing revenue and surplus generated in 1974, it can be observed that for every Shs. 100/- of revenue from Community operations in Kenya Shs. 75/- is swallowed by expenditure. For the operation in Uganda expenditure absorbed 88 out of every Shs. 100/- of revenue. In other words although 51 per cent total Community surplus is generated in Tanzania, the expenditure in Tanzania is only 21 per cent of her total expenditure and 17 per cent in Uganda. (44)

What is certain is that Kenya received more than she contributed. To quote Silas Munabi (Ugandan), then E.A.C. Deputy Minister for Common Market and Economic Affairs:

..... although Kenya contributed more to the Funds of the GFS, the Community's expenditure, Kenya's contribution and the Community's investments in Kenya were more than in both the other partners. (45)

Politics, Ideology and Other Factors.

In the decade or so since the pledge for an East African Federation was made, the forces of disintegration have been on the ascendancy. So divisive were the events of 1963-75 (and particularly the coup in Uganda) that there is no doubt whatsoever that politically East Africa had by the mid-1970s moved very far apart than it was in the early 1960s.

Could the creation of a political federation minimize the problems which faced the Community? Perhaps it could inject a feeling of oneness which could help reduce Common Market problems. But meaningful federations can only be constructed on the basis of a common ideology, and socialist ideology at that; otherwise there would always be the danger to their very stability and survival.

Is it possible to have a successful economic integration if all the partners follow a capitalist policy? Under such conditions a Common Market could be feasible, but an «equal and independent» fully integrated Community is impossible - not even when backed up with federal arrangements. In the event of such an attempt, under capitalism, there would be a built up of pressure which would threaten its very survival and East Africa itself already offers some evidence.

Nsekela in his reflections on «The Economic Aspects East African Federation» (46) was of the opinion that even the pre-requisites for federation were not there. And he listed them as: (a) a reasonably common ideological base between the partner states, implying a broader measure of agreement on certain key issues such as the nature and causes of underdevelopment, the implications for social relations of various economic systems etc. (b) the will and ability to confront regional problems of distribution and minimize them.

The East African Legislative Assembly Select Committee on East African Federation in its report in June 1975, mildly proposed that the E.A.C. be adopted as a nucleus for a federation and argued that the principles of the Community be modified so as to give the Community some form of statehood.

The Treaty provisions were not necessarily the best possible, but the best acceptable solutions which the partner-states could endorse. There was therefore always room for improvement. Indeed the Treaty made provisions in various ways for its own improvement by way of amendments to existing provisions (Article 94) or by way of review of existing institutions such as the Transfer Tax (Article 20.16) and the industrial licensing system (implied in Article 23.2). The crucial thing was perhaps the direction of change. Amendments without far-reaching structural changes would not create the desired thing — what Professor Guruli (47) in his pioneering work on the issue, termed «an equal and independent East African Common Market» — a Community independent of foreign monopoly capital and its accomplices — the national bourgeoisie, and *equal* in the sense of equitable sharing of the fruits of the Community.

It is fitting to refer to Professor Yash Tandon's rather prophetic question in 1973 on the Community, «Is the Survival of the Community at Stake?» (48) Tandon argued that the survival of the Community despite the Uganda-Tanzania post-coup alienation should not be taken as a *raison d'être* for the co-existence between the doctrine of bilateral conflict and multilateral cooperation. He contended that the Community survived (in the most literal sense of the word, at that stage) because of the special circumstances concerning Uganda-Tanzania relations (low linkage by way of transport and communications, trade etc.) and that should there be (as it did) an occasion of conflict between Kenya and her partner (s), neither the Community nor the doctrine had much hope of survival.

Much more significant than this was perhaps the damage caused to the long-run designs of the Community as laid down in the Treaty. To quote Tandon:

The Treaty presumes, although it does not say in so many words, a tactical alliance between Uganda and Tanzania in the rectification of the historical imbalance against them, and it is the basis of this alliance that has been destroyed I think (permanently) by the Uganda-Tanzania hostility of 1971–72. (49).

Tandon was of the opinion that many of inter-state squabbles referred to, were areas where if the UPC Government was still in power, Tanzania and Uganda might have joined hands at twisting Kenya's arms, for despite the guidelines set for operations of things like the transfer tax, the EADB, the Corporations etc. in reality the decisions were subject to competitive negotiation between the member states. Tandon argued that

the demise of the «informal» Uganda-Tanzania alliance had considerably strengthened Kenya's hand in these competitive negotiations. Dresang and Sharkansky in the work quoted earlier, used the greater investment allocations for Kenya by the different corporations to substantiate this argument.

One must take exception to some of these contentions for much of this trend would have been there, coup or no coup, as it was before 1971. Indeed, in practice, even at the height of the tension between Tanzania and Uganda, there was a lot of cooperation in the councils and other organs of the Community between Uganda and Tanzania, in an «alliance» of the least privileged. (50)

The adoption of the Treaty did not remove the differences in attitudes (of mind, to say the least) to socialism and capitalism, to the great socialist and capitalist powers, to the non-citizens, to the organization of economic life in the town and country-side etc. The Treaty offered the possibility of taking common economic decisions at E.A.C. levels, an attempt to make different economic systems co-exist without ill-effects, which as things turned out was impossible.

What of the effects of the E.A.C. given its «demonstration effects» on the development of socialist institutions in Tanzania? Several problems highlighted in the paper exist, and so one do not quite agree with Yaffey's (51) conclusion that the Treaty would not inhibit Tanzanian aspirations towards a socialist society; or with the contention elsewhere, that the EADB would assist Tanzania attain her socialist objectives. (52)

Guruli (53) taking a strictly anti-neocolonialist position in the debate on the Community and the wider issues of development and self-reliance in the three countries, unfolds three major causes of difficulties in bringing about economic integration in the LDCs namely a historical cause, the choice of path of development and the dominating role of foreign monopolies. He explains that as a result the market is limited due to a poor transport system, the dominance of the subsistence sector and the fact that income is skewedly distributed with the result that really effective market is concentrated in a tiny minority of the intelligentsia and the petty bourgeoisie. He makes three recommendations:

- (a) nationalization of the key industries in the whole of East Africa and participation of the states in such a way that they can make key decisions.
- (b) the East African States should follow a socialist path of development.
- (c) there should be co-ordinated planning and especially a co-ordinated industrial strategy.

While the attainment of these proposals could be mere wishful thinking as the Federation appears now, their importance cannot be underestimated. Meanwhile these countries ought to opt for the second best alternative and work out some kind of economic integration within the constraints noted above. And one would stress the need to arouse the political consciousness of the people and to intensify «class struggle» as a pre-requisite for a stable, independent and equal Economic Community.

While Tanzania could form another Community (already there is close economic cooperation with Zambia and Mozambique) with her southern relatively more progressive neighbours Kenya will now be exploited more by the multinational corporations (especially those of the EEC Block) who it seems have welcomed or were indifferent to the EAC collapses. Influential industrialists in Kenya seem to think that Kenya is «developed» enough to trade at par with EEC Block's MNCs rather than pin hopes on neighbouring African countries. At any rate the break of the E.A.C. will give the resident business tycoons an opportunity to fill some, if not all of the vacuum left by the demise of these «socialized» E.A.C. enterprises, of course with foreign participation.

NOTES

- (1) As Mwalimu Nyerere saw it: «Whatever protestations were made by the Colonial Secretary to the contrary, we were certain then and are still certain today that the proposed East African Assembly was a step towards the final amalgamation or federation, in one form or other, of the East African territories. All the Africans and all the Indians were opposed to a closer Union, mainly on the ground that such a Union with Kenya would make the Kenya White Settlers dominate all the affairs of East Africa». «The Race Problem in East Africa» in *Freedom and Unity*, Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 24. In his reflections on the subject, Oginga Odinga, the former Vice-President of Kenya is affirmative: «In the colonial era, Federation would have meant higher control over the African people of the three territories and the extension to Uganda and Tanganyika of Kenya's most virulent form of settler domination and racialism». *Not Yet Uhuru*, London Heinemann, 1967, pp. 275.
- (2) Among the decisions which Tanzania took – decisions which had been long overdue but «postponed» in view of the federal aspirations were: the establishment of a national Central Bank (and issuing of a national currency) replacing the East African Currency Board, the imposition of exchange control regulations etc. As

recent as July 1975, a Kenyan Minister in a Louis XIV's style, could utter what amounted to saying that Kenya was the Community and vice versa. He told Parliament: «The Republic of Kenya is the Community. There cannot be an East African Community without Kenya. Therefore the other partner states of Tanzania and Uganda must realize that it was Kenya that was making it possible for the Community to exist». Mr. K. Munyi, Assistant Minister for Power and Communications, *Daily News*, 3 July 1975.

- (3) Nsekela Amon, «The Economic Aspects of East African Federation», Address to a Public Workshop at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, 30 November, 1975.
- (4) East Africa: Report of the Economic and Fiscal Commission (Raisman), London, February 1961, pp. 8–9.
- (5) East African Development Bank: *Annual Report*, Kampala, 1968
- (6) J.K. Nyerere, «Problems of East African Cooperation», Speech to the E.A. Central Legislative Assembly, August 1965, published in *Freedom and Socialism*, Oxford University Press, 1968, pp.61
- (7) R.H. Green and Ann Seidman, *Unity or Poverty: The Economics of Pan-Africanism*, Penguin Books, 1968.
- (8) *EADB Annual Report*, 1968.
- (9) *EAC Annual Report*, 1969.
- (10) *Daily News*, 15 May, 1974. Witness the hold-up in Kisumu, Kenya, of six East African Railways vessels operating on Lake Victoria as the conflict over the transfer of funds to the EARC Headquarters deepened, *Daily News*, 27 June, 1975.
- (11) See N.R.L. Mwase «How the Community's tax department declined and fell», January 1974, Vol. 8, No. 2. See also Silas Munabi, «Reflections on the Dismantling of the East African Income Tax Department», (mimeo), East African Community, Arusha, 1974.
- (12) *EADB Annual Report*, 1969.
- (13) Raisman op.cit. pp. 23–26.
- (14) *EADB Annual Report*, 1968.

- (15) Annual Reports of the EAC Minister for Common Market and Economic Affairs for 1973 and 1974.
- (16) Raisman, *op.cit.* pp. 23–26.
- (17) One of the issues often raised is whether the index of trade in manufactured goods is an appropriate guide to industrial imbalance. F.J. Ejow in his work, «*EADB and the Industrial Development of East Africa*» disagrees and argues that the partner states will become industrially alike not when their industrial outputs are equal, but when the relative importance of the industrial sector to their economies are similar. A common problem in such an approach would be the availability, the reliability and comparability of statistics in the three East African states.
- (18) See A.D. Monteiro and F.J. Ejow, «Industrial Strategy for EAC: Retrospect and Prospects» in *The Uganda Economic Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 2, December 1972.
- (19) The scheduled industries were (i) textiles (cotton yarn, cotton piece goods and blankets other than knitwear, wollen piece goods) (ii) steel drums (iii) glass ware (iv) metal ware (metal windows and frames, metal door and frames) (v) enamel hollow-ware, (vi) caustic soda.
- (20) Newman, Peter: «East African Economic Growth», *East African Journal*, April 1964, pp. 13–17.
- (21) *EADB Annual Report*, 1968.
- (22) *Ibid.*
- (23) I. Sharkansky and D.L. Dresang «Public Corporations in Single-Country and Regional Settings: Kenya and the East African Community», *International Organization*, Vol. 27, No.3, 1973.
- (24) Unfortunately the breaches of the Treaty were not examined and checked by the Common Market Tribunal. One possibility which would have helped heighten adherence to the Treaty provisions would be to institute sanctions against a partner state which did not implement EAC decisions. In this context, di Delupis has made a comparison: «Even a rudimentary organization like the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) provides for such sanctions and it is perhaps surprising that the East African Community should have omitted such provisions». (di. Delupis, *The East African Community and Common Market*, Longmans, 1969).

Coversely there should have been injunction provisions which might be used to prevent such «punishment» should the victim feel that such verdict is not fair. To take one example, there were no provisions in the Treaty for instance to enable a country subjected to a transfer tax to appeal against it should she feel that such imposition was against the Treaty.

- (25) *The Standard* (Dar es Salaam) 9 February, 1972.
- (26) The Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) Development Bank (incidentally the 1975/76 EAC Treaty Review Chairman William Demas is its Director-General) is modelled more or less on the EADB, the important difference being that while lending more to the less developed members, as the EADB does, the more developed partners contribute more to its funds.
- (27) Robert Ouko «The Role and Future Prospects of the Common Market in the Development of East Africa», talk given to the University of Dar es Salaam Economic Association 13 October, 1972 and subsequently published in *Economic Reflections*, Journal of the Association, Vol. 1, pp.17.
- (28) Ibid.
- (29) Mark D. Segal, «The Revenue Effect of East Africa Transfer Taxes (Tanzania)», *ERB Paper* 71.5.
- (30) Speech by the Minister for Finance introducing the Estimates of Public Revenue and Expenditure for 1975/76 to the National Assembly on 12 June, 1975, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam.
- (31) *A Report of the Working Party on Possibilities for Closer Harmonization of Monetary/Fiscal and Payments Policies within the East African Community*, EAC, CMEAS, November 1973.
- (32) Ibid.
- (33) Ibid.
- (34) See *East African Railways Corporation Economy Report, 1970-71*, presented to the Communications Council, 21 October, 1971.
- (35) The manner in which the financing of the Headquarters and the relations with the Regions would take place following the 1973 crisis in the Railways Corporation was a subject of study by a

Canadian consultancy team appointed to recommend the economic regionalization of the system (decentralizing to the Regions all those functions and responsibilities which for economic reasons or otherwise can be decentralized) without dividing the Corporation into three national entities. It was too late (and too little) for Kenya's new thinking to go-it-alone was taking shape.

- (36) *The Standard* (Dar-es-Salaam), 16 August, 1967.
- (37) N.R.L. Mwase «Prospects and Problems of Regional Economic Integration in East Africa», unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Dar-es-Salaam, July 1975. See also, *Daily News*, 14 February 1975.
- (38) D.L. Dresang and I. Sharkansky, op.cit. In fact its an open secret that some rich and powerful Kenyans wanted to form their own private airline(s). (*Daily News*, 4 July 1975).
- (39) This type of arbitrary allocation could sometimes be due to political pressure which at times could be quite positive. A case in point could be responses to complaints raised over the provision of poor services in some Regions. Zanzibar in particular had been quite vocal on this. As the Zanzibari EALA member, Usi Haji told the EALA in February 1972: «While others are talking about STD we are still using primitive telephones which require winding to get a number». (*Daily News*, 16 February, 1972). This was followed later in the year by a resolution at the ASP Party Congress at Chake Chake, calling on the EAP & T to improve services in the Isles or else Zanzi-Zanzibar would do it herself.
- (40) Dresang and Sharkansky, op.cit.
- (41) The Mtei Committee was the one appointed by the joint EAC Finance and Communication Councils in January 1975 (Under the Chairmanship of EAC Secretary General, Edwin Mtei, and comprising the Permanent/Principal Secretaries to the partner States Treasuries and the Governors of the Central Banks) to study the Corporation's inter-state transfer of funds crisis.
- (42) East African Community, *Reports of the Committee on Inter-State Transfer of Funds for Community Institutions*, 1975.
- (43) Report of the EALA select Committee on the East African Harbours Corporation, June 1975.

- (44) Speech by the Minister for Finance, Ndugu C.D. Msuya, Introducing the Estimates of Public Revenue and Expenditure for 1975/76 to the National Assembly on 12 June, 1975, Government Printer, Dar-es-Salaam.
- (45) *Daily News*, (Dar-es-Salaam) 4 July, 1975.
- (46) Nsekela, op.cit.
- (47) Guruli Kassim, «Towards an Independent and Equal East African Common Market», a paper presented to a seminar on legal Aspects of Economic Integration in East Africa held in Uppsala, Sweden; and subsequently published in Cliffe and Saul; in *Socialism in Tanzania* (eds), Vol. 1, Nairobi, East Africa Publishing House, 1972.
- (48) Tandon Yash, «Is the Survival of the Community at Stake?», *Economic Reflections*, University of Dar-es-Salaam, 1973.
- (49) Ibid.
- (50) The continued cooperation between Uganda and Tanzania in the different Councils of the Community, despite the bilateral conflicts, has been narrated to me by people who were themselves deeply involved in these affairs, notably Ibrahim Kaduma, who served as a Board member in several of the Community Corporations; Wadada Nabudere, former chairman of the E.A. Railways Corporation; and Simon Mbilinyi and Kassim Guruli, who were veteran members of the East African Legislative Assembly.
- (51) M.J.H. Yaffey «The Treaty for East African Cooperation - An Economic Commentary», in *Private Enterprise and the East African Company*, P.A. Thomas (ed.), Dar-es-Salaam Tanzania Publishing House, 1969.
- (52) *Mbioni*, Journal of Kivukoni College, Dar-es-Salaam, July, 1967.
- (53) Guruli, op.cit.

SUMMARY

Avec la cascade des années soixante, les pays Africains venaient de tourner une nouvelle page de leur histoire. Ils venaient d'obtenir l'indépendance politique, première étape vers l'indépendance totale. Il restait à lutter pour obtenir l'indépendance économique. C'est ce que les pays riches ont compris, eux dont le souci constant est de tout faire pour empêcher une collaboration franche et effective entre les pays en voie de développement. Cependant, à cause des moyens matériels limités dont ils disposent les pays en voie de développement ont très tôt senti la nécessité de mettre sur pied des groupements régionaux. Dans cet article, l'auteur essaie de montrer comment des critères tels que le niveau inégal de développement économique ainsi que des structures et des idéologies différentes ont pu saper les fondements d'un groupement sous-régional: la Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Est.

D'abord dans une brève analyse des rapports qui existaient entre les différents pays de la sous-région avant la création de la Communauté, il montre que le Kenya était le pays qui profitait le plus de ces rapports à cause d'une meilleure infrastructure déjà existante. Le Kenya se considérait déjà à cette époque comme «l'atelier de l'Afrique de l'Est». Puis dans le développement de son article, il passe en revue toutes les décisions qui ont été prises pour que la Communauté ainsi mise sur pied joue son rôle. Il essaie ensuite de montrer comment presque toutes les décisions n'ont dans leur pratique profiter qu'au Kenya, qui a à chaque fois pris «la part du lion». Ainsi le traité portant la mise en place d'un système de taxe pour transfert des produits manufacturés ainsi que la création de la Banque de Développement pour l'Afrique de l'Est sans oublier la Décentralisation des organismes de la Communauté et l'Harmonisation des régimes fiscaux des pays concernés n'a pas donné les résultats escomptés à cause de plusieurs points faibles que l'Auteur énumère. Dans son article, l'auteur analyse et montre les insuffisances de toutes les décisions ainsi que de tous les principes théoriques dont l'application devait faire de la Communauté de l'Afrique de l'Est un organisme capable d'aider les pays membres à sortir du sous-développement.

En conclusion, il répond à ceux qui pensent que la solution réside peut être dans la création d'un État Fédéral en soutenant que cela ne serait possible que si les trois États avaient la même idéologie, en l'occurrence l'idéologie socialiste. Pour lui, avec une idéologie capitaliste les États ne pourraient tout au plus mettre sur pied qu'un Marché Commun mais pas une Communauté totalement indépendante et complètement intégrée.

LE ROLE DU SECTEUR PUBLIC DANS LA TRANSITION DU SOCIALISME : LE CAS ALGERIEN

Par

M. S. BEDRANI *

1 - *Le rôle du secteur public tel qu'exprimé par la Charte Nationale*

En 1976, un texte politique fondamental est venu consacrer officiellement la politique suivie par le pays depuis déjà un certain nombre d'années : il s'agit de la Charte Nationale. Sur un projet par un cercle restreint de personnes a eu lieu une discussion réellement très large organisée par les structures du Parti et les organisations de masses. Après des amendements relativement minimes, ce projet a été promulgué comme «source suprême de la politique de la nation et des lois» par l'ordonnance du 5 Juillet 1976.

C'est à travers ce texte que nous verrons le rôle du secteur public dans la transition au socialisme.

1.1. *La phase de transition d'après la Charte Nationale*

En 1976, affirme le texte, l'Algérie a jeté «les bases de l'édification d'une société socialiste». L'Algérie n'a pas encore construit le socialisme mais est entrain de le faire : «les acquis déjà obtenus et les grands projets nationaux déjà entamés ou à venir expriment la finalité de la Révolution Algérienne dans les secteurs industriel, agricole et culturel qui composent par leur étroite imbrication, la dialectique même du changement global de la société dans le sens du socialisme». Ainsi, l'Algérie se trouve bien dans une phase de «transition» caractérisée par un État déjà «socialiste», l'existence des «bases de l'édification d'une société socialiste» (1), mais caractérisée également par le fait que «les forces objectivement acquises au socialisme-travailleurs des villes, paysans pauvres, jeunesses ouvrières et intellectuelles» doivent être «motivés davantage» (2), par le fait que l'administration n'est pas encore «définitivement débarassée des séquelles coloniales» et qu'elle peut donc être le lieu où «les affairistes, les bureaucrates médiocres et les agents incompétents, les arrivistes et les pseudo-militants» risquent d'agir pour «s'enrichir à ses dépens» (3). Etre dans une «période de transition» signifie pour un pays qu'il «s'engage dans une voie socialiste» et cet engagement se perçoit «dès lors qu'il lutte pour l'indépendance réelle, qu'il décide d'abolir la propriété privée des moyens de production et qu'il se prononce, dans les faits, pour la fin de l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme» (4).

* *Chercheur au CENTRE DE RECHERCHES EN ECONOMIE APPLIQUEE.*

Sur le plan des forces sociales, la transition se caractérise par le fait que «dans les pays en voie de développement, les forces socialistes ne sont pas toujours dirigées par un prolétariat encore peu nombreux, mais par une avant-garde formée de l'ensemble des patriotes révolutionnaires parmi lesquels les travailleurs assument un rôle grandissant» (5). Le prolétariat naît en même temps que s'édifie le socialisme, tout comme la «Révolution démocratique populaire» (entendue comme les «liquidations du colonialisme, du néocolonialisme et de l'impérialisme» pour la promotion d'une indépendance réelle, comme la «liquidation des structures pré-capitalistes dans ce qu'elles ont d'archaïque, de périmé et de réactionnaire» et comme une révolution menée par le «peuple» et non par une «couche sociale privilégiée qui s'emparerait du pouvoir pour imposer sa domination») (6), s'effectue en même temps que se construit le socialisme.

En définitive, la Charte Nationale proclame que «la phase historique en cours peut être caractérisée comme une phase de consolidation stratégique du socialisme dont elle doit préparer le triomphe définitif». Cette phase se définit comme phase de transition parce que justement

- 1) ce triomphe n'est pas définitif et,
- 2) parce que cette phase a déjà dépassé la simple étape de la révolution démocratique populaire (7).

Nous pouvons maintenant examiner le rôle du secteur public durant cette période tel que prévu par la Charte à la fois sur le plan économique et sur le plan social.

1.2. Le rôle économique du secteur public

Nous l'examinerons en matière industrielle et en matière agricole.

1.2.1. *Dans le secteur de l'industrie*, le secteur public voit son rôle défini par la place occupée comparativement au secteur privé. Ce dernier voit son activité restreinte à la petite entreprise s'occupant de la phase finale de transformation des produits (8) et s'approvisionnant nécessairement auprès des usines d'Etat situées à leur amont. Dans le cas où de telles usines étatiques n'existent pas, les entreprises privées ne doivent pas s'approvisionner elles-mêmes auprès des marchés extérieurs, mais doivent passer par des organismes d'Etat» (9).

Ainsi donc, le secteur public jouit d'un rôle moteur dans l'industrialisation puisqu'il a le monopole de toutes les industries autres que celles produisant des biens finaux d'équipement ou de consommation. En conséquence, son rôle s'avère primordial pour mener à bien la «Révolution Industrielle» telle que définie par le pouvoir politique : «la Révolution Industrielle tend à entraîner des transformations profondes dans les structures économiques du pays pour qu'il passe d'une économie traditionnelle fondée essentiellement sur le secteur tertiaire et les activités agricoles, à une économie moderne où l'articulation et la complémen-

tarité des activités productrices, caractérisées par l'intensification des échanges entre les branches d'un même secteur d'activité économique, et entre secteurs économiques différents, assurent un développement global harmonieux par l'extension des méthodes industrielles à tous les secteurs de la production» (10).

Ainsi, les objectifs que se fixent la «Révolution Industrielle» doivent être réalisés par le secteur public. Ces objectifs clairement exprimés, sont ambitieux : la «Révolution Industrielle jette les assises matérielles du socialisme» lesquelles impliquent «la création d'une industrie développée et diversifiée s'étendant à toutes les branches» et «dégagée de la dépendance étrangère». La Révolution Industrielle a en outre comme objectifs «l'élimination du chômage, l'amélioration des conditions d'existence des travailleurs et la redistribution du revenu national pour la promotion des masses déshéritées» (11). La Révolution industrielle via le secteur public, doit implanter des activités industrielles dans toutes les régions du pays et contribuer ainsi à créer des équilibres régionaux. Le rôle du secteur public ne consiste pas seulement à être un moyen d'accumulation du capital, de croissance économique, mais à être un moyen de «consolidation de l'indépendance nationale et de renforcement du socialisme» (12). Pour cela, il est nécessaire que le secteur public industriel «vise à assurer au pays la maîtrise de la science et de la technologie» jugées indispensables au «développement autonome et rapide du pays» (13). Cette maîtrise, d'après la Charte, ne peut passer que par «de grandes unités industrielles qui utilisent des techniques avancées et qui constituent des organisations complexes dont la mise en place et la gestion doivent être menées avec rigueur et requièrent des cadres expérimentés et une main-d'oeuvre ayant une qualification de plus en plus élevée» (14).

Enfin, le secteur public doit viser à «la transformation dans le pays même des ressources naturelles et à leur exportation sous formes de produits finis ou semis-finis». Ainsi, il conduit à «la consolidation de notre capacité de financement extérieur, car la dépendance financière conduit à la subordination politique et à la domination économique» (15).

1.2.2. *Dans le secteur agricole*, le secteur public (16) voit également son rôle, sur le plan économique, défini par la place qu'il occupe par rapport au secteur privé. Disposant de la majeure partie des terres les plus fertiles du pays, issu de la nationalisation des terres coloniales, des terres des absentéistes et des gros propriétaires fonciers limités, il est le principal instrument de l'Etat dans l'agriculture.

Son rôle est donc de réaliser les buts assignés par la Charte Nationale à la Révolution Agricole. Celle-ci «met fin au dualisme entre secteur traditionnel et secteur développé, oriente principalement la production vers la satisfaction des besoins nationaux...». La Révolution Agricole «réunit les conditions optimales pour une modernisation des

techniques de production et une mise en valeur intensive des terres au moyen d'une planification globale des actions intervenant dans les activités agricoles et pastorales» (17). En outre, la Révolution Agraire, en zone pastorale «s'assigne pour objectifs.... le relèvement du niveau de vie des bergers, la modernisation des moyens de production des petits éleveurs, la sauvegarde rationnelle des pâturages, une action plus conséquente visant à améliorer et à préserver les ressources en eau destinées au succès de cette politique pastorale et à la mise en valeur de nouvelles terres dans la steppe» (18).

De manière générale, le secteur agricole coopératif doit «consolider les bases matérielles et structurelles de la production agricole» par l'entretien et la préservation des ressources en terre et en eau, par la lutte contre l'exode rural, par la «recherche de meilleures conditions pour exploiter les capacités foncières existantes et, à l'échelle de tout le territoire national, apprendre aux coopérateurs et aux paysans à mieux travailler, à mieux organiser le processus de travail et de commercialisation». Ces objectifs sont nécessaires à la lutte pour l'indépendance alimentaire et, à l'avenir, pour permettre à l'agriculture (en particulier le secteur coopératif) de «devenir aussi une source d'accumulation» (19)

En définitive, le secteur agricole coopératif, doit être un des lieux où se réalise le développement qu'ont été incapables de promouvoir jusqu'à maintenant les gros exploitants et propriétaires fonciers et que ne peut pas mener une petite paysannerie trop pauvre et trop dominée par les premiers.

2.2. *Sur le plan social et politique*, le secteur public a pour rôles fondamentaux, d'après la Charte, grâce à la gestion socialiste des entreprises et à la coopération agricole, «d'obtenir une conservation correcte des biens du peuple, assurer une croissance continue et élevée du potentiel du pays dans tous les domaines, faire fonctionner la vie économique, sociale et culturelle de la Nation suivant les règles de l'efficacité et à la satisfaction de tous, s'intégrer et s'adapter aux transformations qu'entraîne sans cesse le progrès, veiller au respect des principes de justice sociale qui sont à la base du socialisme et, enfin, faire des travailleurs les artisans de leur propre destin» (20).

L'extension du secteur public industriel «permet l'élargissement et le renforcement du prolétariat en tant que composante sociale révolutionnaire» (21). Grâce à la gestion socialiste des entreprises qui organise la «participation responsable des travailleurs» à cette gestion, le secteur public industriel permet l'acquisition par les travailleurs du «sens de la responsabilité» et offre le lieu où se jettent les bases de la gestion démocratique des unités de production (22). Le secteur public parce qu'il met en oeuvre la Révolution Industrielle, permet «des changements profonds dans les mentalités des cadres, des ouvriers, des paysans et du peuple tout entier, par l'élévation générale du niveau

scientifique et technologique qu'il entraîne, par l'ouverture sur des modes d'action et d'organisation modernes qu'il implique» (23).

Ainsi le secteur public industriel a pour rôle d'accroître quantitativement les prolétaires, de permettre l'élévation de leur niveau culturel, scientifique et technique et par là même de renforcer leur rôle politique dirigeant.

Le secteur agricole coopératif joue les mêmes rôles que le secteur public industriel. Grâce aux formules de gestion coopératives, les paysans acquerront le «sens du travail collectif», donneront «une forme organisée à leur solidarité», «éduqueront et élèveront leur esprit d'initiative qui représente une exigence primordiale dans la vie de l'agriculture».

Outre les transformations quantitatives et qualitatives des travailleurs agricoles, le secteur coopératif a pour rôle important d'entraîner à sa suite sur le plan des améliorations techniques et des formes de gestion le secteur agricole privé. Ainsi, l'espèrent les promoteurs de la Charte Nationale : «il ne fait pas de doute que l'expérience en cours dans le cadre de la Révolution Agraire, en ce qui concerne les structures organisationnelles et les gestion, ne manquera pas de déteindre dans l'avenir, sur l'évolution de l'ensemble du secteur agricole» (24).

Ceci est le discours. Qu'en est-il dans les faits ?

Le secteur public commence-t-il à donner les premiers résultats qu'on attend de lui ? Existe-t-il de grandes distorsions entre le discours et la réalité et si oui, pourquoi ? Nous allons essayer de donner des éléments de réponse à ces questions en examinant l'évolution du secteur coopératif agricole.

2 *Le secteur coopératif agricole a-t-il rempli les rôles que lui assigne la Charte Nationale ?*

Nous examinerons également ces problèmes en ce qui concerne les rôles économiques et les rôles sociaux et politiques.

2.1. *Sur le plan économique*

En 1977, le secteur coopératif agricole dispose de 3 070 000 ha sur les 7 542 000 ha de superficie agricole utile recensés dans le pays, soit environ 41 % (25). Sur le plan de la fertilité de la topographie, ces terres sont parmi les meilleures. Elles sont celles qui sont le plus équipées en matériel, celles qui sont approvisionnées prioritairement en semences sélectionnées, produits chimiques, animaux de race. Pourtant ce secteur ne répond que très partiellement aux objectifs que fixent la Charte Nationale à l'agriculture.

2.1.1. *Sur le plan de l'indépendance alimentaire, durant la décade 1966-1976, le secteur agricole coopératif a, en moyenne annuelle,*

accru sa production dans un grand nombre de cultures. Si nous comparons les moyennes annuelles 1965-1969 et 1974-1977, nous constatons des accroissements de production de plus de 45 % pour le blé tendre, + 6 % pour les maraîchages, + 364 % pour les fourrages consommés en sec, + 12 % pour les agrumes, + 30 % pour les fruits à noyaux et à pépins, + 60 % pour l'orge, + 75 % pour les légumes secs, + 29 % pour les figues. Cependant, sa production a diminué de - 8 % pour le blé dur, de - 32 % pour les dattes, de - 55 % pour le tabac, de - 4 % pour la betterave sucrière. Enfin sa production d'olives a stagné en moyenne. Dans l'ensemble, l'accroissement de la production sur la décade 1966-1976 semble à peine avoir suivi le taux de croissance de la population. Or, les exigences de cette dernière augmentent, cela conduit l'Algérie à accroître ses importations de biens alimentaires.

En moyenne annuelle, la valeur des importations se montait à 986 millions de D.A. pendant la période 1966-1969, elle se monte à 3 924 millions de D.A. pendant la période 1974-1976, soit une augmentation de 234 %. Pendant les mêmes périodes, l'Algérie importait respectivement 667 000 tonnes et 1 779 000 tonnes de céréales soit un accroissement de 167 %. Le même ordre de grandeur se retrouve pour l'importation des produits laitiers, des légumes, des oléagineux, des huiles et graisses, du sucre.

Cet état de fait oblige à consacrer une partie importante des ressources en devises procurées par les hydrocarbures à l'importation des produits alimentaires, ainsi que le montre le tableau suivant :

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Indices des importations	100	141	172	193	457	709	557
Indice des exportations d'hydrocarbures	100	90	133	177	470	447	552
Valeur des importations de biens alimentaires	100						
Valeur des exportations d'hydrocarbures.	18	28	22	19	17	28	18

2.1.2. Sur le plan des techniques de production et de l'emploi, le secteur coopératif agricole n'arrive pas également à apporter une solution durable aux problèmes que lui demande de résoudre la Charte

Les techniques de productions demeurent les mêmes que celles appliquées par les colons ou ne se modifient que de façon très potentielle. Ces techniques sont peu intensives et relèvent des techniques

minières d'exploitation du sol cultivable. Elles n'associent pas (ou très peu) l'agriculture à l'élevage.

Ainsi la structure d'occupation de la superficie agricole utile du secteur coopératif demeure massivement dominée par le binôme céréales-jachères. Ce dernier occupait en moyenne 72,6 % de la SAU pendant la période 1966-1969 et il continue d'occuper environ la même superficie en 1974-1976 : 71,9 %. Entre les deux périodes, les cultures intensives n'augmentent que faiblement leur part dans la superficie agricole utile : les fourrages passent de 2,4 % à 8,6 %, le maraîchage de 1,8 % à 2,1 % aux dépens du vignoble de cuve qui passe de 14 % à 9,3 % de la SAU.

L'équilibre agronomique des sols demeure précaire malgré des apports plus importants d'engrais chimiques à cause du mauvais emploi de ces derniers, mauvais emploi dû aux structures étatiques d'approvisionnement souvent défailante dans leur mission (retards de livraison fréquents), mauvais emploi dû également à la faible formation technique des travailleurs, à l'équipement des exploitations insuffisant et souvent en panne. L'emploi des produits phyto-sanitaires reste très insuffisant.

Le maintien de façons culturales, de types d'assolements, de façons d'utiliser la force de travail identiques à ceux de la colonisation ne s'est pas accompagné du maintien du même niveau d'équipement et, bien sûr, du même système d'autorité sur la force de travail. Le niveau d'équipement s'est dégradé. Le système d'autorité, ainsi que nous le verrons ci-dessous, interdit aux travailleurs de former des collectifs suffisamment motivés et responsables de la production.

Cet ensemble de facteurs entraînent une faible augmentation des rendements pour les céréales qui, en l'espace d'une décade (1966-1976), passent de 8,2 quintaux/ha à 9 quintaux/ha et des baisses dans les autres spéculations : passage de 71,3 à 57,0 quintaux/ha pour le maraîchage, de 100,4 à 99,9 quintaux/ha pour les agrumes, de 27,6 à 20,5 quintaux/ha pour la vigne de cuve, de 36,7 à 34,0 quintaux/ha pour le raisin de table.

Sur le plan de l'emploi, alors que la Charte Nationale proclame un des objectifs les plus pressant du pays la disparition du chômage et du sous-emploi, alors que la stratégie de développement adopté dès 1966 demandait à l'agriculture de favoriser le maximum d'emplois en attendant que l'industrie prenne la relève dans ce domaine, les exploitations coopératives ex-coloniales continuent d'occuper approximativement le même nombre de travailleurs à l'hectare. Elles utilisent moins de travailleurs (permanents et saisonniers) en 1975-1976 (208 419) qu'en 1964-1965 juste après l'indépendance (234 430). Le nombre des journées de travail fournies par ces exploitations tombe de 6 267 900 ha en 1967-1968 à 59 749 000 en 1974-1975. Le nouveau secteur coopératif mis en place depuis 1971 avec la « Révolution Agraire » n'apporte pas de solution réelle au problème de l'emploi parce que la très grande majorité des terres retirées au secteur privé sont désormais exploitées avec les mêmes techniques fortement mécanisées que celles de l'ex-secteur colon et parce que le système de spéculation ne s'est pas intensi-

fié. En effet, ce nouveau secteur présente la même occupation du sol que l'ex-secteur colon avec 87,8 % de ses superficies cultivables en céréales-jachères.

De manière générale, le secteur coopératif agricole, issu de la nationalisation des terres coloniales, continue 16 ans après l'indépendance à former des espaces fortement mécanisés, avec un nombre relativement faible de travailleurs, entourés d'une agriculture très peu mécanisée où la pression de la population demeure encore très forte. Cette agriculture continue de servir de réservoir de main-d'œuvre saisonnière au secteur coopératif ex-colon et de force de travail pour les activités urbaines.

Ces faibles performances du secteur coopératif agricole sur le plan économique sont-elles contrebalancées par l'atteinte des autres objectifs sociaux et politiques que la Charte Nationale demande à ce secteur de réaliser ?

2.2. Sur le plan social et politique, la Charte Nationale attend du secteur coopératif deux résultats principaux :

la disparition de la mentalité et du comportement de salariés chez les travailleurs associés dans l'exploitation de la terre. Cela implique que l'ensemble des travailleurs gère effectivement ses moyens de travail et bénéficie du produit de son travail. En particulier, chaque travailleur doit éprouver dans les faits que les décisions économiques principales dépendent en partie de lui et que les résultats des accroissements de ses efforts lui reviennent, au moins en partie, sous forme de revenu.

- Un effet d'entraînement vis-à-vis des paysans du secteur privé à la fois sur le plan des techniques de production et sur le plan des formes organisationnelles de gestion (formation de coopératives, au moins de type primaire par les petits paysans).

2.2.1. — En ce qui concerne le premier point, les travailleurs du secteur coopératif issu des exploitations coloniales se comportent massivement comme des salariés. Ils ne s'intéressent pas à la gestion de leurs exploitations, sont très peu, ou pas du tout, au courant des principales décisions qui se prennent et souvent ne veulent même pas être au courant (26). Cette attitude est le résultat de la tutelle de l'État sur ces exploitations, tutelle si lourde qu'elle enlève toute possibilité d'initiative aux travailleurs.

En effet, l'État, par son administration ou par ses autres organismes (office et institutions diverses) affecte souverainement et les moyens de production et les produits du travail des «auto-gestionnaires» (désormais entreguillémets). Ainsi l'État, propriétaire juridique de la

terre, impose aux travailleurs la taille de l'exploitation (quasi-exclusivement des exploitations de grande taille), les plans de culture et d'occupation des sols, les techniques à employer dans les différents procès de travail agricoles et les inputs nécessaires, les normes de travail à respecter, les sources et les modalités d'approvisionnement, le type de comptabilité à tenir, les salaires à verser par qualification, le type et les modalités de commercialisation, les prix à la production, les modalités d'application du produit financier de l'exploitation. Cet état de fait vide l'autogestion de tout contenu et enlève ainsi toute prérogative réelle aux organes de l'exploitation prévus par le droit de l'autogestion agricole. Massivement déficitaires (sur le plan comptable), depuis qu'elles existent, les exploitations «autogérées» versent à leurs membres des «avances sur revenu» (27) qui équivalent pour le simple ouvrier au salaire minimum agricole garanti. Les «autogestionnaires» ont droit à la sécurité sociale et aux allocations familiales de la même manière que les travailleurs des secteurs non-agricoles (28).

Ainsi, l'ouvrier permanent s'analyse bien comme un salarié dans le plein sens du terme. La seule différence juridique est qu'il ne peut être licencié que par l'assemblée générale des travailleurs, le fait devant être confirmé par le Ministère de l'Agriculture.

2.2.2. En ce qui concerne le deuxième point, le secteur coopératif agricole a deux effets sur le secteur privé.

- a) le premier effet est attractif. Les paysans du secteur privé, dans leur majorité ; aimeraient bien avoir davantage accès aux coopératives agricoles communales polyvalentes de service (CAPCS) (29) parce qu'elles ont le monopole pour certains approvisionnements (engrais, produits de traitement, certaines semences...), parce qu'elles pratiquent des prix d'inputs destinés à l'agriculture souvent très inférieurs à ceux pratiqués par le secteur commercial privé, parce qu'elles disposent de matériels (de labours et de moissons en particulier) très peu disponibles sur le marché et à des prix de location également inférieurs à ceux des agriculteurs privés qui en possèdent.
- b) Le deuxième effet est répulsif dans la mesure où les paysans du secteur privé sont très réticents quant à l'éventualité de se regrouper en coopératives, même de type inférieur.

Cette réticence, si elle trouve certainement une partie de son explication dans la mentalité du petit propriétaire (ou du propriétaire tout court), trouve son explication dans le fonctionnement même des domaines «autogérés» et des CAPRA (Coopératives de production de la Révolution Agraire). La tutelle paralysante de l'État sur tout le système coopératif, l'obligation de commercialiser les produits aux prix fixés par l'État (très inférieurs aux prix du marché libre) par les circuits de com-

mercionalisation étatiques, n'engagent pas les exploitations privées à se regrouper en coopératives. Le secteur coopératif agricole n'arrive même pas à garder les travailleurs qui en font partie : les plus qualifiés de ces derniers (et même les autres quant ils en ont la possibilité) préfèrent travailler dans le secteur agricole privé et surtout dans les secteurs non-agricoles où les salaires et les avantages sociaux sont bien plus importants que dans les coopératives agricoles. Le phénomène du désistement (abandon des coopératives par les travailleurs après qu'ils y aient travaillé pendant un certain temps) touche gravement les exploitations se situant près des villes, des zones industrielles et en général toutes les régions où l'offre de travail non agricole apparaît importante. De ce fait de nombreuses coopératives se retrouvent avec un effectif de loin inférieur à celui prévu. En outre, des terres n'ont pas pu encore être attribuées faute de candidats à la coopération.

En conclusion, le secteur public, entendu comme propriété étatique des moyens de production, ne garantit donc en rien la transition vers le socialisme, si nous admettons que le contenu de cette dernière est la maîtrise, progressive mais réelle, de leur existence par les producteurs directs. Il peut, au contraire, garantir une transition vers un type de société où les travailleurs continuent d'être exclus de la propriété réelle de leurs moyens de travail mais type de société intégrée plus intimement (30) au marché capitaliste mondial parce que le secteur public se sera développé essentiellement en recourant à la technologie et aux prêts étrangers, parce que le secteur public constituera la base économique d'une nouvelle bourgeoisie. Cette nouvelle bourgeoisie constitue à la fois un relais des bourgeoisies impérialistes dans les pays du Tiers-Monde et un centre de contestation de ces dernières. Un relais parce que c'est à travers elle que l'impérialisme impose la division internationale du travail qui lui convient le mieux, un centre de contestation parce que cette bourgeoisie peut être suffisamment nationaliste pour réclamer et parfois obtenir une place privilégiée comme centre-relais.

Tant que les pays en voie de développement ne mettent pas en œuvre des stratégies de rupture réelle avec l'impérialisme, c'est-à-dire tant que leur croissance dépend de l'accroissement des échanges avec lui, il sera indifférent à ce dernier que le secteur public dans les pays en voie de développement soit dominant ou non. Il se peut même que dans certains cas un secteur public dominant soit plus profitable : l'idéologie du secteur public occulte la dépendance vis-à-vis de l'impérialisme, des luttes de classes internes, empêche l'organisation autonome des travailleurs et les luttes syndicales radicales (31). L'impérialisme sauvegarde ainsi ses intérêts fondamentaux à l'ombre d'un secteur public réputé plus « progressiste » que le secteur privé et présenté aux masses comme la « base de l'édification du socialisme ». Cela ne signifie pas qu'il faut préférer le secteur privé au secteur public. Le choix véritable est le refus de se laisser enfermer dans ce dilemme pour opter, dans chaque cas particulier, pour les formes offrant les meilleures bases de luttes aux travailleurs.

N O T E S

- (1) Après la «récupération des terres coloniales dès le lendemain de l'indépendance», c'est à partir de 1966 que les bases matérielles du socialisme ont commencé à être posées avec la nationalisation des mines, du secteur bancaire et des assurances ; ces bases devaient ensuite, de plus en plus, s'élargir grâce à la reprise en main du commerce extérieur et des transports, à la récupération méthodique des autres richesses nationales - qui a culminé dans la bataille du pétrole en 1971 - et à la mise en train d'un vaste programme d'industrialisation conçu dans une perspective socialiste. «C'est cependant en 1972, avec l'entrée en vigueur de la Révolution Agraire et de la gestion socialiste des entreprises, que le processus d'édification socialiste a franchi son cap décisif». Charte p. 29
- (2) «il faut en faire, à la fois des citoyens responsables et des militants socialistes pleinement conscients des objectifs de l'édification d'un monde nouveau...» Charte op. cité p. 14
- (3) Charte p. 4
- (4) Charte p. 25. En conséquence, la Charte rejette la thèse de la «voie non capitaliste de développement» «incapable de rendre compte des développements réels de la pratique sociale dans nos pays.»
- (5) Charte p. 27
- (6) Charte p. 28
- (7) Charte p. 29
- (8) Charte p. 31
- (9) «L'obligation de passer par les entreprises nationales pour ce qui est des importations aura pour résultat de limiter, voire d'éliminer les risques de conjonction avec les milieux capitalistes étrangers» Charte p. 31
- (10) Charte p. 79
- (11) Charte p. 79
- (12) Charte p. 80
- (13) Charte p. 81

- (14) Charte p. 81
- (15) Charte p. 83.
- (16) Que nous assimilerons au secteur coopératif bien que, juridiquement, les formes de gestion ne soient pas les mêmes. La raison de cette assimilation est que c'est à travers ce secteur que l'Etat essaie de transformer les structures agraires et mène, de façon générale, sa politique agricole.
- (17) Charte p. 75
- (18) Charte p. 75
- (19) Charte p. 77
- (20) Charte p. 79
- (21) Charte p. 79
- (22) Charte p. 85
- (23) Charte p. 79
- (24) Charte p. 86
- (25) 2 064 360 ha font partie du secteur autogéré issu de la nationalisation en 1962-1963 des terres coloniales. 1 005 600 ha font partie du secteur de la Révolution Agraire issue de la distribution depuis 1972 des terres cultivables communales dominales auparavant utilisées par le secteur privé et des terres nationalisées aux dépens des propriétaires absenteistes et des propriétaires fonciers limités (c'est-à-dire disposant au-delà des superficies admises par la loi).
- (26) Cf. C. CHAULET – La Mitidja autogérée – SNED-Alger–1971. Ouvrage déjà ancien mais qui conserve, à notre avis, toutes son actualité.
J.L. AUTIN – Le droit économique algérien - Thèse - Montpellier 1977.
H. AIT AMARA - Conditions de la participation dans les exploitations agricoles d'autogestion en Algérie -Thèse EPHE Paris 1970.
- (27) Les «avances sur revenu» sont acquises quel que soit le résultat de la production.

- (28) Les coopérateurs nouveaux, membres des coopératives agricoles de productions mises en place à partir de 1972 par la «Révolution Agraire», ont droit à 70% du SMAG s'ils sont déficitaires ou à 70% de l'avance de l'année précédente s'ils ont été bénéficiaires. Ils n'ont pas droit à la sécurité sociale et aux allocations familiales.
- (29) L'adhésion à ces coopératives est obligatoire pour les exploitations du secteur «autogérée» et les coopératives de la «Révolution Agraire».
- (30) Nous entendons par là que le volume des échanges entre pays périphériques et pays impérialistes s'accroît et se diversifie de manière durable.
- (31) Interdiction de la grève dans le secteur public sous prétexte qu'il s'agit de propriété étatique donc propriété du peuple puisque l'Etat n'est que le représentant de celui-ci.

SUMMARY

The Public Sector has always been considered as one of the most efficient means for the socialists to transform a capitalist society into a socialist one. Indeed it can help politicians and decision-makers control the whole economy of a country so that it is the people of the country who equally works and equally benefits from their output. Bedrani's article can be roughly divided into three parts:

1) – The first part is an account of what is expected from the 1976 National Charter as far as the Public Sector is concerned.

2) – In the second part, he tries to show whether the Public Sector has reached the objectives which the National Charter set to it.

3) – In conclusion, he found that the Public Sector did not achieve what the National Charter expected from it and even worse, it was creating a «Bourgeois» class which is a threat to the fundamental principle of socialism.

A – The Theory

a) – *The Algerian socialism as it is contained in the National Charter.* The National Charter is considered as the «supreme source of the policy of the Nation and of Law». In it, Algeria is described as a country in a transition phase towards socialism. The purpose of this future socialism is to fight for genuine independence, the abolition of the private property of the means of production as well as the end of the exploitation of man by man.

b) — *The economic role of the Public Sector as given in the National Charter.* In industrial as well as in agricultural matters, the role of the Public Sector is defined in comparison with that of the private sector. In both matters, the Public Sector benefits from much more advantages (the control over the whole industry except for factories dealing with the final phase of the transformation of the products, the allocation of the best fields to the co-operative Public Sector with facilities concerning the implements, seeds etc...) The Public Sector is the «eye» of the State in industrial and agricultural matters.

c) — *The Social and Political role of the Public Sector in the National Charter.* Politically and socially the role assigned to the Public Sector is «to get a correct conservation of the people's properties, to ensure a regular development of the country in all its aspects to make the economic, social and political «engine» work according to the rules of efficiency and to the satisfaction of all, to integrate and adapt itself to the changes continuously brought about by development to see that the principles of social justice on which is founded socialism are respected and finally to make the workers be the craftsmen of their own destiny.

B — The Application

Indeed there is a gap between what the National Charter wants the Algerian Socialism to be and what it really is. On the economic plan, the objectives are only partially fulfilled. The objective of food independence which was one of the foremost goals of the National Charter has not been reached because of two reasons:

— The population grows quicker than the food production so that the benefits drawn from the selling of hydrocarbon products were spent to import food products.

— The technics used were not intensive enough and they did not associate agriculture to animal husbandry. As far as employment was concerned the authority system forbade the peasants to put up groups motivated enough to improve the food production.

In terms of social and political results, the principles of the National Charter have proved negative in their application because:

— The workers and peasants behaved as wage-earners since they did not feel involved in the making of decisions.

— The peasants were interested in the cooperative agricultural sector only in the extent that it gave more facilities for the means of production but they were reluctant to the idea of grouping themselves into co-operatives.

In the conclusion, the author says that the Public Sector does not really guarantee the transition to socialism. On the contrary the kind of society it is building is capitalist oriented since its development is highly dependent on technology and foreign investments and that it is creating a new «Bourgeois» class. The main reason for the failure in the policy for a socialist kind of society in Algeria is to be found, according to the author, in the fact that there is not a genuine rupture from imperialism.

STATE CAPITALISM : THE ROLE OF PARASTATALS IN ZAMBIA

By

BEN TUROK *

«The reforms have created a form of State capitalism where tremendous power is thus concentrated in the hands of a small managerial group who have their hands on the important switches and whose elitist attitudes set social patterns far beyond their immediate realm of command»

President Kaunda: Humanism in Zambia (Part Two) 1974.

State Capitalism in underdeveloped countries is a rather different state form to that experienced elsewhere. Its main distinguishing characteristics are the concentration of political power in the state, the predominance of the state sector in the economy, the persistence of profits as the principal economic criterion in a class divided society in which the national bourgeoisie is still underdeveloped. It should be noted that this characterisation includes ownership relations, market relations and political power relations each being an essential aspect of the system.

The characterisation is not meant to have universal application and there are indeed many variations of State Capitalism in the Third World. But there are enough similarities, especially on the African continent, to justify this rough and ready model. What makes characterisation more difficult is that none of the relevant states are stable nor are their particular state forms likely to persist for a long time. The characterisation therefore relates to a system in transition and which is unable to sustain itself but which nevertheless constitutes an important phase in history both for the states concerned and for the world as a whole. We need to emphasise however, the importance of taking a dynamic view of these systems in their considerable variety taking full account of their evolution and development in our present epoch.

The term State Capitalism has not received wide currency in social theory though it has been used by some important writers. There are signs however that there is a growing recognition that Third World State systems need a new concept beyond that of Neo-Colonialism and Post Colonial State to explain some of the contradictions emerging on a world scale.

The term has, however, been fairly widely used in Zambia (Kaunda, Fortman, Martin, Johns) and this is obviously due to the existence of a large public sector in the economy and the concentrated political power structure in a country where capitalist forces and relations remain dominant.

* *University of Zambia*

Important multi-national corporations like Anglo-American Corporation, and private banks like Barclays, Standard and more recently Citycorp International, operate freely though within a framework of a «mixed economy» which is complex in structure and hard to pin down. The definition of the structure and the isolation of its determining elements analytically is made more difficult by the constant emphasis on the pursuit of anti-capitalist policies and non-capitalist goals and the considerable socialist rhetoric which gains some credibility because of the obvious and large state presence in politics and economics.

The Zambian state is undoubtedly a dependent state and as its position becomes more critical due to geo-political and international market pressures so its sensitivity to world forces becomes more obvious as does its vulnerability to the dictates of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the like. The focus of this paper however is on the internal arrangements since the specificity of the system lies there.

The Zambian state is highly interventionist which does not mean that its activities are socialist in nature nor that they are in the interests of the people as a whole. To bring out the effects of this interventionism it is necessary to go beyond more institutional considerations which is unfortunately the more common focus of conventional political science. What the state does must be seen as a dynamic component of the system as a whole, having important effects on the mode of production and on the production and reproduction of classes and class struggle

Curiously enough, state intervention in Zambia did not arouse much alarm in the early years of Independence. This was because some of the measures were situated within the institutions established under colonialism, but also because so much needed to be done in a country so sorely neglected under colonial rule. The state was the natural, indeed largely the only, possible agency.

But even the rather more drastic economic reforms of later years, in the late sixties, when the state took a very big bite out of private sectoral business, were accepted by liberal economists and capitalist readers as valid, in the belief that this was some kind of rationalisation of the economy which was justified in the special conditions of African decolonisation. There were indeed high hopes that Zambia's model of mixed economy could be both socially just, and, efficient.

Writing in 1969, Fortman said,

«Zambia believes in controlled private enterprise . . . Government wants private business to develop the Zambian economy - allowance being made for fair profits - but not to exploit it».

Fortman 1969, 104

Fortman felt that if reasonable profits were allowed, and excessive red tape was avoided, Zambia's model of State Capitalism could well

succeed. He was writing, of course, at a time of boom due to sustained high copper prices and a surging economic performance.

State intervention has grown steadily however, and precisely because private enterprise did not fulfil the role expected of it as will be elaborated later. In fact the state sector has become predominant not because of an ideological predilection on the part of Zambia's rulers but seemingly as a pragmatic response to the behaviour of private capital. This is also why Zambia's economy remains «mixed» and the performance of the public sector uncertain.

Pragmatism in the economy has been matched by similar considerations in the politics of the state system. Although the outgoing colonial power tried to install a British type political system at the time of Independence, including the party system, the Zambian state, like that in the rest of Black Africa, has become increasingly monolithic and concentrated over the years. Africa is a veritable graveyard of multiparty Parliamentary politics. The Zambian state and its ruling party have developed considerable muscle: it is no mere theoretical construct, nor a mere «relation» but has a concrete reality at every level.

Nor does the Zambian state bother to disguise its massive interventions in politics and economics by a web of apparatuses, ideological and others, as is the case in the advanced capitalist states. (Althusser 1971). Official ideology does not minimize the central role of the Party and its Government (using official terminology), even when it seeks legitimation. Thus there is One Party Participatory Democracy based on UNIP. However, notwithstanding the importance attributed to the Party and the existence of a large and separate organization spread throughout the country, political power is exercised through the President as Head of State and through the state apparatuses and this is widely recognised and accepted.

This is not to say that UNIP is coterminous with the state, indeed there are many contradictions in the way the state responds to the policies of UNIP obviously expressing a different complex of interests. These assert themselves through the state apparatuses, especially in the economy, despite a degree of supervision by the Party through the Central committee and its regional structures.

Because the state system in all its aspects is relatively new and still developing, it is difficult to categorise the forces and interests within the state complex. It is not always clear which interests are most served by the complex and a simple reductionism to a comprador model doesn't really get us off the hook. Whatever degree of comprador relations actually obtain there are nevertheless internal interests and forces at work and these have to be identified and specified.

Miliband has argued with great force that Marx and Engels «never departed from the view that in capitalist society the state was above all the coercive instrument of the ruling class, itself defined in terms of its ownership and control of the means of production. (Miliband 1973 : 7).

He also quotes Marx to support the notion that the state is a machine and an instrument of the ruling class. But he also argues that the state does not act at the *behest* of but on *behalf* of the ruling class. (Ibid p 23) He takes more or less for granted that the ruling class is clearly visible.

But in a more recent book, *Marxism and Politics*, Miliband offers a different view for the state in Third World countries. (Miliband 1977 : 106–8). Here is found an «extreme inflation» of executive power in the state due to the absence or weakness of social forces which might limit or control the power of the state. The dominant classes and groups find it advantageous to have a strong and repressive state to act on their behalf.

He goes on to argue that the local entrepreneurs and traders cannot seriously be said to constitute an economically dominant class. Nor can the foreign interests be so designated, thereby parting company with dependency theory. He says that «the state must be taken mainly to «represent» itself, in the sense that those people who occupy the leading positions in the state system will use their power, inter alia, to advance their own economic interests». And, «The state is here the source of economic power as well as an instrument of it.....»

In sum, for Miliband, in some Third World states, political power provides the basis for the formation of an economically powerful, and later dominant class.

In another essay I have suggested that in the Zambian case those who wield executive power in the state advance their economic interests within the state apparatuses but also outside it. That is they seek to build an additional base in the private sector. (Turok 1979).

This point illustrates the difficulty of determining the nature and mode of organization of the ruling class in a State Capitalist system like that of Zambia. And, the fact of concentration of power and authority at the centre of the system makes this task no easier. Yet, the delineation of the parameters of the ruling class remains a vital task.

It should be said, en passant, that the centralisation of power in the state is not, in principle, problematic. There is every reason to believe that underdeveloped countries have no hope of making progress without substantial state intervention and centralised direction of resources. What is problematic, however, is *who benefits?* This point is stressed here, because it is missed in the discussion on the «overdeveloped» post-colonial state. The «over development» is only significant in so far as it places power in the hands of privileged and exploiting classes, it has no other explanatory value.

The Conditions of State Intervention in Zambia

As the performance of Black African states fails to satisfy the needs of the masses it becomes more common for writers to pour scorn on the whole independence saga. In the case of Zambia, whatever judge-

ment one makes about the real effectiveness of the Party in the independence struggle, there can be no doubt about its having raised great expectations among the mass of the people.

The capacity to satisfy these expectations were however limited by the fact that Independence was gained by a populist party without a clear ideology or economic programme. As a result, the first years of Independence were marked by a sense of pressing along the well-worn path of a typical export oriented mono-economy with its base in copper and with colonial institutions to match. While some important steps were taken to fill various gaps in the economy (arising partly from the breakup of Federation, the major interventions by the state came later when the government realised the full effect of the exploitation of Zambia's resources by foreign interests, especially the vast leakages of capital abroad.

Responding in pragmatic manner, corrective measures were taken piecemeal and hesitantly. This was partly due to the reformist outlook of the party leadership, but it was also a reflection of the substantial non-correspondence between the political powers of the government and the inherited economic structures where power was vested in foreign and settler hands. The government was also affected by a feeling that it did not have to hand the management and other skills to run the economy. Even where the levers of authority were directly in state hands, as in the case of the formerly Northern Rhodesian state owned companies and public corporations, the changes in the first post Independence years were made gradually. In the private sector, state intervention and participation was negotiated over some years as has been fully documented elsewhere. (Ndulo, Simwinga, Johns etc.)

It is not surprising, therefore, that the economic reforms were carried out within the existing capitalist framework. As President Kaunda stated in *Humanism* (part two) there developed a new class structure located within the value system and «the economy's capitalistic nature remained unchanged» with the profit motive still the overriding regulative principle. (Kaunda 1974 : 109). It seems that the economic reforms of 1968 and after achieved no more than a major *adjustment* in the ownership of the means of production so that the state became a prominent participant in the existing capitalist relations of production. Indeed it may be that the mode of state intervention (which will be described later) actually undermined whatever socialist aspirations were present within UNIP and made the state a captive within the capitalist system. As President Kaunda points out in *Humanism* (part two), «the state's acquisition of control remained largely limited to the formal aspect of State control. The economy's capitalistic nature remained unchanged..» (Kaunda 1974 : 110).

However this paper seeks to show that the effects of state intervention in Zambia were substantial and that they led to very real contradictions between the Zambian state and foreign interests and that there is a specific shape to Zambia's State Capitalism as a system.

State Capitalism in Zambia can be said to derive from three principal factors: it is a «national» response to foreign exploitation at the hands of locally based branches of multinational corporations, it is due to the weakness (almost absence) of a national bourgeoisie, and it is the result of persisting pressure from organised labour, the peasantry and the masses generally for the fruits of Independence, Realising that the formal political rights established in the Independence constitution also add up to a degree of political power, these popular forces have pressed for the greater utilization of state powers to extend public control over the economy, especially its foreign owned sector. For the first decade, at any rate, government attacks on expatriate and settler interests were undoubtedly popular and seen as a continuation of the anti-colonial struggle in a new form.

But the absence of concentrated and developed class forces rooted within the Zambian people and the vagueness of the policies of the post-independence government meant that State Capitalism was installed incrementally. Despite the installation of an entirely new administration there remained significant continuities from the past which hung on tenaciously.

Ann Seidman holds that little was done to «alter the fundamental institutions and class relationships which emerged during colonial rule». (Seidman 1977: 415). And this view is endorsed by Tordoff, (Tordoff 1974: 8).

However, despite continuities, the present system of State Capitalism does represent a distinct departure from the previous system. The contradictions with foreign capital are significant, and the present state cannot be conceived, as was possible formerly, as the outright agent or instrument of an economic class located abroad.

My case rests mainly on the nature and scope of the parastatal structure in Zambia which require new theoretical formulations beyond those of neo-colonialism and dependency, though this essay cannot go further in that direction. All I can do is to focus on the parastatals as the locus for a definition of the system.

Working from a dependency perspective, Shaw has nevertheless come to the same view. He argues that the relationship between an African ruling class and the multi-national corporations usually occurs within parastatal institutions. (Shaw 1976:3). The state sector largely consists of collaboration agreements between the interests of the state and of foreign capital. «The ruling class in Africa has formal charge over the national economy but lacks effective control because of joint ownership of the major means of production». The state has achieved only the Africanisation of management but not real ownership or effective control and this collaboration is fully compatible with the emergence of State Capitalism as a dominant ethos.

He goes on to argue that the dominance of foreign interests manifested through the parastatals has important consequences for the petty bourgeoisie.

«The dominance of the parastatal sector has retarded the development of a petite-bourgeoisie in Zambia. Although the Africanisation of the retail trade, transport and services has been advanced through legal instruments and party actions, these sectors are dominated by parastatal supermarkets, transport companies and service industries. Moreover, most successful private Zambian companies are either foreign, white, or highly dependent on contracts with parastatals. State Capitalism in Zambia has, therefore, largely prevented the rise of Zambian entrepreneurs outside the parastatal structure. It has however, reinforced the trend towards concentration and monopoly of decision-making in the regime». (Shaw 1976 : 8)

Support for most of Shaw's points lies in the November 1970 measures which were designed to curb the emergence of large local capitalists by threatening state take-overs, measures to control prices and enforce minimum wages, and steep taxes for high incomes plus taxes on luxuries. It has been shown however that many of these measures were not implemented. No Zambian owned company has been nationalised (apart from Mwaiseni Stroes in 1969). (Tordoff 1974 : 391) The evidence seems to point to substantial constraints in the path of the commercial bourgeoisie which are economic rather than political. Their problems lies in the shortage of capital and know-how, in the monopolies exercised by the parastatals and in the priority given to parastatals in licencing, foreign exchange allocations and infrastructural services.

Where I part company with Shaw is in the degree of dominance he allocates to foreign interests. While it is common cause and widely acknowledged that the multi-national corporations prevent the ruling class in Africa from consolidating control of the parastatals, there is nevertheless a substantial difference between the status quo ante and post of nationalisation. In the former case multinational control is complete and this condition is closer to the stage generally called neo-colonialism. In the latter multi-national power is indirect and limited, partly by the formal powers taken by the state, and partly by the socio-political aspirations and imperatives of the local ruling group. These issues have been worked out in a fresh and challenging way by James Petras. His central argument is that «...an internal ruling class with its own apparatus has emerged to dominate rather than mediate the process of exploitation and accumulation». (Petras 1979 : 14) He therefore agrees with the conception of Miliband quoted earlier.

Petras adds, «At one and the same time it (state capitalism) opposes imperialist property interests and attempts to discipline the labour force. The national-state capitalist class directs and controls the process of capital accumulation but at the expense of the labour force-concentrating capital in its own hands. The state-capitalist regime attempts to

redefine the terms of dependency and to contain labour demands to favour nationalist capitalist accumulation». (Ibid p 12)

However the enterprise is doomed to failure because of the pressures of the grip of the international market and the new ruling class is forced to re-enter into the world capitalist system.

The essential point in this scenario is that the new state strives to use its political powers against imperial and multinational interests and that a new stage, which is admittedly transnational only, is reached as a result of confrontation in what becomes the parastatal sector.

The key to an understanding of Zambia's system of State Capitalism therefore lies in the parastatals. Unfortunately while a substantial body of literature already exists on the parastatals much of this is purely descriptive and although the term State Capitalism has been used by several writers this characterisation has been based on the sheer scale of state interests rather than on considerations of the system as a whole.

What follows begins with an outline of factual material on the structure of parastatalism in Zambia which is based on several papers by Sheridan Johns, work by Simwinga, Young, Sklar and others. I shall then attempt to integrate this material with some of the propositions on State Capitalism made earlier.

Parastatals have been defined in a number of ways in Zambia. The most useful seems to have been that

«A parastatal organization is not an integral part of the Government but an institution, organization or agency which is wholly or mainly financed or owned or controlled by the Government».

(Mwanakatwe Commission 1970 : 5) Three distinct types of parastatal bodies have been identified; the «commercial» type, e.g. the mines and other enterprises of the Zimco group; the «semi-commercial» type which provide a public service on a business basis, e.g. the railways; and the «non-commercial» type which perform normal public services and which are not expected to operate on business lines. (Ibid p 10-12). The latter two are often called statutory boards since they are the result of legislation and therefore need to be clearly differentiated from the «commercial» parastatals. It is the predominance of the latter in the economy as a whole which distinguishes the Zambian system from others. These companies are highly sensitive politically and they are most active in competing for control of production and of the market. Whereas there is a certain sense in which all parastatals provide services to the public, those of the non-commercial and semi-commercial variety are also least controversial since they follow the style and practices of similar bodies in most countries. The «commercial» parastatals, however, have been the focus of major struggles between the state and foreign interests. More recently the battle has been joined by local entrepreneurial interests as well though the state is still well in command.

The essential features of the «commercial» parastatals arise from the manner of acquisition. In most cases this has been by taking over of shares in whole or in part, but not by outright nationalisation. The state has not therefore been able to establish full control, direction, planning or discipline over them. A residual autonomy remains with the parastatals individually and as a corporate entity.

Most of the parastatals lie outside of the financial controls of government ministries. «Parastatal» literally means «quasi-government» and indicates that these organizations are not covered in the government budget and that the management is located outside the government bureaucracy.

Parastatals therefore fall somewhere between private and public enterprises. They are administered by a semi-autonomous Board of Directors, they may own and deal in private property, make contracts, retain and invest their surplus, borrow on the open market, and issue loans. They can therefore be said to be businesses in the conventional sense of the word as applied to capitalist forms. There are of course also differences largely in the nature of the political supervision and in pricing and subsidy policies of the government.

Zambia's economy was highly skewed at the time of Independence on the 24th October 1964 with the dominant mining enclave being supported by a fairly small industrial and service sector on the Copperbelt. The «modern» sector as a whole was not integrated with the rest of the economy in any productive way. (UNDP 1976 : 3) Instead, the mining industry and its surrounds were geared to the economies to the south which also treated Zambia as a labour reserve. Domestic production supplied less than one third of the local market for manufactured goods, while total manufacturing accounted for only 6 per cent of GDP.

However a number of state owned companies and public corporations were already in existence before Independence. These corporations were either creatures of the Northern Rhodesian territorial organizations or components of larger Federal organizations. With the break up of Federation they were either taken over by the new Zambian state or set up as partnerships with the other Federal states. But they were not to last in that form as the destinies of the three components drifted apart and later became overtly opposed to each other.

The inherited statutory bodies of Zambia included those which catered for the conservation of natural resources, the provision of credit for agriculture (mainly for European settlers), electricity supply, African housing, and the like. The state owned companies were in electricity, and there was also the semi-publicly owned Industrial Development Corporation, the latter being the main vehicle for government policy in industry for several years after independence.

As the process of establishing the new Zambian state continued, taking several years, additional institutions were set up such as the Bank of Zambia, Zambia Broadcasting Corporation, the Grain Marketing

Board, Dairy Produce Board, Cold Storage Board, and the Tobacco Marketing Board. Other companies like Central Africa Airways, the Agricultural Research Council, Rhodesian Railways and the Central African Power Corporation were shared with Rhodesia or Malawi, though this was not to last long.

Sheridan Johns says of this period that the Zambian government allowed new parastatals to emerge, «but it restricted its activities, for the most part, to the reorganization of existing structures or the implementation of previously declared policy». (Johns 1970 : 5) However he also points out that prior to Independence Anglo American Corporation, Roan Selection Trust, the British South African Company and the Commonwealth Development Corporation moved out of Indeco, leaving it as an entirely Zambian government corporation. As such it became the vehicle for large scale industries in steel, chemicals and textiles.

Johns records that «Through 1966 and 1967 it (Indeco) steadily expanded its scope as it made agreements with foreign investors, including Japanese, Italian, British, American and South African interests, for a fertilizer factory, an explosives factory, a tyre-factory, a sugar estate, a textile mill, cement works, hotels, and other smaller enterprises». Ibid, p 6.

In this way, Indeco grew rapidly being responsible for the management of its own minority interests in its associated companies, as well as for its wholly owned or majority owned enterprises and corporations.

In agriculture, apart from the marketing boards set up there was also the all important Credit Organization of Zambia, (COZ) established in 1967, and which was designed to supply credit for farmers based on an assessment of «ability to farm productively», a rather loose and over easy criterion. It also supplied loans for fishing, housing and commercial activities in the rural areas. COZ and its predecessors pumped large amount of money into rural areas, and by 1975 COZ «became a focus of attention for those jockeying for the monetary fruits of Independence. (Ibid p.3.) In the event, large amounts of money were never repaid nor was all of it used for the purpose it was intended, rural development. Much was squandered or spent on personal unproductive enrichment. Perhaps this was not so noticeable at the time since early post-independence Zambia enjoyed an abundance of public funds and spending was on a grand scale.

The developments in manufacturing were subsidised by fiscal means based on taxes from the copper mining companies. This was possible because of the obvious gaps in infrastructure which required filling from local resources once links with the South were restricted. Independence itself seemed to lift the sense of being a mere appendage to others and there was a surge of economic activity. The high price of copper fed this mood and many doubts about the smallness of the local market were often brushed aside. The state played a not insubstantial part in encouraging this trend.

The need to open up the economy was a major concern. The Seers report has shown that Zambia's resources were sufficiently diverse to support a wide range of manufacturing industries and the need to diversify was perfectly apparent. The First National Development Plan hoped to lead away from copper so that a greater proportion of domestic demand would be met from local production and employment could be generated outside the mines.

Young reports that Zambia was known to have a wide range of non-metallic minerals other than coal, e.g. lime deposits for cement, glass sand in sufficient quantity to supply Zambia's needs for a long time. (Young 1973 : 100)

A further and major impetus to diversification, and also national self-reliance, was the result of Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence on 11th November 1965. The subsequent break in trading relations could, however, only be compensated for by the direct intervention of the state. This led to the creation of an independent Zambia Railways Board, the National Coal Board, the pipeline to Tanzania and later, Tazara.

The cost of disengagement was high for Zambia, but it created the opportunity for Zambia to seize hold of its own infrastructure and to reshape the parastatals to reflect the government's desire to exercise a greater control over the economy.

Government perspective were fixed on three main objectives : to diversify the economy away from copper, encourage rural development and build a substantial infrastructure. It was soon recognised, however, that none of these targets could be reached by relying on the existing private sector nor on the parastatals at that time.

Young has explained the reasons for greater government intervention.

«There were numerous reasons to doubt that the Zambian economy, if left to itself, would achieve an adequate rate and pattern of diversification. In particular, these reasons included the short-time horizons of expatriate investors and their inability to take proper account of inter-industry linkages, the institutionally distorted wage scale, the general absence of Zambian entrepreneurs, apart from the state itself, and the failure of the free market system to bring about a socially acceptable distribution of economic opportunity».....Young 1973 : 296

Other reasons have been set out by Simwinga (1977 : 106). But the clearest exposition is found in President Kaunda's speech on 16th April 1968 at Mulungushi and the accompanying notes in the published version. (Kaunda 1968)

President Kaunda stressed that «political independence without matching economic independence is meaningless». There had been excessive expatriation of profits made in the boom after independence.

As a result there was gross under-capitalisation, excessive local borrowing massive increase in foreign exchange expenditure on invisibles, transfer pricing and so on. The new reforms heralded in the Mulungushi speech were designed to direct available capital to development and to ensure that the Zambians «individually and corporately share in the commercial and industrial life of the country» (p.v). The proposed state participation in existing enterprises was the result of a lack of capital and skills by Zambians to be economically active on their own.».. only the Government of the people can participate on their behalf and ensure that the nation has control of the vital resources in the country, and also provides avenues for the acquisition of skills pertaining to economic development and participation». (p vi)

Participation is the correct term for the measures taken since the method chosen was to acquire shares and not nationalisation. The acquired derived control by means of Articles of Association leading to majority control of the boards of the companies concerned. (Simwinga, op cit) Even today when the government's shares are often 100% of major companies and when the parastatals have a legitimated and seemingly permanent existence, there are still no *statutory* provisions giving the government explicit control over non-statutory enterprises. Outright nationalisation is still not legally possible in Zambia.

The Mulungushi reforms of 1968 were nevertheless substantial by any standards. The Government bought out, to the extent of 51% twenty-four large private companies, including one Zambian owned firm. These were mostly firms which dominated production and distribution throughout the country.

Young holds that the reforms were of major significance. «The reforms signified that the authorities had overcome any lingering preference inherited from the Colonial era for private rather than public enterprise, and also that they were determined to ensure that where the interests of private export business and the interests of the Zambian economy diverged the latter would take precedence. Moreover, the new approach probably enables the Government to secure industrial development more cheaply than it could otherwise have done by relying on a policy of incentives alone». (Young 1973 : 206)

The reforms were certainly directed at large scale foreign enterprises and established state ownership at a high level outside the copper industry. Few Zambian owners were affected by the reforms, instead many might have hoped to gain from them, though the President warned Zambian entrepreneurs not to take advantage of the protection given them, «I do not want them to get rich at the expense of the nation».

While the Mulungushi reforms raised many eyebrows, it was the subsequent Matero reforms which raised the real hullabaloo. On August 11th 1969, the state acquired 51% controlling interest in the giant copper mining countries, which constituted the main pillar of the economy.

Prior to this the government had moved with much caution in respect of the mining companies since there were very powerful interests involved. There were also technical-administrative reasons too. The industry was manned and managed by Europeans at all higher levels and it was feared that radical state intervention would antagonise them irrevocably. There was also the danger that there might be an international reaction which Zambia, with its total dependence on the world copper market dominated by international capital, could ill afford. Hence the actual takeover of a controlling interest was negotiated with caution and with major concessions to the owners which are now deeply regretted by most Zambians. (This arrangement has been fully documented by Ndulo and others.)

Looking back on the reforms of the later 1960s one can see that they enabled substantial changes to be made in the economic and industrial structure of Zambia. Before 1968 industrial expansion was fuelled by private interests acting mainly in smaller scale and simpler industries. There was simply no capital available for larger industries, even if the desire to invest on a grand scale had been present. After 1968 it became possible for much larger capitalisation to take place leading to larger scale development. Zambia certainly needed a stepping up of industry, but there was also unfortunate aspects to the way industry was built. For reasons that are not quite clear, capital intensive rather than labour intensive plants were set up with in some cases disastrous results. The dependency of the economy on foreign inputs, raw materials, skills and management was increased greatly, and this kind of industry led to skewed development.

The result too, was that the parastatal system was established at a much higher level of organisation and power over the economy, leading the way to its present predominance in most industries. The state's power was thereby also enhanced though its effective power was still constrained by its dependence on foreign management and skills and all the other business linkages which were not severed with the capitalist world.

Although the state established its presence in this parastatal structure so that it was highly visible, with the President taking over the Chairman's role of ZIMCO, the super parastatal, it cannot be said that this presence was used to mobilise the resources of this complex from the bottom to the top. Although workers councils were established, and although UNIP expressed great interest in the new structures, the party's role seems to have been supervisory rather mobilisation in character. The term control has therefore to be used with caution, clearly distinguishing the legal-juridical aspects from more subtle indirect aspects which require rather more fundamental analysis.

One might mention in passing that although foreign interests and the international market constitute a strait-jacket for industry in Third World countries like Zambia, the state is not without mechanisms

of its own. In Zambia, private enterprise and interests have certainly been bound around with numerous controls which act as major constraints. There are licencing rules, foreign exchange allocations and numerous other rules and procedures to ensnare the private investor and businessman, especially of the foreign variety. The heyday of flagrant exploitation of Zambia's resources by foreign firms is over, and the extraction of surplus which goes on now is a much muted version of foreign exploitation.

The effect of the reforms was to boost indeco's assets sevenfold from 1965 to 1967. By 1971, Zimco had total assets of K 713 m of which the copper mines constituted 75 per cent. This can be compared to the state-controlled assets at Independence of K 231 m. Total state-controlled assets in 1971 were roughly K 1,009 m. By 1975, Zimco assets alone stood at K 1,468 m and total assets under Government control were almost K 2,000 m.

Writing in 1977 Simwinga estimated that Zimco ranked 123 rd in size among the 300 largest corporations in the world outside the USA and by far the largest in Black Africa. (Simwinga op cit p. 118)

The economy seemed to flourish during this period. Young has noted that «employment in manufacturing grew by 77% over the period 1964-9, output in money terms grew by 192% from 1964-9, or in real terms by 60% between 1965 and 1970; gross fixed capital formation grew by 472% between 1964-8». (Young, 1973, 214)

The image of a successful business operation exuded by the parastatal sector was accompanied by an entrepreneurial spirit and self-confidence on the part of management. The difference between conventional government departments and parastatals was notable. In the latter the practices and styles of private companies were emulated, high salaries were paid to attract the most qualified staff in addition to various incentives. The resulting pay differentials were naturally greater than in government departments leading to queries from the party and the unions.

Many parastatals retained close links with the previous owners, trading partners, consultants etc. With an ethos essentially that of private enterprise, the parastatals remained a focus of alternative capitalist ideology to that being espoused by the party.

However, the interventions of the state were on a scale that could no longer be dubbed «controlled private enterprise». If one includes the land reforms and other measures announced in the Watershed Speech on June 30th 1975 the reforms constituted a very large intervention indeed severely restricting the scope of private enterprise in Zambia. The state has established its predominance in the commanding heights of the economy and certainly not at the *behest* of private capital. To what extent these measures have served private interests, however, is not yet clear.

We should not, however, be blind to the welfare functions performed by parastatal bodies, especially the statutory variety. Johns has described the complex process of consolidation of parastatals begun in 1968 when statutory bodies were brought together into larger units covering entire fields of activity with the object of expanding production and retailing in both rural and urban areas not previously effectively catered for. He suggests that the government was genuinely concerned to make basic and nutritious foods available at reasonable prices through the Dairy Produce Board and other agencies. Similarly, the Cold Storage Board also entered the retail field in 1968 to provide competition to private butchers in the urban areas who had raised prices excessively. Also, in 1969 Namboard took over the wholesaling of vegetables and fruits and also started limited retail operations in several main urban centres to compete with private traders, a practice still continued now. (Johns 1975 : 221)

All these interventions might be subsumed under the general heading of state intervention at the level of welfare in order to meet the basic needs of the population, though one must qualify this by pointing to the heavy urban bias of much of this activity. The subsistence economy has not benefitted equally. On the face of it, it is this concern that the basic needs of the masses, especially in the urban areas should not become out of reach, that remains one of the redeeming features of the Zambian system. There can be no doubt that the state has intervened frequently to stave off unemployment, to peg prices of basic commodities and to ensure a measure of equity in distribution of commodities and this is taken as a sign of its «humanist» face.

This is not to say that the ruling groups in Zambia have developed a viable system. On the contrary, in another essay I have shown how the particular mix chosen in Zambia led to enormous problems in the economy once the copper price fell and the early euphoria and impetus of nationalisation was over. In the *Penalties of Zambia's Mixed Economy*, I have set out in more detail the problems created by having a high degree of centralisation but without central planning, a predominant public sector which cannot overcome the cottonwool effect of monopoly, the general running down of a system which fails to mobilise its labour ever greater productivity, and above all, the effects of failing to break out of the stranglehold of the international capitalist market. There is no point in repeating these arguments here however.

A CHARACTERISATION OF STATE CAPITALISM

We can now attempt to characterise the system of post-colonial state capitalism in Zambia. It is distinguished by:

1. state ownership of all major enterprises accounting for the greater part of total investment;

2. a largely unplanned, competitive commodity market governed by profit-making;
3. a class structure in which workers and peasants are in a subordinate position;
4. an emergent quasi-bourgeoisie which straddles the public and private sectors of the economy and, acting in varying forms of collaboration with foreign capital, penetrates the commanding heights of the economy and political system; and
5. the continuity and persistence of the system which is ensured by the mediation of state power.

It must be admitted, however, that this characterisation is somewhat tentative. State capitalism in the conditions of Africa is a transitional form leading, in most countries, to an indigenously formed capitalism. Earlier hopes that these countries might move to socialism have been largely confounded and it is now clear that the basis for these hopes was not substantial. They were often based on the rhetoric of the nationalist movements in the full flush of the independence struggle when they themselves were not fully conversant with the obstacles awaiting them. Their avowed anti-imperialism and anti-capitalist positions concealed a certain non-correspondence between the political power they won and the economic base in the post-colonial state.

In the event, despite a favourable international climate for anti-imperialist measures, and despite the power of socialism internationally, the economic measures they set in motion, such as nationalisations, generated an economic structure that is essentially capitalist in orientation. This was partly because the economically dominant stratum, brought into close contact with the politically dominant forces, undermined their socialist aspirations, and made them captive in a capitalist type system. The integration of private interests into the orbit of the state (as in parastatals) led to the undermining of the party's socialist objectives. This conception is the reverse of the common materialist conception of the state as the agent of an economic class. (Poulantzas 1973 : 326)

Despite nationalist and even socialist ideologies, state capitalism generates the formation of new classes and growing inequalities (1). The common usage of the term *Apamwamba* in Zambia is a clear reflection of this process, while similar terms are in use in other African states. (e.g. *Wabenzi* in Kenya and Tanzania). While making large claims about being democratic, political leaders in most state capitalist states tend towards demobilisation of the people, increasing social control, if not outright repression. Governments and ruling parties may be populist in style but they are certainly not led by workers and peasants nor do the bulk of the people participate in decision-making (2). These states certainly differ

markedly from those states like Mozambique where the ruling parties have taken an unambiguously socialist position.

Rather more needs to be said about the particularity of class relations under state capitalism, especially about the class affiliation of the state bureaucracy. Poulantzas has argued that the issue of the role of the bureaucracy concerns the state apparatus and not state power. (Though in Zambia, because of the close convergence between the party and the state apparatus those elements are less easily separated). Poulantzas argues that the state bureaucracy is not a class for itself because it functions essentially for the state and not in its own right. It does not hold state power. Its functioning circumscribed within the class power of the state. However, he concedes some possible modifications. «A good example is the case of the *state bourgeoisie* in certain developing countries : the bureaucracy may, through the state, establish a specific place for itself in the existing relations of production... But in that case it does not constitute a class by virtue of being a bureaucracy, but by virtue of being an effective class». (Poulantzas 1973 : 331)

Another way of looking at the bureaucracy, particularly in the case of Zambia, might be to link the bureaucracy in the party and the government under a common class concept on the grounds that they control the access to power in such a way as to gain a monopoly of decision-making over the economy. Szentes argues that the bureaucracy cannot become a class for itself since it does not own the means of production, it can only ensure its position by regulating non-economic (distribution) relations. (Szentes 1973 :318 and Leys 1976 : 45) In Zambia, however, the bureaucracy even in the administration alone exercises considerable control over the means of production, thereby earning for itself at least a place as a fraction of what I call the quasi-bourgeoisie.

As for the business bourgeoisie in the private sector, this might be split into the foreign-linked section and the indigenous section who are largely African and Asian (3). Neither section can be shown to be lined up against foreign capital, rather they want more foreign investment in order to strengthen the private sector as a whole and to provide them with more business outlets. There are certainly no signs of the «revolutionary potential» in the context of anti-imperialism as suggested by Solodovnikov. (Solodovnikov 1975 : 136) Seidman's dependency model seems more appropriate.

In so far as a national bourgeoisie is identifiable at all, I prefer the concept of a quasi-bourgeoisie straddling the party, administration and private sectors, though the empirical evidence to support such a concept needs to be developed.

What are the possibilities for autonomous development in Zambia under state capitalism? Presently, due to the crisis, they are bleak but on the assumption that something will come along to save the situation, like higher copper prices, what might be the prospects?

First, we have to recognise that, unlike in the heyday of capitalism in Europe, there are no external sources of capital accumulation available

to Third World countries. External capital is dependency-making capital which leads to the distortions set out so fully by Seidman and others. There is, therefore, little internal national capital and the rate of accumulation is low. The few short years when Zambia was able to tax copper revenues to finance public expenditure are now over and in any case it is clear that while much infrastructure was built it did not spark nationwide development.

While branches of the multi-national corporations seem to wish to retain their hold on the local small, though high, consumption market based on the Europeans and small African elite, the wider market is marked by low purchasing power. There is no base for large-scale private manufacturing. Plants which have been built are mainly import-substitution factories producing semi-luxury goods for the income market only. These firms are heavily import-dependent on raw material, machinery, spare parts, technical manpower and are consequently a drain on foreign exchange (4).

The large-scale plants built by the state, like Chilanga Cement, have also been heavily dependent on high-cost, imported capital-intensive machinery and on raw materials. Lack of skilled manpower is crippling. Equally, the parastatals are also plagued by a shortage of experienced management and efficiency suffers. The economy is unable to offer employment to the large numbers who are forced to the cities by the failures of subsistence agriculture, always the orphan child of post-colonial state capitalism. For all these reasons, which are applicable to many post-colonial states, there is a retardation of the economy, a phenomenon to which Zambia was only a short-lived exception.

Presently Zambia exhibits the strange paradox that the international capital on which it depends to balance its books is bound to strengthen the public sector. The IMF has shown that it is willing to invest in parastatals rather than struggle with private firms where entrepreneurial expertise is lacking. The effect of this policy is to bolster state capitalism, but in a form which makes it even more dependent on international capital.

The special characteristics of state capitalism are brought out in a comparison with state monopoly capitalism. In the latter the state acts on behalf of, or in extreme cases as the agent of, monopoly capital. In state capitalism the monopolies which are foreign are brought into some kind of direct partnership with the state. There may be a dependency relationship, but there also may be cases where the monopoly interests are either bought out or expropriated. Thus, the state is less obviously a tool of monopoly capital, nor is it so clear that monopoly interests are served by state capitalism. Seidman takes an extreme view on this in arguing that the central issue is the existence of an export-oriented enclave tied to international capital.

However, in both state forms, there is a substantial erosion of the respective autonomies of the political and economic spheres (5).

The most important difference, however, is that state capitalism is a transitional form while state monopoly capitalism is highly developed with hardened arteries, and may be called the highest stage of capitalist organisation. The criticism levelled by Poulantzas against state monopoly capitalism as a concept is that it implies that the state is merely a tool of a class which could under different circumstances be used to operate the passage to socialism. This argument could not be used against state capitalism since the state apparatuses are admittedly ill-formed, often unstable, combine class forces which are contradictory, and could therefore be the vehicle for a socialist transition given a transformation of class power.

A further comparison is also instructive. How does the above model of state capitalism relate to the model of non-capitalist development? The main authority in that field is Solodovnikov and the comparison below is made with reference to his book *Non-Capitalist Development*, previously cited. My discussion is related to Zambia but there are obviously more general applications.

Solodovnikov characterises the non-capitalist path as follows .

1. *Economy.* There is an attack on foreign and local capital, nationalisation, and the creation of a state sector. In the countryside landlord property rights are abolished, there are important agrarian reforms, the allocation of land to the peasants. and cooperatives are organised.
2. *Social.* There is a limitation on exploitation, the state and cooperative forms of property are enhanced leading to new production relations. There is a change in the class structure of society favouring the working people and a rise in their living standards.
3. *Politics.* The working people are involved in the building of the state together with other progressive forces and the society gravitates towards the socialist countries and socialist movements of the world.
4. *Ideology.* There is a movement towards scientific socialism. He concludes, «Thus, the non-capitalist way is a form of approach and ultimately of transition to socialism, the connecting link between national liberation revolution and socialist revolution». (Solodovnikov 1975 : 247).

Post-colonial state capitalism differs from their model in the following respects:

1. While it is overtly oriented towards socialism, there are all too few basic measures taken which might ensure such a transition. Many measures are mere tokenism and cosmetic.

2. The system is marked by incrementalism and gradualism rather than revolutionary transformation. While gradualism is of course necessary, it *must* be preceded by a revolutionary change in class power, else it leads only to the continuation of the basic element of the previous system.
3. While state power is in the hands of broad democratic forces, it by no means enjoys the support of the working class nor does it act consistently in their interests; though it does provide a welfare function (ILO 1977 : part 3).
4. While the state sector is expanded, often at the expense of the private sector, this process is not obviously irreversible, on the contrary, the goal remains the maintenance of a mixed economy with a free market for a considerable time. The planning function is cursory, there is no sign of a command economy. Private sectoral activity is by no means confined to minor branches of the economy – in Zambia the mining companies remain to a large extent under the control of private interests as do some other major enterprises and companies, e.g. Lonrho (Tordoff 1974 : 395).
5. Even where the state exercises a monopoly this by no means constitutes it as a socialist sector.
6. While education is advanced rapidly, the content of education is not given a socialist orientation, rather teachers are drawn from capitalist countries and the books used are primarily of western origin. The same applies to the university – a fortiori where matters are made worse by the obvious placement of post-graduates in western universities so that they repeat western material in their teaching on return. The university retains the character of a western-style institution reproducing elitist minded students.
7. In foreign policy, anti-imperialism is not consistent and relations with the socialist countries remain cool.

However, the main point of difference between state capitalism and states which take the non-capitalist path lies in the classes or fractions in control of state power. In state capitalism the power of the working people is not steadily advanced as against the quasi-bourgeoisie. On the contrary, despite nominal leadership codes and vast rhetoric, the latter become stronger and more numerous, incubating the forces of political reaction which look forward to the expulsion of socialist elements from the commanding positions of the state and party. There

have been numerous warnings of this tendency by President Kaunda, as cited above (6).

Some commentators consider that the most obvious of the deficiencies of state capitalism is its failure to stimulate production for mass consumption for the reproduction of the means of production and the regeneration of production in the subsistence economy. Instead, in the poignant phrase of Shivji : the state accumulates while the bureaucratic bourgeoisie consumes (Shivji 1975 : 95). A word of caution is indicated here. Mass consumer goods are produced and over-produced by the advanced capitalist economies without them becoming in any way socialist, and while Third World economies do not have the same capacities, it cannot be said to be the sole criterion of whether a state is socialist-oriented or not. What is crucial is the political character of the forces holding state power.

FOOTNOTES

- (1) R. van der Hoeven, 1977, *Zambia's Income Distribution during the early seventies* ILO, Geneva, W.E.P. 2-23/WP 54.
This report contains detailed analyses of income differences by cohorts over the early post-independence period.
- (2) A survey by P.E. Ollawa showed that the majority of people canvassed in town and country did not believe the Zambian system was genuinely participatory. P.E. Ollawa (1979) *Participatory Democracy in Zambia*. Stockwell U.K.
- (3) Beveridge states that «Government policies since independence have been generally favourable to the growth of African businesses». A.A. Beveridge, 1973. *Converts to Capitalism: The emergence of African entrepreneurs in Lusaka, Zambia*. New Haven: Ph.D. thesis.
- (4) This is freely acknowledged in several government reports, including the Third National Development Plan.
- (5) N. Poulantzas, *op. cit.*, p. 152.
This book has a useful discussion on state monopoly capitalism though he is critical of the concept.

- (6) President Kaunda has written, «Capitalism has been entrenched in this country whether you look at it from an economic, sociological, cultural, or indeed political angle». *Humanism in Zambia*, p. 16.
- Molteno and Tordoff add, «And the state takeovers of private firms have not altered this situation, for shareholding in a company, on whether scale, does not automatically constitute nor confer real or effective control». Tordoff, *op. cit.*, p. 395.
- President Kaunda's address to the National Assembly, Daily Parliamentary Debates, No. 25a, 8 Jan. 1971, Col. 12.

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RESUME

Actuellement l'un des problèmes majeurs des pays en voie de développement est la prise en main de leur économie. Tous les pays en voie de développement s'ingénient à trouver les voies les plus sûres et les plus rapides pour résoudre ce problème. Quant à la Zambie, elle a placé ses espoirs dans l'institution du capitalisme d'état en système politique et économique. Dans l'article qui précède, l'auteur ne s'intéresse qu'au fonctionnement interne de ce système car dit-il c'est «là où réside la spécificité du système».

Après avoir dans la première partie défini le capitalisme d'état et souligné que c'est une phase de transition vers le socialisme, il fait remarquer qu'en Zambie le capitalisme d'état est dû à «l'existence dans l'économie d'un secteur public très large et à une concentration de la structure du pouvoir politique dans un pays où les forces et les relations capitalistes demeurent dominantes». L'interventionisme a été le caractère dominant de la politique de la Zambie, intervention aussi bien dans le secteur économique que politique.

Il consacre la deuxième partie de son article à l'analyse des facteurs qui ont contribué à l'avènement du capitalisme d'état. Ces facteurs sont au nombre de trois:

- le capitalisme d'état est avant tout une réponse nationale à l'exploitation des richesses du pays par les filiales des entreprises multinationales basées en Zambie.
- il est aussi dû à la faiblesse ou quasi-absence d'une bourgeoisie nationale ;
- Il résulte enfin de la pression constante des travailleurs organisés de la paysannerie et des masses pour réclamer le fruit de l'indépendance.

Dans la troisième partie il fait une analyse détaillée des trois types d'entreprises parapubliques qu'on trouve en Zambie, qui sont :

- Le type commercial, le type semi-commercial, le type non commercial.

Dans la quatrième partie et pour conclure, il résume les traits spécifiques du capitalisme d'état post-colonial en Zambie. Ce capitalisme d'état est caractérisé par :

1. - la possession par l'état des plus grandes entreprises, ce qui implique un investissement plus important de la part de l'état.
2. - un grand marché de denrées non planifié et gouverné par la loi du profit ;
3. - une structure sociale dans laquelle les travailleurs et les paysans sont en position de subordonnée ;
4. - l'émergence d'une quasi-bourgeoisie à cheval sur le secteur public et le secteur privé ;
5. - la continuité et la persistance du système qui a été garanti par la médiation du pouvoir de l'état.

TENTATIVES DE STABILISATION ECONOMIQUE AU ZAIRE

par

KASONGO MUNGANGA *

La hausse des prix étant souvent considérée par les masses comme un indice de la mauvaise gestion, la politique anti-inflationniste et de redressement économique est devenue dans presque tous les pays d'économie de marché, la priorité des priorités. Si les pays industrialisés, plus organisés, sont déjà pour la plupart sortis de la crise, la majorité des nations en développement y pataugent encore et au lieu de prendre des mesures radicales pour la réprimer et la prévenir, se contentent des mesures palliatives la calmer.

Le Zaïre après avoir connu la période de la Zairianisation (1974) et de la radicalisation (1975) vit à l'heure actuelle l'ère de la stabilisation (depuis 1976) visant un taux de croissance positif du PIB et l'arrêt de la flambée de prix (80 % en 1976) dont les effets sont néfastes : modifications dans la répartition des revenus au profit des activités spéculatives sans grand impact sur la croissance économique à cause d'une faible valeur ajoutée (ex : le Commerce), le découragement des secteurs productifs dont les prix sont souvent contrôlés, la détérioration du pouvoir d'achat des travailleurs et des propriétaires de facteurs de production à rémunération fixe.

Emboitant le pas au professeur Kawata Bualum, nous dirons «qu'il n'est pas exact de croire que la hausse infernale des prix même de denrées alimentaires est dûe avant tout à un mauvais système de distribution» (1).

Des facteurs réels internes et externes à l'économie nationale se sont probablement conjugués et ont continué à alimenter et à entretenir les pressions inflatoires.

Il importe de connaître les causes pour comprendre pourquoi dans le cas du Zaïre, les effets de tentatives de stabilisation précédentes n'ont été que de courte durée et pour évaluer les chances de succès des programmes de redressement économique en cours.

(*) *Assistant à l'Université Nationale du Zaïre (Institut Supérieur de Commerce) actuellement en formation à l'Institut Africain de Développement Economique et de Planification (IDEP) – Dakar (Sénégal).*

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LA STABILISATION DE L'ECONOMIE ZAIROISE, NECESSITE DE TRANSFORMATIONS DE STRUCTURES ECONOMIQUES

1. Aspects généraux de la stabilisation
 11. Analyse du concept de stabilisation
 12. Facteurs de l'inflation
 13. Instruments en politique anti-inflationniste
2. Bénéficiaires et victimes de l'inflation au Zaïre
 21. Qui profite de l'inflation au Zaïre ?
 22. Qui en sont les victimes ?
3. Tentatives de stabilisation économique
 31. Tentative de 1963-1964
 32. Tentative de 1967-1968
 33. Tentative à partir de 1976
4. Nécessité de mutations structurelles économiques
 41. Transformations des structures de la production intérieure
 42. Transformations des relations économiques avec l'extérieur
 43. Transformations dans l'espace économique national.

I – ASPECTS GENERAUX DE LA STABILISATION

11. *Analyse du concept de stabilisation économique*

La stabilisation économique ne se confond pas, comme d'aucuns le pensent, avec la stabilisation des prix ; elle ne signifie pas non plus chercher à atteindre et maintenir le taux de croissance zéro. Elle est plus que cela.

Sur une longue période la croissance économique de chaque pays présente une tendance générale harmonieuse ; à court terme cependant, en l'absence des prévisions macro-économiques et d'une politique économique conjoncturelle régulatrice de mouvements économiques, l'évolution de l'économie nationale est marquée des fortes fluctuations : expansion et dépression, déflation et inflation, plus on monte plus on doit s'attendre à une chute brutale.

La politique de stabilisation de l'économie consistera à prévoir les tendances conjoncturelles et à prendre des mesures appropriées correctrices des déséquilibres pour assurer à l'économie nationale une croissance régulière et équilibrée sur une certaine période.

Ainsi donc stabiliser l'économie s'identifie à l'accroissement du Produit National dans le maintien de l'équilibre général entre l'offre et la demande globale, cet équilibre général (macro-économique) est donné par le modèle théorique suivant dérivé du modèle classico-Keynésien :

$$Y + M = C + I + G + E$$

ou encore

$$Y = C + I + G + E - M \quad (2)$$

où Y représente le PIB, C les dépenses de Consommation privée, I les dépenses d'investissements privés, G les dépenses publiques, E les exportations et M les importations.

Les termes du premier membre de l'équation (Y, M) constituent l'offre globale, ceux du second membre (C, I, G, E), la demande globale. L'excédent de celle-ci sur l'offre globale provoque des pressions inflationnistes s'extériorisant par la hausse générale des prix, le déséquilibre inverse engendre des tensions déflationnistes reconnaissables par la tendance générale à la baisse des prix et un éventuel équilibre se manifestant par la stabilité de prix.

Il importe de ne pas se leurrer de l'expression «équilibre économique» ; il n'est pas en soi un but mais un moyen d'atteindre certains résultats. D'ailleurs dans chaque unité économique, quelle que soit sa taille, il y a nécessairement un équilibre ex-post : au niveau de la Nation par exemple, tout bien produit et importé est consommé, investi ou exporté en fin de période.

En définitive ce qui importe ce n'est pas d'arriver à un équilibre (qui est inévitable) mais la manière dont cet équilibre est réalisé, car en effet l'équilibre peut ne pas correspondre aux vœux des Citoyens : «L'investissement peut avoir été sacrifié aux besoins de la consommation

Les importations peuvent avoir dépassé les exportations au point de détériorer la balance des paiements extérieurs.

Les prix peuvent s'être élevés notablement et avoir provoqué un ensemble de désordre d'origine inflationniste.

La production peut être restée en deçà de possibilités matérielles du pays. Un chômage d'une certaine ampleur peut même s'être manifesté, comme on l'observe généralement dans les phases de récession»(3).

12 – *Facteurs de l'inflation*

L'inflation a été définie plus haut comme étant l'excédent de la demande globale sur l'offre globale qui (excédent) se crée soit à la suite d'une augmentation de la demande non suivie d'un accroissement proportionnel de l'offre des biens et services soit comme conséquence de la diminution de l'offre pendant que la demande reste constante ou baisse dans des proportions moindres (4).

De par cette définition, les éléments générateurs de pressions inflationnistes sont de deux ordres : ceux liés au mouvement de la demande et ceux liés à la variation de l'offre.

121 — *Facteurs liés à la demande*

Il existe plusieurs faits socio-économiques influant sur l'accroissement de la demande dont les plus courants sont :

— le déficit budgétaire. L'incapacité des pouvoirs publics de couvrir les dépenses de l'Etat par des ressources normales les pousse souvent à recourir au financement monétaire sous forme d'avances à l'Etat par l'institut d'Emission et augmente la masse monétaire en circulation sans rapport avec les besoins de l'économie : le déséquilibre engendré par une vive hausse de moyens de paiements et l'inélasticité de l'offre au mouvement de demande provoque de pressions inflationnistes - c'est un cas fréquent dans les pays sous-équipés ;

— la majoration généralisée des salaires et un accroissement des coûts de matières premières ;

— La réduction du taux de réescompte et d'escompte qui rendant le crédit moins coûteux, en favorise l'expansion ;

— la persistance de la position créditrice de la balance des paiements. L'accumulation des avoirs extérieurs ayant comme corollaire la multiplication de la masse monétaire en circulation, par la création de nouveaux billets remis aux exportateurs nationaux

122 — *Facteurs liés à l'offre*

— la réduction de la production agricole imputable à des causes diverses (sécheresse, inondation, exode rural)

— la baisse de la production industrielle attribuable à des goulots d'étranglement prévisible ou imprévisible

— les restrictions des importations.

13. *Outils de politique de Stabilisation*

Le programme de redressement économique comporte des actions visant à accroître la production des biens et services et à freiner l'expansion de la demande. Les outils ci-après concernent la manière de restreindre la demande essentiellement.

131 – *Politique financière*

La politique financière s'identifie ici au domaine de la politique nationale qui se préoccupe essentiellement des recettes et des dépenses de l'Etat, des relations qui s'établissent entre ces deux flux et des conséquences économiques de ces recettes (provenant essentiellement des impôts) et de ces dépenses sur toutes les fonctions assurées de nos jours par l'Etat (5).

Elle cherche à réaliser trois objectifs : la répartition des revenus, la stabilisation et la croissance de l'économie ; elle a donc mission de stabiliser l'économie par une imposition et une affectation de recettes appropriées, cela implique que le niveau et la structure de la fiscalité et des dépenses publiques soient déterminés de façon à éliminer les fluctuations économiques.

A cet effet, le secteur étatique dégagera un surplus budgétaire (T-G) en période d'inflation pour contribuer à restreindre la demande globale, le déficit budgétaire sera l'idéal dans la phase déflatoire en vue de stimuler la demande.

C'est ce qu'on appelle « politique fiscale compensatoire (6) dont le rôle est de réaliser la stabilité économique et des prix.

Si dans les pays industrialisés la politique fiscale compensatoire réussit à réaliser le plein emploi et à juguler la hausse des prix, des possibilités sont par contre limitées en pays sous-équipés en raison des contraintes propres à ces pays et notamment une forte dépendance vis-à-vis de l'extérieur pour la vente de produits primaires non consommables à l'intérieur et pour l'approvisionnement en bien d'équipement ; plus la part relative du commerce extérieur dans le PIB est élevée (ce qui est courant pour la majorité des pays en développement), plus la politique des finances publiques est incapable d'empêcher les fluctuations économiques extérieures de se propager à l'intérieur.

Pour concilier la politique de stabilité des prix et la croissance économique, la diminution des dépenses publiques portera beaucoup plus sur les dépenses non économiques au profit des dépenses d'investissement, en d'autres termes : il s'agira de baisser globalement les charges de l'Etat tout en augmentant le taux d'investissements publiques.

En outre la structure fiscale sera aménagée de manière à éviter une aggravation de la pression fiscale sur les secteurs productifs car, comme on l'a observé en Suède (7), bien que les mesures adoptées pour accroître les impôts directs et indirects aient des effets stabilisants à court terme, il semble qu'à long terme elles aient des effets déstabilisants en favorisant une nouvelle poussée des salaires et des prix.

132 – *Politique monétaire*

La politique monétaire est un « ensemble des mesures mises en œuvre par le pouvoir central pour déterminer le volume des moyens de paiements et pour ajuster ce volume aux besoins du marché » (8).

La nécessité de l'emploi de la politique salariale a été comprise par tous les pays sous-équipés dont le Zaïre qui, comme nous le verrons a bloqué les salaires de l'administration publique et lié le taux d'augmentation des salaires au taux d'accroissement de la productivité pour les travailleurs du secteur industriel.

C'est ici cependant que surgissent les difficultés : la liaison salaire-rendements bien que valable sur le plan économique, s'oppose néanmoins à la notion de justice sociale : un taux d'augmentations des salaires plus rapide et plus élevé dans les secteurs à productivité élevée est mal digéré par les travailleurs engagés dans les entreprises marginales, ces derniers seront tentés de faire des revendications salariales pour sauvegarder leur rang social. En face d'un tel problème les pouvoirs publics chercheront un compromis en limitant les accroissements exceptionnels de bénéfices (cfr taxes conjoncturelles) et les salaires (autorisation préalable) dans les entreprises favorisées par des événements conjoncturels et en incitant les autres à travailler davantage pour mériter les avancements de traitements.

Comme dans les cas précédents la limite de la politique salariale en pays sous-équipés provient de leur ouverture grandissante au commerce extérieur : lorsque les prix et les salaires augmentent à l'étranger, il est presque impossible de les empêcher de se répercuter à l'intérieur d'une économie extravertie où les secteurs vitaux travaillent pour l'étranger dont dépend par ailleurs le gros des biens d'équipement et de la consommation des classes dominantes.

134 – *Politique économique extérieure*

La stabilisation économique implique certes l'équilibre macro-économique mais en même temps les autorités politiques recherchent aussi la réalisation de l'équilibre extérieur.

Les actions en vue d'atteindre l'équilibre extérieur sont fonction du type de déséquilibre macro-économique, dans le cas du Zaïre et de beaucoup de pays sous-équipés, il s'agit d'un déséquilibre caractérisé par l'inflation et le déficit extérieur, d'où les principales mesures appropriées sont les politiques monétaires et budgétaires restrictives visant une diminution de la demande qui à son tour favorisera la baisse des importations et ainsi on assistera à la disparition progressive du déficit extérieur.

En plus de ces deux mesures, il sera appliqué une politique protectionniste adaptée aux circonstances et dont les principales techniques sont :

– le renforcement du tarif douanier dont l'incidence financière allège le déficit budgétaire et économise les devises, sur le plan économique les activités productives sont stimulées au détriment des importations.

– le contingentement : le tarif douanier n'étant qu'une mesure d'incitation inopérante pour certains produits dont la demande est inélastique à la hausse des prix, il sera recommandé le recours aux mesures autoritaires en plafonnant les dépenses en devises ou les quantités des produits admises à l'importation.

– le contrôle des changes. Ce moyen est courant dans presque toutes les économies en difficulté de paiement extérieurs : les autorités monétaires réglementent l'offre et la demande des devises et réajustent le taux de change ; le réajustement ira dans le sens de la dévaluation pour promouvoir les exportations et freiner les importations.

Toutefois les mesures réglementaires (droits de douane, contingentements) décourageront les exportations des produits dont la demande intérieure n'est pas encore satisfaite et limiteront les biens de première nécessité non produits localement.

II – BENEFICIAIRES ET VICTIMES DE L'INFLATION AU ZAIRE

L'inflation est un phénomène économique qui déstructure le système social en tant que cohérent de structures politiques, sociales, économiques, etc. Il opère une nouvelle répartition des revenus en pratiquant le transfert de ceux-ci de certaines classes sociales à d'autres privilégiées.

C'est aussi le cas au Zaïre où l'inflation a créée de nouveaux riches en appauvrissant certaines couches de la population.

2.1. *Qui profite de l'inflation au Zaïre*

1. *Les importateurs*

La persistance de l'inflation a engendré deux conséquences : les prix intérieurs par rapport aux prix extérieurs ont connu une hausse relative élevée et ensuite la monnaie locale s'est considérablement dépréciée vis-à-vis des autres monnaies étrangères.

Dans une telle situation, les importateurs Zaïrois sont doublement avantagés. Ils achètent les devises étrangères en vue de financer leurs achats à un cours officiel sensiblement inférieur au cours réel constaté sur le marché parallèle.

D'autre part, ils effectuent leurs achats à des prix relativement bas dans la mesure où le taux d'inflation en Europe est de loin inférieur au taux d'inflation au Zaïre (10% contre 100% à peu près) et ils écoulent leurs produits sur le marché national aux prix courants réalisant ainsi une marge bénéficiaire dépassant parfois 200%. Le contrôle des Affaires Economiques s'est révélé inefficace en raison notamment de la prolifération des intermédiaires en relation d'affaires avec les importateurs.

2. Les autres commerçants

Eux aussi réalisent des profits exceptionnels de deux manières : les commerçants corrects, non spéculateurs, vendent les produits aussitôt achetés en incorporant une marge bénéficiaire (20 %) au prix de revient ; mais avec l'inflation, le prix de revient est en continuelle augmentation, d'où le revenu (ou) mieux le bénéfice résultant de l'application de 20 % est lui aussi en croissance continue ; en d'autres termes le bénéfice est indexé au taux d'inflation. Par contre pour les commerçants malhonnêtes, le bénéfice commercial est plus qu'indexé : avec des hausses rapides des prix sur les marchés, le stockage des marchandises pendant une période de quelques mois créera au moment de la vente des profits énormes dépassant 100 %.

3. Les trafiquants de devises

Cette activité est exercée par ceux qui ont des affinités avec les agents du système bancaire ou avec des hommes politiques.

L'écart permanent entre les cours des monnaies au marché officiel et au marché noir permet à ceux qui en ont les moyens d'acheter les devises à un bon prix au système bancaire et de les vendre à un prix élevé sur le marché parallèle.

Les dévaluations successives au Zaïre ne sont pas encore parvenues à annihiler le marché parallèle.

4. Emprunteurs

La détérioration incessante du pouvoir d'achat interne de la monnaie favorise les emprunteurs dont les dettes sont libellées en monnaie locale. C'est pour cette raison que beaucoup de gens avertis ont introduit des demandes de crédit dans les institutions financières pour des prêts à moyen et long terme. Même sans avoir des appuis politiques, bien d'individus ont ainsi pu obtenir des crédits parce que, par manque de produits sur les marchés, certains agents économiques (ménages) ont dû placés leurs épargnes.

Les emprunteurs sont bénéficiaires dans la mesure où, au moment du remboursement, les sommes remboursées, en termes réels, n'auront qu'un léger pourcentage de leur valeur.

2.2 Qui en sont les victimes ?

1. Entreprises d'exportation

Pour les entreprises, il y a sur le territoire national un relèvement de leur prix de revient imputable à la hausse des coûts des facteurs de production locaux tels les matières premières locales. Les transports et éventuellement la main-d'œuvre car il y a quand même une certaine majoration des salaires bien que à un rythme inférieur au taux d'inflation.

Ce gonflement de dépenses d'exploitation a amenuisé les taux de rentabilité dans la mesure où, en même temps, les prix de vente déterminés sur le marché mondial et libellés en devises, ne sont pas influencés par l'inflation.

D'autre part les recettes de vente (les devises) sont échangées au marché officiel où leur cours est sous-estimé.

Vu cet état de choses, l'Etat a dû recourir souvent à la dévaluation pour encourager ces entreprises, d'autant plus qu'en fait le plus grand perdant à travers les entreprises d'exportation c'est l'Etat lui-même, actionnaire principal si non unique de la plupart de ces entreprises.

2. Consommateurs et salariés locaux

C'est la classe sociale qui souffre le plus durement de l'inflation, elle en encaisse tous les coups.

Les consommateurs subissent la hausse des prix et des produits locaux et des produits importés par suite de certaines dévaluations ou même par l'effet de la loi de l'offre et de la demande dans un pays en crise de produits.

Les salariés, convaincus que malgré leurs revendications, les salaires ne seront jamais indexés à l'indice général des prix, se débrouillent en pratiquant un petit commerce même illicite ou en cumulant des fonctions. Malgré tout cela, leur situation alimentaire est dramatique, beaucoup d'entre eux n'arrivant plus à nouer les deux bouts du mois.

3. Investisseurs extérieurs et épargnants intérieurs

L'inflation a découragé les investissements en provenance de l'extérieur ; les capitaux qui entrent dans le pays sont en effet évalués à un cours sous-estimant les devises étrangères si bien que la valeur des équipements est faible et par conséquent aussi les amortissements ultérieurs ; de même pour les capitaux financiers, la contrepartie en monnaie locale sera faible.

Le problème est aussi préoccupant pour les épargnants locaux qui voient la valeur de leurs placements rongée par une continuelle détérioration monétaire, le taux d'intérêt de loin inférieur à l'indice des prix, est devenu très insignifiant.

4. L'Etat lui-même

Les difficultés des exportations et l'encouragement des importateurs ont rendu la Balance Commerciale déficitaire et puisque le déficit est devenu persistante il s'en est suivi une aggravation de l'endettement extérieur : 1.475,6 millions de Zaires comme dette publique extérieure au 31 décembre 1975 contre 1.265,7 millions en 1974, soit un accroissement de 15,2 % (B.Z. Rapport 1975).

III — TENTATIVES DE STABILISATION DE L'ECONOMIE AU ZAIRE

Grossomodo les politiques de stabilisation au Zaïre visent à redresser une situation caractérisée par une forte inflation interne (80 % en 1976) et par un grave déficit extérieur.

Pour une telle situation, les principaux outils de la politique de stabilisation sont généralement comme dit plus haut des politiques monétaires et budgétaires restrictives pour parvenir à un équilibre macroéconomique tout en réalisant en même temps les équilibres intérieur et extérieur.

31. *Tentative de 1963–1964*

311 — *Origine de l'inflation*

Trois facteurs principaux sont à la base de l'inflation de 1960–1963 : l'expansion des revenus, le déficit budgétaire, la régression continue de l'offre nationale.

1) *L'expansion des revenus*

Après l'indépendance une lutte acharnée entre différents groupes sociaux fut engagée pour s'approprier la meilleure part du «gateau» National pour ne pas dire Revenu National. Les avantages accordés à un groupe engendraient aussitôt des revendications des autres groupes, d'où il s'ensuivit des majorations salariales massives et successives, des promotions statutaires dictées par des impératifs essentiellement socio-politiques.

«Chaque avantage important acquis par un ou plusieurs groupes a bientôt suscité l'envie de groupes concurrents qui ont revendiqué et obtenu avec plus ou moins de succès selon les forces en présence, des avantages semblables.

Cette émulation entre groupes a propagé les hausses de salaires d'autant plus facile qu'il existait des repères indiquant clairement la position de chaque groupe : salaire minimum légal, base de l'échelle barémique» (9).

2) *Le déficit budgétaire*

A un accroissement faible de recettes fiscales, s'oppose une forte augmentation de dépenses publiques imputables à la politique d'expansion de revenus ; cette situation engendra le déficit budgétaire considérable à tel point que 50 % de dépenses publiques étaient couvertes par le financement monétaire.

Cette expansion monétaire, en face d'une offre nationale pas seulement inélastique mais en continue régression ne pouvait qu'engendrer la hausse générale des prix.

Evolution des Finances Publiques de la République du Congo, 1960—1962
(en millions de Francs CFA)

	1960		1961		1962					
	2ème semestre	1er semestre	2ème semestre	1er semestre	2ème semestre	1er semestre				
	Montant	en %	Montant	en %	Montant	en %				
Dépenses globales	5.619	100	5.647	100	7.667	100	8.837	100	8.800	100
Recettes ordinaires	1.757	31,3	18,3	32,1	2.071	27	2.405	27,2	3.231	36,7
Déficit	3.862	68,7	3.834	67,9	5.596	73	6.432	72,8	5.569	63,3

Source : I.R.E.S. Lovanium : Indépendance, inflation, développement.

L'économie Congolaise de 1960 à 1965, Paris—La Haye, Mouton,
1968.

Chap. I : H. LECLERP : «L'inflation, sa cause : le désordre des
finances publiques» page 73.

3) *La baisse de l'offre nationale*

L'offre sur le marché intérieur a deux origines :
la production locale et les importations.

La guerre civile après l'accession à l'indépendance, la suppression des cultures obligatoires et le départ massif des colons et industriels blancs ont provoqué une chute vertigineuse du Produit Intérieur Brut.

D'autre part la diminution des exportations à la suite de la diminution du PIB restreignait sensiblement notre capacité d'importation.

212 – *Politiques utilisées*

Trois types de mesures furent prises :

– une profonde dévaluation accompagnée d'un double taux de change. La dévaluation du 9 novembre 1963 et le double taux de change (conséquence des déséquilibres intérieur et extérieur se traduisant par une hausse vertigineuse des prix et l'aggravation du déficit de la Balance des Paiements) étaient destinés « à stimuler les exportations à compenser substantiellement l'effet inflationniste de déficit budgétaire en procurant de nouvelles recettes publiques ou plutôt à comprimer dans les limites raisonnables et admissibles les propensions marginales à importer » (10).

– le blocage des crédits bancaires pour éviter qu'une inflation bancaire ne se substituât à l'inflation budgétaire (10)

– l'amélioration du rendement fiscal.

213 – *Résultats obtenus*

Dans le premier temps, les poussées inflationnistes se restreignirent d'une part en raison de la diminution de la demande résultant de la compression des dépenses publiques et de la création de nouvelles liquidités publiques procurées par l'établissement d'un double taux de change et d'autre part comme conséquence d'un certain accroissement de l'offre.

La réduction de l'écart entre le taux officiel et parallèle sur les marchés des changes freinèrent les fraudes à l'importation et à l'exportation, la situation du franc s'en trouva redressée.

Des événements malheureux annoncèrent l'échec de la première tentative de stabilisation ; l'extension de la rébellion en 1964 aggrava la détérioration de la production intérieure et conduisit les pouvoirs publics à augmenter les dépenses publiques affectées à la consommation sous forme de salaires.

De nouvelles pressions inflationnistes s'aggravèrent et leur permanence fut à l'origine de la grande réforme monétaire du 23 juin 1967.

2.2 *Tentative de 1967-1968*

Le programme de stabilisation de juin 1967 visait à assainir la situation économique et financière et à instaurer les conditions nécessaires à la relance économique.

221 – *Moyens utilisés*

Une gamme de mesures fut employée pour assurer la réussite de la stabilisation économique :

- la dévaluation en éliminant les écarts entre les prix officiels et les prix courants, supprima les circuits spéculatifs et instaura une nouvelle répartition des revenus au profit de l'État, des exportateurs et des secteurs productifs intérieurs.

- la création d'une nouvelle unité monétaire, le Zaire valant 1.000 FC dévalués ou 2 Dollars USA.

- l'arrêt de crédit à l'Etat et le contrôle de crédit au secteur privé afin de diminuer la masse monétaire en circulation

- la libération du commerce extérieur et du change

- la relance de la production agricole et l'amélioration des conditions de vie rurale

- la suppression du double taux de change, celui-ci décourageant les investisseurs

- le renforcement de la fiscalité

- une politique salariale rigoureuse, toutefois on admit une certaine majoration salariale pour compenser la perte immédiate du pouvoir d'achat.

222 – *Effets*

La dévaluation et les augmentations de salaires créèrent de nouvelles pressions inflationnistes : sur les marchés de Kinshasa, les prix de détail augmentaient de 87 % de juin 1967 à juin 1968, mais après commencèrent à baisser légèrement.

Néanmoins dans l'ensemble la réforme atteignit ses objectifs :

- 1) l'équilibre financier au second semestre 1967, il y eut un excédent budgétaire de 6,2 millions de Zaires. Les crédits à l'Etat en 1968 étaient restés à leur niveau 1967 et ceux du secteur privé n'avaient pas dépassé leurs plafonds.

- 2) l'équilibre de la Balance des Paiements

- 3) le redressement des secteurs en production

- 4) la stabilisation des prix.

23 — *La tentative à partir de 1976*

231 — *Causes de l'inflation*

Alors que les liquidités monétaires augmentent sans cesse, l'évolution du Produit intérieur brut commercialisé est caractérisées par un recul persistant depuis 1975. Ces deux phénomènes conjugués amplifient inévitablement les pressions inflationnistes.

A en croire la Banque du Zaïre, la régression de l'économie Zaïroise est due à la mauvaise conjoncture interne et à des facteurs endogènes dont essentiellement la désorganisation de l'appareil productif du pays à la suite de la mauvaise application des mesures dites de Zaïrianisation de 1973 et radicalisation de 1974 (11)

2. *Déficit persistant et progressif des F.P.
Couvert par le financement monétaire*

Deux facteurs primordiaux sont à la base de l'aggravation du déficit budgétaire. La baisse des ressources et l'accroissement des dépenses publiques.

Selon la Banque du Zaïre, «la chute des recettes a été telle que, malgré une certaine contraction des dépenses (en 1975) par rapport au niveau atteint en 1974, les opérations du trésor se sont soldés par un déficit important.

Une telle situation a contraint à nouveau le trésor public à reporter la réalisation d'un certain nombre de projets d'investissements publics et a recouru au financement monétaire important auprès du système bancaire intérieur. Cela a, par conséquent, contribué à la prorogation des tensions inflationnistes tant par la baisse de l'offre que l'accroissement de la demande intérieure» (12).

Quant aux dépenses publiques, leur évolution défavorable est expliquée par le Commissaire d'Etat aux Finances de l'époque, le Citoyen BOFOSSA W'AMBEA NKOSO : «L'évolution des dépenses continue de subir l'impact d'une croissance inconsidérée des rémunérations, due essentiellement à une insuffisance dans le contrôle des effectifs en particulier à l'Education Nationale et dans les organismes subsidiés. D'autre part, l'assistance à des entreprises frappées par le blocus des voies d'évacuation de leurs produits d'exportations telle que la Minière de Kisenge, et la prise en charge des dépenses non prévues dans le cadre de la réalisation de certains projets d'investissements, telle que la construction de la ligne à très haute tension à courant continu INGA-SHABA, ont largement contribué à accélérer la dépense globale (13)

Evolution du PIB commercialisé en millions de Zaires aux prix de marché de 1970

(prix constants)

Indices de volume, 1970 = 100

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
PIB	857,3	928,3	935,7	1.014,4	1.077,4	1.012	998
Indices de volume	100	108,3	109,1	118,3	125,7	118	116,4
Taux de croissance en %	--	8,28	0,8	8,4	6,2	--	6,07 (a)

Source : Rapport annuel 1975, B.2

N. B. : Les taux de croissance sont calculés sur base des chiffres de ce rapport et des statistiques de l'année 1978 qui y sont annexées.

(a) : La B.Z. dans le rapport 1975 P.XIV a avancé un taux de croissance négatif de 3 % supérieur à celui-ci trouvé sur bases des données en notre possession et fournies par la même institution.

3. L'accroissement progressif de liquidités monétaires et quasi-monétaires pour permettre à l'Etat, aux entreprises publiques et privées de faire face à leurs besoins de financement. L'augmentation de moyens de paiements (demande) contraste avec la diminution du PIB et des importations (10,9 % en 1975) en termes réels.

Evolution des déficits de l'Etat (en millions de Zaïres)

(opérations intégrées)

Année	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Déficit	20,26	76,6	83,98	139,48	326,59	223,24	314,2

Source : B.Z. Rapport Annuel 1975 pp.101 et 102, + statistiques y annexées pour l'année 1976.

232 – La stratégie de lutte anti-inflationniste

Pour réprimer l'inflation et relancer l'économie, le Conseil Exécutif a pris deux séries de mesures en 1976 et en 1977 (14) suivies en 1978 d'un plan de redressement économique communément appelé « PLAN MOBUTU ».

1) Les mesures de 1976

- le réajustement du taux de change (1 Z = 1 DTS au lieu de 1 Z = 2 DTS précédemment) dicté par le souci de favoriser les exportateurs en canalisant les transferts de ressources vers les secteurs d'exportation et aussi pour ramener la consommation publique et privée en termes réels au niveau de l'offre globale de biens et services.

- les restrictions des importations pour éviter d'accroître le volume d'arriérés de paiements extérieurs

- le plafonnement de l'expansion de crédits à 170 millions dont 110 millions aux entreprises et 60 millions à l'Etat

- le réaménagement de la dette extérieure par négociation multilatérale de la dette à moyen et long terme afin d'en alléger la charge en 1976 et au cours des années ultérieures

- l'aménagement des prix afin de stimuler les secteurs productifs

- le tirage auprès du FMI de 150 millions de dollars des E.U. au titre de mécanisme pétrolier, de financement compensatoire et de l'accord de crédit Stand-by.

Evolution de la masse monétaire et du PIB commercialisé exprimé

aux prix constants (1970 = base)

(en millions de Zaïre)

Année	1970 31 déc.	1971 31 déc.	1972 31 déc.	1973 31 déc.	1974 31 déc.	1975 31 déc.	1976 oct.
PIB prix constants	857,3	928	935	1.014,4	1.077,4	1.012	998
Liquidités	227,1	241,9	288,5	392,7	557,4	594,7	775
<u>Liquidités</u> PIB constants	26,5	26	30,8	39	51	58,8	77,7

Source : Quotients liquidités/PIB calculés à partir des données du rapport annuel 1975 de la Banque du Zaïre

2) *Les mesures de 1977*

La persistance de la détérioration de la situation économique a amené les autorités Zaïroises à élaborer avec le concours du FMI un deuxième programme de stabilisation dont voici les grands lignes :

- dans le domaine de Finances Publiques, la création de nouvelles taxes conjoncturelles dont notamment celles sur le café, sur la radio et la télévision, sur les boissons alcoolisées et le tabacs ; il fut également décidé l'amélioration du système de recouvrement de taxes
- concernant les crédits, il fut préconisé le freinage de leur expansion (en situant leur plafond global à 290 millions de Zaïres) et la libération de taux d'intérêts des banques de dépôts pour leur permettre de tenir compte des risques des clients et de l'inflation
- interdiction de majoration de salaires
- orienter les importations vers les biens de première nécessité.

Résultats

Le programme de stabilisation comprenant les mesures de 1976 et 1977 fut une thérapeutique utile pour redresser l'économie Zaïroise à court terme ; néanmoins il ne connut pas un véritable succès à cause de l'accroissement démesuré des liquidités dont la création dépassait les besoins de l'économie et surtout parce qu'on n'avait pas pu assurer l'abondance des biens et services qui, comme l'affirmait un jour le Citoyen NYEMBO SHABANI, alors Commissaire d'Etat à l'économie Nationale, est le meilleur remède anti-inflationniste.

Et c'est pour assurer cette abondance des biens et services que le Président-Fondateur conçut un plan qui porte son nom et dont les négociations pour son financement extérieur sont encore en cours.

3) Le Plan MOBUTU

S'attaquant principalement à l'offre dont l'insuffisance est la cause principale de l'inflation, le Plan MOBUTU s'articule autour des priorités suivantes :

- la réorganisation des transports
- le développement de l'agriculture
- l'optimisation de l'industrie minière
- la décentralisation économique régionale
- le management dans l'ensemble de l'appareil de l'Etat.

Le Plan MOBUTU comporte deux plans : l'un à court terme (1978-1980) vise à réduire les pressions inflationnistes et à assainir la balance des paiements, l'autre à moyen et long terme, est destiné à promouvoir les investissements et à améliorer la production des secteurs-clés : mines, transports, agriculture.

Dans le cadre du plan triennal (1978-1980), des mesures d'exécution ont été rendues publiques et certaines sont même déjà entrées dans leur phase exécutive. Nous pourrions ainsi les résumer :

- Finances Publiques : stabiliser le déficit global par l'amélioration de la gestion des fonds de l'Etat et du rendement fiscal ;
- Commerce extérieur et balance de paiements : limiter les importations aux biens de première nécessité et encourager les exportations
- Monnaie et crédit : arrêter l'accroissement rapide de la masse monétaire tout en assurant le financement des secteurs prioritaires ;
- Change : une dévaluation de 10 % dont l'effet immédiat à notre avis est d'attirer dans le pays les investissements extérieurs *
- une gamme de mesures destinées à développer les secteurs-clés : agriculture, transports, mines.

* Dans la suite il y a eu une série de dévaluations recommandées par le FMI.

Chances de réussite du Plan MOBUTU

Les programmes de stabilisation de 1976 et 1977 ont échoué parce qu'ils n'ont pas pu éliminer la cause principale de l'inflation, à savoir la régression continuelle de l'offre des biens et services sur les marchés.

Le Plan MOBUTU, en mettant l'accent sur le développement des secteurs-clés de production dont notamment l'Agriculture qui nourrit les 7/10 de la population, les Transports dont les déficiences handicapent la relance agricole et les Mines qui représentent une large part dans notre capacité d'importation, a de larges chances d'arrêter l'inflation et même de renverser la situation en engendrant de pressions déflationnistes ; sur le plan des faits un tel succès s'extériorisera par l'arrêt de la montée rapide des prix, et en cas de déflation, par le retour à des prix antérieurs proches des cours officiels.

Toutefois toute réussite risque d'être temporaire, passagère de nouvelles fluctuations économiques extérieures n'épargnant pas une économie Zaïroise extravertie où le premier des secteurs-clés, le secteur minier, travaille pour les besoins des économies des pays industrialisés et où la consommation des ménages et les investissements sont assurés en grande partie par les importations à l'heure actuelle.

C'est pourquoi, en vue de réaliser une stabilisation économique durable, il est impérieux de créer un cadre, des assises économiques appropriées, un tel objectif ne sera atteint que par l'abolition des structures irritées de la colonisation qui provoquent et entretiennent l'instabilité économique.

III — CONCLUSIONS : POUR UNE TRANSFORMATION DES STRUCTURES DE L'ECONOMIE ZAÏROISE

Depuis l'indépendance l'économie Zaïroise est confrontée à une inflation sans cesse galopante ; toutes les tentatives de stabilisation économiques, de 1963 à 1977 ont échoué dans la mesure où les résultats attendus soit ne furent pas atteints, soit n'étaient que de courte durée.

Cet échec est imputable en dernière analyse aux structures économiques qui laissent l'économie Zaïroise à la merci de fluctuations extérieures provoquant tantôt l'accroissement de la demande tantôt le fléchissement de l'offre de produits sur les marchés.

C'est pourquoi nous faisons nôtre cette conclusion des responsables de la Banque du Zaïre : « Cette crise a démontré, de façon éloquente la fragilité de l'économie zaïroise, fondamentalement extravertie, et l'impossibilité pour le pays d'agir sur les éléments de la conjoncture internationale qu'il subit à chaque coup.

Les événements de ces dernières années devraient donc inciter les autorités à une plus grande vigilance et à la redéfinition de la politique économique, celle-ci devant reposer sur un plan de développement à la fois simple et cohérent» (15)

En conclusion, le plan de stabilisation actuel, bien appliqué, a beaucoup de chances de réussir car non seulement il cherche à éliminer le facteur principal intérieur générateur de l'inflation, à savoir la diminution de la production, mais aussi et surtout il est suivi d'un plan de développement économique à moyen terme (1981-1985) à qui est dévolu entre autres la tâche de restructurer notre économie, parmi les transformations structurelles, celles qui influent le plus sur la stabilisation et que nous aimerions retrouver dans le prochain plan de développement sont notamment :

31. *Les transformations dans la structure de la production intérieure .*

Le produit intérieur ne doit pas rester longtemps composé essentiellement de produits primaires ; cela est normal et compréhensible au début du développement et au lendemain de la période coloniale marquée par la division internationale du travail selon laquelle les colonies devaient produire les inputs primaires nécessaires au bon fonctionnement des industries métropolitaines. Mais on doit cependant garder à l'esprit qu'un pays qui se développe ne reste plus cantonné dans les activités primaires, il s'industrialise.

D'où au début on donne la priorité au secteur agricole, grand réservoir de matières premières et un grand débouché potentiel du secteur industriel ; progressivement on passera de l'agriculture à l'industrie, du secteur traditionnel au secteur moderne.

Ce passage présente un grand impact sur la stabilisation économique : les industries transformatrices, par rapport aux industries extractives et agricoles, influent plus sur la croissance économique et puis les prix des produits manufacturés sont plus stables que les prix des produits primaires. (16)

Comme on peut le voir sur le tableau ci-après, le secteur primaire demeure prépondérant dans l'économie Zaïroise et pour cause :

1) la valeur ajoutée du secteur primaire s'élevant à 270,6 millions de zaires (185,7 84,9) dépassent celle du secteur secondaire qui est de 257,6 millions de zaires (238,4 19,2)

2) dans la valeur du secteur secondaire, la part de la métallurgie du cuivre représente près de 50%, or même après cette métallurgie, le cuivre ne représente encore qu'une matière première pour les industries métropolitaines.

Ce travail devait logiquement être assimilé aux activités primaires et on aurait pu alors faire ressortir l'importance réelle du secteur primaire.

32 — *Les transformations dans les relations économiques extérieures*

En regardant la répartition géographique des exportations zairoises, on constate que l'O.C.D.E. jouit d'un quasi-monopole d'achat de produits zairois exportés : leur part est passé de 94% en 1972 à 98% en 1973 et à 99% en 1974 — bien plus, les exportations vers l'O.C.D.E. s'en vont principalement à la CEE (84% en 1973) et en particulier à l'Union Economique Belgo-Luxembourgeoise avec 49% en 1973 (17).

CONTRIBUTION DES DIFFERENTS SECTEURS AU PRODUIT INTERIEUR BRUT

(en millions de Zaires à prix courant, année 1971).

1. Agriculture commercialisée	107,1
2. Extraction minière	78,6
<i>Secteur primaire</i>	185,7
3. Métallurgie	125,3
4. Industries manufacturières	57,2
5. Energie	9,8
6. Bâtiments & Travaux Publics	46,1
<i>Secteur secondaire</i>	238,4
7. Transports et Télécommunications	57,6
8. Commerce	143,1
9. Banques, assurances et autres services	111,2
<i>Secteur tertiaire</i>	311,9
<i>Production intérieure brute aux coûts des facteurs</i>	736,0
10. Fiscalité indirecte	114,5
<i>Production intérieure brute aux prix du marché</i>	850,5
11. Ensemble des services de l'Etat	134,0
<i>Produit inter. brut commercialisé</i>	984,5
12. Agriculture non commercialisée	84,9
13. Construction non commercialisée	19,2
<i>Produit intérieur brut</i>	1.088,6

Source : Banque du Zaïre. Rapport Annuel 1971-1972, p. 60.

**REPARTITION DES EXPORTATIONS ET IMPORTATIONS
ZAIROISES PAR PAYS DE DESTINATION OU DE
PROVENANCE SELON LE CAS
(en millions de Zaires courants en 1974)**

	Exportations	Importations
1. C.E.E. (9 pays)	681,8	303,3
U.E.B.L.	377,4	91,0
France	60,2	53,2
Italie	114,9	38,0
R.F.A.	54,5	72,5
Pays-Bas	31,5	21,3
Royaume-Uni	42,5	24,0
Irlande Danemark	0,2	3,3
2. Amérique du Nord	34,0	72,5
3. Japon	54,3	33,4
4. Autres pays de l'OCDE	13,6	31,0
sous-total OCDE	783,7	440,2
5. Autres pays	12,1	36,8
Total	795,8	477,0

Source : Banque du Zaïre. Rapport Annuel 1975, pp. 156-157.

De l'autre côté les principaux fournisseurs étrangers du Zaïre sont également ses principaux importateurs.

Une telle dépendance accentue la vulnérabilité de l'économie zaïroise, largement tributaire des fluctuations et de la domination économique de la CEE.

La stratégie à adopter consiste à diversifier les partenaires commerciaux, exportateurs et importateurs ; de cette manière la répercussion d'un marasme économique dans un pays donné sera moindre sur notre économie.

33. Transformations dans l'espace économique national

L'espace économique Zaïrois est bipolaire : la région du Shaba, poumon d'acier de l'économie zaïroise et la ville de Kinshasa, un réseau de complexe industriel florissant.

Qu'il s'agisse de la répartition de la main-d'œuvre salariée, des investissements, des industries implantées, de la contribution au Revenu National, etc. la part de ces deux pôles dépasse généralement 80%.

Il va s'en dire qu'un évènement frappant la ville de Kinshasa et surtout la région du Shaba destabilise pratiquement toute l'économie zaïroise, les deux guerres du Shaba et leurs répercussions sur l'économie zaïroise en sont un exemple éloquent.

Il est donc à souhaiter qu'il soit conçu une politique d'équilibre régional par le truchement notamment de la localisation des investissements privés et de la répartition géographique des projets industriels publics.

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SUMMARY

Since price increase has always been considered as a sign of mal-administration, anti-inflationist policy has become the priority of priorities in almost all market economy countries. Such is the case in Zaïre where three economic stabilization attempts have been tried.

In the first part of his article, the writer deals with the general aspects of political stabilization: the very nature of stabilization, the causes of inflation and the different political anti-inflationist means.

In the second part, he identifies the social classes which profit from inflation in Zaïre (importers, other traders-people, currency traffickers and loan-makers) as well as the social categories which suffer from it (export firms, local consumers and wage-cannors, foreign and local investors, the State itself).

In the third part, the writer tries to find the deep causes of the inflations which have led to the stabilization attempts of 1963-64, 1967-68 and 1976. He analyses the policies which have been used and the results obtained. He draws the conclusion that all the means which have been used to combat inflation will be inefficient or even in case they succeed, the success will be very brief because the problems of the Zairian economy are first of all structural.

In the fourth part, he gives more precision about:

- The economic structures which have an impact on stabilization and which must be transformed if the combat against inflation is to be successful;
- The changes which the structures of the home production have to undergo since it is still essentially based on primary products the fluctuation prices of which are higher than those of industrial products.
- The changes in the economic relations with foreign countries, relations directed mainly to Belgium up to now. This situation makes it easy for rapid repercussion of salary increases and other inflation factors on the Zairian economy (imported inflation) .
- The transformations in the national economic space: 8 per cent of the productive national resources are shared between the Shaba and Kinshasa regions so that as soon as one of these two regions is affected economically, the economic instability is felt throughout Zaïre.

ENTANGLING ALLIANCE :
BLACK AMERICANS, AFRICA AND CAPITALISM

By

Maghan KEITA *

Any analysis of African-American relations with Africa must consider the historical framework in which those relations occur. An understanding that the historical record is dominated by capitalism gives clarity to the activities that have existed between African-Americans and Africa from 1776 to the present.

Capitalism has fashioned and sustained an environment that promoted a psychology based on class relations. For the American black the unique environment that capitalism constructed was the institution of slavery and with it a psychology that influenced black political economic behaviour far past the destruction of the institution itself.

The importance of understanding capitalism as the historical framework of this discussion bears on the crucial role that class plays in the development of interaction between oppressed peoples, internally and internationally. For sometime the dominant theme has been that class and its attendant functions did not exist among Africans and African-Americans. This theme dealt with oppression as an external dynamic that did not have internal counterparts among the oppressed. It determined that racism was the oppressing force rather than a mechanism of that force and concluded that the eradication of racism was synonymous with the destruction of oppression.

The view of racism as the source of oppression obscured the real source, capitalism, and hid the fact that people of the same racial ancestry were just as prone to oppress one another as they were to oppress someone of a different color. The emphasis placed on racism distorts the real nature of capitalism and the class relations that are the essence of the system. This emphasis fosters the false belief that racism can be destroyed without touching capitalism.

For the African-American the environment compelled a type of schizophrenia or duality that DUBOIS spoke of as the attempt to be both African and American at the same time.

This schizophrenia was the product of a mentality promoted by the slave experience in America. This mentality illustrated the dialectic of oppression that found the slave, and later the freedman, desiring to trade places with their oppressor rather than destroy the system that oppressed them. The mentality of oppression fostered a profound identification with the oppressor among the oppressed and provided the oppressed with a standard by which they could gauge themselves : the oppressor (Freire, 1968 ; Ofari, *Black Scholar*, September, 1972 : 37 ; DUBOIS, 1946 : 334 ; Wright, 1974 :

* See page 105.

With slavery as the basis for a distinctive psychology whose objective and material circumstance was rooted in capitalism, the structure for black support of things American including foreign policy was developed. It developed out four centuries of blacks aspiring to the American dream. Even where this aspiration rejected American dominance, it accepted the capitalist model ; for good reason given that no other choice emerged until 1917.

Frazier has argued that the origins of the African-American petite bourgeoisie are in the small number of free blacks that existed prior to the civil war.

This is illustrated in the numerous efforts that blacks made to extricate themselves from American exploitation, economically, and at times physically.

Several things become quite interesting about these attempts on the part of some African-Americans to remove themselves from white domination : one was their desire to return to Africa ; two, was that they were free and people of property, no matter how limited ; and three, there was to some degree, white backing for such schemes as safe guards to the maintenance and the expansion of white interests. Right up to the start of the civil war blacks were attempting to convince whites of the practical and profitable nature of their repatriation schemes. Nor did these first «back to Africa» adherents miss the probability of advancing their own economic interests on the continent (1).

From the inception of the African Union Society of Providence, Rhode Island in 1797 to the various undertakings of the present, there has been a «civilizing and proseletyzing» attitude among African-Americans that is characterized by their need «to do something for Africa». However that «something» they proposed showed their inability to totally identify with Africa. That inability may be that African-Americans are ethnically American as Tilden LeMelle states (2). A certainty, however, is the fact that they are products of their economic and educational context, and this economic and educational context has given rise to their class situation and a certain African-American petit bourgeois chauvanism.

Being American and then black activated this civilizing mission. In 1901, the «civility» of the United States' citizen of color elevated the African-American to a status that set him apart from the South African black and it was a separation that African-Americans of the period attempted to maintain. The anxiety that African-American status provoked among South African blacks caused many of them to seek American citizenship in order to enjoy the same priviledges as African-Americans *in* South Africa. (3)

The African-American petite bourgeoisie mission either displaced or sought to compliment emerging 19th and 20th century African petite bourgeoisie that were developing under European colonialism. The activities of the America-Liberians, the implications and

the regalia of the Garvey UNIA propositions, the resolutions of the Lynchburg African Development Society (4), and even Dubois' proposals concerning the League of Nations' Mandate for the conquered German territories in Africa smacked of African-American petits bourgeois sentiments concerning the development of Africa along the lines of a «Christian and capitalist civilization». In any case, the African-American petite bourgeoisie advanced capitalism either through collusion with the Euro-American bourgeoisie or through fear of Euro-American expansion. As James Gilbert wrote in the early 20th century, the expansion of capitalism on the African continent was an African-American prerogative (5).

The powers of the capitalist world began to see the benefits of African-American petit bourgeois missionary zeal in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In the attempt to render the «uncivilized» African masses more pliable it was suggested that they be educated, at least in part. The educational policy, dictated by Europeans to meet European interests was aided to a large degree by African-American educators. The European belief was that education for Africans and African-Americans was one and the same problem. However, there were varying opinions as to how this should be carried out and as to what the end result was to be. General S.C. Armstrong, the first Principal of Hampton Institute, felt that the key to the problem was the «creation of rurally-based African leadership, *made content* through education and gradual advancement» (6). (Italics added).

The General was obviously advancing the idea of developing a black petite bourgeoisie.. His South African counterparts hardly saw education in the same light. It was their contention that any education was only useful in as much as it helped to create and maintain «a race of peasants living by and on the land» (7). Their fear was that if Africans were allowed to «obtain the degree of civilization of blacks in the United States, it would lead to serious consequences for whites» (8).

Given colonial reluctance, America's black petite bourgeoisie was still able to deliver an acceptable educational model. Black America's foremost educator of the time, Booker T. Washington developed an educational prototype that became the standard for education among two oppressed peoples. It was so acceptable in fact that it could be found in the most blatantly oppressive situations on the African continent: German Togoland and British South Africa. Washington's declaration that the Tuskegee model was the «peculiarly appropriate» and «correct» type of education for the Negro race won him international fame when he hosted the International Conference on the Negro. The conference was to aid educators and missionaries in devising a systematic means of expanding industrial training in Africa based on the Tuskegee and Hampton models.

The Washington model was so impressive that there were numerous attempts to enlist his aid or to emulate his accomplishments. John Dube of South Africa was so impressed with Washington, and so successful in copying his model that he was dubbed the «Booker T. Washington of the Zulus» (9).

Within the framework of capitalism, it was obvious that missionary work and education presented problems for both Africans and Europeans. European anxieties were alleviated through the African-American advocacy of an educational model that would immunize blacks against politics. For the African there seemed to be no solution, only the growing awareness that the Christianity, commerce and education that was being distributed among them by a group of European backed African-Americans in the name of «civilization» was creating a class of Africans in virtually the same mold as the process had created a similar class of African-Americans (10).

History shows that there is a contemporary conflict here. Where one might have argued the absence of alternative systems of political economics limited the directions that African-Americans might have pursued prior to 1917, the post-Bolshevik period and especially the period of national liberation in Africa pose a very uncomfortable dilemma. The historical adherence to capitalism and the tendency to promote it have placed the African-American petite bourgeoisie at odds with the very forces that will liberate Southern Africa.

The refusal to accept a class analysis of the African-American situation as well as the Southern African situation poses grave problems as far as African-American participation in the liberation of Southern Africa is concerned, (i.e. the Southern African situation is beginning to crystalize emerging and long existant petits bourgeois interests. Witness the promotion of the internal settlement government and the black petits bourgeois that represent its interests and their own recent, rapid and phenomenal acquisition of capital and land in a country that has severe shortages of both items as far as blacks are concerned. The Namibia exercise, the manœuverings of Swapo and black collusion with the DTA in order to insure continued South African dominance of the territory are illustrations of class interests, not race. The South African direction and supplying of UNITA forces not only in the attempt to disrupt the state of Angola but also to suppress the people of Namibia is another case of the petite bourgeoisie acting on behalf of bourgeois interests. In South Africa itself the same voice, in blackface, can be heard. Their message is investment is good for South African blacks; it will help alter apartheid peacefully. On the American side, the African-American petite bourgeoisie also has spokesmen who individually or institutionally support the expansion of capitalist interests in Southern Africa).

The anti-Marxist sentiment that is prevalent in the United States obscures a number of fundamental questions and often leads to tangential, and sometimes irrelevant discussions of peaceful change, idyllic democracy and civil rights analogies à la Andy Young in the attempt to project solutions for the Southern African situation that are both palatable to American mythology and capitalist interests.

Any question of African-American petite bourgeois interests must address itself to three issues:

- 1) The relationship of the African-American petite bourgeois to the national American petite bourgeoisie;
- 2) The relationship of the African-American petite bourgeoisie to the American black under-class; and
- 3) The relation of the African-American petite bourgeoisie to the international petite bourgeoisie, (in this case the petite bourgeoisies of Southern Africa).

(1) Most recently the basic defense of African-American petite bourgeois interest has rested on the concept that the African-American middle class has nothing in common with its American counterpart and tends to identify almost wholeheartedly with the black American working class. This assumption has been asserted in renewed criticism of E. Franklin Frazier's *Black Bourgeoisie* and in attacks on William J. Wilson's new work, *The Declining Significance of Race*. (11)

While strong racial identification seems highly visible in the black community and its source is oppression, i.e. racism, this identification does not preclude converging class interests among black and white petite bourgeois. The competition, and in some cases the antagonism, that exists between the African-American and the American petite bourgeoisie is based on their relative lack of power and the fact that their *specific* interests are not the same; both compete to control the same *general* interests for the same reasons because those interests and reasons are dictated by capitalism and the interests of class and not race.

African-American petite bourgeois competition with their white counterparts is overshadowed by the cooperation with both the American and International bourgeoisie. Questions concerning the delicate relations of black petite bourgeois who are the assumed, media-, or self-appointed guardians of all black class interests and their dealings with various multi-national corporations as board members or recipients of corporate monies or «expertise», only begin to illustrate the precarious position in which overall black interest might be placed.

In June 1978, the *Washington Post* reported that the «New Black Vanguard», i.e. black petite bourgeoisie, was voicing «corporate conservatism», that in effect, old line institutions that had styled themselves as protectors of black interests were now taking the side of corporations under the same rubric. The new position taken by organizations such as the NAACP and the Urban League have been justified as a re-thinking of «old assumptions about economic self interests». As Congressman John Conyers put it:

«We have just crossed into a new era. Before, we never had to argue economic theory with a black on the other end of the issue. We have always been the workers, the poor, the proletarians. «They» were always the managers, the wealthy, the bankers, the owners. Great. Very simple. «Us» versus «Them». Now it ain't so simple. Because some them is now us» (12).

Clarence Mitchell, lobbyist for the NAACP seconded Conyers view and showed his perceptiveness in this way:

«This really reflects progress in a wry sort of way. These corporations have hired blacks at the managerial level and they think like management I'm glad to see those black people in there, but I recognize they are promoting management's views and, usually, management's views are not good for the underdog» (13)

Interestingly enough the NAACP has reflected some of the management level views as financial crisis and lack of «expertise» have forced it into a far more compromising relation with the multinational corporate structure that has clarified its petits bourgeois nature.

In a recent fund raising appeal the NAACP was embraced by Mobil Oil on one hand and ITT on the other. The configuration may not impress many people until the point is made concerning the two multinational corporations activities: it is Mobil Oil that has been implicated in numerous reports, including the recently published Bingham Report, commissioned by the British Government, as a participant in the violation of sanctions against Rhodesia. It is Mobil Oil that has provided, in part, the life blood for Ian Smith's intransigence and Abel Muzorewa's folly. Its activities have helped to prolong the conflict and contribute to the rising death toll.

ITT, as sinister as Mobil in protecting bourgeois interests, participated in the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile without regard for the fact that it had been democratically elected.

With these answers the question becomes: what will be the role of the NAACP given the tremendous amount of power multinational corporations can bring to bear? A key to the discussion, again, is the relative lack of power of the petits bourgeois institutions, particularly black petits bourgeois institutions.

While Margaret Bush Wilson, chairperson of the NAACP board sits on the board of directors of the Monsanto, Corporation, her counterpart at the National Urban League does the same thing in a much more visible fashion. Vernon Jordan's corporate and foundation activities are prolific to say the least. Mr. Jordan sits on the boards of at least seven different corporations, including two with investments in South Africa. True to the interests he represents, Mr. Jordan has come to the defense of corporate involvement in South Africa:

I could not eat three times a day and go to Xerox and vote those people out of jobs just to placate my morality, especially when I felt it would not help end apartheid. (14)

With the divestment movement and the bank campaign growing on the campuses across the United States Mr. Jordan is not the only black spokesman for US corporate involvement in Southern Africa. Black academicians and administrators have joined the ranks of those opposed to divestiture.

Some black University administrators have (Rudolph W. Bromery Chancellor of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst Campus and member of the board of Exxon) publically lamented the position taken by their institutions in urging divestiture (15). They have spoken favorably of corporate involvement in South Africa, and severely criticized decisions to disinvest:

Now some US activists would have us protest the truly horrible plight of most South African blacks by wiping out the few gains they have made through the progressive influence of US firms. (Lansing, Michigan State Journal,, December 29, 1978).

This position is echoed by a number of the African-American petite bourgeoisie including a former Black official in the Kennedy White House, who until recently handled the very prosperous South African public relations contract for Sydney Barron and Associates. A noted black sociologist of civil rights fame has done consulting for at least one multinational seeking to broaden its base in South Africa. And the Reverend Leon Sullivan, head of the Opportunities Industrialization Center, member of the board of directors of the General Motors Corporation, and author of the much touted Sullivan principles, has expressed serious reservations concerning divestment.

(2) The African-American academy offers an interesting transition here for a discussion of the African-American petite bourgeoisie's relation to the rest of black America. They have been among the most prominent critics of William Wilson's thesis that class has superseded race on issues of interest among blacks. A number of prominent black Americans have argued that blacks still identify with one another on

the basic issues of survival in American society and that across the class barrier there is a great deal of *individual* interaction. In fact, Charles Hamilton states that the consensus is so great that the only issue that the black middle class and working class disagree on is housing (16). What has been presented is an interesting yet superficial case. It would seem that a disagreement over housing is a great one indeed given the dispute that public and low income housing have caused in this country. The implications that are associated with the idea of one socio-politico-economic group's lack of concern for and desire not to associate with another group, (with which it has ties that are supposed to transcend class), on an issue as fundamental and crucial as housing in 1979 are extremely serious; far more serious in the immediate sense than who will be President of the United States in 1980.

The argument of interaction on the individual level between singular members of one class and another is historically grounded. However, the point that proponents have failed to realize is that the activities of individuals *per se* have never threatened class interests; it's only a class and the interaction between classes that have the power to disrupt class activity.

As far as the transcending nature of race is concerned there is a blatant exception in the example of the individual, or individuals, who lend themselves to activities that are damaging to the race as a whole. The interests that they represent in working for South Africa can not reflect a racial or ethnic cultural interest, so they must reflect class. Those interests are hardly the interests shared by the majority of the black community concerning the support for and participation in an exercise that oppresses and exploits an entire region of black people--Southern Africa.

(3) There seems to be some basis to the concept that aside from attempting to make the investment climate a bit better for US corporations in South Africa, the Sullivan Principles are a part of the foundation for the development of a South African black petite bourgeoisie. South Africa seems to have realized that it is in need of blacks who fit into the mold described by Hampton Institute's founder, S.C. Armstrong: blacks who are «made content through education and gradual advancement». The Sullivan Principles call for those exact provisions as safeguards to US corporate interests and the key to the advancement of a South African black petite bourgeoisie.

The Sullivan Principles reflect the hopes of a number of aspiring South African and Southern African petits bourgeois. As Chief Gatsha Buthelezi said:

I wish to appeal to South African industry to ward off a bloody revolution by making our people «blacks» feel that they have something to lose if anything went wrong in South Africa (17).

The South African black petite bourgeoisie has made similar pleas to the American corporate structure and they have been supported by influential members of the African-American petite bourgeoisie.

The Appeals made by Buthelezi and his colleagues, Chief Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana, Chief Kaiser Mantanzima of the Transkei and others, have been seen as aids to the maintenance of the system of apartheid. On February 4, 1978, the International Economist reported that

Even while vehemently fighting the Nationalists' '«separate development'» policy, Chief Buthelezi has helped to make it possible by working within the '«Bantustan» framework.

As Bernard Magubane has said, the homeland chiefs represent the first line of petit bourgeois interests in black South Africa. (18) For this reason they must support investment in apartheid.

The Soweto uprisings impressed the South African government of the need to placate the black population and the urgency for developing a black petite bourgeoisie with a broad base. The government received considerable pressure to accept this position from South African corporate executives who frankly admitted:

we became involved because we were scared. There was concern for the country, of course, but there was also a selfish concern for our assets. (19)

The executives referred to above had just set up the Urban Foundation under the auspices of South African industrialist Harry Oppenheimer. Mr. Oppenheimer has operated for the past twenty years or so as a liberal industrialist on the premise that investment in South Africa would ease the strains and oppression of apartheid. For the past twenty years or so, Mr. Oppenheimer has been proven wrong. As the South African economy continued to expand the system of apartheid increased in its efficiency and brutality.

With the doldrums of the post-Sharpesville and more recently the post-Soweto periods, the South African economy needed an almost life-saving external boost and American corporations along with other multi-nationals have been providing that fix even though the growth rate seems to be slowing.

At this point in the economic history of South Africa another facet of American Yankee ingenuity became apparent. One way to ward off economic disaster is to create a relatively stable, consumer-conscious, broad-based black middle class. Already South African Business is attempting to tap the growing «black market» through the use of «expert» advice from South African black petite bourgeois market analyst who admit that their white bosses expect a little too much of them:

«They imagine that, because you are black you know it all, straight off the cuff— how blacks will respond...» (20)

The South African government and South African business are spending a lot of time, money and energy in order to find out how blacks will respond, and the business sector has made its expectations well known. One member of the board of the South African Urban foundation put it this way:

«We are single-mindedly committed to improving the quality of life among blacks. Of course our work may have a spin off effect of promoting support for a free-market economy, but if it does, it will be entirely coincidental.» (21)

Of course, also coincidental is the report of the Wiehahn Commission, which favors reforms in labour legislation to make the plight of the black worker more palatable on the surface, while the government still exercises a great amount of control. While the complete impact of the Wiehahn Commission can't yet be assessed, it seems safe to assume that its recommendations will be another step in the direction of molding a class of people «made content through education and gradual advancement».

There are some very important international relations that become visible as an international black petite bourgeoisie comes into being. As mentioned above all petite bourgeoisies are relatively powerless. This position of powerlessness forces them to sell their services to the highest bidder; obviously the capitalist class. The purchase of those services allow the bourgeois to do phenomenal things through the words and actions of the petite bourgeoisie. On demand, Andy Young, Vernon Jordan, Gatsha Buthelezi or Lucy Mvubelo can recite the virtues of investment in South Africa and the debilitating effects that sanctions would have on the African working class, (in this case the fear is the loss of positions in the petits bourgeois sector). There are numerous others who will defend the system no matter how distasteful.

What has essentially happened over the space of 400 years is the development of a very specific model based on the exploitation of blacks and other peoples of color. For those exploited within that model the «escape route» was elevation at the expense of ones fellow travellers. Because the process began earlier in America and America experienced such dynamic growth, the model came to maturity and was ready for export to other places like South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya (22).

The similarities in the development of the African-American and the South African black petite bourgeoisie fit quite well into the framework Frazier described. Frazier spoke of the African-American

petite bourgeois emerging out of relative isolation in an era of legal segregation with some similarity to the system of apartheid. The Plessy V. Ferguson decision of 1896, and the doctrine of «separate but equal» that was established with it speaks as a general model for the South African concept of separate development.

Out of similar conceptual frameworks, at different times, in somewhat of an evolutionary manner, the development of two black petite bourgeoisies was encouraged. They were encouraged to help maintain and advance the interests of capitalism. They came into being out of necessity as important mechanisms of internal economic growth and to serve as buffers and managers of an antagonistic working class that could be appealed to on the basis of color.

Now, as a world class they find themselves in a precarious situation. If they honor their class commitments they will be perceived as enemies of the race and the working class; if they honor the concept of race they have failed to understand the full significance of that position.

The African-American, Kenyan, Nigerian, and South African black have emerged at the foremost among an international black petite bourgeois strata. As an international black petite bourgeoisie their role is the management of Africa and the diaspora on behalf of world capitalism. The extent to which they discharge their class interests is the extent to which they become enemies of the liberation of Southern Africa.

The psychology that accompanies the black petite bourgeois phenomenon is laced with tenacity. Being the last to attain status they are reluctant to give it up, even when it might be in their interest. For them the system of world capitalism is like the proverbial apple cart where the apples are rotting. Refusing to accept this, the black petite bourgeoisie, being the last to arrive means to be the last to let go as the struggle for liberation begins to upset the apple cart.

Most analyses of the Africa-American situation *vis a vis* Southern Africa have failed to go beyond the point of liberation. There has been no systematic consideration of the fact that African-American capitalist interests will conflict with the socialist interests of those Africans who have *struggled for liberation* and gained it. When this is done it should become quite clear that the bond that is referred to so often as being transcending will have to reflect more than the interests of color.

FOOTNOTES

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4. «Lynchburg African Development Society», *ibid.*
5. James W. Gilbert, «The Southern Negro's Debt and Responsibility to Africa», in Kilson and Hill, p.121.
6. Kenneth J. King, *Pan Africanism and Education*, p. 7.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
8. Clement T. Keto, «American Involvement in South Africa, 1870-1915: the Role of Americans in the Creation of Modern South Africa», unpublished dissertation, p.201.
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16. Caldwell, *ibid.*
17. Jennifer Davis, «A New Face for Apartheid», reprint in *Southern Africa Perspectives*, 1974 (?), p.3.
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20. *Financial Mail*, «Black Spending in Focus», November 24, 1978, p. 14.
21. Burns, *ibid.*
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RESUME

En 1974, quand J. E. Carter a été élu Président des Etats Unis, la Communauté noire qui l'a aidé à réaliser son rêve commença une longue attente pour le paiement des services rendus.

Le premier versement leur fut fait par la nomination de deux Noirs au Cabinet du Président. La nomination d'Andrew Young au poste d'Ambassadeur des Etats Unis aux Nations Unies commença à chauffer les esprits des Américains Noirs, particulièrement ceux des «Petits-Bourgeois» qui y ont vu une contribution significative des Noirs dans la politique étrangère américaine.

Le départ récent de Mr. Young du poste d'Ambassadeur des Etats Unis aux Nations Unies au milieu de cris de «Au racisme et à la double échelle des valeurs» a de nouveau soulevé le problème du rôle des Noirs Américains dans la formation de la politique étrangère des Etats Unis.

Pendant qu'aussi bien individuellement qu'en groupe les Américains Noirs avancent pour «rattraper le temps» pour ainsi dire il devient nécessaire d'essayer une évaluation de l'impact, si l'impact il y a, qu'ils auraient pu avoir sur la politique étrangère américaine particulièrement quand il s'agit de l'Afrique.



* *Maghan KEITA is former Associate Director of the Washington Office on Africa and Instructor of History and Politics at Bowie State College. Currently Mr. KEITA is conducting research on his Doctoral dissertation in African Studies from Howard University Washington D.C., and is attached to the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning as a visiting lecturer and researcher in Dakar, Senegal.*

A REVIEW OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
INDUSTRIALIZATION STRATEGY OF THE NIGERIAN
STATE, 1960-80 *

By

*Akin FADAHUNSI ***

INTRODUCTION:

The Post Colonial Nigerian State – albeit an overdeveloped one (Colin Leys, 1976) – has been grappling in converse to the nature of its politics with economic underdevelopment without much obvious success. It is still «a nation which cannot feed itself and cannot (therefore) be regarded as self-reliant in any meaningful sense (Obasanjo, 1979)».

Like most Third World nations, Nigeria has put the thrust of coping with the problems of underdevelopment on a strategy of rapid industrialization. In spite of this commitment to rapid development of the industrial sector for self-reliance in three plan documents spanning almost two decades the Nigerian economy still manifests all the features of a dependent neo-colonial economy. The share of manufacturing and crafts was about 8 percent of GDP during 1978 having remained just at an average of less than 5 percent during 1970 - 71 to 1974 - 75. The structure of the manufacturing sector shows a dominance of the so-called «low technology consumer industries» - food, beverages and tobacco as well as textiles - in its value added, and the almost non-existence of the more critical metallurgical and engineering industries. Agricultural exports of some products have either seized or declined considerably while food items have virtually stagnated in the face of an increasing population. What might have led to inevitable economic crisis have been staved off because of the revenue being derived from the export of a single product crude oil - accounting for about 75 percent of estimated total revenues during 1979/80 and also about 75 percent of estimated foreign exchange receipts (Obasanjo, 1979).

The Nigerian State-like all states-necessarily reflects the underlying socio-economic formations and the interests of the nascent classes in the society. The incapacity of the dominant nascent elite (bourgeois) class in Nigeria to develop within the last two decades of national independence a self-reliant economy in any «meaningful sense» cannot be attributed simply to economy mismanagement due to corruption or lack

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** *CSER, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria.*

of motivation or modernizing spirit but to features of the political economy of the Nigerian State. - Some of which are specific to the Nigerian environment and others of the features which take on universal character because of their ideological undertone. This essay is therefore an attempt to describe chronologically the industrial development strategy of the Nigerian State as stated especially in three post colonial plan documents and to appraise the successes and failures of the industrial development policies as perceived by the author within a political economy framework.

The second part of this essay will be a brief discussion of the subject matter - political economy in the context of Nigeria - as understood by the author. The third section will be devoted to reviewing the industrial development policies during 1960 - 80 with critical comments on the possible class interests that have informed formulation and execution of policies. The concluding part of the essay attempts to posit an industrial development strategy within a stable polity.

II

Political Economy - The Nigerian Framework

The problem of the nature of the state after independence is perhaps the secret of the failure of African independence (Amil Cabral)

The International Scene

A laissez-faire economic system will by definition allow only a minimal role for the state in the ordering of economic activities while on the hand a centrally planned economy presumes the supremacy of a political authority - the state. We do know of course from economic history that the laissez-faire doctrine has always been preached by the ideologies of atomistic competition in the market place as opposed to the monopolistic and oligopolistic practices that dominate contemporary industrial capitalist states. Thus the laissez-faire doctrine has remained essentially a philosophical abstraction that has served as a tool in the hands of reactionary forces whenever private acquisition and ownership of capital is threatened as a result of workers agitation. The point being made is that at least since the emergence of the «nation-state» with different social groups or classes that have been contending for limited economic resources the state by definition has always had an economic role. Indeed in Marxian terms the rise of the states was conditioned on the economic division of labour and the resultant emergent of classes. That is the state has a class origin and has always represented the interests - mostly economic - of the

It is in the light of the above link between the state, the social classes or groups and the economic process - production, distribution, and exchange - that the classical economists (Smith, Ricardo, Malthus etc up to Marx and Engels) referred to the discipline that is presently termed «economics» in the West as political economy. - Political economy as an academic subject has however, been given more attention within the last decade that witnessed major crisis in the development of the world imperialist economic system. The most significant being the erstwhile theoretically contradictory phenomenon of inflation and accompanying widespread unemployment (stagflation) which led to balance of payment problems among the leading industrial nations making up OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). The consequence of the crisis has been serious fluctuations in the exchange for major currencies - the weakening of the leader currency (American dollar) and the almost undisguised trade wars.

The economy crisis that has enveloped the world capitalist economy including most of the Third World nations could be attributed to the emergence on the world scene of the so-called «transnationals» whose activities over resources and major economic products are global. The decolonization of the decade of the 1960's weakened the direct control of the metropolis over the economics of the former colonies in favour of the transnationals that seem to have the capacity to do «business» with the new states. Though the industrial nations are still net importer of resources - industrial raw materials and financial capital vis - a - vis the underdeveloped nations, their lack of direct control over the activities of the transnational corporations owned by their nationals has thrown the world imperialist system into serious instability. The on-going efforts at creating a New International Economic Order though illusive is all the same a real exercise in political economy since nation-states are involved in trying to work out mutually beneficial economic relations.

2.2 Nigerian Political Economy: The almost century long British colonization of Nigeria effectively brought the country into the world capitalist system. The immediate effect of colonialism was the elimination of a thriving craft industry and the trade in the products along traditional routes within the country and neighbouring states (Rodney 1972 and Adamu, 1977) along West Africa. An admittedly then subsistent peasant economy became an import - export one to be facilitated with the metropolis with a network of roads and railways all leading to the sea-ports. The ships owned by British companies evacuated agricultural and mineral products from the ports to Britain mostly and brought back predominantly Britain manufactured goods to be distributed by wholesale, and retail companies owned by Britons. In the process an elite emerged, educated to read and write and later

to work in the mercantile houses and in Government institutions. Over the years a trader class also emerged that its members were able to be appointed as factors to the foreign owned trading companies - UAC, UTC, SCOA, G.B. Ollivant John Holt etc.

Thus on the eve of Nigeria's independence in October, 1960 it was possible to identify a nascent bourgeois class. * The presence of this class made it possible for «British imperialism to cede political kingdom in order to maintain the substance of economic domination» (Judith Marshall, 1976). The new state that therefore emerged on the international scene symbolized by acceptance into the United Nations could aptly be described as neo-colonial - independent politically but mostly dependent economically.

According to Dr. Pius Okigbo (1979) the policies (economic) of Governments since 1960 will show that the ideological preconceptions neo capitalist rather than socialist - of the various Nigerian governments have been the same. The ideological underpinning of development policy characterised by Okigbo became more glaring in the recent 20th post independence budget speech of the Nigerian Head of State - especially in the section which contained the review of «the extent of colonial and foreign domination of our economy». Trading and manufacturing activities were at independence operated by British firms - United African Company, John Holt, G.B. Ollivant, Rowntry, Fry and Cadbury, lever Brothers, Nigerian Breweries etc and the financial sector by Barclays Bank and British Bank of West Africa.

«However, soon after independence, companies from other foreign countries began to establish in Nigeria to dilute British colonial dominance while at the same time increasing the totality of foreign control of the economy. It is pertinent to point out at this stage that all these companies from which-ever countries were fully-owned subsidiaries of multi-national companies which had their headquarters in Europe, America or Japan where the policies governing their operations in Nigeria were discussed, determined and handed down» (Obasanjo, 1979).

* A «nascent bourgeois» class is considered to be a more appropriate categorization in the specific Nigerian situation in preference to «Petty-bourgeois» that is used by most contributors to the RAPE publication of 1976, No.5 on the nature of African States.

That is independence for Nigeria facilitated the diversification of imperialist holdings and the consolidation of the integration of Nigeria into the world capitalist system that started about one hundred years earlier when the British annexed geographical expanse that is now referred to as the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The answer of the Nigerian bureaucratic/military elites to foreign ownership of capital assets is the indigenisation decree whose main thrust, «with its quest for indigenous entrepreneurs and so-called entrepreneurial habits, is to legitimes the capitalist road of development..... (seeking) to transfer the means of production without altering production relation» (Onoge 1974). This legitimisation of the capitalist road represents according to Onoge «a misunderstanding of the very historical sources of our contemporary underdevelopment. For was colonialism not, in fact a consequence of expansionist capitalism? How can capitalism which had underdeveloped us since colonialism now suddenly reverse its consequences?» (Onoge 1974). Leading spokesmen of the Federal Military Government have since admitted that meaningful indigenisation - ownership and control of management and technology-is not taking place. What is happening is that the Nigerian comprador class (merchants, retired bureaucrats and military elites or their representatives) is contented to serve as fronts for foreign businesses as long as it is assured of generous dividends.

The budget summary also highlighted the uneven distribution of income between the rural majority condemned to the drudgery of traditional farming techniques and the mass of urban slum dwellers on the one hand and the emerging absentee farmer/kulaks and the comprador class on the other. The strongly skewed income distribution was accentuated during the «era of easy money and conspicuous consumption» that was prevalent during the oil boom. Acquisition of «wealth without labour» is in tune with the ethics of parasitic capitalists who cannot see the benefits of productive labour and the dignity of such a labour.».

An interesting and revealing aspect of the 1979/80 budget under «general measures» is that dealing with the observed «tendency among the youths to regard the material successes of their parents as reasons for not wanting to make any efforts to improve themselves and earn their own living.....believing that they should have no ambition and relying on their parents wealth to see them through life.....», some control is therefore deemed necessary «in order to avoid future disaffection and social explosion».

«In consideration of these and other factors, the Supreme Military Council has promulgated another Decree known as Capital Transfer Tax Decree whose main objective is to impose a tax on capital assets transferred as gifts by one citizen to another. While the first N100,000 of such gift will be free of tax

the next N150,000 will henceforth attract 10 per cent tax while gifts or asset transfers of N2 million and above will attract 60 per cent». (Obasanjo, 1979).

The measures contained in the capital transfer tax decree will no doubt be considered progressive in the context of Nigerian chosen path of capitalist development.

The unemployment which the squeeze on money supply and cut back on public works will create must necessarily depress total demand and stagnate economic development. It is noteworthy that the Nigerian workers are already protesting against some aspects of the budget.

The budget's intention is to build a disciplined, fair, just and humane African Society. This is meant to emphasize a different ideological approach; but its essence is capitalistic – assigning major roles to the private sector in the development generally and in particular to the priority sectors of agriculture and manufacturing. It is the continuing process of transforming the neo-colonial economy to some distorted form of State Capitalism. Monetary and fiscal policies are designed to create favourable climate for capital accumulation by private entrepreneurs. Enormous government contracts are awarded at exorbitant costs, government credits (mobilization fees) are granted, tariffs adapted, subsidies, tax holidays granted – all to sustain the emergent bourgeois class.

If it is appropriate to define political science as the study «either of power or of decision making» it will be possible to identify in the Nigerian policy within the last two decades the major actors. The preceding observation on the budgets indicates the interests which the elites that have been managing the economy are serving. They have exercised their enormous power in the decision making process in the economic interest of the nascent bourgeois class. The post-Keynesian stop-go measures – deflate/inflate – which have not helped economic crisis in the better managed economies of the industrialized capitalist nations can hardly succeed in a poorly developed economy. And yet for political reasons these policies have been stuck to by the Nigerian bureaucratic/technocratic elite.

With this general understanding of the Nigerian political economy we shall be proceeding to review the evolution of the Industrial Development policy of Nigeria over the last two – decades.

III

Review of Industrial Development Policy

The low share of manufactures – less than 10 per cent – in GDP and the dependence on a primary product (crude petroleum) as the principal source of revenue two decades after independence firmly

places the Nigerian State as a dependent neo-colonial economy. On the eve of political independence the small Nigerian industrial scene was made up mostly of such low technology manufactures – like bakeries, oil milling, rubber processing, tanning, saw milling. With this background the national and regional industrial policies for the first national Development Plan were formulated. The policies that have been pursued by governments on Industrial Development are often elaborated in the annual budget speeches, ministerial statements at conferences and public forums and some of the data for appraising effectiveness of the policies are contained in several publications like «Industrial Survey of Nigeria» published by the Federal Office of Statistics.

3.2 *The First Decade:* The aims of policy for the development of the industrial sector were articulated in the first national plan document – 1962–68. They were summarized at the Federal level as:–

- (i) to stimulate the establishment and growth of industries that contribute both directly and materially to economic growth;
- (ii) to enable Nigerians to participate to an ever increasing extent in the ownership, direction and management of Nigerian industry and trade.

The plan also elaborated policy instruments and specific measures for achieving the stated objectives.

- (a) Government was to provide fund for direct participation in industries;
- (b) A development bank was to be set up by government to lend to industries and act as one channel for foreign capital;
- (c) Government legislation to stimulate the growth of private industries.

Further elaboration of the Government objectives contained in (i) and (ii) above were to use industrial development for creating employment and increasing industrial output as well as the indigenisation of industrial capitalism in Nigeria. We should note that the desire of the nascent Nigerian bourgeoisie to own and control industrial enterprises through indigenisation of foreign business already had its origin in the first development plan. The continuing references to the need to indigenize and transfer technology to Nigerians by the present government is somehow an acknowledgement of the failure of a policy that has been pursued for almost two decades.

The policy instruments and measures specified in (a), (b) and (c) above are clearly in tune with the demands of state capitalism. Fund to be provided for direct participation in industries would offer «risk free» contracts for foreign designers and Managers and indigenous collaborators. The profits to the agents are normally fixed and guaranteed.

The creation of lending banks – the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank later duplicated in the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries was part of the deliberate policy of the post colonial state to create an industrial bourgeois class albeit at the expense of the Nigerian toiling masses. The moves that are familiar and calculated to serve the interest of the national elites and entrench the neo-colonial state legislations are passed by government to grant incentives in order to improve the «investment climate». The incentives include, «pioneer certificates which allow for income tax relief, import duty relief, initial capital allowance and depreciation allowance for investment in equipment, duty relief on industrial machinery, spare parts and raw materials and the protection of local industries through tariffs, quota restrictions and licencing of imported competing products». Policy to disperse industries to underdeveloped regions was to be achieved by developing industrial estates supplied with necessary infrastructural facilities in towns spread all over the country and by granting loans for the development of small scale industries. The small scale loan scheme is also seen as a training ground for the desired industrial capitalist class.

Policy was quite unambiguous in its desire to promote private accumulation of capital as opposed to the social ownership of the means of production. It is stated clearly that one of the industrial policy objectives «is to encourage primarily private entrepreneurs to invest in industrial undertakings rather than government or public institutions. Parastatal body to be set up by government was to lend loans or invest in industrial projects only to complement private initiatives. Thus industrial development policy of successive Governments in Nigeria since 1960 has been underpinned by primary reliance on private initiatives».
(A. Fadahunsi, 1978).

In spite of the favourable and generous conditions created by the state for investments in industrial projects by foreign and indigenous entrepreneurs, not only were major projects like the iron and steel complex meant to provide the basis for «economic transformation which ancilliary heavy machines, engineering and electrical industries would have made possible» not executed; but also many of the projected light and intermediate goods industries never got started. A major impediment to the fulfilment of the intention of the plan was of course the reliance on foreign sources for the capital expenditure which the authors of the first national plan put at about 50 per cent of the total. In drawing the plan for the Federation «each government was supposed to limit its capital expenditure programme to twice the amount that it

could provide itself and was permitted to assume that foreign aid would provide the balance of the funds» (Dean, 1972). The neo-colonial dependency mentality informing such a decision by the authors of the plan is quite obvious; and so is the strong desire to link the Nigerian economy and state to the World Capitalist financial institutions - World Bank (IBRD), International Monetary Fund etc.

It is not possible to make a full appraisal of the effects of industrial development policies during the first decade of national independence because of the unstable political climate leading to the Civil War during the last three years of the 1960's. The «dependent but not dependable» (John Saul, 1976) Nigerian State could not fulfill the welfare objectives of the development plan for its population because of the «unrestrained intra-class rivalry» of the nascent bourgeois class. The military/bureaucratic elites were in the circumstances forced to take more stringent and fiscal measures to avert «threatening crisis in the balance of payment position».

Overall state capitalism as we should expect benefitted the private foreign and indigenous entrepreneurs during the first decade. Given over generous incentives the investment plan for the private sector over the whole plan period was substantially exceeded two years to the official ending of the plan. Though deliberate policy in favour of private entrepreneurs paid off the structural transformation of the industrial sector and the economy as a whole did not materialize and hence the policy objective of employment generation and substantial growth in output for mass welfare did not materialize.

3.3 *The Second Decade, 1970 - 80* In its essentials industrial policy continued to be in favour of state industrial capitalism. Indigenisation, employment creation, diversification of industrial output and location of manufacturing establishments etc were all reaffirmed in the two plan documents covering the decade - the 2nd National Plan for Reconstruction and Development 1970 - 75 and the current 3rd National Development Plan, 1975 - 80.

The decade has been particularly favourable for the windfall profits that accrued to the transnational corporations (see table of value of UAC trading and industrial operations below) and their parasitic indigenous merchants. The huge profits followed the expansion of economic activities after the Civil War and accelerated further by the oil boom that enabled the Gowon regime to pay the Udoji Salary Awards. It was indeed the peak period for «easy money» - made legitimately if immorally or by corrupt means. For instance the inability of the Nigerian State to meet the scheduled dates for FESTAC was attributed to not just incompetence on the part of officials but high level corruption starting from the design and award of contracts to the level of suppliers of building materials - cement, planks, gravels, iron, rods etc. Easy money also came through the notorious cement Armada created by the collusion of bureaucratic/military/merchant elites.

UAC (Nigeria) Ltd: Sales and Profits 1972–77

Year	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Sales	201560	213403	248401	395071	576065	701848	788500
Profits	14993	17149	30472	57925	91293	10882	92940
Profits/ Sales%	7.4	8.0	12.3	14.7	15.8	15.5	11.9

The 1970–75 plan also incorporated plans reflecting the twelve state structure of the Federation in 1967. «The creation of new centres of growth» around the new state capitals obviously increased public sector investments in industrial projects since because of lack of basic infrastructures private entrepreneurs were not very interested in investing in the new States. The opportunities for contracts on state sponsored projects also helped in the diversification and strengthening of state capitalism and especially because the plan contained the «policy framework for and the programme of the reconstruction of the war damaged areas». The reconstruction period was concerned with rehabilitation of abandoned or damaged factories. And the class of exploiters who handled some of the rehabilitation programmes had no moral inhibition in defrauding the masses.

As we already indicated the second plan as laid down by the Federal Government was to continue more vigorously some of the objectives laid down during the first plan and to add other policy goals in keeping with the overall industrial strategy. The objectives as stated in the second plan (p.143) were:

- (i) promote even development and fair distribution of industries in all parts of the country;
- (ii) ensure a rapid expansion and diversification of the industrial sector of the economy;
- (iii) increase the incomes realised from manufacturing activity;
- (iv) create more employment opportunities,
- (v) promote the establishment of industries which cater for overseas markets in order to earn foreign exchange;
- (vi) continue the programme of import substitution, as well as raise the level of intermediate and capital goods production;
- (vii) initiate schemes designed to promote indigenous manpower development in the industrial sector; and

- (viii) raise the proportion of indigenous ownership of industrial developments.

Policy instruments for achieving stated objectives would still rely on creating a favourable climate for investments by foreign and indigenous entrepreneurs. Industrial incentives to be granted would include: Pioneer Company Certificates, Duty Relief and Approved User Scheme, Initial and Depreciation Allowances, other monetary and fiscal measures to attract investors.

The thrust of government strategy for industrialization is the indigenisation of ownership and management of industrial establishments. Towards this end the Nigerian Entreprises Promotion Board (1972) Decree amended in 1976), the Capital issues commission, Industrial Training Fund, Bank for Commerce and Industry (in addition to NIDB) were set up. There is no gain-saying that in spite of all the measures taken to encourage industrial development the recorded achievements with respect to objectives – increase employment and income and indigenisation of ownership and management of industrial establishments have been modest. And this should not have come as a surprise since foreign capital which has the capacity and know-how to make the critical investments would not do so for reasons of self interest. Being concerned primarily with making profits foreign investors engage in relatively risk free ventures – wholesale and retail trades with very high rate of returns averaging about 25 – 30 per cent and mining activities that promise quick returns. In an unstable political climate they are understandably less inclined to commit their investments to projects with relatively long gestation period. The Nigerian entrepreneurs who are thoroughly ingrained in the highly profitable «buy and sell» syndrome never paid attention to manufacturing business activities.

Rather than acknowledge the political and cultural constraints to industrial development the authors of the Third National Development Plan, 1975 – 80 still persisted in the policy of reviewing of existing incentives to encourage indigenous and foreign entrepreneurs to invest in most of the subsectors of manufacturing. The plan rightly recognized some other constraint that has hampered development in the manufacturing sector as:

- (a) infrastructural – inadequacy in the supply and management of water, electricity, communication facilities, transport especially railway, port facilities etc,
- (b) restrictive industrial policy and administrative bottlenecks that frustrate investments in a number of worthwhile projects;
- (c) shortage of industrial manpower and the relative unattractiveness of manufacturing to indigenous business-men;

- (d) slow implementation of the public sector manufacturing projects which are generally to act as the foundation for the growth of the sector as a whole.

The review of the current (1979/80) budget showed clearly the preponderance of crude petroleum in the nation's economic activities and the low performance of the progressive modernizing manufacturing sector. The 1975–80 plan to rectify the structural imbalance in the manufacturing sector of the economy by emphasizing the production of basic and intermediate goods failed within a year of the launching of the plan. This was due to the unrealistic approach of the people brought up and still believing in the spontaneity of the market mechanism as opposed to economic development planning which by definition requires to be successful conscious appraisal and rational formulation of economic activities. The unrealism of the planners was so glaring that within a year of the launching of Third National Development Plan it «became quite clear that the total capital expenditure programmes of all the governments of the federation amounting to N32.9 billion of which manufacturing and craft accounts for N5.3 billion» – was over ambitious. The high rate of inflation which was particularly serious among OPEC countries and the dwindling revenue from oil compelled the governments to reorder the public sector investment priorities in 1976.

The preceding analysis of government industrial development strategy and its execution over almost two decades shows some modest achievements in general but in respect of the more desirable structural transformation that can only be the condition for modernization and rapid development of the economy policies seem to have been misplaced. We shall therefore briefly be looking at suggested policies for the 1980's and make some alternative proposals for the future development of the Nigerian industrial sector.

IV

Alternative Strategy for the Future

The official description by the Nigerian political elites of the ideological values underpinning the management of the national economy since independence is that of «mixed-economy». This is supposed to be the economist analogy of «political neutrality» between East (Socialism) and West (Capitalism). As many commentators have indicated it is this «mixed-economy» ideology that has been responsible for the mismanagement, confusion and corruption in the nation's economic life – private or public.

The mixed-economy strategy for industrial development is a product of the already historically established ambivalence of the «petty-bourgeois».

«The petty bourgeois – intellectual elite and those in trade – share a politically unstable nature. It is they who swing to the side of the bourgeoisie or to the side of the working class, according to the conjuncture, since they are polarized around these two classes» (John Saul, 1976).

This ambivalence of the petty-bourgeoisie is expressed concretely in the Nigerian situation by the welfarist egalitarian undertone of the development plan documents on the one hand and the emphasis on the other to giving generous incentives to encourage private accumulation of capital by the elites. It is this inherent contradiction in policy objectives and instruments contained in planning documents and ministerial statements that have led to the notorious inefficiency and corruption of NEPA, P & T, RAILWAYS, NIGERIAN AIRWAYS etc and the privately controlled production or distribution of commodities – petrol, motor vehicles, cement, cooking gas, beer, soft drinks etc and in the building and civil engineering construction industries. For example according to the Nigerian Sunday Times (25/3/79). «The N1.5 million edifice being put up as the new 30.000 line telephone exchange for Kano has been declared unsuitable to carry the weight of the exchange equipment to be installed therein.....the exchange equipment to be supplied by ITT (Nigeria) Ltd. requires a floor concrete load of 700 kilograms per square metre, but the building as it is now could only guarantee a load of below 400 kilograms per square metre».

It will seem from the above quotation that the combined activities of technocrats, bureaucrats and contractors could not ensure that appropriate technical/administrative decisions are taken to facilitate the building of a telephone exchange. The problems are probably the same in other major towns of the Federation and also in respect of other infrastructure facilities. Lack of infrastructures has of course been identified as a very serious constraint to economic development.

It is my considered view that the ideological ambivalence of the nascent Nigerian bourgeoisie is a-historical and an impediment to «meaningful» development. The efforts of the agents of world imperialism to create before and almost two decades after independence a responsible middle class as in Taiwan, South Korea, Brazil etc seem to be futile. The Nigerian elites only understand in a rather crude way the inevitable cooperation between the owners of capital and workers as a condition for the viability of modern (State) capitalism. We note throughout the review of industrial development policy that incentives to create favourable climate for private foreign and indigenous investments are given top priority while never much consideration is given to the condition of the working people. It will seem as if the present Nigeria elites can neither appreciate nor therefore transcend the obvious contradictions within the socio-economic system.

Therefore any strategy for future industrial development of the country must first of all create a favourable or less antagonistic climate for cooperation between the technocratic/bureaucratic managers of the transitional capitalist state and the toiling masses. And to achieve this will require the state which sees itself and acts as an embodiment of the «general interest» rather than one that is seen to «be acting merely on behalf of private property» (E. Mandel, 1971). A state that recognizes the dialectical and historical transcendental nature of the present social relations within the national and the existing international order will be better able to grasp with the problems of industrialization in the 1980's and beyond.

The calling for a state that can minimize the antagonistic relations between social classes emanating from private ownership of capital should not be construed as an attempt to subvert (S. Oyovbaire, 1979) the state but a call to it to fulfill its responsibility to all of the people rather than to a self seeking elite. Since a stable policy is a precondition for economic development it will be pertinent to elaborate on whether a demand for change in an existing social order will necessarily subvert. Or that the emphasis in the Nigerian situation for instance is to deal with decisive issues like ethnicity and religion rather than the «haves» and «have nots». Of course, Marxist scholars will be unequivocal in stating that religion or ethnicity is only an instrument for economic and political domination of the masses in the long run. Therefore, to eliminate the long run intention of the emerging national bourgeoisie (while it may be tactical to deal with the short run issues) it will be more desirable to solve the fundamental question of inter-class conflicts - oppression of the masses by a privileged elite.

As we tried to show earlier in this essay it was British imperialism rather than any mythical «natural capitalists» of Nigeria that brought this country within the world capitalist system. After two decades of independence the Nigerian state is still faced with the problem of underdevelopment borne out of the crisis of world capitalism which itself was some of the aftermates of decolonization and the concomitant strengthening of the role of transnationals in global economic activities. The «lease of life» that imperialism has been given is due to the raw materials – industrially strategic ones – that have been made cheaply available to the world market by the neo-colonial states of the Third World.

We can see from the foregoing that it will be illogical for the industrialized nations to encourage the economic independence of their erstwhile client states. For some reasons already advanced it is neither feasible or morally admissible to try to indigenize capitalism. The present wealth being accumulated by Nigerian elites in the fashion of the era of primitive capital accumulation will be squandered by their children who are already condemned to live in idleness and as spend-thrifts in the style of people in a decadent civilization. The socialist

alternative should be the logical answer. The state of the inhuman elites will be transformed to the just society for all interest groups. The mechanism for a relatively «painless» transition can be worked out. There is no reason to be apologetic for making the socialist choice. The attempt to put African Marxist scholars on the defensive by accusing them of «intellectual dependency» (Ali Mazrui, 1978) is not only puerile but pretty futile and it smacks of intellectual dishonesty. One would like to know the African original and independent system of ideas that have emanated from the «intellectual» apostles of the status quo – the inherited capitalist system.

We believe that a realistic industrialization strategy will require a stable social economic system. The Nigerian policy may because of intra-elite squabbles but it will only be a temporary phenomenon. A durable policy will depend on the creation of conflict free-in terms of socio-economic relations-society.

In concluding this review of the political values that informed Nigeria's past industrial development policies we would like to mention the current thinking with regards to future industrialization policy. Possibly because of the past reluctance of capable foreign entrepreneurs to invest in projects of «strategic importance to the national economy» government was forced to relax the official policy of minimizing direct government participation in manufacturing industry. Projects which are of strategic importance to the national economy and security are reserved exclusively for the public sector. The list includes iron and steel complexes, petroleum refinery, and the manufacture of defense weapons. In order to minimize dependence on imports and to develop indigenous know-how federal and state governments will get involved in such areas as the manufacture of cement, pulp and paper, sugar and fertilizers, etc. which entail rather intricate technology and such heavy investments with fairly long gestation periods that thus make them unattractive to private foreign and local investors.

According to the Federal Commissioner for Industries the primary objective of industrialization policies and strategies for the 1980's should be:

- (a) To re-orientate the general direction of the industrial development in this country with a view to correcting among other things, our lop-sided industrial structures such as have been described above;
- (b) The encouragement through discrimanatory incentives of backward integration of the production process among existing industries which depend on imported raw materials. This will vastly increase value added as well as the technological intensiveness of these industries.
- (c) Specifically engineering manufacturing industries should receive special encouragement again through appropriate incentives particularly

in areas of intermediate and capital goods production. Unless for instance we develop the capacity for machine building and equipment manufacture the more capital intensive complex industries we establish, the more helplessly dependent we would become on those who supply these products;

(d) Utilization of local raw materials to the furthest possible extent in response to the goal of national self-reliance.

(e) The development of small-scale industries, both as independent enterprises and as feeders to bigger industries.

(f) A constant watch on and nourishing of existing financial and institutional infrastructures to ensure not merely adequate funding but also efficient operation and management of industrial ventures.

The policies specified above are theoretically sound for the development of a self-reliant industrial sector; but will be difficult to operationalize as long as state capitalism constitutes the bias for economic activities. Foreign investors will no longer have direct stakes in the ownership of the «priority projects» but will continue to reap huge profits as design and management consultants and suppliers of credits and equipments. The indigenous business class will also continue to make «easy money» through inflation of contract values.

A purposeful development which involves full participation of the national work force in the operation of industrial projects reducing foreign participation to the barest necessary technical role and excluding indigenous middlemen contractors – will accelerate the industrialization process. «The initiative for industrial development – especially in the so-called «strategic projects» – has to therefore remain with the public sector because of the less than favourable international economic order and the political system. Lack of confidence in the political stability of many Third World Countries is not likely to make them attractive to profit oriented transnational companies for long term investments that are critical for any meaningful transformation of the economies from neo-colonial dependency to self-sustaining development (A. Fadahunsi, 1978).

Setting out the mechanism for the transition from a dependent capitalist to a mass oriented self-reliant state should be the proper pre-occupation of concerned and committed scholars. The state whose ideology is based on «mixed-economy» will remain inherently unstable. The mixed economy phase can only be transitional and can never have any enduring features that will sustain it between the hegemonic systems – Soviet Socialism and United States Capitalism. What are, therefore, the prospects for the so-called «Third Line»?

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FURTHER NOTES

Udoji Award: based on salary review commission headed by Chief Udoji Salary Increase ranging from about 70 to 100 % for various categories of workers were major contributors to the high inflation in the economy during 1975–1977.

FESTAC: Festival of Arts and Culture of African People and descent held early in 1977 was at great cost to the Nigerian economy.

NEPA: The Nigerian Electricity Power Authority.

P. & T.: Post and Telegraph.

RESUME

Cet article décrit comment le Nigéria a intégré le Système Capitaliste Mondial après la colonisation britannique. L'Etat Nigérian de l'après-indépendance est resté néo-colonial, instable politiquement et économiquement dépendant. La domination de l'économie par les étrangers a été facilitée par la naissance d'une bourgeoisie nationale, une classe bureaucratique et commerçante. *Les bureaucrates dépendants culturels et les commerçants parasites économiques* ont été les principaux acteurs de la formulation et de l'exécution de la politique. L'incapacité des hommes d'affaires nigériens à changer leur rôle d'agents des entreprises commerciales étrangères pour devenir des investisseurs dans les entreprises industrielles a permis la domination de l'économie par les étrangers et l'absence d'une transformation structurelle significative du secteur industriel, deux décennies après l'indépendance. Les autres facteurs responsables de l'échec de la stratégie d'industrialisation du Nigéria sont *l'état de développement très pauvre des facilités d'infrastructures* ainsi que la corruption des hauts fonctionnaires aussi bien dans le secteur privé que dans le secteur public.

Etant donné les mesures d'austérité appliquées dans le passé à des efforts pour l'industrialisation de l'économie nigérienne et l'actuel environnement économique international défavorable dominé par les entreprises multinationales des pays de l'impérialisme mondial, l'état Nigérian doit participer activement à la soi-disant sous-division stratégique du secteur industriel pour le re-structurer et moderniser ainsi l'économie nationale dans l'intérêt du peuple Nigérian.

LE PROBLEME DE LA REFORME AGRAIRE EN AFRIQUE AU SUD DU SAHARA

M. L. GAKOU *

Les vagues de famine qui apparaissent en ce moment dans bon nombre de pays sous-développés d'Afrique ne constituent pas en elles-mêmes des phénomènes nouveaux. En effet que ce soit pendant la période coloniale ou même pendant la période précoloniale, des crises alimentaires importantes ont été connues dans beaucoup de régions. Mais ce qui constitue l'élément nouveau c'est la dimension particulière de la crise et surtout quand on tient compte des moyens potentiels puissants qui existent aujourd'hui par rapport aux époques antérieures pour pouvoir faire face avec beaucoup d'efficacité à de telles éventualités de crise.

Cela amène tout naturellement à se demander qu'est-ce qui ne va pas dans l'agriculture africaine. La réponse à cette question déborderait certainement le cadre du sujet proposé. Mais elle conduit nécessairement à se poser des questions sur les problèmes de la terre - principale source de la production alimentaire - et les conditions de sa mise en valeur.

La crise est-elle due à une mauvaise répartition de la terre entre la population agricole ? Est-elle due à une mauvaise allocation des ressources entre l'agriculture et les autres secteurs de l'économie ? Est-elle due à une mauvaise répartition des terres entre les différentes cultures vivrières et d'exportation ? Est-elle due à une mauvaise ou à une sous-utilisation des potentialités de terres arables ? Ou bien est-elle due à une insuffisance absolue des terres cultivables ?

Ce sont là autant de questions que l'on est amené à se poser et qui invitent à réfléchir sur les structures agraires et les systèmes fonciers. Mais l'Afrique est certainement le continent où la diversité des formations sociales, des systèmes de productions, des régimes fonciers et des structures agraires est la plus marquée.

Entre les structures socio-économiques rurales de l'Afrique du Nord et celles de la savane soudano sahélienne il y a une différence de nature considérable. Entre ces dernières et celles des zones forestières de la côte il y a également des différentes importantes quoique moins marquées. Aussi convient il de circonscrire quelque peu notre cadre de réflexion.

A L'exception du Maghreb ou de quelques pays comme le Soudan et l'Ethiopie où la structure foncière féodale limitait ou limite encore l'accès à la terre, on s'accorde généralement à considérer que la situation

* *Consultant des Nations Unies à l'Unitar/Dakar/Senegal*

La plus répandue en Afrique est celle de pays où cet accès est assuré même quand le rapport terre-homme n'est pas très favorable dans de rares cas comme le Rwanda. En général le rapport terre-homme est favorable et il ne se pose pas encore le problème de l'insuffisance absolue des terres. Cette situation caractérise la plupart des pays d'Afrique au Sud du Sahara. C'est à cet ensemble que nous avons choisi de limiter le cadre de notre réflexion. Il s'agira donc de pays où le problème de l'accès à la terre présente des limites relativement réduits.

1 – APERÇU DES FORMES TRADITIONNELLES DE L'ACCÈS A LA TERRE

Chevauchant sur les modes de production communautaires et les modes de production tributaires, les sociétés précoloniales lointaines africaines accusent les grandes caractéristiques relevant des formes d'organisation sociales attachées à ces deux types. Suivant les degrés d'évolution la terre était soit collectivement mise en valeur au bénéfice direct des producteurs, soit exploitée avec versement d'un tribut à un groupe social donné sans que ce versement de tribut soit nécessairement lié à l'exploitation de la terre mais plutôt à la soumission politique au groupe en question. Dans tous les cas, la terre «nourricière» était considérée comme propriété des dieux et ne pouvait faire l'objet d'appropriation privée par les hommes.

Au fur et à mesure que la société se hiérarchise, des coutumes vont s'élaborer et préciseront les rapports entre les hommes face à la terre. Ces coutumes ont rarement remis en cause l'absence du mode d'appropriation privative du sol. Le fait que les règles juridiques traditionnelles n'aient pas introduit ce droit sur la terre pourrait s'expliquer par les caractéristiques mêmes de l'économie traditionnelle :

1) L'abondance de la terre par rapport à la population et qui fait que la superficie mise en culture par une famille ou un groupe social donné ne dépendait essentiellement que de la force de travail dont disposait cette famille ou ce groupe social.

2) La caractère rudimentaire des techniques de productions, notamment l'absence d'utilisation des fertilisants qui entraînaient l'itinérance des cultures.

Les conditions dans lesquelles la production s'effectuait ne pouvaient donc en aucune manière justifier un droit de propriété qui serait sans objet. Toutefois l'absence de droit de propriété ne signifiait nullement absence de tout droit sur la terre. Le chef de la communauté (chef de village ou chef de tribu) assurait l'accès à la terre des membres de la communauté. Ceux-ci en défrichant une terre donnée, acquièrent des droits sur cette terre. Ainsi chaque famille peut disposer d'une terre pour

son usage exclusif. Quand elle s'appauvrit, elle peut en défricher de nouvelles pourvu qu'elles ne touchent pas celles déjà mises en valeur par d'autres.

En général, les droits de la famille ne se limitent pas seulement au fruit de son travail sur la terre qu'elle occupe mais aussi aux arbres fruitiers s'y trouvant. Par ailleurs la transmission par hérédité existait et se faisait soit suivant la voie patriarcale (savane sahélo-soudanaise), soit suivant la voie matriarcale (certaines régions côtière de Côte d'Ivoire, du Ghana, etc.).

En raison des conditions de facilité de travail (distance, facilité de fertilisation par la fumure animale), il arrivait que les terres à proximité des lieux d'habitation soient particulièrement recherchées et donnent lieu à contestation entre différentes familles. Cela tendait à renforcer les droits acquis sur la terre qui toutefois n'atteignaient que très rarement le droit de vente. Ce droit de vente était toutefois signalé dans certaines communautés traditionnelles comme c'était le cas par exemple dans certaines tribus du Kenya. Cela est le signe de l'apparition de la propriété individuelle de la terre.

En résumé on peut dire que dans la partie de l'Afrique qui nous intéresse ici, la propriété privée de la terre était pratiquement inconnue jusqu'à l'avènement du système colonial et que cette situation était en harmonie plus ou moins parfaite avec le système de production existant.

2 — LES TENTATIVES D'INTRODUCTION DES LOIS MODERNES

L'apparition des lois modernes dans le régime foncier africain coïncide plus ou moins avec l'introduction de l'économie monétaire et l'agriculture commerciale. Il s'agit d'une mutation provoquée essentiellement par le fait colonial. Pour ses besoins d'approvisionnement en produits tropicaux, le système colonial introduira et développera les cultures de rentes, assurera l'installation de colons blancs sur des terres propices au développement de ces cultures et instaurera l'économie monétaires pour promouvoir l'expansion de ces mêmes cultures. Dès lors l'économie traditionnelle qui jusqu'ici reposait sur l'auto-subsistance va subir des modifications significatives dont les conséquences varieront en fonction des régions (région peuplée ou peu peuplée) des zones écologiques (zones de savanes ou de forêt) des caractéristiques du type de domination (domination anglaise ou domination française) des formes de résistance opposées à la pénétration coloniale, etc. Il s'en suit que l'attitude des systèmes coloniaux face aux problèmes de la terre sera très variable suivant les territoires et à l'intérieur d'un même territoire suivant les groupes ethniques. Mais d'une manière générale (que ce soit dans l'Empire colonial britannique ou français) la tendance a été de faire coexister droit occidental et droit coutumier, propriété privée et propriété collective des terres.

Par la loi sur les domaines qui permettait d'assurer aux colons des concessions et par l'introduction du système d'immatriculation des droits fonciers, le système colonial tendait à modeler les structures traditionnelles à son image, bien que proclamant sa volonté de respecter les coutumes. L'immatriculation pouvait donner des droits de propriété protégés par la loi moderne. Mais la plupart du temps les populations locales n'en voyaient pas la nécessité. Seuls les colons et les groupes sociaux qui se constitueront dans leurs sillages auront recours à ce système pour s'assurer le contrôle de terres étendues qui seront consacrées aux cultures d'exportation. Toutefois avec le temps le phénomène aura un impact beaucoup plus étendu et au moment de l'indépendance des formes de propriété privée de la terre étaient existantes dans beaucoup de pays africains. Les états nouvellement indépendants ont le plus souvent reconduit les règles juridiques établies par le système colonial.

Il convient donc de se demander comment se pose aujourd'hui le problème de la terre tant du point de vue de l'accès que du point de vue de la mise en valeur depuis bientôt deux décennies d'indépendance.

3 - L'ACCES A LA TERRE AUJOURD'HUI

La population africaine représente 10% de la population mondiale, tandis que l'Afrique dispose de 25% des terres arables mondiales, soient 732 millions d'ha. Les terres cultivées ne représentent que 27,8% des terres potentiellement arables, c'est-à-dire «les terres qui semblent présenter un potentiel économique agricole en l'état actuel de la technologie »(1). De ces chiffres, on peut déduire que la pression sur la terre est encore relativement faible dans le continent, notamment dans la plupart des pays situés au Sud du Sahara. Ces pays se caractérisent également par la faible concentration du régime foncier. A l'exception de quelques zones de grandes plantations modernes, la petite exploitation de dimension familiale est dominante.

L'insuffisance effective des terres n'est réellement ressentie dans certains pays que dans les régions où le problème de l'eau se pose avec acuité, en raison du climat aride et de la rareté des pluies (zones sahéliennes notamment). Cependant même dans ces régions, le plus souvent, le problème n'est pas celui d'une insuffisance absolue des terres arables mais plutôt celui d'une pénurie de moyens pour mettre à la disposition de l'agriculture les nappes superficielles et souterraines existantes. Aussi nous semble-t-il que dans la partie de l'Afrique qui nous intéresse dans la grande majorité des cas, le problème de l'accès à la terre se situe au niveau de la rationalisation de cet accès plutôt qu'à celui d'une véritable redistribution.

(1) Etude des tendances de l'offre et de la demande mondiales des principaux produits agricoles, OCDE, Paris, 1976.

Les trois grands types d'exploitation que l'on rencontre sont : l'exploitation traditionnelle qui est la plus courante et qui est régie par le régime foncier coutumier ; à l'autre extrême, il y a les grandes exploitations régies par le droit moderne ; enfin les formes intermédiaires qui empruntent des caractéristiques propres aux deux premières.

Les mesures prises par les gouvernements tendent à adapter les structures agraires aux types de développement souhaités pour le monde rural. Dans beaucoup de pays (Mali, Niger, Haute Volta, etc.) le régime coutumier est considéré comme correspondant à une certaine forme d'organisation sociale reposant sur la famille élargie. Tant que cette forme d'organisation sociale existe, on ne juge pas nécessaire de modifier profondément le droit foncier qui lui est attaché. A part quelques déclarations de principe affirmant que la terre appartient à ceux qui la travaillent ou qu'elle est propriété éminente de l'état qui la laisse en usufruit à ceux qui la travaillent, très peu de mesures ont été concrètement prises pour modifier le régime foncier. Dans d'autres, comme le Malawi, par exemple, qui connaissait le même genre de situation (85% des terres relevaient du régime coutumier) on s'est acheminé vers le système de propriété individuelle des terres qui a été jugé nécessaire pour susciter des progrès dans l'agriculture en encourageant les investissements.

Dans des pays comme la Tanzanie, l'accent est mis sur l'exploitation collective des terres avec le soutien de l'état dans le cadre des villages Ujainaa. Au Kenya où de vastes plantations étaient détenues par des étrangers, la politique à consister à racheter ces terres qui sont redistribuer aux nationaux avec un système de crédit leur permettant de rentabiliser ces terres et de rembourser les fonds prêtés. Par ailleurs, une politique systématique d'enregistrement des terres tend à généraliser la propriété privée. Une raison entre autres invoquée est de mettre fin aux conflits fréquents qui ont lieu autour de l'appartenance des terres.

Tels sont à grands traits les types d'évolution qui se dessinent. Elles oscillent entre deux extrêmes : le premier est le maintien du régime coutumier et l'agriculture itinérante qui lui est liée et qui risque si elle se poursuit de façon permanente de poser des problèmes écologiques en détériorant de vastes étendues de terres. Le second est celui d'une appropriation privée systématique qui risque de conduire rapidement à de très graves injustices dans la répartition des terres, des propriétaires absents du monde rural pouvant acheter et accaparer de grandes superficies de terres riches. Une juste solution devrait être recherchée entre ces deux extrêmes. Notre sentiment est que la solution la plus convenable est celle qui tiendrait à la fois compte des structures sociales existantes dans le monde rural et des nécessités de progrès dans l'agriculture. Cette solution se rapprocherait beaucoup du système des villages Ujainaa. Ainsi l'état mènerait une politique de regroupement des paysans et leur fournirait les moyens nécessaires pour développer une agriculture intensive qui économiserait les terres. Les paysans pourraient exploiter les terres en

commun. Bien entendu au départ avant qu'ils ne soient convaincus de l'efficacité du travail en commun chaque famille pourrait avoir sa terre, l'ensemble du village détenant certains moyens de travail qui dépassent les possibilités d'une seule famille. Il s'agit là d'une coopérative villageoise de production qui pourrait servir de base à une forme d'organisation du monde rural permettant d'épargner les terres, d'élever la productivité les rendements.

Il va sans dire que la réalisation d'une telle politique (à distinguer des simples coopératives de vente qui sont les plus courantes) suppose une ferme volonté des états à engager le développement rural dans une telle voie et aux bénéfices prioritaires des producteurs. Ce qui écarte le désir de prélever des surplus agricoles excessifs par des taux d'intérêts élevés, des prix aux producteurs bas ou tout autre procédé.

4 – L'AMELIORATION DES CONDITIONS DE PRODUCTION

Tant qu'il s'agit de communautés peu peuplées et en croissance plutôt faible, les systèmes agraires traditionnels pouvaient à partir d'instruments de travail rudimentaires (instruments aratoires) et techniques culturales très simples (jachères) constituer des structures agricoles viables ou les besoins alimentaires étaient généralement satisfaits. Mais dans les états nouveaux d'Afrique où on relève des taux de croissance fort élevés de la population, le besoin urgent se fait sentir d'accroître significativement la production agricole et en même temps de prévenir l'usure des terres. Il devient donc indispensable de passer à une agriculture intensive. Celle-ci était jusqu'ici réservée aux cultures d'exportation. Mais depuis les récentes crises, les initiatives se multiplient pour améliorer les conditions de production dans l'agriculture traditionnelle. Aussi bien les états que les institutions de financement affirment de plus en plus leur disponibilité à apporter leur concours aux petits producteurs paysans. Dans un certain nombre de pays des systèmes de crédit ont été institués dans ce but et des structures d'encadrement de la paysannerie mises en place. L'objectif est d'apprendre aux paysans des techniques nouvelles et de leur assurer l'accès aux inputs. Mais jusqu'ici ces expériences restent fort limitées dans leur dimension et les conditions dans lesquelles elles s'opèrent ne permettent pas toujours aux paysans d'en tirer de grands bénéfices.

Ainsi les coûts des inputs sont trop élevés et les crédits sont accordés à des taux d'intérêts qui découragent les paysans parce que récupérant tous les gains de production supplémentaire. Cela rend particulièrement malaisée la modernisation de l'agriculture traditionnelle à partir de techniques importées très coûteuses et dont les prix s'élevent constamment.

Les solutions de rechange qui devraient être recherchées dans le développement de l'artisan et de petite industrie locale ne semblent pas non plus progresser. Cependant c'est dans cette direction que les

pouvoirs publics devraient orienter les efforts pour ne recourir que de façon limitée et sélective aux techniques étrangères.

Par ailleurs, les offices étatiques qui dans la plupart des pays ont le monopole de la commercialisation et qui fixent les prix, imposent aux producteurs des prix trop bas qui n'encouragent pas à accroître la production surtout la production vivrière. Les états devraient s'efforcer de prélever moins sur les revenus paysans qui sont très bas et de réaffecter à la transformation de l'agriculture une bonne partie des ressources provenant de ce secteur, en accordant une attention particulière à l'agriculture vivrière qui regroupe les petites exploitations traditionnelles.

5 – DES SYSTEMES AGRICOLES VIABLES

En définitive le problème de la réforme agraire dans la plupart des pays d'Afrique au Sud du Sahara se ramène à adapter à des sociétés en évolution des systèmes agraires qui dans le passé ont fait la preuve de leur viabilité détruite par l'insertion au système capitaliste mondial le développement d'économie nationales extraverties. La division internationale du travail et le rôle qu'il impartit à l'agriculture africaine constituent des obstacles à l'autorestructuration de ce secteur pour s'adapter aux données nouvelles et générer de nouveaux systèmes viables.

On peut donc difficilement imaginer des solutions satisfaisantes qui ne remettent pas en cause cette division internationale du travail. Cette remise en cause procédera à une réorientation des objectifs fixés à l'agriculture en fonction des besoins des populations locales et non plus en fonction de la demande du marché mondial. Les transformations structurelles que ce changement suppose entraîneraient la reconstitution de systèmes agricoles solides capables d'impulser le développement. Le monde paysan organisé, structuré et allégé du poids des prélèvements et aidé par les pouvoirs publics pourrait alors assurer une production alimentaire suffisante. Et c'est ainsi seulement que les mesures visant à la modernisation du monde rural (système de crédit, formation, vulgarisation, coopératives de production et de vente, contrôle par les organisations paysannes de toutes les étapes du processus touchant à leurs activités, de la production à la commercialisation), pourraient trouver leur pleine efficacité.

SUMMARY

In This short article, we have tried to point out a few of the crucial issues faced when dealing with the problem of agricultural reform in Africa South of Sahara. The analysis is limited to this area simply because the problems of land tenure are more or less the same although different enough from what could be noticed in North Africa.

In most of the countries in Africa South of Sahara, the restrictions to land property are comparatively reduced since the relation between man and land is favourable in most cases. The land tenures inherited from the colonial system have been slightly modified. They allow the coexistence of western land and traditional customary law, private property and collective property of land. Here the problem of agricultural reform is not so much a more equitable distribution of land but rather a question of the rationalisation of the use of land to avoid deterioration of soils and ecological imbalance. Naturally this rationalisation begins with the fight against water shortage and the evolution towards a more intensive agriculture. To achieve this, it is essential that most of the surplus yielded by agriculture is reinvested in it. The reorganization of the agricultural sector would be made easier by bringing the scattered peasants together. This could lead to a more efficient utilization of investments made by the state and those that are collectively carried out by the peasants. From this point of view, the « Ujamaa Villages » experience in Tanzania is very valuable.

LE DEVELOPPEMENT DU CAPITALISME AGRAIRE ET L'EMERGENCE DE PETITS PLANTEURS A L'ILE MAURICE

Par

*Raj VIRAHSAWMI **

INTRODUCTION

La spécificité du développement historique de l'île Maurice est qu'elle n'a pas connu le pré-capitalisme. Jadis inhabitée, son histoire est née avec l'expansion du mercantilisme, lui-même étant une étape de transition vers le capitalisme. Si bien que, contrairement aux autres pays d'Afrique, l'île Maurice n'a pas connu l'existence d'une paysannerie issue d'un mode de production féodal ou «tributaire» (1). Et, pourtant, il existe bel et bien dans l'île une classe de petits producteurs qui, d'ailleurs constitue la majorité de la population rurale. Comment s'est-elle formée ? C'est le développement du capitalisme, plus précisément la concentration du capital même qui l'a engendrée. Dans cet article, nous allons examiner la nature du développement du capitalisme à Maurice, son corrolaire qui est la concentration du capital et le mécanisme inévitable qui donna naissance à la petite production agricole.

Notons, par ailleurs, que ce sont ces petits cultivateurs de canne à sucre qui retiennent notre attention puisque les autres cultivateurs (cultures vivrières, tabac, thé, etc.) dans une petite île de plantation de canne à sucre sont très marginalisés. Les petits planteurs de cannes, comme on les définit chez nous, sont au nombre de 30.000 et cultivent environ 30 % des terres sous cannes. L'île Maurice a une superficie de 1.860 km² dont la plupart des terres cultivables sont consacrées à la culture de la canne. Ajoutons que sa population atteindra bientôt les 900.000 habitants et que le sucre constitue 87 % de nos exportations.

I. Le développement du capitalisme

Un relais mercantiliste

Successivement pour le mercantilisme arabe, portugais, hollandais et français (jusqu'au début du 19^{ème} siècle) l'île Maurice a été un RELAIS MERCANTILISTE de par sa position stratégique sur la route du commerce maritime dans l'Océan Indien. Elle a changé de main en fonction de la montée ou de la décadence des puissances mercantilistes mondiales.

* *Assistant en Economie Rurale à l'Université de l'île Maurice*

Mais, c'est sous l'occupation française (de 1721 à 1810) que le rôle de relais mercantile a été le plus étendu et le plus significatif historiquement. Car, premièrement, cette période a été marquée par un véritable peuplement par des européens (marchands, marins, soldats fonctionnaires et autres) et des africains venus avec la traite négrière. Deuxièmement, à partir de la deuxième moitié du 18^{ème} siècle, l'île Maurice devint même un grand comptoir maritime, s'ordonnant au commerce d'entrepôt, ouvert aux mercantilistes de toutes nationalités. Elle assumait le rôle spécifique de la périphérie qui est de canaliser vers elle les marchandises d'Orient et de transférer ces marchandises ensuite vers l'Europe et même vers les Etats Unis.

Il s'est aussitôt développé une haute bourgeoisie créole (2) (d'origine française) à vocation marchande. Ceci est très significatif dans la mesure où, comme nous le verrons plus tard, cette classe dominante va sous l'occupation anglaise investir dans le secteur du sucre, créant ainsi une interpénétration du capital commercial et du capital sucrier. Cette interpénétration se présente, donc, comme un début de la concentration du capital.

Troisièmement, l'occupation française fut aussi la période de grandes concessions de terre allouées à la bourgeoisie d'origine française. L'accès à la terre quasiment limité à la bourgeoisie d'origine française constitue même, comme nous verrons plus tard, un germe de la concentration des terres.

L'île Maurice fut un relais mercantiliste à main d'œuvre esclave. Elle connut un régime mercantilo-esclavagiste peu commun, puisque la grosse part de la main d'œuvre esclaves était orientée vers le secteur dominant : les activités liées au commerce extérieur (embarquement, débarquement des marchandises, constructions des magasins, entretien du port. Dans cette division du travail au sein du système mercantiliste, l'île Maurice est approvisionnée en produits alimentaires à partir des îles voisines. On dit que l'île Maurice était le port, l'île de la Réunion (île voisine) le grenier.

Economie de plantation semi-esclavagiste

Au début du 19^{ème} siècle, la fin de la guerre napoléonienne guerre inter-impérialiste, établit en définitive la suprématie de l'hégémonie britannique tant au niveau de l'Océan Indien qu'au niveau mondial. L'île Maurice, point stratégique sur la route des Indes, conquise par les britanniques en 1810, devint une base militaire.

En vue de l'auto-financement de l'administration coloniale et pour contribuer en partie au financement de la base militaire, le colonialisme britannique convertit l'île en une économie de plantation de canne. Ceci entre également dans le cadre de la politique britannique qui était de diversifier ses sources d'approvisionnement en canne à sucre et de ne pas

se limiter aux seules Antilles (3). Déjà en 1835, 40.000 arpents * de terre sont sous canne (4) et 95 % des exportations étaient acheminées vers la Grande Bretagne (5).

Le passage de l'état de relais mercantiliste à l'économie de plantation semi-esclavagiste a été relativement facile étant donné l'existence des conditions internes suivantes :

(a) L'île Maurice, inhabitée avant l'ère mercantiliste européenne, n'a pas connu un mode de production pré-capitaliste qui eut pu offrir une résistance à la transition vers le capitalisme.

(b) L'accumulation primitive du capital (le processus historique qui sépare le producteur direct de son moyen de production (6) n'apparaissait pas comme une nécessité historique. Il existait sur place une classe d'esclaves africains constituée par la traite négrière avant l'abolition formelle décidée en 1813 par les Britanniques, et même après l'abolition formelle, par la traite clandestine (7). L'esclave est déjà démuné des moyens de production lui-même étant considéré comme un instrument de travail. Par contre, le mercantiliste français et la classe marchande autochtone avaient déjà accaparé les moyens de production propres aux activités mercantiles.

(c) Les terres, moyen de production principal pendant le développement de la canne, ont été déjà privatisées en grande partie ; comme nous l'avons déjà vu, sous l'administration française qui avait accordé de grandes concessions aux immigrants d'origine française (8). L'administration anglaise n'a fait qu'étendre les concessions, entre autres, à des fonctionnaires et entrepreneurs britanniques.

(d) La superstructure coloniale a joué un rôle moteur, au début, dans la transformation de la base économique (l'ensemble des rapports de production). Le relais mercantile est relégué rapidement au second plan et l'industrie sucrière est poussée par l'administration anglaise à devenir le secteur clé de l'économie. Par la suite, bien sûr, le développement des forces productives une fois stimulé eut des actions-retours sur mes rapports de production.

On a défini cette première phase de l'économie de plantation comme un mode de production semi-esclavagiste. Il nous semble nécessaire d'établir une démarcation entre la forme esclavagiste antique et celle de l'époque de l'impérialisme colonial où les esclaves produisent pour un marché international capitaliste.

* 1 arpent 0:4047 hectare.

«...L'économie esclavagiste proprement dite (dont les différentes formes vont du système patriarcal, orienté avant tout vers la consommation personnelle, aux plantations proprement dites, travaillant pour le marché mondial...». *C. Marx, Le Capital Livre 3ème, Tome III, p. 183.*

Néanmoins, ce régime de plantation semi-esclavagiste ne put durer plus d'une vingtaine d'années. La faiblesse de ce régime réside dans le maintien du processus de reproduction au niveau économique (9). A l'intérieur, il y avait les luttes de classe qui prenaient la forme d'évasion d'incendies des champs de canne et de mutineries à l'intérieur des plantations. A l'extérieur, le capitalisme montant luttait contre les forces féodo-mercantilistes pour l'abolition de la traite puis de l'esclavage. On ne pouvait plus compter sur un afflux régulier de main d'oeuvre d'esclave de l'extérieur pour reproduire la force de travail esclave. A l'intérieur, la forte natalité des esclaves rendait la situation de reproduction encore plus difficile.

Blocage de reproduction du régime.

Le marché mondial du sucre en pleine expansion

Par contre, les rapports de production étaient une entrave au développement des forces productives. Il était dans l'intérêt de la plantocratie mauricienne et du colonialisme anglais de raboter les «imperfections» des rapports de production.

L'économie de plantation semi-capitaliste (1835–1870)

Le passage du régime semi-esclavagiste à celui d'un mode de production semi-capitaliste a été aussi rapide et aussi facile que la transition antérieure (du mercantilisme au régime semi-esclavagiste).

La plantocratie mauricienne tout comme le colonialisme anglais eurent tout à gagner de l'abolition de l'esclavage en 1835. La première obtint une compensation de 2 millions pour libérer les esclaves (ce qui lui donna un capital initial pour investir dans l'importation de main d'oeuvre indienne) ; ensuite l'administration anglaise lui accorde un délai de cinq ans pour libérer les esclaves : ce qu'on appela le système d'apprentissage, qui en fait offrait aux ex-proprétaires d'esclaves une période de répit afin d'organiser et de s'adapter à la nouvelle source de main d'oeuvre indienne (main d'oeuvre sur contrat communément appelé l'engagement). La plantocratie eut en outre bénéficié de tout l'appui de l'administration britannique pour organiser l'engagement.

Cette transition sans douleur est d'ailleurs reflétée dans le fait que la production sucrière n'a subi qu'une très légère baisse en 1835 et en 1836, puis est remontée de plus belle pour tripler vers les années soixante-dix.

«L'esclave était aboli, mais la plantation et la plantocratie demeuraient». (11). Mais, à Maurice les esclaves affranchis ne devinrent pas petits propriétaires de canne comme à la Jamaïque. Ecartés dans leur grande majorité des frontières de la plantation ils s'installèrent à la marge des montagnes et le long des côtes, ou travaillèrent en ville (12).

L'immigration indienne créa un quasi-salariat sous contrat dont une petite partie de la rémunération était payée en nature. Bien que cette nouvelle structure de production se rapprochât un peu plus du capitalisme agraire, elle conservait néanmoins trop de vestiges esclavagistes pour qu'on puisse la définir ainsi. Le travailleur indien ou «l'engagé» n'était pas, à proprement dit, un prolétaire «libre». Il est cantonné juridiquement sous contrat à une plantation particulière, et dans la réalité, il lui était très difficile de changer de région même après l'expiration de son contrat (normalement de cinq ans). Où pouvait-il aller alors qu'il n'existait guère de villages dans l'île, alors que l'accès à la terre lui était interdit, et alors que le squatting était formellement interdit depuis 1838 ?

Il n'avait plus que le choix de rester dans le «camp» de la même plantation ou de retourner en Inde. Par ailleurs, bon nombre d'immigrants prirent la route vers le pays natal à la fin de leur contrat (13). «L'engagé» était également soumis à la corvée que nos grand-parents encore en vie rappellent avec beaucoup d'amertume. Alors que la corvée en Europe était une pratique féodale qui obligeait les serfs à travailler gratuitement pour un certain nombre de jours au compte du seigneur féodal, à Maurice, par contre, elle était une séquelle du régime esclavagiste. Elle était, d'abord, pratiquée par l'administration coloniale, qui comme une forme d'impôt, imposait aux propriétaires d'esclaves de fournir gratuitement à l'Etat chaque année quatre jours de travail d'esclave pour chaque esclave qu'ils possédaient. (14) Ces esclaves étaient utilisés par l'Etat aux fins de réparation des routes et à d'autres travaux d'infrastructure.

Par extension, cette pratique de la corvée a été utilisée par la plantocratie pendant le régime de l'engagement (travail sous contrat) c'est-à-dire après l'abolition de l'esclavage.

Sous maints prétextes — absence au champs, non-respect au patron, faible rendement du travail etc — les «engagés» étaient obligés de venir travailler gratuitement pour le propriétaire de la plantation les dimanches. Ici, la tradition orale mauricienne dépeint d'une façon très riche les circonstances dans lesquelles les engagés subissaient la corvée.

Il est à noter que dans le féodalisme européen la corvée était un moyen d'extorquer le surtravail des serfs. Par contre à Maurice, la situation était différente. La corvée était appliquée non à des serfs mais à un quasi-prolétariat qui, de toute façon, travaillait ordinairement du lundi au samedi. La corvée dans ce contexte était utilisée à des fins coercitives pour décourager l'absentéisme chez l'engagé ou pour les

maintenir dans un état de soumission vis-à-vis des propriétaires de plantation.

L'extorsion du surtravail de l'engagé prit la forme de la plus-value comme dans le capitalisme pur. C'est pour cela que nous refusons d'appeler «l'engagement» «un nouveau système d'esclavage» comme le fait le professeur H. Tinker. (15)

De plus, nous nous abstenons de le définir comme un régime de capitalisme agraire pur, puisque le travailleur engagé n'était pas «libre». Comme l'esclave il faisait partie intégrante de la plantation, et ne pouvait pas changer de patron. Il n'était pas non plus un esclave puisqu'à la fin de son contrat il pouvait retourner en Inde. D'ailleurs, après l'afflux considérable d'immigrants indiens qui dura jusqu'à 1870, le nombre de retours vers l'Inde a été en moyenne supérieur au nombre d'arrivées jusqu'à la fin de l'immigration indienne en 1977. (16)

C'est pour ces raisons que nous préférons appeler le régime de «l'engagement» un régime de semi-capitalisme, préparant la voie à un capitalisme agraire.

La concentration du capital et le développement du capitalisme agraire

Le passage du régime de plantation semi-capitaliste au capitalisme agraire constitue une autre étape très rapide, amorcée vers la fin du 19ème siècle. Mais cette transition se faisait à un moment où le processus de concentration des terres et des usines de cannes était déjà en cours. Si bien que l'île Maurice a brulé l'étape de la libre concurrence, phase qu'a infailliblement connu le capitalisme européen.

Le nombre d'usines de cannes avait atteint son point maximal de 259 en 1859. Depuis, le nombre n'a cessé de décroître, atteignant 85 en 1901, 50 en 1924 et 21 aujourd'hui (17).

Le processus de centralisation des usines est toujours à l'ordre du jour. La plantocratie, par la voix de son président (le syndicat patronal – le Mauritius Employers' Federation), pense qu'aujourd'hui 14 usines suffiraient pour broyer toutes les cannes de l'île (18).

La centralisation des usines entraîne invariablement une centralisation des terres puisque toutes les usines sont rattachées à d'énormes plantations (champs). L'usine et les champs sont parties intégrantes d'une même société d'exploitation.

La centralisation des usines et des terres a été depuis 1859 un processus historique inébranlable, qui n'a été mis en cause ni par la pénurie ni par l'abondance de la main d'œuvre, ni par l'accroissement ni par la stagnation de la production de la canne, ni par les prix élevés ni par les bas prix du sucre sur le marché extérieur.

S'agissant des prix du sucre, le pays a connu de bons moments jusqu'à 1900, puis de 1940 à 1976. Les prix ont été excessivement bas de 1901 à 1910, puis pendant la grande crise du capitalisme international à partir de 1928. La main d'œuvre fut abondante avec l'afflux

d'immigrants indiens de 1841 à 1870 ; puis on connut des périodes de pénurie avec le reflux de cette main d'œuvre et avec la cessation de l'immigration. La stagnation de la production de la canne a été très marquée entre 1871 et 1900, puis entre 1922 et 1950.

Néanmoins, la centralisation des terres et des usines s'est effectué à un rythme quasi-régulier au fil des années. Ces facteurs externes peuvent avoir accéléré ou ralenti la concentration du capital mais ce qui est sûr c'est qu'ils n'en sont pas les causes. La concentration du capital n'est qu'un processus propre au développement et à la maturité du capitalisme lui-même :

- Comme l'a montré Marx : «l'accumulation accélère la baisse du taux de profit dans la mesure où elle implique la concentration du travail sur une grande échelle, d'où une composition plus élevée du capital. D'autre part, la baisse du taux de profit accélère à son tour la concentration du capital et la centralisation par la dépossession des capitalistes de moindre importance, l'expropriation du dernier carré des producteurs directs, chez qui il restait encore quelque chose à exproprier. Ce qui d'un autre côté accélère à son tour l'accumulation, quant à la masse, bien que le taux de l'accumulation baisse le taux de profit.» Karl Marx *Le Capital* Livre 3ème, Tome I, p. 254. Edition Sociale.

Concentration et fragmentation des terres.

Comme le montrent les actes notariés des plantations, (19) il existait bien un marché des terres dans la seconde moitié du 19ème siècle, et beaucoup de plantations changeaient de propriétaire et de superficie. Néanmoins, l'accès à la terre pour les travailleurs immigrés et les esclaves fut quasi-impossible jusqu'à la fin du 19ème siècle, sauf dans les cas de squatting, bien sûr. Par contre, la population métissée «Gens de couleur» commença à acquérir des terres vers la fin de l'occupation française. En 1788, un propriétaire «de couleur» avait 270 arpents de terre et 20 esclaves dans le Sud de l'île (20). Par ailleurs, l'administration anglaise avait affranchi les métis dès 1829 (21) en vue de s'appuyer sur eux dans les moments de conflits avec la plantocratie locale.

La petite production de cannes à sucre «les petits planteurs de canne» est apparue à partir de la fin du 19ème siècle (22). L'acquisition de terres par les petits planteurs indiens s'est accélérée au début du 20ème siècle. En 1910, ils cultivaient déjà 47,888 arpents de cannes soit 31.8 % de la surface totale sous cannes ; en 1915, ils avaient atteint 68,000 arpents et en 1921, ils atteignaient en totalité la superficie maximale de 82,400 arpents soit 45.9 % du total des terres sous cannes (23). Notons que c'était une période de bons prix du sucre, et que la superficie totale sous canne s'était également accrue. Mais à partir de 1922, c'est la chute des prix jusqu'à la 2ème guerre mondiale. La super-

ficie totale des terres sous cannes et celle des propriétés des petits planteurs décroissaient. Néanmoins, l'acquisition de terres par les petits planteurs indiens fut un processus qui continua malgré la chute des prix du sucre, quoique avec une ampleur réduite.

Parallèlement, ce qui étonne, c'est comment en si peu de temps, les petits cultivateurs ont pu acquérir près de la moitié des terres sous cannes. Ce qui nous emmène à essayer de comprendre ce mécanisme de l'acquisition de terres à Maurice, surtout au niveau de la petite production.

Alors que dans la plupart des pays du monde, l'existence de la petite production agricole n'est que le produit d'un mode de production précapitaliste, à Maurice, elle n'est apparue qu'avec le développement du capitalisme, voire avec le processus de concentration du capital. Donc, il serait plus juste, de par leur origine, de définir les petits planteurs de canne dans le cadre du «petit capitalisme». Or, rien n'est plus vrai que : «... celui-ci (le petit capitalisme) n'est pas un vestige du passé, mais un produit de la concentration même». (24)

Cette thèse est partagée par l'auteur à partir d'une étude sur les actes notariés des planteurs et des terres de petits planteurs dans deux régions de l'Ile (25). A mesure que la bourgeoisie agraire révolutionnait les instruments de production, en remplaçant la culture atelée par les tracteurs, la traction animale par des locomotives pour le transport de la canne, les usines à moulin à vente par celles à vapeur, à mesure que les forces productrices se développaient, la production de la canne et du sucre se faisait de plus en plus à grande échelle. Alors les plantations et les usines se centralisèrent, et par conséquent certains durent fermer. L'accumulation du capital exigeant ce mouvement de concentration du capital, or, les plantations redéfinissent constamment leurs frontières. De nouvelles terres sont annexées, d'une part. D'autre part, des terres, surtout celles éloignées des usines centralisées, ou celles marginalement fertiles sont vendues.

Les terres non-annexées aux plantations existantes ont été morcellées et vendues en lots. Il y eut, en fait des vagues de morcellement : d'abord des grands lots ont été vendus, puis ces grands lots ont été morcellés davantage. Ce processus a continué jusqu'à ce que les lots mis sur le marché aient été assez petits pour que les travailleurs immigrés indiens puissent en acquérir. Ils le faisaient soit avec leur propre épargne soit et c'est le cas le plus commun d'ailleurs en l'achetant à l'ex-proprétaire qui leur consentait alors des facilités de paiement. A en juger par les actes notariés (26). Les terres achetées de 1910 à 1921, au moment où les prix du sucre étaient élevés ont été complètement acquittées généralement au bout de 3 à 5 ans.

Dans ce mouvement contradictoire d'annexion et de fragmentation des terres, une classe de petits producteurs agricoles est née. L'accès à la terre des travailleurs agricoles indiens fut un tournant historique. Alors, qu'antérieurement ils devaient forcément habiter dans les

«camps» des plantations même après leur contrat, désormais ils pouvaient se libérer de ces contraintes atroces ; ils pouvaient créer des villages, et devenir un prolétariat libre par rapport à la plantation. En effet, le premier quart du 20^{ème} siècle a été le cadre d'un grand mouvement de population des camps des plantations vers des villages, nouvellement créés à la périphérie des plantations. En fait cette population était devenue un semi-prolétariat, dans la mesure où elle allait travailler à la fois pour le patron des plantations et à la fois pour elle-même sur les nouvelles terres.

En ce qui concerne la plantation, celle-ci allait faire un pas qui perfectionnerait les rapports de production capitalistes.

Cristallisation du capitalisme agraire.

Au début du 20^{ème} siècle, bien qu'il existât un certain marché de terres et de capitaux, il n'existait pas par contre de marché libre de main d'œuvre. À défaut d'un marché libre du travail, le flux de la main d'œuvre importée de l'Inde pour le compte des plantations particulières alimentait jusqu'à la fin du 19^{ème} siècle tant bien que mal les plantations en expansion. Mais à partir de la fin du 19^{ème} siècle, la situation de la main d'œuvre indienne a constitué une contrainte pour la plantocratie. Deux luttes populaires simultanées éliminèrent cette source de main d'œuvre.

Premièrement, la résistance des immigrants indiens face à l'atrocité des conditions de travail dans les plantations, prit la forme de retours en Inde à l'expiration de leur contrat de cinq ans. On notera que dès 1880 jusqu'à la fin de l'engagement en 1923, le reflux des travailleurs indiens vers l'Inde excédait, pour la plupart des années, le nouveau flux d'immigrants vers l'île Maurice (27). Deuxièmement, la lutte des nationalistes indiens en Inde mit un frein à l'émigration indienne vers les plantations d'outre-mer.

Face à la pénurie de main d'œuvre à Maurice, on aurait attendu une grande concurrence entre les propriétaires des plantations pour acquérir la main d'œuvre sur place. Mais, ceci ne pouvait être le cas puisque jusqu'au début du 20^{ème} siècle, les plantations conservaient encore des vestiges de l'esclavagisme dans la mesure où la main d'œuvre indienne, immobilisée dans les «camps» des plantations, faisait partie intégrante de ces plantations. Même à la fin de son contrat le travailleur indien ne pouvait quitter le camp. Où irait-il habiter puisque dans cette petite île où l'accès à la terre lui était interdit ? Il n'existait alors de villages hors des plantations et le squatting comme nous l'avons déjà vu était interdit.

Paradoxalement, ce n'est que l'accès des travailleurs de plantations à la terre qui pouvait débloquer la situation et créer un marché libre de travail. Le morcellement des plantations marginales, la vente des terres aux travailleurs indiens, la création de villages au alentours

de leurs petits champs, libéreraient les «engagés» des «camps» des plantations. Ils pouvaient désormais offrir leur force de travail non plus à un seul patron, mais à plusieurs.

L'apparition de ce marché libre du travail fut un facteur décisif qui entraîna une organisation du travail à grande échelle et encouragea davantage la concentration des plantations. Les plantations en expansion pouvaient concurrencer les plantations de moindre importance sur le plan de la main d'œuvre disponible sur place.

L'apparition de la petite production de canne à sucre fut un avantage tant pour les ex-immigrants indiens que pour la plantocratie. Pour les premiers ce fut d'abord la libération de la contrainte des camps. Pour la plantocratie qui possédait aussi les usines, il a été alors possible d'accumuler le capital en achetant la force du travail directement, en faisant travailler ces nouveaux sous-prolétaires dans ses champs ou indirectement en achetant leurs cannes.

Notons, par ailleurs, qu'au début il y avait même une concurrence entre les usiniers pour s'approvisionner en cannes auprès des petits planteurs. Cette concurrence était bien sûr à l'avantage de ceux-ci puisqu'elle faisait monter le prix d'achat de leurs cannes. C'était un petit souffle de libre concurrence, bien temporaire d'ailleurs. Mais, en général, comme nous l'avons vu l'île Maurice a brulé l'étape de la libre concurrence à cause de la concentration du capital dès la naissance du capitalisme mauricien.

Ce petit souffle de concurrence est apparu alors qu'il existait plus d'une cinquantaine d'usines. Mais bien vite, la centralisation plus poussée des usines (une trentaine au début du second moitié du 20ème siècle) préparait la base matérielle du capitalisme monopoliste. Avec seulement une poignée d'usines en place, la plantocratie pouvait mieux s'entendre tacitement et supprimer la concurrence en son sein. Avec l'aide de l'état, elle fixa un prix commun pour l'achat des cannes aux petits planteurs et institua le système de «factory area». Des zones géographiques sont définies ce qui force chaque groupe de petits planteurs à vendre leur canne à une usine spécifique. Le «factory area» n'est autre qu'une forme de cartel au profit de la plantocratie.

AUJOURD'HUI

Les petits planteurs, en général, ont jusqu'ici préservé leurs terres acquise dans le passé. Mais, à partir de la fin de la première moitié, de 20ème siècle, l'accès à des nouvelles terres ayant été quasi-impossible, leurs terres (existantes) ont été alors constamment fragmentées par l'héritage. Le nombre de petits planteurs cultivant moins de 10 arpents est passé de 13,360 en 1947 à 28,708 en 1974 (28). Et, aujourd'hui, près de la moitié de petits planteurs possèdent moins d'un arpent de terre. Comme le processus de fragmentation continue, l'avenir de petits planteurs est menacé. Déjà pour la grande majorité de cette classe, la culture de la canne n'offre qu'un revenu secondaire.

Par contre, à partir de 1951 alors que la Commonwealth Sugar Agreement assurait un marché et un prix garanti pour le sucre mauricien en Grande Bretagne, les plantations n'ont cessé de s'étendre en superficie, en absorbant des terres antérieurement sous d'autres cultures ou sous forêts.

La plantocratie a dépassé la phase simple de concentration du capital. Elle a transformé le capital sucrier en capital financier. Les sociétés de plantations, autrefois des entreprises, tout en gardant les mêmes noms, sont devenues de véritables «holdings» qui ont investi dans d'autres holdings, ou dans des entreprises dans le secteur du sucre comme dans les autres secteurs traditionnels et modernes de l'économie mauricienne. Il y eut même dans les années cinquante et soixante des investissements à l'extérieur du pays, ce qui fait que jusqu'à maintenant le flux des profits est supérieur au reflux des profits à l'extérieur de Maurice.

C'est une oligarchie financière, contrôlant une dizaine des «super-holdings» qui domine la vie économique du pays. La plupart de ces holdings clés se sont formés à partir du capital sucrier, ont petit à petit encerclé le capital commercial lié au commerce import-export et l'ont prit sous contrôle au détriment du capital étranger et du capital de moindre importance. Ces super-holdings detiennent le monopole absolu dans le secteur sucrier, le commerce extérieur, les assurances, les docks, et dans les nouveaux secteurs que sont le tourisme, l'agro-industrie (liée à la production alimentaire), l'import-substitution. Le capitalisme mauricien a bel et bien passé au stade du capitalisme monopoliste, mais un capitalisme dépendant et dominé puisque l'accumulation du capital s'y fait dans le sillage de la division internationale du travail existante.

FOOTNOTES

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2. Non dans le sens mauricien où le créole est quelqu'un fortement d'origine africaine.
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4. Mauritius Chamber of Commerce – Centenary Year Book 1853-1953.
5. Mauritius Almanach 1835.
6. Le Capital – K. Marx – Livre Ier Tome III E.S.
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8. Le domaine de Bernanés et le début du sucre -- A.Toussaint p.40.
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SUMMARY

The development of agrarian capitalism and the emergence of small planters in Mauritius.

The whole historical process of Mauritius has been a series of transition towards capitalism. For historical reasons, it has by-passed a pre-capitalist mode of production, the primitive accumulation of capital and even laissez-faire capitalism. From a slave-labour mercantilist relay at the periphery of the Dutch and French mercantilist system, it was transformed, under British occupation, into a slave-labour sugar plantation economy. After the abolition of slave-labour and its replacement by immigrant indentured labour from India, the plantation economy underwent a semi-capitalist transformation, but retaining many vestiges of slavery.

Concentration of land and capital has been a constant theme during the whole period. The rise of small planter-class is but a consequence of the concentration of capital itself. Access to marginal land left over from the process of concentration of better land liberated labour, confined previously to plantation «camps». It also gave birth to villages and created a semi-proletariat who could be «free» labour and small planters at the same time.

This process, beginning at the turn of this century, consolidated agrarian capitalism and stimulated further concentration of capital, reaching today, the supreme stage of monopoly capitalism. Sugar capital has been transformed into financial capital which now dominates all the key sectors of the economy. However, it is a dominated monopoly capitalism at the periphery, whose accumulation of capital is dependent upon the international division of labour.

THE ROLE OF THE INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT
RESEARCH IN DEVELOPMENT:
AN EVALUATIVE SURVEY

By

Dr. Alula ABATE *

I. *Research experience at IDR*

The initial research effort of the IDR was based on the priorities set for it at its inception. A group of consultants from the Social Sciences Departments of the present Addis Ababa University and various government agencies identified in 1972 three broad research areas of the highest priority. The first of these revolved around the study of the relationship between growth and equity in Ethiopian rural development. The primary equity objective of rural development were identified as an improved distribution of income, more equitable distribution of rights to land use, and expanded opportunities for employment. The need was also felt to know much more about how these objectives are interrelated with the means of increasing output, productivity, and efficient resource use.

The second area of research relates to socio-economic evaluation of planned agricultural development. The distinguishing characteristics of these studies are: (1) the focus on a carefully delimited area of planned development, and (2) the study in depth of the total systems of inter-relationships among social, economic and civic aspects of change effected by the development project. There was a felt need to define an analytical framework for evaluating the broad social and economic consequences of development programs, and to perfect the techniques for gathering the quantitative information and indicative data by which the consequences of these development programs can be measured and utilized to evaluate both plans and implementation.

A very broad consensus supported the recommendation that initial and intensive effort should be concentrated, with active participation by the Institute of Development Research, on the conduct of baseline socio-economic studies of the areas of planned development before the beginning of operational activities. It was also felt that provision should be made for systematic subsequent study of how operational activity produces change, who and what is affected, and how socio-economic behaviour and institutions are related to the operational activities and among themselves as change proceeds.

* *Director of the Institute of Development Research (IDR)
Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia.*

The study of the means to stimulate local participation, motivation, and initiative was designated as a third major research effort. While many aspects of the need to enlarge participation in development activities and to engage local initiative were identified, the primary research need was, however, linked to the prospective reform and reorganization of local government institutions in Ethiopia.

It was recognized that there are many examples in Ethiopia of local initiative and that local expression of need is often ahead of government. So there remains a critical need to know how to mobilize local institutions and initiative. The baseline projects have given the social science staff of the University as well as development agencies a rare opportunity to learn about the dynamics of underdevelopment and the most important characteristics hindering socio-economic transformation. To a certain degree, the lessons learned from the surveys conducted for the evaluation of ongoing rural development projects have made it possible to identify the bottlenecks for efficient implementation of development programmes. It has also been possible to derive from these studies ideas for making improvement on the development model particularly in the area which is commonly described as integrated rural development.

IDR's objective in conducting baseline and evaluation of socio-economic research projects is to contribute to that body of data needed for sound planning for new projects and feed back for the improvement of existing ones. Although it possesses no way of evaluating its impact in this regard, the dissemination rate of its findings and the interest in the acquisition of its materials seem to indicate that good use is being made of the research findings.

On a more conceptual plane, IDR has tried to participate in efforts to evolve a workable model for integrated rural development. Though there is considerable interest in rural development ventures to alter the low economic standard of the world's rural poor, there still seems to prevail a lack of conceptual clarity of what is meant by integrated rural development. And because of this, planning for rural development has been a very frustrating exercise full of guess work and at times badly managed. IDR believes future research should be centered on the problem of planning, programming and implementing of integrated rural development projects. The question that one usually faces at the conclusion of a research project on rural problems is how to go about designing a sound development project to solve. While such a role was considered potentially valuable, particularly in the absence of a government archives, it was recognized that IDR would have to take the initiative in seeking out information on current Ministerial and agency activities, cultivate informal access to information, and maintain continuous and personal contacts with each of the armatures of government. It was also felt that IDR might gradually assume a responsibility for evaluating

current research, including that completed within government, and disseminating a register of such information.

With the aim of encouraging and effecting staff inter-changes between the university and government, it was believed feasible to have government personnel assigned to the IDR, perhaps on a sabbatical arrangement or by a formula of secondment under supervision. In many cases, this was thought to prove more useful than sending Ministry personnel abroad for studies, particularly in view of the possibility that the IDR in future could constitute a base for post-graduate instruction and supervised research on development problems of Ethiopia. The anticipated interchange has largely been unrealized mainly because post-graduate instruction did not start at the University. But as of the 1978/79 academic year the University is going to launch a graduate program and this would definitely make a significant contribution to encourage Ethiopian graduate students to conduct their thesis research at the IDR, and on Ethiopian problems, rather than at Universities abroad from which they hope to receive higher degrees.

During the previous regime there were some problems associated with government secrecy and with taboo areas of research with respect to the structure and institutions of government or the functioning of the administrative and political systems. When this fetish with secrecy is seen together with the paucity and unreliability of data, research under these circumstances could be quite a frustrating exercise. In general, recognizing that approval must be obtained before publication of research, experience indicates a ranking: research which described existing situations gained easy approval, criticism of existing institutions tended to raise more questions; prescriptive advice encountered more difficulty. It was envisaged that if an advisory committee of government were to be constituted, it would be useful to consult with researchers on questions arising in this area.

III. *The IDR as Contract-research facility for government.*

Since there has not been much past experience in Ethiopia with government contracting for research to be conducted by the University, at least in the social science fields, it was felt that an expansion of such activity would be of interest to some Ministries. Right from the start problems were encountered, and these problems are still with us.

A number of Ministries have established their own research units, Government may prefer to assign needed research to their own units, where problems of official secrecy are obviated and the applied character of the studies can be emphasized. The intention was for the IDR to seek association and close consultation with these units, while giving greater attention to long-term problems and avoiding involvement in the day-to-day informational requirements of official agencies.

Initially, some promising areas of IDR contract research were identified. Some of these included development of methodologies

applicable to program and project evaluation; the definition of standardized data – collection units, i.e. stable statistical areas for surveying change through time; and delineation of a standard series of base maps for development purposes.

For a variety of reasons, government often appeared to prefer contracting for research to be conducted by foreign institutions and scholars. Obviously, failure to utilize Ethiopian research capabilities, where this is feasible, has reduced the opportunities for training of Ethiopian researchers and expanding the capacity of domestic institutions to fulfill development information needs. There is indeed an educational role for the IDR, which has not hitherto been fully realized, in its relations with government. Foreign donors and financing sources ought also to reconsider some present practices which have a similar effect in favouring overseas research institutions, to the disadvantage of efforts to strengthen Ethiopian research capability, such as tied financing of feasibility and evaluative studies of projects considered for financing in Ethiopia.

IV. The IDR as an interdisciplinary research instrument

It is generally acknowledged that the critical research capability gap in Ethiopia is in the interdisciplinary study of development problems and projects. The difficulties of conducting effective programs in Ethiopia's rural environment is partly attributable to the fact that the country's problems generally require study from several disciplinary viewpoints. Since its inception the IDR has tried and still continues to concentrate on facilitating inter-disciplinary research programs and stimulating an interest in cross – disciplinary and development of methodology, among the presently specialized research units. However, while many priority research needs might require an inter-disciplinary approach, others did not. Consequently, the IDR did not confine its attention only to problems that require inter-disciplinary study.

V. The IDR in relation to the Addis Ababa University

The University has established the Institute of Development Research to pursue several goals, some external and some internal to the University. With respect to external objectives, the IDR has, with only limited effect, tried to strengthen the University's liaison with government and to broaden the dialogue between the community of scholarship and public authorities. Through mobilizing the University's social science research capabilities, it sought to provide an alternative to government commissioning of foreign groups and institutions to carry out depth study of sectors of Ethiopian society and economy. The pre-revolution state of complete dependence on the capitalist world had

virtually ruled out a significant role for the IDR to conduct major government research. Happily this state of affairs has now changed since 1974, and the IDR will increasingly assume greater responsibility in this area, in relation to its research capabilities. Hopefully too, it will help identify directions in which the university should go, to help ensure, that university training programs are geared to national needs as enunciated in the country's central plan.

Internally, the roles of the IDR have been and still are to expand the involvement of university staff in development – problem oriented research; to generate teaching materials on development problems, and, when graduate studies in the social science commence next year, to provide a foundation for the conduct of graduate research programs. In addition it provides the opportunity for younger staff members to get experience in research design and execution, through seminars, conferences, and summer research projects – for example, by organizing relatively large-scale projects in which interdisciplinary teams are required to define the topics, narrow down the focus of study, and manage the research enterprise.

VI. Broad Areas of continuing interest for the IDR

a) Emphasis on improving techniques of information gathering and evaluation:

There is an urgent need to test the reliability and cost – effectiveness of techniques for gathering and analyzing information about development problems and programs in the Ethiopian environment. There is still a great deal more to learn about what methods in quantitative, behavioural, and attitudinal research. Much can be learned by evaluating past work of researchers and the techniques employed by existing institution as ARDU *, agricultural research agencies, and government research bodies as well as by units of the University.

b) Develop capacity to evaluate government programs and projects:

A good deal of effort has been put to link IDR research activities to on-going or prospective government development programs to strengthen the nation's capacity to evaluate their effects on the economy and society. Socio-economic base-line surveys of areas scheduled for development projects, investigation of the broad social impact of programs for resettlement, modernization, improvement of

* *Arsi Development unit initially started as a minimum package program in a smaller sub-administrative region.*

production practices, and land and other economic reform, and the collection of essential information to improve the predictability of effects and assess the consequences of government policies and implementation of development programs defines the areas in which the IDR finds the highest priority needs for more effective mobilization of the University's social science research capabilities.

c) *Assist in identifying research and development priorities:*

Four proposals for future activities of the IDR in helping to establish the priority areas of development research action are forwarded

- (i) Broad and regular consultation, than hitherto, among government and University personnel is felt to be useful. There is general concurrence in the proposal that one way for the IDR to achieve this is to convene an annual consultative seminar, with broader participation of development promoting Ministries and agencies of government.
- (ii) Coordination of research and information – gathering might be facilitated within government and University research capacities more effectively focused on priority development needs, by constituting a number of advisory groups, upon the initiative of the IDR, consisting of specialists and representatives of government bodies concerned with specific aspects of development. In some cases, these advisory groups might more closely correspond to traditional academic disciplines, and in other cases be oriented toward critical policy problems.
- (iii) The IDR would be exploring with the Central Planning Office what useful contribution it could make to the process of formulating national development plans. To this end, we are considering to establish machinery for consultation between the IDR and the sectoral departments of the CPO and related Ministries, to hold sectoral meetings as strategy papers are reviewed, and to look for research needs of emerging strategies and critical information gaps.
- (iv) Future research emphasis at IDR would mostly focus on the study of the impact of the new revolutionary legislation particularly those that affect the rural masses. The Institute is now in the process of launching research to measure the impact of the land reform legislation and related proclamations with the purpose of identifying the problems of implementation. It is hoped that the findings of this research would aid appropriate response

by relevant government agencies in having a close look at the socio-economic impact of the various measures. The IDR research on this would particularly focus on the variables that relate to changes in levels of living, monetization and spatial mobility.

The IDR has fallen short of its professed aims and objectives for two main reasons.

a) Ever since the inauguration of the Addis Ababa University, there seems to be a general misguided view prevalent that research is a luxury which the University would do without. This view had been sustained largely because AAU continued to be involved only in under-graduate programs where class-room teaching always assumed a position of priority. In the history of the AAU, in particular, the shortage of teachers has been so chronic that there has always been a tendency to deploy the very few researchers to teaching wherever possible.

b) The second reason relates to the structure of dependence of the ancient regime on the capitalist world in the political and socio-economic fields. This position of dependence and the half-hearted commitment of the Government to development did not help research institutions like the IDR to grow and to contribute in meaningful ways towards the nation's efforts to solve its social and economic problems. The 1974 Revolution and the New Democratic Revolution Program have laid a sound structural basis for research to be properly co-ordinated with the national plan.

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