

AFRIQUE

et développement

AFRICA

development

VOL. III, No. 2, 1978



CODESRIA

Editorial Board — Comité de Rédaction

Editor — Rédacteur en Chef

Abdalla S. Bujra

Assistant Editors — Rédacteurs en Chef adjoints

Lewis Moutou, Luabeya Kabeya

Editorial Advisor — Conseiller à la Rédaction

Winfried Veit

Advisory Editorial Board — Comité Consultatif de la Rédaction

Samir Amin

Kwesi Botchwey

Walter Rodney

K. Lumpungu

K. Gurulli

A. Benachenhou

Duri Mohammed

N. Shamuyarira

Book Review Editor — Responsable de la Critique des Livres

A. Mohiddin

*Regional and Overseas Correspondents — Correspondants Régionaux
et d'Outre-Mer*

Mahmood Mamdani

East Africa

S. Osobo

West Africa

M. Bongoy

Central Africa

M. Balintulo

South Africa

A. Benachenhou

North Africa

Norman Girvan

Caribbean and Latin America

Nirmal Chandra

India

Robert S. Browne

North America

Hamza Alawi

Europe

Ngo Manh Lan

South-East Asia

J. Hilaal

Middle East

CODESRIA greatly acknowledge the support of the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation in publishing this journal.

Le CODESRIA tient à exprimer sa gratitude à la Fondation Friedrich-Ebert pour la généreuse contribution qu'elle a bien voulu apporter à la publication de cette revue.

Africa Development

**A Quarterly Journal of the
Council for the Development
of Economic and Social
Research in Africa**

**Une Revue Trimestrielle du
Conseil pour le Développement
de la Recherche Economique et
Sociale en Afrique**

VOL. III — N° 2

April — June 1978

Avril — Juin 1978.

Edited by

A. S. BUJRA

Guide to Contributors

Contributions are invited from all over the world, and especially from African (and non-African) scholars working in African universities and research institutes. Articles are accepted in both English and French, but should, if possible, include a brief summary in the other language. The average length suggested for an article is about 25 - 30 pages, typed in double spacing, preferably on quarto-size sheets, and on one side of the paper only. Any footnotes should be numbered consecutively and placed at the end of the article. Copyright of accepted articles will be vested with CODESRIA. Each contributor will receive a copy of the journal together with 15 off-prints of his article. Contributors to *Africa Development* express their own opinions, which should not be interpreted as being the official view of CODESRIA or of any institution / organization with which the authors may be connected.

All correspondence and contributions should be addressed to :

The Editor, *Africa Development*, CODESRIA, B.P. 3304, DAKAR, Sénégal.

Avis à nos collaborateurs

La Revue AFRICA DEVELOPMENT est prête à accueillir des articles venant du monde entier et notamment des articles de chercheurs africains (et non-africains) d'universités et instituts de recherche en Afrique. Ces articles peuvent être rédigés soit en anglais soit en français et devront être accompagnés autant que possible d'un résumé dans l'autre langue. Ils devront compter en moyenne 25 à 30 pages, in quarto de préférence, dactylographiées en double interligne. Les notes accompagnant les articles seront numérotées par ordre consécutif et réunies à la fin. Les droits d'auteurs sur les articles acceptés sont cédés à CODESRIA. Chaque auteur recevra un exemplaire de la revue ainsi que 15 tirés-à-part de son article. Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent pas nécessairement celles du CODESRIA ou de toute autre institution ou organisation à laquelle les auteurs pourraient être rattachés.

Toute correspondance et tous articles devront être adressés à :

M. le Rédacteur en Chef, *Africa Development*, CODESRIA, B.P. 3304, DAKAR, Sénégal.

Contents – Sommaire

ARTICLES

P. Anyang Nyong'o

- Liberals Models of Capitalist Development in Africa : Ivory Coast 5
Résumé 20

S. Bedrani

- La Technologie Agricole en Algérie 21
Summary 39

A. Chilivumbo

- On rural development : a note on Malawi's Programmes
of Development for exploitation 41
Résumé 54

H. Galbourne

- Some aspects of ideological functions in the Development
of the Post-Colonial State in Tanzania 57
Résumé 73

BOOK REVIEWS - REVUE DES LIVRES

B. Founou-Tchigoua

- Makhtar Diouf - Echange inégal et ordre économique international 75

J.R. Herzoc

- Towards a theory of Rural Development 79

FOCUS ON RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTES - PLEINS FEUX SUR LES INSTITUTS DE RECHERCHE ET DE FORMATION

- DEVELOPMENT STUDIES AND RESARCH CENTRE,
UNIVERSITY OF KHARTOUM 89

- CENTRE DE RECHERCHES INTERDISCIPLINAIRES
POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT DE L'EDUCATION,
UNIVERSITE NATIONALE DU ZAIRE, KISANGANI 93

Liberal models of Capitalist Development in Africa: Ivory Coast

P. Anyang Nyongo *

1. - Structure

Expanded reproduction of capital results in the articulation of the capitalist mode of production with pre-capitalist modes. The nature of this articulation and its consequences for the pre-capitalist modes of production are a function of the requirements of capital accumulation and of the internal structures of the pre-capitalist modes.

The process of articulation is also a process of class formation. As one mode of production enters into contact with a new one, and, in certain ways gets conserved, re-structured or even annihilated, new relations of production-specific to this determining the economic, social, ideological and political practices of the bearers of these relations of production, the social classes.

It has been argued that articulation with pre-capitalist modes is necessary at all stages of capitalist development, that a purely internal accumulation of capital is impossible, and that, in the process of articulating with these pre-capitalist forms of production, they tend to be destroyed by capitalism. Capitalism, in this regard, tends to be an « exclusive mode ».

But, as stated above, contacts with capitalism need not necessarily lead to the destruction of these modes : they do, however, lead to a process of articulation for surplus extraction that may necessitate the destruction, preservation, or transformation of these pre-capitalist forms of production so long as the changing requirements of capital accumulation are satisfied. These requirements imply the kinds of capitalist activities through which surplus will be extracted, and the forms in which the surplus is to be embedded. The structures of the

* Department of Government, University of Nairobi, NAIROBI, KENYA.

Although I am fully responsible for the ideas expressed in this paper, I am indebted to Cadman Atta-Mills for his critical comments of an earlier version presented at the ATWE-CODESRIA Seminar held in Algeria in January 1978 ; Michael Chegge, Apollo Njonjo, Kabiru Kinyanjui, Michael Cowen, David Rosenberg and Kagenda Atwooki, all of whom have raised important theoretical questions on issues discussed in this paper in seminars and during private discussions at the University of Nairobi.

pre-capitalist society provide the division of labour in that society, the modes of surplus extraction, appropriation and distribution, and the class formations and struggles that arise from these and how they can be dis-imbricated, re-structured or conserved if production of surplus for capitalist appropriation is to be set in motion.

It is therefore possible to envisage the development of various types of colonial and postcolonial societies. The invariant element in the structures of articulation is the eventual transfer of surplus, in one form or another, from the pre-capitalist to the capitalist sector. At a certain stage in the development of peripheral capitalism, the capitalist sector coincides geographically with the colonizing country; this is the stage when capitalism of the colonizer underdevelops the periphery in the very transitive meaning of the concept « underdevelopment ». As time passes, however, not only do the needs for the accumulation of capital at the centre change, but the structures of the precapitalist societies, given their specific and historical forms of articulation with capitalism, also change, bringing to bear new classes and new forms of class struggle.

Initially, extra-economic forces are necessary to create agents for capitalist production out of the pre-capitalist modes before the articulation process acquires its own momentum. That is within the pre-capitalist production processes, there are no built-in mechanisms for producing the surplus for capitalist accumulation. Whatever surplus is produced, class relations within that mode determine its manner of appropriation. For it to be appropriated in a different way, a social power, imposing itself on these pre-capitalist societies, was necessary to re-organize these class relations and re-constitute them in a new way. This task of dis-imbrication of relations of production within the articulation process is a deliberate undertaking of the colonial state.

It is at first an act of intervention, necessitating force, but aimed at creating dominance for the capitalist mode and hegemony for the dominant classes within this mode. This implies that colonial state is, by its very nature, a transitory form of political domination; it must give way to a form of political domination in harmony with capitalist relations of production once these have evolved sufficiently. That is, the colonial state forms classes out of the precapitalist societies only to eliminate the social basis of its own existence.

It is this change in the social basis of the state that explains change from a colonial to a post-colonial form of political domination. A neo-colonial society is born once the articulation process has brought into being « support classes » who are active bearers of capitalist relations of production and who, given sway over the state as the co-ordinator — or the constitutive element — of the social formation, will act as stabilizing agents for the reproduction of the social system as a whole. Formal political independence is a consequence of the evolution of neo-colonial relations and not its origin; it is the formal admission that the deliberate mission of the colonial state to establish capitalist relations of production in a colony has been accomplished and the process can reproduce itself.

2. - Genesis and Evolution

The development of capitalism in the Ivory Coast has been influenced mainly by two sets of economic activities : production of « cash crops » by Ivorian peasants and the buying and selling of these cash crops by French trading companies with Lebano-Syrians as commercial middle-men. In post-colonial times, the state, in conjunction with private capital, has built upon this foundation to redirect ways of surplus production and to create new sectors of capital formation.

To begin with, commodity production was peripheral to economic life : the first stages of articulation, 1843-1913, saw independent Ivorian societies exchanging surplus extracted from within the division of labour in society for over-valued luxury goods brought to the coast by French, Dutch and English traders. This was the case of the French Congo. But a pattern of articulation had been established making possible for the ruling classes of such societies as the Agni of Sanwi to turn into a commercial class at this early stage of contact, or a *planter bourgeoisie* as the trade economy matured into large-scale cash crop production after the Second World War.

During this period, the colonial state was weak and derived its revenue almost entirely from taxes and trade ; it relied on treaties with local states to assert its authority in a colony whose operations were confined to coastal headquarters.

The second period, 1913-1945, begins with military conquest and occupation of the colonies strongly supported by the metropolitan state which constitutes a federal colonial administration, French West Africa, with headquarters at Dakar in Senegal, and end up with the completion of the effective « opening up » of the interior, the encouragement of economic growth and the « self-sufficiency » in administering the colony. Small companies give way to big trans-territorial ones ; the latter have strong contacts with the world of finance capital and are capable of opening up agencies and trading posts in the interior. Instead of leaving the Africans to sell to them whatever could be extracted within the pre-capitalist labour systems, they argue for *la mise en valeur* of these systems, their having to specialise in producing such commodities as would find a market in the metropole — i.e. France — hence their labour (or production) processes having to be re-organised to be in tune with the new mode of production.

The colonial state, to meet its administrative costs and surplus needs of these companies, joins in setting in motion this process of articulation, this process of disimbricating the social relations of production of the pre-capitalist social formations to suit the accumulation of capital in the metropole with companies as her agents.

3. - Elements of the Structure and Production Relations

The essential elements of the colonial system in the Ivory Coast were the following :

- (a) African labour from which surplus was extracted by the colons, the trading houses, the colonial administration, and a minority of African « small masters ».

- (b) The colons and traders, though belonging to different sectors of the economy (the former pre-dominantly rural and agricultural with much smaller capital; the latter, urban and international with more capital in manufacture and commerce).
- (c) The colonial state, interested not only in the fiscal health of the colony as a way of reducing the costs of administration (otherwise paid for by the metropolitan state), but also in *mise en valeur* of the colony, given the predominant interests of the French Economy.

During the Second World War, this system was put through a crises. When the war was over, the crisis, had so shaken the whole of the French Empire that the requirements of capital accumulation in the metropole (and much more so on a world scale) compelled France to dismantle her colonial empire, and reorganize the economic basis of the Overseas Territories in Africa. This new economic programme initiated from above but realising its objectives by articulating with the different ways of producing already set in motion in the colonies, created, in that process of articulation, new relations of production.

By abolishing forced labour, modernizing the techniques of production, improving credit facilities and taking over marketing in conjunction with private capital, the colonial state not only lost its social base but helped to create a new mode of production in agriculture : the rural capitalism whose most enthusiastic « support classes » were the Ivorian small masters.

The role of the post-colonial state is to consolidate the hegemony of international capital over these small masters, and the domination of a local power block of the political economy of the Ivory Coast. The post-colonial state is therefore both a cohesive mechanism for the Ivorian social formation dominated by a power block of local « support classes » and a formal-legal institution through which the general purposes of capital accumulation on a world scale is realised. It therefore enjoys double legitimacy as long as the conditions of accumulation are reproduced; legitimacy from the international bourgeoisies, and legitimacy from the local block of dominant classes. It is the role of the latter as « providers » of legitimacy and stability for the post-colonial state in harmony with the interests of the international bourgeoisies that defines them as « support classes » for capitalist development. Objectively opposed to them are the local direct producers (sharecroppers, rural proletariat and the urban working class) exploited in the process of economic growth, and some of the declassed fractions of classes (the *sans travail* in town and country side) existing outside productive work.

4. - The Development of Capitalism in Post-Colonial Times

Increased production of coffee by the Ivorian peasantry, encouraged by the availability of labour from the north and rising world prices in the fifties, led to an increase in the wealth of the peasant households in the forest zone. There was a general upward mobility

in the southern rural economy which contrasted sharply with the relative stagnation of the north. While southern revenues from cash crops grew from 9.4 billion francs cfa in 1950 (at 1965 values) to 33.1 billion in 1965, northern revenues only went from 750 millions to 2.1 billion. The rate of growth was more or less the same, but the absolute magnitude of wealth differed radically. This is demonstrated much clearer when we look at per capita incomes from cash crops for the two regions : in the north, this increased from 1,000 francs cfa in 1950 to 2,400 in 1965 ; in the south this figure went from 7,100 in 1950 to 14,100 in 1965.

Since the north served as a labour reservoir for the south, it helped create the surplus value on which southern *chefs d'exploitations* then became upwardly mobile while the north stagnated economically. In other words, the north was under developed by the very process in which northern human resources, by the active participation of the state through such bodies as SIAMO (*Syndicat Interprofessionnel d'Acheminement de la main-d'œuvre*), developed the south. But within the south itself, there was also uneven development between zones.

At the level of individual peasant households, this general upward mobility — with varying amplitudes within the forest zone — was not always maintained throughout the decade of the fifties. Whenever coffee or cocoa prices fell, households with less than two hectares of productive coffee/ cocoa land were likely to be reduced to mere subsistence. This vascillation in wealth, cyclical by the very nature in which good and poor harvests follow each other in the coffee culture, did not usually reduce these poor peasants to utter poverty except in marginal zones in the central region ; but even in the latter case the phenomenon of utter impoverishment was not felt until the late sixties and early seventies. Peasants try to fight this impoverishment by migrating to new lands.

Among the medium and rich peasants, the general tendency was for bourgeoisification, i.e., acquisition of more and more labour so as to become real Ivorian planters. And the work of a successful Ivorian planter was not just to be seen in rural wealth, but in social wealth as well : real estate, ownership of means of transport, share capital in parastatal bodies, etc...

Among the rural population as a whole, polarisation of wealth occurred between the *planter bourgeoisie* and the small master social category. But as long as fractions of classes among the small masters had hopes of rising above their class, the social category remained, as its name suggests, a category : a differentiated social mass with its hopes pinned above its present achievements. That is, a suitable ground for the generation of legitimacy for the regime of private property.

Characteristic of all capitalist societies, such a mass has a tendency of conservative politics. Where this mass actually became a majority and enjoyed full rights of citizenship while those from whom they did or could extract surplus value were generally non-citizens, it can be seen how a neo-colonial regime started its lease in office with such an adequate source of legitimacy.

5. - The Post-Colonial State and Liberal Capitalist Development

The post-colonial state has, since formal political independence, stepped in to consolidate the small masters as a class. Through state agencies such as BNNDA, SATMACI, the caisse, SOODEPALM, etc, a class of petty commodity producers is crystallizing in the countryside as expansion into cash-crop production gets more and more tightened. Competition for state resources become, therefore, an arena for inter-class and intra-class conflict, often, appearing in the form of nationalisms, tribalism, regionalism or native-nonnative struggles.

But these struggles are, in actual fact, the specific historical forms of social conflict at this historically determined conjuncture in the growth of a liberal capitalist economy in the Ivory Coast. We might, if only schematically, expound on this liberal model to include dependant post-colonies which, after formal political independence, have committed the post-colonial state to the progressive integration of their social formations into the world capitalist system. Primarily this means a commitment to defend the regime of private property. Thus individual ownership of the means of production and individual accumulation of capital is encouraged if not solicited, but since a significant fraction of potential native capitalists are starting from a disadvantageous point from their foreign counterparts, *they have to rely on the state to build them up as a class.*

This reliance on the state for primary forms of accumulation can, in itself, be a hazard to the creation of a bourgeois democratic republic as the « national political home » for capitalist development. For the state, while creating the juridico-political framework for the augmentation of capital, must seek to appear independant of fractions of capital. But bourgeois legalism does not always open avenues for capital accumulation by upwardly-mobile strata inspite of the state corporations, state banks, stabilization funds, etc all of which syphon surplus value from the direct producers for accumulation by diverse fractions of capital. Those who fail to get legal access to these surpluses can resort to process of primitive accumulation through state machinery. This, is where the problem of straddling comes in and where there can be conflicts among fractions of capital as to what form the bourgeois democratic revolution is to take and who is going to man critical state apparatuses. Thus, in the Ivory Coast, this problem expresses itself in the remarkable increase in the number of French technocrats manning state apparatuses since formal political independence.

At the time of independence there were about 5,000 Frenchmen in the Ivory Coast. In 1907 there were only 750. Since then the Growth of the Ivorian economy and the policy of the ruling class to rely on a governing technocracy which would not involve itself in local accumulation has seen the figure rise to 45,000.

On January 1, 1976, the French consul-general at Abidjan had 34,838 Frenchmen and women on its books (23,000 adults and 11,000 children). There are thought to be another 9-10,000 Frenchmen who have either been in the country since before independence or have not bothered to register since.

Three quarters of the French working population is in the private sector in commerce, industry, agriculture, trade and the professions. This goes a long way to explain why 52 % of the industrial capital of the Ivory Coast is still in French hands. As a result in 1975 there was a turnover of 5,000 Frenchmen mostly in the private sector.

A quarter of the French population is formed by « co-operants », the French technical assistants, who come out through official or governmental organizations. Over half of these young people (osme time doing technical assistance in lieu of national service) are school-teachers and most of the remainder are in public or semi public service.

In other cases, the manning of such state apparatuses become the first arena for intraclass struggles among the ascendant petty bourgeois strata. Ethnicity might then be used by certain fractions of capital to entrust an ethnic petty bourgeois strata with responsibilities over state apparatuses so as to ensure non-legal and legal methods of accumulation by these fractions.

What makes it possible for one country to have this type of state personnel while another has a different type, is that these societies are at different stages of developement. In some the national bourgeoisie as a dominant class is much more developed while in others it is not. Where the bourgeoisie is more developed it tends to be more fractionalised, especially as these fractions engage in cut-throat competition over control of state apparatus to determine patterns of accumulation and to lay down the legal framework for the accumulation of capital. In such cases, the fraction which becomes ascendant makes the state more politically repressive only if it represents politically 'weak' capital, i.e. a capital with little ability to forge a politically broad alliance with other fractions of classes so as to exercise some form of bourgeois democracy. This is the only sence in which we can interpret and explain the emergence of diverse forms of military dictatorships, absolutist regimes and commandist politics in Africa. When the bourgeoisie is still in its very nascent stages, fractionalisation minimal and there is usually greater and more overt collaboration with foreign capital which may lead to the crystallisation of a comprador fraction within the national bourgeoisie. The politics of this nascent bourgeoisie is frequently commandist ; in the Ivory Coast this commandism incorporates reliance on French technocrats governing at the behest of the nascent bourgeoisie and their foreign allies.

6. - Dependency and Indigenization of Capital

Although the indigenous bourgeoisie blossomed much later in the Ivory Coast than in Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, or Senegal, 20 years of the commandist politics of Houphouet Boligny has seen the consolidation of the indigenous agricultural bourgeoisie amongst whom a comprador fraction has crystallized challenging the other bigger fraction over state power. The January 21, 1978 issue of the *Economist*, reporting on president Giscard d'Estaing's visit to the Ivory Coast sees the current fractionnal conflicts as being organized around the « succession issue », a phenomenon which, in Kenya, has been the political game of the bourgeoisie for the past decade. The article says :

It was especially reassuring for the economically buoyant Ivory Coast, a Country which supplies the west with coffee and cocoa and which faces political uncertainty once the moderate Mr. Houphouet Boigny, now 73, leaves office. He is preparing his epitaph in Yamoussoukro, where wide concrete boulevards and a four-storey marble presidential palace contrast startlingly with the flattened jungle.

France still keeps five military bases in Africa, in the Ivory Coast and Senegal in the west, Gabon farther south and Djibouti and Mayotte in the east. In all there are about 7,000 troops in these bases to whom can be added an elite intervention force maintained at constant readiness in Southern France. What is not clear is whether these troops might be used to help FRIENDLY African leaders tackle internal problems as well as to meet attacks from outside.

What kinds of « internal problems » should a successor of Houphouet-Boigny expect in the Ivory Coast ? Would it really be a problem of workers and peasants bidding for state power ? Or would it — which is the more likely case — be fractions of capital « fighting it out » among themselves, and only dragging the masses into politics to support this or that version of the bourgeois democratic revolution led by this or that fraction ?

A broad analysis of the different fractions of capital in the Ivory Coast would reveal the following. One, for most of the last twenty years, indigenous capital has been dominant only in agriculture, and only in that agricultural sector with very low organic composition of capital. Thus coffee and cocoa planters, relying very much on immigrant labour, have been the planter bourgeoisie producing militants for the ruling political party. The practice of straddling has, however, taken certain members of this planter bourgeoisie employed in the state apparatuses, to deploy their capital outside agriculture, or to accumulate in other sectors of the economy in a significant way. These patterns of non-agricultural accumulation have been two : accumulation within the traditional commercial sectors still dominated by the French and Lebano-Syrians ; and accumulation in the booming industrial sector in which transnational capital is becoming the dominant fraction of capital albeit the state is trying to acquire a progressive foothold here.

The traditional commercial sector

The traditional commercial sector was the import-export trade : import of consumer and durable goods and export of agricultural commodities, wood and some minerals. The French import-export houses like the *Compagnie Française de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (CFAO) and *Société Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain* (SCOA) are said to have handled the larger share of this import-export trade. It must not be forgotten, however, that smaller commercial groups, quite often functioning only within the Ivory Coast albeit in alliance at times with these bigger groups, have played important roles in the political economy of the Ivory Coast. At this particular juncture when there is a transitional process from a trade economy to an industrializing economy, the fate

of these small commercial companies become critical. It is they who threatened with extinction either by the dynamism of the industrializing economy or the economy nationalism of the emerging African bourgeoisie, will seek to forge alliance with this or that fraction of the African bourgeoisie to ensure their future.

There are about 5,000 Frenchmen in the Ivory Coast who were born into families that have been established in the country for anything between 20 and 50 years. Over 9 % of Frenchmen were actually born in the country.

This old colonial community is not homogeneous but highly differentiated on wealth, education attainment and profession. It would be wrong to say that there is still a large commercial or planter community in the Ivory Coast. The significance of the few that are still left is determined not by the length of time they have been there (this is significant) but by the kind of economic activities they are engaged in. Many of the longest established industries are presided by colonial household names like M. Blohorn, with his *palm and soap interests*, or François Massieye, President of the Chamber of Commerce and former territorial counsellor and deputy in the Ivory Coast Constituent Assembly, or Hughes de Quatrebarbes, a planter and manager of various companies, and now President of the Association of Frenchmen in the Ivory Coast. Of the 232 coffee exporters, Africans have shares in less than 5 handling a negligible volume of coffee every year. When the *Société d'Etudes et de Réalisation pour l'Industrie caféière et cacaoyère* (SERIC) was established in 1970 to reorganise coffee treatment and trade by establishing a local treatment plant (or factory), then management was entrusted to Jean Abile Gal a French import-export house that has operated within the Ivory Coast since colonial days. Together with Société Nouvelle, Compagnie Ivoire Café, Eburnes, Daniel Angel et Fils and Compagnie Ivoirienne de Promotion pour l'Exportation et l'Importation, they contributed the majority of the private capital component of the factory.

Private foreign capital came in through investments by the Banque Internationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie de Côte d'Ivoire in which Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie, Banque Nationale de Paris and the Société Financière pour les pays d'Outre-Mer all have majority share. In the same way, Crédit Lyonnais of France, through Société Ivoirienne de Banque, also has investments in-hence part ownership of SERIC.

The state holds 55 % of SERIC capital while the private interests hold 45 %. Being a majority share-holder, the state has the power to determine the future of SERIC. From recent experience, however, the local French import-export houses-monopolising management skills for the running of such a factory as the first one at Toumbokro-have managed to determine what kinds of follow-up factories are going to be built and who is going to manage them-the import-export houses themselves. It is quite likely that certain fractions of the Ivorian bourgeoisie, desirous to enter into the coffee business, would find this dominance of the local French commercial interests an impediment to their own upward mobility as a class.

Their reaction would be to ally with fractions of international capital which are also investors in the factory to oust the local French capitals. The local French capitals also have the choice of playing fractions of the African bourgeoisie against one another; this they can do by offering some individuals directorates in their companies. International capital can also do the same, but a local French company, with a restricted capital turn-over, feels much more beholden to its African allies than an international or transnational capital.

The SERIC factory project represents the pattern of industrialisation now beginning in the Ivory Coast. It is no longer a question of just import-substitution-i.e. manufacturing locally goods previously imported as finished products either by doing the « finishing touches » on them once they are imported « semi-manufactured » or by importing the component parts and assembling them locally.

The present Ivorian model is to encourage industrialisation for export using raw materials and commodities from the home economy. Import-substitution frequently only transferred branches of foreign firms from their foreign homes to be housed in the territory of the Ivory Coast. The car assembly plants, especially the Renault one, are of this genre: the technology, the parts, management and capital are all predominantly from the metropolitan parent country. But one may also be led to ask to what extent the Capral soluble coffee factory (Capral is a branch of the Swiss multinational Nescafé) in Abidjan is any different from its motorcar counterparts. The only difference might perhaps be that Capral's products are meant to serve the African and Middle Eastern markets, in which case the « Made In Ivory Coast » coffee might fetch some foreign exchange for the Ivory Coast. But Capral's « backward linkages » into the Ivorian economy apart from coffee which it gets *sur place*, are minimal. The *Société Ivoirienne d'Emballagement* (SIEM), the packaging producing company, is one of the beneficiaries in the establishment of a local coffee exporting like Capral.

But SIEM's own inputs seem to be predominantly imported. Except in partnership with the state or foreign capital, it would appear as if African capital would be very cautious in challenging the hold that non-African capitals have in industry. In uniting with foreign capital, they may have the strength to challenge the much more immediate opposing forms of capital: the local French commercial and industrial capital currently dominating the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Which fraction of African capital will seal this alliance: the comprador bourgeoisie which has recently accumulated capital mainly through strudling or the indigenous agricultural bourgeoisie who, in the words of Houphouët-Boigny, are not the offsprings of a « moneyed bourgeoisie ».

We have created from different people a bourgeoisie of 'responsables' who have made their soil fruitful and have earned their land by their personal effort. Because, in our country, the land becomes the property of those who cultivate it and make it productive... ».

The booming industrial sector

In April 1976, a stock market was opened in Abidjan, the third in Black Africa after the Lagos and Nairobi ones. At the opening occasion, the then Minister for Finance, Henri Konan Bedie, said :

The stock market in Abidjan will be the temple of poor economic liberalism where a nation of peasants can become a nation of shareholders.

The average income per month among northern peasants in that year was 3,500 francs cfa (about \$ 18), and among peasants in the South-Eastern prefectures of Aboisso, Ayame and Abengourou 23,000 francs cfa (about \$ 150)). Given the rise in land values in areas like the South East, the increasing profitability of agricultural investment if more capital intensive, it is unlikely that these peasants will buy shares in the stock exchange instead of ploughing their money back to the land. The stock market gives Ivorians preference in buying shares. But it would appear that only wealthy civil servants and the commercial bourgeoisie — apart from the emerging industrialists — will become share-holders among the Ivorian population.

The stock market therefore heralds the birth of an industrial society in the Ivory Coast. Industrial in many senses : first, in the sense that local industrial production is beginning to rise, and two, that this industrial production will need capital, including share-capital raised from the Abidjan Stock-Exchange by some upwardly-mobile civil servant who would want to retire « on his savings ». Thus a new petty bourgeoisie may be born : a share-holding petty bourgeoisie that excited the imagination of ex-Finance Minister Konan Bedie.

In the 1960's, the Ivory Coast registered an average growth rate of 10 %, i.e., 10.4 % in the early sixties, 8.2 % from 1965-70, and 7 % upto 1974. Over the last 3 years, the growth rate averaged around 5 %. The rapid rise in growth in the sixties was due to the heavy investment in the Vridi Canal, the San Pedro Project and the Kossou Dam. It is in these projects that the bulk of government investment, whether raised locally or from foreign borrowings, went. Industrialisation by import-substitution was undertaken mainly by private entrepreneurs whose activities came to a slow down around 1973. Part of the reason was that, inspite of the very favourable terms on which private foreign and domestic capital was invited to invest, most foreign investors did not choose to re-invest their profits even within the 10 year period in which they were to enjoy no taxation on profits realised. Calculations over the period 1968-1973 showed that repatriation of profits and capital had been in excess of new private foreign investments and reinvestment by local firms. In each of those years foreign firms sent between 9,200 million to 12,700 million francs cfa (an average of over \$ 60 million) out of the country and has reinvested an average of about 4,000 million francs cfa (\$ 24 millions). It seemed highly unlikely, at the end of that period, that the amount of profits sent out would drop even if the government tried to identify the right projects for reinvestors. By 1973, 60% of the industrial sector was in foreign hands, and the only way the government could curb the ability of these foreigners to de-capitalize the economy was to bolster the public investment programme through the

Special Investment Budget. This was particularly urgent if, given the nascent fractionalisation of the Ivorian bourgeoisie, the economic nationalists were to be prevented from stirring populist sentiments among the petty bourgeoisie strata against « French » domination of society.

State share in investments in new (1970's) industrial projects has gone up quite considerably. It seems to be as if the Ivory Coast is pinning her hopes in making the textile industry provide an important base for industrialisation in the Ivory Coast.

The state is entering into partnerships with diverse forms of foreign capitals to build its textile industry. The same thing is happening with the nascent sugar industry and the much older palm oil industry. All these represent different forms of alliances among capitals and we shall not look into all of them. We shall, however, take the cases of textiles and sugar and see how they may both lead to the indigenization of capital in the Ivory Coast from the present liberal economy approach. Our suggestions should be taken as hypotheses, not as well-researched and proven blue prints for the future.

The textile industry

The first textiles factory was established in the Ivory Coast by the Etablissements Gonville, a French company, at Bouake. Gonville's fortunes were never very much geared towards benefitting the Ivory Coast, but it has survived colonial and post-colonial Ivory Coast. In 1963, Gonville set up a new factory at Bouake using ALLEN cotton. To-day the Ivory Coast has 58,700 ha. under cotton yielding about 60,000 tons of cotton grain; plans are underway to increase this to 85,000 ha. and 95,000 tons of grain by 1980. Five companies are involved : SOTEXI, UTEXI, COTIVO, UNIWAX and BLUE BELL.

SOTEXI was started in 1968 to import cloth and print them locally more-or-less on the import-substitution basis. In 1969 it had acquired 6 new cotton spinning mills and 3 ginneries costing 400 million francs cfa. SOTEXI is an affiliate of UTEXI founded in 1974 with French, Dutch, Japanese and Ivorian capital : the Ivorian state owns 20 % of UTEXI-SOTEXI capital. Its plant at Dimbokro is one of the largest textile plants in the world, with a capacity of 12,500 tons per annum. The normal standard in the United States is 10,000 tons a year. UTEXI makes most of its cloth for the export market while SOTEXI takes cloth from it and prints them for the local market.

COTIVO (Cotonnière Ivoirienne), started in November 1975 with its factories at Agboville, is owned 70 % by ICODI and 30 % by the Ivorian government. Production is at the moment around 6,000 tons per annum, but is envisaged to increase to 9,000 tons by 1980.

UNIWAX, a Unilever subsidiary, was first started in 1971 with the aim of importing cloth for local wax printing. Then gradually COTIVO was encouraged to supply the special quality grey cloth required for the wax printing process. UNIWAX's output and demand for its prints is so great that COTIVO cannot as yet supply all the grey cloth it needs for the local market.

Blue Bell is 51 % owned by the US Reigel Textile Corporation, 19 % by ICODI and 30 % by Blue Bell Ivory Coast. Part of the Blue

Bell complex near Abidjan has been producing overalls and jeans from imported cloth since March 1975, but the project is designed to expand in stages. A second major expansion was completed at the end of 1976 : this increased production from 1.8 to 5.6 million clothes a year. Blue Bell Ivory Coast is the biggest of the Blue Bell chains in the world, and Ivory Coast's most ambitious venture in ready-to-wear clothes factory. It is most certainly the largest manufacturing industry in the country.

It has been suggested that one of the reasons why the Ivory Coast may become producer and manufacturer of textile products is that it has hard working and relatively cheap labour compared to Europe and the United States. Ivorian labour can put in 8,000 hours of work a year in the textile industry while their European counterparts can put in only 5,000. This brings in immense *cost savings* as the expensive machinery can be put to use near to capacity. The giant plants will be manufacturing the *same products* all the year round and waste can be reduced to a minimum. The problem in the future will be to find regular markets for products that are made of high quality material but are not high fashion cut.

Apart from cotton-based textiles, the Ivory Coast is also experimenting a MULBERRY plantation at Ndouci in the south with the aim of producing *silk* for a future silk industry advised and financed by the Japanese Nichimen company. The Japanese mulberry trees take some time to establish themselves but production is expected to begin this year. Again, it will be in collaboration with international capital and technology, particularly with the French firm Rhone Poulenc, that the state will initiate this silk industry.

This diversification of state — private — and foreign capital alliances in setting into motion the process of industrialization is also reflected even more glaringly in the sugar industry. The Ivory Coast has, for a long time, been a net importer of sugar. With increasing urbanisation of the consumption habits of Ivorians in rural and urban areas, sugar has become an important ingredient of the diet of the average Ivorian. Although statistics for its consumption are not reliable, import figures show that it has been going up steadily since independence. With the development of the dairy industry in the north, production of sugar cane is going to be very important in the Ivorian economy as part of the base in expanding cattle rearing.

In 1973 the Ivory Coast consumed 60,000 tons of sugar, in 1975 this figure fell to 35,000 due to the increased cost of sugar. By 1980, the 60,000 figure is expected to be regained, and consumption should rise to 100,000 in 1985 and 240,000 in the year 2,000. In 1974, a sugar complex was started at Ferkessedougou in northern Ivory Coast. This project, run by Lonrho, could produce 22,000 tons of sugar (1976 figures) and 35,000 tons (1977 production). Even with the projected 60,000 tons production for 1978, the Ivory Coast could not expect to be self-sufficient in sugar. Hence 5 new projects, aimed at making the Ivory Coast a sugar-exporter in the near future, have been envisaged. These are the Borotou, Ferkessedougou II, Serebou, Katiola and Zuennoula sugar projects.

Borotou, estimated to cost a total of 25 billion francs cfa, with capacity of 41,500 tons and a 5,000 hectares plantation, will be financed by French capital and managed by the French company, ADRA, of the Renault group.

Ferke II will cost about 85 million pounds to be put into operation at a capacity of 53,500 tons with an acreage of 5,700 hectares. Management will be provided by the Canadian company Redpath Sugar Ltd., a subsidiary of the English group Tate and Lyle. Its capital comes mainly from American, Canadian and English sources. Production is to begin by December this year.

The Franco-Belgian Company of SOMDIAA of the Grands Moulins de Paris group and the French engineering company SODETEG are behind the construction of the Serebour sugar project which is expected to produce 45,000 tons by the end of this year from 5,500 hectares of sugar cane. The capital has been provided by mainly from French and German sources.

The Katiola project, financed by Belgium, Austria and other fractions of international capital, will begin production in 1979 at a capacity of 47,500 tons from 6,600 hectares of sugar cane. The factory will be managed by the Belgian company SOPEX, while the field and irrigation work will be undertaken by an Austrian company called Bauer.

The last project, the one at Zuenoula, with a capacity of 40,000 tons and exploiting a total area of 4,200 ha., will be managed by two Belgian companies : abr and SOCFINCO, and a Dutch company AVA ENCO. Its Capital is from Belgium, the Netherlands and other smaller fractions of international capital.

When all these projects are completed and they are in production, the total capital investment in them will amount to over 275 billion metropolitan francs. Of this, 190 billion will have been generated from outside. By next year, the Ivory Coast will begin exporting her sugar. Exports are expected to stand at 75,000 tons in 1980 and 180,000 tons by 1985.

This development will greatly affect the northern region which, up to now, has been disfavoured in the country's economic growth. It is expected that a total of 15,000 to 20,000 new jobs will be generated by the sugar industry alone. Of these 250 will be managerial or administrative positions, 1,000 supervisory positions, 4,000 skilled workers and 4,250 ordinary specialised work needing minimal training.

Certain economic analysts have observed that this rural industrialisation in the Ivory Coast, though heavily dependant on foreign capital, may provide the Ivory Coast with a base from which to build a self-centered capitalist economy. Thus a 1973 (November) *African Development* « Economic Survey of the Ivory Coast » notes :

The textile industry is a good example of how once the principle of large scale, export orientation has been adopted, the process almost automatically leads to diversification and to integration of a large industrial sector. It also brings the Ivory Coast nearer the point and contributes to the self-sustaining growth process of the economy.

The idea of a self-centered development, in a situation where the very structure of industrialisation seems to integrate the Ivorian economy more and more into the international capitalist system, is, of course, fraught with numerous problems. But it would seem probable to argue in its favour on the following lines. One, that it is quite clear that the Ivorian state seems to be playing fractions of international capital against each other. That, by calling in different « national capital » to invest into this or that industry, the state curves for itself a mediating role which may create avenues for Ivorianising the industrial capital much more easily when Ivorian industrialists come of age. This might, in fact, involve an alliance of the Ivorian industrial bourgeoisie or Ivorian state capitalism with various fractions of international capital.

But then the relationship must then be looked at as an *alliance* and not simply as a *dependency syndrome*. In spite of their ability to be fractionalised, we are here forced to look at the bourgeoisie as a *universal class* which can recruit its members even in the so-called « dependent countries ». Two, that the present Ivorian African bourgeoisie, with few roots in industrial capital, has no alternative but to seek alliance with foreign capital. In the immediate, this will mean technological dependance as the most advanced forms of technology must of necessity come from capitalist economies with the most advanced forces of production. If a developing economy is going to engage in production for exports, especially within an environment and a political set-up where competition with other exporters is acute, it cannot help adopt the most advanced forms of technology. If a country has big enough home market, then industrialising with backward forms of technology may be possible.

CONCLUSION

It is possible that capitalist development, following a very different path from the English experience, may actually mature in Africa inspite of the present structures of dependence. The initiative that diverse fractions of the African bourgeoisie may take in this process will be varried, at times disappointing and frequently not very well formulated. But researchers must not forget to notice the concrete germs of these innitiatives whenever they occur, especially when propelled into history by the struggles that the subordinate classes wage against imperialism and all its local manifestations.

REFERENCES

The bulk of the data, and most of the theoretical issues discussed, have been taken from my doctoral dissertation for the University of Chicago, Department of Political Science, December 1977 entitled « Articulation of Modes of Production : The Political Economy of Coffee Production in the Ivory Coast, 1943-1975 ». I have also relied on the Economic Surveys of the Ivory Coast done by *African Development*, particularly the following issues ; November 1973, August 1976, February 1975, *Le Monde*, 15-16 January 1978 also had a special economic review of the Ivory Coast which proved useful and up-to-date. For a good summary of the role of the state in the economic development of the Ivory Coast, see, especially, *L'Etat et le développement économique de la Côte d'Ivoire*, Bibliothèque Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Bordeaux, Centre d'Etudes d'Afrique Noire, Série *Afrique Noire* 6 (Paris : Editions A. Pedone, 1976).

RÉSUMÉ

Dans ce papier, l'auteur s'efforce de décrire et d'analyser le modèle de développement actuellement en vigueur en Côte d'Ivoire. Il s'agit du modèle de développement par voie de capitalisme périphérique dépendant. Après avoir situé sa naissance et son développement dans la perspective historique coloniale et décrit son évolution dans l'ère post-coloniale, l'auteur brosse rapidement le tableau de principales structures et activités économiques de la Côte d'Ivoire.

Celles-ci consistent dans l'agriculture de rapport (café principalement) assumée par les paysans, dont les produits sont achetés par les grandes entreprises multinationales françaises par l'intermédiaire de commerçants libano-syriens. Sur cette structure de base, héritée de la colonisation, l'Etat post-colonial, de concert avec le capital privé international, essaye de bâtir une économie plus diversifiée en investissant dans les secteurs nouveaux. Ce faisant, il consolide l'hégémonie du capital international sur la bourgeoisie agraire et commerçante nationale naissante dont il est précisément l'instrument politique et juridique et dont il reçoit sa légitimité et sa stabilité. A cette bourgeoisie nationale s'opposent, objectivement, les producteurs, les travailleurs et les chômeurs ruraux ; les travailleurs et les chômeurs urbains.

Il analyse également la dynamique de fractions, groupes et classes sociales face au degré de leur insertion dans le système, le rôle qu'ils y jouent et leur accès aux infrastructures et ressources disponibles pour leur développement. Il conclut en notant que la voie capitaliste de développement peut bien réussir en Afrique, en dépit de structures actuelles de dépendance. Il importe, pense-t-il, de déceler les éléments prometteurs dans les initiatives que prennent les diverses fractions de bourgeoisies africaines.

La technologie agricole en Algérie

S. Bedrani *

Avant d'aborder l'étude de la technologie dans l'agriculture algérienne, il importe d'abord de définir ce terme et de nous poser la question de savoir si on peut parler de transfert de technologie agricole comme on parle de transfert de technologie industrielle. Autrement dit d'examiner la pertinence des notions et concepts utilisés pour cette dernière à l'analyse de la première.

1 — Technique, technologie et transfert de technologie

1.1. *A propos des définitions*

Dans un article publié dans les cahiers du CREA, F. YACHIR définit la technologie comme « l'essence » des combinaisons hiérarchisées d'inputs dont les produits composent la structure industrielle (1). Cette définition quelque peu ésotérique, est intéressante dans la mesure où elle épuise le champ des questions que pose son objet. En effet, elle permet de ne pas confondre la technologie avec les éléments de sa matérialisation et donc de traiter correctement les problèmes de la création technologique et des transferts de technologie. La création technologique ne signifierait donc pas la reproduction de machines ou de produits semi-finis (ou autres) conçus ailleurs, mais la conception et la réalisation de ces produits « La production technologique est nécessairement production d'innovation. Elle est donc conception (plutôt que production) de produits technologiques » (2).

De manière plus concrète, et pour nous en tenir au sens du mot, la technologie serait la « technique globale » qui, « à un moment donné et pour une économie donnée » (c'est-à-dire dans un système de rapports de production donnée) représenterait « l'efficacité avec laquelle dans cette économie les inputs sont transformés en produits » (3). La technologie est donc l'ensemble articulé de manière déterminée des techniques de fabrication des produits. Le mot « technique » s'applique alors à un produit. On dira « la technique de production du blé, de l'acier »... Mais on dira « la technologie agricole » et on entendra par là l'ensemble des techniques de production des produits agricoles.

* CREA, Alger. Cet article a été présenté à « The International Seminar on Transfer of Technology and African Development » 18-20 Novembre 1977. Finland.

Dans sa définition empirique de la technologie et de la technique, Yachir clarifie ces notions de manière à éviter les confusions et les raccourcis schématiques qui obscurcissent souvent les débats sur ces questions. Ainsi il analyse une technique comme « l'ensemble des méthodes directes et indirectes de production des biens de consommation individuels et collectifs » (4). La méthode directe de production d'un bien consiste dans la combinaison de force de travail et de moyens de production qui permet d'obtenir le produit final. La méthode indirecte de production est celle qui permet d'obtenir les inputs nécessaires à la fabrication du produit final. L'intérêt de cette distinction est évident : la maîtrise de la technique de production du blé grâce à l'engrais chimique, passe par la maîtrise de la technique de production de l'engrais

Enfin, Yachir introduit deux notions descriptives utiles pour l'examen de l'objet qui nous préoccupe, qui sont « l'éventail historique des techniques » et « l'éventail des techniques efficientes ». La première indique, pour un produit, l'ensemble chronologique des méthodes de fabrication apparues au cours de l'histoire. La seconde recouvre l'ensemble des méthodes appartenant à la même génération technologique (5).

1.2. — Peut-on parler de transfert de technologie agricole ? Avant de répondre à cette question, il importe d'abord de préciser le contenu de l'expression à partir d'un exemple.

Produire du blé implique l'utilisation de semences (sélectionnées ou non), de machines (ou d'animaux, ou des deux), d'inputs divers (engrais, autres produits chimiques), de terre, de force de travail... Mais cela implique également une certaine forme d'occupation du sol. Le blé entre nécessairement dans un assolement lequel influe sur le rendement à l'hectare de cette céréale. L'assolement consistant dans une certaine succession de cultures (ou de jachère pour préserver la fertilité du sol, il apparaît que la technique de production du blé est liée à la technique de production de son précédent cultural.

Cette précision une fois apportée, il convient de remarquer que les techniques de production agricole par le fait qu'elles s'adaptent à des conditions naturelles difficilement maîtrisables par l'homme en l'état actuel des connaissances (climats, pluviométrie, topographie, composition physique et chimique des sols) ne sont pas d'un transfert facile. Certes, ces éléments interviennent dans l'activité industrielle, mais de façon ponctuelle et/ou marginale, bref de manière telle que la production peut s'effectuer de la même manière, quel que soit le pays, moyennant des aménagements toujours possibles. Par exemple, on peut isoler des milliers d'hectares de céréales des effets néfastes du sirocco.

Il résulte de ceci qu'on ne peut, sous peine d'échec, importer des technologies agricoles pour la simple raison qu'on ne peut pas importer des éléments naturels, ni les modifier à grande échelle

Il apparaît alors que les pays importent davantage d'éléments matériels de techniques que des techniques proprement dites. Ainsi, l'Algérie achète à l'extérieur des tracteurs, des machines, des produits

chimiques, des semences sélectionnées, de la force de travail qualifiée (ingénieurs agronomes) mais elle n'importe pas la technique de production du blé. On peut donner à ce sujet, l'exemple de l'introduction du blé à haut rendement. L'institution étrangère qui a financé le projet n'a pas, et ne peut pas reconstituer le procès de production tel qu'il existe au Mexique ou en Inde. Elle fournit la semence sélectionnée, mais elle envoie des ingénieurs qui étudient l'adaptation de cette semence au milieu agro-climatologique, c'est-à-dire qui déterminent les façons culturales, les dates de semis, de traitement, de récolte compte tenu des contraintes naturelles. Ainsi, on peut dire que ces ingénieurs conçoivent en Algérie la production du blé à haut rendement et font donc œuvre de production technologique. °

Dans la mesure où des travailleurs algériens participent de très près à cette conception, on peut dire qu'il y a une certaine forme de transfert de technologie.

2 — Les techniques employées dans l'agriculture algérienne

2.1. — *L'éventail historique est très étendu* puisqu'on peut trouver des procès de travail se déroulant sans doute de la même manière qu'aux périodes antiques et des procès de travail incluant des découvertes les plus récentes de la science en matière de biologie, de zoologie et autres.

Les techniques varient suivant la logique des différents systèmes de production présents dans l'agriculture. Essayons de les décrire dans le domaine de la production du blé.

2.1.1. Le système de production à dominante « autoconsommation » comprend les exploitations de faible superficie (5 ha et moins) quasi-exclusivement céréalières dont les travailleurs n'ont pas, ou peu, de revenu extérieur à l'exploitation. La technique directe de production des céréales consiste dans la plupart des régions à semer sur la terre non labourée puis à remuer (ou retourner légèrement) le sol après les premières pluies d'automne. L'agriculture attend ensuite que la céréale soit mûre pour la moissonner à l'aide généralement de la faucille. Le transport des gerbes vers les aires de battage s'effectue à dos d'animal (ânes, mulets) dans des filets. Le battage s'effectue par piétinement d'animaux (ânes, mulets, bovins, chevaux) et le vanage par la pelle et le vent.

La méthode indirecte de production (fabrication des moyens de production) ne fait intervenir que l'artisanat local. L'araire est en effet, un outil en bois que les paysans façonnent, eux-mêmes. La seule pièce principale en métal (le soc qui pénètre la terre) est forgée par les artisans encore disponibles dans les villages, mais à partir de pièces en fer provenant des secteurs capitalistes de production.

La faucille et les autres outils (pelles et fourches) relèvent de la même méthode de fabrication. La semence employée provient de la récolte de l'année précédente et est donc issue d'une méthode de production similaire.

Les animaux de traits proviennent de l'élevage traditionnel qui ne fait intervenir que les connaissances coutumières.

Enfin la force de travail mise en œuvre n'a pas d'autre qualification que celle transmise par la tradition.

Il est fort probable que cette technique de production ne diffère en rien de celle appliquée pendant l'époque romaine. Sauf en ce qui concerne (en partie) la méthode indirecte de production, le fer nécessaire au soc de l'araire et à la faucille provenant sans doute des hauts fourneaux.

Il semble que cette technique de production soit encore largement présente dans le secteur privé puisque, selon le recensement général de l'agriculture (1972-1973) 47 % des exploitations ayant des terres labourables n'utilisent pas la charrue métallique (elles utilisent donc l'araire et/ou des outils à main pour travailler le sol).

2.1.2. Le système de production à dominante « production marchande » fait intervenir les techniques parmi les plus avancées dans les pays capitalistes. Ces techniques s'utilisent de manière quasi-exclusive dans le secteur agricole d'Etat, le secteur issu de l'application de la réforme agraire depuis 1971 et une partie du secteur privé.

Décrivons la technique de production des céréales observables dans cette partie de l'agriculture.

La production du blé peut entrer dans un assolement plus ou moins intensif (c'est-à-dire permettant un taux d'occupation du sol plus ou moins grand). L'assolement constitue en lui-même une technique dont l'application fait intervenir des connaissances scientifiques modernes. L'assolement le plus fréquent semble être blé-jachère dont le procès de travail se déroule de la manière suivante.

Vers le mois de mars-avril, le labour de la terre s'effectue avec des charrues lourdes (souvent à 3 disques ou 3 socs) à une profondeur d'environ 30 cm. En automne (septembre-octobre), des pulvérisateurs à disques (cover-crop) cassent les mottes en plusieurs passages croisés de manière à affiner le lit pour la semence. Immédiatement après les engrais (ammonitrate) sont mis en terre à l'aide d'épandeurs mécaniques, puis les semences (souvent sélectionnées) à l'aide de semoirs en ligne ; les agriculteurs tassent ensuite la terre en passant des rouleaux lisses. Une fois que le blé a levé, on applique des désherbants chimiques (soit par voie aérienne, soit par voie terrestre à l'aide de pulvérisateurs trainés). Le désherbage est suivi par l'épandage d'engrais dit « de couverture » (ammonitrate 33,5 %).

D'autres produits chimiques peuvent éventuellement être utilisés contre les parasites (punaises des céréales) ou les maladies à certaines périodes du cycle végétatif.

La récolte s'effectue grâce à des moissonneuses-batteuses automotrices. La moissonneuse-batteuse est suivie par des remorques tractées qui reçoivent les socs pleins (acheminés ensuite vers les docks-silos) et par des ramasseuses-presses-botteuses mécaniques, pour la récolte de la paille.

S'agissant de grandes exploitations, l'ensemble de ces travaux s'organise dans des chantiers comprenant plusieurs dizaines de travailleurs obéissant à une hiérarchie.

La méthode directe de production s'analyse donc comme une méthode hautement mécanisée, faisant intervenir une force de travail sensée être hautement qualifiée puisqu'elle utilise des produits chimiques, des semences sélectionnées, un matériel souvent sophistiqué. Cette technique ne diffère sans doute guère de celle employée dans les pays capitalistes présentant les mêmes caractéristiques de sol et de climat.

Les méthodes indirectes de production sont celles en vigueur dans les pays capitalistes avancés, puisque les équipements soit proviennent de ces pays, soit sont en partie fabriqués en Algérie suivant les mêmes méthodes (tracteurs fabriqués dans des usines installées par des firmes capitalistes suivant la formule « produit en main »).

2.1.3. — Entre ces deux techniques s'échelonnent toute une série de techniques combinant de manière différente des éléments matériels de techniques directes et/ou indirectes appartenant à des périodes historiques différentes.

Donnons-en quelques exemples concrets observés au cours de nos enquêtes :

a) Le premier exemple (6) est constitué par la technique employée par un paysan exploitant 5 ha de terre pris avec un contrat de « khammes ». Ce paysan ne fournit que sa force de travail (pour laquelle il reçoit le 1/5^e de la récolte). Il organise lui-même le procès de travail, les moyens de production lui étant fournis par le propriétaire.

Le labour s'effectue en automne avec une charrue à 3 disques trainée par un tracteur de 60 CV (matériel loué à la coopérative agricole polyvalente communale de services). L'agriculteur sème ensuite à la main (des grains non sélectionnés) puis fait retourner la terre sur la semence à l'aide d'un cover-crop trainé par le même tracteur loué à la CAPCS. Des salariés moissonnent à la faux (et non à la faucille) la superficie (lui a refusé de moissonner parce qu'il ne reçoit que 1/5^e de la récolte). Les gerbes ont été transportées par le khamès jusqu'à l'aire de battage, employant pour cela une charrette tirée par un cheval. Le battage s'est fait à l'aide d'une batteuse à poste fixe louée à son propriétaire.

Ce procès de travail fait intervenir des éléments appartenant à des périodes historiques extrêmement éloignées qu'on peut classer chronologiquement ainsi :

- 1 - Technique très ancienne (antiquité et en-deçà), semis à la main de grains non sélectionnés. Technique de la jachère non travaillée (probablement pâturée) ;
- 2 - Technique de la fin du 19^e siècle (pour l'Algérie, avant pour l'Europe), début 20^e siècle : emploi de la faux, emploi de la charrette pour le transport des gerbes.
- 3 - Technique des années 1920-1930 : batteuse à poste fixe.

4 - Technique des années 1950 à aujourd'hui : charrue 3 disques trainée par un tracteur de 60 CV.

Les méthodes indirectes de production recouvrent, bien sûr, les mêmes périodes historiques.

La logique de ce type d'exploitation est la résultante du rapport de force qui existe entre le propriétaire et le khammès. Ce dernier a intérêt à maximiser le produit en nature puisque son revenu est constitué par un pourcentage fixe de ce produit. Il aurait donc tendance à utiliser les techniques aptes à ce but. Il minimisera sa dépense de force de travail chaque fois que cela ne fait pas diminuer la production. Cette logique se heurte à celle du propriétaire des moyens de production qui, lui, a pour objectif le profit, c'est-à-dire la minimisation des coûts monétaires et la maximisation du produit brut. La logique qui domine est, bien évidemment, celle du propriétaire et ce dernier déterminera donc la technique à employer. Alors que le khammès désirerait, sans doute que l'ensemble du procès de travail soit mécanisé, le propriétaire n'utilisera des machines que si le coût du travail mécanisé est inférieur au coût du travail non mécanisé (ou que si les disponibilités en machines sont insuffisantes sur le marché, cas fréquent constaté au cours de nos enquêtes).

b) Le deuxième exemple, observé également à Mérouana, est celui d'un paysan attributaire individuel de la Réforme Agraire qui a bénéficié d'un lot de 19,5 ha, dont il n'a cultivé qu'un hectare en 1975-1976 parce que la CAPCS n'a pas eu le temps de lui labourer l'ensemble (7).

La technique employée est la suivante : semi (semence triée à la main sur terre non labourée, couverture de la semence par un labour au cover-crop tiré par un tracteur de 60 chevaux (matériel loué à la CAPCS), hersage avec le même tracteur, récolte à la faucille transport des gerbes par charrette à traction animale, battage par piétinement d'animaux.

Cet agriculteur consomme intégralement la production, laquelle ne lui suffit d'ailleurs pas.

Les différences techniques entre la méthode de ce paysan et la méthode du paysan examiné précédemment sont :

- le non-emploi de semences triées et de la herse par le premier ;
- le non-emploi de la charrue à 3 disques (qui travaille mieux le sol que le cover-crop), de la faux et de la batteuse à poste fixe par le second.

La technique du premier paysan a pour résultat un meilleur travail du sol mais minimise la dépense en travail (utilisation de la faux et de la batteuse à poste fixe).

La technique du second minimise la dépense monétaire (n'emploie pas de travailleurs salariés et ne loue pas de matériel de récolte, n'effectue pas de préparées de printemps nécessitant une charrue lourde et donc un tracteur) et fait intervenir, corrélativement davantage la force de travail.

Ces deux exemples suffisent pour montrer la multiplicité des techniques possibles en matière de production du blé. Chaque agriculteur,

selon sa logique (autoconsommation, production pour le marché, production en partie seulement pour le marché selon ses disponibilités financières, selon les disponibilités de main-d'œuvre, selon que cette main-d'œuvre est gratuite (main-d'œuvre familiale) ou achetée, combiner les éléments matériels et organisationnels de techniques différentes historiquement.

Pour toutes les autres productions de biens agricoles finaux, on peut trouver la même diversité de techniques. L'éventail des techniques apparaît donc comme extrêmement ouvert. A l'heure actuelle, l'agriculture algérienne comprend des techniques fortement utilisatrices de main-d'œuvre, d'autres faiblement utilisatrices de main-d'œuvre.

2.2. Les techniques employées dans l'agriculture tournée vers le marché demandent une moindre quantité de force de travail.

En ce qui concerne les méthodes directes de production, les différences de temps de travail employé par hectare de terre travaillée sont relativement importantes. Ainsi pour la production de blé les statistiques agricoles donnent les normes d'emploi suivantes (journée ha) :

	Secteur d'Etat (mécanisé)	Secteur privé (non mécanisé)
Blé dur	5,5	15
Blé tendre	5,5	15
Orge	5,5	8

Source : Statistiques Agricoles N° 6 - Février 1969.

En ce qui concerne les méthodes indirectes de production les différences doivent être encore plus grandes puisque les machines et les outils de travail proviennent, pour l'agriculture tournée vers le marché, d'industries capitalistes hautement mécanisées et produisant à grande échelle, alors que les outils et les animaux de traits de l'agriculture tournée vers l'autoconsommation proviennent de l'artisanat et de l'élevage traditionnels. L'exemple de la production d'eau pour l'irrigation est très significatif à cet égard. Les techniques anciennes (historiquement) de production d'eau ne font appel quasiment qu'à de la main-d'œuvre :

- dérivation au fil de l'eau par des rigoles mesurant parfois plusieurs kilomètres ;
- creusement et construction de puits par des puisatiers et de la main-d'œuvre non qualifiée locaux ;
- captage de sources pour l'utilisation de l'eau à l'aval.

Les techniques récentes font appel à une main-d'œuvre peu nombreuse mais utilisant des machines très diversifiées, provenant des pays capitalistes avancés. La conception des barrages et leur réalisation en

Algérie se fait de la même manière que dans n'importe quel pays capitaliste avancé pour la bonne raison que ce sont les bureaux d'études et les entreprises de ces pays qui font le travail.

De la même manière, les forages demandent des études hydrogéologiques menées par les bureaux d'études étrangers et des matériels fabriqués par les firmes capitalistes étrangères.

Les techniques d'irrigation anciennes et récentes se différencient nettement (qualitativement et quantitativement) quant à la main-d'œuvre mise en œuvre. Les premières utilisent la force de travail humaine pour le puisage de l'eau et sa distribution (système de séguias), les secondes utilisent des réseaux d'irrigation couvrant plusieurs milliers d'hectares, dotés de stations de pompage, de châteaux d'eaux et d'asperseurs automatiques où un seul surveillant suffit à plusieurs dizaines d'hectares.

Les techniques récentes dont les éléments sont essentiellement importés des pays capitalistes avancés (8) utilisent donc peu de main-d'œuvre par rapport aux techniques anciennes. Cela s'explique par le fait que ces éléments sont conçus dans un système impliquant la minimisation des coûts en main-d'œuvre.

Il nous faut cependant nuancer cette affirmation. En effet, théoriquement, on peut augmenter l'utilisation d'éléments technologiques récents tout en augmentant l'emploi par hectare. Ainsi, on peut très bien faire intervenir, dans le procès de production du blé du système de production à dominante « autoconsommation », l'application de produits chimiques contre la punaise des céréales ce qui accroît la quantité de travail à l'hectare puisque l'ensemble des autres façons culturales s'effectue de la même manière (9). Cet exemple est valable parce qu'il n'existe pas, dans le procès de travail traditionnel, de moyen de lutte (et donc de travail) contre ce parasite. Mais remplacer la faucille par la moissonneuse-batteuse automotrice supprime du travail sans forcément augmenter la production. Plus précisément, on peut, théoriquement, organiser la force de travail disponible dans le pays (sans la changer qualitativement) pour moissonner à la faucille à temps l'ensemble des céréales et donc se passer de moissonneuse-batteuse. Mais on ne peut lutter contre la punaise des céréales qu'en important le produit chimique qu'on ne fabrique pas actuellement.

De cela, il ressort que l'accroissement de la production ne provient pas obligatoirement d'un renforcement de la mécanisation du procès de production directe. De cela, il ressort également que la mécanisation apparaît dans tout pays où il n'y a pas plein emploi permanent de la force de travail, essentiellement comme un rapport de production impliquant l'exploitation du travail (10).

Conséquemment, on pourrait classer les techniques de production en deux catégories : celles qui accroissent la production tout en accroissant la quantité de travail direct utilisée, celles qui accroissent peu à peu la production mais diminuent la quantité de travail utilisée. Ceci dit en prenant pour base de départ un procès de travail sans mécanisation, ni produits chimiques, ni semences sélectionnées, ni force de travail ayant subi un cursus scolaire.

Dans la première catégorie on pourrait classer les produits chimiques pour lutter contre les parasites (animaux ou végétaux) et les maladies inattaquables par les méthodes traditionnelles, les labours profonds, l'utilisation des engrais naturels disponibles compost, engrais organiques divers, fumiers...), les semences sélectionnées et/ou traitées,, les techniques d'irrigation relevant de la petite hydraulique.

Dans la seconde on pouvait classer le matériel de traction mécanique pour le travail léger du sol (qui peut être fait par des animaux), le matériel de récolte (moissonneuse-batteuse, arracheuse de pomme de terre, d'alfa...) les produits chimiques dés herbants, une bonne partie des matériels de traitement (pulvérisateurs automoteurs avions pour les épandages...), les techniques d'irrigation relevant de la grande hydraulique (dans la mesure où les potentialités de petite hydraulique ne sont pas épuisées).

Or les techniques employées dans l'agriculture algérienne la plus riche (secteur d'Etat et secteur privé capitaliste) combinent ces deux catégories dans des proportions défavorables à la première catégorie. En effet les semences de céréales sélectionnées sont très peu utilisées (400 000 ha environ sur 3 230 000 ha), ainsi que les produits de traitements aussi bien pour les végétaux que les animaux ; les labours profonds sont peu pratiqués, la taille des arbres également, la traction animale est quasi-inexistante dans le secteur d'Etat, en voie de disparition dans les grandes exploitations privées.

Les petites exploitations privées et la frange inférieure des moyennes ont même tendance à se mécaniser en faisant appel à des procédés de la deuxième catégorie, dans certaines régions, parce que l'emploi de la machine devient compétitif par rapport à l'emploi de salariés devenu nécessaire par suite de l'exode agricole des jeunes travailleurs attirés par des salaires plus élevés en ville et par l'infrastructure urbaine qui offre une plus large gamme d'activités sur tous les plans.

Cependant, toutes les techniques dont les éléments se trouvent actuellement disponibles sur le marché soit local, soit mondial, ne sont pas accessibles à une grande partie des agriculteurs.

2.3. Les techniques récentes (par opposition aux techniques ne faisant intervenir que des outils de travail artisanaux, de la main-d'œuvre non scolarisée et des semences ou plants traditionnels) sont, parfois dans certains cas, toujours dans d'autre, inaccessibles aux agriculteurs pour plusieurs raisons.

2.3.1. — La première raison, peut être la non-disponibilité des biens de production sur le marché à cause de la défectuosité des semences sélectionnées, des pièces détachées pour les engins mécaniques, des produits chimiques...) (11). Il n'y a guère de saisons qui ne voient pas manquer dans les magasins privés ou du secteur d'Etat tel ou tel moyen de production réclamé à cor et à cris par telle ou telle catégorie d'agriculteurs. Les pièces détachées, les lubrifiants sont les produits, dont, apparemment, ces derniers manquent le plus.

2.3.2. — La deuxième raison réside dans l'insuffisance de la production locale concomittante au refus d'importer. Ainsi, le complexe moteurs-tracteurs de Constantine (construit par le consortium allemand DIAG selon la formule «)produit en main» devait fournir 4.000

tracteurs à roues et 1.000 tracteurs à chenilles. Or il n'en a produit que 388 en 1973 et 799 en 1974. En 1975, les importations cessent en prévision de l'entrée du complexe en pleine production. Mais cela ne se réalise pas et l'agriculture, cette année là, ne peut acheter tout le matériel de traction prévu (12).

Le même scénario se répète pour les complexes de production d'engrais azotés et phosphatés depuis qu'ils sont entrés en production. Les pannes et les difficultés techniques empêchent l'obtention d'une production normale et régulière (13). Ce qui perturbe chaque année l'approvisionnement des exploitations agricoles.

Le refus d'importer de la part des organismes commerciaux peut également être motivé par des contraintes de ressources en devises. Ainsi, pour cette raison, la SONACOME (Société Nationale de Construction Mécanique) qui importe les tracteurs a réduit le programme d'achat à l'étranger présenté par le Ministre de l'Agriculture pour l'année 1976 de 7.893 à 5.600 tracteurs.

Cette deuxième raison freine certainement le développement de la mécanisation agricole. Nous avons pu constater, au cours d'une enquête effectuée pour le Centre de Recherches en Economie Appliquée (CREA) dans plusieurs communes du pays au mois de mai 1977, la volonté désespérée des agriculteurs de trouver des machines (particulièrement tracteurs) à l'achat.

Cette volonté n'émane pas seulement du secteur agricole d'Etat dont les plaintes émaillent quotidiennement la presse nationale, mais également de paysans moyens (et parfois petits qui n'hésitent pas à verser 6 à 12 mois d'avance le prix du tracteur (14). Les paysans interrogés à El Attaf (El Asnam) déplorent, dans leur très grande majorité, que la CAPCS ne dispose pas de suffisamment de tracteurs pour labourer et de moissonneuses-batteuses pour la récolte.

2.3.3. — La troisième raison de l'inaccessibilité des techniques récentes se trouve dans la faiblesse des revenus d'une grande partie des agriculteurs et les prix élevés des produits industriels nécessaires à l'agriculture. Selon le Recensement Général de l'Agriculture (1972-1973) 80 % des exploitations qui ont des terres labourables (celles-ci représentent 90 % de la superficie totale, il apparaît que la grande masse des exploitations de moins de 10 ha sont des exploitations céréalières. Englobant 30 % de la superficie totale, la superficie moyenne de ces exploitations se situe à 2,84 ha. Même avec un rendement moyen de 6 quintaux-hectare, ce qui est très optimiste (15), le revenu brut d'une telle exploitation serait extrêmement bas. Même en supposant qu'elle ne cultive que du blé dur (céréale dont le prix est le plus élevé), la vente du produit ne procurerait que 954 DA en 1969 et 1.548 DA en 1976, somme tout à fait insuffisante pour faire vivre la famille algérienne moyenne composée de 5 personnes. En fait, la récolte suffit à peine à l'autoconsommation et de nombreux travailleurs agricoles complètent leur revenu par le travail salarié dans les grandes exploitations ou bénéficient de transferts de revenus gagnés par les parents salariés dans les villes. Malgré ces transferts éventuels, les petits paysans et beaucoup de paysans moyens n'ont pas les moyens financiers pour louer le tracteur de la CAPCS (16 DA l'heure

avec charrue 3 disques à Mérouana) la moissonneuse-batteuse (60 DA l'heure à El Attaf, 55 DA à Mrouana) et encore moins pour les acheter (un tracteur pneumatique 65 CV coûte 37.000 DA en 1973). Les engrais coûtent également très cher et la majorité des agriculteurs privés, d'après nos enquêtes de 1977, déclarent ne pas en utiliser à cause de leur prix. Les produits de traitement entièrement importés, ne subissent pas le blocage des prix décidé pour le matériel agricole et les engrais en 1974, voient leurs coûts augmenter régulièrement et rapidement du fait de l'inflation mondiale.

La généralisation de ces formes techniques dans l'agriculture demande la fourniture de crédits importants à ce secteur et la mise en place d'une infrastructure bancaire à la portée de l'ensemble des agriculteurs (géographiquement et sur le plan de la forme d'octroi des prêts). Or, l'agriculture (et en particulier le secteur non-étatique) demeure globalement insatisfaite sur ce plan. Nous avons pu constater au cours de nos enquêtes que les CAPCS demeurent incapables d'effectuer une grande partie des travaux de labours et de récolte demandés par les paysans, du fait de leur sous-équipement et des pannes fréquentes du matériel.

Chaque année, les CAPCS et les exploitations du secteur agricole d'Etat voient leurs demandes de crédit amputées parce que les côtes globales de crédit accordées par le Ministre des Finances sont insuffisantes. Par ailleurs, les crédits alloués annuellement au secteur privé restent à un niveau très faible. En effet, leur volume a évolué entre 1966 et 1973 et de 113 millions de dinars en 1967 à 12 millions de dinars en 1973 avec une tendance à la baisse comme le montre le tableau suivant :

Millions de DA

1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
85	113	110	102	54	45	23	12

Source : Tutelle des SAP et BNA (16).

Si on rapporte ces sommes seulement au nombre des exploitations ayant des terres labourables (731.000 selon le recensement 1972-1973) on obtient les chiffres suivants par exploitation :

1970	73,87 DA
1971	61,55 DA
1972	16,41 DA
1973	31,41 DA

Il est évident que les crédits accordés au secteur privé ne représentent qu'une goutte d'eau par rapport à la masse du financement nécessaire à une agriculture où il y a emploi généralisé de machines,

de produits chimiques, de semences sélectionnées, de terres amendées et aménagées, de force de travail qualifiée, toutes choses très faiblement présentes dans l'agriculture actuelle.

La généralisation de ces éléments technologiques, forcément importés, dans l'état actuel de l'industrie algérienne, s'avère impossible compte tenu du modèle d'industrialisation choisi lequel demande des dépenses considérables en devises.

Si, pour ces différentes raisons, les éléments technologiques avancés ne sont pas accessibles à la grande masse des agriculteurs, leur emploi, quand ils le sont, ne va pas sans poser un certain nombre de problèmes.

2.4. — L'emploi des éléments technologiques importés pose le problème de l'adaptation de la main-d'œuvre et de l'organisation économique à ces éléments.

2.4.1. — Les travailleurs ne sont pas correctement formés à ces techniques et pas en quantité suffisante. L'indice de ce phénomène se trouve dans le taux de panne extrêmement élevé des engins et dans la consommation anormale de pièces détachées. 15,7 % des tracteurs du secteur agricole d'Etat sont en panne en 1971. Bien que ce pourcentage ait diminué par rapport à 1966 où il était de 34,3 % (mais cela s'explique aussi par la jeunesse du parc en 1971 par rapport à 1966) il ne se passe pas de saison où le problème de la fréquence trop importante des pannes ne se pose pas.

Ainsi, pour la campagne labours-semailles de 1977, il paraîtrait qu'en moyenne 30 % du parc de traction du secteur agricole d'Etat de l'Ouest algérien serait immobilisé pour panne mécanique (17). L'Office National du Matériel et des Pièces détachées, qualifie d'abusive la consommation de pièces de rechange et ne manque pas de tirer régulièrement la sonnette d'alarme à ce sujet (18). Ainsi, dans la wilaya de Constantine en 1977 la valeur des pièces détachées atteint 28 % de celle du matériel utilisé alors que cette valeur ne devrait pas dépasser 10 %. Les pannes seraient fréquentes même sur du matériel acquis récemment (19).

Ce phénomène trouve ses origines dans :

1. — La complexité du matériel importé (20). Il s'agit du même matériel que celui employé par l'agriculteur européen, par exemple allemand, qui, lui dispose à proximité de toute la main-d'œuvre nécessaire à la conduite et à la réparation d'une part, et d'autre qui « comprend » le matériel qu'il utilise grâce à sa formation technologique. Même l'agriculteur allemand, par ailleurs, se voit imposer par les constructeurs industriels des matériels de plus en plus sophistiqués donc délicats, qu'il maîtrise mal et qu'il renouvelle donc plus souvent.

2. — L'inégalité des salaires et des conditions générales de vie entre agriculture et autres secteurs qui fait émigrer les travailleurs qualifiés de l'agriculture vers l'industrie, le commerce, les transports... Ce phénomène, certes peu mesuré, est néanmoins notoire.

Il est fort peu probable que les quelques 19.000 personnes formées au cours du 2^e plan quadriennal 1973-1977) (allant de l'ingénieur de conception à l'ouvrier qualifié) (21) soient toutes restées dans le secteur agricole. Il n'est pas à craindre d'avancer que plus de la moitié travaille actuellement hors de l'agriculture. Ce phénomène ne doit guère étonner si on considère les écarts de salaires entre agriculture et autres secteurs. Un tracteuriste du secteur agricole d'Etat est payé environ 20 DA par jour, bénéficie d'allocations familiales inférieures du fait du plafonnement à 4 enfants, à celles servies dans d'autres secteurs de l'économie. Le même tracteuriste travaillant dans le bâtiment ou l'industrie perçoit un salaire parfois deux fois supérieur, 24 DA d'allocations familiales par enfant sans plafonnement (cela est important quand on sait que les familles algériennes ont beaucoup d'enfants) et fait des heures supplémentaires payées (22). L'inégalité est encore plus grande pour les travailleurs agricoles du secteur de la réforme agraire (pas d'allocations familiales, pas de sécurité sociale, avance sur revenu très faible) et pour les travailleurs du secteur agricole privé qui eux, ne sont pas généralement déclarés de la sécurité sociale et ne touchent donc pas d'allocations familiales.

L'agriculture devient donc le lieu où il est possible d'acquérir une certaine formation professionnelle pour partir travailler ailleurs où le revenu et les conditions de vie sont jugés meilleurs.

Améliorer la situation de l'agriculture du point de vue de la main-d'œuvre qualifiée pour l'emploi d'éléments technologiques importés implique soit l'égalité des salaires dans les différents secteurs (à qualification égale) soit la formation de travailleur à un rythme plus rapide que le rythme de départ des travailleurs qualifiés de l'agriculture vers les autres secteurs. Une méthode à la fois alternative et complémentaire consisterait à mettre l'accent sur la formation technologique des producteurs agricoles dont il est sûr qu'ils resteront dans l'agriculture (petits paysans en particulier). Or, jusqu'à aujourd'hui l'effort financier pour la formation a été fait principalement dans le domaine des cadres de conception et d'application. Il s'agit là d'une formation onéreuse et peu efficace, parce que d'une part le cadre peut trouver un travail mieux rémunéré hors de l'agriculture (donc il aura tendance à fuir), d'autre part le cadre ne peut pas transmettre son savoir au producteur direct de manière immédiate (à supposer qu'il veuille le transmettre). Il y a ainsi séparation de producteur direct d'avec le moyen de travail dans la mesure où le travailleur suit les instructions de celui qui possède le savoir, sans les comprendre. Ne dominant que la technique, mais l'exécutant, le travailleur risque de mal l'employer, de négliger certaines opérations dont on ne lui a pas démontré l'utilité. Cela entraîne l'inefficacité relative des éléments technologiques importés.

2.3.2 — L'inefficacité semble évidente si on examine le cas des engrais. L'utilisation officielle des fertilisants chimiques progresse bien plus rapidement que les rendements constatés. Ainsi pour le secteur

agricole d'Etat, l'évolution se perçoit clairement dans le tableau suivant :

Année	Unités fertilisantes par an	Rendement à l'ha (*)
1967-1968	30	9,2
1969-1970	50	7,5
1970-1971	70	8,5
1971-1972	110	9,6
1972-1973	134	6,7

(*) Pour l'ensemble blé dur, blé tendre, orge et avoine.

Ce phénomène n'est pas isolé. Les rendements de la betterave sucrière dans la plaine d'El Khemis varient entre 15 et 35 Qx à l'hectare dans le secteur agricole d'Etat, alors que les rendements des champs d'expérimentation atteignent aisément 100 Qx à l'hectare. Pourtant cette culture a bénéficié d'une assistance technique étrangère nombreuse en effectifs et de longue durée.

Le cas le plus dramatique est sans doute celui des périmètres irrigués par grands barrages et système d'irrigation par aspersion. Les périmètres nécessitent un temps extrêmement long pour leur aménagement. Ainsi la plaine de Annaba ne reçoit pas encore, dans toute sa superficie, l'eau du barrage de la Bou-Namoussa terminé en 1962-1963. Le même cas se retrouve pour la plaine d'Abadia et le barrage de l'Oued Guir réalisé et mis en eau en 1969.

Dans d'autres domaines de la production agricole nous retrouvons le même phénomène d'inefficacité des éléments technologiques importés. Ainsi, les vaches de race sélectionnées importées d'Europe ne fournissent, en Algérie, souvent, que la moitié du lait qu'elles produisent dans leur région d'origine (2.500 litres au lieu de 5.000 litres par an) à cause d'une alimentation insuffisante et de l'absence d'une main-d'œuvre qualifiée et intéressée au rendement de ce bétail.

Il en va de même pour les cultures sous abri en matière plastique où les rendements obtenus n'atteignent jamais les rendements prévus parce que les travailleurs maîtrisent insuffisamment la technique. Le mauvais contrôle de la température de l'intérieur de l'abri entraîne la brûlure des plantes. L'aération correcte demande une attention très soutenue. Ces abris favorisent, en outre, le développement de certains parasites et maladies grâce à l'humidité et à la chaleur. Cela implique la parfaite maîtrise par les travailleurs des traitements phyto-sanitaires, maîtrise qu'ils ne possèdent que très imparfaitement. Enfin, les rendements obtenus ne remboursent souvent pas les coûts de la culture.

Peu efficace, l'emploi de certains éléments technologiques importés se révèle parfois dangereux pour le sol et les travailleurs.

2.5. Depuis longtemps pour l'Algérie, il a été démontré que la mécanisation intensive, en particulier dans la méthode dite du « dry-farming », appauvrit le sol. Le travail continu du sol (jachère travaillée) sur de grandes étendues empêche la formation d'une végétation protectrice. Le sol est ainsi soumis à une érosion intense aussi bien éolienne qu'hydrique qui décape le sol de sa partie utile. Il est certain également que cette méthode diminue la quantité d'humus dans une terre, qui, d'après les spécialistes en est déjà faiblement pourvue. En effet, l'humus exposé au soleil trop chaud et dans une atmosphère sèche s'oxyde. Parallèlement la quantité de végétaux enfouis par les labours superficiels ou profonds risque d'être peu importante : souvent les chaumes sont brûlés pour faciliter le passage des machines, et on supprime les herbes dès qu'elles poussent pour éviter qu'elles ne pompent l'eau et les éléments nutritifs qu'on veut garder en réserve pour les plantes utiles.

L'utilisation des produits chimiques pose les problèmes généraux de pollution maintenant abondamment décrits et analysés dans les pays de capitalisme avancé. En Algérie, une maîtrise encore insuffisante provoque des pertes et des accidents dont on n'entend pas toujours parler. C'est un fait connu qu'au niveau de la Mitidja les épandages aériens de produits de traitement ont détruits les abeilles dans cette région productrice de miel. Dans la même région des travailleurs mal protégés ont été accidentés par un produit de traitement pour les agrumes.

Favorisant une faible utilisation de main-d'œuvre dans un pays où le sous-emploi agricole demeure important (malgré des manques de main-d'œuvre dans certaines régions industrialisées), inefficaces partiellement parce que difficilement maîtrisables, parfois dangereux pour le milieu, les éléments technologiques importés posent également le problème de la déqualification de la force de travail traditionnelle.

2.6. Les connaissances techniques anciennes de la paysannerie tendent progressivement à disparaître. Certes, ce mouvement est encore lent. Mais, néanmoins, on peut faire cette hypothèse sur la base de certains faits constatés.

Actuellement, et de plus en plus fréquemment, le travailleur ne maîtrise plus les différentes étapes du procès de travail agricole conduit avec les éléments technologiques importés. Ce sont les conseillers techniques, les ingénieurs (quand il y en a) qui indiquent au travailleur quand labourer, à quelle profondeur, avec quelle machine, quelle semence, quels engrais utiliser, à quelle époque.. En bref, les différents moyens de production que le travailleur agricole utilise lui deviennent étrangers parce qu'ils lui parviennent de l'extérieur.

L'emploi d'éléments technologiques importés (ou, soulignons-le encore une fois, fabriqués localement avec des techniques importées) entraîne les travailleurs agricoles à ne plus utiliser les techniques qu'ils (ou que leurs pères) maîtrisent parfaitement. Ainsi, les ouvrages de petite hydraulique (digues, puits, trouvent de moins en moins de main-d'œuvre pour leur réalisation. Des millions de dinars

ont été dépensés pour construire des digues d'irrigation sur de petits oueds à travers l'Algérie en ayant recours à des techniques « modernes » ; ingénieurs, bureaux d'études étrangers, ciment, gabions... Combien de ces digues ont résisté aux crues ? Combien ne sont-elles pas rapidement ensablées ? Combien de ressources en dinars et en devises auraient pu être économisées si les techniques habituelles (mais améliorées avec et par les paysans) avaient été adoptées ?

En outre, l'habitude de l'utilisation des machines conduit parfois les travailleurs à ne pas effectuer les façons culturales quand la machine est absente pour une raison ou une autre, soit parce qu'ils n'ont plus les animaux de trait (ce qui est le cas le plus fréquent) soit parce que la main-d'œuvre est insuffisante (certains des enfants vont travailler en ville, ceux qui restent refusent purement et simplement de manier la charrue).

Ainsi s'éteignent lentement mais sûrement l'art de conduire un attelage, celui des cultures en terrasses, celui de la recherche et de l'utilisation de l'eau, sans que ces techniques soient remplacées par d'autres. Cela entraîne l'abandon, voulu ou forcé, de terres réputées maintenant « marginales », la non-utilisation ou la sous-utilisation de nombreuses ressources en eau superficielle ou souterraine.

Enfin, le paysan intégré dans les structures de production à techniques récentes perd également, faute de temps pour les employer, d'autres techniques de production (qui sont en même temps un mode de vie), celles par exemple de cueillette et de chasse extrêmement importantes dans beaucoup de régions, il y a seulement quelques dizaines d'années (23), celles de fabrication d'objets de production ou de consommation à partir des ressources minérales ou végétales locales.

Faut-il rejeter toute importation de technologie ou d'éléments technologiques ? Encore plus faut-il rejeter l'application du développement scientifique et technique actuel à la croissance et au développement ? La réponse à ces questions doit certainement être négative, les positions maximalistes ne relèvent, dans ce domaine, que de l'utopie. Il s'agit d'abord de poser correctement le problème : importer de la technologie ou des éléments technologiques et pourquoi ? La réponse est claire : aboutir au développement (c'est-à-dire à « la croissance de la productivité du travail de toutes les personnes en âge de travailler et l'utilisation des fruits de cette croissance à satisfaire les besoins de ces mêmes travailleurs (24). L'importation permet-elle d'atteindre le développement tel que défini ici ? Sinon peut-on imaginer d'autres alternatives possibles et réalistes ?

3 — Pour une technologie du développement

3.1. Il ne semble pas que l'importation systématique de technologie ou d'éléments technologiques des pays capitalistes puisse aboutir au développement. Une partie des raisons justifiant cette affirmation se trouve dans les développements précédents : inadaptation de la main-d'œuvre, inadaptation de l'organisation économique générale, faiblesse des revenus de la grande masse des paysans, inadaptation de ces éléments technologiques au milieu...

Une autre raison est que le développement, tel que défini, suppose la maîtrise par les travailleurs des techniques employées. Or, il ne semble pas que les pays capitalistes avancés, détenteurs des techniques, consentent à un transfert qui aurait pour résultat cette maîtrise par les travailleurs.

Le refus des pays capitalistes de vendre certains types de matériels aux pays de l'Est et en particulier à la Chine Populaire ne peut s'analyser que comme un refus de transférer la technologie dont ils disposent, laquelle fait leur force. Vendre cette marchandise à des pays politiquement ennemis constitue un danger éminent, même si elle contribue à transformer les rapports de production dans un sens favorable à la constitution d'une certaine forme de capitalisme.

En effet, l'importation de technologie ou d'éléments technologiques des pays capitalistes avancés peut entraîner à créer, ou à maintenir et même à renforcer, la division de la société en classes antagonistes (cela signifie que les pays importateurs pourraient connaître, à la limite, une croissance de leur économie, mais certainement pas le développement tel que défini ci-dessus). Les techniques des pays capitalistes avancés résultent d'un haut degré de séparation du travail manuel et du travail intellectuel. Un pays achetant les éléments de ces techniques aura tendance à créer et reproduire la même séparation. Une technocratie, disposant du monopole du savoir en son nom ou au nom de ceux qui la font travailler, pourra ainsi naître et se renforcer aux dépens des producteurs directs exclus d'une connaissance qu'ils ne peuvent acquérir rapidement. On constatera alors une répartition de plus en plus inégalitaire des revenus qui, à terme, peut bloquer même la croissance, sans parler du développement (25).

Il convient donc d'inventer, d'imaginer une technologie propre aux pays qui veulent aboutir à un développement véritable. Cette technologie devra nécessairement, pour les raisons visées plus haut, tendre à les dégager de la dépendance des pays capitalistes avancés, donc tendre à minimiser les rapports marchands avec eux.

3.2. Quelques propositions

Il a été vu que l'éventail historique des techniques présentes dans l'agriculture est très étendu. Pourquoi ne pas choisir dans cet éventail la technique la mieux maîtrisée par les travailleurs tout en l'améliorant grâce aux ressources (intellectuelles et matérielles) disponibles dans le pays? L'initiative libérée des travailleurs agricoles et industriels doit pouvoir créer des technologies propres à atteindre le but qu'ils se proposent : le développement. Ceci n'est pas une simple profession de foi. L'exemple de la Chine et d'autres pays socialistes (Vietnam, Cuba...) est là pour nous montrer que, dès lors qu'on veut compter sur ses propres forces sans chercher à accroître la production en vue de profit, il est possible d'améliorer les conditions d'existence des grandes masses en un laps de temps relativement court.

Il s'agit de souligner, enfin, que les travailleurs pour créer ces technologies nouvelles ne disposent pas que des connaissances pratiques que leur ont transmis les siècles antérieurs. Ils disposent éga-

lement de toute la science moderne qu'ils sauront progressivement acquérir non en important systématiquement des systèmes de machines et d'organisation mais sur les bancs des écoles et des universités populaires. L'impact du livre (c'est-à-dire du savoir théorique) est sans doute le moyen le plus sûr de créer une technologie propre rapidement et sans dépendance.

NOTES BIBLIOGRAPHIQUES

- (1) F. Yachir. — Technique et technologie. — Définitions analytiques et définitions descriptives. In « Cahiers du CREA » N° 2, octobre-décembre 1976, p. 163 (Centre de Recherches en Economie Appliquée. Alger).
- (2) F. Yachir, article cité p. 163.
- (3) F. Yachir, article cité p. 135.
- (4) Id. p. 135.
- (5) Exemples concrets, cf. l'article cité.
- (6) Cas observé dans la commune de Mérouana (Bata) en 1977.
- (7) Cet attributaire nous a déclaré ne pas savoir où se trouvent des parcelles qu'on lui a attribuées et qui couvrent 11,5 ha. Il ne possède donc réellement que 8 ha.
- (8) Ou fabriqués en Algérie par des firmes capitalistes selon les formules « produits en main » ou « clefs en main » qui autorisent la réalisation « copie conforme » de la même usine de France ou de R.F.A.
- (9) C'est une manière, parmi d'autres, de procéder à l'intensification de l'agriculture.
- (10) Encore qu'on peut imaginer un pays où le travail peut être garanti mais garanti à un niveau de salaire relativement bas par rapport aux revenus de la couche dirigeante, ce qui exigerait une mécanisation et une déqualification du travail justifiant cette hiérarchie des salaires et des revenus.
- (11) A propos ds engrais, cf. notre étude sur « la production, la distribution et la consommation des engrais en Algérie » CREA, Alger 1976.
- (12) Le déficit de livraison à l'agriculture a été de 2.296 tracteurs dont 1.470 tracteurs pneumatiques de 65 CV
57 tracteurs pneumatiques de 45 CV.
100 tracteurs pneumatiques de 100 CV.
709 tracteurs à chenilles de 70 CV.
- (13) Cf. S. Bedrani op. Cité.
- (14) Cas constaté à Mérouana (Batna). Il est certain que ces paysans candidats à l'achat d'un tracteur comptent le rentabiliser non seulement en l'utilisant sur leur propre terre mais également en le louant à des paysans qui n'ont pas les moyens pour l'acheter.
- (15) A titre de compensation, le rendement des céréales en secteur agricole privé a été en 1973 de 4,25 quintaux à l'hectare et en 1974 de 3,90 quintaux à l'hectare.
- (16) Cités par J.C. Karsenty in « les investissements dans l'agriculture algérienne ». Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord XIV — 1975, CNRE France.
- (17) Cf. Le quotidien El Moudjahid du 17 octobre 1977.
- (18) Cf. El Moudjahid du 12-10-77 et du 9-10-77.
- (19) Cf. El Motdjahid des 16 et 17 septembre 1977 à propos de la Daïra du Telagh.
- (20) Ou fabriqué localement selon la formule « produit en main » par des firmes capitalistes.
- (21) Cf. MARA. — Rapport sur l'enseignement et la formation agricole.
- (22) Si on ne se réfère qu'au salaire minimum garanti (toujours appliqué dans l'agriculture d'Etat, mais peu appliqué dans l'industrie dans un sens favorable aux travailleurs), il diffère d'environ 38 % entre l'agriculture et les autres secteurs de l'économie.
- (23) Cf. pour l'Afrique noire à ce propos les études présentées par P.P. REY dans « Capitalisme négrier — La marche des paysans vers le prolétariat ». F. MASPERO, Paris 1976.
- (24) Cf. problèmes économiques du Tiers-Monde. Premier Congrès des économistes du Tiers-Monde — CREA — 1976, p. 213.

SUMMARY

In this paper, the author discusses the problems of agricultural technology as they arise in Algeria. To do this, he first defines the conceptual apparatus he uses in his study. In his view, and following the definitions of F. Yachir, technology is related to the overall technique which, at a given time and for a given economy (that is, in a given system of relations of production) represents the efficiency with which the inputs are transformed into products in that economy. Technology is therefore the whole network, interrelated in a definite way, of product manufacturing techniques. Thus agricultural technology relates to the whole of the techniques of agricultural production, the technique of agricultural production being understood as the total of direct and indirect methods of production of individual and collective consumer goods. The direct method of production of a good consists in the combination of labour-power and means of production which makes it possible to obtain the end product; while the indirect method of production of a good is that which makes it possible to obtain the inputs needed for the manufacture of the end product.

In considering the problem of transfer of technology, the author immediately rejects the idea of transfer of agricultural technology, because, he feels, one cannot import the natural elements (climate, rainfall...), which it involves nor modify them on a large scale. What countries import, and this applies to Algeria, are material elements of technique rather than techniques themselves.

As to the techniques used in Algerian agriculture, the author notes that there is a very extensive historical range, from traditional (antique) processes to so-called « modern » work processes, including the most recent discoveries in biology, zoology... through numerous combinations of these two processes.

The first type of techniques or traditional techniques are used in private peasant agriculture which is mainly for « own consumption »; comprising farms of small area (5 hectares or less), almost entirely under cereals, where the workers have no income, or little income, apart from the farm. According to the agricultural census of 1972-73, 47 % of the farms use this type of techniques.

The second type of techniques or « modern techniques » are used in the production which is mainly for the market, almost entirely run by the State but marginally by a part of the private sector. These techniques do not require much labour, but use highly diversified machinery.

Between these two types of techniques there is a whole series of techniques which combine in different ways the material element of direct or indirect techniques belonging to different historical periods.

The Algerian farmers do not have easy access to so-called modern techniques. There are three reasons underlying this situation. Firstly, low incomes of some of the farmers and the high prices of these goods. secondly, the insufficient local production of these goods; thirdly, the

low incomes of some of the farmers and the high prices of these goods. Hence, if the use of so-called modern techniques is to be generalized in Algerian agriculture, there is a need for a large amount of credit and for the setting up of a banking infrastructure accessible to all the farmers, which is not yet the case.

Moreover the use of imported technological devices raises the problem of the training and adaptation of the labour force and of the economic organization concerned. If there are no adequate solutions to these problems, as is the case in Algeria, the use of imported technological devices must be inefficient.

In conclusion the author puts forward two proposals. Firstly he notes that the systematic importing of technology or technological devices from capitalist countries cannot lead to development, conceived as the growth of labour productivity of all people of working age and the use of the fruits of that growth to satisfy the needs of those workers, for the reasons already mentioned above. Secondly, he suggests that a technology must be invented, or devised, that is specific to the countries which want to achieve a genuine development. This technology will necessarily have to tend to release them from dependence on the advanced capitalist countries, and hence to reduce their commercial relations with them. In view of the extent of the historical range of techniques in Algerian agriculture, the author suggests that the technique in this range, which is best mastered by the workers should be chosen, while it should be improved with the help of the resources available in the country: traditional know-how and modern science.

On rural development: a note on Malawi's Programmes of Development for exploitation *

Alifeyo Chilivumbo

I. — Introduction

The aim of the paper is to examine the empirical realities of Malawi's programmes of rural development against a radical model of development. From the data available the paper contends that independence, the end result of politics of nationalist movement has not brought to the peasants, as a sociological category, the goods the ideologies of nationalist struggle promised. Rather the fruits have accrued into the hands of the new « elites », in particular the bosses of the party machinery, who have turned politics into a means to economic gain. To the peasantry independence has not liberated them from the realm of want, but has meant an exchange of White for Black exploiters: the faces of exploiters have changed but the bases, forms and contents of exploitation remain. The peasantry is now worse off than before.

II. — Concept of Development

To understand this proposition: « the rape of peasantry », a brief search of the meaning of the concept of development is essential. The term, development, is an amorphous concept, rather difficult to articulate, has been used to mean different things to different people. The use is often influenced by one's motives and interest. Often it has been used within the economic framework. Although economic progress is an essential component of development it is not clearly the only one. Development, in the context of the rural milieu, must encompass more than just the economic sphere, it must include people's well-being, freedom, changes and advancement in institutional social and administrative structures from oppressive to liberal forms.

Within this context programmes of rural development must be directed to the entire peasantry, to the totality of the rural population, to enable them to move qualitatively and quantitatively from low level of material and spiritual endowment to a higher, more abundant level. Development is a process in which man is liberated from the realm of want to the realm of freedom to create, to produce, to enjoy and

* Paper presented at the First Southern African Universities Social Science Conference, 12-16th May 1978, Lusaka, ZAMBIA.

to consume. Development Programmes must result in broad-scale redistribution of the resources and wealth to the peasantry.

In defining and measuring development concern should not centre on maximizing aggregate rates of GDP growth, or on measures of central tendencies such as arithmetic means, but focus should be on the reduction and elimination of growing social and economic inequalities, unemployment, absolute poverty, malnutrition, disease, illiteracy and rural alienation. When development is measured in terms of per capita GDP growth the result is distorted empirical realities. Almost always and more so in the multistuctural economies of the Third World the high rates of GDP growth only reflect the economic wealth pocketed by the richest few, the minority, a numerically insignificant proportion of the population while at the same time the economic and social status of the bulk of the population, especially the peasantry and the urban poor, remains static or deteriorates.

Development is inevitably a normative and emotive term. For it to be meaningful its definition and measures must relate to the closing of the gap in areas of poverty, unemployment and inequality. In the words of Dudley Seers : « If all three of these (poverty, unemployment and inequality) have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned... If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all the three have, it would be strange to call the result development even if per capita income doubled » (1). This definition is echoed by Uma Lele's whose criteria for rural development are in terms of « improving the living standards of the mass of low income population residing in rural areas and making the process of their development self-sustaining » (2).

The two approaches to development are in direct conflict and reflect different realities. The first one, an exploitive one, measures development in terms of growth rate. The second one regards the concept in terms of narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, directs attention to the eradication of social and economic inequalities, improving the well-being and living conditions of the rural masses. This is a radical and humanistic approach.

III. — Malawi's Economic Growth and Organization

The growth model is often used in evaluations of the rural development Programmes. Under this approach in which development is synonymous with growth Malawi's achievements since independence not only show but tell a bewildering success story. In the brief period of the country's independence the GDP at factor cost has grown by more than 100 % in the monetary sector and by 45 % in the subsistence sector, annual income per capita has doubled ; from K16 to K32, the country's fixed investments have increased by 4 times to K52 million with an estimated projection of K665 million by 1980. These achievements are impressive and underscore incredible economic growth.

It is this growth rather than development which has received widespread acclaim. The most outspoken proponent is the country's President who in everyone of his speech makes unrealistic claims of

having given the peasantry prosperity, high standard of living, plenty of food, money etc. The country's mass media echoes the claims, creates and paints the impression of economic prosperity and the well-being of the peasantry. In one of his typical speeches delivered to the Malawi Congress Party annual convention, Lilongwe, October, 1977, the President told a large crowd : « My people, especially my women, are better dressed, have more food and more money under my leadership » (3). For weeks earlier in an address welcoming the President the Kasungu District Chairman of the Party had parroted the political platitude when he emotionally told the President : « Under your leadership we have ample food and a lot of maize crop each year, last year's crops are still in the granaries, we have not started eating this year's maize, from our cash crops we are able to get a lot of money ; in fact much money ; the problem now is not money but how to spend it, today, unlike before, we are well dressed, free, healthy. All this is a result of your wise and able leadership » (4). The parrot speaker was given a staged wild cheers. It was a circus worthy of a Disneyland drama.

Scholars of the capitalistic orientation, using growth model, have echoed similar platitudes. Lele' a representative of the World Bank, cites Malawi as a model of successful rural development programme. She cites the Lilongwe Land Development Project as a typical story of success in rural development (5). What Lele Uma Saw refers to is economic growth which stands sharply against her definition of development quoted above. Unlike in her definition her intuitive conclusion reflects exploitive orientation of the World Bank and the capitalistic world.

The evaluations operate within the framework of growth model. Consequently they fail to pose the cardinal question : *who benefits in these programmes of rural development ?*

Analysis of the empirical realities reveals not development but growth, the enrichment of a few at the expense of the peasantry. This picture stands in total contradiction to the country's widespread acclamations of developmental success which ecludes realities.

One way to elucidate this tenet is to examine patterns and forms of programmes of rural development operative in the country. The trends in the programmes of rural development appear to aim at growth ; in particular increased production of export crops. The programmes' strategies can be classified into three broad categories : private estates, capital intensive agricultural development projects and sponsored small holder capitalistic farmers.

The most rewarding is the private estate farming. This category is only open to a small exclusive powerful minority category, Its membership is based on political power and influence both of which have become means to economic gain. Its membership is composed of bosses of the party, ministers, politically appointed heads of parastatal bodies, top civil services positions such as permanent secretaries, incumbents of key positions in the armed and police forces and a few others who are variously connected to the head of the state or the state hostess.

This is a privileged powerful minority « class ». Loans and credits on easy terms are intrinsic and inbuilt components of their positions.

Credits and loans are guaranteed either from the commercial banks or the special bank; the Industrial Development Bank-INDE Bank whose aim is to effect the translation into empirical realities the accumulative aspiration of the « class » by giving out easy loans. For farming the minimum loan amount is K25000 and one of the requirements is the employment of a White Rhodesian estate manager.

The present estate farm system in the country is to be seen in the perspective of historical development. The estate system was established in the colonial period for such crops as tea, tobacco and tung by the White Settler planters. Immediately after independence many of the White tobacco planters left the country and the new class of Black estate owners moved into the estates. While some White Settler planters left on their own others were forced out by the new aspirants. Not only did the new class take over estates but have established and continue to establish new estates.

At the top of the new class is the head of the state. Through the General Farming and Press Farming, subsidiaries of the Press Holdings, a personal company, he has not only taken over some of the impressive vast imperialistic estates of the Colonial Development Corporation but has opened up countless large tobacco, tea, coffee, rice, maize, groundnuts and cotton estates all over the country. The most impressive estates are in Kasungu and Mchinji Districts both of which have been turned into extended tobacco and maize estates. From the estates an impressive annual net profit of not less than K4 million accrue.

The national policy requires all political leaders to open up estates. Thus all men of power, Cabinet Ministers, Members of Parliament, Central Committee Members and executive chairmen of para-statal bodies own at least one estate, especially tobacco estate in either Kasungu or Mchinji District. Kasungu, the home district of the head of the state, through estate farming has experienced phenomenal agricultural expansions, greatly changing her rural map.

The number of estates and the wealth accruing to the minority « class » are not easily assessed. Data from and on the estates are not made available. However, it is to be kept in mind that the importance of the estates remains a vital empirical reality which can be verified by aeral map examination. Comparison of pre-and post-independence areal rural maps show remarkable difference. Through the estate system political power has also bestowed upon the « powerful » control over large expanse of fertile land resources.

Post-independence epoch has witnessed expansion and acquisition of estates in aggressive way, mainly at the expense of the peasantry. The growth of estate system is a sad story of de-peasantization of the masses. In areas such as Kasungu and Mchinji the end result of the process has resulted in many peasants being pushed towards infertile lands. It is evident that the estate system is being established in a circumvention of rules of descency and fair play. It is from this point of view that in the cognitive perception of the peasantry the legitimacy of the estates has remained constantly in question. Strong resentment and strong feelings of injustice mark the peasantry's view of the estate farms.

Where estates have been established the peasantry has three alternatives, to be tenant, hired labourer or move away from the land. Under the estate systems the estate labourer are victims of extreme exploitation. In these estates farms conditions and terms of service for the White Rhodesian managers are quite attractive : free accommodation, domestic servants, water, electricity, car, a fat salary ranging from K500 to K1000 per month, attractive terminal benefits, incentives in the form of commission, often of 10 % of the net profit. These provisions of luxurious conditions of services to the White manager and to reap profit for the estate owner are only possible at the expense of the labourers who are paid insignificant sums of K5 per month, live in deplorable estate huts with no amenities, no terminal benefits and social security.

Estates are of two types. The first type operates on hired labourers. The labourers who work under close supervision live on the farms and get in addition to meagre wages, weekly rations of mealie meal flour and beans. The accommodation is designed for bachelors, single rooms, no allowance is made for wives or children.

The second type of estates system is more exploitive. An entire population in areas declared estate is turned into tenants or sharecroppers. In exchange for the right to use land the inhabitants under compulsion grow tobacco in addition to their staple food crops, using family labour but working under the close supervision of the estate manager. The state owner provides to his tenants « free » fertilizer to improve the quality and increase the yield per acre. The obligatory tobacco growing also entails that all the tobacco be sold to the estate owner, the patron, at very low prices. In turn the estate owner resells it on the auction flour sale in Limbe at extremely high prices.

The tenants must comply with these harsh conditions for fear of reprisals. Thus the peasantry in an independent African country finds itself living under conditions of serfdom ; conditions of « internal colonialism ».

The second category of agrarian programmes take the form of capital intensive agricultural development projects, aimed at improved quality and achieving high yields of specific crops in selected areas of fertile lands and are funded almost wholly from international loans. The World Bank has funded three : the Lilongwe Land Development Project, K21,235,000, the Shire Valley Agricultural Development Project, K11.7 million, and the Karonga Rural Development Project, K5.1 million ; the Federal Republic of Germany's loan goes to the Central Region Lakeshore Development Project, K10.8 million, the British and the Taiwan Governments run many small scale rice development schemes and several settlement scheme are run by Israelis.

Although the stated objectives of the land development projects are to increase the yield per acre and improve the quality of crops through the provisions of loan facilities in the form of equipment, fertilizer and pesticides, their assistance is highly selective and restrictive. Similarly the amounts of loans are extremely low. The bulk of the peasants farmers do not in fact procure income and agricultural produce beyond those of subsistence level. Although most of the peasantry have ample land they cannot utilize the land and raise both

quality and yield per acre because of lack of capital and labour. Thus the core of rural poverty is not necessarily lack of land but lack of access to capital and labour for development. Instead of providing capital to peasants, thus enable them improve quality and increase yield per acre, consequently reduce rural poverty, the land development projects do not do this.

The pattern of fund distribution in the land development project shows that relatively little amounts are allocated to very few selected peasants farmers. In Lilongwe Land Development Project, for example, one of the largest and costly projects, in 1974, out of a half million peasants, only 5 % obtained credit facilities amounting to just K586.000, averaging about K20 per farmer. In another major project, Karonga Project, credit facilities were extended to only 4 % of the total population, each one receiving about K30. In the Shire Valley Project only 19 % of the total funds were reserved for revolving peasant farmers' and fishermen's credit funds, while 81 % of the funds were allocated to capital development and management costs. Rather than redirecting the funds to the peasantry in the form of credits to eradicate poverty the projects spends the bulk of its funds on capital development, luxury offices, accommodation and salaries of top heavy bureaucracy. Thus in 1974 the Shire Valley Development Project was able to give credit facilities averaging K20 per person to only 3 % of the total population (6). The patterns of expenditure show reluctance to improve the lot of the peasantry. Though a few are assisted the majority of the peasantry is left out.

The few who are assisted have harsh terms for the loans. Loans, in addition to being small in amount, are only provided for fertilizer, high breed seeds, pesticides capital equipment but not for labour and must be repaid within one crop season.

The irrigated rice schemes are on small scales. They aim at double or tripple — crop harvests per year in the floods of several rivers and one annual crop but of improved quality in the rain-fed rice crop schemes. Participation is on voluntary basis. Participants receive fertilizer on loan through the projects credit funds. But the terms of repayments are harsh : payable at the end of each crop season by direct deductions which in many cases leave the farmer with very little amount. The participants work under close supervision of the project's management, do not own right of tenure and can be kicked out at any time. Sizes of plots vary from one to two acres. Rarely do farmers make more than K100 per year.

A number of settlement schemes are operating in the rural areas. Settlers from various parts are invited to take up plots to cultivate specific cash crops : tobacco, rice or cotton. On the settlement schemes they work under close supervision, have no rights of tenancy, or security.

The objectives are not directed at development for the peasantry. The policy legitimizes the government's anti-cooperative's measures which since independence closed down all the cooperative societies in the country and replaced them with the para-statal organization ; the Agricultural Development and Marketing Cooperation. Prior to independence the country had several cooperatives run and controlled by

the peasants. Among the most successful ones were Kota-kota Rice Cooperative Society, Karonga Rice cooperative Society, Lake Chilwa Fishermen's Cooperative and Lilongwe Farmers Cooperative. The first two produced more rice than currently being purchased by the ADMARC. Long before independence the two cooperatives introduced into the rural areas impressive developments including electricity. All these developments have now collapsed, the prosperity has been replaced by poverty.

The mass production through the cooperatives has been replaced by the current development programmes aimed at selective development, oriented at anti-equitable distribution of agrarian generated wealth. Through selective development strategies the government aims at achieving economic growth, especially through export crop sector.

The agrarian achievements in export crop production : tobacco, tea, cotton, have not been in response to the needs and welfare of the peasantry but to the response and demands of the acquisitive needs of the powerful minority « class ». Thus the preponderous emergence of the export agricultural economy signifies the dominance of the interests of the powerful few.

Since independence export trade, exclusively, through agricultural produce, has increased steadily. Tobacco export has increased from K8 million in 1964 to K50 million in 1975, tea and groundnuts tripled while the value amount of exported maize increased by ten times, see table I. While the value of exported crop value increased the earnings of the peasantry show not increase but decline.

For the peasantry the earnings from cash cropping is the principal, in some cases, sole source of income. If this is correct it means since independence the peasantry has steadily become more impoverished. The trends over the four year period, 1972-1975, show drop in total earnings as well as quantity of the major crops : tobacco, maize and rice, see tables 2 and 4.

TABLE I
MAJOR COMMODITY EXPORT IN K'000

Year	Tobacco	Tea	Ground-nuts	Cotton	Sugar
1964	8,400	6,700	2,200	1,900	0
1965	10,300	7,500	3,300	2,200	0
1966	9,000	8,900	2,000	2,200	0
1967	8,500	9,000	6,900	1,400	0
1968	10,600	9,700	4,600	1,300	0
1969	12,700	9,500	5,600	1,700	200
1970	16,592	10,916	4,241	2,777	158
1971	22,066	11,905	5,883	2,547	314
1972	24,968	12,022	7,123	2,567	360
1973	30,259	13,721	5,922	1,951	3,300
1974	39,269	17,2p0	5,202	2,720	9,200
1975	50,390	20,827	6,503	1,933	12,300

Source. — *Monthly Statistical Bulletin*, Zomba, Government Printer, 1964-1975.

IV. — Economic Growth and Income Distribution

The pattern of distribution of agrarian generated wealth from the available data appears to reflect realistically the maldistribution of income between the peasantry and the few estate owning «class». The information gives demonstration of sharp income gaps between the extremely low level of incomes earned by the peasantry and those of the estate owners. In 1975 the peasantry, making up 95 % of the entire population earned only K14 million out of a total of K120 million agrarian generated wealth, see tables 2 and 5. In that year, 1975, tobacco generated or brought into the country K44 million.

TABLE II

ADMARC DOMESTIC PURCHASE

Year								
	Purchase	Tobacco	Grund. nuts	Cotton	Rice	Maize	Pulses	Other
1972	15,011	4,018	4376	1957	1437	1980	889	354
1973	13,559	3,730	3694	1940	1266	2216	363	350
1974	10,244	2,483	4543	3409	1567	2873	624	745
1975	14,861	3,182	5221	2895	1360	1250	512	461

Source. — *Monthly Statistical Bulletin, ibid, table 2.*

Out of the total value of K44 million only K3 million was earned by the peasantry, the bulk K41 million, went to a few estate owners, who account less than 1 % the entire population, and to ADMARC, see tables 2 and 3.

TABLE III

TOBACCO ACTION SALE BY QUANTITY AND VALUE

Period	Total sales : Quantity in '000 lbs	Values in K'000
1969	28,441	9186
1970	48,890	14394
1971	57,905	19953
1972	68,980	20905
1973	68,980	26294
1974	59,163	31739
1975	76,538	44293

Source. — *Monthly Statistical Bulletin, ibid, table 6.*

The source of the income inequalities and the means for their perpetuation lies partially in the country's system of marketing. The peasantry is not allowed to sell its commodities directly to international or national markets. Since the abolition of cooperatives all produce of the peasants are bought by ADMARC which resells it, either through export or on domestic markets, e.g. auctional flour sales for tobacco or grain and milling for food crops. On the other hand estate owners sell their produce not through ADMARC but directly, hence their produce fetch high prices. In case of tobacco estate owners not only sell their tobacco on the auction floor but have licence to buy cheaply peasant produced tobacco and resell it on the auction floor sale. In both cases the profits do not go to the rural areas to be reinvested and stimulate further developments. Profits from ADMARC is given to the government treasury to help reduce the government's recurrent budget deficit.

V. — Malawi's External Trade Constraints

Analysis of the patterns of the country's external trade equally reflect self-oriented policy of the powerful minority. Since independence Malawi's

TABLE IV

ADMARC DOMESTIC PURCHASES BY COMMODITY IN SHORT TONS

Period	COMMODITY							
	Total Purchase	Tobacco	Ground-nuts	Cotton	Rice	Maize	Pulses	Other
1972	202152	19484	43291	24355	21979	70079	17661	5305
1973	168497	165559	33048	17866	19047	69518	7521	4938
1974	187854	12762	31741	32591	23030	72168	8735	15777
1975	131726	1395	36164	19596	16163	32237	653	7535

Source. — *Monthly Statistical Bulletin, ibid, table 5.*

import trade has mushroomed rapidly from K29 million in 1964 to K217 million in 1975, see table 5. This has not been followed by similar rises in the exports. The result has been a negative trade balance leading to a soaring and serious trade gap, — K97 million in 1975, see table 5.

The large trade deficit is offset partly by large scale borrowing from various international organizations, export cash crops and human labour to mines in South Africa. The unfavourable trade gap is particularly marked between Malawi and the two Southern African racist states, South Africa and Rhodesia, see table 6. Since independence Malawi's policy of anti-liberation movement has drawn her more closely into the racialistic camps of Rhodesia and South Africa.

TABLE V
EXTERNAL TRADE IN K'OOO

Period	Total Imports	Total Export	Trade Balance
1964	28,640	25,000	— 3,640
1965	40,804	28,782	— 12,022
1966	54,292	34,816	— 19,476
1967	50,852	40,908	— 9,944
1968	58,180	40,044	— 18,136
1969	61,478	43,972	— 17,506
1970	71,367	49,697	— 22,076
1971	89,750	59,302	— 30,148
1972	102,913	64,486	— 38,427
1973	114,651	79,919	— 34,732
1974	157,726	101,306	— 56,420
1975	216,629	119,673	— 96,956

Source. — *Monthly Statistical Bulletin*, Zomba, Government Printer, 1964-1975.

The trade involvement is an integral part of Malawi's total and wider involvement with South Africa and Rhodesia whose racialistic and capitalistic policies are seen as beneficial to the Malawi's powerful minority group. Thus since independence Rhodesia and South Africa have steadily replaced Britain as a chief supplier of goods to Malawi. On the other hand the two White ruled countries import relatively little from Malawi, hence a growing trade deficit. The negative trade balance to Malawi has grown steadily since independence. While the negative trade balance to Malawi from Rhodesia was — K12 million in 1964, it scored to — K45 in 1975, from South Africa in 1964 it was — K1.2 million and by 1975 it was as high as — K35.5 million, see table 6.

TABLE VI
MALAWI TRADE BALANCE IN K MILLION

Year	COUNTRY		
	United Kingdom	Rhodesia	South Africa
1965	— 2.5	— 12.1	— 1.2
1966	+ 3.5	— 10.7	— 2.9
1967	+ 3.5	— 9.4	— 3.0
1968	— 0.9	— 8.9	— 4.9
1969	— 1.4	— 8.2	— 6.6
1970	— 1.9	— 12.5	— 8.5
1971	— 3.6	— 9.8	— 7.0
1972	— 7.4	— 13.4	— 9.9
1973	— 1.8	— 24.0	— 17.5
1974	— 3.8	— 28.2	— 32.8
1975	— 8	— 45.4	— 35.5

Source. — *Monthly Statistical Bulletin*, Zomba, Government Printer, 1965-1975.

Each year Malawi becomes more indebted to South Africa and Rhodesia. To reduce this trade imbalance Malawi exports large scale human labour to both South Africa and Rhodesia (7). The human labour serves two purposes. First, Malawi earns substantial foreign exchange, i.e. K32 million from South Africa alone in 1977, and in the second instance the human labour helps maintain the economy, especially the mining economy of South Africa, by constant supply of cheap labour. Thus, ironically, Malawi by becoming a reserve of cheap labour to the South greatly contributes to the sustenance of the imperialist regimes in both South Africa and Rhodesia.

An analysis of the items imported underscores the egoistic orientation of the minority « class ». The imported goods include large proportions of consumer goods, motor cars and other transport items, commodities for consumption, miscellaneous appliances etc. all of which are of no value to the peasantry but satisfy the needs of the minority « class ». These items account for about a half of the total value of imported goods (8). It is obvious that the commulative negative trade balance is overtaxing the country, above all the rising imports are not in the public interests.

All other development plans in the country are geared to serve the interests of the same « class ». It serves their interests to have improved transport and communication system. As owners of estate farms improved transport lowers the cost of export crops. Further, it enables comfortable and easy mobility in the imported luxurious cars. The wish to translate these aims into reality has led the Government to embark on most costly programmes of improvements and construction of roads, railways lines and bridges funded by large international loans. This item heads the list of the public sector investment, accounting for a third of the total development investments (9).

VI. — Social Conditions in Malawi

Indeed, an overview analysis of the government's record of public investments in all the spheres of the institutions of the peasants infrastructure and welfare is appalling. Since independence very little has been done to improve the welfare of the peasantry. A programme of rural development intended to improve the living standard of the peasantry cannot afford to neglect the health and educational aspect to the ruralites. Yet these have been the most neglected areas.

Today the country's infant mortality is alarmingly high : 140 per 1000. Those who are born alive their chances of survival is dim ; third of children born alive die before their fifth birthday. Life expectancy among the peasantry is 45 years. 14 years after independence the country has only two central hospitals, one general hospital, 21 district hospitals, 10 rural hospitals, 117 health centres and can only boast of a total of 7250 hospital beds in a country of 5 million. The 7250 hospital beds represent an increase of 2314 only since 1964. While on the eve of independence the country had 37 physicians today, almost 14 years later, the country has about 80 physicians, i.e. 1 physician to about 90.000 persons. Since independence only one new central and

about 3 new district hospitals have been built by the post-independence government (1).

The programme of health is elitist in orientation. In the urban centres of Blantyre, Lilongwe and Zomba there are separate paying hospitals which in the colonial epoch were exclusively for Europeans. The high standards established then are maintained and the treatment is superb. To these hospitals no peasant or proletariat can go. The fees are deliberately raised. In the non-paying hospitals which are only in towns or district headquarters the quality of treatment is appalling. But more the location of hospitals at the district headquarters make them inaccessible to the bulk of the population.

In the educational system the situation is once again biased against peasantry. Though there are now quantitatively more pupils and schools than on the eve of independence the numbers are dismally low. In a population of over 5 million, most of whom are aged below 20 years, the total school enrollment is only 481,461. Out of this only 10,000 are in secondary school while the country's only university has a total annual intake of 100 degree students.

Today the country has about 9285 primary school teachers, 1473 primary schools, 46 Government secondary schools of which 4 are full boarding schools and 13 mission secondary schools. Much less than 40 % of children of school age can find space in schools (11).

The location of schools reflect urban bias. In rural areas not only is there paucity of schools but where they exist the conditions are deplorable. Further because of high fees most peasants cannot send their children to school. There is, therefore, a strange situation in which in addition to shortages of schools, the schools in rural areas are empty, no children, because parents cannot pay fees. In secondary schools children of peasants are dismally and poorly represented. Though the fee, by well paid workers is low, K50, it is not easy for a peasant to raise the sum. Consequently most of the peasant's children selected into secondary schools are unable to take up their places.

The rural map today is in sharp contrast to the acclamation by the power structure. The empirical facts of the rural areas show that the peasantry lives under conditions of poverty, hunger, disease and extreme exploitation. The typical peasant has a few tools and belongings necessary for bare existence, cannot afford a pair of shoes, decent clothes, balanced diet. A typical peasant's livelihood consists of a few chickens, a granary of maize, a garden of cassava, he often runs short of food before the next harvest, his house is of no economic value. Equally his farm has no monetary value.

The bulk of the peasantry lives in huts, often windowless, built of wattle and daub with dirt floors, Adults and children crowd in one roomed huts on the hard floors, a few can afford even wooden beds. There are no water taps, though a few have access to boreholes, the bulk of the peasantry drinks water drawn from open well pits, situated frequently far from the houses. There are hardly indoor or outdoor toilets and no effort by the Government is made to encourage either the construction or the use of toilets. The economy is still basically

peasant. Lacking modern medical facilities the peasantry is still hunted by the witchcraft belief.

The state of nutrition, clothing, housing and sanitation in rural areas is at substandard level. Most people live under starvation, hunted by hookworm, bilharzia, malaria and many other tropical diseases. Apart from those who live along the lakeshore who benefit from fish proteins many live under conditions of chronic malnutrition and run out of food long before the next harvest season.

VII. — Conclusion

The conclusion is inevitably clear. To the peasantry the fruits of independence have been sour grape. The unequal distribution of wealth resulting from exploitive programmes of rural developments is a fundamental cause of the sharp cleavage between the powerful rich minority « class » and the peasantry. The extreme unequal distribution of scarce resources has become the overt expression of the politics of post-independence epoch. The situation is one in which power is the means to economic gain, creating a situation in which the powerful continue to be powerfully rich at the expense of the powerless but the numerical majority. For the latter the objective assessment of the realities of post-independence reinforces not only their feelings of being cheated but the general distrust of the non-peasants. After many years of independence the average income per capita for the peasantry remain below K20 per annum, resulting in one of the three countries with lowest standards of living in Africa. While the peasantry languishes, the minority « class » remains one of the wealthiest social categories in the present day Africa. Therefore the question : Development in whose interests ? The conclusion is simple and logical ; the country has and continues to experience growth but not development.

In this paper we have briefly delved into the problem of rural development in Malawi. The data and discussions indicate widespread inequalities of wealth with many ramifications. These inequalities are immense, persistent and increasing, resulting in the peasantry, the bulk of the population, living under intolerable conditions and that these disparities are created and perpetuated by systematic exclusion of the peasantry from the means of which would enable them to improve their fate. The disparity in wealth distribution is a problem precisely because of the unequal access to the material opportunities for personal and collective material achievement within the agrarian setting. The source of inequalities and the means for their perpetuation lie in the control of political power. Those who hold political power hold and control the key to means of accumulation of wealth.

REFERENCE

- (1) Dudley Seears.
- (2) Uma Lele, 1975, *The Design of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa* The Johns Hopkins University Press, London, page 20.
- (3) Times of Malawi, October, 31, 1977.
- (4) Times of Malawi, Blantyre, October 16, 1977.
- (5) Lele, *ibid.*
- (6) *Malawi Year Book*, 1975, Zomba, Government Printer.
- (7) A. Chilivumbo, 1978, « Malawi's Labour Migration to the South », paper read at the ECA Conference on Migratory Labour to South Africa, held in Mulungushi Hall, April 1978.
- (8) *Monthly Statistical Bulletin, ibid*, May, 1976.
- (9) *State of Development Policies 1971-1980*, Zomba, Government Printer.
- (10) *Malawi Year Book, ibid*, 1976, page 86.
- (11) *Ibid*, page 61.

RÉSUMÉ

Dans ce papier, l'auteur examine les programmes et stratégies de développement rural du Malawi depuis l'indépendance. Il constate que pendant qu'un petit groupe de gens, à savoir l'élite au pouvoir, s'approprie le bénéfice de la croissance économique que le pays a connue depuis l'indépendance, le développement n'a pas été réalisé dans ce pays. Au contraire, note-t-il, les conditions de vie des masses populaires, et en particulier des paysans, se sont largement détériorées en comparaison avec la période coloniale.

Il mentionne, en particulier, les programmes de développement agricole, de propriétés foncières, qui, pendant qu'ils enrichissent un petit groupe de gens, ont fait des paysans des métayers et des serfs sur leur propre terre. La minorité dirigeante contrôle presque tout, y compris production, commercialisation, institutions financières et de crédit, et surtout, l'Etat. Il signale l'abolition des coopératives paysannes qui existaient du temps colonial et leur remplacement par les institutions de commercialisation d'Etat qui, arbitrairement, fixent des bas prix pour les produits qu'elles achètent aux paysans et des prix très élevés pour les produits qu'elles leur vendent. Ces pratiques ont évidemment appauvri profondément les paysans.

L'auteur souligne aussi l'intégration de Malawi dans l'orbite raciste de l'Afrique du Sud et de la Rhodésie. Il en résulte une détérioration très marquée de la balance commerciale de Malawi en faveur des Etats racistes d'Afrique australe, qui ont remplacé la Grande-Bretagne comme fournisseur principal de Malawi pendant qu'ils importent très peu de ce pays.

Enfin, l'auteur analyse les conditions de vie de la majorité de la population en examinant, la qualité de vie, la santé publique, l'éducation, etc. Il constate que ces conditions se sont profondément détériorées en comparaison avec l'époque coloniale.

Il conclut en indiquant que pour les masses populaires, la soi-disante indépendance n'a apporté que misère. L'élite minoritaire dirigeante, non seulement contrôle l'Etat et s'approprie le bénéfice de la croissance économique en appauvrissant la majorité de la population, mais encore, utilise l'appareil de l'Etat pour s'enrichir davantage et reproduire le système.

Some aspects of ideological functions in the Development of the Post-Colonial State in Tanzania

Harry Galbourne *

Introduction

Although the importance of politics and ideology in the much discussed « novel experience » of Tanzania are generally recognized, they are very rarely — and this is particularly true of ideology — the subjects of rigorous analyses. There can be little doubt, however, of the fact that the ideological question is crucial in the internal developments of the post-colonial state in African societies such as Tanzania. Such political and ideological developments require situating within a wider and more rigorous analytical framework than this paper, given its scope, is able to offer. The present effort must therefore be understood as being a preliminary analysis of the function of ideology in the specific context of the Tanzanian experience which will necessarily require greater theoretical elaboration.

1. The Problem

The ideological factor in the Tanzania social formation derives its importance from its role within the specificity of the experience of the classes comprising that formation. This is not to say that this role cannot be understood from a general understanding of ideology, but simply to stress that the particular expression ideology assumes in Tanzania can best be appreciated if placed within the context of a specific social practice. The point may be expressed another way : ideological functions in Tanzania, as in other social formations, are derived from the fundamental contradictions characteristic of that society. It follows, therefore, that a potentially fruitful analysis of ideology takes as its starting point the contradictions evident in the society being analysed.

This has not been the general practice of those who have considered the question of ideology in Tanzania. Studies which touch upon or deal directly with the questions, tend to assume that ideology can be treated as a neutral instrument which may be taken and used indiscriminately. For example, Benien hailed the Arusha Declaration as

* Department of Political Science, University of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.

being « an ideology for Africa » (1), as if ideology is like a knife which can be used to cut with and therefore it is a question of finding the correct ideology for a given situation. On the 'left' the situation has not been any better: Cliffe and Saul, as representatives of early 'leftist' trends in Tanzanian academic life, reduced the question of ideology to an unspecified set of abstractions. Still for others the question would appear to be reducible to a general, and necessarily vague, question of international finance capital. There is, in short, a conspicuous lack of a thorough-going analysis of ideology which takes as its starting point a materialist perspective of the class contradictions and struggle in Tanzania (2). This point has particular bearing on the efforts of those who take as their unit of analysis the political thought of President Nyerere (3). The President is usually treated as if he lived, worked and thought in a vacuum; he is usually presented as if he is an island in himself. Such treatments, of course, ignore Nyerere's own stress on the close relationship between society, economy and polity. His preoccupation with the very real socio-economic and political problems of Tanzania from which his political views derive are not perceived as part of the cognition process (4).

The general view that consequently from the literature is one that further mystifies rather than clarifies the question of ideology. With respect to the specific case of the Tanzanian social formation this question is usually presented within theoretical frameworks which are inadequate for the task of generating questions which can signal any significant advance in our understanding of that formation. So far then as a general or formal definition of ideology is possible and useful, ideology is best regarded as being the reconstitution of an imaginary relationship at a specific level of social existence. This understanding of the question is, of course, derived from the works of Louis Althusser and Nicos Poulantzas (5) and is adopted not without some caution because some of the logical outcomes of this formulation are wholly misleading. It cannot be denied, however, that this perception of ideology, particularly *if restricted* to capitalist formations, marks a distinct advance in a materialist understanding of the complexities involved in the 'base/superstructure' problem. The limited scope of this paper does not allow for the development of these points but it is important to indicate the relevance of this understanding of the question for the purpose at hand.

Firstly, the formulation takes us away from a presentation of ideology as being a simple and direct representation of the 'real' and therefore rejects the crude dichotomy between the 'real'/'unreal' as found in the formulations articulated by Lukacs and Korsch who, amongst others, have kept alive the Hegelianism of the young Marx. Ideology as a specific aspect of a social practice must be perceived as being very real indeed but this does not mean that it is 'true'; the question, however, need not necessarily be related to the empirically defined 'truth'/'falsity' problem found in the historicist formulation. What are therefore reflected — if this is the best way to express the point — are not in fact the real relations themselves but an existing false understanding of those relations.

This may be illustrated by Marx's own analysis of the first encounter between labour and capital in the market when the former appears as seller (of labour power) and the latter appears as purchaser (of labour/time). In this encounter the two agents enter the market as 'equals', as 'bare individuals' and they exchange equivalents. Yet, this encounter, with its apparent equality, 'hides' the fundamental contradiction between capital and labour which exists prior to this isolated encounter and which is fundamental to their wider social relations. Thus bourgeois juridico-political ideology blurs, hides, the distinction underpinning the apparent equality. The scene of transaction, therefore, appears as « in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man ». But this does not nullify the fact that this 'phenomenal form', as Marx calls it, exists : Tanzania can be fruitfully approached in this manner ; certainly, it cannot be categories. The rather simplistic notion that arises from this formulation of the question that ideology is a sort of instrument which can be manipulated to more or less move people to do or not to do a particular set of social action, is not particularly analytically useful.

Secondly, the formulation under consideration — particularly as elaborated by Poulantzas — allows for a more theoretically adequate understanding of the complexity that ideology is in capitalist social formations. This is perhaps the strongest point in Poulantzas' presentation of the question. Ideology, for him, has a specific region which exercises some autonomy, although determined in the last instance by the economic ; it is a « relatively coherent ensemble of representations, values, beliefs » (6) and different aspects of ideology — the moral, political, religious, economic — may dominate the rest depending on the combination in a specific mode of production. In the feudal social formation, although the political was the dominant region in the formation it was religious ideology which tended to dominate the various aspects of ideology, not the political. Under capitalism, on the other hand, the dominant region within the ideological was, at a particular phase, the juridico-political, under monopoly capital economic ideology is tending, in Poulantzas, view, to dominate. It is characteristic of the dominant region of the ideological that it not only hides the fundamental contradictions in capitalist society but it also hides the fact of its dominance. This dominance may be identified by the degree of borrowing by other ideologies from a particular aspect, for example, borrowings from religious ideology under feudalism and borrowings from the juridico-political under capitalism.

An important consideration that flows from this discussion is the fact that for Poulantzas there is one, single ideology perceivable at particular periods of a given mode of production. There are at any one point in time, a number of ideologies co-existing — in capitalist formations there may be expected to be bourgeois, working-class, peasant, petit-bourgeois, etc., ideologies. In such a formation the dominant ideology need *not necessarily* be bourgeois ideology as it would appear in the historicist formulation of the problem. Almost invariably a mixture of feudal, bourgeois, petit-bourgeois ideologies may be expected to form the ideological at any one time. The dominant ideology, for

example bourgeois ideology in such a formation, will be 'contaminated' by the sub-ensemble of ideologies in the society and will not therefore exist in a 'pure' form.

Such a presentation is invaluable in any endeavour to understand the question of ideology in a post-colonial state such as Tanzania where ideology appears to play an important role in the social formation. The formulation helps us to raise some relevant questions made necessary by the fact that the social formation being looked at exists within a post-colonial situation. Thus, the idea that one may expect to find an impure bourgeois ideology, for example, in the metropolitan 'centres', properly handled, can help us to hypothesise more usefully about the *mixed* nature of ideology of the formation under consideration. This leads to the whole question of 'petit-bourgeois ideology' but although this concept can be useful it is not wholly adequate to deal with the question of ideology in the Tanzanian social formation, because to characterize ideology in Tanzania merely as 'petit-bourgeois' is insufficient. For, although this supposed fragmented class is expected to project a correspondingly fragmentary and eclectic ideology these features of ideology in Tanzania *necessarily* leads also to a consideration of the effect of imperialism on ideological construction.

A third aspect of this formulation which is of importance to this paper is the view that ideology has a « specific objective level » in the social formation and that it therefore has identifiable functions (7). The stress on the 'function' of ideology in Althusser and Poulantzas is such that some of their critics have correctly pointed to the high functionalist understanding of ideology which may possibly arise from their presentations of the question (8). Even so, the function of ideology cannot be ignored and what is therefore more useful is to determine the status that 'function' has as a criterion for the definition of ideology, rather than to abandon it, even though it may appear to bring us close to an empirically defined functionalism.

Ideology attempts to ignore, and exclude the contradictions operative at another dimension of social life. Ideology in class society thereby *attempts* to resolve these contradictions at its plane of social existence; it attempts to get people to see themselves as parts of a harmonious whole and to such an extent ideology may be logical, consistent and coherent. Indeed, such is the integrative, cohesive function of ideology that a dominant ideology usually forces the oppressed classes to carry out their ideological struggle within the framework set by that ideology.

In the specific case of the Tanzanian social formation the cohesive function of ideology is a necessary one due to historical developments — of course, not all particular to that formation. The new *governing* faction which assumed formal political powers, were forced to be creative if they were to surmount these problems and one implication of this was that the development of ideological functions in Tanzania took on an active and dynamic characteristic, so much so that to a considerable degree an occlusion of its objective function has been achieved.

2. Ideological Functions in Tanzania

In more specific terms some of the most important aspects of the functions of ideology in the Tanzanian social formation have been to (i) create a new unity of the social formation itself, (ii) establish a new framework within which the concept of work would appear acceptable to the productive classes and, (iii) foster a significantly modified concept of the state. These relate to the function of political ideology which is the dominant region of ideology in the Tanzanian formation and therefore tend to dominate the other areas of it. These do not exhaust the specific functions of ideology in this formation but they may be tentatively stated as being the more important aspects. These three specific instances of ideological functions may be treated separately for analytical purpose but in practice they are of course closely intertwined and do not enjoy the autonomy or independence the presentation would appear to attribute to them.

(i)

One of the social effects of the backward state of Tanzanian economy was that with the nationalist struggle for political independence in the 1950s, there was an almost total unity of social classes behind the banner of TANU. What little opposition there was the Party was able to surmount more easily than if there had been a greater degree of social differentiation in the society of the kind prevalent in some former West African colonies. Indeed, in some non-African colonies the process of constitutional decolonization took as long as two or more generations to mature not merely because the colonialists were reluctant to relinquish power but more importantly because of the intra-class conflict in the colonies themselves over the very issue of independence. Tanganyika did not go through such a process as Nyerere himself recognizes — « The fact is » he wrote and has repeated in various places and forms, « historical circumstances favoured Tanganyika » (10) in this particular respect.

But the degree of unity which was achieved during the nationalist period seemed destined to break-down at the impact of political independence after 1961. For although independence did not bring about fundamental changes in the socio economic arrangements of the country, it did have very important effects upon them. Very quickly the undeveloped class formations both started and held back by colonialism began to develop as government institutions expanded, as localization of aspects of the civil service occurred and as education and other career-orientated fields developed and offered opportunities to hitherto blocked segments of the class that had assumed political power. In short, the nationalist unity crumpled by the degree to which the 'petit-bourgeoisie', or the 'nizers' or the 'bureaucratic-bourgeoisie' (11) (however described) began to develop and distinguish itself from the depressed working class in the towns and the mass of the peasantry. Contradictions between the classes and within the 'petit-bourgeoisie' itself began to find political expression — the very terrain on which the struggle for independence had been fought.

Being a relatively inexperienced governing faction the leadership reacted harshly — at least initially — to this crisis of unity, imposing drastic measures to ensure control, particularly after the army mutiny in 1964 which supplied the leadership with the opportunity to forcefully nip in the bud any alternative source of power in the society, such as the trade union movement. But the Tanzanian leadership may be distinguished from most African political leaderships by its sense to seek for a more lasting social peace not by force but by ideological means; thus, whilst political force may have been used to restore a working unity, its continuation could only be safeguarded by the ideological weaponry of the state.

One of the main characteristics of the ideological level in the Tanzanian formation therefore is the notion of social and political unity; if at the more practical level of day-to-day existence the formation reveals its rifts and contradictions, at the ideological plane these do not appear. In his early and important essay, *Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism*, Nyerere, who himself articulates the tenets of this ideology clearest in Tanzania, argued that the main characteristic of traditional African society, which he wished to see having a bearing on contemporary developments in the country, was unity. This unity was expressed in the spirit of 'ujamaa', or 'familiarity' which would also be the source of the new unity he sought for the new Tanzania. The new social order was to be informed by values to be found in the traditional African family. Even after the Arusha Declaration the word retained this meaning for Nyerere who stressed that 'ujamaa' was specially chosen to describe the socialism that Tanzania wished to follow it was chosen because «it brings to the mind of our people the idea of mutual involvement in the family as we know it (12). For Nyerere the family in African traditional society was a harmonious unit within which there was no fundamental rift reflecting particularistic interests; the interest of the individual was also the interest of the whole. For Nyerere, therefore, the individual in pre-colonial (pre-capitalist) African society enjoyed an equality with his fellows because there were no class interests «I doubt if the equivalent for the idea of 'class' exists in any indigenous African language; for language describes the ideas of those who speak it and the idea of class or 'caste' was non-existent in African society» (13). Rather, it was the 'extended family' which was the basis or the foundation of the social order that obtained and was informed by the mutual feeling members of a family are assumed to have for each other.

Taking these propositions as the starting-point of his social-political philosophy, Nyerere has repeatedly emphasized that in the attempt to build socialism, defined as ujamaa, Tanzania would be opposed to «doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man»; (14). Nyerere found this conflict «intolerable» because it is fundamentally antagonistic and divisive. This position has remained a basic principle in Nyerere's social thinking even though its presentation has been sometimes modified. This basic political position has had profound effects on the development of the state ideological apparatuses in Tanzania, such as the political party and the ideology of political participation

has been served by it. Two illustrations may serve to make the point clearer.

The stress on unity helps to present all Tanzanians, irrespective of the determinate structural position they occupy in the society, as equals in their relations to the means of production; all are described as workers and consequently the antagonistic underlying relation between capital and labour is perceived as non-existent because all participants in a given concern are involved in a common enterprise. This view very much resembles the marginal utility theory which held that both labour and capital receive what they brought to the enterprise or, the post-industrial society 'theories' of sociologists such as Dahrendorf, which identify a common interest in the economy by all. The situation in Tanzania has been stated more explicitly and particularly in relation to the economy. For example, Job Lusinde, a Minister, told a group of NDC Managers in 1970 that public enterprises « are owned by the public who include workers of the enterprises themselves » (15). The worker, generally, is presented and encouraged to see himself as 'owner' or 'partner' not merely an 'employee' of a given public enterprise. The Presidential Circular, N° 1, of 1970 conceived of workers being eventually regarded as « fully respected partners » because, presumably, nationalization entailed « community ownership » (16). The legal form which is currently utilized to express property ownership (nationalization) plays the function of blurring the contradictory relation between labour and capital, whatever form capital may take in this specific context. Of course, this is not unique to the Tanzanian case, but given the relative political positions between the classes in Tanzanian society, this may be more effective than elsewhere.

Secondly, the unitary perspective that ideology provides also has serious implications at the political level. Platt (17), among others, has correctly stressed the fact that in Nyerere's conception of the polity there is no room for conflicting groups; in the President's view of society and polity a harmonious relationship exists so that one all-embracing group — the party (TANU/CCM) — is sufficient to accommodate all possible views. The Party which claims and is seen to represent the wishes of the people as a whole also serves as the forum for the 'arguing until we agree' perception of democracy that Nyerere endorsed in his early polemical pieces. For example, in one such paper, « The African and Democracy » (18), he postulated that democracy need to take the two-party form it has taken in western countries and therefore the prescription of these forms for Africa was incorrect and betrayed an insensitivity to indigenous democratic practices. Discussion, equality and freedom were African characteristics and Nyerere has always argued that these should be given institutional forms in a developing Tanzanian state. Thus, in his *Guide* to the commissioners who were asked to look into the mechanics of establishing a one-party state in Tanzania, The President specifically emphasized that although there would be « maximum political freedom for all » this freedom would have to be exercised « within the context of a single national movement » (19). The Commission was not asked to consider, the President pointed out, « whether Tanganyika should be a one-party state.

That decision », he made clear, « has already been taken » (20). Many liberals would see here a profound distrust by Nyerere of one of their most cherished principles, namely, the freedom of association in order to represent particularistic interests and perhaps more importantly to ensure democratic practices in a political community.

The development of the ideological apparatuses of the state in Tanzania reflects and gives concrete forms to these ideas. Perhaps the best example of this is the development of the Party as the sole actor of its kind in the political arena. The Interim Constitution in which the one-Party state is enshrined declares that :

*All political activity in Tanzania,
other than that of the organs of
state... shall be conducted by or
under the auspices of the Party (21).*

This was more than simply giving legal/institutional form to a *de facto* situation; the constitutional change effectively blocked any possibility of formal, institutional opposition emerging to jeopardize the unity of the social formation. Another glaring example of the institutionalization of unitary ideas is that of the trade union movement which was effectively brought under the control of the Government and Party so that consequently the two roles which usually, if only symbolically, represent the underlying conflict between capital and labour, the Minister of Labour and the Secretary-General of the trades union movement, are merged by virtue of one functionary combining both contradictory roles simultaneously. It is probably here that the notion of one-ness expresses itself most clearly in an institutional form and at the same time convinces itself that these contradictions no longer obtain.

Even after the creation of a unity at the ideological level and the obvious effect of this on the ideological apparatuses, deep rifts existed in the Tanzanian social formation because the mode of production remained predominantly capitalist, with subordinated features of pre-capitalist and socialist modes. But the apparent success of the new unity at the level of the ideological led many leaders, it would appear, to over estimate the extent to which this was true also at the primary dimension of social life. Realization of the fact that this was not the case by the most conscious element of the leadership led to the enunciation of the Arusha Declaration in 1967 : particularistic interests had to be subjected to wider interests. Some commentators have viewed this as a positive sign as regards the 'good' intentions of the leadership but this is hardly the point at all : it is not a case of whether the leadership had 'good' or 'bad' intentions; rather, it was a situation in which they were taking steps to 'correct' a situation in the direction they would have preferred to see developments taking. More recently also Nyerere, always far ahead of his colleagues, intimated that there may be *internal* enemies who Africans will have to fight if the economic as well as the political independence of Africa is to be realized (22). Depending on the degree to which the President is prepared to take

this line of argument it may be possible to argue that he is seeing a crack in the unity he has stressed over the years and the stamp of which institutions in Tanzania bear.

In terms of the question at hand, however, there can be little doubt that at the ideological level a unity is reconstituted. The effect of this region on the primary level of contradictions, the ultimately determinant economic, is evident — the notion of unity does seem to have a very real, definite, effect on the relations existing at that level. Individuals are not only perceived to 'live' this unity, to a significant degree they do in fact 'live' this unity. In a sense, then, the Hegelian perception that what exists is not necessarily real, washed of the philosophers concern over 'existence' and 'essence', may well have a meaning: in other words, to 'live' the unity is not to say that this unity negates the fundamental contradictions in 'reality'. It is in this sense too that ideology can be said to exercise a measure of relative autonomy, *vis-à-vis* the economic 'base' and the political 'superstructure'.

(ii)

The fundamental problem faced by an underdeveloped class in a neo-colonial situation, is not political in the first instance but economic and becomes political precisely because this weak/underdeveloped class does not have the resources to fully assert itself predominate and thus establish its hegemony over the classes. It therefore resorts to the political sphere to enhance and develop. In Tanzania this situation was compounded by the fact that the « *petit-bourgeoisie* » as a whole suffered from the fact that those with the greater share of economic power at independence were not (ethnically) Africans and therefore struggled with the African factions rather than enhanced 'petit-bourgeois' strength. This had the effect of strengthening the governing faction, politically and thrusting upon it the double task of subjugating the various factions and, secondly, improving on the colonial system in providing a stable political system which would ensure safe accumulation. But the problem of how to ensure the rapid generation of surplus entailed that the state should enter directly into the economy, rather than simply providing the Benthamite edifice of (legal) rights for the safe conduct necessary for such accumulation. This problem which faces many dominant classes in post-colonial states usually express itself in terms of 'economic development' or 'growth' with economists being concerned with the 'take-off point' of such 'developments'. Presented then with the need to create appropriate factors to ensure the creation of surplus, if this class were to develop or to even maintain itself, the more conscious elements of the class perceived correctly (in terms of class perceptions) that there was a need not only for cohesion of the social formation but also to put this cohesion to good economic use. Again, the manner in which the Tanzanian *petit-bourgeoisie* tackled this question marks it off from most African social formations which the governing factions were faced with similar problems in the 1950-60s. Whereas most of these classes broached these questions in an emphatically pure/vulgar economic manner, with their social practices repeating some of the grossest excesses of early capitalist accumulation in the West combined with a political barbarity the

barbarians would have shivered at, the Tanzanian petit-bourgeoisie has laid a great deal of stress on the ideological functions of the state. Thus, in terms of the specific question of accumulation the petit-bourgeoisie tackled it by attempting to build a social ethic within which the concept of work was to take pride of place.

Whether or not it was meant to confront historical materialism (which asserts the primacy of matter, ultimately, over ideas) Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of the Capitalism*, does point to an important factor within the development of capitalism. The Calvinist ethic that God rewards each individual in this world according to the measure of his work gave the accent to hard work in an ideology appropriate to the capitalist mode of production. In other words, the ideological presentation of work in capitalism as a rewarding activity was and remains a necessary factor if surplus is to be achieved and discipline enforced. Under pre-capitalist modes of production the attitude to work was not perceived as being so important to the individual largely because he was not individualized nor was he removed from the means of production in the manner that he is under capitalism. In the specific case of Tanzania, it remains a question for investigation as to the degree to which capitalist values penetrated what is usually poorly described as 'traditional' values. This question is not made any more easy by the fact that pre-capitalist modes developed and maintained values which are not inimical to capitalism. However, with regards to the work ethic there would appear to be a great need still to create one more favourable to the capitalist mode of production that currently obtains. The very fact, of course, that the productive forces are backward means that the relations of workers to work is likely to remain backward in a number of important ways. Briefly then, the problem of how to speed-up the process of accumulation has led the dominant class in Tanzania to tackle the task of creating a work ethic appropriate to the ends in view.

At the ideological level, therefore, work in Tanzania is presented as being a moral virtue whilst lack of work evidences moral shortcomings. The man who does not work is portrayed as an 'exploiter', as 'lazy', as a 'loiterer'. In *Ujamaa* Nyerere stressed that 'loitering' in traditional African society was « an unthinkable disgrace; everybody », he emphasized, « was a worker » (23). The 'worker', in his view, cannot be simply contrasted with the 'employer', he must also be contrasted with the 'loiterer' or the 'idler'. In traditional African society, therefore, the security men enjoyed derived from the fact that « it was taken for granted that every member of society — barring only the children and the infirm — contributed his fair share of effort towards the production of its wealth » (24). In the Arusha Declaration itself these points received greater refinements; Nyerere argued that :

In our country work should be something to be proud of, and laziness, drunkenness and idleness should be things to be ashamed of (25).

He went on, in talking about 'good policies' for the country to stress that no one should be allowed to sponge off others because this was exploitation of friends and relatives and at the wider social dimension :

Likewise, nobody should be allowed to loiter in towns or villages without doing work which would enable him to be self-reliant without exploiting his relatives (26).

These statements elaborate the unitary perception the President has of society in what he understands as 'traditional' Africa and they are also his prescriptions for the new Tanzania under socialist construction. But in his view the society also has a duty towards the individual — it is duty bound to provide work for him. In his speeches and writings Nyerere has remained very aware of the importance of the question of an appropriate work ethic to what he conceives of Tanzania as doing and repeatedly he has stated that work constitutes one of the three elements necessary in the production of wealth. Two points may serve to both illustrate the general argument here and Nyerere's own attitude over the years.

To achieve a modern socialist society, as conceived by the leadership, it is seen as necessary to discipline the work force. In the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere recognized that the « biggest requirement is hard work » and reasoned that urban workers working for forty-five (45) hours per week and between forty-eight to fifty weeks in the year were insufficient — « For a country like ours these are really quite short working-hours », he concluded. In his view, the « normal (my emphasis) thing is to begin with long working hours and decrease them as the country becomes more and more prosperous » for to start with such short working hours is really to imitate developed societies which themselves begun with much longer hours when they started to develop (7). Undoubtedly the underlying basis of the argument is correct because labour is the creator of wealth and if the need is to generate surplus then the labour — time of the worker must be reconsidered by the participants in this particular context of primitive accumulation.

In the Declaration the stress is placed on rural, not urban, development because it is the peasantry which produced the surplus — a point which calls for examination of the peasantry as a more productive class than the urban working class which produced industrial substitutes and a reconsideration of the political potentials of the two classes as a result. Yet, in terms of work, Nyerere felt that even in the villages people were not working as much as they could — apart from the women. He pointed out that :

The energies of the millions of men in the villages and the thousands of women in the towns which are at present wasted in gossip, dancing and drinking could contribute more towards the development of our country than anything we could get from rich nations (28).

The discipline, however, that Nyerere calls for is encouraged, in the first instance, to come from workers themselves, rather than be imposed. This necessitates and entails that the worker internalizes and 'lives' this discipline himself. In *Freedom and Development*, Nyerere writes that — « all have to work together, and all of us have to accept the discipline we impose upon ourselves. It must be joint discipline... But in accepting this discipline *we must remain free men, implementing our own decisions* » (29).

Moreover, the President has come to believe that the best way to ensure that workers achieve high productivity, particularly in the public sector, is to encourage workers' participation. In his own view « true industrial discipline does not exclude the workers in an industry from participation in the enterprise, or from a responsibility for its improvement (30). Indeed, the « true discipline in a workplace should be easier when the workers understand what they are doing... » (31). Means should therefore be instituted to ensure that workers do participate in decision-making regarding planning, marketing, etc., in particular, the worker should be acquainted with the 'work targets' of the enterprise and he should know how his division of labour fits into a greater whole. But this did not mean that workers had interests which were different from those of management, indeed, the Workers' Councils which were set up to effect these aims reflected in their composition Nyerere's unitary view of worker and management in an enterprise.

As with the unity of the social formation, labour cannot be allowed to go unsubjected to discipline should the individual fail to respond positively to self-discipline. Consequently, failure to be engaged in work, in production in one way or another, has not been viewed without displeasure by the institutions of state. In opening the Chinese-aided Friendship Textile Mill in 1968, Nyerere remarked :

It seems that some people in this country have taken the emphasis on people in the Arusha Declaration to mean that there can be slackness in work, and that people in supervisory position can do nothing about it. Nothing can be further from the truth. The Arusha Declaration demands more discipline, not less (my emphasis) (32).

Thus, the President made it clear that although maximum output cannot be achieved without workers imposing their own discipline on themselves should they fail to do so, « then there must be hard industrial discipline imposed by management » (33). Although at one time Nyerere commented that unemployment is no problem for Tanzania, in recent years youth have repeatedly flocked to the towns from the rural areas in search of urban employment because the regime has not been able to convince youth that its proper place of work is in the countryside. Failure to gain employment in urban areas has been met with a ready response from the state, so that from time to time the coercive arms of the state, the police and militia, are called out by

the Party to round-up the unemployed and return them to the villages where their labour is needed. In this situation the ideological and the coercive arms of the state, combined to achieve a desired result. This could also be said of the policy of setting up ujamaa villages for which Tanzania has earned an international reputation : again, when persuasion failed the force was, reportedly, applied to get people to move into such villages. It is important to note also that the setting-up of ujamaa villages represents perhaps the most important method used in Tanzania to discipline the work force in the countryside. Ujamaa, therefore, was partly geared also as bringing elements of the peasantry together in closer units which made them more united as a workforce and more accessible as a producing stratum of the peasantry. This was particularly important in a country which did not experience the plantation systems to any significant extent.

(iii)

The proclaimed 'ideology' of Tanzania is 'socialism' but the obvious variance between this and the predominant mode of production that exists has led to a great deal of debate in some quarters over the question whether Tanzania is indeed a socialist country, but this is not at issue here for it leads to questions which go beyond the stated aims of this paper. Nyerere himself has never claimed that Tanzania is a socialist country but rather that there is a commitment to build socialism and to foster a socialist outlook in the country. It is however, useful to consider briefly what the leadership means by "socialism" and how this understanding — often referred to as 'ideology' — has its own ideological function.

Nyerere's *Ujamaa* opens polemically with the statement that « Socialism — like democracy — is an attitude of mind » (34) and in defending this thesis he pointed out that it is feasible to have socialists who are millionaires and poor men who are, in attitude, capitalists. There is a strong condemnation running through the tract of what are considered to be capitalist values such as hoarding, acquisitiveness and lack of care for the poor. In Nyerere's view « society itself should look after « those without » and this was « exactly what traditional African society succeeded in doing » (35). Both 'rich' and 'poor' were secured in that society and therefore ujamaa, or Tanzanian socialism is aimed at achieving such ends. Nyerere has not departed from this view of socialism although in the Arusha Declaration this received the elaboration that socialism is also « a way of life » but only because it is first 'an attitude of mind'. What was 'new' in this regard with the Declaration is that Nyerere now took deliberate steps to give organizational form to this 'attitude of mind'. The socialism Nyerere sees Tanzania striving towards has utter disregard for « doctrinaire marxism » and for capitalism ; this socialism is characterized essentially by its eclectic nature — there are elements which can be traced effortlessly to the early socialist, the British fabians and more recent social-democratic trends in West Europe and there is also a strong sense of christian values interspersed. Nyerere's intense conviction of these values and his attempts to provide them with an African foundation gives a dis-

tinct political colour to what would appear to be a contradictory set of values.

The 'ideology of socialism' succeeds to a significant degree in transforming the (ideological) presentation the state received under colonialism. Whereas the liberal democratic state presented itself as representing the 'general interest' but in fact through its institutions mediated between the various antagonistic interests of the dominant class (es) the colonial state made no pretence, initially, to be 'representing' the people/nation but accorded preferential treatment, such like the state under feudalism, to the various factions depending on economic as well as racial status. With political independence, however, the 'bare individual' of bourgeois juridico-political ideology was able to better make his appearance — each individual now had 'equal rights' before the law and the principle of 'one man, one vote' became an actuality. But the changing situation which expressed itself first at the political level also involved changes at the level of the ideological; but such ideological changes, since they came via the political, had to be superimposed. Consequently, the individual is not only a 'bourgeois individual' but also a 'social' or 'socialist' individual: in the crucial areas of work and political participation the individual is partly transformed' from being the rather selfish, Benthamite atom into one which has a social responsibility. At the level of the state itself, representation is not particularistic but general, or, more, precisely, the state is presented as coming close to representing Rousseau's 'general will'; interests become universalized. Where factions seek representation therefore justification must be understood to be derived from socialist norms if they are to be considered legitimate.

Perhaps an equally important aspect of the ideology of socialism' in the formation under discussion is that it functions so as to eradicate all evidence of class domination. Poulantzas has correctly pointed out that one of the most important features of bourgeois ideology is that it excludes all evidence of domination either by the dominant region of that ideology or by the pre-dominant class or faction (36). This situation is in sharp contrast with pre-capitalist formations — for example, in the feudal formation the dominance of the aristocracy is not hidden, but on the contrary, proclaimed in the prevailing ideology and defended and 'explained' by reference to the 'sacred' the 'divine' or the 'natural'. In a socialist formation, also, the fact of domination is made explicit, that is to say the state is declared to be the instrument of a specified class; it is described as a 'dictatorship' and it derives its legitimacy from the fact that it is the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. Bourgeois ideology is distinct in the respect therefore that it conceals/concludes, the fact of class domination and people are not presented as members of particular classes but as individuals which, although correct and necessary for the mode of production that predominates, nonetheless slides over the equally important fact of the socialization process.

Similarly, in the Tanzanian social formation the 'ideology of socialism' denies the existence of any domination and inserts 'individuals' into a unitary whole; they are perceived as being parts of a harmonious solidaristic whole. Nyerere himself finds « doctrinaire socialism » as indicated earlier, « intolerable » because it posits a condition of antagonism

in the social order. The prevalence of populist political language and behaviour largely arising out of the nationalist struggle, further helps to exclude all traces of domination in the dominant ideology of the social formation. Consequently, political ideology stresses the importance of 'the people' or the 'masses' and the state is projected as one of 'workers and peasants', but, crucially not as one of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. For the state to declare itself as such would be to cut across the unitary presentation the social formation receives in the 'ideology of socialism' which has its own consistency and coherence. The ideological presentation of the role of the state is therefore similar to the Hegelian presentation in which the state is the realization of freedom.

Conclusion

The conditions prevalent in the post-colonial state impels the political to dominate over the economy and society and although this is not peculiar in the era of monopoly capital the specific turns developments in particular post-colonial state take may show significant divergence from a dominant trend. In Tanzania the dominant class has established to a considerable degree its hegemony over the dominated classes by using the apparatuses of state but its success has been due largely to that class' use of political ideology. Thus, there appears to be an 'over-politicization' of social and economic factors, as well as an 'over-ideologicalization' of both the socio-economic and political levels. Unfortunately, the narrow scope of the paper and the constraints under which it has been written do not make possible an analysis of some of the important implications these comments raise, the presentation must therefore be regarded merely as preliminary points for a discussion.

RÉFÉRENCES

1. H. Bienen, « An Ideology for Africa », in Cliffe & Saul (eds.), *Socialisme in Tanzania: An Interdisciplinary Reader*, vol I, (Nairobi : East Africa Publishing House, 1972), pp. 178-9.
2. This argument is more elaborately treated in, H. Goulbourne, « Politics and Ideology : The Tanzania Case », paper presented at the 12th Annual Social Science Conference of East African Universities, Dar es Salam, 1976.
3. For a fair treatment of Nyerere conceived and presented in this vein see, H. Glickman, « Dilemmas of Political Theory in an African Context : The Ideology of Julius Nyerere », in J. Butler & A.A. Castagno (eds.), *Boston University Papers on Africa : Transition in African Politics* (New York : Praeger Publishers, 1967). pp. 195 ff.
4. For an extensive and very sympathetic treatment of Nyerere's political thought see, Cranford Pratt, *The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945-1968 : Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy* (Cambridge University Press, 1976), ch. 4.
5. L. Althusser, *For Marx* (New York : Vintage Books, 1970) ; Althusser & E. Balibar, *Reading Capital* (London : New Left Books, 1970) ; also Althusser, « Ideology & Ideological State Apparatus : Notes Towards an Introduction », in *Lenin & Philosophy and Other Essays* (New York & London : Monthly Review Press, 1971) ; N. Poulantzas, *Political Power & Social Classes* (London : New Left Books, 1975) ; There are some very useful essays on Althusser and Poulantzas, in *Working Papers in Cultural Studies* 10 ; *On Ideology*, (Birmingham : Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham, 1977).
6. Poulantzas, *op. cit.*, p. 206.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 206 ff.
8. See, for example, Stuart Hall, « Rethinking the 'Base-and-Superstructure' Metaphor », in, Jon Blomfield (ed.), *The Communist University of London Papers on Class, Hegemony and Party* (London : Lawrence & Wishart, 1977) also, J. Clarke, I. Connel, R. McDonough, « Misrecognizing Ideology : Ideology in Political Power and Social Classes », in *Cultural Studies* 10.
9. On this question the criticism of Clarke, et al, should be well taken, namely, that the cohesive function of ideology is a contingent, not a necessary, function.
10. J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom & Unity/Uhuru na Umoja* (Dar es Salam : Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 1.
11. For a consideration of these descriptions in the literature see, M. von Freyhold, « The Post-Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version-Contribution to a Debate », Mimeo, Sociology Department, University of Dar es Salam, 1976 ; also, H. Goulbourne, « TANU Since the Arusha Declaration », unpublished ms., 1977.
12. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism/Uhuru na Ujamaa* (Dar es Salam OUP, 1966), p. 2.
13. Nyerere, *Ujamaa : Essays on Socialism* (Dar es Salam : OUP, 1968), p. 11.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
15. J. Lusinde, « Workers Participation in Industrial Management in Tanzania », in H. Mapolu (ed.) *Workers and Management* (Dar es Salam : Tanzanian Publishing House, 1976), p. 160
16. Nyerere, « Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1970 : The Establishment of Workers' Councils, Executive Boards and Boards of Directors », *Ibid.*, pp. 153 ff.
17. Pratt, *op. cit.*
18. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, pp. 103 ff.
19. Nyerere, « Guide to the One-Party State Commission 1964 », *Ibid.*, p. 262.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Interim Constitution of Tanzania*, EPCT (Dar es Salam : Government Publications Agency, 1976 ed.), p. 7, this was amended in 1975 so that TANU was recognized as being supreme over state organs also ; the new CCM Constitution (1977) makes the Party « the sole political party exercising supreme authority over all state organ », p. 4.
22. Perhaps the best example of this departure in the President's speech at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, « The Process of Liberation », reprinted in, *Daily News*, 18 November, 1976, p. 4.
23. Nyerere, *Ujamaa*, p. 4.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
25. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism*, p. 247.
26. *Ibid.*

27. The quotations in this paragraph are to be found, *Ibid.*, p. 244.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 245.
29. Nyerere, « Freedom and Development », in, *Freedom and Development* (Dar es Salam : OUP, 1973), p. 70.
30. Nyerere, Presidential Circular No. I, 1970, *op. cit.*, p. 154.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
32. Nyerere, *Freedom and Development*, p. 49.
33. *Ibid.*
34. Nyerere, *Ujamaa*, p. 1.
35. *Ibid.*
36. Poulantzas, *op. cit.*

RÉSUMÉ

Dans ce papier, l'auteur discute, en conclusion, la question fondamentale de savoir si l'idéologie devrait être traitée comme un instrument neutre, applicable à toute formation sociale, quelle que soit sa nature, indistinctement. Ou, au contraire, elle découlerait de la nature de la société concernée et des contradictions qui la caractérisent. Pour sa part, l'auteur, s'alignant, entre autres, sur Poulantzas, soutient ce dernier point de vue et pense que l'idéologie tanzanienne et son rôle dans la société sont les produits des contradictions fondamentales de la formation sociale post-coloniale tanzanienne.

Définissant l'idéologie, en sociétés capitalistes, et cela suivant la ligne de Poulantzas, comme :

- a) Un ensemble complexe et cohérent de représentations, valeurs, croyances, comprenant, entre autres le moral, le politique, le religieux, l'économique, disposant, à chaque moment dans le temps, d'une zone spécifique exerçant une certaine autonomie, bien que déterminée, en dernier ressort par l'économique ;
- b) Cet ensemble jouissant d'un niveau objectif spécifique dans la formation sociale concernée et, dès lors, exerçant des fonctions identifiables ; l'auteur analyse les fonctions qu'exerce l'idéologie tanzanienne dans la société post-coloniale tanzanienne. D'après lui, les aspects les plus importants des fonctions exercées par l'idéologie tanzanienne sont de trois ordres :
 - 1) Créer une unité nouvelle de la formation sociale tanzanienne ;
 - 2) Etablir un nouveau cadre dans lequel le concept de travail serait accepté par les classes productives ;
 - 3) Développer un sens nouveau du concept d'Etat.

L'auteur conclut en notant qu'en Tanzanie, la classe dominante (la petite bourgeoisie) a établi son hégémonie sur d'autres classes en partie par l'utilisation de l'appareil étatique de coercition, mais sa réussite est fondamentalement due à l'utilisation intense de l'idéologie politique. Ainsi en Tanzanie, note-t-il, il semble y avoir sur-politisation de facteurs économiques et sociaux et sur-idéologisation des aspects socio-économiques et politiques.

BOOK REVIEWS – REVUE DES LIVRES

Makhtar Diouf :

Echange inégal et ordre économique international

B. Founou-Tchigoua

Nous n'avons pas l'intention de lire tout le livre de Makhtar DIOUF qui n'est pas très volumineux (127 pages), et qui est écrit dans un langage clair, quoique concis. Nous voudrions plutôt attirer l'attention sur l'intérêt du livre et mettre l'accent sur les points acquis, mais surtout sur les points qui méritent des débats.

Le livre comporte deux parties. La première est consacrée à la critique des théories et des politiques de l'échange inégal, soit au niveau de la concertation internationale soit dans chaque Etat du Tiers-Monde. Après avoir fait la critique des théories néo-classiques et d'Emmanuel mais pas de S. AMIN (qu'il cite sans approuver ni désapprouver), et après avoir rappelé les impasses où conduisent les politiques économiques des pays qui accomplissent des actions dites de développement sans remettre en cause leur appartenance au système capitaliste, il passe à la partie la plus neuve, celle sur laquelle, les économistes du Tiers-Monde se montrent en général très prudents, à savoir les *relations économiques entre les pays du système socialiste contemporain*. La première partie du livre ne fait que préparer l'analyse du COMECON, car selon l'auteur, l'Afrique doit prendre position. C'est pourquoi notre commentaire portera essentiellement sur la deuxième partie du livre intitulé :

l'Ordre Economique International du Socialisme : Le COMECON.

L'objectif de Makhtar DIOUF est de nous montrer que les rapports économiques entre les pays socialistes et notamment entre des membres du COMECON ne sont pas régis par les lois de l'échange inégal et du développement inégal comme c'est le cas entre les pays capitalistes développés et les pays capitalistes sous-développés. Par là même, il invite les pays sous-développés, et notamment ceux de l'Afrique à s'inspirer de cet exemple du double point de vue des changements sociaux révolutionnaires (il reproche très sévèrement à A. Emmanuel son réformisme), et à jeter des bases de coopération économique inspirées de l'expérience du COMECON et peut-être à s'associer ou même à adhérer au COMECON.

Ainsi, alors que toute l'Afrique ne participe actuellement pour l'essentiel qu'à l'ordre international capitaliste (Convention de Lomé, Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO), la ligne de partage entre l'ordre international capitaliste et l'ordre inter-

national socialiste traverserait alors l'Afrique comme elle traverse déjà l'Amérique Latine (Cuba est déjà membre du COMECON) et l'Asie (DIOUF pense qu'il est de l'intérêt de la Chine et du Vietnam de participer au COMECON).

Cette présentation appelle des remarques dont nous allons examiner quelques unes :

1°) La thèse selon laquelle, le système capitaliste impose de lui-même l'échange inégal et le développement inégal et qu'aucun aménagement à l'intérieur du système ne permet de passer du sous-développement au développement capitaliste, ne souffre plus de discussion. L'échec des conférences instaurées par les Nations Unies (conférence de Paris, CNUCED) est patent. La convention de Lomé ne changera pas la structure économique des pays associés dans un sens opposé au développement inégal.

2°) L'analyse du COMECON et celle des régimes socialistes soulève des problèmes que DIOUF ne signale pas. Le plus important et qui, bien sûr, n'est pas spécifique au COMECON et à ses pays membres, est celui de l'information. Marie Lavigne signale dans son étude (1) la difficulté qu'il y a même pour un pays membre du COMECON d'accéder à certaines informations pourtant nécessaires au renforcement de la coopération. Sans verser dans le procès des régimes en matières d'informations, il faut reconnaître que le système rend extrêmement difficile la connaissance réelle des structures nationales et du système de coopération multilatérale.

Evidemment, il y a des choses indiscutables : la transformation de la Bulgarie d'une économie agraire en une économie où l'industrie joue un rôle de premier plan est une réalité qu'on ne peut nier. Le fait que c'est l'Union Soviétique qui approvisionne les Démocraties Populaires en produits de base nécessaires à l'industrialisation, et, ce, souvent en-dessous des prix mondiaux capitalistes est aussi une réalité. Mais il faudrait disposer aussi des informations politiques, des débats etc..., ce qui n'est pourtant pas le cas.

3°) Un autre point de débat est celui de l'exemplarité qu'offre le COMECON aux Etats Africains dans le cadre d'une option socialiste. C'est sans doute le problème le plus difficile à résoudre théoriquement. Nous pensons que le succès du COMECON doit beaucoup à la présence de l'Union Soviétique comme grande puissance économique, politique et militaire. C'est pourquoi dans le contexte africain, l'option idéologique ne doit pas effacer le rêve de l'Unité et de la puissance. L'Afrique ne pourra pas se développer seulement par le choix socialiste. La balkanisation nous impose de créer des *pôles de puissances*, non par la coopération économique intra-africaine aux résultats extrêmement incertains, mais par la réalisation de l'*Unité Politique*, fût-ce d'abord par région. C'est pourquoi deux pays africains contigus qui optent pour le développement auto-centré, doivent immédiatement chercher les moyens de réaliser l'unité politique. Certes, lorsqu'un tel choix est effectué, l'impérialisme prend des dispositions pour étouffer

(1) Le COMECON, P.U.F., 1973.

l'expérience. C'est pourquoi la coopération avec les pays socialistes est nécessairement étroite. Mais l'Association au COMECON ne comporterait-il pas le danger de l'abandon du rêve de l'Unité politique ?

4°) Aujourd'hui, le concept de socialisme est devenu moins simple à formuler qu'avant les expériences en cours dans le monde. On peut certes faire abstraction des contradictions et des solutions historiques, mais on ne peut aujourd'hui proposer le socialisme sans exprimer ne fût-ce qu'une définition personnelle. On sait que la définition la plus générale se rapporte à la base économique : socialisation des moyens de production, régularisation par les plans et non par le marché, élévation du niveau de vie des travailleurs. Est-ce désormais suffisant ?

5°) Le problème de la théorie des rapports économiques entre les pays du COMECON est escamoté. DIOUF soutient que la théorie Ricardienne des coûts comparatifs sert de guide. Alors que Ricardo a fait sa théorie pour des économies capitalistes, alors qu'Arighi Emmanuel a mis à jour les hypothèses fondamentales de la théorie, dont en particulier celle de l'égalité des salaires dans les pays partenaires, l'auteur de l'échange inégal et l'ordre économique international déclare qu'elle est applicable là où il n'y a ni libre échange, ni détermination de l'allocation des ressources par le marché et la répartition des revenus. A mon avis, le recours aux arguments extra économiques, invoqués d'ailleurs par DIOUF me paraissent plus convaincants que la loi des coûts comparatifs. La division internationale du travail basée sur les principes de l'industrialisation de tous les Etats et de la réduction des écarts de développement relèvent plus de la politique, de l'idéologie et même de la géopolitique que d'une loi économique, en l'occurrence celle de l'optimum économique via la loi des coûts comparatifs.

D'ailleurs, certains auteurs soviétiques soutiennent que leur pays subit l'échange inégal à travers l'échange en produits de base pour des produits industriels (2). C'est possible. Pourquoi l'URSS supporterait-elle cette situation si la loi Ricardienne était un régulateur essentiel des échanges ?

(2) Voir Michael Senine, *l'Intégration socialiste*, Ed. du Progrès, Moscou 1974.

Towards a Theory of Rural Development

By John R. Herzog

The two studies published together in the 1977 volume of *Development Dialogue* under the title «Towards a Theory of Rural Development» explore boldly and thoughtfully the possibilities in Third World countries for initiating and sustaining a process of mass-based rural development (1). The four authors, Wahidul Haque, Niranjan Mehta, Anisur Rahman and Ponna Wignaraja, all Asians, carefully develop the thesis that to liberate the rural masses, release their creative potential and thus make possible true development, the economic bases, institutions and attitudes of the rural poor must be progressively strengthened through carefully coordinated collective action.

Arguing that the kinds of development strategies pursued heretofore in Asian countries have not succeeded — and cannot succeed — in generating broadly-based rural development, the authors of «Towards a Theory of Rural Development» maintain that a real process of rural development can be initiated and sustained only by releasing the potential of Asia's greatest resource, the productive abilities of its peoples.

To accomplish that, the existing constraints on the activities of the rural poor must be overcome, and the authors argue that that requires the mobilization of the rural poor. Indeed the authors make mobilization the keystone of their Rural Development Strategy and deal perceptively with diverse aspects of rural mobilization in case studies of actual experiences and in analyses of specific issues.

The case studies presented in «Towards a Theory of Rural Development» include broad reviews of the rural development experiences of four countries (India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and China) and intensive investigations of current conditions and recent changes in three small rural areas (in India, Bangladesh, and Thailand).

Both sets of case studies are of unusual interest, partly because they relate the specific problems that emerge in particular situations to more general tendencies and phenomena, partly because they trace specific interrelationships among the socio-political, economic, and ideological aspects of rural development. Also helpful are illustrations of the nature and origins of barriers to rural development and of the grave difficulties that even knowledgeable and well-intentioned leaders encounter. Quite possibly the case studies will be of especial interest to readers not well acquainted with the experiences of Asian countries in rural development.

«Towards a Theory of Rural Development» deals explicitly with a number of major issues immediately relevant to efforts aimed at mobilizing the rural poor: for example, what should be the criteria

for selecting target groups ? What should be the role of cadres ? How ambitious should mobilization efforts be ? How much emphasis should be placed on developing the political consciousness of the rural poor ? The seriousness of « operational » problems in implementing mobilization schemes is not overlooked, and consideration is given to such problems as how to persuade different segments of the rural poor to unite so as to defend their collective interests ; how to prevent rural elites from gaining control over new « cooperative » institutions ; how to establish a balance among economic, socio-political, and ideological actions in mobilization projects ; and how to avoid loss of momentum, especially in the case of withdrawal of outside support.

Though at times the authors' style is rather ponderous, on the whole the issues raised are important and relevant, the arguments coherent and sensible, and the analyses cogent and useful in clarifying basic options. For these reasons « Towards a Theory of Rural Development » is apt to be of considerable use to many readers in developing their own analyses and proposals. Moreover, readers who are especially interested in Africa may find of particular interest discussions in « Towards a Theory of Rural Development » of problems which seem likely to become increasingly acute in many parts of Africa. Among such problems would seem to be growing disparities within and between rural communities, especially in relation to differential access to credit, fertilizer, and the like ; the emergence of a class of landless agricultural labourers ; changes in land tenure and use benefiting the rich ; and increasing reliance on goods and services obtained from outside the community.

The authors of « Towards a Theory of Rural Development » might well be satisfied with the thought-provoking analyses of past experiences and specific problems that they provide. But even as the titles hint, the authors' objectives extend to constructing a theory of rural development and to deducing from that theory a strategy of rural development and criteria for use in the design and evaluation of rural development projects.

With this in mind the authors set out their development objectives ; describe with care the principal features, or at least symptoms, of the present situation ; and suggest a number of guidelines, tactics, actions and so forth. But they do not — and, in fact, they cannot — show that under the conditions currently prevailing in most Third World countries, adopting their proposals would quite probably lead to the mobilization of the rural masses and to the commencement of a process of genuine rural development.

At times the authors seem well aware of this problem. Not only are certain sections of their text heavily laced with qualifications but the introduction to the formal presentation of their « Rural Development Strategy » notes that :

the principles outlined in the following three chapters would be of immediate operational interest to societies where a mass-rooted leadership has actually come into power... (p. 48).

This key qualification, abandoned in subsequent discussions of the design and evaluation of rural development projects, may reflect the finding that of the four countries studied only China seems to have succeeded in mobilizing the rural poor. In effect, from an historical vantage point the authors identify a socio-political precondition to the « operational » relevance of their strategy and design criteria, and at that point they claim modestly that in situations where a mass-rooted leadership has *not* come into power, the « Rural Development Strategy » they propose may simply help such a leadership « to form its own vision of the future and accordingly chart its own course of action » (p. 48).

Were the authors to maintain steadily that their Rural Development Strategy is of « immediate operational interest » only for societies with mass-rooted leadership, it would be difficult — and perhaps unnecessary — to criticize their proposals. But in fact the authors quietly abandon their admission that insofar as societies without mass-rooted leadership are concerned they are only contributing to a « vision of the future » and treat as operational their strategy for creating an « ascending spiral of positive interaction between the superstructure and base to generate a process of rural development » (p. 121) :

The strategy of generating the ascending spiral that we see in operational terms... is the following :

1. Separate out the exploited as the target group.
2. Work in the superstructure to activate the cooperative values among the target group.
3. Initiate a cooperative activity by voluntary consensus among the target group or a subset of this group...
4. As the cooperative base makes progress, work in the superstructure to strengthen faith in cooperative effort, to systematize experience... and to advance further the cooperative economic base « quantitatively and qualitatively » (p. 122-3).

At first sight the authors' strategy, replete with level-headed recommendations, lucid arguments, and appeals to such fashionable notions as basic needs, self-reliance, and indigenous technology, is apt to seem quite attractive (2). But whether in a society in which a mass-based leadership is not in power such a strategy will actually bring on mobilization of the rural poor and continuing rural development cannot be established directly, i.e., by trying to evaluate abstractly the specific proposals put forward. A critique or defense of the strategy must be based either on review of actual experiences in the use of the strategy or on analysis of the theory from which the strategy is, implicitly or explicitly, derived.

The macro and micro case studies of actual experiences contained in « Towards a Theory of Rural Development » do not reveal whether the authors' strategy would be effective. Evidence as to the possible efficacy of the strategy where a mass-rooted leadership is not in power would have to be derived from systematic efforts to apply the strategy under such conditions, but even such evidence would have to be interpreted very cautiously (3).

But while the reviews of actual experiences do not support even tentative inferences as to the adequacy of the proposed rural development strategy, it is possible to argue that the theory of rural development upon which the authors' rural development strategy is based is not satisfactory.

In a sense the source of the inadequacy of the theory underlying the authors' strategy is that it operates almost exclusively at the level of appearances, that is, at the level of observable events and conditions and of their apparent, immediate determinants.

To be sure there is nothing wrong with studying intensively the immediate causes of particular events or sequences, and in many situations — as in analysing the causes of growing intra-village disparities — such an approach may be invaluable. However, in most cases the specific phenomena actually observed as well as their apparent causes and consequences are but a part of larger, more complex, less evident and dynamic processes and systems: when they are seen in isolation and from very near by, such phenomena ordinarily cannot be sufficiently well understood to justify drawing conclusions regarding causal relationships and policy needs.

Because they do not look beyond or through immediately evident phenomena to consider the foundations, « laws », and tendencies of the prevailing « system », the authors of « Towards a Theory of Rural Development » leave themselves without a broad perspective on or penetrating analysis of prospective developments in rural areas and are constantly tempted to explain what has happened and what is likely to happen in terms of proximate, apparent causes and to seek solutions at the same level. Unfortunately the efficacy of solutions based on shallow analyses tends to be quite uncertain.

To show how the authors' shallow theoretical perspective has undercut their efforts at analysis and biased the strategy they propose, three of the principle elements of their theory are examined critically below. As is argued there, each of those elements — they concern the nature and function of rural classes, the forms and causes of rural exploitation, and the process of growth in output — is crucial to the authors' (partly implicit) theory of rural development and to the strategy they deduce from it.

1. It is to the authors' credit that they specifically recognize the existence of classes in rural areas, the possibility of changes in class structure, and the ubiquity — and complexity — of class conflict in rural areas. On the other hand the authors often fail to view classes as the products and agents of historical change and as integrally linked to the fundamental economic structures, institutions and ideologies of a society.

That leads the authors to suppose that while a rural social class is apt to float about in historical space, the victim or beneficiary of the breezes of change, it can, by becoming conscious of its own possibilities, learn to set and steer a steady course towards its own chosen destiny.

Such confidence in the capacity of a class to shape its own future helps to explain the conviction with which the authors of « Towards a Theory of Rural Development » argue that the rural poor should

unite and struggle to liberate themselves from the oppression of the rural rich. Such confidence may stimulate efforts to put an end to oppression, but if unjustified, it may engender policies and projects which fail miserably, ultimately weakening rather than strengthening the moral and economic bases of the rural poor.

The authors' confidence in the ability of the rural poor to navigate in historical space — i.e., to unite and to overturn the oppressive system through which they are exploited — seems to be based primarily on two assumptions, neither of which appears to be well founded :

(a) The first assumption is that the primary barrier to the mobilization of the rural poor is the prevalence of inappropriate attitudes. In presenting their strategy, the authors call for working in the superstructure before initiating cooperative activity, and they state « The project, then, starts in the superstructure » (p. 122) (4). Their assessment of the situation in the village of « Sultanpur » is unambiguous :

The objective barriers are formidable but not insuperable if scaled in stages. The major hurdles are subjective — though they originate because of past and present objective conditions (p. 82).

Indeed the authors maintain that in rural areas in general « the poor... have tended to become non-innovative, non-problem-solving and non-experimental » (p. 114). While the authors attribute that to the economic dependency of the poor on the rich, they claim that bringing about changes in such attitudes is critical to initiating rural development. Many analysts would argue to the contrary that the behaviour of the rural poor is in fact inovative and adaptive and that the crucial barrier to rural development lies not in the attitudes of rural populations but in the socio-economic structures and conditions to which their behaviour is of necessity adapted.

Over the past decade many economists have come to believe that the economic behaviour of rural populations does reflect objective conditions as expressed in « relative prices », « rates of return », and the like. In a roughly analogous manner students of socio-political behaviour may come to the conclusion that the attitudes of the rural poor are not the primary barrier to mobilization. If the rural poor have not joined together to overthrow their oppressors, perhaps that is because they have sound reasons for believing that under actual conditions they cannot succeed.

That is not to suggest that the rural poor are entirely helpless before objective conditions which they cannot influence or that there is no interaction between the ideological and material bases of a society. But the authors' readiness to attribute primacy to ideological factors is no more satisfactory than forms of historical materialism which disregard them altogether.

(b) The second assumption underlying the authors' faith in the capacity of the rural poor to determine their own future concerns the « objective » power of the rural poor. The authors suppose in effect that in rural areas the relative objective strengths of the rich and the poor are, so-to-speak, visible to the naked eye. Since it is evident that the rural poor are numerous, that their labour — or its fruit — is

essential to the rural rich, and that nowadays brutal forms of repression are unacceptable, the rural poor are in a position, according to the authors, to resist and ultimately end their oppression by the rural rich.

What the authors overlook is that rural populations, rich and poor alike, are deeply integrated into larger economic and socio-political systems. In many cases the rural rich are in large measure agents for extra-village elites, domestic and foreign, who benefit indirectly from the exploitation of the rural poor.

Extra-village elites will not invariably support the rural rich — who may on occasion be seen as parasitic rivals. Moreover, the extent to which they will back the rural rich and the ways in which they will do so may not be clear in the absence of an overt conflict, as elites, both rural and other, may not display all their forces until they are forced to abandon the pretense of a system based on mutual consent. Accordingly it is difficult to evaluate prospects for successfully combatting the rural rich and improving the material situation of the rural poor, especially as the interrelationships between the village and the national (and international) economy are apt to bear heavily, though possibly indirectly, on the outcome of a struggle between the rural rich and the rural poor.

2. The authors of «Towards a Theory of Rural Development» seem to use the term «exploitation» mainly to express the view that the terms under which the rural rich (and merchants in adjacent towns) exchange goods and services with the rural poor are generally highly unfavourable to the latter (5). In effect, in keeping with their emphasis on observable phenomena, the authors focus on seemingly evident forms of «exploitation» and concentrate their efforts on identifying the agents (land-owners, money-lenders, merchants) and on describing the instruments (usury, sharecropping, graft) on such exploitation.

That leads the authors to ignore indirect or concealed forms of exploitation and the possible beneficiaries thereof, notably urban elites and rich countries; to hold the rural rich largely responsible for the exploitation (and misery) of the rural poor; and to recommend that the rural poor unite in a struggle against the rural rich and undertake to dismantle progressively the instruments and mechanisms by means of which they are oppressed and exploited.

Possibly the rural poor can in some cases successfully combat the oppression of the rural rich and check certain blatant forms of exploitation — e.g. usury. But whether that would mean an end to the exploitation of the rural poor is quite another question: the conspicuous forms of exploitation which attract the attention of the authors are neither the only nor most effective means for exploiting the rural poor.

Indeed the focus in «Towards a Theory of Rural Development» on direct, conspicuous forms of exploitation (which fits better with the authors stress on unity and cooperative values than with their Marxist vocabulary, references to «dependency» and claims to having an historical perspective) invites neglect of such mechanisms for draining the rural economy as monopolistic «cooperative» marketing boards;

various kinds of taxes and subsidies; flows of adult workers from rural to urban areas; and expropriation of land (6). More than a century ago Marx suggested that under capitalism exploitation is concealed, and one may ask whether pursuit of the strategy proposed in « *Towards a Theory of Rural Development* » might ultimately lead more to the development of new, more subtle modes and mechanisms of exploitation than to a significant reduction in the intensity of the exploitation of the rural poor.

3. That the authors of « *Towards a Theory of Rural Development* » place less emphasis on the material bases and objectives of development that is usually the case is not disturbing and surely the importance of raising material levels of living does not justify any policy expected to stimulate production. Still in view of the necessity of improving the living conditions of the poor it is important to consider how increases in output can be obtained.

To the extent that the authors deal with that question, they tend to maintain that by liberating the creative potential of the population, mobilization will lead the way to « economic » development. Apparently they count heavily on collective action, especially for the construction of infrastructure and new institutions, and on the development and utilization of appropriate, indigenous technology.

Without denying the importance of liberating the potential of the population and of developing cooperative activities, one can ask whether that constitutes an adequate « strategy » for the economic development of rural areas. Indeed the authors hardly raise many issues which seem fundamental. For instance, is it necessary to change the market orientation of agriculture or can « market signals » be relied upon to induce responses conducive to development? Is it necessary to promote the complementarity of agriculture and industry, rural areas and urban areas, or can rural areas develop fairly autonomously? Is it desirable to eliminate quickly and completely the rural rich or should a more « pragmatic » approach be adopted (similar to that taken by the mass-rooted leadership in China)?

It often seems that the authors' emphasis on the liberation of the rural poor stems from the implicit presumption that once direct exploitation has come to an end, « economic growth » will proceed more-or-less spontaneously in the manner envisaged by neoclassical economics: savings and investment will expand, improved techniques will be developed and adopted and scarce resources will be used more efficiently...

But such a presumption may fail to take account fully of the « legacy » of the past. The authors' timid proposals for « delinking » the rural economy from the larger economy in which it is inserted may point in the right direction but do not seem sufficient to cope with the problems that are apt to be encountered at three levels:

(a) At the level of the rural area itself the methods of land use, the food habits, the infrastructure, the quality of « human », land, and other resources, and the tools, techniques, and technical know-how inherited from the past are not readily modified, not only because they are interdependent but also because they are tied to the area's relationships with the outside world.

The authors of «Towards a Theory of Rural Development» do not doubt the difficulty of transforming the economic structures and system of a rural area but they seem to believe that the sort of rural mobilization they envisage will be sufficiently dynamic and forceful to overcome such difficulties and to initiate and sustain a process of economic growth, even in situations in which mass-rooted leadership is not in power.

(b) Constraints on rural development are likely to be imposed too by national economic structures, as the incentives and pressures emanating from the national economic institutions and mechanisms associated with «underdevelopment», «dependency», and «peripheral capitalism» are frequently such as to discourage true rural development.

For instance, because of intense pressure to acquire cash, rural populations are often tightly bound to mechanisms (e.g., seasonal migration) which provide cash earnings, and they tend to be highly responsive to cash incentives, even to the point of not giving priority to covering their own needs in staple foods. And problems of food scarcity may be aggravated by political pressure to hold down the price of staple foods in urban areas, low prices reducing incentives to try to produce more.

Weakness of linkages between agriculture and industry may also pose problems. Typically «industrial» activity is oriented towards the production of (luxury) consumer goods and export markets and not towards the production of the inputs needed to increase production and productivity in agriculture.

(c) To the extent that under the current international economic order a rural population is paid poorly for what it «sells» but pays dearly for what it «buys», not only are levels of living held down but possibilities for saving and incentives to invest are severely restricted.

In the last analysis the authors of «Towards a Theory of Rural Development» expect mobilization of the rural poor to initiate and sustain economic growth because they do not consider that the fundamental causes of «underdevelopment» might be built into the foundations of the actual socio-economic structures but confine their attention to apparent, seemingly direct constraints on expansion — e.g., lack of innovative spirit, insufficient investment, inappropriate technology, inefficient use of land. Such constraints can, they believe, be overcome relatively easily once rural mobilization releases the forces of economic expansion that exploitation and oppression have long suppressed.

If the reservations expressed above as to the adequacy of three of the principal elements of the authors' theoretical structure are even partly justified, pursuit of the authors' strategy may not lead to the sort of rural development they envisage. Ultimately the shallowness of the authors' conceptual framework imposes a constraint on their analysis that no amount of empirical research, good will, or careful reasoning can overcome.

Handicapped by a narrow perspective and superficial analysis, the authors of «Towards a Theory of Rural Development» are vulnerable

to mistaking adaptive changes in the prevailing system for transformation of the basic socio-political and economic structures of contemporary rural areas.

Despite the authors' claim to offer radical solutions, their proposals do not seem to indicate how rural populations can escape from their distinctly subordinate roles in national and international economic structures and begin to influence the economic system which bears so strongly on their situation ; indeed the authors' proposals seem to point more in the direction of eliminating certain remnants of pre-capitalist and proto-capitalist structures in rural areas and of increasing the stability and efficiency of rural economic structures within the framework of peripheral capitalism. One must fear that the analysis, strategy, and tactics suggested by the authors of « *Towards a Theory of Rural Development* » do not measure up to their ambitious and commendable objective of pointing the way to rural development.

FOOTNOTES

- (1) The first of the two studies, which in *Development Dialogue* is entitled « The Perspective », originally appeared in 1975 under the title « *Towards a Theory of Rural Development* ». The second study, completed in 1977, appears in *Development Dialogue* under its original title, « *Micro-level Development : Design and Evaluation of Rural Development Projects* ».
- (2) A distinction between the authors' « *Rural Development Strategy* » and their « *ascending spiral* » strategy does not seem crucial to the argument here. Similarly, discussion here of exactly what constitutes « *mobilization* » seems unnecessary.
- (3) The last sentence of « *Towards a Theory of Rural Development* » proposes « *field tests* » of the proposed strategy (p. 133).
- (4) The authors view « *working in the superstructure* » rather narrowly, placing the emphasis on building unity and cooperative values rather than on spreading a comprehensive ideology.
- (5) The authors do provide a broad definition of exploitation : « *appropriation of a part of the product of another's labour by exercising social, political, or economic bargaining power rather than sharing the product by agreement as to what constitutes a fair share in the product for each* » (p. 114). However, the « *fair share* » criterion is at best rather nebulous, and the authors do not refer back to their own definition when considering specific instances of exploitation.
- (6) The authors tend to interpret « *dependency* » very literally. Thus they refer to the dependency of landless agricultural workers on land-owners (p. 114) but ignore the role of « *dependency* » in perpetuating « *underdevelopment* ».

FOCUS ON RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTES PLEINS FEUX SUR LES INSTITUTS DE RECHERCHE ET DE FORMATION

DEVELOPMENT STUDIES AND RESEARCH CENTRE FACULTY OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF KHARTOUM

The University's contribution to over-all national development has always been central to its role as a leading national institution. The different University bodies — and the Faculty of Economic and Social Studies in particular — participated in several ways in the study of many of the problems facing the Sudanese Society.

Recently, however, — and mainly as a result of the active acceleration of the national development programmes — it has been increasingly recognized that the University's efforts in this direction should be rationalized and further intensified. This has meant, in particular, a closer association between the University and the on-going development programmes.

The « Development Studies and Research Centre » could become an effective vehicle for the achievement of this desirable goal. The aim of the DSRC is to offer a mission-oriented interdisciplinary programme of training, research, publications and consultation in the field of development studies.

The Centre will lay particular emphasis in its programme on the identification and solution of high-priority issues of socio-economic development with view to leaving, whenever possible, direct impact on policy making and policy implementation.

1. - Training

The Centre will offer Post-graduate diplomas and shall organize workshops, seminars and courses designed to serve government officials with various backgrounds. (The « Diploma in Development Studies » will be the first in its series of offerings).

The aim behind this training programme is to further strengthen the theoretical and practical knowledge of the participants in the interdisciplinary field of Development studies with view to improving their decision-making and executive capabilities.

University lecturers, policy-makers as well as staff of international organizations are expected to contribute to the training programme.

II. - Research

The training programme will be supplemented by a research programme that will concentrate on important issues of socio-economic development. The DSRC could effectively formulate, organize and help to execute the research programme and disseminate its results — both locally and abroad — through publications, conferences, public lectures etc.

Research activities will be further aided through the establishment of the « Documentation Unit » which will act as a « clearing-house » for development literature from national and international sources.

III. - Consultation

The Centre shall perform, as well, consultative services in areas relevant to its field of activity. Consultation shall be restricted, however, to public, regional and international organizations.

Aside from aforementioned activities, it is hoped that the Centre will become an effective Forum where University academicians and policy makers will get together to exchange views on appropriate policies and programmes and help find solutions for many of the pressing problems of socio-economic development.

IV. - Statute

In accordance with section 15 (2) of the University of Khartoum Act 1973 as amended in 1975, the Council of the University hereby makes the following statute :

A. - Title and Commencement

1) This statute may be cited as « Statute N° 1 » of the Development Studies and Research Centre and shall come into force on signature by the Chairman of the Council.

B. - Creation of the Development Studies and Research Centre

1) There is hereby constituted in the University of Khartoum a Development Studies and Research Centre.

2) The Development Studies and Research Centre shall function as a training, teaching research and consultation unit within the Faculty of Economic and Social Studies.

C. - Objects of the Centre

The objects of the Centre shall be as follows :

- 1) To encourage, promote and co-ordinate interdisciplinary research and teaching in development studies.

- 2) To offer Post-graduate degrees and diplomas in development studies subject to the approval of Faculty Board & Senate.
- 3) To conduct courses, seminars, public lectures, workshops and conferences on problems of socio-economic development, development planning and methodology of research on development studies.
- 4) To follow up research work on development studies through periodical reports on publications, dissemination and documentation .
- 5) To advise on issues, schemes and policies for development referred to the Centre by government departments and ministrues and the other economic sectors.
- 6) To act as a liaison between Faculty Researchers and other units of the University and the government and other bodies.
- 7) To co-operate with all persons, institution and other bodies interested in its field of specialization and to exchange publications and establish regular contacts with the same whenever that is deemed desirable.
- 8) To do all things that may be necessary for or incidental to the above objects.

D. - The Centre Board Constitution and Functions

The Centre shall be governed by a Board which shall be constituted as follows :

- 1) The Dean of Faculty of Economic and Social Studies : Chairman
- 2) The Director of the Centre : Secretary
- 3) All Heads of Departments in the Faculty of Economic and Social Studies
- 4) One Member to represent the teaching staff of the Centre.
- 5) One member to represent the Economics and Social Research Council.
- 6) Three members to represent the Ministry of Finance, Planning & National Economy
- 7) One member to represent the Institute of African and Asian Studies.
- 8) One member to represent the Ministry of Transport.
- 9) One member to represent the Ministry of Agriculture, Food & Natural Resources.
- 10) One member to represent the Graduate College
- 11) One member from each of the following Faculties : Medecine, Agriculture, Venerinary Science and Engineering.
- 12) One member to represent the Ministry of Industry.

The Centre Board shall have the following functions :

- 1) To determine the general policy of the Centre and approve its plans.

- 2) To advise the Faculty Board on the financing of the activities of the Centre and allocate funds put at its disposal by the Faculty Board.
- 3) To acquire and allocate research grants from sources outside the University.
- 4) To recommend to the Faculty Board such courses as may lead to Diplomas and Higher Degrees in Development Studies and other courses offered by the Centre.
- g) To review periodically the research and other academic activities of the Centre and to report thereon to the Faculty Board.
- 6) To determine the amount of fees to be paid for work done by the Centre.
- 7) To perform such other functions as may be assigned to it by the Faculty Board.

E. - The Director

There shall be a Director of the Centre who shall be appointed by the Vice-Chancellor in consultation with the Dean of the Faculty of Economic and Social Studies and who shall :

- 1) Be in general academic and administrative charge of the Centre and the execution of its policy subject to the directives of the Centre Board.
- 2) To Be generally responsible to the Centre Board for the fulfilment of the objects of the Centre.
- 3) Be responsible for the preparation of the annual budget and the development plans of the Centre Board.
- 4) To Be responsible for the editing of the publications of the Centre.
- 5) To Ensure that funds allotted for research are spent on projects approved by the Centre.
- 6) To Carry out any other functions assigned to him by the Centre Board.

F. - Finance of the Centre

The activities of the Centre shall, subject to the advise of the Centre Board, be financed out of income received from the following sources :

- 1) University of Khartoum.
- 2) Grants and donations.
- 3) Fees paid for work carried out by the Centre.
- 4) Any possible return from activities carried out by the Centre.

Contact address : P.O. Box 321
KHARTOUM
S U D A N

CENTRE DE RECHERCHES INTERDISCIPLINAIRES POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DE L'ÉDUCATION

(C. R. I. D. E.)

Université Nationale du Zaïre - Kisangani - ZAIRE

I. - Création et objectif

Le CRIDE a été créé en mars 1972 au sein du Campus de Kangani. Il fonctionne auprès de la Faculté des Sciences de l'Éducation dont il est le principal organe de recherche.

C'est en avril 1972 que le CRIDE a été reconnu par la Commission de recherches et publications scientifiques de l'UNAZA.

Le CRIDE, Centre de Recherches Interdisciplinaires pour le Développement de l'Éducation, a pour but principal de préparer, de coordonner et de réaliser toutes recherches concernant la réforme et le développement de l'Éducation au Zaïre, ainsi que d'autres recherches relevant du domaine de la psychologie et de la pédagogie et des études interdisciplinaires consacrées aux problèmes de l'éducation au Zaïre. Le CRIDE entend également, en tant que principal centre de recherches de la région du Haut-Zaïre, fournir une base et une collaboration à tous ceux qui ont pour objectif d'améliorer la connaissance de la région et de son chef-lieu dans tous les domaines.

II. - Organisation et personnel du CRIDE

La structure et l'organisation du CRIDE sont fonction des objectifs qu'il poursuit. Il se compose de 4 services et d'un cellule administrative :

- La direction et la coordination des recherches collectives et individuelles.
- L'organisation du programme des cours de 3e cycle réservés aux assistants et doctorants.
- La bibliothèque et la documentation.
- Le service des publications et d'information.
- La cellule administrative.

Chaque service est placé sous la responsabilité d'un chef de service choisi parmi le personnel permanent ou à temps partiel du CRIDE.

Le CRIDE est dirigé par un Directeur assisté par des directeurs de recherches. Ensemble avec le secrétaire administratif, ils constituent le Comité de gestion du CRIDE. Le Conseil Scientifique restreint du CRIDE comprend les membres du Comité de gestion et du bureau facultaire de la Faculté des Sciences de l'Éducation.

Le Conseil Scientifique élargi comprend, outre les membres du Conseil restreint, des personnalités extérieures, notamment des représentants d'autres institutions académiques et scientifiques de l'UNAZA et des délégués des pouvoirs publics intéressés à l'Education (Département de l'Education nationale, Département du Plan).

Le Conseil Scientifique définit la politique scientifique du CRIDE et est chargé de préparer le programme de recherches nécessaires au développement de l'Education au Zaïre.

III. - Fonctions et activités du CRIDE

Quatre fonctions ont été assignées au CRIDE, en rapport avec ses statuts et les objectifs qui lui furent confiés par les autorités académiques : recherche, formation des doctorants et chercheurs, bibliothèques, documentation et bibliographie, publications.

A. - Recherches

La fonction de recherche du CRIDE comporte deux volets : un programme de recherches collectives à caractère appliqué ayant pour objet spécifique la réforme et le développement de l'Education au Zaïre à tous ses niveaux, et une série de projets de recherches dans le domaine de la psychologie et de la pédagogie, conçus par des professeurs et des chercheurs de la Faculté des Sciences de l'Education en fonction de leurs orientations personnelles et des besoins du pays.

Le CRIDE donne priorité aux recherches collectives en relation directe avec le développement de l'éducation et consacre la plus grande partie de ses ressources matérielles et humaines dans cette direction. Il soutient également dans la mesure de ses moyens les projets individuels répondant à cette politique.

Ce choix est fondé sur l'analyse du problème de l'Education au Zaïre et sur les directives données par le Chef de l'Etat dans son discours du 30 novembre 1973. Il correspond également au souhait exprimé à plusieurs reprises par les autorités du Département du Plan.

Le programme des recherches collectives et les projets individuels sont décrits à la section IV.

B. - Formation

Fonctionnant auprès de la Faculté des Sciences de l'Education, le CRIDE a également pour rôle de contribuer à la formation des étudiants et du personnel académique et scientifique de celle-ci :

La fonction de formation est remplie de plusieurs manières :

- 1°) En associant les chercheurs de la Faculté (étudiants, assistants, professeurs) à la réalisation du programme de recherches collectives.
- 2°) En organisant, pour les assistants et les doctorants, le programme de séminaires du 3^e cycle. Celui-ci est décrit à la section V.

- 3°) En prenant en charge la direction de mémoires et de thèses rentrant dans son programme de recherches.
- 4°) En organisant des colloques et en faisant participer ses membres à des colloques ou conférences se tenant en dehors de Kisangani.

Le CRIDE a organisé en juillet 1972 un colloque en vue de définir ses fonctions et son programme de recherches, et en décembre 1974, un colloque sur l'interdisciplinarité. Il a participé au colloque sur la technologie éducative organisé en avril 1975 conjointement par la Faculté de l'Éducation et par le CRIDE à Kisangani. Il a délégué deux de ses assistants au colloque sur l'utilisation de l'ordinateur dans les sciences sociales qui eut lieu en décembre 1975 à Ifé (Nigéria). Il a ensuite organisé en mars 1976 des journées d'études sur le même thème à Florida State University, Tallahassee (USA) à l'intention de ses doctorants qui étudient depuis 1975. Un quatrième colloque s'est tenu à Kisangani en juin 1977 ayant pour objet la situation de l'UNAZA, ses problèmes et ses perspectives d'avenir.

C. - Bibliothèque, Documentation et Bibliographie

La bibliothèque du CRIDE est ouverte aux professeurs et assistants de la Faculté et du CRIDE. Elle compte depuis 1973 une cinquantaine de périodiques tenus à jours et 3.000 ouvrages. Bien que spécialisée dans les problèmes de l'Éducation, dans les méthodes de recherches en sciences et dans les disciplines psychologique et pédagogique, elle fait une large place en raison du caractère interdisciplinaire du CRIDE, à l'anthropologie, à la sociologie, à la science politique, aux ouvrages sur l'Afrique.

Elle a ouvert une section documentation consacrée aux problèmes de l'Éducation au Zaïre et possède des séries de microfilms à ce sujet. Elle accueille tout dépôt de documents officiels ou privés, toutes brochures ou périodiques relatifs à l'Éducation au Zaïre et en Afrique.

La section documentation de la bibliothèque a l'ambition de devenir peu à peu une banque de données en ce qui concerne les statistiques et l'information sur l'Éducation au Zaïre et en Afrique. Elle entend dans cette perspective développer ses relations avec le Département de l'Éducation à Kinshasa et avec les organisations internationales spécialisées dans ce domaine.

La bibliothèque a commencé en 1977 un service d'analyse bibliographique et d'indexation des documents.

Le champ couvert est celui de l'Éducation au Zaïre. Il comprend tout ce qui est publié au Zaïre concernant l'éducation et tout ce qui est publié à l'étranger sur l'éducation au Zaïre.

Le CRIDE a adopté une méthode d'analyse et d'indexation et un thesaurus des mots descripteurs qui répond aux normes de la standardisation internationale recommandée par l'UNESCO et les autres organisations internationales. Il s'inspire notamment des expériences en cours de l'INIS pour des réalisations du C.D.A. (Centre de Documentation Agricole) de Kinshasa.

Il compte utiliser le Thesaurus EUDISED préparé par le professeur J. VIET de la maison des sciences de l'homme durant les années 1972-1973, tout en l'adaptant aux réalités zaïroises et africaines.

Le projet dans une première phase couvre toutes les publications parues après le 1^{er} janvier 1977. Il s'étendra plus tard aux années antérieures.

Chaque texte retenu comme significatif fera l'objet d'une fiche contenant toutes les références bibliographiques et un résumé utilisant les mots descripteurs du Thesaurus EUDISED.

Les fiches seront publiées par le CRIDE deux fois par an et pourront être utilisées comme telles, sans recours à un ordinateur. Il est cependant prévu qu'elles pourront être traitées par ordinateur, afin de rentrer dans un programme plus global couvrant par exemple toutes les publications sur le Zaïre, ou toutes celles relatives à l'Education dans l'Afrique et dans le monde. Ainsi le CRIDE souhaite apporter sa contribution à une bibliographie générale du Zaïre qui serait étendue à tous les domaines de la connaissance.

D. - *Publications*

De 1972 à 1975 le CRIDE a assuré la coordination de la rédaction, la publication et la diffusion de la Revue Zaïroise de Psychologie et de Pédagogie dont l'impression et l'édition étaient confiées aux Presses Universitaires du Zaïre. Six volumes ont déjà paru. Depuis juin 1975 le dernier numéro de la Revue est à l'impression aux P.U.Z. à Kinshasa et deux numéros sont préparés sous forme de manuscrits prêts à paraître.

Devant la carence des P.U.Z. et l'inutilité de poursuivre la préparation d'une revue dont les manuscrits ne sont pas édités, le CRIDE a décidé de concentrer ses efforts sur la publication de Cahiers ronéotypés et d'en accélérer la parution.

1. - *Les Cahiers du CRIDE*

Pour remplir sa fonction de publication, le CRIDE édite depuis 1974, sous sa responsabilité, des cahiers renéotypés à couverture imprimée. Ces cahiers visent d'abord à communiquer l'état d'avancement des projets et les résultats des recherches entreprises par le CRIDE ou rentrant dans son programme, mais également à publier des articles et travaux à caractère scientifique rentrant dans le cadre de sa fonction interdisciplinaire et de sa localisation au chef-lieu du Haut-Zaïre.

Treize cahiers sont sortis jusqu'à présent, ordonnés en 7 séries à savoir :

- Série I : résultats de recherches,
- » II : notes de méthodologie et de pédagogie,
- » III : programmes, objets, rapports du CRIDE,
- » IV : bibliographie et recensions,
- » V : documents et statistiques,

- » VI : essais critiques et théoriques en rapport avec l'éducation,
- » VII : connaissances de Kisangani.

2. - *Ouvrages et brochures*

Le CRIDE a publié aux P.U.Z. un ouvrage intitulé :

KISANGANI 1876-1976, Histoire d'une ville. Il s'agit du tome I consacré à la population.

Le tome II consacré à l'histoire politique de la ville sortira de presse en décembre 1977 et le tome III décrivant l'histoire économique en juin 1978.

3. - *Bulletin d'informations*

Le CRIDE publie de manière irrégulière et occasionnelle un bulletin d'informations décrivant ses activités dans tel ou tel domaine de son fonctionnement : acquisitions et libraires, activités de la bibliothèque, etc...

IV. - Programme des recherches

Cinq projets de recherches collectives sont actuellement en cours au CRIDE. Ils répondent tous aux trois critères qui définissent la politique de recherche du CRIDE :

- 1) - Une méthodologie interdisciplinaire ;
- 2) - Une organisation du travail en équipe ;
- 3) - Une finalité pratique répondant aux exigences d'une réforme de l'enseignement au Zaïre.

1. - *L'éducation pratique en milieu rural*

— Directeur du projet : ABEMBA Balaimu.

— Chercheurs : DINZENZA, KIMPESA, MBWAKA, TSAKA, NGAY.

— Résumé du projet : Analyse des conditions et des facteurs sociologiques, économiques et pédagogiques favorables à la transformation d'une collectivité rurale en un milieu éducatif où chaque composante de la population a une fonction éducative dans un plan d'ensemble de développement.

— But du projet : formuler une méthode d'enseignement rural qui réponde à la fois aux exigences du développement économique et des forces productives et aux aspirations des masses rurales à une promotion collective et individuelle.

2. - *Analyse sociologique des étudiants de l'UNAZA*

— Directeurs du projet : KABAMBI NTANDA, et B. VERHAEGEN.

— Chercheurs : SANO, PUATI, KASONGO, BONGELI, NSHAMAMBA, MBAYA, BUMBA, LUSHIKU, ODIA, MAROYI, MAZONO, BENE.

— **Résumé du projet :** Analyse sociologique des conditions de vie, des aspirations et des attitudes des étudiants entrants et finalistes de l'UNAZA. La recherche est centrée sur l'étudiant pendant ses études universitaires. Débutée en janvier 1975 elle en est cette année à sa troisième enquête. Les résultats des deux premières sont codés et mécanographiés. L'analyse est en cours. Elle vise à établir les relations entre d'une part les déterminants sociaux, culturels et économiques de l'étudiant et ses conditions de vie et d'étude et d'autre part, ses aspirations, attitudes et opinions, ainsi que ses chances de réussite et ses choix professionnels.

— **But du projet :** fournir les matériaux pour une réforme de l'enseignement supérieur qui tienne compte en permanence des réactions et des aspirations des étudiants.

3. - Problèmes et objectifs de l'évaluation en Education

— **Directeurs du projet :** BAMWISHO MIHIA et TUTAZIBWA IYEZE.

— **Chercheurs :** KATAKO, EMPUNDEA.

— **Résumé du projet :** La recherche à évaluer une situation d'enseignement à un stade initial, puis à mesurer l'impact de réformes et d'innovations dans les programmes, la pédagogie et le système de contrôle des connaissances. L'évaluation comporte des aspects pédagogiques, psychologiques, économiques et sociologiques. Elle est donc conçue d'une manière interdisciplinaire et fondée sur l'utilisation de deux techniques de recherche : l'enquête par questionnaires et interviews et les tests de connaissances scolaires.

— **But du projet :** mettre au point une méthode d'évaluation adaptée à la situation du Zaïre et à la disposition des planifications du Département de l'Education Nationale.

4. - Utilisation de la technologie éducative en vue de la formation des enseignants zairois

— **Directeur du projet :** LUMEKA lua YANSENGA.

— **Chercheurs :** YANGOY, MUKENDI wa MPOYI, NGOY MWEPU, MAKURU.

— **Résumé du projet :** Mettre au point un système de formation qui permette de produire un nouveau type d'enseignement. Ce système est basé sur l'utilisation systématique et intensive de la télévision en circuit fermé tant pendant la formation que lors du recyclage de l'enseignement.

— **But du projet :** préparer les conditions d'un enseignement télévisuel au Zaïre.

5. - Sociologie de l'enseignement secondaire au Zaïre

— **Directeur du projet :** MANDA KIZABI.

— **Chercheurs :** MUKENI BEYA, KABILA NGOY, NGOY MWEPU, MUKENDI wa META.

— Résumé du projet : Dans sa phase actuelle le projet est complémentaire à l'analyse sociologique de l'UNAZA. Il vise à connaître les déterminants sociaux, les conditions objectives de vie, les attitudes et les aspirations des étudiants finalistes du secondaire tant à Kisangani, que dans les autres régions du Zaïre, et plus particulièrement la représentation qu'ils se font de l'enseignement supérieur à l'UNAZA. Le projet s'élargira à d'autres aspects et problèmes de l'enseignement secondaire à partir d'octobre 1977.

— But du projet : adapter l'enseignement secondaire à sa double finalité de préparation à l'université et d'entrée dans la vie professionnelle.

V. - Le programme d'enseignement du 3^e cycle

L'enseignement du 3^e cycle organisé par le CRIDE s'adresse aux assistants et chefs de travaux de la Faculté des Sciences de l'Éducation, du CRIDE et de l'I.S.P., qui ont au moins un an d'ancienneté.

Le programme a été approuvé par les autorités académiques en 1974 et a été publié dans le Cahier du CRIDE, n° 1, 1974, pp. 35-38. Tant les cours de nature théorique que ceux initiant pratiquement à la recherche, se donnent sous forme de séminaire et impliquent la participation active des assistants.

Le programme a entre autres pour objectifs d'assurer la formation des assistants pédagogiques ou psychologiques vers d'autres disciplines et de les mettre en contact avec des professeurs et chercheurs d'autres facultés et des autres campus. C'est la raison pour laquelle le CRIDE a invité en 1977 deux professeurs de Kinshasa et de Lubumbashi.

Les cours suivants ont été donnés au cours des années académiques 1975-1976 et 1976-1977 :

- Introduction à la méthode scientifique : théorie et concepts (C1).
- Le rôle de l'éducation dans le développement économique et social (C3).
- Initiation pratique à la recherche (C4).
- Problèmes théoriques et pratiques en sociologie de l'éducation (SEE 1).
- Problèmes théoriques et pratiques en économie de l'éducation (SEE 2).
- Application de l'anthropologie à l'Éducation (SE 3).
- Problèmes théoriques et pratiques en planification de l'éducation (SEE 4).
- Introduction à la théorie du matérialisme dialectique (C1)..

Adresse de contact :

C.R.I.D.E.
B.P. 1386,
Kisangani
ZAIRE

africa development

A Quarterly Journal
published
by the Council
for the Development of
Economic and Social
Research in Africa

Une Revue Trimestrielle
publiée
par le Conseil
pour le Développement de
la Recherche Economique
et Sociale en Afrique

C. O. D. E. S. R. I. A.

**B. P. 3 3 0 4 - D A K A R
S É N É G A L**

Annual Subscription

Abonnement Annuel

INSTITUTIONS 15 US-\$/75 FF

INDIVIDUALS 12 US-\$/60 FF

STUDENTS/ETUDIANTS .. 7 US-\$/35 FF

Each issue/Le numéro 3.50 US-\$/17.50 FF

Subscriptions should be sent to :

Envoyer les demandes
d'abonnement à :

The Editor
Africa Development
B.P. 3304
DAKAR (Sénégal)



Enclose cheque or transfer to :

Envoyer un chèque ou faire
un virement bancaire à :

CODESRIA, Cpte. ET 900 795,
Banque Internationale pour
le Commerce et l'Industrie
2, Avenue Roume
DAKAR (Sénégal)

Published by Codesria Dakar, and printed by G.I.A.

9, Rue Thiers, DAKAR — B.P. 51



ARTICLES

P. Anyang Nyong'o

Liberals Models of Capitalist Development in Africa
Ivory Coast

S. Bedrani

La Technologie Agricole en Algérie

A. Chilivumbo

On Rural Development: A Note on Malawi's Programmes
of Development for Exploitation

H. Galbourne

Some Aspects of Ideological Functions in the Development
of the Post-Colonial State in Tanzania

BOOK REVIEWS

REVUE DES LIVRES

B. Founou-Tchigoua

Makhtar Diouf – Echange Inégal
et Ordre Economique Interna-
tional

J.R. Herzoc

Towards a theory of Rural
Development

**FOCUS ON RESEARCH AND
TRAINING INSTITUTES**

**PLEINS FEUX SUR LES INS-
TITUTS DE RECHERCHE ET
DE FORMATION**