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Editorial Board

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Guide to Contributors

Contributions are invited from all over the world, and especially from African (and non-African) scholars working in African universities and research institutes. Articles are accepted in both English and French, and although CODESRIA can arrange for translation where necessary, it would be appreciated if authors could make their own arrangements for this. The average length suggested for an article is 4,000 to 6,000 words, with occasional exceptions of up to 10,000 words. Notes on African universities, research institutes, research projects, and reports on recent conferences or meetings are also welcome. These will be published in CODESRIA's bi-monthly *Newsletter*.

Each contributor will receive a copy of the number in which his article appears together with 15 offprints of the article free of charge. Contributors to *Africa Development* express their own opinions, which should not be interpreted as being the official view of CODESRIA or of any institution/organization with which the authors may be connected. All articles for consideration should be typed in double spacing, preferably on quarto-size sheets, and on one side of the paper only. Any footnotes should be numbered consecutively and placed at the end of the article. Copyright of accepted articles will be vested with CODESRIA.

All correspondence and contributions should be addressed to:

The Editor, *Africa Development*, CODESRIA, B.P. 3304, Dakar, Senegal.

Editorial

This is the first, and hopefully the only, editorial that will appear in this journal. However, since this is the first issue, a statement about the objectives of the journal and the sponsoring organization is both necessary and appropriate.

Africa Development is a journal of the Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA)*. The main purpose of the journal is to provide a forum for African (and non-African) scholars to critically analyse the problems emanating from the continuous process of underdevelopment, past and present, taking place in Africa.

That underdevelopment of the African continent is a long-standing historical process that began *even before the advent of formal colonialism*, is now grudgingly accepted even by conservative scholars. The so-called Africanists had, until recently, presented us with a simplistic and factually incorrect view of the African past as being suspended in a 'traditional timelessness' where, since time immemorial, the varied social systems of African societies existed in a perfect, almost mechanical, harmony. At one point, European Africanists were arrogantly stating that African societies had no history (before colonization) because such societies did not possess a script with which to record events. (And in any case, since such societies were structurally harmonious and unchanging, i.e. not developing, there were no important events and processes worth recording! So even if some societies had an alphabet, this would have been used mainly to record marriage ceremonies, and to draw up genealogies!) This extreme, unscientific view has now of course been abandoned. It has been replaced by a more sophisticated school which holds that each African society in fact had its particular and glorious history. This African history, however, consists of tribal migration, tribal warfare and the building up of political institutions, from kinship to kingship.

Tribal historians now abound in Africa, and needless to say the majority are Africans. This school of history is obviously an advance from the earlier ahistorical school. The historical process is immensely complex in any continent and there is an obvious need to record and explain past migrations as well as the evolution of political institutions. But this is only one aspect of Africa's historical development and, as some would argue, it is not the critical and fundamental aspect of Africa's history. Thus over-emphasis on tribal histories, however brilliant some of the individual studies may be, is a form of mystification and a diversion from the proper understanding of Africa's real history.

Path-breaking historical studies have recently been made and these are having a profound effect on our understanding of Africa's past. Removing such false and unscientific conceptual blinkers as 'traditional', 'unchanging', 'harmonious system', these studies have looked at Africa's past in terms of technological and economic systems that were being developed in different areas; how such developments (or the lack of them) were affecting specific social formations, the creation of surplus, the emergence of internal trade and inter-African (long distance) trade, and so on. In other words, Africa, like any other continent, was undergoing a process of technological, economic and social development, within specific historical epochs. Some have indeed persuasively argued that Africa's own indigenous independent technological and economic development was destroyed and distorted some centuries ago by the intervention of Europe in Africa. This intervention in the name of 'trade' and over a period of some two or three centuries, laid the groundwork for the formal colonization of Africa by European powers.

Research on Africa's past is now being conducted by both the 'tribal history' school and, if I may call it this, the 'mode of production' school. Research findings by either school which are capable

*CODESRIA activities are described in its brochure, *Basic Information*, which is available on request. For more information, please write to: Executive Secretary, CODESRIA, B.P. 3304, Dakar, Senegal.

of giving us a better understanding of the process of development and underdevelopment of Africa in the past will be welcomed. It is indeed part of CODESRIA's objectives to encourage such research. We would, however, insist that authors who submit papers to this journal clearly state their assumptions or theoretical framework of reference.

If it is necessary and useful to research the pre-colonial past of Africa in order to have a proper historical perspective of the process of development and underdevelopment, it is in our opinion even more essential to carry out detailed research of Africa's immediate colonial past. Indeed the immediate colonial past is encapsulated in the present—this is often referred to as the colonial heritage—and any meaningful understanding of the present so-called development problems must therefore relate to this immediate past.

The literature on the colonial period (by both Africans and non-Africans) is considerable and often brilliant in its ethnographic details. It is however not too harsh a judgement to say that most of the literature tells us more about the writers than the fundamental nature of the colonial reality (with of course a few noble exceptions). A careful examination of the writings of anthropologists, sociologists, economists, political scientists, and so on, shows that they are all operating within the ubiquitous school of functionalism. Partly because of this and partly because of the researchers' ideological position, most of the literature carefully avoids the fundamental issues of colonial oppression and exploitation, and the resultant economic and social structures that were being deliberately developed by the colonial powers in the colonies. As a result, a number of so-called theories were propounded. The anthropologists and sociologists propounded a series of 'theories' known as 'culture contact', 'social change', 'modernization'. Some of the writing belonging to these schools had interesting insights and considerable detail on the 'borrowing' by Africans of the European's material culture, on the changing kinship and kingship rules of various African societies, on how successfully or unsuccessfully the emerging African élite was modelling itself on its metropolitan counterpart, etc. The assumption behind the stories was that what was happening in Africa was good, and in its own African way this was progress and social development. The economists also told a similar rosy story using, as they say, 'hard facts'. Metropolitan powers had invested considerable capital in the colonies—in laying down physical infra-structure, in starting industries, in opening up plantations and cash crop farming by Africans—all this investment, so it was argued, was economic development and for the benefit of the Africans! Most of the social scientists however, failed to point out the three fundamental aspects of the colonial situation, namely the distorted nature of the colonial economy, the considerable return to the metropolitan power from its so-called 'investment', and the concomitant distorted social structure that was being deliberately created by the colonial state. Thus, the 'social change-modernization' literature on African societies which is still predominant even today (the 'culture contact' school, originating from the US became dysfunctional and was dropped towards the end of the colonial period), was basically diversionary and performed the function of mystification. Such literature had very little scientific value in terms of explaining the fundamental process of underdevelopment that has taken place in Africa during the first half of this century.

And what of the last fifteen years since independence? African studies programmes have mushroomed during the 1960s in North America and Europe. In Africa itself, institutes of African studies and of development studies also sprang up all over the place. Research projects, carried out by individuals or by teams originating from North America and Europe or from within Africa itself, have vastly increased in number. All conceivable aspects of African societies—'traditional' and 'modern'—are being studied. Research projects on topics as varied as the 'role of witchcraft as an obstacle to economic development', 'traditional beliefs and family size', 'strategies for industrial development' or 'the role of foreign capital in economic development', are now being churned out in large numbers from African universities themselves as well as from outside. As a result, the quantity of the so-called 'development' literature on Africa has, over the past fifteen years, vastly increased. The sheer volume of literature, however, has not proved to be any more enlightening on the fundamental nature of the development process since the 1960s.

Considerations of space do not allow us to make more than a cursory examination of the epistemology of that literature. Nevertheless, a few very brief comments must be made even at the risk of oversimplification. The quality of some of that literature has been very low even when measured by the minimal standard of 'information gathering'. On the other hand, part of it has been good in terms of the insight it has given us on micro details of the social life of particular groups. On the whole, however, there have been very few intelligent analyses of the basic nature of the economic structures of African countries, and very little on the determining role of the international context in African economies. There is hardly any information and no research on the critical area of ownership of economic undertakings (in industry, commerce and agriculture) and of real estate; no research showing the continuity of the colonial economies to the post-independence neo-colonial societies. Indeed one of the most notable gaps in the so-called development literature has been the lack of research on the social and class structure of African countries. The class structure that was being deliberately created during the colonial period, its continuation, expansion and consolidation over the past fifteen years, has not been researched into and examined scientifically. The omissions in this literature clearly indicate the political nature of the research organizations and the researchers themselves. There are, of course, striking exceptions to this characterization. There have been some African and non-African scholars who have consistently and often brilliantly drawn attention to the basic and central issues concerning Africa's development processes. However, these exceptions prove the rule. Indeed the literature from these exceptional researchers has often been very difficult to come by and was rarely available in African universities, libraries or bookshops.

If we are to understand the process of Africa's development, there are a number of important areas which need thorough and scientific analysis. Firstly, Africa's position in the international economic order and more particularly, a deeper analysis of a specific country's external economic relations and their implications in the development process. All the general issues discussed in terms of the international level—raw materials, transfer of technology, etc.—need to be studied and related to the contexts of specific countries. Secondly, strategies for development vary and the differences are always related to the overall social system. In a recent speech* President Nyerere of Tanzania, pointed out that African countries are faced with *only two* alternative paths of development; that of capitalist or of socialist development. Though Nyerere's preference is for the socialist path, he correctly points out that the objectives, strategies and the problems to be encountered will depend very much on which path is chosen by a given country. The contrast of strategies and so-called implementation problems is very sharp between African countries developing within a capitalist or socialist framework. The specificity of each type of development within the African context must be studied thoroughly in all its ramifications and in all sectors of society. For example, little scientific study has been made of the objectives, strategies and problems of rural development in, say, Guinea compared with those of Ivory Coast. Thirdly, it is now absolutely necessary to carry out a serious analysis of the class structure and its dynamics in African countries. This is not to minimize the contribution of recent debate on the theoretical aspects of classes in Africa. It is simply to say that focusing on definitional problems of classes misses the main point of relating so-called development to the class structure (however 'embryonic' or 'proto' the classes may be). It also misses the even more important issue of class alliances internally and externally, as well as the mechanism whereby such alliances are maintained, and the mechanism for controlling the 'commanding institutions' in society through state machinery. All these are aspects of the social structures of African societies, whatever the label of the social system—socialist or capitalist. At present, there is very little serious research on these aspects of African societies. We hope more will be forthcoming.

*J.K. Nyerere, 'The Rational Choice', in *Freedom and Development*, O.U.P., Dar es Salaam, 1973, pp. 379–390.

The list of important but neglected areas of research in Africa is long. The main purpose of this journal is to draw attention to this and to provide a forum for African (and non-African) scholars to debate on important issues as well as to make known the findings of their researches. In this way, we hope to encourage more relevant and policy-oriented research within an African perspective. The ultimate objective is to provide an opportunity for African scholars to contribute to the general development of the continent through vigorous discussion of existing development strategies, problems and alternatives. I am an optimist and therefore am sure that this challenge will be taken up by African social scientists.

The fourth meeting of UNCTAD will take place in Africa (Nairobi, Kenya) in May 1976. At that meeting the problems of the present international economic order will be discussed in detail and measures for changing it to a new order, an order that will help Third World countries to develop, will also be discussed and hopefully adopted. Because the first issue of *Africa Development* is coming out in May, we thought it appropriate to focus on the problem of the new international economic order and Africa's role within it. We hope that future issues of the journal will focus on other equally important themes relating to Africa's development.

In this issue we also have articles on Eastern and Southern Africa discussing the findings of specific research projects. These are good examples of the kind of scientific article based on solid research that we look forward to publishing. Another and equally important aspect of the journal is that of information on African research institutes. In this issue we have a description of the history and aims of two important institutes, one Francophone and one Anglophone, from West and East Africa respectively. In this way we hope to bridge, in however small a way, the linguistic and regional gaps in our continent even if it is only at the level of information. Thus, we hope other research institutes will respond and send us articles of a similar nature.

We hope in the near future to publish this journal in both English and French. We have started with one language because our resources are at the moment limited. Nevertheless, we accept articles in both languages.

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Editor and Executive Secretary, CODESRIA

UNCTAD IV and the New International Economic Order*

Samir Amin

For the past two years it has become a 'tradition' for the United Nations General Assembly to hold an extraordinary session in addition to its regular one, a practice imposed by the non-aligned members of the Group of 77. Efforts are now being made to turn these extraordinary sessions into a permanent feature of the General Assembly, for they provide a forum where the Third World can express its views. It was during these two extraordinary sessions that the themes and objectives of a new international economic order were defined and adopted through resolutions and recommendations put forward by the non-aligned group. Within the United Nations family, UNCTAD constitutes the developing countries' main weapon because the institution was set up at their own request to study the specific problems of their integration within the world system and to help create a common platform which would enable Third World countries to unite and so negotiate from a position of strength.

The political problems of the Third World were more or less formally 'solved' when most of our countries became independent in the three decades following World War II. However, this political independence was limited because it was generally unaccompanied by sufficient internal or external changes for real economic independence. The international economic system has remained basically unchanged during the past thirty years (in Africa it is fundamentally the same as during the colonial period) and economic dependence is as strong today as it has been for the past century, despite the fact that some changes have seeped through in the international division of labour. The issue now is whether or not we are entering into a new phase in the battle for our real economic independence. Obviously, this battle presupposes not only internal political and social transformations but also international changes which in turn could facilitate or complicate those transformations.

Over the past twenty five years, the Third World has experienced a pattern of dependent development within which economic growth has merely been a by-product of expansion and growing prosperity in the economic centres of the developed world. The by-product of this prosperity was not only extremely unevenly distributed among our countries but also, within each, among the different social groups. The Third World supplied raw materials and energy in unlimited quantities and at constantly declining prices to meet the insatiable demand of the developed world without in any way considering its own short-term, let alone long-term, interests. Energy, and more specifically oil, provides the most striking example of the plunder of natural resources in underdeveloped countries to boost prosperity and growth in the already developed nations.

Dependent Development

Dependent development has proved to be a total failure and the bill is a heavy one—a staggering increase in poverty and famine in Africa where land is generally plentiful, massive rural migration, chaotic urbanization, proliferating slums, permanent and growing unemployment, increasingly flagrant inequalities in income distribution and, consequently, the penetration of consumption patterns and ideologies of the dominant countries. Furthermore, this 'development', which in isolated cases has given rise to relatively high growth rates, has been extremely uneven among Third World countries. It has clearly accentuated the inequalities, in terms of wealth and development, between the nations of the Third World and, particularly in Africa, between those states which by a freak of nature are

*Translated from the French.

well-endowed in resources much coveted by the West—oil, copper, bauxite—and those that have, or appear to have, nothing. Even in geographically medium-sized countries this dependent development has resulted in marked regional inequalities, for it has generally polarized around the capital or, occasionally, around mining or plantation areas. It is against this background that over the past decades a number of contradictions have arisen in our countries leading to the present situation where Third World states have decided to engage in battle for a change in the international economic order.

The main issues in this important battle are well known: (a) raw materials and basic commodities, including energy; (b) industry and trade in manufactured goods; (c) the transfer of technology; (d) the international monetary system; (e) uneven development among developing countries; and (f) economic cooperation between Third World countries. These are also the main topics to be discussed at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi in May and it is to be hoped that the conference will bring forth a minimum, if not a maximum, degree of agreement so as to enable the Third World to confront the rich nations as a relatively homogeneous bloc with very precise demands. This is our only hope for achieving real progress in the task of changing the international economic order. The basic assumption here is that the prerequisite for such change is unity, a unity which given the right momentum and direction could facilitate the necessary, nay essential, internal transformations by thwarting the intentions of those in a position to exert pressure on developing countries taken in isolation.

Raw Materials

As far as raw materials are concerned, the Third World has—for at least twenty years—been fobbed off with slogans about price stabilization and the need for special measures to do away with erratic price fluctuations, supposedly due to the laws of supply and demand but in reality only the result of political considerations and political pressures on the Third World. These arguments no longer hold water, which does not mean that stabilization measures have become totally useless but rather that we have become much more demanding; what *we want now is a substantial and stable increase in the price of raw materials.* Without the remarkable victory of OPEC many of us would probably still consider this demand to be wishful thinking. The success of the oil-producing countries is encouraging and clearly shows that the relative prices for raw materials, as compared with those for manufactured goods, are determined neither by inexorable 'economic laws' nor by a *Deus ex machina* in the form of supply and demand, but purely by political power relations. The oil cartel, mainly made up of American monopolies, was in a position to impose unfavourable prices on our countries. These were clearly political prices and now the oil-producing countries have retorted by imposing a different political price and one that, so far, has held good.

The same could apply to all raw materials of which we are the main suppliers as well as to a large range of strategic mining products and some agricultural commodities which, even if they appear to be less vital, are in fact equally strategic because of their strict inelasticity within the consumption patterns of the rich countries. Yet it is an established fact that the price paid to our producers for all those commodities is extremely low, whereas the prices paid by the consumer at the other end have kept up with the pace of initially creeping and subsequently runaway inflation. The result is that the producer did not benefit from this economic situation because his income did not rise and neither did that of the state since it could not raise the level of indirect taxes on these commodities. This clearly shows that the prices *are* political and only we can reverse the trend by imposing other political prices which correspond to different international power relations.

The time has come not merely to produce precise technical studies on each of these commodities but also to make concrete proposals for producer agreements and price indexing. That should be one of the main objectives of the Nairobi conference.

There is, however, another and more fundamental issue than prices, namely control over the exploitation of natural resources. With independence, the Third World generally inherited economic and commercial structures whereby multinational corporations were in control of most of its resources. The situation has changed, albeit unevenly, both with regard to the countries concerned and the commodities involved, through a series of legal measures such as nationalization, control of foreign trade, marketing, etc. In a large number of Third World countries, especially in Africa, concessions for the exploitation of natural resources were granted in a shameless manner by the colonial administration. Royalties were a matter of mere formality—let it not be forgotten that gun-boat diplomacy was never an empty threat. In some countries many of these agreements have now been revised and in others governments have gone one step further either by becoming majority shareholders in such companies or by completely nationalizing their assets, with or without compensation. However, it has now become clear that the legal ownership of a company does not guarantee control and that at best, nationalization is an instrument which must be strengthened by the formulation of long-term policies for developing natural resources. However, in so far as we are integrated in an international trade system, we have certain financial needs and must therefore continue to export. These financial needs should be defined in accordance with our prospects and potential for internal development. In the long term, we must take measures to protect our natural resources and preserve them for our own use. Up to now, the system has functioned as if we were automatically obliged to satisfy the demand of the developed countries and spontaneously adjust to their needs. We have been compelled to supply, without any restrictions whatsoever, unlimited quantities of commodities through the exploitation of our natural resources, our subsoil and our soil.

Here again, the discrepancy between the developing and the developed world is striking. Not one country among us could force Canada, for instance, to supply wood or to exploit its timber resources at any rate other than that decided upon by Canada itself. No Third World nation is in a position to compel the United States to supply wheat in any quantities or at any rate other than that determined by the American administration. No one could force Poland to exploit its coal more intensively and to export it to those of us who need it. These countries are considered to possess full sovereignty and are able to decide for themselves whether or not to develop, to export or to preserve any of their own natural resources. But in the case of our states, every time we even mention slowing down exploitation of our resources, we hear cries of 'embargo!', 'unilateral decision!' accompanied by the usual threats. When the oil-producing countries, very modestly, spoke of an embargo or of limiting production, these threats became even more vehement than when the question of nationalizing the oilfields was raised. In a number of cases such nationalization measures have been accompanied by agreements entered into with multinational corporations not only to determine prices but also—and even more important for the developed centres—to guarantee supplies at a given rate. This, in effect, constitutes an attack on our sovereignty, which is not just legal but also political, for in no way is the sovereignty of developed countries similarly restricted. The Nairobi conference should, therefore, consider the establishment of export ceilings for each commodity or group of commodities. This would set the stage for the battle to win control over the exploitation of our natural resources to suit our medium- and long-term needs.

Industry and the Transfer of Technology

The second issue concerns industry, which I will link to the transfer of technology. Over the past twenty five years, the Third World as a whole has achieved industrialization rates, however uneven, which in the eyes of the most optimistic proponents of the system could appear truly remarkable.

The average growth rate for the Third World, and even for Africa, is higher than the rate of industrial growth in the developed world. Thus, by mechanically projecting this trend into the future, the optimists are claiming that we shall be able to catch up with the developed countries as far as industrial output is concerned. A projection of between 2 and 3 per cent annual industrial growth over a period of twenty, thirty or fifty years could produce any required result, at least on paper.

It has now become clear that this import-substitution industrialization model, despite its high growth rates for some countries, cannot be prolonged indefinitely because it has produced and intensified an increasingly unequal internal income distribution and demand structure which has now reached its ceiling. Many Latin American countries have long since reached this ceiling which explains their present dramatic plight. Few African countries have as yet attained this level, with the possible exception of Egypt, but in view of the small size of African markets and the very low level of industrialization—with no more than a few tens of thousands employed in industry—we are approaching this point.

In addition, external dependence is reinforced by import-substitution industrialization, both because of the consumption pattern on which it is based, the increasingly unequal income distribution it generates and the high degree of technological dependence which in turn is linked to the consumption pattern. Certain needs must be satisfied—and I am not referring to the needs of the masses—in such a way as to ensure that the goods produced are more or less competitive with similar imported goods. Such an industrialization model has increased not only moral and intellectual but also financial dependence through the transfer of technology. A small part of this process is revealed through the payment of royalties for patents, registered trade marks, etc. But that is only really the tip of the iceberg. What lies hidden underneath in the form of unequal prices for the cost of technology and capital goods (to serve this technology) is quite staggering. Very instructive studies have been carried out on this precise point, particularly by the Lima Group in Latin America. With the possible increase in the prices of raw materials (likely to be highly uneven since the strategic importance of commodities varies), some countries will find themselves in a better financial situation, as is the case for the oil-producing countries at present. This will enable them to think in terms of a further stage of industrialization, but because of technological dependence the spontaneous response of the system is to establish outward-looking export industries to supply the developed countries.

This is indeed in accordance with the conventional view of development. The line of reasoning is as follows: 'We have a cheap production factor available, namely labour (and sometimes other cheap factors too, such as raw materials) and we could therefore sell these factors cheaply to the developed world by producing industrial goods for them.' This is nothing more or less than selling our labour cheaply in the form of consumer goods which, if they were to be produced in the developed countries would cost ten to twenty times more in wages even though productivity is the same in both cases. However, even this battle is far from being won, for the developed countries feel sufficiently sure of themselves to demand that we not only sell our labour cheaply but in addition subsidize these industries; in other words, make the peasants and the whole of our population pay to subsidize those poor consumers in the rich countries!

An alternative model of industrialization can be put forward, i.e. industrialization for ourselves, based primarily on the satisfaction of domestic needs and, as a matter of priority, the needs of the masses both at national level and at the level of groups of developing countries. This represents a different strategy for industrialization, one that does not rely mainly on the transfer of technology but on the development of a self-reliant capacity for technological research geared towards meeting the needs of the mass of the people of our countries.

The International Monetary System

The crisis in the system of the international division of labour first appeared in the sixties as a crisis in the international monetary system. The post-war prosperity of the west had been built on the hegemony of the dollar, which was the monetary symbol of the economic and political domination of the United States over the western world as a whole and over our countries as western dependencies. This hegemony was first threatened by internal transformations within the developed world itself through a crisis in the American balance of payments, the accumulation of dollar reserves in Europe and Japan, the growing external debts of the United States, which for its creditors was becoming an increasingly bad debt, and finally, the *de facto*, followed by the *de jure*, devaluation of the dollar. The result was utter confusion and a gradual deterioration in the Bretton Woods system of multilateral transfers.

The trend, therefore, is towards isolating monetary systems from the international system. Even during the 'great boom', the Third World never really participated in the international monetary system whose virtues (the 'advantages' of unlimited transferability, the relative stability of exchange rates, the liberalization of trade, etc.) were extolled by one and all. The reason is the structural imbalances in the system, caused by our dependence on and over exploitation by the developed world. In these circumstances, we could only draw marginal 'benefits' from the system and it is unfortunate that in the present state of confusion some of us still believe in the need for re-establishing the international monetary system at any cost, for it is thought to be a good thing in itself because of those publicized virtues. In the struggle for establishing a new international monetary order, the Third World only occupies a passenger seat. It is true that every country officially has one vote within the United Nations system, but the situation is quite different in such organizations as the International Monetary Fund, where the richest countries have pride of place with a voting quota proportional to their wealth and 'importance' within the world system. The struggle was, and will no doubt continue to be waged between the United States, Japan and Europe with the Third World being manipulated rather than actively participating. Committees, like the Committee of 20, have been convened by one or other of the protagonists to suit any changes in their tactics or strategy, only to be forgotten immediately afterwards. What is important is whether concurrently with this battle which certainly is not ours the Third World can evolve a different strategy for strengthening its monetary and financial relations. This, I believe, would carry greater weight whenever decisions are taken within the international system.

Less Developed Countries

The situation of the less developed countries provides a further illustration of uneven development as a result of the dependent development strategy practised over the past thirty years. There is nothing mysterious about that situation, it is totally within the logic of the system. However, those responsible for promoting dependent development are now using its consequences as an argument to divide the Third World. Crocodile tears are being shed about the so-called 'Fourth World' whose peoples are said to be the victims, not of the dominant international system, but of those countries 'lucky' enough to have 'benefited' from a higher degree of integration within the international system.

There are evidently conflicts of national interest and they will persist for a long time to come even among developing countries; the crucial point now is to make sure that these conflicts are resolved among ourselves, through agreements and negotiations that would enable us to present a common front *vis-à-vis* the developed nations and not allow these secondary contradictions to override the primary contradiction between us and the developed world. If we fail in this we shall allow ourselves to be manipulated for the benefit of those who dominate us all.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITHIN THE THIRD WORLD

If the outcome of the Nairobi conference is agreement, or at least some measure of progress, on the issue of economic cooperation, it will be definite proof that UNCTAD has struck a new path. If not, we shall have every reason to be pessimistic, because it will mean that the new international economic order for which we are fighting would only be an empty shell, pure window dressing. The result would be a series of compromises and minor concessions, with the Third World further divided and the process of uneven development more accentuated.

Much remains to be done, for the current conventional approach to economic cooperation is based on the establishment of common markets; because of cultural and ideological alienation, we are trying to imitate structures created in other regions for a very definite purpose, i.e. the furtherance of independent developed capitalism. Our problems are fundamentally different and we must learn to plan together, to think in terms of complementarity in order to arrive at agreements and mutual concessions for the self-reliant development of our countries.

CONCLUSIONS

The outcome of the battle for a new international economic order is uncertain. The most innocuous and yet probable end result is that the whole question will be reduced to a series of minor compromises. There is cause for concern at the almost universal approval of the principle of a new international economic order and we may well suspect that the issue has been emptied of all substance. Efforts to shift the debate and concentrate on a few aspects only, such as the recycling of the financial resources of the oil-exporting countries, are highly suspect for they suggest that the industrialized countries are trying to take back with one hand what they have conceded with the other.

This battle for the new international economic order must not be used as an alibi for failing to deal with internal development problems. Development is above all a national issue, a problem of transforming domestic social, economic and political structures. Foreign relations merely reflect internal structures, but they can be used either to reinforce negative aspects or to bring about positive changes. Priority must therefore be given to our own self-reliant development at a national level and to collective self-reliance and collective autonomy within the Third World. With a policy of national and collective self-reliant development, the Third World would be in a better bargaining position and more likely to obtain real changes at the international level, whether on prices for raw materials, control over production or any other issue.

This battle will not be an easy one. It will become even more difficult in the next few years and already 1976 promises to be a year of deepening world economic crisis. This crisis is already grave and has been marked in the United States and Europe by unemployment on a scale unknown since the thirties, combined with slackening growth at a time of galloping inflation. Inflation was slowed down in 1975 because of world-scale deflationist policies in the developed countries, but a reversal of the trend is planned for 1976 in an attempt to reduce unemployment. The United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and other countries are due to hold elections and one can therefore expect a recrudescence of runaway inflation this year. The developed countries are planning to shift the main burden of this inflation onto the Third World by, among other things, recovering part of the benefits obtained by the oil producers and by accelerating the deterioration in the relative prices of all raw materials; but above all they will try, through the International Energy Agency, to break OPEC and to bring down the price of oil from 10 to 12 dollars to the floor price of 7 to 8 dollars in accordance with American policy.

The attempt to force the developing countries to bear the brunt of the crisis will have violent repercussions. A Dakar newspaper recently reported that a 'great power' had threatened to reduce its aid to Senegal because, allegedly, Senegal had voted too often against its policy at the United Nations. Such crude and direct language had been used rarely in the past but is likely to be heard more often in future. Is there not a direct link between our battle and the financial crisis of the United Nations? It is no secret that this crisis arose as a result of the response of certain developed countries to the growing majority which the Third World, the non-aligned, represented at the United Nations General Assembly. There was never any talk of financial crisis in the United Nations when it was still a political instrument of the great powers. Things are rather different today and the United Nations could well become a forum, however modest, where the voice of the majority of mankind may be heard. Hence the threat to cut the purse strings! The financial crisis will provide a pretext for increasing attacks against those in the Third World who are trying to turn the United Nations into an instrument capable of serving its peoples. This, then, is the time above all when priority must be given to the Third World and, particularly for us Africans, to African unity and Afro-Arab unity.

The New International Economic Order and the Theory of Dependency

Oscar Braun

In May 1974, the UN General Assembly adopted a Declaration and Action Programme for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. In September 1975, also within the framework of the United Nations, the more advanced countries, including the United States, accepted a series of proposals put forward by the member countries of the Group of 77. These were proposals which had repeatedly been rejected in the past. Meanwhile the Group of 77 held a number of meetings and the positions which emerged from these became more radical on the subject of negotiations with the advanced capitalist countries. These events took place against the background of large increases in the prices of raw materials, mainly oil, a trend which since April 1974 has been reversed for all commodities except oil.

We intend, in this article, to discuss the question of whether there is any radical change in the attitude of the imperialist countries in their relations with dependent nations and, subsequently, whether the basic structure of international economic relations, and particularly the tendency for prices of raw materials to fall, has actually changed.

Answering these questions may imply a double danger, the most serious being the revival of 'developmental' theories based on a superficial reading of recent events in the world economy. The second danger lies in minimizing recent changes, from the socialist view of the theory of dependence, without taking into account certain realities. In the final analysis developmental ideology in its various forms relies on the false assumption that no fundamental contradiction exists between imperialist and dependent countries. In other words, it is based on the belief that development of dependent countries would be beneficial to everyone. Such an orthodox view is often expressed in documents produced by different United Nations agencies, for example UNCTAD. It assumes that mutual benefits exist at an economic level, that the development of dependent countries may open new ways to both international trade and investment, and that, even if some imperialist countries were forced to make some sort of sacrifice in terms of external aid or liberalization of trade, there would be political compensations since the development of dependent countries would promote world-wide political and economic stability.

Since the imperialist nations are very rational from their own point of view, they have never accepted the validity of these theses and ever since UNCTAD I in 1964 have consistently refused to accept proposals put forward by dependent countries concerning trade, external aid, the transfer of technology, and so on. Or, if they did accept any of them, as was the case of the Generalized System of Preferences, their effects were cancelled in practice. Surely, some advocates of developmental theories will say, things are different now, the more advanced countries are beginning to change their attitude to these issues. This is not true.

The primary contradiction between imperialist and dependent countries is as alive as ever and its main features have not changed. The difference now is that this contradiction cannot be resolved, as in the past, to the benefit of the imperialists only: the success of OPEC has clearly shown that there are limits to the power of imperialist countries. This discovery led the advanced capitalist countries to change their negotiation tactics and to adopt a more flexible position. Obviously this change did not come about as a result of a sudden awakening to the truth. Instead, realizing the danger of a global confrontation between centre and periphery, the former prefer to use negotiations.

If, then, we reject the developmental ideology, we must study and interpret recent events in the light of the dependence theory and determine what possibilities are open for dependent countries in the present international context. This will be our main theme.

I

We do not intend to restate the ideas formulated by those who elaborated the theory (theories) of dependence, but will confine ourselves to summarizing its substantive elements. We will then go on to discuss which of these elements, if any, need to be changed in the light of the present world economic situation. We propose to group the main elements of the theory of dependence as follows:

(a) *Underdevelopment is a consequence of the development of capitalism on a worldwide scale.* This premise, stated by a number of authors, in particular André Gunder Frank, challenges the orthodox thesis that underdevelopment is merely a lag in the case of some countries *vis-à-vis* the growth of others. This thesis is based on an analysis of the way in which capitalism, since its beginning, disarticulated and reorganized African, Asian and Latin American societies for its own benefit. It further demonstrates how this constituted an obstacle to the development of those societies and finally points out that the present economic and social structure of dependent societies and their articulation with central capitalism remains a hindrance for the development of the former.

(*b*) *Capitalist development inevitably means unequal development.* World-wide expansion of capitalism creates unequal economic and social structures and concentrates power in the central countries. This economic power monopoly rests on a number of factors, both economic and non-economic, the main being:

(i) The greater development of productive forces in the centres and, in particular, their monopoly over the means of enlarged reproduction of capital, i.e. monopoly over the technology and industries required to produce capital goods;
(ii) the diversification, both with regard to commodities and regions, of international trade carried out by the advanced centres compared with the limited range of export products and markets of dependent countries. Such concentration clearly results in a weak position for dependent countries when, for instance, negotiating commercial treaties;
(iii) the control by multinational corporations over the industry of the Third World, which can be either direct—ownership of the means of production—or indirect—control of technology, marketing, etc.;
(iv) the quasi-total monopoly of imperialist countries over the development of new technologies in the capitalist world;
(v) superior management methods and total control of the world's commercial channels by multinational corporations based in imperialist countries;
(vi) the class structures generated in dependent countries as a result of their unequal development. The dominant classes—landowner oligarchies, compradore bourgeoisie, state bourgeoisie or dependent industrial bourgeoisie—have little interest or no possibilities of changing the *status quo* without damaging their own status;
(vii) the imperialist countries control the means of production and the transmission of ideology;
(viii) the military power of imperialist countries.

(c) *The development of underdevelopment and its consequences* (*the unequal development of capitalism*) *brings about exploitation of dependent countries to the benefit of imperialist nations.* The exploitation of the former is, in fact, a fundamental factor in the development of the latter, and it takes different forms at different times in history. At present, exploitation is mainly realized through:

(i) unequal exchange, i.e. the imposition of terms of trade favourable to imperialist countries;

(ii) the flow of profits, interests, etc. from dependent to imperialist countries;
(iii) the realization of monopoly profits over and above those derived from unequal exchange in the selling or buying of goods and services.

(d) *The development of dependent countries is possible only within the framework of a social revolution and through breaking the ties with the capitalist world.* A profound change of social structures, i.e. a socialist society, is a prerequisite for development, but it must be accompanied by a strategy of individual and collective self-reliance.

II

Should the crisis now shaking the capitalist world make us change any of these propositions? I believe the answer to be in the negative, although in some cases it is possible to change or adjust their scope.

OPEC's action and the resulting increase in the price of oil is sufficient to show that even if the relative power of imperialist countries (as we stated above) is very strong, the situation can be reversed or, at the very least, partially modified in certain circumstances. The imperialists are dependent, too, in the sense that to develop they require raw materials at low prices. If the dependent countries, who provide these raw materials, can use the elements of power they possess skilfully, they should be able to improve their relative position in the world economic structure.

This implies that we should, at least partially, correct the proposition stating the need for self-centred development in the dependent countries, i.e. cutting or reducing relations with imperialist nations. Even if it is generally true that a self-centred development strategy is the best way towards development, it would seem that in cases where dependent countries can obtain better trade conditions with imperialist countries, these relations should be maintained. We cannot deny, for instance, that the Peoples' Republic of China will obtain important benefits from exploiting their recently discovered oil and exporting part of its production to the capitalist world.

If, then, it is true that the present world economic structure offers new possibilities for dependent countries, can we still claim that socialism is a prerequisite for development? Is it not possible for reformist capitalist regimes to be an instrument for development?

The question is incorrectly stated. The argument in favour of socialism does not rest on the statement that it is 'a tool for overcoming underdevelopment' even if it can also be that. Pro-socialist arguments rely on the intrinsic merits of a socialist society and on a critique of the iniquities of capitalist societies; and also, of course, on the fact that most dependent capitalist countries are unable to overcome underdevelopment and if they succeed in partially overcoming it, only a small privileged class or group benefits. Besides, all the advantages that can be obtained by a reformist capitalist regime within the framework of a reorganized world economic order can also be obtained, and probably to a larger extent, by a socialist regime. Hence we will leave the argument 'reformism versus socialism' and go on to analyse our main theme, i.e. the recent changes in the world economic structure and the possibilities they provide for dependent countries.

III

The present crisis of capitalism is a reflection of its main contradictions. The continuous growth of monopoly capitalism depends on two main factors: (a) the availability of a labour force, i.e. the existence of a working class prepared to work for a wage (which may or may not grow with time) in an alienated context and according to the needs of and discipline imposed by capital; and (b) the availability of an increasing flow of raw materials at constant, or decreasing, real prices to allow for industrial growth at a constant rate of profit even if real wages increase at the same rate as productivity. In the past few years, both dependent countries and the working class at the centre have refused to continue playing the role which monopoly capital tries to impose on them. Since the end of the 1960s, increasing working class militancy at the centre has coincided with a refusal by dependent countries to go on providing cheap raw materials.

The best example of this refusal is OPEC itself and its action in increasing oil prices. Other raw material producers have tried to follow their example by forming cartels. Faced with such a challenge, monopoly capital will use all its weapons, ideological, political and even military power. Their most effective weapon, however, has undoubtedly been the economic one, as witnessed in the present world crisis.

Many spokesmen of imperialism are suggesting that the present crisis, i.e. recession plus inflation, is caused by the increase in the price of raw materials. This is far from the truth, however. Inflation due to the effects of the increase in the prices of raw materials on production costs is insignificant in relation to the total increase in the prices of manufactured goods. Similarly, the reduction in the level of effective demand in real terms for a given level of monetary income due to the increase in the prices of raw materials is just a fraction of the reduction of effective demand during 1974 and 1975. In any case, governments in industrialized countries can always use fiscal and monetary policies to increase the level of effective demand as they, in effect, are now doing.

What actually happened was that imperialist countries deliberately created the most serious world recession since the 1930s, and they did so using restrictive fiscal and monetary policies. They try to justify these by arguing that they are fighting inflation. But inflation itself is the result of the way monopoly capital functions, in the sense that it passes on the cost of higher wages through higher prices. And they are obliged to pay higher wages to the working class in an effort to satisfy its growing demands.

That this is a deliberate policy of recession has, on occasion, been made explicit. In November 1974, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer declared. 'If wages rise beyond the limits set by the TUC, the government will be compelled to take offsetting steps to curtail demand. And the effects on the financial position of the company sector are *bound to lead to unemployment*.'[1] In other words, if workers ask for higher wages, the government will take care to leave them without jobs.

This recession is not only directed against the working class at the centre, it is also one of the most effective weapons for reducing demand for raw materials and thereby for jeopardizing the efforts of producer associations to stabilize or increase the prices of their exports. Indeed, the rise in the price of raw materials during 1972/73 was sharply reversed after the first quarter of 1974, and even the price of oil has substantially declined in real terms. Although it may be possible for OPEC to maintain and increase the real price of oil by strictly controlling (and reducing) production in member states, the situation is quite different for the majority of producers of other raw materials. The demand for oil is extremely price-inelastic and income-elastic: the association of oil producers is made up of a small number of countries and, perhaps most importantly, thanks to the foreign exchange reserves accumulated by the oil producers, they are in a better position to weather the storm of temporary upsets in their trade balance.

The last point highlights one of the crucial factors in fixing prices of raw materials. Countries which are not 'dependent' in the sense of not being compelled to export more and more in order to obtain foreign currencies to pay for their current 'indispensable' imports, are in a strong bargaining position and are able to increase the price of their exports which, in turn, makes them less 'dependent'.

The policy of 'deliberate recession' was not confined to Britain, it was worldwide. In the United States, 'the severity of the current recession can to a large extent be attributed to restrictive monetary and fiscal policies.'[2] In France, 'By the autumn, the government's mid-year anti-inflationary measures, combined with the worsening international economic climate, rapidly reduced the pace of expansion.'[3] In Germany, 'Economic policy . . . last year was single-mindedly focused on economic restraint.'[4] In

Italy, '. . . industrial production fell back dramatically largely because of the drastic measures taken to correct the high balance of payments deficit and to slow down the inflation rate.'[5] In Japan, 'The credit restrictions which were introduced at the end of 1973 contributed significantly to the subsequent fall in output.'[6]

We have already stated that the present recession has been very effective in halting the increase in the price of raw materials and forcing its decline. It has also significantly reduced the rate of increase in prices of industrial products, mainly because given the growing unemployment affecting the working class at the centre, the rate of increase in nominal wages has dropped.

Now that the imperialist countries have achieved some of their intended objectives through recession, they are trying, albeit slowly, once again to expand their economies using expansive monetary and fiscal policies. This should lead to an increase in the volume of demand of raw materials and this is the context in which we shall examine the possibility for action open to dependent countries. We must not, however, lose sight of the fact that although there are political and economic limits to the extent to which effective demand can be manipulated, recession is a weapon which is always available to monopoly capital which, in addition, can make use of other instruments to put pressure on dependent countries.

We shall now go on to examine the proposals for establishing a new international economic order and consider their viability.

IV

The proposals adopted and incorporated in the Declaration and Programme of Action as well as in other UN and international meetings, are not new. A number of authors concluding that international trade and integration within the developed capitalist world in general has not generated development in the periphery have long since proposed substantial changes in the mode of this integration. Since 1964, UNCTAD in particular has proposed corrections to the international economic organization which, though indisputably sensible, and not contradictory to the economic orthodoxy of the advanced capitalist countries, have been systematically rejected by the latter.

The main UNCTAD proposals deal with the problem of external trade. They identify the external sector's bottleneck as the main obstacle to the development of dependent countries without however attempting a deeper analysis of the problem. Two means of correcting this bottleneck have repeatedly been put forward by UNCTAD.

(a) the regulation of trade in raw materials to enable it to cope with cyclical fluctuations and with the deterioration in the terms of trade;
(b) the diversification of exports of dependent countries and in particular expansion of the export of industrial goods.

The second point in particular can be sustained by the most orthodox economic logic, arguing on the basis of the theory of the international division of labour. Dependent countries have a competitive advantage in exporting relatively labour-intensive industrial products, because of the low level of real wages in their industrial sector. According to this theory, the development of this type of export would not only benefit dependent countries, but more advanced countries too, if they specialized in those industrial sectors in which they have a comparative advantage. But the imperialist countries did not view the matter in this way; not only did they refuse to listen to calls for liberalization of the trade of labour-intensive industrial products, but they even reinforced the tariff and other restrictions to discourage this type of export from dependent countries. Exceptions just tend to confirm the rule; the facilities obtained by some countries or industries—South Korea, Mexico's border industries—can be explained by the specific background to each case. The general policy of central countries has been systematically protectionist *vis-à-vis* the exports of industrial products from dependent countries.

When it comes to regulating the trade in raw materials, the behaviour of the advanced capitalist countries has been, if anything, even more negative. Arguments have been advanced on the importance of increasing the value of raw material exports through their partial or total processing within the country of origin, but the central countries responded by maintaining a discriminatory tax structure (high taxes for manufactured products; low taxes for raw materials) making the development of local processing industries impossible.

In the past few years, member countries of the Group of 77 and even UNCTAD, have begun to realize that the only way to transform present trade structures was to negotiate from a position of strength. This was to be achieved by forming producer cartels and imposing prices on consumers. An important element in the reasoning has been the analysis of the possibility of forming stocks of different primary products in an effort to facilitate price regulation. Another has been the signing of long-term contracts specifying the volume of raw materials to be exported annually and their prices as well as the creation of compensatory financial mechanisms to cover periodic deficits produced by fluctuations in the volume or prices of Third World exports. So far, all these proposals have been very firmly opposed by the imperialist countries who identified, and still identify, producer cartels as an act of aggression justifying even armed intervention.

Dependent countries are now proposing price indexing, i.e. an increase in their export prices *pari passu* the nominal increase in the prices of industrial products as a result of inflation. Finally, it has been repeatedly stated that an end should be put to the restrictive commercial practices of multinational corporations since they limit the ability of dependent countries to expand their trade. Needless to say, not one of these claims has received a positive answer from the developed countries.

In addition to the proposals concerning international trade, the major proposals put forward by dependent countries—none of which have so far been accepted—are, I believe, the following:

(a) an increase in the transfer of resources from central to dependent countries up to a rate of 1 per cent of the GNP of the former;
(b) a change in the structure of shipping and insurance markets to allow for larger participation by dependent countries;
(c) a change in the rules concerning the transfer of technology, which now flows from imperialist to dependent countries in a limited way at very high cost;
(d) linking the reform of the international monetary system to new financial mechanisms designed to assist dependent countries; in particular 'linking' the creation of special drawing rights to credits granted to dependent countries.

These proposals could provide some elements for the new international economic order, but for a long time, imperialist countries reacted to them in a totally negative way. Their attitude changed, at least verbally, at the Seventh Extraordinary Session of the UN General Assembly, and at the Paris meeting in October 1975: they agreed to start the North-South discussions on the basis proposed by the dependent countries.

V

We shall now discuss the possibilities of an actual change within the world economic structure, bearing in mind the new positions adopted by dependent and central countries. For such a discussion, we must take into account both the historical experience of the past decades and the theoretical tools elaborated by the theory of dependence.

Restrictive practices and a refusal to accept the views of dependent countries are very old imperialist methods. Is it likely that these countries have now realized that they were mistaken in their policies, and are now trying to correct their errors? I think not. The theory of dependence, and especially the theory of unequal exchange, go a long way to explain how the advanced capitalist countries 'benefit' from the old international economic order and how some elements, such as restrictive tax structures and commercial practices, are fundamental to ensure that the conditions of exploitation of the Third World are reproduced. We can see no valid theoretical arguments to alter these ideas. Since the oil crisis we are, however, confronted with a new situation, one that clearly shows that in some ways the advanced capitalist countries, too, are dependent. They have only accepted negotiations after a foretaste of the serious consequences and a sudden awareness of their dependency. The interests of imperialist and dependent countries are basically contradictory and it is only through fully understanding this fact that dependent countries will be able to take effective action and engage in useful international negotiations.

This basic contradiction between imperialist and dependent countries manifests itself at many different levels, the principal one being that any increase in the price of commodities exported by dedependent countries benefits the latter at the expense of the former. We do not claim that there are no secondary contradictions between countries within each group, but we are saying that the main 'North-South' contradiction is crucial. It follows that negotiations can only take place if the power relations change, at least partially, in favour of dependent countries. The main purpose of negotiations is to legalize new power relations, and in this case they must be real ones: quantitative voting strength at the UN is only illusory.

Which are the areas, if any, of the proposed 'new' economic order, where dependent countries are powerful? Only one, i.e. total or partial monopoly of some raw materials which, in principle, makes possible the formation of producer cartels. For the rest, they can do very little. They cannot force imperialist countries to do away with their tariff barriers; as far as restrictive practices or policies on the transfer of technology are concerned, the Third World can only formulate defensive strategies. The foundation of their policy should therefore rest on the use of the only real weapon available to them, namely control of all, or at least some, raw materials.

This immediately raises the problem of the secondary contradictions between dependent countries, for if they can achieve an increase in the prices of raw materials, this increase will never be homogeneous. Some countries will benefit more than others and some (e.g. the case of oil), will lose in absolute terms. There are, however, some factors tending to weaken these contradictions in the long run. An increase in the price of some raw materials implies a transfer of resources from imperialist to dependent countries. In principle, this could have the effect of a general increase in the demand for raw materials and, hence, of an increase in the price of raw materials exported by those dependent countries which did not benefit from the original increase.

Why should this be so? Assuming that the transfer of resources causes an increase of capital accumulation in dependent countries and a corresponding reduction in imperialist countries, then the investment and industrial growth structures will change.

Firstly, investment in dependent countries gives employment to previously unemployed or semi-employed workers. The same investment in advanced capitalist countries would mean the transfer of a labour force employed with relatively unproductive capital to new presumably more productive machines. In the first case, the net increase of production would be clearly superior and would lead to an increase in the demand of raw materials required for this production.

Secondly, it is possible that the increased investment in dependent countries will involve machines incorporating a different technology than that which is used to produce the same commodities in the central countries. If the technology is different it would be because output per worker would be smaller whereas total output (and employment) for the same investment would be bigger. Since there would be a bigger increase in total output the increase in demand for raw materials will correspondingly be bigger.

Thirdly, increased investment in dependent countries need not be channelled to the same 'modern' industries as in the advanced capitalist countries, and as it is well known that these industries tend to use less raw materials for the same volume of production than more traditional industries, should a certain shift in the total volume of world investments take place, it would lead to an increase in the demand for raw materials.

Of course, this reasoning is based on the strong assumption that a transfer of resources from imperialist to dependent countries would result in a decrease of investment in the former and a corresponding increase in the latter. Many different scenarios can be imagined, depending on which countries would benefit and which suffer loss as a result of the transfer of resources. It is reasonable to assume, however, that if some transfer of resources were to take place this would, in the long run, lead to a certain reduction in the investment rate in central countries with a corresponding increase in dependent countries.

In any case, we cannot depend on such indirect and long-term mechanisms for generalizing the advantages of increases in the price of raw materials; an adequate system of compensation and distribution of benefits among dependent countries will need to be established if their vital solidarity is to be maintained.

What commodities produced by dependent countries could become the subject of producer cartels capable of forcing price increases? More than one would believe at first sight. Bergston refers to a number of commodities for which prices could be or have already been raised by producer countries: bauxite, copper, phosphate, tin, coffee, bananas, iron ore, tea, tropical timber, rubber, nickel, tungsten, cobalt, pepper and quinine.[7] The UNCTAD Secretariat, for its part (Document TD/B/C.1/166) has identified 18 primary products for which it is technically feasible to build up stocks, and these cover more than 55 per cent of raw material exports, excluding oil, from dependent countries. They are: wheat, maize, rice, sugar, coffee, cocoa, tea, cotton, jute, wool, hard fibres, rubber, copper, lead, zinc, tin, bauxite, aluminium and iron ore. Such lists give us some idea of the opportunities open to dependent countries, and we will proceed to discuss the general conditions which, in each case, would make effective price control possible.

But before that, it will first be necessary to recall that the social structure of exporting countries fundamentally affects their bargaining power. Since our objective is to develop a monopolistic strategy for the reduction of the supply of primary commodities in order to force prices up, we could expect in the case of some products a fall in the total value of exports. On the other hand, those countries who would have suffered from price increases may retaliate by, for example, an economic blockade. The success of restricting supplies must therefore to a great extent depend on the capacity of a country (or several countries) to overcome the problems of the transitional periods during which the external sector might be thrown out of balance. Undoubtedly, a socialist planned economy able to command the enthusiastic support of its people even when obliged to apply austerity measures (such as rationing imported goods or those using imported inputs) would be in a much better position for weathering temporary storms than a capitalist economy dominated by a weak bourgeoisie, unwilling to make sacrifices and itself unable to impose them on the population.

Secondly, the main economic conditions to bring about or facilitate concrete monopoly actions are, we believe:

(a) *Little or no possibility of substitution of the product in question.* The less the advanced capitalist countries are able to produce the same commodity, or an adequate substitute, locally the bigger the possibilities of achieving substantial price increases. Consideration must be given not only to the short-term substitution possibilities but also long-term defensive actions open to the economies affected by the measures. The prospects for adequate substitution are narrower if supply restrictions affect more than one commodity. For example a restriction in the supply of tea and coffee would be more effective if accompanied by a similar restriction on cocoa. An increase in the price of oil benefits the competitive position of natural rubber, and the same applies to most primary products.

(b) *Adequate control of supplies.* A prerequisite for the effective operation of a cartel is that it includes all, or a majority, of exporting countries. The problem that might then arise has often been discussed within the traditional theory of monopoly, i.e. even if the cartel benefits all its members, once it exists each member on its own could achieve greater benefits by breaking the rules of the cartel, through for instance expanding its sales at the ruling higher prices over and above the quota it has been allotted. It is important, therefore, to identify those commodities which best lend themselves to solidarity within a potential cartel.

(c) *Possibilities for constituting stocks.* Even though it is true that the constitution of stocks of a given product is not necessary to restrict supplies, it does make restriction easier.

(d) *Establishment of compensatory financial mechanisms.* Cartels often fail at times when all or some of their members face a difficult situation. If members, when organizing their cartel, are able to obtain adequate financial facilities to help overcome potential difficulties, the stability of the cartel is reinforced.

This brief analysis of the prerequisites for possible monopoly action by dependent countries helps us to appreciate the fundamental importance of solidarity. Countries that produce a certain commodity must act collectively and their action is significantly strengthened if producers of substitute products follow suit. The chances of success are enhanced if a group of countries that have already succeeded in forming a cartel (as with the oil producers) are able to provide financial facilities to constitute stocks and overcome inevitable teething troubles. In addition, as mentioned before, an increase in the price of some commodities could have an indirect positive effect on the demand of other commodities.

We have tried to show that the prospects for a new international economic order depend mainly on collective action by dependent countries to maximize whatever monopolistic power they may possess. This could be interpreted as a call for confrontation, which in fact it is. Imperialist interests stand in contradiction to the interests of dependent countries and it is as futile to try to reconcile them as it is to deny the contradiction between capital and labour.

Confrontation does not exclude negotiation, but negotiations become possible if and when dependent countries succeed in achieving a strong bargaining position. A strong cartel could agree to expand supplies if importing countries in turn agreed to allow processing of the raw materials to take place within the exporting countries. Dependent countries together could guarantee certain rates of supply in return for technology on better conditions, an opportunity to penetrate the market for manufactured goods, better access to financial markets, and so on. These were the demands put forward by dependent countries and rejected by the developed countries. They could be negotiated with success provided dependent countries are able to overcome their former weaknesses.

Finally, let us consider in brief how, in our view, research in the social sciences ought to be oriented in Third World countries with regard to the issues discussed in this paper.

VI

It is obvious that if we wish to move from general statements to concrete action, we must carefully identify those areas where we can operate successfully. To begin with we must study the conditions of supply and demand, both short-term and long-term, for those commodities that best lend themselves to monopolistic action. Such a study would include an analysis of the range within which price variations can successfully operate, the possibilities of substitution, imperialist retaliatory action, etc.

Secondly, in the case of each commodity, we must identify which group of countries must be members of the cartel if it is to succeed, and once this has been established we must determine the extent to which an alliance among this group is plausible. Possible difficulties arising for each member of the cartel must be defined and ways of avoiding them worked out. And what is more important, the total benefits to the cartel must be calculated and the methods for distribution determined. If for instance, the cartel decides to reduce the supply of a given commodity, how will reductions in supply (or increases if the intention is to expand supply at a slower rate than prior to the existence of the cartel) be distributed among the different countries? The whole economic system of each member must be discussed if we wish to propose a formula that would benefit all its members.

Finally, we must study the defensive policy of the cartel after its constitution as such. This would include adequate mechanisms for compensation to the members, mechanisms of transport and marketing of a given product (now generally under the control of the advanced capitalist countries), a definition of the possibilities of retaliation by the imperialist countries, etc.

This programme is a very ambitious one and only the future will tell whether the objectives are attainable; whether the dependent countries will really be able substantially to modify the intolerable relations imposed on them by imperialist countries. We feel, however, that it is well worth a try.

Footnotes

1 *National Institute Economic Review*, February 1975, my italics.
2 *ibid.*
3 *ibid.*
4 *ibid.*
5 *ibid.*
6 *ibid.*
7 *Foreign Policy*, **14**, Spring 1974.

Africa and the New International Economic Order

Cadman Atta-Mills

The Current International Order and Africa: a Critical Review of the Past Decade and a Half

Despite the diversity in avowed official policies (strategies of development) the past decade and a half of political independence has witnessed the consolidation of peripheral capitalism in all African countries without exception. The main characteristic is clear; derived development within the context of the world capitalist system wherby development in Africa becomes a by-product of the development of the industrialized west. It is this context that in the first instance accounts for the dismal (by any standard) performance of the African economies over the past decade and a half and has put a re-structured international order on the agenda of international discussion—a new order required not just for the African countries but for all peripheral countries whose increasing dependence within the current order has neither permitted the 'catching up with the west' which was promised nor the laying of foundations for autonomous self-centred development which some states had hoped for. But first it is necessary to review the record and to establish our thesis that the poor performances of the last 15 years are no more than the manifestations of the limitations of externally oriented growth within the *current* international order.

According to the Economic Commission for Africa, 'In the early 1970s the overall economic performance of the 41 independent developing African countries as measured by the output of goods and services continue to give cause for concern.'[1] This concern has a very good basis in fact; in 1972 the overall rate of growth was only 5.4 per cent and an even poorer 4.0 per cent in 1973. In *per capita* terms, the rate of growth for 1971–1972 was only 2.6 per cent. This figure, however, hides one very important fact; that in fully 16 countries, GDP *per capita* actually fell. These are the 16 countries which according to the ECA 'recorded either negative rates or rates which were less than the average rate of population growth' (p. 16). In fact most of the growth in the overall figures were accounted for by only 10 countries among which it will surprise no one to note the names of Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Ivory Coast and Gabon. We may also note that in fact 1971–72 was a rather good year by African standards, as the record for the 1960–1970 decade amply demonstrates. With the exception of the East African sub-region (which recorded average growth rates of 6.0 per cent for the 1960–1970 decade as opposed to 3.9 per cent for 1971–1972) in all other sub-regions (East, North, West and Central, according to the ECA classifications) the 1971–1972 rate of growth of expenditure on GDP (at 1970 constant market prices) was a definite improvement over the averages for the 1960–1970 decade. Overall, the 5.4 rate of growth for 1971–1972 compares with an average of only 5.0 per cent for the 1960–1970 decade. Measured at 1970 constant factor costs, the discrepancy is even larger; 6.1 per cent for 1971–1972 as opposed to 4.7 per cent average growth for the 1960–1970 decade and 3.9 and 4.3 per cent for 1970–1971 and 1972–1973 respectively. The picture therefore is quite clear; feeble growth rates overall and extremely uneven economic performance (in terms of growth) both across countries within the region and over time.

It should come as no surprise to anyone that the main reason for the relative improvement in the growth figures for 1972 was the rather large increase in the value of exports (18 per cent overall). It is not open to argument that since the incorporation of African economies into the world capitalist system, the driving force of these economies has always been external to these societies; for example the price of cocoa, and oil, the price of imports (i.e. the vagaries of the world market).

However, in order to understand the record, namely feeble and uneven economic performance and the obligatory correlation between the performance of the export sector and the performance of the economy, it is necessary to recall at least the dominant features of the world system into which the African economies were integrated.

The Context: the International Division of Labour

Since the very inception of capitalism (here we include the period just prior to the emergence and consolidation of full mature industrial capitalism in the central countries, namely mercantilism), capital accumulation has always taken place on a world scale. It has been a process whereby various parts of the globe have been fashioned and assigned specific tasks in producing or making possible the production of surplus for capitalist accumulation. Africa's role in this process is now very well documented, the first phase of it dating from the late sixteenth century through to the eighteenth century. This was the phase of primitive accumulation of wealth in what is now the developed centre of the world capitalist system. The repercussions of this phase (mercantilism) for Africa are well known; in Africa it was man himself—not labour—that became merchandise. Slavery in Africa meant massive depopulation (typically of the youngest and ablest members of the societies) resulting in, among other things, the degradation of agricultural and handicraft techniques, and the accentuation of tribal and group conflicts as slave-raiding became a profitable pastime. This phase set the stage for Africa's loss of autonomy, as thereafter Africa began to be shaped by the needs of metropolitan economies and societies (mercantilism at that particular stage) and by the modality of capital accumulation at the centre of the system in general.

The advent of the industrial revolution in Europe—the historical conditions for industrial capitalism having been created through the emergence of a dispossessed wage-labour force in Europe permitting the profitable transformation of money wealth into capital—meant the end of slavery for Africa. But at the same time, there was a new role for the African periphery; that of supplying cheap agricultural produce and raw materials for the industrial machinery of Europe. This new role, however, was to await two developments which were to permit its intensification and efficiency; these being the beginning of formal colonialization and the concentration of capital at the centre on a large enough scale to permit its export abroad thus enabling production on the spot. Formal colonization, of course, assured that the Africans would play the roles assigned to them—that of wage labourers in European-owned mines and plantations as well as direct producers of agricultural exportables. The instruments used were taxation (in money), dispossession of land, forced labour, etc. Of course, for the African periphery, industrialization was systematically refused since it would have been superfluous given the role foreseen for Africa within the international order. We contend also that Africa's role within the international order has not significantly changed in spite of nearly two decades of political independence for a number of African countries.

The international division of labour that always accompanies capital accumulation on a world scale culminates in a number of specific features which are characteristic of the world order: uneven development on a world scale, and the emergence of peripheral capitalist countries (being as they are underdeveloped, subordinated and distorted) as the necessary historical complement of the developed centre of the capitalist system, namely the mature industrial capitalist countries of Europe and America. Today the most casual observer of the international system cannot fail to confirm this thesis which had hitherto been categorically rejected by the bourgeois economic theorists, content as they are with endless repetitions of a bogus theory of linear development which views peripheral capitalist countries as being simply in a transitional stage towards full mature industrial capitalism.

For in the African periphery the pattern of the international division of labour, which required and still requires cheap primary products in exchange for a few manufactured goods, has had dramatic consequences. For a start it has meant loss of control (in any meaningful sense) over their own raw materials, being as they are powerless to dictate the conditions for their exploitation or the rate of their exploitation. For another the structure of production within any particular African country typically has no correspondence to the structure of domestic consumption; a situation which leads to the rather anomalous fact that in spite of the African countries being predominantly 'agricultural' they are food deficit areas—the best lands, resources, credit, etc. being available only for the cultivation of agricultural exportables. It has meant massive surplus transfers, both open (e.g. repatriated profits) and hidden (e.g. transfer pricing and unequal exchange). It has also meant unequal growth and development not just at the continental level (the landlocked countries being practically neglected) but at the level of regions within the same country—the coastal areas and regions with good potential for agricultural exportables being obviously favoured. We need not underline that this is precisely what the record of the past decade and a half testifies to.

In an earlier article, Samir Amin had stressed that one of the manifestations of the limitation of externally oriented growth (in addition to the obligatory correlation between the performance of the export sector and recorded increases in the GDP) is the dual structural crisis of public finance and the balance of payments. The crisis in public finance, far from being the brainchild of African bureaucrats, is the result of necessary increases in public expenditure arising from the infrastructural and educational needs (as well as military needs in order to maintain internal law and order) brought about by integration into the world capitalist system. At the same time, this integration limits the expansion of the country's material base as the consistently poor performance of the African economies amply testifies. There is also an unavoidable tendency towards a deficit in the external trade figures because with growing export orientation and the narrowing of the range and quantity of goods produced for the internal market, there is at the same time an expansion in the range of goods demanded as GDP increases and/or income distribution gets more highly skewed. The record of the past 15 years amply bears him out. For in spite of the fact that 1972 was a relatively good year for exports from Africa, fully 28 countries had substantial trade deficits. In the area of public finance more and more states were obliged to rely on loans and grants to balance their budgets.

We would, of course, be guilty of gross neglect if we failed to mention that the record has not been uniformly bad for all countries or even social groups within each country. For alongside the increasing impoverishment of the bulk of the direct producers there are powerful indigenous groups who have benefited from the distortions in the economies due to their export orientation. Among these groups we would include an emergent agrarian capitalist class as well as a state bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Nor can anyone seriously question the correlation between the growing affluence of a minority and the increasing impoverishment of the majority. In fact it is precisely this that has led some states to demand profound changes within the system and has to date frustrated any attempt at radically modifying the system.

Africa and the New International Economic Order

The very fact that the peripheral capitalist countries are demanding the installation of a new international economic order is for us enough proof that the old order (with its structure of international economic relations) had failed to meet the aspirations of these countries. Further, the list of proposals for a new international order, emanating from the Third World and arrived at at various international meetings, needs to be taken seriously if for no other reason than that it pinpoints problem areas within the old order as well as identifying the preoccupations of the peripheral countries with respect to the future. This said, it is clear that we are not bound to accept all the problem areas identified by these proposals as being of the same order of importance and it is precisely on an attempt to establish a hierarchy of issues to be concentrated on that the rest of this short note will direct its attention.

Our point of departure is that for Africa (as well as for most other Third World countries) the development challenge must be regarded as a continuation of the political struggle for *total* independence. This is so given the historical context and background to the current phase in the international division of labour and our conviction that the major contradictions between dependent and imperialistic states have not evaporated. We are convinced also that the development challenge requires, (a) disengagement from the world capitalist system as a necessary condition, and (b) a radical transformation of the economic, social, institutional and political structures of the dominated African countries. Further, disengagement is only possible within the framework of socialist systems organized over large *self-reliant* regions. We note also that this is a view which is increasingly shared by many social scientists as well as a not insignificant minority of African governments.

We are convinced, therefore, that regardless of the international order, the major battles are to be fought internally at the level of each African country, and not in international forums. These battles concern major structural transformation, social, political and institutional within the countries concerned. To the extent, however, that the engagement of the African countries within the international system is real and will continue to be so within the foreseeable future, it is necessary to review the proposals with a view to identifying which ones are likely to advance the attainment of the longer term objectives, which ones are likely to be neutral and which ones are likely to *frustrate* the attainment of the objectives outlined above.

From the series of resolutions adopted at various meetings for the installation of a new international economic order, we note that one of the primary preoccupations of the Third World countries has been to eliminate all international trade barriers to permit, in the first instance, the growth of exports of traditional products at profitable or non-declining real prices (the indexation problem) as well as to permit the export of semi-processed traditional exports and manufactured products to the developed countries. This primary concern of the Third World countries obviously confirms our earlier statement that the old order had no other use for the peripheral capitalist countries than as suppliers of raw, unprocessed agricultural products at cheap and declining real prices. Beyond this, we note that interrelationship between the three demands cannot be missed and we refer the reader to the sensible critique levelled at this proposal by Ayi Foly Kouevi of the ECA (among others), both as to the realism of the proposals and the likelihood that they would form the basis of a new order no matter how radical.

But then Samir Amin had already anticipated this proposal when he pointed out in an earlier article on 'Development and Structural Change in Africa' that the path of development centring mainly on the orientation of producers towards primary commodities and extractive industries for export is severely limited (if only because the growth of international demand for such products cannot be adequately supported for the entire Third World). Nor do semi-processed primary commodities and manufactured goods face any better prospects in the markets of the advanced countries. For it is difficult for us to see how the developed centre of the capitalist system can absorb any more manufactured goods (taking into account those from Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, etc.) without substantial and politically costly structural changes within those societies themselves. The vast array of barriers already in place to discourage such exports is ample testimony to this fact. Of course, over the longer term horizon this would mean accentuated dependence on the markets of the advanced countries—not less—with all the risks attached to it; and it would be directly contrary to the aim of self-reliant autonomous development.

But then what about the shorter term horizon? Indexation of the prices of primary commodities makes sense as a short-term measure to stabilize the prices of raw materials thus enabling exporters of these items to maintain their export earnings plus their import capacity for essential services in a transitional phase towards self-reliance—and this is only compatible with a constant or decreasing volume of such exports not an increasing volume. It would therefore call on all exporters of certain primary commodities to collude in controlling the volume of such exports and would call for the establishment of adequate mechanisms for compensating those countries who lose as a result of having the volume of their exports restricted. It is precisely here, however, that the Third World countries have shown most shyness in international forums. The so-called 'costless' strategy of using OPEC oil surpluses to finance buffer stocks of all other primary commodities simply will not do though it is this strategy that attracts most attention in international forums.

It is just as easy to dismiss almost all the other proposals emanating from the Third World on the grounds that they would badly serve, or not serve at all, the longer-term objective of self-reliant autonomous development, if taken at face value and without the necessary internal structural transformations. In fact, the transfer of technology issue is a non-issue in isolation from the creation of an indigenous technological capacity which at the same time caters to a consumption basket indigenously derived. Further, the demand for the real transfer of resources from the developed centre of the capitalist system to the Third World countries is for the most part wishful thinking. The record of aid, loans, grants, military assistance, etc., originating from these countries towards the Third World speaks for itself. Even during the best times of the capitalist system the aid target was never reached.

It is clear, therefore, that now that the system is in crisis the advanced countries are hardly going to make a special effort to pull along the suffering Third World countries. Even if such a request were to be granted and for whatever reason (moral obligation, reparation for centuries of unbridled exploitation, etc.), it is not clear that it would be in the interest of these Third World countries to subject themselves to another form of dependence whereby their development plans would be made on the basis of a continued recognition by the developed centre of their obligation to aid the poorer countries. Of course if this proposal were *really* accepted, which it cannot be, it would in fact constitute a new international economic system; namely one that is based on the recognition of the mutuality of interests between the various parts of the international system and not on the exploitation of one part of the system to the benefit of the other. But this would be presupposing that the nature of the capitalist system would have changed; i.e. the system would no longer be a capitalist one with major contradictions between the two parts. But it is precisely this which cannot be true.

However, there is one proposal emanating from the Third World which we believe constitutes a real basis for the struggle against underdevelopment both in the long and short terms, and which does not depend on the willingness of the developed countries (with whom they have contradictory aims) to make any concessions. This is the proposal concerning the Third World's inalienable sovereignty over her natural resources. If this sovereignty over natural resources were internationally recognized it follows that the world would automatically recognize the rights of these countries to regulate their exploitation, conservation and commercialization in line with their goals of social and economic progress. It would mean the exploitation and commercialization of these resources to meet with the immediate and longer term development needs of the countries concerned and not, as has always been the case, the needs of the advanced countries or the immediate profit of the foreign companies involved in their exploitation. If the Third World countries took this proposal seriously, it would clearly form the first real basis for *autonomy*. It would form a situation whereby their external economic relationship became *dependent* on the needs of domestic economic transformation and not the inverse; and would lay the ground for eventual disengagement from the world capitalist system substituting in its stead self-reliance even at the level of each African country. In an earlier article we had insisted that this is in fact the only context within which the question of cooperation between Third World countries can be meaningfully posed; that is, the context of each individual country's disengaging from the all-determining world capitalist system. We still hold this view. For it is only in this context that the key economic question, how best to organize resources (either nationally or in a collective self-reliance scheme) and social production to meet the needs of the bulk of the indegenous population, can be unambiguously posed.

Socio-Economic Structure and Traditional Authorities in Lesotho

Gabrielle Winai-Strom

Introduction

This paper focuses on the socio-economic structure of the peripheral state Lesotho, sovereign since 1966 and a former British colony surrounded by South Africa. It is part of a larger study of the development policy and mechanism of exploitation in Lesotho.

South Africa is commonly looked upon as a sub-imperialist nation exploiting the neighbouring countries. Aggregate figures of trade relations show extreme, and growing dominance.[1] To look upon southern Africa as a system of hierarchically ordinated nations may be useful for some purposes,[2] but explains little of the actual mechanisms of exploitation and possibilities for change in these mechanisms. For this purpose we have to know more about both the expansion of capital and trends in the socio-economic structure. According to the economic plan of the Republic of South Africa[3], the two legs South African economic growth stands on are cheap foreign capital and cheap migrant labour. Eighty per cent of South African production was controlled by foreign capital in 1973 according to the President of the Afrikaans Handels-Instituut. Around 500,000 migrant workers are recruited every year through the migrant labour system.[4]

We shall firstly look at the present socio-economic structure in Lesotho, secondly summarize changes over time in that structure, and thirdly make a few comments on the traditional authorities in Lesotho and their changing roles from colonial to neo-colonial times.

Today's Labour Reserve Society

Lesotho today is a labour reserve society with a minor agricultural sector. A majority of the people have long been in contact with the industrialized sector. Their habits are shaped by wage employment in South Africa and the consumption of manufactured goods produced outside their home country. In spite of the association of the people with the industrialized sector, the structure of society in Lesotho resembles that of most Third World countries including those dependent on raw material production, both mineral and agricultural.

An underdeveloped country is commonly believed to be a society dominated by traditional agriculture. This is thought to be the case also in so-called labour reserves. In Lesotho's five-year plan dated 1970, 85 per cent of the population is described as peasants although it is well known that nearly 200,000 persons work in South Africa at any given time.[5] The population census shows that there are four dependents for every income earner. A recent study of agricultural households shows that 80 per cent of the total income of all households comes from off-farm production (60 per cent from South Africa and 20 per cent from Lesotho). Less than 10 per cent of the income of all 'farm' households comes from agricultural production in the studied area of Thaba Bosiu, which is not an extreme migration area. Another 10 to 15 per cent came from commercial wool, mohair and cattle production.

TABLE 4A

SOURCES OF INCOME IN THE AREA OF THABA BOSIU[6]

All farms	Crops	Livestock	Misc.	Migrant labour	Other off-farm	Total
%	6	13	1	59	21	100

THE GRAIN EXPORT SOCIETY

If this picture of a society almost totally dependent on off-farm production (80 per cent in peasant areas) is correct, it differs totally from the descriptions of the former colony of Basutoland seventy five years ago. What is now Lesotho used to be a very efficient agricultural economy, both self-reliant for food and certain handicraft products and integrated into the money economy of southern Africa through large exports of wheat, maize and other agricultural products as well as through consumption of manufactured goods.[7]

The country seems to have accumulated wealth throughout the nineteenth century despite periods of war and drought. Although the country was annexed by Britain in 1870 and lost its best agricultural areas to the Boers in the Orange Free State, it recovered quickly, and in 1872 exported 100,000 *muids* of grain (wheat, mealies and kaffir-corn). In 1837, the Sotho of Basutoland (which then stretched west of the Caledon river) 'had grain stored for four to eight years', and in 1844 'white farmers flocked' to them to buy grain.

The Basotho cultivators benefited from a long experience of agricultural production in an area which is the best irrigated region of South Africa's interior and they managed during the whole of the nineteenth century to compete successfully with inexperienced Boer farmers in the dryer areas. The Basotho responded quickly to new techniques and new crops like wheat and maize.

As long as South Africa was not integrated into the world economy, it was easy for the Lesotho people to compete. An observer at the end of the nineteenth century wrote: 'The establishment of the railway has profoundly modified the economic situation of Basutoland. It produces less and finds no outlet for its products. Its normal markets, Kimberly and the Free State, purchase Australian and colonial wheat. Money is scarce, so scarce that the Government has had to receive tax in kind'.

It should be noted, however, that this gloomy picture is somewhat contradicted by the evidence given before the Transvaal Labour Commission in 1903. A missionary, a store-keeper and the resident Commissioner of Basutoland, spoke of intense agricultural activity and high production.

> 'There is no country that produces anything like the cereals it [Lesotho] does: every man is a farmer, and all arable land is under cultivation. It supplies all the actual food requirements to the natives. I think it is, taken all round, the greatest granary of South Africa. Speaking from memory again, after a good season, perhaps 120,000 bags of wheat and a great quantity of wool is exported.'[8]

Basutoland might have had a boom during the Boer War. They provided not only grain but also horses and guns to both sides. Little has been written about this so we can only make guestimates.

Although men and women from Basutoland were already working in South Africa in the 1870s and 1880s, it seems as if it was only during our century that the socio-economic structure came to be dominated by migrant labour. People went on short-term contracts; they were able to choose to work near their home and they were well paid in relation to the cost of living at a much higher rate per hour than today.

THE IRON WORKERS AND PEASANTS OF THE PRE-1830S

Why was it that the Sotho society was able to absorb innovations and accumulate wealth so successfully during the nineteenth century and yet be so increasingly exploited during the twentieth century? The changes with regard to the traditional authorities and in the socio-economic structure took place gradually and an exact explanation will not be given here. We have, however, tried to go back to the period before the famous king Mosheshue, who gathered together scattered Sotho groups and united them into a nation which resisted white rule until 1870.

Records concerning Sotho society before 1830, when Mosheshue invited missionaries from the Paris Evangelical Mission, are scarce. Anthropological and archeological sources give us some information about the economy and social structure of the Sotho society.

Language determined who belonged to the Sotho people. There is a tendency to confine the definition to those who live in Lesotho, but king Mosheshue, who created Lesotho a century ago, was of the same stock and spoke the same language (albeit a different dialect), as the Tswana of Botswana and the Pedi of South Africa. In 1965, there were five million Sotho speakers scattered throughout southern Africa of whom one million were in Lesotho. One hundred and fifty years ago they were concentrated between the Limpopo and Orange rivers, north and west of the Drakensberg.

Iron was worked in what is today southern Transvaal from A.D. 1000 and in the now Orange Free State from between A.D. 700 and 800. Whether the Sotho iron workers arrived in the area in which smelting was already practised is uncertain. The Sotho speakers originally came from the north and there are some indications, although no conclusive evidence, of the time of their arrival.

In the region of today's Lesotho there was, however, no iron ore. Instead cattle-keeping and the production of grain were predominant.

The following examples of the size of the Sotho towns indicate that they were fairly large and much larger than any of the white-settler towns:

Kadtshwene 13,000–16,000 inhabitants (1820)
Masweu 10,000–12,000 inhabitants (1820)
Taung 1,300–1,400 (1824) and 20,000 (1836)
Kgwakge (1824) covered a large area and was larger than any South African town known to the eye-witness in question, a European missionary.
Phitshane, on the Molopo river, had a population of 'upwards of 20,000' (1824)
Thaba Nchu 9,000 (1839)

Each large settlement was a capital in which an independent chief lived with most of his followers, and each was surrounded by cattle-posts. Small groups of hunters, customers of the chiefs and leading families, occupied areas distant from the capital and cattle-posts. Many of the settlements were on hill-tops, exactly like the capital of Mosheshue at Thaba Bosiu described by the missionary Casalis between 1830 and 1870.

The cultivated fields spread out around the capital, sometimes covering 'several hundred acres', 'at least twenty miles in circumference' in the valley below. During the sowing and reaping seasons families could camp in the fields, but their huts might be burned if they failed to return to the capital when the work in hand was done.

Sotho society was not only diversified economically. We can also anticipate a diversified social structure. The chief and the families surrounding him ranked high in the society. There were groups of soldiers, cultivators, herders, miners, skilled craftsmen, hunters and traders. They depended largely on game for meat, using the cattle for milk and transport. Pack-oxen were constantly used for bringing in grain from the fields (some of which lay twenty five miles from the owner's home) and for transporting articles of trade. The Sotho were distinguished from their neighbours not only by their skill as craftsmen (they refused to buy knives from European traders as being not as good as their own), but also by the fact that most of them lived in large permanent stone-built settlements rather than scattered homesteads.

They grew sorghum and sweet reed, kidney beans, pumpkins, sweet melon and gourds. Maize was probably unknown until 1822 and was only later on introduced on a large scale. In exchange for hides of wild animals, some of the Sotho speakers purchased grain from other people living in neighbouring regions. Hemp and tobacco were used both for consumption and barter.

In 1843, David Livingstone reported from the Transvaal: 'The manufacture of iron seems to have been carried on here uninterruptedly from a very remote period.' Travelling eastwards through the Transvaal, he came to 'Banalaka', and reported: 'they smelt iron, copper and tin and in the manufacture of ornaments know how to mix the tin and copper so as to form an amalgam. Their country abounds in ores.' He also described how between 20,000 and 30,000 hides were tanned and sold to China.

No wonder that Livingstone's reports spread quickly and led to a rapid inflow of capital and men from Europe and to the British Government's orders to colonize the country. It seems fair to assume that the mineral deposits were not discovered by the Europeans but taken over directly from the Sotho. The Sotho were probably also consulted and later employed as miners, a profession they knew well.

We know little about who ranked high in the social structure. Trade was monopolized by the chiefs. None of the Sotho societies were organized in the form of military kingdoms similar to those of the Zulu and Swazi. Order was assured rather through negotiation and compromise, and early travellers noted that the freedom to criticize authority in public assembly was much greater than was permitted in Europe.

Cleavages were traditionally expressed in terms of opposing lineages, but they were not necessarily considered as opposition. Much of traditional history is concerned with tracing divisions and showing the links between the ruling lineages of existing chiefdoms, but there is little known about the actual underlying causes of fission.

The independence of a chief was asserted by a leader moving away with his followers and establishing himself in a territory which might or might not overlap with that claimed by the chief whom he left. He also asserted the independence of his court, *kgotla*, no cases being sent on appeal to any other authority. Independence did not mean, however, that the chiefdoms were isolated from each other. Emissaries were exchanged, trade relations existed and the chiefs often met.

Authority during Colonial Times

In Basutoland, like in Bechuanaland and Swaziland, the British colonial policy in annexing the country as a colony was to delegate most of the administration and decision-making at the local level to the chiefs, the missions and the traders. The title of chief existed before colonization, nor were missionaries and traders new. But the functions of these three groups changed. The chiefs were made tax-collectors in addition to their old roles of judges and distributors of land. The greatest change, however, was an increase in the number of chiefs, who became wage-employed for life as well as colonial bureaucrats.

For a long period the missions held the supreme right to decide on the organization and content of education, health and other services. The white traders had the exclusive right to buy the produce of Basutoland and to import manufactured goods into the colony. They were also responsible for the roads in Basutoland. Many Basotho worked for the traders to keep the roads in condition.

In contrast to the chiefs in South Africa, those of Basutoland came to serve the colonial power and represent it. In many areas of South Africa, the chiefs were discriminated against and the British magistrates took over their functions as tax-collectors and judges; in the Cape Colony, for example, common land ownership was abolished during a period of twenty to thirty years around 1900.[9] In Basutoland, the chiefs were looked upon as traitors, whereas in certain areas of South Africa they were on the same side as the rest of the people in relation to the colonial power.[10]

British colonial policy in Basutoland has often been described as *laissez-faire*. According to some sources, this meant freedom of choice for the people. The fact is probably that the élite groups, chiefs, traders and missionaries, had quite a high degree of freedom in relation to London. As long as these élite groups served the interests of the colonial power, few British administrators were needed and they only played a minor role.

It was in the British interest that its colony of Basutoland should cost nothing, serve British capital in South Africa and provide labour where it was most needed, i.e. in mining. As long as the élite groups of Basutoland served these interests and assumed the necessary state functions at the ideological, economic and political levels, the British administration did not intervene. During the 1930s, however, this was no longer the case. Tax collection did not function and labour was too scarce in the territory for the migration offices to recruit.

A British commission, known as the Pim Commission, was sent to Basutoland to investigate the state of affairs. Pim reported in 1935 that there was a complete lack of any kind of government. What he might have meant was that the traditional authorities, which Britain had used for ruling, no longer had the same control as before. In Tanzania (then Tanganyika) and Nigeria, a reorganization had been carried out long before, and Pim suggested reforms for building up a bureaucracy to take over from the chiefs.[11]

As we have discussed already, Basutoland had changed from a peasant society, dependent on land distribution by the chiefs, to a society of freely moving wage earners. New offices for tax collection were set up in South Africa, the Sotho were integrated into a pass-law system where the movement of labour was better controlled. The two interests of the British colonial power were met. The chiefs were reduced in number from 1,300 to 122 over a period of eight years and their function as judges was taken over by trained lawyers, who were seldom chiefs.

However, the few chiefs who were left still held a certain amount of power. They were still the richest land holders in most villages and had indirect access to the financial sources of the colony, even if tax collection had been successfully taken over by educated Sothos and British employees who did not issue from the chiefs. The common belief that the chiefs in Basutoland, and in today's Lesotho, base their power on land distribution has to be reconsidered since only a few Sotho get their income from land.

Authority During Neo-Colonial Times

The neo-colonial practice of building up an élite to serve the interests of capital and government in the centre had already started before independence. Centralization within Lesotho, and a certain decentralization from the colonial power to the authorities in Lesotho, has continued from the 1930s until today. The government in Lesotho has strengthened itself at the ideological, economical and political levels and centralized all decision-making processes in the capital, and more recently to a junta.

Changes in the structure of authority and in the socio-economic structure in Lesotho resemble that in many other African countries. An African bourgoisie grew up within the context of an essentially externally-oriented economy. The educational system played a major role in the process of recruitment. During the 1960s, Britain's dominant position in Lesotho was gradually reduced as the influence of South Africa, the United States, Israel and the Scandinavian countries, partly via UN assistance, grew.

Almost no effort was made during the post-independence years to change the socio-economic structure within the country and meet the basic needs of the majority of the people, nor were any changes made in the basic relationship with overseas capital. Instead, the government, dominated by *status quo* interests (chiefs, former British administrators and Catholic missionaries), took no decisions on internal affairs and used all its time to increase the inflow of aid in order to improve infrastructural services and thereby expand capital intensive production and Africanize the state bureaucracy.

Some inflow of capital did occur: in agriculture, tractor-hire services were established, fertilizers and high-yield crops supplied. But the new technology neither increased productivity nor production. The result was no increase in employment within the country. Tourism expanded enormously from 3,000 to 150,000 visitors per year in the three years from 1970 to 1973, but no tax was paid in accordance with an agreement signed between the government and the foreign tourist companies.

The Africanization of the civil service expanded the African professional class, but did not come anywhere near meeting the demands of employment at this level since the output of secondary school graduates had risen so rapidly by the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s that competition for jobs was greatly intensified.

The new Sotho bureaucrats started investing their savings in share-cropping and small businesses. They were authorized to give orders to the chiefs on what land to use for industry, winter-crops or soil conservation.

The impact of foreign capital investment upon the Lesotho society as a whole was very limited, but it was of crucial importance to the Basotho élite which had taken over the state after independence. Financing the state sector depended very heavily upon growing aid subsidies from the United States and Europe and on the customs union agreement with South Africa in 1970, which after the decrease of grants-in-aid from Britain was the largest single financial source of government revenue.

Conclusions

We have found that South Africa was not an empty country when the Boers and the British settled in the area. The Sotho ancestors of today's poverty-stricken migrant labour reserve were the iron workers and craftsmen ruling the interior of South Africa until the middle of the nineteenth century. This fact is censored in South African history books and known only by oral tradition in today's Lesotho.

The Sotho of Lesotho were producing grain both for their own consumption and for export to the rest of southern Africa until the beginning of the twentieth century. Subsistence agriculture has been of minor importance since the end of the nineteenth century. This is unknown to the development agencies aiding Lesotho to 'build up' agricultural production after independence.

These conclusions are important if we want to characterize the mechanisms of exploitation and assess the government's development policy and the social, economic and political base of the government in Lesotho.

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The Political Economy of the Migrant Labour System: Implications for Agricultural Growth and Rural Development in Southern Africa

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INTRODUCTION

Throughout the twentieth century most of the economies of southern Africa have been linked to South Africa in one way or another. With the march of history, some of these links are disappearing or undergoing metamorphosis, but important economic links threaten to outlast the present stage of political transformation. The system whereby South Africa has been able to use the region as a source of supply for cheap unskilled labour for her farms and mining industry is the link that is of interest to us.

Structurally and functionally, the relationship between South Africa and the rest of the region is analogous to one between a centre and its periphery. On the other hand, due to its excessive dependence on the North Atlantic powers for capital, markets, consumption tastes and technology, South Africa should itself be conceived of as a sub-centre.[1]

Although the South African mineral-based economy itself started out as a full-blown settler periphery to the centre of nineteenth century capitalism, Britain, it was forced by a combination of wartime needs and deliberate state actions to look somewhat inward and develop its own dynamism as a sub-centre with its own peripheral satellites.

The analysis that follows will utilize the 'centre-periphery' conceptual framework which allows us to see the dynamics of the southern African peripheral development model in terms of its *raison d'être*, internal consistency, functioning and potential for achieving its goals—however perverse. We are singling out one important component of that model: cheap labour exportation from the periphery to the centre of the sub-system, tracing that component in its historical evolution from the turn of the century onwards. We shall show how the migrant system has brought growth to the South African economy, and the mining industry in particular, while simultaneously bringing increased dependence, rural destitution and underdevelopment to neighbouring countries which constitute the periphery of the sub-system.[2]

RATIONALE FOR THE MIGRANT SYSTEM

Many reasons could, and have, however, been advanced for retaining and perpetuating the system of migratory labour in southern Africa. Many countries in the region see this as an additional method of earning foreign exchange and raising government revenue.

*As an economist at the United Nations, the author wants it to be known that the views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the United Nations or of UNCTAD.

1 For the pattern of South African linkages to the North Atlantic, see First, Steele and Gurney, *The South African Connection: Western Investment in Apartheid*, Harmondsworth (UK): Penguin Books, 1973, and J.C. du Plessis, 'Foreign Investment in South Africa', in Lityak and Maule (eds.), *Foreign Investment: The Experience of the Host Countries*, New York: Frederick Praeger, 1970.

2 Southern African countries which have traditionally supplied labour to South Africa are Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Botswana, Swaziland, Angola and Rhodesia, more or less in that order of importance.

Secondly, wage remittances are generally looked upon to supplement the generally low income of the migrant worker's family, especially during periods of crop failure. Thirdly, some see the migratory system as an opportunity for workers to acquire badly needed skills while being trained into a more disciplined work force for development tasks at home.

Fourthly, the system could be justified for employment creation reasons, assuming that the worker would otherwise be idle or underemployed if the opportunity to go to South Africa had not existed. Fifthly, in the absence of the magic commodity to earn foreign exchange, neo-classical international trade theory argues that factor movements (labour in this case) can effectively substitute for commodity trade although one would have to assume, of course, that neo-classical theory correctly explains the situation and that all gains from trade are not appropriated by one of the partners.

Sixthly, the earnings and other potential 'gains' from South African mine employment could be viewed as providing a 'growth pole' to the periphery economy. In particular, these earnings could buttress and widen the internal market, leading to the well known linkages and spread effects; the domestic economy could now support consumer-oriented industries which would in turn support corresponding producer-goods-oriented industries, and so on, spreading economic activities in a mutually supportive manner. Last, but not least, the mining industry in South Africa obtains a vital production factor which should increase its potential output, and in a mutually dependent world, the economies on South Africa's borders should in turn reap some of the benefits of that increased production.

These arguments are very powerful, if not persuasive; but before we evaluate them it is better to look first at the special characteristics and pattern of labour migrations to South Africa during the past eighty years or so.

Characteristics and Pattern of the Migrant System

It was not long after the 1652 landing at the Cape that the Boers dispossessed the local African inhabitants of their land and forced them to work as slaves on grain and wine farms. They soon reinforced their slave labourers with fresh importations from East Africa and South Asia. With the formal end of slavery, the local slave system was transformed into share-cropping along lines similar to the South of the United States.

Soon after the discovery of diamonds and gold at Kimberly and on the Witwatersrand in 1867 and 1885 respectively, local Africans were again stripped of their land and through a system of land, head and hut taxes were forced to provide cheap labour to the mines. Under the leadership of Cecil Rhodes and others, diamond and gold mining and marketing syndicates were set up, with the Anglo-American Corporation emerging with control over 40 per cent of gold production (or almost a third of the world's), a third of South African coal, about a quarter of its uranium and almost all its diamonds (and almost all the world's for that matter). Anglo-American has also branched into industry, commerce, banking and investments abroad.

White miners were recruited from Europe and America. As the mines were still short of labour, in 1904 a move was made to get Chinese workers from Hong Kong and by 1907, just before white workers forced their repatriation, Chinese migrant workers had approached the 60,000 mark. The total number of miners had risen from just over 160,000 in 1906 to over 750,000 today, with Africans accounting for 90 per cent.

In order to ensure regular labour supplies, in 1900 and 1912 the Chamber of Mines established two African labour recruiting agencies: the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA) to recruit from Mozambique, Malawi, Rhodesia, and Angola; and the Native Recruiting Corporation (NRC) to recruit within South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. These agencies recruit for fifty one gold, copper and platinum mines of the Witwatersrand and Orange Free State while smaller agencies recruit for the coal mines of Natal.

In order to ensure adequate labour supplies from local sources, the Native Land Act (1913) was enacted to allocate only 13 per cent of all national land (usually the less fertile) to Africans who then constituted over 90 per cent of the total population (87 per cent). This created the desired land hunger which in turn released many Africans for work in the mines and on white farms.[3] With population pressure and absence of subsequent land redistribution, it is no wonder that one of the hardest hit African areas—the Transkei (a 'Bantustan'—the South African term for cheap labour reservations located within South Africa itself)—in 1969 supplied over 170,000 migrant workers with most going to the mines. Even as early as 1955, a government commission reported that in the Transkei and Ciskei, on an average 360 families were occupying land which could barely support 103.[4]

Africans in South Africa try to avoid mine work as safety and working conditions are very bad and wages are much lower than in industry. Most of those going to the mines come from cheap labour reservoirs or 'Bantustans'. This explains why up to now South African mines rely on foreign African labour to the tune of 70 per cent of the work force. In 1961 the average annual African wage in manufacturing was R370 while it was only R146 in gold mining.[5]

The disparity between white and African mine wages finally reached a 20:1 ratio in 1969 as a result of a series of legal measures dating back to 1889 when it was 7.5:2. Since that time the average African nominal wage has risen from R57 a year to R199 in 1970. The corresponding white wage rose from R666 to R4,006 per year over the same period. In real terms, Francis Wilson found that white earnings were constant from 1911 to 1946 and increased steadily thereafter attaining a net increase of 70 per cent by 1969, but real African wages fell by 8 per cent up to 1946 and by 1969 they had merely attained their 1911 levels.[6]

In each labour-exporting state, labour recruitment is regulated by a labour agreement or convention between the recruiting agency and the state. Recruiters are issued with permits or licences for which they pay varying amounts in fees, depending on the number to be recruited. These agencies in turn sub-contract the work to 'runners' who do the actual search for recruitees. These runners are also licensed. Once a recruitee is brought up, the agency pays a head tax to the government of the labour-exporting state. In many cases the recruitee himself pays a certain sum, apparently for the 'privilege' of going to work in the mines.

Malawi, Mozambique and Lesotho provide the largest contingents to the mines outside of the 'Bantustans' as the average annual recruitment for 1969 to 1973 in the table below shows:

TABLE 5A

AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF RECRUITMENT TO GOLD AND PLATINUM MINES AND COLLIERIES[7]

Country	*Numbers*
Swaziland	7,000
Botswana	20,000
Mozambique	100,000
Malawi	120,000
Lesotho	100,000
South Africa	100,000

Sources: Republic of South Africa, *Bulletin of Statistics*, and *Financial Mail;* Botswana, Central Statistical Office: *Statistical Abstract;* Lesotho, Bureau of Statistics; *Annual Statistical Bulletin*; Swaziland, Central Statistical Office: *Annual Statistical Bulletin* (several issues). Labour Commissioners provided extra information.

3 Francis Wilson, *Labour in the South African Gold Mines 1899–1969*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972; and Sheila vander Horst, *Native Labour in South Africa*, Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1942, give an excellent review of the history of this period.
4 See, South African Government, *Summary of the Report of the Commission for Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa*, Pretoria, 1955, p. 113.
5 Francis Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 169.
6 *ibid.*, p. 46.
7 These figures are extremely rounded and are very broad indications only. They exclude migrant farm workers whose numbers are even less certain.

The Mozambican arrangement has a long history. It dates back to 1909 when Portugal and South Africa signed the Mozambique Convention under which Portugal has annually supplied no less than 100,000 African men to work at any one time in the mines in return for deferred payments and taxes payable directly to Portuguese authorities in Mozambique. In 1928, the convention was amended to include a 'gold option' under which Mozambican African labour has earned gold for metropolitan Portugal itself. Upon recruitment, Africans sign a twelve- to eighteen-month contract under which they get their full wages for the first six months, but are paid only 40 per cent for the balance of their contract. The rest is transferred to the South African Reserve (Central) Bank. Every three months the Bank of Portugal through its subsidiary in Mozambique, Banco National Ultramarino, exercised its option to receive the deposits either in foreign currency (rands) or in gold at the official price of $42 per ounce since the Smithsonian Agreement (or at $35 per ounce, before). Portugal almost always preferred gold.

The gold bars were shipped to Lisbon through Lourenco-Marques. Portugal then payed the miners in local escudos upon their return to Mozambique.[8] At wage rates prevailing in 1974, Portugal could easily have realized an annual profit of at least $75 million if it had resold the gold on the world market at current prices of $170 per ounce.

The other labour-exporting states are very unlikely to have obtained the terms that Portugal had. Malawi has subsequently banned all fresh recruitment for the mines in the aftermath of the 1974 crash of a plane, in Botswana, carrying new Malawian recruits to South Africa.

In response to Malawi's ban and to uncertainties surrounding the likely policy of a new African government in Mozambique, South Africa concluded, effective from 1 January 1975, an agreement with Rhodesia to supply 20,000 recruits annually on initial one-year contracts. The number is projected to rise to 100,000 per annum over a five year period.[9]

With governments operating with dwindling revenues, especially in the aftermath of the food-crop and energy crisis of 1973 and 1974, the example of the Portuguese has since been emulated by all other labour exporters. By agreement with South Africa, the wage retention clause has been amended, again effective from 1 January 1975, to require 60 per cent of the worker's wages to be deducted and remitted directly to authorities in the labour-supplying country. The worker would then be paid in local currency after the state has deducted head and income taxes.

The new terms soon sparked riots at mine sites and resulted in a mass exodus of workers from South Africa. This was especially serious in Lesotho[10] where the underdevelopment effects of South African exploitation are so glaring and where the line between official ineptitude and collaboration is particularly thin.

Most of the recruits come from remote areas of the exporting countries. The mines prefer recruits of this kind as they are said by mining officials to be 'undemanding, obedient and disciplined'.[11] By the end of their tour, at most 20 to 25 per cent of the labourers are estimated to have acquired any technical skill, and from 60 to 65 per cent return home as unskilled as ever. About 10 per cent become assistant (to white co-miners), supervisors or 'boss boys' in local colloquialism. According to laws designed to protect white miners against potential African competition, only the white miners are allowed to perform skilled jobs.

South African mines are known for their bad safety and working conditions. In 1964 the death date from accidents was officially put at 2.25 per thousand, so that out of 348,294 miners employed that year, 784 died from mining accidents.[12] During the last 30 years, on average, 560 African miners have died from underground mine disasters each year.[13]

8 See *Financial Times* (London), 16 October 1974, and 4 March 1975, p. 5.
9 *Financial Times*, 4 February 1975, p. 23.
10 *Financial Times*, 9 January 1975 and *The Economist* (London) 18 January 1975, pp. 45–46.
11 See United Nations Unit on Apartheid, *African Labour in the Mines of South Africa*, No. 20/73 (1973), p. 4.
12 Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, *Report of the Board of Directors* for 1964, Johannesburg, May 1965, p.2.
13 According to official reports cited in the London *Observer* (16 September 1973), p. 12.

Health conditions are also deplorable. Silicosis and other lung ailments cripple many. As soon as a miner is diagnosed as having this disease, he is repatriated to his home country (usually to await a slow death) accompanied by only a small lump-sum gratuity. In 1964, in one mine (Whitbank) 109 accident victims were compensated a total of R8,967, averaging R82 each.[14] Working conditions are so bad and the work load so heavy that the mining companies themselves have estimated that by the prime age of between 40 and 50 years, many returning recruitees are physically worn out.[15]

Recruitees range in age from 15 to 50 years, the greater number (65%) being between 20 and 35. The majority of those who are married are separated from their families during the period of the contract and are not allowed to leave the mine premises except for occasional approved trips into a neighbouring town for shopping. They live in compounds which are fenced off from surrounding areas. Within each compound there are a number of dormitories which hold 100 to 200 people per room. Workers sleep on triple-decker concrete beds.[16]

The average length of a contract that the recruitee signs with a mine is nine to twelve months, with maximum extensions up to eighteen months or two years at a time. This amounts to a complete turnover every one and a half or two years—hence the need on the part of mining officials constantly to pursue new recruits. For many reasons in economic terms this process is very costly to the mines.

In the first place, the high turnover means continual processing, fresh training or retraining (usually lasting between 4 and 9 days) for each recruitee. By the time a worker is confident in his job he is about ready to return home except in the case of contract extensions. Even these extensions are limited to a maximum of two years without interruption. The loss in productivity is obvious. But in view of the low-skill content of most African mine work, the loss in training should not be exaggerated, especially if one consideres the fact that once the miner has gone through the training period, the company tries to extract as much as possible out of him in terms of longer working hours and low wages.

In fact it is easy to see how the mining companies extract a net gain from this system of temporary migrant workers. The high-turnover rates prevent African miners from organizing trade unions with their potential for promoting nationalism and class consciousness. Formation of such unions could well set the stage for a calling into question of the entire socio-economic structure, not only in South Africa, but also in their homelands where this modern form of human bondage receives direct or indirect official endorsement.

Secondly, the short term contracts are very convenient to mining authorities who are thereby absolved from providing pensions, sick pay and other benefits that generally accrue to workers under normal long-term working arrangements.

On the other hand, the labour-exporting states do realize some foreign exchange and revenue. But one should not lose sight of the fact that to obtain these earnings over 45 per cent of Lesotho's labour force (numbering over 250,000 in 1972) had to be committed to South African farms and mines; and for Botswana about 25 per cent of the male population of between 15 and 54 years is usually in South Africa. It is upon these and similar drawbacks that the next section will dwell, arguing for a basic reversal of the cheap-labour-exporting policy pursued by these states.

14 Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, *op. cit.*, p. 2.
15 See South African Government, *Summary of the Report of the Commission for Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa*, Pretoria, 1955, p. 95.
16 I gathered most of this information in interviews: first, with two NRC recruiting agents at Mbabane, Swaziland, 31 July 1973; second, with the Lesotho and Botswana Labour Commissioners in Maseru and Gaberone in August 1973; and finally from interviews with ten former Malawian recruitees in Blantyre in September 1973. The information gathered in these interviews only served to corroborate and complement what is already available from publications.
17 M. Harris, *Portugal's African 'Wards'*, New York: American Committee on Africa, 1958, p. 28. This is corroborated by Duffy, *Portuguese Africa*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959.

Reappraisal

In evaluating the migrant labour system, the underdevelopment effects and the tendency towards increased dependence that the system fosters will serve as our analytical base.

Many of the countries exporting cheap labour to South Africa have come to depend increasingly on this 'option' to provide employment for an expanding population. This option has certainly mitigated the trend of population migration from rural to urban areas of the source countries as young Africans go to the Rand, Kimberly and to Natal collieries and farms straight from the rural areas of Lesotho, Malawi, Botswana, etc. This might help to explain the fact that the cities and towns of Botswana, Swaziland, Malawi and Mozambique are proportionally smaller (*vis-à-vis* the total population) than those in other parts of Africa.

Dependency on South Africa in this sphere in many cases substitutes for the development of an independent employment policy on the part of these governments. Since manpower constitutes a nation's most important resource, employment policy becomes a major sector of any meaningful economic development strategy especially for countries with relatively high labour-to-capital ratios.

In many countries we are examining, labour policy is designed in such a way as to leave rural workers without much choice except to migrate to the mines. In colonial Mozambique, in particular, this policy bordered on physical coercion as those who could not find employment in the narrow urban sector faced emigration or arrest as vagrants or parasites:

> 'When the hunt for *shibalos* (or vagrants) is intensified in a particular district, the recruiting posts of the W.N.L.A. (the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association), which are strategically placed throughout southern Mozambique, are suddenly deluged with Africans anxious to sign mine contracts'.[17]

External dependence in the employment area in time becomes self-reinforcing to the extent that labour-exporting governments eventually develop a vested interest in the continuation of the unfair labour arrangement. For example, a few years ago when Botswana suggested to Lesotho and Malawi that they jointly negotiate for higher wages and better conditions for recruits from their territories working in the mines, the latter balked for fear of jeopardizing the 'gains' which they thought they were getting under existing arrangements.

There are a number of underdevelopment effects on the labour-exporting countries which derive from the migrant labour system as a whole; and it is to these that we now turn. Given (i) the pattern of contract extensions and renewals and (ii) the fact that the majority of recruits are between the prime ages of 20 and 35 years, the absence of this most vigorous and productive sector of the population obviously retards development at home, especially in the rural areas from which they spring. It is not hard to see how the migration system has a depressing effect on agricultural output and overall rural productivity. In rural Lesotho it is obvious to the naked eye that those who remain on the farm—usually women and children—cannot carry the burden effectively.

Many studies have been undertaken to assess the impact of the exodus of male labour from the rural areas to the mines and farms of South Africa. In a study on Botswana, Schapera found reverses in agricultural productivity: 'Owing to labour migration, many people are no longer available at home to attend the routine tasks of tribal life, and as a result both animal husbandry and agriculture have suffered.[18]

In an examination of a typical African rural district within South Africa itself, Houghton and Walton found the rural exodus responsible for rural blight and stagnation: 'In many cases land is not ploughed for the simple reason that there is no one to do the ploughing'.[19] Furthermore, an examination of the

18 I. Schapera, *Migrant Labour and Tribal Life*, London: Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 230.
19 Hobart Houghton and E. Walton, *The Economy of a Native Reserve*, Petermaritzberg: Shuter and Shoter, 1952, pp. 112–114.

trade statistics of Botswana and Lesotho reveals a trend towards greater and greater reliance on food imports. Ironically, the supplier is South Africa, and it would not be surprising if most of these food imports were produced by migrant labourers from these countries. Underdevelopment at the periphery and increased dependence on the centre clearly spring from the same sources—the migrant labour system.

According to the standard neo-classical theory of economic development, the underdevelopment of these peripheral states derives from 'structural characteristics' of low savings, low *per capita* incomes, low productivity, etc., which could be remedied by international aid and local effort. But it seems to us that these states are underdeveloped, and are becoming increasingly so, because of their incorporation as satellites to South Africa which exacts labour inputs from them and harnesses them to provide a market for its products.[20]

It is often argued that labour finds its way into mining work in order to supplement low family earnings resulting from poor harvests which are in turn blamed on poor soils, bad weather, excessive soil erosion and low carrying capacity of rural land. In many cases, poor performance on the part of rural land springs from neglect—lack of measures to conserve the soil through manuring, irrigation, proper crop rotation, and so on. Even bad weather in the form of drought in many ways springs from a backlog in tree planting as rural vegetation is removed to provide fuel and building materials. One can see, therefore, that general neglect in preserving the rural ecosystem to a large extent has its genesis in labour shortages (both in terms of numbers and quality) which are created by the labour-exporting system itself.

Furthermore, neo-classical 'economic growth' men have argued that in labour-surplus economies, labour can be pulled out of agriculture without affecting productivity which means that the marginal product of labour in agriculture is zero, if not negative. Needless to say, such theoretical possibilities lack empirical content, especially in Southern Africa where one would not just be removing labour at random, but removing the best workers (both in terms of creativity and physical vigour).[21]

In view of early physical exhaustion, health and other hazards attending recruitees one wonders how beneficial the continuation of the migration system is to the labour-exporting countries. It seems that the South African economy is not satisfied with breaking one generation of rural labour (especially the vital 20 to 35 year group), but its policy of high labour turnover ensures the breaking and tearing down of succeeding generations of the rural sector's most vital resource. As a result the labour-exporting peripheral state has no choice but to fall back on its own resources in order to repair and reproduce fresh labour supplies. Even the meagre government revenue originating from labour-recruitment fees and taxes would hardly be sufficient for medically rehabilitating the sick and exhausted. From an immediate fiscal standpoint therefore, the whole operation would appear to be ruinous to the peripheral state.

A number of observations could be made on the general economic picture. To begin with, income repatriated home by recruitees could be higher if the wages were reasonable. Widespread strikes in 1973 and 1974 resulted in large percentage wage increases, but these gains are minimal when one considers the low levels in the base period and the rate of inflation associated with the two years. Moreover, African wages would have to rise by many thousands per cent to come anywhere near parity. It is clear from various sources that present wages are at, or even below subsistence level in which case wages paid are just enough to ensure that the workers have sufficient energy to report for work.[22]

20 For a generalized treatment of the workings of these underdevelopmental processes and mechanisms, see recent contributions by S. Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale* (vols. I & II), Monthly Review Press, 1974, and Andre Gunder Frank, 'The Development of Underdevelopment', *Monthly Review*, vol. 18, no. 4, September 1966.

21 On a more human level, mining recruiting agents and some ill-advised government officials offer as benefits the opportunity to earn the bridal price or dowry that mine work accords, as if rural Africans would not get married in the absence of the modern money economy heralded by the mining industry.

22 See 1973 hearings before the British Parliament; House of Commons, Expenditure Committee (Trade and Industry Sub-Committee), 'Minutes of Evidence on Wages in South Africa', *Command Paper no. 268* (i–x), London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1973: see evidence by De Beers, Consolidated Gold Fields and by Prof. Charles Harvey and Adam Raphael.

In view of the fact that a disproportionately large amount of mine work assigned to recruitees is of very low-skill content, the potential gains on this front are also minimal; it appears that for the overwhelming majority, the only skill acquired or 'instilled' is an ability to obey orders, as the recorded opinions of mine officials cited earlier indicates.

Repatriated earnings and deferred pay when deposited in the local peripheral economy usually go to the savings counters of Barclays and Standard Bank—the two ubiquitous relics of British colonial presence. These banks, controlled as they are from regional headquarters in Johannesburg, usually recycle these savings back to South Africa or lend to local foreign enterprises (generally South African and British) which normally remit the proceeds to South Africa or elsewhere in the form of profits, dividends, interest and royalties.

Where earnings by recruitees are spent on consumption, South African-based and other foreign retail chains, such as Edworks, O.K. Bazaar and Woolworth, are only too ready to absorb these savings. Moreover, returning miners would have acquired consumption tastes geared to South African products during their tour in the mines, so that any hopes on the part of locally-based consumer industries are similarly aborted.

It is evident that the famous linkages and spread-effects of a labour-exporting strategy are at the best minimal. Therefore labour-exporting, if it could be regarded as a 'growth pole' at all, does transmit growth, not to the peripheral economy, but to the labour-importing centre.

Concluding Remarks

While one understands the anxiety of governments in pushing to provide employment opportunities, one ought to be alert to avoiding a full-employment policy that works perversely—as the cheap-labour-export model has shown. Full employment should not be looked at abstractly, thereby ignoring important dynamic effects of the policy. After all, black slaves on the cotton and sugar fields of the southern part of the United States had full employment on the plantation. But that worked only to impoverish the slave and enrich the slave owner.

As underdevelopment effects deepen and dependency increases, humanitarian calls for better conditions (to achieve labour 'commitment'), the provision of family housing (to end the seasonality of the work force) and calls for unionization will increase, as if a fractured leg requiring surgery could be cured merely by providing better bandages. At the periphery, such policies would only improve the delivery of more and better labour services to the centre and avoid structural changes that would jeopardize continued participation in satellite status.

After almost a century of 'participation' in the prosperous South African mining economy, the rural populations of Lesotho, Mozambique and Botswana still live more or less in abject poverty. Our analysis has shown that the poverty at the periphery is not merely independently juxtaposed with the prosperity at the centre of the sub-system, but that these are interconnected in a mutually supportive manner.

Hence, any meaningful agricultural development policy for the peripheral states of southern Africa has to take as one of its bench-marks the dismantling of the migrant labour system.

Agricultural Cooperation and the Development of the Productive Forces: Some Lessons from Tanzania

H. Mapolu and G. Phillipson

I

This paper discusses the relationship between agricultural cooperation and the development of its productive forces. We take Tanzania's policy of 'Ujamaa' and the associated villages (agricultural producer cooperatives) as the example for our analysis. The argument presented is that to begin with cooperation in agriculture is essential for the overall development of the productive forces in African economies, but it is not a sufficient condition for this development in so far as the development of local industry—particularly that which manufactures instruments of labour—is either negligible or totally absent. Secondly, we argue that for these conditions to exist, that is for cooperation to act genuinely as a lever for the sustained development of the productive forces (hence within a specific form of industrialization), there must be a definite political framework whose social base is the class/classes with an objective interest in revolution.

The agricultural sector in central capitalist social formations has been penetrated by the capitalist mode of production in a manner characteristic of the uneven development of capitalism itself. Samir Amin, for instance, distinguishes three phases: the first one in which the role of agriculture is to supply the nascent capitalist sector with manpower and raw materials to help realize primitive capitalist accumulation; the second in which agriculture is left out of the rapid growth of productive forces in the industrial sector; and the third when agriculture itself becomes not only the supplier of raw materials for industry but also the recipient of various industrial products which will serve as inputs for the transformation of the mode of production in agriculture itself.[1] In a similar manner, P.P. Rey mentions three stages in the articulation of capitalism with 'the modes of production in which agriculture and petty craftsmanship are closely associated'.[2] His stages coincide rather well with Amin's, but put more emphasis on the role of landed property in the articulation process.

It is only during the latest stage, then, that the development of technology transforms agriculture in any meaningful manner as is testified by the rapid growth of productivity in this sector experienced by most capitalist societies at the centre (although, to be sure, many underdeveloped areas remain in the countryside of those societies where peasant relations of production still resist capitalist penetration). In the social formations of the periphery, on the other hand, stage three has not generally been reached (except marginally and in a distorted way, as for instance in India's so called Green Revolution) due to the particular nature of the articulation between the capitalist and pre-capitalist modes in those societies. The necessities of accumulation on a world scale, and the complex nature of the totality formed by the central and peripheric social formations, make it both difficult and unnecessary for capitalism to transform the rural societies in the same way that it did in Western Europe (or North America in altogether different conditions). These limits, both economic and political, inherent in the capitalist mode of production in the age of imperialism will probably not allow most of the periphery social formations to reach stage three at all, and a socialist revolution is thus necessary to achieve any significant improvement in the harmonious development of the productive forces.

In Africa, this problem of the productive forces in agriculture multiplies a hundredfold. Here, not only is agriculture the overwhelming economic sector in terms of the population's involvement—hence the socio-economic transformation presenting itself essentially as a transformation of rural life—but the tools and skills available in this sector are extremely primitive in relation to the historical period in which they happen to be involved. The era of colonialism has at best stultified the productive forces found in Africa at the initial period and at worst has actually caused them to degenerate by eliminating vital skills and various industrial activities already achieved in Africa by the time colonization began.[3]

In an economy such as Tanzania's where the general development of the productive forces in agriculture does not exceed the level of the 'two acres and a hoe' described in the agricultural literature, cooperation is the only way of introducing a higher form of division of labour through; (a) increasing the surface of cultivated land; (b) developing skills through specialization, (c) pooling resources for the purchase of machinery, implements and inputs in general that would be above the capacity of any one small producer, and (d) planning the total manpower resources by allocating them over extended periods so as to reduce and eventually do away with the underutilization of labour at slack periods which is so typical of peasant agriculture (this of course can only be achieved once and for all by the widening of employment opportunities outside agriculture itself). Furthermore, since the development of the productive forces specifically includes the development of the general abilities of the producers themselves, cooperation—if successful—should enable progressive ideas to take root more firmly in all aspects of peasant life and through cooperative self-management and decision-making give the direct producers more control over State apparatus at the local level, thus enhancing their participation in running the economy at national level. Obstacles on this road are numerous, of course, since the very underdevelopment of the productive forces and their scattering over the countryside create a considerable degree of opacity between the decisions and their results which will not be eliminated until production is *socialized* in the real sense of the term.[4]

But cooperation as such does not have a clear-cut class character. It takes on its class characteristics from the general strategy of development in which it is inserted, which is in turn an expression of the interests of the ruling class (or alliance of classes) in each particular social formation. It should be needless to point out that only the domination of the proletariat in alliance with the toiling peasantry (and progressive elements from other classes) can determine that overall socialist character of agricultural cooperation (the same would be true of nationalization in industry). It is a well known fact that many governments in Africa, and the Third World in general (even during the colonial period), have favoured agricultural cooperation in order to; (a) increase their political control of the rural producers, and (b) increase the surplus extracted from them at least cost. The mere existence of agricultural cooperation is thus by no means proof of a truly socialist strategy.

The historical experience of the Chinese Revolution has shown that the harmonious solving of the contradictions existing *inter alia* between agriculture and industry have a vital bearing on the expanded growth of the productive forces in both sectors. 'Walking on two legs' is, then, just as basic an element of socialist strategy as 'self-reliance' is and, in fact, the absence of the former all but nullifies the latter. Either the inexistence of an industrial base leads to the stagnation of productive forces in agriculture or—more often—to a heavy *de facto* reliance on imported technology and expertise which reinforces the links with imperialism.

The lack of industrial sectors in African economies has often grounded many attempts at bringing about 'rural development' including the rarer attempt at producer cooperatives. Reliance on imported tools and technology has time and again caused the failure of many projects, as the supply of such tools and technology has failed to be sustained over time for various reasons, or the tools have proved unsuitable for the local physical conditions, and many other complications that have been discussed many times.

The model of development adopted by People's China for the combined and integrated growth of the agricultural and industrial sectors—and to which an amazing number of 'development strategists' both in western and Third World countries pay lip service without in the least intending to emulate it—stresses the decentralization of projects and their management at the lowest possible level, thus promoting the diffusion of modern technology in the countryside and furthering the masses' control over it and subsequently their creative contribution to it. The indispensable frame for the successful application of this strategy has, of course, been the collectivization process which led from individual family farming through mutual aid teams and producer cooperatives to the creation of People's Communes. The different stages of the transition have always been marked by an increased participation of the masses in the class struggle, both against renascent differentiation in the countryside and against the threat presented by the entrenchment of a State bureaucracy. The process of collectivization is thus not a formal or 'organizational' solution to the problems of the peasantry but a manifestation of the ever present class contradictions in the society and the necessary way to solve them. It is first and foremost a *political* process.

We are far from the 'solutions' proposed by experts such as those of the World Bank, who at various times in the early years of Tanzania's independence recommended several types of 'rural development' policies which all failed. Perhaps it is appropriate here to remind ourselves of these experiences if only to show up the technical aspect of their failure. Through the 'transformation approach' recommended by a World Bank mission,[5] Tanzania, soon after independence in 1961, started some 23 'settlement schemes' on which were settled more than 3,400 rural families.[6] These were very capital intensive projects; the total cost after the two years they lasted (before they were abandoned as a failure) was more than Shs 18 million, and this is excepting the vast administrative and other expenses incurred outside the individual schemes themselves.[7]

The capital inputs on this case could not be justified by the productivity that finally resulted from the investment. Above all, however, the machinery imported was quite often dormant—due either to a lack of spare parts and various other technical ingredients or the skill necessary to use or repair the machinery properly. Thus the lack of an indigenous technical foundation made it difficult for production to rise and for the imported machinery to have a multiplier effect on the production process as a whole.

Another attempt by the government to create 'block farms' with the assistance of Israel and other aid donors soon met the same fate. The idea was to acquire tractors which would plough large areas of land, which would also be sprayed aerially if necessary, but which would then be divided into small plots to be taken care of by individual peasants.[8] Again this degree of mechanization could not be maintained for long and its results were anything but impressive.

All these deficiencies are of course in addition to the inappropriateness of the social organization for the projects—for although at the technical level resources had been pooled together, the production process was actually individual in character. Thus there never developed the social organization that is essential if the technical innovation is to bear any long term fruits.[9]

We shall therefore go on to examine Tanzania's attempt to create producer cooperatives and how they relate to the question of the development of the productive forces.

II

The policy of 'Ujamaa Vijijini' (Socialism and Rural Development) launched by President Nyerere after the adoption of the Arusha Declaration by TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) in 1967, has received considerable attention from scholars and commentators from various parts of the world, and no more than a sketch of its theoretical and ideological background will be given here.[10] As developed by the party leadership, and most elaborately by President Nyerere himself, the policy of

Ujamaa aims at organizing the Tanzania peasantry in self-reliant productive units where the major means of production would be held in common and the returns shared according to every member's contribution in labour. The model approximates rather closely to the classical definition of an agricultural producer cooperative, although in the official Tanzanian ideology the roots of the policy are said to be found in the traditional practices of cooperation among members of extended families, clans or traditional village units in Africa.[11]

It should be noted that there is a strong 'villagization' component in this policy, i.e. it is considered desirable to organize the peasants into village units of a substantial size, contrary to the settlement patterns prevailing over most areas of Tanzania. This component has tended to become more and more dominant in recent years, culminating with the present villagization drive aimed at regrouping the entire Tanzanian peasantry into large villages by 1976. At times this villagization component has been a much more prominent factor in the implementation of Ujamaa villages than the organization of collective production, local officials being satisfied with the mere regrouping of peasants into one village after having stuck the 'Ujamaa' label onto it.[12]

The policy recognizes three stages in Ujamaa development: stage one (the formative period) represents the grouping of villages in one place with communal production non-existent or minimal; stage two should be reached when the village constitutes a viable economic unit and the villagers have learnt to live and work together; and in stage three the village is to be registered as a 'producer and marketing cooperative society', meaning, in principle, that most of the production is now carried out on a collective basis and organization is sufficiently advanced for the unit to have legal recognition. In fact, as pointed out by several authors[13], the attribution of villages to these three categories is quite haphazard and some villages can be officially classified as belonging to stage three when there is hardly any communal production at all.[14]

The spread of Ujamaa villages (whatever the reality covered by this designation) has been very uneven in the country's regions as can be seen in Table 6A. In some regions the overwhelming majority of the population has 'gone Ujamaa', whereas in others the proportion is between 1 and 2 per cent. The present villagization policy, started in 1971 in Dodoma, in Kigoma in 1972, and extended to the whole country in September 1973, has added to the ambiguity. For instance, it is not clear whether the new 'development villages' (the official designation for the villages formed by regrouping the population) are supposed to emphasize the collective aspect in production or not. In Dodoma district where the move started earliest and where practically the whole population has been grouped in large villages—at times as large as 5,000 people—all these units have been labelled 'Ujamaa villages'. Actually, the development of collective farming seems to be just as varied in these planned villages as in the earlier more sporadic forms, and it is probably too early to make a comprehensive statement at this stage.[15]

Another element needing emphasis is the steady trend away from participation and initiative at grass-roots level and the ever greater concentration of power in the hands of the bureaucracy. Although the official policy stresses the need for the initiative in starting an Ujamaa village to be entirely in the hands of the peasants concerned, authoritarian decisions from above have by no means been rare, and varied pressures combining threats with promises have often been at the basis of the decision to form Ujamaa villages. Another factor not to be underestimated has been the competition between various groups of peasants for government aid.[16]

The villagization programme has accentuated these features, and starting a village is no longer seen as an autonomous decision emerging when given groups of peasants have reached a certain level of consciousness, but as the implementation of a decision taken at national level and put into practice by the regional and district authorities according to a rhythm of their own. The specious argument that villagization is compulsory for 'nation building' purposes whereas collective production can be decided only by the villagers themselves, is belied by the example of Dodoma where in the drought-stricken areas villagers can have access to famine relief only if they can prove to have put in a certain number of work days in the collective field. A recent statement by the President (18 February 1975) that members in Ujamaa villages should be carefully scrutinized and their commitment evaluated before being allowed to join, is not likely to be anything other than a pious wish given the reality described above.

TABLE 6A

NUMBER OF UJAMAA VILLAGES AND TOTAL MEMBERS BY REGION

Region	*1970*	*1971*	*1972*	*1973*	*1974*
Arusha	25 5,200	59 14,018	92 19,818	95 20,112	110 25,356
Coast	56 48,300	121 93,503	185 111,636	188 115,382	236 167,073
Dodoma	75 26,400	246 239,366	299 400,330	336 378,915	354 504,952
Iringa	350 11,600	651 216,200	630 207,502	659 243,527	619 244,709
Kigoma	34 6,700	132 27,200	129 114,391	132 114,391	123 111,477
Kilimanjaro	9 2,700	11 2,616	24 5,009	24 4,934	14 3,176
Mara	174 84,700	376 127,371	376 127,370	271 108,068	111 233,632
Mbeya	91 32,900	493 64,390	713 98,571	715 103,677	534 86,051
Morogoro	19 6,000	113 10,513	116 23,951	118 19,732	96 25,509
Lindi	285 70,673	592 203,128	626 175,082	589 169,073	339 218,888
Mtwara	465 173,027	748 371,560	1,088 441,241	1,103 466,098	1,052 534,126
Mwanza	28 4,600	127 18,641	211 32,099	284 49,846	153 40,864
Ruvuma	120 9,000	205 29,433	205 29,430	242 42,385	184 62,736
Shinyanga	98 12,600	150 12,265	123 15,292	108 12,052	134 18,425
Singida	16 6,800	201 51,230	263 59,420	263 59,420	317 141,542
Tabora	52 16,700	81 18,408	148 25,115	174 29,295	156 28,730
Tanga	37 7,700	132 35,907	245 77,858	245 77,957	255 67,557
W. Lake	22 5,600	46 9,491	83 16,747	85 13,280	77 15,968
Rukwa	— —	— —	— —	— —	121 24,988
Dar es Salaam	— —	— —	— —	— —	25 4,713
TOTAL:	1,956 531,200	4,484 1,545,240	5,556 1,980,862	5,631 2,028,164	5,008 2,560,472
Average per village:	272	345	357	360	511

Note: figures in the top row refer to the number of villages, while those at the bottom refer to the total population in the villages.

A very important consequence of the growing commandist trend in the bureaucratic implementation of the Ujamaa policy has been that democratic decision making about production targets, division of labour and sharing of the returns which should all be included in the village plan, has been too often removed from the villagers themselves and entrusted to 'experts' from district or regional headquarters. The wealth of knowledge of, and adaptation to, the local environmental conditions which lie dormant among the peasantry cannot be drawn upon and the foreseeable result is that unrealistic decisions are taken and imposed (through persuasion or compulsion) upon the peasants, with negative or even catastrophic results in production output. This in turn increases the passivity of the peasants who feel that they are working 'for the government' and put the minimum effort into their communal production, saving all their energies for their individual plots.[17]

This situation, of course, is by no means unknown in other countries, including the 'socialist ones', and finds its roots in the class structure of the society in question. As far as Tanzania is concerned we cannot here go into a further analysis of this class structure,[18] but we must point out certain characteristics of the relationship between the bureaucracy and the peasantry: the power of the bureaucracy is largely justified ideologically by the fact that they are the possessors of a type of 'knowledge'—i.e. Western technocratic—from which the peasants are radically estranged. They are 'experts'. The constant display of this 'knowledge' is thus a necessity for the reproduction of this relationship of command and subservience. Trying to engage in a dialogue with the peasants would considerably weaken the position of the bureaucracy, for it would more often than not disclose the purely ideological nature of this 'knowledge' and its irrelevance to concrete development tasks.[19]

The introduction of modern technology in the villages will thus be faced with the consequences of this situation. New agricultural practices, new implements, etc., are presented from above to the 'ignorant' peasants as steps which are progressive in themselves, with little prior study of local conditions. Tractors, for instance, are the object of a bureaucratic display of 'modern agricultural techniques' and sent to villages which have for one reason or another met the favour of the district officials or appear to them as being particularly deserving (a notorious example is that of a village lucky enough to have an M.P., or some other high official, among its members[20]). Very often, costs are not taken into consideration, returns are very low due either to the nature of the crop or to the lack of other inputs which would be necessary to achieve higher yields (weeding and harvesting are very frequent bottlenecks), and the only result of their introduction is to have increased the leisure time of the villagers during the cultivation period.

This use of means of production as 'prizes' or 'rewards' to villages which the bureaucracy favours can have as its only result the further estrangement of the villagers from modern technology—always received from above—and planning, since information on costs and productivity are never made available to them beforehand.[21] For instance, a village which has been allocated say, ox-ploughs, will find itself penalized in comparison with its neighbours who would have 'enjoyed' the benefit of having a tractor at their disposal, even if the use of the tractor brought a loss in financial terms. This attitude is emphasized by the bureaucracy who often look down upon 'primitive' implements such as ox-ploughs and consider mechanization a conspicuous sign of progress. On the other hand, villages which have earned the displeasure of the bureaucracy will find themselves with neither inputs nor technical assistance and will not be able to make full use of resources which might be just as promising.

This vertical relationship, which always places the peasants at the receiving end in passive dependence, must be considered the major obstacle to any rural development strategy in Tanzania, and it is certainily a more important one than environmental constraints or the low ideological level of the peasant masses. It is fairly obvious that with the limited capital resources at the country's disposal, labour must be relied upon as the major productive force in the Tanzanian countryside and its better organization is the key to any further success. Only the villagers themselves are in a position to assess their manpower resources and democratically direct them towards the most valuable activities. It is necessary to put the planning process into their own hands and let them have access to the information vital for this process. It should be the role of the local cadres to give them this information and help them reach viable targets instead of bossing them around. It is only within this democratic framework that the development of productive forces, making the best use of the scarce capital resources, can be set in motion.

There is some doubt as to whether this can actually be achieved in the present Tanzanian class context without revolutionary change.

III

In order to assess the difficulties to be overcome in the process of developing the productive forces in Tanzania's countryside, it is necessary to focus on meaningful units of analysis. We will make the district our main focus. Districts are generally fairly homogenous geographically and socially and their importance has been all the more enhanced with the decentralization process embarked upon in 1973. Since it is obviously impossible to give a description of all the districts of mainland Tanzania, we will deal with three, on account of both the variety of environments that they represent and the availability of data on Ujamaa villages.

(a) Lushoto District

Lushoto district (Tanga region) represents a fairly typical example of the overcrowded highlands of north eastern Tanzania which also include Moshi, Rombo and Pare districts in Kilimanjaro region, and part of Morogoro district in Morogoro region. Its highland part consists of the mountain block of West Usambara which is an island of high-rainfall country in an otherwise dry plain environment. Apart from a dry area in the north eastern corner, mainly the Mlola division, rainfall is generally sufficient to permit two grain crops per year and even three in the most humid zones (Bumbuli and Soni divisions). The mountains, once selected by the Germans for their very promising agricultural potential, have become an area of increasing erosion. Furthermore, the soils are not very favourable for coffee—the main cash crop—compared with the rich volcanic soils of Kilimanjaro, for instance, and after the coffee boom of the early fifties, returns have decreased almost to insignificance.

Most peasants have coffee plants in their banana plots but devote very little attention to them outside the harvesting season. Tea and vegetables have been introduced as substitute cash crops but they are only suitable for certain areas and the main problem remains that of competition between land requirements for cash and food crops. Holdings per family are around four acres and do not allow more than subsistence production; furthermore, the habit of dividing land equally among all male children has led to extreme fragmentation. In part, this pressure on the land has been resolved temporarily through constant emigration, particularly of young men to towns and perhaps more substantially to the less fertile plains. As a whole then, the tendency has not been towards the accumulation and concentration of land resources; such accumulation as there has been locally has taken the form of merchant's capital—and already one finds a fairly wealthy trading class concentrated in the 'trading centres'.

The creation of Ujamaa villages has been rather slow in the district due mainly to the fact that the villagization component of the policy does not apply. Contrary to the pattern prevailing over most of Tanzania, the Shambaa live mainly in clustered villages, often built on steep slopes so as to leave flatter land for cultivation.[22] Land scarcity is such that in certain areas practically no sizeable collective field can be created without alienating land from individuals.

The following are a few examples of villages in the district:

(i) Mayo (Bumbuli Division) created in 1969, had, in 1973, two acres of vegetables for 120 members. There were two working mornings per week, but since it is obviously impossible for all the members to be in the field at the same time, a working day actually represented not more than 80 to 100 man-hours at most. The product for the field between 1 January and 30 April 1973 was Shs 1,605.12. If we assume that these four months total 32 working days, the produce per working day is only about Shs 50.00, i.e. less than fifty cents per member.

(ii) Kwa Nguluwe (*Bumbuli Division*) created in 1972 with 71 adult members, had selected as its collective *shamba* (cultivated field) a large tract of uncultivated and unproductive waste land. They cultivated a quarter of an acre of onions in 1972 and nothing at all in 1973, devoting their time to non-agricultural activities.

(iii) Malibwi (*Mlola Division*) created in 1970, had, in 1973, a ten-acre maize *shamba* for 500 registered members (this number includes children, and productive members can be estimated at around 130). In 1971 they produced 4 sacks of maize, valued at Shs 160.00, and in 1972, 10 sacks valued at Shs 400.00. In 1973 the harvest was nil 'because of drought'.

It can easily be seen that these figures are much too low to attract the existing members, not to speak of the potential ones. Taking into account the environmental conditions, i.e. the mountainous nature of the district, tractorization is hardly applicable, except maybe in a few rare instances of flat valley lands. Development of the productive forces has thus to be seen initially as consisting mainly of intensification of labour, improvement of skills, and the use of various ingredients in the labour process (fertilization, irrigation, quality control of seeds, soil conservation, etc.). Obviously such steps cannot bring substantial results in the existing socio-economic framework which makes for drastic fragmentation of land resources, chronic unemployment/underemployment, concentration of efforts on export crops and close domination of the producers by the parasitic traders and bureaucrats who, as in the case of the 'marketing cooperatives' and 'marketing boards', tend to be one and the same. In other words, therefore, the lack of such policies and the very limited possibility of their success, should they ever be attempted, are defined in the last instance by the political economy, not of Usambara as such, but of the country as a whole.

The role Ujamaa villages can play within the present context is obvious: by providing the opportunity to combine the labour force of relatively large numbers of people they can introduce an increased division of labour, specialization, and all that goes with them. At the moment, however, one sees very little division of labour in the villages—partly because nearly all of them have too few co-operative resources and partly because their production as such can hardly be considered sufficiently organized for development. In most cases, Ujamaa work consists simply of the juxtaposition of individual efforts which, moreover, are insignificant even as far as the individual peasant is concerned. For instance, in Mayo Ujamaa Village each member is allocated a given task on the small plot (e.g. cultivating a ridge of about six square metres) and he can do it at a time of his choice. Once the task is accomplished his name is entered in the register by the secretary.

Following the emphasis of the leadership generally, the villages understandably concentrate on producing export crops—even when, as in this case, natural conditions are more favourable for other crops. Lushoto district has ample potential for vegetables, fruit and dairy products. Looked at from the standpoint of internal economic needs, these would probably be more appropriate than coffee—but as is well known, export promotion makes for a very irrational pattern of production. In any case, as long as the Ujamaa *shamba* remains so ridiculously small, communal production will remain nothing but symbolic.

The question of land conservation is of course vital. In the colonial period the authorities tried to enforce conservation measures through compulsion; peasant resistance was strong[23] and the measures could not be implemented. It is unlikely that the present bureaucracy can do better, given the same socio-economic conditions, and in fact some parts of the district (e.g. Mlola Division) have almost reached a point of no return as far as erosion is concerned. The success of anti-erosion measures can only be based upon the general level of agricultural skills which had already been developed traditionally—irrigation, manuring, mulching, etc.—and particularly upon the transformation of the mode of production. It is within such a transformation framework that the problem of unemployment/underemployment would also be tackled. The placing of agricultural production on a scientific footing would be the basis of the development of non-agricultural activities, which nevertheless would be integral to agriculture. At present one sees in the villages a few haphazard activities: Malibwi, for instance, has a metal working unit which produces watering cans, most of which are sold in Lushoto town since their unitary price is beyond the reach of most peasants. In general, at the moment, the reservoir of traditional skills is not only not stimulated and developed, but is in most cases not utilized at all. Thus one finds many unemployed masons, bricklayers, carpenters, tailors, etc., in a situation where the natural resources are plentiful and the need for their products, judging from the poverty of the mass of the people, is definitely there.

Apart from the smallness of each Ujamaa village—as far as the production process is concerned—the lack of a political programme to bring social transformation in the country as a whole precludes the possibility of integrated activities and plans across a number of villages in the district. Thus resources and skills are fragmented to the extreme and individual efforts to end exploitation or irrational forms of organization at the local level cannot but be immediately frustrated. The very nature of the relationship between the bureaucracy and the peasantry leads to competition between villages rather than cooperation—each village trying to get more favours for itself, the ultimate result is invariably that the peasantry cannot be an immediate force *vis-à-vis* the bureaucracy and are therefore incapable of extracting resources from the bureaucracy, except for those which the latter unevenly and haphazardly dish out.

The critical issue, therefore, is that at the moment the Ujamaa villages cannot escape from the general socio-economic web which militates against the development of the productive forces. As we have seen, the Ujamaa units are an infinitesimal part of the Usambara economy, and their organization and planning are too backward to warrant a process of development in the villages different from non-Ujamaa activities. In fact, it might even be argued that the introduction of symbolic production activities simply detracts valuable time and material resources from desired and useful activities and hence, in that sense, is a hindrance to the development of the productive forces.

(b) Sukumaland

Sukumaland is the large cotton belt engulfing six districts[24] immediately to the south of Lake Victoria. It is generally flat terrain, interrupted only sporadically by small hills. Natural vegetation has largely been destroyed by extensive cultivation and cattle rearing, and one finds large stretches of land totally devoid of even the smallest shrubs. In part, this is a result of the large concentration of cattle in the area—for there are more cattle per unit of land in Sukumaland than in any other area in Tanzania. But perhaps a more important reason for this is the gigantic expansion of the area under cultivation that has been going on in Sukumaland during the last three decades.

Soils are relatively good and rains are also average—conditions which have given the area a considerable capacity to support both animal and crop husbandry on a scale hardly equalled by any other area in the country.[25] Hence the area carries a relatively high population density.[26]

Since colonial days, Sukumaland has assumed greater and greater importance in the economy of the country as a whole, as cotton has come to take an ever greater proportion of export earnings.[27] Cotton production, as a smallholder crop, was introduced into the area by the German administration at the turn of the century. After the Second World War the British laid very great emphasis on cotton cultivation in Sukumaland and tried a series of 'development' projects aimed at raising productivity.

For historical reasons pertaining to the political status of the Colony, and because of the meticulous attention required in cotton production, the colonial government never attempted any of the large-scale projects requiring large investments in this area, despite the pressing need for cotton by British industry. Instead, efforts were channelled almost exclusively into improving the productivity of the smallholder farmer. Above all, efforts have been concentrated on expanding the total land area under cotton cultivation.

The immediate consequence of these efforts has been the rapid expansion of the average proportion of land under cotton per household. At the end of the war, there was less than an acre of cotton per household on the average; now the figure is about three and a half acres—just over a third of the total cropped area on the average. This expansion has, of course, been at the expense of food crops grown in the area, particularly since cotton, unlike coffee for instance, is never inter-planted with other crops. Nevertheless, a further consequence has been the even more rapid expansion of Sukumaland. Because of this incursion of cotton into subsistence production and the need to maintain large tracts of land for the huge cattle herds, the population in the area has been constantly shifting into neighbouring areas which are less densely populated. In fact, this shift was at first consciously induced by the colonial government in the fifties through a 'resettlement' plan which moved a large proportion of the people from the more densely populated districts of Mwanza and Kwimba into the neighbouring districts, chiefly Geita. Since then, 'Sukumaland' has gradually expanded, as both cotton and cattle have moved with the population into the neighbouring regions of Tabora, Kigoma, Mara, etc.

The overall result of this has been a tenfold increase in cotton production. But this increase has resulted solely from the expansion of acreage under cotton;[28] the peasants' productivity having by and large remained stagnant despite concerted efforts to exhort them to plant and harvest early, to weed and burn stocks properly, to use insecticides and fertilizers, and so on. Although the area has received by far the highest concentration of field assistants from the various technical ministries, and although various official projects have been attempted there, neither cotton husbandry nor productivity have improved appreciably.[29]

A crucial aspect of this failure to improve productivity has been the negligible impact which the rapid commercialization of production in the area has had on the instruments of labour. The local beneficiaries of this commercialization have been essentially those engaged in intermediary activities —chiefly transporting and trading of all sorts. Such surpluses as have been appropriated by these elements have not found their way back into agricultural production but—where they have not been wasted in conspicuous or bureaucratic consumption—have been invested in the urban areas in non-productive spheres such as houses for rental, shops, petrol stations, etc.

Furthermore, as far as the producers themselves are concerned, this commercialization has not led to a rapid process of social differentiation as has been the case elsewhere. There definitely has not emerged a substantial *kulak* class with a firm base in land and cotton production, instead one has a fairly strong class of both Asian and African traders who are very wealthy and expanding their activities everywhere except in production.

Cotton cultivation has therefore remained a peasant crop, and most work is done by household labour using mainly hand tools. Increasingly, however, ploughs and tractors are playing a bigger role —but again this has resulted from attempts by the traders to maximize their profits through having a firmer grip over those who produce the wealth. Tractor hiring has become a very lucrative business for tractor owners.[30] The productive forces thus continue to be at a very low level because of this social structure. The importance of fertilizers and insecticides is continually stressed by the authorities but again without much success since the resources of the actual producer are so limited as a result of his exploitation by the trader—not to speak of the unequal exchange between his product and industrial goods on the international market.

We have already referred to the 'block farms' that were started by the independent government in the sixties in Sukumaland with a view to creating farm sizes that would allow mechanization and in some cases, aerial spraying. Since, in actual fact, production in these farms continued to be individual in character there could not develop the social organization necessary for the technical organization to bear long term fruits; and in any case, as we have seen, this technical capacity in a situation of under-development was bound to be extremely limited both in the long and short run.

With the launching of the policy of Ujamaa villages in 1967, several of these units began to emerge in Sukumaland more or less spontaneously. As elsewhere in the country, these units were very varied in nature—some had a substantial degree of communality while others performed co-operative activities more or less in a symbolic manner, some were reasonably well organized while others were in total disarray. We shall now concentrate on Mwanza district as a case in point. Table 6B summarizes the growth of these units in the district.[31]

With the introduction of an official policy of Ujamaa, attention increasingly focused on the established villages. These units began to receive priority in the allocation of government resources, field assistants were increasingly stationed in them and in some cases came to be seconded permanently to individual villages. The tractors that had been used in the previous attempt to establish 'block farms' were in some cases handed to individual Ujamaa villages, but in most cases were retained by the authorities to be loaned free of charge to successive villages during the cultivation season. The immediate problem that arose with this 'tractorization' was, once again, that of breakdowns. Often tractors were grounded just at the time when they were needed most, and often, too, the reason for this would be the lack of a simple spare part which nevertheless had to be ordered abroad. At times, however, even when such spare parts were readily available, the skills and experience required did not exist at grass-root level—as usual no plans had been made to train at least a few peasants in the rudiments of tractor maintenance. Hence the physical presence of tractors in any Ujamaa village did not necessarily mean that the production process was mechanized.

TABLE 6B

UJAMAA VILLAGES IN MWANZA DISTRICT

	Villages	*Households*	*Men*	*Women*	*Children*	*Total*
1969/70	16	822	1,027	769	1,548	3,344
1970/71	42	1,493	1,689	1,367	4,171	7,227
1971/72	76	3,053	3,043	2,164	7,088	12,295
1972/73	75	3,343	3,519	2,387	7,973	13,879

Nevertheless, another issue that cropped up as far as mechanization was concerned was the correlation between the tractor's capacity to cultivate land and the labour force required to carry out the other productive processes on land not touched by the tractor. For, in this case, the tractor could only plough the land and make ridges, but weeding, applying fertilizers and insecticides, and above all picking and grading the cotton, continued to be done manually.[32] Thus, where mechanization expanded the area under cotton cultivation, these processes became unbearable for many small-and average-size Ujamaa villages. The average size of Ujamaa villages in the district is 45 households with limits of 7 and 263 households.

Because of the emphasis put on cotton by the authorities, most villages naturally have tended to put more of their land under cotton, hence exhausting their capacity to mobilize their labour resources. We encountered a village of less than twenty households which, with the generous assistance of government tractors, had cultivated so many acres of cotton that not even five times their number would have been able to weed the field efficiently and harvest the crop. In the end, more than half of the crop had to be left to rot in the fields.[33]

This problem was of course multiplied by the inadequate organizational ability of these units to effectively mobilize their labour resources for cooperative activities at this early stage when the benefits of such activities are as yet unclear to the participants. Based on a sample of nine villages in Mwanza region, it was found in 1969/70 that the proportion of utilized to available labour on cooperative activities was 52.9 per cent for males and 56.6 per cent for females (with the lowest turn-out for some months being 52.4 per cent and 24.9 per cent for males and females respectively).[34]

Indeed, the problem of production in the Ujamaa villages has been an issue at national level, for in most cases it has been found that while single fields cultivated by them are very large, in actual fact they are insignificant in terms of the labour force available to them. This, however, is not simply a question of the peasants being deceived by the apparently large size of their collective endeavours, but essentially it is a question of the extent to which the peasant can depend on the cooperative farm when, invariably, its organization is most uncertain, and experience has taught him that 'development' projects initiated by the authorities always fail, and that it is he who suffers most from the failure. His caution is therefore quite understandable.

In a sample of 24 villages in the district, it was found that in 1973, 42 per cent of the villages did communal work for three days in the week, 21 per cent for four days, 8 per cent for five days, and only 4 per cent for six days per week.[35] Needless to add, the length and intensity of the working day are equally varied. In the 75 villages in the district, a total of 7072 acres of communal plots was cultivated in the 1971/72 season, which means that on an average there were 45.2 acres per village and 0.9 acres per person who took part in Ujamaa work[36]—an average that is definitely much below the average production in the area even when one takes into account the fact that villagers in nearly all cases also had substantial private plots.[37]

As far as the application of fertilizers and insecticides is concerned, the formation of Ujamaa villages has had some positive effect. This is because the authorities have been able to enforce their instructions more effectively; the chemicals are delivered to the villagers as a matter of course (the villagers are compelled to pay for them when they market their produce), and the actual presence of government staff in some of the villages has the effect of making sure that instructions are followed—particularly if the villagers, as is always the case, are expecting other forms of government assistance (e.g. education, health, water supply, famine relief, etc.). Yet, it cannot definitely be claimed that productivity in these units has increased in any substantial manner—at least if the present inability of the villages to attract many new members is anything to go by.

Thus, once again, we see that it is the social structure that is the basic cause of the low level of the productive forces and, particularly, of the lack of any significant progress. The Ujamaa villages as production units within this structure cannot be expected to avoid this general problem. Undoubtedly, the extent to which Ujamaa organization and production have developed cannot be compared with the Lushoto case. The efforts to increase cotton production on the part of the authorities have meant that Ujamaa must be implemented more seriously here. Yet the ultimate results are hardly different from those encountered in Lushoto. In so far as the approach of the bureaucracy is that of issuing instructions and dishing out more or less haphazard technical assistance, in so far as this bureaucracy is essentially parasitic on the production process, and in so far as the producers are closely dominated and exploited by a commercial class with no interests in the production process itself, then the development of the productive forces cannot but be minimal, despite enthusiastic officials, and in some cases a population which is just as enthusiastic to implement the new policy of Ujamaa.

(c) *Handeni District*

Handeni District (Tanga Region) is on the eastern edge of the huge dry plateau that covers most of central Tanzania. Environmental conditions are very adverse to agricultural development; rainfall is low and unreliable—between 700 and 1000 mm—and there is little groundwater. Population density is about 10 per square km. The area has been subject to many severe food shortages in the past: one researcher[38] has numbered 22 years of food scarcity in the period from 1925 to 1972, i.e. almost one year out of two, and of these 13 years were considered particularly severe. Thus the major agricultural problem of the district is to provide enough food for its inhabitants from year to year. There is some doubt, so far, as to whether this can be achieved.

As is frequent in drought-stricken districts, the pressure from above to start Ujamaa villages was very strong in Handeni as early as 1968. From the point of view of the officials, it is easier to supply water and famine relief, and to exercise control, if the population is grouped in villages. It was made compulsory to be an Ujamaa village member if one wanted to get famine relief—although this measure was not always strictly adhered to in practice. By 1974 there were 82 Ujamaa villages in the district with 40,600 people representing almost 27 per cent of the district population.

Obviously, lack of land is not a problem in the area. The major constraint is time; it is vital for the villagers to cultivate an area as large as possible so as to counteract the effect of disastrous yields due to possible failure of the rains, and to do so as quickly as possible before the beginning of the rainy season. On the other hand, another major constraint will then be labour, since early planting almost necessarily means more weeding. The question of crop selection is also crucial; maize is the major staple in the district, but it is not as drought resistant as, say, millet or sorghum. On the other hand, the latter are very susceptible to attack by birds, so that much time-consuming watching must be done in the fields before harvest.

The problem of cash crops for the district has never been solved satisfactorily. One exception is sisal in villages such as Kabuku Ndani but these villages are hardly representative of the district and will not be dealt with here. The colonial authorities tried to enforce the cultivation of cotton but this always met serious resistance from the people since it meant diverting labour from the cultivation of food crops thus increasing the risk of famine, and for very little return indeed. In 1973, it was found[39] that only about 4.4 per cent of the Ujamaa land was under cotton in central Handeni, and only 2.4 per cent in eastern Handeni. Some researchers think that crops with higher unitary prices, such as tobacco, might prove more attractive to the villagers since 'they give such high returns that the harvest of one year can make up for the failure of the next'.[40] So far, however, tobacco nowhere reaches even 1.00 per cent of the total communal acreage.[41]

So, for some time to come, it is probable that the villages will mainly concentrate on food crops with the aim of achieving self-sufficiency. Even in this area, however, very little improvement in productivity has been realized. In fact, one researcher[42] gives figures for the average yields in communal plots as 1.8 times lower than on individual fields. He attributes this fact to the competition between labour requirements on individual and communal fields, where the individual fields always get the better share.

If the intensity of labour is lower, do the villagers at least make use of their larger numbers to cultivate more extensive areas? The answer here again is no. According to the same study, the average cultivated by one member is 0.3 acres for the district as a whole and, rather significantly, the higher the number of members the smaller the average cultivated per person. Komsala Ujamaa Village, with only 25 members, cultivated 54 acres in 1972 (i.e. 2.16 acres per person), whereas Kwekikhwembe, with 340 members, cultivated 24 acres (0.08 acres per person), and Mkata, with 713 members, only 110 acres (0.15 acres per person). It should, of course, be borne in mind that the number of members correlates only imperfectly with the actual attendance. In one village, the average number of attendants per week between January (cultivating season) and the first two weeks of June (just before harvest) fluctuated as follows:[43]

January	85.5	April	51.8
February	58.2	May	43.7
March	69.5	June	35.0

The very low returns on labour can explain this lack of enthusiasm: for a sample of 33 villages in the district it was estimated that the average yearly income per member—at prevalent producer prices—would have been only Shs 11.25.

It seems that the main reason for this stagnation, apart of course from the unfavourable environmental conditions, is that very little transformation of the productive process has taken place and new inputs have been either non-existent or under-utilized. Relatively little emphasis has been put on tractorization, probably because the risks of failure are so obvious. Instead, the use of oxen has been emphasized since 1971 and two training centres were set up in the region. The results however have been disappointing.[44] It appears that too little time was devoted to training the farmers, for whom oxploughing is an entirely new exercise. Even elementary care in feeding the oxen was neglected, so that many of them were too weak to work and eventually died (tsetse flies also represent a serious obstacle). Moreover, the attitude of officials towards the use of oxen is ambiguous; many of them would prefer tractors which they consider to be a better index of progress (see part II above) so that 'the worst of both worlds' is realized. Mechanization is either not there or unprofitable (one case is known in western Handeni where the same tractor was supposed to be ploughing the land in two villages, Msaje and Nkama, at the same time—places separated by 80 km of bad roads[45]) and ox-ploughs are not properly taken advantage of and do little good, if any.[46]

Much has been written regarding the innumerable problems that Tanzania's Ujamaa villages face as institutions. The issues that have been discussed most often are those concerning the almost complete lack of economic planning and organization, the shortage and haphazard nature of government technical assistances and the dire need for political guidance (see part II above). From a national point of view, however, the most crucial question has been the failure of the Ujamaa policy to make any positive impact on rural production.

Obviously, the low level of production and of the rate of progress in rural Tanzania cannot be explained outside an analysis of the existing social structure and of the manner in which the economy is linked to the international capitalist economy. Hence the fact that this particular policy has not proved to be a substantial basis upon which improvement in rural production could be generated arises from the failure of the policy to address itself to the fundamental problems of social structure and economic integration. In essence, therefore, the issue is really political: to be able to sufficiently mobilize and organize the masses in a manner which would extricate the economy from its domination and exploitation by international capitalism, requires a class base and an ideological perspective which hardly a single African government can be credited with at present.

It is therefore not accidental that the various attempts to bring about 'development' have generally failed to accomplish worthwhile results. As we write, the policy of Ujamaa villages has already begun to lose its official limelight and judging by the measures taken for the rural areas, especially since 1974, it is doubtful if the policy is going to last for long in practice. Increasingly the problems of a dependent and dominated economy have grown to such proportions that drastic measures have had to be resorted to in place of the gradual efforts to create producer cooperatives. By the end of 1973—i.e. just seven years after the policy of Ujamaa villages had been launched—the twin issues of declining foreign exchange reserves and shortage of foodstuffs due to the stagnation of the agricultural sector and worsening terms of trade for agricultural produce on the world market, had become too critical to be contained within existing policies.

What the Ujamaa village policy has tried to do is to raise rural production through political exhortation and enlargement of the peasants' scale of operations. Apart from cooperation, the policy has held constant the amount of technology available in these units, the idea being simply to combine the resources in the hands of the peasants for more rational utilization. It will be recalled that this policy was formulated in the light of the failure of earlier rural policies—particularly the 'settlement scheme' and 'block farms' approaches. These earlier policies had followed the line that it is only by rapid capital injection that rapid progress in rural production can be made, forgetting, as we have already seen, both the necessity for appropriate forms of social organization, and the structural requirements for the continued availability of those capital inputs. The resultant policy went to the other extreme—caring only for cooperative organization without providing for the technical strength without which even this form of social organization cannot be sustained for long.

The experience gained in the attempts to implement the policy so far, is that first, the units do not show any consistent improvement in production and hence in their members' standard of living. This fact leads to numerous social conflicts which are, of course, aggravated by the lack of enlightening ideological leadership from the officials. Therefore the units have a high tendency to disintegrate, a fact which obviously makes it more difficult to convince other peasants to form similar units. Hence success has been most difficult, whether one looks at implementation from the perspective of individual Ujamaa villages or that of implementing the policy in the entire rural economy.

The official response to this—and particularly to the problems of food shortage and declining foreign exchange reserves—has been to move from ideological exhortation to physical compulsion. At the beginning of 1974, it was suddenly decided to begin compulsory villagization—resettlement of the entire rural population into new areas where it is easier for officials to see to it that the bureaucratic instructions regarding agricultural production are followed by the peasants. Needless to add, the emphasis now is just on 'production', and the concept of cooperation has therefore lost much of its earlier prominence.[47]

Judging from past experience, it can hardly be expected that the new approach will solve the existing contradictions and lead to increased economic and social development. If anything, the attempts to increase export crops in the rural areas will only intensify the social contradictions basic to a dependent and dominated economy.

The argument presented here, therefore, is that the development of the productive forces under the system of underdevelopment (as everywhere) is first and foremost a political question. We therefore refrain from offering 'solutions' regarding the technical organization of cooperative production. For the failure to maintain tractors in Ujamaa villages, the lack of chemicals and better seeds, the failure to provide the peasants with political and technical guidance, are all structural problems arising both from the nature of the economy and the social basis of political power, hence they cannot be solved by any suggested improvement of 'techniques'.

As far as mechanization is concerned, the process is bound to continue to be one-sided and thus to fail to bring about any genuine overall development of the productive forces until an indigenous industrial base is constructed in these countries. For developing the agricultural sector of the economy necessarily means strengthening the industrial base at the same time, and as rapidly as possible (since time is vital), and beginning to make full use of the country's resources both in the industrial and the agricultural sectors. This process will definitely bring upheavals in the social structure, for it will be indispensable to mobilize the large masses of the people instead of leaving the decision-making process in the hands of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie—and this is a feat that the ruling classes in Africa just cannot accomplish.

Recognizing the problems that often arise when mechanical production is introduced in rural Africa, some have concluded that mechanization *per se* is inappropriate: 'The governments of developing countries must realize that the continuance of hard labour in agriculture is not shameful but a rational response to the prevailing circumstances.'[48] This is nothing but a defence and rationalization of those 'prevailing circumstances', for the masses of Africa definitely need mechanization so as to increase their cultivable area, increase yields, reduce fatigue, and so on—only the political organization needed for this is at the moment absent.

Others have urged much more 'cautious' mechanization: for instance, Dumont has suggested that the tractor should come only in stages—the first steps being directed at increasing the quality of work with hand tools and improvement of these hand tools themselves; then attempts should be made to introduce insecticides and fungicides, manures and fertilizers. He says, 'When the spread of these new means of production has allowed a fairly significant yield level to be reached, and when the knowledge of husbandry and mechanical knowledge are raising it more quickly, then one can think of the tractor'.[49] These reformist approaches have been tried both by the colonial governments and their successors without any measurable success.

The underlying assumption of these 'solutions' is the idea that Africa is still at an early socio-economic level, long left behind by the developed countries. Analysing the failure of the colonial government to institute mechanical farming of groundnuts in Tanganyika, one author asked: 'Is it possible for

Africa to go direct from the Middle Ages to the twenty-first century? Can you cut out the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, which was its aftermath?'[50] The fact is that Africa is in the second half of the twentieth century, like Europe, America and the rest of the world—and not in the Middle Ages. As has now become a cliché, development and underdevelopment are two sides of the same process of capitalist expansion.[51]

This is not to suggest that the most complex aspects of mechanization, chemicalization, etc., ought to to be introduced immediately all over Africa and that hand tools, ploughs, etc., have no role to play. That this is not so should be clear from the earlier discussion. The basic point made here is that a certain political framework is necessary if technical processes of various kinds are to bring about an overall development of the productive forces and thus improve the living conditions of the masses.

Footnotes

1 S. Amin et K. Vergopoulos, *La question paysanne et le capitalisme*, Paris, 1974.
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3 W. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Dar es Salaam, 1972.
4 cf. C. Bettelheim, *La transition vers l'économie socialiste*, Paris, 1968, and *Calcul économique et formes de propriété*, Paris, 1970.
5 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Tanganyika*, Baltimore, 1961.
6 J.R. Nellis, *A Theory of Ideology: the Tanzanian Example*, Nairobi, 1972.
7 The story of these schemes has been retold many times, see, for instance, A.O. Ellman, 'The Introduction of Agricultural Innovations through Cooperative Farming', *East African Journal of Rural Development*, vol. 3, no. 1, 1971; L. Cliffe and G.L. Cunningham, 'Ideology, Organisation and the Settlement Experience', in L. Cliffe and J. Saul (eds.), *Socialism in Tanzania*, vol. 2, Dar es Salaam, 1973; and N. Newinger, 'Village Settlement Schemes,' in H. Ruthenberg (ed.), *Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania*, Munich, 1968.
8 J.D. Heijnen, 'The Mechanised Block Cultivation Schemes in Mwanza Region, 1964–69', Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, Research Report no. 9, Dar es Salaam, 1969.
9 For case studies of settlement schemes in tropical Africa, see R. Chambers, *Settlement Schemes in Tropical Africa*, London, 1969.
10 The policy document, 'Socialism and Rural Development', by President Nyerere is reprinted in his *Freedom and Socialism*, Dar es Salaam, 1968.
11 cf. L. Cliffe, 'Traditional Ujamaa and Modern Producer Cooperatives in Tanzania', in C.G. Widstrand (ed), *Cooperation and Rural Development in East Africa*, Uppsala, 1970; and H. Mapolu, 'Tradition and the Quest for Socialism', *Taamuli*, 1973.
12 cf. P. Raikes, 'Ujamaa Vijijini and Rural Socialist Development', East African Universities' Social Science Conference, 1973; H. Mapolu, 'The Social and Economic Organisation of Ujamaa Villages', M.A. thesis, 1973 (mimeo).
13 cf. the case of Ikwiriri Ujamaa Village in H. Mapolu, [12].
14 cf. unpublished research papers by sociology students in Dodoma district.
15 cf. P. Raikes, *op. cit.*, and M. von Freyhold, 'Rural Development through Ujamaa', Dar es Salaam, 1972, for all the problems cited.
16 cf. P. Raikes, 'Village Planning for Ujamaa', *Taamuli*, 1972.
17 See [16].
18 cf. the various studies by I. Shivji, *Tanzania: the Silent Class Struggle*, Dar es Salaam, 1973 and *Class Struggle in Tanzania*, Dar es Salaam (forthcoming).
19 For a similar view of the role of the bureaucracy in another African country, see G. Althabe, *Oppression et libération dans l'imaginaire*, Paris, 1969.
20 For instance, the case of Butiama Ujamaa Village in Mara region has been studied by J. Bugengo, 'Ujamaa in Mara', East African Universities' Social Science Conference, Dar es Salaam, 1973 (mimeo).
21 cf. Raikes, [16].
22 On the general problems of development in Lushoto district, see M. Attems, in H. Ruthenberg (ed.), *op. cit.;* and L. Cliffe, W. Luttrell and J. Moore, 'The Development Crisis in the Western Usambaras' in L. Cliffe *et al.* (eds.), *Rural Cooperation in Tanzania*, Dar es Salaam, 1975.
23 cf. L. Cliffe, 'Nationalism and the Reaction to Enforced Agricultural Change in Tanganyika during the Colonial Period', in L. Cliffe and J. Saul (eds.), *op. cit.*
24 The districts are Mwanza, Geita, Kwimba and Magu in Mwanza Region, and Shinyanga and Maswa in Shinyanga Region.
25 cf. D. Conyers *et al.*, 'Agro-Economic Zones of Sukumaland', BRALUP Research Report, no. 16, Dar es Salaam, 1970.
26 The density is 63 persons per km^2 for Mwanza Region (the highest among Tanzania's regions) and 21 persons for Shinyanga Region.
27 Cotton now contributes about 30 per cent of all agricultural export earnings, and Mwanza and Shinyanga regions contribute about 75 per cent of the country's cotton produce.
28 cf. BRALUP, 'Preliminary Report of the Sukumaland Interdisciplinary Research Project.'
29 Cotton yields in Tanzania for 1971/72 were 205 pounds per acre, compared to an average of 241 for Africa as a whole, 243 for Asia, 296 for E. Europe, 479 for North America, and 645 for W. Europe: *Cotton World Statistics*, July 1972.
30 Ox-ploughs are not very popular since their ability to cultivate the land well enough for cotton is more limited.
31 H. Mapolu [12], p. 68.

32 According to the *Tanzania Cotton Growing Handbook* prepared by the Lint and Seed Marketing Board and the Ministry of Agriculture, the labour requirements for an acre of cotton in Sukumaland are: 8 man-days to '*sessa*', 11 man-days to ridge, 2 man-days to sow, 4 man-days to tie-ridge, 4–6 man-days to weed per weeding, 2 man-days to apply fertilizer, half a man-day to spray. Picking and grading takes 60 pounds per man-day and 40–100 pounds per man-day respectively.
33 This was quite common particularly from 1968 to 1970 all over Tanzania.
34 R.D. Sharma, 'Manpower Utilization in Ujamaa Villages', Ukiriguru Research and Training Institute Report.
35 H. Mapolu [12], p. 85.
36 [12], p. 70.
37 According to R.D. Sharma ('Studies in the Economics of Farm Management in Sukumaland and West Lake Region'), the average farm size in Sukumaland is about 4 hectares with limits of 1.81 hectares and 6.13 hectares.
38 S. Sumra, 'The Development of Ujamaa Villages in Handeni', Economic Research Bureau Paper, 1975.
39 [38].
40 M. von Freyhold, *op. cit.*
41 S. Sumra, *op. cit.*
42 [41].
43 [41].
44 [41].
45 Unpublished research reports by sociology students, 1974.
46 M. von Freyhold, *op. cit.*
47 cf. A.C. Coulson, 'The Evolution of Rural Policies in Tanzania', ERB Paper, 1975.
48 M. Hall, 'Mechanization in East African Agriculture', in G. Helleiner (ed.), *Agricultural Planning in East Africa*, Nairobi, 1968, p. 109.
49 R. Dumont, *Tanzania's Agriculture after the Arusha Declaration*, Dar es Salaam, 1968.
50 A. Wood, *The Groundnut Affair*, London, 1950, p. 245.
51 cf. A.G. Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*, New York, 1967.

Focus on Research

RESEARCH FOR DEVELOPMENT: THE INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

The Institute for Development Studies (IDS) is a multi-disciplinary as well as multi-purpose organization. It was created in 1965 as a response to a strongly felt need for organized, full-time research on urgent and long term social, economic and cultural problems of development. Until 1970 the Institute had two divisions, the social science division and the cultural division. The social science division has become the present Institute for Development Studies, while the cultural division became the Institute for African Studies. The IDS is an integral part of the University of Nairobi and is treated on a par with the other faculties.

The bulk of the resources and staff time of the Institute are devoted to research. The research programme is designed to mirror the high-priority social and economic problems of development; it emphasizes East Africa, but the broader problems of the African continent are also considered. It is concerned both with basic, long term development problems as well as with more immediate pressing policy issues.

The research carried out at the Institute is published in various forms. Working Papers provide a medium for initial discussion of research proposals at the regular seminars held at the Institute which all interested persons, especially social scientists and members of Government ministries and other organizations concerned with development, are welcome to attend. Discussion papers, which have a worldwide circulation, incorporate complete research. Many of them are eventually published in local and overseas professional journals. The Occasional Papers present findings of larger research projects as well as proceedings of conferences and workshops convened by the Institute. The Monograph Series contains book-length studies carried out by Institute members and published by commercial publishing houses. Technical Papers, which describe various computer aids and software produced at IDS and at the University Computer Centre, and Subject Bibliographies are prepared occasionally and issued free on request.

In addition to the regular IDS seminars, specialized workshops and conferences are held to disseminate research findings and promote knowledge of specific areas of development policy. Last year (1975) the Institute held two workshops which attracted wide interest and promise to stimulate important further research. At the first workshop discussion took place on a food and nutrition strategy for Kenya. Interest in the deliberations of this workshop is now culminating in the development of new policy-making machinery in this important area within the Kenya Government. The second workshop considered the potential for intermediate technology, particularly animal-drawn agricultural implements, for the small farms of Kenya. In collaboration with the National Christian Council of Kenya, Government research stations and the Faculty of Agriculture, IDS is now assisting in the systematic testing of tillage equipment to evaluate the economic potentials of ox-drawn cultivation methods.

Over the past year, one of the primary activities of the Institute has been to assist the Kenya Government in its second evaluation of the Special Rural Development Programme. Papers written by IDS staff and other members of the University include an evaluation of rural credit schemes, a report on group extension techniques which have been extremely successful in areas where they have been tested, a report on the labour-intensive road building programme, and a report on the efforts to assist Kenyan women through special community development activities. The final report will be issued as Occasional Paper No. 12.

Research on rural development will continue with studies of rural income distribution and differentiation, and an evaluation of the Ministry of Health's new integrated programme for maternal and child care, nutrition counselling and family planning. In addition, the Institute will continue its research projects related to equity in development, focusing particularly on income distribution, differentiation in the countryside, the role of the State and state apparatus in development and the growth of different forms of capital, internal and international.

The research expertise of the Institute is also used through consultancy and advisory services by staff members. Institute staff have acted as consultants to ministries in the Kenya Government, the East African Community, voluntary agencies and international and bilateral development organizations. In addition, members of the Institute have served on a wide variety of working parties and commissions set up to investigate specific problems of development.

The Institute pursues a number of training activities with the purpose of adding to the local pool of research capability and specialist knowledge. It has attempted, through its programme of Junior Research Fellowship, and research supervision and guidance by senior scholars, to provide opportunities for Kenyans to engage in and complete research for doctoral dissertations. Members of the Institute staff also make a contribution to the teaching programmes of the University in the faculties of Agriculture, Arts, Education, Commerce and Law.

The core support for the Institute's activities is provided by the University budget. In addition, several national, bilateral and international agencies have provided financial support for various components of its programmes. Among the important sources of assistance are the Kenya Ministry of Finance and Planning, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Danish International Development Agency, the Swedish International Development Authority and the British Overseas Development Administration.

The Institute is keen to keep in touch and cooperate with scholars from other institutes and universities and particularly those from Third World countries with research interests in the social sciences and related disciplines. Over the years the Institute has been assisting persons interested in conducting research in Kenya by encouraging them to associate with IDS as 'Research Associates'. Persons interested in associating with the Institute in this way are welcome to write to us for further information. In addition, the Institute is interested in fostering a relationship with other African social science research institutes.

To sum up, the main functions of IDS are research and related activities, a teaching contribution in the relevant departments of the University, the training of East African social scientists, the provision of facilities for visiting scholars qualified and prepared to make a significant contribution to the research programme of the Institute, and the diffusion of research findings to the widest possible audience.

INSTITUT FONDAMENTAL D'AFRIQUE NOIRE (IFAN): (FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR TROPICAL AFRICA)*

IFAN, whose initials formerly stood for the French Institute for sub-Saharan Africa, was founded during the colonial period. After independence, it was renamed Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire (IFAN) and became a public institution attached to Dakar University.

To define its structure we must outline its historical background and explain its new orientations in the context of the harmonious development of the nation. For this reason we have planned this article as follows:

I. Historical evolution.
II. The research structures.
III. The administrative and technical structures.
IV. Achievements and new orientations.

I. Historical Evolution

We do not propose in this brief article to trace the whole historical evolution of IFAN, but we may recall some characteristic features. There were two main stages in the transformation of IFAN's structures:

(a) a colonial period (1931 to 1960),
(b) a period of decolonization (1960 to the present day).

(*a*) *IFAN during the colonial period*

Established in 1931, IFAN was geared to the purposes of colonial policy in the field of research. Its role was outlined in a 'pre-project' by a history 'agrégé'†, Albert Charton, in these words: 'The constitution of an African Science is a requirement of our colonial policy'.

Thus, on the lines of what was done in the Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia), the primary task of IFAN was to coordinate research work in the continent. For this purpose, informal journals (bulletins) were established; first the journal of the Committee for Historical and Scientific Studies of French West Africa, created on 10 December 1915 by Governor Clanzel, then this same journal changed its name to 'Bulletin' of the Committee for Historical and Scientific Studies of French West Africa, and has now become the Bulletin of IFAN. Centres were set up at Saint Louis, Abidjan, Conakry, Bamako, Niamey, Porto-Novo, Wagadougou, Douala, Lome and in Mauritania. During this period, some personalities of outstanding scientific talent helped the Institute to flourish; in particular, Theodore Monod, Doctor of Science, who was one of the first pioneers, Jean Richard Molard who founded the Geography Section in 1945, Georges Balandier, Rene Guitat, Hampathe Ba and many others who all devoted their knowledge and skill to the cause of research.

After this first phase of laying foundations, IFAN became part of a federal University of Dakar established by decree No. 57240 of 24 February 1957, and another decree of 21 March 1959, supplemented by Order 3118 of 31 March 1959, which turned the Federal IFAN into an institute of the University of Dakar.

*Translated from the French.

†Translator's note: the 'agrégation' is a competitive state examination for admission to posts on the staff of lycees and universities (post MA level).

(b) The period of decolonization

The year 1960 was a historic one for the states of sub-Saharan Africa which attained their sovereignty. The federation broke up and the states, jealous of their sovereignty, redefined their scientific structures with orientations in line with their ideologies. However, in the field of education and research, it must be stressed that the process of inter-African cooperation managed to save the institutes and establishments formerly serving the needs of education. Hence the inter-African vocation of IFAN was not undermined; on the contrary, it was strengthened by a vertical collaboration with the former colonial power which maintained its financial and moral aid. Nevertheless, reforms were tried out and the Institute was marked by two stages which gave it a new lease of life. The years 1968 and 1973 were characteristic of this post-colonial period.

And 1968 was an important stage in the history of the university. In France the protest movement of May 1968 had completely changed the university structures; the faculties were split up and stress was put on inter- and pluri-disciplinary education combined with research. In Dakar, the partially French university experienced the same upheavals. The integration of IFAN into the university was carried out under the direction of two Frenchmen, Vincent Monteil and Pierre Fougeyrollas, the former being an Islamologist and the latter a sociologist. Thus there was added to the former research role of IFAN that of teaching, assumed by research scholars who lectured in their respective faculties.

Another decree of 1973 (73390, 30 April 1973 to 5 May 1973) laid down the new conditions of the organization and functioning of the Institute. This decree set out IFAN's research role in the general provisions of Article 1 of the decree in these terms: 'The Institute is responsible for initiating and promoting scientific studies concerning sub-Saharan Africa in general and West Africa in particular'. The decree redefined the organs of IFAN, i.e. the governing body, the scientific committee, the Director, the departments and services.

That is, briefly, the historical background, which clearly shows that the authorities wished to provide IFAN with an autonomous scientific staff whose main activity would be research. By examining the research structures, we can show how the organization of departments and the establishment of research programmes correspond to this continuing vocation of research which IFAN had assumed ever since its creation.

II. The Research Structures

(a) The Department of Social Science

This department comprises five researchers and is headed by Abdoulaye Diop Bara, Lecturer (maître assistant) in the 'Faculté des Lettres' who is completing a doctoral thesis on the Wolof people. This department has planned its research work in several directions:

(i) rural sociology; the study of the social structures of the peoples of Senegal (Wolof, Serer, Toucouleur, Diola). This section is analysing family and kinship and the various social stratifications.

(ii) socio-economic problems; the study of the land tenure structures, land reform, the changes in traditional society under the impact of modernism (a study being conducted since 1973 by Mamadou Niang, head of the economic and legal section, Doctor of Legal Sociology, with a diploma in Comparative Law),

(iii) urban sociology; the study of the problems of housing and levels of living,

(iv) religious sociology, a study conducted by Yaya Wane, Doctor of Sociology and senior researcher (maître de recherché) at the National Centre for Scientific Research,

(v) the social psychology section.

Mrs. Fatou Sow, Doctor of Sociology, and junior researcher at the CNRS, has already completed several studies on the status of women in relation to development, and on the problems of level of living and housing.

Mrs. Solange Camara who is completing a doctoral thesis, is working on problems of nutrition among the Senegalese black Africans.

Apart from its research work, this department includes a technical assistant in the person of Oumar Gueye, who has 15 years' experience and has taken part in all the major surveys of IFAN. Oumar Gueye is at the same time a repository of oral traditions through his numerous contacts with informants.

(b) The History Department

Abdoulaye Ly, the first Senegalese to be a 'Docteur ès Lettres', former Minister of Health and head of this Department, has written a famous book on the peasant masses. He is doing research on the European expansion and the formation of underdevelopment in West Africa since the sixteenth century (the case of Senegal). His focus of interest also covers Senegal and West Africa between the Brazzaville Conference (1944) and the 'loi-cadre' ('outline-law' which led to the institution of the French Community) of 1956.

Others who have contributed to the work of this department are Sekene Mody Cissoko, lecturer at the Faculté des Lettres, who is working on the Mandingo civilizations; and another historian, Moussa Oumar Sy, who is concentrating on oral traditions. Camara Laye, author of *L'enfant noir*, who is working on the Mandingo civilizations, is collaborating in this history 'laboratory'.

(c) The Department of Geography

The Head of the Department is C. Barbey, lecturer in the Faculté des Lettres.

The department includes human geography and physical geography. Research is under way on the formation of dunes and deserts in general. The department is also contributing to the preparation of the third volume of the *International Atlas of West Africa*. Also working in this same department is Mme Diouf Ndeye Bineta Sene, who has a 'maîtrise' (master's degree) in geography.

(d) The Department of Prehistory and Protohistory

The Head of Department is Syr Descamps, lecturer at the Faculté des Lettres, Dakar University. There are also two researchers each holding a doctorate, Annie Ravise and Abdoulaye Sekhna Diop.

The aim of the Department is to advance the knowledge of West African civilizations in general and Senegalese ones in particular, for which there are no written or oral records. Several technicians and specialists are working there on the reconstitution and restoration of ancient ceramics. Cartology work for cataloguing sites is being done in collaboration with the Ministry of Culture and the Government tourism office. In 1974, the department held an exhibition dealing with prehistory which was visited by 45,000 people.

(e) The C 14 Laboratory

This department, planned by Cheikh Anta Diop, 'Docteur d'Etat ès Lettres', historian, linguist and physicist, is analysing samples of geological, geomorphological, prehistorical and archeological interest. The department is collaborating with several foreign institutes (the French Archaeological Mission in Ethiopia, the Paris Institute of Human Palaeontology, the University of Dahomey).

(f) The Department of Anthropology

The research scholar in charge, Guy Thilmans, is doing research on protohistory, studying human bone remains.

(g) Indo-African Languages and Civilizations

Dr. Upadyaya, Professor of Indian Studies, is conducting a comparative study of the Dravidian languages and the Negro-African languages. He intends to broaden this to an in-depth study of all the linguistic, socio-cultural and religious aspects. He is now working on a project for preparing a comparative etymological dictionary.

(h) The Department of Linguistics

In charge is Mme Arame Diop, 'Docteur 3e cycle'. With her is a researcher, Mlle Jeanne Lopis, who holds a 'maîtrise' in linguistics.

The Department's project concerns the use of the national languages in the educational system. The department is collaborating with the CLAD (Centre de Linguistique Appliquée de Dakar) in the preparation of a Wolof-French dictionary of 6,000 words.

(i) The Department of Islamology

There are four researchers trained in Arab universities. The department's current programme concerns the collecting of documents of all kinds written either in Arabic or in national languages using Arabic characters. These manuscripts cover several fields: history, pharmacopoeia, linguistics and geography. The department is also helping to prepare a history syllabus which will be taught in secondary schools.

(j) The Department of African Languages and Civilizations

The head is Lilyan Kesteloot, Professor of African Literature, author of an anthology of negro-African literature. The department is helping to prepare a card-index of documents concerning history in the oral literature.

(k) The Department of Botany

The head is researcher Antoine Nongonierma, assistant at the 'Faculté des Lettres' and the 'Faculté de Médicine Vétérinaire'.

The programme concerns the following fields: research related to the knowledge of all the flora and vegetation of West Africa; in-depth studies of particular taxonomic groups (family, genus, etc., in West Africa).

The department is collaborating with the Faculty of Science in connection with the supervision of master's degree courses in natural science.

(l) The Department of Vertebrate Zoology

The researcher in charge is Cisse Mamadou, Assistant at the Faculty of Science. Its activities include a study of the lizards of Senegal and study of all the vertebrates of the country and of West Africa. The department is in fact the reference point for all information concerning the vertebrate fauna of West Africa. The department has interdisciplinary relations with the Faculty of Science (the Department of Invertebrate Zoology, ORSTOM, and the Faculty of Biochemical Medicine).

(m) The Department of Terrestrial Invertebrate Zoology

The researcher in charge is Roger Roy, agrégé of the University.

The activities of the Department include the collection of terrestrial and marine invertebrates located in Goree; the identification of insects and their stomach contents and the identification of insects that are harmful to the crops of BUD-Senegal and the horticultural station of Camberene.

The department is collaborating on the West African level with Ivory Coast, Ghana, Cameroun, Upper Volta, and the Central African Republic.

(n) The Technical Departments

The publication services. There is one researcher in charge, Dominique Zidouemba, who is the holder of a master's degree in history. Two newsletters are published every quarter (A series for natural sciences, and B series for social sciences).

Other publications are *les notes africaines* (quarterly) and other irregular publications such as *memoires* (dissertations) of IFAN, introductions and African studies, catalogues and documents.

It should also be pointed out that on 24 October 1973, the department signed an agreement for publication and dissemination with the Nouvelles Editions Africaines (N.E.A.).

The library services. Oumar Diop, certificated lecturer in modern literature is in charge.

The documentation centre has a number of books and periodicals that are available to researchers. There is a reading room where foreign students and researchers can have access to the documentation. As regards exchanges, IFAN receives several collections and periodicals. Apart from the periodicals and files, the library has nearly 60,000 books.

As well as its research departments and technical services, IFAN hosts in its premises other research services or structures with which it collaborates. This applies to the Dakar Centre for Applied Linguistics (CLAD) and Rul 12 (Dakar-Holland) the inter-university project for research on urbanization and planning of urban extensions in the Cap Vert area.

We should also mention the IFAN museum department, which includes the Museum of African Art in the Place Tacher, the History Museum and the Museum of the Sea which are in Goree.

III. The Administrative and Technical Structures

After this brief glimpse of the history of the Institute and its research departments, we should mention the administrative and technical structures, without which IFAN would find it difficult to fulfil its mission.

IFAN functions with the help of the technical services, headed by qualified staff. For the last four years, Mahady Diallo, the chief administrator, assisted by his colleagues, has been looking after the sound financial management of this establishment, for which he recently received the congratulations of the State Inspectorate. IFAN's administrative structures comprise the accounts section, the personnel section and the technical services such as the car park and the carpentry services. We should also mention the secretaries/shorthand-typists who, being recruited by competition, can provide guarantees of competence and assiduity in their work which involves helping to prepare the documents written by the researchers.

IV. Achievements and New Orientations

Although it is too early to sum up the results of an old institution like IFAN which is increasingly dynamic, we can at least outline the recent prospects or new orientations that are emerging.

Since the last reform mentioned (decree 73 of 30 April to 5 May 1973), IFAN has been determined to assume its own responsibilities for research. The decree stipulates that there should be appointed, to head it for three years, a 'Docteur d'Etat maître de conférence' or 'Professeur agrégé', with the approval of the governing body and the university convocation. The present Director is Professor Amar Samb, agrégé in Arabic and 'Docteur d'Etat ès Lettres'. He is an established Islamology scholar with a well-known book on the contribution of the Islam of Senegal to Arabic literature.

In 1975/76, IFAN has 26 researchers, mostly of various African nationalities but including a few Frenchmen from the technical cooperation service. With its pluri-disciplinary structure and its researchers of many nationalities, IFAN intends to assume its research responsibilities in order to serve the development of the African continent and is even contributing to the enrichment of a universal civilization on the basis of a widely disseminated culture. The form of its participatory collaboration and the richness of the programmes of its departments constitute firm support for an overall development in the service of Africa.

As regards education, IFAN is already helping, at primary level, to compile textbooks in history and geography. At a higher education level, the researchers do part-time lecturing in their respective disciplines and faculties.

We may also note that the various national government departments can use reports or documents on various disciplines that have been prepared by the researchers (tourism, rural development, educational tèlevision, pharmacopoeia, etc).

Conclusion

We are glad to note that one of the oldest research institutions in Africa has kept its inter-African vocation and is contributing to the development of the cultures of the negro-African world. To achieve its goals, IFAN could not do other than set itself an ambitious task, so that one wonders whether the institution still has the resources for carrying out its policy. It is not pleasant to end this study on a bitter note, but it would be difficult to ignore some obstacles which sometimes hamper the implementation of goals already defined by IFAN.

For the moment, IFAN is the only institution which has scholars mainly devoted to research, as shown by their regular visits to the field and the quality of their publications. It is therefore to be hoped that it will continue to fulfil its role of giving 'impetus and co-ordination' to African research, in order to serve development.

Reviews

The Paradox of the Settler-Dominated Colonial Economy

R.M.A. van Zwanenberg: *Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya 1919–1939*, East African Literature Bureau, 1975.

Richard Wolff: *Britain and Kenya 1870–1930: The Economics of Colonialism*, Transafrica Publishers, 1974.

Reviewed by JANET M. BUJRA

The historian, R.G. Collingwood, once observed that 'every new generation must rewrite history in its own way'. Certainly the last decade has witnessed numerous attempts to rewrite the history of the colonial period, and to reinterpret it from the critical angle of hindsight. Two recent books on Kenya colonial history are part of this trend, and, coincidentally, they address themselves to the same problem —namely the economics of settler production during the first few decades of colonial rule. The two authors present an interesting cross-disciplinary contrast, for whereas one is a historian with a grounding in economics, the other is an economist with an interest in history.

R.M.A. van Zwanenberg's book, *Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya: 1919–1939*, represents the fruits of detailed research into colonial records relating to an issue which was central to settler production—namely an adequate supply of cheap African labour. Richard Wolff's book, *Britain and Kenya 1870–1930: The Economics of Colonialism*, whilst shallower in depth, has a rather wider focus in that it considers other facets of the settler economy in addition to its labour supply—the decision to introduce European settlers, the alienation of African land, and the choice of crops to be grown in the new colony. Detailed material, critically presented, has been inadequately available on all these topics in the past, so both these books are welcome additions to any library on East Africa. But to my mind they also have an additional interest in that they provoke reconsideration of a fundamental problem in understanding Kenyan colonial history, namely, the paradox of the settler-dominated colonial economy.

It is Wolff who, apparently quite unintentionally, brings this paradox to our attention in the first chapter of his book. There he attempts to provide a wider historical context for his analysis of the Kenya case by critically assessing the phenomenon of latter-day British imperialism—albeit within the narrow confines of a framework of cost-benefit analysis. Thus he disputes the argument of certain writers that the colonies acquired by Britain in the last phase of her imperialist expansion were of minimal economic benefit to her. What was more important than the net economic benefit gained, he contends, was that the new colonies contributed significantly, and increasingly, to certain *strategic sectors* of Britain's economy. The irony of this position is that whilst it would appear to hold in a general sense (Wolff assembles some convincing and valuable supporting evidence here) it has little to say regarding the particular case of Kenya, which is in many respects exceptional. As Wolff himself shows, the colony of Kenya was acquired not in pursuit of economic benefit for Britain, but almost, as it were, by default—the real prize was the rich kingdom of Buganda and control of the source of the Nile. Nor in the end could it be said that Kenya contributed significantly to strategic sectors of the British economy. Cotton, for example, a vitally important input for British industry, failed to be established successfully in Kenya. Wolff has no satisfactory explanation for this, beyond the argument of contemporary officials—that cotton could be grown by Africans only with extensive European supervision, and by Europeans only with considerably more labour than was available. Only perhaps in the case of coffee (of which Kenya was Britain's second most important supplier by 1922) could such an interpretation be considered valid—but even here, this position was achieved at some considerable cost. In general, 'European agriculture', as Wolff points out, 'was an inefficient, artificially protected, and in strict accounting terms even privately unprofitable use of resources' (p. 146).

If Kenya is not the best illustration of the more general process whereby the colonial world served as producer of cheap raw materials to metropolitan capitalism, neither is it a good example of the successful establishment of a European settler-dominated economy such as occurred in Rhodesia or South Africa. The settler economy of Kenya was always weak and always dependent on external supports. Zwanenberg brings this out very well in his study, only perhaps to heighten the sense of paradox even further: 'it was the Colonial State which provided the legal, political, and military administrative conditions for the establishment of European plantations, but then failed to provide sufficient economic supports for their rapid growth. . . . During the great depression, the plantation sector had to be supported with just under three quarters of a million pounds sterling to avoid collapse of the whole framework' (p. 277).

In view of these built-in contradictions, one is forced to reconsider the initial decision to introduce European settlers, and thereafter to allow them to exercise an undue influence over colonial policy even where this might be detrimental to the long-term interests of British capital. This is partly to be explained in terms of the historical conditions pertaining in Kenya itself at this period, but it also relates to the whole ideological debate concerning the relative merits of settler as opposed to peasant production. Zwanenberg acknowledges that there was 'considerable argument internally over this question' (p. 276) but does not really attempt an explanation of the outcome. To state that: 'In a colonial situation, where the tribes could not assert themselves politically over their new masters, it was the latter who decided the form of the new mode of production' (p. 277), avoids the issue, for whilst it is true, it does not explain the fact that in colonial Uganda a peasant-based economy was established, whilst in Tanganyika a mixture of peasant and plantation production eventually prevailed.

Wolff devotes a lot of space to this question, but merely succeeds in confusing it further. In the first place he implies that the necessity for introducing European settlers was a result of the dislocating effects of the 'Arab slave trade and its consequences' (p. 48). This is to distort historical fact, for the influence of this trade was largely confined to the coastal region[1] and had only a marginal effect on pre-colonial conditions in up-country Kenya. Thus it can not have been the effects of the slave trade which inhibited early African cash crop production in Kenya. Indeed it is only necessary to bring into focus the contrasting situation in the neighbouring territory of Tanganyika to see that such a position is untenable. Tanganyika was, of all three East African countries, the one most affected by the slave trade[2], yet it soon had a flourishing African cash crop sector. In fact, one could argue that the trade routes *laid the basis* for a peasant economy in Tanganyika since they brought many previously subsistence farmers into commodity production (to supply trading caravans as well as the Zanzibari market).[3] By contrast, the limited effect of the trade routes in Kenya had laid no such extensive base, and hence the *immediate* foundation for a peasant economy was lacking. It is of interest, however, that Africans in Kenya very soon began to produce a surplus for the market, once that market was established. In the first twenty years or so of colonial rule it was African, not European, settlers who provided the bulk of Kenya's exports—and this included peasant-grown crops such as maize and simsim as well as goods such as hides and wild rubber.[4]

Wolff argues further that the decision to encourage European emigration to Kenya was 'a careful reasoned decision responding to the Imperial needs and circumstances of the time' (p. 147). This again seems to be off key. As in Rhodesia (see Arrighi, 1973, p. 336) the decision to introduce European settlers to Kenya was based rather on short-term expediency.[5] The building of the Uganda railway had involved heavy outlays, and in order to recoup a part of the cost, development of the fertile areas lying alongside the line seemed to be the best solution. At the time there was a temporary sparcity of the African population in these areas due to the dislocations caused in the closing decades of the nineteenth century by famine, by epidemics, and by resistance to British rule. In view of this, the introduction of European settlers seemed to be the only acceptable means of developing the land. That this was undoubtedly a tactical 'error' in both political and economic terms (in view of the early adaptation of certain Africans to commercial production) is beside the point. The fact is, that by the time this became evident, the settlers had already consolidated themselves as a class, and had gained enough local and metropolitan political leverage to defend their interests. Their ability to ensure that the colonial economy was structured almost solely for their benefit is attested to by the early prohibition on almost all African export crop production and by the labour policies pursued by the colonial government. Neither of these strategies was followed in the rest of British East Africa, where the colonial authorities were in fact quick to repudiate settler and plantation interests so long as peasant production could more cheaply service the export economy.

What is peculiarly interesting about the Kenya case is therefore the emergence of the settlers as a class conscious of its particular interests, but never effectively succeeding in fully asserting them. These interests, though basically economic, reflected themselves in a political struggle by the settlers to institutionalize and promote their economic advantage. This struggle was expressed in class relations at two levels—relations between the settlers and the indigenous population, and relations between the settlers and the metropolitan bourgeoisie (represented by colonial officialdom). Thus characterized, it can be seen that the settlers were an intermediary class *par excellence*—their very existence depended both on their being able to appropriate local surplus by exploiting African labour, and on their ability to protect themselves from being expropriated of the greater share of that surplus by the metropolitan bourgeoisie.

The key to the whole struggle was of course state power. Why was it that by the 1930s the Rhodesian settlers had gained a large measure of political autonomy from Britain, whereas at the same period Kenya's settler economy was on the verge of collapse? Zwanenberg hints at the solution to this problem when he notes that Kenya was 'without the rich mineral resources which have made the South African development so successful for its white population' (p. xxiv). It would appear that in the case of Rhodesia, too, the prospect of large gold deposits being discovered made for eager and abundant investment from overseas. Gold and other minerals accounted for a quarter of Rhodesia's national income in the 1930s (Arrighi, p. 354) and mining operations had many spin-off effects. A work force, composed both of African labour and of white skilled and supervisory workers, was created outside of agriculture, and thus existed as a market for the products of European farms. Until the 1940s Rhodesian agriculture catered as much for the home market as for exports (Arrighi, p. 355), whereas Kenya European farmers have always had to rely on the export market. Capital investment in Rhodesia, in the form of machinery and infrastructural facilities, was necessitated by mining operations, and after coal deposits were discovered it made economic sense to create a local iron and steel industry (Arrighi, p. 345). Almost from the beginning, then, the Rhodesian economy was more internally integrated than the Kenyan economy was ever to become under colonial rule.

This being the case, it is not surprising that the Kenya settlers always found themselves hard pressed. As Zwanenberg puts it: 'It was the economic weakness of the settler export-orientated economy that led to the need to extract from the local community an ever larger proportion of its total resources of land and labour' (p. xxiv). This process of expropriation is the main theme of both Zwanenberg's and Wolff's books, and both writers argue strongly that it led to underdevelopment of the indigenous sector of the economy. There however their analyses diverge. Each, for example, considers the extent to which Marx's notion of primitive accumulation could be applicable to the case of Kenya, but they come to quite different conclusions. For Wolff, the process whereby thousands of Kenya Africans were transformed into wage labourers on European farms was 'strikingly similar' to the process of primitive capital accumulation which occurred in Europe as a result of the expropriation of the feudal serfs

(p. 92). Zwanenberg points out, however, and I think rightly, that the analogy cannot be stretched too far, since Kenya was not an autonomously developing economy but a dependent colonial one. In historical terms the analogy is in fact very misleading, for whereas the demise of feudalism in Europe coincided with the accumulation of mercantile capital and hence the rise of industrial capitalism (the landless serfs being transformed into an industrial proletariat), in Kenya the alienation of land simply led to the imposition of an inefficient and largely parasitic foreign agricultural sector, still largely producing for the metropolitan market. There was no corresponding development of large-scale basic industrial enterprises in Kenya, only the growth of a petty manufacturing sector, without much potential for instigating further growth in the economy.

Equally importantly, as Zwanenberg points out, 'the pre-capitalist producers were not robbed of all their means of production, a large proportion of their land was left to them, and as a consequence the process towards proletarianization was of a different character [to that which occurred in Europe]' (p. 289). Wolff here considerably over-simplifies the picture: he does not appear to recognize, for example, what Zwanenberg makes very clear—namely that the creation of an adequate supply of cheap labour for settler farmers depended not only on coercion but on the domination and exploitation of pre-existing African modes of production. Hence it did *not* lead to a situation in which, from being 'more or less self-sufficient peasant proprietors in common, the African population was increasingly transformed into wage labourers on European farms' (p. 92). The 'transformation', where it occurred, was in fact only partial—African 'wage labourers' were for the most part only semi-proletarianized peasantry, whose low wages could be justified by their access to food supplies from their meagre subsistence plots in the reserves or on European farms (as squatter labour).

Nor was it just any, or all, Africans who were brought into class relations with the European settlers, as Wolff often seems to imply. The impact of the colonial economy was highly uneven, both spatially and structurally. Vast areas which could not easily be exploited for the benefit of the settler economy were left to stagnate in 'traditionalist' backwardness, whilst other areas experienced violent socio-economic upheavals as a result of land alienations to settler farmers. To a large degree these regional disparities of effect coincided with 'tribal' boundaries and hence Kenya politics has always worn the guise of tribalism. But already by the 1930s class differences had begun to emerge, and to be consolidated, in those sectors and amongst those Africans most deeply affected by colonial rule. Zwanenberg brings this out very well (p. 100 and pp. 225–6) when he shows that those Kikuyu most likely to become squatters on European farms were those already at a disadvantage because of land pressure in the reserves, whereas there were other Kikuyu who had begun to build up large holdings, sometimes by purchasing land from men too poor to pay their taxes. Furedi has also shown that even in this early period settler oppression created its spontaneous and bitter reaction from those most affected.[6] The settler economy thus set in motion a complex process of emerging and unfolding class contradictions both within the African population and between Africans and the class of European settlers. This process culminated in the Mau Mau rebellion in the fifties and was reflected in the existence of loyalists as well as forest fighters, and of an opportunistic petty bourgeois African nationalist leadership.

During the period of which Wolff and Zwanenberg are writing, the settlers were fairly successful in exerting pressure on the colonial authorities to provide the institutional framework within which they could exploit African labour power to its full. They were less successful, however, in their attempt to change the other factor in the equation of their economic survival—namely their relationship to state power. The settlers continually struggled for greater control over local political institutions in their attempt to transform themselves from a dependent colonial bourgeoisie into an authentic and autonomous national bourgeoisie. This inevitably brought them into conflict with metropolitan interests and with the local representatives of those interests in the form of colonial officialdom. Wolff here chooses to ignore these conflicts—or rather, as he says, to 'de-emphasize' them: 'these disputes were political rather than economic. They hinged mainly on the settlers' demands for ultimate control over governmental policy in Kenya' (p. xv). One cannot evade the issue in so facile a fashion however, for clearly economic policy was here the very essence of the struggle for political control. Wolff goes on to say that in any case the differences between settlers and officials over matters of economic policy were less important than their 'common goals' (p. xv).

Zwanenberg's position on this point is rather similar, though more complex. He argues, too, that there was 'a coincidence of the interests of the Colonial State [colonial officialdom] with the farmer settlers' (p. 281) and that whilst conflicts occurred, these were simply 'between individuals'. On the other hand, he argues that there *was* a contradiction between the Kenyan administration and its metropolitan master: 'the Colonial State leaned strongly towards the development of [local] capital, while the Imperial State leaned towards the limitation of the actions of the Colonial State [by acting as 'a brake on capital development' (p. 279)]' (p. 282). This seems to me to be far-fetched—for whilst many colonial officials were, as individuals, sympathetic to settler aims, as a class they were merely the representatives of metropolitan interests, without independent freedom of political action. And whereas the settlers basically aimed for *local* capital accumulation, the colonial state existed to *service*, as cheaply as possible, *metropolitan* capital accumulation.

The fact that this period was characterized by constant struggle over these competing interests does not come out well in either of these books. It was some three decades before settler production could be said to have become viable in Kenya. In the meantime the settlers' position was periodically under attack from metropolitan interests which compared high-cost settler production unfavourably with African peasant production (the difference here being between a situation in which an intermediary class takes its cut out of the surplus and one in which the surplus is more or less directly expropriated to the metropole). To counteract metropolitan pressure and to stabilize their insecure economic position, the settlers attempted to extend their political and economic influence to impinge on the other two East African territories. In particular, they successfully promoted the East African common market (which was almost solely to their benefit), and they propagated the idea of an East African federation which would be under their political control. In this latter aim they were blocked by metropolitan interests which did not want to see low-cost African peasant production in Tanganyika or Uganda threatened, or African surpluses appropriated for settler ends. This debate over politico-economic issues resounded throughout the twenties,[7] and yet it is not mentioned by either of these writers as one factor in the development of colonial economic structures. In fact the attempt by the settlers to extend their political and economic influence to encompass the whole of East Africa, and thereby to gain access to peasant surpluses, was almost as vital to their continued economic survival as the creation of the internal coercive mechanisms to ensure them of a supply of cheap labour. They were only partially successful in this attempt because they were never economically strong enough to assert complete political autonomy. They always remained ultimately dependent on the colonial state to bail them out of temporary economic difficulties (as occasioned by economic depressions, world war, etc.) and hence their political leverage was circumscribed.

The fact that the settlers were unable to seize ultimate control of the colonial state should not however lead one to the conclusion that the Kenya colonial state simply and directly reflected the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie, as has been suggested by Mamdani.[8] He argues that the Devonshire White Paper of 1923, which asserted the paramountcy of African interests in Kenya, in fact established the paramountcy of *metropolitan* interests, since it was the metropolitan power which would in the last analysis 'interpret' these African interests. This is an argument which seems more valid when applied to the colonial states of Tanganyika or Uganda, than when applied to Kenya. For in Kenya there is no denying that whilst *ultimate* control remained in the hands of the metropole, in day to day practice it was largely the settlers' interests that were served. The paradox can be partially explained if we recognize that 'metropolitan interests' were not unitary but encompassed many conflicting elements. Thus whilst metropolitan cotton interests were largely anti-settler and pro-African peasant production, mercantile interests which had established branches in East Africa were ready to back the settlers because, for a period, their interests and those of the settlers coincided—namely to open up the whole of the East African market to free trade. The history of East African cooperation illustrates this point rather nicely, for whereas British mercantile interests backed the idea of a settler dominated federation, British industrial interests were always opposed.[9] Thus the colonial state is more usefully seen as an arena of conflict between the representatives of various class interests, both settler and metropolitan, and held together only by a common interest in maintaining European control over the surplus produced by the colonial economy.

Understanding the class character of the colonial state is clearly essential to the comprehension of its economic structures and strategies. It seems to me that in Wolff's analysis the economic significance of the entrenchment of settler interests in the structures of the colonial economy is misunderstood. This entrenchment, far from assisting in the process whereby surplus was transferred from the colonies to fire the engines of Britain's industrial expansion (as he seems to assume), in fact led to a situation whereby a share of this surplus was retained locally. It is true, as Wolff points out (p. 145), that some of this surplus simply went into consumption by the settlers. Nevertheless this very process soon made it profitable to establish manufacturing concerns—of the import-substitution type—to service the settler market. Settlers themselves were involved in some of these ventures. In addition the settlers invested capital in their farms, and they also used their political influence to put pressure on the colonial authorities for utilization of surplus in the building of infrastructural facilities. The end result of this diversion of colonial surplus into local investment was to create a level of development in colonial Kenya far higher than that which pertained in Tanganyika or Uganda. This is still true even when we add that this development was highly uneven, completely skewed towards serving a minority class, and with little potential for further real growth.

I should perhaps end by apologizing to the two authors here if they feel that I have unjustly used their analyses to illustrate a theme which was not their primary concern. My justification would be that I found both these books a stimulus to reconsideration of a problematic issue in Kenya history, and what more could one ask of any study than that it provokes critical discussion?

Footnotes

1 See A.I. Salim, *Swahili-Speaking Peoples of Kenya's Coast*, East African Publishing House, 1973, pp. 15–20.
2 Though couched in general terms, Wolff's description of the effects of the slave trade on the East African interior (pp. 44–6) is in fact a description of the effects on what was later to become Tanganyika, and is largely inapplicable to Kenya.
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4 E. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa*, Heinemann, 1973, p. 176.
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7 See Brett, *op. cit.*, pp. 99–107.
8 M. Mamdani, review of Brett, in *African Review*, vol. 5, no. 2, Dar es Salaam, 1974.
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African Rural Development

Uma Lele: *The Design of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa;* World Bank, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1975, 246 pages.

Reviewed by TONY OBENG

In the words of its first chapter, this study, a product of the World Bank's African Rural Development Study or ARDS, 'grew out of a substantial interest within the World Bank in finding ways of designing mercantile interests which had established branches in East Africa were ready to back the settlers because, for a period, their interests and those of the settlers coincided—namely to open up the whole of the East African market to free trade. The history of East African cooperation illustrates this point rather nicely, for whereas British mercantile interests backed the idea of a settler dominated federation, British industrial interests were always opposed.[9] Thus the colonial state is more usefully seen as an arena of conflict between the representatives of various class interests, both settler and metropolitan, and held together only by a common interest in maintaining European control over the surplus produced by the colonial economy.

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Reviewed by TONY OBENG

In the words of its first chapter, this study, a product of the World Bank's African Rural Development Study or ARDS, 'grew out of a substantial interest within the World Bank in finding ways of designing relevant projects that could be accomplished despite limited resources, particularly of money and trained manpower, and that would reach a large proportion of the low-income rural population.' A footnote in the same chapter (p. 7, fn. 9) warns, although merely in the name of brevity, that the terms 'low-income' and 'subsistence' are used interchangeably in the study to describe the target populations.

The careful reader may therefore prepare to receive or reject the study, if he has not already done so, as an excursion into the nature of the concern for, or about, the target populations as felt or understood in the World Bank and by the author, herself an economist in the World Bank's Eastern Africa Projects Department. He may also regard the study as an example of how, with the sort of concern or interest noted above, a particular kind of social science perceives, analyses and draws lessons from past and ongoing projects or programmes designed, or ostensibly designed, in various countries to 'reach' the rural poor or even benefit them. This might suggest to the reader of this review that the study, or the concern that produced it, is judged as having been animated purely and simply by the problem of 'reaching' the target population or as having been interested mainly in the technologies, projects and programmes for resolving it. This impression is intended; and the author bears the major responsibility for it. But it ought, in fairness, to be added that the study is also pregnant with evidence that the author goes beyond this to announce cumulative improvement in the living standards of the mass of the low-income population of the rural areas in her use of the term 'rural development'. She also studies the programmes and projects reported in the book in relation to the role ascribed to them by their initiators or managers as direct or indirect means toward this improvement.

But it is by no means obvious that the 'reaching' in question—characterized by a growing number of development workers in the Third World and elsewhere as 'penetration', 'encapsulation' or even economic subversion—and the improvement in the living conditions of the rural poor are necessarily or always complementary or even compatible. Nor, for that matter, is it always easy to identify the rural poor as either the prime or true beneficiaries of rural development programmes and projects ostensibly, and even perhaps sincerely, designed to achieve improvements in their living conditions. On the contrary, a large body of development literature now exists which exposes a number of rural development projects hitherto advertised as steps towards the elimination or reduction of rural poverty as being in fact contributions to the underdevelopment and dependency of the regions and countries into which they were inserted.

Not that the author is unaware of some, at least, of these reservations or the realities that have compelled some observers to adopt a position of ruthless agnosticism towards a whole range of so-called rural development projects and led others to question the socio-economic framework that produces them and look for alternative development strategies that would give new meaning to the concept and challenge of rural development and, with it, to the conception, design, implementation and evaluation of rural development projects. In an admittedly weak but real acknowledgement that a good deal of past and contemporary 'rural development' programmes and projects have been exercises in futility, if not worse, the author notes (p. 5) that 'contrary to much of the conventional wisdom on development, which assumed that growth would lead to greater participation, increases in productivity in the already commercialised rural subsector have had relatively little effect on the living standards of the subsistence population'. Another reason for not judging our author innocent of all the facts that render the conventional wisdom on development, and the rural development projects and programmes inspired by it, suspect is her recognition that 'the manufacturing sector has included a relatively small indigenous entrepreneurial element and few linkages to domestic resources or rural demand'. Altogether, the author begins with what might appear to be enough awareness of the poverty of conventional wisdom on development to make her offer, in the title and elsewhere, to take us through various attempts at rural development in Africa, as the basis for a learning experience that would hopefully lead us to better rural development design and implementation. This impression is, however, countered by stronger signals throughout the book that what one should expect is not an alternative view of development to which rural development and rural development projects might respond but just another set of recipes for preparing more, if more bankable, versions of what has come to be the traditional rural development menu.

These other signals begin with the foreword by President Robert S. McNamara of the World Bank, where we are told that 'the problem (of rural poverty) is not merely that the benefits of economic growth have been inequitably distributed, as they have, but that the poor themselves have been unable to contribute to that growth', and assured that 'the solution . . . lies in raising the productivity of the poor, so that their own incomes can rise as those of others in their societies do'. The research question, according to President McNamara, is how this 'raising of the productivity of the poor' can be achieved. And with the authority of his position as president of the bank that commissioned the study on which the report was based and employs its author, he advertises, some will say exposes, the book as '[representing] an important element of our [World Bank] research in this direction'. Thus forewarned or forearmed, the study's readiness to concede that, contrary to much of the conventional wisdom on development, increases in productivity in the 'already commercialised' rural 'sub-sector' have had 'relatively little effect on the living standards of the subsistence population' can be received in perspective not as the beginning of a new effort to seek out for possible elimination that conventional wisdom which helped lay the basis for this disappointing result, but as a challenge to further 'reach', 'penetrate', encapsulate or absorb 'subsistence populations' and make them more active participants in the 'economic growth' of their countries. More serious yet, the author occasionally lapses into conventional development obscurantism of the worst kind—for instance, in her attempt (p. 5) to blame population growth rates in the range of 2.5 to 3.5 per cent for the problems of poverty, which she lists as 'hunger, unstable family life, poor nutrition, ill health, and little or no access to formal education'.

To meet the challenge which the World Bank and the author defined for themselves in this study, seventeen sets of rural development projects and programmes located in the African countries of Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria and Tanzania and involving the participation of a number of multilateral, bilateral and national agencies, were analysed. From this set and analysis thirteen project reports are presented under the categories of commodity programmes, regional rural development programmes, functional programmes, a miscellaneous category of planned programmes and a category of so-called 'spontaneous efforts'.

Without exception, all the four sets of commodity programmes reported in the study have, in the words of the author, 'the straightforward objective of increasing production of export crops in the small-holder sector'. Significantly, the programmes selected for analysis in this area were all initiated prior to independence and financed, in their original form, by European commercial companies, development corporations or the former colonial governments. In three of the export-crop schemes reported—a tea production and exports project in Kenya; a small-holder tobacco development scheme in Tanzania; and 'operation cotton' in Mali—the agricultural services of extension, credit, inputs, marketing and processing have been administered through project authorities or parastatal organizations. Management in most cases was initially provided by expatriates, although they 'are being more rapidly africanised since independence'; but their purpose, not surprisingly, remains the same. In the fourth reported case—the development of cotton for export in the Sukumaland area of Tanzania—the scheme began under the direct authority of the regular administrative system and did not, therefore, raise separate questions of 'africanisation'.

Three sets of programmes undertaken 'mainly on the initiative of donor agencies and planned and administered by expatriates' are reported along with two programmes 'undertaken with substantial initiative and participation by national governments' under the category of 'regional rural development programmes'. Programmes of the first type covered by the study include (i) the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) and the Wolamo Agricultural Development Unit (WADU), both in Ethiopia; (ii) the Lilongwe Land Development Programme (LLDP) in Malawi; the Zones d'Action Prioritaires Intégrées (ZAPI) and the Société de Développement du Nkam (SODENKAM) settlement scheme (originally Opération Yabassi-Bafang), both in Cameroon. A feature of these programmes is that they 'have provided a number of productive and social services such as soil conservation measures, roads, general agricultural extension, credit, marketing services, livestock development services, training, health clinics, water supply, and nutrition education' (p. 15). They have also 'involved substantial concentrations of financial and trained manpower in relatively small geographical areas' and virtually all claim as a major aim, if not *the* aim, increases in the *per capita* incomes of the target populations. The 'nationally initiated efforts' reviewed in the study are the Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP) in Kenya and the Ujamaa movement and associated decentralization of administration in Tanzania. The reported objective of these two programmes is that of 'improving the domestic capacity for planning and implementation' as a means towards 'the ultimate objective of increasing the incomes and welfare of the mass of the subsistence rural population'.

The author next draws a distinction between these sorts of programmes, characterized as involving 'multi-faceted [approaches] to rural development' and 'functional programmes' which are reportedly 'undertaken to remove a single constraint that is particularly critical for getting rural development underway'. The one case presented of this type of programme is the agricultural credit administered by Kenya's Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) to finance a large number of activities throughout the rural sector, including purchase of land from European 'owners', livestock raising, procurement of farm equipment and on-farm development.

The Kenya Livestock Development Project (KLDP), the Industrial Development Centres (IDC) in Nigeria, and the Minimum Package Programme (MPP) in Ethiopia are reported as constituting a residual or miscellaneous category of programmes. Their distinguishing and unifying characteristic is their involvement in the production and development of specific commodities or goods through the provision of a number of services related to the development of a specific sub-sector or region.

Also reviewed by the author are three allegedly representative settlements—the Kibwezi-Mtito-Chyulu hill zone in south-east Kenya and Ngoliba B and D and the Muka Maku Cooperative Society whose absorption of 'both legal and illegal settlers from all the major tribes in Kenya' causes the author to review it as a 'spontaneous effort'. Notable in connection with these 'efforts' or 'events' is the author's reluctance to call them 'projects' or 'programmes'. They are, indeed, discussed essentially as 'problems' and the author allows herself to relate them to 'projects' and 'programmes' only in so far as these 'efforts' provoke official responses. The responses which become 'programmes' or 'projects' in the author's terminology include the activities of the African Land Development Board (ALDB) which undertook from 1946 until Independence in 1963 the reconditioning and reclamation of land in 'African areas' to make up for the 'fact', reported by the author without a trace of irony, that 'land for resettlement was unavailable' (p. 214); an earlier 'settlement scheme' carried out by the colonial government at Gide in 1937; 'a land registration drive' begun in 1955 'to [increase] the productive use of land' but resulting, on the author's admission, in 'negating the traditional ways of absorbing the landless and thus [worsening] the squatter problem'; the Kenya government-sponsored 'Million Acre Scheme' began in 1962 and advertised as a scheme to purchase large 'European estates' and distribute 'parcels' to African farmers; and the setting up in 1965 of 'a special commission . . . to supervise the registration and resettling of squatters'.

If this review has given an inordinate amount of space to the choice of projects from which the 'lessons from Africa' are drawn and to the manner in which those projects are reported, this is because on the major issues of rural development and underdevelopment what the author chose to report on and the framework in which she chose to present her reports are sufficiently revealing. Ordinarily, a reviewer would still be required to put the positions thus revealed into some kind of perspective, if only as a service to persons interested in the subject matter of the book's title but who still have to make up their minds on whether or not to invest their time in reading the report. Given its title, such a service might have taken the form of an answer to one basic question: to what extent do the rural development projects and programmes reviewed by the study, and the nature of the study itself, bring us nearer to a clear perception of what to do and what to avoid doing to bring about rural development either as an autonomous aim or as a step towards national development?

In the specific context of the book under review, however, this question is both innocent and inapplicable. To begin with, it does not take the reader too long to discover that what the book sets out to do is not to enlighten us on the basis of the case studies presented, on the nature of rural underdevelopment and the challenges that it poses for rural development research and policy making, but to respond to the research question posed by President McNamara and quoted earlier in this review. Nor is it even clear that the problem of rural development as defined by McNamara in his foreword is intended necessarily for the edification or consideration of the world outside the World Bank and its network of client policy and decision makers—and even less for the benefit of the rural poor, except in so far as they wish to place themselves under the patronage of the World Bank. Indeed the author goes out of her way to warn us on page 6 that the African Rural Development Study which fathered the study under review 'was carried out to improve such knowledge [of how to bring about 'development' of the subsistence rural sector] and to provide guidelines, based on analysis of past experience, for design and implementation of the World Bank's future rural development programmes in Africa'. We are also assured, of course, that the author and the World Bank have an explicit interest in 'promoting participation of the lowest income groups through rural development programmes' and that 'development has been viewed [in this study] broadly from the perspective of improved welfare as well as of increased agricultural production' (p. 6). But these assurances are drained of their ordinary meanings further in the book as we read through an attempt on page 27 and elsewhere to emphasize 'the desire of subsistence producers to ensure domestic food needs' as a 'constraint' on the type of development the author has in mind for a hungry and undernourished continent and witness the virtual dedication of at least three of the book's eleven chapters to the proposition that 'organisation of effective delivery of extension, inputs and credit has been relatively less difficult, both administratively and financially, in the case of export crops'. Beyond that, and in view of the fact that the study is unabashedly advertised as a bankers' report prepared at the request of a bank by a banker for the attention of the bank and its actual and potential clientele, the author's remark (p. 28) that 'not only was it easier to recover costs of delivery of services provided for export crop production, but it was also easier to mobilise substantial additional resources through a combination of pricing and marketing policies' is a clear enough warning to those whose interest in the problems of rural underdevelopment and development are not conditioned by the banker's view of the world, or interest in it, to keep off this book.

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News and Activities

1 Articles for the second issue of *Africa Development* should be submitted by the end of May and for the third issue by the end of September.

2 The first issue of CODESRIA's bi-monthly *Newsletter* will be out in April. All information to appear in the *Newsletter* should be sent to the same address as for this journal. The description of items should not be more than ten lines long (typed) and could be as short as three lines.

3 Data for the *Africa Development Research Annual 1974*, is being processed. The volume is expected to be published by the end of 1976.

4 CODESRIA's General Assembly is to be held this year. The date and venue will be announced later. A conference on 'Industrialization and Income Distribution in Africa' will be held in conjunction with the General Assembly. A CODESRIA Working Group will be set up at the same time under the chairmanship of Professor J.F. Rweyemamu of Tanzania.

5 Other workshops and the setting up of working groups will be announced in the *Newsletter*. Themes for 1976 workshops are:
(a) Economic Cooperation and Integration in Africa.
(b) Monetary Problems in Africa.
(c) Vital Statistical Registration in Africa.
(d) Landlocked and Least Developed Countries in Africa.

CODESRIA SECRETARIAT

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