



‘Open the Servers’: The Implications of Electoral Technology for Kenya’s Democratisation Process

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Abstract

Digital technologies for elections were introduced in Kenya with a vision that they would bring election reforms through increasing administrative efficiency, reducing long-term costs, and by enhancing transparency in the electoral process would enhance citizenry inclusivity. Despite the voting exercise taking place without a hitch, the 2017 General Election results were dismissed by various stakeholders who called on the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) to ‘open the servers’, with witnesses, to use the results inside the servers to verify the ballot papers in the ballot boxes. Promises by IEBC that counting, transmission and verification of results would promote citizens’ rights during the electoral process were not met hence the Swahili phrase, ‘*Fungua server*’ (Open the servers) was coined. The server became the Holy Grail, the gadget of hope for free and fair elections. Chants of ‘*Fungua server*’ unveiled the dreaded side of Kenya’s democratisation; of flawed elections and violence that followed. ‘*Fungua server*’ was a call to free and fair elections. The paradox of technology this article seeks to interrogate was how technology has subverted democratic elections in Kenya; arguing that there is need to demystify the server and focus on electoral transparency as a yardstick of democracy.

Keywords: server, subvert, democracy, digital technologies, elections, hashtag, Kenyans on Twitter (KOT)

Résumé

Les technologies numériques ont été introduites au Kenya pour les élections avec la vision qu'elles apporteraient des réformes électorales en augmentant l'efficacité administrative, en réduisant les coûts à long terme, et en améliorant la transparence du processus électoral renforcerait l'inclusion des citoyens.

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Bien que l'exercice de vote se soit déroulé sans accroc, les résultats des élections générales de 2017 ont été rejetés par diverses parties prenantes qui ont appelé la Commission électorale et des frontières indépendante (IEBC) à « ouvrir les serveurs », avec des témoins, afin d'utiliser les résultats à l'intérieur des serveurs pour vérifier les bulletins de vote dans les urnes. Les promesses de l'IEBC selon lesquelles le comptage, la transmission et la vérification des résultats permettraient de promouvoir les droits des citoyens pendant le processus électoral n'ont pas été tenues, d'où l'expression swahilie « *Fungua server* » (ouvrez les serveurs). Le serveur est devenu le Saint Graal, le gadget de l'espoir pour des élections libres et équitables. Les chants de « *Fungua server* » ont dévoilé le côté redouté de la démocratisation du Kenya : les élections entachées d'irrégularités et les violences qui ont suivi. Le « serveur Fungua » était un appel à des élections libres et équitables. Le paradoxe de la technologie que cet article cherche à interroger est la façon dont la technologie a subverti les élections démocratiques au Kenya, en soutenant qu'il est nécessaire de démystifier le serveur et de se concentrer sur la transparence électorale comme critère de démocratie.

Mots-clés : serveur, subversion, démocratie, technologies numériques, élections, hashtag, les kenyans sur Twitter (KOT)

Introduction and Background

There has been growing use of digital technologies in elections around the world. Digital technologies were introduced in Africa's elections with the hope that they would transform electoral systems, enabling credibility; through offering devices and resources that generate, store or process data. Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis (2018: 1397–8) echo this by noting that:

The hope is that new technology will enhance the electoral environment in three main ways: by making the functioning of the electoral commission more robust and efficient, by reducing the scope for electoral manipulation, and by generating greater clarity and transparency regarding election outcomes. On this basis, the proponents of new technology also expect it to boost the process's legitimacy – and hence that of the elected government.

The nature of politics in Kenya in the digital age has been coupled with the introduction of digital technologies in General Elections, local telecommunication networks and international data collection firms contracted to offer services. Digital technologies for elections were introduced with a vision that they would bring election reforms by increasing administrative efficiency, reducing long-term costs, and enhancing transparency in the electoral process. This motivation came after the 2007 polls, which were marred by irregularities in the tallying and transmission of final results for parliamentary and Presidential candidates. This was a

clear indicator of how lack of proper use of modern technology and a weak electoral system can trigger political chaos.¹ Digitisation of the 2013 General Election came with some fiasco. The secure servers intended for results transmission were unable to handle the volume of data being uploaded, leading to a breakdown. There was an error with the results transmission system source code that multiplied the actual number of invalid ballots by 8 (an '8x error').² This motivated improved digitisation of technologies to be used in the 2017 General Elections; through the Kenya Integrated Election Management System (KIEMS) that used biometrics to identify voters and sought to curb impersonation during the voting exercise, making sure that only those who had been registered are allowed to cast their votes.³ The technologies the KIEMS system handled included: the Biometric Voter Registration (BVR) and Electronic Voter Identification (EVID) Results Transmission System (RTS) to be used during tallying.

Despite the voting exercise taking place without a hitch, the digital aspects (transmission of the results) failed; hence the election results were dismissed by various stakeholders. The voting exercise, I argue, was smooth because malpractice had been successfully executed during campaigns by Cambridge Analytica (CA), but without detection by the opposition and civil society. At this point, digital technologies did not offer opportunities but threats to democracy as well. A few hours after tallying began, Presidential candidate Raila Odinga termed the outcome that saw him trail Uhuru Kenyatta by more than one million votes as 'sham, fictitious and fake'. Mr Odinga said that the results were the 'work of a computer' and did not reflect the will of voters, a claim denied by the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC).⁴ Raila's team claimed that forms 34A and 34B⁵ should be the basis of the results but the Commission was keying in results without scanning the forms as required, demanding that the IEBC should provide forms 34A and 34B to help verify the outcome as claims that numerous Forms 34A are at total variance with the KIEMS kits. Similarly Forms 34B were differing. The refusal by IEBC to offer these forms led to anti-IEBC demonstrations, and voters demanding that the Commission should open its servers for stakeholders to verify whether the results on forms 34A and 34B are similar to those that had been tallied.

Promises by the IEBC that counting, transmission and verification of results would promote citizens' rights during the electoral process were not met, hence the Swahili phrase '*Fungua server*' (Open the servers) was coined. The servers became the Holy Grail, the gadgets of hope for free and fair elections. Chants of '*Fungua Server*' unveiled the dreaded side of Kenya's democratisation; of flawed elections and violence that followed. '*Fungua*

server' was a call to free, fair and transparent elections, a call to IEBC to avail Form 34A and form 34B and open the server, with stakeholders as witnesses, to use the results inside it to verify the ballot papers in the ballot box. Refusal of IEBC to open the servers precipitated protests, chants, and violence in major cities of the country. IEBC had betrayed its mandate to give effect to the sovereign will of the Kenyan people and instead delivered predetermined computer generated leaders (Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto); referred to by the National Super Alliance (NASA) principal Raila Odinga (at a press conference on Wednesday 16 August 2017) as '*Vifaranga vya kompyuta*'. According to Mr Odinga, the two Jubilee leaders were elected through the computer. He asked Kenyans to 'say no to computer generated leaders' and ask IEBC to open the servers.

Digital technologies, which were introduced to the Kenyan electoral process for the citizenry to trust the process and outcomes since manual voting was not trusted, revealed that the more technology is incorporated into the Kenyan system, the more there was mistrust towards the administrative systems hence digital technologies destabilising the process of participatory democracy. The voters regarded the manual aspects in the electoral process as free, fair and transparent while the digital ones denied them their rights. This puts emphasis on the technological paradox that this research seeks to interrogate.

Kenya's number one mobile network provider, Safaricom, was accused of aiding IEBC by hosting their website and other crucial databases on Safaricom servers. Their fault: electoral malpractice during the results transmission; Safaricom had been hired to provide connectivity between polling stations and the Electoral Commission's national tallying centre. Telephone network, internet connectivity, and the transmission of votes and central electronic tallying were a concern as Safaricom did not deliver its mandate. So did CA, a British data collection firm that provides data, analytics, and strategy to governments and military organisations worldwide. Allegedly, CA used artificial intelligence robots for Kenya's President Uhuru Kenyatta's Jubilee's online campaigns, and secretly stage-managed campaigns in the hotly contested 2013 and 2017 elections. Kenya's newspaper (*Daily Nation*, 21 March 2018) reported that:

Cambridge Analytica has claimed to have worked with President Uhuru Kenyatta in the 2013 and 2017 elections. According to the exposé on Britain's Channel 4, the company's Managing Director Mark Turnbull was recorded saying that the company rebranded both The National Alliance and Jubilee parties, conducted research on behalf of the Kenyatta campaign and wrote Jubilee's manifestos and speeches. Cambridge Analytica has been accused of obtaining data and psychological profiles of over 50 million Facebook users

through an app that was developed by British scholar Aleksandar Kogan for academic use. The application then collected data from the users and their Facebook friends, mining over 50 million Facebook records, and then handed it over to Cambridge Analytica. According to Facebook, once they discovered what had happened, they deleted the data, but investigative reports by the international media suggest otherwise.

Crisis of democracy was feared as IEBC frustrated the people's will by delivering a flawed election. To ease the political pressure, Raila Odinga petitioned the Supreme Court for a review of the results of the 2017 election. On 1 September 2017, the Supreme Court declared the Presidential election held on 8 August 2017 invalid, null and void. The IEBC was ordered to conduct a fresh presidential election within sixty days. The second Presidential poll became uncertain when electoral reforms required to ensure irregularities would not be repeated were not set in motion. Elections were nullified, followed by a call for another election, the servers still remain unopened. In the second election, results coming in through the same digital technologies used in the first election showed false votes, fake votes, children voting (despite the KIEMS), and thousands of votes where there had been a handful of voters. This contested the idea of participatory democracy; which appeared to be a fallacy based on the Kenyan context.

The server mystery continues. To date, the aggrieved stakeholders, whose shouting of 'Open the servers' died out after the infamous handshake,⁶ still make sarcastic references using the phrase '*Fungua server*' (Open the servers). There have been debates around the use of digital technology in the national vote tally, everyone wondering whether sticking to physical counting of ballot papers may have been the better option. This begs the questions: are votes transmitted electronically the true voice of the people? Are the servers the evil of flawed elections? Are digital technologies possible futures of democratisation in Kenya? How can Kenya protect its democracy by harnessing the benefits of digital technologies?

The paradox of technology and democracy in Kenya focuses on how technology has subverted democratic elections in Kenya; is accountability, participation, and respect of the rule of law a lived outcome of multiparty elections carried out in Kenya?

Statement of the Problem

During the 2013 General Elections in Kenya, secure server(s) intended for results transmission were unable to handle the volume of data being uploaded and the system kept breaking down producing invalid ballots. This motivated the Kenya electoral body, the IEBC, to use an upgrade of

the voting system and technology; introduced through the KIEMS kits, the servers and website portals meant to conduct and supervise the 2017 elections. In spite of electoral management bodies being enabled by the internet and digital technologies to engage with citizens through the electoral cycle, absence of transparency of election technology introduced new dimensions of election malpractice posing risks of manipulation of servers to determine the final Presidential tally results; therefore subverting Kenya's democratic elections. Efforts to rig elections increase with inequality between the opposition and the incumbent, the rich and poor; but competitiveness – which institutions help to shape – determines the ballot-rigging strategies parties adopt (Lehoucq 2003).

Research Questions

1. How have digital technologies subverted Kenya's democratic elections?
2. What is the relationship between management of the server and stakeholder satisfaction?
3. How can Kenya protect its democracy by harnessing the benefits of digital technologies?
4. Are low levels of public confidence in the Electoral Management Board correlated with the contentious application of electoral technology?

Method

This research employed a mixed method approach allowing for both exploration and analysis of the same study including case study qualitative analysis, desk research, descriptive research, contextual analysis, and content analysis. A case study analysis approach was employed to study the impact of the use of digital systems in the 2017 General Elections in Kenya. The method was selected because it is based on an in-depth investigation of a single event to explore causation (Yin 2003). The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or a set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result (Schramm 1971 cited in Yin 2003: 12).

The research was digital in nature, its intention was to use case-reports and surveillance, hence desk research was important towards finding relevant data which already exist in regard to digital technologies and the democratic dilemma in Kenya. Content analysis was used to analyse the public participation clauses in Kenya's Constitution and recommendations

by the Kriegler report, an international commission of inquiry established by the Government of Kenya in February 2008 to inquire into all aspects of the 2007 General Elections with particular emphasis on the Presidential elections. Descriptive research method in this case was used to diagnose issues that warrant the immediate attention of policymakers, practitioners, and researchers (Loeb, Dynarski, McFarland et al. 2017: 9), help stakeholders understand that there is a problem, and subsequently target and test interventions for the population in need.

To find out how digital technologies influence filter bubbles, implementation and management tech infrastructure by electoral bodies and cases of using algorithms for election rigging, and vote tallying issues, this research used contextual analysis; the semantic representation of what has been made explicit in the utterance and what is implicit from context was analysed.

To date Kenyans still question the legitimacy of the government; therefore qualitative methodology is preferred in seeking to find out the attitudes people have towards technology and how important elections are to the citizenry. This is due to its ability to provide detailed data and to tell the story from the point of view of the actors (Silverman 2005; Baxter 2003). The qualitative method, unlike the quantitative, has the advantage of giving room (Silverman 2005; Priest 2010) and allowing for an in-depth focus on the study (Patton 2002). The data obtained from the research were in the form of words rather than numbers, while the majority of the data will contain verbatim quotes from the respondents (McNeill and Chapman 2005: 20) through Twitter and court documents from the cases filed by the opposition party.

Theoretical Underpinnings of the Study

Activity theory⁷ was used as a framework of qualitative analysis to position digital technologies. Blayone states that 'digital technologies are not independent forces responsible for defining human action. Rather, they are social artifacts with affordances, representing opportunities for action implemented by design and made visible in relation to human needs' (2018: 7). In relation to this research on whether technology has subverted democracy in Kenya, the study borrowed heavily from Blayone's (2018) thoughts that humans are positioned as active agents capable of identifying, taking up, modifying and even subverting established technology uses in pursuit of meaningful objectives. In the Kenyan case, technology goes beyond electoral management bodies but is more embodied by the stakeholders. This is a clear illustration that societal culture is not changed by technology use. Rather the culture of election rigging would only become electronic.

The participatory theory of democracy was also employed in this research. The two central characteristics of participatory democracy are the directness of participation by citizens in governance and deliberation in public opinion formation (Zittel and Fuchs 2007: 39ff.). Participatory democracy ‘involves extensive and active engagement of citizens in the self-governing process; it means government not just for but by and of the people’ (Barber 1995: 921). Political participation is characterised by direct and immediate involvement in the process of decision-making by the individuals concerned. Based on the above, this theory was used to establish a greater understanding of policy formulation and implementation.

Technology and the Elections in Kenya

In as much as it is assumed that technology will enhance the quality of the electoral process and deepen the democratic culture, Kenyans are not confident that their ballots are counted, despite the IEBC using the Results Transmission and Presentation system to enhance transparency through electronic transmission of provisional results from the polling stations.

The Kenyan case reveals: ‘It’s not the voting that’s democracy, it’s the counting’ (Tom Stoppard in Murphy, Chad and Johnson 2019). These authors note that democratic governments should be concerned that everyone’s vote is counted and counted fairly. Discrepancy in electoral information flows, network disruptions, struggles with biometric kits and poor planning and coordination among the election administrators, election observers and election compromised the integrity of an election, posing threats and challenges to democracy.

Elections and the management of the electoral process in Kenya have failed, hence the demand that the IEBC should ‘open the servers’ due to the fact that there has been no voter confidence in election administration; there is a lack of confidence in the electoral process, so that citizens can negotiate towards democracy as a peaceful process to avoid painful problems confronting Kenyan citizens caused and resolvable by citizen participation that occurs during General Elections.

Data Presentation and Findings

#Funguaserver: Social media as a tool for democratic participation

Social media has created opportunities for active citizenship and civic engagement. The current social media statistics in Kenya reveal that Twitter is among the most popular social media platform in Kenya (Stats 2020);

with active users famously known as Kenyans on Twitter (KOT), with the hashtag #KOT that forms part of this research. #KOT is a hashtag that was turned into an activist movement used to characterise the participants on Twitter, rallying participants towards a certain subject. Discussions span from stories that have been turned into tweets based on subjects that KOT are passionate about. The most trending being politics, corruption, socio-economic injustices, soccer, battles with international media, celebrity gossip and memes. While interrogating the #FunguaServer hashtag, this article notes that the discussions around *Fungua server* were not only based on elections but injustices surrounding the election process depicted in the following themes.

Democracy: State of the Country after the Flawed Elections

Through the Kenyan citizens' responses to the IEBC's role in the flawed elections, this study revealed that digital technologies subverted Kenya's democratic elections.

#FunguaServer Hashtag

Months and years following the 2017 flawed elections, #FunguaServer chants still prevail, evidence that Kenyans still want their democratic right to be met.

Some random tweets read:

Salome @nyagonyalo, on October 20, 2017 states:

'FUNGUA server bwana! THAT'S about rule of law AND standing up against FRAUD! Watu wa NASA are Kenyans too!'

Mathenge Wahome @mathenge_wahome

'Dont blame the System it only generates what it is fed. Fungua server.'
(12 July 2018)

Doug Onali Chancnima @onalihhi on October 16, 2017

'Fungua server #NoReformsNoElections Form 34B 34A #NasaDemosWeek4
#NasaInMombasa'

Other users still blame the IEBC officials as being responsible for subverting Kenya's democracy. Evident is in a tweet by Ezra Chiloba, a Former CEO at IEBC. Through his twitter handle @ezraCHILOBA, he states:

'Lots of FAKE NEWS today. Let us all be advocates of TRUTH – at all times. It doesn't matter how long it takes! As a matter of fact the event went on very well. There is lots of genuine LOVE and good FOOD in Trans Nzoia County (TNC) – And that is my home' (3 February 2018).

His tweet is met by responses by The Kennedy @Sempaiken, stating that:

‘You should be the last person to lecture us on FAKE NEWS, fungua SERVER that is where there isn’t FAKE NEWS’ (3 February 2018).

IEBC used their Twitter handle @IEBCKenya to send wishes to the Muslim community. The tweet states: ‘Eid Mubarak to all our Muslim brothers and sisters’ (24 May 2020). This was followed by the following responses:

Balikuddembe Snr. @NNabwangu, “Fungua server” (Open the server) (24 May 2020)

Shilabula @ShilabooksM, ‘You cannot wish people good things. Stick to your lane’ (24 May 2020)

Kenya’s newspaper the *Daily Nation*’s headline on Tuesday 24 November 2020 read ‘Trump takes leaf out of Uhuru, Raila playbooks.’ In the content, ‘*Fungua server*’ was mentioned. The author compared Trump’s lead in the count only to suddenly be overhauled overnight by an influx of votes from Biden strongholds; then the Trump lawyers argued that the Biden votes were inflated through an algorithm embedded in the electronic vote counting machinery to Kenya’s electoral KIEMS kits. The computer system used in the US elections in 2020 was owned by a foreign company with counting being done in Germany. The author states that ‘At that point I half expected to hear Giuliani demand “*Fungua server*”’. That purported evidence was lifted direct from the Odinga election petition of 2017. On the above one ILubembz @iLubembz tweeted: ‘Trump about to start yelling “fungua server”’ (7 November 2020).

The Handshake: Implications of Electoral Transparency for Kenya’s Democratisation Process

The handshake, as described earlier in this article as a public declaration to cease all hostilities and instead find a common ground in the interest of moving the country forward economically and politically after a flawed election, was meant to put Kenya back on its feet. Presidents Kenyatta and Odinga shook hands on 9 March 2018 at the steps of Harambe House, marking the end of the political differences that were fuelled by Odinga’s defeat in two Presidential elections in 2017. However, politicians allied to the National Super Alliance (NASA) felt that this was betrayal and that Raila had not consulted. In as much as Kenyans perceived it an act of leaders putting their egocentric interests aside, there was an element of betrayal that was brought out by this sudden union.

Criticism over the handshake continues to prevail three years on. Machakos governor Alfred mutual recently noted that despite Mr Odinga being criticised, without the 'courage of the handshake', Kenya would be unstable and ungovernable, 'even for cowards who cower when the going gets tough' (*The Nation*, 9 March 2021). Criticisms of the handshake include: clamour for constitutional changes in the country through the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI)⁸ which was anchored on solidifying the country's unity and curing the winner takes it all mentality that is usually witnessed after every electioneering period.

Some Kenyan citizens believe that the BBI team squandered a golden chance to remedy electoral disorder by focusing on political power; while others believe that the handshake brought unity, but its brainchild BBI caused disunity. The Star newspaper (10 March 2021) reported that the constitutional reform proposals fall short of expectations and hardly guarantee peaceful elections, due to be held in seventeen months. Politician Martha Karua, speaking to Citizen TV stated that 'The Handshake distorted our democracy. The watchdog role of the minority party in Parliament has been distorted ... It has brought intolerance and tension' (9 March 2021).

Conclusion and Policy Recommendation

The above examples suggest that the nexus between technology deployed and Kenya's democracy is still at stake unless election policies are revised and implemented. The discussion above reveals that Kenyans have used ICT to hold discussions with the aim of influencing policy and decision-making in regards to the election process. While doing so, they have strived to hold the IEBC accountable to the flawed elections of 2017; albeit through satire, hence the Twitter chants via the hashtag #FunguaServer. Therefore one wonders: are low levels of public confidence in the Electoral Management Board correlated with the contentious application of electoral technology?

What is the future of digital technologies in democratic elections in Kenya? The potential impact of harnessing new technology in the twenty-first century and learning access to technological resources could be introduced in African states to curb the many challenges that came with digital technologies; the ease of manipulation of vote tallies, and unaccountability, such as unopened servers, to date.

Electoral conflicts in Kenya occur due to deeply rooted causes that re-emerge after every election. For peace-building to take place, Kenya needs long-term investments in capacity building and setting up structures that

can help prevent violent conflict. Digital technologies can offer this capacity by providing long-time structures and avenues for alternative discourse and community engagement with digital cultures that promote peace, fostering non-violent attitudes and behaviours.

Weak policy areas that have led to mismanagement of elections need to be strengthened by policymakers. The Kenyan government should invest in civic education to ensure it has an educated electorate to curb overdependence on technology; since technology is not the solution to electoral fraud, but factors such as ballot rigging, and violations of electoral law are issues that undermine political stability.

Kenyan citizens, sharing similar experiences with American voters, have raised numerous questions in the realm of public policy about the relationship between election administration practices, on the one hand, and the size and composition of voter turnout, on the other (Stewart III 2011).

Kenyans seem not ready to protect their democracy by harnessing the benefits of digital technologies. Controversies over the use of new voting technologies have and continue to be met with resistance; therefore policies guiding elections should give the mandate (to various interest groups) to decide which voting technologies should be made available to voters.

Notes

1. *Standard Media*, 27 November 2011, <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000047306/use-of-ict-in-elections-will-deepen-democracy>.
2. Martin Andago: presentation titled 'The Technological Face of Kenyan Elections: A Critical Analysis of the 2013 Polls', http://www.kenyalaw.org/LVI2014/docs/Technological_Face_of_Kenyan_Elections.pdf.
3. This system sought to: enhance transparency through electronic transmission of provisional results from the polling stations; display provisional results at the tally centres for all agents and officials and provide access to provisional elections data to media and other stakeholders in real time for broadcast. Joseph Sosi: 'What Kenyans need to know about the IEBC KIEMS kit and provisional election results transmission', *Standard Media*, 7 August 2017, <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ureport/story/2001250595/what-kenyans-need-to-know-about-the-iebc-kiems-kit-and-provisional-election-results-transmission>.
4. The Nation Team: 'Raila Odinga disputes preliminary results', *Daily Nation*, 9 August 2017, <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Raila-Odinga-reject-preliminary-results/1064-4050768-lhhnykz/index.html>.
5. Form 34A is the first form used to tabulate results of the presidential election. It is filled by the Presiding Officer after the counting of votes at the polling station. It contains details of the votes garnered by each candidate and then

details the total number of registered voters in that station, the rejected votes, the objected ones, the disputed and the valid ones. The candidate or their agents are then required to sign and ratify that the contents of that form are correct. Form 34A is handed over to the Constituency Returning Officer, who then fills Form 34B. It is used for the collation of the presidential election results. On it is indicated: the polling station code, the name of the station, the number of registered voters, what each candidate garnered and the number of valid votes cast (Ndirachu 2017).

6. At the wake of 9 March 2018, Kenyans woke to 'life-changing' news through a rather unexpected event. News that the key leaders, Raila Odinga, and Uhuru Kenyatta, who were at the helm of the divisive politics and hurling insults at each other were putting their differences aside and uniting through a 'handshake'. This was a public declaration to cease all hostilities and instead find a common ground in the interest of moving the country forward economically and politically. After a prolonged period of turmoil, Kenya was now back on its feet. However, politicians allied to the National Super Alliance (NASA) felt that this was betrayal and that Raila had not consulted. In as much as Kenyans perceived it as an act of leaders putting their egocentric interests aside, there was an element of betrayal that was brought out by this sudden union.
7. Originated within Soviet psychology in the 1920s with its roots in the cultural–historical school. Further founded as activity theory by Leont'ev and his students in 1974. Later applied and extended by Scandinavian researchers in mid-1980.
8. BBI's nine-point agenda: how to end ethnic division; inclusivity; how to solve polarising elections; safety and security; how to deal with corruption; how to deal with lack of national ethos; responsibility and rights; shared prosperity; enhancing devolution.

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