Introduction

Chachage Seithy L. Chachage* & Karuti Kanyinga**

‘Globalization’ and ‘citizenship’ have increasingly become part of the important organizing processes in the world and in Africa specifically in the past three decades or so with the implementation of a series of socio-economic and political reforms aimed at creating a single market for goods, capital, services, skills and technology globally. Within the context of these reforms, the perceptions that states are the driving force of economic growth have been replaced by those that privilege the increased role of market forces in the allocation of resources, and ascribe a much-enlarged role for the private sector in the production and management of the economy. These reforms have entailed the restructuring of the public sector by removing protection, subsidies and support for parastatals; by privatizing public enterprises and civil service agencies (firing of workers, euphemistically re-labelled retrenchment or down-sizing); the restructuring of agriculture (by introducing individualization, titling and registration of land and removal of subsidies); and the creation of ‘enabling environments’ for investors through tax exemptions, holidays and cuts in government spending for social and productive services provisioning through ‘cost-sharing’ measures.

Given the fact that the history of post independence Africa has involved the struggle over citizenship as a consequence of the multi-ethnic composition of the continent and citizenship rights in a bid to redress the imbalances and inequalities inherited from colonialism, these reforms have complicated matters by reinforcing imbalances and inequalities. To the extent that these processes have resulted in the loss of control of productive and reproductive resources for the majority of the people in Africa; they have shaken the means by which people procure

* Department of Sociology, University of Dar es Salaam.
** Institute for Development Studies (IDS), University of Nairobi, Kenya.
their livelihood. Consequently, over the years Africa has witnessed an increased resurgence of conflicts (ethno-regional and religious ones), new forms of identities and further impoverishment and immiserization of the majority of the people. Various patterns of exclusion and inclusion (inequalities, exploitation and domination) on which the economic reforms rest over the years have necessitated the consolidation of repressive politics in terms of increased state intervention through introduction of laws aimed at labour control, protection of investments and markets, reduction of public expenditure on social and infrastructure services, welfare and human development. It is in this context that the theme of 'citizenship and rights' has been placed at the centre of development and political discourse in Africa.

Erosion of nation-state barriers by global as well as local forces has led to a major revival of questions of citizenship in terms of how to conceptualise the territorial composition of African territories and countries (Pan-Africanism) and citizenship rights, entitlements and obligations. With innovations in communication and information technology, which have been accelerating economic and cultural interactions and activities at the global level, the post-colonial nation-state project is facing immense challenges in terms of recomposition and resurgence of ethnic, religious, regional, gender, generational and regional identities. These have fuelled instabilities, conflicts and violence in some instances. The worst manifestations of these have been the collapse of the centralized states (such as the case of Somalia and DR Congo). Globalization has complicated questions of nationhood and state-driven projects to reconfigure former colonial territories; it has also eroded the foundations of the post-colonial social contract. This discourse, it can be argued, has posed a major challenge to policy makers and intellectuals, in terms of how diversities can be managed best and rights for all people (citizens) be secured. A mapping of some conceptual issues in the world of citizenship is in order here.

Western ideas about citizenship are derived originally from classical Greek and Roman worlds. It has the connotation of full participating membership to a territorial state. The term implies a 'universal basis': former for all adults or some category of them (e.g. males and property owners). In the Greek city-state, a citizen was one who had permanent share in the administration of justice and holding of office. In these city states, citizenship was important both for allowing one to play some part in public life and in determining private law, in such matters as inheritance (Dummet and Nicol 1990). A significant fact during these classical periods was the
fact that privilege of the Athenian or Roman citizenship was based on slavery and complete exclusion of women. Every citizen, therefore, was fed, clothed and sheltered by someone who did not enjoy that same status. Only in this way could the citizens of these city-states devote themselves to the arts, politics and military service, without participating in any productive activity. In these city-states, the number of slaves was greater than that of the citizens. It is not surprising that Aristotle believed that slavery was a natural condition of life for some races and even Plato could not envisage a perfect state in which slavery was non-existent.

The conception of citizenship had no meaning for most people during the medieval period (except in the small city-states). This was due to the fact that empires did not necessarily coincide with divisions between ‘nations’, and the majority of people lived under feudal relationships with local lords, and it was these relationships that determined rights and duties. ‘National’ borders in the modern sense were insignificant to the individual travellers, and it was only those who were ‘free’ (as opposed to serfs) who had freedom of movement. The concept of citizenship began to be revived and developed during the emergence of the modern nation-states in the late middle ages. This more or less coincided with Renaissance Europe, a period which was also marked by the beginning of European intervention in Africa, and the subsequent purchase or capture of human beings for enslavement and the eventual entombment of the American Indians in the processes of colonizing the Americas. Thus, for example, in William Shakespeare’s King Lear and Coriolanus, the appearance of the concept of citizenship is associated with responsibility for the ruled. That is, power was supposed to be exercised justly for the benefit of the community as a whole and not any one class or section (Legum 1962).

The emergence of the modern nation-states in Europe, which were accompanied by progress in the continent’s scientific, cultural and religious freedom of thought, were also increasingly being transformed into a ruthless international business through mercantilism, with trade in gold, slaves and skins at the centre. It was in this way that Britain, France and Spain were constantly at war during the eighteenth century, with adventurers prospering in the name of patriotic actions by pillaging other continents and competing over the enslavement of Africans. The revival of the concept of citizenship and the political ideals it espoused was seemingly in contradiction to the system of slavery, which the same movement sought to emulate. People who began trading in slaves were devout and enlightened, ready to die for their countries and privileges, and their privileges as citizens were premised on the acquisition of wealth.
The rise of nationalism had acted as an impetus in the creation of separate states. At the same time, the process of the creation of the nation-state went hand in hand with struggles and conferring the franchise on free and equal citizens and also the right to self-determination. Even the noble ideals of equality in Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, though created in a previously colonized country, fell short of granting citizen rights to women, slaves and other non-European people. Citizenship and pride in it was associated with beliefs in equality, freedom and self-government. The new form of citizenship was based on the concept of the nation and the question of loyalty to the state. Here, state power was exalted and popular hostility, accompanied with racist and chauvinistic outbursts towards foreign people, was encouraged in some instances. The most extreme form of this was Hitler’s Germany where state authorities invoked intolerance and xenophobia in the name of national interests. In such cases, a ‘citizen’ was naturally superior to an ‘alien’, i.e. inequality between citizens or nationals and aliens or foreigners was part of the proper order of things.

Basil Davidson captured this contradictory nature of the nation-state as being the main feature of Europe historically in the following remarks:

The most striking case of all is that of Italy...Compare the spirit with which the liberators of Italy set sail for Sicily and overthrew the Bourbons. They believed with Garibaldi that freedom does not betray its volunteers. So in 1861, Italy became an independent state. The Pope was soon reduced to what he now has. The Bourbons disappear, the Austrians disappear, the French disappear, and we have an Italian state. The Marseillaise of that liberation was written by a young 21-year-old Genoese poet. His song was that the Italians had been persecuted and exploited for centuries.

...In 1861 they are united. In 1876 they invade Assab, in 1880s they go to Eritrea, in 1890s into Ethiopia. In the 1900s they go into Libya. In other words, no sooner do they get united than the whole thing turns upon its head and they begin to persecute others...Aldous Huxley...said this...in 1950...about Europe: ‘Within five years of achieving its liberty, every oppressed nationality takes to militarism and within two or three generations, and sometimes within a single generation, it becomes—if circumstances are propitious—an imperialist aggressor eager to afflict upon its neighbours the oppression which it was itself so recently a victim’. (Davidson & Munslow 1990: 19)

In other words, nationalism and the nation-state in the West were based on the notion of the exercise of hegemonic power (cultural, political and
economic) by the national bourgeoisie, which projected itself in terms of the nation belonging to all citizens. As Samir Amin described these transformations: bourgeois democracy in the West was a product of revolutions that ‘established “equal rights” and personal liberties, but not equality (except under law)....Western democracy is thereby restricted to the political and public domain, while economic management continues to be based in non-democratic principles of private ownership and competition’ (1994:323).

Colonialism and the creation of empires as can be observed from the example of Italy were based upon nationalistic and patriotic notions, just as the perpetuation of slave trade and its defence against the abolitionists were based on the same. The West, it was claimed, had a moral and patriotic duty to ‘uplift’ the rest of the world through direct intervention. This history of the intervention of some ‘superior races’ into other areas of the world led to ‘race’, ‘civilization’, ‘nation’, ‘tribe’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘the state’ becoming catchwords. These conceptions had gender and sexuality implications, in that women became central in the representation of categories as the biological ‘carriers’ of a ‘race’ or ‘tribe’. This entailed a racist discourse within the reconstruction of patriarchal relations, which defined the private (women) and public (men) spheres and translated into political definitions of identities, as an expression of material practices of the exploitation of labour and imposition of the states (by conquest, with the conquerors dominating on the basis of separation from the conquered). The preoccupation of the colonial agents and anthropologists with themes such as kinship, marriage, fertility, sexuality and African religions was central in this process. In this way, people were arbitrarily classified and partitioned. They were based on arbitrary partitioning of people in the colonies. The conquest and domination over the land and people of Africa modelled itself upon the power relations of masculinity and femininity. Simply, racialisation and stereotyping of race and gender went hand in hand with the theorisation of tribes and ethnic identities in Africa, in the process, finally producing an African male hegemonic discourse, associated with the formation of tribes, nations and states. The state was regarded as the medium of cultural and political identity.

After the partition of Africa from 1884–5, these conceptions found their material expression in promulgation of outrageous laws related to natives (and creation of such courts), detention without trial, prevention of vagrancy, native pass regulations, and land laws which invested the title of all land in governors. Violent, brutal massacres and other forms or reprisals of natives (‘as a means, of bringing tribesmen to parley’, as some
colonial officers put it) were the norm under colonialism. Naked examples were such as those of the massacres of the people of Congo when it was a private possession of Leopard II, King of Belgium, from 1885 to 1908; the sacrificing of thousands of people during the building of the rail connecting Brazzaville with the port of Pointe-Noire; the Herero people of Namibia; and the people of Southern Tanzania who were massacred on a genocidal scale by the Germans from 1905-7. These massacres have not entered Western historical and moral memory like their later counterparts, like Lidice in the former Czechoslovakia—the Nazi Massacre in World War II!

It was within this context that the categorization and definition of African communities and their relationships were achieved. The conceptualization of ‘race’, ‘nation’, ‘tribe’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic identity’ became the main pre-occupation of colonial agents. Colonial powers in Africa created coercive states, which were based on the arbitrary and contradictory classification of people. Besides vivisecting people through drawing boundaries that had no historical reference (Asiwaju 1985), distinctions were made between what were considered to be conquerors and conquered, natives and citizens, backward and enlightened ‘tribes’, within territories. From a people who were organized in the form of social groups (sometimes language being the basis of that organisation) and not ethnic groups, colonial powers (in different ways) ethnicized these groups by creating social political conditions that would lead later to discriminatory tendencies.

This was contrary to the actual existing relationships and realities. There is ample evidence that before and even after colonial occupation African people were moving freely around their respective regions (west, east, central, southern and north) in large numbers. ‘Mozambicans have moved to Malawi, Malawians to Zimbabwe, everyone to South Africa and so it goes on. Many families contain at least a member with direct experience of another country…’ (Davidson 1990: 11). Historical studies by Ranger (1983), Iliffe (1979) and others in the 1970s revealed that particular ethnic identities have come into existence in the relatively recent past as a colonial creation, that these ethnic groups are constructs, which have been changing over time, given the nature of the state. They further demonstrated that accounts (by ethnologists, travellers and missionaries) on nineteenth century pre-colonial Africa rife with ‘tribal wars’, descriptions of whole populations perpetually at each other’s throats were an imperial creation to justify the intervention and colonisation of Africa. According to Kjekshus (1977:19):
The majority of the East African peoples practiced either an agricultural economy or a cattle economy, neither of which had any in-built necessity for extensive warfare. Where raiding took place, it is therefore possible to understand it in limited terms. Tanner has given statistics from Musoma in the 1950s when no more than 1.5 percent was affected. There is no reason to believe that the raiding incidence, under normal conditions in the nineteenth century, should have been very much higher.

It is quite possible that our impressions of a warlike past come about partially through uncritical translation into accepted history of tribal lore and legend despite their well-known tendencies to exaggerate past achievements on the battlefield. John Ford quotes a West Lake tradition recorded in the Bukoba District book that fully illustrates the exaggerating tendency. After one of the tribal battles in Karagwe, four piles of testicles, each four feet high, were reportedly exhibited as trophies of victory. Ford thought that at least 75,000 men would have been slaughtered to collect this unusual booty. He noted that the entire chiefdom in the 1948 census had less than 13,000 males over 16 years of age.

Studies in the 1970s demonstrated that colonial literature had gross exaggerations: ‘Statements such as...the Waganda frequently lost 30 to 40 percent of their men, can only fall in such a category. ...[W]ars in most instances were limited in scope and intent’ (ibid.).

These exaggerated accounts served a purpose also in terms of how to re-organize Africans as subjects. For the colonials, it was absolutely imperative to divide and rule these people. In many of the British colonies, this was to take the form of ‘indirect rule’. When expressed in political terms, as some of the colonial agents were to put it bluntly in Tanganyika in the 1920s, the biggest fear they had was that of Pan-African ideals of the Ethiopian church and the possibility of Africans holding the conception of Africa for Africans. The paranoia of the emergence of a ‘detribalised’ African reached a pathological level. In 1917, for example, the Private Secretary to the East African Protectorates (Kenya) Acting Governor was to put a suggestion on the best way to implement a ‘definite policy of encouraging strong and isolated tribal nationalism [as] one of the most effectual barriers against a Pan-African upheaval....’ (quoted by Lonsdale 1975: 25). It was the fear of the impact of the ideas being widely read and reproduced in the colonies by Pan-African papers and journals such as, The New Leader, The Keys, International African Opinion, Negro Worker, etc., replete with accounts of struggles of African masses all over the world, who openly proclaimed ‘Africa for Africans!’
It was fear of the resistance of the African masses, expressed in various forms, including armed struggles, fought almost throughout Africa by communities that often cooperated. African masses' forms of resistance to European domination up to the 1950s tended to take place within the context of *Pan-African identity* and not 'tribal', 'ethnic' or 'national' identities. Kenneth Kaunda, Frantz Fanon, John Okello and Osale Otango are some examples of people who were part of independence movements away from their colonial territories of origin. The fear by the Europeans of a Pan-African upheaval was a result of the fact that most anti-colonial struggles, even when localised, tended to emphasise race as opposed to place or territory. In the imperial world itself, new developments were taking place, which were geared towards restriction over movements of people across national borders, as a worldwide phenomenon during this time. Before World War I, people could travel between a number of countries without a passport and with no restriction on taking work after arrival. It was in this way that millions of people moved from Europe to the Americas, Africa, Australia and elsewhere; from China to South East Asia and the Americas; from India to numerous territories of the British Empire (freely or indentured labourers). Before this, restriction was not general and systematic: refusal of entry and imposition of conditions or removal from a country was directed against particular individuals, such as political subversives rather than against foreigners or aliens in general.

After World War I, possession of a nationality became a matter of practical importance in order to enjoy basic residence somewhere. It was mainly during this period that immigration laws that spelt residence and other rights for the citizens and nationals were framed. This is despite the fact that after World War II the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation introduced conventions that set standards for treatment of people who were not nationals, including their protection and their rights (civil, political, economic and social). Formal citizenship, defined in terms of membership to a nation-state became a central issue in politics especially after World War II. This was a result of the massive post-war immigration of people to Western Europe and North America (Brubaker 1992). At the same time, new conceptions of citizenship—substantive citizenship, defined as possession of a body of civil, political and social rights, were developing, with T.H. Marshall's (1967) tradition, initiated in the post World War II period. In this tradition, alongside the reformulation of citizenship was the issue of social policy, defined as the 'policy of the governments with regard to action having a direct impact on the welfare of citizens by providing them with services or income' (6).
Social policy was supposed to include state provision of social security, housing, education, income, health and personal services.

The main focus, in this conception was on the individual, and the tendency was to leave out all central or local state activities affecting the quality of life of communities—communal services such as roads, water supply or protection of the environment. Even non-state activities (such as those of occupational welfare or voluntary agencies) that affect the welfare of citizens or communities were not taken aboard. The 1950 study by T.H. Marshall (1992) depicted a sequence of the extension of the eighteenth century civil rights (equality before the law, personal liberty, freedom of speech, thought and religion, the right to own property and make contracts) to the nineteenth century political rights (electoral and office-holding rights) and twentieth century social rights (a basic level of economic and social welfare and social security, the welfare state, and full participation in national culture). By combining Marxist and Weberian insights, Marshall was able to show that while capitalism increased perverseness of class conflict, citizenship in the territorial state represented not its elimination, but its institutionalisation and the conversion of nation into nation-state. Principles and policies of social citizenship were meant to counteract, to some extent, the inegalitarian tendencies of the capitalist economy.

These conceptions had certain assumptions and ideological underpinnings about the functioning of the market economies. The functioning of the market economies was taken for granted; the issue at stake was how to distribute resources, status and power among different sections/groups in a society within the existing order. This ideological position historically resulted in some forms of state provisioning of public health, public education, public housing and social security in Europe (i.e. the welfare state) in the post-World War II period, to replace market solutions. These forms of state provisioning established collectivist and egalitarian principles and policies that counteracted, to some extent, the inegalitarian tendencies of the capitalist system. Some state intervention in social provisioning in Europe was accepted in recognition of some forms of collectivist and institutional solutions, while at the same time acknowledging the impossibility of a self-regulating market pragmatically. In a way, this approach was a response to the East European socialist countries, where social policies had been largely built into the operation of the economy by means of full employment, public provisioning of social services and subsidized prices. This was a system, which tended to curtail most of the civil and political rights at the same time as they provided a
considerable range of important social rights that posed serious challenges to the Western conceptions of forms of social organization and capitalism.

Given such a situation in the imperial countries, Pan-Africanism in the hands of the African educated elements increasingly became riddled with contradictions by the time various countries were achieving independence. For the nationalist leaders, rather than aim at grasping the nature of African social formations and understand their driving force as a means to transform the colonial arrangements, they only sought to de-mystify the myths of colonialism and intermarry what they considered to be African Civilization and Western Civilization. In other words, they rejected Western civilization in so far as it denied them equality and appropriated from African civilization what was acceptable in universalistic paradigms. Their demands after World War II, transformed into economic demands in the form of creation of 'modern economies' of their countries by governments and the control of resources, translated into what were to become nationalist politics, territorially defined by the 1884 colonial conquest. This was despite the fact that at the All African Peoples Organization (AAPO) Conference held in Accra in December 1958 these leaders had resolved that Africa must unite. In their resolutions, they had categorically stated that 'the bulk of the African continent has been carved out arbitrarily to the detriment of the indigenous African peoples by European Imperialists....'; that 'the great masses of the African peoples are animated by a desire for unity'; the latter would be 'vital to the independence of its component units and essential to the security and the general well-being of African peoples'. They had further resolved that 'the existence of separate states in Africa is fraught with dangers of exposure to imperialist intrigues and of resurgence of colonialism even after their attainment of independence, unless there is unity ....' They had endorsed the Pan-Africanist desire of unity and called upon independent African states to work towards the evolution and attainment of the African Commonwealth (Legum 1962).

Contrary to those aspirations, nationalist leaders after independence sought to consolidate the states that were created by the colonialists and even attempted to annex parts of other territories. When the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was born in 1963, Ethiopia and Somalia were at war over Ogaden; at the same time, Somalia wanted to annex Djibouti and was also claiming to be given the northern part of Kenya. By 1965, Malawi was claiming a part of Tanzania. The inaugural summit of the OAU in 1963 accepted the borders inherited from colonialism. From a
people’s movement, Pan Africanism had been transformed into a movement of the states. The consolidation of the nation-state in Africa after independence was more or less the beginning of the defeat of the rebelling masses, in the form of acceptance of the violation of people’s rights committed in 1884 by the imperial powers. The 1963 OAU Charter recognized these territories. Wole Soyinka has made the following observation:

Beginning with the Organization of African Unity, which formally consecrated this act of arrogant aggression, reinforced by civil wars on varied scales of mutual destruction in defence of imperial mandate, the continent as a whole appears, however, to have swallowed intact this explosive seed of disunity—under the iron banner of unity. If only African leaders could become acquainted with how much—just to illustrate the hollowness of such beginnings—the division of India and Pakistan (and the allocation of their respective boundaries) owed to the whimsical decisions of a mere civil servant imported straight from Whitehall, someone who had never even visited the Asian continent until then, but was selected to for the ‘objective’ distancing that that very arrogance was presumed to confer on him, was given a deadline of a mere twenty-eight days to complete his task in order to ensure that the continent was effectively divided before Independence Day—such leaders and cheerleaders would learn to be less cocky about the mangy claims of ‘national sovereignty’. Much of the division of Africa owed more to a case of brandy and a box of cigars than to any intrinsic claims of what the boundaries enclosed (1999: 36-7).

This consecration had implications, as far as the state forms were concerned, in that the new rulers could oppress their own people without interference from other African countries. Once identity was reduced to a territory, it was a short step to exploiting ‘ethnicity’ as a vehicle for accumulation (concentration of wealth and power in a few hands and the ruination and disempowerment of the majority). Henceforth, communities and groups were ranked according to their differential access to resources and power and became hierarchical.

The establishment of the African Union (AU) since 2002 has not altered this situation, for, as Michael Neocosmos points out in his article in this issue, ‘the AU is little different from its predecessor and cannot be the source of a renewal of pan-Africanism. Rather, the renewal of the pan-African ideal has to be sought in pan-African mass movements, particularly in a mass movement for peace.’ It is within this context that one can appreciate the theme of this issue. The papers in the volume have used different aspects and dimensions of globalization to address ques-
tions of nationalism, citizenship and rights in contemporary Africa. Donor-inspired reforms and development initiatives as well as ‘changing politics’, new forms of identities and regional and continental integration and other global processes constitute the most significant entry points in most of these papers. The contributors look at how some of these events have affected citizenship over the years and why it has been difficult to protect and promote rights even in the wake of political and economic reforms.

In his article, Neocosmos reevaluates post-colonial politics in Africa and the reasons for the crisis of state-nationalism, given the various forms and manifestations of globalization. Implicit in his argument is the need to renew the goals of the AAPO Conference of 1958, while taking into account the current developments in the continent and globally. According to him, the way out for Africa is to renew Pan Africanism in a popular democratic form that facilitates human emancipation. He argues for the necessity of a democratic struggle beyond human rights from the perspective of the oppressed majority. In his opinion, the ‘national question’ in Africa so far has reflected the culture and concerns of western dominance and neo-liberalism, which has privileged state politics in the discourse on transformation. This paper in some ways tackles most of the theoretical issues that are pertinent to the rest of the papers in the volume.

Chachage Seithy L. Chachage’s paper on the Wamaasai notes that economic goals have historically constituted the agenda of integration in East Africa. The welfare of people in the form of access to social-economic rights has not been at the centre of nation-state integration initiatives since the colonial period. Moreover, there has been a tendency by states to conceptualize citizenship from a politico-legal perspective in which citizenship is simply identified with being a member of a particular nation-state. This politico-legal conceptualization of citizenship has obvious negative implications for the communities that straddle nation-state boundaries. Conceptualizing citizenship on a territorial basis erodes an important social-cultural aspect of citizenship: communality and rights associated with being a member of a community. It results in excluding, discriminating and oppressing the people whose ‘citizenship’ and social organization were destructed and destabilized by the colonial act of partitioning and dividing the continent among different colonial powers.

Chachage’s paper shows how the post-colonial states of Kenya and Tanzania have continued to deprive the Wamaasai by accentuating ‘deprivation’ policies. Setting land aside for the creation of national parks and game reserves under the guise of conservation policies, as well as the
Chachage & Kanyinga: Introduction 13

privatisation of communal land, generally resulted in eroding the means of livelihood of the Wamaasai. This weakened economic base has further reduced the Wamaasai's entitlements as citizens. Through market-inspired reforms, the Wamaasai have lost an important aspect of citizenship—social-economic rights. The failure of the governments in both Kenya and Tanzania to provide them with basic services has meant further loses. These difficulties notwithstanding, the Wamaasai have been deeply involved in rejecting the whole question of citizenship. They have organized rejection of the colonial territorial identities by moving across borders at will. The paper concludes that the nation-state is an obstacle to genuine transformations in the region owing to the manner in which it conceptualizes the notion of citizenship. It also notes that the border communities form the most important basis for a meaningful unity in the region. In spite of the surveillance on boundaries and repressive conditions around the borders, the border communities have continued to unite and work together.

Danson Kahyana's paper examines the question of the Asian (im)migrants in East Africa via fiction. His special focus is on the post-colonial crisis of identity and the way it manifests itself culturally, racially, ethnically, nationally and even internationally. He tackles the issue from the (im)migrants' point of view. Within this context, his main concern is with the descendants of (im)migrants who settled in East Africa for many generations rather than the contemporary 'investor Asians' who have come to settle since 1980s. Kahyana's choice of fiction is in a way quite an innovation as far as studying tensions, conflicts and contradictions in the communities concerned. Beyond using fiction, he equally marshals historical evidence to support his thesis. Ultimately, Kahyana's aim is to draw lessons that can lead to the rejuvenation of the East African community and its integration. That is, the possibility that transformations can lead to the evolution of a 'multiracial, multiethnic and multicultural society, where all citizens will be considered full citizens regardless of racial differences'.

Globalization has had other significant consequences on the nation-state and social citizenship in Africa. Peter Mwangi Kagwanja's paper clearly points at several contradictions of the operation of global forces and how different dimensions of globalization have shaped the construction of citizenship among Kenya's Tana River communities. It shows how globalization has undermined enjoyment of citizenship rights in Kenya by spawning new forms of conflicts and violence. Noting that globaliza-
tion appears to appreciate 'cosmopolitanism’ as a base for global citizenship, the paper points out that rights associated with citizenship are exercised within the nation-state whose importance, ironically, globalization seeks to reduce. Furthermore, it argues that globalization and emphasis on neo-liberalism (market reforms in particular) has undermined the welfare state; it has resulted in the state withdrawing from service provision. Globalization itself has rapidly occasioned a reversal of gains which may accrue; it is eroding social citizenship.

Certain important negative aspects, notably, new perceptions of nationalism, which are not emancipatory, have attended the process of globalization. Negative identities based on culture and ethnicities have also arisen to lay claim to power using identity labels. This generally threatens the peaceful coexistence of communities in various parts of Africa. These are now the most significant challenges to the nation-state project. In Kenya, this has resulted in violence and new form of conflicts. Some of these conflicts have origins in how identities are constructed and appropriated to assist in claims over natural resources. Conflicts and violence within Tana River region provide a good illustration in this regard.

Implementation of economic reforms and, in particular, introduction of market reforms, has had other consequences on citizenship in the region. They have generally contributed to the loss of livelihood of citizens. The entry of new actors in the market has not transformed the economic conditions of the poor; it has impoverished them. Karuti Kanyinga and Musambayi Katumanga’s paper examines how economic reforms have continued to deprive peasants of rights to their livelihood. They point out that from the colonial period, rice farmers working in different irrigation schemes have been subjects of the state; they have existed to farm their produce only with the wish of the state. Their relationship with the state has meant continued deprivation of their livelihood. They lack secure tenure to the lands, which they have cultivated for generations. Political elites have not been of any help to them. The practice has been one where the state co-opts all prominent individuals seen as critical in the struggle for economic emancipation by the peasants. The state has often deflated these struggles by co-opting the leadership. Extending certain important political and economic privileges to the local elites and the local leadership in general has generally exerted cooptation.

The state has used this approach on numerous occasions to tire the peasants and to undermine their struggles. Given that peasants have no secure means of livelihood and that they lack secure land tenure, they have generally failed to sustain their struggles for rights. The peasants
have succumbed to eviction threats and physical repression. However, they have established new forms of resistance against the state; seeking alternative markets for their produce and organizing themselves through cooperatives. Kanyinga and Katumanga conclude that economic liberalization has occasioned the economic repression of the local peasants. This has constrained improvement of their incomes through rice farming and as a result it has led to peasants becoming highly indebted both to state marketing agencies and local economic elites. Given this indebtedness, farmers cannot organize significant struggles against the state. The peasants have continued to lose out.

Finally, Jude Fokwang’s ‘Ambiguous Transitions: Mediating Citizenship Among Youths in Cameroon’ seeks to deal with youth experiences and discourses of citizenship in the context of Cameroon’s political and social (dis)order. Beyond this, it attempts to show the relationship between youth transition and citizenship as localized experiences within the current global era. The paper draws on the concept of social citizenship rather than political citizenship. That is, rather than focus on the issues of participation in certain institutions and processes, it focuses on the rights of youths in society. These rights include education, health, housing and social welfare. Thus central is the critical relationship between individuals/groups and the postcolonial state.

Given that the right to the full participation of youths in society is determined by social structures of inequality such as class, gender, race, disability and so on, Fokwang explores the ways youths negotiate the distribution of resources and opportunities in the context of the difficulties facing them. The specific question addressed in this paper is, ‘what are young people’s understanding and experiences of citizenship in Cameroon and how do these shape the choices they make in their transition to adulthood’. As Fokwang shows, these choices are as varied as they are creative in making use of new opportunities and communication technologies.

Fokwang’s paper is the result of ethnographic research conducted in two towns in Cameroon. It is primarily inspired, however, by a commitment to treat the lives of individual youth with rigour and candour; Fokwang takes into account both the social structures and economic problems facing the country in a global context in her discussion which offers an intense look at issues with which the other contributors of this volume are concerned as well. While their approaches do not delve as deeply into ethnographic material, each one is equally innovative historically, methodologically, and theoretically. Each one is also especially well-prepared
to help us rethink the tensions of citizenship present in post-colonial Africa and the new social configurations through which these are expressed in the current moment.

References