
Africa Development, Vol. XXVIII, Nos. 1 & 2, 2003, pp. 112–152

(ISSN 0850-3907)

Globalizing Ethnicity, Localizing Citizenship: Globalization, Identity Politics and Violence in Kenya's Tana River Region

Peter Mwangi Kagwanja*

Abstract

This paper is about the ways in which forces of globalization have impacted on, and shaped the construction of, citizenship in Africa generally and Kenya in particular. It is also about globalization and violence associated with the resurgence of ethnic nationalism. The empirical part of the paper focuses on Tana River region, a marginalized, poor and bandit-prone multi-ethnic region on the delta of Kenya's largest river. The region's proximity to Somalia, where the state has collapsed and warlords hold sway, has also exposed the region to the effects of cross-border flows of firearms, 'mercenaries' and bandits. Moreover, the World Bank has funded several projects in Tana River, but its funding, management policies and the overall impact of the investments have accentuated ethnic conflict within and between herders and farmers over water-points, pasture and farmlands. These conflicts have engendered the reconstruction of new ethnic identities and alliances, and the selective use of historical memories and cultural institutions to buttress exclusive claims to territorial citizenship. These localized processes are linked to ethnic contests at the civic realm by intense politicization of citizenship as a logical consequence of liberal majoritarian democracy in ethnically divided polities. The paper maps the contours of the historical process through which globalization has undermined social citizenship and the nationalist project in post-colonial Africa, thus everywhere animating ethnicity and localizing citizenship.

Résumé

Cette contribution étudie l'impact des forces de la mondialisation sur le concept de citoyenneté, et sur sa construction sur le continent africain, en général, et plus particulièrement au Kenya. Elle porte également sur les principes de

* Dr Peter Mwangi Kagwanja is currently a Research Associate with the Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria and Director, International Crisis Group (ICG) in South Africa.

mondialisation et de violence, associés à la résurgence du nationalisme ethnique. La partie empirique de cet article étudie la zone de la rivière Tana, une région marginalisée, multiethnique, pauvre, regorgeant de bandits, qui est située sur le delta de la plus grande rivière kenyane. La proximité de cette région d'avec la Somalie, où l'État a échoué dans sa mission et où les seigneurs de guerre dictent leur loi, a favorisé dans cette région l'apparition de phénomènes, tels que le flux transfrontalier d'armes et la circulation de mercenaires et de bandits. De plus, la Banque Mondiale a financé un grand nombre de projets de la rivière Tana, mais ces financements et politiques de gestion, ainsi que l'impact global de ces investissements, ont aggravé les conflits ethniques entre pasteurs et agriculteurs, portant sur les points d'eau, les zones de pâturage et les zones agricoles. Ces conflits ont provoqué la re-formation de nouvelles identités et alliances ethniques, ainsi que l'exploitation exclusive des mémoires collectives et des institutions culturelles, dans le but de justifier les revendications exclusives de citoyenneté territoriale. Ces processus localisés sont liés aux luttes ethniques, sur le plan civique, par une forte politisation de la notion de citoyenneté, qui découle logiquement de la démocratie libérale majoritaire au niveau des États divisés sur le plan ethnique. Cette contribution définit les contours du processus historique, par l'intermédiaire duquel la mondialisation a porté atteinte à la citoyenneté sociale et au projet nationaliste en Afrique post-coloniale, favorisant ainsi un peu partout des phénomènes d'ethnicité et de localisation de la citoyenneté.

Introduction

> My father was a Ghanaian patriot...But he also loved Asante, the region of Ghana where he and I both grew up, a kingdom absorbed within a British colony and then a region in a new multiethnic republic...And like so many African nationalists of his class and generation, he always loved an enchanting abstraction they called Africa. When he died, my sisters and I found a note he had drafted... After a summary reminder of our double ancestry—in Ghana and in England—he wrote, 'Remember that you are citizens of the world.

So writes Kwame Appiah, celebrating the amity between his 'global citizenship' and a heritage of congeries of ethnic, national, racial and pan-Africa identities (1998:91). The idea of globalization—that the Internet and unfettered flow of capital are homogenizing cultures, transforming markets, creating new economic linkages and inter-dependence, compressing time and distance, and erasing boundaries—has inspired blissful imaginations of a planetary citizenship in Marshall McLuhan's 'Global Village' (1989). This luscious intellectual excursion into cosmopolitanism has enabled us to imagine and plot citizenship along the entire local-global continuum. However, the rights, privileges and duties of citizens are still defined by, and exercised within, the state.

In spite of theoretical forays into 'post-national citizenship' (Tambini 2001) and the recent double-barrelled assault on the nation-state by localized forces of ethnicity and globalized currents of liberalism, the state is still the domain of citizenship and the nodal-point of our international system (Wallerstein 1995). Globalization has simultaneously undermined the welfare state and eroded 'social citizenship' in Africa and promoted 'market citizenship' which is assumed to be driven by economic interests and civil society. In promoting 'market citizenship' in Africa, globalization has proceeded against the backdrop of the collapse of the welfare state in the West, the nationalist project in the Third World, and Sovietism in the Eastern bloc (Amin 1997:34).

While globalization's most ubiquitous symbols are the 'Mac computer and the Big Mac' (code names for technology and multinationals), its indelible birthmark is violent conflict—evocatively captured by Barber's title: *Jihad Versus MacWorld* (1995). The theory of globalization has a long pedigree in Rosa Luxemburg's Marxist notion of the world market and imperialism. However, globalization has substituted struggles along market-based identities such as worker and capitalist or landlord and tenant for struggles based on cultural, ethnic or religious identities (Amselle 2002:214). Fukuyama's *End of History*, the emblematic *oeuvre* of liberal triumphalism in the twenty-first century, envisioned a blissful post-Cold War world where culture, ethnicity and religion are the only residual issues. However, in Huntington's (1996) *Clash of Civilizations*, these issues loom even larger and are imagined as the focal points of a cultural clash on the global stage between the 'West and the Rest' (meaning the Western civilization versus the whole mass of Islamic and Confucian worlds). Viewed in this context, globalization emerges as the legitimate heir to the paradoxical and centrifugal twentieth century, which the historian, Eric Hobsbawm, dubs the 'Age of Extremes' (1994). However, Huntington's binary framework of global identity conflict leaves out Africa and other parts of the world where violent ethnic conflicts everywhere are undermining civic citizenship and emboldening parochial and localized claims.

Intellectuals and publics have increasingly used the term 'nationalism' to describe the sensibilities and violence linked to culture, ethnicity, religion and other negative antinomies of society (Anderson 1991). Nationalism in the contemporary period, Hobsbawm (1990) argues, has acquired a quite different, and reactionary, form to that of the emancipatory nationalism of the nineteenth century which was strongly associated with the struggle for national democratization. This form of nationalism, which

Berman (1998) characterizes as 'uncivil-nationalism', is about identity politics or claim to power on the basis of identity labels—Croat, Serb, Hindu, Maasai or Tutsi. It has also produced what Mary Kaldor (1999) has christened 'new wars': new because they lack 'the geo-political or ideological goals of earlier wars' and are largely internal or 'civil wars'. The form of violence this nationalism generates is theorized as 'non-revolutionary,' a deviation from Fanon's (1962) emancipatory and humanizing violence associated with anti-colonial liberation and akin to the senseless and dehumanizing violence that underpinned Nazi Holocaust (Arendt 1975).

Faced with this violence, some researchers treat it as a legacy of the colonial strategy of divide-and-rule that invented and politicized the ethnic identity. This colonial manipulation of ethnicity, it is argued, bequeathed post-colonial societies with the ethnic polarities of settler (or migrants) and native (indigenous) as the axis about which claims to rights and citizenship rotate (Mamdani 1996:2001). However, the political identity analysis illuminates and historicizes ethnicity and colonialism, but fails to animate ethnic violence in the light of a globalizing world. Other analysts have perceived the logic of this violence as a new phenomenon of 'informal repression', a strategy by the ruling elite of the one-party vintage to covertly employ violence to undermine political opposition, counter multiparty democracy and regain political initiative (Kirschke 2000).

However, nationalism flowing from 'communal' forces is not always venal, reactionary or illegitimate; for ethnic nationalism is a Janus-faced phenomenon. John Lonsdale's (1994) dichotomous categories of 'moral ethnicity' and 'political tribalism' aptly describe its benign and disruptive faces. In a similar vein, theorists have stressed the key point that ethnic-based movements have served as counter-hegemonic forces to the centralizing and hegemonic ambitions of the modern territorial secular nation-state. They have everywhere localized the struggle for citizenship in ways that create moral communities, mobilize social capital, and broaden the space for cultural citizenship in post-colonial Africa (Eyo 1999). Finally, ethnic identities have provided social safety-nets that have cushioned many Africans from poverty, disease and illiteracy in the face of the debilitating effects of Structural Adjustment Programs and other policy excesses of globalization.

This paper is about globalization and citizenship, the ways in which forces of globalization have impacted on, and shaped the construction of, citizenship in Africa generally and Kenya in particular. It is also about globalization and violence associated with the resurgence of ethnic nationalism.

In this regard, Appadurai has argued that globalization fosters uncertainties and inequalities that have reinforced primordial sensibilities and recidivist ideologies, and inspired the atomization of political processes (1998, 2000). Forces of globalization, including the predatory activities of multinationals and negative effects of cross-border contraband have stoked the embers of violence within and between ethnic groups, which has killed off and maimed thousands, destroyed communities and created millions of refugees. After all, Kaldor's 'new wars' are not just 'internal' or 'civil wars.' They are part of ubiquitous 'regional conflict formations' that link the 'local' and the 'global' and expose the dark under-belly of globalization. Bandits, militias and other local combatants are connected to, and largely thrive on, 'economies of war' that connect globalized illegal trade networks in firearms, drugs, precious metals and gemstones across Africa's porous borders with local theatres of war (Raimo 1984; Rubin 2001).

The empirical part of the paper focuses on Tana River, a marginalized, poor and bandit-prone multi-ethnic region on the delta of Kenya's largest river. The region's proximity to Somalia, where the state has collapsed and warlords hold sway, has also exposed the region to the effects of cross-border flows of firearms, 'mercenaries' and bandits. Moreover, the World Bank has funded several projects in Tana River, but its funding, management policies and the overall impact of the investments have accentuated ethnic conflict within and between herders and farmers over water-points, pasture and farmlands. These conflicts have engendered the reconstruction of new ethnic identities and alliances, and the selective use of historical memories and cultural institutions to buttress exclusive claims to territorial citizenship. These localized processes are linked to ethnic contests at the civic realm by intense politicization of citizenship as a logical consequence of liberal majoritarian democracy in ethnically divided polities. This paper maps the contours of the historical process through which globalization has undermined social citizenship and the nationalist project in post-colonial Africa, thus everywhere animating ethnicity and localizing citizenship.

Historicizing Globalization, Citizenship and Violence

Globalization is linked to the complex processes that are undermining citizenship based on the nation-state and localizing citizenship in ways that have reinforced 'communal' violence everywhere in Africa. This centrifugal and paradoxical aspect of globalization is rooted in the history of the equally contradictory twentieth century, with its monumental economic and technological progress on the one hand and cataclysmic vio-

lence, on the other. In order to come to terms with this centrifugal streak of globalization and to understand how it is wrecking civic citizenship in favour of localized, primordial derivatives of citizenship, it is imperative to confront the discursive trope that casts globalization as a 'new' phenomenon now permeating the entire globe.

In the early 1990s, globalization was launched as a 'new' epoch in world history embodied in the international system that replaced the Cold War system after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Friedman 1990). The 'newness' of globalization, indeed, its ahistorical stance, has been a bone of contention. The historian, Fred Cooper, rightly argues that the 'global' and the 'ization' in globalization pose serious conceptual problems: 'The implication of the first is that a single system of connection—notably through capital and commodity markets, information flows, and imagined landscapes—has penetrated the entire globe; and the implications of the second is that it is doing so now, that this is a global age' (2001:189). Cooper's is a sagacious invitation to intellectuals to problematize globalization by historicizing it. It is no longer in dispute that globalization did not start 'the other day with CNN or yesterday with the Internet.' In fact, 'the world has been globalizing for a long time, that the intensity and extent of international interactions across the continents, countries, communities and cultures have been growing for centuries, although they have progressively accelerated in the twentieth century' (Zeleza 2002: 10). Less flattering versions of this interpretation equate globalization with the logic of exploitation, culminating in the westernization of non-Western societies and capital's final conquest of all corners of the globe (Waters 1995; Tandon 1987).

Over the last half millennium, Africa has been integrated, and indeed, has contributed to the economic, political, cultural, and even discursive processes that have led to our modern world and its systems. Yet, 'Africa's engagement with, and contributions to, globalization have [not] necessarily been beneficial to its people.' The stark reality is that the continent's people 'have paid a high price over the last 500 years in the construction of a more integrated world through the European slave trade, colonialism, and structural adjustment' (Zeleza 2002:10).

Commenting on capitalist globalization in the age of slave trade, Thomas Paine found it surprising that civilized, nay, Christianized 'traders in men' would steal and enslave men and women through violence, and turn them into a commodities, thus taking away their rights, citizenship and humanity (Paine 1775).

The crisis of citizenship came to a head in Africa during the phase of colonial globalization. Fanon's (1963) analysis of the separate regimes of rights, between the 'settler' imbued with citizenship and with full civic rights and the colonized 'native' with no rights, revealed the colonial crisis of citizenship that gave rise to wars of liberation (1963). Colonial violence on the colonized natives rested on the modernist notion that is clearly articulated by John Stuart Mill: 'Barbarians have no rights as a nation' (Mazrui 1967:38). To that end, 'the Law of Nations came to mean in effect the 'Law of Civilized Nations.' This was to apply to the uncivilized (barbarian) world unilaterally and with all the moral fibre of social Darwinism and the self-righteousness known as the White Man's Burden (Ayele 1998:108). When he came face to face with colonial violence, pillage of indigenous peoples and systems, forced labour, corporal punishment, police brutality and the denial of citizenship and rights, Fanon arrived at his famous thesis: 'de-colonization is always a violent phenomenon' (Fanon 1963:35). Convinced that 'the colonized man finds his freedom in and through violence,' Fanon hardly concealed his contempt for African variants of Mahatma Ghandhi's epistle of non-violence, *Satyagraha,* soul force. 'Non-violence,' he wrote, 'is an attempt to settle the colonial problem around a green baize table...' (Fanon 1963:61).

However, Fanon earmarked, as the most urgent agendum...for the post-colonial African intellectual, the 'building up his nation,' leading the nascent nation to play its part on the stage of history, and making it part of 'the international consciousness' (Ishay 1997:314–7). By prioritizing nation-building as the foremost agenda in post-colonial Africa, Fanon, like many African nationalists, was simultaneously problematizing colonialism's legacy on the concept and practice of citizenship in Africa. Post-colonial Africa inherited from colonialism, not nation-states of the Wesphalian mould, but balkanized and multi-ethnic units demarcated by arbitrary boundaries that cut across ethnic groups, and which perhaps only made sense to the cartographers and underwriters of the 1884 Berlin Conference.

Right from the outset, the nation-state project was perpetually haunted by fear of instability, disintegration and anarchy. Some African leaders, among them, Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, went as far as arguing against the armament of African states as they would only use these arms against one another (Mazrui 1969:89–105). Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, a Pan-Africanist par excellent, argued that if it is to escape the legacy of balkanization and the prospects of cataclysmic wars, 'Africa Must Unite.' Nkrumah's greatness lay in the tenacity and vigour with which he de-

fended the vision of a 'United States of Africa,' to which all Africans would be citizens. And for a while, Accra became 'the Mecca' of African nationalists and Ghana 'home' to Africa's siblings in the diaspora. Some actually relocated to Ghana after independence in 1957. Among them was the Pan-African sage, W. E. B. Dubois who died in Africa, finally resolving the 'two-ness' that for decades tortured his view of citizenship (Abrahams 2000:11). By the time Nkrumah fell to a military coup in 1966, he was already canonized as 'a great African'—a defender of supra-national citizenship similar to pan-slavism or pan-Arabism. He was also demonized as an icon of the authoritarian post-colonial African political elite that preyed on the rights of fellow citizens.

With Nkrumah's exit, the pan-African vision dimmed. It also flung wide open the gates of afro-pessimism regarding the future of the post-colonial nation-state project and of civic citizenship. A bird's eye view of the Africanist writings reveals an array of epithets that began mourning the African nation-state even before it was pronounced clinically dead. Written off as an aberration from the Weberian ideal-type, the African nation-state entered the Africanist discourse simultaneously as 'dysfunctional,' 'lame leviathan,' 'soft,' 'weak,' and 'vacuous,' and as 'strong', 'authoritarian' and 'patrimonial' (Chabal and Daloz 1999). Finally, Ali Mazrui (1995) took away its own citizenship and declared it 'a political refugee' in search of asylum.

Paradoxically, the African State made monumental gains on the frontier of social citizenship and social economic rights. It provided a modicum of social services such as health and education, housing and food subsidies to its citizens. However, these gains on the front of social citizenship came via the developmentalist ideology, specifically the now discredited 'full-belly thesis.' In a nutshell, the 'full-belly thesis' posits that civil and political liberties, especially the freedoms of speech, assembly and press, are incompatible with economic progress. It, therefore, called for the suspension of, or trade-off between, civil and political rights and social-economic or development rights. The imposition of SAPs took away these hard-won social economic rights, thus plunging Africa into a situation of no-rights at all. The 'second liberation' (a reference to the struggle for pluralist democracy) that got under way in the 1990s was, therefore, a two-pronged struggle for civil and political rights and to defend and deepen the gains made on the social citizenship front.

Globalization's Assault on the Civic Nation

The 'second liberation' witnessed an extraordinary alliance between the forces of capital and forces of African nationalism, especially social movements. Like the alliance between liberalism and Communism against Fascism in the 1940s, the *détente* between revitalized African nationalism and refurbished neo-liberalism was a marriage of convenience destined to fall apart. Against the background of the euphoric celebration concerning 'the winds of change,' African academics warned of a contradictory trajectory of the reform process, the impending clash of 'reforms from above' and agitation 'from below' (Mkandawire 1995). The World Bank, IMF and other forces of globalization had tactically adopted the liberal rhetoric of democracy, human rights and good governance as a strategic and programmatic ploy of loosening the grip of the welfare state on the economy. This strategy struck a familiar chord with African nationalists whose goals were fairly mundane. They sought to dismantle the infrastructure of authoritarianism, restore basic freedoms taken away by the elite, rebuild the economic basis of social citizenship, but never to destroy the nation-state. Indeed, their main economic grievances were at the same time a critique of the effects of economic globalization and an indictment of the hegemonic elite for lack of sinew and moral fibre to resist the ruinous SAPs. The result of this fallout is a crisis of citizenship and violent conflict across the continent linked to the forces of globalization. Eloquent accounts by African scholars have exposed the dreadful impacts of SAPs on the social sphere, and indeed social citizenship in Africa (Mkandawire and Olukoshi 1995). Suffice it to observe that SAPs have completed the 'dirty job' of destabilizing the nation-state that began with largely externally sponsored military coups, 'low intensity warfare' in countries like Angola and Mozambique, and underwriting of dictators throughout the Cold War epoch.

In the face of globalization, two divergent views emerged regarding the future of the nation-state. The more radical view is that nation-states are on their way out. A more realistic view is that nation-states are adapting to the new pressures by changing their styles of management and functions. Globalization's assault on the post-colonial nation-state project gathered a new momentum after 1989. This onslaught has proceeded against the backdrop of liberalism's triumph over the three subsystems that anchored the postwar political economy: the national welfare state in the West, Sovietism in Eastern Europe, and the national project of Bandung in the Third World (Amin 1997:34). During the Cold war, globalization was converted to the utility of the social sphere and welfarism as a strate-

gic response to the 'threat' of communism, especially in a Europe that was devastated by war. In a similar vein, development in Africa, as in other parts of the Third World, was made possible by the success of national liberation movements, the post-colonial nationalist coalitions and the opportunities created by Cold war realities. However, after the collapse of communism in 1991, dominant capital went for the jugular, seizing every opportunity to undermine the nation-state project and social citizenship.

The idea of citizenship that globalization has sponsored is conceptually hedged on a one-sided reading of Alexis de Tocqueville's theory of democracy and social citizenship. This is interpreted as a rejection of the welfare state, elimination of public assistance and relief, which in Africa is still needed by the poor and marginal groups. Proceeding from this, globalization has drawn a Manichean separation between 'social citizenship' and 'market citizenship.' It has rejected social citizenship defined by the state's involvement in the regulation and provision of services and in social policies and investments aimed at poverty alleviation. Instead, globalization pushes for what is theorized as 'market citizenship,' a congerie of myriad individuals located at different levels of government, civil society, the corporate world, and 'communities', which will result from the refashioning of state institutions along neo-liberal lines (Schild 2000:275–305).

So devastating has been the social impact of economic globalization that some analysts have likened it to a global 'economic genocide.' One analyst has made this trenchant critique:

> Structural Adjustment is conducive to a form of 'economic genocide', which is carried out through the deliberate manipulation of market forces. When compared to various periods of colonial history, its impact is devastating. Structural Adjustment Programmes directly affected the livelihood of more than 4 billion people' (Quoted in Thomas 1998:171).

Globalization has undermined a whole range of rights in Africa, including the rights to food, education, employment, shelter, health, clean environment, the security of the person and to democratic choices. It has undermined the state's capacity to guarantee the right to development. In line with this, the UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur, Danilo Turk, notes that increasing integration of world economy undermines the states' ability to fulfil the economic, social and cultural rights of their citizens (Thomas 1998:171).

The configuration of power engendered by globalization impaired the capacity of some social groups such as women to advance their democratic participation and rights. Seidman (1999) has argued that in South Africa, the drawn-out democratic transition, often influenced by international feminist discussions, addressed questions of gendered citizenship and worked to consider 'women's interests in the democratic process. Yet this case cannot be generalized'. As Nkiwane (2000) rightly argues, over and above the negative effects of globalization, the rights of women with respect to citizenship are manipulated by the state while this discrimination is often couched in the language of African 'culture' or 'tradition' and buttressed by patriarchal courts and justice structures.

Globalization has also reinforced racial tensions especially against well-placed and wealthy racial minorities such as Asians in East Africa. Asians have tended to benefit from economic liberalization because of their strategic economic positions. In Kenya and Tanzania, for example, indigenous entrepreneurs have lobbied the governments to return to the indigenization or Africanization policies of the early post-colonial period. As Heilman (1998) observes in the case of Tanzania in the 1990s, a populist faction within the African business community has challenged the non-African domination of the economy's private sector and questioned the citizenship regime that gives equal rights to prosperous Asian communities and African Tanzanians. Although the government has stood firmly behind a notion of citizenship that guarantees all Tanzanians equal rights and equal application of the law, the widening gap between the poor Africans and rich Asians is not only a potential for conflict, but is gradually alienating the state from its poor citizens. The breach between the state and its subjects is exacerbated by state's inability to guarantee social economic rights, especially the right to work, to food, to adequate housing, to health, to education and to development. This tension is exemplified by the continent-wide escalation of strikes by students, professionals and workers in recent years, signifying the widening rift between the state and the largely donor-dependent civil society. Finally, while some states have collapsed, others are too weak to assert that authority throughout their territory or to mediate between warring groups on the periphery. Eventually, these centrifugal forces of ethnicity are coming home to roost and challenge the efficacy of the state.

The New Wars: Globalization or Return to Barbarism?

Africa has become a cesspool of all genres of 'communal' violence, exemplified by the civil war and implosion of the state in Somalia, the geno-

cide in Rwanda (and its ripples in the Great Lakes region) and the complex of violent conflict that has engulfed Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. Three arguments have emerged to explain this kind of violence. First, 'communal' violence is seen in liberal circles as senseless violence, a 'return to barbarism.' Second, violence is viewed as a ploy by the incumbents to undermine democracy through 'informal repression' or a strategy by which they undermine political opposition, win multi-party elections and put democracy in cold storage (Kirschke 2000; Kagwanja 2001). Mohamed Salih (1989) brazed the trail in this line of analysis by clearly demonstrating that the Sudanese State has contributed to the 'retribalization' of politics by recruiting tribal militias to terrorize and rob the civilian population.[1] The third strand stresses the legacy of colonial manipulation of ethnicity as the root of violence in Africa (Mamdani 2001). This analysis has not connected globalization with the violent conflicts in Africa. The present discussion advances this analysis by bring globalization into discussions about the 'new wars' in Africa.

Mary Kaldor (1999) has tried to make sense of this wave of violence. She argues that these conflicts are not wars in the modernist sense between states or organized political groups for political motives. Rather, they are a complex mishmash of "organized crime" or violence by private groups for private purposes, usually financial gain. They are strongly connected to the resurgence of identity politics in the Post-Cold War era in contrast to the geo-political or ideological goals of earlier wars. Identities appear in the battlefront armour-plated to wage claims to power within the arena of the nation-state on the basis of their identity labels—Hutu, Tutsi, Kalenjin, Hausa-Fulani or Zulu. However, far from being internal conflicts, these are 'globalized' wars. As Appadurai (1998) notes, ethnic violence is deeply rooted in the uncertainties, anxieties, disillusions and chaotic environments created by economic globalization. The wars:

> Involve the fragmentation of the state. Participation is low relative to the population both because of lack of pay and lack of legitimacy on the part of the warring parties. There is very little domestic production, so the war effort is heavily dependent on local predation and external support. Battles are rare, most violence is directed against civilians, and cooperation between warring factions is common (Kaldor 1999).

Ironically, efforts by forces of globalization to tap from markets within the theatres of war have produced new dynamics that escalate and sustain violent conflicts. A recent report by New York University's Center for

International Corporation on the global and regional linkages of these violent conflict wars in the Great Lakes region has concluded that:

> Linkages between international corporations and the region have exacerbated conflict on a number of levels: not only do they provide financial incentives for contenders for power, but they have also employed mercenaries to provide security for commercial extractive ventures... In addition, international regulation regimes and other legal restrictions often make the black market more profitable. These restrictions provide financial incentives for corporations to engage in business ventures with whoever controls and delivers state resources, regardless of the impact on local population or the political repercussions for the state (CIC 2001).

The direct and indirect involvement of the forces of globalization in these wars has transformed them into 'wars for business'. In the theatres of ethnic violence one now finds the increasing participation of globalized mercenary companies, invoking the eerie memories of pillage and violence of chartered European Companies such as the British East African Company during colonialism. Andy Storey reveals that the Sandline International and Executive Outcomes aided local militias in Sierra Leone to secure access to mineral-producing areas in return for direct payment and commercial concessions.[2] Following upon the Sandline story, Francis demonstrated that the British government knew of and supported the activities of the Sandline International in 1997 and 1998 (Francis 1999).

The flourishing commerce in 'blood diamonds' in West Africa seems to give credence to the claim that 'markets are capable of flourishing without states at all' (Duffield 2001). In fact we are reminded that the area of Liberia and Sierra Leone controlled by Charles Taylor in the 1990s was the third largest supplier of tropical hardwood to France (Storey 1999: 46). Even local classes are benefiting from the ruins of the state in Africa. In Somalia, internationally connected Somali businessmen have developed lucrative global trading links without the inconvenience of state regulation (such as taxation). Without state support in the form of a national telephone or banking network, Somali traders have perfected the system of 'paperless banking' based on 'customary' trust. Through the system they are able to transfer money across borders, and to tap resources of an extensive diaspora, which helps them contribute to the warlords embroiled in the inter-clan war (Fahy 1999). In a strange twist of irony, after the terrorist attack on America on September 11, 2001, this paperless banking was targeted, leading to the closure of one point of transaction in Yemen. With

the spectacular success of markets amidst chaos, globalization has no tears to shed in mourning the disintegration of African nation-state.

There is a military logic to this, though. To the forces of globalization and Western Governments in particular, such companies are excellent proxies for the conduct of foreign policy. They are performing the role akin to that played by tyrants like Mobutu in the Democratic Republic of Congo or Jonas Savimbi in Angola during the Cold War. Not only are they fulfilling economic-strategic interests such as the protection of mining companies, they are actually doing so with no risk of Western troops being killed in the field—or with no 'Somali syndrome' as far as the US is concerned (Fahy 1999). Thus violence has tended to aid the course of globalization in Africa in subtly cruel and barbarous ways that take away not only citizenship but the very humanity of Africans involved. If the tusk is the curse of the elephant, the presence of mineral resources seems to be rapidly becoming the curse of Africa. By the same token, the activities of international mercenaries mirror those of, and sometimes reinforce the new phenomenon of warlords in Africa. The invisible hand of the 'market' is now stretched into unstable areas. Companies are able to secure degree of privilege and protection through negotiating private deals with warlord-type rulers such as Taylor in Liberia (Duffield 2001).

The endemic corporate corruption in the West also reared its ugly head in Africa's theatres of war. The preponderance of an economy outside the paradigm of governments has created new opportunities for transnational corporate crime across national borders for purposes of economic gain (Russell 2002). This calls for new laws capable of holding the corporate world criminally liable for their activities outside their home base.

Implications for Citizenship

The areas affected by ethnic violence and warlord politics are increasingly falling out of the purview of law and norms governing modern states and the international system. Globalization is increasingly producing a global system bifurcated into a 'zone of stability or compliance' and 'zone of instability,' to borrow McGrew's classification (1998:195). In the former, modern laws and international norms governing human rights and defining the contours of citizenship are upheld while in the 'zone of instability' violent conflict linked to economies of war and authoritarianism creates poverty, undermine human rights and challenge citizenship based on nation-state.

The fizzling authority of the state and its role in providing services in Africa has widened the global/local divide. There are, on the one hand,

those members of a global class who can speak globalized languages such as English and French who also have access to faxes, email and satellite television, who use dollars, euros or credit cards, and who can travel freely. These are within the realm of modern citizenship and human rights. On the other hand, there are those 'who are excluded from global processes, who live off what they can sell or barter or what they receive in humanitarian aid, whose movement is restricted by roadblocks, visas and the cost of travel, and who are prey to sieges, forced famines, landmines.'

This local/global divide signals the preponderance of the 'outlaw,' the bandit, the mercenary, and the 'warlord' who now stalk and dominate the 'customary sphere.' The Somalia experience with warlords calls for a critique of the modernist discourse on citizenship. The modernist discourse accounts for the crisis of social and economic rights, civil and political liberties, indeed, the problem of citizenship, facing the Somali people by arguing that 'they have warlords instead of a government.' The warlord, perceived as the Other of the nation-state, is a scapegoat for the levelling of citizenship. In short, by undermining the nation-state in Africa, forces of globalization are gradually pushing Africa to the world of the warlord, the Hobbesian past of brute force and disorder where claims to citizenship and human rights are rendered obsolete.

War for the Tana Delta: Globalization and the Politics of Citizenship in a Marginal District

It has been noted that with the onset of globalization, even the world's most isolated societies have become constituent, permeable parts of a wider world (Amselle 2002:213). This is true of the Tana River region. Tana River exists on the extreme margins of the Kenya coast, which Ali Mazrui (2000) has characterized as an area 'between globalization and marginalization.' For decades, the Tana River District has been a hotbed of banditry. However, it was only after the onset of globalization and the subsequent economic and political liberalization in the 1990s that violence in the Tana delta became distinctly tied to the question of citizenship.

In the nineteenth century, during the scramble for Africa, Germany declared a protectorate over the Tana delta (by then a part of the Witu Sultanate of Zanzibar). However, with the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 it renounced the claim, and the region was annexed to the British East African protectorate (Ghai and McAuslan 1970:10). After independence, the area became the Tana River District of Kenya's Coast province. Here, both the inhabitants and public workers speak of 'Kenya'

as 'abroad' and the Kenyan state in past tense, stressing its marginality and isolation. When I tried to secure an appointment with the area District Officer, a security officer manning the gate told me, pitiably unaware of the contradiction in his explanation, that '*Bwana* (Mr.) DO went to Kenya.'

In spite of this apparent marginality and remoteness, the communities of Tana River have not been shielded from the wind of globalization. Located on the fertile delta of Kenya's largest river and home to unique and fabulous flora and fauna, Tana River has not only experienced the nationwide effects of the IMF-SAPs, but the World Bank has also funded energy, agricultural and conservation projects in the area. The region has also felt the negative ripple effect of the adoption of liberal (majoritarian) democracy in ethnically divided Kenya. Even its biggest defenders concede that:

> Liberal democracy may be more functional for a society that has already achieved a high degree of social equality and consensus concerning certain basic values. But for societies that are highly polarized along lines social class, nationality, or religion, democracy can be a formula for stalemate and stagnation [a euphemism for chaos and anarchy] (Fukuyama 1992:118).

Tana River has also become an axis of regional contraband and illegal trade, especially in firearms, and cross-border movements of refugees, bandits and mercenaries. These factors have variously contributed to the citizenship crisis and violent conflict between the communities living there. The unfolding events in Tana River reflect what is taking place at the national level and in other parts of the country. It is, therefore, imperative, to begin by examining the effects of globalization at the realm of civic nation, which we argue are trickling down to Tana River and other areas.

The National Context of Globalization and Citizenship

The question of citizenship, especially civic citizenship, in the initial years of post-colonial Kenya was dominated by racial antagonism between Africans and non-Africans, especially former European settlers and Indians. Donald Rothchild (1968) has argued that Europeans were unhappy with the decision of the post-colonial government to legislate against dual citizenship. Europeans and Indians who opted to retain their British citizenship were either to leave the country or to stay on as expatriates with little chance of local integration. The second point of tension was the conflicting interpretations of citizenship by both the Europeans and Africans. While the new African government highlighted the concept of citizenship as a total

commitment, non-Africans viewed citizenship as a mere legal status. However, underlying these tensions and fears was the perceived instability and uncertainty surrounding the post-colonial state, particularly in the turbulent 1960s and 1970s (Rothchild 1970).

Beyond the issue of race, citizenship has been characterized by two trends. The first is the duality of citizenship of individuals at the ethnic and civic levels. In fact, the *raison d'être* of the post-colonial nation-state project has been to balance the demands of ethnic and civic citizenship and to attenuate any potential violent conflict between them. Economic globalization has complicated this role by undermining the authority of the state (Ndegwa 1998).

The process of disintegration of the nationalist coalition that began in the late 1960s reached its nadir in the 1990s. This was as a result of two reasons: the first is the ethnicization of politics and citizenship under multi-party system. The second is the erosion of welfare state and social citizenship through economic globalization. Kenya's return to political pluralism in 1991 brought the collision of civic and ethnic citizenship to a head. The political space has become ethnicized, political parties are organized around ethnic loyalties, and people adhere to ethnic criteria when fighting for electoral positions, or electing their national and civic leaders.

Kenya adopted SAPs in the early 1990s. The issue of SAPs was a subject of serious debate and acrimony during the transition to political pluralism. For instance, during the 1992 election campaigns, opposition groups accused the government of corruption and mismanagement, in the process articulating and internalizing the discourse of international donors. On their part, the incumbents accused the opposition of not being nationalistic, arguing that SAPs were instituted at the instigation of opposition parties (Kanyinga and Ibutu 1994). Initially, the Kenyan public was amenable to external pressure on the state, including aid conditionalities, as a way of breaking the backbone of authoritarianism. However, opinion shifted with the realization that SAPs were responsible for the plummeting standard of living of workers, women, pastoralists and other marginalized social groups.

The anti-globalization backlash in Kenya found eloquent expression in the language used in public discourse. The World Bank and the IMF were viewed in the same light as the authoritarian government of the one-party era. At the height of one-party dictatorship, in the 1980s, the elite in the Kenya African National Union (KANU) had the slogan: *KANU ni mama na baba* (KANU is the mother and father). During the struggle for

pluralism the slogan was widely employed by pro-democracy activists to parody KANU's tyranny and to make the statement that they were now of age and need no father and mother. With the presence of the World Bank and the IMF becoming visible and their effects being widely felt, the KANU slogan was quickly turned on the IMF which was now parodied as the 'International Father and Mother,' a critique of the dependency of the state on external donors.

The widening gap between the rich and the poor also found articulation in the social discourse on citizenship. The public discourse distinguished became *wananchi* (Kiswahili for the ordinary citizens) and *wenyenchi* (owners of the nation). With the endemic corruption, a new category was introduced, the *walanchi* ('eaters' of the nation). This distinction has been especially used to express popular disillusionment with the elite who continue to live luxuriously, in spite of the dire economic conditions of ordinary citizens. It is also a commentary on the scandalous and cynical corruption and crude accumulation by the elite, which has take a toll on the lives of ordinary citizens (*wananchi*).

A popular, and highly politicized tune, '*Nchi ya Kitu Kidogo*' (nation of 'eating' or corruption) has become an effective tool of redefining and reintroducing morality into the notion of citizenship. The tune satirized those associated with looting state coffers, especially in the wake of the privatization of public enterprises. However, the language of 'eating' has found expression in ethnic claims to power. When I suggested that I would support one presidential candidate from another ethnic community and praised him as a just and uncorrupt Kenyan, a colleague reminded me of the rule of the game: 'The tree must move with its fruits, and only legitimate children will eat the fruits.' The language of 'eating' is an idiom of ethnic exclusivity in regard to rights and citizenship. During general elections it has become common for ethnic communities to declare that it is their turn 'to eat'—a code for ascension to power—and to exhorted others to cool their heels and wait for their turn. This is an acknowledgement that the state is still axial in the mobilization and distribution of resources for development.

Authorities have argued that the incumbents whipped ethnic sentiments to mobilize their ethnic constituency and to defend and retain power. As political pluralism got under way, the one-party elite warned that the introduction of a multiparty system would trigger cataclysmic 'tribal' violence that would destroy the nation. Politicians from President Moi's Kalenjin group publicly demanded the return of *majimbo*,[2] a federal system based on the notion of ethnic purity which required the expulsion of all other ethnic groups from land occupied by the Kalenjin and the Maasai

before colonialism. The Kalenjin elite mobilized the smaller and independent ethnic groups in the Rift Valley around a new multi-ethnic conglomeration called KAMATUSA, an acronym for Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu. These groups clustered round the idea that they were pastoralists and Nilotes, a linguistic formation consisting of many indigenous groups found in Southern Sudan and Eastern Africa. They organized their claim to exclusive ownership of land and citizenship in the Rift Valley province around this new identity primarily to ensure that rival ethnic groups did not win elective seats in the Rift valley. They declared themselves the 'indigenous' people of the former 'white highlands' and, therefore, the bona fide 'citizens' of the territory. They classified the non-KAMATUSA communities in the Rift Valley as 'migrants' or 'settlers' and, therefore, non-citizens, and ordered them to leave and return to their 'homelands' before voting began.

Ahead of the 1992 general elections, 'communal' bands consisting of mysterious 'Kalenjin warriors' and 'Maasai *morans*' clad in traditional attire and faces painted with red ochre, descended on non-Kalenjin populations in parts of the Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western Kenya. 'Communal' violence that occurred during the 1992 and 1997 general elections, killed an estimated 1,500 people, displaced nearly half a million others and ensured the victory of the elite of the one-party vintage, and effectively confined Kenya's embryonic democracy to cold storage (Kagwanja 2001). The cut-throat struggle for state power by ethnic elite and the atomization of the political process in Kenya reflect the uncertainty that has resulted from globalization. In Tana River this anxiety and inter-ethnic rivalry over land, water and pasture occurring within the context of globalization exploded into open conflict.

Globalization and the Politics of Citizenship in the Tana Delta

There are three major ethnic communities living in Tana River: the Pokomo, the Orma (formally referred to as the Galla) and two Somali[3] sub-clans, the Wardei and the Galje'el. Anthropological studies of ethnic relations in the area have stressed the differences between Tana River communities in regard to their descent, morphology, language, religion, culture and social formations (agriculture versus pastoralism). The Pokomo Bantu-speakers, overwhelmingly Christians and sedentary farmers, are starkly contrasted to the Orma and Somali 'Cushitic-speakers,' nomadic pastoralists, and largely Muslims (Townsend 1978; Turton 1978; Holway 1970). In the process, this has offered a tailor-made 'internal' explanation for the endemic violent conflict between them. This rigid classification

obscures many aspects of the interactive and integrative history of the Tana River communities, and makes it difficult to account for inter-ethnic alliances as well as serious cases of violence within ethnic clusters.

Suffice it to observe that raids, rustling, feuds, skirmishes and even protracted clan and ethnic wars within and between herding and farming communities are not uncommon in the semi-arid zones in Kenya. The Pokomo, Orma, and Somali of Tana River are no exception. What is new is the protracted, politicized and large-scale character of recent ethnic wars. With the adoption of economic reforms and inception of political pluralism in 1991, uncertainty and insecurity increased in Tana River, and cases of banditry and criminality became bolder and rampant. Violence in Tana River escalated against the background of ethnic tension in Kenya's Coast province. A wave of ethnic attacks in Mombasa and its environs claimed nearly 100 lives and displaced an estimated 100,000 people, mostly immigrants from up-country Kenya, and raised the stakes of citizenship claims to dangerous levels (Kagwanja 2001; Africa Rights 1997). Two waves of this violence occurred in Tana River in the 1997–2002 interlude.

The first wave of violence occurred in 1999 within the 'Muslim-Cushitic' cluster. It pitted the Orma against one of the Somali sub-clans, the Galje'el. The narrative of the Orma-Galje'el conflict begins on January 2, 1999 when a senior government officer, an Orma, in a convoy of three vehicles was attacked by bandits along the Malindi-Lamu road that passes through Tana River (*Daily Nation* 1999). Although Kenyans travelling through the road have encountered bandit attacks, this particular attack had dire implications for national security and ethnic relations in Tana River. Bandits threatened the life of a senior Orma, Hussein Dado, and a government officer in charge of President Moi's home district (not a particularly high ranking officer in the government hierarchy).[4] This unveils a powerful streak of identity politics: achievements and appointments of individuals to positions in the central government trigger in the imaginations of ethnic groups a collective sense of accomplishment and representation in the nation state. In the ensuing hunt for the culprits, there was a convergence of state and ethnic interests: the Orma's desire to avenge their kith and kin and the government's eagerness to reassert and dramatize its authority by punishing those who ambushed its officer.

The Government and the Orma held the Galje'el collectively responsible for harbouring bandits who attacked the Orma. This fact was given weight by the Galje'el's 'suspect' citizenship. The Orma and the Government also accused the Galje'el of possessing firearms and refusing

to surrender them voluntarily to the provincial administration. This linked them to a wider national problem of insecurity where the state was losing its monopoly over violence to armed militias in rural areas and vigilantes in urban centres. The Orma-Galje'el conflict entered the public sphere, becoming what Mamdani rightly calls "pornography of violence' (a naked, provocative and non-conciliatory coverage) by African media.[6] Kenya's leading newspaper, the *Daily Nation*, reported that:

> [A] confrontation was anticipated between the GorGor [sic] and Orma clans, with the latter arguing that the [bandit] attack was intended to 'finish' their senior people in the government. Hundreds of armed Orma clansmen reportedly entered the bushes in Garsen and were assisting security forces to comb the area in search of bandits who attacked the administrator... Reports indicate that following the accusations by the Orma, the GorGor community had started preparing for war (*Daily Na*tion, January 6, 1999).

The government 'revoked' the citizenship of the Galje'el and the area DC gave them notice to leave Tana River and return to their homeland, perhaps a reference to the Somali-dominated North-eastern province or, worse still, to Somalia. According to oral sources, the Galje'el are said to have migrated to Tana River in 1960 but moved to Danisa, the settlement from which they were being evicted, sometime in the 1990s. The Galje'el sought the protection of the law and filed a court order in the High Court of Kenya to restrain the government from forcibly evicting their community.[7] Contrary to the perception of this conflict as a 'primitive' war, the Orma made attempts to use modern ways of mobilizing and shaping opinion in the public sphere in favour of their position in the impending war. On February 12, 1999, nearly two hundred Orma demonstrators marched through the streets of the small Bura town protesting against increasing incidence of banditry in the area. They completed the protest by giving members of the Galje'el community one week to leave the district (*Daily Nation* 1999).

A few days latter, Orma youths, armed with heavy guns, attacked and drove out of Tana River the estimated 2,400 members of the Galje'el community in blatant disregard of the law (*Daily Nation* 1999a; *Daily Nation* 1999b). Many were killed while scores were eaten by crocodiles as they tried to escape across the Tana River. Among those who met their gristly end in the jaws of crocodiles was a young Galje'el women, Rukia Barre Abdi. Rukia has been memorialized as the symbol of the plight of her people who were caught between the smouldering rock of banditry and ethnic violence and the heavy hammer of the state that stripped them

of their citizenship and took away their rights (Muhuri 1999:1-2). The post-colonial state has routinely resorted to collective punishment in its response to violence in the Somali-inhabited areas rather than enforcing the law, signifying its perception of ethnic violence in this area as barbaric violence outside the domain of modern law (M'Inoti 1992:7). This time, the government provided impunity to the Orma to mete out collective retribution upon the Galje'el and to expel them.

Confronted by human rights organizations on the question of Galje'el rights as citizens, the Orma asserted their exclusive ownership to the territory and citizenship rights in Tana River: 'This is not the [government's] land. This is our land, Orma territory. And here, we do as we please.' As one human rights group ruefully conclude, 'Tana River left one with the impression that 'the law' has no significant place in the lives of the people' (Muhuri 1999:11). The tragic case of the Galje'el illuminates the fluidity of citizenship of cross-border and diasporic communities, from the Somali of the Horn to the Banyamulenge of the Great Lakes region of Africa.

The second wave of violence occurred in 2001–2002. It involved the Pokomo against a loose ethnic alliance of the Orma and another Somali clan, the Wardei. This spate of violence erupted on March 7, 2001 when Orma/Wardei youth vigilantes attacked the Pokomo after a *baraza* (public meeting), killing 10 people and injuring many others. A low intensity warfare where 'every day a person is killed, women frequently raped, and animals raided' in an orgy of ethnic attacks and counter-attacks ensued (Interviews 2001). By January 2002, an estimated 100 people had died, thousands injured and displaced and homes and property destroyed in the fighting.

It turned out that this was not a straight ethnic war between the Pokomo and the Orma/wardei. Pokomo residents alleged that Muslim groups, especially Arabs and Somalis in the neighbouring Hola and Garsen towns were supplying arms to their fellow Muslims, the Orma/Wardei. And although Government officials and Orma informants refuted this claim, it was widely voiced by civil society and political parties throughout the Coast. In a press statement issued on October 3, 2001, the Coast-based Federal Party of Kenya appealed 'to the Arab community in Hola Town and Garsen not to take sides and support the Orma/Wardei communities or else we shall mistake them for being partisan.' The regional, national and even 'global' context of the violence was eclipsed by the 'communitarian' discourse on banditry and the modernist discourse on 'barbaric' or 'primitive violence.' It is imperative, therefore, to de-bank

banditry of this conceptual baggage and to locate it within the larger context of the emerging economies of war in the age of globalization.

Banditry and the Economy of War

The post-colonial state in Kenya has consistently dismissed insecurity in Northern and Coastal belt as the work of 'bandits and thugs.' Eric Hobsbawm's seminal study, *Primitive Rebels*, eulogized banditry as an archaic form of social movement and 'caught the richness of the bandit and of his meaning for protest and resistance' (Hobsbawm 1959). He identified two bandits: the outright criminal and venal bandit, who preys 'on the productive and industrious.' The other is the 'social bandit'—the Robin Hood—who often acts as protector, the distributor and the avenger of the oppressed. The social bandit reaches his 'most glorious career in the moment of great social upheavals' (Crummey 1986:6). Bringing Hobsbawm to African studies, Donald Crummey and others have animated banditry as a phenomenon which is intricately interwoven with the long history of nationalism, of resistance, rebellion and social protest in Africa (ibid).

Perhaps in no other part of Africa is banditry as deeply ingrained in the social struggles for power and ethnic configuration of citizenship as in the Horn. In addition to Hobsbawm's *criminal banditry*, 'social banditry' in the Horn appears in two forms: One form is *cultural banditry*, a phenomenon manifest in the traditional practice of raiding and cattle rustling among the Maasai, Turkana, Somali, Borana and other pastoral communities in the Horn. The significant point is that this practice has been viewed as apolitical and detached from the struggles for power at the ethnic and civil realms. This myth would burst wide open in the multiparty era when violence linked to banditry, rustling and other cultural institutions became a determinant force in the politics of citizenship in Tana River and beyond (Muhuri 1999).

The second form of banditry conflates with Hobsbawm's characterization of 'social banditry' and has a much more recent origin, is historically specific and has a local name to boot: *Shifta* (Somali for bandit). It is linked to the so-called *Shifta* War of 1963–1967 between the nascent Kenyan State and sections of its ethnic Somali who, with the supported of Mogadishu, tried to secede to join the hypothetical 'Greater Somalia' (M'Inoti 1992). In the post-*Shifta* war, banditry has become ethnicized and appears in the official imagination as indelibly ingrained in Somali politics, indeed their bane, as the camel is in their social fabric and physical environment in North Eastern Kenya. Not surprisingly, the official

tendency is to attribute banditry in Tana River to Somali nomads, refugees and illegal migrants.

However, banditry is noticeable in virtually all parts of Kenya and has become a metaphor for spiralling insecurity (EAS 1999a; EAS 1999b). It is also a supreme feature of globalization: a flourishing 'economy of war.' In Tana River, banditry is a multi-ethnic enterprise 'with the Orma, the Wardei, the Gikuyu from Mpeketoni and members of other ethnic groups joining the exercise' (Muhuri 1999:28). Underpaid and corrupt government officials in the area 'are either directly involved or give tacit support to bandits with the understanding that they would get a cut of the loot' (ibid.). Liberal democracy, introduced against the backdrop of the uncertainties and tempests of identity politics, has extended the lease of life of banditry. Like other forms of violence, banditry is widely used in marginal parts of Kenya for electoral ends. One commentator on banditry in northern and coastal belt noted that politicians have not only extensively and insidiously used bandits for political ends, some have actually recruited their own bandits:

> They use them mostly during election time to fight the supporters of their rivals. In the last [1997] general elections...villagers were attacked by bandits armed with AK 47 rifles. The thugs were not normal. They robbed people of their voter's cards instead of money and other valuables...Candidates in the election unleashed the bandits on strongholds of their rivals to disenfranchise voters there. Some criminal politicians gave the stolen cards to refugees to vote for them in the polls (Charo 1998:26; Muhuri 1999:29).

During the 1992 and 1997 multi-party elections, both Pokomo and Orma/Wardei politicians enlisted the services of bandits for electoral purposes. The Federal Party of Kenya mentioned the existence in Tana River of a *Blue Army*, a band of mercenaries allegedly hired by the Orma/Wardei, some from outside Kenya and 'others dressed in the military fatigue used by the Kenya army' (FPK 2001; Interview 2002). These mercenaries reinforced ethnic youth vigilantes. The issue of citizenship, defined in terms of right to land and water points especially in the fertile Garsen and Kipini divisions, underpins the preponderance of banditry in Tana River.

The official discourse depicts citizens as victims without agency or responsibility. The government portrays banditry as the work of, indeed a conspiracy by, foreigners, illegal migrants and refugees, particularly from Somalia. Echoing this position, one newspaper, headlined one of its issues: 'Somali Men Now Roaming Kenyan Territory.' It claimed that 'remnant soldiers of former Somali dictator, Mohamed Siad Barre, are behind the

upsurge of banditry attacks which have left many dead and injured in Tana River (*The Star* 1999). It has also been argued that: 'many refugees and former fighters immigrating from neighbouring war-torn countries carry with them all manner of firearms' which they sell for subsistence (HRW 2002). Defeated or fleeing militias from Somalia, deserters from the Sudanese People Liberation Army (SPLA) and regional gun-runners have been a source of arms which have turned ethnic conflict brutal and bloody (HRW 2002). This has produced a widespread xenophobia and resentment against non-citizens and refugees in Kenya.

However, the problem is larger than a wholesale condemnation of the Somali and non-citizens. It is firmly embedded upon another feature of globalization: the proliferation of cross-border trade networks in illegal goods such as firearms, drug, precious stones and minerals. Smugglers and contraband thrive on the porous and thinly populated border, corrupt officials in charge of the few custom checkpoints at the main entry points, and lack of capacity on the part of the government to patrol the border and the coastline. In the Horn, banditry feeds on the ripples of civil wars and warlordism which has taken roots in Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia, and which is linked to as far-flung sources of arms as the Middle East.

The government has responded to the expansion of banditry and ethnic violence by creating community-based police reservists and home guards. While reservists and home guards have managed to counter bandits, to reduce the level of violence and to save many lives, they are equipped with inferior weapons compared to those of bandits and ethnic raiders, who sometimes wield M50 and M16 guns. Because reservists and home-guards have ethnic loyalties, firearms supplied to them by the government have often found their way into the hands of bandits and vigilantes who have used them in inter-ethnic wars (Interview 2001b). The locals have also blamed government laxity and complicity for the proliferation of illegal arms. According to one informant, 'a lorry full of arms was arrested and taken to Tarasa police station. Later on we saw the lorry leave the station. They said they had done their work' (Interview, 2002a). A fact finding mission by a coalition of civil society and Christian churches at the Coast, the Coast Peace Initiative, confirmed the temporary seizure and release of the said lorry by the local police officer (Interview 2001a). This became a point of dispute between the clergy and the Kenya government with the latter demanding an explanation from the relevant state authorities for the release of a lorry full of firearms by its personnel (Interview 2001b).

Ethnic relations became so volatile that genuine development activities were viewed through the prism of ethnicity. For example, at the height of the conflict in November 2001, Orma leaders invited a government minister to conduct a *harambee* (fund-raiser) for youth groups in Tana River, where nearly 4.5 million Kenya shillings (US$ 60,000) was raised. Pokomo elders alleged that this fund, which was fully controlled by Orma youth, would be used to purchase firearms. 'They have nothing to say which they are doing with it. It is raised in the name of the youth but used for another purpose' (Interview 2002b). Whatever the veracity of this claim, it underscores the fact that ethnic wars are total wars; they involve all citizens and mobilize social capital from all sectors of society.

Globalization and Conflict

In spite of their evident isolation, marginality, insecurity and lack of modern infrastructure (good roads, telephone, Internet and technology), globalization has rapidly transforming the communities of Tana River into constituent parts of a wider world and shaped their worldview of rights and citizenship. It is clear from the work of the anthropologist, Jean Ensminger (1991), who studied the impact of SAPs on Orma women, that the communities of Tana River have experienced the effects of economic globalization since the early 1980s. Ensminger (1991) concluded, on an optimistic note, that, on average, the rescheduling of agricultural and meat prices and decentralization of the government bureaucracy in the 1980s, improved the agricultural and pastoral economy of Tana River. This argument corroborated the official verdict of World Bank and IMF in the 1980s that SAPs were a stirring success in Africa, which critics of the entire adjustment endeavour have satirized as *Dark Victory* (Bello 1994). Evidence from subsequent studies does not only pale this glossy picture, but also link economic globalization to the escalation of communal tension and citizenship crisis in Tana River.

The World Bank has made determined forays into the development arena of Tana River. By and large, these development initiatives contributed to the frightful herd of Kenya 'white elephant' projects in the 1980s and 1990s. The first was an energy project, the Kiambere dam, began up the river in the 1980s and completed in 1993 to create 140 megawatts of electric power. The project was a great technological success that increased the electric output for consumption by Kenya's expanding urban population and small industries. However, reviews of the project's resettlement and social aspects have made the damning critique that the energy project was completed and has operated at heavy social costs, turning it into a

monumental travesty of social justice (Horta 1994). It displaced 6,000 people without any significant compensation while the displaced families lost 82 percent of their money-equivalent income. This plunged the World Bank into a serious conflict with the displaced over the question of territorial citizenship.

A second project is the Bura irrigation scheme, which the World Bank funded in the 1980s to irrigate about 35,000 acres of cotton and maize. Launched at an estimated cost of $98 million, the Bura agricultural scheme grounded to a disastrous halt in the 1990s as a result of corruption, poor planning. While the project benefited few local inhabitants, it exposed the farmers and their families to abject poverty and increased their vulnerability to drought and famine. Leichenko and O'Brien (2000) have shown, in their study of South Africa, that ecological vagaries occurring in the context of globalization have exposed farmers to new and unfamiliar conditions and increased their vulnerability. Not surprisingly, the violence in Tana River got underway against the backdrop of globalization and serious drought and famine in the 1999–2001.

The third in the series of World Bank projects in the Tana delta is the Tana River Primate Reserve project. This was funded in 1992 with a grant from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to protect the Tana River Crested Mangabey and the Red Colobus, two rare primate species, under the World Bank's biodiversity protection project. Besides the Red Colobus monkey and the Crested Mangabey, Tana River is home to five other primate species, 262 recorded bird species, at least 57 species of mammals, several endemic species of trees and a range of other animals and plants. The US$ 7.14 million Primate Preservation project is based on a conservationist logic that conceives Africa as 'a large zoo' to be preserved at all cost for the purpose of foreign tourists and researchers. This form of consumer 'environmentalism' insists on a total separation of the native peoples from their environment, including wildlife. To that end, the World Bank insisted that the conservation of the forest ecosystem where the monkeys live is not compatible with the continued presence of local people in the area. It, therefore, made it a precondition for the project that access of Pokomo villagers to the fields and trees in the area be curtailed (World Bank 2001).

In contrast, many people in rural Africa grew up in an environment where there are no electric fences between humans and the wild. Therefore, the Pokomo villagers believe that they have co-existed for centuries with the monkeys, and indeed, they were part of their life. According to their oral history, the Pokomo themselves brought the Mangabey and Red

Colobus to the banks of the Tana River when they migrated there from Central Africa more than 600 years ago. Indeed, the primates are actually more numerous near their villages than in abandoned forestlands and it was the local people who called the attention of researchers to the monkeys in the first place! (Horta 1994). The World Bank conservation policies have not only estranged the Pokomo and induced conflict between them and their neighbours over diminished farming and grazing land, water resources and citizenship in the territory. It has also created a rift between the Pokomo and their wildlife. Said a Pokomo elder:

> 'We will be reduced to beggars if they interfere with our farming. We Pokomo are farmers. We have never killed wildlife, but if you beat me because of wildlife, then I will kill the wildlife, because it has become my problem.'

So acrimonious has the relationship between the Bank and its implementing partners and the Pokomo become that foreign researchers are strictly warned to stay away from the recently abandoned research station at project site. And the Kenya Wildlife Service, the parastatal agency in charge of implementing the GEF project, visits the area with heavily armed guards, although poaching is not a problem in the area (Horta 1994). Globalization has encroached upon the natural environment of the Pokomo and the Orma of Tana River and is rapidly incorporating it into the global consumer culture that underpins tourism. However, economic globalization has not commercialized the Pokomo or Orma culture, unlike the Maasai, whose culture is globally advertised as a tourist attraction, over and above their scenic land rich in wildlife. Because their culture is produced and consumed as an authentic relic of the modernist 'noble savagery,' the Maasai (and their neighbours) operates a thriving trade in art while their dances are a staple in the tourist entertainment menu in Kenyan hotels (Brunner 2001). While modernization in Tana River may have been meant to improve the life of the people, it has had the (un)intended effects of restricting opportunities open to them and has become part of the wider conflict in the area.

Localizing Citizenship

Ethnic struggles in Tana River have set in motion an intricate process of identity formation. Although the process of identity formation in Tana River may have started earlier, it intensified from the late 1990s. In fact, it became a dominant aspect of Kenya's political life with the eruption of the so-called 'land clashes' (a euphemism for ethnic violence) in parts of the multi-ethnic Rift Valley, Western and Nyanza provinces in 1991–1998

(Africa Rights 1997; Mazrui 1997; Kagwanja 2001). Towards the end of 1998, the government established the Land Review Commission, under the chairmanship of a former Attorney-General, Charles Njonjo. The Commission's mandate was to collate views of Kenyans on the thorny issue of land and to make policy recommendations aimed at stabilizing and streamline land tenure across the country.

The Commission visited Tana River on March 7, 2001. The debate that ensued brought the Pokomo-Orma/Wardei differences on the land question to the open. Worse still, it sparked off the 2001–2002 spate of violence. From the outset, the Commission adopted liberal land policy that favoured a tenure system based on individual land ownership. This policy created a sharp split between the Pokomo and the Orma/Wardei. The Orma/Wardei virulently resisted the idea of land demarcation based on individual freehold. They accused the Government of fuelling ethnic conflict by imposing a liberal land tenure system on an area where land is communally owned without adequate consultation. 'This problem,' said an Orma civic leader, 'has been started by the government.' He continued to argue that:

> 'The Pokomo, Wardei and Orma elected me in 1997 and our ancestors lived together harmoniously. It is this idea of land adjudication and the failure of the government to educate us on what it means which has caused this problem. They should tell us how many acres a herder with 3,000 heads of cattle will be given' (Interview 2002a).

The Orma and Somali nomads argued that land adjudication would deprive them of access to water-points and grazing fields that are traditionally owned by the Pokomo. They insisted that the government should not interfere with the existing communal land regime, insisting that these should continue to be in the hands of elders who understand the traditional tenure system. The ethnic bleach over land in the Tana delta came as a much needed grist for the mill of local political elite keen on consolidating their electoral clout within their respective ethnic groups in the run up to the multi-party elections due later in 2002. For example, the legislator for the Garsen constituency, an Orma, is widely quoted to have told a political gathering of the Orma/Wardei that: 'If the land is demarcated in Tana River, the Government will govern trees and monkeys. If they [government] do not go to the Wazee [elders], they will run' (interview 2002).

The Orma were making reference to the communal land system that regulated not just land ownership, but also land use by both the Pokomo and the Orma. This communal system provided two sets of rights: On the

one hand was the *right of ownership* that the Pokomo were entitled to, as the 'indigenous' people to the area by the virtue of having been there before the arrival of the Orma. On the other hand, there was the *right of access* which the Orma were entitled to, and which the Pokomo guaranteed and defended. Traditionally, the Pokomo and Orma observed specific customary rituals and practices that allowed the Orma herders to gain access to water-points and pasture on the banks of the Tana River, especially during dry season. After elders from the two communities performed these rituals the latter set of rights became accessible to the Orma. These customary practices defining these rights emerged over the years, revealing a long interactive and integrative history of the two communities.

On their part, the Pokomo supported lock stock and barrel land adjudication on the basis of the liberal idea of individual free hold. This was a way of dealing with what they viewed as manipulations of land ownership by the Orma. They also claimed that as the oldest inhabitants of the area, they were entitled to the land. To be sure, even before the Commission visited Tana River, the Pokomo had registered their displeasure with what they viewed as the Orma elite's manipulation of land ownership. They charged that high-ranking Orma elite were exploiting their positions in the Moi State to legalize the Orma claims to, and settlement on, the land in the riverine areas of Garsen and Kipini, thus excluding the Pokomo.[7] The Pokomo also claimed that the Orma had not only acted arrogantly and armed themselves against their hosts, they had also invited such Somali clans as the Wardei and Galje'el without consulting with Pokomo elders. This, they argued, contributed to population pressure, ethnic competition and conflict over land.

It is worth reiterating that the debate over land ownership took within the framework of declining pasture, water and land in the Tana Delta as a result of ecological calamities especially famine and drought. Uncertainties, inequalities and social stress that forces of globalization precipitated, strained inter-ethnic relations and created fertile grounds for conflict. In fact, the 2001–2002 violence erupted against the background of a prolonged dry spell in the 2000–2001, which forced the pastoral Orma and Wardei to migrate to and overstay in dry season grazing areas on the Tana River banks. This put pressure on Pokomo farmers. At the same time, both wild and domestic animals were grazing on the dry period grazing areas of Garsen and Kipini.[8]

The exigencies of liberal democracy and liberal land policies in Tana River set in motion an intense process of identity formation as rival eth-

nic groups asserted exclusive rights and citizenship in the area. The Orma embarked on forming an ethnic conglomeration, reminiscent of the KAMATUSA cluster discussed earlier, by forming alliances with Somali sub-clans. When I asked one Orma civic leader the difference between the Orma and Wardei, he quickly replied: 'We are one people, the Orma and Wardei are one inseparable group' (Interview 2001b). In forging this new ethnic cluster the Orma appealed to a common linguistic identity (Cushitic), a common religion (Islam) and a common social formation (nomadism).

After the state collapsed in Somalia, the government of Kenya introduced very stringent measures of ensuring that the non-Kenyan Somalis did not acquire identity cards. There were complaints that the policy also hurt bona fide Kenyan Somalis. In this context, the Orma, whose citizenship was not in question, moved to help Somali ethnic allies to acquire Kenyan Identity cards. This becomes clear from a petition to the Kenya Government entitled 'Plea of Orma and Wardei Elders to the Central Screening Committee, and Our Esteemed Government' dated March 10, 1990. The Orma claimed that:

> 'We, the elders, assure the Government [of Kenya] that we and out siblings, the Galjaal, have been living together since 1960... We and the Wardei and the Galjaal are one people. We would like our government to know that whenever we apply for national identity cards we are asked about our ethnic origin. When one says (s)he is Wardei, (s)he is asked to identify her or his specific lineage. And that is how we have come to be dived and told we are the offspring of Galgal, Abdu Wako, Mohamed Suber and Abdalla."[9]

Some commentators have argued that the Orma forged unity with the Wardei and Galje'el in order to out-number the Pokomo and win multiparty elections. Ethnic victory in the election was crucial in dealing with the issues of citizenship and distribution of resources. It has, therefore, been alleged that Orma politicians 'assisted in the registration of those members of the Galje'el community who did not have identity cards precisely with the understanding that they would join forces with fellow pastoral Ormas to cast their vote in [their] favor' (Muhuri 1999:24).

However, from the earlier discussion it is clear that the Orma-Galje'el alliance fall apart after the elections. The Orma used the question of citizenship to maintain their position as patrons in the 'Cushitic' cluster. And they never hesitated to 'revoke' or manipulate the issue of citizenship whenever their interests came under threat. Thus in 1999, after the December 1997 elections they turn the tables on the Galje'el and expelled

them from Tana River. One commentary on this link between the manipulative use of citizenship and the imperatives of pluralist democracy noted trenchantly that:

> 'One morning...at election time, the Galje'el are legitimate citizens who deserve Kenyan ID cards—secured with the assistance of prospective members of parliament, and the next morning, after the elections, they are asked to justify their citizenship' (Muhuri 1999: 24).

It is a hilarious paradox that the Pokomo also hedge their claim to exclusive rights and citizenship in Tana River on the Orma's 'dubious' citizenship in the territory because they are not 'natives.' To proof this point has engendered selective use of historical memory, construction of new historical identities and categories and reordering and reinvention of oral histories migrations and settlements of the communities involved. The Pokomo argue that the Orma were moved from Somalia where they were fighting for the British during the Second World War and settled in Tana River. The import of this history is that they are recent migrants to, or settlers in, the territory, and therefore, when land is being adjudicated, they have no claim in the fertile Tana delta.

Orma informants never discounted this argument, but claimed that over seven decades latter, they are as 'indigenous' to the area as the Pokomo. They refer to the law of Kenya when provide 12 years as the time to prove residency in an area. They have also highlighted their common identity with the Oromo of Ethiopia and Borana of Kenya. They have animated the fact that they are the southernmost representatives of the once powerful Oromo (Galla) nation of Ethiopia and Northern Kenya. This is a way of proving not only their indigeneity, but also their numerical prowess in the Horn. In line with this, the Orma of Tana River have reordered their oral histories of migrations to fit the oral and written accounts of the migrations of their Borana kith and kin in Nothern Kenya. The latter are said to have reached Kenya from the Borana Province of Ethiopia between 1,400 and 1,500. At the national level, Orma leaders have joint the forums of pastoralists like the Maasai, Kalenjins and Turkana who have been forging a common front based on their 'indigeneity' in larger part of Kenya to counter the politically and numerically power of the 'Bantu' farmers. The struggle for the Tana delta is both local and global.

Conclusion

Globalization has made it possible for us to imagine citizenship along the particularism–cosmopolitanism continuum. In reality, forces and policies

of globalization have reinforced primordial sensibilities and identities that have increasingly given rise to ethnic violence and localized claims to resources, rights and citizenship. Economic globalization has assaulted the post-colonial welfare state and, indeed, the nation-state project. In the process it has undermined the foundation of social citizenship, and with it, the authority and legitimacy of the state. Thus the nation-state has been caught between the depredations of globalization from above and the centrifugal forces of ethnicity from below. The factions and fractions of the national elite have responded to the challenge of atomization of political processes and the uncertainties resulting from the introduction of liberal democracy by resorting to ethnic mobilization and, as the case of Kenya reveals, using underhand violence in defence of power at the level of civic nation. This has also accentuated the localization of claims to resources, rights and citizenship within and between ethnic groups and other local actors. Yet, localized struggles have also led to the formation of supra-ethnic but sub-nation identities, based on cross-cutting identities such as religion and social and linguistic formations, which are competing for power at the civic national arena. The unintended consequences of globalization, including the proliferation of cross-border contraband and illegal trafficking in arms, drugs, metals and even human beings, have stoked localized conflicts and given them a regional, even global, connections. Ethnic wars are regional wars that are thriving on regional economies of war with global linkages. In Tana River, the proximity to Somalia where the state has collapsed has linked an isolated region to the negative forces of globalized crime and violence. It is clear from this analysis that while no part of the world has escaped the influence of globalization, the negative effects of this influence have made it difficult to homogenize cultures, create prosperity, integrate economies and create interdependence. To globalize citizenship and the rights involved, theorists of globalization have to address the dynamics within it that undermine citizenship at the civic and ethnic levels and localizing it in a brutal way.

Notes

1. Andy Storey (1999).
2. A Kiswahili term that is loosely translated as 'Federalism' or 'regionalism', Majimbo allows for multi-ethnic federalism, but when used in a narrow sense it has insisted on ethnic purity and exclusivity in regard to access to resources and citizenship rights within ethnic territories, often leading to ethnic cleansing.

3. The Somali are divided into six major clan-families: Hawiye, the Issaq, the Dir, the Dagil, the Darod, and the Rehawayn. They are further split into many sub-clans.
4. Kenya is divided into eight administrative units called provinces and headed by a Provincial Commissioner (PC). Below the PC are nearly fifty districts headed by District Commissioners (DC); hundreds of Divisions under District Officers (DO) and at the bottom are locations and sub-locations headed by Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs, respectively. This is called the provincial administration, a distinct legacy of colonialism that is directly subordinated to an equally complex bureaucracy in the office of the President. It is the supreme symbol of authoritarianism in Kenya.
5. Mahmood Mamdani, 'Making Sense of Non-Revolutionary Violence: The Genocide in Rwanda,' Public Lecture, Center for African Studies, University of Illinois, November 1, 2002.
6. Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 28 of 1999 in Mombasa High Court 'For Leave to Apply for Orders of Prohibition and Certiorari and Matter of Operation Against the Galjeel Community of Tana River District of the Republic of Kenya.'
7. Local Politicians point accusing fingers at Hussein Dado, the former District Commissioner of Baringo District, President Moi's home district, who did everything possible to establish the Orma settlements when, in fact, there were no Ormas beside the river before, so as to control the water points and grazing land. See remarks by Amara O. Kalasigha, Shirikisho Party candi'date in 1997 cited in *Banditry and the Politics of Citizenship* p. 33.
8. Peace Net, 'Fast Update Security Situation Tana River District', August 9, 2001, email correspondence.
9. Galgal, Abdu Wako, Mohamed Suber and Abdalla are the principal nomadic Somali sub-clans that grazw their animals between Tana River and Garissa and often into Somalia. The memoradum cited here is available in the files of The Mombasa-based Muslim for Human Rights (Kenya), an affiliate of the Kenya Human Rights Commission.

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