

The State, Legitimation and Human-centred Development*

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Résumé: *L'article propose un paradigme qui conceptualise la légitimation, essentiellement à deux niveaux: (1) la légitimation juridique/rationnelle par laquelle le gouvernement maintient sa domination presque exclusivement par la promulgation de lois et de décrets, une fois que la classe politique s'empare du pouvoir, soit à la faveur des urnes, soit par des moyens coercitifs. (2) Il existe également un type de légitimation qu'on appelle encore légitimité socio-économique. Pour l'essentiel, on soutient que les attributs du processus de légitimation socio-politique, constituent en même temps les caractéristiques significatives d'une véritable culture démocratique. Par ailleurs, il est dit que, du point de vue conceptuel, la légitimation socio-politique recouvre le type légal/rationnel mais pas l'inverse en termes concrets, empiriques.*

Whether we talk about the State in advanced liberal constitutional democracies or in peripheral social formations, it ordinarily seeks to command loyalty from the masses. The process by which the State in any context tries to invoke loyalty from the people and thereby reproduce the dominant *status quo* is referred to as *legitimation* in broad terms, in the initial instance. The paper provides a paradigm which conceptualizes legitimation at two primary levels, namely: (1) Legal/rational legitimation whereby the rulership maintains its domination almost exclusively as a function of the enactment of decrees or legislations once the political class gets the state power either through popular mandate or coercive means. (2) There is also a type of legitimation process that is dubbed as *socio-political legitimacy*. This emanates as a function of the extent to which the aspirations, needs and values of the masses are fulfilled or enhanced by virtue of particular state administrative policies that may be geared towards the practical amelioration of the human condition. In which case, there would be widespread and equitable opportunities and access to adequate nutrition, housing, formal basic education, transportation, communication, civil and political liberties that would enhance and promote human-centred development.

It is argued that, in essence, properties of socio-political legitimation process are also constitutive of the significant features of a truly democratic culture. It is also asserted in the paper that socio-political legitimacy is

conceptually encompassing on the sheer legal/rational type but not the other way around in concrete empirical terms.

A comparative analysis of legitimation processes in a group of advanced welfare states such as they exist in Scandinavian countries, France, Canada and the United States, on the one hand, and the levels of development (or underdevelopment) in peripheral societies of the sub-Saharan African and Latin American regions, on the other hand, would suggest that human-centred development by way of the fulfilment of people's aspirations and needs, generally speaking, as well as the prevalence of socio-political legitimacy feature prominently in advanced societies. Herein lies the genuine path to sustainable development in peripheral societies.

Preliminaries

In the conceptualization of the State in Western advanced liberal constitutional democracies, it is observed that the state ordinarily seeks to command allegiance from the masses. To a limited extent, a similar value of inculcating loyalty from the dominated classes and groups is also nurtured in the so-called newly emerging nation-states of Africa, otherwise referred to as peripheral social formations.¹ As it has been observed since the pre-enlightenment period and beyond by scholars like Hegel, Hobbes, John Locke and Jacques Rousseau in Europe; in line with the social contract between the state and its citizens, the former is supposed to provide an enabling environment for the people to be able to fulfil their basic needs and the attainment of socio-political freedom in all its basic attributes. These basic needs and facilities which the state, whether it is metropolitan or peripheral in character, is expected to provide to the masses, include mass transportation, communication, sewage disposal system, electricity, formal education, health care system, institutional individual personal safety and security and so on. These facilities and services are supposed to be provided to the people at minimal cost, generally speaking. It has historically been the belief and value that is universally held on a global scale that these services are essential for the welfare of the populace. So much so that the provision of these utilities cannot ordinarily be solely entrusted to private individual economic interests. This is to enable a lot of people to afford these essential services and amenities.

The state, of course, ordinarily wants to sustain its legitimacy and command loyalty by way of the satisfaction of basic needs of people. But, as we shall explain shortly, the process of legitimation goes far beyond the provision of basic utilities and services. While these are very important aspects of the pre-requisites for legitimation, they are not in and of

¹ The notion of peripheral state/social formation is discussed hereafter.

themselves sufficient. Respect and recognition of basic human rights, tolerance of individual differences in lifestyle, social justice, freedom of association and expression are some of the other key properties of a truly democratic culture (UNDP 1992; Ninalowo 1990a).

The kernel of our thesis here is that whether the state is metropolitan or peripheral, its legitimation is most importantly a function of the extent to which it is oriented towards human-centred development. As we shall demonstrate shortly, legal/rational legitimation whereby the rulership sustains its domination predominantly by way of the enactment of decrees or legislations once the political class assumes the state power either through universal suffrage (in an ideal typical or abused sense) or coercive means (such as through a military usurpation of civilian regime), is relatively ultimately less effective and enduring than socio-political legitimation— or legitimation as praxis. The latter type of legitimation is relatively more robust on account of its being in tune with the utilitarian and socio-political values of the people in general. Socio-political values embrace various types of freedom having to do with citizenship rights, human rights and respect for due process of natural law of justice and fairness by the ruling elites and other state functionaries.

In what immediately follows — Section II — we shall take a look at some of the structurally immanent limitations of the state in relation to human-centred development. In Section III, we shall try to further juxtapose legal/rational legitimation (or legalism) with socio-political legitimation (as praxis) within a cross-cultural context in relation to the problem of human-centred development. The final section highlights the key points of all the discussion as well as postulating on viable alternative paths to development in peripheral social formations in particular.

Antinomies of the State and Human-centred Development

In order to enhance the discussion of some of the structurally immanent contradictions of the state in general and the peripheral state in particular, it is deemed necessary at this juncture to present a heuristic conceptualization of the notion of human-centred development. We shall, thereafter, embark on a pertinent sketch on the conceptualization of the state, with particular reference to human-centred development.

A vital component of human-centred development has to do with the quality of life of people and their general welfare. This has to do with readily available equitable access to adequate nutrition, housing, individual personal security, basic formal education, health care, communication facilities as well as general democratic permissiveness and tolerance. It was the concern for human-centred development that compelled Adebayo Adedeji (1989:10) to observe in particular reference to African societies:

The ultimate goal of development in Africa is to ensure the overall well-being of the people through a sustained improvement in their living standards. It is this quintessential human aspect of development that underlies all other objectives that Africa will have to pursue, be they economic, social, cultural or political. Regrettably, the realization of the objective of raising the welfare of the people has proved elusive. Instead, there has been increased immiseration and suffering for the majority of the population, with an increase in the numbers of people in absolute poverty and those who are perpetually vulnerable and threatened by the adversities of nature as well as the malaise of socio-economic disruptions. Unless there is an immediate amelioration in the conditions of the vast majority of African population, there is a real danger of a systemic breakdown in the socio-economic fabric and the supporting natural environment.

While there are several dimensions and components of human-centred development (UNDP 1992) there are three broad categories of human-centred development which are not mutually exclusive that we shall like to specify for the present endeavour, namely: (1) Basic human condition, (2) Socio-political stability and (3) Democratic culture. We shall now take a look at this attributes of human centred development in sequence.

Basic Human Condition

As part of the *desideratum* for human-centred development, there must be, at least, minimal levels of comfort that are general and pervasive to all citizens in a given society in terms of pronounced access to basic housing, health care, nutrition, formal education, communication facilities and so on. Human-centred development is partly and significantly a function and the degree to which these opportunities and facilities are made available through the instrumentalities of the state, on the one hand, and the civil society on the other, to the masses. It, of course, goes without saying, that there must be corresponding levels of development within the technoscientific and economic infrastructure of the society for the enhancement of the availability and provision of these basic needs. It is quite unthinkable to envisage human-centred development without a liberal access to basic opportunities and facilities. That is, such that would provide minimal human comfort and enhance the quality of life of people. To be sure, an improvement in a category of these basic needs is actually bound to have corresponding positive effects on other areas of need. Conversely, a neglect in the provision of certain basic needs is likely to portend negative ripple effects on other areas. For instance, on health, according to a World Development Report (1991:53) (WDR):

Better diets, housing, and control of communicable diseases have raised the quality of life everywhere. By reducing illness, these improvements have increased people's alertness, capacity for learning, and ability to cope with

and enjoy life. By prolonging life, they have made investments in knowledge and skills even more worthwhile. And the benefits of good health flow well into the future: a mother's good health strongly influences the early physical and mental development of her children...

In respect to the multiplier effect of formal education, the findings of the above-named report compelled the researchers to note that:

By improving people's ability to acquire and use information, education deepens their understanding of themselves and the world, enriches their minds by broadening their experiences, and improves the choices they make as consumers, producers, and citizens. Education strengthens their ability to meet their wants and those of their family by increasing their productivity, and their potential to achieve a higher standard of living. By improving people's confidence and their ability to create and innovate, it multiplies their opportunities for personal and social achievement... (WDR 1991:55-56).

Similarly, a well-developed transportation and communication network, to the extent that it is likely to enhance temporal efficiency, by way of conserving travelling time, enhancing information processing and dissemination, is likely to reinforce possible effective provision of other welfare-related services. Conversely, where the transportation and communication network is poor, this is likely to lead to a vicious circle of impoverishment in other areas of basic needs. For instance, it is inconceivable to get an effective health care system without an effective mass transportation and communication network that would enhance the systemic capacity to deal with emergencies.

The extreme importance of individual personal security as it relates to other aspects of basic human-centred development is, of course, not to be undermined. For it is under conditions of relative safety from, say, armed robbery, vindictive assassination, mugging, rape and other violent crimes, that innocent citizens contribute their roles towards development with relative undivided attention. To be sure, there cannot be national security without pervasive individual personal security. For national security is nothing but the sum total of individual personal security. It will therefore, amount to an exercise in self-deceit to conceive of national security without a corresponding effective provision of an enabling environment for individual security, through the instrumentality of the state.

A cursory observation of empirically-based data would suggest that, whereas basic characteristics of contradictions of underdevelopment are, of course, prominent in the sub-Saharan African region, conditions are a little better within Latin American and the Caribbean regions, the conditions are, predictably, better still in advanced industrial societies. For instance, on the average, a child born within the sub-Saharan region expects to live for up to 51.8 years, the corresponding figures are 67.4 years and 74.5 years for the

Latin American and the Caribbean regions and advanced industrial societies respectively (see Table I, Appendix). Basic facilities such as access to health services, potable water, literacy levels, communication and so on are better in Latin America and the Caribbean. These utilities and services are even by far more widely distributed and available in advanced societies *vis-à-vis* the sub-Saharan region.²

Socio-political stability is the second of the three dimensions in our conceptualisation of human-centred development. It is to this we now turn.

Socio-Political Stability

Socio-political stability is essentially a function of the extent to which there is an effective mechanism for dealing with and resolving conflicts amongst contending interests within and across groups and classes of people. Stability in this sense does not mean the presence of absolute consensus or absence of conflict. For such a situation has historically not been known to exist anywhere in the world. The idea of socio-political stability recognizes divergent class-oriented and group interests, as well as intra and inter party conflict. However, *dissensus* and conflict are resolved through established institutional mechanism. This mode of conflict resolution is in contradiction with extra-constitutional means of seeking a redress such as through a military *coup d'état* or putsch (Lipset 1981).

Whereas socio-political stability is the normative reality in advanced industrial democracies, unfortunately, it is the exception rather than the rule in Africa in particular. Examples of socio-political instability are legion in Africa and, to a less extent, Latin America. We note, for instance, that only eighteen of the fifty-four nominally independent nation states of Africa have not experienced successful military coups. Six out of these eighteen have experienced serious attempted coups, military revolts or massive civil conflict (Wunsch and Olowu 1990:1). Furthermore, it is noteworthy that:

In too many cases, military regimes have turned their guns, or at least their rifle butts, on their own people, stifling dissent and repressing the opposition. In Liberia, Ethiopia, Central African Republic, Uganda, Sudan, and others, this has happened. Bloody civil wars have been fought in seven countries (Nigeria, Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia, Angola, Zaire, Uganda)... (Wunsch and Olowu 1990:1-2).

The import and the necessity of socio-political stability exist in the realities that it provides an enabling environment for other features and possibilities for human-centred development.

2 There are far more interesting relevant statistics than time and space would allow for, but see Tables I through IV in the Appendix here.

We shall now take a brief look at democratic culture as a moment in the dynamics of human-centred development.

Democratic Culture

There is a general consensus within the pertinent literature that the concept of democracy goes beyond the sheer notion and practice of universal suffrage-general voting rights. Democratic culture also importantly entails social justice and fairness, the notion and practice of tolerance of individual differences or idiosyncrasies (Ninalowo 1990a). The concept of democratic culture also embraces a whole gamut of socio-political freedom and liberties. That is the rule of law, freedom of expression, freedom of association, political participation and equality of opportunities are other components of a truly democratic culture (Gastil 1989; Lipset 1981; Ninalowo 1990a; UNDP 1992; WDR 1991). Let us now amplify the discussion on some of the key properties of democratic culture.

In respect to the rule of law, some of the parameters for ascertaining the extent to which it obtains in real concrete terms include fair and open hearings in such cases as the determination of criminal charges. There must be a relatively equal access for defence and legal counselling without undue delay. There must also be an independent and impartial judiciary that is incorruptible and relatively free of extraneous pressures or influence.

As for freedom of expression, this must be constitutionally or legally protected individual right. Clearly, censorship in, say, screening of electronic or print media production by state agencies, harassment of publishers or journalists, closure of media houses by the state for legitimately expressed views, censorship of personal mails, phone tapping or any other form of intrusive surveillance by state agencies and functionaries constitute an infringement of freedom of expression.

One more key component of democratic culture is relative structural equality of opportunities and access to basic facilities. That means that basic needs and facilities of nutrition, housing, health, formal education, communication, decent remuneration levels and employment are attained throughout a given society on a fairly pervasive and general extent. In situations where there are gross inequalities in the attainment and access to these basic needs and opportunities, democratic principles would have been violated.

A cursory survey of available data suggests to us that, whereas democratic properties that have been identified here are generally pervasive in advanced industrial societies of the West and the far Orient (particularly Japan). By contrast, violations of democratic principles in parts of Africa and Latin America (to a less extent) are commonplace (Gastril 1989; Weil 1989; London 1987; Ninalowo 1987).

It is instructive to note that most of the relevant studies have suggested that a proportional correlation exists between democratic properties and economic development. One possible reason is that, for instance, institutional prevalence of freedom of expression would make it possible that private economic interests are not superimposed on general societal interests unnoticed in a way that would hamper or block general levels of socio-economic growth (Onimode 1988; Lipset 1981; WDR 1991; UNDP 1992).

This leads us to a particular consideration of structurally immanent contradictions of the state in general and peripheral state in particular.

The State and the Reproduction of Underdevelopment

Precisely on account of the realities that the state is a product of the preponderant division of the society into dominant and dominated classes, conflict of mutually divergent interests ensues in ways that might not necessarily harmonize with collective national interests. It was the crises that ensued as far back as the period of reformation and the industrial revolution in Europe that led to the breakdown of the traditional society.

This rupture exposed for the first time in history the dichotomy between the state and civil society (Lipset 1981; Bottomore and Nisbet 1979). For our present purposes and scope of concern here, it suffices to focus precisely on some of the ways by which the class state as that which invokes and nurtures mutually contradictory and contending divergent values as well as class-oriented interests in ways that reproduce contradictions of underdevelopment.³ That is to say that the state has generally historically been a product of the division of the civil society into classes with mutually divergent interests and values. This is a crucial reason the state, with its various organs — the government, the polity, the judiciary, including the coercive apparatus comprising the armed forces and the police — have historically been a political as well as hegemonic device by which the ruling class maintains and re-enacts in real terms its domination and hegemony over subaltern classes and social groups.

Now, the incidence and expressions of domination and hegemony is diverse and multilateral. Moments of domination and hegemony transpire variously and/or simultaneously along the socio-political, socio-economic and cultural dimensions. Hence, Marx and Engels (1969:110-111) had been compelled to observe that: 'The executive of the modern state is but a

3 For more elaborate treatments of the concept of the state in general as well as the peripheral state in particular — see Stevenson 1980; Veltmeyer 1980; Bradshaw 1985; Ninalowo 1987, 1988; Wallerstein 1979; Baran 1960; Frank 1972; Milliband 1969; Graf 1988; Poulantzas 1968, 1974; Boswell and Dixon 1990; Gana 1985.

committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’).⁴ In this respect, the immense significance of the conceptualization of peripheral state resides in the realities of ‘... the form and central role of the state in the creation and reproduction of the social order that constitutes favourable conditions for the functions of a capitalist economy, in this context, peripheral capitalist economy’ (Ninalowo 1987:2). In so far as the peripheral state formation is also concomitantly typified by an economy where key as well as minor economic outfits and institutions are spearheaded by transnational corporations and their indigenous local confederates, socio-economic development is consequently hampered. Furthermore, the socio-political and cultural spheres are also determined and shaped to, some significant degree, this distorted operating principle of ‘unequal exchange’ between the metropolitan societies and peripheral social formations. This is one crucial reason contradictions of underdevelopment are inordinately comparatively severe in the latter set of societies (Emmanuel 1972; Boswell and Dixon 1990). A cursory look at the global indicators of human development,⁵ as we have seen before, indeed, suggest that elements of human-centred development such as democratic culture, health, educational, nutritional housing and similar facilities are far more unevenly distributed in favour of dominant classes in, say, sub-Saharan Africa than in advanced industrial societies. This is quintessentially a testimony to the antinomies of the reproduction of underdevelopment.

The theoretical as well as historical situations of the reproduction of underdevelopment, as perpetrated by the class state, has particular implications for processes of legitimation. It is to this we shall now direct our attention.

4 To be sure, the instrumentalist conception of the state being advanced here is not more than an attempt to bring the historico-theoretical basis of the reproduction of underdevelopment into a sharp focus. It is, of course, well recognized here also that the function of the class state is by no means monolithic, serving the interests of a unitary class. There are indeed various factions and fractions within the ruling class quite often variously dominating the economic, political, ideological, cultural, legislative and repressive realms (Alavi 1989). Hence Ralph Miliband (1969; 1977) talks about relative autonomy of the state as an organ of the ruling class. This is to reinforce the idea that the state both remains independent to operate as a class state and reproduce attendant structural inequalities. However, regardless of the various class fractions and factions, the ruling elites in general have a vested interest in perpetuating structural and institutional inequalities. This is one more reason for the contradictions of underdevelopment.

5 Appendix A.

Legitimation as Legalism and Praxis

Whether we talk of the state in advanced industrial societies or in peripheral social formations, the ruling class within the configuration of the state, ordinarily, aspires to enjoy loyalty and conformity on the part of subaltern groups and classes to its forces and measures of domination or activation of superior power. The process that is routinely deployed in order to attain the goal of loyalty and conformity is referred to as legitimation. As it is by now well known, the concept of legitimation runs along a typological spectrum which corresponds to a particular bureaucratic administrative device, namely, the traditional/patrimonial, charismatic, legal/rational types as well as admixtures of these (Weber 1978). However, for the present purposes and scope, it is the legal/rational type that we shall appropriate. It is note-worthy, therefore, that the most common form by which the state seeks to legitimize its activation of power or moments of domination is premised on the principle of legalization or through legal/rational means *à la* Weber (1978). This mode of legitimation constitutes legalism. Power so exercised in contemporary state and civil society may take two general primary forms, namely, constitutional and extra-constitutional. The former is that which has the full backing of the normal legal democratically enacted constitution that stipulates the rights and privileges of various actors within the state and civil society. Ideal typically, constitutional legalization of moments of domination specifies in clear terms the patterns of relationships, the rights and obligations of the state to individuals or groups such as the provision of general health care, mass transportation, electric power supply, potable water and so on. Correspondingly, through the same constitutional channel, individuals, groups or corporate entities are expected to discharge certain obligations to the state and civil society, particularly through the modality of taxation and 'national service'. Both from theoretical and empirical standpoints, legalized legitimation of moments of domination is supposed to be in conformity with the parameters and principles of liberal democracy.

Therefore, for reasons we have seen earlier, constitutional legalization of domination should ordinarily harmonize with human-centred development. However, in actual concrete terms, there are quite often violations of this constitutional expectation that tend to stimulate the reproduction of under-development.

The other type of legalized legitimation of moments of domination within the state and civil society is hereby dubbed — extra-constitutional. That is, that which has no basis in any constitution. Such form of enactment of power is, of course, from a rigorous conceptual and technical standpoint, actually illegal in the first instance. Military usurpation of power from an elected civilian regime embodies the quintessence of this type of illegal usurpation of power. It is, of course, an infringement of the democratic

process as well as a moment within the contradictions of underdevelopment. Nonetheless, military aberrant extra-constitutional coercive domination of this sort quite often seeks to 'legally' legitimize its existence by way of extra-constitutional enactment of decrees. Instances of this have been known to exist in Ghana, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Angola, Somalia, Brazil, Argentina and so on. These are societies, as we have seen before, that have been characterized by socio-political and economic instabilities. Correspondingly, these societies have not fared well in respect to some key indicators of human-centred development as compared with advanced industrial societies (see the Appendix).

Extra-constitutional means of legalized legitimation is almost invariably counter-productive to human-centred development. This is precisely on account that those at the political commanding heights of the state under this form of extra-constitutional mode of legitimation, more often than not, do not portend much by way of a sense of accountability or obligation to the larger societal interests, in real terms. The ruling elites under this type of legitimizing arrangement are usually there by virtue of coercion as opposed to persuasion, as by through a *proper*⁶ electoral process under a liberal democratic arrangement. For these reasons, constitutionally legalized mode of legitimation by the state within a proper democratic framework, is of course, by far a better option when compared to the extra-constitutional counterpart, in so far as human-centred development is concerned.

This leads us to the type of legitimation of domination that is unmistakably genuinely oriented towards the fulfilment of the interests, aspirations and values of all individuals, groups and classes in the society in, at least, basic ways. (Habermas 1975, 1984; Weil 1989; Ninalowo 1990b). This mode of legitimation is informed by the principle of praxis, since it potentially portends emancipatory interest. It is also a form of socio-political legitimacy. This is so, since its orientation is not only broad-based, but it also commands popular appeal. A germane observation was invoked recently in another context:

People may regard a given prevailing *status quo*, regime, programme or national goals as legitimate or illegitimate in terms of the ways by which dominant ideology or values are consistent with those of the generality of the people since they also have and harbour specific interests that might often be at variance with dominant elitist ones. The alignment or reconciliation of general interests and values with dominant ones is said to

6 It is to be noted here that, as we have intimated earlier, a lot of state structures and organs in parts of Africa and Latin America present a facade of democratic forms in a formalistic sense. However, in actual concrete terms, what happens is a travesty of democracy (Wunsch and Olowu 1990; Gana 1985; Hyden 1983; Boswell and Dixon 1990).

enhance the possibilities of socio-political legitimation of the *status quo*... In effect, the ultimate dynamics of legitimation goes beyond sheer legalization of elitist national goals, values or norms. The ultimate test of legitimation resides in people's fulfilment of their needs, aspirations, values and interests — that is, socio-political legitimacy (Ninalowo 1990a:112-13).

It is to be noted that legitimation as praxis which approximates the conception of socio-political legitimation is exactly in consonance with democratic culture. To the extent that it supersedes sheer legalism, for reasons that have been marshalled earlier here, legitimation at the level of praxis is in harmony with human-centred development. Indeed, the data that are contained within the tables in the Appendix most clearly suggest that societies where democratic principles are relatively properly operative through the instrumentalities of the class state, are also the most socio-politically stable and socio-economically developed with human centredness.

Looking Back and Forward

It is by now a commonly acceptable idea that the state both in advanced industrial societies and peripheral ones, would ordinarily be interested in gaining allegiance from the dominated members of the society in order to maintain and perpetuate the dominant existing socio-political and economic relations and structures. Now, this process of legitimation of domination portends particular implications either for the enhancement of human-centred development or conversely, reproduction of underdevelopment through the instrumentalities of the class state.

The main problem of the paper had been to unravel the linkages between various modes of legitimation in relation to human-centred development or otherwise as mediated by the class state both in metropolitan as well as peripheral social formations. Our analysis suggests that extra-constitutional means of legal/rational legitimation of moments of domination is both coercive and undemocratic. Hence it is counter-productive to human-centred development, since the political elites under this form of legalized legitimation really do not harbour much by way of obligations to the people in terms of their interests, values and needs. Our evidence also shows that extra constitutional means of legalized mode of legitimation are widespread in peripheral social formations. This partly explains the pattern of the reproduction of underdevelopment in this region.

In contradistinction, legalized constitutional form of legitimation is consistent with the precepts of liberal democracy and welfare state. Ideal typically, this form of legitimation is in tune with people's general aspirations, values and needs. Hence, by definition it is supposed to be consistent with human-centred development. This type of legitimation is generally operative in advanced industrial societies. By the same token,

there are variations in the manner by which constitutional legalized form of legitimation is operative in real terms. An instance, of say, denial of certain privileges — such as school admission — on the basis of ethnic or racial identity would, of course, constitute an infringement of particular relevant constitutional provisions to the contrary.

An ultimate measure of legitimation in relation to human-centred development comes in the form of praxis or socio-political legitimacy. This is a function of the extent to which the quality of the human condition is enhanced or ameliorated through the instrumentalities of the state. This would allow for widespread and equitable opportunities and access to adequate housing, nutrition, formal basic education, mass transit network, communication, civil and political liberties in ways that would harmonize with human-centred development.

In effect, the most robust test of people-oriented form of legitimation obtains at the level of praxis in real terms by virtue of human practical activities. This form of legitimation is not only the most promising for socio-political stability but it is also the most practical form for human-centred development (Neuhausser 1992).

Now, in terms of the intermediary roles that could be played through the instrumentalities of the state between legitimation and authentic path to human-centred development. That is, some practical alternative policy options need to be adapted in order to allow for human-centred development, especially in peripheral social formations. First, there is a dire need for accountability on the part of political elites and other state functionaries for the expenditure and disbursement of public funds. Second, there must be openness and transparency in the procedures and modalities for the awards of contracts, decisions on investments, and appointments of personnel into the various organs of the state. Both of these measures should go a long way in mitigating against corruption amongst public officials. Third, there must be a drastic re-ordering of priorities of national goals and needs. That is, elitist class oriented goals are not to be conveniently misconstrued as pertaining to larger societal interests. For example, a feature of the so-called Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) is the devaluation of local currencies in relation to other major world currencies such as the US dollar and the British Pound Sterling. Whereas such a policy measure serves to heighten the level of inflation with the concomitant high prices of basic consumer goods and lower purchasing power of the masses, the elites are however, cushioned from these negative consequences by special privileges and perquisites of office (Ninalowo 1990a). Such a policy orientation is, of course, counter-productive to human-centred development. Fourth, there must be genuine concerted efforts on the part of the political elites and other state functionaries in peripheral social formations to shift their posture towards a direction that would help mitigate the extent of the

efficacy of external dominant forces on the local socio-economic, political, and cultural lives. This is one practical way the contradictions of underdevelopment could be abated. Fifth, there must be a re-distribution of power and resources in the society so as to mitigate against structural inequalities which are really not consistent with human-centred development. Sixth, and finally, since by definition, there can not be human-centred development without the existence of democratic culture, it therefore, becomes prudent to institutionalize democratic values and principles.

Appendix A
Table I: Profile of Human Development - Selected Indicators on Human Development (Regional Aggregate Data)

	Sub-Saharan Africa	Latin America and the Caribbean	Advanced Industrial Societies	World Average
Life Expectancy	51.8	67.4	74.5	64.7
Access to Health Services	48	75	-	-
Access to Safe Water	40	79	-	-
Access to Sanitation	30	65	-	-
Calorie Supply (% of Reg.)	89	116	-	-
Adult Literacy Rate	51	84	-	-
Prim. & Sec. Enrolment	46	84	-	-
GNP per capita	475 (US\$)	1,962	17,017	4,836
Real GDP per capita	1,187	4,514	15,043	4,622

Table II: Human Capital Formation

	Sub-Saharan Africa	Latin America and the Caribbean	Advanced Industrial Societies	World Average
Adult Literacy Rate:				
Total	51	84	-	-
Male	62	86	-	-
Female	40	83	-	-
Mean Years of Schooling:				
Total	1.6	5.2	10.0	5.0
Male	2.2	5.3	10.3	5.8
Female	1.0	5.1	9.6	4.3
Scientists & Technicians	-	29.6	81.0	22.2
R & D Scientists	-	4.1	40.0	2.2
Tertiary Graduates	0.2	2.5	9.4	3.7
Science Graduates	23.0	29.0	36.0	34.0

Source: UNDP 1992:176-7, 127-9.

**Table III: Widening Global South-North Human Gaps
(Expressed as percentage of North Average)**

	Sub-Saharan Africa	Latin America and the Caribbean	Advanced Industrial Societies
Real GDP per capita:			
1960	14	37	100
1989	8	30	100
GNP per capita:			
1963	7	22	100
1989	3	12	100
Mean Years of Schooling:			
1980	17	48	100
1990	16	52	100
Population per Nurse:			
1965	12	35	100
1984	6	15	100
Population per Doctor:	2	37	100
Radios	14	33	100
Newspapers	4	21	100
Telephones	3	18	100

Source: UNDP 1992:176-7, 127-9.

Table IV: Selected Disaggregated Data on Human Development Index in Rank Order

High Human Development	Life Expectancy at Birth (Years) 1990	Adult Literacy Rate (%) 1990	Mean Years of Schooling 1990	Real GDP per capita (\$) 1989	Human Develop Index	GDP Rank Minus HDI* Rank
Canada	77.0	99.0	12.1	18,635	.982	10
Japan	78.6	99.0	10.7	14,311	.981	1
Norway	77.1	99.0	11.6	16,838	.978	1
Switzerland	77.4	99.0	11.1	18,590	.977	-3
Sweden	77.4	99.0	11.1	14,817	.976	1
USA	75.9	99.0	12.3	20,998	.976	2
France	76.4	99.0	11.6	14,164	.969	5
United Kingdom	75.7	99.0	11.5	13,732	.962	11
Bahamas	71.5	99.0	6.2	11,293	.875	-7
Chile	71.8	93.4	7.5	4,987	.863	32
Argentina	71.0	95.3	8.7	4,310	.833	16
Venezuela	70.0	88.1	6.3	5,908	.824	12
Medium Human Development						
Brazil	65.6	81.1	3.9	4,951	.739	-5
Panama	72.4	88.1	6.7	3,231	.731	7
Jamaica	73.1	98.4	5.3	2,787	.722	13
Paraguay	67.1	90.1	4.9	2,842	.637	7
Peru	63.0	85.1	6.4	2,731	.600	6
Guyana	64.2	96.4	5.1	1,453	.539	39
Botswana	59.8	73.6	2.4	3,180	.534	-20
Algeria	65.1	57.4	2.6	3,088	.533	-37
Low Human Development						
Nicaragua	64.8	81.0	4.3	1,463	.496	2
Guatemala	63.4	55.1	4.1	2,531	.485	-9
Bolivia	54.5	77.5	4.0	1,531	.394	0
Ghana	55.0	60.3	3.5	1,005	.31	4
Côte d'Ivoire	53.4	53.4	1.9	1,381	.289	-23
Nigeria	51.5	50.7	1.2	1,160	.241	12
Togo	54.0	43.3	1.6	752	.218	-8
Senegal	48.3	38.3	0.8	1,208	.178	-32
Ethiopia	45.5	66.0	1.1	392	.173	21
Burundi	48.5	50.0	0.3	611	.165	2
Sudan	50.8	27.1	0.8	1,042	.157	-30
Chad	46.5	29.8	0.2	582	.088	5
Gambia	44.0	27.2	0.6	886	.083	-12
Guinea	43.5	24.0	0.8	602	.052	-41

* Whereas a positive figure means that the HDI rank is greater than the GNP rank, a negative figure indicates the obverse.

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