

Reflections on Social Change in Mozambique (State Civil Society and Social Progress in Mozambique)

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Introduction

The focus of this paper is twofold: the process of democratization, on the one hand, and on the economic situation determined by the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP), on the other. A brief theoretical presentation is essential for contextualising them and for providing a framework. Such contextualisation plays a central role in both the diagnosis of the situation and prescriptions of solutions to the issues raised above.

A universal definition of democracy becomes problematic not because of inadequate analytical tools, but because democracy, as practiced in different countries, is impacted upon by the effects of economic, social, historical and cultural factors. We need, therefore, to go further than the very well known quotation of Abraham Lincoln of democracy as being a 'government of the people for the people and by the people' (Nabudere and Patel 1991).

We agree with the point made by Kwesi Prah (1992) that: 'the notion of democracy is essentially a relative concept which can be specifically defined only in a given historical context'.

Moreover, its definitional boundaries relate to the character and interests of specific socio-economic groups at a given point in history. Thus at a given point in time, the content of democratic organization for a propertied class, cannot mean the same or have the same relevance for landless peasants and tenant farmers (Prah 1992:4).

One can agree that by definition democracy is conceived as the ideal form of political organization consistent with the maximum observance of human rights. This means that it is necessary, therefore, to determine under what economic, social, historical, cultural conditions, certain forms of democracy may be most applicable to each case.

Mozambique is a country where a multi-party system has been established barely two years. Of course this is one highly interesting case, but unfortunately since this event took place so recently, there is still very little relevant academic literature. Where there is some written material on the process of democratization some of the materials are rather theoretical

and tend toward generalizations, and virtually no original field work has been conducted. This leads to a number of rather optimistic, extremely idealistic, voluntarist publications. The most important fact is that most Mozambican intellectuals are now in favour of more open social frameworks.

Many social forces are still at the starting point of organization. Nevertheless, some of them are relatively more structured and formal. Other organizations are more spontaneous. They operate, in some sort of partnership, with the State or the ruling political party. In some instances they are emerging, strongly assisted in the initial phase by people who were in exile or deserters from the Frelimo Party (Imprensa Nacional 1991). And others are the product of independent initiative. Some are also supported by NGOs. Some are fighting to survive within a new framework and programmes because the State or the party had assumed greater control of their projects and designs.

Consequently, as part of this analysis, it is necessary to see what kind of democratic institutions the government and the party have tried to put in place in Mozambique since independence. We have also to refer to some less positive aspects as well.

Even the so-called nationalist vocabulary of the first generation coming from the national liberation's movement has dissipated and given way to a new and imported discourse: Structural Adjustment, real prices, debt re-scheduling, reduced wages and social expenditures are the new creed.

It is difficult to study the issue of 'social movements' in Mozambique empirically with full confidence of achieving factual accuracy or specificity, but we can study the stratagems and calculations involved from reports of certain events where this question is on the agenda. The difficulties and inconsistencies in the theory are most apparent in terms of conceptualization of the State, its trajectories and role in the society (Diop and Diouf 1990). However, it provides the means to measure the extent of the social actors' intervention in the political arena.

In this paper we seek to analyze the following issues: What is our democratic heritage at the present moment? To what extent, could elements of the traditional democracy achieved under the earlier social formations, be now useful and relevant in considering the kind of democratic structures which are suitable for the ongoing process and for the future? What are the peculiarities of the democratization process in Mozambique?

It is in principle clear that one of the main questions is closely linked to Anyang Nyong'o's position that: 'democracy is important for Africa's development in and of itself' and what we need to do is 'political empowerment' of the people.

What is the role of civil society? How could their demands be realized in the new political and social-economic framework? What forms should be

established in order to ensure popular participation in society? What are the preconditions for a workable and democratic society?

In Mozambique, as in other countries, we are confronted with a dilemma. One is against the old one party-system which leads to instability and to civil war between Frelimo and Renamo. However, some of the parties which have emerged, around twenty, at least in principle, succumbed to tribal and ethnic pressures. The new political segmentation arena will be formed to reflect these divisions. This will bring about instability in the country.

The question of democracy should be taken into account in connection with the question of development. The translation of political power into economic power is a more crucial problem than the emphasis of one over the other.

Peter Anyang Nyong'o is right in his affirmation that:

In this context (about the need to link democracy and development) there is still a quest and thirst among the African popular masses for two things—on the one hand, political freedom, on the other hand socio-economic progress. These two things are never separated (*Africa Demos* 1990).

The effects of the Economic Recovery Programme at political, social and economic levels are one of the constraints for the building of a democratic society and progressive change and good government. The most important factor, in the Mozambican case, in order to ensure the democratization process is the need for peace because without it no progressive measures can be undertaken either by the government or by our society (Frelimo Party, August 1991).

The United Nations Security Council approved a request from Secretary General Boutros Ghali for a force of about 7,500 soldiers to be sent to Mozambique to assist in implementing the peace accord between the government and Renamo. The UNO Moz (UN peace keeping force in Mozambique) will cost at least US \$331 million dollars (Mozambique File, January 1993).

The United Nations Under Secretary-General James Jonah at his Maputo press conference recently said that Boutros Ghali was fully committed to the Mozambique operation, and that the United Nations was 'making efforts to avoid an Angola type outcome' (Mozambique File, February 1993).

Mozambique was at war during almost 30 years and therefore many people are refugees or displaced people within the country. Most of the Mozambicans who have fled their country during the war years live in refugee camps and settlements in Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The number of Mozambican refugees who have fled to South Africa has been estimated at about 250,000. Malawi is home to over one million, who constitute 10 per cent of the country's population. In Zimbabwe there are about 190,000. Swaziland: 35,000,

Tanzania: 72,000 and in Zambia about 25,000 (South Scan Radio, 30.April.1993).

The problems include the destruction of the infrastructure, wanton pillaging, the social and economic disruption of the country and the severe traumatization of the people as a result of the war (South Scan Radio, 30.April.1993).

To what extent will it be possible to allow this people to take part in the process of democratization and elections in the country? This means that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will soon have to undertake its largest operation in Africa to date when it will repatriate nearly 1.5 million Mozambicans. This should be done before elections to allow them to vote, however, the operation is expected to take at least three years to complete.

These are the historical, political, economical and cultural factors that one needs to understand in order to be able to formulate the appropriate forms of democracy and economic programmes which can be suitable and stable for short-, medium- and long-term in Mozambique or elsewhere.

Our presentation below is necessarily sketchy but we believe it suffices to illustrate the complex theoretical and empirical issues that we are going to analyze.

Economic Development and Political Processes

Democracy without Economic Development Policy

Historically, 'by the middle of the 19th century, when the world capitalist system was beginning its transition to the imperialist phase, Portugal was still taking its initial steps towards capitalist development' (De Brito 1980). The weakness of the Portuguese bourgeoisie due to lack of capital has to a large extent determined its subordination to the interests of England and countries in the region, namely: South African capital (mines) and South Rhodesia (De Brito 1980).

In colonial times Mozambique's main source of income came from the provision of services to the hinterland countries, of which South Africa was the biggest and most important. The port of Maputo was conceived to serve South Africa. Mozambique was one of the main suppliers of labour for mines.

As a result, the colonial economy had to be organized in such a way as to create surplus value from its own instability, the Portuguese administration had to ensure a policy of maintaining a considerable labour force capable of meeting the needs, at any moment, of the capitalist sector, namely, the Railways, as cargo workers even when that meant a temporary regime of employment. Such part of the population would be concentrated in the simple mercantile sector that was per se the industrial reserve army.

On South African economic pressures, including the repatriation of Mozambican migrant miners, the decision on the miners was taken that we have more unemployed people in Mozambique for whom we have to try and create jobs, and we are losing hard currency resulting from their remittances. There used to be about 120,000 miners a year, but the number has since 1986 been drastically reduced to half.

The employment crisis generated by the reduction in contracts for Mozambican miners aggravates the problems arising from the general disintegration of the rural un- and under-employment and a flow of unemployed to the towns in search of wage labour. When one considers the number of industrial workers in Mozambique, it is clear this is a problem of enormous dimensions. Even with fairly rapid growth, industry is unlikely to absorb the unemployed within the next decade, for the collapse of the colonial economy had itself produced unemployment in the tourist and service sector as a whole (Lopes 1980).

The strategy chosen by Mozambique after independence was the construction of a centrally planned economy. Analysts of the Mozambican situation used to point to the development options made by the Mozambican authorities as the root for the economic failure. The authorities, however, consider that the failure was due not to the development strategy, but to the speed at which the transformation of the Mozambican society was carried out and to the external constraints.

National independence, in 1975, paradoxically, did not bring about any worthy alteration, since the economy was functioning on the basis of a central planning model that eliminated any type of private economic initiative.

The Third Congress of Frelimo, in which the movement was transformed into a Party, defined as a main goal for the Government the construction of a socialist society.

There were errors on the political and social administration that created the critical ambiance. What are the consequences of the economic management and wrong choices of some economic policies followed by the government in the post-independence period?

The choices made by the Mozambican authorities, giving priority to the State and cooperative ownership in allocation of resources, was in conformity with the demands of building a socialist society. This aspect of socialization in the countryside, mainly related to the formation of cooperatives, was undertaken without any consideration of the reaction of the peasants confronted by a new system about whose advantages there was no identifiable proof. In other words, the policymakers did not take into consideration the fact that economic agents are rational, and are capable of reacting negatively to the measures introduced.

Although the rural strategy in principle was coherent, its implementation counteracted the state's objectives. Practically all attention was concentrated upon the State farms, which gorged most available resources. Several years later, at the Fourth Congress of Frelimo in 1983, the State apparatus was criticized for having directed only 2 per cent of investments in agriculture to the cooperative sector. This also implies that the peasants, the majority of whom are women, were left with only minimal support in terms of extension services or credits. In addition, Frelimo's policy suffered from the fact that it did not satisfy the peasantry's land hunger. On the contrary, it added insult to injury: the State not only kept the lands that the Portuguese had expropriated from the Mozambican peasants, but new hands were integrated into the expanding State farm sector.

The State farms, with their perhaps 150,000-200,000 hectares, never constituted more than a small portion of the arable land, but they normally occupied the most fertile land, equipped with the most advanced infrastructure. In some places, therefore, Frelimo came to be as a new usurper of peasant authority over the land, and not as the liberator it had promised to be.

Furthermore, the nationalist middle strata in the countryside, which had supported the struggle for independence, saw its ambition thrown out by Frelimo's policies. This experience was furthermore shared by representatives of traditional power and religious groups. Thus, a strong element of resistance interfered with the process of transformation which Frelimo initiated.

One observation is related to the adequacy of the technologies chosen for the achievement of the objective of quick development. Agriculture was assumed to be a basis for development. Among industries, heavy industry was chosen to be the main priority. Also, for State owned agriculture, it was decided to follow a mechanized development of large farms.

One important aspect is related to the fact that Mozambique, although a Portuguese colony, had as its main economic partner — South Africa. The decision of constructing a socialist economy, and other political commitments of the government, affected directly some economic and political interests in South Africa. The reaction appeared in the form of the reduction of economic links and the support of an opposition movement in Mozambique. It means that the reaction of the most powerful neighbouring country to the decisions made was not correctly estimated.

Frelimo stated that everyone had a place in independent Mozambique. But no compromises were entered into, no alliances were concluded either with settlers or with the few Mozambicans who were capable of organizing and setting in motion a process of accumulation. In a sense, this could be said to be a reflection of the outcome of the political struggles of 1969 between the 'two lines' and the fact that the 'new exploiters' then lost their

influence. In the Frelimo, leadership was interpreted as a sign that it was unnecessary to compromise with them, and that this contradiction had been solved once and forever.

The Lusaka Agreement between Portugal and Frelimo, in which undivided power was handed over to Frelimo, further reinforces this stand. In addition, Frelimo did not take advantage of the possibility that existed of carrying the broad front of the liberation struggle forward into the nation building stage. Instead of upholding this alliance, Frelimo set about doing it alone, shedding along the way the earlier principle of building on a broad political alliance.

Other problems in Mozambique are also based on some misapplications of the socialist system. One of the reason was an incomplete picture of the economic and social situation inherited from the colonial era, and then, the choice of a model of development might have been made without a sustainable basis. Actually, Mozambique is considered as one of the poorest countries in the world. In fact, the country has been facing an extremely difficult period, characterized by the increase of absolute poverty, reflecting an adverse economic environment and unsatisfactory performance. In 1992, the Gross National Product per capita was estimated at around US \$80 dollars, following estimates published by the Minister of Finance, around 60 per cent of the population was considered to be within the limits of absolute poverty.

The devastating effects of the war are also abundantly documented in reports from the United Nations, and other sources. During the period 1980-1988 Mozambique suffered a loss in transit traffic revenue of approximately US \$1.5 billion dollars, a similar loss in export trade revenues, and a loss in domestic agricultural production of an estimated US \$1.25 billion dollars. With GDP at approximately half of what could reasonably be expected without the war, the total loss of GDP for the whole period 1980-1988 can be added up to the almost inconceivable figure of US \$15 billion dollars, according to a United Nations estimation.

The impact of war on the rural population was aggravated in 1983-1985 by serious drought conditions. For a country in which production did not cover its domestic consumption, the development of the level of official grants, mainly in form of grains and other food items, is not surprising.

The scarcity of goods and services, in the beginning of the 1980s created material-objective conditions for the rise of informal activities.

From the very beginning we recognized that socialism does not mean that the State takes control of everything, that the State would own all the farms, shops and industries, do all the marketing. We knew this from the outset. Our problem was that Mozambicans had not been prepared by colonialism to become private entrepreneurs. At independence there was no

Mozambican private sector and if one exists today it is because the Government has created the conditions for it (Prah 1992:10).

Under the pressure of day-to-day reality, the relation between democracy and development is once again being debated in Mozambique and in other African countries. Once again, Mozambique is facing a big dilemma, is it feasible to put democratic ideals and principles into practice under poor economic conditions, in some areas even poorer than when we first became independent?.

Therefore the question is: is democracy a prerequisite for development or is development a prerequisite for democracy? The main difference is that today Mozambique has learned from its experiences obtained in the last 20 years of independence. This question partly was answered by the 'Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to sustainable Growth', a report published by the World Bank in 1989, which cited a causal relation between political liberalization and successful economic rehabilitation. To a large extent, it was this report that made it feasible to link political requirements to economic aid, as it is now an integral component of the policy of Western donor nations (Chazan 1992).

One important dimension in this debate is expressed by the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Salim Ahmed Salim, who pointed out that 'while Africa must democratize, our efforts will be hamstrung by the non democratic international economic system in which we operate' (Buijtenhuijs and Rijmeree 1993).

The Government as part of adjustment is on a deliberate policy to cut public expenditures in order to reduce the budget deficit. The measures have clearly adverse effects on the social services, such as: housing, health, education, etc. that have to be reduced substantially.

It is to be noted that the highly and densely populated cities like Maputo and Beira suffer from inadequate service facilities especially health and education. The largest being that of medical facilities where certain services have now to be paid for.

All these economic realities coupled with a high and growing inequality in income distribution, obviously suggest a trend towards increasing misery of large sections of the urban population. As a result, people's living standards markedly deteriorated. In Mozambique today the cost on human life do not only affect so much the low income groups but the middle class as well. There is a need to provide education and other skills that will enable ordinary peoples to participate effectively and meaningfully in society. It also gives one ability for effective participation in the political system from which decisive decisions that affect all spheres of human life come from.

Politically by fostering decisions that will enhance peace and stability, etc. Peace and stability in political and socio-economic sense should not be seen just as an absence of war, rather it should be seen in the

socio-economic environment in terms of conditions that will enhance human productivity and social harmony, not inequality and deprivation.

It was evident that an economy like that of Mozambique which relies essentially on backward or underdeveloped agriculture and one that is foreign dependent cannot sustain serious economic shocks and droughts.

Therefore, the Government has taken steps to restructure the economy, but has not yet succeeded. The imposition of policies with adverse effects on significant sections of the population requires a certain constellation of social forces to ensure that the policies stick. And yet, if the current wave of policies is to stick or to be reversed, it is essential to understand their political underpinnings. It means that the social basis and political implications of the new package of Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) should be taken into consideration.

The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) is not only an economic question. It also has social and political implications. The social and political structure in Mozambique is changing. More specifically to what extent are new policies encouraging capitalist production relations and social forces who are linked to the external financial support to new policies directions (Hermele 1989).

There is a new 'coalition' that, in the Mozambican case, the ERP brought a new type of relations between classes: the old alliance between peasants and workers passed to the alliance between bureaucrats and technocrats with the international capital. This means that internally, a new national bourgeoisie is rising, peasants are being marginalized. Nevertheless, it should always be borne in mind the fact that the networks involved are very plastic and are unstable constructions.

Policy makers believe that this process is important for economic recovery and accumulation in general. It is definitely the question of accumulation, the relationship of the State to accumulation.

The Role of Ethno-regionalist Aspects

Another question is how important is the ethno-regionalist factor in the nature of social movements and their political competition? The question of ethnicity is a topic that has been written about and one that warrants careful scrutiny (Macamo 1992). First, let us examine the problems demarcating the field of study. In the earliest studies, there was confusion as to the use of such concepts as tribe, race, ethnic group, ethnic identity and tribalism, and even today there is very little consensus about what are the central features of the ethnic group.

Ethnicity is still a relevant issue in civil society and plays a role in the process of democratization because in the long-term view of Mozambican or African political history, the colonial and post-colonial era are seen as a relatively short periods, during which traditional African structures have

certainly not disappeared. This view emphasizes the large extent to which traditional structures inform present-day reality. Without insight into these structures, the contemporary situation cannot be comprehended.

The position of ethnic groups and ethnic identities have not remained completely static even after independence. On the contrary, they are subject to change, and that they are not isolated phenomena but components of a much larger whole, i.e. the modern State, in which they develop and manifest themselves in interaction with other groups of a comparable nature (Macamo 1992).

In fact, ethnic groups are not always monolithic blocs but they often split up into various clientistic network led by keenly competing political 'forces'. The ethno-regionalist dimension in the organization of social movements is associated with political logic, like, for example, ethnic proportioning within the government, the party, etc. Such political calculations, largely influenced by ethnicity, are important especially as they often determined the leadership of social forces.

Despite the difficulty of defining ethnicity and the polemics on the concept, even today in Mozambique the rivalry for scarce government jobs and scarce development funding is perceived by many people in ethnic terms, and ethnicity thus remains an integral factor in the Mozambican political life. For example, the people keep on questioning why the Southerners are in high positions in the government and therefore enjoy greater economic and political standards and why is the city of Beira, located in the centre of Mozambique, not the capital of the country?

Emerging Political Parties: What for?

Do the present-day opposition parties have any clear political platforms? (Macamo 1993). The response to this question is very difficult, given the fact that we are dealing with a country where multi-partism is recent and there is still very little relevant academic literature available. In general, however, it could be said that the opposition groups do not yet represent a markedly alternative view of society — the social movements had no clearly formulated programmes. Some of them usually confined themselves to vague slogans about more freedom and economic development, and certainly produced no thinkers. Some others have not developed programmes which appeal to emerging social grouping. They appeal either on the basis of minor ethnic identifications or religious values which are highly irrelevant to the social context. Others have been developed by people who no longer have any link with grassroots support. Some others make promises that in practice they will not be able to keep. The programme on economic reconstruction is neither coherent, nor well thought through or articulated. Unless and until the opposition groups draw up a more coherent

programme with respect to economic democratization, there will be little or no structural change after elections.

Civil Society and Democratization: Forms of Constraints

One may distinguish two forms of constraints facing the emerging political parties or social movements in Mozambique: constraints arising out of interference or control by outside forces and those arising out of the inherent limitations of the organizations themselves. One of the problems has to do with prohibitive financial costs and bureaucratic obstacles to obtain registration or permits. Constraints having to do with lack of resources are crippling for social movements. They invite interventions from outside and create dependency. It is self evident that the lack of access to information is a serious limitation. It may be added that greater information will provide social organizations better knowledge of the dynamics of government decision-making and of policy alternatives.

Social movements have to do with the organization of power and its institutionalization. They can avoid bureaucratization of the instruments of power. One partyism has often created, in some countries, a real gulf between the ruling elite and the society as it protects the elite from any opposition. We can find the following problems among the new emerging social movements in Mozambique: their tendency to isolate themselves from the struggles of the working class; their tendency to become urban based social groups without any linkage with the population of the rural areas.

Entrepreneurs: Development and Democracy

We agree with Peter Anyang Nyong'o (1992) who pointed out that:

we must realize that there is still a quest and thirst among the African popular masses for two things — on the one hand, political freedom, on the other hand, socio-economic progress. These two things are never separated. People don't want political freedom first and then socio-economic progress later. They want socio-economic progress today and freedom also today.

Even our past history and the performance of our society today, the open question is what is the role of entrepreneurs in the process of social and economic development? To what extent are entrepreneurs able to promote social change in the society? Can they link development and democracy in our country?

The ongoing social and economic situation in Mozambique is dominated by the SAP and a new social and economic force is emerging — the entrepreneurs.

The World Bank believed that generally they raise the level of popular participation in the community. It means, in other words, that it is expected that, small and medium enterprises can contribute to competition within the society and improve the welfare of community in economic terms. Small

entrepreneurs on the other hand are thought to be the seed bed of talent and efficiency. Our entrepreneurs in Mozambique, however, suffer from a wide variety of constraints and handicaps that inhibit them to be more active. They are weak and unstable. Access to capital, credit and markets are not readily open to them. The operating environment is discouraging. Crippling bureaucracy on the one hand, and corruption among the State functionaries on the other, further add to the burden of entrepreneurial endeavour.

With regards to the role of entrepreneurs in the process of democratization and economic development in Mozambique, to what extent could they play a role in the process of democratization in Mozambique?

It is important to note that there is a difference between the process of class formation and class structure in the former Portuguese colonies and other countries dominated by white settlers in Southern Africa. The difference consists in the fact that in Mozambique for example there is no white bourgeois class. Apart from this fact, around independence, 'about 90 per cent of the 250,000 Portuguese who lived in Mozambique left the country' (Frieling 1987). Another reason for this difference is the fact also that:

colonial regulations nearly completely denied the African population access to educational and medical facilities. Settlement of the African population was restricted. Furthermore, Africans were not allowed to trade or to carry out commercial activities.

In this context, the entrepreneurs emerged as one possible alternative that can be seen as a social class, able to introduce progressive social change and contribute to the socio-economic development of the country.

The main questions to be analyzed are as follows: do the entrepreneurs have a wide social base that could be mobilized as a social movement towards a programme of progressive social change? Are they interested objectively in the process of accumulation which could improve the economic situation of the country or are they only 'lumpen bourgeois' interested in self-consumption and corruption? Do they have a nationalist approach and what is their position to the process of accumulation? The Maputo entrepreneurs' informal sector is partly of a different character, because of different economic conditions prevailing in the country, namely, the social-political and economic crisis in Mozambique. After independence, strict regulations regarding the informal sector were kept in force until 1986. Until 1987 the Government of Mozambique did not explicitly include entrepreneurs in their development plans. But recently particularly after the introduction of the Economic Recovery Programme, this attitude is changing. In contrast with the situation in West Africa or South Asia, is its very weak and shallow production base which, in a way, reflects the smallness and underdevelopment of the country's manufacturing sector?

Furthermore, manufacturing activities are heavily concentrated around the capital city and Beira, the second largest city in the country. In this way, I strongly agree with Fisherl (1990) who pointed out that:

we need research into the informal sector from the angle of encouraging entrepreneurship, and in considering how and whether such essentially small-scale enterprises can become the seeds for medium sized firms.

There are some historical reasons why entrepreneurship is still underdeveloped in Mozambique. First of all, due to the (until recently) heavily centralized control of the economy, it was difficult for small entrepreneurs to exist in the informal sector without licensing because of the difficulties in obtaining raw materials and other inputs (previously obtained by showing tax payments).

Historically, Mozambique as well as other labour reserve countries in Southern Africa usually exported labour to South African mines and farms. This was a kind of release valve for the potentially unemployed which inhibited the emergence of the type of informal sector common in other parts of Africa.

Another fact is the decline of small-scale business during the first post-independence decade, many skilled workers and artisans left Mozambique for other countries. This skill drain has adversely affected the development of the formal economy and limited the productive capacity of the informal sector.

Finally the capital base of small entrepreneurs — whether operating in the formal or informal sector — is extremely low. The economic marginalization of small private entrepreneurs for a decade since independence eroded their capital base to a mere fraction of what it was. Then, despite recognition given to small business in 1983, during the 4th Congress of Frelimo, and regular reiterations about the importance of small enterprise, entrepreneurs found it difficult to acquire credit and, until recently, almost impossible to obtain foreign exchange (Fion 1992)

The Role of the Church in the Restructuring of the Mozambican Society

There is consensus between the State and the churches, that the churches in Mozambique have a very important role to play in the restructuring of the society — a society plagued by various serious problems, like civil war, poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, a soaring crime rate and many more problems. In this concluding section we focus on the areas in which the churches can make a contribution towards the rebuilding of this country.

The first and most important task of the churches in Mozambique is to bring an end to the civil war. All the churches realize this as their top priority, because the rebuilding of the Mozambican society is an idle dream as long as the war prevails. The churches fortunately are in a position where they could mediate between the warring parties. In the past they played an

important role in urging the warring parties into negotiations with each other. It seems that the churches are seen by both parties as a credible and reliable mediator. This of course is a good indicator that the Church will also in future be able to play its role as peace maker.

A second and equally important task for the churches is the rehabilitation of the morality of the population. The war in combination with the severe poverty that the population have experienced over nearly two decades, had an eroding effect on morality in the country. Respect for human life had diminished and crime had become a way of life for many people and especially the young. In Mozambique one can hear many pitiful tales of thirteen-year-old children who have already killed a dozen or more people often for reasons that bear no resemblance to the war. People who have nothing to eat often have to steal food in order to survive. Besides, there are also mobs of criminals who exploit this situation and for whom crime has become a way of life. The State is quite explicit about the fact that it could not on its own stem this tide of criminality or rebuild the morality of the society. Without a steep decline in criminality and a corresponding rise in morality, they know that a new political dispensation will have very little practical effect. They are therefore urging the churches to do their utmost to restore morality in the country.

The churches generally are more than willing to perform this task, not in order to please the government in the first place, but because they see it as an authentic task of the Church. In all of the churches there is a commitment to rebuild the family, Church and community life. Once integrity and morality have been restored to a certain extent in these spheres, the foundation for a more morally responsible society has been laid.

Education and social services is a third area where the churches will have to continue to play an important role. In both of these areas there is such a huge backlog that it is impossible for the present or a future government to cope with it on its own. The churches have to a certain extent the personnel, the money and the will to assist the government in this task. It seems that schools owned by churches will in future once again become a familiar sight in Mozambique. There is even an indication that one of the churches might start its own university in the not too distant future.

A fourth area where the church can play an important role in the rebuilding of the Mozambican society, is political education of the population. The Mozambican population did not have any decent preparation for life in a multiparty democracy. First they were subjected to colonial rule and then to a one party State and civil war. If the talks between Frelimo and Renamo succeed in bringing peace and free elections to the country, the population will generally be very ill-prepared for such a new political dispensation. Although not all churches see it as their duty to prepare members of their church for this future dispensation, at least some of

churches feel that they have a responsibility in this regard. Most prominent amongst these are the Protestant churches who are convinced that there are good theological reasons for educating people in basic human rights and democratic political procedures. It could hardly be denied that such political education is indeed necessary to make multiparty free elections work in the Mozambican society.

Finally, the churches could also play a role in the economic rebuilding of the society. Internally they could create working opportunities for the mass of unemployed people in the country. Externally they could use their influence in international religious and ecumenical organizations to bring the living conditions of the Mozambican people to world attention. In this way they can initiate development projects and channel international funds to Mozambique.

The Situation in Mozambique Before the General Elections of October 1994

Mozambique's poor economic performance was largely caused by failure of policies and poor management of national affairs. Right from the beginning of our study, one illusion or notion has to be put to rest. It is the idea that socio-political and socio-economic aspects of development have to be kept separately.

Mozambique tried between 1984 and 1986 on its own to review the situation by implementing an economic plan, a kind of self adjustment that allowed the government to undertake some measures. Unfortunately, these have not contributed enough to activating the economy as a whole. This policy did not change the nature of the problems inherited from colonization combined with the crisis created by the post-independence management. As a result of this failure, SAP came into place in 1987. At this stage, it should be pointed out that SAP was one of the conditionalities put forward by foreign forces in order to bring peace back to the country completely devastated during 17 years of civil war. Along with the process of economic liberalization or opening the doors for the penetration of foreign i.e. Western capital, Mozambique should liberalize internal political affairs by introducing multiparty democracy and hold elections. Because of the war in particular in the rural areas, it was obvious that SAP could not be implemented all over the country. Thus, the so called theory of 'self regulating market for everybody's benefit' would not work.

The reasons that brought about the SAP to Mozambique were not only economic but political as well. The political crisis came at the moment when the ruling class lost some of its national identity and role in national building. With SAP, this class gradually became more and more closer to foreign interests and international capital. SAP weakened the element of loyalty and accountability to the people.

Mozambique is currently one of the world's most indebted countries with foreign debts totaling US \$5.4 billion dollars (Fion 1992).

Mozambique can be characterized as a country in transition from a centrally-planned to market-oriented economy. The country achieved a staggering Gross National Product (GNP) growth rate of 19 per cent in 1983, one of the fastest growth rates in the world. Authorities argued that this was due to the twin effects of the end of the 1991-1992 drought and the end of the Mozambican civil war. Agricultural production jumped in 1993 as Mozambique enjoyed rains after its worst drought in this century and thousands of farmers moved back to their long abandoned land, following the 1992 peace accord ending 17 years of civil war.

An increase of 4 per cent for 1993 was forecasted and expected by the government. This was a good signal of the existing potential for growth of the Mozambican economy despite many negative factors. Despite these figures, the situation in the country is characterized by a high cost of living for the majority of the people and political instability.

The World Bank representative Nils Tcheyan, says economic growth in peace-time Mozambique could double to about 6 to 7 per cent per annum, largely from increases in agricultural output and improvement in transportation (*Facts and Reports* 1994:6).

Mozambique needs to urgently find ways of reducing the country's dependence on food imports. At this stage, one negative factor is that 'many people are still afraid to travel. There is a need for troop confinement and disarmament. There are also many weapons in the hands of those who, for many years, lived by killing...' (Radio Mozambique, Maputo, 2 February 1993).

Agriculture is acknowledged as a vital sector in the Mozambican economy. Meanwhile, the main question is the need to integrate refugees and displaced people as early as possible so that a wide range of crops and livestock can be produced by the commercial and small-scale farmers.

The manufacturing sector should be rehabilitated and diversified. Mozambique's important cashew nut industry is to receive a boost from the European Investment Bank (EIB), which has announced that it is providing ECU 3 million (US \$4.2 million dollars) to a joint venture between Mozambican and European partners. Mozambique produces some 40,000 to 50,000 tons of cashew nuts annually. But this figure is only a small fraction of the level of production that was achieved before the country's independence from Portugal in 1975; the country's output of cashew nuts in 1974 was 204,000 tons.

Economists attribute the decline to several factors, not least the inefficient practices of the State marketing boards. Cashews are, with prawns, a top foreign exchange earner. This is the reason why the government has in recent years sought to boost production by doubling

producer prices? Nonetheless, in 1991, the government had to legalize for the first time the export of unprocessed cashew nuts because the country's processing capacity could not handle all the nuts harvested (*Facts and Reports* 1993:25).

Nevertheless, the situation in terms of export shows us that there is a high dependence on two products namely cashews and prawns. This means that among 57 products, cashews and prawns made up in 1991, 47 per cent of all commodities exported; in 1990 they represented 46 per cent and in 1992, 59 per cent. On the other hand, there are three countries as the main buyers of these products. They are: Japan, Spain and USA. This kind of constraints indicate clearly that the production for export must be diversified and economic partners expanded urgently.

Another alternative that Mozambique used for getting foreign currency was based on the remittances from migrant workers abroad, mainly in South Africa (there were 120,000 Mozambican miners per year in South Africa in the 1970s, but in 1986 the Apartheid regime cut them to less than half per year) and around 18,000 workers in former East Germany were suddenly dismissed and sent back to the country in 1992.

Consequently, Mozambique is currently one of the world's most indebted countries and for this reason it is very vulnerable and exposed to foreign interests. This country's extreme financial dependence and the internal crisis could be explained as being, on the one hand, a lack of accumulation at national level (expressed by the fact that the majority of the people live below the poverty line) and lack of legitimacy by the ruling party (represented by the fact that they are unable to fulfill the indispensable needs of the people for which they originally fought and stood).

Despite some good figures registered in the economy last year in most provinces of Mozambique, thousands faced starvation. AIA/Caiphaz Cimhete reported recently that:

most crops were complete failure due to poor rainfall in some parts, migratory birds, locusts and a cyclone which killed people and left others homeless in Nampula province in the central part of Mozambique (*Facts and Reports* 1994:6).

Meanwhile, half a million refugees are preparing to return home before April 1995. The number could be higher as some refugees were not registered. There appears to be a speeding-up of repatriation to get people home before the multiparty elections scheduled for October 27 and 28 this year.

A document entitled Consolidated Humanitarian Programme for 1993-1994, prepared by the UN and the government, reveals that food security is linked to the restoration of agricultural production in the family and the revival of the local trading system. Displaced people, returning

refugees and demobilized soldiers have been supplied with agricultural implements to start the recovery cycle.

Elections versus Political Parties

In preparation for the elections, it is correct to ask ourselves whether the people are prepared to vote and what are the prospects beyond this process?

We should start by realizing that Mozambique is a country without any political tradition and culture related to multiparty democracy. Historically, before independence and under the Portuguese colonial rule, due to its fascist nature, the mere existence of political parties was impossible and prohibited. After independence, we instituted the one party system.

Second, Mozambique's 17-year civil war means that the emergence of multi-partism is not historically a result of a spontaneous, genuine and natural development within the country. Multipartyism is on the agenda in the country in order to bring peace and this comes after the General Peace Agreement signed in Roma between Frelimo and Renamo. Political openness is the price of peace.

Third, this means also that the other political parties that were not involved in the war in the existing political arena could be considered to be non 'relevant'. However, they do complement the scenery by building an apparently 'third force'. Although they do not possess any army, they are a third voice to be listened to in any case.

Fourth, Renamo is no longer a military organization in its structure, policy design and means. It has to be transformed into a political party. Furthermore, it has never had a political programme.

In order to solve the difficulties that the political parties are faced with, Mozambique's 17 political parties will each receive some US \$200,000 dollars from the United Nations to help set up their organizations ahead of elections in October. The money comes from the US \$3.5 million dollars in international donations held in a UN trust fund. The agreement was reached by the parties under the chairmanship of the National Elections Commission after months of wrangling. Recently, two political parties have banded together to form a new political coalition in Maputo in preparation for the October elections. Pressure is growing on the Frelimo President to accept a deal for a government of national unity in Mozambique, as it becomes clear that the country will not be ready for the planned 27-28 October elections (*Facts and Reports* 1994:5). Although no one expects an Angolan-style return to war, either side could reject the outcome and provoke a stalemate and extended negotiations, so diplomats are arguing increasingly forcefully that Frelimo and Renamo must make a deal before election to prevent chaos afterward. One of the main problems is the fact that:

with little over 2 months to go before the election, Mozambique has fallen impossibly behind schedule. By the end of October fewer than 7,000 of the new 30,000 person army will be trained (some for as little as four weeks) and the new army will have no command and control structure (*Facts and Reports* 1994:5).

As a result of this situation

in a report to the UN security council, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali reiterated the view widely held in Maputo that both government and Renamo are stalling and not demobilizing all their troops. There is a danger, therefore, that three armies will be in existence in Mozambique during the election period (*Facts and Reports* 1994:5).

Another problem has to do with the fact that, meanwhile, Renamo continues to block access to some of the areas it controls. According to a news report on the 10th September, Dhlakama — the Renamo leader — said that despite the understanding achieved at his recent meeting with Mozambican head of State Chissano, reintegration of Renamo controlled areas into the State administration system, would only occur with restrictions. Dhlakama added that political parties and businessmen could only work in those areas with permission from the Renamo leadership (*Tempo* 1994:4-7).

Raul Domingos, head of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR, Renamo) team to the Supervision and Control Commission (CSC) of the General Peace Accord (AGP), said that, what was made clear in the document signed by J. Chissano and A. Dhlakama was the creation of posts for Renamo advisers who would be working with provincial governors concerning matters linked to Renamo-controlled areas (*Facts and Reports* 1993:15).

We should note that these two aspects, namely: the existence of three armies and lack of access to rebel zones were the two factors which allowed a return to war after the Angola election. The two sides bear most of the responsibility for the foot-dragging and delay, there are two other factors; one is the UN, especially the UN Development Programme, has caused huge delays. It has delayed the start of a US \$14 million dollars of mining project for more than a year, which in turn has held up repatriation of refugees and made some areas much less accessible to registration teams (*Facts and Reports* 1994:5).

Civic education began late and has been limited, so many people in remote areas still do not know about the election. Return of refugees is also slow. Consequently it will be impossible to register all 7.5 million eligible voters in time.

Frelimo and Renamo agreed on the Mozambique General Peace Accord that the electoral process should be simplified to facilitate the division into small opposition groups and suggested that the proportional voting system be used, to allow these parties to be represented with 5 per cent of votes.

However, it has also become clear that the unarmed opposition will not have time to come together to form a 'third force' coalition in the election. None of the new small parties will win the 5 per cent of the national vote needed to get into parliament, which means only Renamo and Frelimo will have Members of Parliament (MPs). Meanwhile, the UN Security Council is thus forcing Mozambique to have an election for which it will not be ready.

The OAU, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, United Kingdom, the United States, the foreign observers in the Supervision and Control Commission (CSC) made clear some times that the UN Security Council was concerned about the continued failure to stick to the timetable for the implementation of the General Peace Accord. They voiced concern about the implications of a lack of trust arising from the delays. They reminded that both sides must remember that the international community has but finite resources and that making them available requires major efforts. For the international compromise towards Mozambique — including economic and social reconstruction efforts — to be honoured, there must be continuous, visible and specific progress.

They stressed that the priority issues are the confinement and demobilization of the troops on both sides, along with the formation of a new army, adding that, holding elections will depend on their successful implementation (*Facts and Reports* 1993:14).

Apart from the bipolarization which opposes Frelimo and Renamo, the opposition is not strong enough to impose a new order even after elections have taken place in order to ensure the implementation of progressive democratization in the society.

What is the real social base of these political parties? Do they have a programme beyond the process of elections aimed at bringing changes in the society? Or are they only concerned about taking over power, in other words are they really fighting for democracy or just for the redistribution of the role to play within the elite in the exercise of power? Some of these political parties do not see election as a way for the empowerment of the people but rather as an end itself.

Social Movements Weakened

The policy of political and socio-economic adjustment in its various forms of crisis has weakened the social movements. Due to growing unemployment and lack of jobs for the school leavers; to the downgrading of the economy, the crisis has affected the workers.

There were attempts to manage some aspects of the crisis, an example being the workers who said:

the Confederation of Trade Union must discard its old socialist habits if it is to retain credibility and the loyalty of its 250,000 members from 13 affiliate unions. About 3,000 delegates at the annual congress in May 1994

were visibly disillusioned and felt betrayed because of the leadership's apparent reluctance to change its ways. This despite the fact that 58 per cent of the newly elected officials came from affiliated unions (*Facts and Reports* 1994:6).

The situation of the labour movement under SAP in Mozambique could be explained as follows: first, there is a deterioration in the relative weight of organized labour to the benefit of expansion in non-organized labour and in the informal sector, and increase in unemployment due to privatization and rationalization in all sectors but mainly in public service. Second, lack of experience of trade unions in dealing with this kind of situation; and third, emergence of other trade unions among the workers. The trade unions become weaker to the benefit of the system instituted by SAP against the workers. As a result, there is the end of a single trade union system, which was closed to the government. Apart from this, the employers are able to play a role in the division of trade unions and through threatening redundancy.

There is the supposition that the State and the market are opposing forces. We have been told by the World Bank and the IMF that the State intervention in the economy is useless and it necessarily reduces efficiency, defined according to just one unexamined criterion: competitiveness. Competitiveness, thus defined, could be driven by short-term impulses leading to the impoverishment or destruction of a society⁷. Recently, under strong pressures from the country's trade unions, the Mozambican government has reimposed price controls on basic foodstuffs.

The announcement of the controls came at the end of a meeting on 20 April between Labour Minister Teodato Hunguane, and representatives of the trade union movement, and of the main business associations. This was the first ever tripartite deal between government, unions and employers.

The maximum price for a kilo of yellow maize, the staple food of the poor, was set at 700 meticaïs (US \$0.12 dollars). Maximum prices were also fixed for rice — 2,400 meticaïs (US \$0.42 dollars) a kilo; for sugar 4,350 meticaïs (US \$0.76 dollars) a kilo; and for cooking oil 6,500 meticaïs (US \$1.13 dollars) a litre. To maintain these prices, the government has removed sales tax from imported basic foodstuffs, and cut the already minimal customs fees on these goods by 50 per cent, while retailers and wholesalers represented at the meeting, agreed to cut their profit margins (*Facts and Reports* 1994:7). The question is whether or not these workers will be able to become or to revolutionize themselves into an autonomous social force by way of an alternative? If yes, what options can they bring about to undertake progressive chances in the society?

What are the main features of the Mozambican situation? The State has been terribly weakened by the 'brain drain' which practically emptied the public service, social polarization has become extreme not only between the

rural and urban societies but also among the various social strata of the middle class, on the one hand and the elite in the ruling party on the other. In addition to that, at a social level, the number of children obliged to start working in order to survive or to help their parents is speedily increasing.

In order to be able to solve all these problems there is no substitute to an alternative in which the people would play an active political and economic role.

Mozambique: Thoughts about Regional Cooperation and Integration

Mozambique's regional and geographical location gives a set of relative advantages in terms of ports and railway services to the hinterland.

For historical, political, cultural and economic reasons, Mozambique should be seen within the context of the developments that are taking place in the region of Southern Africa. This is one crucial point on how to understand the real change for the process of democratization and economic progress in the country. Apart from human resources, Mozambique has a lot of potential elements that can help the country to overcome the existing situation characterized by hunger and poor performance of our economy.

Furthermore, we have to avoid discussing the short-term without long-term perspectives. What kind of integration will be defined and implemented in the near future? Is it high time we posed the question whether that integration model will follow the 'Western style' which tries to integrate the periphery in the process of global capitalist system of accumulation or not?

South Africa became recently a member of SADC (Southern African Development Community). Is South Africa prepared, on the one hand, to enter into a positive and integrative programme or given its high and better economic performance going to economically dominate the rest of Southern African countries? Will Mozambique be able to construct an economy which is not completely so dependent on selling port and railway services, on the other hand?

What are the alternatives? Will the emerging political parties — they should be seen in the existing political arena as the main social actors — be able to understand that the struggle for democracy is an integral part of the struggle for economic independence?

In our post-colonial history and post-independence era characterized by one party State control over the means of production because of the fact that the Mozambican regime had no active policy of industrialization. Since the economy was liberalized in 1987, South Africa has been seen, by the local and emerging Mozambican entrepreneurs and petty bourgeois which is still weak and fragmented, as the gateway to the resources for development. This explains why the petty bourgeoisie is right now organically linked to South

African private capital and through it to international capital operating in the region.

The West in general have no strategic interest in supporting the creation of an industrial bourgeoisie in Mozambique. They intend to lock certain countries into the role of basket-case economies specializing in the supply of raw materials, services and cheap labour force. What may happen is that the Western nations do not support industrialization anywhere unless the process is judged necessary to the maintenance of their security. This can be seen as the role of South Africa and the kind of integration in the region that may occur unless alternative available strategic options are worked out against imperialism.

One possible scenario that may also happen is that all countries that for any reason will not be able to be 'integrated in the model', will find themselves finally marginalised. These key policy questions may help to elucidate why there are discussions in terms of the future nature of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) i.e. why not eliminate or expand it to include some other countries in the region.

Some forces within the donor community believe that if they invest in South Africa this would have a trickle-down effect and all countries in the region would benefit and take advantage of that situation.

This is not yet the case with the existing institutions originally created with this idea of generating growth in the subregion with South Africa as a key player. South Africa Trade and Industry Minister, Trevor Manuel, said recently that 'in 1993-1994 Southern Africa Customs Union made payments to the other members of SACU of R 5.6 billion Rands from customs and excise revenue of R 16.3 billion Rands' (*Facts and Reports* 1994:24). He added that 'there was a great deal of unhappiness about the SACU Agreement because the regional States believe it had not helped their industrial development' (*Facts and Reports* 1994:24).

On the table is also the question of why not Africanize Cabora Bassa? In this regards during the last meeting of the Organization of African Unity's summit of Heads of State — Mozambique's Joaquim Chissano, South Africa's Nelson Mandela and Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe got together over an economic dossier which is of major importance for their region: the future of the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric complex. They studied the hypothesis of either an 'acquisition' or a 'recuperation' of shares in the company being held by Portugal making it responsible for running the Hydroelectrica de Cabora Bassa (HCB) complex. President Chissano went on to say that there is no call for a project of this regional importance to remain in the hands of outside non-African interests since electricity from Cabora Bassa must be available for South Africa and Zimbabwe (*Facts and Reports* 1994:24).

The other means for joint projects in the cooperation in Southern Africa, for instance, Cabora Bassa hopes to be rebuilt soon in order to enable the dam to provide electricity again to the subcontinent. Cabora Bassa was expected to provide power up to 1.750 MW to Eskom in South Africa, before the destruction of the original transmission line—some 900 km—to the eastern Transvaal during the Mozambican civil war. Another project was aimed to build a much shorter line—300 Km—to link the dam to Zimbabwe's overload electrical grid. These plans to rebuild these lines, now that the civil war in Mozambique is over, are still very much alive.

Energy, ports and railway services, migrant labour force, communications have been always in the context of integration of Mozambique in the international capitalist market dominated and represented in the subregion by South Africa.

In the seventies and eighties through SADCC and the Front Line States, an attempt was made to revise this socio-political and economic structure distinguished by the dominating and controlling role of the subregion by South Africa's apartheid regime. The subregion fought with all means against dependency.

All these facts were well understood by South Africa's President Mandela who visited Mozambique in July. He viewed his first State visit to Mozambique as a key to the region's stability. Mozambique is now South Africa's third largest trading partner in Africa (*Facts and Reports* 1994:7).

Meanwhile, South Africa and Mozambique set up a joint chamber of commerce last July. According to a communiqué issued by the South African embassy in Maputo, the new chamber would promote and facilitate South African investment in Mozambique as well as encourage bilateral trade.

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