# Democracy, Multipartyism and Emancipative Politics in Africa: The Case of Zaire

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*Résumé: Cet article traite de l'histoire du multipartisme et des rapports entre le parti et la politique émancipatrice au Zaïre. La démocratie en Afrique d'aujourd'hui suppose-t-elle une politique émancipatrice? La démocratie est certes à l'ordre du jour en Afrique mais il faudrait éviter de la confondre avec l'Etat parlementaire qui nous vient de l'extérieur et qui ne favorise que l'élite intéressé par le partage du pouvoir comme c'est le cas au Zaïre. Un développement auto-centré des peuples passe nécessairement par de nouvelles formes d'organisation susceptibles de promouvoir les aptitudes politiques des masses pour la libération des peuples.*

## Elements for a History of Emancipative Politics

In Africa today, is democracy the new name for an emancipative (progressive, revolutionary or liberating) politics and is multipartyism its indicator or operator? Using the case of Congo-Zaire, this article briefly examines this difficult political question. To do this and to understand the political currency of the present world situation, a vision of emancipative politics is needed. In this context, the historicity of multipartyism and the relationship between the party and emancipative politics must be considered.

In its modern sense, emancipative politics is politics under condition. This conception was introduced by Lenin (1902) in his *What is to be done?*.[1] Politics under condition implies that politics is of a subjective order i.e., of the order of phenomena of consciousness; what Lenin called 'consciousness'. Politics is identified, in its subjective condition, as a 'revolutionary consciousness': it is a break with 'spontaneousness'. In everyday life activities, we can identify three basic attitudes: political, trade-unionist and ordinary (routine or common sense based) consciousness. The political attitude is not accommodating; the state of affairs in the world does not have to remain so because it is so. People may live differently than they live. Politics is not expressed through the spontaneous consciousness. It is an

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1   I am using Sylvain Lazarus's (1992) interpretation of the essay. Lazarus is probably the most creative thinker of Marxist politics around.

active prescriptive relationship with reality and not a reflection or representation in consciousness of invariant structures (economic structure or level of development' or the state). Politics is a creative invention. Let us do something about the situation! characterizes a political attitude.

Politics is one of the four generative processes (Badiou 1988; 1992)· which produce *truths as events*. The other three are: science (scientific practices), art (artistic practices) and love. Truth-events, in science, are called 'discoveries'; those in art are referred to as 'masterpieces' and 'courtly love' was a truth-event of love. The ancient Athenian democracy, for example, emerged as a political event and not as a reflection in politics of processes outside of politics. Political materialism requires that politics be dealt with in political terms.

As Mao Ze-Dong said:

> *'not everything which moves is red'; the mere existence of social movements does not carry with it the existence of politics. For there to be politics, according to Lenin, there must be a break in the subjectivity, a break described by him as a 'consciousness of antagonism with the existing overall socio-political order'* (Lazarus 1992, 9).

That is the active realization that the existing state of affairs must disappear — not as a scientific discovery but as a politics. This modern vision of politics under the condition of subjective break is encountered and not observed. It is revealed through militant forms of thought (e.g. Mao Ze-Dong's political enunciations at the outset of the cultural revolution) and not through the movement of history, or the representation (reflection, description) of social structures. Only such a symptomatic break and the militants it gives rise to differentiate politics from the state. The history of states is different from that of politics. Politics has sites and militants (Lazarus 1992). Sites are constituted by localized political processes through which matters of politics are treated. We can cite as examples the factory as site of politics (political processes against factory despotism), democracy as people relating to themselves, and the national question (political processes for national self-determination).

Emancipative politics does not always exist; when it does, it exists under conditions. It is, thus, precarious and sequential: it unfolds until its conditions of subjective break disappear. When people lose the consciousness of subjective break by ceasing to be involved in political processes, emancipative politics disappears. The completion of a sequence of progressive politics does not lead automatically to another. In the absence of emancipative politics, the state problematic or the imperialist influence prevails in the treatment of matters of politics. To reduce every political capacity to a state capacity is to abscond from politics.

Politics is incarnated or organized through what Lazarus (1986, 1989, 1990, 1992) calls historical modes of politics. Through an analysis — still incomplete — of the history of emancipative politics, he has identified five major sequences. The historical sequence of the Jacobin Convention (during the French Revolution) existed between 1792 and 1794 (the 9th Thermidor) with Robespierre and Saint-Just[2] as militant figures and the Jacobin Convention, *sans culottes*, clubs and revolutionary armies as its sites. The revolutionary mode organized this sequence. The sequence opened up by the 1848 workers revolutionary struggles ended with the failure of the Paris Commune in 1871. The militant figures of this politics included Karl Marx and Engels (authors of *The Communist Manifesto*): 'communists in the revolutionary movement' constituted its sites. Lazarus calls its historical mode of politics, the classicist mode (Lazarus 1991). The Bolshevik sequence, opened up by Lenin's *What is to be Done?* (1902), reaching a peak with the 1905 Russian Revolution, ended with the October Revolution of 1917. Lenin was its militant figure and the workers socio-democratic party and the Soviets (people's councils) were its sites. The revolutionary war' sequence, opened up with Mao's writings related to the Chingkangshan base, closed with the seizure of the state power by the Communist Party of China in 1949. Mao Ze-Dong was one of its militant figures and masses (political processes in the masses, 'Mass work'), the Red army, great situations (war, etc) were its sites. Lazarus calls its historical mode of politics, the dialectical mode. This is because, for Mao dialectics is the site of politics and politics the site of dialectics. And finally, the sequence of the Cultural Revolution, which started in 1965, ended in the spring of 1967. Mao was again its militant figure. The historical mode of this politics still needs to be worked out. I call it a non-party mode of politics. The respective historical modes and their characteristics related to these sequences are summarized in Appendix 1.

It is only in the Bolshevik historical mode of politics that the party was an operator reinforcing the revolutionary political process. The practical existence of the consciousness of antagonism with the existing overall socio-political order', a break with the 'spontaneous forms of consciousness', in a revolutionary process, required four articulated necessities: the need for professional revolutionaries ('Marxist politics'), necessity of viewing things from the perspective of the whole (at least from a national framework), the need for alliances between workers and rural masses, and the need to break the counter-revolution by a protracted centralized and militarily offensive process. The party was the operator to master that process. Moreover, the

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2    This important speech would have been a good source of inspiration in the CNS déballage, to explain why President Mobutu should have been condemned.

party was not the sole site of politics; the soviets (councils) were another site. Emancipative politics is a politics of a multiplicity of sites. That is why its identification through constant summing-up at an independent and consistent political thought is necessary.

After the seizure of the state power, in October 1917, the party became a structure for managing the socialist state. It became intolerant (Brinton 1970) of any break in subjectivity and independent politics. It is the existence of an independent (emancipative) politics which makes the destructive transformation of the state possible. The notion of professional revolutionary' and the military breaking of counter-revolution have state-line characteristics. The political treatment of contradictions among the people is not in line with these characteristics. Managing the state is not a destructive transformation of the state *per se*. From which sites is the state destructively transformed to allow the politics of non-domination to emerge? Is the violent change in the state personnel such a transformation? Does the routinization of a 'subjective break' constitute the victory of an emancipative politics? Those are difficult questions whose answers might explain the fate of Bolshevism.

In the situation of 'revolutionary war', in China, the party did not play the role of an operator of an independent politics. The Red Army was in charge of the political tasks of the revolution. The party, the mobilization of the masses, the people, etc. were treated politically through dialectical laws of political capacity — the distinction between antagonist contradictions and contradictions among the people was one of such laws. Political capacity under the condition of proper handing of dialectical laws does not solely depend on the party as an operator to exist. The party is one of the mediations of human capacity and subordinated under the same laws.

At least at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, politics under the condition of the subjective break with forms of the spontaneous consciousness occurred without the party and went against the state party (the Communist Party of China). This was the beginning of post-Leninism. Similarly, the French May 1968 movement and the Polish Solidarity led movements — with a repercussion of the Cultural Revolution politics — took the form of politics (without the party or against the party) through political movements. Since the failure of the Cultural Revolution to find a proper trajectory and operators, no self-proclaimed revolutionary parties have successfully incarnated emancipative politics. The Communist Party of China, *per se*, became an obstacle against such a politics; and the call to build a party of the new type produced no significant result.

This type of analysis of politics as 'revolutionary consciousness' is needed for Africa to be in a position to critically assess the limitations of multipartism. This will allow us to clearly distinguish 'democracy as imperialist policy' from 'democracy as people's political capacity for self

control and control of their leaders'. The so-called failure of African intellectuals to take up liberal democracy[3] may also be seen in a proper perspective; of which specific sequence of emancipative politics have they been (or failed to be) militant figures? We need to identify historical sequences of emancipative politics in Africa: their respective historical modes of politics, militants and sites. In what sense are universities for example, site of politics?

## Tentative Analysis of Sequences of Emancipative Politics in Congo-Zaïre

From 1921 to 1992 five sequences of emancipative politics could be identified in Congo-Zaïre. The Ngunzist (or prophetic) sequences, opened up by Simon Kibamgu's 'preaching', in 1921, ended with the establishment of the Kimbanguist Church.[4] Kimbangu's teaching summarized by 'the civilization of the Congolese, by the Congolese for the Congolese' enunciated a politics under the condition of the subjective break with *évolué* consciousness as well a the 'traditional' consciousness, i.e. a break with a submissive consciousness. I propose to call this historical mode of politics, the independence mode. Nguzist groups, the healing universal meetings and solidarity communities (*kintwadi*) were the sites of that politics. Kimbagu, Filipo Mbumba, etc. were the militants. In some aspects, the *Alliance des Bakongo* (APAKO) drew its inspiration from this Ngunzist politics.

The self-determination sequence, opened up by Lumumba's speech on June 30th, 1960, ended with Mobutu's first coup d'état and the assassination of Lumumba and his colleagues. This politics under the conditions of unshakable principles of self-determination (marked by a profound trust in the destiny of the country), in the epoch of the Cold War needs more study to characterize clearly its sites. Besides the popular meetings', and the 'Nation stripped of puppets', Lumumba tended to view even state apparatuses (government and parliament, especially) as sites. He increasingly found himself a prisoner inside his own government. The mere occupation of colonial

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3    I am referring to Jibrin Ibrahim's (1993) article in which we made too much of heroes for perhaps one's own publicity. In any case, I never call for a return to the past tradition. But, when a specific movement creatively reactivates ideas which once emerged in the past, one must explain why one has to reject them *a priori*. Even traditional intellectuals seem to be ahead of us on this. See for example Muhlberger (1993), and Geschrene (1982).

4    It is from the point of view of the symptomatic break enunciated by this new Ngunzist sequence, that it is made clear that the establishment of the Kimbanguist church by Dianbgienda was based on a deviation from Simon Kimbagu's doctrine. By searching for recognition by all means, the Church fell back to submissive consciousness. A similar current is very much alive in Congo-Brazzaville related to Andre Matsoua and Matsouaism.

state apparatuses proved to be in contradiction with the politics of self-deter-mination.

The second Independence movement sequence existed between 1963 and 1968. Pierre Mulele, Thomas Mukwidi, Théodore Benguila, Leonard Mitudidi and Felix Mukulubundu were its militants. The sequence was or-ganized as a politics under the condition of mass armed insurrection in con-stant attachment with the rural masses. This politics had to distinguish various contradictions operating among the people to resolve them correctly. That is why I call its historical mode of politics, a variant of the dialectical mode of politics. Its sites were the various *maquis*, 'liberated zones', the *Conseil National de Liberation* (CNL) and village assemblies and councils. The glaring omission was the neglect of cities and factories as sites of politics. Sometime in 1966-67, Mulele and colleagues were detached from the village masses. The condition of the subjective break with submissive consciousness disappeared. This sequence ended with Mobutu's 1965 coup d'état and the murder of Mulele, Benguila, Mukwidi, and Mitudidi.

Another Ngunzist sequence, beginning from 1969, seems to be gaining momentum. It incarnates a politics under the condition of *cultural break with Western domination* and reactivation and elaboration of indigenous civilization. This is understood as an actualization of Kimbangu's 'civiliza-tion of the Congolese for the Congolese and by the Congolese'. The first volume of the basic book, Makongo (equivalent of the *Bagvad Gita* the *Torah*, the *Koran*, the *Bible*, the Nihonqi, etc.) has been issued. I call its mode of politics, the *culturalist* mode. Its sites are called *Maziku* and are scattered all over from Angola to Gabon. Ne Muanda Nsemi (1989, 1992) is its militant.

The last identified sequence is that of *the Conférence Nationale Souveraine* (CNS) (Wamba-dia-Wamba forthcoming). It began with the for-mation of the civil society coordinating committee and ended with the forced closing of the CNS on December 6th 1992. I call its mode, the democracy mode of politics', it is politics under the condition of people's capacity as a political subject (people's sovereignty). The whole nation as a universal palavering community, 'the CNS, marches, secular Christians' Committee, civil society organizations, *Mbongi*, etc. constitute its sites. The coup attempt, triggered off by the January 1993 military looting, marked the end of this sequence. It is difficult right now to say who were its major militants: the late Dr. Numbi was definitely one of them. The above indica-tions (see a summary in appendix II) are preliminary. They are only useful to characterize more clearly the consistency or lack of it of emancipative politics in the mass movement for democracy. The historical thread linking various upsurges of emancipative politics has been the emphasis on prin-cipled subjective break with submissive consciousness (rejection of every

form of domination) and people's capacity as a political subject (people's sovereignty).

Lumumba and Mulele advocated the necessity of the party but, it is not clear how the party could have served as the operator reinforcing the political processes in which they were militants (Wamba-dia-Wamba 1981). Of course, Lumumba failed to conceptualize the sites from where the colonial state and its conditions of existence (the submissive consciousness, etc) could have been destructively transformed. It is symptomatic that Mulele (Martens 1985) thought of the vanguard party as the key to extend and reproduce the liberated zones' in the epoch in which the party was becoming an obstacle to emancipative politics. Parties (self-proclaimed Lumumbist or Mulelist) created after the death of Lumumba or Mulele, do not seem to incarnate an emancipative politics. Madame Pakasa, the 'iron lady', seems to have led pro-democracy marches independently of the *Party Lumumbiste Unifié* (PALU) party politics. The centrality of the party to bring about a politics of non-domination in Congo-Zaïre needs to be proved. What politics (i.e. subjective break) will it be an operator of?

People's resistance against the Congo-Zairean neocolonial state has been protracted since the assassination of Patrice E Lumumba (17/1/1961). A political class collaborated in his murder while serving the West in the localized struggle against the communist world. This class was formed through a Western imposed variant of parliamentarism and encouraged to use physical elimination of political adversaries as a method of political rule. Lumumba incarnated, at least briefly, a form of politics operating under the condition of complete subjective independence. It required a complete break with *évolué* class consciousness of submission to the West. The practical impossibility for its immediate realization led, among other things, to his murder. This practical impossibility is often dealt with in terms of the need of a vanguard party serving as the leading core of the whole people. Without an undying confidence in the Zairean masses, this problem cannot be solved. How can a politics under the condition of a subjective break be provoked in the people?

## Multipartyism in Congo-Zaire

The first Constitution of Congo-Zaire, *La Loi Fondamentale*, was patterned on the Belgian model. It:

> *had juridical implications exactly like those of the Belgian monarchical constitution: a head of state who 'rules' but does not govern; a government supervised and able to be dismissed by the head of state; an over-large and relatively powerless parliament consisting of a chamber of representative and a Senate. There was furthermore a colonial 'Force Publique' more in the nature of an expeditionary force than the basis for a real national army; and a carefully worked out limitation to*

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> *the powers of the central government, which would enable the*
> *provincial authorities to make decisions against the national interest,*
> *but to the advantage of foreign big business* (Ranza 1977).

That was the framework, rooted in imposed structures of conquest, on which multipartyism was grafted in Congo-Zaire.

Modern state structures in Central Africa were fundamentally erected on the basis of military conquest[5] as required by primitive accumulation for Western powers and economies. They had, as a backbone, praetorian militarism. Almost everywhere, coups d'état prevented popular attempts to create state formations principally based on civil institutions.

In this context, multipartyism could only be limited to *évolués* (i.e. Westernized, principally urban people) who had accepted and internalized their individual conquered state. To them, independence was an extra gift of the colonial civilizing mission — sign that one has evolved — and not as a result of struggles against foreign domination. Only after a real cultural revolution and a complete freeing of their colonial subjectivity can the universalist significance of multipartyism become apparent. The reproduced colonial state-neocolonial state — is seen as the key structure to have access to outside benefits.

The limited multiparty system, open principally to *Evolués*, became an occasion for the Africanization (replacing white colonialists from the colonial state apparatuses) of the 'independent' variant of parliamentary post-colonial state. In relation to the perspective of entering the colonial state, parties defined through this multipartyism framework were not fundamentally different from those sponsored by white colonialists. Those which drew some inspiration from repercussions of emancipative politics (the Ngunzist element for ABAKO, etc.) ran into crisis while trying to fit into multipartyism. The latter was at variance with ABAKO's demand for a federal reorganization of the colonial state, for example.

The multiparty system is a form of the state and not independent of or antagonistic to it. In its subjective dimension (see Appendix 3) the system entertains spontaneous consciousness'. Legal and constitutional dimensions, separation of powers, recognition of freedoms of association, expression, religion, etc., are structural traits of the state. They do not identify a mode of politics which has to be grasped through its subjective dimension. Subjectively, the above freedoms are not often consciously exercised. Voting, the institutional articulation between the subjective side of opinion and the governmental objectivity, is the essential political act of parliamentarism. It

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5   The implications for the resulting form of state are well discussed by Cheikh Anta Diop, (1981).

transforms vague 'programmes' or 'promises' of parties into the authority of a consensus — useful to capital. The parliamentary state, thus, has no programme (which can only be that of a social group or class) as this state has to be only functional and based on consensus; it is regulated externally by capital. By insisting that his government had to have a programme for the interests of the oppressed, for the complete abolition of conditions of colonial life (June 30th 1960 speech), Lumumba had to go; he did not abide by the authority of the consensus. To protect the authority of the consensus, a multiparty system can become very repressive. Very much so, when it is, like the one introduced in the 'decolonization process', grafted onto a colonial, essentially undemocratic (variant of apartheid) state. The state, in our African countries, is fetishized: it is believed that through the state people will have international aid and without it nothing can be done. This is in line with Nkrumah's 'seek ye first the political kingdom and everything will be given unto ye'. Relations of power, of production and of consumption are thus fetishized.[6] The real role of the state in imperialist dominated relations of power and production is misunderstood. The state is seen to represent only relations of international legitimation.

Very soon, in Congo-Zaire, the masses realized that independence had been sold to imperialist powers by the murderers of Lumumba. And people had to struggle for a Second Independence (Wamba-dia-Wamba 1987). The constitution of the CNL (first indication of a subjective breach with *évolué* independence) opened up the sequence of the Second Independence which reached its peak with Mulele's leadership of mass armed insurrections. The pro-West neocolonial state, during this sequence, was on the verge of collapse. Through a coup d'état (1965), with direct and indirect Western interventions (military and financial) the state was re-organized[7] As long as the peoples' organized resistance continued, governing the country was just a continuous reproduction of the coup d'état. That is a permanent or protracted organization of the usurpation of people's sovereignty. This is how (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1980) developed, a policy which needs outside support to survive.

After the defeat of the armed mass insurrections, different forms of political organizations incarnated the pursuit of people's resistance. This was

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6   My thanks to Jacques Depelchin who reminded me of this important issue of state fetishism in Africa.

7   One of the leaders of the mercenaries, Mike Hoare, who helped destroy the 1964 nationalist movement and who, by so doing, laid the conditions for the 1965 coup d'état was reported to have said: 'our mission in the Congo was to kill as many communists as possible. As far as we were concerned all Congolese were potentially communists. We killed as many as we could'. These mercenaries, like the missionaries before them, described themselves as 'defenders of Western civilization'.

true under the *Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution* (MPR) fait privé state (1967-1971), the Authentic neocolonial state (1972-1986), the *MPR-Parti Etat* state (1986-1990) as well as now under the 'split personalized collapsing' (Mobutist/Haut Conseil de la République (HCR) state. Those organizations included: religious movements,[8] student movements, 13 parliamentarians' Second Party movement leading to the creation of the *Union pour le Développement et le Progrès Social* (UDPS), armed struggles. (*Front National de Libération du Congo* (FNLC) and two Shaba, People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), etc.), peasant mobilization movements and cooperatives (*La Solidarité Paysanne*), and other so-called civil society' organizations (e.g. *L'Ordre des Médecins*), etc. As long as the Cold War existed, supporting the process of neocolonization based on militarism, massacres of population (e.g. Kwilu) or massacre of students (1969-1990) was acceptable to the Western sponsors of the state. By 1990, of course, after the end of the Cold War, the concentration and convergence of the resisting people's forces galvanized into a strong mass movement for democracy against the increasingly personalized '*Mobutiste*' state which has continued to usurp people's sovereignty.

The December 1989 events in countries of Eastern Europe started off a process, leading to the collapse of socialist states and the break with socialism, opening up the epoch of post-socialism. Celebrants of capitalist triumphalism have seen in this development the 'end of history', the 'triumph of capital over communism', and a 'single transition from planned economy to market economy.[9] Shock therapy advice, based on classical capitalist property rights, has been given to those countries. The centrality of understanding the role of the state in capitalism has thus been left out. After all the epoch is periodized by the collapse of the state. When a state collapses (or is in a dying crisis) does the combination of multipartyism and marketization constitute an emancipative solution? Is this solution that is being applied in post-socialism states and societies doing any miracles? The movement for democracy in Zaire is being offered this solution by the West

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8　At some point, the number of syncretic churches reached up to 4000. The regime took measure making it illegal to create a church outside of the accepted ones. Some of these churches were hidden ways of doing politics under a single party authoritarianism.

9　In fact, in the USSR,, for sometime before the collapse of the state, through a series of reforms, new norms of production, circulation and sometime capitalization in certain sectors of the economy were introduced. This was, under the socialist state, an attempt to develop sectors regulated through market economy. This was a transition from planned economy to market economy within the socialist state. China is in this transition. This transition, in the USSR, did not solve the problem those reforms aimed at solving. Instead, it aggravated them leading ultimately to the collapse of the socialist state and a break with the first transition.

and its local allies. Despite some reluctance, Mobutu himself accepted this idea under the condition that it be grafted onto his state!

Since European intervention in Africa or the colonial period, international capital and its world economy subordinated our countries' economies. The open door policies connected with the 1960s experiences of multipartyism and marketization failed to provide for the masses' basic needs. The resumption of the people's struggle for the Second Independence interrupted the experience. Attempts, in Africa, at some 'rationalist protectionist reforms ('non-capitalist path', developmentalist experiences, etc.) were fought against in a very protracted way, by institutions of international capital — the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and their supporting states. Strategies included: invasions, coup d'état, Structural Adjustment Programmes and aid conditionalities. They were presented, as in the case of colonial civilizing mission, as acts of charity to salvage the countries from the very crises they had induced. This reminds me of a saying by one of the Nzinga ancestors: 'Colonialists found us alive, well and kicking; after they had taken over our land they turned around and claimed that if it were not for them, we were going to die off'. The appeal to marketization and multipartyism as a solution to bring up our countries and economies in the image of the West for the latter's interests is not new. It is more audible now within the movement for democracy because we are in the epoch of post-socialism. The celebrants of capital (in its worldwide phase) present the Western variant of democracy as emancipative politics — leaving hidden the fact that pro-democracy movements are also developing in those countries. This new transition to more marketization aiming at breaking down through enclosures remaining social ties (which allow people to reproduce themselves), will not guarantee the emancipation of the masses of people. Further marketization of an economy already subordinated under the international market will not take up the question of people's basic needs.

The crisis of parastatals, in Africa, for example, reveals the crisis of the state whose role has been fetishized. It was the informal unethical privatization in the functioning of the parastatals which led these to crisis. Formalization of that privatization will not change much as far as people's needs are concerned. When a head of state steals from his own state treasury or uses national resources in private dealing with the outside, is there a state? When a head of state privatizes the army or the central bank, is there still a state and is he still a head of state? An appeal to reconstruct the state from the point of view of the people is part of an emancipative politics.

The analysis, briefly alluded to above, is important for appreciating the forms of consciousness structuring the politics of the mass movement for democracy. This powerful movement does not just aim at bringing out liberal democracy or a parliamentary form of the state. Even if it were the case, we need to know on whose initiative this is being realized. The various

forms of consciousness characterizing the movement are complex and need a thorough study. It is reductionist and statist to insist that as we are in a post-socialism period only those forms of the subjective break that are consonant with the parliamentary form of the state are epoch-making and supportable. This attitude forgets that 'people think'. A politics which does not start from the notion that 'people think' is an oppressive elitist politics.

## Zaire under the Sequence of the Conference Nationale Souveraine

On the 24th of April 1990, President Mobutu made an important speech introducing a limited multipartyism. International pressure connected with the end of the Cold War and internal pressure-from-below forced Mobutu to accept limited political pluralism. Forces of resistance which were brewing underground suddenly came to the fore.

Despite some reluctance and retreat (May 1990 speech), by June 1990 President Mobutu was forced to grant complete multipartyism. Parties started to form and register by the dozens, reaching by the opening of the *Conférence Nationale Souveraine* (CNS) in July 1991, at least 300 parties. Independent newspapers, very critical of the regime and of its President, arose almost eclipsing the official ones. Subjects which used to be taboo, such a Mobutu's CIA involvement, started being publicized.[10]

During the epoch of the Cold War, the United States led Western countries had a tight grip on Zaire by relying on the militaristic usurpation of the people's sovereignty. Mobutu and his Binza group were the key elements in such a grip. To remind the reader, the Binza group grew out of the CIA sponsored effort to politically and physically eliminate Patrice E Lumumba who was seen as a potential if not a real ally of the Communist World. Mobutu used 'the threat of Communism' to get the necessary support of the Western powers in smashing the Congolese people's resistance to this dictatorial rule. Direct invasions,[11] mercenaries as well as financial and military aid were used for this purpose.

Without the threats posed by the Cold War, the West had to change the form (if not the content) of its grip on the country. Lessons drawn from the experiences of the Eastern European countries had to be taken into account. The new form of grip had to be a combination of the World Bank/IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes and the articulation of multipartyism

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10   Here are some of the title appearing in various newspapers: 'Mobutu l'homme de Washington Révélations sur les opérations secrètes de la CIA *'La Conscience'*, 50 (19-26 Sept. 1991): 5-8. 'Mobutu pourrait se réfugier au Brésil' *Elima*, 6 (14-15 sept. 1991). 'Mobutu Assassin' *La Conscience*, 49 (13-19 sept. 1991).

11   Comité d'organisation et de promotion de la mouvance progressiste du Zaire (Congo), 'le Peuple Congolais doit être son propre libérateur'. Solidaire, 8 (827) (24 Feb. 1993); 14. The most recent account of six foreign (Western) invasions since independence.

('democratic governance') and marketization (through the community of essentially compradore NGOs). Pushed by the radicalization of the lower clergy, the Catholic higher clergy, supportive of Mobutu's regime all along,[12] started agitating for democracy. Notorious members of the Binza group became also supporters of democracy'. This made it somewhat difficult to differentiate democracy as imperialist policy' from 'the real thing': self-empowerment of the people for people's sovereignty necessary to control themselves and their leaders. The dominant matter of politics of this sequence emerged as the need to rehabilitate people's sovereignty against all those who have condoned its usurpation: Mobutu and his (national and foreign) allies. How to understand this need, what to do to achieve it or make it impossible to be achieved is the bases of the Zairean people in different camps.

We can, very roughly differentiate three camps in the Zairean politics during this period: the camp of those in power and around Mobutu forming a group giving itself different names at different moments — from *Famille Présidentielle, Majorité Présidentielle* to *Mouvance Présidentielle*. This group is fundamentally opposed to any form of people's sovereignty. It would like to use anything-including multipartyism — to keep itself in power without changing the content of its dictatorial power. The second camp includes elements of the political class in the opposition — essentially an internal class opposition — organized in parties regrouped in four fronts: the *Union Sacrée radicale* led by UDPS, the *Union sacrée libérale, Front nationale des partis progressistes* and *Union des Forces Nationalistes Lumumbistes* led by PALU. These regroupings keep shifting with the unfolding of political struggles. This is the camp of the elite politics of democracy. The idea of the people's sovereignty is slightly modified as national sovereignty more in line with state politics. The occupation of state positions, by good people, through fair elections constitutes the horizon of this camp's politics. In the absence of documents, it is difficult to analyze and correctly classify the 300 or so parties contending for state power. Of course, the second camp is for liberal democracy and against Mobutiste state militarism. It hardly grasps the essence of Mobutiste regime and uses vague notions such as 'dictatorship', 'personalized state'. It does not seem so clear to many members of this camp that the mere disappearance of Mobutu will not destroy his regime.

Parties which have remote connections with past mass uprisings (UGEC student movements, Mulelist mass armed insurrections, Second party

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12. Even the declarations of Churches (Catholic, Protestant and Kimbanguist) at the CNS contained no credible self-criticism for the fact that they have, in the main been supporting Mobutu's dictatorship from which their leaderships have benefitted a lot.

movement) such as UDPS, PALU, *Front Patriotique*, etc. seem to have organized links with the large masses of people, much more so than others. These parties seem to accept the notion of people's sovereignty, even if they give priority to the control of the state. They feel, like others, that nothing can be done without state power.

Parties of the *Mouvance Présidentielle* are just mediations inside the people and the state of Mobutiste dictatorship. Former collaborators of Mobutu, who became very rich by dubious means and later became disappointed with Mobutu, lead some opposition parties (e.g. *Union des Démocrates Indépendants* — UDI). In view of the new balance of forces, these former collaborators perfectly understand that their only possibility to remain in power will depend on distancing themselves from Mobutu.

In the main, most of the self-styled parties are not parties at all, but clientelist, family and corruption based state organizations (in the sense that they are geared towards sharing state power). It is difficult to believe that the representatives to the *Conférence Nationale Souveraine* of some of these parties were representing anything more than their personal interests. *Directoires* (Central Committee) of these parties were never elected by any party congresses. Judged by the number of scandals going on in established democracies (Italy, Japan, etc) can we not say that this way of functioning of parties is typical of multipartyism. On the other hand, in Kinshasa at least, one felt that a strong connection existed between the people and the UDPS, PALU and to a lesser extent, MDR (where some cadres were nothing but state security agents).

The people's camp which constitutes a terrain of struggles is organized by multiple types of organizations (civil society organizations, church based organizations, etc.) through which the would-be ruling political class tries to win people over to its politics. It is precisely because of the historicity of the political class and its organizations, that the civil society as a political category viewed as being independent from party politics emerged.[13] It was an attempt to conceptualize a people's politics independent from the elite politics of multipartyism. Division in this camp are numerous: Class, gender, generation, urban/rural, ethnic, etc. The progressive leadership among the civil society organizations has been trying to unite the camp. This topic needs further research to explain the independent political stand vis-à-vis political parties. The coordinating committee of the civil society group, especially under the leadership of the Late Dr Numbi, incarnated this stand.

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13  In Zaire the use of the category société civile is very particular. It does not include political parties. It is an indication .of the political distance advanced civil society organizations would maintain in relation to political parties geared towards the occupation of state posts.

The main objective of the struggle of the opposition elements of the Zairean 'ruling' political class is to force the *Mobutiste* state to open up to other members of the class in the dynamics of *power sharing.* This is true whether or not these class members are organized or not in their various parties. This political class, to salvage its class global interests, wants to end Mobutu's reign which is based on an increasingly narrow clientelist network and Western sponsorship. However, as a class, they remain open to Western commands (orders) for solving Zairean political problems. The call for democracy, coming from the mass movement, is politically interpreted by them as signifying the return to or the realization of the multiparty system and not as the self-empowerment of the Zairean people to overthrow the compromised political leadership based on the usurpation of people's sovereignty. That is, the 'ruling' class members want a parliamentary form of the state stripped of *Mobutiste* militarism and extravagances of personal exercise of power, but not necessarily of its Western sponsorship. This approach was very actively supported by elements of the Sinza group, the CIA sponsored Zairean power broker. At face value, this idea constitutes a major change in the existing state if compared to the period before the acceptance of multipartyism. However, it is clear, that at this point, this party pluralism does not strip the state of its militarism and extravagance.

The state and the market constitute two appealing arenas for the class members' appetite for accumulation. The competitions of Mobutu, in terms of wealth (Kengo wa Dondo, Thalbwa Lyalba, etc. who are regrouped in UDI) are in the *Union Sacrée Radicale* pushing for market economy and the privatization of state parastatals. Democracy precisely means here to make the rules of the accumulation game fairer than Mobutu has made them.

In contrast, the masses of Zairean people and their militants want a new politics and a new society for the country. They want the country to cease from being controlled by outside Western interests (economic or strategical) through a Zairean minority which benefits from this relationship. They want the country to be made self-propelling on the basis principally of the basic needs and wants of the Zairean people as a whole. They want true independence against any attempts at colonization or neocolonization; they want real liberation from imperialist domination; and they want the transformation of social relationships which make social justice possible. To achieve this, the key is a process of political self-empowerment of the people i.e., the revitalization of people's sovereignty which has been usurped since the overthrow of Lumumba's government. The political class, whose rule has been erected on the basis of this very usurpation, must be forced to reform its modes of life or prevented from controlling the state. The links with Western powers, based on the denial of people's sovereignty, must be redefined on a different basis. *The Conférence Nationale Souveraine* was seen as the process through which such a politics could be achieved (CNS,

1992). Various experiences of armed struggle politics have failed. Militants of this new politics were scattered around various sites — including: parties (more in some than others), churches, so-called civil society organizations (cooperatives, trade-unions, study groups, NGOs etc.) and the independent mass media.

Due to the fact that the 'ruling' class was politically formed, on the basis of submission to the Western powers, its members have always preferred treating political matters behind closed doors (in camera) away from the participation of the masses (e.g. from the Brussels political Round Table, Coquilhatville, Tananarive, Lovanium Conclave to the Palais de Marbre I & II conferences). They have failed to exercise, with confidence, any significant cultural hegemony at all. Even the so-called 'Authenticity' movement, forced on them from below, ended up becoming nothing but a celebration of 'authentic neocolonialism', i.e., trying to make people believe that neocolonialism is real independence (Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1981).

In a certain sense, Tshisekedi has more subjectively, publicly and more persistently stood up against Mobutu. Although he had been, for a long time a member of Mobutu's block, he appears to now incarnate politics under the condition of courageous unshakeable principles and in so doing he breaks with Mobutism (the system of *anti-valeurs*). This is what has made him very popular and made him appear to be the 'hammer to crush the rock — Mobutu'. In July 1991, after consultation with Mobutu, he accepted to become Prime Minister; his supporters pressured him to refuse. He had to refuse the offer, even if, later on he accepted it. The opposition elements have seen the post of Prime Minister as the key for the transition to democracy. It is not made clear that the new politics, struggled for by the Zairean, people, does not need to have the post of Prime Minister as its strategical operator. With Mobutu still in power, the occupation of the post of Prime Minister by Tshisekedi — viewed as a personal enemy of Mobutu — does not ease the process of transition; instead it blocks it. What is needed is a structure, strong enough, coordinating the various militants of the new politics who are scattered around. The civil society coordinating committee for the work at the CNS was a beginning that should have been developed. It is through this process that a genuine leadership in favour of the Nganda Congress which came out with the magic formula'; *'Mobutu reste, règne et ne gouverne pas'* (Mobutu stays, reigns and does not govern) emerged. The formula echoes the one patterned on the Belgian model and found in the *Loi Fondamentale*. It aimed at making Mobutu another Kasa-Vubu'. It is said that the visits in Zaire of the US Under-secretary of State in charge of African Affairs, Herman Cohen, occasioned the adoption of that formula. As is usually·the case with this political class, this Western advice or order was adopted; the desires of the masses were completely ignored. And no real explanation for the change was given — the 'hammer' slogan

not withstanding. This decision to conform to 'power-sharing', this 'Mobutu reigns and does not govern' became the guiding principle of the organization of the process of transition to democracy. It was probably believed that by following the Western advice, the West would eventually remove Mobutu. Ironically, now the UDPS continues to call on the West or even the UN 'to liberate Zaire from Mobutu'!

The conception of transition to democracy in line with the new politics was different. It called for: (1) the necessity of a genuine national reconciliation; (2) this *Réconciliation Nationale* (RN) should be informed by a critical reading of the country's political history exposing individual and collective responsibilities; (3) the reports to be discussed through a *déballage* (unpacking, washing dirty linen — public self-criticism, a palaver); (4) forcing the accused to admit their wrong-doings, to amend themselves and seek and obtain pardon after having accepted to repair the damages they wrought. The NR was seen as crucial for the transition to even take off. It would have been nothing less than the creation of a sound political atmosphere for a new beginning. This conception was, at the CNS, defeated by the 'power-sharing' politicians — which included representatives of the mainstream party opposition, the high clergy, public institutions (presidency, parliament, magistrates, etc.), etc.

The RN, despite the monument built for the purpose, never took place. Reports containing the crucial critical rereading of the country's history were not read or discussed. For the obscure political reason of 'pleasing the wrong-doers to avoid bloodshed'. The reading of the report of the political commission was stopped by the NCS president. And people are still being killed. This CNS president's decision provided MPR representatives with excuses for leaving the CNS. Important acts of the CNS which are favourable to the profound aspirations of the large masses of people (peasants, workers, students, women, children, simple soldiers etc.) are failing to be implemented. This failure is due to the conception of transition to democracy based on 'power sharing' with a dictator.

True national self-determination requires, in Zaire, the reconstruction of the 'collapsing' personalized state on the basis of accountability from below and the eradication of *anti-valeurs* (negative values). This is how the state power will be limited and subordinated under the people's control. The people agitated for an emancipative politics based on people's sovereignty and political capacity. This was to be achieved on the basis of a subjective break with all forms of 'structural' consciousness. They, thus, called for the CNS as a universal palaver in which the complete and free realization of the principle 'people think' would take place. In principle, a universal palaver has many sites and not just one physical location. The *Mbongi* (meetings provoked by specific events or situations) which emerged outside of the *Palais du peuple* (where the CNS met) were as many universal palavers as

the CNS. The sad thing was that, especially after the election of the Prime Minister, not many *Mbongui* were organized. The pro-new politics people's pressure on the deliberation of the CNS subsided.

The party representatives thought of the CNS as an *élargissement* (extension) of the state or a prefiguration of the parliamentary form of state (*Etat de droit*). It aimed at constructing the parliamentary state with or without the people's involvement. This construction tended increasingly to be viewed as a technical question. This made jurists become heroes of the CNS debates. Rules for rules' sake, courtesy, etc., were considered more important than political truths in the effort to achieve consensus. Every opinion was seen as equal truth character wise — to every other opinion. Opinions of offenders (murderers, human rights violators or embezzlers and those of the victims (orphans of arbitrarily murdered fathers, etc) were treated equally. The CNS was then hardly a prefiguration of the new society in which rules are rooted in political truth of people's sovereignty and equality. Some participants — a minority, fortunately — saw in the CNS an opportunity to receive a substantive *per diem*.

Although dominated by forms of state consciousness (protection of state secrets', legalism, church pastoralism, state entryism, etc.) and incarnated by parties as well as state representatives (*Institutions Publiques*, the CNS dinosaur guests), the CNS accomplished some important things. These include: a fairly democratic project of the federal constitution, charters for national education and press and information, and important acts to reorganize specific domains of the country's life (health, economy, legal system, conservation of nature, etc.). Unfortunately people's demands for *déballage*, transparency, and national reconciliation were not met. Disoriented by the politics of occupation of the state positions (entryism) and the death of Dr. Numbi (the coordinating committee chairman of the *Société Civile* group), the *Société Civile* group failed to continue to correctly orient the direction of the CNS. Its own candidate for CNS bureau presidency, Archbishop Mosengwe Pasinya, became more drawn into state/church politics rather than people's politics. Disoriented by the victory of Etienne Tshisekedi, in the Prime Minister election, and on whom tremendous hope was placed to alleviate people's miseries, the mass movement failed to outwardly pressurize the CNS. The defence of Etienne Tshisekedi's government took precedence over people's self-empowerment.

## The Need for a New Sequence of Emancipative Politics

When the CNS was forced to close on December 5th, 1992, in Camera (without the people viewing the ceremonies through the media, there was no organized people's protest. In his closing speech, the CNS president was forced to concede that national reconciliation had not taken place. Shortly before the closing, the CNS participants' criticism of the CNS leadership

was made without expecting any change. The CNS president was already being elected to the HCR presidency by acclamation. The critical evaluation of the CNS remains to be done. This is necessary to clearly see how a successful CNS (in terms of the new politics) can be organized.

In the face of the threat or violence by the *Mobutiste* regime, the movement for the *déballage* in line with people's fundamental demands subside. The state problematic and imperialist influence took over. This marked the closing of the sequence of the CNS emancipative politics. Even the *Cité morte* movement declaring Mobutu dead on December 18, 1992, was unable to conceptualize how to carry out its execution. This was due in part to the opposition party leadership's acceptance of the formula 'Mobutu reigns and does not govern' for two years of the transition. The declaration of Mobutu's death is an attempt at a subjective break from the *Union Sacrée Radicale* politics. How do we give a political autonomous consistency to this break? The masses' strength which forced the CNS to be held, in spite of the systematic opposition of the *Mobutiste* state, seems to have disappeared. After all, why continue dying in vain? The continued struggle for emancipative politics seems to have no clear path. While the mass support of the Prime Minister and the support from the HCR are not enough to drive out Mobutu from controlling positions, appeals are being made for the intervention of the external partners. Some people, including the *Union Sacrée Radicale* leaders, were advocating, as a liberating solution, the intervention of Belgian troops.

A leadership, independent of both the regime and the opposition party leadership, is needed for the pro-democracy mass movement to start moving again. The *Union Sacrée Radicale* became the opposition faction of the ruling class within the state. It thus, distanced itself from a politics of people's self-empowerment. Its politics could not go beyond the very state it has, at the same time, to protect even if it succeeds to drive out Mobutu from controlling the central bank and the control of taxes, the state will not be transformed and take up people's interests.

Without a new sequence of emancipative politics, the killing will continue without any breakthrough in sight. That is, unless the West intervenes militarily or the Zairean armies are thoroughly divided in such a way that Mobutu's control is broken. Being part of the state (with eyes on the West for legitimacy), the opposition party appears unable to conceive of creating parallel radio or TV channels, let alone organizing a pro-people army. Does the failure of the CNS point to a turn to a politics based on armed insurrection? Hopefully not. Where this politics is systematically organized (Peru, Cambodia, etc.) it is not winning. We now have two Prime Ministers, two governments and two parliaments in Zaire. Is this still 'power sharing' politics? Will another 'political compromise' be reached or should we just wait until our small gods, Western partners, liberate us from Mobutu? Or is

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this 'peaceful transition to democracy' taking place? It is the movement of people's self-empowerment, independently of the state, which has to be deepened. Will the so-called *'Mouvance progressiste'* contribute to this?

## Conclusion

I tried, very briefly, to show that democracy, understood as people's political capacity for people's sovereignty, is on the agenda in Africa. But, in Zaire, it should not be confused with the project of a parliamentary state, a model which, was proposed from the outside and incarnated by an inside elite who are interested only in the limited project of 'power sharing' with or without Mobutu. To even consider this last project as a stepping stone towards achieving people's self-empowerment, new forms of political organizations are needed. Self-proclaimed parties linked to the parliamentary, state project — whatever their nature — can not achieve this. By the time the CNS was closed, tribalism was on the rise under the guise of 'geopolitics' and federal or local self-determination. Parties did not go against this development. They seemed to be sowing it.

# Appendix I

## Concrete Experiences of Emancipative Politics According to S Lazarus

| Year | Sequence | Historical Mode of Politics | Main Theoretician | Conception of Politics | The Status of the Party |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Summer 1982 to July 1994 | The Jacobin Convention | This revolutionary mode of politics. Its sites: Jacobin Convention, sans culottes, clubs, revolutionary armies (multiplicity of sites) | Saint-Just, Antoine de (1767-1794) - author of 1793 constitution - political theoretician of revolutionary war - general principles | Politics, when it exists, is confronted by the State. 'A people has only one dangerous enemy: its government'. Politics as phenomena of subjective order (forms of consciousness) | Saint-Just talks of the need for institutions to keep the revolution going.... for 'the revolution masses', not the Party. |
| Opened up by 1848 and closed by 1871 | 1848 (the French workers hot June 1848 | Classist mode of Politics. Its sites: Communists in the 'revolutionary movement' (Multiplicity of sites). | Karl Marx (1818-1883) with F Engels wrote *The Communist Manifesto* (1848) | Fusion: politics and the State. Independent politics possible only in communism, classless, stateless society of non-domination. Unity history-politics (major category: history). | The Party as prefiguration of Communist society. Communists inside Proletarian Parties are those who incarnate the communist society to come. They live as if communism is already a reality. |
| 1882 to 1917 | Opened up by 1882 Lenin's *What is to be done?* reaching a peak with the 1985 Russian Revolution and closing with the October 1917 Revolution. | The Bolshevik Mode of politics. Its sites: - Workers socio-democratic party. - Soviets (Multiplicity of Sites) | V I O Lenin (1876-1924) He made a sum-up, from the point of view of the subjective break, of the Paris Commune's failure. The 4 necessities requiring the Party as an operator to be actualized. | Politics under the condition of a subjective break. Politics as phenomena of the order of subjectivity. | The Party as the operator of the 'Consciousness of antagonism with the existing overall socio-political order' The Party does not incarnate the political process, it empowers it. |
| 1927/28 to 1949 | The revolutionary war sequence. Opened up by Mao's writings at the Chingkangeshan base and closing with the seizure of the state power in 1949. | The dialectical mode of politics. Its sites: Dialectics is the site of politics and politics the site of dialectics - mass work. | Mao Ze-Dong (1893-1976). Thought of war as a political process. Emphasis on Internal causes and forms of consciousness related to them. | 'The Red army is in charge of the political tasks of the revolution'. Politics is specific, but has *laws*. It serves the proletariat and relies on practice. 'in the end everything comes to one question; whom do you serve' | The masses, the Party, great situations are all operators of a specific politics. 'One must have confidence in the masses and in the Party. |
| 1965 to Spring | The Cultural Revolution 1967 | The non-Party mode of politics? | Mao Ze-Dong (1893-1976) | Politics without or against the Party. 'It is right to rebel against reactionaries' | The Party as an obstacle to the pursuit of emancipative politics. Mass mobilisation against the State Party. |

## Appendix 2
### Congolese (Zairean) Experience of Emancipative Politics
#### (Tentative Indications)

| Year | Sequence | Historique Mode of Politics | Main Theoretician | Conception of Politics | Forms of Organisation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1921-1957 (?) | The Nguzist sequence | Independence mode of politics site: Toghemess communities | Simon Kimbangu (1887-1951) | 'Civilization of the Congolese, by the Congolese', for the Congolese', civilisation under the condition of complete subjective independence | Universal healing Mbongi/Baraza' |
| 1960 | Opened up by Lumumba's June 30, 1960 speech and closing with his 'letter to Pauline'? | Self determination mode of politics? Sites; the People, the 'Popular meeting' | Patrice E. Lumumba (1925-1961) | Politics under the condition of unshakable principles. | People as Party understood as a new type of people mobilized by a profound trust in the destiny of the country' |
| 1963 1968 | Second independence Movement | A variant of 'dialectical mode of politics'? | Pierre Mulele (1929-1969) | Politics under the condition of armed mass insurrections. Politics under the conditions of Constant attachment to the masses of people | The party as people's revolutionary movement |
| 1969 To? | Another Ngunzist Sequence? | Culturalist mode of politics? | Ne Muanda Nsemi | Politics under the condition of cultural break with the West | 'Universal Maziku'? |
| 1991- 1992 | Conférence nationale souveraine | 'Democracy mode of politics'? (People's sovereignity politics) | Some leaders of the 'Civil society organization (e.g. Dr. Numbi, etc. | Politics under the condition of people capacity as political subject | 'Universal Palavar' |

Appendix 3: Example of External Referenced Modes of Politics
(against the notion 'people think')

While historical modes of politics of the emancipative politics have no external references (the state, classes, etc.) serving as the foundation of the identification of that politics (as it is the order of Phenomena of consciousness), externally referenced modes of politics refer to external 'invariant structures' (the state, class, economic level, religion, etc) for its bearers: political thought in terms of invariant structures. Thinking expressing opinions corresponding to invariant structures.

| Historical Mode of Politics | Characteristics | Elements of Reference | Site of Politics |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parliamentary mode of politics | - Against the conception of politics under the condition of subjective break (Politics as phenomena of consciousness). | Against the figure of the militant is opposed: the journalist media as a 'state organizations' (A state is what its government does). | Unique site: The state the (Parties and Trade Unions are internal to that unique site). |
| | - Politics not seen as *thought* but essentially an *opinion on government*. Parliamentary Parties are the organizers, in subjectivity, of those opinions. They organize the subjective dimension of the state. These parties are thus, state organizations Parliamentarism as politics is a function of the state-parties. | - They are integral part of the functioning of the constitutional and state system. Multipartyism is a form of the state. | |
| | - The principle of Parliamentary politics is not 'people think' but 'people have opinions' | These parties have their *raison d'être* from the existing bourgeois state | |
| | - Voting as the institutional articulation between the subjective side of opinion and the governmental objectivity; as such it is the *essential political act* of parliamentarism. | They are not marked by any relationship of antagonism to the State | |
| | To vote, whatever the expressed intentions of the voter, is an essential subjective alignment to parliamentarism. | The factory is seen as simple enterprise for commodity production: there is no politically significant individual at the factory | |
| | - Voting does not serve to 'represent' opinions. The parliamentary state is functional and based on consensus. Its functioning depends on having a majority of professional-political personal provided by parties. Voting produces that majority; it transforms the plural subjectivity of opinions on the government into a functioning unity. | The country is identified with citizenship defined in indigenous terms; non-citizens have no rights. | |
| | As based, on consensus, this State has no programme (which is by essence an expression of a group-say class). | The nation-state - the indigenous Ethnic nationalities - State | |
| | - Voting transforms vague 'programmes' or promises of parties into the authority of a consensus. The State is regulated from the outside by capital. | Politics as reflection of the state, economy, or the social structures | |
| Stalinian mode of (politics based on revolutionary or Marxist-Leninist or socialist Parties without socialist state) | An external referenced mode of politics taking the form of a self-referenced mode of politics - with the Party claimed to be a subjective factor. The Party in seen as the exclusive and obligated incarnation and the principle of its actualization. The Party is the sole subjective space of Consciousness i.e. The Party functions as political *thought*. | The Party is the elements of self-reference | The Party as the exclusive site of politics. The so-called red trade unions are seen as an extension of the Party, i.e. the Party in the factory |
| | Consequence: the organizational scheme becomes a thinking agency at the expense: of Mao's people think. | | |
| | Organization becomes the content of thought. Thinking political becomes a procedure of organization and the Party ceases to be an apparatus of rigorous thinking to become a police of real thinking excluding attempts of creative self-referenced political thoughts of emancipative politics | | |

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