

South Africa Versus Southern African Development Coordination Conference

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Résumé. La Conférence de Coordination de Développement de l'Afrique Australe (SADCC) est une organisation régionale inter-gouvernementale mise sur pied en Avril 1980 par la volonté de neuf états africains indépendants dont le but est d'unir leurs efforts pour le développement économique et la libération. L'Afrique du Sud est un pays indépendant et souverain dirigé et contrôlé par une minorité blanche au pouvoir qui, pendant des années depuis la découverte des minerais au XIXe siècle consolide sa puissance, soutenue en cela par le capital, les armes et la technologie de l'Europe. En 1948, la domination et la ségrégation raciale furent légalisées, donnant ainsi naissance au système de l'apartheid. Ce système aux antipodes de tout concept des droits de l'homme, devint la politique officielle du gouvernement Sud-Africain. En raison de leur opposition à la politique de l'apartheid et aux politiques régionales connexes de l'Afrique du Sud, les Etats membres de la SADCC ont été la cible d'activités de stabilisation et d'agression militaire qui se sont traduites par d'énormes pertes en matériels et en vies humaines. Certes, on peut parler d'identité régionale, mais la situation en Afrique australe, causée par l'Afrique du Sud, aidé en partie par l'Occident, a été un grand obstacle à la réalisation du plein potentiel économique de la région. Le soutien du monde occidental a rehaussé la puissance militaire de l'Afrique du Sud au point qu'aucun pays de la région n'est à l'abri de la machine de guerre sud-africaine. Il s'en est suivi la destruction des infrastructures économiques, routières vitales et la montée de la terreur dans la région. L'objet de cet article est d'examiner les résultats de l'initiative d'intégration régionale en mettant en exergue les politiques de l'Afrique du Sud en Afrique australe et de montrer que la situation en Afrique du Sud est telle que le paix et le progrès passent nécessairement par le démantèlement de la politique de l'apartheid.

Introduction

It is imperative to re-emphasize two forces in Europe -feudalism and capitalism to fully and correctly understand contemporary South Africa. To begin with, South Africa is a settler capitalist formation which was created by the imperialist extension of European capitalism. Partly because of the domination status, South Africa was developed to provide raw materials and market for British capitalism. Since then, capitalist development has captured Southern Africa and consolidated the region's link to imperialism (Magubane, 1986). The Industrial Revolution in England and the collapse of feudalism in continental Europe capture the essence of why these displaced peasants and farmers constitute the settlers who were to run away from these hardships and look for "new lands". Because of unemployment, social discontent, chaos, instability and the threat of civil war, Europe had no choice but to look for colonies.

In the second part of the 19th century, diamonds and gold were discovered. The discovery led to new inroads in South Africa by the Europeans. But this discovery itself cannot explain why South Africa developed the social system it now has. The understanding of this requires an awareness of the Afri-

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can labour in a settler economy leading to the type of exploitation that has never been witnessed elsewhere in Africa. South Africa's structure supports a state in which the minority whites are the accumulators of capital, wealth and political power; while the majority blacks are unemployed, exploited and oppressed. Furthermore, the settler economy instituted a land tenure system which enabled the whites to own practically all good land while the majority blacks are condemned with no land ownership rights (Legassick, 1974).

The Union Act of 1910 offered nothing new. Rather, it was a consolidation of colonial policies that had prospered under British rule. The post-1910 period witnessed the mushrooming of apartheid laws and policies which continued to subjugate the black population to-date. For example Blacks constitute 87 per cent of the total population, but can legally reside on only 13 per cent of crude, arid poor land as stipulated in the 1913 Land Act. This strategy has led to the creation of the so-called "independent homelands" or "Bantustans". Outside these homelands, blacks have to carry passes at all times, failing which they face arrests and imprisonment. An essential element of this separation is that blacks have to commute to the white lands (which contain the mines and agricultural plantations) to provide cheap labour at wages barely enough for survival. Even this single fact alone shows that there are two societies in South Africa, a black one, which is an exploited colony and a white one, which is the colonial power. The relationship between the two can never be one of equality. In 1948 South Africa officially instituted the domestic racial policy of apartheid. Apartheid is a government policy which denies human rights justice, equality and civil norms on the basis of race.

South Africa in Southern Africa

The wind of change that swept across Africa during early 1960s resulted in important post-colonial developments. In some respect, these were negation of South Africa's attempts to have relations of peaceful coexistence. The new independent African states were hostile to any accommodation with South Africa. As early as June 1961 Nyerere (1966: 12) had warned that his participation in the Commonwealth was only possible if South Africa was out: "to vote South Africa in is to vote us out". By the mid-1960s, South Africa began to embark on an outward policy of trying to extend her links with independent African states (Geldenhuys, 1984). There were some initial "success" including establishing diplomatic relations with Malawi in 1967. A cornerstone strategy was continuous alliance with white ruled Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonial rulers of Mozambique and Angola. But the defeat of Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique in 1974 led to a reassessment of South Africa's regional strategy. Even more disconcerting to South Africa, were the results of the elections leading to Zimbabwe's inde-

pendence in 1980, in which Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF won an outright majority.

The increasing isolation of South Africa in Southern Africa led Pretoria to attempt some new initiatives with her neighbours. First, came the dialogues of the 1970 with some independent African countries. In this venture, Pretoria's aim was to win acceptability as a country concerned with regional problems. The tactic used here was one of economic means some of which can be traced back to the earlier days of mineral exploration and expansion.

To a certain extent the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 accepted peaceful change in the name of dialogue to redress the obnoxious South Africa Apartheid system¹. Quite interestingly, this belief of peaceful change was once again echoed in 1985 by the Commonwealth. The "club" assigned a task force (Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group) to explore the path to peaceful change in South Africa. Their conclusion was not different from what has already been said: "that South Africa is not ready to accept the reality. But change is inevitable and Apartheid must by any means come to an end" (Fraser and Obasanjo, 1986).

The failure of the dialogue attempts of the early 1970s led South Africa to change tactics towards realizing her objectives. These have included economic, political and security hegemony. In the economic field, South Africa has been trying to expand the volume of her export to African countries, partly as an attempt to compensate for the domestic market which has been curtailed by Apartheid's negative impact on the incomes of black Africans, thus reducing their purchasing power. It has also been the deliberate policy of the South African regime to increase the role of the state as a regional power in Southern Africa by consolidating, protecting and expanding Pretoria's economic activities in SADCC member-countries. In November 1986, for example, South Africa signed an agreement with Lesotho for the construction of a water canal-the Highland Water scheme - to supply water to South Africa. Actually this implicates Lesotho to be even more dependent on Pretoria.

The ever-increasing internal resistance against white South Africa has made the regime proclaim that the threat to white South Africa is not confined to the borders but is as also beyond the borders. According to Pretoria, this represents a "total onslaught" against South Africa and can only be effectively met with a "total strategy". As a result of this militaristic policy, state power has shifted to the security-military establishment. This is particularly true for the defence forces, which are determined to destabilize the

1 Paragraph 20 of the Lusaka Manifesto may have been a source of confusion in the nature of the struggle (Shamuyarira, 1971).

internal order of SADCC countries (Cawthra, 1986). The domination of the military in decision making has increased to the extent that South Africa Defence Minister General Magnus Malan is increasingly becoming Pretoria's main spokesman on regional matters². The 1985 State Emergency declaration has to be understood in the context of the crisis that Pretoria is confronting partly because of the increasing black African popular revolt, partly because of international public opinion advocating economic sanctions and disinvestment from South Africa, and finally because the system was becoming too expensive to maintain with state repressive policies.

South Africa authorities clearly know their isolated position in the region. To counter this position, various policies have been pursued. To begin with, South Africa has never been serious in granting genuine independence to Namibia. The lack of progress in Namibia's struggle for independence must be understood as part of South Africa's economic-strategic formula for colonising the territory. During the sixty-eight years of struggle for Namibia's independence, South Africa has made the territory its own colony and rejected any attempts for the UN to assume responsibility over Namibia. Even earlier attempts by the Western Contact Group or "Gang of Five" faced delaying tactics intended to create an alternative to South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO).

There is something significant about this tactic, because South Africa knows the mass support SWAPO enjoys - it is known worldwide as the only legitimate advocate of Namibia interest. This explains the repressive and destructive campaign being levelled against SWAPO and its supporters. Furthermore, Pretoria's illegal occupation of Namibia has provided South Africa with a springboard for launching terrorist attacks on neighboring states. The Pretoria regime is quite aware that the independence of Namibia, even within the context of the much-debated UN Plan would have a colossal impact on the politics of Southern Africa. The liberation of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe led to the withdrawal of the white colonialist. In the case of Namibia, because of the apparatus of the South African state, and the psychological impact of losing an "Afrikaner colony" it would be more catastrophic.

African States In Southern Africa

Throughout the colonial period, South Africa made vigorous attempts to incorporate Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS). Competition with Britain for control led Britain to reject such attempts including the Verwoerd

2 The South Africa Defence Minister General Malan, for example, said in November 1986 that unless Mozambique agreed to cooperate with South Africa as Swaziland and Lesotho did, terror and instability would continue. See *Africa-Asia* No.35, November 1986.

Proposal of establishing a common market or "Commonwealth" in Southern Africa. The failure of these ideas led BLS to a position where incorporation into a South-Africa dominated customs union and rand monetary zone was a survival choice.

Over the years, as they have attempted to look North, BLS have been subjected to various negative tactics by South Africa. The Pretoria regime has always alleged that BLS are giving sanctuary - or even training - to the African National Congress (ANC) combats. But the sole aim has been to justify military intervention.

However, internal contradictions in South Africa are clearly visible to Lesotho - the "captive state". Following the Soweto uprising, Lesotho became more vocal denouncing Apartheid. The determination to arraign South Africa policies has led to series of military raids in Maseru. On 20th January 1986, the pro-Pretoria Lesotho paramilitary headed by major General Justin Lekhanya staged a coup which was preceded by a South Africa backed economic blockade. The outcome was the overthrow of the civilian administration of the late chief Jonathan. An increasingly outspoken critic of Apartheid, Jonathan had refused to sign a Nkomati-type pact of peaceful co-existence with Pretoria despite the massive pressure he faced.

Botswana, another border state, has been an example despite its economic and geographical position vis-a-vis South Africa. In addition to being a member of the Frontline State Group also embracing Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, Botswana is a founding member of Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and hosts the SADCC secretariat. Confrontations with South Africa have basically been always due to Botswana's staunch opposition to Apartheid. In the course of this, Botswana has sheltered numerous refugees fleeing the racist terror inside South Africa and Namibia. Well before the signing of the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique in 1984, Pretoria had vainly put pressure on Botswana to enter into a similar agreement. But Botswana had learnt enough from experience to reject the overture. This rejection led to a series of military threats which climaxed on may 14, 1986 when Gaborone, Harare and Lusaka were attacked by South Africa defence forces, resulting in the deaths of innocent citizens and heavy destruction of property.

The Botswana delegate to the UN Security Council speaking on proposals to condemn South Africa's raids to neighboring states, echoed the views shared by many in the region:

Botswana harbours refugees, not terrorists. It would never turn its back on victims of racial tyranny in South Africa, regardless of consequences. Botswana refused to be enslaved by a non-aggression pact with a country which notoriously violated agreements concluded in good faiths. That pact, in addition to turning Botswana into "Servile buffer Zone" in the struggle for freedom in South Africa, would commit it to

performing slave tasks for which it had neither the capacity nor the moral inclination (UN Chronicle, 1986).

Swaziland is no exception to the factors that have contributed to the role South Africa has played in the region: geographical proximity and economic dependence. However, what distinguishes Swaziland within the BLS grouping is the acceptance of a 1982 secret security agreement drafted by South Africa with police powers over Swaziland bestowed on South Africa. This agreement goes further than the Nkomati Accord. It is puzzling as to why Swaziland being in better position than Lesotho readily swallowed this bait. For one thing Swaziland was unlike Mozambique-there was no MNR-type banditry. Once again, Pretoria imagined ANC "terrorism" to raid Mbabane occasioning many deaths. The increasing alliance between the ruling elite in Swaziland and South Africa capital may probably be a crucial factor to explain the Mbabane-Pretoria axis which often has led to agreements.

Perhaps the 1982-84 period is one during which attacks on neighboring states in the region peaked³. In this destabilisation drive, giant South African war machinery was partly supported by an International Monetary Fund credit of US\$ 1.1 billion on very low conditionality terms with the tacit backing of the Reagan administration (Campbell, 1984). This credit offered under the Compensatory Finance Facility would under normal cases, have required an cut in public expenditure. But in this case the IMF credit was intended to upgrade South African ability to stabilize neighboring states. Thus on October 6, 1982 *BEELD*, an Afrikaans-language newspaper editorialized that:

it is not a matter of weakness. Actually we would get along without the loan, but... the interest rate is so attractive... it is a feather in our cap since granting such a loan means our house is in order⁴.

It was in this very spirit that South Africa increased military logistical support to her proxy - Savimbi's Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Once again, the USA was openly supportive of this militaristic policy with increased aid to UNITA to the tune of US \$15 million⁵. The absolute certainty of American-South African policy regarding Angola is that destabilisation is central. Examples of this abound. The occupation of Southern Angola led to the Lusaka Agreement of February 1984, under which South Africa was to withdraw from Angola's territory on two condi-

3 From 1981 to 1985 South Africa conducted 168 bombing raids, 234 airborne troop landing, 90 strafing incidents, 74 ground attacks and 4 naval landing. *New York Times Magazine* February 1, 1987, p. 28.

4 Quoted in "IMF Strikes a blow for Apartheid", *New York Times*, January 27, 1983.

5 *Daily News* (Dar-es-Salaam) February 2, 1987.

tions. First, the Cuban troops would not use Southern Angola to fight in Namibia. The full implementation of this agreement would have ideally led to the implementation of UN Security Resolution 435. It is not insignificant that no sooner had the Angola government accepted this agreement than the South African regime, with the full support of the Reagan administration, unearthed the linkage of Namibia's independence to the withdrawal of the Cubans. This intransigence of the Americans meant a delay in Namibia's independence, more destabilisation of Angola and Namibia falling victim to Pretoria's war machinery.

The case of Mozambique was even more serious. It culminated in the signing of an agreement on non-aggression and good neighborliness, popularly known as the Nkomati Accord in March 1984. We do not intend to discuss the merits or demerits of the Accord in this paper. However, it is worthy asking whether the agreement has been honored by South Africa and whether, therefore, peace and stability have been achieved in Mozambique since the Accord. Although interpretations vary, the Accord has brought Mozambique no sign of relief. The South African supported Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) has continued to spread terror and play havoc in rural Mozambique. This situation had led to widespread insecurity, adversely affecting economic activities. One result has been the worst famine ever to hit Mozambique this century, which left some 100,000 people dead and some 4 million others suffering from dietary deficiencies. The recent international call to come to Mozambique's help is a testimony of the gravity of Pretoria's destabilisation policies which are estimated to have cost Mozambique US\$ 5.5 billion since 1980.

It was against the background of this state of affairs that the search for peace and stability in Southern Africa led to the death of President Samora on 19th October 1986, paradoxically near the banks of the Nkomati river on the South Africa side, where the Nkomati Accord was signed. This tragic event be-speaks obsolescence and non-starter nature of the Nkomati Accord.

Why South Africa Survives

Basic to Western interest in Southern Africa is the presence of strategic minerals, traditional ties and high level of investment. Following this, one could categorize the interests. First, there is the security interest arising from the Cape Route. This is considered crucial to the supply of oil and minerals to the West and should, therefore, be free of hostile powers. The USA, as a leader of the Western world, has accepted this view and incorporated it in its official policy on South Africa. The Reagan administration's assistant secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester A. Croker (1980) had succinctly stated this view:

At a time of general war or even limited conflict that would break out elsewhere, these supplies (oil, minerals, etc.) via the Cape Route remain vital. It is clearly more than a mere convenience that South Africa's

excellent port and air facilities not be in the hands of a potential adversary or be available to such an adversary.

Ronald Reagan's 1980 election victory aroused hope among white South Africans. It looked as if the erstwhile claim by Pretoria that it was a protector of Western interests, bastion of freedom and a bulwark against communism was embraced wholesale in the West. The Reagan administration may have been responsible for the elevation of that belief and the increased violence and instability in the region.

For a time, it appeared that with the backing of the West, South Africa could play the role of a regional power, promoting peace and stability. The West's expectation was that after Namibia's independence, under UN supervision, other tension would be reduced and a situation of peaceful coexistence would be realized by both South Africa and her neighbors. But how could this be achieved while Apartheid remained intact?

All these signals led to the West's policy known as "constructive engagement" spearheaded by the USA. Even if this policy has failed, it was never constructive as Ungar & Vale, (1985), Johnson & Martin, (1984) have aptly pointed. It was a destructive engagement. Namibia is no closer to independence partly because of Washington's linkage of the Cuban withdrawal from Angola so that the West could continue to deplete Namibian resources and partly because of South Africa's Apartheid policy.

Because of its white population, vast resources and giant geographical size, South Africa is regarded by the West as the single most important country in the region, followed by Zimbabwe. Angola, because of its good relations with Cuba and the USSR, is accorded special status, when the argument is in terms of strategic importance. This, to a degree implies that the competition between the USA and the Soviet Union has to be extended to all parts of the world and thereby render the very nature of governments, everywhere a matter of international security.

Secondly, the political interest of the West have included a preference for governments that support the West's global strategic view point. It has been the interest of the West to deal with governments that agree with their view about the "threat" from the Soviet Union. This has meant an application of country-by-country assessment of governments. For example, Zimbabwe's aid was in 1986 cut on the basis of political difference with the USA. A related factor to the political interest is the perceived impact of Western credibility in global politics whereby honoring commitments to friends is of importance to foreign policy maker. In short, in the global strategic perspective, Southern Africa is linked to the struggle between the USA and the

USSR, thus seeing the issues in the context of containing communism⁶. The third and most important interest lies in the economic arena. This includes access to raw materials, protection of investments and promotion of unequal trade. Since the West has invested heavily in South Africa, there is an active Western policy which promotes exploitation and depletion of natural resources (First et al, 1973).

Economic and political interest make strange bed-fellow. It is noteworthy that the very countries that have been Pretoria's backbone and which have reaped enormous profits from the Apartheid system are the ones expected to support or even add vigor to the process of disengagement from South Africa. The West is certainly committed to Southern Africa, for well-known reasons. Perhaps, it should be of concern to SADCC to ascertain the flow of foreign assistance which could be used to continue dependence on South Africa and thus further South Africa's domination and the Apartheid system.

Although South Africa remains SADCC's foremost public enemy, it must be remembered that the West and Japan are the main sponsors of the evil system of Apartheid. This reality can be traced back to the early South African history when British capitalism was responsible for developing South Africa into part of British imperialism. And, in our century, the role USA imperialism plays in supporting South Africa, and therefore destabilising and supplanting African states such as Angola, is too obvious to be elaborated here (Hanlon, 1986). All that merits repetition is that Angola, for example, has become one of the battle-grounds where forces for a *Pax Praetoriana* are waging a proxy war supported and financed by the West (Cawthra, 1986).

The Apartheid Bomb

Records show that while the West remains silent on South Africa's nuclear development, the military links developed in response to the 1963 United Nation Arms embargo point to the contrary. The records also show that in more recent times when repressive measures in South Africa have increased, collaboration with the West has been encouraged in the fields of licences, patents and technological transfers through Western multinationals with subsidiaries in South Africa. While South Africa possesses uranium, it has been the West which has provided the knowledge for nuclear development. The USA, for example supplied Pretoria with its first nuclear reactor and, by 1981, South Africa was the third largest recipient of USA nuclear exports in the world (Adeniran, 1981).

6 Reagan's First Secretary of State, Alexander M. Haig Jr. emphasized this view when he said that the tendency of the Carter administration and the USA public not to think in global terms had "cost (the American people) dearly" (Haig, 1984, 1984: 118).

The arms embargo never had an effective deterrent role in South Africa's armament development. But it is Pretoria's possession of nuclear weapons which has the greatest implication for SADCC and Africa as a whole. The Soweto uprising in 1976 coincided with a contract awarded by a French consortium for building a nuclear power plant in South Africa. Three years later, a detonation and nuclear device was spotted in the Atlantic Ocean. The Western media pointed to South Africa as the source of this "mystery" (Washington Office on Africa, 1985). This development raises a number of important questions. First, South Africa is unlikely to use nuclear force in her own territory. Second, and more alarming, there is a possibility of using it against some SADCC countries. To be sure, SADCC is in a dilemma because of lack of countervailing power. And, with the recent increasingly desperate acts by South Africa, the deployment of nuclear force cannot be ruled out in the face of the Black people's struggle and white South Africa's intention to survive. The racist's Deputy Minister of Defence, H.J. Coestsee has clearly stated Pretoria's view:

As a country with a nuclear capacity, it would be very stupid not to use it if nuclear weapons were needed as a last resort to defend oneself (Quoted in Casthra, 1986: 109).

SADCC for a Change

The political and economic experience of the 1960s and 1970s indicated that autonomous national development undertakings were failing in the world's low-income countries partly because of dependence on primary products and partly because of the linkage with colonial powers. The countries constituting SADCC in 1980 were no exception. SADCC is a multi-government organisation with political programme for economic liberation, reducing dependence and disengaging from South Africa, for which the nine member-states have committed themselves for the realisation of their goals. In a sense, SADCC was born in the context of the Monrovia Strategy and the subsequent Lagos Plan of Action of 1980. It was in line with the African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER) adopted at the United Nations Special Session on Africa held in May 1986.

The absence of a formal treaty establishing SADCC and instead only relying on a declaration setting out the objective is a reflection of the situation in Southern Africa as characterised by conflicts and war. These conditions have resulted in government initiative, involvement and control at the highest political levels. This initiative explains why sectorial activities are decentralized, i.e. individual member-states are assigned programme for formulation and co-ordination, ministerial committees are created for major areas of activities, proposals are put forward by the government and SADCC institutional arrangements have been kept to a minimum.

On 22 August 1986, SADCC held its sixth summit in Luanda. As predicted, the heads of states and government agreed that SADCC projects it-

self into the future, the post-Apartheid period in the region, as an example of South-South cooperation. While Apartheid represents its biggest obstacle to the realisation of full economic potential in the region, SADCC is not limited to eliminating economic dependence on South Africa. Rather, other overriding interests are to achieve development of resources in the interest of their citizens and attain a degree of economic self-reliance necessary to achieve even further development.

Because of the war situation in Southern Africa one, of the major aims of SADCC is transport liberation. The dependence of southern African States on South African transport network has been well documented. Lesotho, for one, has no overland options; 50,100 and over 90 per cent of Zairian, Zambian and Zimbabwean trade, respectively passes through South Africa. And the dependence of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland on South Africa's transport is in the range of 80 to 100 per cent either to and from South Africa or through South Africa's rail and port system to and from world markets. The two points at Mafeking and Belt-Bridge, where the rail-lines from Botswana and Zimbabwe cross, point to the consequences to be expected should Pretoria want to destabilize. Between Botswana's border and the South African town of Mafeking, train must cross 16 kilometres of territory in the so-called homeland of Bophuthatswana which all countries in the world, except South Africa, have denied diplomatic recognition. In January 1987, this homeland decided to force international recognition by demanding visas from citizens of Botswana and Zimbabwe working as railway crews in trains plying across South African territory. The trains carry over 50 and 90 per cent of Zimbabwean and Botswana's trade, respectively. But this move, which could not be instituted without South Africa's knowledge, had the intention of an economic blockage of these countries. Although the situation has been temporarily resolved with heavy costs, it points to the terrible consequences of dependence on South Africa. This pervasive policy of destabilisation include the staking off of "Bantustans" at the borders as a tactic of winning recognition for these homelands and trying to force some kind of relationship with other Africa states. It is in essence, the externalisation of Apartheid and domesticating dependence.

The basic document for SADCC's cooperation is the Lusaka Declaration of 1980. It has an increase in intra-trade as one of its highest priorities. The trade is doubtless a means for SADCC to achieve other ends, the central objectives being the ability to increase production, employment and incomes. Intra-regional trade is also likely to increase other trade benefits, including reducing external dependence and producing inter-trade linkages for alternative development.

The low level of intra-trade in SADCC is a reflection of three factors. First is lack of complementary economic structure. Second, because of its dominating position in the region, Pretoria has been the major trading partner,

importing about 17 percent of SADCC member-countries exports and exporting 22 per cent to SADCC compared to a meagre 5 per cent intra-SADCC trade (Lewis, 1986). This could explain why South Africa is concerned with efforts to increase her trade with SADCC and is therefore, still committed to agreements such as the South Africa Custom Union which comprises Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and South Africa. And, finally another factor has to be found in the colonial ties inherited and periodically updated in such other forms as the ACP-EEC agreements. To a considerable extent, the development of intra-SADCC trade will depend on industrialisation in the region. And, since industrialisation requires costly imported machinery and other inputs, these undertakings are the target of South Africa and her proxies. The increasing violence and other acts of sabotage have been costly to SADCC countries⁷. As in many other policies pursued by Pretoria, it is once again being demonstrated that violence is part of her external economic policy. Violence has been used to make it difficult for SADCC to attempt any serious economic liberation measures. The destruction of transport networks, bridges, oil installations and industrial projects and the creation of "technical tactics" of providing and then withdrawing of railway stock or cut-price mechanism to compete with Mozambique's network when the line has not been sabotaged are all violent tactics directed towards SADCC member-states.

Given the performance of regional integration initiative in Africa during the past two decades, can one be optimistic about SADCC? It may be argued that SADCC has a future, for the following reasons. First, SADCC member-countries are facing such economic crises that these countries are being forced to consider practical integration programmes as one of the strategies to deal with the crises. secondly, as the 1987 Gaborone and 1988 Arusha SADCC conferences showed, there is new awakening on the part of donor and aid agencies on the value of regional integration and of the need to provide wide-ranging support for regional projects. One may not want to dispute whether or not aid increases dependence on South African partners. But what is being suggested is that SADCC fully knows the dangers. It is, therefore, perhaps that a combination of local and foreign forces will be marshalled to re-orient SADCC's priorities into constructive cooperation. The partnership with foreign investors could act as a deterring effort in the increasing sabotage activities by South Africa.

7 Since SADCC's creation, total economic damage caused by South Africa's activities has been estimated to be USA\$30 billion, with Angola alone accounting for US\$20 billion (See *Courier* September/October 1986). Coffee production in Angola, for example, has fallen from a total of 215,000 tonnes in 1974 to a mere 11,000 tonnes in 1987 (*Daily News* - Dar-es-Salaam), January 25, 1988.

The third argument lies precisely in the reason that led to the establishment of SADCC, namely the political will to fight for economic independence. That is the alternative to lessening dependence on South Africa or at least keeping economic contacts to a minimum level? SADCC is a threat because it negates what South African Foreign Minister Eric Low pointed out in the late 1950's that the territories to the north of Limpopo are going to be natural markets for South African goods. The same argument was echoed by Werwored:

that Southern African states should be free to pursue their own domestic policies but continue to cooperate economically with South Africa (Geldennuys, 1984).

If SADCC succeeds in loosening its links with South Africa to a meaningful degree and develops an acceptable economic capability, the fear for Pretoria is that these states will be more assertive, more demanding and more independent in their relations with South Africa. The expected policies could include open support for ANC because they would be less vulnerable to South Africa's machinations. One of the crucial factors in regional cooperation efforts is the level of political commitment, this including the degree of ideological tolerance. It might be politically strange for some to see that Malawi and Tanzania are co-existing in SADCC but not in the Frontline States Group. The fact that SADCC has accepted political tolerance in fighting South Africa is an exercise in political sophistication.

Concluding

It need not surprise anyone that in the 1980s the revitalization of the ANC of South Africa has been the most dramatic occurrence in the politics of Southern Africa. After being driven underground in the 1960s, the aftermath of Soweto uprising saw ANC growing with such force that almost every action in the fight against Apartheid in South Africa is being identified with the ANC. From the 1985 message of ungovernability to "from ungovernability to people's power", the ANC has become the central force (Tambo, 1985).

This point can be emphasized by looking at recent measures adopted by different groups inside and outside South Africa in the wake of the ANC's increased role in post-Apartheid South Africa. Over the past few years, there been an increase in the flow of South African businessman who have travelled to Lusaka to seek audience with the ANC on the future of South Africa. And in July 1987, fifty prominent white South Africans including politicians, academicians and businessmen led by former liberal opposition leader, Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert defied their government and travelled to Dakar for talks with ANC. They accepted armed struggle as a historical reality and saw the meeting as an attempt to start a dialogue between white Afrikaners and the ANC on structure of government and economy in a fu-

ture South Africa⁸. With the proclamation of the 1986 state of emergency, it is beyond doubt that force and repression are part and parcel of the policy to confront rising demands for political power.

Equally important has been the crisis that the system is facing in the wake of ANC efforts to mobilize international opinion towards enforcing economic sanctions on Pretoria. Whether sanctions alone can work is not the issue. Sanctions are in reality, only a means to an end and not an end in themselves. The main thrust of sanctions lies in the political will that South Africa has transgressed against international conventions on the Rights of man - on Human Rights and Civil norms.

The more the South African regime has faced both domestic and international opposition, the more it has depended on the military establishment for military solutions to political problems. Thus, the more the regime relies on the military, the more repression and terror that will be waged in the region. Indeed, it was racist Defence Minister Melan who sold the idea of 'Total National Strategy', an ideology which in essence assigns the predominant role for the military in the policy-making process (Jaster, 1985). By increasing destabilisation in the region, South Africa has certainly reaffirmed the policies that were begun in 1978 by P.W. Botha, under which the regime was put on war footing in preparation for a wider war in Southern Africa.

Perhaps, South Africa may be harboring the belief that the monopoly of the instruments of violence may help it survive. Tolstoy, in *War and Peace*, was critical of those experts who predicted the outcome of battles by only looking at number of opposing armies: men, tanks, guns and other weaponry. Such a view was misleading. In his view, the fighting spirit and morale are often the decisive factors. The fighting spirit in South Africa and Namibia is evident among young children, women and the even the aged workers who are determined to destroy the Apartheid system. Although for the past 27 years the ANC has been banned in South Africa with its members and sympathizers subjected to various repressions and deaths, the organisation has grown in fighting spirit both internally and worldwide. And this is a powerful weapon for the oppressed.

The growing instability in Southern Africa means that the African States must continue to fully support the liberation struggle. The masses in these countries have demonstrated a general and politically important taste for active support for the liberation process, despite domestic constraints. Neither Pretoria nor its allies at the IMF or in London, Washington, Bonn or Tel Aviv should be given the chance to thwart the liberation process. It is very clear that the effort of the FLS, especially founding members Tanzania and

8 *The Guardian*, July 13, 1987.

Zambia, created bases from which other struggling peoples in the region re-organised themselves and fought for their independence. Thus, the war in Southern Africa will require collective efforts to mobilize enough resources and progressive forces around the world to defeat Apartheid.

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