Regional Economy and Foreign Capital in Economic Integration in Africa: Reflections on ECOWAS

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RÉSUMÉ. Dans un monde structuré par des rapports inégaux et dépendants installés par la division internationale du travail, les résultats de l'intégration économique en Afrique post-indépendance ont été pour l'essentiel ceux d'une désintégration plutôt que une intégration marquée par à une marginalisation plus poussée des économies régionales dans l'économie capitaliste globale. En Afrique, le résultat auquel a abouti l'intégration est la création de "pôles de croissance" parmi les pays économiquement les plus avancés et des "pôles de stagnation" dans le groupe des pays les moins avancés. Les problèmes d'intégration économique régionale vont au-delà des problèmes d'instabilité politique, de diversité idéologique, d'insuffisance d'infrastructures de faible développement industriel et de loyauté divisée des membres etc. Encore, plus important est la domination du capital étranger qui a mené à une marginalisation de ces économies dans la division internationale du travail. Comme se présentent les choses maintenant, les efforts d'intégration régional comme ceux de la CEDEAO ne pourront probablement pas transcender le courant actuel de laissez-faire tant que le plus gros des bénéfices de l'intégration continuera à couler vers les compagnies multinationales.

Introduction

Since the 1960s, there have been attempts by independent African states to form economic groupings in order to improve their bargaining position and achieve "sustained" economic growth and development in a world structured by unequal and dependent relations by the international division of labour. The fruition of these attempts were to manifest not only in the formulation of the subsequent regional groupings such as the Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest - West African Economic Community (CEAO), the Mano River Union (MRU), the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), but also in the strengthening of bequeathed economic unions from the past colonial administrations, such as the Conseil de l'Entente, the Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) etc.

On balance it would seem that the records of economic integration in post-independent Africa have been largely that of disintegration rather than integration with the regional economies becoming increasingly, marginalized in the global capitalist economy. However, in spite of the shortcomings, there is almost a staggering unanimity in principle among African states, through their leaders and private interests as exemplified in speeches and pledges, signing of protocols, conferences and resolutions, on the urgent need for

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some form of close cooperation. While African countries continue to integrate in order to "reduce" their dependence on the advanced countries, attempts are made by the latter to maintain and deepen this relationship. One such attempt is the Lome Convention whose essence is "the continuation of international capitalism, the continued flow of raw material production in one direction and processed materials in the other" (Galtung 1976:140). Thus for Galtung, the Lome Convention is a new strategy of capitalist imperialism to maintain the international division of labour, rather than its decline (For detailed discussion on the Lome Convention see Galtung 1976:33-53, Gruhn 1976:241-262, Olofin 1977:53-72, Shaw 1979:135-158, Asante 1984:171-195). Against this background of divisive strategy by the advanced countries, it is doubtful whether the underdeveloped countries of Africa can ever reduce their dependence on the advanced capitalist economies.

In 1975, the ECOWAS was formed. This feat as Asante (1986:1) put it, marked the "culmination of many years of efforts by these states to increase the economic mass, and therefore the bargaining base, of their economies". Due to its wide ranging objectives and the claimed positive measures taken from the experiences of other moribund groupings on the continent, and because of its optimism, the ECOWAS according to Ojo (1985:171) might be seen as "the bright star in the sky". However, the evidence suggests that the ECOWAS was formed upon the basis of neo-classical theory of free trade and customs union which has the latent potential of treating asymmetrical exchange relations among members on the one hand, and maintaining the dependent relations between these countries and the advanced countries on the other. In fact integration in Africa has led to polarization of the economies resulting in the creation of "poles of growth" (among the countries which are more economically advanced in the group), and "poles of stagnation" among the more backward countries in the group (Axline 1977:17).

The problems of regional economic integration in Africa go beyond those of political instability, ideological diversity, and lack of infrastructure, low industrial development and divided loyalty of members etc. Of crucial importance is the problem of foreign capital which is in alliance with the local dominant classes and the continued marginalization of these economies in the international division of labour.

The aim of this paper is to examine and assess the role of foreign capital in the integration efforts of African states using the ECOWAS as a case study. For a better understanding of this subject, we shall divide this paper into the following:- (i) the nature of the regional economies, (ii) foreign capital and African integration, iii) foreign capital in West Africa, (iv) foreign capital and the formation of the ECOWAS, (v) the need for a regime and (vi) conclusion. It is hoped that this approach will not only highlight the importance of foreign capital, but show the underlying variables necessary in any analytical study of African integration.

The Structure of Regional Economies

While several previous studies such as those by Arrighi and Saul (1973), Brett (1973), Rodney (1974, Ake (1975 and 1981), Offiong (1980) Cohen and Daniel (eds) (1981), and Gutin and Wallerstein (eds) (1985) etc, have detailed analyses of the underdeveloped and dependent nature of the African economies and the processes which led to these twin phenomena, it is none-theless pertinent to spotlight some of the key features of the region.

African economies are underdeveloped and dependent on the advanced capitalist countries. For a proper understanding of the dynamics of integration in West Africa, and indeed Africa generally, three key aspects of the West African region have to be understood. These are - the local economy, the regional economy and the relationship between the two and the global economy. This division is by no means rigid as features of local economy for instance, are found in regional economy and vice versa.

At the local level, the economies are characterized by disarticulation, production of primary commodities, poverty and low standard of living, and absence of autonomous control of the key sectors of the economy. At the regional level, the West African region is characterised by disparity between the more developed states and the less developed states. At the global level, there is high level of dependency in trade, capital and technology by these states on the advanced capitalist countries.

Local economy

(a) *Disarticulation or incoherence:-* An economy is disarticulated when the various sectors of the economy are not complementary and reciprocal and lack the forward and backward linkages of production. In other words, there is no diversification in production. Disarticulation is a colonial legacy and it is manifested in many facets of the local economies. For instance, there are poor transportation and communication networks in the region. The railways for instance link the sources of raw materials and the sea ports. The roads are adjuncts not competitors to the railways. The industries are not complementary and there is lack of strong inter-firm and backward linkages. As a result, the level of intra-community trade remains very low. A low rate of 3 to 3.5 per cent has been given for the total recorded trade for 1973, 1974, 1975, with Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire dominating such trade (Robson 1983:93). This low rate of trade has persisted. For example, in 1985 Nigeria's oil export to ECOWAS member states stood at 3.2 per cent, while its export to Western Europe and the Americas were 65.8 per cent and 30.9 per cent respectively (Central Bank of Nigeria 1985:98). Regional exchanges are limited and concentrated around old colonial capital titles like Lagos, Dakar, Abidjan, Lome, etc.

(b) The local economies are characterised by the production of primary commodities which service not the local industries but the industries of the West. For example, Nigeria relies heavily on petroleum, Ghana relies on cocoa and lime stone, Liberia on iron ore and rubber, Mauritania on iron ore, Sierra Leone on diamonds, and Guinea on pineapples, iron ore and bauxite etc. Appendix 1 demonstrates which shows the principal exports of ECOWAS member states the narrow resource bases of these countries. It is also important to note that the prices of these commodities are determined not by them but by the advanced capitalist countries which control the world economy to which these countries are satellites.

(c) *Poverty and low standard of living*: African countries are generally considered to be among the poorest countries in the world, and of the 25 countries designated by the United Nations as least Developed Countries (LDCs), 15 are to be found in Africa and of this number, 7 are in West Africa (Nikoi 1975:11) - Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Mali and Niger. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that some of these countries are small and geographically land-locked. The per capita incomes of member states of ECOWAS are generally low, with an average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of about $760 per capita in 1980 including subsistence incomes (Robson 1983:88, Asante 1986:35). Appendix 2 indicates the size of population, the income, the growth rate, life expectancy, fertility rate and the school enrollment, thus illuminating the underdeveloped nature of these economies; The Appendix further indicates that Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Sierra Leone had the least life expectancy of 38 years in 1984. On the other hand, Cape Verde with 64 years, Ghana 53 years, Côte d'Ivoire 52 years, Nigeria and Liberia 50 years respectively which had the highest life expectancy among the ECOWAS states in 1984, rank low wher. compared to other developing countries like Brazil which had 64 years Egypt 63 years, Algeria 50 years South Korea 67 years, Kuwait 72 years etc (See the World Bank Atlas 1987, for comparison). But paradoxically, it is these ECOWAS countries with low life expectancy, and those that are economically poor that have high fertility rate and low school enrollment, with the exception of Togo which had 72 per cent enrollment in 1984. Low life expectancy is a manifestation of poor health services and inadequate nutritional requirements.

The problem of poverty is furtner compounded by the huge external depts of these countries. Appendix 3a and 3b show the degree of the external debts of ECOWAS states. The Appendix indicate that the debts are on the increase with Nigeria topping the list. Appendix 3b specifically shows that ECOWAS' debts account for about two-third of debts in Africa, South of the Sahara. Figures 1 and 2 show graphically this rising trend.

(d) The local economies are characterised by lack of autonomous indigenous control over the key sectors of the economy, such as industry, agriculture and commerce. This is far more pronounced in the francophone countries, essentially in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire. Rita O'Brien noted that in the case of Senegal, industrialisation remains largely in foreign hands, which means retaining overseas linkages rather than generating domestic ones (cited in Asante 1986:38). The Ivorian economy is dominated by a fairly large expatriate population while development and investment decisions "are largely determined by the interest of metropolitan investment as well as those of Westernised elites - the so-called comprador class or "auxiliary bourgeoisie" which controls the political machinery and collaborates with the foreign capitalist to deplete the resources of the territory" (Akpan, M.B., cited in Asante 1986:36-37).

In some cases, the State is under an informal but de facto control by the transnational corporation which controls the key sectors of the economy. As most dependency scholars (e.g. Sunkel 1973, Amin 1976, Frank 1980 and 1981) have argued, the political economy of the state in the third world is dominated by foreign capital and "the third world state mediates between its national capital - labour - and international capital... to the benefit of international capital at the relative cost to national capital and at absolute sacrifice of local labour" (Frank 1981:231). Examples of this phenomenon abound in the region. Campbell's (1975) clinical study of cotton and textile industry in Côte d'Ivoire is a clear manifestation of the use of the state by foreign French firms to control the sector in collaboration with the "landed plantation" based class. Bonete (1975) also showed how a foreign consortium - Société Anonyme des Mines de Fer de Mauritanie (MIFERMA) financed a third of the state budget and controls the mining of iron ore, which is the principal export of Mauritania.

Furthermore, lack of autonomous control of the economy or the control of the economy by foreigners can lead to instability when there is an attempt to regulate or check foreign capital. Turner (1976) noted that the contradictions which developed between the various local classes - middlemen, state compradors and collaborators of transnationals on the one hand, and the technocrats and the military officials on the other hand over Nigeria's oil partly explain the overthrow of General Gowon in 1975.

Even when various measures such as the acquisition of majority interest in equity of assets of local subsidiaries, joint ventures, indigenization and outright expropriation or nationalization to control TNCs is made in various African countries, the capabilities and level of control needed is lacking. Rood's (1976:435) study showed that in Côte d'Ivoire, and Liberia there has been no significant control of TNCs; in socialist Guinea, the Halco and Fria bauxite operations continue to be privately controlled; in Ghana, the Valco aluminum plant, despite the 1975 decree authorising a 30 per cent take over, continued to be privately owned; and in Nigeria, despite the massive nationalization of the petroleum industry and comprehensive indigenization, there are scores of foreign-owned construction and manufacturing corporations which are doing a handsome business. Similarly, Hamid (1932:157) noted that after the nationalization of MIFERMA, the management still remains in the hands of the French economy.

In fact the degree of foreign control of these economies is aptly summarised by John Kwadjo (West Africa, 15 October 1980:1777) thus:

> *French monopolies control 95.7 per cent of Niger's economy, 27.4 per cent of Senegal and 30 per cent of Ivory Coast economy; according to 1974 UN sources on transnational corporations, British monopolies control 87 per cent of the Gambia's economy, 14.4 per cent of that of Sierra Leone. In Nigeria, foreign monopolies continue to control 65 per cent of all industrial investment and similar percentage holds for Ghana as well.*

Rood's assertions in the case of Nigeria was further substantiated by Bierstaker's (1987a and b) recent studies in which he showed the various attempts in 1972 and 1977 at indigenization and the countervailing measures such as fronting, regrouping and careful selection of joint-venture partners, devises by the TNCs to thwart these efforts and ensure that they maintained effective control over their operations (1987:286). Bierstaker concluded that although indigenization had some effects e.g. the state control of the domestic finance (banks), it had certainly not contributed significantly, for effective managerial control of enterprises in Nigeria has eluded Nigerians in most joint ventures even where they hold majority of the equity (1987:298-299).

The control of these economies by foreign actors and their local allies have in some cases led to the concentration of wealth in a few hands with the economies passing through "growth without development", that is, "growth engendered by and kept up from the outside, without the construction of socio-economic structures that would enable the automatic passage to a still further stage, that of a self-centered and self-maintained new dynamism" (Amin 1970:288). Amin observed this situation in the Ivorian economy in the 1960s and this goes for Nigeria, especially during the oil boom of the 1970s.

Regional economy

The movement or expansion of international capital or the internationalization of capital not only produces disparity on a global level between the center (developed) and periphery (underdeveloped) countries, it also produces disparity within the peripheries, that is, between the more developed or prosperous and the less developed or poor countries. Evidence of this is found in the West African region between the more prosperous countries, e.g. Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal; and the less developed countries of the Community. As shown in Appendix 2 above, Nigeria according to the World Bank projected population for 1985 is about 99.7 million, while the rest of ECOWAS member states have less than 23 million. A corollary of this is the size of the markets that are very small and the transportation and communication facilities which are inadequate. In terms of per capita income as of 1985, there is a wide gap between Nigeria with $760 and Côte d'Ivoire with $620, and those of Guinea Bissau $170, Mali $160, and Burkina Faso $140 at the bottom (see Appendix 2).

The disparity in income is a manifestation of the varying degrees of industrial development or underdevelopment. There is disparity in industrialization. For instance, there are more industries in Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal than there are in other ECOWAS countries. This can be explained in part by the fact that industrial activity is one indicator of the differences in national resources endowment and levels of economic development. In all, the region is dominated by industries with low technological requirements, e.g. food processing, industries, beverages, tobacco, beer and soft drinks, textiles and clothing etc, which lack the capacity to stimulate backward linkages for sustained industrial take-off.

Urbanization accompanies industrial development. Except for Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Senegal, a vast majority of the population of ECOWAS countries live in the rural areas and/or cities with population less than 500,000 people (Asente 1986:35). The region is characterized by varying levels of unemployment and underdeployment of resources, especially human resources. For instance, in 1970, before the formation of ECOWAS, the unemployment rates were as high as 17 per cent in Ghana, 15 per cent in Sierra Leone, and 14 per cent in Nigeria (Asante 1986:44). There is of course an upward trend in the level of unemployment in recent times following the global economic recession and the various adjustment measures introduced in some of these countries - this is a case for Nigeria and Ghana. For instance, the recent unemployment statistics show that the rate of unemployment for Togo in 1985 was 4.076 per cent; Niger 27.747 per cent for 1986, Nigeria 33.039 for 1985 and Sierra Leone 0.299 per cent for 1986 (International Labour Organization 1987:363-64).

It was against this background of different levels of development that the ECOWAS Treaty made provision for some corrective and compensatory mechanisms through the establishment of the Fund; customs and trade liberalization policies and co-operation and harmonisation in industrial and agricultural policies of member states.

Global level

At the global level the regional economy is structured by dependence on the advanced capitalist countries for trade, capital and technology. In Africa, political independence only meant a change of dramatis personnae. The dependent vertical linkage in trade, capital and technology continue to exist. Attempts to re-establish national control in order to match political independence with economic independence remained largely unsuccessful. This was so because the "inheritance class" (the nationalist leaders) lacked the real economic power to re-orient the various economies in order to generate autocentric growth and development. Instead, this class began to rule in collaboration with external interest and had to legitimate the organisation of production under the existing monopolistic metropolitan control, thus giving it ideological assistance in some cases (see Campbell 1975:36-53 in the case of Côte d'Ivoire).

The dependence on the former metropolitan countries is more pervasive and intensive among the Francophone countries whose monetary system (apart from Guinea) are closely linked to the French franc which serves as the guarantor of the African economy (Alex Rondos, West Africa 8 September 1980: 1696). This means in effect that changes in France's fiscal policies are bound to have effects on the balance of trade and payments of those countries belonging to the Communauté Française Africaine (CFA). Monetary dependence on France as Rondos further noted ensures "free transfer of capital, because of the existence of the fixed parity" (p. 1697). Financial dependence by these countries also takes the form of aid, which may be bilateral or multilateral.

Trade is another important form of dependency which heavily marks the relations between West African countries and the advanced capitalist countries. Trade dependence is usually asymmetrical because trade between these countries and the advanced countries is structured by the international division of labour which ensures that manufactured goods cost more than raw materials. The available evidence shows that West African countries trade more with the advanced countries than with countries in the region or the rest of the continent (see Appendix 6). This is because of the vertical linkage relations that were established during their various phases of incorporation into the world capitalist system. Appendix 4, 5 and 6 show this pattern of trade dependence on the West.

Appendix 4 for instance, shows the principal trading partners of the CFA West African countries between 1976 to 1978, while Appendix 5 indicates the major trading partners of ECOWAS countries from 1980-1986. Both Appendix indicate that the pattern has not changed in spite of the formation of ECOWAS. The Appendix further indicate that the "mother" countries - Britain and France are still prominent with the other Western countries dominating the external trade. Appendix 6 specifically shows that intra-regional and intra-African trade is very low and that trade dependence has not been diversified. For instance the trade pattern between ECOWAS and other developing countries on the one hand, and trade between ECOWAS and USSR on the other still remain low, while the industrial countries dominate. This means that the nature of dependence hinges more on contingent historical variation than it does on the general schema of international capital and production.

This pattern will continue because of the structure of the global economy, and General Mery (former Chief of Staff of the french army) explained this (in the case of Francophone countries) by saying that:

> *between France and this continent (Africa) there exist a unity of links established by geography and history which the complementarity of their economies, with one founded on raw materials and the other on the transformation of those raw materials (quoted in West Africa 15 October 1980:1749).*

West African countries and indeed Africa are dependent on the industrialised countries for their technological needs. Technology which is the foundation of industrial development has a weak base in Africa. In fact UNCTAD estimated that the developing countries' share of world patent grants was only 6 per cent and that nationals of the developing countries "held in their own countries no more than about 1 per cent of the world stock of patents" (quoted in Ake 1981:107). Technological dependence which according to Alschuler (1988:18) results when "the transfer (purchase or rental) of technology inhibits the receiver countries' technological self-reliance", like trade has not been diversified. West African countries are titled to the West in their technological dependence. Helge Hveem's study on Multinational Firms in Africa, showed that of the patent granted in independent African countries in 1977 between 90 and 99 per cent were from the United States of America and the European Economic Community (cited in Ake 1981:107).

The economies of ECOWAS countries also depend on the advanced countries for investment and capital. Foreign investment in these countries also follow the same pattern as in trade, finance and technological dependence. Appendix 7 for instance, shows the cumulative foreign investment in Nigeria from 1970 to 1976. It indicate that throughout the period the United Kingdom was the principal investor in Nigeria followed by other advanced countries.

The increasing EEC existence to ECOWAS member states as showed in Appendix 8 demonstrate not only the manifestation of the Lome system, but more significantly, it indicates the degree of external dependence on Western Europe. For instance, between Lome 1 (1975) to Lome 2 (1982), EEC made commitment of 1,255,000,000 ECU and disbursed 731,344,300 ECU. Of this amount, the francophone ECOWAS members had 671,752,000 ECU, while their Anglophone counterparts had 111,591,000 ECU. Although the francophone countries are larger, it does indicate the role of France in EEC. Besides these commitments to the members of ECOWAS, the EEC financed the ECOWAS Customs and the Statistical Nomenclatures Harmonisation Project and contributed $50 million to the Community Telecommunication programme. It also provides direct financial assistance of $341,620 and technical assistance to both the ECOWAS, the Secretariat and the Fund (Asante 1986:127).

In sum one thing that stands out among the countries of ECOWAS despite their variant levels of underdevelopment, is that all of them share the features enumerated above which make it difficult for any autonomous development and it is these features that enable foreign capital to play a significant role in autonomous integrative attempts. The analysis above provide some background as to the questions of who integrates and for whose interest?

(ii) Foreign capital and African Integration

In a world where the internationalization of capital has become significant in all spheres of economic endeavours, the integration process is by no means an exception. The purpose of this section is to assess the role of foreign capital in the integration process in a continent with a high preponderance of foreign investment.

There are two basic forms of foreign capital inflows - direct foreign investment (DFI), whose purveyors are the TNCs; and the indirect foreign investment (IFI), which may be bilateral or multilateral aid. Although we are aware of the degree of sensitivity and vulnerability which aid exposes a recipient country to, and the sright which (in some cases) the donor has to review projects, we shall be concerned more with (DFI) for their direct involvement in the economic and sometimes political process of their host countries. References of course shall be made to (IFI) from time to time.

Since the political independence of most African states, TNCs have come to play a significant role in the exploitation of their economies. In fact the TNC has been portrayed both as an engine capable of eliminating international economic inequality and as a major obstacle to development; as a force capable of revolutionalising the productive forces in the economically backward areas of the world as well as a major cause of underdevelopment through a massive drain of surplus to the advanced capitalist countries (Jankins 1987:1). In Africa, the presence of TNCs seem not to have triggered off significant development, rather they have helped to strengthen the dependent relations between the African states and the developed capitalist countries.

There are different definition of multinational corporations but we shall adopt the definition proffered by V. Bornschier and Chase-Dun (1985). According to them, a multinational corporation is "a business firm operating in different countries, under centralised authority, producing commodities and services for profit" (quoted in Aschuler 1988:7). From the above definition the driving motive of MNCS is profit.

The editorial of *Review of African Political Economy* 1975:1, summarized the purposes of TNCs thus:

> *It is all but impossible to summarize the impact of multinational corporations in Africa, for these firms play many parts; they are the expanded colonial trading companies; they are the vanguard of the most advanced technology, but also the surveyors of over-priced obsolete equipments; they are rapacious exploiters of raw materials and labour, but also the invaluable allies of petty bourgeois elitist and in some cases "progressive" Government; they are a source of capital, but also the major agents of profit repatriation and resource outflow.*

The claim by the editorial has been substantiated by several studies such as those by Amin (1970), Campbell (1975), Alschuler (1988) etc, in the case of Côte d'Ivoire; Bonte (1975) and Burner (1976) in the case of Mauritania and Nigeria respectively. Alschuler's recent study shows that the activities of TNCs led to maldevelopment in Argentine, Côte d'Ivoire and Korea. Further more studies by Langdon and Mytelka (1979:178-9) showed that:

> *the contemporary crisis of regional integration in Africa is not, however, a purely nationalistic affair in which states are pitted against each other in conflict over the intensive distribution of gains from integration. Rather, this interstate conflict is a reflection of more fundamental problems that are associated with the distribution of gains between national and international capital, as the Multinational Corporation seeks to structure not only national but also regional markets around its own needs and interests.*

This shows the dimension of the role of TNCs in Africa.

On more specific case studies, Waitsos (1977, 1978) and Mytelka (1979) showed that the TNCs are the beneficiaries of gains from integration in LDCs. Vaitsos was led to this conclusion based on the following assumptions:

1. TNCs are never passive in relation to the policies and their implementation in TNCs integration process. They bring their power (economic and non-economic) to bear both in the content of integration and in

the actual application of the integration processes. Their aim consists in capturing most of the benefits that regional integration can generate and in reducing the risks that integration can introduce in their corporate interest (1977:252).

2. "TNCs do not... promote effective economic integration among developing countries if the latter have a medium or large size market and some (even minimal) local developing industrial capacities" (1978:732). This is so because (a) TNCs seek to maximise long-run surpluses, not only by minimising costs but also by maximising the difference between costs and sales, and (b) discourage national economic planning, because they seek to avoid risks from competition.
3. That conflictive interest among the TNCs within oligopolistic market structures brings them, in some cases in closer links with national authorities in their host countries (1977-78:253)

Studies on some regional organizations in Africa though not directed at evaluating the role of foreign capital, do highlight the impact of foreign capital and even the role of the "mother" countries, especially France, in dictating the paths and the patterns of regionalism amongst its former colonies.

At the regional level, Fredland's (1984) study of the OCAM epitomises the degree of French control in the union. For instance, while each of the eleven founding states of the OCAM Airline - Air Afrique - owned 6 per cent of the company, 34 per cent was owned by the Société pour le Développement du Transport Aérien de l'Afrique (SOUDETRAF), in which the French government had 25 per cent (Friedland 1984:118).

Mytelka's (1984:139-146) study showed that the population of the TNCs in UDEAC med to the segmentation of intra-regional trade through duplication of production among its member states. Intra-regional trade in manufactures among the UDEAC was governed by the operation of the single tax system in which only firms accepted under the system could export within the region (page 139). She noted that over the years the single tax exports declined among the most traded projects. For instance, between 1976 and 1978, although the volume of beer brewed in UDEAC increased form 1.8 million hectolitres to 2.2 million hectolitres, the proportion of its export within UDEAC declined from 1.4 per cent to 0.3 per cent over the same period (page 141). According to her, the ownership structure of the firms in the region and the interaction of the single tax system in relation to the ownership structure accounted for the decline (page 142). She noted that the Banque de Développement des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (BDEAC), that is, the Development Bank of UDEAC for instance had a capital of 16 million CFA franc. Out of this amount, the five UDEAC states had 13.1 per cent each, while France had 6.3 per cent, West Germany 6.3 per cent, Kuwait 6.3 per cent and the African Development Bank (ADB) had 2.5 per cent (page 139).

Similarly, by 1979 most of the firms operating in the UDEAC states were owned by foreign investors. For instance, of the 49 Cameroonian single tax firms, 76 per cent were foreign owned, 74 per cent of the 23 Congolese firms, 75 per cent of the 12 Gabonese firms and 64 per cent of the 11 Centrafrican firms were foreign owned (page 142). Accordingly some of these TNCs were to operate in more than one of the UDEAC states. Thus by establishing subsidiaries in different member states, the TNCs ensured that the regional markets remained segmented, hence distorting efforts at regional planning.

Using some TNCs - Bata, Emen, Splendor, Moura at Gouvela and Africaplast, which produced elastic and leather footwears, she argued that these companies exploited the single tax system in the region which permitted duty free imports of raw materials and intermediates instead of using the local source materials such as leather and rubber which were produced in large quantities in the region (pages 143-144). This, as she had earlier noted in (1979:13) was partly responsible for Chad's withdrawal from the union. In fact, an ECA report criticised the segmentation of the UDEAC markets by the TNCs and condemned their motives as "unconstructives and as constituting a disintegrative rather than an integrative force in the regional economy" (quoted in Robson 1983:54). The report further noted that the single tax system facilitated the restructuring of UDEAC markets by the TNCs in such a way that it limited intra-industrial specialisation and hence the growth of intra-regional trade.

Foreign capital is tied with the political and economic ideologies of the countries from where the capital comes, and the juxtaposition of foreign capital from different countries with varying ideological inclination in a region, may generate conflict for it can lead to competition for foreign partners as well as foreign markets. The case of the now defunct EAC which became a tournament for foreign firms from the West as manifested in Kenya; China in Tanzania; and the Arab and the Soviet Union in Uganda is demonstrative of this dimension. Ojo (1985) has noted that competition for foreign partners and markets had three consequences in the history of the EAC.

Firstly, it treated different conditions in terms of tax incentives, patent laws, labour conditions and foreign exchange privileges, all of which impeded the coordination and harmonization of national development plans. It was this that accounted partly for the "neutralisation of the intent to transfer tax and the investment policies of the East African Development Bank" (Ojo 1985:170).

Secondly, it lead to the duplication of inefficient plants within the Community. For instance, the influence of multinational and other external interests led to such decisions as the building of a tyre factory in Kenya which was to be sited in Tanzania according to the Kampala Agreement of 1964. The construction of the Tan-Zam railway without due reference to the East African Railway Corporation; the establishment of an international laboratory for research on animal diseases in competition with the widely acclaimed East African Veterinary Research Organisation; and the building of plywood manufacturing facilities in each member state in competition with the single existing large facility (Mazzeo 1980:104; Fredland 1980:74) Ojo (1985:170) are clear examples of the attempt by foreign capital to undermine the objectives of regional integration.

Finally it resulted in "inter-imperialist rivalry" which led to the creation of the *de facto* zones of influence which in turn altered the "strategic image" of the partners, changed their perceptions of balance of power and created mutual distrust and suspicion amongst them. For instance, Kenya's Western connection coupled with its increasing economic superiority, elevated it to the status of an African middle power, "sub-imperial state" hence undermining the interest of Tanzania and Uganda. Consequently, the latter having perceived themselves as relegated to a subordinate position renewed connections with external actors in order "to compensate their loss of regional influence" (Oyo 1985:171). While Tanzania was to reestablish bilateral cooperation and trade agreement with China, Uganda sought financial and military aid from Arab countries and the Soviet Union. This competition, coupled with the divergent external affiliation it engendered, weakened intra-regional ties.

Similarly, foreign capital in the form of IFI have played significant role in integration process in Africa. For example, Sesay (1985:125-148) has noted the stupendous inflow of foreign capital, especially from the UN, EEC, the Netherlands and West Germany in the Mano River Union. According to him, of the $4,568,901 annual budget for 1977-78, $1,398,240 came from external sources. Also the 1978-79 budget of $4,979,554 showed that members' contribution amounted to $3,473,779, while $1,485,775 came from external sources; and the 1979-80 budget of $4,803,554 showed that members contributed $3,666, 384, while external contributions stood at $845,844 (p. 139-141).

Furthermore, in Southern Africa, the SADCC is supported by foreign capital largely in the form of aid, especially from the Nordic countries. For example, in addition to their individual pledges amounting to $36 million, they (Nordic countries) pledged to finance the transport, Harbour and Communications Commission Secretariat to be built in Maputo, Mozambique for SADCC (Abegunrin 1985:200). Ravenhill (1982:184, 1985:224) while noting the efforts of the external donors during the 1980 donor conference, expressed the fear that counter-dependency effort may, at least in the short term create new dependencies.

At the continental level, the African Development Bank (ADB) and the African Development Fund (ADF) indicate a significant presence of Foreign capital. The ADF is a satellite organisation open to any member of the UN and any of its specialised agencies (Woodie 1984:92-93). By 1979, for instance the ADF had 21 non-African membership - Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the United States of America. Others are Spain, Yugoslavia, France and Argentina (page 102). African membership to the ADF is only 21,500,000 unit of account (UA) or less than 9.5 per cent of the resources, with 50 per cent voting right; Japan the highest contributor enjoys 202 votes or 10 per cent right, while the six countries of EEC have 300 million UA, with 304 votes or 15 per cent (page 96). This proportionality in the ownership structure of the resource shows the degree of control exerted on ADF by these non-African members even though it is controlled by the ADB. As Woodie further showed, whereas the ADB invested more capital, about 64 per cent on telecommunication, power and industry (sectors that would stimulate the development of productive forces), the ADF only invested 5 per cent (page 98). The ADF places high premium of the social character of projects, and this complementarity according to Woodie might be viewed by dependency theorists as an attempt by the members of non-African states to perpetuate the existing North-South division of labour by giving less support to the more productive activities (page 102 note 11), hence marginalizing the economies of African states in the international division of labour. However, what the above assertion ignores is that investment is usually not forthcoming for non-productive, social projects. This is precisely a crucial area in which the ADF can play a role.

Furthermore, competition for foreign aid helps to reinforce dependence on donor countries as these are tied to the purchase of goods and equipment from donor countries which often induces demands for certain complements such as spare parts and technical skills. This undermines the task of integration to generate transactions locally, Ojo (1985:170) noted that Tanzania's trade agreement with China, affected its economic relations with its EAC partners because this relationship resulted in re-direction of Tanzania's imports from intra-community to extra-community sources.

The list is interminable and the implications are multifarious but mostly deleterious to the sustained economic growth and development which these unions mere supposed to usher in but were never to be realised, while the economies continue to be appendages of the advanced capitalist economies.

(iii) Foreign capital in West Africa

Here we shall be dealing with foreign capital in the region and its role in the formation of the ECOWAS. From the 1960s the number of foreign firms in West Africa, and indeed Africa increased. There was in fact a surge among the organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, notably Japan as serious competitors to the established imperial centers of Paris, London and Lisbon (Onwuka 1985:153). In fact as Patrick Wilmot noted, between 1960 and 1971 Japanese overseas direct investment in Africa increased fifteen times from $45 million to $675 million and that of the United States of America increased to $650 billion (cited in Onwuka 1985:153). By 1982, Japanese DFI in Africa had increased to $2 billion or 4.4 per cent of its total foreign investment in the world (*New African*, May 1983, No 188). Most of these investments were concentrated in shipping and ship building.

Direct foreign investments are largely concentrated in the extractive and mining sectors - petroleum, copper, iron, tin, bauxite, phosphate and gold. They are also concentrated in import-substitution industries such as beer and soft drinks, beverages, bicycle and car assembly plants, furniture and fixtures etc. TNCs have subsidiaries in the region which operate within a wider global framework in a vertically monopolistic position. For instance, products such as Omo washing powder, Blue Band Margarine, Astral soap, Gibbs toothpaste etc, are widely distributed in the region by numerous subsidiaries of Unilever. Appendix 9A-G show the leading multinational corporations in seven west African countries - Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The Appendix indicate that TNCs concentrate in primary products which are the main source of foreign exchange earning. For instance, the Appendix show that they concentrate more on petroleum, mining and construction. Appendix 10A-G also show the inflow of DFI into these countries before and after the formation of ECOWAS. Figure 3 is a bar chart which shows this concentration of TNCs in the region.

There are two possible reasons for this tremendous increase in direct foreign investment in the region. The first is that the TNCs have a relative monopoly of supply of both capital and technology and tend to concentrate more in areas of high returns. Secondly, members of the ruling class take interest in acting as "agents" or "carriers" for the TNCs (Onwuka 1985:155). As Vaitsos rightly pointed out:

> *From the very beginning of integration efforts of developing economies during the colonial period, the presence and position of some local hegemonic groups proved, together with the interest of the colonial*

powers, to be fundamental in shaping regional economic cooperation. The mechanisms and instruments of the integration process correspond to the interests, ideology and conception that are attributed to economic development by the social groups which stand to derive the major advantages from that process (1978:722).

We have noted in the preceding sections of this paper how these classes - middlemen, state comprador, collaborators etc play their pervasive compradorial role for their transnational mentors and in the process help to rule the economies of the region and thwart integration attempts to their benefits and their foreign allies. These comprador classes, as Shehu Umar Adbullahi vexatiously remarked:

do everything within their ability to justify even the unjustifiable as long as it can help the western world. They are mentally sick and intellectually dwarf. They employ their intellect to defend whatever they know can help their western masters even when that can clearly wreck or weaken the economy of their fatherland (quoted in Onwuka 1985:155).

And according to Mytelka (1979:18) this linkage between the national political and economic elites and TNCs:

not only reduces the effectiveness of compensatory mechanisms, but to the extent that the MNCs seek to shape integration process to their own needs and interests, they exacerbate the tendency towards nationalistic competition, thus thwarting efforts at integrated planning and increasing the level of conflict within the integrative system.

It was essentially members of this compradorial class that were to be galvanised by foreign capital in the name of the Nigeria Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture and the trans-territorial organ - the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce (WACC), herein-after referred to as the "Federation".

Kwadjo's descriptions as we have noted in the preceding pages and Appendix 9 and 10 are some of the indicators of the degree of direct foreign investment in the West African region. It is not surprising therefore that an attempt to bring the various states in the region in the name of a Community would have been a welcome gesture, for such Community would among other things ensure large markets for their goods and cheap labour for their factories and plantations, and more importantly provide greater opportunities for backward linkage with their parent firms at home.

(iv) Foreign capital and the formation of ECOWAS

The role of foreign capital in the formation of ECOWAS could be seen from the role played by the Nigerian Chambers of Commerce and the Federation. To assess this role, a brief history of the Nigerian Chambers of Commerce and an analysis of its structure and membership is pertinent.

The Nigerian Chamber of Commerce was founded in 1888 as the Lagos Chambers of Commerce, and until after the second world war was exclusively dominated by foreign firms. By 1969, Nigerian companies (most of them commercial or partnership with expatriate) constituted about 25 per cent of the Chambers' membership. In fact as Bierstaker (1987:78) pointed out in his recent study on the Nigerian economy, by 1972 when the first indigenization decree was promulgated, about 952 foreign firms were to be affected excluding those exempted for one reason or another by the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Board. In the construction sector for instance, he noted that in 1970, of the 99 firms in Nigeria, 82 (83%) were foreign and by 1975 when the idea of forming ECOWAS had matured, the number had increased to 134 (76%) out of 176 construction firms. The service sector ventures also had the same pattern. Appendix 11 shows this pattern of ownership between 1970 to 1975. Appendix 12 indicates the colossal inflow of DFI in Nigeria between 1970-75: a manifestation of the degree of the penetration of foreign capital into the economy.

The ownership structure also reflects the structure of the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce. From the two Appendix it is logical that any idea of regional integration will be welcome for it will expand their business horizon by establishing their subsidiaries in other West African states.

In order to realise and guarantee the participation of foreign capital in the nation's economy, efforts were made to restructure the membership of the Nigerian Chambers of Commerce. For instance, of the thirty executive positions in the Chambers, seventeen were Nigerian (Ihonvbere, n.d.:11-12), but the leadership of the vital standing committees and trade groups - shipping, exports and imports, industrial motor and transport, economic and statistic, and publications remained firmly under the effective control of the TNCs, thus leaving only the small businessman and tourism committees to Nigerians (cited in Ojo 1980:587, Ihonvbere, page 12). By 1973, when the idea of the ECOWAS has been incubated, a Nigerian Chief Henri Fajemirokun become its president. The re-organization of the executive position of the Chambers was a way of using Nigerians to further the interest of foreign firms that constituted the bulk of the association. It was this local leadership that was to galvanise other National Chambers of Commerce in the region for the formation of a larger association which was to eventually support the formation of ECOWAS.

The connection between the Nigerian state and foreign capital in the formation of ECOWAS is further substantiated by a keynote address delivered by the then Federal Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction, Adebayo Adedeji (who has been in the forefront for the formation of the ECOWAS, to the International Conference held in Lagos in 1975. According to him:

> *The reality of a community rests largely in the hands of what one might loosely describe as the agents of socio-economic activity - business, industrial and financial enterprises and institutions and their organised association like the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and professional associations. If these agents... do not exist, they have to be created, if they exist, they must be included to function across national frontiers (quoted in Ihonvbere, page 13).*

This call on the business community was an appeal on both foreign and indigenous entrepreneurs to participate in the formation of the ECOWAS. It was this kind of appeal that partly led to the formation of the West African Chambers of Commerce.

The Federation of the West African Chambers of Commerce was formed in 1972 by 11 members of ECOWAS - Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Guinea, Gambia, Niger, Benin and later Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire joined in 1973. Its first president was Chief Henry Fajemirokun. According to Fajemirokun (1983:77) the Federation was an organic association of the Community "representing the organised private sector of the economy of the subregion". Apart from providing a permanent link between the National Chambers of Commerce, the Federation among other things sought to "promote the establishment of an economic community and a Common Market in the West African region and encourage the speedy co-establishment of supranational commercial institution" (Fajemirokun 1983:78). In other words, the goal of the founding fathers of the ECOWAS and those of the Federation, as Fajemirokun pointed out, was identical in every material detail.

According to the *modus operandi* of the Federation, the different National Chambers of Commerce "were to conduct their affairs in a manner that is not repugnant to the attainment of the objectives of the Federation or ECOWAS and they were to closely cooperate with their respective governments in their efforts to establish an Economic Community" (Fajemirokun 1983:92). From the time of the formation of the Federation to that of the ECOWAS, there were series of exercises in shuttle diplomacy by members of the Federation to canvass for the formation of the latter (see appendices in Fajemirokun 1983-87-90) and to convince the various governments and industries of the benefits to be derived from such a union.

The participation of foreign firms in the formation of ECOWAS through the Federation was supported by the Nigerian state. Olusegun Obasanjo's, (who later became the Nigerian Head of state, (1976-79) address at the official commissioning of the Peugeot Automobile (Nigeria) Plant Limited, Kaduna in March 14, 1975 gives credence to this assertion. For as he later said after the formation of the Federation and before the formation of ECOWAS:

> *May I express our great satisfaction with the bold initiative taken by the businessmen in our West African subregion have given practical demonstration of our hopes and aspiration by forming the Association of West African Chambers of Commerce. They deserve our fullest support (quoted in Ihonvbere, page 13).*

In Côte d'Ivoire, the formation of a wider Community was to favour the plantation and the industrial sectors which were controlled by foreign firms, for it will not only ensure "the continued inflow on traditional Voltaic Labour, but cheap labour all over the region in "the spirit of ECOWAS" (Ihonvbere, page 12).

In sum, from the outset, private interest through the Chambers of Commerce supported regional integration.

(v) A regime

For a regional integration such as ECOWAS which seeks collective self-reliance in a region characterised by asymmetrical exchange relations imposed by capitalism, a regime to regulate direct foreign investment is necessary. Is there any regime in ECOWAS Treaty for the regulation of foreign capital in the region? On the other hand, is there any "policy externalisation" on foreign capital? (Policy externalization is a term used by Schmitter (1972:1) to describe a situation whereby "integrating, units jointly elaborate a common position in negotiations with outsiders"). A regime there means measures designed to regulate the behaviour and operation of firms, especially foreign enterprises in a region. These measures may include company tax, trade marks, patents, ownership structure, profit repatriation etc. Article 32 of the treaty which calls on the Council of Ministers to "take steps to reduce gradually the Community's economic dependence on the outside world and strengthen economic relations among themselves", is a policy of externalization, but there is no institution or machinery in the Treaty that is empowered to enter into negotiation with external actors on behalf of the Community.

Similarly, the freedom of association allowed by the Treaty to its members, on the proviso that such association does not "derogate from the obligations of the member state" (ECOWAS Treaty, article 20 [3], p. 19) is in itself ambiguous as there are various forms of association - association with TNCs, fomer colonial authorities and with states in the continent. Also, although the Treaty in Article 30 charges members to "harmonize their industrial policies so as to ensure a similarity of industrial climates", there is no institution or body of ECOWAS given the power to allocate industries or to ensure that industrial policies are harmonized. Furthermore there is no institution to regulate the importation of technology. Nor does the Treaty make any common regime on the control of foreign investment and divestment beyond harmonization of industrial policies in the areas of industrial incentives, company taxation and Africanization (Asante 1986:120). These loopholes leave much to be desired and tend to negate the spirit of "collective self-reliance".

We are yet to experiment the workability of the draft ECOWAS protocol relating to Community enterprises issued in Lagos in 1981 which is supposed to serve as a safety-valve to regulate the activities of Community enterprises (see Ezenwe 1983:163-167). The draft only set out conditions for the approval of Community enterprises and not how they would be implemented. According to the protocol the following conditions are set out for Community enterprises:

1. that no less than 51 per cent to the equity holding of the enterprises is at anytime vested in citizens, entities, or governments or their agencies of two or more of the Member-State;
2. that the majority of its Board of Directors or equivalent body are citizens of the Member-States;
3. that its operations affect two or more of the Member-States;
4. that its capital in local currency is not less than the equivalent at 200,000 or 150,000 units of accounts in the case of the advanced and less developed Member-States respectively; and
5. that its purposes will promote the development policies and programmes of the Community.

According to the protocol, the enterprises shall contribute to.

1. the development of the Community in general, and in particular the industrially less developed states;
2. the efficient use of resources of the member-states;
3. expansion and creation of employment within the Community·
4. improved access to international markets;
5. the transfer and adaptation of technology, and technical skills to, and absorption thereof by citizens of the member-states; and
6. the efficient saving of imports from third countries and the increase to intra-Community trade and exports to the countries with a view to strengthening the balance of payment position of the member-states (Ezenwe 1983:163-164).

The protocol sets out what ought to be. The problems lie with its implementation. Besides, the conditions only apply to Community enterprises and not firms operating in the various local economies. Even the 51 per cent indigenous ownership and participation which will take effect throughout ECOWAS countries as from 23 May 1989, "merely gives a false sense of satisfaction because in practice, the management will still lie in the hands of the TNCs who will continue to manipulate economic decisions in their favour" (Asante 1986:118). This uncertainty about the ECOWAS industrialization stems partly from the fact that internationalization of capital in the region has manifested itself through the activities of the TNCs, and the fact that past attempts to indigenous foreign firms have not produced the desired results. Although the reaction to its implementation may be different, it is not unlikely that it may lead to a similar situation as noted by Mytelka in Latin America, where the process of industrialization

> *does not promote development where development is conceptualised as a process of structural change and capital accumulation that have a society closer to the conditions in which the basic needs of the people (shelter, foods, clothing etc) are met, full employment prevails, and socio-economic equality increases. Rather, as in Latin America, it produced under-development, that is, a process of a structural change and capital accumulation that moves a society in a direction that makes it more difficult to achieve these conditions - a process marked by segmentation and disarticulation in Latin American political economies... (1979:xiv).*

The need for a regime is germane, and transfer of ownership should be matched by a meaningful transfer of crucial managerial powers (in matters of budget, expansion and development programmes) and the acquisition and mobilization of technical expertises for the purpose of effective management and control, if not, the quest for autonomous development may remain illusive. The experience of the Andean group, and the various indigenization decrees and the counter measures by foreign firms should serve as an object lesson to integration planners.

(vi) Conclusion

Here we shall try to relate Vaitsos' propositions to ECOWAS. Perhaps one of the significant questions which this section raises is, given the nature of the regional economy, what roles do the foreign firms play in the activities of ECOWAS? We have noted as in the case of the OCAM, UDEAC, EAC, SADCC, and ADS/ADF that external actors have played significant roles in their activities. Similarly, in ECOWAS, external actors played various roles in varying degrees towards its evolution and existence. In the case of the

ECOWAS, although our conclusions may not be definitive, the following points are worthy of note.

The TNCs as Vaitsos argued are not passive in relation to policies of integration in developing countries. In West Africa, the evidence at our disposal show that foreign capital and its agents played significant roles in the evolution of the ECOWAS. In the formation of the ECOWAS, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) played a significant role, for it was one of the participants in drafting the first protocol of the Community which was considered during the 1976 meeting of the Council of Ministers (Adedeji 1985:xxv). The preponderance of foreign firms and their control of the various local economies as we have noted in the first section of this paper tends to strongly suggest that they were passive in shaping the ECOWAS. In fact as Gowon (1984:202) noted:

> *where elsewhere small industries and manufacturers have tended to be opposed to programme of regional integration that was certainly not the case in Nigeria. Our manufacturers seemed to welcome the challenge of wider competition and the opportunities that the proposed comunity offered them...Manufacturers elswhewere in the region were not slow to see the possible benefits to be derived from the west African cooperation...*

The role of the Lome system in ensuring financial assistance as shown in Appendix 8 is very instructive in this regard. Of equal significance is the role played by the Nigerian Chambers of Commerce (which was dominated by foreign firms) and the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce. The restructuring of the leadership positions in the Nigerian Chambers of Commerce was one of such attempts of using the local classes in furthering the interest of foreign capital. It was this new leadership, as we have noted, that was to further the interests of the business community in the formation of ECOWAS.

Furthermore, as Vaitsos noted, the TNCs do not promote effective economic integration among developing countries if the latter have a medium or large size market and some local developed industrial capacities. In other words, TNCs support laissez-faire type of integration in order to ensure that the benefits thereof accrue more to them than the integrating economies. We have noted in the first section of this paper that the various local economies are basically underdeveloped, producing essentially primary products. Even where there are industries, such as in the extractive, construction and manufacturing sectors, such industries are owned and controlled by foreign investors. Some of the economic indicators as shown in Appendix 2 indicate that the region is underdeveloped, hence a pool of resources in the form of regional integration is necessary. There are for instance no large markets with the exception of those of Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal. This is because of the size of the population of the various countries. For instance, apart from Nigeria with a projected population of about 99 million in 1985 the rest of the countries are below 20 million. Thus bringing them together in the name of ECOWAS which seeks to eliminate all barriers to trade, would have beneficial effects for the industries operating in the region.

We have also noted that TNCs operate through local allies and states which play a compradorial role. This is an essential requirement for an effective exploitation of the economies. The role played by the Nigerian state through its ruling class and the bourgeois/comprador classes in the Nigerian Chambers of Commerce, and the role played by the plantation owners in the case of Côte d'Ivoire are illustrative of this trend.

In sum, foreign firms react to situations depending on the prevailing policies at the time. At the moment, the gradual implementation of the goals of ECOWAS means to present a non-conflictual picture in the region. However, future research in this area may uncover more of the activities of foreign firms. We have argued in this paper that foreign capital plays significant role in regional integration in Africa through the analysis of the salient features of the regional economies, we have also distinguished such essential variables as class, external actors such as foreign governments and the TNCs, and interest groups as important elements in any meaningful discourse on integration in Africa. Finally, the paper contends that because of the preponderance of foreign firms in the region, ECOWAS is likely not to transcend its present laissez-faire stage to Type 3 of Mytelka's (1979) classification, and until then, maximum benefits will continue to go to the TNCs while minimal benefits go to member states.

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Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3 : Leading Multinationals



Appendix 1 - Principal Exports of ECOWAS Countries

Countries	*Principal Projects*
Benin	Palm products / cotton, fish
Burkina Faso	Cotton, livestock, groundnuts
Côte d'Ivoire	Cocoa and cocoa products, coffee, timber, bananas
Gambia	Groundnuuts
Ghana	Gold, diamond, timber, aluminium, cocoa
Guinea	Iron ore, bauxite
Liberia	Rubber, iron ore
Mali	Cotton, rice, livestock, groundnuts, fish
Mauritania	Iron ore, copper, gum, gumarabic, fish
Niger	Uranium, livestock, groundnuts
Nigeria	Petroleum, tin, groundnuts, palm products, rubber, cocoa, timber
Senegal	Groundnuts, phosphate, fish, manufactures
Sierra Leone	Diamonds, iron ore, bauxite, palm kemals, coffee, cocoa, ginger, kolanuts
Togo	Phosphate, cocoa, coffee

Source: Adapted from West Africa, 15 September1980:1751 and Gowon 1934:578.

Appendix 2a - Some Economic and Demographic Indicators of ECOWAS Countries

Countries	GNP US$000000 1984	GNP US$000000 1985	RGR (%) 1973-85	Population (000) 1984	Population (000) 1985	GR 1973-85
Benin	1,080	1,080	4.5	3,920	4,043	2.9
Burkina Faso	1,040	1,080	2.7	7,688	7,885	2.3
Cape Verde	140	140	6.7	320	327	1.6
Côte d'Ivoire	6,080	6,250	3.2	9,703	10,072	4.3
Gambia	200	170	0.6	718	737	3.4
Ghana	4,580	4,960	-0.6	12,309	12,710	2.7
Guinea	1,800	1,950	2.0	5,932	6,049	2.0
Guinea Bissau	150	150	1.9	870	886	3.7
Liberia	1,000	1,040	1.4	2,127	2,196	3.3
Mali	1,060	1,070	3.6	7,341	7,511	2.5
Mauritania	760	700	2.3	1,659	1,693	2.1
Niger	1,200	1,250	3.5	6,205	6,391	3.0
Nigeria	71,540	75,940	0.3	96,485	99,669	2.8
Senegal	2,340	2,400	2.0	6,376	6,558	2.8
Sierra Leone	1,400	1,380	1.9	3,664	3,745	2.1
Togo	740	750	1.7	2,940	3,038	2.8

Appendix 2b - Some Economic and Demographic Indicators of ECOWAS Countries

Countries	GNP per Capita (US$) 1984	GNP per Capita (US$) 1985	RGR (%) 1973-85	RGR (%) 1984-85	Life Exp. 1970	Life Exp. 1984	total fert. 1970	total fert. 1984	SCHLEnr. 1970	SCHLEnr. 1984
Benin	270	270	1.6	1.2	44	49	6.9	6.5	24	37
Burkina Faso	140	140	0.4	4.6	43	45	6.6	6.5	8	13
Cape Verde	430	430	4.9	0.6	56	64	7.5	5.5	35	57
Côte d'Ivoire	630	620	-1.1	1.8	46	52	6.6	6.5	41	52
Gambia	270	230	-2.7	-12.2	38	42	6.4	6.5	16	34
Ghana	370	390	-3.1	2.8	49	53	6.6	6.4	58	57
Guinea	300	320	0.0	3.0	35	38	5.9	6.0	20	20
Guinea Bissau	180	170	-1.8	-0.3	35	38	5.9	6.0	NA	34
Liberia	470	470	-1.9	-0.9	43	50	6.3	6.9	33	53
Mali	140	140	1.0	-1.2	40	46	6.5	6.5	16	17
Mauritania	460	410	0.1	-4.1	42	46	6.0	6.2	10	25
Niger	190	200	0.5	4.0	39	43	6.8	7.0	8	17
Nigeria	740	760	-2.5	1.5	43	50	6.9	6.9	19	59
Senegal	370	370	-0.8	0.1	42	46	6.4	6.6	25	33
Sierra Leone	380	370	-0.2	-2.5	34	38	6.3	6.5	25	35
Togo	250	250	-1.1	4.9	44	51	6.6	6.5	41	72

Source: Compiled from *World Bank Atlas* 1987.

Notes: RGR (Real Growth Rate); GR (Growth Rate).

GNP: the market value of the final output of goods and services claimed by the residents of a country in a year.

Population: the number of people living in a country in the middle of a year.

Population Growth Rate: the average annual percentage change in a country's population.

GNP Per Capita: a country's GNP divided by its population.

GNP Per Capita Growth: the average annual percentage change in a country's GNP per capita.

Life Expectancy: the average number of years a newborn infant would live if patterns of mortality prevailing for all people at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.

Total Fertility Rate: the number of children a woman will bear during her life time, given prevailing age-specific fertility rate.

School Enrollment Ratio: the number of children in primary and secondary school, expressed as a percentage of the number of children aged between 6 and 17 years.

Appendix 3a - Total External Debts of ECOWAS Member States (TEDE) 1980-1986. (US $Million)

	1980	*1981*	*1982*	*1983*	*1984*	*1985*	*1986*
Benin	410.8	477.7	653.6	695.9	651.6	784.3	889.6
Burkina Faso	333.6	347.5	377.7	421.8	433.0	540.0	664.7
Cape Verde	20.2	38.5	57.7	70.6	75.5	97.0	112.7
Côte d'Ivoire	5,918.4	6,764.5	8,039.4	7,732.3	8,312.7	9,794.8	10,865.1
Gambia	136.5	175.5	206.1	209.1	225.1	235.5	273.0
Ghana	1,268.6	1,415.4	1,333.2	1,497.1	1,739.7	2,132.9	2,384.6
Guinea	1,087.9	1,322.3	1,315.0	1,318.9	1,235.6	1,383.9	1,515.5
Guinea Bissau	130.2	136.4	158.6	189.6	237.7	289.3	306.9
Liberia	705.5	824.1	836.7	991.6	1,060.1	1,187.3	1,303.1
Mali	719.1	829.9	874.2	1,008.1	1,277.2	1,475.2	1,715.6
Mauritania	822.9	974.9	1,146.3	1,283.6	1,310.6	1,468.4	1,761.1
Niger	826.7	1,021.4	960.8	913.7	948.9	1,196.9	1,459.4
Nigeria	8,887.9	12,039.0	12,908.2	18,585.7	18,755.9	19,375.6	21,876.3
Senegal	1,284.2	1,400.7	1,633.6	1,894.4	2,014.9	2,448.1	2,989.8
Sierra Leone	419.8	466.9	502.4	520.8	435.7	527.4	589.8
Togo	1,032.4	949.3	915.2	925.7	800.6	922.2	1,049.7
TEED	**24,038.7**	**29,184.0**	**31,968.7**	**38,258.9**	**39,590,8**	**43,859.0**	**49,756.9**

Appendix 3b - Total External Debts of Africa South of the Sahara (ASS) 1980-86 (US $ million)

	1980	*1981*	*1982*	*1983*	*1984*	*1985*	*1986*
ASS	55,620.3	63,533.9	68,924.0	77,955.0	80,192.1	90,564.3	102,030.4
TEDE	24,038.7	29,184.0	31,968.7	38,258.9	39,590.8	43,859.0	49,756.9
Ecowas share of ASS debt	31,581.6	34,349.9	36,955.3	39,696.1	40,601.3	46,705.3	52,273.5
% of ECOWASdebt	**43.2**	**45.9**	**46.4**	**49.0**	**49.4**	**48.4**	**47.8**

Source: Compiled from World Dept Table: External Debt of Developing Countries 1987/88 edition, vol. 1 p.6 and vol. 2 pp. 26, 42, 58, 94, 138, 142, 158, 162, 218, 238, 246, 270, 274, 326, 334, 373. - Note: (TEDE) Total external debts of ECOWAS Member States.

Appendix 4 - Principal Trade Partners of West African Franc Zone members

Country		*Imports (%)*		*Exports (%)*
Benin (1977)	France	23.3	France	24.7
	UK	12.7	Japan	20.1
	W. Germany	8.2	Netherlands	13.4
			Nigeria	8.0
Burkina Faso	France	44.7	Côte d'Ivoire	31.5
	Côte d'Ivoire	13.3	France	22.2
	United States	9.4	UK	10.8
Côte d'Ivoire (1978)	France	39.3	France	23.4
	Japan	7.3	Netherlands	23.4
	W. Germany	7.2	United states	14.6
	United States	5.2		
Mali (1978)	France	40.1	France	30.8
	Côte d'Ivoire	14.3	Côte d'Ivoire	12.6
	Senegal	9.8	W. Germany	10.9
	China	7.1	China	10.8
			UK	8.5
Niger (1976)	France	43.4	France	54.0
	Côte d'Ivoire	7.8	Nigeria	23.2
	W. Germany	6.8	Italy	15.6
	United States	6.4		
Senegal (1977)	France	37.4	France	44.7
	United States	8.7	UK	7.4
	W. Germany	5.6	Italy	4.7
Togo (1977)	France	34.0	Netherlands	31.6
	UK	9.6	France	20.9
	W. Germany	9.4	W. Germany	11.8

Appendix 5a - ECOWAS: Major Trading Partners 1980-1986 (US $ million)

Countries	*Exports*							
	1980	*1981*	*1982*	*1983*	*1984*	*1985*	*1986*	*Total*
Benin								
France	9.6	6.8	3.4	10.1	17.7	15.8	16.1	79.5
W. Germany	4.6	2.6	1.8	6.6	23.1	33.2	35.6	107.5
United Kingdom	4.8	.9	1.7	3.9	2.5	7.6	6.6	28.0
Netherlands	17.8	3.5	5.3	11.0	4.5	9.0		6.157.2
Burkina Faso								
France	16.2	9.0	8.0	6.8	8.4	19.1	33.3	100.8
Côte d'Ivoire	29.7	22.9	11.6	5.1	11.8	1.5	1.6	84.2
US	.1	*	.1	*	*	.7	.7	1.6
Netherlands	.1	.2	1.1	.2	.6	.6	.6	3.4
Cape Verde								
Netherlands	-	.2	-	-	-	-	-	.2
Spain	.7	-	.6	.3	.2	.1	-	1.9
Italy	-	.2	.1	.6	.5	.6	.5	2.5
Côte d'Ivoire								
France	680.8	472.3	446.9	398.3	444.2	486.1	541.9	3470.5
US	259.9	291.0	319.3	260.2	407.6	342.9	412.4	2,293.3
Netherlands	427.0	334.2	277.2	243.1	443.4	502.2	244.3	2,471.4
Italy	360.7	201.3	196.9	184.3	173.8	269.1	299.4	1,685.5

Gambia								
United Kingdom	4.9	4.3	3.2	5.2	4.3	3.1	3.1	28.1
Switzerland	*	4.4	6.9	6.3	9.4	7.1	4.4	38.5
France	2.4	4.8	4.1	4.5	9.9	3.5	3.9	33.1
Italy	2.2	.4	4.9	6.5	2.9	2.1	1.2	20.2
Ghana								
United Kingdom	203.1	94.1	107.3	114.3	73.8	114.1	138.2	844.9
Netherlands	174.7	111.6	122.1	105.6	15.6	31.4		10.9571.9
US	93.9	196.0	151.0	71.1	46.5	86.2	182.6	827.3
West Germany	72.4	79.3	73.4	75.7	42.2	48.2	94.9	486.1
USSR	167.8	61.4	46.7	92.2	101.4	101.4	106.4	677.3
Guinea								
US	109.5	119.1	150.4	126.0	125.8	127.1	102.6	860.4
France	39.1	43.8	45.2	44.7	25.3	40.5	29.3	267.9
Spain	64.2	61.1	52.7	59.3	74.4	64.0	56.7	432.4
West Germany	60.0	70.2	48.4	38.5	86.2	64.8	60.9	429.0
Guinea Bissau								
Portugal	3.0	2.9	6.5	5.3	6.5	1.8	1.4	27.4
France	*	1.4	1.1	.7	1.1	2.2	1.4	6.9
Italy		-	*	-	*	*	.6	.6
Netherlands	.6	.2	.5	.1	.3	*	.1	1.8
Liberia								
West Germany	144.4	132.4	150.3	131.0	134.8	172.6	199.9	1,065.4

US	125.7	123.5	83.4	76.5	91.4	94.2	88.5	683.2
Italy	67.1	70.3	68.7	75.3	68.8	87.9	106.4	539.1
France	76.0	52.5	42.7	30.0	40.2	47.8	55.8	345.0
Mali								
France	35.4	31.0	14.7	15.3	20.2	14.9	15.4	146.9
West Germany	16.6	36.5	9.1	10.0	16.2	12.6	8.4	109.4
Belgium-Luxembourg	21.3	-	25.7	24.2	18.9	10.1	8.8	109.0
United Kingdom	23.9	14.2	5.4	5.3	6.7	5.5	10.9	71.2
Mauritania								
France	69.2	62.5	54.5	38.1	38.6	43.6	49.1	355.6
Spain	15.8	80.4	17.7	16.3	18.7	10.7	10.0	169.6
Belgium-Luxembourg	22.4	32.5	31.4	29.6	47.2	47.0	41.5	251.6
West Germany	19.1	14.6	12.8	9.2	8.3	13.1	11.7	88.8
Niger								
France	228.8	162.2	192.6	210.9	175.9	168.2	203.6	1,342.2
Japan	89.8	80.5	48.3	4.0	3.4	3.1	*	229.1
West Germany	14.5	9.3	0.2	9.5	.1	.1	6.0	48.7
US	.3	.1	*	4.2	.6	9.1	11.3	25.6
Nigeria								
US	10,471.0	6,360.0	4,430.0	3,530.0	2,369.0	2,826.0	2,437.0	32,423.0
France	2,728.0	1,494.0	2,041.0	1,779.0	2,011.0	1,533.0	763.0	12,349.0
West Germany	2,756.0	1,149.0	1,078.0	1,656.0	2,007.0	1,960.0	1,140.0	11,736.0
United Kingdom	320.0	220.0	314.0	537.0	442.0	745.0	440.0	3,018.0

Senegal								
France	152.8	124.1	160.9	172.3	163.7	137.5	177.4	1,088.7
United Kingdom	27.0	27.7	22.6	28.9	30.6	20.2	18.6	175.6
Côte d'Ivoire	35.9	39.4	31.5	25.6	27.7	31.1	32.7	225.9
Italy	9.2	3.4	17.2	19.3	22.1	21.6	23.1	115.9
Sierra Leone								
United Kingdom	89.6	82.2	51.1	38.3	17.3	20.3	15.5	314.3
US	24.7	43.2	10.0	1.9	13.0	17.6	1.2	111.6
West Germany	6.7	22.1	4.6	.7	2.5	23.9	35.7	96.2
Netherlands	17.0	12.3	11.1	14.0	24.4	13.3	14.4	106.5
Togo								
France	51.7	36.5	39.1	28.9	40.4	40.2	46.5	283.3
Netherlands	68.2	45.9	32.6	32.3	44.3	14.4	24.9	262,7
West Germany	24.4	10.1	8.2	5.2	12.7	13.4	19.8	93.8
United Kingdom	1.6	6.6	2.1	1.3	3.1	2.1	6.7	23.5

Appendix 5b - ECOWAS: Major Trading Partners 1980-1986 (US $ million)

Countries	*Imports*							
	1980	*1981*	*1982*	*1983*	*1984*	*1985*	*1986*	*Total*
Benin								
France	76.0	107.9	114.2	105.3	82.7	93.2	126.9	579.3
West Germany	14.8	29.0	26.0	16.7	7.8	12.1	18.1	124.5
United Kingdom	34.7	54.8	57.1	17.7	9.9	12.2	10.9	197.3
Netherlands	21.5	43.6	35.6	20.2	21.4	33.8	35.3	211.4
Burkina Faso								
France	140.6	111.9	110.9	80.4	66.2	90.9	130.0	730.9
Côte d'Ivoire	67.2	74.0	77.8	67.7	57.1	93.3	98.0	353.1
US	32.3	36.2	23.0	27.0	25.6	29.7	10.8	184.6
Netherlands	13.8	11.0	14.9	14.7	11.8	13.3	14.9	94.4
Cape Verde								
Netherlands	3.5	7.0	10.0	6.0	7.3	24.7	18.8	77.3
Spain	2.9	4.5	2.8	5.7	3.1	7.3	3.1	29.8
Italy	.3	.7	.4	.2	1.6	9.8	7.5	20.8
Côte d'Ivoire								
France	1,190.4	747.3	691.1	651.2	495.6	551.7	664.4	4,991.7
US	143.5	130.3	112.2	73.6	99.1	117.9	65.3	741.9
Netherlands	96.7	91.8	90.5	54.3	72.8	82.0	124.2	612.3

Italy	139.8	84.7	68.4	63.3	48.4	64.8	85.7	555.1
Gambia								
United Kingdom	44.5	20.4	19.5	22.1	14.9	17.1	26.7	165.2
Switzerland	.8	.3	.1	.1	.1	.2	.2	1.8
France	12.2	12.5	6.2	7.4	10.0	13.3	15.7	77.3
Italy	4.0	2.4	4.2	3.2	5.4	6.8	8.7	34.7
Ghana								
United Kingdom	246.5	204.8	144.0	292.2	120.7	166.6	182.7	1,952.8
Netherlands	31.9	40.4	16.3	38.5	21.4	23.5	35.2	207.2
US	136.7	140.8	155.7	113.3	50.5	58.7	92.3	748.0
West Germany	106.3	135.0	67.0	165.0	52.7	71.5	107.9	705.4
USSR	.6	.4	.7	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7	8.1
Guinea								
US	37.4	58.4	30.6	24.4	36.3	56.0	26.7	269.8
France	107.0	106.0	97.5	90.7	100.0	112.7	129.9	743.8
Spain	25.6	11.4	8.1	5.1	16.6	11.5	15.2	93.5
West Germany	14.9	23.0	11.8	13.8	21.6	18.7	24.7	128.5
Guinea Bissau								
Portugal	17.2	14.8	21.1	13.4	14.6	12.2	9.8	103.1
France	6.3	2.6	5.7	3.8	2.2	3.7	3.6	27.9
Italy	.7	2.0	2.9	12.7	6.8	8.9	5.8	39.8
Netherlands	4.1	3.3	2.5	3.8	2.4	3.4	4.6	24.1

Liberia								
West Germany	52.1	48.6	42.8	50.4	39.8	65.9	52.4	352.0
US	121.8	142.2	119.2	102.5	82.0	80.2	72.1	720.0
Italy	4.4	4.7	3.8	4.0	5.2	21.6	12.0	55.7
France	11.1	13.2	11.2	15.0	7.6	48.6	106.6	213.3
Mali								
France	150.7	159.8	91.5	84.5	112.7	124.7	128.5	862.4
West Germany	28.2	73.9	28.4	37.6	19.1	29.6	33.4	250.1
Belgium-Luxembourg	6.8	5.8	10.2	7.1	8.7	10.3	15.7	64.6
United Kingdom	20.1	9.7	8.4	26.2	8.0	10.3	6.6	89.3
Mauritania								
France	109.0	97.9	130.8	93.1	81.4	109.6	126.8	748.6
Spain	30.2	70.1	39.9	50.0	73.4	45.7	102.6	411.9
Belgium-Luxembourg	24.6	23.6	22.1	11.4	13.5	16.0	13.5	124.9
West Germany	16.8	24.5	20.5	35.0	35.6	26.4	23.2	182.0
Niger								
France	232.0	182.9	145.1	94.5	90.6	105.6	110.2	960.9
Japan	15.1	12.7	15.0	15.9	8.7	10.4	9.1	86.9
West Germany	20.8	18.5	18.1	37.2	14.3	15.2	17.5	141.5
US	23.7	18.9	28.6	2.4	1.9	14.4	2.4	92.3
Nigeria								
US	1,265.0	2,180.0	1,651.0	950.0	635.0	743.0	450.0	7,874.0
France	1,483.0	1,692.0	1,367.0	990.0	969.0	627.0	542.0	7,679.0

West Germany	2,010.0	2,821.0	2,109.0	782.0	453.0	714.0	736.0	9,625.0
United Kingdom	3,079.0	3,779.0	2,787.0	1,332.0	1,114.0	1,338.0	912.0	14,341.0
Senegal								
France	354.7	335.9	333.2	354.5	262.6	289.2	364.4	2,294.5
United Kingdom	56.5	34.2	22.4	18.6	14.4	19.4	19.9	185.4
Côte d'Ivoire	29.9	34.8	28.9	32.4	33.0	50.5	53.0	262.5
Italy	32.8	29.3	24.3	27.9	26.6	30.5	53.2	224.6
Sierra Leone								
United Kingdom	94.0	54.6	29.3	17.6	19.1	23.4	28.1	266.1
US	23.0	28.9	19.1	5.2	7.0	6.6	25.9	115.7
West Germany	30.7	22.2	26.3	9.2	18.4	17.1	18.1	142.0
Netherlands	17.8	11.6	12.9	7.8	8.4	7.7	13.0	79.2
Togo								
France	138.4	137.1	106.0	91.0	87.5	110.6	148.1	818.7
Netherlands	49.7	38.9	42.9	27.7	27.8	35.1	49.6	271.7
West Germany	31.4	25.6	26.7	14.3	18.7	35.9	48.8	201.4
United Kingdom	42.8	54.9	39.3	22.3	15.2	20.0	28.0	222.5

Note:- (i) * less than .5; (ii) figures to 1 decimal place.
Source: Compiled from Direction of Trade Statiscs Year Boot 1987.

Appendix 6a - ECOWAS' countries direction of trade 1980-1986 (millions of U.S Dollars)

Industrial Countries				*Exports*			
	80	*81*	*82*	*83*	*84*	*85*	*86*
Benin	49.96	17.98	16.98	6761	90.29	127.81	95.19
Burkina Faso	37.13	29.07	26.35	19.67	38.24	37.05	54.74
Cape Verde	1.1	.4	1.5	.9	.7	1.3	1.4
Côte d'Ivoire	2,368.8	1,789.4	1,614.4	1,455.4	1,977.7	2,137.9	2,409.0
Gambia	20.25	17.48	22.97	32.64	36.02	20.42	27.36
Ghana	917.4	822.2	685.2	782.5	341.4	441.3	620.4
Guinea	257.89	349.98	370.67	347.86	409.09	409.40	389.74
Guinea Bissau	5.993	10,104	4,278	2,996	2.849	3.622	3.711
Liberia	556.2	488.8	447.2	403.8	417.0	582.1	672.8
Mali	125.74	105.63	71.66	74.81	80.85	59.83	67.08
Mauritania	224.59	317.37	243.15	231.21	246.09	227.99	313.72
Niger	449.46	292.80	281.44	241.52	183.40	185.44	227.42
Nigeria	21,679.00	13,478.00	11,539.00	10,686.0	10,457.0	11,304.0	6,993.0
Senegal	239.17	197.68	260.85	285.74	267.55	250.32	301.44
Sierra Leone	153.28	181.61	85.03	78.03	96.59	129.97	127.98
Togo	183.24	125.15	100.68	82.45	126.46	125.62	188.15

Industrial Countries	Imports						
	80	81	82	83	84	85	86
Benin	225.10	375.07	336.66	333.39	231.31	334.73	321.43
Burkina Faso	248.50	224.48	212.70	173.32	142.15	175.00	248.91
Cape Verde	24.8	34.2	34.5	36.1	31.1	31.1	55.6
Côte d'Ivoire	2,103.8	1,530.5	1,385.4	1,211.0	1,018.8	1,189.1	1,399.1
Gambia	98.03	71.29	70.95	68.76	72.64	82.39	115.84
Ghana	704.1	697.9	522.8	812.0	384.5	472.3	636.7
Guinea	323.96	271.39	208.42	199.54	256.69	294.17	290.65
Guinea Bissau	22,301	23,515	20,963	28,581	21.480	33.2	28,926
Liberia	339.9	346.6	283.8	320.7	267.9	1,150.1	1,145.5
Mali	240.33	302.03	181.17	207.79	204.52	267.12	276.56
Mauritania	263.11	330.60	324.29	276.41	272.08	275.91	335.77
Niger	408.11	281.60	264.88	195.59	170.72	220.75	197.82
Nigeria	13,497.0	7,190.0	12,500.0	6,738.0	4,953.0	5,263.0	4,158.0
Senegal	637.71	676.22	575.22	595.97	558.06	628.74	720.39
Sierra Leone	275.22	202.71	147.45	74.47	87.55	84.77	136.23
Togo	378.13	345.73	274.43	219.11	207.98	272.34	394.80

Appendix 6b - ECOWAS' countries direction of trade 1980-1986 (million of US dollars)

	Exports							Imports						
	80	*81*	*82*	*83*	*84*	*85*	*86*	*80*	*81*	*82*	*83*	*84*	*85*	*86*
Africa														
Benin	9.10	8.35	6.91	7.91	9.14	7.81	7.63	23.65	43.97	36.97	28.15	42.85	46.12	40.33
Burkina Faso	38.87	27.56	17.60	14.99	16.30	5.66	5.49	83.88	88.98	95.83	82.74	75.75	107.73	111.82
Cape Verde	.7	.5	.9	1.2	1.3	.6	.5	6.1	4.1	2.9	7.2	4.6	3.4	3.8
Côte d'Ivoire	482.4	435.9	426.3	381.5	365.0	413.0	433.2	184.8	226.5	263.2	309.2	240.2	360.5	298.4
Gambia	9.15	14.54	15.86	33.58	38.20	38.10	39.83	14.08	11.39	4.91	5.24	6.64	6.64	6.98
Ghana	4.4	10.9	13.6	190.3	4.6	4.4	4.5	240.7	411.1	298.6	200.0	114.8	114.2	103.3
Guinea	18.63	32.79	14.11	33.76	32.02	31.90	33.49	14.58	22.39	12.11	7.1	12.92	15.85	9.83
Guinea Bissau	1,655	1,240	.456	.356	.260	.260	.273	3.645	4.231	2.210	5.066	5.270	5.807	5.521
Liberia	11.2	10.7	9.8	8.8	11.7	9.4	8.7	10.4	10.3	9.6	17.5	48.7	32.1	28.6
Mali	14.59	68.34	10.30	12.21	13.03	11.63	11.13	167.59	211.86	106.83	113.95	94.14	111.68	117.38
Mauritania	1.77	7.94	21.03	24.43	10.39	.89	8.59	38.44	57.20	55.67	43.44	17.68	17.53	18.81
Niger	70.83	81.51	45.72	39.92	37.69	33.95	27.48	110.92	149.38	128.59	92.61	85.47	81.00	69.37
Nigeria	548.00	486.00	344.00	222.00	355.00	349.00	250.00	227.0	125.0	95.0	81.0	88.0	73.0	55.0
Senegal	147.40	184.13	116.01	94.78	113.59	120.99	117.91	152.91	137.07	166.54	262.74	258.96	242.72	193.86
Sierra Leone	2.44	6.55	1.36	1.46	2.65	1.39	2.66	5.27	50.89	36.96	50.96	63.16	26.68	20.89
Togo	88.71	39.26	42.68	47.79	24.02	9.56	8.83	108.17	29.30	38.50	22.12	30.78	13.56	13.83

Table 6 c - ECOWAS' countries direction of trade 1980-1986 (millions US dollars)

Exports									*Imports*						
	80		*81*	*82*	*83*	*84*	*85*	*86*	*80*	*81*	*82*	*83*	*84*	*85*	*86*
Asia															
Benin	1.68	1.65	-	.04	.27	.09	.48		60.29	96.74	71.16	65.16	69.91	74.42	120.33
Burkina Faso	5.52	5.96	1.19	6.74	4.85	1.27	.73		14.63	10.18	19.36	16.55	27.48	21.09	25.10
Cape Verde	-	-	-	-	-	.1	.3		.3	-	.1	.3	.3	.6	.1
Côte d'Ivoire	18.9	37.6	39.0	45.5	55.9	42.9	97.1		201.0	148.9	173.0	146.7	101.9	78.5	114.0
Gambia	.07	.66	1.57	.95	.98	.87	1.04		36.16	26.62	21.42	20.22	22.52	23.39	33.53
Ghana	41.1	21.6	28.2	31.3	18.7	22.4	68.3		43.6	44.9	26.3	56.6	48.7	54.5	61.6
Guinea	1.42	.64	2.83	2.66	.74	9.84	.21		.73	19.93	3.27	5.80	6.03	8.38	10.70
Guinea Bis.	.433	1456	-	4070	1.9	1739	.631		4794	2390	8853	15258	4789	8076	14499
Liberia	3.6	2.1	5.4	3.8	2.9	214.2	169.0		26.2	14.8	18.2	26.4	25.5	736.0	579.5
Mali	.95	31.73	3.57	7.88	5.62	4.07	8.02		3.18	21.84	12.26	9.44	24.07	23.93	23.40
Mauritania	-	.06	.07	1.06	.36	.14	.09		8.49	52.10	45.02	33.34	37.96	31.76	24.84
Niger	.03	9.42	.01	.18	.03	.04	.01		27.26	70.02	39.49	14.34	16.10	19.15	18.11
Nigeria	6.0	122.0	14.0	14.0	10.0	69.0	45.0		1437	1733	1180	903	646	572	495
Senegal	13.69	21.45	10.94	32.16	13.89	15.59	19.82		162.89	133.28	118.56	70.69	108.81	61.35	79.87
Sierra Leone	2.78	.59	.77	1.02	3.72	1.07	2.74		24.81	28.42	39.08	11.01	7.94	22.02	11.33
Togo		.04	.34	-	-	.06	.37		25.23	27.28	24.14	22.23	16.20	50.32	67.29

Table 6d - ECOWAS' countries direction of trade 1980-1986 (millions US dollars)

Export	*80*	*81*	*82*	*83*	*84*	*85*	*86*
USSR and other non-members of NIE							
Benin	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Burkina Faso	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cape Verde	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Côte d'Ivoire	119.4	119.7	65.8	62.9	141.7	135.5	142.2
Gambia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ghana	167.8	63.8	53.5	125.4	133.9	137.9	144.8
Guinea	N.R						
Guinea Bissau	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Liberia	2.1	2.4	.1	.2	-	-	-
Mali	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mauritania	N.R.						
Niger	-	.01	-	-	-	-	-
Nigeria	4	13	16	13	12	10	7
Sénégal	2.20	3.26	1.28	.04	.12	.12	.13
Sierra Leone	-	3.04	.31	2.53	11.30	2.97	3.11
Togo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Imports

	80	*81*	*82*	*83*	*84*	*85*	*86*
Benin	6.13	9.15	10.88	10.88	11.97	11.97	12.57
Burkina Faso	2.26	1.63	.94	.92	.96	.96	1.0
Cape Verde	.7	.7	2.4	.8	2.3	2.3	2.4
Côte d'Ivoire	34.8	36.9	18.3	12.9	17.7	19.9	20.8
Gambia	4.78	4.78	4.54	4.54	5.00	5.00	5.25
Ghana	8.3	'17.0	3.1	30.3	33.3	33.3	34.9
Guinea		N.R		N.R.			
Guinea Bissau	4,369	3,149	2,135	2,135	2,348	2,348	2,466
Liberia	1.2	1.5	3.0	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.16
Mali	8.95	3.86	3.67	3.67	4.04	4.04	4.24
Mauritania		N.R.		N.R.			
Niger	1.77	2.11	1.50	1.50	1.65	1.65	1.73
Nigeria	56	179	387	348	313	266	200
Sénégal	5.25	25.86	6.50	9.42	6.49	6.49	6.81
Sierra Leone	-	-	3.55	.85	.84	.69	.72
Togo	3.99	3.22	5.66	3.49	2.12	1.33	1.39

Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Year Book 1987, pages 105, 117, 128, 146, 187, 192, 207, 209, 258, 272, 279, 303, 305, 347, 352. Published by IMF, Washington D‹ N.R - No Record.

Appendix 7 - Nigeria: cumulative foreign private investment, 1970-76. (million of Naira)

	1970	*1971*	*1972*	*1973*	*1974*	*1975*	*1976*
United Kingdom	444.4	592.0	769.7	360.9	832.8	857.5	942.0
United States	230.0	337.4	286.6	308.0	300.0	535.2	376.2
Western Europe (excluding UK)	224.8	261.0	367.0	415.5	459.8	590.1	653.1
Others	104.0	132.4	147.8	179.6	219.5	304.7	362.8
Total	**1,003.2**	**1,322.8**	**1,571.1**	**1,763.7**	**1,812.5**	**2,287.5**	**2,333.8**

Source: Ake 1981: 113.

Appendix 8 - EEC' Assistance to ECOWAS Member States; from Lome 1, 1975 to Lome II, September 1982 '000 ECU)

Country	*Commitment*	*Disbursement*
Benin	62,438	43,689
Burkina Faso	118,179	56,683
Côte d'Ivoire	[illegible]04,775	63,866
Cape Verde	14,043	8,265
Gambia	36,098	23,498
Ghana	79,833	32,524
Guinea	73,355	45,940
Guinea Bissau	44,331	27,091
Liberia	35,211	21,429
Mali	125,895	83,7[illegible]
Mauritania	98,430	67,156
Niger	134,338	87,237
Nigeri	20,459	13,138
Senegal	212,561	158,488
Sierra Leone	41,531	21,002
Togo	53,583	37,572
Total	**1,255,060**	**791,344**

Source: Asante 1986:128.

Appendix 9a - Leading Foreign Multinational Companies in Ghana as at 1987

Name	Home Country	Sector
Trumpy and Fjell	Norway	Hotels
Bankers Trust Int.	United Kingdom	Banking
British Aluminium Co.	United Kingdom	Mining
MacMillan	United Kingdom	Publishing
Agri Petco International	USA	Oil
Brown and Root	USA	Mining
Philip Petroleum	USA	Oil
Texas Pacific Oil Co	USA	Oil
Compagnie Française des Pétroles	France	Mining
Interagra	France	Mining
Alosuisse	Switzerland	Mining
Impregilo Recchi	Italy	Construction
Mazzoni	Italy	Construction
Granges Int. Mining	Sweden	Mining
Allgemeine Ball-Union	W. Germany	Construction

Appendix 9b - Leading Foreign Multinational Companies in Côte d'Ivoire as at 1985

Name	*Home Country*	*Sector*
Banque Nationale de Paris	France	Banking
BRGM	Francc	Mining
Dumez	France	Mining
Crédit du Nord	France	Banking
Crédit Industrial and Commercial	France	Banking
Ponticelli	France	Construction (oil)
Bankers Trust Compai	USA	Banking
Chase Manhattan	USA	Banking
Citibank	USA	Banking
Chemical Bank	USA	Banking
Fluor	USA	Oil
Exxon	USA	Oil
McDermott	USA	Construction (Oil)
Mobil	USA	Oil
Colgate-Palmolive	USA	Pharmaceuticals
Philip Petroleum	USA	Oil
Tenneco	USA	Oil
Texaco	USA	Oil
Union Texas Petroleum	USA	Oil
DAF	Netherlands	Motor Vehicles
Abay	Belgium	Construction
Solei Boneh	Israel	Construction

Appendix 9c - Leading Foreign Multinational Companies in Liberia as at 1985

Name	Home Country	Sector
Keihin Raefer	Japan	Sea Transport
Konoike Construction Co.	Japan	Construction
FRIED Krupp Gmbh	W. Germany	Bulk carriers
Hans Mehr	W. Germany	Mechanical engineering, textile, food, drink, tobacco, chemical and pharmaceutical
Nordman, Rassemann Gmbh and Co	W. Germany	Wholesale distribution
Alpha-Laval AB	Sweden	Mechanical engineering
Electrolux AB	Sweden	Mining exploration
Nordstrom and Thulin AB	Sweden	Sea Transport
Amax. Inc.	USA	Mining and metals manufacturing
Aluminium Co. of America	USA	Mining and metals manufacturing
Chemical New York Corp.	USA	Banking and finance
Exxon Corp.	USA	Petroleum
Gatx Corp.	USA	Shipping
Getty Oil Co.	USA	Petroleum
ITT	USA	Telecommunication
Koppers Co. Inc.	USA	Chemicals
Marathon Oil Co.	USA	Petroleum
Marcona Corp.	USA	Shipping
Mobil Corp.	USA	Petroleum shipping
Occidental Petroleum	USA	Petroleum
Ogden Corp.	USA	Shipping
Philips Petroleum Co.	USA	Petroleum
Sea Containers Inc.	USA	Sea Transport
Standard Oil Co.	USA	Petroleum
Slenber Co. Inc.	USA	Shipping.

Appendix 9d - Leading Foreign Multinational Companies in Nigeria as at 1984

Name	*Home Country*	*Sector*	*Turnover (US $ M)*
Unilever	UK/Netherlands	Manufacturing, Merchants	994.0
Peugeot	France	Motor vehicles	890.0
Gulf Oil	USA	Petroleum	766.0
SCOA	France	Motor vehicles	519.2
Agip	Italy	Petroleum	395.2
Nigerian Breweries (subname)	UK	Brewing	392.5
Total Nigeria	USA	Petroleum	390.0
Mobil	USA	Petroleum/marketing	365.8
UTC (subname)	United Kingdom	Metals, textiles	336.0
Flour Mills	USA	Flour milling	284.1
Nigerian Bottle Co. (subname)	Greece	Beverages	252.0
Guiness	United Kingdom	Brewing	240.4
Texaco	USA	Petroleum	227.0
Unipetrol Nigeria (subname)	USA	Petroleum	214.0
United Nigeria Textiles (subname)	India	Textiles	187.9
W.African Portland Cement (subname)	United Kingdom	Building materials	166.0
Cadbury Schweppes	United Kingdom	Confectionery	148.6
BAT	United Kingdom	Tobacco	146.0
A.G. Leventis (subname)	Greece	Manufacturing, retail	124.5
Chemical and Allied Productucts	United Kingdom	Chemicals	92.8
Seven-Up Bottling	Lebanon	Beverages	82.8
Management Enterprises	USA	Trading, building	78.1
Tate and Lyle Nig.	United Kingdom	Sugar, plastic	74.1
G. Cappa	Italy	Civil engineering	49.1
Westminister Dredging	United Kingdom	Reclamation, Infrastructure	47.3

Appendix 9e - Leading Foreign Multinational Companies in Senegal as at 1983

Name	*Home Country*	*Sector*
James Park	S. Korea	Manufacturing
Main L. Park	S. Korea	Manufacturing
S T C	S. Korea	Miscellaneous manufacturing
International Housing Corp.	USA	Construction
Favomar	Denmark	Fishery
Lauritzen	Denmark	Fishery
Beliard & Murdoch	Belgium	Transportation equipment (ship repair)
Chanic	Belgium	Miscellaneous manufacturing
Hachette	France	Distribution
Novotel	France	Hotels
Optorg	France	Transportation equipment (distribution)
Petro-Canada	Canada	Oil
Fincantieri	Italy	Transportation equipment (ship repair)
Weser	W. Germany	Transportation equipment (ship repair)
Compagnie Française des Pétroles	France	Oil
Lafarge	France	Cement
Mobil	USA	Oil
Nestle	Switzerland	Food products
Schneider	France	Mechanical engineering

Appendix 9f - Leading Foreign Multinational Companies in Sierra Leone, 1983

Name	*Home Country*	*Sector*
Caldeonian Hotel Holding	United Kingdom	Hotels
Aracca Petroleum Corp.	US/	Oil
Bethlehem Steel	USA	Mining
Nord Resources	USA	Oil
Transierra Exploitation Corp.	USA	Mining
Austro Mineral	Austria	Mining
Alu Suisse	Switzerland	Mining
BAT Industries PLC	United Kingdom	Tobacco

Appendix 9g : Leading Foreign Multinational Companies in Togo as at 1983

Name	*Home Country*	*Sector*
Compenon Bernard	France	Construction
Dyckerhoff and Widmann	W. Germany	Construction
OT Africa Line	United Kingdom	Shipping
Ste Nat du Commerce	France	Commerce
SGGG Togo	France	Distribution
SCOA	France	Distribution
Société Sica Togo	France	Imports
Ciment du Togo	France	Construction materials
Satelit	France	Public works
Sototoles	France	Construction materials
Sotedi	France	Commerce
Satal	France	Agro/industry
Ste de Productions Alimentaires	France	Food Trade
L'air Liquide SA	France	Industrial games

Source: Dunning and Cantwell 1987:370, 377, 392, 428, 434, 447 and 460.our

Appendix 10a - Flow of Direct Foreign Investment

	In Ghana 1970-84 (Ced. million)			*In Côte d'Ivoire 1970-81 (IC Fr bn)*		
Year	*Reinvested profits*	*Other*	*Total*	*Reinvested profits*	*Other*	*Total*
1970	8.2	61.2	69.4	2.78	5.83	8.61
1971	12.4	19.6	32.0	5.28	-0.83	4.45
1972	12.9	2.9	15.8	4.38	0.28	4.66
1973	15.3	1.4	16.7	7.70	3.72	11.42
1974	8.3	4.2	12.5	4.34	3.47	7.81
1975	19.5	61.5	81.0	10.93	6.50	17.43
1976	11.9	2.7	14.6	8.83	1.93	18.76
1977	2.1	14.4	16.5	27.2	-14.7	12.6
1978	3.4	4.4	7.7	47.4	19.1	66.5
1979	N.S.A.	-2.2	-2.2	35.7	22.2	57.9
1980	9.4	2.6	12.0	50.5	22.1	72.7
1981	9.8	4.0	13.8	16.2	11.6	27.8
1982	9.6	5.2	14.8			
1983	1.5	0.7	2.2			
1984	2.0	N.S.A.	2.0			

Appendix 10b - Flow of Direct Foreign Investment in Liberia 1975-84 (L $ million)

Year	*Reinvested Profits*	*Other*	*Total*
1975			80.7
1976			39.1
1977	N. S. A.		44.7
1982			34.8
1983			49.1
1984			39.0

Appendix 10c - Flow of Direct Foreign Investment

Year	*In Nigeria 1970-84 (Million Naira)* Reinvested profits	Other	Total	*In Senegal 1970-84 (US$ million)* Reinvested profits	Other	Total
1970	37.9	108.5	146.4	5.0	0.0	5.0
1971	57.9	145.8	203.7	6.0	4.0	10.0
1972	40.7	160.0	200.7	10.9	4.3	15.2
1973	20.4	225.1	245.5	20.3	-15.5	4.8
1974	57.5	104.3	161.8	12.0	-1.2	10.8
1975	80.7	176.4	257.1	18.2	4.9	23.1
1976	82.5	159.8	242.3	19.6	16.2	35.8
1977	48.2	234.8	283.0	14.0	14.0	28.0
1978			135.2	25.0	-30.0	5.0
1979			186.9			3.9
1980			-404.1			1.9
1981			335.1			5.2
1982			289.1			4.5
1983			256.0			
1984			224.8			

Appendix 10e - Flow of Direct Foreign Investment

Year	*In Sierra Leone 1970-83 (Le million)* Reinvested Profits	Other	Total	*In Togo 1970-81 (US$ million)* Reinvested Profits	Other	Total
1970	N.S.A.	N.S.A.	6.67	N.S.A.	N.S.A.	1.0
1971	1.66	2.50	4.16	1.0	4.0	5.0
1972	0.87	2.60	3.47	1.1	0.0	1.1
1973	0.97	1.95	2.92	1.2	2.4	3.6
1974	1.03	8.72	9.25	1.2	-40.9	-39.7
1975	2.19	6.55	8.74	N.S.A.	N.S.A.	N.A
1976	1.80	7.71	9.51	3.5	2.3	5.8
1977	0.67	5.09	5.76	2.9	9.1	12.0
1978	10.36	15.08	25.43	3.3	93.6	96.9
1979	13.66	3.28	16.93	4.1	49.8	53.9
1980	0.14	-19.67	-19.54	-14.3	55.7	41.4
1981	N.S.A.	N.S.A.	8.75	-19.4	27.9	8.5
1982	25.57	-19.83	5.74			
1983	10.48	-7.26	3.22			

Note: N.S.A. (not separately available);
N.A. (not available).
Source: Dunning and Cantwell 1987; pages 367, 373, 387, 424, 431, 443 and 457.

Ownership structure of cumulative incorporation of service sector ventures in Nigeria 1970-1975

Year	*Local*	*Foreign*	*State*	*Total*
1970	49 (33%)	77 (51%)	24 (16%)	150
1975	84 (38%)	109 (49%)	29 (13%)	222

Source: Adapted from Bierstaker 1987a: 140 and 141.

Appendix 11 - Ownership structure of cumulative incorporation of construction companies in Nigeria 1970-75.

Year	*Local*	*Foreign*	*State*	*Total*
1970	16 (16%)	82 (83%)	1 (1%)	99
1975	49 (23%)	134 (75%)	1 (1%)	176

Appendix 12 - Direct Foreign Investment Inflows to Nigeria 1970-1975 (in millions of Naira)

Year	*Non-oil sector*	*Oil sector*	*Total*
1970	144.4	N.S	144.6
1971	148.8	14.0	162.8
1972	132.0	195.3	327.3
1973	128.0	115.5	243.5
1974	95.5	186.2	231.7
1975	149.1	210.5	359.6

Source: Bierstaker 1987a: 152.