AFRICA DEVELOPMENT
AFRIQUE ET DÉVELOPPEMENT

Vol. XLVIII, No. 1, 2023

Papers *CODESRIA's Meaning-making Research Initiatives (MRI)*

Articles issus *des Initiatives de recherche pour la construction du sens (*MRI)

CODESRIA

AFRICA DEVELOPMENT
AFRIQUE ET DÉVELOPPEMENT

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Revue trimestrielle du Conseil pour le développement de la recherche en sciences sociales en Afrique

Papers from *CODESRIA's Meaning-making Research Initiatives (MRI)*

Articles issus des *Initiatives de recherche pour la construction du sens (MRI)*

CODESRIA would like to express its gratitude to the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), the Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY), Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Open Society Foundations (OSFs), Oumou Dilly Foundation, Ford Foundation and the Government of Senegal for supporting its research, training and publication programmes.

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Africa Development is a quarterly bilingual journal of CODESRIA. It is a social science journal whose major focus is on issues which are central to the development of society. Its principal objective is to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas among African scholars from a variety of intellectual persuasions and various disciplines. The journal also encourages other contributors working on Africa or those undertaking comparative analysis of the developing world issues.

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Africa Development / Afrique et Développement
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Tel: +221 825 98 22 / 825 98 23 – Fax: +221 824 12 89
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Editorial Note

Preparation of this issue of *Africa Development* started under the direction of Prof. Ibrahim Oanda Ogachi while he served at the CODESRIA Secretariat in Dakar. Oanda, as we call him, was Senior Programme Officer in the Training, Grants and Fellowships (TGF) Programme and Acting Head of the Publication and Dissemination Programme. In August 2022, his contract with CODESRIA came to an end. The Council retained his services under CODESRIA's sabbatical arrangement until October 2022, when he formally resigned to join Mastercard Foundation as Head of Research Strengthening. A few of the forthcoming issues of CODESRIA journals, including *Africa Development*, *Journal of Higher Education in Africa* (JHEA) and *CODESRIA Bulletin* will still bear Prof. Oanda's name as editor because he edited the manuscripts and oversaw the production of these articles before he left the service of the Council.

Oanda, as he is popularly known at the Secretariat, first engaged with CODESRIA during the 1997 Democratic Governance Institute. Then a young lecturer at Kenyatta University, Nairobi, Kenya, he acquitted himself admirably at the Institute, whose director was the late Jean-Marc Ela. His first ever peer-reviewed publication was titled 'Economic Reform, Political Liberalisation and Economic Ethnic Conflict in Kenya', published in 1999 in *Africa Development*, Vol. 24, Nos 1&2 (10.4314/ad.v24i1.22118). Since then, Oanda has published on several platforms of intellectual engagement but especially in his area of expertise, the field of higher education studies. His accomplished interventions in this field led him to be appointed one of the editors of the *Journal of Higher Education in Africa* and he contributed significantly to revitalising the journal to its current standing. He also scaled the heights of academia to become Associate Professor at Kenyatta University before he joined CODESRIA.

At CODESRIA, Oanda served as Programme Officer in the Research Programme from June 2015 to August 2016, before being appointed by the Executive Committee to the position of Senior Programme Officer in TGF from September 2016 to 31 August 2022. Oanda revived several programmes at CODESRIA, including the higher education component of CODESRIA's work and, briefly, the economic justice aspect of the Council's programme. He was a key proponent of investing in what he justifiably understood to be CODESRIA's core areas of work and in doing so he went the extra mile

to secure funding to establish the Economic Justice Institute, which ran until 2017. While the initiative did not last, it remains a good illustration of Oanda's belief that issues of economic justice ought always to be core to CODESRIA's research agenda.

Oanda stands out for his ability to raise funds for the Council. Over the period he worked at CODESRIA, he developed funding proposals to the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Andrew Mellon Foundation and Open Society Institute of Southern Africa (OSISA). By our internal calculations, he single-handedly raised USD 6,380,000. He also contributed to other funding proposals the Council developed, most importantly the proposed project on the Sahel. This project, developed jointly with the Arab Council for the Social Sciences, was meant to enable a reflection on the Sahel using the humanities as an entry point. Oanda developed and nurtured the Council's relationship with funding partners and left a rich legacy of fundraising on behalf of the Council. Indeed, among CODESRIA's senior programme staff he holds the record for fundraising, which he was focused on up to his last days at CODESRIA. To the last day, he remained concerned about the health of the Council especially in the context of the series of audits the Council went through after 2020.

But perhaps Ibrahim Oanda's greatest legacy to CODESRIA is its publishing system. By the end of 2019, the Council had accumulated a backlog in all its core journals, including *Africa Development*. I requested senior colleagues in the Secretariat to work together to resolve this challenge. Ibrahim Oanda agreed to step in as Acting Head of Publications and deal with the problem. Through a consultative process, he reorganised the different editorial and production elements of the programme, secured qualified and competent external service providers for copy-editing, cover design, typesetting, proofreading and indexing, and put them to work. He created an editorial and production pipeline, set targets for staff and worked meticulously to reduce and eliminate the backlog.

Oanda facilitated the development of a new database for peer review, created a systematic process of tracking articles and ensured that a proper system of feedback to researchers was established. He nudged the Council to invest in proper dissemination channels so that the work of the Council would be easily and effectively projected to the wider society and the impact of its research would be felt beyond the academy. He even fundraised for dissemination and ensured that modest resources were available in budgets to facilitate dissemination. A significant component of the recent advancements in CODESRIA's communication and dissemination is in large measure due to Oanda's effort.

Once the publication system was running smoothly, CODESRIA was able to generate enough content to sustain a daily update to the community through our different platforms, including our website and social media. This was in no small measure due to the effort, commitment and hard work of Oanda. By the time he departed from the Council, both *Africa Development* and *JHEA* had a sufficient number of articles. He left behind enough fully edited and typeset articles to cover all the available issues of *Africa Development* for 2023. This is the reason his name will appear as editor of some of the forthcoming issues of *Africa Development*, even though he has formally left the Council.

On behalf of the Executive Committee, staff of the Secretariat, and the community in general, I want to express our gratitude to Prof. Ibrahim Oanda Ogachi for his excellent service to CODESRIA and its community of scholarship. His dedication to work, his commitment and loyalty to CODESRIA as an institution, and the humility with which he engaged with everyone, are all attributes worth emulating. As a Council, we wish him the very best in his new roles and look forward to reunion whenever opportunity allows.

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Note éditoriale

La préparation de ce numéro de *Afrique et Développement* a commencé sous la direction du Professeur Ibrahim Oanda Ogachi, alors qu'il était encore sous contrat avec le Secrétariat du CODESRIA à Dakar. Oanda, comme nous aimions l'appeler, était l'Administrateur principal du Programme Formation, Subventions et Bourses (TGF) et assurait l'intérim du Programme Publications et Dissémination. Son contrat avec le CODESRIA est arrivé à son terme en août 2022, mais le Conseil, dans le cadre de son dispositif sabbatique, l'a retenu jusqu'en octobre 2022, date à laquelle il a officiellement démissionné pour rejoindre la Fondation Mastercard en tant que Responsable du renforcement de la recherche. Quelques-uns des prochains numéros des revues du CODESRIA, notamment *Afrique et Développement*, la *Revue de l'enseignement supérieur en Afrique* (RESA) et le *Bulletin du CODESRIA* porteront encore le sceau du Professeur Oanda en tant qu'éditeur parce qu'il a révisé les manuscrits et supervisé la production de ces articles avant de quitter le service du Conseil.

Les premières interactions entre Oanda et le CODESRIA remontent à l'Institut sur la gouvernance démocratique de 1997. Alors jeune enseignant à l'Université Kenyatta de Nairobi, au Kenya, il s›est admirablement acquitté de sa tâche à l'Institut, dont le directeur était feu Jean-Marc Ela. Sa toute première publication évaluée par des pairs était intitulée *« Economic Reform, Political Liberalisation and Economic Ethnic Conflict in Kenya »* (Réforme économique, libéralisation politique et conflit ethnique économique au Kenya), publiée en 1999 dans *Afrique et Développement*, Vol. 24, Nos 1&2 (10.4314/ad.v24i1.22118). Depuis lors, Oanda a publié sur plusieurs plateformes de discussions intellectuelles, mais surtout dans son domaine d'expertise, celui des études sur l'enseignement supérieur. Ses interventions accomplies dans ce domaine l'ont amené à faire partie des rédacteurs en chef de la *Revue de l'Enseignement supérieur en Afrique,* et il a contribué de manière significative à la revitalisation de la revue jusqu'à son niveau actuel. Il a également gravi les échelons universitaires pour devenir professeur associé à l'Université Kenyatta, avant de rejoindre le CODESRIA.

Au CODESRIA, Oanda a occupé le poste d'Administrateur de programme au sein du Programme de recherche de juin 2015 à août 2016, avant d'être promu par le Comité exécutif au poste d'Administrateur principal du

Programme TGF de septembre 2016 au 31 août 2022. Oanda a revitalisé plusieurs programmes au CODESRIA, notamment la composante enseignement supérieur du travail du CODESRIA et, brièvement, l'aspect justice économique du programme du Conseil. Il a été l'un des principaux promoteurs de l'investissement dans ce qu'il considérait, à juste titre, comme les principaux domaines de travail du CODESRIA et, ce faisant, il a fait un effort supplémentaire pour obtenir le financement nécessaire à la création de l'Institut sur la justice économique, qui a fonctionné jusqu'en 2017. Bien que l'initiative n'ait pas duré, elle reste une bonne illustration de la conviction d'Oanda que les questions de justice économique devraient toujours être au cœur du programme de recherche du CODESRIA.

Oanda se distingue par sa capacité à lever des fonds pour le Conseil. La période pendant laquelle il a travaillé au CODESRIA, il a élaboré des propositions de financement adressées à *Carnegie Corporation of New York*, *Andrew Mellon Foundation* et *Open Society Institute of Southern Africa* (OSISA). D'après nos calculs internes, il a levé à lui seul 6 380 000 USD. Il a également contribué à d'autres propositions de financement élaborées par le Conseil, notamment le projet proposé sur le Sahel. Ce projet, développé conjointement avec le Conseil arabe des sciences sociales, devait permettre une réflexion sur le Sahel en utilisant les sciences humaines comme point d'entrée. Oanda a développé et entretenu les relations du Conseil avec les partenaires financiers et a laissé un riche héritage de collecte de fonds au nom du Conseil. En effet, parmi les Administrateurs principaux de programme du CODESRIA, il détient le record de levée de fonds, sur laquelle il s'est concentré jusqu'à son départ du CODESRIA. Jusqu'au dernier jour, il est resté préoccupé par la santé économique du Conseil, en particulier dans le contexte de la série d'audits que le Conseil a subis après 2020.

Mais le plus grand héritage d'Ibrahim Oanda au CODESRIA est peut-être son système de publication. À la fin de l'année 2019, le Conseil avait accusé un retard dans la publication de toutes ses principales revues, y compris *Afrique et Développement*. J'ai demandé à mes collègues du Secrétariat de travailler ensemble à la résolution de ce problème. Ibrahim Oanda a accepté d'assurer l'intérim de l'Administrateur principal du Programme Publications et de s'attaquer au problème. Par le biais d'un processus consultatif, il a réorganisé les différents éléments rédactionnels et de production du programme, s'est assuré le concours de prestataires de services externes qualifiés et compétents pour la révision, la conception des couvertures, la composition, la relecture et l'indexation, et les a mis au travail. Il a créé un portefeuille rédactionnel et de production, fixé des objectifs au personnel et travaillé méticuleusement pour réduire et combler le retard.

Oanda a facilité le développement d'une nouvelle base de données pour l'évaluation par les pairs, créé un processus systématique de suivi des articles et veillé à la mise en place d'un système adéquat de retour d'information avec les chercheurs. Il a incité le Conseil à investir dans des canaux de diffusion appropriés, afin que le travail du Conseil soit facilement et efficacement projeté dans la société au sens large et que l'impact de ses recherches soit ressenti au-delà de la communauté des chercheurs. Il a même collecté des fonds pour la diffusion, en s'assurant qu'un certain pourcentage des budgets, même modeste, soit disponible pour faciliter la diffusion. Nous lui devons en grande partie les pas de géants récemment accomplis dans la communication et la diffusion du CODESRIA.

Une fois le système de publication sur les rails, le CODESRIA a été en mesure de générer suffisamment de contenu pour une mise à jour quotidienne au profit de la communauté à travers nos différentes plateformes, y compris notre site Web et les médias sociaux. Cela est dû en grande partie aux efforts, à l'engagement et au travail acharné d'Ibrahim Oanda. Au moment où il a quitté le Conseil, les publications que sont *Afrique et Développement* et *RESA* disposaient d'un nombre suffisant d'articles. Il a laissé suffisamment d'articles entièrement relus et mis en page pour couvrir tous les numéros pour *Afrique et Développement* 2023. C'est la raison pour laquelle son nom apparaîtra comme rédacteur en chef de certains des prochains numéros de *Afrique et Développement*, même s'il a officiellement quitté le Conseil.

Au nom du Comité exécutif, du personnel du Secrétariat et de la communauté en général, je tiens à exprimer notre gratitude au Professeur Ibrahim Oanda Ogachi pour l'excellente qualité des services qu'il a rendus au CODESRIA et à sa communauté de chercheurs. Son dévouement au travail, son engagement et sa loyauté envers le CODESRIA en tant qu'institution, et l'humilité avec laquelle il a échangé avec tout le monde, sont autant de qualités qui doivent servir d'émulation. En tant que Conseil, nous lui souhaitons le meilleur dans ses nouvelles fonctions et attendons avec impatience l'occasion de nous retrouver chaque fois que l'occasion se présentera.

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"Cabo Verde à beira da revolução": a emergência do pan-africanismo cabo-verdiano e os protestos em África

Redy Wilson Lima* & Stephanie Duarte Vicente**

Resumo

A história de Cabo Verde é uma história de resistências anticoloniais e de revoltas. Sendo assim, não escapou às contestações sociais surgidas um pouco por todas as cidades africanas, a partir dos anos de 2000, que teve, a 30 de Março de 2015 e a 5 de Julho de 2017, as suas maiores demonstrações de rua e no *rap* o seu principal articulador e mensageiro político. Com este artigo, que tem como base uma pesquisa qualitativa realizada nas cidades da Praia e do Mindelo, palco destas manifestações, pretendemos analisar os seguintes pontos: o contexto sociopolítico do surgimento dos protestos em Cabo Verde; a sua natureza e ligação com os protestos africanos e com a ideologia pan-africana; e o papel desempenhado pelo *rap* nesse processo.

Palavras-chave: protestos, movimentos sociais, pan-africanismo, *rap*

Abstract

The history of Cape Verde is a history of anti-colonial resistance and revolts. Therefore, it has not escaped the social protests that have arisen in all African cities since the 2000s, which had, on 30 March 2015 and on 5 July 2017, its largest street demonstrations and rap as its main speaker and political messenger. This article based on qualitative research conducted in the cities of Praia and Mindelo – the stage of these demonstrations – aims to analyse the following points: the socio-political context of the emergence of the protests in Cape Verde; their nature and connection with African protests and pan-African ideology; and the role played by rap in this process.

Keywords: protests, social movements, pan-Africanism, rap

* NEU/CeProK, CEsA/CSG/ISEG-ULisboa. Email: redywilson@hotmail.com

** Universidade Técnica do Atlântico (UTA), Cape Verde. Email: stephanieduarte@outlook.com

Résumé

L'histoire du Cap-Vert est une histoire de résistance et de révoltes anticoloniales. Par conséquent, il n'a pas échappé aux protestations sociales qui ont surgi dans toutes les villes africaines depuis les années 2000, qui ont eu, le 30 mars 2015 et le 5 juillet 2017, ses plus grandes manifestations de rue et le rap comme principal porte-parole et messager politique. Cet article basé sur une recherche qualitative menée dans les villes de Praia et Mindelo – théâtre de ces manifestations – vise à analyser les points suivants : le contexte sociopolitique de l'émergence des protestations au Cap-Vert ; leur nature et leur lien avec les protestations africaines et l'idéologie panafricaine ; et le rôle joué par le rap dans ce processus.

Mots-clés : protestations, mouvements sociaux, panafricanisme, rap

Introdução: A problemática dos estudos dos movimentos sociais em África

Uma das primeiras problematizações acerca dos movimentos sociais e das lutas pela democracia em África foi realizada nos anos de 1980 por Mamdani, Mkandawire e Wamba-dia-Wamba (1988), numa altura em que pairava sobre o continente uma nuvem de pessimismo e se difundia a ideia de que se estaria perante uma crise africana. Identificaram-se três escolas de pensamento que se destacaram na busca do entendimento dessa suposta crise e que deveriam servir de ponto de partida para a compreensão das razões de base do subdesenvolvimento de estudos sobre os movimentos sociais africanos:

1. A africanista, de inspiração norte-americana, nascida como reacção de alguns historiadores à ideia difundida de que África não tinha história, focando-se na era gloriosa dos reinos africanos pré-coloniais, factos esses negligenciados pelas ciências sociais coloniais;
2. A da modernização, de inspiração funcionalista e institucionalista, adoptada pelos africanistas no período pós-independência, sobretudo por aqueles que compreenderam que a construção nacional teria de ser realizada em aliança com as antigas potências coloniais;
3. A da teoria da dependência, de inspiração marxista, que apesar da crítica ao dualismo moderno-tradicional, ao focar se na análise nas relações de dominação, base da tese de subdesenvolvimento, manteve a lógica analítica dualista, mas centrada na relação centro-periferia.

A tese defendida pelos autores referidos era de que nenhuma destas escolas detinha ferramentas epistemológicas adequadas para o estudo dos

movimentos sociais em África. As duas primeiras, ao seguirem um quadro analítico orientado pela teoria da modernização, com vista à construção de um estado-nação forte liderado por uma elite burguesa apoiada pelas antigas forças imperiais, olhavam qualquer tipo de conflito como algo disfuncional e portanto, um problema. A terceira, ao limitar o seu quadro de preocupação às relações produtivas, centralizou a sua análise na luta das classes trabalhadoras inviabilizando as outras formas de luta, tidas como primitivas.

Desde modo, nos anos de 1990, o CODESRIA, sob direcção de Mahmood Mamdani e Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba, publicou o primeiro estudo sistemático sobre os movimentos sociais em África, introduzindo análises mais profundas e críticas, as visões e formas de participação democrática destes movimentos (Mutzenberg 2015). O referido estudo estabeleceu que no contexto africano, a compreensão dos discursos sobre a sociedade civil deveria começar pelo reconhecimento do papel desempenhado pelos movimentos sociais, na luta pela democracia e desenvolvimento social (Aina 1998).

Para Nyong'o (1995), a democracia foi um dos ideais mais inspiradores dos movimentos de libertação em África e, embora na maioria das constituições pós-independências se tenha estabelecido a promoção e defesa da democracia, na prática, em muitos países tal não aconteceu. Segundo o autor, esta situação não significou que houve uma espécie de agenda obscura de autoritarismo, mas a crença de alguns teóricos do sistema de partido-único que o rápido desenvolvimento das nações africanas dependeria de um sistema político forte, com capacidade de garantir a unidade nacional e assegurar a disciplina necessária para o efeito.

No entanto, sendo um facto que em muitos destes Estados, incluindo Cabo Verde, as pressões internas protagonizadas pelos movimentos sociais, motivadas pelo contexto internacional, conduziram à abertura democrática, os levantamentos populares mediatizados a partir dos anos de 2000 nos principais centros urbanos indicam que, tal como nos anos de 1990, a luta pela democracia continua no centro da agenda popular africana.

Em termos analíticos, embora existam inúmeras publicações a retratar estes protestos, Aidi (2018) entente que a grande maioria carrega marcos conceptuais eurocêntricos. No seu entender, esta situação deriva da forma como muitos pesquisadores encaram as sociedades africanas: como rurais, tradicionalistas, étnicas e pouco desenvolvidas em termos de estruturas de classe, negligenciando assim muitas acções colectivas, com excepção do movimento operário e anti-*apartheid* sul-africano.

Sendo assim, os protestos que tem marcado a paisagem urbana africana sub-sahariana desde os anos de 2000, segundo Aidi, têm sido tratados pela

literatura ocidental como tendo sido iniciados e inspirados pela Primavera Árabe. Mamdani (2011) contrapõe essa ideia demonstrando que a revolta de Soweto nos anos de 1970, liderada por Steve Biko e pelo movimento de Consciência Negra, representam o antecedente político dos acontecimentos da Praça Tahrir. Argumenta que a revolta sul-africana deve ser entendida como a viragem histórica nos movimentos sociais africanos, por ter sido a primeira em que se usou uma imaginação alternativa de confronto focada em lutas populares no período pós-independências.

Para Honwana (2013), tanto os protestos árabe-africanos como subsarianos, representam a nova expressão do acordar africano. A sua análise vai, em parte, de encontro às realizadas por Aidi (2018), e Mueller (2018) ao defenderem a ideia de que esses protestos revelam a continuidade da luta e resistência pan-africana, iniciada entre os anos de 1940 e 1950, período em que o pan-africanismo, enquanto ideologia e movimento, encorajou a solidariedade entre os africanos em todo o mundo, na luta contra o sistema colonial europeu (Adi 2017).

Ao sinalizarem esse período como a primeira vaga destes protestos, tanto Aidi como Mueller identificaram as demonstrações de rua dos finais de 1980 e anos de 1990 como a segunda vaga, explicadas como resultado das políticas de ajustamento estrutural. Todavia, em relação à terceira vaga, enquanto Aidi (2018) aponta o seu começo em 2005 e defende que se estendeu até 2014, Mueller (2018) diz que o seu início foi no ano de 2011, tendo-se prolongando até 2016. Durante este último período foram registados aproximadamente 19.816 grandes protestos em todo o continente, como resposta à intensificação das políticas de austeridade incentivadas pela guerra contra o terrorismo. O *rap* e a cultura *hip-hop* africana foram apresentados como os seus principais mobilizadores e mensageiros (Honwana 2013; Mueller 2018).

Cabo Verde seguiu essa tendência e neste artigo, resultado de um projecto de pesquisa financiado pelo programa *Meaning-making Research Initiative CODESRIA 2018/2019*, o objectivo é dar conta desta realidade e analisar, do ponto de vista histórico, o contexto sociopolítico do surgimento dos protestos no arquipélago, a sua natureza e ligação com os protestos africanos e com a ideologia pan-africana, assim como o papel desempenhado pelo *rap* nesse processo.

É de referir que o principal propósito do projecto de pesquisa foi a possibilidade de contribuir para a construção de uma agenda endógena de pesquisa sobre os movimentos sociais juvenis urbanos em Cabo Verde. Assim, optámos por uma abordagem qualitativa, enquadrando numa antropologia do próximo (Ela 2013 [1994]), que permite apreender de dentro o ponto de vista dos sujeitos inseridos neste tipo de ativismo político,

complementado por bibliografias que se têm debruçado sobre este tipo de assunto e estatísticas oficiais. Deste modo, privilegiou-se neste artigo a análise de conversas informais e 10 entrevistas realizadas entre os meses de Janeiro e Março de 2020, nas cidades da Praia e do Mindelo.

Sendo este um tema sobre o qual nos temos debruçado há já algum tempo, utilizámos também entrevistas realizadas antes da pesquisa para este projecto e como complemento às técnicas clássicas de pesquisa, conferimos às narrativas do *rap* o mesmo estatuto que as outras fontes exploradas, por reconhecermos nos *rappers* algo como que um intelectualismo orgânico.

O artigo está estruturado em 3 sessões: na primeira, apresentamos os antecedentes históricos do movimento pan-africano cabo-verdiano; na segunda, expomos as contradições da democracia liberal em Cabo Verde e as consequências políticas daí decorrentes; e na terceira, destacamos as demonstrações de rua de 30 de Março de 2015 e de 5 de Julho de 2017, nas cidades da Praia e do Mindelo e lançamos um olhar exploratório sobre o MFPA-CV, um novo movimento pan-africano de cariz cabralista, surgido entre estas duas datas e as suas interconexões com o continente africano.

Antecedentes históricos dos movimentos sociais e o pan-africanismo cabo-verdiano

A historiografia mostra que a história cabo-verdiana é uma história de resistência cultural, política e de revoltas (Vieira 1986; Mascarenhas 2014). Para Silva (1996), a auto-libertação dos escravizados e a edificação de comunidades autónomas nas montanhas e nos vales profundos deve ser considerada como o primeiro prenúncio de resistência social e cultural africana em Cabo Verde. Vieira (1986), por seu lado, aponta que os eventos de 1835 poderiam ser percebidos como o primeiro esforço para a independência do arquipélago, quando africanos escravizados e forros, instigados por homens do círculo da governação, tentaram tomar posse de Santiago. Este episódio veio reforçar, no imaginário das elites colonial e nativa, o receio da ilha poder vir a transformar-se numa espécie de Haiti.

Em São Vicente, no final desse mesmo século, a crise carvoeira faz despoletar o embrião de um movimento social operário liderado pela elite intelectual, em que a questão de autonomia foi pela primeira vez colocada em discussão pública (Silva 2005). A mesma elite que vai ter um papel preponderante na reprodução do Estado burocrático racista colonial no pós-independência (Varela 2017) e que, sustentada pelas teorias da escola da modernização, constrói o Estado pós-independência e consolida a mestiçagem como identidade de todos os cabo-verdianos, diferenciando-os, do ponto de vista identitário e civilizacional, dos outros africanos.

Não obstante estas evidências históricas, a literatura científica cabo-verdiana tem sido omissa no estudo dos movimentos sociais, salvo um ou outro trabalho, sobretudo no campo da história colonial. Silva (2005) considera que, do ponto de vista sociológico, o movimento social mindelense do início do século XX é uma entidade trans-classista gerada num contexto de crise e cuja organização é fluída e precária. Aponta que a grande preocupação dos seus líderes era a formalização de uma espécie de liga ou rede de organizações cívicas que pudesse servir de embrião de futuros sindicatos ou até de partidos políticos regionalistas.

Segundo Zibechi (2015), existe a tendência de se conceptualizar os movimentos sociais a partir de marcos eurocêntricos, centrando-se apenas nos seus aspectos formais, desde as formas organizativas até aos ciclos de mobilização. Entende que, ao definir-se este tipo de organização a partir desse marco conceptual, se está a excluir um conjunto de movimentos, na medida em que no contexto sul-americano, africano ou asiático, a maior parte não actua dessa maneira.

Mueller (2018), por seu lado, afirma que a literatura dos movimentos sociais tende a olhar os protestos, independentemente da sua natureza pacifista ou violenta, através de dois distintos processos confluentes: o seu início e o seu crescimento popular. Logo, entende que analisar apenas um desses processos fornece-nos um diagnóstico incompleto, uma vez que, ao focar-se somente no início, se está a ignorar os desafios desprendidos pelo recrutamento e organização dos mesmos; de igual modo, ao centrar a atenção apenas na participação popular, está-se a tornar difícil a explicação do porquê e quando o processo foi desencadeado. Isto porque cada processo envolve um conjunto diferente de actores e se, para iniciar é necessário existir a figura de um líder, para que o movimento cresça é fundamental haver adesão de outras pessoas. A vida e a ampliação do movimento, portanto, irão depender da coordenação e da cooperação entre as diferentes partes envolvidas no processo.

No caso africano, depreende que o uso do termo vaga, permite identificar a continuidade dos movimentos sociais e que a sua aplicação é divergente de como normalmente é utilizada pela ciência política. Na óptica desta área académica considera-se que as vagas de protestos precedem, naturalmente, vagas de mudança de regime. No caso das vagas de protestos, pelo contrário, derivam transformações na sociedade e não nas estruturas de governação. Estas transformações incluem o aumento da frequência dos protestos, as novas ligações entre os actores e sectores envolvidos, o surgimento de tácticas inovadoras de acção coletiva e a possibilidade de revisar os quadros mentais de modo a entender o lugar dos movimentos num possível novo mundo. A inovação da proposta é demonstrar que as vagas de protestos não acontecem

num vazio, mas sim num contexto herdado por uma anterior mobilização (Chalcraft 2016 *cit. in* Mueller 2018).

Tomando como referência estas duas lógicas teórico-construtivas dos movimentos sociais, percebemos que os factos referidos no abrir desta secção como as heranças que antecederam os protestos anti-coloniais cabo-verdianos, materializados nos anos de 1950 com a criação do PAIGC e o desenvolvimento das suas acções políticas e militares, bem como a prática subversiva ambígua de alguns líderes religiosos no processo (Varela 2011). Isto é, que tal como observa Mamdani (1995) noutros contextos africanos, estes movimentos antecessores actuaram como veículos de protestos que, não só prepararam o terreno no qual emergiram os movimentos nacionalistas, mas também serviram de âncora para a sua popularidade em alguns sectores sociais.

Diríamos que este período fica marcado pela passagem das ideias à prática do projecto do movimento pan-africanista emergido no século XIX com o objetivo de unir os negros africanos e seus descendentes, no combate ao racismo e à subjugação política, fruto do sistema colonial esclavagista. Embora a primeira geração de ativistas que construiu as bases do pan-africanismo tenha sido formada por intelectuais de tradição epistemológica ocidental (Barbosa 2012), estes contribuíram significativamente para a recuperação do conceito racializado do sujeito africano, assente em caraterísticas como dignidade, valorização própria e solidariedade negra (Mueller 2018).

Sob a liderança de Henry Williams, a então recém-fundada Associação Africana organizou o primeiro Congresso Pan-africano em 1900, sendo que o segundo e o terceiro foram organizados por W.E.B. Du Bois (Barbosa 2012; Adi 2017). Contudo, é de notar a fraca presença de intelectuais africanos e sul-americanos nos primeiros Congressos, facto explicado por Barbosa (2012) pela inexistência de redes de contacto entre os intelectuais negros dessas regiões e o centro de produção intelectual negros da época, os EUA. No caso cabo-verdiano, como indica Semedo (2006), alguns nativistas, considerados a primeira geração nacionalista cabo-verdiana, surgida nos finais do século XIX, já se consideravam ativistas pan-africanos e tinham participação em publicações organizadas pelo movimento sediado em Lisboa.

Cabo Verde, fruto da ligação estabelecida pela emigração para os EUA, iniciada no século XIX, e a influência da maçonaria norte-americana no movimento nativista cabo-verdiano (Semedo 2006), fazia parte dessa rede. Talvez por isso possamos falar de uma certa influência do pan-africanismo dos EUA dessa época no arquipélago. É de lembrar que esta primeira geração pan-africana emerge contra a subalternização do negro na sociedade

norte-americana e, no plano internacional, "postulava que os negros estadunidenses deveriam guiar os africanos para a civilização" (Barbosa 2012: 136). A mesma fórmula do nacionalismo luso-crioulo defendido nas ilhas (Fernandes 2013), radicalizado mais tarde pelo movimento claridoso na busca do reconhecimento pela estrutura colonialista portuguesa através da invenção da personalidade mestiça.

É, aliás, possível identificar, na tese da mestiçagem nativista, a dupla consciência teorizada por Du Bois (2007 [1903]), importada da dicotomia clássica da filosofia alemã (cultura x civilização) (Barbosa 2012), em que a personalidade negra norte-americana é apresentada como alguém que vivia o dilema identitário entre a comunal (negra) e a nacional (norte-americana). No caso cabo-verdiano, entre a busca da especificidade e a integração no ocidente. A viragem desse marco construto-identitário teve em Cabral (2013 [1970]) o seu protagonista, ao apelar aos cabo-verdianos que (re)africanizassem os seus espíritos e as suas mentes, como forma de reconquistar a sua personalidade africana esquecida pela força do poder simbólico colonialista missionário português, por via de processos de assimilação e aculturação.

No campo africano, a ideia da personalidade africana serviu de base ao princípio da unidade entre os povos africanos, que levou ao desenvolvimento do movimento *Back to Africa,* liderado por Marcus Garvey, que reforçou o nacionalismo africano e fez do Congresso Pan-africano de Manchester, em 1945, um marco para a luta de libertação e de unidade política africana (Nkrumah 1963). Com a independência do Gana em 1957, Nkrumah, sob a bandeira do pan-africanismo, promove, no ano de 1958, a Conferência de Todos os Povos Africanos, onde se veio a discutir os princípios democráticos do direito à autodeterminação e a declaração da urgência de África ser devolvida ao seu povo (Nyong'o 1995). Como deixa transparecer Graça (1998), foi esta a fórmula seguida por Cabral na edificação do projecto de frente comum de luta entre Guiné-Bissau e Cabo Verde que, entretanto, viria a conhecer profundas tensões.

Medeiros (2012) afirma que o maior erro de Cabral foi ter insistido na unidade racial de dois povos culturalmente diferentes um do outro. Aliás, como observa Tomás (2018), o entendimento que Cabral tinha da cultura estava ligado muito mais à sua biografia pessoal do que a uma ideia de nacionalismo capaz de dar conta da realidade étnica bissau-guineense. Afirma que a ideia de unidade cultural entre os dois povos, embora estratégica, estava longe de corresponder à sua visão idílica, visto que Cabo Verde e a Guiné-Bissau ocupavam uma posição hierárquica diferenciada no contexto do colonialismo português.

Convém lembrar que o cabo-verdiano, não obstante o desprezo luso, nunca foi submetido ao Estatuto do Indigenato. Esta realidade, associada ao facto dos bissau-guineenses não terem sido integrados no governo do arquipélago, ao contrário do que aconteceu com os cabo-verdianos na Guiné-Bissau, são apontados como umas das prováveis causas que levaram ao seu assassinato em 1973 e à ruptura da unidade dos dois países desencadeada pelo golpe de Estado de 1980 (Lopes 2013; Tomás 2018). Isto na sequência das profundas divergências surgidas no interior do movimento pan-africano cabo-verdiano (Lopes 2012a).

Do paradoxo da prosperidade ao apelo à política da dignidade

Nos discursos de Cabral (2013 [1970]) é sentida alguma inquietação sobre a governação pós-independência. Por várias vezes apontava o dedo a militantes formados na Europa e que ao ver o avanço da luta se apressavam a integrar o partido, mas cujo comportamento revelava que os seus principais objectivos eram aceder ao poder. Aristides Pereira, em entrevista a José Vicente Lopes, assinalou esse facto ao reconhecer que, nos anos de 1980, por questões ideológicas, alguns dirigentes aparentavam ganância desmesurada e sede de poder, o que veio a contribuir para a reprodução da fulanização, não só do partido-Estado, mas da própria sociedade. Mencionou também os jovens quadros do partido (que governaram o país entre os anos de 2001 a 2016) e as suas reticências à mudança, sentindo-se incomodados pela expressão da sociedade civil no Congresso do PAICV, em 1988, quando se decidiu começar a debater uma possível mudança de regime. Sobre eles disse que "a preocupação era partido, mas partido para subir, não para introduzir nenhum arejamento" (Lopes 2012b: 350).

Nesse Congresso, devido à crise económica e social que o país atravessava desde 1982, aprovou-se a liberalização económica (Lopes 2012a) e dois anos mais tarde declarou-se a intenção de avançar para a liberalização política (Évora 2004). Para Hutchful (1995), as transformações surgidas nesse período, em África, devem ser entendidas como resultado de um conjunto de mudanças políticas e económicas ocorridas na ordem global: o desaparecimento do bloco socialista enquanto alternativa económica e política mundial; a conquista da hegemonia militar pelos EUA; o processo da globalização económica, a emergência de uma força económica tripartida entre a União Europeia, a NAFTA e a cooperação de livre comércio do Japão e da Costa do Pacífico, que substituiu a competição militar pela económica; a reforma da ONU e a sua dominação pelos EUA e demais potências ocidentais, que inauguram uma nova filosofia de intervenção humanitária

nas zonas de conflito, com vista à promoção de uma *pax americana*; e a ascensão de movimentos sociais e, consequentemente, a emergência de uma sociedade civil internacional.

Foram, portanto, esses processos internos e externos que conduziram à realização das primeiras eleições multipartidárias em 1991, em que o MpD, partido recém-formado por grupos urbanos com sensibilidades ideológicas diferenciadas, venceu as eleições. É de realçar que, apesar da suposta demanda popular, o MpD foi fundado por um grupo de dissidentes do PAICV – os chamados trotskistas – que, ao imporem a sua agenda no processo de transição, evitaram que a mesma fosse controlada pela elite do poder (Évora 2004), tendo em pouco tempo, conseguido popularizar o movimento e absorver todas as frustrações e anseios dos cidadãos.

Se, no período da descolonização, numa lógica de africanização da memória, uma das primeiras acções foi a substituição de alguns símbolos esclavagistas e coloniais por figuras revolucionárias africanas, em 1991, um dos primeiros actos públicos do MpD, a partir de uma lógica de desafricanização da memória (Cardina & Rodrigues 2020), foi repor essas figuras e dar início a uma campanha de difamação da figura de Cabral, apresentado como uma fraude (Amado 2012).

Uma outra mudança radical foi a opção por uma agenda de reforma económica orientada pelas propostas e recomendações do Banco Mundial – BM e do Fundo Monetário Internacional, que vê o desenvolvimento, não como um processo conduzido por um Estado benevolente que procura o bem-estar colectivo, mas que resulta de decisões descentralizadas de indivíduos livres que procuram maximizar os seus benefícios. Estêvão (2011) descreveu as linhas básicas dessa agenda em três eixos: 1) a estabilização macroeconómica como prioridade; 2) a redução do papel do Estado e a libertação dos mercados (privatizações, desregulamentação, etc.); e 3) a orientação da produção para as exportações, de forma a transformá-las no motor do crescimento económico. Ainda que esta política tenha catapultado o arquipélago para um crescimento económico acima da média (cerca de 8,4 de média anual), de acordo com Estevão, não teve grande impacto sobre o modelo tradicional da economia arquipelágica e nem contribuiu para a diminuição das desigualdades sociais, que se mantiveram altas nos anos de 1990, à volta dos 0,59 por cento (INE 2018).

Do ponto de vista político-ideológico, com a passagem de um sistema leninista-marxista para um sistema neoliberal, difundiu-se a ideia de que a sociedade civil estaria livre dos mecanismos de repressão do aparelho do Estado (Lima 2012). Embora esta transição tenha permitido a realização de manifestações sem receio de represálias institucionais, como o caso das duas

grandes manifestações organizadas pelos estudantes do ensino secundário na cidade da Praia (em 1992 e 1994), na maioria das vezes, estas demonstrações aconteceram de forma confusa, quase sempre no bojo dos partidos e de forma bastante desorganizada.

Convém ter-se em conta que este período ficou marcado por aquilo que Aidi (2018) designou de ONGuificação da oposição. A reestruturação económica obrigou o Estado a recuar em matéria de políticas sociais que foram terceirizadas para as organizações da sociedade civil, tanto locais como internacionais, que passaram a ser financiadas pelos programas das agências de ajuda para o desenvolvimento, inaugurando aquilo a que se chamou de internacionalização da segurança social (Fowler 1992, *cit. in* Aina 1998). Assim, estando dependentes dos financiamentos e obrigados pelos doadores a submeterem se ao controlo do Estado, a sociedade civil entrou num processo de despolitização (Hucthful 1995), transformando-se numa sociedade servil (Costa 2013).

A fractura da coligação democrática poucos anos depois do MpD ter alcançado o poder, que se dividiu em três facções, contribuiu também para que a sociedade civil se tenha fragmentado. Essa fractura foi justificada pelos dissidentes como reacção aos laivos de autoritarismo desmedido pelos líderes do partido, que Évora (2004) explica como estando relacionado com as suas biografias políticas, visto terem sido socializados no regime anterior, onde ocuparam postos de confiança.

Foi nesse contexto de ambiguidade e crispação político-ideológica que o *rap* se consolida nos principais centros urbanos como espaço de denúncia, tornando visível o mal-estar social e proporcionando aos jovens a possibilidade de reformular as suas críticas, na medida em que se encontravam numa situação de desespero e desilusão (Lima 2012). Para Victor Duarte, *rapper* mindelense entrevistado em Março de 2020, o *rap* "não deixa de ser um movimento social, porque retrata muitas vivências (…), nós, desde há muito, fazemos críticas sobre o governo e sobre o que acontece em São Vicente e sobre o que não nos deixa satisfeitos com o governo de Cabo Verde, de uma forma geral". Essa ideia é também corroborada por Dj Letra, entrevistado no Mindelo, nesse mesmo período: "No início, preocupávamo-nos sempre com temas ousados, contra o sistema, temas de cariz social".

Mafeje (1995) chama a atenção para o facto de que as pessoas votam com expectativas altas que, caso não sejam satisfeitas, poderão resvalar para um sentimento de desilusão. O *rap* apenas veio amplificar este sentimento que, segundo Lima (2012), na esteira de Diouf (2003), possibilitou o surgimento de uma nova geografia de resistência e de manifestação desta desilusão social e política. As conversas desenvolvidas ao longo da pesquisa com *rappers* e

ativistas indicaram que, tal como observou Mafeje (1995) noutras paragens africanas, a percepção social, sobretudo juvenil, é de que a ideologia do mercado livre não conseguiu garantir o tão prometido bem-estar colectivo. Deste modo, face ao autoritarismo governamental, persistência da crise económica derivada da opção por uma política que, em vez produzir riqueza, produz ricos, somado aos escândalos de corrupção (Rosário 2013), o PAICV foi reconduzido ao poder nas legislativas de 2001.

Em 2015, ano em que o PAICV assinalou 14 anos de poder e Cabo Verde comemorou 40 anos de independência, o INE (2015) apresentou os números dos ganhos alcançados nas últimas quatro décadas, colocando o país no pódio africano dos países ditos de boa governação. Nesse mesmo ano, o então primeiro-ministro lança um livro de propaganda pessoal (Neves 2015), em que, autoproclamando-se uma continuidade de Cabral e através de um exercício de fulanização desses ganhos, preconizou um futuro risonho com a adopção de uma nova Agenda de Transformação. Uma agenda que, sob a liderança dos parceiros internacionais, iria transformar o arquipélago num centro internacional de prestação de serviços e base de apoio logístico (europeia e norte-americana) na sub-região oeste africana. Na prática, com a assinatura da parceria especial e o acordo de mobilidade de uma única direcção com a União Europeia estava a contribuir para a activação do papel histórico do arquipélago enquanto capataz do império (Varela & Lima 2017).

Os ativistas entrevistados consideram este tipo de declaração como prova de que estamos perante um novo estado de dependência. Mkandawire (1995) considera que, para os teóricos da política de ajustamento estrutural, o crescimento económico e, por conseguinte, o desenvolvimento, só pode ser alcançado a partir de uma boa governação, na forma como foi conceptualizado pelo BM. Desta forma, salienta que a política imposta fomentou nos países africanos alguns retrocessos alcançados com as independências, sendo o mais significativo a perda de soberania.

Varela (2008), na esteira de Mkandawire, entende que, na actual governação global neoliberal, os Estados pós-colonizados, além de continuarem a suportar os condicionalismos económicos impostos pelas instituições financeiras internacionais, sofrem também através das agendas dos programas de ajuda para o desenvolvimento, condicionalismos políticos. Nesse sentido, a expressão da boa governação para classificar estes Estados apresenta-se como vazia e relativa, já que serve também, paradoxalmente, para designar muitas transições políticas consideradas de sucesso, pese embora não terem tido como base processos ditos democráticos. Em vez de dar mais força aos Estados-alvo, esta lógica de relação internacional encerra-

os num ciclo vicioso de dependência, apesar do discurso de que a ajuda ao desenvolvimento esteja a diminuir.

José Maria Neves justificou a opção do seu governo da seguinte forma: "Os instrumentos criados não são suficientes para responder isoladamente às questões do presente, nem para preparar esse futuro que aponta para o desenvolvimento avançado, senão no quadro de uma agenda global, liderada pelas Nações Unidas e de uma intensa cooperação e parceria internacional, tanto na vertente multilateral, como na vertente bilateral" (2015: 87). Para Lima (2020), este discurso significa que, de uma dependência consentida de matriz ideológica socialista, vivenciada no período pós-independência, se passou para uma dependência declarada de matriz ideológica híbrida, no contexto pós-democrático.

De acordo com Silva (2014), apesar dos inegáveis ganhos nesses 40 anos de governação, Cabo Verde passa actualmente por uma crise de reprodução do modelo de distribuição social e de crescimento económico vigente desde a independência, ou melhor dito, desde sempre (Varela 2017). Germano Almeida questiona: "com a independência, recebemos a ajuda da comunidade internacional, que foi bem gerida, de um modo geral, mas pergunto: será que essa ajuda foi usada no sentido de criarmos, de facto, um país capaz de viver de forma autónoma" (Lopes 2014a)? Segundo este escritor e nacionalista cabo-verdiano, a impressão que dá é que hoje se vive num país gerido como se rico fosse, o que tem provocado grandes tensões entre os partidos e respectivos membros muito virados para os seus próprios umbigos e o povo.

> *Oji e papu retu sem papa na lingua/N representa maioria di família/Kes ki sta sufru ku nhos dimagujia/Kaza para todus e la simiteriu/Es la e kaza pa alguns, kes ki tem dinheru/Kau sta mau pa tudu kau/Ma pamodi ki rabidanti riba Praia ta pirsiguidu/Koitadu di kes pobris/Sta minis dizinpregadu i lisensiadu/I nhos na Parlamentu ta diskuti pasadu en diretu na TV moda un filmi di ason (…). Nu sta paga pa ses stragu/Nu tem ki korta nhos karu di luxu/Subsidiu sem sentidu pa ministros/Dja sta bom di mama/Stop nipotismu/Izenplu tem ki dadu gosi e tenpu sakrifisiu/Nu tem ki subi kel salariu minimu/Kualidadi di vida pa noz idozus/Nu tem ki pusta mas na nôs minis…Povu na puder/Omi ku mudjer/ Si bu ka luta pa bu tera ken ki sta ta bem fazel?/Nu teni tenpu pa parodia i na manifestason poku omis ku mudjer ki sta da kontribuison/Ma nu ka podi kala/ Di Santo Antão a Brava/Ora ki kuzas fadja/Nu tem ki sai pa prasa/Sabi ma nada ka ta muda sem kel unidade i luta/Nu skesi di partidu i nu poi mo na mas (…). Ku povu na puder nu sta bem muda Cabo Verde* [Hélio Batalha, Povu na Puder, 2014].

Para os jovens como o *rapper* Batalha, entrevistado em Abril de 2020, o que se espera da classe política é o regresso daquilo que Fukuyama (2018)

denominou de política da dignidade e não a reprodução de uma política de inimizade (Mbembe 2017). Porém, para que se passe de uma para a outra, é necessário um apelo ao povo para a prática de uma política de indignação (Innerarity 2016).

> *Poderia falar de Nelson Mandela, Bem Bella, Agostinho Neto, mas temos é de falar de Cabral. Foi ele quem lutou pela nossa independência, que fez a luta armada e deu a cara na ONU. Há um livro escrito por Cabral com muitos tópicos sobre os objectivos a seguir depois da independência. Quando hoje olhas para este país, vês coisas diferentes (…) e quando trazemos Cabral para a cena do rap, o objectivo é mostrar aos políticos que estão no governo a real essência da igualdade, liberdade e fraternidade, que é o que o povo precisa* [Hélio Batalha, entrevista realizada na Praia, em Agosto de 2011].

Este tipo de reivindicação, reiniciada nos anos de 1950 e internacionalizada a partir de Maio de 68, segundo Fukuyama (2018), representam uma continuidade da revolução francesa (ou da própria revolução haitiana), uma vez que têm na exigência de dignidade e reconhecimento a sua força-motriz. De acordo com Mafeje (1995), o *slogan* liberdade, igualdade e fraternidade não se traduziu numa igualdade e solidariedade entre pessoas em situação de desvantagem social. Porém, o seu valor reside no facto de ter rompido as fronteiras da sociedade feudal e ter inaugurado uma nova era histórica, em que as novas liberdades não só puderam ser desfrutadas, como os seus limites verificados.

O cenário do fim da história apresentado por Francis Fukuyama e o falhanço do socialismo como alternativa ao capitalismo e à democracia neoliberal, segundo Presthold (2009), tirou relevância a muitos ícones revolucionários que foram substituídos por figuras musicais globais, como Tupac ou Bob Marley, representados como os novos heróis revolucionários. Hutchful (1995), no entanto, entende que o que ocorreu não foi o triunfo final da razão liberal ou o fim da história. Pelo contrário, o que ocorreu foi a libertação de muitas histórias locais e nacionais secundarizadas pela dinâmica do imperialismo. Portanto, a morte do socialismo oficial possibilitou o ressurgimento de velhas fontes de resistência mais radicais e extremistas, com destaque para o nacionalismo e fundamentalismo religioso. Estes, e sobretudo as figuras apontadas por Presthold, apresentaram narrativas que continham similaridades com as experiências de muitos jovens a nível mundial.

Desse jeito, em Cabo Verde, do *rap* de intervenção social dos anos de 1990, inaugurou-se nos anos de 2000, uma outra forma de estar no *rap*, que encontrou no *revolutionary gangsta rap* de Tupac e nos discursos de Cabral,

importantes ferramentas de interpelação do poder e de mobilização popular, sobretudo juvenil e em situação de precariedade e marginalidade. Isto num contexto marcado por altos índices de desigualdades, sobretudo do acesso às oportunidades e de segregação dos sonhos. Em 2015, o INE (2018) indicava que no contexto urbano, 20 por cento da população mais rica concentrava 56,7 por cento das despesas realizadas e que além da pobreza ter migrado do campo para a cidade, o que criou uma imensa geografia da pobreza urbana, o seu perfil continuava jovem (60% dos pobres têm menos de 25 anos) e feminina (53%). Cerca de 76,1 por cento das famílias consideraram que a gestão do orçamento mensal é feita com dificuldades (20,8% com muita dificuldade), em particular, as despesas com a alimentação.

Em termos políticos, o INE (2013) apontava que, embora a maioria dos cabo-verdianos preferissem o regime democrático, o interesse pela política era bastante baixo e a classe política em que menos confiavam eram os deputados, sendo que 48,8 por cento declararam que os políticos não dão respostas às suas necessidades. A participação nos protestos era, no entanto, bastante baixa e apenas 49 por cento da população disse identificar-se com um partido político. A maioria (44,5%) acreditava que a incidência da corrupção era preocupante e que o governo era pouco eficiente no seu combate (40,9%). O Afrobarometer (2017) indicava que a maioria dos cabo-verdianos considerava que o país era mal dirigido e, tal como em 2014, cerca de metade dos inquiridos entendiam que a situação económica do país era má. Cerca de 76 por cento mostravam-se poucos satisfeitos com o funcionamento da democracia e 82 por cento achavam que os políticos nunca, ou poucas vezes, fazem o melhor para os ouvir.

A análise de uma sondagem recente (Borges & Semedo 2021) indica que 41 por cento dos cabo-verdianos consideram que em Cabo Verde a democracia apresenta grandes problemas e cerca de 82 por cento dos jovens entre os 18 e 35 anos não se mostram satisfeitos com ela e não se sentem representados. Indica que os jovens são os que menos participam nas eleições, mas que evidenciam grandes preocupações com a governação, em matéria da gestão do desemprego, criminalidade, desigualdade e pobreza.

Cabralistas (*wake up*): a rua como campo político de luta

Em 2012, num comício para as eleições presidenciais num dos bairros da capital, o então primeiro-ministro e presidente do PAICV, na ressaca das divisões interinas provocada pela imposição do seu candidato, afirmou que Cabral tinha sido assassinado pelos dirigentes do PAIGC. Colocando-se no papel deste líder pan-africano, comparou a insurgência interna do partido

com um dos possíveis episódios apontados como tendo sido a causa do seu assassinato. Como resposta, alguns *rappers* responderam com Cabralistas (*wake up*):

> *Intilijensia nu disenvolvi pa nu ka duminadu/Pa nu intendi nos prisenti nu tem ki studa nos pasadu/Sanpadjudu ku badiu mesmu inu nu ta kanta/Divison e kel simenti ki tugas tinha ki planta/Mas fasil duminanu si nu sta dividídu/Prusedi ses diskursu ku palavras difísil/Nhos kumesa sintetiza nhos ganansia e visível/ Sakrifika nhos irmon pamodi sedi di puder/Guvernus manipuladu sem da nun pirsiber/Nu foi vitima di un diskordia ki ti oji ta rifleti/Ma nu ta akridita na mudança* [Pex, Rabeladu Lopi & Hélio Batalha, Cabralistas (*wake up*), 2013]

Esse episódio, como muitos outros, revela a tendência de reprodução dos partidos políticos cabo-verdianos das lógicas de dominação morgadia, em que as relações se baseiam em laços de compadrio e clientelismo entre as chefias e a base militante, o que faz com que quaisquer desvios de orientação vertical sejam tratados como traição e os desviantes confinados ao ostracismo político-partidário e/ou social. Foi, por exemplo, o que aconteceu com alguns fundadores do movimento MAC#114, grupo de jovens, apoiantes do movimento de Cidadania, considerados pelo líder do partido de jovens turcos. Os mesmos que protagonizaram, no dia 30 de Março, uma das maiores demonstrações populares no arquipélago.

O pretexto oficial para a saída às ruas foi a aprovação, por unanimidade, na Assembleia Nacional da República, do Estatuto dos Titulares dos Cargos Públicos que previa, entre outras regalias, aumentos salariais para os políticos em função. Isto numa conjuntura em que a maioria das reivindicações salariais exigidas pelos sindicatos tinham sido rejeitadas devido à precária situação económica do país. Os protestos, manifestados anteriormente no aumento das abstenções nos sucessivos pleitos eleitorais, deviam-se também ao cansaço e descrença na classe política e nos partidos "e o seu manancial de cumplicidades, jogos de influência e corrupção".

> *O surgimento do MAC veio no sentido de criar nas pessoas aquela consciência política, no sentido de que, mesmo que tenhas uma simpatia ou uma ideologia política, mas tens sempre de pensar na unidade nacional, ou seja, mesmo que espelhes nas políticas do MpD ou do PAICV, falamos desses dois, porque são esses dois que têm maior representatividade, mas tu tens de te lembrar que tu não tens de ir cegamente no que eles fazem, se na verdade vês que as suas acções não se reflectem na colectividade (…). Os crioulos têm uma coisa, eles podem ser burros na política, mas quando o assunto é dinheiro, que lhes mexe com os bolsos, eles entendem. Basta entenderem que alguém lhes está a mexer-lhe com os bolsos, eles entendem. Foi nesse quesito que fomos reparando que as pessoas começaram a*

> *perceber muitas outras coisas que estavam aí e que não viam claramente (…). Fomos juntando isso a outras coisas que já estavam aí, como a questão do emprego ou desemprego na juventude e que ajudou muito para que o 30 de Março tivesse essa massificação. Porque as pessoas foram vendo que, de facto, os nossos políticos estavam a comer literalmente [no erário público], que muitas outras instituições não tinham dinheiro, porque eles viviam no luxo* [Ativista do *MAC*, entrevista realizada na Praia, em Março de 2020].

Embora alguns ativistas do MAC e participantes na manifestação, com quem conversámos, se tenham declarado cabralistas e colocado a luta de classe no centro da discussão, o enquadramento ideológico do movimento era pouco evidente, havendo uma ala a defender o neoliberalismo. Segundo um dos líderes entrevistado, o grupo "é tanto apologista da esquerda como da direita, desde que fosse um meio-termo e não o extremo de nenhum deles". Embora o MAC não fosse meramente cabralista, o certo é que arrastou muitos ativistas e grupos que se auto-intitulam cabralistas.

O grupo surge nas redes sociais, mais concretamente no *Facebook*, que funcionou como o lugar privilegiado por onde se tentava consciencializar a população e receber denúncias. Meses antes, na chamada Semana da República, tinham realizado as suas duas primeiras manifestações, não passando, no entanto, de uma dezena de jovens, todos membros do núcleo fundador. Embora na agenda tivessem a implementação da democracia participativa, o veto presidencial em tempo recorde do ETCP, a fulanização do protesto, a falta de uma visão integrada de acção e de uma agenda política concreta, bem como a insinuação de que poderiam transformar-se num partido político, pode ser considerado como um dos motivos que possibilitou a sua morte prematura.

> *A minha percepção talvez seja por causa daquela vontade manifestada de que as pessoas se integrassem, talvez nessa altura como partido. Mas o que constatei foi isso, que havia essa vontade de trazer pessoas com capital social para o MAC, o que não aconteceu e foi por isso que o MAC se dissolveu, eu analiso-o assim, porque não quiseram ou não puderam continuar sozinhos (...). Mas é possível, porque, considerando que as pessoas, e tudo o que se disse aqui, e toda essa adesão, que eu acredito que foi por isso, era um movimento contra os partidos políticos, então, é possível que as pessoas não quisessem aderir a um partido político e sim a um movimento civil* [Chissana Magalhães, entrevista realizada na Praia, em Março de 2020].

O *rap*, tanto da Praia como do Mindelo, foi um dos primeiros movimentos a associar-se aos protestos, servindo igualmente de seu fundo sonoro. Vários outros movimentos, como a *Korrenti Ativizta* e a Associação *Kilombo*, pelo facto de não terem sido devidamente aproveitados, impossibilitaram a

territorialização do MAC nos bairros. Caso isso tivesse acontecido, o grupo poderia ter atingido outro tipo de público que não apenas uma parcela do chamado novo proletariado e a nova classe urbana aburguesada dependente directa ou indirectamente do Estado. É de lembrar que tanto um como outro, assumidamente cabralistas e pan-africanos, destacaram-se como mediadores, face aos altos índices de violência dos gangues de rua na cidade da Praia, ganhando com isso alguma notoriedade e poder comunitário.

Como salienta Lima (2020), as ações do dia 30 de Março devem ser entendidas como o culminar de um conjunto de demonstrações de indignação, liderados por jovens que marcaram a paisagem urbana cabo-verdiana a partir de 2005. Todavia, o vazio político deixado pelo MAC, depois de ter criado uma enorme expectativa nos seus seguidores, contribuiu para que se instalasse uma certa desilusão e desconfiança, em relação aos movimentos sociais e ao trabalho desenvolvido nos últimos anos. Ainda assim, ao desgastar o governo do PAICV, estas demonstrações de rua criaram condições para que o MpD voltasse ao poder, em 2016. Contudo, as ambiguidades políticas e ideológicas do MAC ficaram expostas com a entrada de alguns ativistas mais mediáticos para a estrutura juvenil do MpD. Em 2021, o seu suposto líder participou na lista deste partido nas eleições legislativas e foi recentemente nomeado assessor especial do Primeiro-Ministro, posicionando-se nas redes sociais com uma postura político-ideológica contrária ao colocado antes.

O vazio deixado pelo MAC em 2016 foi retomado em 2017 pelo recém-criado *Sokols*. Surgido também nas redes sociais, este movimento organizou uma grande demonstração popular contra o poder centralizado da Praia em prol da regionalização e autonomia da ilha de São Vicente no dia da comemoração dos 42 anos de independência nacional. O movimento herda o nome dos Falcões Portugueses de Cabo Verde ou *Sokol* em actividade entre os anos de 1936 e 1939, que Cabral (2015 [1963]) menciona como um grupo de resistência formado por cabo-verdianos. Não obstante, segundo Carvalho (2011), o nome *Sokol* foi importado da antiga Checoslováquia, bem como a ideia baseada nos ideais nativistas dos povos eslavos, base do racismo existencial e epistémico ocidental. O movimento autodissolveu-se, após tentativas de co-optação pela Mocidade Portuguesa, segundo Cabral, como uma forma de protesto e de resistência. Em Outubro de 2019, no Mindelo, a jornalista e ativista Matilde Dias em entrevista, definia o novo *Sokols* da seguinte forma: "O referencial não é africano, não é ligado a Cabral ou à nossa identidade africana, é sempre uma questão que tem muito a ver com os referenciais daqui". Entretanto, para o líder deste movimento,

> *se quisermos que a democracia em Cabo Verde evolua e, contrariamente àquilo que dizem que queremos, dividir Cabo Verde, o que é um absurdo, nós queremos unilo. Porque, numa casa, se houver desigualdade, os irmãos ficam mais desunidos. E mesmo falando de Santiago, propriamente dito, há grandes assimetrias dentro da Praia (…) Ele [Presidente da Câmara da Praia] mesmo diz que tem de haver toda uma descentralização, para que haja outros pólos de desenvolvimento, para que as pessoas não tenham de ir obrigatoriamente para lá. Em Santo Antão, todas as pessoas que têm curso vão para Praia, as que não têm, vêm para São Vicente* [Salvador Mascarenhas, entrevista realizada no Mindelo, em Outubro de 2019].

O *Sokols* retoma as reivindicações apresentadas pela geração nativista e os movimentos sociais proletários mindelenses do início do século XX, apresentando a autonomia e a criação de um senado em Santiago e em São Vicente como solução para o problema das assimetrias regionais. Vai buscar também, no *rap* mindelense, o meio para a disseminação de suas denúncias e ideias contra uma suposta República de Santiago, termo cunhado por Onésimo Silveira (Lopes 2014b).

> *A maioria apoiou a causa, porque, no início, sentimo-lo como um escape para o sufoco da ilha, mas, lá pelo meio, a malta começou a perceber que ia dar à mesma. Organizar uma, duas ou três manifestações, fazer aquele barulho, reunir aquela multidão na rua e, na prática nada é feito. Ou seja, estamos a perder o nosso tempo. Estamos a gastar a nossa energia num movimento que é suposto fazer algo depois disso e não faz nada. Quando fazes uma ou duas manifestações, com a quantidade de pessoas que saiu na rua, alguma mudança, mesmo que pouca, tem de ser feita. A partir daí, a malta não vê nada, fica cansada e recua* [Dj Letra, entrevista realizada no Mindelo, em Março de 2020].

Rappers como Gol Waine, Seiva, Revan ou o colectivo Nigazz Ponta, todos entrevistados no âmbito desta pesquisa, são algumas das várias figuras do movimento *rap* mindelense que deram a cara à causa, como também o tinham feito com o MAC, mas foram pouco a pouco recuando.

> *Da primeira vez fui e correu tudo bem. Já da segunda vez fiquei com o pé atrás. Fui lá para cantar, eu e o Indzays. Fiquei com o pé atrás, porque, quando estavam a fazer o discurso no palco, apresentaram uma senhora a quem iam apoiar, caso ela se candidatasse. Crias um movimento, antes de te afirmares, já estás a apoiar alguém. Estás a apoiar essa pessoa. A partir do momento que a apoias, todas essas pessoas que lá estão vão votar. Depois ela ganha. E quem é que a vai tirar de lá? Onde é que fica o Sokols. Estás a perceber? É complicado (…). Sokols é um partido político. Fiquei com a ideia de que Sokols é do PAICV (…) As pessoas são ligadas ao PAICV. E não só, eles atacam por todos os lados. Como um movimento para precisar estar a atacar a tudo. Tens de ter um plano e dizer: "durante este ano vamos fazer isto, isto e isto". Não é: "já foste aqui, já*

> *foste acolá". Tem de ser esse plano (…). Acreditei naquela autonomia. Precisas de autonomia. Mas, também há outra coisa, eles querem a autonomia, mas querem-na para já e autonomia não se consegue para já. Tem de se ter noção do que se quer. Imagina, como é que vais descentralizar tudo. Tirar tudo da Praia (…). São Vicente pode conseguir alguma coisa. O que é que as outras ilhas vão conseguir? Nada. O que Santo Antão irá conseguir? Sal e Boa Vista podem até conseguir alguma coisa, agora o resto, nada*. (Gol Waine, entrevista realizada no Mindelo, em Março de 2020).

Tal como nos disse Gol Waine, surgido igualmente noutras entrevistas, esse afastamento prendeu-se com a desconfiança da relação do movimento com o PAICV, mas também com a suspeita de que o seu real objectivo seria alcançar o poder autárquico em 2020 e a notória falta de uma agenda política concreta.

Sendo certo que nenhum dos dois movimentos destacados se identificam com o pan-africanismo, não obstante um dos seus principais líderes se considerar cabralista, o período entre as suas acções viu nascer, na Praia, um outro movimento declaradamente pan-africano: o MFPA-CV, de inspiração cabralista, cujo comité nacional foi criado após responderem, em 2015, à convocatória internacional para a participação no Congresso Federalista Pan-Africano. Com o objectivo de reunificar os povos africanos, o MFPA reconstrói um paradigma pan-africano a partir das ideias centrais de Cheikh Anta Diop: a África como berço da humanidade e a unidade afro-negra, fundada na sua relação histórico-cultural com o Egipto Antigo e a Núbia, enquanto primeiras civilizações humanas. De Frantz Fanon recuperam, por um lado, a compreensão da cultura negra e tradição africana como algo dinâmico ligado à vivência popular e, por outro, a visão do processo de descolonização como algo em aberto, compreendido como uma luta que se coloca também contra o neocolonialismo vigente em Cabo Verde.

Um dos seus principais argumentos é de que, tal como a transição para a independência, a transição democrática incluiu apenas aspectos formais e regras constitucionais operativas do sistema multipartidário. Na prática, entendem que a elite política cabo-verdiana, em particular e africana no geral, traíram as esperanças da revolução ao alcançarem o poder, substituindo o colonial por um nacional oligárquico, servil aos antigos colonos.

Depois de terem organizado algumas actividades de consciencialização identitária e política, bem como de tentar articular os diversos movimentos que se dizem pan-africanos saídos na sua maioria do universo *hip-hop*, os seus coordenadores participaram no pré-Congresso de preparação do

Congresso Federalista Pan-Africano realizado em 2018 no Gana, por ocasião da comemoração do 60º aniversário da histórica Conferência de Todos os Povos Africanos. A sua participação nesse Congresso marca a sua integração oficial no novo movimento pan-africano.

Contudo, vários outros ativistas, incluindo *rappers*, têm participado, desde 2017, em intercâmbios internacionais na África do Sul, promovidos pela escola Nkrumah. Para o Pan-Africanismo, cujo objectivo principal é a educação política dos jovens africanos para a luta num contexto de globalização marcado pela luta de classes, estes intercâmbios têm possibilitado também a vinda a Cabo Verde de alguns ativistas do continente.

Com uma agenda bem definida e lutando contra o afro-pessimismo que impera no arquipélago, ambos os movimentos têm encontrado na política comunitária, pensada a partir das premissas da escola de sociabilidade, a solução para os problemas sociais cabo-verdianos, mas fora das esferas político-partidárias e do próprio Estado. Nessa lógica, argumentam que o futuro de África passa pela construção de uma visão contemporânea do estilo de vida tradicional dos seus povos, fundada numa base colectivista e na mútua responsabilidade social. Através de um interessante trabalho de consciencialização identitária e política, que tem na *Marxa* Cabral ou Marcha do Povo um dos seus principais marcos de afirmação cultural e política, mantêm preservada a chama dos protestos e os ideais do pan-africanismo cabralista.

Notas finais

Neste artigo procuramos contextualizar, a partir de uma perspectiva histórica, o surgimento dos movimentos sociais e de protestos em Cabo Verde, tendo as cidades da Praia e do Mindelo como campo de pesquisa, identificar a sua natureza e as ideologias que os guiam e perceber o papel desempenhado pelo *rap* em todo o processo. Para tal, a abordagem metodológica utilizada foi a qualitativa, suportada por entrevistas e conversas informais, sem deixar de lado o uso da estatística oficial e das narrativas do *rap*.

Vimos que o *rap* proporcionou a vários jovens, em situação de precariedade e marginalidade, o acesso a uma plataforma transnacional e pan-africana de reivindicação que lhes permitiu produzir uma auto-reflexão, enquanto sujeitos políticos, e ler criticamente o contexto sociopolítico onde se inserem.

Os *rappers,* autodeclarados revolucionários e mensageiros do povo, ao recuperarem o legado de Amílcar Cabral e os discursos pan-africanistas, contextualizaram historicamente a sua existência e deslocaram para o

espaço público dos principais centros urbanos os discursos infra-políticos dos becos e das pontas dos territórios em resistência. Com isso, apelaram constantemente à necessidade de unidade destes territórios, de modo a realizar uma nova luta pela dignidade colectiva e juvenil, criando condições para mobilizações em torno de movimentos como o MAC e o *Sokols*, no qual participaram activamente.

Ainda que as acções do MAC e do *Sokols* ou de qualquer outro surgido na segunda metade dos anos de 2000, com destaque para a *Korrenti Ativizta* e Associação *Kilombo*, tenham coincidido com a cronologia dos protestos observados no continente africano, não foram por eles influenciados, pelo menos directamente. Sendo certo que o movimento *hip-hop* teve inspiração nos movimentos anti-racistas e pan-africanos norte-americanos, os restantes tiveram como principal referência a Primavera Árabe e as ocupações das praças europeias. A aproximação aos protestos africanos apenas se dá muito mais tarde, com as agendas pan-africanas do MFPA e da escola Nkrumah, conectando ativistas das ilhas com alguns movimentos do continente.

Em termos ideológicos, tanto o MAC como o *Sokols* colocaram ênfase na questão classista, embora a principal agenda de reivindicação deste segundo tenha sido a regionalização, cuja pauta é recuperada dos movimentos sociais mindelenses do início do século XX. É, portanto, um movimento com um legado de resistência à identidade africana e uma certa tendência para o afro-pessimismo, apesar da forte contribuição de alguns intelectuais do Mindelo na luta pela libertação e um dos bairros da cidade ter sido declarado zona libertada antes da independência nacional. Pelo contrário, os movimentos de cariz pan-africano, que situam historicamente o seu legado na resistência dos africanos auto-libertos, mesmo quando se auto-identificam como cabralistas, subdividem-se em quatro vertentes: a renascença africana de Cheikh Anta Diop; o socialismo africano de Kwame Nkrumah; o rastafarianismo de Marcus Garvey; e o afrocentrismo de Molefe Kete Asante.

Por fim, é de referir que compreendemos as acções destes movimentos como fazendo parte de uma reação juvenil, com base na descrença do papel do Estado construído à luz da teoria de modernização em assegurar o bem-estar social. Isto num contexto marcado pela reprodução de relações tardo-coloniais promovidas por uma classe política que privilegia as lógicas político-corporativistas, segundo Varela (2008), denunciadas nos finais dos anos de 1990 por Onésimo Silveira, ao afirmar que a abertura democrática substituiu um regime de partido-Estado por um regime de Estado-do-partido.

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Why Nigerian *Agbada* Fabric is (often) Imported, While Indian *Sari* Fabric is Local: A Comparative History of Textile Manufacturing

Yarri B. Kamara*

Abstract

In the 1980s, both India and Nigeria had textile sectors that satisfied their large domestic demand. Today, however, Nigeria imports most of its textiles, including identity-imbued fabrics, while India is a major textiles producer. This article proposes three explanatory factors for this divergence based on a review of secondary sources. From independence, Indian policy placed greater emphasis on supporting craft and small-scale textile production, whereas the craft sector in Nigeria was neglected. Nigeria's indigenisation of industry strategies failed to achieve endogenous processes in the textile industry, whereas the Indian textile sector was characterised by high Indian ownership and endogenous skills and technologies that rendered the sector resilient to shocks. Lastly, while both countries adopted import-substituting industrialisation strategies, the Nigerian textile sector benefited from little trade protection as smuggling greatly undermined the protection in place.

Keywords: textiles, manufacturing, crafts, industrialisation, identity fabrics, Nigeria, India

Résumé

Dans les années 1980, l'Inde et le Nigeria avaient des secteurs textiles qui satisfaisaient leur importante demande intérieure. Aujourd'hui, cependant, le Nigeria importe la plupart de ses textiles, y compris des tissus identitaires, tandis que l'Inde est un important producteur de textiles. A partir d'une revue de sources secondaires, cet article propose trois facteurs explicatifs de cette différence. Dès l'indépendance, l'Inde a davantage mis l'accent sur le soutien

* Institut Free Afrik, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Email: yarri.kamara@outlook.com

à la production artisanale et à petite échelle de textiles, alors que le secteur de l'artisanat au Nigeria était négligé. Les stratégies nigérianes de l'indigénisation industrielle n'ont pas abouti aux processus endogènes dans l'industrie textile, tandis que le secteur textile indien était caractérisé par une forte proportion d'industriels locaux et des compétences et technologies endogènes permettant au secteur de résister aux chocs. Enfin, les deux pays ont adopté des stratégies d'industrialisation de substitution aux importations, mais le secteur textile nigérian a bénéficié de peu de protection commerciale car la contrebande a affaibli considérablement les protections en vigueur.

Mots-clés : textile, fabrication, artisanat, industrialisation, tissus identitaires, Nigeria, Inde

Introduction

Globalisation has led to the increasing uniformisation of dress across the world with widespread adoption of Western-style clothing. Some countries, however, still maintain a significant level of non-Western dress. India and Nigeria are among these: both countries are famous for weddings with prominent displays of local wear and their leaders rarely appear in Western dress. Different forms of local dress are often worn with pride as markers of cultural identity. One could expect that demand for identity-imbued dress would be met principally through locally produced fabrics. While this is largely the case in India – *saris, salwar kameez* and *akhan sherwanis* are made from made-in-India fabrics – it is generally not the case in Nigeria today, where *agbadas, iro* and *bubas* and wedding *aso-ebi*[1] are often made from imported fabric.

Some handwoven Nigerian fabrics, such as *aso-oke*, and resist-dyed fabrics (*adire*), continue to be produced or processed locally. However, the majority of other fabrics considered as markers of Nigerian, or more widely African, identity, are imported today. These fabrics include wax-print fabrics (called *ankara* in Nigeria), Guinea brocade (also known as *shedda* or *bazin*) and Nigerian lace. These fabrics, considered 'African', have foreign origins,[2] but in the 1980s, when the Nigerian textile industry was at its peak, all were also being manufactured locally and today some mills still produce these fabrics.

Therefore, from an economic perspective, understanding why Indians use locally produced fabric for their identity wear whereas Nigerians rely largely on imported fabric is an issue of understanding the history of textile manufacturing in the two countries. This article uses comparative historical analysis to identify factors that enabled the Indian industry to satisfy its large domestic demand, and those that fragilised Nigeria's industry, leaving its textile market flooded by imports. The period of analysis focuses on the

decades preceding independence – that is, from the 1930s for India and 1940s for Nigeria – to the 1990s, the decade in which Indian and Nigerian textile performances markedly started to diverge. The article starts by presenting the study methodology and justification for a comparison between India and Nigeria. This is followed by a brief overview of the history of textile manufacturing in the two countries. The three sections that follow explore explanatory factors for the divergence in Indian and Nigerian textile-manufacturing trajectories: the first concerns synergies between craft and industrial manufacturing; the second, the level of endogenisation in the textile sector; and the third, the possibility to effectively limit importation of textiles.

Methodology

The comparative analysis uses mainly secondary sources. A limited number of interviews were carried out in Nigeria to confirm and complement findings from the literature.[3] There is a vast literature on Indian textile history and a growing body of literature on the Nigerian experience. The latter literature has identified an array of reasons explaining the decline of a once-flourishing Nigerian textile industry. Some explanations, such as poor electricity supply driving up production costs, are not explored further here (Muhammad et al. 2018; Maiwada and Renne 2013; Banjoko, Iwuji and Bagshaw 2012; Aminu 2016). This article focuses instead on factors that can be more fully fleshed out through qualitative comparison.

The article ascribes to the new comparative economic history approach, which posits that economic processes are best understood by systematically comparing experiences across time and countries (Hatton, O'Rourke and Taylor 2007). In his comparative study of how nations cope with crisis, Jared Diamond quips: 'Those who study just one country end up understanding no country' (Diamond 2019: 13). Indeed, comparison offers new perspectives. Nevertheless, a comparative approach has limitations: it cannot attain the same depth of knowledge as when working on a single country. With this in mind, this article, which may be the first in the literature to directly compare Nigerian and Indian textile experiences, has the modest ambition of highlighting a few salient explanatory factors and the hope of spurring further research.

The study adopted an inductive approach, focused on identifying factors that were present in India's relatively successful trajectory, and less present or absent in Nigeria's, or vice versa, as a way of bringing a fresh perspective to explanations of Nigeria's textile failure. The analysis pointed to explanatory variables from the broad realm of economic nationalism, and

the article focuses on three non-mutually exclusive facets. Given the array of definitions and interpretations of economic nationalism,[4] fleshing out the different facets has the utility of helping refine and nuance the concept of economic nationalism.

The case selection was based on the strategic commonalities that India and Nigeria presented. Nigeria was also singled out for its status as an exemplary case of the failure of textile industrialisation in West Africa. If any country should have a thriving textile industry in the region, it should be Nigeria. India and Nigeria are among the most populous countries on their continents, and while India's population may be roughly ten times that of Nigeria, the latter has since independence, at least, represented a significant consumer market.[5] Kilby (1969) estimated that the Nigerian market was large enough for the establishment of a large-scale textile mill as early as the 1890s, when an estimated 8 million yards of cloth were traded. Thin domestic markets have therefore not constrained textile development in either country. Both countries, at independence from Britain, also had high levels of poverty and a largely illiterate population. One can suppose thus that both countries faced similar constraints in terms of consumer income and a modern skilled workforce.

Table 1: India and Nigeria – General Indicators

	At independence (or earliest available year)		**1990**	
	India	**Nigeria**	**India**	**Nigeria**
Population (million)	376 (1950)	45 (1960)	873	95
GNI per capita (US$)	90 (1962)	100 (1962)	380	560
Adult literacy rate	12%	–	48% (1991)	55% (1991)

Sources: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; Macrotrends.net (data sourced from World Bank); UNESCO Institute of Statistics

The most salient reason for comparing the two, however, is their textile history, and notably the shared sequence of strong precolonial textile manufacturing, disruption by European powers from about the seventeenth century, and a resurgence of textile manufacturing post-independence based on nationalist import-substitution strategies. This sequence is presented in the section that follows.

Overview of Textile Manufacturing History in India and Nigeria

Prior to the seventeenth century, it can be said that the Indian subcontinent clothed the world: South Asia accounted for approximately a quarter of global textile output (Riello and Roy 2009). India's highly competitive handloom weaving industry produced quality cottons that seduced European markets to such an extent that manufacturers there lobbied for protection. British manufacturers obtained this in the 1701 Calico Act and renewed legislation in 1721, severely restricting imports of Indian textiles for the domestic market (but allowing them for re-export elsewhere, Gupta 2013). Indian textiles were also widely sold in Africa, both on the Indian Ocean coast and indirectly to West Africa (Inikori 2009; Machado 2009). To counter Indian textiles, European powers implemented the first import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategies, closing their markets to Indian textiles to consolidate their own industries. By the mid-nineteenth century, Britain's textile industry had upstaged India as the centre of global textile manufacturing, and India started importing textiles from its coloniser.

Nigerian textiles did not play as prominent a role in global markets and its textile history is not as well documented as India's. However, the region that would become Nigeria had several hubs of skilled textile manufacturing, notably the Yoruba kingdoms, the Igbo areas and the Hausa states. The Yoruba produced specialised cloths – *aso-ado,* or Benin cloths – specifically for export to the Benin kingdom prior to the arrival of Europeans in the fifteenth century. In the initial phase of trade with Europe, European traders operated as carriers exporting *aso-ado* to present-day Ghana. Between 1644 and 1646, for example, Dutch traders exported 16,000 pieces of *aso-ado* to the Gold Coast (Inikori 2009). In the Hausa regions, under the pre-seventeenth-century trans-Saharan trade, textiles from Borno were traded to North Africa, the Middle East and even Europe (Falola and Heaton 2008). The Kano indigo textile industry was particularly renowned in the nineteenth century. In 1851, European traveller H. Barth extolled the virtues of Kano as an excellent centre of textile production and estimated cloth sales at an equivalent of £60,000 per year (Onyeiwu 1997; Shea 2006).

European textile imports arrived in West Africa earlier than in India as they became an essential exchange commodity in the transatlantic slave trade (Hopkins 2019). Textile imports steadily increased from the seventeenth century, and initially these were largely composed of Indian textiles, re-exported by European traders. But as European industries matured, European textiles came to dominate, including significant quantities of white bast fabric. For the period 1880 to 1892, textiles averaged 44 per cent of the total imports that arrived in Lagos (Hopkins 2019: 179), and during

the colonial period textiles remained the single leading import, accounting for a quarter of imports in British West Africa (Hopkins 2019: 229).

In addition to seeking ready markets for its textiles, Britain tried to make its colonies a source of raw cotton to feed its textile industry. The British Cotton Growing Association (BCGA) was formed in 1902 to promote the supply of cotton from British colonies. During an earlier cotton crisis in the 1860s, Britain had turned to India, but challenges with securing supplies there had led Britain to focus on African colonies, including Nigeria. However, in Nigeria too, the BCGA had challenges and was frequently outcompeted by local weavers who offered higher prices for raw cotton than British industry was willing to pay (Onyeiwu 2000). Nonetheless, Nigerian weavers felt the burden of their supply of local cotton being diverted from them probably more strongly than their Indian counterparts.

Although Britain has been blamed for the demise of Indian and Nigerian textile production, finer analyses show that pockets of local manufacturing survived. Textile manufacturers in both countries maintained markets for high-quality luxury cloths that were too specific and difficult to reproduce industrially (Kriger 2006; Hopkins 2019; Roy 2013, 2020). On the one hand, there was a decline in demand for luxury cloths: domestic demand in India for luxuries of all kinds declined greatly with the demise of Moghul aristocrats under British colonialism (Maddison 1971), and Nigerian producers lost their historic West African export markets to European competition (Inikori 2009; Kriger 2006). On the other hand, specific tastes for certain luxury fabrics protected some markets from imports. Moreover, new pockets of demand arose: in Nigeria, farmers who grew rich from the palm oil trade stimulated the growth of *akwete* and *adire* cloths, for instance (Kriger 2006). Thus, locally produced textiles survived throughout the colonial period.

In the lead up to independence, efforts to relaunch local textile manufacturing stepped up. Both countries adopted ISI strategies that initially resulted in thriving textile manufacturing sectors. The textile sector represented the largest employment sector after agriculture in India (Kar 2015) and the largest formal sector employer after government in Nigeria. In 1984, when the Nigerian textile industry was at its peak, there were 175 textile factories, and the sector accounted for 22 per cent of employment and 15 per cent of manufacturing value (Muhammad et al. 2018; Onyeiwu 1997).

In the 1980s, both countries faced significant challenges. The highly regulated textile industry in India showed pockets of poor capability and high cost (Roy 1998) and the country as a whole faced a foreign exchange crisis (Ramesh 2017). Nonetheless, the industry continued to satisfy domestic demand for textiles. A Ministry of Textiles was established in 1983

to spearhead sectoral reform that initially focused on deregulating the sector, and then from 1991, a trade liberalisation programme – emphasising export promotion more than import liberalisation – was progressively embarked upon. Textile exports to the rest of the world rose (Ghosh 2000; Roy 1998; Kar 2015). Rodrik and Subramanian's (2005) analysis of Indian growth in the 1990s emphasises how it was the bases laid under preceding decades of ISI that enabled manufacturing growth in the 1990s. Nigeria, for its part was hit by falling oil prices from 1983. Foreign exchange reserves fell and imports of capital goods necessary for textile manufacturing became scarce, while the general economic crisis exacerbated infrastructural constraints, such as electricity supply. The textile industry started contracting from 1985 and in the 1990s declined rapidly.

There are thus several commonalities in the textile trajectories of India and Nigeria, until the 1990s, when their trajectories diverge: India's textile resurgence following colonial disruption continued, whereas Nigeria's textile industry declined. The pair thus constitute fertile ground for comparison. Nonetheless, there are some differences to keep in mind. The first concerns the scale of India's past textile experience, in particular with regards to export markets. As mentioned, precolonial India clothed the world. Indian textile producers and merchants had extensive experience catering to a variety of tastes in overseas markets in the precolonial period. Postcolonial India could thus reactivate a much larger reserve of technical and marketing expertise in the textile sector than Nigeria could. The second – linked somewhat to the first – is that India started modern industrialisation earlier than Nigeria. The pre-existence of significant merchant classes probably facilitated the earlier emergence of local capitalists in India (Roy 2013). The first modern textile mill was established in 1854 by a local entrepreneur, and by 1875 another fifty mills had opened (Kar 2015). Nigeria's first modern mill, Kaduna Textile Mill, opened in 1956, a full century after India.

With these caveats in mind, I explore three explanatory factors of the divergence in Indian and Nigerian textile manufacturing trajectories.

Small-scale Textile Manufacturing: The Missing Link in Nigeria

A striking feature of India's textile manufacturing is the long-term prominence of handloom weaving and an intermediate form of manufacturing, powerloom weaving.[6] Under colonial India, handloom weaving continued to engage a third of India's industrial workforce (Roy 2013) and accounted for 25 per cent of cotton cloth produced in 1901 (Roy 2010). The handloom sector particularly catered to the market for specific identity-imbued sari fabrics.

The powerloom sector developed organically at the turn of the twentieth century, when handloom manufacturing, initially largely home-based and organised around family units, evolved into more productive, yet still small, wage-based workshops giving rise to a 'weaver capitalist' class (Haynes 2001; Roy 2010, 2013). Weaver capitalists were more willing to take risks involved in innovating and upgrading and they drove the adoption of powerlooms that resembled semi-automatic handlooms but used electrical power. At a time when several large mills were discarding looms as scrap to adopt newer technologies, weaver capitalists bought up these looms cheaply and modified them. The first weaver-owned powerloom factories were typically small, with most having between ten and twenty powerlooms, sometimes installed in weavers' homes. These factories represented a considerable jump in productivity, with powerlooms able to produce up to four times the number of saris as handlooms in a day (Haynes 2001). By 1940, there were 15,000 powerlooms in operation (Haynes 2001; Roy 2010). Like the handloom sector, powerloom manufacturers initially specialised in special forms of sari fabric.

While the initial growth of the small-scale sector occurred mostly organically, from 1947 government pursued policy that deliberately favoured the sector. The concern that large industrial mills should not enter into competition with the handloom sector, an important purveyor of employment in a labour-surplus country, appeared in policy debates from 1932 (Mazumdar 1991). Another logic that guided policy was that investment resources should be primarily devoted to heavy industry (including capital goods), whereas demand for consumer goods should initially be met through existing capacity in the small-scale sector, until the capital-goods sector became capable of providing machinery for consumer-goods manufacturing. Powerloom workshops benefited from policy designed for the handloom sector as long as units had less than five looms (Mazumdar 1984). The 1948 Cotton Textile Order defined a set of products reserved only for small-scale manufacturers and obliged large-scale manufacturers to obtain operating licences. Financial and marketing support schemes were also established for small-scale units. Lastly, small-scale units were exempt from the excise duty paid by large mills (Kar 2015; Mazumdar 1984) .

In 1956, restrictions on the physical capacity of mills were put in place: they could now install new looms for export purposes only or to replace old looms, but not to simply increase their capacity (Mazumdar 1984). The one area where large mills were favoured by policy was the spinning sector, for mills were expected to provide yarn to the small-scale sector. Powerlooms often worked closely with large mills – buying yarn from them and sending their grey fabric for dyeing, printing and finishing to mills (Mazumdar 1984).

India's dirigiste policies have been heavily criticised, particularly by economists concerned with India's textile export competitiveness.[7] The policies are said to have introduced distortions and handicapped large mills. By the 1960s, large mills started running into difficulties, and by the late 1970s, more than a hundred mills had gone bankrupt – the government had to establish a scheme to nationalise 'sick mills' (Mazumdar 1984; Ghosh 2000). The 1982–83 Bombay Textile Strike killed off several more mills (Roy 2020). Mills that remained operational were hampered in their efforts to modernise or diversify into export markets.

However, from an import-substituting perspective, India's policy did its job and attained self-sufficiency in the textile market (Kar 2015; Ganesh 2002). A wide variety of Indian-made fabrics were available in the domestic market. Indians were employed in both the small- and large-scale sector, although wages in the former have been estimated as being typically half of the latter (Mazumdar 1984; Haynes 2001), and overall employment in the textile sector grew continuously from the 1970s to 1991, even as India faced its sick mill problem (Roy 1998). Furthermore, India exported textiles throughout the period, albeit probably at a much slower rate than would have been possible with a more vibrant mill sector. Haynes (2001) and Tewari (2006) also emphasise how the small size of powerloom units enabled them to maintain the flexibility of craft production. Unlike methods of mass production, small units could adjust production to small, regional patterns of demand and adapt quickly to changing markets. When large mills died off en masse in the 70s and 80s, powerloom units successfully stepped in (Roy 2020).

Indian policymakers reacted to the increasing strains in the textile sector from 1985 by relaxing regulations on the mill sector, and from 1991 liberalisation was progressively pursued to strengthen export performance. India's 1992–1997 Development Plan foresaw the mill sector concentrating on the production of textiles for export, while the powerloom sector was to cater to the domestic market (Ghosh 2000). In 1995 the share of powerlooms in total textile production in India was still high, at 68 per cent (Haynes 2001).

To sum up, we see that continuity of a craft tradition enabled endogenous transformation, resulting in a more productive yet still flexible intermediate scale of production that catered well to identity-fabrics and made the textile sector more resilient to shocks. What continuity was there between craft and industrial textile production in Nigeria?

The literature on craft textile manufacturing in Nigeria is sparser. Various woven fabrics, such as *aso-oke, akwete, ofi, sanyan* (wild silk cloth) and *saki*,

continued to be produced locally after disruption from European imports (Maiwada, Dutsenwai and Waziri 2012). In addition, resist-dyed *adire* cloth continued to be produced, although from the 1930s local fabric and indigo dyes were replaced by imported white bast fabric and chemical dyes (Kriger 2006). Prior to independence, some of the production of *adire* cloth was being exported to Ghana and Senegal (Kriger 2006). Estimates of the scale of craft manufacturing around independence include: 2 million pounds of imported yarn processed and 50 million square yards of cloth produced by artisans in 1962 (Onyeiwu 1997), accounting for 8 per cent of textiles on the domestic market that year (Hopkins 2019); and 12 per cent of cloth sales coming from handwoven cloths in 1966 (Bray 1969 cited in Austin 2013). Figures for later years are hard to come by to assess how the share of craft textiles progressed after independence.

The literature mentions a few innovations in textile craft manufacturing, but none that seem of sufficient import to have enabled significant increases in productivity. A 1966 study (cited in Austin 2013) on *aso-oke* manufacturers in Iseyin found no evidence of wage workers; family labour still prevailed. A study thirty years later (Renne 1997) found that *aso-oke* weaving workshops in five Yoruba towns had much lower productivity (75 per cent lower!) than the 1966 Iseyin weavers. Two craft production studies (O'Hear 1987; Renne 1997) both mention weavers staying in the profession only for lack of better opportunities, as income derived from weaving was low. From the 1960s, weaving cooperatives were set up, with mitigated success (Akinbogun and Ogunduyile 2009; O'Hear 1987). Although wage labour in craft weaving certainly existed in the period under study, at what level it existed cannot be ascertained. What is certain is that there is little evidence of a weaver capitalist class such that drove productivity gains in the artisanal sector in India.

There was thus little organic upgrading of craft textile manufacturing in Nigeria; there was also little in terms of structured support to the sector. The most significant government initiative was a colonial scheme, which had disappointing results. After the Second World War, colonial policy paid greater attention to developing local industries in Nigeria and in 1946 the Textile Development Scheme was launched (Renne 1997). Eight textile centres were established with the mission of investigating local textile production methods and introducing improved methods. Technologies such as the broad handloom and the hand-carding machine were introduced and local carpenters were trained in their manufacture. Why did the scheme have so little impact? Accounts highlight that the scheme was also an initiative to generate employment for ex-servicemen who had fought for

Britain. These had little interest in weaving, and were seeking white-collar government jobs as textile trainers instead. Few to none of the trainees went on to set up their own business (Onyeiwu 1997; Oladejo and Suberu 2016; Renne 1997). From 1954, the initiative fizzled out. The Textile Research and Advisory Centre set up under the scheme closed down in 1957, as did the Mechanical Training Centre that trained loom mechanics (Kilby 1969).

There were some examples of entrepreneurs willing to take innovation risks, but it is not clear if these entrepreneurs came from a weaving background. At least five locally owned powerloom units were established between 1940 and 1950 with support from the colonial government (Onyeiwu 1997). These units were much larger than the average powerloom units we saw emerging in weavers' homes in India, with each installing (or planning to install) up to sixty second-hand powerlooms. The fate of these pioneer medium-scaled factories is unclear. Onyeiwu (1997) notes that none of these mills survived beyond the 1950s, whereas Kilby (1969) states that one was still operating in 1964. The difficulties that befell the units included: looms getting damaged during transit; a lack of technical and managerial expertise (training had focused only on handlooms and not powerlooms); and the refusal of the Colonial Loans Board to renew loans. Further research into the fortunes of these factories would be useful to better understand the 'missing middle' of flexible yet productive small-scale manufacturers in Nigeria.

After independence, there was a lack of attention to craft textile manufacturing, with little industrial research undertaken to upgrade the sector (Adu, Ajayi and Aremu, 2018; Okoduwa 2007; Ajayi 2009).[8] Although the Federal Institute for Industrial Research was established in 1956 with instructions to 'pay particular attention to design of products for small-scale industry' (Schatz 1977: 58), the impact of this and other small-scale industry initiatives on the textile sector were limited. Nationalist fervour at independence placed an emphasis on large-scale industrial projects (Ohiorhenuan and Poloamina 1992). Indigenous skills and technologies were not articulated with new imported technologies. Austin (2013) remarks that technologies used in craft weaving, and in other indigenous industries such as iron smelting, were distinct from those used in factories in the same industry, and highlights that generally for West Africa there was little direct carry-over in personnel and skill formation in the sense of entrepreneurs or workers moving directly from old forms of manufacturing to new industrial forms.

Nigerian textile development thus, in contrast to India's, did not give prominence to small-scale manufacturing. Economic nationalism does not

necessarily imply a focus on craft manufacture. Nationalist industrialisers, such as South Korea and China, also favoured large-scale textile manufacturing at the expense of craft production.[9] Thus, the issue at hand is not necessarily the choice of large-scale versus small-scale production. However, in the specific context of Nigeria, the failure to have capitalised on and upgraded traditional textile skills and technologies resulted in a lost opportunity to capture a naturally protected market of identity fabrics. The Indian experience shows how small-scale producers were instrumental in satisfying demand for identity fabrics shielded from import competition by local preferences. Similar preferences existed in in Nigeria.[10] One paper mentions machine-woven *aso-oke* manufactured in China not finding willing buyers in Nigeria because it was not handwoven (Adu et al. 2018). Had there been significant productivity gains in craft manufacturing, this potential could have been better exploited. Nigeria's policy neglect of textile crafts left less room for indigenous skills to be used productively, and as we will see in the next section it also contributed to limited endogenous processes in Nigeria's textile industry.

Endogenous Processes in the Textile Sector: Ownership and Technology

Endogenous growth theory emphasises endogenous rather than exogenous forces as drivers of growth. This section examines two elements that can influence endogenous processes and that are often part of economic nationalism strategies: the ownership of industry and the ownership of technology. On the first issue, whether industry is predominantly locally owned or foreign owned has important consequences for how effective skills transfer is. On the second, the capacity to produce technology, or at least to master technology, is necessary for an innovative and resilient sector. It is all the more so if pre-existing indigenous technologies and skills have been neglected, as with the craft textile sector in Nigeria. Significant divergences between India and Nigeria are observed on the two criteria.

The Indian literature dwells little on foreign participation in industrial textile mills, and as we saw in the preceding section, the small-scale sector was driven by local weaver capitalists. The first textile mills were set up by Indian entrepreneurs,[11] and while some sectors of the economy, such as shipping and banking, prior to independence were highly dependent on British capital and firms, in the pioneer Bombay textile industry most of the capital was Indian. Technical and managerial skills for the industrial sector were also acquired progressively by Indians: in 1895, 42 per cent of managerial and supervisory staff of textile mills were British; by 1925 this had fallen to 28 per cent (Maddison 1971).[12]

India's extensive historical experience in textile manufacturing and trade may have facilitated early endogenisation of the textile industrial sector. However, endogenisation also resulted from ideologies that deliberately shaped policy. India's long independence struggle was imbued with a strong current of economic nationalism. The debates on independence profoundly questioned the direction that Indian development should pursue. Gandhi stressed that the 'imitation of English economics' would cause the 'ruin' of India: the idea that India's national development would founder on industrialisation was recurrent, appearing more than half a century before independence (Klein 1973). An 1891 article from the *Calcutta Bangavasi* attacked industrialisation because it would require the import of machines. Perhaps with great foresight, the article warned that 'machine civilisation' would also require the import of the 'practical energy and innovative genius of the English people' (Klein 1973: 96). The anti-industrialists did not win outright, but what prevailed was a determination to be self-sufficient in industry and revive indigenous craft industries. The Swadeshi movement for independence was galvanised around these ideas. On a practical level, the Swadeshi movement also involved a boycott of British products, facilitating import substitution.

The influence of the Swadeshi movement on India's first textile policy is visible in the emphasis placed on the handloom sector, as well as in the wider policy objective of ensuring self-sufficiency in machinery to enable production of consumer goods. Foreign participation in industry was kept deliberately low after independence. Complex controls were used to circumscribe the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the economy. Among developing countries, India was among those that received the least amount of FDI until the 1970s, and this did not change significantly until liberalisation in 1991. The textile sector in 1980 drew only 3.4 per cent of a relatively small FDI stock (Sharma 2000). Even under liberalisation, segments of the textile industry remained closed to foreign investment. Overall, India's textile development, including its textile exports, have been dominated by domestic firms (Tewari 2006).

In terms of technology, we saw in the previous section how the organic development of the powerloom sector allowed for local mastery of machinery in the small-scale sector. This was complemented by the focus on developing the capital-goods sector, which meant that machinery and skills were locally available also for the mill sector, although all sectors to some extent imported machinery. However, when technological constraints are mentioned in the literature, these arise from investment controls on the mill sector, which hindered the upgrading of technology, rather than from a lack of skills to

manage or repair machinery. The ultimate sign of the endogenous mastery of textile technology is perhaps the fact that Indians have exported their textile skills across the world, and particularly in Africa, including Nigeria, where several textile industries are run by Indian expatriates.

The prevalence of foreign owners and managers, and the dependence on foreign machinery, by contrast, are common themes in the literature on Nigerian textile development (Ohiorhenuan and Poloamina 1992; Onyeiwu 1997; Oyejide et al. 2013; Pessu and Agboma 2018; Banjoko et al. 2012). Nigeria's independence fighters did not have as coherent and focused a vision for Nigeria's development as a nation as the Indian Swadeshi movement figures did. Nigeria's independence struggle was shorter than India's, which perhaps afforded Nigerians less time to consolidate their nationalist vision and strategy. Independence led to the adoption of an ISI strategy, like India. However, the Achilles heel of Nigeria's ISI was that the industries developed were far from self-sufficient. The post-independence textile industry was dependent on foreign expertise, imported machinery and, at certain moments, even on imported cotton and yarn.

The goal of increasing Nigerian participation in industry transpired in policy papers as early as 1949, but was not followed by concrete measures until the 1970s (Schatz 1977). 'Indigenisation' was an explicit goal in Nigeria's Second Development Plan, 1970–74[13] and was operationalised through the 1972 Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, which limited foreign participation in defined economic sectors. Textiles were not on the initial restricted list, but the 1977 amendment to the decree limited foreign equity-holding in the textile sector to 60 per cent (Banjoko et al. 2012; Onyeiwu 1997). The goals of indigenisation policy, however, were thwarted by cheating, with Nigerian nationals acting as fronts or holding empty positions in textile firms (Schatz 1977; Banjoko et al. 2012; interviews). The scheme was dismantled under the structural adjustment programme and replaced with fiscal incentives for pioneer industries in 1986.

Table 2 shows the percentage of foreign equity of seven first-generation textile mills in Nigeria at start-up. On average, Nigerian equity accounted for less than a third of total equity, and was mostly provided by regional governments. Recent analyses of Nigeria's textile sector still raise the issue of foreign ownership: a 2013 study characterised the industry as having a disproportionate level of foreign ownership (Oyejide et al. 2013); a 1992 analysis highlighted the high number of foreigners on textile company boards and in technical positions (Ohiorhenuan and Poloamina 1992); and a 1989 analysis of ownership by textile subsector showed levels of Nigerian ownership per major sector ranging from just 11 per cent to 34 per cent (Table 3).

Table 2: Share of equity held by foreign shareholders in early textile mills

Mill	Kaduna Textiles Ltd (1958)	Nigerian Textile Mills (1962)	Norspin (1963)	Nortex (1963)	Aba Textile Mills (1964)	Arewa (1964)	United Nigerian Textiles (1964)	Textile Printers of Nigeria (1965)
% of foreign equity	33%	70%	93%	53%	76%	60%*	100%	84%
Main foreign shareholder nationality	British	Swiss	Anglo-Dutch	Sudanese	Indian	Japanese	Hong-Kong	Anglo-Dutch

Source: adapted from Kilby 1969:120

* The International Finance Corporation held 16% equity, so, a total non-Nigerian equity of 76%.

Table 3: Ownership of Nigerian cotton mills by nationality in 1989

Textile sub-sector	Nigerians	Chinese	Indians	Lebanese	Others
Spinning					
ring	34%	36%	13%	6%	11%
rotor*	19%	7%	31%	36%	6%
Weaving					
shuttle	28%	46%	17%	0%	10%
shuttleless*	11%	0%	63%	13%	13%
Knitting	11%	3%	86%	0%	0%

Source: John Short Economic Consultants 1989, cited in Onyeiwu 1997:244

* Rotors and shuttleless looms were the best-practice technologies at the time.

Foreign ownership has hampered Nigeria's textile development in two ways. Firstly, it has exacerbated the lack of synergies between craft and industrial production. An analysis of textile experiences in East Africa concluded that modern factories there displayed little or no synergy with craft producers. Western industrialists were unaccustomed to working with artisans and often ignorant of local artisan heritage (Clarence-Smith 2014). This conclusion applies, at least partially, to Nigeria. While there are some links between craft and textile mills – with weavers sometimes procuring yarn from mills or factories subcontracting orders to craft workshops – little mention of such synergies appears in the literature, and interviews indicate it is a limited practice. One industrialist who reported such collaboration indicated that working with craftworkers in Kano was easier for him as a native than for

foreigners because he knew – and cared about – the craft heritage. Foreign owners face higher transaction costs (language, culture, trust, etc.) working with artisans. Distanced from the industrial sector, Nigerian artisans did not have the opportunities of their Indian counterparts to rub shoulders with new technologies and build up knowledge and confidence to innovate.

Secondly, foreign ownership played a role in limiting endogenous mastery and adaptation of technology in the industrial sector. A case study of how Nigeria's first large mill, Kaduna Textile Mill, was set up concludes that Nigerian participation in the pre-investment stage of the project – feasibility and engineering studies – was 'abysmally low', and yet literature on technical development emphasises how local participation in the pre-investment stage of an industrial project is instrumental in strengthening local technological capabilities (Onyeiwu 1997:239).

With or without foreign investment, technological choices were made that favoured capital intensity over labour intensity (Austin 2013). Policies tended to subsidise the import of capital goods, while the actual manufacture of capital goods was neglected. There were some machinery manufacturing initiatives (in the cement and shoe-manufacturing sectors, for instance), but Nigeria was to a significant extent in the throes of 'machinery merchants' (Kilby 1969). Turnkey factory sales were popular as these capital-intensive projects brought prestige. During the oil boom years, turnkey transplantation continued to be favoured (Chete et al. 2014). Echoing the 1891 Calcutta newspaper's warning, Ohiorhenuan and Poloamina (1992) highlight how the lack of a systematic framework for technology transfer in the 1970s and the continued absence of a capital-goods producing sector led to the continued dependence of industry on imports for machinery and expertise.

Thus, despite post-independence nationalist aspirations, Nigerian policy failed to establish national textile industrialists and to achieve technological autonomy. The dependence of Nigerian industry limited the resilience of the textile sector. When the 1980s oil slump led to foreign-exchange shortages, production at several mills experienced halts because firms could not import spare parts or new equipment. If textile equipment had had a greater endogenous nature, the capacity to repair, if not manufacture, machines would have been in place. Foreign dependence may also have rendered Nigeria more vulnerable to foreign competition: an interviewee cited in one study alleges that several textile firms of Asian ownership, which closed down in the 1980s, relocated to their home countries and, with their knowledge of the Nigerian market, started manufacturing counterfeit 'Made in Nigeria' fabrics to be smuggled into Nigeria (Pessu and Agboma 2018: 618). Smuggling, as we will see in the next section, was a major challenge to Nigerian textile production.

The Possibility of Trade Protection as an Instrument

Trade protection is the most widely recognised tool of economic nationalism. For decades, economic orthodoxy has vilified the role of trade protection in development, but recent work is recalling the crucial role it has played in a myriad of industrialisation success stories (Chang 2009; Rodrik 2017; Soludo, Ogbu and Chang 2004). Both India and Nigeria made frequent use of trade protection measures for their textile sectors. The diagram below shows a continuity of protective barriers – quotas, import licensing, tariffs and even bans – against textile imports from before independence to well into the 2000s after both had become members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). India has a reputation as one of the most protectionist countries in the world (Chan 2019): it is, along with the US and the European Union, one of the heaviest users of antidumping duties under the WTO (Rodrik 2017). Of note in the Nigerian arsenal is a ban on textile imports that lasted two decades until 1997 and was reinstated in 2002, that is, well after Nigeria's accession to the WTO in 1995. In 1989, close to 96 per cent of Nigerian tariff lines for textile and clothing were subjected to an import prohibition regime (Oyejide et al. 2013).When the ban was lifted in 2010, it was replaced with tariffs once again on textile imports.

Table 4: Comparative timeline of textile protection – India and Nigeria

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2">Up to 50% tariffs on Japanese textiles</td><td>Import ban on textiles during World War II</td><td colspan="3">Import licensing system.
Most textile imports banned or severely restricted.
Limitations also on imports of textile machinery</td><td>1992: Trade liberalisation reforms. Textile EPR fall below 100%</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="8">INDIA</td></tr>
<tr><td>1930s</td><td>1940s</td><td>1950s</td><td>1960s</td><td>1970s</td><td>1980s</td><td>1990s
1995 : WTO</td><td>2000s</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="8">NIGERIA</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Import quotas on Japanese textiles</td><td>High tariffs on textiles.
Stricter import quotas on Japanese textiles.</td><td>1977: import ban on all textiles. 136% EPR on cotton prints prior to ban</td><td>Import ban, & licensing scheme for textile or garment inputs</td><td>1997: textile import ban lifted</td><td>2002: Textile import ban reinstated</td></tr>
</table>

Source: Author's compilation

EPR – effective protection rate

Table 5: Simple average tariff (effectively applied) on fabrics

Year	India	Nigeria	Bangladesh	China	Pakistan	Thailand	USA
1995	49.4	38.7	34.2	30.1	9.2	51.3	10.6
2011	9.2	14.5	21.2	9.9	11.5	11.5	6.5

Source: Oyejide et al.2013

Adapted from World Integrated Trade Solution Database.

Therefore, on paper, at least there were comparable protective environments to encourage local textile industries. Table 5 compares simple average tariff rates applied on fabrics in India, Nigeria and other major textile manufacturing countries in 1995 (earliest year available) and 2011. Dwelling on the figures for Nigeria, however, may be a somewhat futile exercise given that throughout Nigeria's restrictions on imports smuggling was a widespread phenomenon. The failure to protect domestic industry from stifling competition has more to do with Nigeria's political economy than its formal trade policy.

Smuggling is mentioned in the literature on the Indian textile industry. However, it appears to have been sufficiently limited (and often textiles were being smuggled *out* of India) that it is never mentioned as a constraint to the development of the industry (Sen 1975; Van Schendel 1993; Roy 1998). By contrast, in the literature on Nigeria, accounts of smuggling are frequent from the 1970s onwards. For example, lace fabrics made for the Nigerian market became very popular during the oil boom years (1970s) and in that decade Nigerian industries started producing lace locally. Yet, even after the 1977 textile import ban, Austrian lace manufacturers continued their thriving export trade to Nigeria, now transiting through Benin (Plankensteiner 2013). Newspaper articles during the 1980s often evoked the fight against smugglers of myriad goods, including textiles.

Despite on-paper draconian measures and occasional spectacular seizures, accounts suggest that large-scale smugglers often had powerful connections that shielded them from prosecution (Burgis 2016; Plankensteiner 2013). Reliable estimates of the extent of smuggling are difficult to come by: a 2010 World Bank report estimated that textiles worth USD 2.2 billion were smuggled into Nigeria from Benin annually and that textiles represented more than 50 per cent of all smuggled goods (Raballand and Mjekiqi 2010). In addition to smuggling, textile imports were coming in through official import waivers. These were intended to enable textile and garment manufacturers access to necessary inputs. However, the process of attributing these waivers was decried by industry analysts as inconsistent and non-transparent (Oyejide et al. 2013).[14]

Exasperated industry players have characterised the tariffs and import bans as counterproductive, because they encouraged smuggling and provided rent-seeking opportunities to customs officials (Pessu and Agboma 2018; Oyejide et al. 2013). In the rent-seeking culture that has prevailed in Nigeria since the discovery of oil, import restrictions could not find the necessary rigour for effective application. Industrial textile manufacturing in Nigeria, which had a shorter existence than in India, therefore enjoyed only a brief period of ten to twenty years of actual protection to consolidate its strengths.

Chinese textile imports have particularly been decried for their deleterious effect on the Nigerian textile sector. The chronology of Nigerian textile industry performance, however, indicates a decline almost a decade prior to a significant spike in Chinese imports (see figures below). Peaks of output and employment in the textile sector were reached in 1982 and around 1985 respectively. The decline was slow at first and then accelerated from 1990 (Muhammad et al. 2017). Chinese textile exports to Nigeria, however, were extremely low in the 1990s and started to rise significantly only from the 2000s.[15] This suggests that other factors fragilised the Nigerian textile industry first, creating opportunities that were exploited by Chinese imports. Chronologically, we can argue that fundamental weaknesses of an undeveloped small-scale sector and weak endogenisation left the Nigerian textile sector extremely vulnerable to the multiple shocks (foreign exchange, falling consumer incomes, erratic electricity supply) of the 1980s. Once cheap textiles from China started arriving massively in the 2000s, an already difficult operating environment for textile industries was made even more difficult, and the closure of textile factories greatly accelerated.



Figure 1: Number of textile factories in Nigeria, 1956–2015
Source: Muhammad et al. 2017



Figure 2: Employment in the Nigerian textile industry, 1970-2015.
Source: Muhammad et al 2017



Figure 3: Textile exports from China to Nigeria, 1992–2018.
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution Database (World Bank)

Conclusion

This article has examined three differences in the Indian and Nigerian textile manufacturing histories that highlight different facets of economic nationalism. Chang (2004) proposes the term 'selective industrial and trade policies' in lieu of ISI to highlight the idea embedded in such strategies that some economic activities are more socially desirable than others. Although post-independence Nigeria expressed economic nationalist aspirations, comparison with the Indian experience shows a lack of sufficiently selective policies to translate such aspirations into reality. The article has shown that India actively chose to bolster its craft textile sector to maximise employment through labour intensity; Nigeria did not. India actively chose to limit foreign participation in its textile sector in the first decades; Nigeria remained ambivalent and indigenisation policies were thwarted in practice. In trade protection, India and Nigeria visibly made similar choices, but corruption rendered Nigeria's trade protection nothing but a paper tiger. The three factors explored in this article have affected textile manufacturing in several West African countries with similar textile craft heritages and tastes for identity fabrics. What useful big lessons can we glean?

Firstly, a disconnect between craft and industrial textile production generated lost opportunities. In the context of demand for identity fabrics, textile production building on artisanal heritage should have taken much greater space in the local market. Had craft production developed and innovated alongside industrial production, craft productivity would have increased and demand would have been propelled both by falling prices and new fabrics invented in response to changing tastes. This lost opportunity takes on even greater significance when one considers that the global scene has shifted significantly since India successfully protected its markets, and it is more difficult to attain the same levels of protection through trade policy today (Rodrik 2017). Specific localised consumer tastes can offer a certain level of natural protection, as we saw in the survival of craft textiles in both India and Nigeria during colonisation.

Secondly, past poor choices regarding factor endowments and capital intensity handicapped industrial development in Nigeria and other African countries. In today's rapidly shifting world of manufacturing, in-depth analyses of ideal choices of capital or labour intensity for African industry are needed. Rodrik (2017) notes that manufacturing has become much more capital- and skill-intensive, substantially reducing the labour-absorbing potential for low-skilled workers.[16] Farsightedness and deliberation, more than ever, are essential when making choices of manufacturing models to ensure desirable socioeconomic outcomes.

Thirdly, the dichotomy between Nigeria's protective trade regime and the massive influx of smuggled textiles shows just how harmful endemic corruption can be to national industrialisation strategies. This dimension, the potential disablement of industrialisation efforts, should not be forgotten in strategies to fight corruption.

One issue not addressed in the article is that of electricity supply. The influence of poor electricity supply on the Nigerian manufacturing sector as a whole cannot be downplayed. Had the weaknesses in Nigeria's policy environment explored in this article been corrected, would the textile sector have had sufficient resilience to counter the challenge of expensive and erratic energy driving up production costs? That is a question for further debate.

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Notes

1. For weddings, often family and friends of the spouses tailor clothes in the same fabric. This ceremonial uniform is called *aso-ebi*.
2. Wax-print fabrics were brought to West Africa in the 19th century by Dutch traders who had failed to find a market for their industrial copies of Javanese batik in Indonesia (Grosfilley 2006; Sylvanus 2002). Guinea brocade was originally imported from Europe – one account traces its arrival in Africa to a Malian trader who imported brocade from Germany, making adjustments to please the African market (De Bla 2014). The finishing, and particularly dyeing, of brocade is sometimes done on the African continent – Mali, Senegal and northern Nigeria are particularly renowned for their brocade-dyeing crafts industry. Lace fabrics were originally imported from Europe during colonialism. Later, Austrian and Swiss lace started to be produced specifically for the Nigerian market, in particular during the oil boom when a huge taste for lace fabrics developed (Plankensteiner 2013; Olorunyomi 2011).
3. The research included a one-week field visit to Nigeria (19–26 January 2020), but not to India. Literature on the Indian textile experience is more readily available. Furthermore, as the underlying objective of the study is to offer lessons for Nigerian policy, it was more crucial to confirm preliminary conclusions from the literature through field observation and interviews in Nigeria.
4. See, for instance, Boulanger (2006) on the difficulty of defining economic nationalism, or Hall (2004), who argues for motivation rather than policy content as the defining feature of economic nationalism.

5. Austin's (2013) analysis of labour-intensive industrialisation in global history characterises West Africa, including precolonial and colonial Nigeria, as short of labour. Regions of what would become Nigeria were particularly hard hit by the slave trade; between 1676 and 1730, 42 % of slaves taken from Africa were shipped out of the Bight of Benin (Falola and Heaton 2008: 53). However, by independence, the Nigerian population had grown rapidly and it was, after Burundi, the most densely populated country in Africa (Kilby 1969).
6. Powerloom weaving is an intermediate technology that uses non-automatic looms driven by electric power. The powerloom sector grew to include a range from small home-based production units to factory-size units with hundreds of looms. The mill sector, by contrast, in the Indian definition, refers to large factories with integrated spinning, weaving and finishing units (Mazumdar 1991).
7. See, for instance, Mazumdar 1991.
8. Interviews in January 2020 with industry players confirmed this. Textile engineering professor Olufemi Sunmonu mentioned doctoral research carried out on artisanal looms, but this research, as other research before, saw little uptake by manufacturers.
9. Comparative scholarship of textile manufacturing history between Nigeria and countries that emphasised large-scale industrial manufacturing, like China, could further elucidate on the trade-offs of focusing on large-scale versus small-scale manufacturing. It is interesting to note that (former) textile giants like Japan, South Korea and China have largely lost their unique vestimentary codes.
10. One critical difference is that some identity-fabrics in Nigeria were initially of foreign origin – wax fabrics, Guinea brocade and lace. It could be that taste preferences for these identity-fabrics are actually skewed in favour of foreign-produced versions.
11. At independence in 1947, India already had a much larger industrial base than Nigeria would have in 1960; India was the first non-Western power to set up a modern textile industry, preceding Japan's by twenty years and China's by forty years (Maddison 1971).
12. It is not clear whether this skill acquisition was facilitated by educational efforts. Further comparative research on education and training for textile production would be of interest.
13. The plan stated, for instance, 'Experience has shown through history, that political independence without economic independence is but an empty shell …. The interests of foreign private investors in the Nigerian economy cannot be expected to coincide at all times and in every respect with national aspirations' (Schatz 1977: 22).
14. India's import licensing system was also notoriously complex. However, analyses of the constraints of the system rarely bring up the issue of smuggling or bribery. A 1992 analysis (Aksoy 1992) of India's complex trade regime has no mention of the terms 'smugg', 'rent-seeking', 'corruption' or 'bribery', for instance.

15. These are official figures, and do not (fully) account for smuggling. The graph displays export figures reported by China, which are significantly higher than corresponding figures for imports reported by Nigeria. 1992 is the first year available in the data set. However, other data sets indicate a low level of exports of all products from China to Nigeria prior to this year.
16. Rodrik (2017) also warns that technological advances, such as 3D printing and robotisation, may wipe out the comparative advantage of low-income countries in labour-intensive manufacturing.

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Communal Governance and Transnationalism: A Case Study of the Nigerien Forex Trading Community in Benin City

Martha Sambe*, Oreva Olakpe** &
Rafeeat Aliyu***

Abstract

Migrant community associations are well-structured and often engage in political transnationalism with their countries of origin. Nigerien migrants in Benin City, Edo State, occupy a dominant position in the unofficial foreign exchange market. Their communal governance structures reveal interesting parallels in the way the migrants govern themselves in relation to their status and the local nationals they work with. The politics within the migrant association suggest that, even in the absence of status, migrants are able to govern and protect their interests while contributing to the societies they find themselves in. This article looks at examples of Nigerien transnationalism in Nigeria at the micro level to reveal a complex network of communal governance. By studying the organisational lives of the Nigerien migrant community, we aim to understand how this group contributes to the maintenance of ties with Niger and enables their integration into their host community.

Keywords: transnationalism, migration, South-South migration, Niger, Nigeria, Benin City, Edo State, home-town associations, migrant niches, communal governance, integration, West Africa

* Independent Researcher. Email: martha.sambe@aun.edu.ng
** Researcher, CERC, Ryerson University. Email: oreva.olakpe@ryerson.ca
*** Independent Researcher, North Carolina University. Email: roaliyu@ncsu.edu

Résumé

Les associations communautaires de migrants sont très bien structurées et s'engagent souvent dans un transnationalisme politique avec leurs pays d'origine. Les migrants nigériens de Benin City, dans l'État d'Edo, occupent une position dominante sur le marché parallèle de change de devises. Leurs structures de gouvernance communautaires révèlent des parallèles intéressants dans la manière dont les migrants s'autogouvernent en fonction de leur statut et des nigérians avec lesquels ils travaillent. La politique au sein de l'association de migrants suggère que, même en l'absence de statut, les migrants sont capables de se gérer et de protéger leurs intérêts tout en apportant leur contribution aux sociétés dans lesquelles ils se trouvent. Cet article examine des exemples de transnationalisme nigérien au Nigeria au niveau micro pour révèler un réseau complexe de gouvernance communautaire. En étudiant la vie organisationnelle de la communauté migrante nigérienne, nous tentons de comprendre comment ce groupe contribue au maintien de liens avec le Niger et réalise son intégration dans sa communauté d'accueil.

Mots-clés : transnationalisme, migration, migration Sud-Sud, Niger, Nigéria, Benin City, État d'Edo, associations d'origine, niches de migrants, gouvernance communautaire, intégration, Afrique de l'Ouest

Introduction

The city of Benin, in Edo State, Nigeria, is a melting pot of diverse peoples and cultures that dates back to the twelfth century, when it served as the capital of Benin Kingdom, one of the most powerful kingdoms in West African history. The city was a major traditional urban centre in pre-colonial West Africa and has since retained its heritage as an economic and political hub in the region. Benin City is also an attractive destination for migrants both from within and outside Nigeria. Apart from the local residents, there are various migrant ethnic groups who now reside in Benin City. Some of these migrants, like the Hausa, have been there for at least a century; others, like the Igbo from South-Eastern Nigeria, also have a presence in the city.

Benin City was historically divided into special functional zones known as *owa*, with different guilds and professions operating in them (Ozo 2009). Sakponba Road, where a burgeoning market thrives to this day, was once the *owa* for blacksmiths and bronze-casters. Today, Sakponba market is the epicentre of the unofficial foreign exchange (forex) trade that operates outside the confines and regulations of the state. Sakponba is also home to Hausa Quarters, so-called because it is largely occupied by Hausa-speaking Nigeriens and Nigerians engaged in currency exchange within the market.

Initially, Nigerien migrants started business there trading jewellery and precious metals. The 1980s saw an increase in migration from Benin City to Europe, which resulted in the growth of the foreign exchange market as returning migrants sought avenues to exchange the foreign currency they had brought back with them. These returning migrants often assumed that the Nigeriens who sold jewellery were also involved in forex. The Nigerien migrants quickly saw this as an opportunity and expanded their businesses to become currency traders in the informal exchange market.

The focal group of our research is these migrants, originally from the Republic of Niger, who have settled in Nigeria. The Nigerien migrants in Benin City have created transnational linkages and governance structures that aid their integration and co-existence with their host community. The need for integration and proper representation of migrants has often led migrants to create informal social networks within their receiving communities. As Bosiakoh's (2012) research on Nigerian migrants in Ghana shows, several networks were useful in helping new migrants adapt to and integrate into their receiving communities. Additionally, the networks were important because they served as channels through which new and old migrants found representation to have their collective interests and needs met (Bosiakoh 2012). We add that these networks are not only social, they are also cultural and political in nature. Our research unpacks the political structures of these networks and how they contribute to the representation and integration of the Nigerien community in Benin City.

This article also studies the systems of communal governance in the Nigerien community, showing the inner workings of governance structures. Communal governance is used to frame our research because it explains how groups (including migrants) organise themselves in order to be empowered and to have influence on the issues that affect them. Transnationalism, too, frames our work because it attempts to explain how and why members of a community maintain strong political and economic ties across borders with their country of origin.

This article seeks to answer the following questions:

1. What are the systems of communal governance employed by Nigerien migrants in Benin City?
2. How have these systems aided relations between Nigerien migrants and members of the receiving community, as well as their integration into the community?
3. In what ways have these systems of communal governance aided transnationalism between the Nigerien community in Benin City and their home country?

We answer these research questions through the analysis of data gathered through interviews with over forty study participants. Our analysis is also tied to relevant theoretical frameworks on governance and transnationalism, as expounded further in the next section of the article. After explaining the theoretical underpinning of the research, we discuss our research findings on governance structures in the Nigerien community in Benin City. This is integrated with our theoretical frameworks. We then explore the issues of power asymmetries and representation in the structures we observed, which is followed by an examination of the significance and limitations of our research in the fields of transnationalism and communal governance. Finally, our conclusion draws out the most important results of our study.

Theoretical Framework

Relevant Literature

Towards the end of the twentieth century, researchers Jessop (1994, 2000), Rhodes (1994, Pierre (2000) and Stoker (2000) discussed a shift in academic discourse with regards to the concept of 'governing', in which the focus was no longer solely on the *government* but on *governance*. The difference between the two is centred around the role of the state. Whereas the state was the sole sponsor and executor of economic and social programmes within a typical government, the focus on governance indicated an increase in collaboration between the state and non-governmental organisations (Murdoch and Abram 1998). Somerville (2005) claims that the change in focus from government to governance is not a recent phenomenon and that the modern state has always comprised more than institutions of government. Somerville adds that the act of governing itself often includes a wide range of techniques beyond any sovereign authority.

Somerville (2005) refers to the interactions between government and governance as 'metagovernance', defining it as a system that sets the ground rules for governance. All aspects of metagovernance are geared towards a collective citizen empowerment throughout all institutions and levels of society, such that citizens are able to determine and influence the conditions in which they live. According to Somerville, communal (or community) governance is a form of metagovernance because it allows the highest degree of democratisation through public empowerment and by honouring the right of community members to participate in and determine issues that affect them, whether through direct control or through institutions such as neighbourhood forums and community councils.

Totikidis, Armstrong and Francis (2005) define community governance as community-level management and decision-making, which is undertaken by,

with, or on behalf of a community, by a group of community stakeholders. They also emphasise the role of the community, rather than corporations, organisations, local governments or the public sector, as the distinguishing feature of community governance relative to other forms of governance.

Communal governance and the way migrant communities organise and interact with the state has been linked to transnationalism in the social sciences. Transnationalism was first coined to explain the relations between states and groups that existed outside the realm of traditional military encounters (Clavin 2005). Faist (2010) suggests that available literature on transnationalism has tended to take divided positions that either focus on the role of the state or ignore it completely. Itzigsohn (2000) regards organisations that operate in ways that cannot be constrained by 'the territorial and political boundaries of states' to be under the banner of transnationalism. Earlier associated with remittances from migrants, transnationalism has come to be understood as being about people, encompassing their networks and the exchange of ideas (Clavin 2005).

The concept of transnationalism is not new; however, it started gaining novel perspectives from 2003 (Portes 2003). Scholarly interest in transnationalism continues to be renewed with the sustained movements of people across borders and nations. As a theory of interest to many disciplines within the social sciences, transnationalism takes on different meanings depending on the field of interest. Historians of international relations characterise transnationalism in terms of border crossing (Clavin 2005), whereas sociologists and anthropologists regard it as a social formation that spans borders (Vertovec 2009). In migration studies, it has been recognised in how migrants maintain contact with their homeland, for example, through sending remittances. Vertovec (2009) defines transnationalism as the sustained connections and exchanges between non-state actors across national borders. These non-state actors can range from businesses to religious bodies and other non-governmental organisations.

Going further, Vertovec draws attention to the relationships that take place regardless of distances and international borders in a common, virtual space. He identifies typologies of migrant transnationalism, including institutions 'from above' (media and political institutions) or 'from below' (local, grassroots activity), broad and strict, or linear and resource-dependent, to list a few. Vertovec also suggests that transnational theory can be refined through categorising different kinds of transnational migrants – for example, unskilled labour migrants, refugees, highly skilled workers, etc – or looking at degrees of mobility. Our research takes on this challenge by focusing on a community that is largely made up of undocumented forex traders. This is a 'from-below' typology of transnationalism.

Portes (2003) identifies emerging thoughts on the theory of transnationalism, noting that transnationalism has occurred throughout the history of migration. The advent of technological development in transport and communications has led to a rise in transnational exchanges, as migrants can now easily communicate across long distances. Portes also identifies transnationalism as a grassroots phenomenon driven by the desires of everyday people looking to establish ties across borders. In practice, not all immigrants are transnationals, as social and political exchanges are carried out by a minority of the population.

Faist (2000) defines transnationalism as 'the sustained ties of persons, networks and organisations across the borders across multiple nation states'. On the other hand, Portes (2001) restricts transnationalism to civil society and their practices that take place outside the control of the state.

In exploring non-state organisations and their leaders, Kassimir (2001) connects transnationalism to communal governance in Africa. Non-state organisations can often act as middlemen that represent their members' interests, forming a united face when interacting with the state and other local institutions. Kassimir points out that, in international spaces, some non-state organisations can exercise governance and other forms of control over members, as in the case of transnational corporations and refugee camps.

The internal politics of organisations that sustain relations across borders are influenced by what happens in the larger community. They are well-run with formal constitutions that establish membership criteria and provide guidelines and codes of conduct to guide leadership roles. These organisations may also control the behaviour of members using internal guidelines. When they are formed along ethnic lines, organisations can act as loci of non-state political authority in African countries, as seen in the case of chiefs and other stakeholders of traditional authority who govern and represent members who share a common ethnic heritage. Our research delves into this aspect with the aim of understanding how internal politics shape the operations of the organisation as well as the relationship between the migrant community and non-members.

Morales and Jorba (2010) in their study of migrants' organisations in Barcelona, Madrid and Murcia, in Spain, note that transnational practices often transcend ethnic lines and are not restricted to a specific ethnic identity, as migrants can rally around religious, regional or professional identities. Ethnic-based organisations play a crucial role in the manifestation of political transnationalism, as organisations formed along ethnic lines

are usually more likely to engage in transnational practices. While defined ethnic identities can promote engagement in transnational activities, ethnicity is not crucial for the establishment of transnational links or even political transnationalism. According to Morales and Jorba, 'associations that define their primary identity along territorial lines and a single country of origin are more likely to maintain transnational activities or links'. The organisations they studied were formal, with members not receiving any payment for membership; they also were majorly run and represented by first- and second-generation migrants. The organisations covered in this article are formed along occupational and nationality lines. Nonetheless, smaller communities formed along ethnic and religious identity exist within the migrant community.

In addition to the literature on transnationalism and communal governance, there is very rich and significant work on home-town associations (HTAs) that deals with the 'voluntary organisations whose members share a common place of origin and generate support to carry out significant projects in migrant and home communities' (Lamba-Nieves 2013). Lamba-Nieves studies how HTAs reconstruct the political and social dynamics of their host communities and home countries. Lamba-Nieves highlights how the politics of HTAs create new outcomes in the two localities, including the formation of new groups that can deepen social hierarchies or create new ones. Our research on Nigerien communal governance takes a similar slant, studying the political and social dynamics of the organisations they participate in and the impact this has within the market.

Orozco and Garcia-Zanello (2009) define HTA as 'an organization formed by migrants living in the same community and sharing a common nationality'. Noting their importance in migrant communities in the United States, they found that African migrants largely tend to be members of HTAs. Through these associations, immigrants seek support and form relationships with local communities. Orozco and Garcia-Zanello found that HTAs often engage in philanthropy and thus play roles in the development of communities in their homelands and host countries. This is echoed in findings by Mazzucato and Kabki (2009) who analysed Ghanaian HTAs in their study connecting HTAs with the successful mobilisation of community development projects. Their research looked at villages and towns in Ghana and their respective HTAs in Netherlands, revealing the effective ways in which HTAs finance and mobilise to aid community development projects back home.

Bosiakoh's study of Ghana also makes a rich contribution to the study on HTAs. Bosiakoh (2012) identifies that HTAs do several things. Because HTAs contribute to migrant integration, sociocultural empowerment, intercommunal conflict resolution and development, HTAs should be studied and understood by policy-makers. Most importantly, Bosiakoh's research on HTAs in Ghana shows that because of sturdy organisational structures, clear-cut leadership roles and tenures, and recognised leaders, HTAs can serve as 'useful platforms for state-migrant engagement'. This is a very important contribution because it highlights the role that HTAs play in engaging migrants with state policies and laws, making them crucial in policy-making processes. Characteristics of HTAs, which Bosiakoh holds can be keyed into migration policy and management, include the influence that HTAs wield on the behaviour of their members, social cohesion and conflict resolution. Our research also contributes to this perspective by studying the organisational structures and leadership roles in our case study and how migrant sociopolitical structures are impacting on social cohesion, conflict resolution and migration law and policy in Benin City.

Research Context

Immigrants have created linkages that are social, political and economic with their countries of origin at an increased pace in modern times. Migrants today are better equipped to form and maintain communication with their countries of origin than those in the past. The impact of transnationalism in migrant communities is not yet fully understood. What exists largely studies specific groups and communities, and looks at the diverse organisations of the chosen ethnic and/or migrant community. Furthermore, studies on the relatedness between transnationalism and migrant associations are lacking (Dahinden 2010), with more attention focused on organisational transnationalism (Portes 2003).

Our research into communal governance among Nigerien migrants in Benin City adds to the study of transnationalism by looking at different organisations within the Nigerien migrant community. Specifically, we studied two key unions: the Haut Conseil des Nigériens de l'Extérieur (HCNE), through which migrants in Nigeria interact with the Nigerien government; and the Wazobia Traders' Union, which brings together traders in the foreign exchange market in Edo State and in which Nigerien migrants occupy key positions. Our research is in line with current research on communal governance and transnationalism as it is qualitative. Keeping in mind, as Clavin (2005) warns, 'transnationalism is in danger of becoming a catch-all concept', our work looks specifically at non-state actors engaged in the foreign exchange (forex) business in Benin City.

Research Findings

In gathering the research presented below, we conducted interviews with people in and around three major markets in Benin City: Sakponba, Ring Road and New Benin. The size of the unofficial foreign exchange market is hard to quantify, due to the informal nature of the market as well as the migration status of most of the Nigerien forex traders. Leaders of the Nigerien community informed us that there were thousands of Nigerien migrants living in Benin City. However, we were unable to confirm the exact number as many are undocumented. Although we could not get exact figures for the amount of money that goes through the market, our interviews reveal that large volumes of cash move through the market weekly—for example, around NGN 500,000 for individual agents. The foreign currencies that are mainly traded are the euro, due to linkages with European-based migrants, and the US dollar, which is the official currency used in the formal foreign exchange market in Nigeria.

Among our interviewees were Nigerien migrants as well as Nigerians who are established traders. Migrants from Niger Republic have dominated the foreign exchange market since the late 1980s when locals started emigrating to Europe. Their presence within the market was of interest to us because we wanted to understand how a migrant group came to dominate this niche. We employed market observations, and one-on-one and group interviews, as part of our methodology. In interviews, we asked about the support network between the community of trading markets and the challenges they faced in their line of work. We spoke to key members of the organisations discussed below, such as the union president, as well as community and ethnic leaders. We utilised informal, unstructured interview styles so that the conversation was driven by the interviewees.

Our research questions took shape during our field study in Benin City as we became familiar with the market dynamics, paying attention to the political and social dynamics of the organisations of which the Nigerien migrant community are part (Lamba-Nieves 2013). Based on our interactions in the markets, we observed that the market had a system of governance that was separate from the system that governed the community of Nigeriens, despite their dominant presence in the market. Without close observation of the political and social dynamics in the market, this dual governance structure is not evident. Thus, we set out to understand the systems of governance in place, the functions they served, and how they helped to maintain the ties between Nigeriens and their communities and government in Niger. Our research revealed an intricate governance

structure that has been in place since the establishment of the forex market in the early 1980s. We found two branches of governance in the migrant community in Benin City:

1. Haut Conseil des Nigériens de l'Extérieur (The National Union of Nigeriens)
2. The Wazobia Forex Traders' Union.

Haut Conseil des Nigériens de l'Extérieur (HCNE)

The Haut Conseil des Nigériens de l'Extérieur (HCNE) was created by the Nigerien government in 1999 to handle the affairs of Nigerien citizens abroad. This union is present in every country to which Nigeriens migrate, including Nigeria. The union has a leadership in Nigeria that is separate from the Embassy of Niger to Nigeria. The interactions between migrants, the HCNE leadership and government back home are an example of metagovernance, according to Somerville (2005); the HCNE enables individuals in the community to participate in and influence the conditions in which they live in the diaspora, as well as the level of engagement they have with their home country.

The HCNE has a Constitution in English and French, which regulates the powers and responsibilities of the elected leaders, guarantees rights and protections and delineates the duties of the members of the union. Within the union, the top leadership positions are the national chairman and national vice chairman. Zonal chairmen, state-level presidents and vice presidents are next in the chain of power, followed by treasurers, secretaries and the members of the union.

The national chairman and vice chairman of the union are elected by vote by all the members of the HCNE in Nigeria. Based in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria, they relay issues from each region to the embassy if those issues require high-level intervention. They interface with the zonal chairmen to keep abreast with the affairs of Nigeriens in all six geopolitical regions of Nigeria: North Central, North East, North West, South East, South-South and South West. The union is present in four regions through zonal chairmen who oversee the affairs of Nigeriens in each region. Edo State is under the purview of the zonal chairman of the South-South region.

Zonal chairmen are also elected by vote and report to the national chairman. Tanimu Ibrahim, the current zonal chairman of the South-South region, was elected in 2005 and oversees Edo, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Rivers and Cross Rivers states. All the union leaders in those states report to him. Additionally, the zonal chairman intervenes when disputes grow beyond the state-level union president, and when third parties seek clarification on

exchange rates for forex and scrap metal, niches in which Nigeriens operate. According to the zonal chairman, every state where the HCNE is present has two delegates of the union. The zonal chairman of the South-South region is also the vice chairman to the overall chairman in Abuja. These chairmen are the minority engaging in transnationalism on behalf of their communities (Portes 2003).

Additionally, each of Nigeria's thirty-six states has a union leader (a president) who may be elected by vote or chosen by Nigeriens in the state. The local authorities and authorities of the country of Niger have no role to play in the election or nomination of the president. In Edo State, the president, vice president, treasurer and secretary of the HCNE have been chosen without election since 2004. Although state-level union presidents have tenures of two years, this is not a hard and fast rule. According to the existing president, a meeting is held every two years when his tenure is expiring to find out if members of the union would prefer to vote in a new leader, and in his case the members chose that he continue in his current capacity. In order to have a right to vote at state level, the union must pay fees to the Nigerien Embassy in Abuja. The headquarters of the HCNE in Edo State is at Sakponba Road, an area which also happens to be the largest forex market in the state and, arguably, the region.

The first leader of the Edo State union was based in Sakponba. According to our interviews, in the 1990s it was a more traditional, unstructured system, with no vice president, secretary, treasurer or advisers. Because of this unstructured system, the leadership of the union was not democratic or symmetric. The second leader changed this system in 2004 and organised governance by creating new leadership positions in order to foster a balance of power in the community. In this new system, all leaders including the president are open to critique and queries if members are dissatisfied with their performance or policies. As a result, the union has internal accountability that checks the behaviour of its leaders.

The Edo State union meets monthly or bi-weekly, and meetings centre on advising Nigeriens on getting or maintaining their documentation in Nigeria. According to the president, Nigeriens are supposed to have an ECOWAS card, which is stamped at the Nigerian border and lasts for a duration of three months. This card can be renewed twice, after which they have to get a residence permit if they wish to continue staying in Nigeria. Nigeriens also have the *carte consulière*, which is issued by the Embassy of Niger, and the union has a membership card for its members in different states. This membership card enables members to access support from the union when they have issues in Nigeria, wherever they are. It is also a way to identify who

belongs to the community and who does not. People who do not have the membership card cannot receive support from the union or participate in the decision-making processes. The card enables members to participate in Nigerien elections, censuses, union elections and events, etc. from Nigeria. This illustrates how the HCNE encourages transnationalism by keeping the members of the community engaged in the politics and affairs of Niger.

The Edo State union president gave an instance of the significance of membership cards. During the 2012 subsidy removal protests in Benin City, Nigeriens were attacked and robbed. Those with membership cards were protected by the union and the issue was escalated to the ambassador in Abuja. This illustrates the importance of belonging to the union as it shields Nigeriens from insecurity or political violence in Nigeria.

In addition to immigration issues, the union resolves issues relating to criminality and disputes in the Nigerien community. Challenges that cannot be dealt with in house are reported to the Nigerian authorities. According to the Edo State president, the HCNE usually works with the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) for ECOWAS cards and residence permits and collaborates with the police when Nigeriens commit crimes in the state. The president held that the collaboration with the NIS and the police made some members of the community unhappy. However, his role as leader of the community meant that he was responsible for keeping members of the community informed about how to remain law-abiding in Edo State.

Here, we see that for communal governance to be efficient in the migrant community, collaboration with the state may be inevitable. What this means is that there is usually some form of interaction or collaboration between the community and the state; it is impossible for migrant communities, including those who are largely undocumented, to operate outside some form of relation to the state. Collaboration with the NIS means that members of the union must have their permits renewed on time, as once they come into Nigeria without documentation it becomes difficult to protect them.

For instance, the Edo State union president stated that when a Nigerien had a problem with a Bini woman in an interpersonal relationship, the union took the woman and the Nigerien person to the state's Assistant Inspector General of Police. The first thing the union was asked to provide was the residence permit of the Nigerien, without which the case would not have been resolved. According to the zonal chairman, when a Nigerien accused of theft of money or property absconds, the union sends someone to Niger to bring back the person, and enforces restitution or hands them over to the police. If the offences are immigration-related, they are handed over to the NIS.

Members of the HCNE are encouraged to participate in the political, economic and social life in Niger. For example, in addition to participating in Nigerien elections, they contribute funds for different initiatives that the union carries out in Niger. All the older members of the union we spoke to send remittances to Niger, keep abreast with the news and developments in the country, visit often, and own properties and pay taxes in Niger, even though they have lived in Benin City for decades. This trend may or may not continue with the younger generation, who may be more integrated in Nigeria than in Niger.

In observing the dynamics within the HCNE, we learned what shapes relations within and outside the community, and how from-below transnationalism is taking place. The written Constitution, as well as unwritten social and cultural codes of conduct, shape the internal politics of the organisation as well as the behaviour of the documented and undocumented members of the HCNE, within the Nigerien community, within the market and in the wider community in Benin City.

Wazobia Forex Traders' Union

Unlike the HCNE discussed above, the Wazobia Forex Traders' Union is an occupational organisation that unites forex traders. The forex market in Sakponba was established in 1982 and the Wazobia union has had only two chairmen since its establishment. Rather than selection by vote, the union designates leadership positions by nomination. Both the first and second union chairmen were not voted into their positions; rather, they were offered the position by forex traders in the market due to the influence they wielded in the business and the market. We believe that election by nomination is the preferred method of selection because Nigeriens constitute a majority in the forex market and election by vote would give Nigeriens an unfair political advantage. The local authorities, the official Nigerien authorities, as well as the HNCE have no role to play in the election or nomination of the leader of the Wazobia union. Within the union, the leadership structure has the chairman at the top, followed by the vice chairman, a treasurer, a secretary and the union members. In this it is similar to the structure and leadership of the HNCE at the state level.

The first chairman of the Wazobia union was a Nigerian from Kebbi State, whereas the current chairman is from Niger and was asked to lead the union in 2008 after being the financial secretary and treasurer. The union is made up of Nigerian and Nigerien forex traders in the market and unites official and unofficial/undocumented forex traders under one umbrella in what appears to be a from-below typology of transnationalism (Vertovec

2009). According to one of our interviewees, 'Oga Fulani', Binis, Hausas, Igbos and Nigeriens have coexisted in the market for a long time under the aegis of the union.

The Wazobia union offers identification cards to its members and is registered under the Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission. The union solves disputes between its members, regulates forex traders' behaviour and provides security in the market to its members. The chairman is responsible for solving problems at the market level, but when a problem is too big it is referred to security agencies like the police. Every business in the forex market has a leader who has (or is supposed to have) a Wazobia Forex Traders' Union membership, participates in monthly meetings, and pays dues and security fees. We observed that each business or office we encountered had a cluster of traders; members of the union with official forex licences often 'housed' a number of unofficial or undocumented forex traders as part of their businesses. This gave the unofficial forex traders protection within the market and the union. Wazobia is also present in the thirty-six states of Nigeria but it is unclear if the structure in Edo State is the same as elsewhere.

The main issues that the Wazobia union resolves relate to theft, insecurity, fraud and disputes between forex businesses and individuals, as well as between communities. From our observations and interactions, we learned that there have been numerous cases of fraud; Bini locals who bring large sums of foreign currency to invest have been defrauded by other forex traders who have then fled from the state and, in some cases, travelled to Niger. These cases are often escalated to the chairman or security operatives. The market is highly prone to crime because of the large flow of foreign currency; as a result, security is the highest priority of the union. Each member of the union must pay a security levy each month to ensure the safety of their offices. When levies are unpaid, the union locks up the office of the defaulter until the fees are paid.

The Wazobia union is a crucial part of communal governance in the Nigerien migrant community because the majority of Nigeriens in Benin City are forex traders and therefore members of the union. Because the majority of the members of the union are Nigerien, the union is inevitably an instrument of communal governance, particularly pertaining to the forex market. Having a majority of Nigeriens impacts on the power structure and representation in the union and shapes the experiences and perceptions of non-Nigerien members of the union, as well as how much Nigeriens rely on the union to address communal issues.

Power Asymmetries and Representation Within the Community

Our observations indicated that there are asymmetries of power between the leadership of the HCNE, the Wazobia union, the Hausa community leadership and Edo State locals. The Hausa community in Benin City was founded by Hausas who moved from northern Nigeria, where they are predominantly located, to settle in Benin City. According to Alhaji Badamasi Saleh, the leader of the Hausa community in Edo State, the first Hausa migrants to settle in Benin City worked as butchers, in an area now known as Butcher Street that was allotted to them by Oba Akenzua (who ruled from 1933 to 1978). Alhaji Saleh did not give us a specific date for when the Hausas started to move into Benin City. As a result, we cannot ascertain whether it was early in the reign of Oba Akenzua or more towards the end of his reign.

It is important to note that the Hausa community in Edo State is different from the HCNE. The Hausa community consists of various Northern Nigerian ethnic groups who speak Hausa as a lingua franca. This community has a chairman who is elected to office by the traditional rulers of the represented ethnic groups. The Northern Nigerian ethnic groups represented under the broader Hausa community include: Hausa, Nupe, Kanuri, Fulani and Zabarma. Alhaji Saleh informed us that Northern Nigerians face challenges arising from the difficulty non-Nigeriens and non-Hausa speakers have in telling Nigeriens apart from Northern Nigerians. We found that many Northern Nigerians are often mistaken for Nigeriens and get picked up by local authorities. Their only way of getting out is to prove they are Nigerians by stating precisely where they come from in Nigeria (state, local government, village, etc.). This notwithstanding, Saleh assured us that the community leaders all work together to support each other and the government.

Nevertheless, there has been friction between Nigeriens and Northern Nigerians. After the death of the first HCNE president, it was difficult to find another leader. Within this period, Nigeriens in Edo State faced numerous problems, including harassment and fraud. In addition, the lack of leadership in the community forced members to turn to the police instead of dispute resolution mechanisms within the community, which put members of the community at a disadvantage. At this time, the head of the Hausa community in Edo State was interested in the chairmanship of the Edo State union because of the perceived similarities between the Hausa and the members of the HCNE. However, the members of the community were not in support, which caused some tension between the Nigerien and Hausa communities.

HCNE leaders in Abuja and Lagos had to come to Benin City to ease the friction and explain that the Edo State union was only for Nigeriens in that state. Eventually, they were able to create mutual respect between the Sarkin Hausawa (the leader of the Hausa community) and the new Nigerien union chairman, which has ensured a level of harmony between the two communities since then. The friction between the Hausa community and members of the HCNE shows the issues of representation in Edo State; because Nigeriens are commonly mistaken for Hausa Nigerians, the politics of the two communities may be at odds often. A major challenge of the HCNE leadership is to ensure that the distinctions between the communities are clear, while maintaining cordial relationships with other communities.

Within the forex market, there are also frictions. The HCNE is charged with the wider affairs of Nigeriens in Edo State, and as a result, the zonal chairman and the state-level union president have a greater role to play and more executive powers within the Nigerien community than others. The Wazobia union is meant to focus solely on forex-related affairs in the markets. However, when there is an overlap between the affairs of Nigeriens and issues in the forex market, tensions may arise between the two unions.

For example, the relationship between the HCNE and Wazobia came under strain due to an overlap in the governance of the Nigerien community because the Wazobia chairman was also Nigerien. Our interviews revealed that, in 2016, there was an escalation of the conflict between the two union leaders, and the head of the HCNE in Abuja had to come to Benin to intervene. According to the Edo State HCNE president, he tried to stay out of matters relating to forex specifically because that is the jurisdiction of Wazobia. However, in matters affecting all Nigerien citizens, the responsibility falls on the leader of the HCNE.

Within Wazobia, there were also asymmetries of power between the different members. We noted that the official forex traders were placed higher in the union than unofficial or informal forex traders. The informal forex traders often had to rely on the few official forex traders for protection, access to business support, security, etc. Additionally, our research revealed imbalances between the different groups within the union. For example, even though Bini people bring the capital for the forex business as well as the customers, they were not actively involved in the union. In terms of representation, Nigeriens had an advantage over the locals because they were the largest population in the market. This gave the appearance of skewed power within the union in favour of Nigeriens. Additionally, some participants alleged that the allocation of

ID cards within the union had been politicised, and that some members had ID cards, whereas others did not. As a result, those with ID cards were more likely to participate in and benefit from the union than others, and more Nigerien traders tended to have ID cards than other members of the union.

Furthermore, ethnicity still occupies an important role within the community of Nigerien migrants in Benin City. Although the Nigeriens we spoke to operated under the banner of the HCNE, they also had groups along ethnic lines, whether Zabarma, Hausa or others. Just as there is a Sarkin Hausawa, there is also a Sarkin Zabarmawa, a title given to a man chosen as the leader of people from the Zabarma ethnic group who also engages in the forex business. These subgroups have internal community politics that shape their interactions with the larger community as well. The Zabarma have stronger representation because they are higher in number and dominate the forex market. We were not able to delve deeper into the interethnic politics in the HCNE and this is an area that can be developed in future research.

Both the HCNE and Wazobia union are male-dominated structures and women were underrepresented. For instance, in the multistorey complex that houses several bureaux de change at Sakponba Road there was no woman in the union structure. This meant that within the Nigerien community and in the forex market, women faced high levels of exclusion and the issues that affected them in the market and in the community might not be efficiently addressed. Although we did not find any female member of the HCNE, we did find female forex traders, but they were not active in the Wazobia union. One of the women we interviewed held that there were many women in the Wazobia union but it did not appear that they were greatly represented or active. Our interviewee, a local of Edo State, Ms A, felt that the Wazobia union was more of a Nigerien thing and stated this as the reason for her lack of participation in the organisation.

This means that in both the HCNE and Wazobia, gender exclusion is one of the power asymmetries that impact on communal governance. Also, it shows how identity shapes the politics of the unions: those who are not Nigerien or male are less likely to be active members of the unions. Another female interviewee, Ms B, held that many women struggle with handling the forex business because of the lack of security and of a support system in the union and the market for women. Nevertheless, she believed that as long as there was a cordial or formal relationship with the different groups in the market, she would be able to carry out her business.

The Future of the HCNE and Wazobia

We have discussed the communal governance structures in the HCNE and Wazobia in Sakponba in Benin City, and the asymmetries of power within and between these structures of governance. Based on our observations, we believe that the future of both unions will be shaped by certain factors. Firstly, in Edo State, because of the organised structure under the second president of the HCNE, future leaders will be able to manage the community more easily. Sharing the responsibilities of governing the union between the leadership removes the burden of governance from the president, who in the past had shouldered the responsibilities alone. This means that if the current structure is continued under a new leadership at state and zonal level, the chances of a cohesive community remain high. However, if these painstakingly created structures crumble, Abuja will find it hard to organise the governance of the community in Edo State. We believe this applies to other states as well. Cohesion at national level is highly dependent on how well the zonal and state leadership of the community performs at the grassroots level.

Mutualism and a cordial relationship will have to be maintained between the HCNE, Wazobia and the Hausa communities in order for peaceful coexistence to continue. As discussed above, there is an overlap of roles in the leadership of these different communities, which sometimes leads to tensions. This means that the maintenance of clear communication on the parameters of leadership and diplomacy is crucial for coexistence.

Trust is at the centre of the forex business; the Bini, Esan, Igbo, Hausa, Nigeriens and other traders in the market have to strengthen trust in order to coexist comfortably. As discussed above, the trust between the different people represented in the market has been eroded by fraud, theft and the lack of security, as well as a lack of representation of Edo State locals in Wazobia's political structures and decision-making. Many locals did not feel protected and represented in the union, and believed that Nigeriens enjoyed more rights in the union than others because of perceptions of representation. Exclusion within the union leads to disunity, lack of participation and lack of trust, which may impact the community negatively in the future. Some of our interviewees believed that it would be possible for the state indigenes to become more active in the union in the future but this would depend greatly on how the current leadership managed pluralism in the community. Leadership in the union would have to be opened up to include not only locals but also women.

Gender exclusion is likely to continue in both the HCNE and Wazobia because both structures are male-dominated; the social and cultural practices in both communities are also male-centred. This signifies that, foreseeably, Nigerien women and female forex traders will remain underrepresented and unprotected within both unions in the future. But female leaders are needed within the governance structures of the market in order for women to have a support system and a forum in which their needs and problems can be addressed.

Another factor impacting on the future of communal governance is the involvement of the next generation in the HCNE and other transnational initiatives the union is involved in. We observed and interviewed some of the children of forex traders, who seemed to be better assimilated into Nigerian life than in Niger. The children were born and educated in Edo State, having little to no affiliation to Niger, outside one or two visits. This may shape their connection to Niger and how involved they will be in sending remittances, owning properties in Niger, participating in elections or contributing funds to the Nigerien government through the union. What this means is that communal governance will evolve after the generation who first migrated from Niger are no longer leading the union. This evolution will depend on how well second-generation immigrants are assimilated into the activities of the union and if their connections to Nigerien politics and social and economic life continue. Most of the children we encountered were involved in the forex trade alongside their parents, so while they might be active members of Wazobia, it was not clear if they equally participated in the HCNE and its activities.

Discussion

This study is pivotal in that it assesses the structures and power dynamics of the governance systems that are central to the existence of the Nigerien community in Benin City and, by extension, in Nigeria. Other researchers (Little 1957; Twumasi-Ankrah 1995; Bosiakoh 2012) have studied how migrant communities organise and govern themselves for the purpose of integrating into receiving communities and maintaining ties with their home communities. Our research is enriched by the narratives and lived experiences of the migrant Nigerien community in Benin City and provides a unique perspective in the discourse on a key feature of migrant communities, which has been dubbed the 'forgotten area' of African migration, according to Bosiakoh (2012).

Our research findings from both the HCNE and Wazobia reveal well-structured associations that have developed over time, leading to defined

leadership roles and highly organised groups, recalling the hypothesis of Bosaikoh (2012) about HTAs. Although both the HCNE and the Wazobia Forex Traders' Union did not meet the definition of a home-town association as an organisation formed by migrants living in the same community—the HCNE was created by the Nigerien government while Wazobia is an occupational group—the structures that Bosiakoh noticed in his study of Ghana are very similar to what we found in Benin City. Organisational structures tend to have a leadership that is either elected by vote or nominated. Additionally, both the HCNE and the Wazobia union were involved in a wide range of activities that promoted peaceful coexistence, integration and conflict resolution. It is because of these activities that Bosiakoh states that migrant associations or HTAs achieve development and should be a policy focus.

Specifically, through the HCNE, Nigeriens in Benin City are able to maintain civic engagement in Niger and keep abreast of ongoing developments in the country, as well as in their local communities. This confirms the role of HTAs in guaranteeing social and political cohesion within the migrant community and also in their host country. Through Wazobia, Nigerien migrants are able to achieve security and representation in the unofficial forex market. As a whole, the objectives of both unions helped Nigeriens integrate better in the market and in the city and also maintain links to Niger.

Our findings also highlighted the role of metagovernance in democratisation by giving community members the space to participate in decision-making and accountability processes (Somerville 2005). As our research showed, the HCNE processes had to be democratised by the union president in order to enable members to remove leaders whose performance and policies they were dissatisfied with. The Wazobia union, on the other hand, was not as democratic, even though it also has a well-developed structure. The dominance of the Nigeriens in this union impacted on the representation of its non-Nigerien members. This means that the Wazobia union indirectly and inevitably was Nigerien-focused, like the HCNE. This is the reason there are more visible tensions within that structure than the HCNE. Nationality is the overarching feature of HCNE, which unites the association as a whole. Forex, on the other hand, is not a strong enough factor to unite the different groups within Wazobia.

By focusing on issues of documentation, the HCNE also plays a role in migration law and policy engagement; this, according to Bosiakoh (2012) is what can be leveraged by the state in migration management and migrant-state engagement. The Nigerian government benefits from the

engagement between the members of the community and the NIS through the HCNE. On the other hand, by focusing on security in the forex market and collaborating with the police, the Wazobia union is engaging Nigerien migrants with the security apparatus of the state. This shows that there are different ways migrant associations connect migrants to the state regardless of their migration status because these organisations represent the interests of the migrants and interface with the state and the local community as a bloc.

Our findings have shown the intricate details and power dynamics of the two unions that intersect the forex market and Nigerien community in Benin City. We uncovered the complexities of communal governance within a community where different identities exist and interests vary. Our work has also uncovered conflicts within the unions in the forex market which, if not properly mitigated, might severely threaten the fragile peace not only within the unions but in the greater community in Benin City. As has been discussed, differences within the occupational union, Wazobia, have left several members (coincidentally also members of the same ethnic group) feeling left out and disenfranchised from the activities of the union that was created to serve the interests of all forex traders in the market. Likewise, in the union for Nigerien migrants, we saw differences that have arisen along ethnic lines, which could potentially escalate and lead to division if not properly managed.

Another important implication of this study is the gender perspective. Even though women are responsible for a greater portion of the remittances coming into the forex market in Benin City, our research showed that women are underrepresented, generally in the forex market, and especially in the unions discussed in this article. This presents an opportunity for the HCNE to involve female Nigerien migrants living in the city who have been excluded from the association. HCNE is a very well-defined structure and it begs the question why Nigerien women are not part of the union or hold any leadership positions in it. Concerning Wazobia, there are women who work as forex traders in the unofficial forex trade, but they are missing from the governance structure. The Nigerian traders of Benin City are also largely excluded from the Wazobia union, as discussed in our research findings. These are things both unions will have to come to terms with if they want to maintain co-existence and integration with the host community.

While we have extensively studied the dynamics of the unions in Benin City, there are limitations to our research which present an opportunity for further research in this field. For instance, we focused on the Nigerien community in Benin City and thus studied the HCNE within that location only, even though we were told that Benin City has the fourth-largest

concentration of Nigerien migrants in Nigeria. The conclusions drawn herein are thus relevant only to the community of Nigeriens in Benin City and do not reflect the dynamics of other HCNE chapters across Nigeria. Thus, an area of further study might be to conduct a comparative analysis of the unions across states and regions in Nigeria.

Our research was also limited by the fact that we focused on Nigeriens living in Nigeria and did not have a chance to interview their community members, relatives and state officials based in the Republic of Niger. Consequently, we cannot speak about the strength of the ties that our interviewees claimed to have with their local communities back in Niger, neither can we confirm the level extent of their participation in local politics in Niger. This also presents an avenue for further studies, perhaps to measure the impact that Nigerian-based Nigeriens have on their communities back home.

Conclusion

Our case study shows how Nigerien migrants in Benin City navigate daily life using community governance to carry out their civic duties both within the receiving community, and their country of origin. Our research is relevant in that it shows how community governance has aided the settlement and integration of Nigerien migrants in Benin City. Our article shows that community governance is a useful tool for transnationalism because it creates the systems that sustain transnational relationships and allows them to govern themselves to achieve the purpose for which they were created. Using transnationalism as our grounding theory, our research shows how the community of Nigerien migrants actively maintains transnational linkages and exchanges with political institutions. The Nigeriens of Benin City have organised themselves in two primary ways: firstly, along the lines of their nationality, then also along the lines of their business interests. We have shown how this community, through the HCNE, relates formally with the government of their home country in a sociopolitical transnationalism. Through the HCNE, this migrant community is able to maintain strong political ties with Niger from within Nigeria, voting in elections for example.

Our research shows that communal governance in migrant communities particularly is intertwined with transnationalism. In our case study, without the structures of the HCNE, it would be difficult for the Nigerien government to keep Nigeriens in Nigeria engaged in the politics and economics of Niger at the grassroots level. Through these structures all members of the community, including the undocumented, can remain linked to their country of origin, in addition to accessing dispute resolution, security and other protections.

As a result, this article contributes to available research on transnationalism and migrant associations. Our use of interviews and case studies also makes a methodological contribution; West African transnationalism and communal governance is an area with a diversity of knowledge due to freedom of movement and ease of settlement. There are numerous communities with structures of transnationalism and communal governance that need to be unpacked for a clearer understanding of the contributions and engagement of migrants with their countries of origin and destination.

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Towards a Bottom-up Approach for Localising SDGs in African Cities: Findings from Cairo and Dar es Salaam

Omar Nagati*, Hanaa Gad**, Amin Ali El-Didi***, Jacob M. Kihila****, Elinorata Mbuya***** & Emmanuel Njavike******

Abstract

This article attempts to apply a localisation methodology previously developed by the authors to analyse the current status of the implementation and monitoring apparatuses for SDGs 6 (water and sanitation) and 11.2 (mobility) in the case study cities – Cairo and Dar es Salaam. It uses comparative, top-down and grounded bottom-up analyses to identify gaps in the existing SDG framework and ultimately proposes a set of evaluation criteria to replace the global indicators with new localised and quantifiable indicators in the two cities. In doing so, it responds to prevalent critiques of SDGs specific to their application in the global South, including difficulties in measuring and monitoring urban conditions, misrepresentation due to the reduction of complex local conditions to abstracted data, and the inadequate capacity of the agenda to consider and assess informal activity. The proposed revisions to targets and indicators for SDG 6.1, 6.2 and 6.b, and SDG 11.2, were later discussed with community organisers and residents to bolster their validity, and represent a stepping stone towards negotiating better sustainable-development paradigms with Egyptian and Tanzanian policy-makers. More generally, these revisions invite further inquiries into other African cities or other geographies

* Architect and Urban Planner, Co-founder, CLUSTER, Cairo, Egypt. Email: onagati@cluster.org
** Architect and Community Development Leader, CLUSTER, Cairo, Egypt. Email: hanaa.gad24@yahoo.com
*** Architect and Researcher, CLUSTER, Cairo, Egypt. Email: amin_aldidi@hotmail.com
**** Senior Research Fellow, Ardhi University, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Email: kihilaj@gmail.com; ki-hilaj@yahoo.com
***** Research Fellow, Ardhi University, Dar es Salaam. Email: angelambuya@yahoo.co.uk
****** Research Assistant, Dar es Salaam. Email: enjavike@gmail.com

with a prominent urban informality in order to update the general SDG framework across its seventeen goals and develop locally embedded standards for different kinds of service provision and outcomes.

Keywords: Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), localisation of SDGs, global South, informality, citizen science, water and sanitation, mobility

Résumé

Cet article s'ingénie à appliquer une méthodologie de localisation précédemment développée par les auteurs, afin d'analyser l'état actuel des dispositifs de mise en œuvre et de suivi des ODD 6 (eau et assainissement) et 11.2 (mobilité) dans nos villes d'étude, le Caire et Dar es Salaam. Il utilise des analyses comparatives, descendantes et ascendantes pour identifier les lacunes dans le cadre existant des ODD, et, propose un ensemble de critères d'évaluation pour remplacer les indicateurs mondiaux par de nouveaux, localisés et quantifiables dans les deux villes. Ce faisant, il répond aux critiques habituelles faites aux ODD et spécifiques à leur application dans les pays du Sud, avec les difficultés à mesurer et à suivre les conditions urbaines, les fausses représentations dues à la réduction de conditions locales complexes à des données abstraites, et l'inadéquation de l'agenda à examiner et évaluer l'activité informelle. Les révisions proposées des cibles et des indicateurs des ODD 6.1, 6.2 et 6.b, et l'ODD 11.2 ont ensuite été discutées avec les organisateurs communautaires et les résidents pour renforcer leur validité, et représentent un tremplin vers la négociation de meilleurs paradigmes de développement durable avec les décideurs égyptiens et tanzaniens. Plus généralement, ces révisions invitent à d'autres enquêtes sur d'autres villes africaines ou d'autres zones géographiques à fort caractère informel urbain, afin d'actualiser le cadre général des ODD à travers ses dix-sept objectifs, et développer des normes intégrées localement pour différents types de prestation de services et de résultats.

Mots-clés : Objectifs de développement durable (ODD), localisation des ODD, Sud global, informalité, science citoyenne, eau et assainissement, mobilité

Introduction

In June 2019, global, regional and national stakeholders from African governments, multilateral and bilateral institutions, foundations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the private sector, academia and civil society met in Kigali to discuss the progress of Agenda 2030 in Africa, and to outline future steps towards Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) achievement for the continent. The final diagnosis of this conference, entitled 'SDGs Implementation in Africa: Reflections on a Three-Year Journey', was alarming. This final report pointed to the multiplicity of 'unfinished

business' for the continent and indicated that African governments were largely oblivious to the efforts needed to reach the SDGs (The Sustainable Development Goals Centre for Africa 2019: 4). It referred most prominently to shortages in funding, in the requisite political will and devolution of governance and, finally, in reliable data across different social, economic and demographic variables, with only 96 out of 231 SDG indicators currently having data in African countries (Ibid: 8).

Albeit already known to most researchers and policy-makers across Africa, the report's reification of such challenges re-emphasised the need for more efficient methods of adapting the SDGs to local realities, improved local data and clearer frameworks for holding governments accountable. These relative shortcomings in Africa also remind us that, as 'discursive formations of power/knowledge […] aiming to shape lives and conducts' (Malonza and Ortega 2020: 5), the SDGs risk embodying one more example of developmentalism whereby the North, by virtue of its rank within power/knowledge hegemonies, dictates development models to countries in the global South. And while the SDGs offer a substantial improvement compared to their predecessor, which had been formulated entirely without the participation of the global South, they are still not disconnected from Eurocentric understandings of 'development' manifest in imposed worldviews surrounding informality. This echoes the importance of better SDG localisation strategies and the general urgency for locally developed (or at least locally honed) models for sustainable development that correct misrepresentations or the oversimplification of the complex realities of the global South.

While the SDGs seek to provide a comprehensive system for defining and measuring progress towards achieving the goals at global and national scales, their applicability and relevance in Southern contexts have been deemed lacking (Valencia et al. 2019). This is especially so given the prevalence and specificity of informal urbanism in the global South, and, conversely, the over-reliance on state actors and formal policy interventions within the SDG planning and monitoring processes, and the generally negative view of informality that underpins much of the framework's language. Reinforcing the 'city without slums' development paradigms and national programmes (see, for example, Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform 2016: 34), many SDG benchmarks are simplified to the extent of the very absence of informal urban developments or activities, or rely on formal data sources that exclude informal activity. This, it is argued here, ignores the inevitability of informality as a mainstream urbanisation process, in the context of neoliberalising cities in the global South and the ensuing retreat of state-sponsored service provision.

Thus, this research project rests on the conviction that working with informality is not an option but the only modus operandi for researchers and policy-makers alike for the next generation (Nagati 2016: 257–8). The overarching issue that the localising methodology presented here attempts to address can be construed as the interplay between universalism and particularism. Using a comparative approach with Cairo and Dar es Salaam as our case studies, the research herein attempted to develop an SDG localisation methodology that accounts for the myriad of informal or quasi-formal practices characteristic of African cities, yet retains the ambition to achieve the general goals as laid out by the original SDG targets. The case studies explore questions of evolution, land ownership, availability of services, proximity to the city centre, and the role of state and non-state actors, further complicating the single definition of informality in African cities and the global South and offering a more nuanced and dynamic framework of urban practices on an analytical and a normative level.

A three-legged approach, proposed as a general methodological framework, offers an opportunity to mediate the universal principles of the SDGs in question, with specific practices at a local level, through a set of revised and grounded criteria that both fairly assess and identify potential improvements to local practices (Fig. 1). This is done by, firstly, a policy analysis stage, investigating the ways in which governments translate the SDGs into policies and programmes, exposing the gaps between the various levels of urban governance and highlighting the differences between highly centralised states (as in the case of Egypt) and more empowered local authorities (as in Tanzania). Secondly, a grounded research stage, whereby the local practices with respect to water/sanitation and transportation/mobility are described and translated to the informal neighbourhood level. The way in which these two themes evolved as systems, or networks, and the role of state and non-state actors in creating, advancing or limiting the capacity of such infrastructure systems, is comparatively analysed. Finally, we suggest a framework for mediating the relevant SDG indicators, developing a toolkit to evaluate and potentially improve performance-based criteria on local practices.

The research has two principal outcomes: the development of a localising methodology, and the generation of research findings through the application of this methodology to our case studies. While the paper will present the latter, detailing the research findings and comparatively and critically analysing them, it will first briefly outline the methodology developed before presenting the research findings across three sections. Taking the North African megapolis Cairo and the East African port-city

Dar es Salaam as case studies, the first of these sections will comparatively assess the application of the SDG framework from a formal policy perspective. The second section will present the bottom-up grounded fieldwork in informal neighbourhoods in each city, comparatively unpacking the nuances, differences and complexities across each site, with a specific focus on sanitation and mobility. The third section presents the results of a comparative workshop where researchers from each city came together to synthesise the findings. This resulted in the development and testing of an alternative approach to measuring local standards and practices along sustainable development criteria, thus proposing revisions to the SDG targets and corresponding indicators related to achieving universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water and adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all, through the participation of local communities (SDG 6.1, 6.2 and 6.b), and access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all (SDG 11.2), in accordance with our findings.



Figure 1: Overall methodological framework

Policy Analysis

National Scale

Egypt and Tanzania are signatories of Agenda 2030 and are expected to take ownership of and establish national frameworks for the achievement of the seventeen SDGs (UN 2018). Despite the submission of a Voluntary National Review (VNR) to the UN High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) on Sustainable Development by the Egyptian government in 2016, only 41

per cent of baseline data was available for the SDG indicators (Ministry of International Cooperation 2016: 20). This mirrors the pronounced data gap present in many African countries and the global South at large (Woolfrey 2020; The Sustainable Development Goals Centre for Africa 2019). There are particular discrepancies in the data used to track and report on the progress and conditions of water and sanitation in Egypt. For instance, a joint publication by WHO and UNICEF, in 2017, shows that Egypt has 100 per cent water coverage (UN-Water 2016), whereas we noted a different level of household coverage of nationwide access to both drinking water and sanitation. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), on the other hand, report that more than 90 per cent of households in Egypt have access to clean water and 50 per cent have access to sanitation, which presents a roadmap for improvement (Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform 2016). A clear difference between the WHO/UNICEF figures and those of Vision 2030, Egypt's key policy roadmap, is therefore apparent (Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform 2016: 25). Furthermore, while Vision 2030 is structured along the three dimensions of sustainable development (economic, social and environmental), it exhibits a clear focus on the economic dimension. This is illustrated by plans for the construction of several new cities and industrial areas, and new desert land reclamation schemes, with the aim of attracting national and international investment and accommodating a growing population and workforce.[1]

In Tanzania, progress monitoring shows that as of 2019 the country had not yet adequately progressed towards achieving the SDGs (Office of Auditor General 2018). Issues affecting implementation included poor identification of the required resources and capacities, and insufficiencies in establishing mechanisms for monitoring and reporting on SDG implementation performance (ibid). Despite the objective of co-ordinating and directing people's efforts, minds and the country's national resources, Tanzania's Vision 2025 is unlikely to be attained (Planning Commission 1999). Generally, a gap exists between the way in which the SDGs have been framed when it comes to sanitation and mobility, and the actual plans and programmes in place to address the challenges of slum dwellers. In parallel to Tanzania's Vision 2025, the Second Five Year Development Plan (FYDP II), 2016/17 to 2020/21, seeks to improve efficiency in implementation through organising and rationalising national resources under one framework and addressing critical challenges (Ministry of Finance and Planning of Tanzania 2016). One of the objectives of the FYDP II is to ensure that global and regional agreements (such as Africa Agenda 2063 and SDGs) are adequately mainstreamed into national development planning and implementation

frameworks for the benefit of the country. The responsible organ for domesticating (training at local level) the SDGs is the Ministry of Finance and Planning (MoFP). It does this by: incorporating the SDGs into national plans; mobilising resources for their implementation; mainstreaming the SDG indicators; collecting data for monitoring SDG implementation at the national level; and reporting on implementation progress to the UN High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF). However, while the need to localise the SDGs is recognised, the strategies adopted remain too aggregate and do not account for the specific conditions and issues faced by different urban or rural contexts in Tanzania.

Provincial/City Scale

Concerning the monitoring and reporting on the implementation of SDG targets 6.1, 6.2, 6.b and SDG 11.2 and their respective indicators at provincial level in Egypt, the country lacks comparable data sets, as highlighted by the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS) in the 2016 VNR. This report attributed the main challenges to the data gap and the availability of updated data, as well as the need for capacity-building in institutions and of individuals involved in the data collection process (Ministry of International Cooperation 2016: 20).

In addition, with reference to SDG 11, the VNR took a number of measures to account for urban development and to formulate adequate programmes and projects for reaching universal norms. This led to the development of the National Urban Policy (NUP) to guide urban development for the next 30 to 50 years (UN 2016). This NUP outlines plans for the implementation of SDG 11-related targets through the use of one governorate (Qena) as a pilot case by the General Organisation for Physical Planning (GOPP), the establishment of a National Observatory, the renewal of the concept of New Towns, and the upgrading of slum areas and informal settlements (UN 2016: 31–32). The two last strategic plans represent the core of the national urban development strategy of Egypt's Vision 2030.

The Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) of Vision 2030 with regard to urban improvements rest on two, interlinked major concerns. One is the elimination of informal (and insecure) areas, and the second is the expansion of new urban communities. New urban communities are satellite cities, towns or entire cities constructed either by private large-scale real estate developers or through state-led initiatives. Vision 2030 further extends this urban planning model ideal. The KPIs focus on building up new urban communities, many of them in the Greater Cairo region, and settling urban

dwellers in these new areas. This goes hand in hand with the elimination of 'slums', as well as the eviction of people from areas that are declared 'unsafe'.

Within the larger scope of urban development, one KPI addresses mass transit, which aims to double the public transportation ridership by 2030 through increasing the capacity and quality of existing transit systems. However, there are no indications that current Egyptian urban policy will allow for these goals to be met. Of EGP 26 billion planned to be allocated to the transport sector in the state's national Fiscal Year (FY) 2016/2017 budget, only 5.5 billion, or 21 per cent, went to public transport (Shawkat 2017). Although this represents an EGP 1.5 billion increase from the FY2015/2016 budget, it remains insufficient relative to demand. Moreover, expenditure on the underground metro in Greater Cairo accounted for 91.8 per cent of the public transport budget, where 81 per cent of that was in Cairo governorate, while spending on public buses through the Cairo Transport Authority and the Alexandria Public Transport Authority accounted for only 8.2 per cent of the Public Transport budget. This calls attention to the focus on one form of transportation present in formal areas only, the neglect of a deteriorating public bus system (which is often the transit mode nearest to informal areas), and the lack of recognition of informal modes of transportation.

In Tanzania, the 'Dar es Salaam Master Plan' seeks to address water provision and sanitation and their particular issues at the provincial level (Ministry of Land, Housing and Human Settlement Development 2018: 86). The plan states that the city has severe shortfalls in its sanitation systems and hence there is a need to undertake community-level programmes to raise public awareness of improved sanitation practices. A key risk associated with the sanitation and sewerage system is the contamination of water, leading to poor water quality and threats to public health (Mkanga and Ndezi 2014). In informal areas in general, sanitation issues are closely linked with poor health, worsened by a relatively high water table, poor surface drainage and highly inadequate toilet and wastewater facilities. Particularly in the area of sanitation, critical interventions are needed if citizens are to be appropriately served and serviced, as per the aim of SDG target 6.2 on sanitation. As for mobility, the 'Dar es Salaam Transport Policy and System Development Master Plan' of 2008 provides a classification of community roads as access roads within communities and residential areas, linking to feeder roads (JICA 2008). This clause of the policy is expected to positively contribute to improved mobility within the city of Dar es Salaam and the informal areas, by ensuring local circulation and property access.

Comparisons and Conclusions

Firstly, considering how SDGs are incorporated by both governments in their respective development agendas, there is a differentiation between institutional responses and political rhetoric. In both countries, it can be said that there has been a substantive institutional initiative at national level, where new state bodies were established to measure and monitor indicators or that responsibility was allotted to existing ministries. However, ambitions rooted in SDG achievement seem well integrated in rhetoric, backed by 'political will' across the Tanzanian government, while in Egypt, SDG rhetoric seems to have been appropriated under economic investment agendas rather than local development. In practice, the clarity of indicators in representing an accurate picture of on-the-ground conditions is crucial to prevent the co-option of data and to facilitate the applicability of SDGs within local communities. It is also an imperative step in facilitating the shift from 'measuring' to useful intervention.

Secondly, both countries are facing a data gap in terms of the representation of baseline data, in addition to a lack of recent data sets at provincial and district scale. This is pronounced in the large discrepancy present in SDG 6 sources and interpretations in the Egyptian case, and the accuracy of some of the base data in the Tanzanian case. It can be concluded that indicators need to be flexible and responsive to on-the-ground limitations if they are to be useful and translatable into easily monitored data.

A third point of comparison revolves around the absence of critical localising. This is mostly apparent in the ways in which SDGs are pronounced in governmental policies and the urban visions of both countries, and in their wording, with no clear indication of how they are tailored to their respective context. For example, in Egypt there is no contextual critical interpretation of goals undertaken as part of existing localising practices, equating good housing to the very absence of 'slums', while new indicators added locally reinforce the biases in 'universal' SDGs.

Lastly, the difference in urban governance systems of Egypt and Tanzania is reflected in the prominent appearance of SDGs at national and strategic levels in rather abstract terms in the former, highly centralised state, while the translation of the goals and targets of SDGs at a city level in Dar es Salaam, in both transportation policies and health concerns around water and sanitation, is more pronounced. There is thus a need to develop alternative tools to integrate local priorities into SDG targets, including participatory modes of data collection and frameworks for the co-production of knowledge.

Grounded Research

The overall methodological framework of this research seeks to understand, develop and evaluate local performance-based standards along comparable sustainability criteria beyond the limits of a standardised approach. It proposes to combine the analysis of formal policy, government actions and plans, in the context of the SDGs, with a bottom-up assessment of local practices and performance-based standards. To achieve this, field research was conducted between November 2019 and March 2020 through a series of visits, community workshops (involving three to ten community actors with a range of positions, from municipal representatives to participating residents), participant observation and mapping, semi-structured interviews and meetings (Fig. 2). Secondary data was used to substantiate and fill in missing information. In addition, maps and visual documentation by community-advocacy social-media platforms were employed.[2] Lastly, the SDG framework was refined through the development of a 'Toolkit for Localising SDGs'. A second round of community engagement was conducted towards the end of the project through feedback workshops to assess some of the research findings and proposed measures.

Figure 2: Visit in Ard al-Liwa

Table 1: SDGS 6 And 11, Their Relevant Targets and Measuring Indicators

Goal 6: Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all	**Target 6.1:** By 2030, achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all	**Indicator 6.1.1:** Pro-portion of population using safely managed drinking water services
	Target 6.2: By 2030, achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and end open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations	**Indicator 6.2.1:** Pro-portion of population using (a) safely man- aged sanitation services and (b) a hand-washing facility with soap and water
	Target 6.b: Support and strengthen the participation of local communities in improving water and sanitation management	**Indicator 6.b.1:** Proportion of local administrative units with established and operational policies and procedures for participation of local communities in water and sanitation management
Goal 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable	**Target 11.2:** By 2030, provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, notably by expanding public transport, with special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable situations, women, children, persons with disabilities and older persons	**Indicator 11.2.1:** Proportion of population that has convenient access to public transport, by sex, age and persons with disabilities

Source: UN General Assembly, 2015, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform Available online at https://sustainabledevelopment. un.org/ post2015/transformingourworld

Figure 3: Field Visit in Keko Machungwa

Engaging at the Neighbourhood Level

Within the broader context of each country's national policy and institutional response to the SDG agenda, local practices were analysed and compared at the neighbourhood level in both cities: Ard al-Liwa in Cairo and Keko Machungwa (Fig. 3) in Dar es Salaam. The choice of these two sites was based on their history, size and location vis-à-vis their respective cities, including their representations of broader informal areas. Further, practical considerations, such as proximity and strong connections with local community organisations, were also taken into account by the two leading research teams in Cairo and Dar es Salaam. The main themes of the two goals under analysis (access to water and sanitation in targets 6.1, 6.2 and 6.b in SDG 6, and transportation and mobility in target 11.2 under the umbrella of bettering cities in SDG 11 – as shown in Table 1) are examined through three analytical lenses: historic evolution, systems and actors. Each lens addresses local practices for each theme in both neighbourhoods through a comparative framework to explore the gaps between the formal policy measures corresponding to SDGs and local needs and priorities. Also addressed is the extent to which these practices live up to the standards and indicators developed by SDGs, and how to develop an SDG indicator framework that is more sensitive to the local context, yet aspires to international standards.

Water and Sanitation

Water and sanitation provision in Ard al-Liwa differs from that of Keko Machungwa. While the census data indicates no problems with water access in the former, the reality of the situation on the ground is very different (CAPMAS 2017). Interviews with the local community indicate that the northern part of Ard al-Liwa, which is the most recently built, suffers from a lack of many services, including water. Although most households have the necessary water infrastructure and are linked to the public network, residents keep reporting water shortage issues (for instance, water running for only two hours a day) to the authorities or through social media.[3] By tracking design interventions that seek to upgrade plans and make changes at the local level (Fig. 4), the reasons behind water shortages become clear. In short, the quantity and pressure of water is inadequate and does not match the high population density in the area. According to local authority officials, the area needs a stronger water pump, which requires the necessary supporting infrastructure, this being the first phase in the water upgrading system[4].

The many actors in water systems transcend the main provider and beneficiaries of the service – the government and residents respectively – to include other integrated systems that control either the quantity or the quality of water. Based on the analysis of water system evolution and typologies, institutions and actors are divided into three main categories – government institutions, international donors and community initiatives – which have built up a body of knowledge on their local infrastructure. In some cases, the roles of these actors overlap or complement one another to help achieve community needs in times of shortage in resources. For instance, the French Agency for Development (AFD), in collaboration with governmental institutions, is implementing water projects in Ard al-Liwa to install 14.8 kilometres of sewerage network; lay 34.6 kilometres of water pipe network; pave 138 kilometres of road network, install fire hydrants and support electricity networks and the installation of 100 lighting poles.[5] These interventions, which were led by operative NGOs in the area, were steered by a participatory process that began with questionnaires and interviews with residents and continued by forming a focus group of active community leaders.

In Keko Machungwa, there are three main sources of water: the municipal supply obtained from a pipe network which is available within the area; deep boreholes with submersible pumps; and traditional wells. Through field visits and communication with local residents, it was determined that municipal water is provided primarily through standpipes and a few



Figure 4: Water and Sanitation Map

house connections, with water from the network mainly used for drinking purposes. Deep boreholes are privately owned and supply water for the neighbourhood at a relatively cheaper price than the municipal supply. Individuals with access to this source of water normally install a submersible pump, which pumps the water to an overhead or ground tank, from which the water is distributed to the consumers. Usually, one borehole serves an average of fifty households.

In some cases, where a neighbourhood is far from a private borehole or a household selling municipal water, water is obtained from vendors who collect and sell it to the needy. Traditional wells are shallow and manually cultivated and collect subsurface water. But even though the wells often appear clean, the water can be polluted and unsafe for drinking purposes. The residents use this freely available water for all purposes other than drinking. The distribution of types of water supply and use is mainly influenced by economic status. The number of households that can afford the municipal supply connection costs and water bills are few. The number of connections is therefore much less than the number of households/plots.

The main type of sanitation in the neighbourhood is on-site sanitation, as the settlement has no sewerage network. The majority of the residents use pit latrines – improved (with a washable floor, superstructure, roof, pit cover and offering privacy) or unimproved (lacking one of the features of improved latrines). Few modern houses have water closets (pour flush) or toilets connected to septic tanks or pits, and few others use ecological toilets. The distribution of the toilets is mainly influenced by environmental conditions, economic status, level of awareness, external intervention, such as from NGOs, and accessibility. The ecological toilets, for example, are evenly distributed in general terms while supplied by different sources of funding.[6] Traditional pit latrines are mostly found in poor houses and along the drainage river. Poor housing conditions reflect the economic status of the household and their inability to construct an improved toilet because of its relatively high cost. Areas along the river have very high water tables, which means that although it is possible to construct improved toilets in such areas their installation entails more cost than in a different environmental setting.

Transportation and Mobility

An analysis of transport systems and their evolution reveals a number of distinctions between the two neighbourhoods in terms of mobility. Ard al- Liwa's mobility structure follows an organic, semi-geometrical division of land. This is characterised by long, narrow streets. The area is bordered by a railway to the east, 26th of July Road to the north and Ring Road to

the west. These arteries work as separators in drawing the relation between formal and informal areas, which are connected by pedestrian stairs, bridges and vehicular ramps (Fig. 5). Ground-level pedestrian crossings over the railway were closed in 2015, due to frequent train accidents at those points. They were replaced by bridges for vehicles and pedestrian overpasses. The heavy pedestrian traffic attracts commercial and entertainment activities at both ends of the bridges, which also provide access to public transport, such as tuktuk (auto rickshaw, bus and microbus, heading towards multiple destinations across the city.

The formal and the informal intersect at these nodes. The formal is manifest in the bridge infrastructure, whereas the surrounding activities began informally.[7] A number of these activities have become regulated and formalised, such as microbus transport and their stations, operating alongside the informal, such as 'tuktuk' in the two cities, or sometimes 'bajaj' in Dar es Salaam). There are semi-formal markets at these points, which are formal in terms of paying rent to district authorities. However, the limits of expansion for each seller are not clearly defined and are under constant negotiation. From the aspect of measuring official presence, we note fewer or even no traffic stations and officials to organise the movement of vehicles.[8]

The Egyptian government has led a number of projects in the neighbourhood to address issues of mobility. These include, among others, a side street improvement scheme which began in 2014, paving the side streets with interlocking tiles to restore and improve them and protect them from the effects of rain, as well as adding lighting. The actors in this endeavour included the Egyptian Armed Forces in collaboration with the Giza governorate and the Informal Settlements Development Fund (ISDF), as well as a number of local private contractors who were hired in the implementation of the project.

Movement in the Dar es Salaam case study follows different patterns, grounded in the stark contrast between the topographical nature of both areas. Keko Machungwa's proximity to the city of Dar es Salaam makes it possible for the residents to walk to the city centre. The area can also be reached from different parts of the city by public transport, largely in the form of minibuses, called 'daladalas'. While external mobility is therefore not a challenge, movement within the neighbourhood is difficult. There is no sophisticated transportation infrastructure within the area. The roads are unpaved and have drainage channels along them. As a result, the residents have built simple bridges between the houses, and these, as well as existing footpaths, are the main routes of foot traffic.



Figure 5: Transit and Road Network Map

Comparisons and Conclusions

While indicators for SDG target 6.1 seek to achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all, by measuring the percentage of the population with such access in Cairo, there is a stark difference between the reality of water provision in the city and the image portrayed by the official census data (as highlighted in Ard al-Liwa). This raises the question of whether informal areas are included in such data sets, when the national agenda and its current development paradigm is to 'eliminate slums', rather than improving them. To recognise and improve informal settlements and networks would entail understanding and representing such neighbourhoods as functional; they would also reflect in the census data collected. The lack of strategies to recognise informal areas serves as a critique of SDGs at a larger scale. The disparity between the classification of informal neighbourhoods/slums, the consequences of such classification on the measurement of other SDGs, and whether certain districts are included or excluded from data sets, is a problem that needs to be addressed by the indicators posed.

Secondly, the uneven topographical nature of Keko Machungwa and its effect on mobility differs from Ard al-Liwa's more complex, geometrical road network and transport systems. This raises the issue of implementation priorities, of the SDG localisation process being inevitably subject to the complexities of each situation, and of the local indicators that must be negotiated in each context to address these differences. This distinction is apparent not only in the street and transportation network in each neighbourhood, but, more relevantly, in how state and non-state actors are involved in the operation, regulation and management of each system or network. In Ard al-Liwa, tuktuk licensing, routes and fares are generally unregulated, and thus operate informally for the most part, whereas the microbuses, which link the neighbourhood to the city at large, are usually semi-regulated and licensed. In Keko Machungwa, on the other hand, public transportation and regulated commuter buses (daladalas) are limited to the main street outside the neighbourhood. Tuktuks and motorcycles, both operated by private actors, also extend their services only to the main street surrounding the area. The rest of the neighbourhood is predominantly accessible only to pedestrians. Questions of safety, accessibility and inclusion are thus intricately linked to these spatial and social hierarchies, and should be formulated as such.

Thirdly, the interplay between systems of water/sanitation and transportation/mobility, on the one hand, and state versus non-state actors, on the other, may offer a framework to rethink the localising of SDGs beyond a mere top-down implementation of a priori principles and

goals into a more dynamic (dialectic) engagement between structure and agency. Rather than being based on abstract ideals, such as sustainability and inclusion, such a framework would take the tuktuk driver or the water carrier as a point of departure to assess service delivery and performance. The framework proposed below hinges on local and informal practices as starting points to localise the SDG framework through performance-based standards and revised criteria.

In conclusion, the field analysis of local practices in both neighbourhoods demonstrates the vibrancy and creativity of solutions to fill the gap between individual and community needs, on the one hand, and formal state provision of urban services, on the other. While many of these solutions address this gap, the question of standards and quality of life remains a fundamental challenge, both technically and ethically, facing politicians and researchers alike. Are universal standards, proposed by SDGs or other international norms, applicable to these local contexts? If not, what are the yardsticks to measure and evaluate these practices? Do informal practices and survival measures offer a starting point to develop performance-based standards and codes to mitigate the gap between imposed universalism and romanticised localism? The section below attempts to tackle this dilemma by mediating between top-down policies and bottom-up practices.

Mediating SDGs

A Toolkit for Evaluating and Improving Local Practices

The following toolkit for SDGs involves three steps: localising the global indicators to produce revised criteria; extracting measurable indicators; and testing the revised framework by evaluating local practices and proposing improvement measures. The first two steps contribute to localising the existing SDG framework; i.e. adapting the global and regional/national SDG indicator framework to better suit local application. The final step, with its two sub-components, then serves the purpose of validating and piloting the revised SDG indicator framework, illustrating how it may be applied to evaluate existing practices and propose improvements.

Revised Criteria

In response to the contextual specificities and local priorities in each case study, the comparative workshop held to synthesise the findings of the research proposed to replace the existing SDG global indicators with a set of evaluation criteria. These modify the existing global indicators to produce mutually exclusive principles or ideals that any urban system may be fairly

and consistently evaluated against. Rather than using the existing indicators, which carry within them added biases and priorities, we suggest the following six criteria: safety, affordability, accessibility, sustainability, inclusiveness and convenience. These criteria go beyond the existing SDG targets, extracting from them key ambitions and framing them as potentially quantifiable attributes that are specific in what they seek to measure, but can be flexibly applied according to local specificity. For example, the ambitions for 'access' to 'safe' drinking water expressed in SDG target 6.1, are encompassed in the quantifiable attributes of 'accessibility' and 'safety.' These criteria can then be applied to a variety of elements within water systems, regardless of scale or actor.

The revised criteria avoid the linguistic biases embedded in the existing attempt to produce globally relevant statistics, and offer flexibility in how they may be appropriately measured in different contexts. The revised criteria thus straddle the 'conceptual' and 'measurable' scales of the existing SDG targets and indicators, offering a middle ground that is better suited to the global scale, and better facilitates application at the local scale.

Measurable Indicators

The second step extracts out of each criterion a set of measurable indicators for each SDG that would enable researchers to assess and quantify (if applicable) local systems and practices. For example, for SDG 11.2, the proposed quantifiable measures include the time and cost of trips, the number of accidents, harassment cases, CO2 emissions, etc. The revised indicators, which stem from the criteria defined above, seek to minimise embedded biases in order to allow any kind of urban service or intervention to be measured and fairly assessed. Secondly, the proposed framework offers a greater degree of flexibility to accommodate a variety of local conditions and the potential of context-specific difficulties in data collection. The methods for measuring the revised criteria can be adapted through the design of localised indicators for specific contexts (in this case Cairo and Dar es Salaam). The more flexible nature of the proposed global evaluation criteria (affordability, for example) facilitates this, allowing the most appropriate and accessible methods for data collection to be used in different locations, while maintaining global comparability and minimising the misrepresentation caused by unsuitable indicators (Figs 6 and 7).

As such, the proposed global criteria offer an adaptable framework for monitoring, while the revised SDG indicators offer more appropriate and locally embedded standards for measuring different kinds of service provision in an unbiased, yet quantifiable and comparable way. The next part of this section imagines these indicators being in place, and puts them to the test by testing and demonstrating the benefits of the revised indicators.



Figure 6: Comparative Framework, water and sanitation/transport and mobility

Figure 7: Comparative Framework: Water and sanitation/transport and mobility Dar es Salaam, Tanzania / The Neighborhood of Keko Machungwa

Evaluating local practices and proposing improvement measures

The work of grounded fieldwork continues beyond the revision of indicators, in order to ensure their effective application. For example, through a quantifiable assessment of the proposed indicators that show the number of accidents and amount of CO2 emissions, the tuktuk as a mode of informal transportation fails to meet the safety and sustainability criteria. Once these gaps are identified, possible measures and policies could then be proposed to narrow these gaps and bring informal practices closer to the (revised) normative criteria, by upgrading local systems to improve and enhance them rather than substituting them with imposed global norms. To demonstrate the ways in which the measurable indicators may be applied to local practices, the case of the tuktuk is discussed further, looking at a) how to evaluate performance vis-à-vis the SDGs, and b) what measures and policies could be proposed to improve their standards.

Research Findings I

The tuktuk/ bajaj as an example to assess indicators and propose measures for improvement.

The tuktuk is an omnipresent mode of transportation in most informal areas in African cities, due to its small size and ability to manoeuvre in narrow streets, its relatively affordable fare, and its resilient routing in response to the ever-expanding informal sprawl outside the planning frameworks. However, despite its relative success, the tuktuk can hardly be considered as meeting international or national standards (Mohan and Tiwari 2019: 272). To evaluate its performance, the above toolkit proposes a number of measurable indicators, using the criteria of safety, inclusiveness and sustainability.

Firstly, safety could be measured through the number of accidents and fatalities compared to other modes of transport, and in absolute terms based on the volume of ridership. The tuktuk may represent risks and hazards not only to passengers, but to other drivers and passers-by as well, particularly in informal areas where sidewalks are not always available for pedestrians. Further, tuktuk drivers, many of whom are under-age in Cairo, often do not abide by traffic rules and directions, and often drive against oncoming traffic or make abrupt turns or U-turns.[9] Finally, in Cairo, there have been numerous publicised cases of abduction and violence against women by unregulated tuktuk drivers (Alaa El-Din 2015). Therefore, unreported harassment incidents may also serve as indicators of safety.[10]

Secondly, while tuktuks may be more affordable and a more flexible trip in terms of pick-up and drop-off points, their access by elderly citizens and those with physical disability is limited, due to their seating configuration and low level of comfort. This criterion could be measured by a simple observation of the social makeup of tuktuk passengers, in terms of gender, age, physical ability and income level, compared to other modes of transportation offered in the same area, through a representative sample that considers trip times, locations and routes, and peak hour journeys.[11]

Thirdly, compared to other modes of public transportation, the tuktuk's consumption of petrol and its CO2 emission are quite low: one gallon of fuel burns for an average of 5.3 litres per 100 kilometres travelled in town (Rickshaw Challenge 2020), compared to a minibus with seventeen seats, which uses 6.2 litres per 100 kilometres (Car-emissions.com), and taxis, which use 13.16 litres per 100 kilometres (El-Dorghamy 2015).

These measurable criteria for evaluation may then offer direct recommendations to improve the tuktuk's performance indicators, such as regulated and monitored routes, licensing trained drivers, and designing solutions to address passengers with special needs, such as designated stops and lower steps to make it easier to get in and out. High-tech solutions, such as GPS and other rider-sharing software to track drivers, may also help mitigate the harassment and violence issues. Switching fuel consumption to natural gas and potentially to electric engines would enhance the environmental performance of this informal mode of transportation, bringing it closer to SDG targets and criteria from the bottom-up.

Across the city of Dar es Salaam, although different modes of transport are used, including private cars, the rapid bus transit system, the city's commuter buses (daladalas) and motorcycles (known as bodaboda), the bajaj (three-wheeler) is used with relatively high frequency in the city, and more so in informal settlements. In Tanzania, the use of motorised three-wheelers as taxis is legal.

Safety could be measured by assessing the frequency of accidents, as well as 'the safety-related practices' of the bajaj riders, compared to those of other means of transport. A comparatively high percentage of bajaj drivers learn to drive through informal coaching with friends.[12] This poses a huge risk, even if other safety regulatory measures are in place, such as regular vehicle inspection by the police force.[13] It was interesting to find communities who categorised themselves as non-users of bajaj, claiming that these vehicles did not keep their balance while on the road, risked overturning, particularly

when it rained, and that their drivers were careless. Quite a large number of users had their own means of transport, to ensure their safety, but when they used the bajaj, would ride only with bajaj owners/drivers whom they trusted, who were trained, observed safety measures and the speed limit, and generally drove safely. They trusted these drivers to take care of family members, dropping off and picking up young children from school, taking family to health care facilities, and other such important services. Accessibility to the available transport services was enhanced by the use of mobile phones by most households. The majority of the community expressed their preference for using bajaj over motorcycles, which were said to be cheaper but highly unsafe. Age and gender featured in the choice, with the bajaj preferred mostly by women and the elderly, contrary to men and youth. It is important to note that all the bajaj drivers seen in Keko Machungwa were male.

This assessment is important for the formulation of recommendations to improve the safety of the bajaj. One of the major reasons includes the ever- growing informality in housing construction, making the use of bajaj an indispensable practice. Its other advantages include affordability (resulting from its low fuel consumption),[14] flexibility (readily available when required either for sharing or for private use), and reduced waiting time as few passengers fill it. The extensive use of the bajaj in unplanned areas where there is a poor network of routes for both motorised and non-motorised transport conforms with previous studies on informal transport systems (Vahidi and Yan 2016). The routes are created informally as mobility is sought. Apart from the main access road at the centre of the settlement, most passages are narrow and bajaj are therefore not only the most preferred, but the most practical solution.

An evaluation of the findings and general recommendations favour the use of the bajaj as a standard mode of transport especially with regard to safety, hence it can be promoted. Otherwise, mobility in the informal areas would remain poor and exclude many of the inhabitants. In terms of en route experiences, in the findings, no cases were reported/experienced of harassment or any other gender-based offence while using a bajaj.

It was acknowledged that, to improve safety, it is important to establish proper regulatory frameworks and realistic enforcement methods. One of the initiatives in place was an agreement between SUMATRA (the public transport regulatory authority) and local councils, which was formed in 2015, encouraging motorcycle and three-wheeler taxi operators to form associations and generate revenue to support road safety operations. However, it has had a comparatively low uptake from the stakeholders

(Bishop et al. 2018). Other suggestions include 'upgrading' the design or adding accessories that would protect passengers from the weather and increase their comfort, since bajaj are not safe or comfortable to use during the rainy season. The findings highlighted the need to formulate and/or reform the legislation geared to improving mobility, particularly the need for more recognition and use of the bajaj. Bottom-up interventions are needed, as these have the potential to be more efficient than the currently used guiding criteria, many of which were established through a top-down approach, or with very minimal public consultation.

While the tuktuk/bajaj is becoming almost universal as a mode of transport in cities in Africa and the global South, it varies in its functions, routes and regulations, and, therefore, its image in the city culture. In Cairo, the tuktuk is not regulated and officially not acknowledged as part of the transportation network. It is limited, in theory, to informal areas and back streets, since the drivers have no licence and if caught on a main road could have the tuktuk confiscated. In practice, however, tuktuk drivers find ways to cut corners, drive against the traffic and negotiate informal fines with traffic police. The stigma attached to tuktuks in mainstream culture is directly linked to the term that defines informality in Egypt, 'ashwa'iyat', meaning 'chaotic' or 'random'. It indicates a denial of informal urbanism and practices, viewing them as an exception that will eventually be eradicated or give way to more 'civilised' urban conditions.

This image and related practice is different in Dar es Salaam, where the bajaj industry is more regulated and acknowledged as part of the transportation network. Bajaj are licensed, and even though their fares are informally negotiated, they are incorporated into the Uber app. They are allowed onto main streets and highways, even though they often take side or service lanes, alongside other modes of transportation. These distinctions are relevant to the current research with direct implications for issues of safety, accessibility and sustainability. In Ard al-Liwa, which is a much larger neighbourhood than Keko Machungwa, the tuktuk is the main mode of transportation other than microbuses, which are limited to routes along major arteries and collector streets Moreover, given that they are illegal outside the neighbourhood, when they do interface with formal districts outside the area's boundaries they are more visible and pronounced. In contrast, Keko Machungwa is a smaller and more walkable neighbourhood, and the use of bajaj is not limited to its main streets since bajaj can negotiate the available passages. However, the legality of driving 'outside' into the city at large means its interface with other modes of transportation is less apparent. With regulatory frameworks in place, enforcing mechanisms for

safety and environmental quality are more effective than when they are not and when the tuktuks are dismissed by traffic police as completely illegal, as in the case of Ard al-Liwa.

In conclusion, some proposed measures to improve the standards with reference to SDG target 11.2 may be applicable to both case studies, such as finding solutions to make vehicles more accessible to the disabled and switching fuel consumption to natural gas while exploring the use of electric engines, as seen in cars and buses. However, other indicators and measures are specific to each context and regulatory status, such as introducing a licensing system for tuktuk usage in Cairo, repeating the regulation process that the previously informal microbus industry went through, and revisiting the formation of an association that plays an active role in addressing issues of road safety in Dar es Salaam.

Research Findings II

Community feedback workshops on revised indicators and proposed measures

As a follow-up to the empirical data-gathering, a final round of community engagement through feedback workshops was conducted at both sites to assess the research findings. In Ard al-Liwa, three separate meetings were organised due to social distancing restrictions. These involved four community members, from a community centre, a youth association and two individuals representing a range of age, gender and vocational backgrounds. In Keko Machungwa the research team conducted one focus group discussion involving nine community participants, including the Tumaini Letu women group, Amka group and Keko youth community group.[15]

In contrast with the first round of engagements, this workshop focused on the community to propose measures to improve the standards of water and sanitation, and transport and mobility. In Ard al-Liwa, where the transportation issue was more pressing than water, proposals concerning the regulation of tuktuks, including licensing, designated lanes and stops were considered favourably. Some suggested a regulatory body at an intermediate level between formal institutions and informal practices. Although tracking drivers through phone applications was viewed as a positive step to address the safety of women and potential violence against them, it was considered a far-fetched possibility within such informal networks of transportation. Suggestions proposed by the research team for microbuses included better-lit and more spacious stops, and an additional metro station close to the neighbourhood. These were viewed as a major step forward, while contested as unrealistic.

In Keko Machungwa, respondents were positive about the proposed measures, but concerned about the cost implications of the suggested improvements. For instance, the idea of the registration of boreholes was positively received but it was feared that this would drive up the costs to access water and sanitation services. Moreover, among the suggested improvements, some were not positively received by the respondents, based on their experience. For instance, suggestions to improve rainwater harvesting with large catchment and storage facilities were met with claims that the challenge is not with storage but rather the deteriorating quality of rainwater when stored. Respondents therefore suggested that the collected rainwater be treated. Trust was also an element that arose during the discussion, particularly regarding water treatment on site. The respondents were skeptical about this suggestion because it might cause doubt about the ways in which the treatment was performed, which would have implications for its usage.

In addition to the different priorities of the two communities – water and sanitation in Keko Machungwa, and transportation in Ard al-Liwa – a number of other distinctions could be inferred from the response of their respective communities. Firstly, due to the varying sizes of the two neighbourhoods, the visible presence of community organisations in Keko Machungwa, and their ability to mobilise and communicate with local authorities, contrasted with the weaker communal ties of the much larger and more heterogeneous area of Ard al-Liwa, which was clearly reflected in the poorer ability to organise community workshops. Secondly, while in Cairo most of the suggestions for improvement were viewed with scepticism towards government willingness to implement such improvement measures, since most infrastructure investments are related to city-scale projects, in Dar es Salaam the issue of cost was raised multiple times in relation to the proposed measures. Thirdly, while the issue of enforcing measures of safety, accessibility and sustainability was of common interest in the two communities, in Keko Machungwa the respondents expressed their interest in enforcing them by means of 'social codes' rather than the police. In Ard al-Liwa, on the other hand, most of the respondents called for stronger regulatory measures and presence of law enforcement, which was viewed as generally lacking yet necessary in the neighbourhood.

Conclusion

This article has used a localising methodology to investigate the utility of the current SDG framework relating to water and sanitation and transport and mobility in Cairo and Dar es Salaam. Our findings revealed opportunities for improvement across different targets and indicators linked to SDGs

6 and 11.2, and corroborated our general emphasis on considering and destigmatising urban informality when localising the SDGs. For example, while under the existing SDG framework an informal transport solution such as the tuktuk would be entirely dismissed, the localised framework allows us to fairly assess the type of vehicle and its contextualised use in order to make the most of its opportunities. Conversely, the formal railway crossing at Ard al-Liwa, although seemingly providing 'convenient access to public transport' infrastructure, was found to be an inadequate intervention, based on the majority of interviews done with local users, and given the broader ambition of the SDGs.

The proposed indicators offer a more grounded tool to bridge the scales of global and local within the SDG framework itself, allowing it to become more effective in achieving its proclaimed goals, all the while accounting for informal solutions, which are often ignored, discredited or even persecuted by policy interventions. Derived from an engaged, in-the-field comparative project in Tanzania and Egypt, the toolkit is proposed as a useful method for going beyond sweeping statistics and top-down census perspectives, favouring a more nuanced understanding of on-the-ground conditions in other geographies, which could be applied across all seventeen SDGs. If there is real political will and an interest to engage with informal areas and activities, the toolkit provides an effective mechanism through which the SDG framework can be effectively applied to on-the-ground realities, without diluting or romanticising the complexity of informal urban life. Beyond specific localising efforts, however, the research has sought to localise the global framework itself. This research has ultimately argued that for the SDG framework to be effective, it must be influenced and shaped by experiences from the bottom up. Through a comparative South-South analysis, the research offers an iteration to the global framework that removes embedded biases, translates more effectively across multiple contexts and thus better facilitates localising processes at the national, provincial and neighbourhood level.

Notes

1. Examples of this are the Suez Canal Development Corridor, the construction of a new administrative capital, the development of the 'Golden Triangle' project, New Galaa City and the building and provision of one million social housing units.
2. Based on reviewing CAPMAS (Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics) data and GOPP (General Organisation of Physical Planning) related documents to identify water and mobility problems.

3. According to various typical posts from community social media platforms and petitions to local authorities, such as 'Shabab wa-Banat Ard al-Liwa' (Young Men and Women of Ard al-Liwa) https://www.facebook.com/groups/ardellwaa. Accessed 10 June 2020.
4. Interview held by the research team with Ard al-Liwa sector manager, in the municipal authority, 2 November 2019.
5. Interview held by the research team with the project's construction engineers on site during the implementation of the project, 28 January 2020.
6. For instance, Ardhi University is building a toilet in collaboration with the Centre for Community Initiatives (CCI) where social factors were used to decide where to construct it.
7. Observation by the researcher on site, 28 January 2020.
8. According to local leaders, an initiative was introduced by them and members of Parliament proposing the establishment of a traffic station in Ard al-Liwa in January 2020.
9. Researchers observation at field visit, 28 January 2020.
10. Interviews with women talking about their journey to work and girls to their schools during a community meeting, as part of a workshop on Gender and Safety organised by the Women and Society Association workshop, July 2019; R. Hassan, 2019, Creating A Safe Zone for Girls in Informal Areas in Cairo, Powerpoint presentation, Population Council.
11. Observation by the research team during field visit on 28 January 2020.
12. Interviews with sub-ward leaders, discussions with local communities and observation by the researchers.
13. Interview and field work, 7 May 2020.
14. Interview and field work, 7 May 2020: none of the interviewees complained of unaffordability.
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A 'Chinese' Street (Un)scripted and (Re)imagined: Material Shifts, City-making and Altered Ways of Living in Suburban Johannesburg

Romain Dittgen*, Gerald Chungu** & Mark Lewis***

Abstract

Derrick Avenue in Cyrildene, is a striking example of clichéd Chinese (street life) atmosphere in Johannesburg. Owing to its visible markers and demographics, this activity node sparks visions of a spatialised elsewhere. Standing in sharp contrast to a surrounding quiet and mostly residential neighbourhood, Derrick Avenue has been viewed as exceptional, different and closed, resulting in a spatial and cognitive divorce from the rest of the area. These representations, largely associated with Chinese spaces, not only shape the ways in which such spaces are commonly examined, understood and conceptualised, but also contribute to side-lining the existence of transversal urban processes and realities. This article moves away from entering Derrick Avenue through the lens of ethnicity and othering, in an effort to read this street as a holistic object of research. Through (un)writing this space, we unpack its complexities as well as explore the coexistent tension between specific characteristics of a lived and constructed differentiation and geographies of the 'familiar' Once decoupled from predetermined analytical categories and conceptual frameworks, the articulation between 'migrant space' and 'host city' is not merely confined to a study of relational ties (whether parallel, contentious or complementary), but becomes one of entanglement in terms of city-making processes and broader societal dynamics.

Keywords: neighbourhood shifts, city-making, streetscape, built form, Chinatown, Johannesburg

* Department of Human Geography & Spatial Planning, Utrecht University, The Netherlands; and the Centre for Asian Studies in Africa, Department of Sociology, University of Pretoria, Tshwane, South Africa. Email: r.dittgen@uu.nl

** (1970–2021). University of the Witwatersrand (School of Architecture & Planning), Johannesburg, South Africa.

*** Urban photographer based in Johannesburg, South Africa. Email: searose@mweb.co.za

Résumé

Derrick Avenue à Cyrildene, constitue un exemple saisissant d'une atmosphère stéréotypique (de vie de rue) chinoise à Johannesburg. Du fait de ses marqueurs visuels et de sa démographie, cet axe suscite un imaginaire d'un ailleurs spatialisé. Contrastant fortement avec le quartier avoisinant calme et principalement résidentiel, cette rue a été considérée comme exceptionnelle, différente et refermée sur elle-même, produisant une séparation spatiale et cognitive du reste du voisinage. Ces représentations, essentiellement associées aux espaces chinois, façonnent non seulement la manière dont ces espaces sont étudiés, compris et conceptualisés, mais contribuent aussi à la mise à l'écart de l'existence de réalités et de processus urbains transversaux. Soucieux de lire cette rue comme un objet de recherche holistique, nous évitons dans cet article d'aborder Derrick Avenue par le prisme de l'ethnicité et de l'altérité. En (dés)écrivant cet espace, nous déballons ses complexités et explorons la tension coexistante entre les caractéristiques spécifiques d'une différenciation vécue et construite et les géographies de l' « ordinaire ». Une fois découplée des catégories d'analyse et des cadres conceptuels prédéterminés, l'articulation entre « espace migrant » et « ville d'accueil » ne se cantonne plus à une étude de liens relationnels (qu'ils soient parallèles, conflictuels ou complémentaires), mais devient celle d'un enchevêtrement en termes de processus de fabrication de la ville et de dynamiques sociétales plus vastes.

Mots-clés : changements de quartier, faire la ville, paysage de rue, forme bâtie, Chinatown, Johannesburg

Introduction

'There needs to be more [Chinese] development here; any development is a positive sign.' This is what Dave, a local landlord, remarks, partly to us, partly to himself, as we walk along Derrick Avenue in Cyrildene, a suburb in the eastern parts of Johannesburg.[1] Since the late 1990s, this strip, about half a kilometre long and running perpendicular to two busy transit routes, has gradually evolved into the city's main Chinatown. Dave is a middle-aged white man with a long beard, tattoo-covered arms and a slightly rough demeanour. He owns two building blocks at the southern end of the street, comprised of 45 flats and seven shops, which he rents out to Chinese tenants. In a street where the bulk of the existing built environment is nowadays in the hands of variations of Chinese and Taiwanese capital, this long-term Jewish resident appears to be an anomaly. Nonetheless, his vision is geared towards turning Derrick Avenue into a successful Chinatown, a tourist attraction with street food vendors and a stronger emphasis on the commercial aspect as seen in other major cities across the globe. Halfway along the street, he

pauses next to a four-storey temple-like building, adorned with a 'pagoda-style' roof and traditional dragon figures, red pillars and painted and wooden ornaments. He expresses the hope that going forward, this type of 'Chinese' architecture will become more visible throughout the street. While, in this context, Dave may be unusual as a property owner, Derrick has progressively attracted growing numbers of non-Chinese residents in Johannesburg looking for food, leisure and grocery shops.

The existence of two gates (one only completed recently after long delays) towering over each end of the activity node, the clustering of Chinese and other Asian restaurants and supermarkets, and above all the specific demographics spark imaginations of a spatialised elsewhere. With its visible 'oriental' features, Derrick Avenue appears out of place in this leafy hillside suburb which is characterised by spacious detached properties and a number of compact apartment blocks dating from the 1950s and 60s. Ambitions about increasing development and densities along and even beyond this main street, as expressed by Dave and other Chinese landlords, sit uneasily with the more established residents living in the vicinity of Derrick.

Up until the early 1990s, the street and its surroundings were largely characterised by Jewish, and to a lesser degree, Greek residents and associated spatial markers. With the advent of democratic South Africa in 1994, concerns about political uncertainty and rising crime rates triggered a significant demographic overhaul in the neighbourhood, with many of the initial inhabitants leaving and the temporary void along Derrick Avenue being filled by new residents from Taiwan and mainland China (Dittgen et al. 2019:39). While middle-class suburbs such as Cyrildene experienced significant demographic shifts and have, over the last ten years, become racially more diverse, tolerance of newly arrived suburbanites is conditioned upon newcomers conforming to the suburban ideal and norms of a conventional, residential and calm neighbourhood (Ballard 2010:1070; Chipkin 2013). The lifestyles and cultural reference points of Chinese migrants in the area seem to defy this unwritten (moral) code, and changes have largely been viewed as incompatible with the surroundings.

Whether viewed as a (new) space for socialising or as a nuisance,[2] Derrick Avenue exists within a context of imagined urban othering. To borrow Njabulo Ndebele's words, Chinatown in Cyrildene emerges as a 'representation of spectacle, […a] spectacle of excess […] that captures the imaginations of the spectators' (1991:31). Viewing the street in a particular light contributes to 'transform[ing the] objective reality into conventional tropes which become the predominant means by which that objective reality is artistically ritualised' (*ibid.*:39). In fact, this tendency of

resorting to a spectacle as the primary lens of analysis commonly features within scholarly research on 'Chinese' urban spaces outside of China and contributes to an analytical divorce from broader urban phenomena. In the case of Cyrildene, we argue that this specific analytical framework not only obscures the narrative but also assigns a particular singularity to urban dynamics and realities which often transcend the confines of this geographical area of focus. In line with this argument, we shift away from pre-emptively classifying Derrick Avenue and seek rather to engage this street and its surroundings as a holistic object of research. Stripping it, at least at the outset, of its Chinese features, our aim is to understand how characteristics of a lived and constructed differentiation materialise and co-exist alongside a geography of what, in the context of Johannesburg, is perceived as 'familiar' or 'conventional'. As such, it helps us to 'stop seeing streets [merely] as geographical locations and rather interpret them as lively expressive archives of [broader] urban realities' (Quayson 2014:129).

The notion of Chinese space (or street) then becomes a fluid signifier, as we insert categories of 'migrant space' and 'host city' into the same analytical framework. We hereby draw inspiration from Çağlar and Glick Schiller, who argue 'that migrants [and their associated spaces] can no longer be considered a separate category of actors but must be seen, along with everyone else, within their multiple identities/disparate positionalities' (2018:19). By assessing the ways in which Chinese 'drivers' have transformed the built environment and urban practices along Derrick Avenue (whether in obvious or discreet ways), while also looking at how these spatial alterations are themselves shaped by the host city, our aim is to '[counter] disciplinary divisions between migration [area] and urban studies that continue to obscure global processes of city-making' (*ibid*.:16).

This research draws on a long-standing interest by one of the authors in 'Chinese' spaces in Johannesburg (from 2009 onwards), and a more focused analysis on the street since 2017, as part of a broader collaborative and multi-disciplinary research project. During this more recent phase, we conducted qualitative semi-structured interviews with close to fifty people in addition to organising a few transect walks with several key figures in the area. We spoke to business and property owners, entrepreneurs and workers operating along Derrick Avenue and surroundings to explore the different processes unfolding within and beyond the street. Furthermore, we interviewed current and former residents about the reality of everyday life at various periods, alongside meeting with city planners, the ward councillor, consultants, developers and resident associations to get a better sense of the different visions for the street and the neighbourhood. These qualitative

research methods were combined with a semester-long design studio on the Chinatown precinct with graduate students at the School of Architecture and Planning (University of the Witwatersrand), led by Gerald Chungu, and a layered and longitudinal photographic mapping exercise undertaken by Mark Lewis.

The article begins by critically engaging some of the existent literature on Chinese spaces, bringing publications focused on Johannesburg into conversation with similar research conducted elsewhere, alongside mapping out an alternative way towards studying such spaces. We then focus specifically on Derrick Avenue and the most recent Cyrildene Precinct Plan, looking at the extent to which material changes in the built environment and existing dynamics along the street reflect broader urban tendencies, and speak to the City's planning visions and challenges. Approaching this street as a constituent part of a larger reality, the last segment of the paper moves beyond the appearance of an established neighbourhood identity and deals with questions about renewed ways of living together in altered (sub)urban environments in Johannesburg.

Flipping the Script

The study of 'Chinese' urban spaces in various international contexts – predominantly in North America, but also in South-East Asia, Europe and increasingly across Africa – has received significant academic attention from the 1980s onwards. The aim here is not to provide a comprehensive list, but merely to highlight a broad spectrum of tendencies. Areas of interest have been diverse, covering themes as wide as:

- entrepreneurship, labour markets, and forms of community organisation (e.g. Zhou & Logan 1989; Zhou 1992, 2009);
- semiotic landscapes and cultural markers (e.g. Preston & Lo 2000; Lai 2003; Lou 2007, 2010; Leeman & Modan 2009);
- longitudinal analyses of the construction of racial categories and evolving perceptions (e.g. Anderson 1991; Shah 2001);
- residential mobility and spatial transitions (e.g. Zhou & Logan 1991; Zhou 1998a, 1998b; Li 2005; Li & Li 2011); and
- place-making, preservation of identity or blending in within suburban environments (e.g. Ip 2005; Li 1998, 2009; Luk & Pha, 2005; Lung-Amam 2017).

The initial scholarly focus on Chinatowns, as entry and reference point of 'Chinese urbanity', has gradually widened to incorporate other spatial configurations (Harrison et al. 2012:901–902), mirroring the reality of growing complexity and diversification of 'Chinese' urban spaces abroad.

In Johannesburg, the presence and gradual expansion of Chinese footprints have similarly, if to a lesser extent, translated into growing numbers of scholarly publications. While unfolding in a specific context, research has largely resonated with themes and broader areas of study on Chinese urban spaces elsewhere. A lot of attention has been directed towards historical aspects, given that the living conditions and the emplacement logics of Chinese migrants – from as early as the late nineteenth century and throughout the apartheid era – were determined or at least shaped by discriminatory laws and regulations (Harris 1998; Accone & Harris 2008). First or 'old' Chinatown, small in size and situated on the western edge of downtown, has often been the focal point used to illustrate questions of belonging and identity tied to the local Chinese (commonly referred to as South African born Chinese) (e.g. Yap & Man 1996; Accone 2006; Park 2008), but also as a space of memory, nostalgia and abandonment (e.g. Park 2010; Harrison et al. 2012). A more recent phenomenon, from the late 1990s up to about 2010, has been the emergence and mushrooming of Chinese-run malls, generating research on entrepreneurialism, commercial logics and broader economic functions (e.g. Lin 2014; Dittgen 2015; Huang 2015, 2021; Zack & Lewis 2017). In 2013, the announcement of an ambitious new city project to be built in Modderfontein by a property developer from Shanghai, which then subsequently collapsed, sparked research outputs looking at aspects of modernity and differentiation of the initial project vision (Dittgen 2017), as well as at the limits and challenges of replicating and transferring a project to a specific context (Brill & Reboredo 2019; Ballard & Harrison 2020).

Research on the second (or 'new') Chinatown in Cyrildene has most often formed part of broader enquiries into various aspects of the Chinese presence in the city, with ethnicity or othering used as the main entry points into studying the street. Some have focused on the lives of Chinese migrants within the immediate neighbourhood or the ways in which they navigate the city (e.g. Accone 2006; Harrison et al. 2012; Huang 2015; Liu 2017), others on aspects of cultural identity (e.g. Huynh 2015; Dittgen 2017; Dittgen & Anthony 2018). As argued by Harrison et al., 'space has not been ignored in the growing literature on the Chinese presence in South Africa, but it has generally not been foregrounded or theorised' (2012:905). In terms of the spatial framing of Derrick Avenue, the street has been portrayed as an ethnic enclave (Park 2010), a somewhat atypical Chinatown in a suburban setting (Harrison et al. 2012), an ethnoburb, or even an ethnic edge city (Xu 2017). Park's depiction of this section of Cyrildene as 'the loud, colourful, take-over-the-streets, in-your-face version of Chinatown' (2010:118), at the receiving end of bad media coverage during the 1990s and early 2000s,

and rejected by the local and more established Chinese, contributes to ascribing this street to a realm of difference. Symbolically, Derrick Avenue has also been associated with particular perceptions or urban imaginaries, whether as 'dirty, dodgy, and dangerous' (Dittgen & Anthony 2018:122), as 'a carrier of authentic Chineseness and modernity' (Huynh 2015:109), or as a mixture between both a real and constructed form of 'orientalism' (Dittgen 2017:992–995).

Xu's paper on Cyrildene Chinatown, framed as a critique of the ethnic enclave, discusses how the current form of Derrick Avenue must be read against broader phenomena. This includes the arrival of new waves of Chinese migrants across Africa, 'dramatic suburbanisation' in post-apartheid South Africa, as well as tendencies towards private management and self-governance (Xu 2017:82, 98). His portrayal of this stretch as characterised by 'a whole range of "hybridised" strategies in opening itself to new and different worlds', as well as 'shaped by complex imbrications of global, national, and local forces' (*ibid*.:99) is helpful in opening up the analysis of the street. Yet at the same time, his use of the spatial category of 'ethnic edge city', described as deeply connected with broader urban dynamics, stands in direct contradiction to the above, as it distinguishes Chinatown through a clear (ethnic) boundary. Even so, Xu makes a timely observation about the difficulties of defining places like Cyrildene Chinatown (see also Huynh 2018:34), amid notions of spatially segregated enclaves, processes of low-end globalisation, and the unprecedented nature of transnational social spaces spurred by Chinese globalisation (2017:100).

Overall, studies on Derrick Avenue have mostly ended up being confined within fixed analytical categories and terminologies. This is partly due to attempts to ascribe a specific definition to this space and to the people evolving within (whether by scholars, planners, or the general public), alongside the use of ethnicity or difference as privileged conceptual entry points. Not only has this resulted in obscuring the commonalities between migrant and non-migrant populations, for instance by viewing practices across categories as coeval (Çağlar & Glick Schiller 2018:5, 22), but it has also contributed towards neglecting spatial adaptations and gradual social changes. This echoes Anthony's argument that 'an obsessive focus on China [or Chinese features] brackets out other actors' and that 'analyses dwelling almost exclusively on the role of China fail to identify the broader context and its challenges' (2019:114). As a departure from this rigid compartmentalisation, we suggest a conceptual unfreezing, which is aimed at 'understand[ing] how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term' (Sellars 1962,

quoted in Van Norden 2017:XVII). To do this, we turn to Doreen Massey's vocabulary, approaching 'Chinese urban spaces' as relational, continually moulded, and open to the future (2005:11–12).

How can one then achieve a 'problemati[sation of] the very concepts that undergird its own frameworks once they have become canonical[, in particular as] certain constructs come to dominate an intellectual landscape and train our gaze' (Mattingly 2019:1)? Cheryl Mattingly uses the notion of the *perplexing particular* – described as 'an *encounter* [, in our case a street,] that not only surprises, in the sense of striking unexpectedly, but also eludes [simple] explanation' (*ibid*.:13) – with the 'ambition to critique concepts [and categories] not merely via other concepts but experientially' (*ibid*.:18). If she aims to 'reveal their limits' (*ibid*.:13) and 'provoke the sort of thinking that awakens critical concepts and guards against their ossification' (*ibid*.:18), in our own research we seek to avoid pushing the discussion and argumentation into any preconceived direction. Rather than working towards giving concepts new meaning or introducing new ones (due to the risk of potentially falling back into the trappings of a spatial 'container'), our goal is to multiply the gaze and angles of vision. It requires pursuing a combined effort of first un-writing, aimed at untying the analysis of 'Chinese spaces' and specific conceptual categories, followed by an exercise of writing anew, exploring how assumed antipodes such as ordinary/exceptional or internal/external become entangled and form co-constitutive parts of a much larger and complex landscape of urban change (Dittgen & Chungu 2019).

This attempt of flipping the script can, in part, be illustrated by the following two examples. Anderson, in her work on 'Chinese urban spaces', has argued in favour of a paradigm shift, away from 'a reductive framework of "difference" [and] alterity' (2018:136), 'introduc[ing] an order of complexity and contradiction to the dualisms of West and East around which conventional accounts of Chinatowns have been framed' (*ibid*.:135). By critically revisiting some of her own work (Anderson 1990, 1991), she makes a case for 'multiplying the epistemic standpoints on a place [*i.e*. Chinatown] whose relentlessly communal scripting, even through the critiques of orientalism, requires recasting for the present day' (*ibid*.:134). She draws on the example of Sydney's Chinatown and considers that, given its increasing diversity and openness, 'it might even be possible to envisage a future in which difference is no longer "other" to a mainstream but inherent to the very fabric of an evolving metropolitan culture' (*ibid*.:144). In another paper focused on the 'difficult flowering' of Chinatown in Zeedijk in Amsterdam, Rath et al. shift away from traditional understandings of ethnic commercial landscapes,

referring to 'a themed economic space', where market share and the right to an identity-bound claim of the area become a competition between Chinese and other, more upmarket, entrepreneurs (2017:95). One aspect of their broader analysis stresses that the 'legalising and protecting [of the area's (light)] Chinese character could fossilise [an] otherwise dynamic process', not only considering declining numbers of immigrants from China and other Asian countries but also in connection with the area's shifting identity when viewed from a long-term perspective (*ibid*.:92).

Whether in Sydney, Amsterdam or Johannesburg, the '*multiplication* of the referential points of Chinatown's narration beyond the singular one'[3] (Anderson 2018:144) helps to disrupt the '"only one narrative" [that] obliterates the multiplicities, [and] contemporaneous heterogeneities of space' (Massey 2005:5). Therefore, 'if space [and in our case Derrick Avenue] is genuinely the sphere of multiplicity, if it is a realm of multiple trajectories, then there will be multiplicities too of imaginations, theorisations, understandings, meanings' (*ibid*.:89). Far from claiming that this section of Cyrildene does not bear any elements of specificity (not least its demographics), what matters here is to investigate and read across urban phenomena (processes and practices) that resonate with dynamics perceived as conventional for Johannesburg, and those that appear as more singular. This is first outlined through the shifts in the built environment and visions for the area.

Built Form, Aesthetics and Functionality

As a locational reference point, the suburb of Cyrildene has come to be primarily associated and correlated with the image and existence of Chinatown, in particular due to the discernible transformations along Derrick Avenue. The arrival of Chinese migrants, first predominantly Taiwanese during the 1990s, followed (and largely replaced) by higher numbers of mainlanders since the turn of the century, led to a densification of the urban mass. As argued elsewhere, factors such as concerns about safety, the lack of 'accessible' public spaces and linguistic ease have increased the central function of Derrick Avenue and adjacent streets as 'a space of temporary connection and pragmatic human interaction' (Dittgen 2017:986). The rising demand for accommodation by Chinese migrants as well as the need for social and economic functions resulted in gradual alterations of the built form along the street. The initial layout, at least dating back to the 1950s, had been structured around detached bungalow houses lining up the space between both extremities, occupied by multi-storey (three to four floors) and mixed-use buildings. If the latter structures have been preserved, the demographics have changed and previous shops on the ground floor have largely evolved into Chinese-run restaurants, grocery stores or hair

salons. Many of the bungalows have been demolished and replaced with newly built three- to four-storey structures often using up a large proportion of the plot size. The few remaining bungalows along the central axis have been partially remodelled and most often turned into shop fronts (see Picture 1).

Picture 1: Gradual transformation and stratification of space along Derrick Avenue
Photo Credit: Mark Lewis, March 2019

Other alterations, less visible, illustrate the complexity of urban dynamics present in the area. If difficult to notice at street level, closer examination of aerial photographs produced by the City of Johannesburg (from 2000 to 2015) reveal a horizontal densification in the form of backyard dwellings which provide additional accommodation options for migrants, either from China or from neighbouring countries on the continent. In a context where the demand for living space has exceeded the supply,[4] most of the initially rather spacious flats along Derrick and many of the bungalows, especially those in vicinity to the main activity node, have been internally sub-divided to lodge more people. If some of the buildings have been structured around shared facilities, in Dave's two adjacent buildings all units are self-contained, since, based on his own experience, collective amenities remain largely under-used.[5] The maximisation and multiple usages of space can also be observed on certain balconies (mostly at the back of buildings), sometimes serving as extended kitchens for restaurants. The presence of Chinese characters on signboards, a limited number of buildings with distinctive architectural features

and predominance of Chinese people along Derrick can be conceptually distracting and generate a feeling of spatial alienation. Views by residents in the surrounding neighbourhood as well as media reports (as early as the late 1990s) have correlated the arrival of Chinese migrants along Derrick to a sudden neighbourhood disruption in the form of a so-called 'Asian invasion' (*Financial Mail* 1997; *Mail & Guardian* 1998).

However, when considering the 'genetic factors underlying urban patterns' (Storper & Scott 2016:1115), changes along this street parallel those occurring in other (sub)urban areas. Comparable conversions of residential buildings into commercial spaces (whether shops, restaurants or cafés) are visible elsewhere, for example along core sections in upmarket suburbs such as Greenside (Gleneagles Road), Parkhurst (4th Avenue) or Parktown North (7th Avenue), as well as in Kensington South (Queen Street), a suburb adjacent to Cyrildene. Similarly, backyard accommodation as a strategy to increase land coverage and intensity of use is a widespread phenomenon across numerous areas in Johannesburg (e.g. Crankshaw et al. 2000; Shapurjee et al. 2014; *Gauteng City-Region Observatory* 2013), as much as the multi-purpose use of space is often combined with the practice of converting and dividing rooms inside older existing apartment blocks (e.g. Poulson 2010; Harrison et al. 2018). While these illustrations of the production and alteration of space form part of broader urban dynamics and often respond to similar motivations, some are read and examined from within an ethnicised framework while others are not. Similar arguments can, for example, be made regarding the Somali presence in Mayfair (along Church Street) or Indian one in Fordsburg (in and around Mint Road).

While forming an integral part of the city, there is also an intentional effort towards differentiation in Derrick Avenue. Cultural identity is not only expressed through the variety of cuisines on offer (although varying in degrees of authenticity and adaptation to local palates) but also through a partial symbolic commodification of urban space (Lou 2010). A limited number of buildings, mainly in the middle segment of the street, stand out in terms of the built form and through the adoption of specific aesthetics. The building pointed out by Dave is the most noticeable, but there are also a few examples of smaller features being added to the existing built environment (such as decorative pillars or roof tiles). The elaborately decorated front side of the temple-like structure, showcasing elements associated with traditional Chinese architecture, contributes to the branding of the streetscape and serves as a visual magnet for visitors. This deliberate alienation through aesthetics is however partial and clearly directed towards the activity street, with the back side bare and plain, revealing a standard design used in most buildings (see

Picture 2). The gateways, through their sheer size and architecture, are, next to the shop signs, the most quintessential example of cultural place-making and spatial coding (see Picture 3). Yet, when considered beyond their 'ethnic' branding and in the context of Johannesburg, gates or gateways are the norm rather than the exception. In many of the city's upmarket gated communities (such as Steyn City or Waterfall Estate), gates are not only a security feature but also serve as place branding. The main difference is that in the latter case, the controlled gate marks a hard boundary between those who belong and those who do not (Murray 2015), whereas Chinatown archways are open and aim to draw people into a public street.

Picture 2: View of the middle section of Derrick Avenue from a side street, displaying a purely functional and bare back side

Photo Credit: Mark Lewis, March 2019

From a spatial planning perspective, changes along Derrick Avenue resonate with recent debates in Johannesburg about the direction the city should take going forward. The Cyrildene Precinct Plan exemplifies some of these aspects. Commissioned by the City in 2016, the precinct plan was approved by the Council towards the end of 2018. The latest version is far more detailed and comprehensive than two previous iterations. An initial Chinatown Precinct Plan, developed in 2009 and mainly focused on the older Chinatown, only looked towards Derrick Avenue as a comparison. A 2013 plan, centred on Cyrildene, merely provided a superficial reading of the area. It never went

through Council and warranted the production of the current version. The study area, about 22 ha large, is demarcated by Marcia Street to the south, Friedland Avenue to the east, Aida and Christeen Avenues to the west, with Derrick Avenue as its central feature. The plan aims to engage with an area 'in need of improvement, […] encourage a more appropriate built form along Derrick Avenue […] through regulatory support and development incentives, and through the maintenance and appropriate development of the public realm', while 'limit[ing] its impact on the surrounding residential area' (City of Johannesburg 2016a:9, 11).

Picture 3: Street view centred on the second archway at the intersection of Derrick Avenue and Marcia Street

Photo Credit: Mark Lewis, August 2019

Whether by describing Derrick Avenue as 'an activity street [with] a high level of on-street interaction' (*ibid.*:18), with its mixed-use functions and increased building density or by suggesting ways to manage future densities in the study area, the plan is strongly aligned with the City's Spatial Development Framework 2040 (City of Johannesburg 2016a). In light of Johannesburg's severe spatial and social challenges, including (among others) urban sprawl and fragmentation, spatial inequalities, jobs-housing mismatch, inefficient residential densification and land use diversity (City of Johannesburg 2016a:28), the City's ambition has pursued the ambition of producing a polycentric compact city form, promoting compaction, higher densities and integrated neighbourhoods. This has been most visible in the

context of the Corridors of Freedom (CoF) initiative, a citywide project aiming to undo the spatial legacy of apartheid planning by altering existing well-located areas and integrating poorer people so that they can live closer to job opportunities. Structured around transit-oriented development (in this instance the rolling out of a bus route), the City put in place favourable incentives to attract interest from private developers willing to buy into the idea of providing higher density, affordable and mixed-use dwellings in these areas. Announced in 2013, during Mayor Tau's term in office (2011–2016), this large-scale and long-term project was met by considerable resistance from impacted middle-class neighbourhoods, making it difficult for the City to build consensus (Harrison & Rubin 2020).[6] When comparing the design vision for the Cyrildene precinct plan with the one for precincts included within the CoF initiative, there is a similar focus on combining density, mobility and multi-functionality along the main axis, while retaining the character of the suburb as one moves further away from the main section. The Cyrildene plan, despite falling beyond the confines of the CoF, deliberately adopts the language and direction of the City's spatial transformation agenda,[7] but one notable difference is that the transformation of the built environment along Derrick Avenue has been self-initiated instead of being carried and driven by the municipality.

Picture 4: Everyday work rhythms along Derrick Avenue
Photo Credit: Mark Lewis, March 2017

The street reveals a complex set of relations, overlapping within a specific location. Derrick Avenue as such provides accommodation options for Chinese migrants and others (with the former operating to a large extent in the Chinese-run malls south of the CBD), work possibilities as kitchen staff, shop assistants or security guards (often carried out by migrants from neighbouring countries but also by South Africans), as well as access to supplies (e.g. rice, condiments, vegetables) for resale elsewhere (see Picture 4). More structurally, one of the interviewed Chinese developers and property owners was adamant that the level of activity needs to be increased and the perimeter of the precinct expanded. In his view, the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) does not see the benefit of higher levels of densification, holding on to past modes of development even when realities on the ground are changing:

> What is needed is a more compact city approach where land-use can be intensified and changed to mixed use just like in Sandton [the financial heart in the north of the city]. There is a need to move away from bungalows which use valuable land with low intensity; that can be unsustainable because government (and people) will be forced to open up new virgin land outside the city, when that land can be preserved. [...] CoJ needs to allow the area to develop instead of holding back progress. White people in the area don't want change. They don't realise that such developments will ultimately increase property values in the area since it will become a more attractive place. Currently there is a need for stronger government action, but unfortunately CoJ does not have capacity and is unwilling to work with the Chinese people who live in the area.[8]

As a proponent of urban compaction, he mentioned plans to tear down his own four-storey office building along Derrick Avenue, assemble some of the adjacent plots of land, and develop a much larger and higher building complex with several floors dedicated to commercial activities alongside an integrated food court. His reference points are both drawn from China, in terms of density and entrepreneurship levels, and locally, with regards to the challenge of stretched-out urban geographies.

Another mixed-use development project, comprised of retail, office space and residential, mirrors these ambitions to increase the scale of activities. It led to the demolition of four separate bungalow houses translating into a massive vacant plot of land. The project was approved by Council in 2012, but – aside from a temporary billboard announcing the development in Chinese (which disappeared after a while) – nothing hints at the launch of the construction phase amid rumours about the business-owner returning to Hong Kong, no longer interested in developing the property (City of Johannesburg 2016a:73). A group of women from Mozambique seized the opportunity to occupy this 'gap' in the existing built environment to sell vegetables and fruit as well as

seafood (fish, squid and crabs) arriving by truck from Maputo (see Picture 5).[9] Eventually, the overgrown bushes on the empty stand were temporarily cleared to accommodate additional parking possibilities, with the hawkers operating alongside the boundary wall increasingly pushed to a smaller section at the edge. This co-existence of long-term visions, some of them uncertain and unlikely to materialise, and everyday activities, whether adaptive or transient, reacting to or anticipating business opportunities, is reflective of an area that fuses multiple scales and temporalities (Dittgen et al. 2019).

Picture 5: In-between spaces and future visions
Photo Credit: Mark Lewis, March 2019

Apart from the materiality of physical change and debates about the ideal usage of space, the articulation between this street and the wider neighbourhood also speaks to questions of collective life, class and identity in a changing suburban environment.

'One must well live together…'

The current makeup of Derrick Avenue has given rise to various interpretations in terms of priorities, realities and possibilities. During a walkabout in the area with the local ward councillor (representing his constituency and a voting base of mostly established residents), he almost exclusively focused on the non-compliance with by-laws (some essential such as hygiene and building safety)

but without considering the discrepancy with current lived experiences and usage of space.[10] For the City Council, due to more pressing urban issues at the scale of the whole city of Johannesburg, and given Cyrildene's categorisation as a consolidation zone, the neighbourhood has not been considered a priority in terms of public capital allocation and attention. This might explain the slow reaction from planning authorities and the fact that the 'proposed land use plan is [largely] an indicative framework of possible and preferred zonings that may be supported by the City' (City of Johannesburg 2016a:85). If existing land uses along Derrick Avenue, often deviating from current zoning conditions and building regulations, should be accommodated if they do not compromise health and safety standards (*ibid*.:20), the City's main objective was to clearly define the boundaries of Chinatown. As such, the plan suggests implementing additional smaller secondary gates or thresholds along the side streets as well as 'varying pavement types to distinguish between the higher density of Derrick Avenue and the residential character of the wider Cyrildene' (*ibid*.:66, 76). However, for one of the long-term Chinese residents of Cyrildene, the City's predominant logic of spatial and economic containment seems counterproductive and more could be done to support the core drivers of change in the area:

> In order to develop the area, attention needs to be paid to the economic base. So far, it has developed organically without any plans in place. […] The main thing to note is that this area has slowly been changing and even if it looks the way it does, this should be seen as positive and can be used as a foundation to develop it to be better, in a holistic and sustainable way. Whatever plans the City has, they are not communicated effectively with the Chinese community and not much effort seems to be made to understand our needs. There is also a disconnection about the way development should proceed between CoJ and the Chinese community. For them, there must be a plan before the area can be developed, and since it is not a priority area, nothing happens and we have this organic form of development which looks chaotic. If this area is not a priority for CoJ, why don't they then support community efforts? Cyrildene has faced ups and downs; no one can control that.[11]

In condensed form, these different standpoints were also at the heart of the associated public engagement process, comprised of various interest groups. On the one hand, established (non-Chinese) residents were 'concerned about unregulated building and conversions, land uses, and urban management problems', and these dynamics 'spread[ing] into the adjoining areas not intended for business or rental accommodation purposes' (City of Johannesburg 2016b:5). As for the Chinese, owners were 'keen to use their properties to best advantage, mostly informally', and shopkeepers along

Derrick Avenue were mainly concerned about the trading conditions and the impact of rules and enforcement on the success of the street market. On the other hand, the Chinatown Johannesburg Community Committee was frustrated by the inability to finalise the gateways (at the time blocked due to a dispute with City Power), the lack of day-to-day service provision in the area and the shortfall of appropriate and consistent rules to regulate traders (*ibid*.:5). If there was a clear split of opinion regarding the nature and level of urban development between both sides, amid varying levels of support for the enforcement of by-laws among Chinese stakeholders, a general agreement emerged around the inadequacy of parking and the City's disinterest in the area. According to the lead designer of the precinct plan, the participation process, which consisted of three meetings (between May and July 2016), turned out to be very one-sided, dominated by established residents and a general anti-Chinese attitude, which can partially explain the reticence by Chinese to attend.[12]

This middle-class discomfort with urban change, 'expressed not only [through] a loss of place but also, more profoundly, a loss of self' (Dixon & Durrheim 2000:36, cited in Ballard 2010:1082), is comparable to the predominant mood characterising the public engagements in middle-class neighbourhoods impacted by the CoF. In each case, the culprit was framed as the *other*, the 'black urban poor' or the 'Chinese', responsible for causing undesired shifts, and anxieties about dropping property values in *their* neighbourhoods. However, despite certain parallels, there was also a striking difference which can be captured by the following two quotations. The first one highlights a particular reaction to the CoF initiative raised by established residents in Westdene:

> …if this is not in place before the developments are forced onto this area, it will turn into another Hillbrow. […] Entirely up to residents if we want it to be this way or not. Anger and disgust without eyes wide open have helped us nothing up until now. Time for residents to decide if we shall continue to become the new Yeoville or the new Parkhurst.[13]

The second one concerns Cyrildene:

> Once shoppers have done their shopping in Derrick Avenue, on many occasions these same people (guess what nationality) simply litter the road and pavement by nonchalantly throwing all their unwanted packaging, empty beverage cans/bottles and fast-food wrappers, wet tissues, cigarette butts and packages, wood meat skewers, etc onto the pavement and roadway before leaving. […] What kind of people are these and who do they expect should clean up after them? All this for the benefit of the Derrick Avenue businesses and nobody cleans up the mess.

> To top all this, we have a continual cacophony of spitting on the roads and pavements by shoppers and 'illegal guest houses' and other residents (this very often includes young women?). Lionel Street must be one of the most spat on streets in South Africa.
>
> Except for certain portions, like in front of my house and my neighbour (both of us, strangely not Chinese) the pavements are generally full of weeds, rubbish/litter, holes, builders' rubble and on many occasions discarded old torn/dirty and stained mattresses. There does not appear to be any pride by certain people in the area we live in.[14]

The first statement, referring to the implementation of the Corridors project, points to specific places; Hillbrow and Yeoville as signifiers for over-crowding, poor urban management, crime, general mayhem and a high percentage of predominantly black African migrants; Parkhurst is mentioned as a trendy and upmarket neighbourhood. In relation to Cyrildene, the second comment focuses directly on the Chinese themselves while mirroring a barely concealed racial prejudice and aggressive attitude experienced throughout most parts of the public participation process.[15] It could be argued that there is little difference between these variations of othering, whether disguised by place metaphors or openly ethnicised.[16] At the same time, it offers an indication about where these *other* groups fit within middle-class urban imaginaries: both tolerated if kept at a distance, but the former seen as part of a local phenomenon (associated with the city's history of inequality and exploitable cheap labour force); the latter relating to a more global and disconnected one. It is not only that the lifestyle is deemed unsuitable for established suburban values (Ballard 2010),[17] or that the *other* emerges within the boundaries of the constitutive core (Lu 2000), but also that these Chinese newcomers fall outside the middle-class and are associated with a type of low-end globalisation. More broadly, the comments by surrounding residents regarding the lack of salubrity and inability of grasping a normative suburban standard of living were also echoed by others. On a Facebook group called 'Cyrildene remembered', and predominantly made up of Jewish members who used to reside in the neighbourhood between the 1950s and 1990s, references to Derrick's current configuration were largely negative and framed in contradiction to what was once a 'harmonious' community and neighbourhood.[18] Furthermore, more established middle-class Chinese, mostly living in Johannesburg's upmarket neighbourhoods, increasingly avoid Derrick and its inhabitants due to their low *suzhi* (素质), which refers to qualities measured in terms of behaviour, education, ethics and ambition.[19]

Picture 6: A street-scene during the Chinese New Year celebrations, attracting visitors from all over the city

Photo Credit: Mark Lewis, February 2019

'Cast within [this] racialised frame of belonging', Derrick Avenue is not only refused 'recognition of the many sources of identity formation' (Amin 2002:977) but also becomes excluded from broader discussions about renewed ways of living together in suburban areas. Indirectly, it speaks to Doreen Massey's critique of reducing the conception of place 'to drawing lines around' or setting 'a frame in the sense of a concave line around some area, the inside of which is defined in one way and the outside in another' (1993:65–66). She further states that '[d]efinition in this sense does not have to be through simple counterposition to the outside; it can come, in part, precisely through the particularity of linkage *to* that "outside" which is, therefore, itself part of what constitutes the place' (*ibid*.:68). During the second public meeting, residents engaged in a slightly more positive manner once they realised that the likelihood of approval for the plan was high, and the spreading of Derrick Avenue was to be contained through specific street coding. At the same time, the design team wanted to deliberately bring out the *ethnic* component as something positive, and as a contribution to the city:

> The story we wanted to tell is that for immigrants,[20] there is a freedom in how they develop their properties, and which promote public life: The removal of the front wall, for example, giving the front yard over to the public realm, and with a shop in that interface. Part of the story was to say, there are clues

> here. Sure, most of this has been done illegally, without following the by-laws, but there are clues about how we can make our city a more public place, more active, and more vibrant. […] While there is a general fear of exercising agency in the public realm, these guys just do it. With its by-laws or not. We didn't project anything; it was just there.[21]

While opting for a themed *ethnic* approach, their underlying argument was to situate these changes and transformations of space as part of a broader narrative of city-making. As such, rather than pointing towards a question of 'integration' and 'assimilation', this reasoning relates to what Çağlar and Glick Schiller refer to as 'emplacement', 'which invokes both a sense of place-making and allows us to focus on a set of experiences shared by people who are generally differentiated by scholars and policy makers' into separate categories (2018:21). The closely knit neighbourhood identity of old times, as invoked by former residents, is long gone, as much as the people themselves, who have either moved overseas or live in other more up-market suburban areas. Nowadays, apart from the direct correlation with Chinatown, Cyrildene's identity is unclear. Next to the fading away of earlier Jewish and Greek footprints, few of the 'established' residents have lived in the area for more than fifteen to twenty years, amid a growing racial mix of suburbanites. In this context, Derrick Avenue, having gradually emerged as a central focal point (see Picture 6), becomes a starting point rather than an end-result of ongoing shifts in the process of 'suburb-building' (Mabin et al. 2013:183). While the Precinct plan has been approved, the challenge is that there is little chance of public funds being allocated towards any infrastructural upgrades in the area. It will, therefore, be up to the residents and private initiatives 'to make the plan work'.[22] Subsequently, living together [in Cyrildene], as interpreted by Derrida, becomes 'always a matter of necessity' as 'one cannot not "live together" even if one does not know how or with whom', or if it implies 'hav[ing] to live *badly* together, which [is] also [a] manner of living' (2013:23–24).

Conclusion

In light of Derrick Avenue's current configuration, research and analyses have predominantly been cast within an ethnicised framework. Throughout this paper we have adopted an alternative approach, opting for a method of (un)writing, and with the aim of embedding the street and its surroundings back into the city at large. Thinking about relational comparison, Gillian Hart stresses the importance of 'starting with [...] *processes* and practices rather than with any sort of bounded unit – be it nation, city, village, [street] or whatever – and engaging in an initial round of abstraction or

theorising. What are typically seen as bounded "units of analysis" are often more usefully understood as vantage points from which to try to begin to grasp the coming together and interconnections of what (at least initially) appear as key processes' (2018:389, emphasis in original). As such, if the street with its predominant demographics, architectural features and cuisine easily stands out and speaks to geographies of difference, once stripped of these ethnic markers more underlying patterns come to the fore. In relation to changes in the built environment, these self-initiated efforts (while often done illegally) relate in their own way to dynamics of compaction, mixed-use developments and interactive street environments envisioned by official urban planning documents (such as in the case of the mayoral Corridors of Freedom Initiative). They also showcase the reality of a city that functions across formal and informal divides (related to planning and production of space). Furthermore, a comparative view of the public participation process linked to both the CoF and the Cyrildene Precinct Plan revealed similar forms of *othering* by more established middle-class residents and targeted at undesired newcomers, whether existing or potential. If narratives in relation to the Chinese were openly ethnicised, raising questions about where they fit in within South Africa's society (e.g. Harris 2018; Dittgen & Anthony 2018), this also invites a broader discussion about renewed forms of collective life in these in-between (sub)urban environments, characterised by a growing diversity (both racially and socio-economically) amid reduced public funding for infrastructure upgrades. Alterations such as those along Derrick Avenue (as well as in other 'migrant spaces') are driven by spatial efficiency and ideal usage of space in a city where this is challenging. As such, it is important to flip the script and consider these spaces not only as drivers, but also as firmly rooted within debates about (sub)urban change.

Acknowledgments

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Notes

1. Pseudonym (series of interviews, April to May 2018, July 2019).
2. Given the limited amount of safe outdoor spaces for socialising in Johannesburg, there is a growing appetite for high-street environments and food market spaces as an alternative to shopping malls. If Derrick Avenue is not as popular as, for example, 7th Street in Melville, or 4th Avenue in Parkhurst, both upper-middle-income suburbs, there is a novelty appeal which becomes visible over weekends and reaches its apex during the Chinese New Year celebrations. While negative attitudes to the area are expressed at a neighbourhood level (both by current and previous residents of Cyrildene), those eager to explore the street come from various areas of Johannesburg or are visitors from elsewhere.
3. While displacing the communal script, Anderson nonetheless focuses on the diversification of ethnicities as one of her reference points.
4. Interviews conducted between 2009 and 2011 showed this to be the predominant impression at the time. However, just a few years later, there have been on-going rumours about Chinese migrants leaving, in part, due to harsher economic prospects amid continued concerns about safety. While it remains difficult to say how this has affected the demand for space in Cyrildene, quite a few restaurants have closed or changed ownership over the years.
5. Interviews in Cyrildene with Dave (1 May 2018) and with the caretaker of the building (23 August 2019).
6. If, following political changes in the summer of 2016, this major initiative gradually lost traction within the local administration, the key principles and aims behind the CoF remain highly relevant.
7. This point was emphasised during an interview with the lead consultant of the Cyrildene Precinct Plan (12 September 2018) and with a senior planner of the City of Johannesburg's Planning Department (23 April 2019).
8. Interview conducted in Chinese (own translation) and in English, Cyrildene (19 October 2018 and 1 September 2019).
9. First, they sold seafood quite openly, but subsequently in covert form, after a nearby Chinese fishmonger had complained to the police of them selling informally.
10. Interview in Cyrildene (24 October 2018).
11. Translated excerpts from interviews held in Chinese (Cyrildene, 28 June 2018 and 21 August 2019).
12. Interview (12 September 2018). In addition to these public gatherings, the design and planning team organised a walkabout of the study area, conducted 26 surveys with residents and 30 with businesses, and held a number of focus group meetings with different stakeholders (City of Johannesburg, 2016b:4).
13. Excerpts from a WhatsApp Street group conversation in Westdene, a lower-middle-class neighbourhood earmarked as part of the Corridors of Freedom Initiative (various dates in June and September 2017).
14. Excerpt from an email thread written by a Cyrildene resident, sent to CoJ on 9 June 2016.

15. This was pointed out in interviews conducted with one City planner (1 June 2018), the lead designer (12 September 2018) and the main project consultant (27 September 2018).
16. The Cyrildene Precinct Plan was conducted in parallel to another Precinct Plan in Forsdburg/Mayfair. According to the lead designer, similar comments were made about the living standards of Somalis in Mayfair (interview, 12 September 2018).
17. Ballard's research on cattle slaughters by black residents in suburban neighbourhoods offers an interesting parallel, as it partially speaks to registers of a *swart gevaar* (black peril), which can be compared to those of a *gele gevaar* (yellow peril) in the context of Cyrildene.
18. This was also expressed during interviews with five former residents (various dates in May and June 2018, and in August 2019).
19. Conversations and interviews with several Chinese upper-middle-class residents throughout the years. With the emergence of a concentration of Chinese restaurants and supermarkets in Rivonia, located in the wealthier northern suburbs, there has been a growing split along class lines in terms of Chinese patrons.
20. This was the case for both precinct plans: Chinese in Cyrildene and Somalis in Mayfair.
21. Interview with the lead designer (12 September 2018).
22. Interview with City Planner (1 June 2018); minutes of the public participation meeting on 19 July 2016.

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De-territorialisation in Egypt's Desert Cities: The Case of Sixth of October City

Deena Khalil*

Abstract

This article examines the application of ideas around the 'de-territorialisation' of cities in the global South to new desert cities surrounding Cairo, Egypt. It also responds to the call for 'engaged theory-making' by working with a local community development organisation on a case study of Sixth of October City (SOC), a new city in Cairo's desert hinterland. Drawing on interview data, the article argues that a certain form of Western-inspired suburbanism has come to characterise Egyptian cities, stemming from the need to recirculate capital outside the existing cities. I propose three ways in which these desert suburbs are being de-territorialised. First, I argue that governance in the new cities is more focused on territorial transformation than on management of populations, and that this has resulted in what I describe as planned informality. Second, I show that housing in the new cities has become so financialised that even social (purportedly subsidised) housing has been integrated into circuits of capital. Finally, I demonstrate that there is a persistent form of inequality in basic services and infrastructure, and that the way the state governs the system of service provision has made it impossible for residents to develop alternative modes of access, resulting in an end to people's ability to act as infrastructure.

Keywords: de-territorialisation, Egypt, infrastructure, subsidised housing

Résumé

Cet article examine la mise en œuvre d'idées ayant trait à la « déterritorialisation » des villes du Sud global dans les nouvelles agglomérations urbaines du désert entourant le Caire, en Égypte. Il répond également à l'appel à une « élaboration théorique engagée » en collaborant avec une organisation de développement communautaire locale sur une étude de cas de Sixth of October City (SOC), une nouvelle cité dans l'arrière-pays désertique du Caire. S'appuyant sur des données d'entretiens, l'article soutient qu'une certaine

* Assistant Professor, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, American University in Cairo, Egypt. Email: deena_k@aucegypt.edu; deenakhalil@gmail.com

forme de suburbain d'inspiration occidentale en est venue à caractériser les villes égyptiennes, caractérisation qui découle de la nécessité de faire re-circuler le capital en dehors des villes existantes. Je propose trois manières de déterritorialiser ces banlieues désertiques. Premièrement, je soutiens que, dans les nouvelles cités, la gouvernance est plus axée sur la transformation territoriale que sur la gestion des populations, et que cela a abouti à ce que je qualifie d'informalité planifiée. Deuxièmement, je montre que, dans les villes nouvelles, le logement est devenu tellement financiarisé que même le logement social (soi-disant subventionné) a été intégré dans les circuits du capital. Enfin, je démontre qu'il existe une forme persistante d'inégalité dans les services et les infrastructures de base, et que la manière dont l'État régit le système de prestation de services empêche les résidents de développer des modes d'accès alternatifs, ce qui a mis fin à la capacité des personnes servir d'infrastructure.

Mots-clés : dé-territorialisation, Égypte, infrastructures, logement social

Introduction

For many working in urban studies in the so-called global South, it would be difficult not to notice how the influence of real-estate capital has been substantially altering significant portions of the urban landscape. Real-estate speculation has often relied on erasing cities' unique architectural characteristics and reproducing them in the image of Western cities (Simone 2020).

This trend has been quite evident in Cairo for decades, as large historical settlements are labelled 'informal' and then evicted and replaced with shopping malls (Abaza 2001), and as gated communities sprout up with Western names such as Hyde Park and Beverly Hills. The juxtaposition of luxurious gated communities against Cairo's informal areas is one of the city's most striking features. Furthermore, the spatialisation of social difference and inequality is one of the most dominant characteristics of the Greater Cairo Region (GCR) (TADAMUN 2017).

The potential spoils of real-estate speculation and the transformation of urban territory have led to seemingly unlimited urban expansion, which has extended far into the hinterlands of existing cities. Simone (2020), speaking of the agricultural hinterlands of Kinshasa and Addis Ababa, describes such extended urban regions as a 'hodgepodge of makeshift, hurriedly constructed commercial centres; affordable housing for an emerging middle class; farmland; rough-hewn, autoconstructed provisional shelters; leisure parks; waste dumps; and factories'. He has labelled this type of unlimited urban expansion the 'deterritorialisation of southern cities', while he terms efforts by communities to eke out a living and make these cities habitable by manoeuvring the patterns of urbanisation as the 'reterritorialisation' of these cities.

This study is concerned not with the 'hodgepodge' urbanism of many agricultural hinterlands, but with the carefully planned, state-led urbanisation of Cairo's desert hinterlands. These cities – or 'new urban communities' as termed by the Egyptian state – have been built with the purpose of avoiding (urban) mistakes of the past. With an initial interest in exploring the extent to which the dynamics of spatial inequality in the GCR are replicated in its desert hinterland cities, this research ended up coming across a web of urban relationships that defied simple notions of spatial inequality, and instead shed light on how Egyptian urbanism is being de-territorialised through these new cities.

The study focuses on Sixth of October City (SOC) a 'new urban community' established by presidential decree in 1979 as part of a first generation of desert cities created to fulfill Sadat's vision of exiting the valley and populating Egypt's vast swathes of unused desert lands. Given SOC's construction on vacant desert land, this study examines the dynamics of de- and re-territorialisation within the city. One of the main raisons d'être of the new cities is to avoid certain pitfalls of the GCR – in particular, informality, ad hoc urban governance and pervasive inequality. This research argues that while these phenomena are indeed much less visible in the new cities in comparison with the GCR, the dynamics of de-territorialisation are actually operating insidiously within them.

The findings presented here are based on information collected during three months of field research in SOC, from mid-December 2019 to mid-March 2020. The fieldwork included interviews with residents, officials and experts, in addition to personal observation during neighbourhood visits. Overall, in-depth interviews were conducted with twenty residents, two experts and three officials. In addition, we had several informal conversations with residents and gathered data from observation in field visits we conducted in various districts. The twenty resident interviewees came from the different districts within SOC, ensuring that every district was represented.

I also hope through this study to respond to calls for 'engaged theory-making' in southern cities (Ernstson, Lawhon and Duminy 2014), which involves expanding research beyond academia to work with communities, companies, NGOs, activists, etc. and to use one's engagement with them to support the emergence of new insights into urbanism and urbanisation. In order to apply this in practice, we needed to, in the words of Edgar Pieterse, step 'outside traditional roles towards a deliberative context where we were not the experts' (Nicolson 2018). Thus, for the field research, I worked with Takween Integrated Community Development (TICD), Egypt's leading community development service provider with extensive

experience in urban research and practice around the built environment and socioeconomic development.

Together with two researchers from TICD (a senior researcher and a junior researcher) we used the concept of adequate housing as a multi-dimensional framework that would help guide the field research and interview questions around multiple urban phenomena. The features of adequate housing are access to physical shelter, with secure tenure and basic services/infrastructure, of a reasonable physical standard (well ventilated, not overcrowded, etc.), without putting unreasonable strain on the inhabitant's income. In asking questions around these issues, multiple interrelated trends of de- and re-territorialisation became evident, which I discuss along three main themes: urban governance as spatial transformation; precarity through housing financialisation; and the end of 'people as infrastructure'.

The article is structured as follows. The first section elaborates on Egypt's new cities as a new form of (sub)urbanism that has come to dominate the country's urban landscape. The second, third and fourth sections elucidate the three lines of analysis stated above. In the fifth and final section, the article concludes with reflections on the implications of the analysis for how Southern urbanism is understood.

New Cities and the (Sub)urbanisation of Egypt's Desert

The history of Egypt's new cities dates back to the 1970s, when President Sadat announced plans to reshape the country's population map by encouraging people to move out of the over-populated Nile Valley and inhabit the desert hinterlands that surround the cities. Since then, this call has become the central policy of Egyptian urban planning. Despite decades of limited success in attracting significant populations, the plan has continued stubbornly, with forty-one new cities established countrywide (some already built, and some still under construction). In order to oversee the planning, construction and administration of the new desert cities, the Egyptian state established the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) in 1979. NUCA's recently updated goals state the following:

> The agency aims to achieve a number of social and economic goals that the revolutions of 2011 and 2013 called for, in order to achieve social justice. It aims to guarantee a decent life for all citizens through providing urban/residential communities with integrated services that include housing units suitable for all social groups, as well as the associated utilities, in addition to educational, healthcare, cultural and entertainment services' (NUCA 2020a)

In aiming to achieve the above-mentioned social goals, particularly in attracting lower-income populations who would otherwise settle in informal areas, the nine 'first generation' new cities – the first batch of new cities decreed by President Sadat in the late 1970s and early 1980s – were designed to be industrial and/or mixed-income cities. However, the later generation cities soon began to deviate from this model, particularly those around Greater Cairo, as they increasingly began to target Egypt's wealthier classes. With incomes rising during the 1990s among the emerging middle class that had been accumulating wealth through migrant work in Gulf countries, as well as the rising appetite for new 'modern' lifestyles, new cities began incorporating the phenomenon of gated communities, referred to in Egypt as 'compounds'.

Although state discourse around the new cities has revolved around avoiding the problems of past urban planning, many issues have discouraged people from moving there, namely, the lack of jobs and the lack of public transportation. This is especially true in the new cities in Upper Egypt, where the population sizes have remained incredibly low according to the latest national census (CAPMAS 2017). Contrarily, the cities around Greater Cairo have been faring relatively well in attracting inhabitants, compared with those in the Delta region and Upper Egypt (ibid.). The city of Sixth of October is actually the most highly populated new city in the country.

At the national level, the new cities are governed by NUCA, while locally each city has its own city authority, which is directed by NUCA and is in charge of all local services and infrastructure. According to law, the new desert cities remain the responsibility of NUCA only until they are deemed 'complete', after which they should be handed over to the nearest governorate authority and become subsumed into the existing urban governance regime.

Sixth of October City (SOC) – named after the 1973 Egyptian-Israeli war – was established according to Presidential Decree 504/1979. It is situated in the desert hinterlands to the west of Gisa governorate, around 17 kilometres from the Giza Pyramids and approximately 32 kilometres from downtown Cairo. It has an area of 218 square kilometres and a population of 348,870 (CAPMAS 2017).[1] NUCA aims for SOC to reach a population size of three million people by 2030 (NUCA 2020b).

The city was established with the goal of being independent economically and geographically, rather than as a satellite city of the GCR (Shalabi 2018). Its economic base was originally planned to be a large industrial area in the west of the city, while the eastern part of the city would include a mix of public and private housing, in addition to a large commercial axis in the city centre (World Bank 2008). The reality is that today it functions as a bit

of both: the city offers many job opportunities, largely due to a substantial number of companies, institutions and factories that decided to relocate their offices there. But, despite the number of factories in the city's industrial zone, SOC is far from being an industrial city, since it has increasingly been catering to upper- and upper-middle-class social groups.

During the city's initial planning and construction during the 1980s and early 1990s, attracting the working-class nuclear family was a main goal, and this was done by constructing thousands of residential units that NUCA then offered at subsidised prices (Shalabi 2018). But as the Egyptian state took on a more neoliberal approach during the mid-1990s, under the guidance of President Mubarak, and the profit-making potential of the new desert cities became more evident, large swathes of land were sold to investors, and gated communities and upscale commercial hubs began changing the city's landscape. NUCA kept up with trend by planning and constructing new districts that targeted upper-income groups and consist largely of villas and gated communities. SOC's first gated community, Dreamland, was established in the early 1990s (Mitchell 1999). Many more have followed since then, constituting one of the dominant features of SOC's housing market. The subsequent real-estate boom led to a rise in the phenomenon of vacant units, whether unsold or purchased and kept vacant for the purpose of speculation (Shalabi 2018). The 2017 National Census estimates that today there are 156,822 vacant units in SOC out of a total of 234,262 housing units, a vacancy rate of 67 per cent; there are an additional 180,365 vacant units in Hadayeq October City[2] out of a total of 195,998, a vacancy rate of 92 per cent.

As with most new desert cities in Egypt, SOC consists of housing units built by NUCA, as well as private-sector housing that includes gated and non-gated areas, and a number of state housing projects, some of which target upper- and middle-income groups and others for lower-income groups. All these forms of housing are formal and all are represented in the field research. SOC does not have any 'informal' housing, in the sense that all homes are either planned or licensed by NUCA. However, there is a degree of tenure insecurity, which stems from home-owners who are part of state social housing programmes illegally subletting their apartments, even though the programme's regulations forbid this. Therefore, any subletting in this category is not licensed and creates some informality within formal housing. These types of units are also covered in the field research.

For the purpose of this research, we focus on the city's twelve residential districts (except District 9 which is still under construction), as well as the Touristic and Mutamayez areas.

District 1 lies in close proximity to October 6 University. It therefore hosts a substantial number of students, both Egyptian and non-Egyptian, who rent rooms or flats in order to live close to the university. It is a central and lively area with many commercial facilities. Districts 2, 3, 4 and 5 are somewhat similar to District 1, but smaller, less populated and more residential, with fewer commercial facilities. These five districts consist mainly of large apartment complexes built by private companies, catering to students and small middle-class families, according to our interlocutors.

District 6 has a visibly different urban fabric, as it consists more of subsidised housing built by NUCA in the 1990s with the goal of attracting working-class nuclear families. The buildings are not as high as those in Districts 1 to 5, and have a large number of small shops and workshops on the ground floors, many of which operate without a formal licence. Since the vast majority of the shops are informal, these districts have no big supermarkets or entertainment facilities. District 6 is the largest and second-densest district in the city after District 11.

Districts 7 and 8 are purely residential, with few commercial services (malls, cafes, shops, etc.), fewer students and more families, higher ownership rates and lower rental rates. Both are considered more upscale, inhabited by middle-class families, and District 7 especially used to have some famous/wealthy people who have lately moved to compounds. District 7 is a better neighbourhood than District 8, in terms of physical structure and services, with some villas and many small three- and four-storey apartment buildings that function as family homes. District 8 has more large apartment buildings, but both districts contain mostly private housing with only a small percentage of subsidised housing.

Districts 10 and 11 are in the older parts of the city, where NUCA built many subsidised homes to attract low-income groups in the early days. Due to this, both are considered 'popular' or 'working-class' areas by our interlocutors. Since the homes are decades-old, their maintenance and physical structure are not good, and infrastructure and services are problematic. District 12 is quite similar, but was described by our interlocutors as in worse shape physically than Districts 10 and 11, and poorer. The Touristic Villages district is a residential area of gated communities/compounds, whereas the Mutamayez district has mostly wealthy families living in villas or expensive apartments. Both areas have sound structures and good service delivery, and barely any commercial business according to field observaion and interviews with residents.

Statistics for SOC Districts

District	Area (km2)	Population Size	Poverty Rate (%)	Illiteracy Rate (%)
1	1.95	11,866	6	9.6
2	1.7	15,514	4	1.6
3	1.5	15,720	5	3.3
4	1.5	19,742	22	5.4
5	1.7	27,905	13	6
6	2.11	63,419	19	14
7	1.1	8,043	7	0.5
8	1.2	15,861	3	2.3
10	1.1	25,792	24	11
11	1.2	38,443	9	3.6
12	1.1	21,072	21	12
Touristic villages	Not available	13,022	Not available	1
Mutamayez	Not available	5,012	Not available	4

On the issue of reputation, many of the interviewees indicated some stigma attached to specific areas, especially District 6. In multiple interviews the district was labelled as the '*ashwa'eyat*'[3] of SOC. Due to the prevalence of markets, as well as informal shops and workshops in residential buildings as opposed to the designated commercial centre, District 6 has acquired a style and image that is very different from the rest of SOC, and is unique among the other districts. It is described by outsiders as 'uncivilised' and informal.

For example, Marwa (an interviewee from District 8) expressed how uncomfortable she felt when she used to live in District 6 because of its 'low standard', and said that almost any family would leave District 6 as soon as their financial situation improved. Other negatively stigmatised areas are the Masakin Uthman and Abou El Wafa areas, which lie between District 5 and District 6. The importance of the different districts' reputation among SOC residents was clear in the responses of our interviewees, such as the below quote from one who described his impression of the different districts:

> SOC is divided into 12 districts, among which are two districts that are uninhabitable: District 6 and District 12. This is because of the low social standard and because they are all workers/labourers. I would not feel safe leaving my family there. Districts 10 and 11 are a bit higher in social standard,

> and Districts 7 and 8 are even better and more expensive, especially since District 7 has a lot of universities. As for Districts 1, 2 and 3 they are the most expensive, and Districts 4 and 5 are trying to be like them (Mohamed, District 11).

Another interviewee from District 10 echoed similar sentiments:

> There are only two areas in SOC that I would never live in: Abu El Wafa (between District 5 and District 6) and Masakin Uthman. Abu El Wafa is youth housing and used to be good but it acquired a bad reputation because the government started relocating people to it from unsafe slums or areas where buildings had collapsed. But the majority of these relocated people went to Masakin Uthman, so Uthman has become a warzone. Don't try to go visit the area. People get kidnapped there, and even the police don't enter the area because if they do they won't ever leave. These are areas you should never visit (Mohamed, District 10).

In general, high population density and informality are dominant characteristics of the 'popular' districts (6, 11 and 12), and we relate this to the failure of the formal planning approach and the lack of proper development/economic models to cater for the majority of the people in these districts. The existing planning/economic model does not recognise the economies and lifestyle of the working class, which is discussed further on in this article. District 6 alone hosts 65,000 people, which is three times more than the second-biggest district in SOC, and twelve times more than the smallest district. It is highly functioning because of its informal economy, but also stigmatised and neglected for the same reason.

Within scholarship on cities in the global North, the emergence of suburbs around metropolitan areas, suburban urbanisation, has been analysed by Marxian scholars as a spatial fix to the capitalist crisis of over-accumulation (Harvey 1982). This perspective argues that cities concentrate consumption and production, which makes them vulnerable to urban crises, generating repeated cyclical crises such as boom and bust. Capital investments are channelled through circuits of capital, whereas industrial production functions as a primary circuit of capital. When over-accumulation takes place, capital seeks out a spatial fix and in turn re-channels capital through a secondary circuit of capital, which is residential real-estate developments outside the main city.

Suburbs are therefore created essentially as a conduit for capital to ensure its continued circulation, which is why suburbs in Europe and America have tended to be dominated by upscale real-estate projects, low-density neighbourhoods and gated communities. This suburban lifestyle is also tied

to a particular urban culture centred around the American groomed lawn, unified architectural style, nuclear families and a rigid system of regulations regarding what is and is not acceptable conduct.

These dynamics of capital can be seen quite clearly within the new cities around Greater Cairo, especially in how the cities have become major pull factors for the upper and middle classes to leave the existing metropolitan region in favour of less urban decay (Denis 2006). However, this is only one side of the story, as argued by Ortega (2016: 25): 'in interrogating the neoliberalisation of urban space, economistic narratives intersect with context-specific processes and relations that need to be accounted for'. It is this intersection that comes to shape the specific ways in which cities are de- and re-territorialised, which I discuss in the following sections.

Governance through Spatial Transformation and Planned Informality

Schindler (2017) has argued that cities in the global South are characterised by a disconnect between capital and labour that results in local governments being more interested in spatial transformation than they are with managing populations. This rings very true for Egypt's new cities, especially those like SOC that surround the GCR.

In these cities there is no governance per se but rather management of the city as a sort of permanent construction site. As mentioned previously, the new cities are not governed through governorates like the existing cities, but rather through city authorities that report directly to NUCA. Therefore, SOC's city authority is completely independent from Egypt's local administration structure. Even though public services are governed by their respective line ministries (for example, public schools by the Ministry of Education, public hospitals by the Ministry of Health, etc.), the only entity responsible for SOC as a whole is its city authority. But governance is traditionally considered to involve some continuous process of development planning and engagement with residents and other stakeholders around the socioeconomic needs of the city and how to allocate resources (Avis 2016).

In that sense, the SOC city authority does not actually govern. Legally speaking, the city authority is tasked with managing the city's assets until the city is declared to be 'complete', after which it should then transfer the city to the closest governorate. Despite this mandate, not one single new city has been transferred to a governorate; even though some cities, like SOC, are over four decades old, because not one city has been declared as 'complete'. In the words of one high-level NUCA official speaking of SOC:

> How can we hand it [SOC] over when construction has not ended? For construction to end this means there are no more extensions, no more investments, and no more building. In other words, when we reach the point when an investor approaches me to say I want to build a school, or a university, or a compound, and I say I'm sorry I don't have any land left, only then will I consider the city complete, and only then can I transfer it to the governorate. This could take 100 years.

In fact, the official discourse around the new cities in general portrays them as functioning construction sites rather than inhabited cities. This ignores the universal fact that cities are ever-expanding, especially if they are built in the middle of the desert where shortage of land for extension is not a near-future concern.

To illustrate just how much SOC has expanded over the years, we need to look at the stages of its development. The city was established following Decree 504/1979, which allocated the land and launched the strategic plan. Early in the 1980s, the master plan was introduced, and the city authority started distributing the land and providing infrastructure. In the mid-1990s the concept of gated communities (GCs) emerged and dramatically shifted the mindset of land management and value capture. The city expanded way beyond the original plan, whether by adding new GCs or by the city authority planning and building new housing projects.

Some argue that the city authority controls more sites than it could cater for, which has led to major management failures in the border neighborhoods. The most recent development was the split of SOC into three independent cities: 1) Sixth of October City, which includes the old districts in the original strategic plan and some of the extensions; 2) Hadayeq October City (HOC), which includes the southern part beyond the Wahat Road highway; and 3) New Sixth Of October City (NSOC), which includes the old industrial zone of SOC and the land to the west of the city and planned to hold the new Cairo airport.

As for any sort of engagement with the residents of the SOC, the city authorities in the new cities are made up entirely of appointed officials, with no form of elected government, with the exception of the Councils of Trustees (CoTs), which were decreed in 2013 by the Minister of Housing as entities that would represent the voices of the new cities' residents. However, only a few years later, the CoTs' mandate and rights were reformed by another decree (107/2018) causing consternation and even, in some cases, resistance among the newly established CoTs. They claimed that the new decree reduced their power and hindered their ability to participate in city governance.[4]

This form of 'territorially focused urban governance' (Schindler 2017) has resulted in the odd situation in which a city like SOC, with a population of over 300,000 (and possibly more than one million according to NUCA's estimates), has no government, and is rather being managed as a territory trapped in a permanently expanding construction site.

Furthermore, as Schindler (ibid.) argues, another implication of this form of governance (or lack thereof) is the disciplining of 'people who interfere with the transformation of cityspace', particularly those who do not abide by the 'grandiose visions informing urban transformation' (ibid.). As argued by Simone (2020), such visions tend to form around the imaginary of the Western city. Within SOC, the Western city-image has clearly influenced the city's urban design, as there is a very clear aspiration for what could be considered to be the modern Western suburban aesthetic of uniform buildings, manicured lawns, wide boulevards and designated commercial spaces that are not within walking distance from the residential areas.

One example of this is the Ibni Beitak subsidised housing project, which is based on the sites and services approach. Launched as part of Mubarak's National Housing Programme, many of its residents are today, over a decade later, still struggling to make this area liveable. One of the main complaints from Ibni Beitak is that the planning standards do not recognise people's way of living nor their limited financial resources. The project's building standards force people to have a front yard as well as a back yard, while the internal space of the actual housing unit is extremely small, resulting in overcrowded housing for larger families. On a land plot with an area of 150 square metres they are allowed to build their home over only 75 square metres, while the rest must be kept as a lawn. The project targeted lower-income groups, and so naturally the residents do not have the resources for gardening such a space. This has resulted in many of them living in overcrowded conditions while the so-called yards are used for storage or left to waste.

This is just one example of how the state's modernist planning paradigm is out of touch with the needs and lifestyles of the people it is supposedly planning for. This planning paradigm is dismantling one of the core features of Egypt's cities – and of many cities around the world – which is that each neighbourhood has a cluster of shops and services within walking distance. This can be seen very clearly in all of Egypt's existing cities. But in SOC, there are strict instructions to separate residential and commercial areas. All shops should be clustered in each district's central commercial area, away from the homes, meaning all shops and services are accessible by car/public transport only.

Such a city design caters to specific socioeconomic groups by making car-owners more easily able to access goods and services than non-car-owners. It also results in a local economy that advantages larger shops and chains over smaller shops, which rely on foot traffic. Furthermore, the rent for a shop in the commercial centres tends to be quite high in exchange for the oligopoly that naturally emerges from the limited shop spaces offered in the commercial centre.

The result of this is that many retailers have opened their shops within the residential areas, thereby going against the planning regulations and building codes, and having to operate 'informally' because they cannot register as a commercial unit but rather only as a residential one, creating a substantial informal economy. This informality has been framed in official and mainstream discourse as people acting in an uncivilised way because they are unable to fit in with the government's modern plans and designs. However, the reality is that the link between the informal practices of the lower-income population and the non-inclusive and unsustainable planning and development model is ignored by state authorities, who prefer to stigmatise people as being uncivilised, illegal and not suitable for the government's 'good plans'. By insisting on urban plans that do not match people's lifestyles, and leaving them no room to modify or adapt these plans to fit their needs, this can be described as planned informality.

Different social groups or income groups have different ways of navigating the city's strict rules. Upper-income groups have been more able to adapt their lifestyles to fit the city's urban vision. Lower-income groups, on the other hand, often have had to resort to operating informally. This gives them the space to manoeuvre within the system, but it also puts them in a precarious position, creating structural gaps between the city's rich and poor.

Financialised 'Subsidised' Housing

One of the most striking features of Egypt's new cities in general, and SOC in particular, is just how financialised the real-estate sector has become. Not only has private housing become embedded in a system of real-estate speculation, but even the government's public housing has become more money-driven than it ever was.

Housing financialisation in major cities is a global phenomenon that has been documented through many studies (see Rolnik 2013; Aalbers 2017). What is interesting about the phenomenon in SOC is that even public housing, which is meant to be subsidised for the poor, is becoming financialised in subtle ways.

Many studies of housing affordability in certain cities focus on residents already living in the city, but this is only one side of the affordability story. The other side, which is crucial to any question of affordability in Egypt's new cities in general and SOC in particular, is the question of who is left out from even being able to relocate to SOC. On the surface, it seems that families from a wide range of income groups are settled in SOC. But the real – and perhaps less visible – form of inequality in regards to the affordability of housing concerns access to housing and land finance, particularly today under the Social Housing Programme.

Based on our interview with one NUCA government official, it seems that the city authorities and NUCA are not involved in setting a shared or citywide vision/policy of affordability for different target groups. Rather, the provision of affordable housing is project-based and left to the market/developer or dependent on the different units provided by the state's subsidised housing schemes, which are determined by the Ministry of Housing. For lower-income groups, the main channel through which to access housing in the new cities around Greater Cairo is through the state's social housing initiatives. Under Mubarak, this was mainly the National Housing Programme (NHP), whereas under El-Sisi the current programme is the Social Housing Programme (SHP).

Two interviewees from District 6 who are living in NHP housing claimed that housing during the time of Mubarak was much more affordable than it is today, and most of those working in SOC were able to apply for and access subsidised housing. That is the route through which they obtained their homes for symbolic rent, and they both feel they got their homes for a very good price. Furthermore, they also have the option to own the homes after a certain number of years of paying rent regularly. Once this happens, they can put their units on the market if they want. So it is clear that despite any problematic aspects with the NHP, there was some acknowledgement that housing is a right. This is despite the fact that recent studies have highlighted serious gaps (and corruption) within the NHP that made a large number of units ultimately go to middle-income Egyptians rather than the poor (see Shawkat 2012).

Today, under the SHP, the form of support that applicants receive in making housing more 'affordable' is very different, in a number of ways. Firstly, only 3 per cent of available units have so far have been offered for rent (Shawkat 2012), while the vast majority of SHP units are for purchase (under the NHP, 14 per cent were offered for rent). Secondly, they are not actually subsidised, as applicants end up paying the full market price for

the unit. The only advantage they get from purchasing via SHP versus the market is the size of the instalment and the payment period, which can last for up to twenty and thirty years in some cases. Thirdly, according to article 1 of Prime Minister Decree 1864, 2008, which is an update on article 35 of Mortgage Law 148, 2001, low-income housing is defined as housing provided for households whose income does not exceed EGP 30,000 annually (EGP 2,500 per month).[5] This definition far exceeds the actual incomes of low-income households and, according to the Household Income, Expenditure, and Consumption Survey (HIECS), this income strata actually includes high-income groups. Thus, higher-income groups are competing with lower-income groups for the offered units (Ahmed, Khalifa and Abdel-Rahman 2017).

Finally, under NHP, the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MoSS) was responsible for setting the eligibility conditions and evaluating the applicants. Since the units were heavily subsidised, the main criteria for this process were based on who was most deserving or in need of subsidised housing. Today, under SHP, this responsibility has been transferred to the Housing and Development Bank (HDB). The bank, as is the case with most banks, evaluates applicants based on their potential ability to pay the instalments. This also becomes the basis on which the size of the instalment and payment period are set. Applicants in their twenties with a steady formal job would likely be offered a long payment period (therefore with smaller instalments), whereas applicants in their sixties might be granted only five to ten years to pay the total (unsubsidised) price, even if the two applicants earned the exact same income.

Even people without full-time, formal jobs (the self-employed, informal workers, etc.) are judged by how much they earn, such that the bank sends an accountant to calculate the applicant's average monthly income and uses that as the basis for the evaluation. Under the NHP this group was totally excluded from being able to apply, so it is a positive step that they can apply under the SHP. But the fact that the main evaluation criterion is average income means that the poorest of the poor (such as day labourers) would still be effectively excluded, because they would be offered instalments that are too high for them to afford.

This type of real-estate financing is the only financing mechanism available for those who cannot afford to purchase through the market. Current financing mechanisms do not recognise the needs of the lowest-income groups, so the concept of social housing itself has changed drastically over the past several decades, and it is now financialised.

The End of 'People as Infrastructure'

One of Greater Cairo's largest studies of urban inequality was that done by TADAMUN (2017), which covered all the GCR's districts and neighbourhoods. This expansive study found that one of the biggest areas of inequality in Egypt's capital historically has been in basic service delivery and infrastructure.

In SOC, the issue of service provision is much less uneven, as NUCA has been making a strong effort to ensure the availability of a basic infrastructure for everyone. All housing in SOC is planned or sanctioned by NUCA, and all buildings are immediately connected to the public infrastructure networks. But given the fact that NUCA's mandate for the new cities is – as mentioned above – to manage them as functioning construction sites until they are completed, NUCA is only actually responsible for putting the service in place; the governorate should then be responsible for 'governing' the services once the city is transferred.

Due to this loophole, there is a huge ambiguity around who is responsible for the maintenance of basic services and buildings. Residents of public housing projects as well as those in gated communities all pay a 'maintenance deposit' on purchasing a unit. This deposit is collected from all residents and meant to ensure that maintenance of services and infrastructure takes place regularly and continuously. According to residents, NUCA claims the deposit is too small to carry out maintenance of the buildings or the neighbourhood. For many buildings in the city, it is not clear who is responsible. For example, there are a large number of buildings owned by the Housing and Development Bank, but the bank claims it is responsible only for collecting instalments and not for the maintenance of these properties.

Within the gated communities, there is an ongoing debate about who is responsible for funding the maintenance of the infrastructure and buildings, and for the services, particularly garbage collection, landscaping and security. The developer claims that this is the responsibility of the residents, and that once the construction has been completed, the owners' union should take over. The owners indeed pay the maintenance deposit, but it is the developers who contract the companies that carry out the maintenance. According to residents, the developers often go for expensive foreign companies, which end up charging more than the deposit paid by the residents. As a result, the developers argue that residents owe them large sums of money for the cost of the maintenance companies, and refuse to give them their ownership contracts until they do so.

For regular private housing that is neither part of a gated community nor a public housing project, it is the responsibility of the city authority to maintain the basic services, but all residents we spoke with agreed that it does not do this. There was, for example, a common issue in all districts – rich and poor – that streets were not paved. Many complained about the lack of safety due to the poor presence of security forces and poor street lighting.

Inequality of service delivery and maintenance is also manifest between the different districts. Even though all districts suffer from this, the city authority seems to be more responsive in wealthier districts. For example, when a sewerage pipe burst in the wealthy Touristic Area district, it was fixed immediately. In contrast, in District 12 – one of the poorer districts – residents had been suffering from sewage flooding for over a year. The residents of District 6 and District 12 had no way of contacting the city authority and were not even aware that they had a municipal head for their neighbourhood. Residents in the Touristic Area, on the other hand, were all members of a WhatsApp group of which the municipal head was also a member, and they sent all their complaints to him directly.

The issue of infrastructure and services in SOC is not one of provision or availability, as the services are there and the infrastructure networks are in place. It is more about quality, functionality and the system of governing. Such problems are not clearly visible, as most analyses of services focus on availability.

> In the existing cities – and GCR is a case in point – residents simply banded together and fixed things themselves. Indeed, several studies have delved into the way residents have negotiated around these inequalities by working together to put alternative (often informal) mechanisms of access in place (cf. Bremer and Bhuiyan 2014; Khalil 2019). These ways of collectively navigating the city's management have been described by Simone (2004) as a form of 'people as infrastructure', such that city-dwellers come to rely on each other in the absence of state provision of basic services. As shown by Khalil (2019), this was for decades an important, if not primary, means of accessing basic services in many Egyptian cities.

But this collective spirit does not seem to exist in the new cities, and when it does emerge, the strict rules of what is 'acceptable' in the new cities do not allow them to act independently of the city authority. For example, in one of the poorer districts (District 12), for every cluster of buildings there is a piece of land that should be used as a small public garden. The city authority, however, did not plant the garden nor carry out any maintenance of the land, and so it was left to waste. A couple of years ago, the residents decided to plant it themselves. The city authority then proceeded to fine

the residents for using a public space for private use, although the residents had left the garden open to the public. The city authority also demanded that the residents remove what they had planted, and return the garden back to its original state. This indicates that the government authority in this case is more interested in control than it is in actual provision of the service, and that it is trying to ensure that residents never feel like they own or belong to the city – as if the extent of residents' ownership is limited to their individual homes and not beyond. In essence, the city's rules destroy the ability for people to act as infrastructure, and almost alienate people from the city by preventing any room for collective action.

In the GCR there are districts where the state is present and others where the state has largely removed itself. This is why the spatial manifestation of inequality is so clear. In the new cities the state is present everywhere, as NUCA is the planner, constructor and manager. But the way the state is present differs in subtle ways from district to district, and the different social groups have different methods of navigating this and the resources that are available to them. This creates gaps that can produce inequities. This is something that distinguishes service/infrastructure inequality in the new cities from that in the GCR. In the GCR, inequality is more centred around provision. In SOC, inequality is related rather to the lack of room to manoeuvre the system and create alternatives where there are gaps in quality and functionality.

Conclusion

The three lines of de-territorialisation presented in the previous sections provide a different perspective on Southern urbanism from what is commonly presented in the literature. In fact, the most common features of Southern cities are those that the new cities are trying purposely to avoid. However, in this avoidance the desert cities are not only recreating some of these features, but are also creating new modes of de-territorialisation.

I argued that the new cities are governed mainly with the purpose of territorial transformation rather than the management of populations. This has resulted in a sort of planned informality such that the city's narrow regulations are largely out of touch with people's needs and lifestyles, practically pushing them towards informal modes of urbanism.

I also argued that housing in the new cities is so embedded within the circuits of capital that even social (supposedly subsidised) housing has become financialised. This ensures that certain social groups will always be excluded from accessing housing in the new cities, in a way creating a minimum social standard to be allowed to live in a new city.

Finally, I argued that there are forms of inequality in the new cities regarding basic services and infrastructure, but that this inequality centres more on quality and functionality than provision/availability. Whereas gaps in the existing cities are addressed by residents who put alternative informal services in place, the room for this to happen in the new cities is much narrower.

In general, the Egyptian state in the past year has been addressing informality much more aggressively than it ever has in the past, whether in regards to unlicensed buildings, informal areas or informal labour. The regulations around these issues change on a regular basis, and it is therefore unclear how the large number of informal shops in SOC will be addressed. But thus far it is clear that the state is minimising the room to manoeuvre as much as possible. Restricting the space for independent solutions, with the existence of strong structural gaps, is reshaping the production of subjectivity and alienating people from their cities, eliminating people's ability to act as infrastructure.

The analysis offered above is by no means meant to be an exhaustive list of the ways in which such state-led city-building projects are reshaping Southern urbanism, but sheds some light on the subtle ways in which inequality and precarity operate as and through complex modes of urbanism.

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Notes

1. The NUCA website claims that SOC's population size is 1.5 million. It is not clear where this large discrepancy between estimates by NUCA and the census stems from.
2. At the time of the census, Hadayeq October City had not yet been established, and is listed in the census as part of SOC.
3. The term 'ashwa'eyat' is the colloquial term used to refer to informal areas. It has a negative connotation similar to that of 'slums'; it literally translates to 'haphazards'.
4. News in 2018 and 2019 indicated unusual mobilisation among these councils, which included advocacy efforts to gain support within the government and the Parliament. The First CoTs Forum in Egypt was held in response to Decree 107/2018, but members of at least one CoT (the CoT of the New City of Al-Shorouk) resigned in protest to the new decree. However, the decree was not reconsidered and is still regulating the CoTs of the new cities.
5. EGP 1 = USD 0.064 (6 May 2020).

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« L'histoire de l'eau » et la dynamique politique, sociale et culturelle du nord du Cameroun

Sambo Armel*

Résumé

Cet article présente le rôle et la place de l'eau dans l'histoire des sociétés du nord du Cameroun. Il est question ici de montrer l'importance de l'eau en tant qu'objet d'étude pour comprendre l'organisation, la dynamique et l'évolution de ces sociétés. Cet article s'appuie sur des entretiens, des récits de vie, l'observation des rapports que les sociétés ont avec l'eau et l'exploitation des données écrites (archives, rapports, travaux scientifiques, etc.). Le recoupement de toutes ces sources a permis d'esquisser une « histoire de l'eau » dans la partie septentrionale du Cameroun. Ainsi, l'eau est à l'origine des migrations et des choix des sites d'implantation des populations. Elle occupe une place essentielle dans l'organisation sociale, les pratiques culturelles, et symbolise le pouvoir politique. Bien commun pour les sociétés au départ, elle est devenue source de conflits entre les individus et les communautés.

Mots-clés : histoire, eau, sociétés, culture, Nord-Cameroun

Abstract

This article presents the role and place of water in the history of societies in northern Cameroon. It aims to show the importance of water as an object of study to understand the organisation, the dynamics and the evolution of these societies. This article is based on interviews, life stories, observation of the relationships that societies have with water and the use of written data (archives, reports, scientific works, etc.). The compilation of all these sources allowed to outline a 'history of water' in the northern part of Cameroon. Thus, water is at the origin of migrations and the choice of settlement sites for populations. It occupies an essential place in social organisation, cultural practices and symbolises political power. Initially a common good for societies, it has become a source of conflict between individuals and communities.

Keywords: history, water, societies, culture, North Cameroon

* Enseignant-chercheur, historien, Faculté des Arts, Lettres et Sciences humaines, Université de Maroua, Cameroun. Email : samboarmel@yahoo.fr

Introduction

L'eau est un élément qui a occupé une place de choix non seulement dans la vie, mais aussi dans la fondation des entités à travers le monde en général et au nord du Cameroun en particulier. Liquide vital, indispensable et irremplaçable, elle a joué un rôle important dans la fixation et l'évolution politique, économique, sociale et culturelle des collectivités. L'histoire de l'eau est de ce fait « un outil qui permet de comprendre les relations séculaires entre l'homme et la nature en abordant les questions politiques, économiques, etc., liées à l'eau en les replaçant dans une perspective historique » (Anomyme 2016:133). L'approche historique permet ici une analyse plus fine de l'objet, qui prend en compte les comportements anthropiques vis-à-vis de la ressource en eau. L'histoire de l'eau permet donc de comprendre le rapport de l'homme à l'eau, les relations entre les communautés, et la dynamique de coopération et des conflits entre les États (Szöllösi-Nagy & Tejada-Guibert 2011). Pour Fournier, « elle permet ainsi de dépasser une approche exclusivement technique des aménagements hydrauliques et aide à comprendre les configurations sociales et politiques sous-jacentes à ces réalisations[1] ». Elle sert de ce fait de cadre idoine pour penser l'avenir en matière d'eau, en transmettant les expériences passées.

Le nord du Cameroun prend ici en compte les régions administratives actuelles de l'Extrême Nord et du Nord. L'étude se focalise essentiellement sur la partie sahélienne, où l'eau est rare dans l'ensemble. C'est une zone peu pourvue en eau. La rareté de l'eau justifie notamment son importance pour les sociétés, d'où la pertinence du choix de cette zone. Cette région baigne dans un climat soudano-sahélien de type tropical sec qui s'étend du sud au centre et de type sahélo-soudanien au nord. Ce climat est caractérisé par des sécheresses récurrentes et des moyennes pluviométriques annuelles qui décroissent avec le temps. L'eau est au centre de toutes les activités économiques, dans cette région. Si l'eau pluviale est tributaire du climat, le réseau hydrographique est particulièrement dense avec le lac Tchad, les fleuves qui l'alimentent, des plaines inondables, bien que l'accès et la disponibilité soient hétérogènes pour les populations, qui adaptent leurs modes de vie et leurs activités aux cycles pluviaux de crues et de décrues.

Des travaux ont été menés sur l'eau dans le nord du Cameroun. L'accent a été orienté vers la question de sa disponibilité et de sa gestion dans cette région. Les travaux de Saibou Issa (2001, 2010), Yokadjim Mandigui (1988), Anonyme (2010, 2011, 2016) étudient les rapports entre les États et les communautés, notamment en matière de gestion des eaux et

des ressources disponibles. Nizésété Bienvenu Denis (2001), quant à lui, insiste sur le symbolisme et les représentations de l'eau dans les sociétés traditionnelles du Nord-Cameroun. Taino Kari Alain Désiré (2015) évoque la place de l'eau dans les migrations et la sédentarisation des Moundang dans leurs sites actuels. D'autres historiens se sont davantage préoccupés de l'histoire du peuplement, des migrations, de l'islamisation, de l'émergence, de l'essor et du déclin des grands empires et royaumes (le Kanem, le Bornou, le Ouaddaï, le Baguirmi, le royaume Moundang de Léré, etc.). À leur avis, au centre des facteurs de migration, l'on relève les mobilités liées à la domination, à la recherche des points de sécurité ou des terres agricoles fertiles. Pourtant, l'eau est un élément important pour comprendre l'organisation et les dynamiques des sociétés. Cette ressource, dans une zone en proie à la désertification, est indissociable de la construction de ces entités et de l'évolution des relations intercommunautaires et sociales. Bien plus, les formes de contrôle et de gestion de l'eau sont très souvent à la base de l'organisation et du fonctionnement de sociétés entières.

La nouveauté épistémologique et heuristique, c'est que dorénavant, l'eau est un objet d'étude en histoire. De ce fait, quelle place prend « l'histoire de l'eau » dans la compréhension de l'évolution politique, culturelle et sociale des sociétés du nord du Cameroun, une région fragilisée par la récurrence de la sécheresse ? L'idée centrale de cette étude, qui repose sur l'assertion selon laquelle l'eau est un document d'intérêt historique, vise à montrer dans quelle mesure ce matériau peut contribuer à la compréhension de la dynamique des sociétés du Cameroun septentrional en procédant à l'évaluation des incidences politiques, sociales et culturelles, ainsi que des représentations que les hommes s'en font.

Cette recherche s'appuie sur des entretiens avec les populations, les autorités traditionnelles, les usagers de l'eau, etc., les récits de vie de quelques « maîtres » de l'eau ou des « faiseurs » des pluies, l'observation des rapports que les sociétés ont avec l'eau et l'exploitation des données écrites (archives et travaux scientifiques). Un accent a été mis sur les récits des explorateurs et des voyageurs arabes qui racontent la vie des sociétés vivant le long des cours d'eau. Le recoupement de toutes ces sources a permis d'esquisser une approche historique de l'eau et de ses impacts sur les dynamiques politiques, sociales et culturelles au nord du Cameroun. L'article est organisé en trois parties : d'abord, l'eau comme facteur de migration et d'implantation des populations sur leurs sites actuels ; ensuite, la place centrale de l'eau dans la vie socioculturelle et politique des populations cibles ; enfin, le rôle de l'eau dans les relations intercommunautaires dans la région d'étude.

Eau : facteur de migration et d'implantation des populations au nord du Cameroun

L'hydrographie est un élément important dans l'étude du peuplement et du contrôle de l'espace. Cela est d'autant plus vrai que le nord du Cameroun a connu une série de catastrophes naturelles (la désertification, les inondations, etc.) qui a entraîné les mouvements des populations aux abords immédiats des cours d'eau, des *mayos* et des plaines inondables. Ces mouvements très anciens ont été observés durant les périodes de la désertification du Sahara, à partir du IIe millénaire, de l'émergence et de l'expansion des Grands Empires du Soudan central entre le IXe et le XIXe siècle, de la colonisation à partir de la fin du XIXe siècle jusqu'à la période post-coloniale (à partir de 1960).

Le nord du Cameroun : une occupation ancienne des abords des points d'eau

Le nord du Cameroun est une zone d'occupation très ancienne où se sont installées, depuis des siècles, des populations entraînées dans différents courants migratoires. Depuis le paléolithique moyen, l'économie de cette région est essentiellement basée sur l'agriculture, la pêche et l'élevage. Des activités qui sont conditionnées par l'eau, d'où tout l'intérêt de considérer que l'accès à l'eau et aux terres fertiles a toujours été au centre des migrations et de l'implantation des populations.

Le nord du Cameroun fait partie des premiers sites d'occupation humaine, notamment aux abords du lac Tchad. Si l'on s'en tient aux travaux des archéologues menés dans cette contrée, les cours d'eau ont joué un rôle majeur comme axes de déplacement des populations. Ils fournissaient aux hommes de quoi boire et manger et constituaient par la même occasion les voies de transport. C'est ainsi que les zones les plus humides du bassin tchadien et de la vallée de la Bénoué étaient les endroits les plus sollicités dans la partie septentrionale du Cameroun actuel. L'évolution climatique a eu un impact sur le peuplement.

L'assèchement du Sahara commence à la fin du III^{e} millénaire avant J.-C. (Diop-Maes 1997:109). Des millénaires plus tôt, le Sahara connaissait déjà une baisse de la pluviométrie, qui s'est accompagnée progressivement d'une raréfaction de l'eau et d'un appauvrissement du sol. De vastes étendues se sont alors asséchées, entraînant du coup un redéploiement des populations. Selon Camps Gabriel (1978:299), « cette végétation subsistera dans les massifs du Hoggar, du Tassili, du Tibesti, au moins

jusqu'au IIe millénaire, époque où le Sahara entre dans sa phase définitive d'assèchement ». Les mouvements des populations fuyant le désert les ont conduites vers les zones où l'eau était disponible pour l'essentiel. L'une des motivations de ces populations était aussi l'accès aux potentialités qu'offrent ces zones du point de vue économique. Les zones inondées et exondées, selon ces populations, offraient de multiples avantages de mise en valeur. Les Massa et les Mousgoum, par exemple, expliquent que leurs migrations et leurs implantations dans la vallée du Logone sont une conséquence de l'assèchement du Sahara (Anonyme 2010). À ce titre, un patriarche Massa affirme que « notre peuple a toujours suivi l'eau depuis l'époque ancienne. On a raconté que les premiers groupes à se déplacer étaient influencés par les contraintes environnementales[2] ». Cela se confirme dans la mesure où la désertification du nord du lac Tchad a conduit les populations présentes dans cette partie à migrer vers le sud, où l'on notait déjà l'appauvrissement des débits des fleuves. L'avancée du désert les a conduites vers la zone la plus humide que sont les plaines inondables et la vallée de la Bénoué. Selon J. Chapelle, il a fallu 3 000 ans pour que les peuples se joignent d'un bord à un autre de la mer paléo-tchadienne suite à l'avancée du désert (Chapelle 1986:9). Leur instinct de survie les a poussés vers une zone où l'eau était disponible en permanence.

Au cours du premier millénaire avant J.-C., émerge au sud du lac Tchad l'une des plus grandes civilisations de l'Afrique, la civilisation Sao. Pour J. Chapelle, c'est l'un des premiers peuples qu'on puisse nommer dans le bassin. Les légendes, dans tout le Sahel (Kanem, Bornou, Baguirmi, Peul, etc.), avaient déjà fait la renommée de ces populations qu'on qualifiait de « géants ». Les ossements découverts dans leurs cimetières le prouvent. Ces populations ont été aussi connues grâce aux écrits des lettrés musulmans et des récits de voyages des Arabes (Lebeuf 1969:42).

Quoi qu'il en soit, les Sao ont développé une brillante civilisation. Une « véritable civilisation » née de l'argile « est sortie de ce delta en formation où l'invention humaine n'avait à sa disposition que ce pauvre mélange de terre et d'eau » (Chapelle 1986:30). Ils avaient occupé, en plus des abords sud du lac Tchad, le delta du Niger. Plusieurs objets découverts, tels que les céramiques, les harpons, les poinçons, démontrent le rapport que ce peuple avait avec l'eau. Les Sao avaient une industrie du fer, car selon les archéologues, des preuves ont été découvertes sur les lieux mêmes de l'ancienne mer paléo-tchadienne (Chapelle 1986:30). C'est ainsi que les Sao « ont puisé dans le lac les ressources matérielles et spirituelles favorables à la construction de leur patrimoine culturel » (Nizésété 2001:91).

Selon Urvoy, les Sao sont « une population autochtone qui est finalement absorbée par les différents groupes d'origine orientale et septentrionale par lesquels prédominent des éléments berbères et arabes », d'où la formation des principautés Kotoko sur les sites Sao (Urvoy 1949:41). Plus de 630 sites ont été repérés sur une aire qui s'étend à l'est jusqu'au lac Fitri, à l'ouest jusqu'à la vallée de la Yoobé et au sud jusqu'à Bousso (rive droite du Chari). Leur dispersion sur ces sites, selon les travaux de Ibn Fartua, est la conséquence de maintes expéditions d'Idris Aloma, où ces groupes sont massacrés ou amenés en esclavage, parfois convertis à l'islam (Seidensticker-Brikay 1997:140). Les Sao sont considérés comme les ancêtres des Kotoko, des Fali, des Mousgoum qui peuplent le Nord-Cameroun actuel (Mveng & Beling-Nkoumba 1978:49-51).

Plusieurs autres peuples, en plus des Kotoko, vont s'installer dans le bassin tchadien, suite à la désertification du Sahara. La présence du lac, du Logone, du Chari et de la Bénoué a attiré plusieurs groupes ethniques du Soudan pour leurs ressources halieutiques et leurs terres alluviales. Les zones privilégiées étaient les oasis et les zones inondables. Les oasis du nord, par exemple, étaient peuplées de Soudanais. Ils se sont répandus entre la boucle du Niger et l'Ennedi. D'après les informations recueillies chez les Massa, les Fali, les Mousgoum et les Kotoko, les atouts naturels des cours d'eau les ont aussi attirés. Une première forme de la séduction « des plaines du Diamaré et de la Bénoué découle des possibilités de colonisation agricole qu'elles offrent » (Boutrais 1972:330). Taino Kari Alain Désiré (2015) rappelle que « les Moundang sont dans le Mayo-Kani parce que la région était giboyeuse » :

> Peuple de chasseurs, ils recherchaient les sites ou les lieux qui attiraient les animaux. Ces lieux sont les alentours des cours d'eau et les lieux au sol salé dont raffolent les bêtes qui les lèchent. On comprend donc la raison de la fondation de Kaélé (« à côté de l'eau, la rivière ») et de l'installation des Moundang Kabi dans le Mayo-Kébi. L'eau est donc symbole de mère nourricière et de mère féconde dans la mesure où elle attire les gibiers qui font vivre les Moundang.

Ainsi, depuis l'époque ancienne, les hommes ont, par endroits, occupé les zones exondées du lac Tchad et le delta du Chari. La désertification, les sécheresses, l'aridité les ont poussés vers les régions nouvelles, occupant de ce fait les berges des cours d'eau au nord du Cameroun. Au départ, les hommes ont migré pour des raisons climatiques, mais avec les incursions des conquérants pendant la période des Grands Empires, ces zones sont devenues des endroits de refuge.

Les berges des cours d'eau et les plaines inondables comme zone refuge pendant la période des Grands Empires (IXe-XIXe siècles)

L'une des plus grandes phases de mobilité des personnes vers les berges des cours d'eau a été observée pendant la période de l'émergence et du développement des Grands Empires dans le bassin du lac Tchad, entre les IXe et XIXe siècles. C'est ainsi que, successivement, l'on a vu naître et s'agrandir dans le Soudan central le Kanem Bornou, le Baguirmi, le Ouaddaï, le Mandara et le royaume Moundang au bord du lac Léré.

Les actes de pillage, les raids, les razzias esclavagistes auxquels se livraient ces États ont provoqué une autre vague de migration des populations victimes en direction des zones marécageuses, qui se présentaient comme des zones de refuge. Ces populations avaient subi les incursions des États ayant émergé dans le bassin du lac Tchad, auxquels s'ajoutèrent les conquêtes de Rabah au XIXe siècle. Leurs replis défensifs les ont conduits sur les berges de ces cours d'eau (les fleuves Logone, Chari et le lac Tchad) où elles espéraient trouver la sécurité. En ce qui concerne les Massa, qui se trouvent sur les berges du fleuve Logone, par exemple, est évoqué le désir d'échapper aux raids des chasseurs d'esclaves du Bornou et du Baguirmi au XVIe siècle. Quant aux Kotoko, ils ont aussi été victimes des razzias menées par Idris Aloma à partir de 1571 (Reounodji *et al.*:147). Cette remontée des Kotoko vers ces sites coïncide avec l'apogée du Bornou en 1574. C'est à cette époque que se situe la dispersion des groupes Sao, ancêtres des Kotoko, vers leur site actuel (Lebeuf 1969:45). La plupart des cités Sao ont été occupées par les Bornouans, obligeant ceux-ci à fuir vers les abords des cours d'eau (Chari et Logone). Bien plus, les cités kotoko, aménagées sur des pentes élevées des cours d'eau, sont dotées de murailles. L'on peut citer ainsi les cités de Kousseri, Goulfei, Makari et Afadé. Ces sites présentaient, selon les populations, plusieurs atouts militaires. Leur sécurité était fort dépendante de ce milieu qui, selon Taimou Adji, est un territoire « dépourvu d'accidents orographiques. La plaine est également dépourvue d'arbres, hormis le long des cours d'eau : Logone, Chari, Serbewel » (Taimou Adji 1994:49).

Pour le confirmer, un informateur précise que « la plaine ne disposant pas des grands arbres, l'on pouvait apercevoir les mouvements de l'ennemi[3] ».

Leurs adversaires sont généralement réputés pour leur maîtrise de la cavalerie. Il s'agit en fait des Haussa, des Bornouans, des Peuls, qui étaient de véritables guerriers. Les berges des cours d'eau furent pendant longtemps inondées, et même après la crue, c'était une zone boueuse qui rendait le déplacement des chevaux pratiquement impossible. Les chevaux ne pouvaient pas se déplacer aisément dans les mares inondées ou dans

les zones boueuses, ce qui, militairement, n'est pas un avantage pour les envahisseurs. Dès lors, « pendant une bonne partie de l'année, la machine guerrière […] se trouve littéralement paralysée » (Taimou Adji 1994:50).

En outre, rapporte-t-on dans cette région, même lorsque l'ennemi parvenait à y pénétrer, les populations avaient la possibilité de s'enfuir. À plusieurs reprises, les Mousgoum et les Kotoko ont traversé le Logone et le Chari pour échapper à leur ennemi. Les mouvements d'une rive à une autre étaient une stratégie pendant cette période. Lors de certaines expéditions bornouanes, les fugitifs Kotoko traversaient la rive ouest du Logone, dans l'espoir d'être en sécurité (Barth 1965:383). Les populations Massa actuelles de Zébé, village situé sur la rive droite du Logone, se sont établies sur ce site à la suite des razzias des « Barma », nom donné aux Baguirmiens par ces derniers (Garine 1964:53). Vivant sur les berges des cours d'eau, ces populations constamment menacées se sont organisées pour s'accommoder à cet espace, qui était désormais marqué par la domination des Foulbé et des Baguirmiens. Ils ont tenté de concilier leurs installations sur des buttes non inondables.

Enfin, ces razzias vont être progressivement freinées par l'implantation des Européens en Afrique à la fin du XIXe siècle. Ces nouveaux arrivants mettent fin à ces incursions, ainsi qu'aux conflits résultant du dessein d'expansion de certains chefs. D'autres intérêts vont entrer en jeu. Toujours est-il que l'eau va continuer d'influencer les déplacements des populations au nord du Cameroun.

Migrations et implantation des populations depuis la période coloniale jusqu'aux années 1990

Pendant la période coloniale, la « mise en valeur » économique du nord du Cameroun, bien que tardive par rapport à la partie du sud, est un facteur de migration. Le développement de la riziculture, dans la plaine du Logone, et des cultures du coton et des arachides dans la vallée de la Bénoué, par l'administration coloniale française, à partir de 1950, entraîne un redéploiement des populations du Nord Cameroun.

Pour les colonisateurs, ces premiers projets de mise en valeur de cette région s'accompagnent « d'une volonté d'aménagement du territoire et de déplacement de populations » (Boutinot 1994:67). L'eau a occupé une place importante dans la formulation de cette politique d'émigration. Ainsi, l'on a observé de façon générale que ces aménagements se faisaient autour des plaines inondables, des berges des *mayos* et des vallées des cours d'eau (le fleuve Bénoué), et ce, à cause des potentialités de production

agricole. L'objectif visé par la France était d'abord d'améliorer l'agriculture. Les premières populations à migrer sont celles des monts Mandara. Il s'agit principalement des Mafa. Si on s'en tient aux travaux de Boutrais (1964:61), le souci des administrateurs français était de favoriser la descente de populations montagnardes dans les plaines. Très vite, elles ont été contraintes de cultiver le coton et le *mouskwari* dans les plaines et sur les bords des *mayos*. De ce fait, des centres d'accueil des migrants ont ainsi été aménagés à Zouvoul, Mokyo, Aïssardé près des monts Mandara, mais aussi à Sanguéré près de la Bénoué à Garoua.

L'on va aussi noter les périodes de sécheresse les plus récentes (1905-1908, 1912-1914, 1940-1944) observées dans le Sahel. Celles-ci ont été très sévères et longues. Ces épisodes ont entraîné des redéploiements des populations vers les zones riches en eau et disposant de terres fertiles. D'ailleurs, les sécheresses des années 1972-1984 vont contraindre le gouvernement camerounais à organiser les migrations des populations.

Sur les mouvements spontanés des populations se sont greffées des « migrations organisées » dans la vallée de la Bénoué. Une Mission d'étude pour l'aménagement de la vallée supérieure de la Bénoué (MEAVSB) a été créée en 1974 pour organiser et encadrer ces migrations. La migration dans le cadre du projet Nord-Est Bénoué (Lagdo), par exemple, « a créé des zones d'anciennes implantations de migrants. Celles-ci ont été la base de départ pour des mouvements plus méridionaux : à Ngong, à Garoua, dans le Sud-Ouest Bénoué » (Mfewou 2010:24). Il importe de préciser à ce niveau qu'une forte migration des populations des monts Mandara vers ces zones a été organisée. Avec la croissance démographique élevée de ces zones, les populations, pour satisfaire leurs besoins en terres et en ressource en eau, étaient contraintes de migrer vers les zones où leurs conditions de vie pourraient être améliorées. Ainsi,

> Entre 1976 et 1992, 43 777 personnes ont été installées et on estime à 45 417 le nombre de personnes venues de façon « spontanée » (dont 80 % comptabilisés à partir de 1984). Cela nous donne un total de 89 194 migrants arrivés dans le périmètre du NEB entre 1976 et 1992. Avec un accroissement naturel, estimé à 3 740 personnes sur ces années, qui vient s'additionner. (Boutinot 1994:78)

En somme, l'on constate que dans l'histoire du peuplement du Nord Cameroun, l'accès à l'eau a été au centre des mouvements des personnes et de l'implantation des populations sur leurs sites actuels, notamment celles installées aux abords des cours d'eau. Ces populations qui suivent l'eau restent attachées par leur culture à cette ressource.

La centralité de l'eau dans la vie socio-culturelle et politique des populations du Nord Cameroun

Le nord du Cameroun se trouve essentiellement dans une zone aride où l'eau occupe une place essentielle. Au fil du temps, les populations ont développé une civilisation dans laquelle l'eau occupe une place prépondérante. Ainsi, l'eau structure l'organisation sociale et les pratiques culturelles. Bien plus, elle symbolise le pouvoir politique.

L'eau au centre de la vie socioculturelle des sociétés du Nord Cameroun

Dans les sociétés du Nord Cameroun, la place centrale de l'eau se révèle aussi bien dans les modes d'organisation sociale que dans les croyances. En effet, les génies de l'eau sont l'objet d'un culte qui confère aux « faiseurs de pluie » ou aux « maîtres des lacs » une position de pouvoir prépondérante.

De ce fait, l'origine de l'eau dans les sociétés du Nord Cameroun est *a priori* divine. Dans la conception « animiste », l'homme ne pouvait avoir accès à ses bienfaits que s'il concluait une alliance avec les forces qui l'animent, d'où la présence des « dieux » dans la plupart de ces sociétés. Ainsi, l'on retrouve les dieux des pluies, les dieux des eaux, etc., dans ces sociétés. J. Magnant (1991) regroupe ces divinités en deux catégories. Il s'agit des dieux des eaux d'en haut, qui renvoient à la pluie, et des dieux d'en bas, qui font allusion à ceux qui se trouvent dans les mares, les puits et les cours d'eau. Dans les sociétés du nord du Cameroun, les génies des eaux et des pluies sont des représentants de ces divinités.

Les Massa le nomment Mununda. Ils l'imaginent sous l'aspect d'une sirène à la peau blanche et aux cheveux très longs (Dumas-Champion 1997:389). Chez les Mofu-Gudur, vivant sur les monts Mandara, le dieu des eaux s'appelle « *mamayam* ». Une seule personne, le maître des eaux (*bay nga yam*), est censée communiquer avec lui. Chez les Moundang, on a *Mass¶h bame* qui signifie littéralement le « dieu de la pluie ». On l'invoque en cas de sécheresse prolongée (Taïno 2015).

Dans de nombreuses sociétés, notamment chez les Kotoko, les Moundang, les Massa, les Toupouri, les Dourou, l'eau, comme d'autres éléments naturels, est imprégnée d'un esprit, d'une force vitale. Manifestation physique de l'eau, l'esprit peut prendre l'apparence d'une divinité. Ces esprits peuvent prendre la forme d'un animal ou de forces surnaturelles. Chez les Kotoko, le serpent symbolise très bien cette forme qu'on accorde à l'eau. Le serpent « est lié à l'eau, à la lumière, au pêcheur, au mouvement, à la masculinité… » (Nizésété 2001). Chez les Mofu-Gudur, peuple des montagnes, les pierres représentent les pluies. Selon les Fali, l'eau (féminine) est associée aux

poissons (Talkeu-Tounouga 2000). À l'analyse, l'on se rend compte qu'il y a un lien entre ces représentations et la situation géographique de ces peuples. C'est ainsi que pour des peuples des montagnes, les pierres sont identifiées comme symbole, alors que pour les peuples de l'eau, l'on relève les poissons, et chez ceux de la plaine les serpents. Il existe un lien entre ces symboles et l'environnement de ces peuples.

Des mythes existent et traduisent le caractère divin de l'eau. Dans les plus anciennes civilisations, l'eau est en effet sacrée, car elle est la source de la vie. Elle tient une place importante dans toutes les mythologies et dans toutes les religions. Il existe chez ces peuples plusieurs récits de la découverte de l'eau qui mettent en rapport le peuplement et les dieux. Ainsi, le chef de Mowo, de l'ethnie Mofou-Gudur, rapporte : « Arrivé à Mowo, Dieu lui a révélé dans le songe la manipulation de ces pierres. Après une première manipulation, la pluie tomba. Dès lors, cet homme devint faiseur de pluie et transmit ce don à sa descendance. C'est pour cette raison que le clan de Mowo est respecté par tout le monde[4]. » Chez les Moundang, le mythe de l'origine de l'eau raconte que c'est une princesse qui a reçu le don de faire tomber la pluie en composant un hymne dont l'exécution faisait tomber la pluie. C'est ainsi que les Moundang découvrirent la pluie, qu'ils appelèrent plus tard « bi ». Et depuis ce jour, la pluie, selon Dili Mbring, n'a cessé de pleuvoir en pays moundang[5].

D'ailleurs, l'eau dans ces sociétés est le symbole de la vie et de la mort. L'eau, de prime abord, représente la vie dans toutes ces sociétés. L'eau est au centre de toutes les activités de l'homme. C'est dans ce sens que les personnes rencontrées affirment que l'eau est source de vie, et ce, dans la mesure où c'est elle qui fait vivre l'homme, fait pousser les plantes et permet aux animaux de vivre. L'eau est indispensable aussi bien à l'environnement qu'aux hommes. Il y a ici deux niveaux de représentation de l'eau comme source de vie : l'eau à l'origine de toute forme de vie et son utilité pour la survie des populations. Et pourtant, l'eau, par la même occasion, demeure une source d'angoisse par ses effets imprévisibles (inondations, tempêtes, etc.), qui entraînent régulièrement des décès.

Les grandes périodes de sécheresse que le nord du Cameroun a connues ont entraîné des famines qui ont affecté les mémoires collectives. Par exemple, l'on se souvient des années de sécheresse de 1967-1969 comme de l'époque du *« dara bodum »*, littéralement « se tenir bien ». La mémoire collective a trouvé un ancrage historique suite à certaines crises naturelles autour de l'eau. Il existe des références historiques en langues locales qui s'appuient sur ces événements pour relater les phénomènes liés aux sécheresses, aux inondations et aux catastrophes naturelles. D'ailleurs, ces catastrophes

naturelles (disettes, inondations, sécheresses, famines, épizooties, etc.) sont devenues pour certains peuples un repère historique. Dans la localité de Moulvoudaye, un informateur affirme qu'« il suffit de dire l'année où les gens consommaient les racines et les écorces pour que certains se souviennent immédiatement des sécheresses des années 1972-1973[6] ». À cet effet, il est possible de rattacher certaines croyances et certains rites à ces événements historiques. En pays mafa par exemple, l'invasion acridienne des années 1930, qui dura pratiquement 7 ans[7], avait amené le chef à importer un *« kuley »*, un rite de Gudur en pays Mofou, pour la sauvegarde de son pouvoir. Ce que l'on retient ici, c'est que la situation de la raréfaction de l'eau a entraîné de nouvelles pratiques cultuelles en pays mafa.

Depuis l'islamisation du Nord Cameroun après le Djihad mené par Ousman Dan Fodio en 1804 et l'expansion du christianisme, il y a lieu de préciser que ces représentations ont évolué. Le christianisme et l'islam ont beaucoup influencé les pratiques rituelles autour de l'eau. L'on note, par exemple, la disparition de certaines mares d'eau sacrées dans ces sociétés et l'acculturation des populations. De ce fait, certains rites ne sont plus connus par la jeune génération. Suite à cela, d'autres abandonnent progressivement les pratiques culturelles. Ainsi, l'eau dans les sociétés du nord du Cameroun demeure une source de vie et de mort. Les phénomènes tels que les inondations, les épidémies, les désastres écologiques provoqués par les eaux sont loin d'être des phénomènes naturels. C'est justement pour tempérer ces agressivités que les rites liés à l'eau sont fréquents et occupent une place de choix dans la religion des peuples du bassin tchadien.

L'eau dans les pratiques culturelles dans les sociétés du nord du Cameroun

Dans les sociétés africaines en général et en particulier celles du nord du Cameroun, l'eau est indissociable de toutes les activités religieuses. Les rites de passage (naissances, mariages, initiations, funérailles…) ou les rites agraires ne peuvent se dérouler sans aspersion d'eau, immersion et libation. L'eau intervient souvent « dans le déroulement d'un culte comme vecteur de pureté et de spiritualité[8] ». L'eau, dans ce cas, joue un rôle pluriel : apaiser la colère des esprits, créer un climat de paix et prévenir les fléaux.

Lorsqu'on prend le cas des cérémonies funéraires chez les Guiziga, les Moundang, les Guidar et les Mousgoum, en rendant un ultime hommage aux morts, l'eau intervient à plusieurs niveaux et chaque geste a un symbole. Le dernier bain auquel a droit le défunt consiste à le nettoyer et à le purifier pour qu'il se retrouve parmi les ancêtres dans un état de pureté. L'eau ne

nettoie pas seulement les signes extérieurs de salissure. Chez les Massa par exemple, elle efface les souillures spirituelles. La toilette mortuaire symbolise ainsi la purification du corps comme de l'âme. Même ceux qui nettoient les morts, à la fin de la baignade, se lavent les mains. Il s'agit à travers ce geste, comme l'affirme Ngouya Tchilina, « de se débarrasser des saletés contractées en rendant le défunt pur[9] ». L'eau, en nettoyant et en purifiant le défunt et ses proches, devient un liquide sacré. Ainsi, en plus de la place capitale qu'occupe l'eau dans les cérémonies religieuses, il y a des rites qui sont pratiqués dans les cours d'eau, les puits et les mares.

Les cours d'eau sont souvent des lieux sacrés. Pour bénéficier pleinement de tous leurs bienfaits, il est nécessaire de communiquer avec les divinités et les génies des eaux. Des offrandes sont régulièrement adressées à des cours d'eau. Ces rites sont fréquents pour solliciter les pluies ou en cas de noyade, et périodiques pour le début de la saison de pêche. Chez les Mafa, l'eau constitue également un signe de communication entre les dieux ou les ancêtres et les populations. En effet, lors d'un sacrifice voué aux dieux ou aux ancêtres, c'est l'eau qui détermine si l'offrande est acceptée par ces dieux ou ces ancêtres[10]. L'animal (chèvre, mouton ou bœuf) qui sert d'offrande doit être aspergé d'eau, et pour savoir si les dieux ou les ancêtres l'ont accepté, l'animal devrait « gesticuler », selon ce peuple.

Si l'eau est bienfaisante, les eaux des cours d'eau souvent entraînent des noyades. Sur les fleuves Bénoué, Logone et sur le lac Tchad, l'on assiste régulièrement à des noyades, à des accidents de pirogue lors des traversées, et aussi à des morts occasionnées par les animaux aquatiques tels que les hippopotames. L'eau apparaît dans ce cas comme un moyen de transport dangereux et maléfique. Ces accidents, pour les Moundang, les Massa, les Guidar, les Fali, les Mousgoum ou les Kotoko, sont souvent l'œuvre des esprits, des divinités qui vivent sous l'eau. Souvent, ces agissements sont considérés comme les manifestations de colère de ces dieux envers les hommes et leurs biens. Et c'est justement pour tempérer cette fureur de l'eau que les rites sont fréquents. Généralement, comme l'affirme un vieillard kotoko, il s'agit pour eux, dans ce cas, « de demander la générosité des esprits des eaux afin d'épargner les enfants[11] ». Lorsqu'il arrive qu'une personne se noie, que ce soit chez les Kotoko, les Massa ou les Mousgoum, il y a toujours une cérémonie conjuratoire pour solliciter la libération de la victime. À ce titre, les noyades sont considérées comme les manifestations du mécontentement des génies des eaux. Dans cette catégorie des noyés, l'on retrouve aussi les victimes des accidents lors de la traversée des fleuves, car les chavirements des pirogues sont toujours considérés comme l'œuvre des esprits qui se trouvent dans l'eau.

À chaque fois qu'une situation de noyade se présente, l'on fait appel aux maîtres des eaux pour faire des sacrifices et les offrir aux génies, car on les considère comme les responsables. Chez les Massa, en cas de libération, et si la victime s'en sort vivante, elle devient du coup le maître de ce point d'eau. En fait, les Massa considèrent celui-ci comme quelqu'un qui s'est entretenu avec les dieux et les génies des eaux. Lui seul peut désormais servir d'intermédiaire entre ces divinités et les populations. Dès lors, son pouvoir se transmet à sa mort à ses descendants. Il maîtrise par la même occasion l'art divinatoire, qui occupe une place importante dans la société massa. C'est dans ce sens que Tchago Bouimon (1997:379) affirme, en parlant des Toupouri, que « ce séjour sous l'eau est appréhendé comme un signe d'élection confirmant le don de voyance ou un signe de choix au rang d'ami parmi les humains. À son retour sur la terre ferme, l'individu acquiert une sorte d'immunité à l'égard de la divinité aquatique et la faculté de faire des pêches fructueuses ». Seulement, pour qu'une personne noyée parvienne à ce stade de miraculée, on ne doit pas se lamenter jusqu'à sa libération, selon la plupart des conceptions de ces peuples.

En pays kotoko, la pêche est dénommée *« piage kula »* qui, littéralement, signifie « barrer la rivière ». La pratique de cette activité s'accompagne de tout un ensemble de rites. Ce sont ces rites qui inaugurent la saison pendant laquelle les populations vont se livrer à la pêche. Une offrande est faite annuellement aux génies des eaux avant l'ouverture de cette activité. Chez les Massa, chaque mare, chaque point d'eau au bord du Logone a son maître de l'eau ou « père de la mare ». C'est lui qui est chargé d'effectuer les sacrifices lors des rites de pêche. Une fois ce rituel effectué, le maître des eaux entre le premier dans l'eau et effectue la première prise. Ce n'est qu'à sa sortie que la pêche peut commencer. Les sacrifices de substitution sont fréquents lorsque des individus commettent l'infraction de pêcher avant le « père de la mare ». À cet effet, dans la plupart des cas, l'on condamne le coupable à offrir un mouton pour les divinités de l'eau. Cette méthode consiste simplement à réparer la faute et à éviter la fureur des dieux. Toutefois, à côté de la place de l'eau au centre des rites, elle est considérée aussi comme source de pouvoir politique.

Eau et pouvoir politique au nord du Cameroun

Au-delà des dimensions sociale et culturelle, l'eau est considérée comme symbole du pouvoir politique chez certains peuples du nord du Cameroun. L'eau, ressource vitale pour ces populations, représente aussi une source de puissance politique. Les souverains sont les acteurs de cette gestion. La mainmise des chefs traditionnels sur l'eau participe d'une stratégie de renforcement de leur pouvoir.

Malgré la gratuité de l'accès à l'eau, ils ont gardé leur autorité sur l'accès aux points d'eau (fleuves, puits, *mayos*) compte tenu de tous les avantages économiques qu'ils offraient. Bien plus, la maîtrise de l'eau était un signe de pouvoir. Par ce contrôle des points d'eau, le chef joue un rôle capital ; il a droit de contrôle, de gestion et d'usufruit. À travers l'eau, s'est développée la puissance économique du chef. L'eau, que ce soit chez les Kotoko, les Massa ou les Fali, appartient aux hommes de privilèges qui sont les sultans, les chefs traditionnels en fonction de chaque société. Des exemples abondent dans les régions de Pouss, Logone Birni, Yagoua, Blangoua, Garoua, Lagdo où les chefs traditionnels prélèvent des droits coutumiers sur la pêche et le transport sur les fleuves Chari, Logone et sur la Bénoué. Au détriment des pêcheurs Laka, Mousgoum, Djoukoun, Laka sur le fleuve Bénoué, les Lamibé « contrôlent les terres, cours d'eau et nappes dormantes qui se trouvent dans leur "commandement" » (Stauch 1966:27).

Contrairement aux Toupouri qui associent les dieux de la pluie à celui de l'eau, les Massa et les Kotoko disposent des dieux de pluies. Ce sont ces derniers qui, chaque fois, à la fin de la saison sèche, marquent aussi le début de la saison des pluies et organisent des rites pour solliciter l'aide des dieux pour une année riche en eau. Chez les Kotoko par exemple, le rôle du sultan est réduit en ce qui concerne les rites de pluies. Lorsque la saison sèche se prolonge, on fait appel à la population féminine et aux enfants pour implorer les génies de la pluie à travers des lamentations. Les prêtres n'interviennent qu'en cas d'échec de ces derniers. Et même lors de l'ouverture de la saison agricole, le sultan est indirectement associé au sacrifice. Il importe de préciser ici que chez certains peuples (Toupouri, Guidar, Fali), la maîtrise de l'eau par le chef est aussi un signe de pouvoir. Ici, une bonne pluviométrie pendant l'année renforce le pouvoir du souverain dans les domaines politique et économique.

En revanche, une sécheresse récurrente conduit à une suspicion envers le souverain, souvent qualifié dans ce cas d'illégitime. À ce propos, Tchago Bouimon (1997:377) précise : « et comme tel, le souverain n'apparaît plus aux yeux de ses sujets comme intermédiaire bienveillant entre eux et les puissances invisibles ; il devient bouc émissaire, perd progressivement son autorité et, à la longue, il pourrait être destitué par le clan électeur. » Les populations établissent une relation étroite entre l'acquisition, la gestion, la perte de pouvoir et l'eau.

Chez les peuples de montagnes, les maîtres des pluies sont des hommes très puissants et respectés dans la société. En pays mafa, les « maîtres des pluies » sont les détenteurs du pouvoir de la maîtrise des pluies. Ils auraient le pouvoir de dévier ou d'anticiper les pluies. Leur expertise est sollicitée

lors du *« Kworay »*, terme qui désigne une interruption des pluies en pleine saison pluvieuse. Ils organisent alors un rite sacrificiel pour provoquer les pluies. Parlant des Mofu, Vincent (1997) qualifie les maîtres des pluies de princes, car ils ont le pouvoir d'attirer la pluie et de la stopper. Bien plus, Catherine Jouaux (1989), sur la base de la tradition orale, raconte l'histoire d'un chef Mofu-Gudur du clan Maavaw qui, avant de mourir, avait promis à son fils adoptif un « *kuley* de pluie », c'est-à-dire un sacrifice de pluie. On reconnaissait donc un grand chef chez les Mofu-Gudur par sa capacité à contrôler la pluie. Les Mofu-Gudur associent ainsi le pouvoir à la pluie.

Ces fonctions de maîtres des eaux ont connu une évolution avec la colonisation et la période post-coloniale. Avec la centralisation du pouvoir religieux, puis politique, J. Magnant (1991) constate que « les fonctions de prêtre de la terre et de prêtre des fleuves et des mares vont être unifiées à l'échelon local, puis régional au sommet de la hiérarchie sociale entre les mains de grands prêtres, de princes ou des rois ».

Cela est d'autant plus vrai que les offrandes qui étaient censées être reversées aux prêtres reviennent aux rois. Seulement, dans les sociétés de la région du nord du Cameroun, malgré l'accaparement des pouvoirs religieux par l'autorité traditionnelle, les prêtres ou les maîtres des eaux continuent d'exercer leurs fonctions. C'est un rôle sacré, comme l'approuve un notable massa, car personne ne peut le faire, puisqu'il communique avec des êtres invisibles pour les autres. Ils sont et demeurent, malgré l'influence des religions révélées (christianisme et islam), les garants de la fertilité et de la pluie.

Pendant la période coloniale et post-coloniale (depuis 1960), les chefs ont toujours gardé leur autonomie en ce qui concerne certaines activités (la traversée par pirogue, la pêche, etc.). L'on observe encore sur le lac Tchad, le Logone, le Chari et la Bénoué, les représentants de ces souverains qui contrôlent tous les mouvements des pêcheurs et collectent de l'argent. En raison de sa rentabilité, chaque chef de village voulait absolument contrôler cette activité. Seulement, de plus en plus, avec l'expansion des autorités administratives, les pouvoirs des chefs traditionnels ont considérablement diminué, l'État ayant repris ses prérogatives. À côté de ces faits, il importe de préciser que l'importance accordée à l'eau dans cette partie peut se comprendre à partir de la toponymie et de l'hydronymie.

En effet, l'importance de l'eau dans la vie politique et administrative des peuples se lit aussi à travers les noms des lieux. Tel est le cas pour l'essentiel des circonscriptions administratives au nord du Cameroun, où les noms des cours d'eau sont souvent usités pour déterminer un territoire administratif. Il s'agit du département du Logone et Chari qui a pour chef-lieu Kousseri, de la Benoué, dont le chef-lieu est Garoua et du Faro ayant pour chef-lieu Poli.

Bien plus, le terme « *mayo* », qui désigne un cours d'eau, est souvent utilisé pour déterminer au Cameroun les noms de certains départements administratifs. C'est le cas de la plupart des circonscriptions du Nord Cameroun, par exemple le Mayo Danay, le Mayo Sava, le Mayo Louti, le Mayo Tsanaga, le Mayo Rey. Les rattachements des points d'eau à des unités administratives démontrent que l'eau occupe une place essentielle dans la culture de ces peuples et, partant, dans leur imaginaire. Les politiques l'ont bien compris et l'ont intégré dans la gestion des territoires et des peuples.

L'eau dans les rapports intercommunautaires au nord Cameroun

L'eau est une ressource qui occupe une place primordiale dans les rapports intercommunautaires au nord du Cameroun. Elle est à la fois facteur de paix et source de conflits, surtout en ce qui concerne son usage.

L'eau : facteur de paix et d'intégration au nord du Cameroun

Conscientes de l'importance de l'eau, les populations ont toujours mis en place un cadre où l'eau est un facteur de paix. Dans ces sociétés, l'eau est un facteur de paix et de stabilité sociale. Elles savaient déjà qu'il fallait permettre l'accès de tous à l'eau tout en la préservant pour les générations futures et en assurant par la même occasion sa pérennité tant en quantité qu'en qualité. L'accès à l'eau, de façon générale, est libre et gratuit à tous les individus. Ce principe de l'eau comme bien commun est partagé par toutes les ethnies du nord du Cameroun. Il faut toutefois noter que cet accès gratuit à l'eau connaît des restrictions du fait de la récurrence de la sécheresse, de l'explosion démographique et du modernisme.

Dans chaque communauté, il était interdit de refuser l'eau, même à un étranger. D'ailleurs, refuser l'eau chez les Moundang, les Toupouri, les Guidar, les Fali ou les Buduma était un comportement que l'on qualifiait d'acte criminel. L'eau est la première chose qu'on offre à toute personne qui rend visite ou qui est de passage. Cette règle de bienséance, comme l'approuve Jean Magnard, se traduit par la présence le long des rues des grands centres ou autour des grands marchés, de cruches de quarante à cinquante litres d'eau, surmontées d'un gobelet, que leurs propriétaires mettent devant leur porte à la disposition des passants assoiffés (Magnard 1991:4). De ce fait, l'eau symbolise la solidarité entre les différents groupes ethniques. À ce propos, un informateur rapporte qu'il « arrive que dans un village, les populations s'associent pour aménager des puits[12] ».

D'ailleurs, dans la région des monts Mandara, les berges des *mayos* sont progressivement devenues des marchés. Bien que ces *mayos* soient des lieux de ravitaillement, ils sont aussi des espaces d'échanges, de partage

et, finalement, de socialisation. À ce propos, un informateur rencontré sur le marché de Mokong nous précise que « le *mayo* est considéré comme un carrefour, car les gens viennent de partout et autour des activités commerciales, ils s'échangent des nouvelles entre les différents villages, entre les différentes familles[13] ».

Les points d'eau (puits, mares, cours d'eau) étaient des lieux de rencontre et de partage. Ce sont des endroits où, parfois, femmes et enfants se retrouvent. Les femmes causent, travaillent, se partagent les nouvelles autour de la recherche de l'eau et des lessives. Ces points d'eau deviennent ainsi un point de rassemblement, un cadre idoine de dialogue et de paix. Autour des cours d'eau, par exemple, certains peuples organisent des rites et des festivals. On l'observe régulièrement sur les berges de la Bénoué, du Logone et du Chari. Le Tokna massana, comme lieu de mobilisation des Massa, se tient généralement sur les berges du fleuve Logone entre le Tchad et le Cameroun. On invite les autres communautés à contribuer à la cohésion et à l'intégration. Il y a même des sacrifices (alliances sacrificielles) qui imposent la paix à la communauté.

L'eau : source de conflits au nord du Cameroun

Il importe aussi de préciser qu'autour de l'eau, on distingue plusieurs autres ressources, à savoir les vallées fertiles, les pâturages et les poissons. Ces ressources se justifient dans cette région par la présence des différents cours d'eau ou *« mayo »*. C'est pourquoi, au-delà des relations interétatiques, l'accès à l'eau est l'affaire des personnes, des familles, des communautés, etc. De ce fait, l'on peut noter plusieurs échelles, non seulement d'usage de l'eau, mais aussi de types de conflits inhérents à sa gestion (Anonyme 2011). Il s'agit ainsi des usagers de l'eau (agriculteurs, pêcheurs, éleveurs), ou alors des communautés ethniques (Massa, Mousgoum, Kotoko, etc.).

De ce point de vue, l'accès aux ressources en eau s'est progressivement imposé comme un enjeu sociopolitique local générateur de tensions et conflits entre groupes et communautés dans la région du nord du Cameroun. Ces conflits se manifestent particulièrement « lorsque de nouveaux acteurs, souvent extérieurs aux communautés d'usagers, tendent à modifier la maîtrise de l'eau et bouleversent les usages traditionnels[14] ». La récurrence des sécheresses dans la région depuis les années 1970, associée à l'explosion démographique, est une source de compétition entre usages et entre usagers. Les conflits éleveurs-agriculteurs sont traditionnels et fréquents dans la région. Ils sont enregistrés autour des mares d'eau pendant les activités de nomadisme et de transhumance. Ce sont les « luttes d'intérêts autour des points d'eau et des espaces de pâturage réservés ou utilisés pour l'agriculture » (Kossoumna Liba'a Natali 2014). Les localités de Kaélé, Midjivin et Boboyo

dans le département du Mayo-Kani connaissent une montée des tensions entre agriculteurs et éleveurs nomades. Plusieurs rixes ont été enregistrées entre les communautés contre les éleveurs nomades.

Autour des cours d'eau et des *mayos* de la région du Nord, l'on observe parfois les conflits qui opposent de temps en temps les populations situées en amont à celles de l'aval et les populations installées sur des rives opposées. Les cas les plus réguliers dans la région sont observables sur le Logone, la Bénoué et les *mayo* dans les localités des monts Mandara. Le véritable bassin aval du Logone se trouve en pays kotoko.

Il y a aussi une autre migration qui porte les Mousgoum vers les villages kotoko au confluent du Chari à cause de l'abondance en poissons. D'ailleurs, un rapport du chef de la région du Diamaré, en 1953, signalait déjà l'ampleur de l'immigration mousgoum vers la région du Logone et Chari. Ainsi, écrit-il, « le chef de la région du Logone et Chari, dans son rapport politique de juillet, signalait un fort courant d'immigration qui porte les Mousgoum des régions surpeuplées de Pouss vers le Sud du sultanat du Logone, où les terres vacantes ne manquent pas[15] ». Ce fort courant d'immigration des Mousgoum ne s'explique pas seulement par l'accès aux terres fertiles, mais aussi par la richesse des poissons de cette zone. La raréfaction des ressources a, dans ce cas précis, engendré les protestations des Kotoko, qui accusent les Mousgoum d'exploiter leur eau, leurs pâturages et leurs poissons. Si ces protestations ont frisé les bagarres dans certaines localités, dans d'autres, l'on a assisté à des conflits très violents. C'est le cas du conflit de Zina, qui a opposé les pêcheurs mousgoum aux pêcheurs kotoko le 4 janvier 2009. Le bilan officiel a dénombré 11 morts, en plus de nombreux dégâts matériels[16].

Des disputes et des conflits sont aussi notés parfois autour des points d'eau (puits, forages, cours d'eau, etc.). Ces conflits ne peuvent être énumérés, car ils sont permanents dans cette région, plus particulièrement dans les zones de montagnes. Ils résultent du non-respect des rotations de puisage, de la raréfaction de l'eau en saison sèche, de la réclamation des droits de propriété, etc. Parfois, des conflits entre deux personnes autour d'un puits dégénèrent en batailles rangées entre communautés. Tel est le cas régulièrement depuis 1991 entre les populations de Djengué et celles de Dougvé le long du cours d'eau qui traverse la localité de Soulédé-Roua, dans le département du Mayo Tsanaga.

Ainsi, les solutions pour les conflits de l'eau[17] à l'intérieur des villages entre les différentes communautés sont trouvées soit par la médiation des patriarches, soit par les tribunaux coutumiers, car il existe dans ces sociétés des principes d'une gestion rationnelle et équitable de l'eau. L'arbre à palabres vient aussi en appui à la justice.

La justice traditionnelle constitue donc un cadre de médiation intégré au système traditionnel du pouvoir. À côté de ces mécanismes, l'on note un ensemble de mécanismes endogènes de promotion de la paix autour de la gestion des ressources en eau.

Conclusion

En somme, l'eau occupe une place importante dans l'histoire des populations du nord du Cameroun. Elle a joué un rôle capital dans l'histoire et le processus du peuplement des berges des cours d'eau, des *mayos* et des plaines inondables. La désertification du Sahara, espace auparavant vert, a entraîné le redéploiement des populations dans toute la partie méridionale du lac Tchad jusqu'à la vallée de la Bénoué. Parties du Soudan, celles-ci vont essaimer les zones riches en eau et en terres fertiles. Elles vont alors s'installer là où elles peuvent aisément avoir accès à l'eau, près des fleuves (Logone, lac Tchad, Bénoué, Faro, etc.) et des points d'eau (les rivières, les mares, etc.). Cet attachement des populations à l'eau a permis le développement d'une culture de l'eau.

Cette ressource, au-delà de ses apports économiques, présente aussi des risques. C'est ce qui a créé cette relation ambivalente à l'eau dans l'imaginaire des populations. L'eau, d'origine divine, intervient pratiquement dans tous les rites à travers l'aspersion, l'immersion et la libation. Elle joue un rôle très important dans ces sociétés, au point où tout un ensemble de mécanismes a été mis en place pour sa gestion. À cet effet, l'accès à l'eau dans ces sociétés est gratuit. Les souverains étaient les garants de la préservation de sa qualité, surtout en ce qui concerne la gestion des cours d'eau. La maîtrise et le contrôle de l'eau sont devenus un symbole du pouvoir politique et une source d'accumulation.

Enfin, l'eau occupe une place importante pour comprendre les relations intercommunautaires. La toponymie et l'hydronymie dans le septentrion le démontrent à suffisance et permettent de saisir son histoire. Au-delà de son aspect utilitaire dans la société, l'eau est aussi source de conflits entre les différents usagers. Aujourd'hui, avec l'insécurité liée à l'expansion du terrorisme menée par Boko Haram, la question des rivalités autour de l'eau et de la gestion des pâturages est instrumentalisée par les terroristes pour raviver les tensions intercommunautaires.

Notes

1. Fournier, P., 2015, « Les leçons d'une hydro-histoire : quelques pistes de réflexion », Siècles [En ligne], 42 | 2015, mis en ligne le 17 mars 2016, consulté le 9 mars 2017. URL : http://siecles.revues.org/2970.
2. Entretien avec Nigaina Paul, Yagoua le 5 août 2019.

3. Entretien avec Ngouya Tchilina, Yagoua le 9 août 2019.
4. Entretien avec Alkam Guidgalam, faiseur de pluie, Mowo le 15 juillet 2019.
5. Entretien avec Dili Mbring, Lera le 22 septembre 2020.
6. Entretien avec Dansala, Moulvoudaye le 5 septembre 2020.
7. Entretien avec Balna Jules, Mokolo le 18 septembre 2020.
8. Jaskulké, E., « Eau, Symbolisme et Religions », www.ifrance.com/salsaloca/fr http:/fig-st_ die. education.fr/actes/actes_2002/jaskulke/article.htm., consulté le 26 janvier 2009.
9. Entretien avec Ngouya Tchilina, Yagoua le 9 août 2019.
10. Entretien avec Baldiyégaï Hadamou, Soulédé le 10 juillet 2019.
11. Entretien avec Maï Ali Mamouloum, Blangoua le 30 août 2019.
12. Entretien avec Bigued Ganava, Koza le 20 octobre 2019.
13. Entretien avec Meweley Soukouiladou, Mandaya le 15 octobre 2019.
14. Patrick Fournier, « Les leçons d'une hydro-histoire : quelques pistes de réflexion », *Siècles* [En ligne], 42|2016, mis en ligne le 17 mars 2016, consulté le 12 juillet 2018. URL : http:// journals.openedition.org/siecles/2970.
15. Archives nationales de Yaoundé (ANY), 1AC1752/6. Immigrations Mousgoum, rapport du chef de la région du Diamaré, Maroua, 15 septembre 1953.
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17. Nous avons publié un article sur la résolution des conflits liés à l'eau.

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La RSE stratégique dans le secteur minier au Sénégal : incubateur d'inclusion de genre et de développement communautaire ?

Bakary Doucouré*

Résumé

La responsabilité sociale/sociétale de l'entreprise (RSE) dite stratégique est une démarche de plus en plus plébiscitée à travers certains réseaux socioprofessionnels au Sénégal, y compris dans le secteur minier et extractif. Cet article pose la question de savoir si ce type de RSE favorise, notamment au niveau local/communautaire, l'inclusion de genre, d'une part, et, d'autre part, le développement. L'analyse, basée sur des cas empiriques, montre une contribution mitigée des initiatives de RSE stratégique à l'accomplissement de l'égalité/équité de genre et du développement au niveau communautaire. Parmi les principales causes de ce constat, se trouvent : les limites dans le dialogue et le processus de concertation/inclusion, la durée limitée de la plupart des initiatives et leur capacité à produire des effets et impacts durables, les préjugés et les stéréotypes dans la répartition des rôles sociaux des sexes et de genre, etc.

Mots-clés : RSE (stratégique), secteur minier/extractif, inclusion de genre, égalité/équité de genre, développement local/communautaire, développement durable, Sénégal

Abstract

So-called strategic corporate social/societal responsibility (CSR) is an increasingly popular approach in some socio-professional networks in Senegal, including in the mining and extractive sector. This article raises the question of whether this type of CSR promotes, particularly at the local/community level, gender inclusion on the one hand and development on the other. The

* Enseignant-chercheur, Section de Sociologie, UFR Lettres & Sciences Humaines. Université Gaston Berger de Saint-Louis, Sénégal.
Email : doucourebakary@yahoo.fr; bakary.doucoure@ugb.edu.sn

analysis, based on empirical cases, shows a mixed contribution of strategic CSR initiatives to the achievement of gender equality/equity and development at the community level. Among the main causes of this observation, there are the limits in the dialogue and consultation/inclusion process, the limited duration of most initiatives and of their capacity to produce lasting effects and impacts, prejudices and stereotypes in the distribution of sex and gender roles, etc.

Keywords: CSR (strategic), mining/extractive sector, gender inclusion, gender equality/equity, local/community development, sustainable development, Senegal

Concept à géométrie variable (Vincent 2012; Gond & Igalens 2008; Evans 2007), la responsabilité sociale ou sociétale de l'entreprise (RSE) est désormais une notion qui s'est largement vulgarisée dans le secteur minier (Reeve 2017; Campbell & Laforce 2016; Lado *et al.* 2011). Elle manifeste les évolutions dans la gouvernance des entreprises ou des organisations tant privées que publiques. Elle regroupe l'ensemble des pratiques mises en œuvre par les entreprises et allant au-delà de leurs obligations légales (Gamu *et al*. 2015; Dashwood 2012) dans le but de respecter les principes du développement durable. En tant que démarche et pratiques, la RSE relève de la gouvernance d'entreprise et y participe simultanément, comme l'illustrent les cas relevés dans le secteur minier extractif au Sénégal.

Le secteur minier sénégalais comprend une diversité d'entreprises pour lesquelles la RSE apparaît comme un facteur jouant pour l'obtention de l'autorisation (ou licence) sociale d'opérer (*social license to operate*), notamment dans un contexte de quête de légitimation (Diallo 2017:188) ou de légitimité (Campbell & Laforce 2016), et de pressions multiples subies par celles-ci (Minzberg 2004:105; Diallo 2017). Elle est aussi un engagement pris par l'entreprise pour générer des effets sociaux, économiques et environnementaux visant à compenser les externalités négatives induites par celles-ci (Carroll 1999). Elle englobe en tant que concept de nombreuses dimensions de la performance des entreprises, notamment économique, légale, éthique et philanthropique/discrétionnaire (Carroll 1999, 1991). Elle reflète la prise en compte par l'entreprise de l'impact de ses décisions et de ses actions sur l'environnement et la société (Mintzberg 2004), se traduisant par l'adoption de comportements responsables ; ainsi parle-t-on de plus en plus de « conduite responsable des affaires ». Ce qui fait de la RSE un moyen volontaire de compensation de ces externalités négatives, au-delà des formes de compensations et des obligations imposées par la législation (Gamu et al. 2015 ; Dashwwood 2012). La RSE traduit donc une relation entre une entreprise et les autres organisations (ou acteurs sociaux).

Au Sénégal, outre la généralisation progressive de la RSE dans le secteur formel, les discours[1] relatifs à celle-ci font état de l'existence de plusieurs types de RSE, en l'occurrence : « RSE locale » ou « RSE communautaire », « autre RSE »/« vraie RSE », « RSE stratégique », « RSE internationale ». Le présent article est axé principalement sur la RSE dite stratégique. Moins un aboutissement ou une finalité, la RSE stratégique est présentée comme un travail continu (*work in progress*) prenant en compte aussi bien les Objectifs de développement durable (ODD) et d'autres normes et standards internationaux (OCDE[2], GRI[3], Compact Global[4], SFI[5], BIT[6], ISO 26 000, etc.). Elle est ainsi à la fois une méthode de management, un outil d'influence et de dialogue, un outil de prévention des risques et des conflits. Dans le cadre de la RSE dite stratégique, les actions réalisées au profit des communautés minières ne sont pas en amont de la stratégie de RSE, mais sont censées découler d'un processus de dialogue et de consultation. La dimension stratégique de la RSE émane des risques et des coûts pouvant, pour les entreprises minières, être entraînés par la négligence de leurs responsabilités ou le refus de les assumer, tout comme elle émane de la capacité de celle-ci à renforcer l'image positive des entreprises auprès des parties prenantes en augmentant par exemple leur attraction, en favorisant le maintien des salariés et en entretenant la paix/la stabilité entre les parties prenantes. D'un point de vue théorique et conceptuel, elle est assujettie à des principes (comme la bonne gouvernance), aux objectifs de développement durable (dont l'objectif 5 correspondant à la réalisation de l'égalité des sexes et l'autonomisation de toutes les femmes et les filles) et à des normes (comme ISO 26 000) ; et le dialogue entre les parties prenantes (Cazal 2011) en constitue à la fois une modalité conceptuelle et une condition pratique *sine qua non*. Dans le cas du Sénégal, l'actualité et la pertinence de la question genre et du développement local en matière de RSE se justifient par ailleurs par l'existence de disparités de genre et de développement entre les groupes sociaux ou encore entre les localités.

Partant des constats ci-dessus, cet article s'articule autour de la question suivante : la RSE stratégique constitue-t-elle une innovation en matière de gouvernance d'entreprise favorisant l'inclusion de genre, et au demeurant le développement communautaire (ou local) ? De manière subsidiaire, l'article rend compte des instruments de gouvernance de la RSE stratégique, des acteurs (ou parties prenantes) et des mécanismes de dialogue dans le processus d'élaboration et de mise en œuvre des politiques de RSE (stratégique) des entreprises minières concernées. De ce fait, nous soutenons que pour contribuer au développement communautaire, la RSE stratégique doit d'abord être un incubateur d'inclusion de genre. Nous formulons que les entreprises minières au Sénégal visent en général, à travers leurs politiques

de RSE, à contribuer à l'inclusion de genre et au développement local ou communautaire. Des auteurs ont déjà essayé d'analyser les liens entre la RSE dans le secteur minier et le développement en Afrique (Randriamaro 2018; Campbell & Laforce 2016; Goyette-Côté 2016; Keita 2016; Darimani 2016). Pour ce qui est des théories du genre et du développement (Anderson 2003; Moser 1990; Molyneux 1985; Boserup 1970), elles se sont évertuées à montrer la place capitale et les rôles prépondérants des femmes dans toute stratégie de développement. Il émerge de cela qu'il existe des rôles de genres et que les femmes ont des rôles spécifiques/différents qui engendrent à la fois des besoins pratiques situés dans l'immédiat (ou le court terme) et des intérêts stratégiques situés dans le long terme (Anderson 2003). Ici, l'analyse est centrée sur les catégories de genre suivantes : les filles et les femmes, les garçons, les actifs précaires (jeunes et adultes) appartenant à certains groupes socioprofessionnels ou secteurs socioéconomiques, comme l'agriculture.

La première section de cet article est consacrée à la présentation de quelques arguments et théories en lien avec la RSE, le genre et le développement, ainsi qu'à la méthodologie de collecte des données empiriques. La seconde section présente les résultats. Enfin, l'analyse des résultats et la discussion sont engagées dans la troisième section.

Théories et méthodes

RSE, genre et développement : quelques pistes pour comprendre

Plusieurs théories et arguments voués à l'explication des pratiques des industries extractives et minières, y compris celles de RSE, peuvent être mentionnés comme : les théories ou les arguments *stabilistes*, voire *marketistes* faisant à la fois appel aux notions de paix, de stabilité (Téné 2012), de marketing (Bikanda 2012), de contrat social (Rosé 2006; Cazal 2011), mais aussi d'hypocrisie ; les théories relevant de l'extractivisme, du néo-extractivisme et du post-extractivisme (Acosta 2014; Bos & Laverd-Meyer 2015; Grieco & Kyra 2016; Randriamaro 2018) ; l'argument de la « *beneficiation*[7] » (Baxter 2005; Mutemeri & Peterson 2002; Cawood & Oshokoya 2013; Gamu *et al*. 2015) ; l'argument de la RSE comme la traduction d'un « capitalisme socialement responsable », etc. À cela s'ajoutent les multiples catégorisations des stratégies de RSE (Fouda 2014; Manwa & Manwa 2007; Carroll 1991).

Campbell et Laforce (2016:239) affirment que la question de la légitimité apparaît en raison d'un vide dans le processus de « légitimation partielle ». Or cette légitimation partielle est liée au fait que les stratégies de RSE privilégient la résolution des problèmes des investisseurs et occultent certains problèmes comme le développement socioéconomique des pays

concernés et la perpétuation des rapports de pouvoir asymétriques entre les parties prenantes. Dès lors, ils suggèrent, à l'instar de Harvey (2014), que pour l'obtention de leur acceptabilité sociale (ou licence sociale), les entreprises minières doivent se concentrer sur leurs stratégies d'affaires et non sur des stratégies de développement social dont la responsabilité incombe en priorité aux pouvoirs publics, en concertation avec les autres acteurs (collectivités locales, populations, compagnies minières, etc.).

Au cœur des arguments *stabilistes* et/ou *marketistes,* se trouve l'idée que la RSE est à la fois un moyen d'obtention de la paix et de la stabilité auprès des communautés minières, soit « un écosystème local durable[8] », et un outil de marketing au service de l'image de ces entreprises. Pour certains, la RSE suggère un nouveau contrat social (Rosé 2006) conduisant à des partenariats entre plusieurs acteurs, bien que celui-ci ne soit pas dépourvu *d'impasse* (Cazal 2011). En revanche, d'autres voient la RSE comme une hypocrisie ou une duperie des entreprises visant à abuser le public, en ce sens que la vocation première de celles-ci est de préserver leurs intérêts propres.

Les discours sur l'extractivisme et ses dérivés contemporains (néo-extractivisme, post-extractivisme) suggèrent que pour sortir du sous-développement endémique causé par l'abondance des ressources naturelles et l'extractivisme primaire dans certains pays, il faut : une « bonne gouvernance » dans la gestion de ces ressources, une inclusion renforcée notamment par la participation accrue de la société civile au contrôle des opérations minières, une transparence financière, une expansion de l'investissement social dans les zones d'extraction. Partant de ce constat, les initiatives de RSE peuvent être considérées comme des contreparties très minimalistes au regard des profits et des bénéfices engrangés par les entreprises minières. Ce qui implique au demeurant les questions de profitabilité et de justice économique liées aux activités extractives. Randriamaro (2018), pour sa part, affirme que les femmes et les filles subissent plus que les hommes et les garçons les impacts négatifs des industries extractives « sans en tirer de réels bénéfices ».

L'idée de « capitalisme socialement responsable » renvoie pour l'entreprise à concilier la maximisation de son profit sur le long terme et la réponse aux problèmes de la société par la satisfaction des besoins des populations locales. Elle se traduit par exemple par le soutien de l'entreprise à l'emploi de certains groupes (jeunes, femmes, groupes défavorisés/vulnérables, populations pauvres, etc.), mais surtout par l'intégration des initiatives de RSE dans la stratégie globale de l'entreprise.

Partant des données de terrain et au regard des arguments et théories ci-dessus, nous formulons que l'objectif de l'autonomisation socioéconomique des groupes cibles et des communautés impactées, mais aussi celui de

contribuer au développement local (ou communautaire) à travers la RSE conduisent de plus en plus les entreprises à s'appuyer sur les contextes socio-économiques locaux et nationaux en matière d'inclusion de genre et de développement afin d'élaborer leurs politiques de RSE.

Toutefois, les actions visant les groupes spécifiques et les plus vulnérables ne sont pas suffisamment inspirées des politiques structurelles, tant en matière de promotion de l'égalité de genre qu'en matière de développement communautaire ; elles sont peu aptes à se poursuivre après la fin des projets miniers. Cela résulte en partie des limites du dialogue et de la consultation entre les parties prenantes. Il y a également des limites dans l'implication des pouvoirs publics et des destinataires, notamment dans un contexte d'extraction minière où les relations de pouvoir sont le plus souvent marquées par une asymétrie et des déséquilibres criants.

Méthodes

Les données proviennent d'une enquête de terrain réalisée entre août 2019 et février 2020 auprès de quatre compagnies minières et de leurs parties prenantes. Afin de diversifier l'échantillon, les entreprises concernées ont été choisies en tenant compte prioritairement de la zone d'implantation (site opérationnel) et du type de ressource exploitée. Il s'agit de : Sabodala Gold Operations (SGO), Petowal Mining Company (PMC SA), SOCOCIM Industries et Dangote Cement Sénégal (DCS). Leurs sites opérationnels se situent respectivement à : Sabodala (Département de Saraya/Région de Kédougou) pour SGO, Mako (Département de Kédougou/Région de Kédougou) pour PMC SA, Rufisque (département de Rufisque/région de Dakar) pour SOCOCIM Industries et Pout (Département Thiès/Région de Thiès) pour DCS. En outre, l'enquête a ciblé les différentes catégories de parties prenantes à différents niveaux : national, intermédiaire et local. En l'absence d'une base de sondage pour les entreprises et les parties prenantes, nous avons opté pour la constitution d'un échantillon « boule de neige » en le combinant avec un échantillon raisonné afin d'assurer la représentation de toutes les catégories d'acteurs. La stratégie d'enquête a été ainsi construite en s'appuyant à la fois sur des personnes-ressources et des personnes déjà enquêtées pour identifier de nouveaux enquêtés répondant aux principaux critères de constitution de l'échantillon, à savoir :

(i) l'appartenance à l'une des catégories de parties prenantes,
(ii) la présence de filles et de garçons, de femmes et d'hommes, d'actifs (jeunes et adultes) de certains secteurs socioprofessionnels et économiques,
(iii) la connaissance de la stratégie RSE de l'entreprise concernée ou le fait d'être bénéficiaire des actions de RSE.

Les données présentées sont essentiellement qualitatives et résultent d'une triangulation des informations issues de sources différentes (primaires et secondaires) et de parties prenantes multiples. D'une part, il y a les données issues des entretiens individuels (semi-directifs et directifs) et des entretiens collectifs, des observations dans certains sites d'enquêtes, des ateliers de restitution et de partage de rapports de RSE ou de durabilité, mais aussi des forums. D'autre part, il y a les documents fournis par les enquêtés, les rapports officiels et autres informations publiées sur les sites officiels des entreprises minières, des organismes et des institutions concernés. L'analyse de contenu a été privilégiée pour l'exploitation de l'ensemble des données.

La collecte des données s'est opérée à plusieurs niveaux : central (national ou siège), intermédiaire (déconcentré ou décentralisé) et communautaire (local ou infra-local) ; et les outils de collecte (guides d'entretien et d'observation) ont été élaborés en fonction des cinq catégories de parties prenantes ciblées. Premièrement, au sein des communautés d'accueil, plusieurs types d'acteurs ont été rencontrés, dont : des représentants des groupes et associations de jeunes, de femmes et d'habitants, des représentants de groupes socioprofessionnels (paysans/cultivateurs, orpailleurs, etc.), des gérants d'infrastructures communautaires (forages, etc.), des autorités traditionnelles (chefs de village, notables), des autorités religieuses et coutumières (imams). Deuxièmement, pour les entreprises minières, les enquêtes se sont déroulées principalement à deux niveaux : celui du siège (avec le personnel de direction notamment[9]) et dans les zones d'opérations ou d'implantation (avec des employés et des responsables techniques de certains départements[10]). Troisièmement, au sein des collectivités territoriales et des institutions décentralisées, les acteurs suivants ont été rencontrés : les élus locaux[11], les membres de commissions techniques[12]. Quatrièmement, pour les pouvoirs publics et les services techniques de l'État, la collecte s'est déroulée à trois niveaux : central, intermédiaire et communautaire. Au niveau central, les entretiens et les rencontres ont eu lieu avec des hauts fonctionnaires[13] du ministère des Mines et de la Géologie et des directions relevant de celui-ci, mais aussi des administrateurs d'organismes publics comme le Comité national ITIE Sénégal[14].

Au niveau intermédiaire (notamment régional ou départemental), des entretiens ont été réalisés avec des autorités administratives[15], des chefs de service de l'administration déconcentrée[16], tandis qu'au niveau communal et communautaire, des fonctionnaires et des agents de l'État ont aussi été interviewés dans différents secteurs, dont : la santé (infirmiers-chefs de poste), l'éducation (enseignants, chefs d'établissements). Enfin, et plus particulièrement dans la région de Kédougou, des opérateurs économiques agissant à titre de fournisseurs/prestataires de services ou de sous-traitants ont été également interviewés.

Résultats : microscopie de la RSE stratégique au Sénégal

La « RSE stratégique » en quelques points

L'impulsion de cette conception de la RSE s'est faite en partie à travers des réseaux professionnels, des structures de conseil et d'appui aux entreprises, dont le réseau Initiative RSE Sénégal et le cabinet CFPMI[17]. Considérée d'abord comme une méthodologie, ses promoteurs la réfèrent à plusieurs standards élaborés par divers organismes (OCDE, GRI, Pacte mondial, SFI, BIT, ISO 26000, etc.). En outre, la contribution des entreprises à la réalisation des Objectifs de développement durable (ODD) occupe une place importante dans la RSE dite stratégique qui est aussi assimilée à une démarche holistique, en ce sens qu'elle nécessite l'implication de toutes les parties prenantes[18]. Ce qui fait dire à l'un de ses promoteurs que :

> « La RSE stratégique permet notamment d'expliquer les finalités et les enjeux de la RSE, d'assurer le dialogue entre les parties prenantes tout en exposant à chacune d'elles les limites de l'entreprise[19] ».

Le dialogue est considéré comme une condition *sine qua non* de la RSE dite stratégique, notamment à travers la capacité de chaque partie prenante d'influencer celui-ci. L'instauration du dialogue entre les parties prenantes nécessite une interconnaissance mutuelle permettant une identification des enjeux pour chacune d'elles. Ainsi, l'établissement du dialogue donne lieu à la définition de la matérialité des enjeux à travers l'analyse de la matérialité[20] qui, en retour, favorise le dialogue. La matérialité, dans le cadre du *reporting* du développement durable, est le principe qui détermine les enjeux (pertinents) jugés suffisamment importants pour qu'ils soient couverts dans le rapport de RSE ou de durabilité de l'entreprise.

Outre le dialogue, la RSE stratégique se construit à partir des principes comme la transparence, la redevabilité, le respect des intérêts des parties prenantes et des droits humains, la légalité ou le respect de la législation en vigueur, le respect des normes internationales de comportements, mais aussi le devoir de vigilance. Dans une démarche de RSE stratégique, ces différents principes constituent un tout. Ainsi, la transparence et la redevabilité s'apprécient respectivement en analysant les pratiques de chaque entreprise en matière de RSE et en définissant des indicateurs. Quant à la légalité, elle renvoie à la conformité avec la législation tant au niveau national qu'international. Enfin, le devoir de vigilance exprime la nécessité, voire l'obligation pour l'entreprise de veiller à sa responsabilité propre, mais aussi à celle des entreprises partenaires ou sous-traitantes dans de nombreux domaines comme le respect de la législation en vigueur et des droits humains.

La démarche de RSE stratégique est soumise à plusieurs impératifs sur le plan opérationnel parmi lesquels :

(i) la mise en place d'un comité RSE,
(ii) la révision complète des *process* au sein de l'entreprise,
(iii) l'identification des impacts sociétaux,
(iv) l'identification de l'ensemble des parties prenantes et des enjeux spécifiques pour chacune d'elles, et, enfin,
(v) l'élaboration d'une stratégie de RSE partagée par l'ensemble des parties prenantes.

Des entreprises minières en mode « RSE stratégique »

La traduction du modèle de RSE stratégique dans le secteur minier au Sénégal peut être observée à travers des entreprises minières comme SGO, PMC SA et SOCOCIM Industries qui sont toutes les trois membres du réseau Initiative RSE Sénégal. SGO et PMC SA sont deux entreprises aurifères, tandis que l'activité principale de SOCOCIM Industries relève de la cimenterie. DANGOTE Cement Sénégal (DCS), quant à elle, opère également dans le secteur de la cimenterie à l'instar de SOCOCIM Industries, mais elle n'est pas membre du réseau Initiative RSE Sénégal. Néanmoins, on relève plusieurs similarités entre la démarche RSE de DCS et les trois autres entreprises.

SGO, PMC SA, SOCOCIM et DCS : de quelques éléments d'identité et de convergence

SGO est une filiale de la société aurifère canadienne Teranga Gold Corporation. Actuellement, sa principale mine en cours d'exploitation au Sénégal se situe à Sabodala[21], dans le département de Saraya et la région de Kédougou (sud-est du Sénégal). Son effectif est estimé à 1 310 salariés[22] en 2018, dont 92 pour cent d'hommes et 8 pour cent de femmes.

PMC SA est une filiale du groupe minier australien RESOLUTE MINING Ltd[23]. Sa mine en cours d'exploitation au Sénégal est située à Mako dans la commune rurale de Tomboronkoto (région de Kédougou). En 2018, soit la première année d'exploitation de la mine aurifère, l'effectif total à la mine de Mako est de 953 travailleurs, dont 832 hommes et 121 femmes[24].

Créée en 1948, SOCOCIM Industries a été nationalisée en 1978, avant de devenir en 1999 la propriété du groupe français VICAT. Implantée principalement dans les régions de Dakar et de Thiès au Sénégal (en l'occurrence à Rufisque, Bargny, Pout et Ngoundiane), son effectif actuel est estimé à 300 salariés environ en 2019.

Dangote Cement Sénégal (DCS) est une filiale du groupe nigérian Dangote Cement. Elle a démarré sa production au Sénégal en décembre 2014. L'activité de DCS impacte principalement quatre communes situées dans la région de Thiès : Keur Moussa, Pout, Diass et Mont-Rolland. En 2018, le nombre d'employés permanents de DCS est estimé à 254 salariés, dont 34 femmes et 220 hommes.

SGO, PMC SA et SOCOCIM Industries sont toutes les trois membres du réseau « Initiative RSE Sénégal », contrairement à DCS. Toutefois, la gouvernance[25] de la RSE dans ces quatre entreprises présente plusieurs points de ressemblance. Il y a notamment :

(i) l'exercice de l'analyse de matérialité et l'instauration du dialogue avec les parties prenantes,

(ii) l'élaboration d'un rapport annuel de RSE ou de durabilité conformément à certains indicateurs,

(iii) la volonté de contribuer à la réalisation des ODD à travers certaines actions et des projets spécifiques,

(iv) mais aussi la signature, en l'occurrence par SGO, PMC SA et SOCOCIM Industries, de chartes élaborées par le réseau Initiative RSE Sénégal et le cabinet CFPMI comme la charte « RSE et développement durable des entreprises du Sénégal » ou encore la charte « Diversité ».

De quelques spécificités en matière de gouvernance de la RSE

Chacune des quatre entreprises présente des spécificités tant dans sa gouvernance globale d'entreprise que celle de sa stratégie de RSE.

Pour SGO, ses quatre piliers en matière de RSE sont :

(i) la bonne gouvernance qui comprend la transparence, le dialogue ouvert et la collaboration avec toutes les parties prenantes,

(ii) la promotion et le développement des employés dans un environnement sécuritaire,

(iii) l'atténuation des impacts des activités minières sur les populations et l'environnement à travers une gestion active,

(iv) le partage des bénéfices à travers la création d'opportunités de développement socioéconomique à long terme.

Elle a élaboré un document de stratégie de développement territorial. Depuis 2015, SGO est aussi partenaire du Pacte mondial de l'ONU (UN Global Compact). Et depuis l'adhésion du Sénégal à l'Initiative pour la Transparence des industries extractives (ITIE) en 2013, SGO publie chaque année un rapport relatif à ses paiements au gouvernement du Sénégal. Il y

a au cœur de sa stratégie de RSE deux processus essentiels : l'un consiste en la tenue de consultations régulières avec les différentes parties prenantes au niveau régional[26] et l'autre consiste en l'organisation d'un atelier national de restitution du rapport annuel de responsabilité. De manière spécifique, le dialogue s'opère à travers des mécanismes particuliers selon les catégories de parties prenantes : des réunions régulières sont tenues avec les communautés impactées dans le cadre du « Forum de négociations », tandis que le dialogue avec les fournisseurs/prestataires locaux se fait dans le cadre de la « Plateforme des fournisseurs locaux des entreprises minières de Kédougou (Plafomine) » mise en place par ces derniers, etc. Pour 2018, les actions en matière de RSE concernent en priorité : la santé, l'éducation, la jeunesse, l'amélioration des conditions socioéconomiques des communautés et des groupes, l'environnement. Les différentes actions sont soutenues et financées à travers deux fonds : le fonds social de Sabodala et le fonds de Gora.

PMC SA, pour sa part, a créé un fonds d'investissement social et environnemental (dénommé FISE) destiné en priorité à appuyer le développement économique et social des collectivités territoriales impactées dans la zone d'intervention du projet minier. Les actions et microprojets relevant du FISE couvrent, au niveau local et communautaire, les secteurs d'intervention suivants :

(i) la santé,
(ii) l'éducation,
(iii) l'hydraulique rurale,
(iv) la jeunesse et le sport,
(v) les infrastructures,
(vi) la lutte contre la pauvreté,
(vii) l'urbanisme,
(viii) l'électrification, et
(ix) la planification.

Les modes et les mécanismes d'interactions de PMC avec les parties prenantes varient selon chaque groupe. Par exemple, les interactions de PMC avec les communautés locales s'opèrent par le biais de plusieurs mécanismes et de structures consultatives locales (permanentes ou ponctuelles) comprenant des représentants élus. Il s'agit, en l'occurrence, du comité consultatif local[27], du groupe de travail technique pour l'emploi[28], du comité de vigilance[29]. En outre, il existe des réunions de coordination spécifiques au projet minier, des assemblées villageoises trimestrielles, un mécanisme de gestion des griefs[30], des panneaux d'affichage communautaire et une enquête de veille socioéconomique.

Concernant SOCOCIM Industries, c'est en partie à travers sa fondation qu'elle réalise ses actions de RSE. Créée en 2010, la fondation SOCOCIM Industries constitue d'une certaine manière le bras technique de l'entreprise en matière de RSE. Sa principale vocation est de financer des projets destinés aux femmes et aux jeunes, et d'aider les populations à sortir de la pauvreté. Ainsi, pour son administratrice,

> « Le rôle de la Fondation ne consiste pas à faire de l'assistanat. Elle donne la chance à des personnes désireuses de réaliser leurs projets et d'être autonomes[31] ».

Les actions et projets financés entre 2013 et 2017 par SOCOCIM Industries dans le cadre de sa responsabilité sociétale, concernent les cinq secteurs suivants :

(i) la promotion socio-économique,
(ii) l'éducation et le sport,
(iii) l'environnement et le patrimoine,
(iv) les arts et la culture,
(v) la citoyenneté et la solidarité.

Quant à DCS, sa gouvernance met en avant, d'une part, la promotion de la diversité, du leadership et de l'entrepreneuriat dans l'entreprise et les communautés concernées, et, d'autre part, la recherche de la durabilité et de l'inclusion. Il s'agit par conséquent d'avoir un impact bénéfique sur la société à travers sa gouvernance d'entreprise en général et sa politique de RSE en particulier. DCS a structuré sa politique de RSE autour de six volets que sont :

(i) le volet social,
(ii) l'habitat social et l'environnement,
(iii) la jeunesse et l'éducation,
(iv) le sport et la santé,
(v) la collaboration avec l'amicale des femmes de l'entreprise,
(vi) la mise en place d'une plateforme de concertation RSE.

Dans le but d'améliorer sa gouvernance en matière de RSE, notamment en favorisant l'implication et la participation de l'ensemble des parties prenantes au processus, DCS a également mis en place une plateforme de concertation RSE au niveau local et institué un programme de visites et d'échanges récurrents avec les populations (dont les chefs de village). La plateforme de concertation est composée de représentants : de l'administration locale

(en l'occurrence la sous-préfecture de Keur Moussa), des collectivités territoriales (conseil départemental[32] et conseils communaux[33]) et du staff de DCS[34]. Les rencontres au sein de cette plateforme se font régulièrement, suivant une périodicité allant de 2 à 3 mois, ou sur la demande d'une des parties prenantes en cas d'urgence. Outre sa vocation qui consiste à favoriser la communication entre les parties prenantes, la plateforme locale de concertation RSE participe également à la sélection de projets de financement soumis par les conseils communaux des localités impactées.

De quelques actions et initiatives de RSE en lien avec la promotion du genre et le développement

Les actions mises en œuvre dans le cadre de la RSE par ces quatre entreprises sont conçues comme des réponses à des problématiques locales, tout en demeurant en adéquation avec des objectifs et des politiques de développement tant au niveau national que global. La synthèse des actions et initiatives mises en œuvre par ces quatre entreprises permet d'identifier plusieurs axes d'intervention en lien avec la prise en compte du genre dans leurs stratégies et le développement au niveau local/communautaire.

- L'encouragement à l'entrepreneuriat féminin au niveau local : l'exemple des soutiens de la Fondation SOCOCIM à des groupements féminins de Rufisque pour l'extension de leurs activités de transformation céréalière ; le financement par DCS de la formation des femmes à la transformation des produits locaux et l'appui à la commercialisation des produits transformés.
- Le soutien aux activités productives et la promotion socioéconomique en général : c'est le cas des actions d'appui aux producteurs de semences de maïs du Saloum par la SOCOCIM.
- Le renforcement du capital humain et des compétences professionnelles au niveau local/communautaire et national, à l'instar des soutiens de la SOCOCIM pour le renforcement du leadership féminin et des organisations féminines, des appuis divers aux élèves et aux étudiants en bourses d'études et en logement aussi bien par PMC SA, SGO, SOCOCIM et DCS, du financement par DCS de la formation des étudiants à certains métiers.
- La rénovation et la construction d'infrastructures publiques, communautaires et administratives dans plusieurs secteurs comme l'éducation (SGO, PMC SA, DCS et SOCOCIM), la santé (SGO, PMC, DCS), la construction d'un pont à Keur Moussa et la réhabilitation de la route de Ngomène par DCS, etc.
- Les programmes de réinstallation des populations déplacées à l'instar de ceux mis en œuvre par SGO à Niakafiri (région de Kédougou), par DCS à Galane (région de Thiès).

Bien que les parties prenantes des différentes sociétés minières apprécient positivement les actions et investissements réalisés dans le cadre des politiques de RSE, elles expriment également de nombreuses insatisfactions, voire des divergences vis-à-vis de certaines actions publiques. Ces insatisfactions et ces divergences portant en partie sur les montants alloués à certains projets ou actions s'expliquent par plusieurs raisons. Outre le manque de pertinence et d'efficacité de certaines actions de RSE, des parties prenantes (leaders communautaires, agents des services techniques déconcentrés de l'État, etc.) et certaines catégories de genre (femmes, jeunes) déplorent également leur faible implication dans les processus de prise de décision menant à l'élaboration et la sélection des projets et des actions en matière de RSE, à la détermination du montant des financements alloués, voire à l'identification des cibles prioritaires. En effet, en matière de RSE, compte tenu de la nature volontaire des actions, la détermination des actions, des projets, des investissements et des montants relève souvent des prérogatives et de la volonté des entreprises minières. Les destinataires et les bénéficiaires des actions en matière de RSE, en l'occurrence les communautés minières, apparaissent à ce titre davantage comme de simples réceptacles sans un réel pouvoir délibératif.

Analyse et discussion

Au Sénégal aussi, à l'instar d'autres pays en Afrique et dans le reste du monde, deux logiques s'opposent souvent dans le cadre de l'exploitation minière : la légitimité clamée par les communautés et la légalité brandie par les sociétés minières. Dans le premier cas, les populations mettent en avant leur légitimité à bénéficier pleinement des retombées de l'exploitation minière pour de multiples raisons (Téné 2012) : la primauté de leur présence dans les zones d'exploitation, mais aussi la confiscation, l'expropriation et même la destruction de leurs patrimoines (fonciers, culturels, écologiques, naturels, etc.) par l'État à travers l'octroi de permis miniers et par les compagnies minières. Les actions, réalisations et autres investissements sociaux des entreprises minières sont considérés par les communautés impactées comme étant à la fois un dû, des contreparties et des compensations nécessaires, voire obligatoires. Dans le second cas, les sociétés minières mettent en avant la légalité de leur présence, autorisée par les pouvoirs publics (État, gouvernement, autorités locales, etc.) à travers l'attribution de permis miniers et l'établissement de conventions minières. Cette présence légale est souvent obtenue à la suite de procédures administratives multiples (comme l'obtention d'un permis environnemental), d'une période d'attente plus ou moins longue au cours des différentes phases (recherche, exploration et

exploitation), de contributions financières et d'investissements (matériels, etc.) jugés conséquents par elles. Dans ce contexte, les initiatives et les actions développées par les entreprises au profit des différentes catégories de parties prenantes et de genre demeurent des compromis et des engagements volontaires contribuant à la pacification des relations et des interactions, ainsi qu'à l'atténuation des conflits. Il en découle que les arguments stabilistes et marketistes tantôt présentés trouvent ici une résonnance, et même une justification empirique. Néanmoins, les différentes et nombreuses initiatives des compagnies minières en matière de RSE ne suffisent pas à satisfaire définitivement les préoccupations d'égalité/équité de genre et celles liées au développement qui interpellent la plupart des acteurs (communautés, élus, gouvernants, société civile, ONG, etc.). Ces limites sont en partie liées à la gouvernance de la RSE dans les entreprises concernées et dont les principaux piliers doivent être : le dialogue, la transparence, la redevabilité, la durabilité et l'égalité/équité de genre.

Pour ce qui est de la RSE stratégique, elle apparaît comme une manière de mettre localement en pratique et de rendre opérationnelle la version internationale de la RSE, ce qui tend par ailleurs à ce que Persais (2010) qualifie, en parlant de la gestion de la RSE dans un contexte international, de « glocalisation des pratiques ». En effet, on relève que même si les approches des entreprises minières se réfèrent à un cadre conceptuel et normatif similaire (parfois même identique), leurs pratiques en termes d'actions et de mise en œuvre de la RSE, sont quant à elles, différenciées en raison notamment des contextes locaux (Fouda 2014), des ressources et des moyens de chaque entreprise, de ses priorités, de ses valeurs, etc. L'exemple de SGO, PMC et SOCOCIM montre quelques-unes de leurs différences en matière de RSE, bien que leur approche de RSE soit qualifiée de stratégique. En y ajoutant DCS, qui n'est pas membre du Réseau RSE Sénégal, on constate néanmoins que les quatre entreprises partagent des méthodologies voisines en matière d'élaboration de leur politique/stratégie de RSE. Ce qui conduit à considérer que la RSE dite stratégique correspond d'abord à un référentiel ou à un réservoir de principes et de méthodologies et à un cadre normatif varié à partir duquel chaque entreprise élabore sa politique de RSE en fonction de ses priorités, des attentes des parties prenantes, mais aussi des ressources disponibles. On constate cependant que les piliers forts de la RSE stratégique (le dialogue, l'articulation avec des normes et des politiques à différentes échelles, l'intégration de la durabilité et la prise en compte du genre) ne sont pas rendus opératoires de manière identique par les différentes entreprises.

Le dialogue : un pas nécessaire encore insuffisant pour atteindre l'inclusion de genre et le développement communautaire

Dans l'approche GED (Genre et Développement), le développement n'est pas un processus linéaire, mais plutôt un processus dynamique avec des potentialités de changement et visant à donner des chances égales aux hommes et aux femmes bénéficiaires des actions de développement. Cette approche considère les femmes ainsi que les groupes défavorisés et/ou vulnérables comme des agents de développement et non seulement comme des bénéficiaires du développement. Dans cette approche, les actions, les projets et les mesures adoptés peuvent être catégorisés selon cinq types : les projets *insensibles au genre*; les projets *neutres au genre*; les projets *sexo-spécifiques*; les *actions positives*; et les projets *sensibles au genre* qui incorporent l'analyse genre et visent à éliminer progressivement les inégalités. L'approche GED, pour être efficace, nécessite de combiner deux approches (*twintrack approach*) consistant : d'une part, à élaborer des projets spécifiques pour les femmes et les autres catégories socioprofessionnelles défavorisées et, d'autre part, à adopter une approche transversale. L'intégration du genre est assujettie à plusieurs processus comme :

(i) l'application de la législation en matière de genre,
(ii) l'existence d'une volonté politique forte et d'engagements opérationnels en matière d'égalité de genre,
(iii) l'élaboration de plans et de budgets sensibles au genre,
(iv) un changement institutionnel,
(v) la production de données sexospécifiques (vi) la réalisation d'analyses de genre, et,
(vii) l'accès à l'information.

Quant à *l'approche intégrée de l'égalité entre les sexes (prise en compte des genres)* ou *gender mainstreaming* (Daupin & Sénac-Slawinski 2008), elle vise l'atteinte de l'égalité (*de facto* et non seulement *de jure*) des genres (Morris 1999) ; elle nécessite une analyse de genre pour comprendre les possibilités et les obstacles à l'égalité de genre à tous les niveaux (micro, méso et macro), ainsi qu'une planification basée sur le genre.

Dans une démarche de RSE stratégique, le dialogue (entre les parties prenantes) demeure un moteur capital censé permettre à la fois la concertation, la participation et l'implication de toutes les parties prenantes. Il permet une identification pertinente des besoins (pratiques) et des intérêts (stratégiques) des acteurs, des actions et des investissements en faveur des cibles (Bikanda 2012), dans la perspective notamment de l'atteinte

des objectifs en matière de promotion de l'égalité/équité de genre et de développement au niveau local/communautaire en l'occurrence. Dans le cas de SGO, PMC SA, SOCOCIM SA et Dangoté Cement Sénégal, le dialogue est initié à travers plusieurs mécanismes : visites informelles, planification de rencontres régulières, mises en place de plateformes, consultations avec les élus et les gouvernements locaux/conseils municipaux, etc. Néanmoins, les mécanismes existants ne garantissent pas toujours, malgré le volontarisme des entreprises minières, une représentation fiable des communautés, des différents groupes sociaux (en l'occurrence les femmes et les jeunes). Ils ne garantissent pas non plus la bonne implication de certains services de l'État au niveau déconcentré pour une identification pertinente des besoins, un suivi efficace des projets et des réalisations en matière de RSE, etc.

Les instances de représentation politique (tels les gouvernements locaux et les assemblées locales) reflétant souvent les déséquilibres et les inégalités de pouvoir au sein de la société, les interlocuteurs demeurent parfois incompétents à exprimer efficacement les besoins et les intérêts des communautés et de certains groupes tels que les enfants (filles et garçons), les femmes ou encore les actifs précaires. Cette incompétence conduit donc à choisir et à suggérer des actions, des réalisations et des investissements de portée limitée, peu propices à contribuer durablement à l'inclusion de genre et au développement communautaire. Dans le cas de la RSE dite stratégique en particulier, la concertation entre les parties prenantes et l'implication des bénéficiaires des actions constituent même des conditions obligatoires, bien que soumises à des procédures et à des cadres de concertation pouvant être différents selon les entreprises. La légitimité et la validité de la concertation et de l'implication des parties prenantes sont assujetties à l'existence de procédures et cadres de concertation partagés et reconnus par les parties prenantes.

Concernant SGO, PMC SA, SOCOCIM Industries et Dangote Cement Sénégal, la question du genre, au sens large, apparaît comme une préoccupation commune à la quasi-totalité des parties prenantes. Toutefois, les initiatives de RSE stratégique, telles qu'elles se présentent dans ces quatre entreprises, oscillent davantage entre des initiatives à *caractère sexo-spécifique* et *des actions positives*. Celles-ci apparaissent moins comme des *initiatives* (des réalisations, des actions) *sensibles* au genre, c'est-à-dire des projets d'ordre général incorporant une analyse selon le genre et visant l'élimination progressive et durable des inégalités. La nature des initiatives, associée aux limites du dialogue évoquées précédemment et au fait qu'elles ne relèvent pas toujours des priorités définies à la base (groupes, communautés, plans locaux/communaux de développement) réduit leur sensibilité au genre, même quand elles sont sexo-spécifiques ou positives.

L'exemple de SGO, PMC SA, SOCOCIM Industries et Dangote Cement Sénégal montre que la quête de l'autonomisation économique des femmes ainsi que d'autres groupes socioprofessionnels fait souvent partie des objectifs mentionnés dans le cadre des initiatives d'action et de financement en matière de RSE stratégique. Cette quête de l'autonomisation économique des femmes et des groupes socioprofessionnels défavorisés à travers les initiatives de RSE s'élabore en partie par la mise en place d'activités génératrices de revenus, le renforcement des capacités et des compétences professionnelles, etc. Outre les avantages que procure la RSE aux bénéficiaires, l'objectif d'autonomisation socioéconomique apparaît pour les entreprises comme un moyen de contribuer au développement communautaire ou local.

Le dialogue comme facteur d'incitation à la transparence, la redevabilité et la durabilité

Le dialogue est à la fois un palier et un pilier importants dans toute démarche de RSE dite stratégique. Il incite à des concertations entre les parties prenantes, en favorisant la participation des différents groupes d'acteurs au processus décisionnel. Un dialogue inclusif et équilibré entre les parties prenantes joue comme un facteur incitant à la transparence dans les procédures et les décisions adoptées, à la redevabilité des acteurs (ou des parties prenantes) et à la durabilité des actions entreprises. Néanmoins, le problème du dialogue demeure le caractère asymétrique des relations de pouvoir existant entre les parties prenantes (Campbell & Laforce 2016:239). Or, pour Prieto-Carron *et al.* (2006), le pouvoir et la participation représentent deux éléments-clés du débat en matière de RSE et de développement. Ils voient la RSE comme « une arène de contestation politique » dans le sens macro (relations entre marché et État, et entre différents acteurs et groupes sociaux), mais aussi en relation avec la participation à la prise de décision.

La transparence dans les procédures et les décisions permet d'établir objectivement les initiatives faites en faveur des enfants (filles et garçons), des femmes et des actifs précaires. L'enjeu de la transparence dans le cadre du dialogue des parties prenantes consiste à orienter et à cibler de manière pertinente les initiatives en matière de RSE, à partir de la prise en compte des besoins sexo-spécifiques et des intérêts stratégiques de chaque partie prenante. Pour PMC SA par exemple, les initiatives et les actions financées dans le cadre de la RSE découlent en priorité d'un processus de dialogue avec plusieurs catégories de parties prenantes, dont les élus et les assemblées représentatives locales (conseils communaux et départementaux), les groupes sociaux et professionnels, etc. La transparence implique nécessairement

la redevabilité en ce sens que cette dernière contraint à rendre compte du respect (ou non) des procédures et des décisions établies, de l'atteinte (ou non) des objectifs et des résultats attendus par exemple en matière d'autonomisation socioéconomique, d'inclusion de genre ou encore de développement communautaire. Dans le cas de PMC SA et de SGO, la redevabilité de l'entreprise envers les parties prenantes s'opère à travers des mécanismes comme l'organisation d'ateliers de restitution des rapports annuels de RSE/ou de durabilité à plusieurs niveaux (national, régional, communautaire) et en présence des différentes catégories de parties prenantes. L'existence d'un dialogue inclusif et équilibré entre les parties prenantes joue également comme un facteur d'influence sur la durabilité des initiatives en matière de RSE. En effet, la transparence et la redevabilité agissent également comme une contrainte sur les entreprises pour réaliser des actions de RSE plus durables en faveur des différents bénéficiaires, dont les filles et les garçons (y compris les élèves), les femmes, les jeunes actifs et les groupes socioprofessionnels précaires et défavorisés de manière générale.

La RSE stratégique ou non : des finalités sans cesse adaptées

La RSE, qu'elle soit appelée stratégique ou non, est donc une pratique d'entreprise dont les finalités sont sans cesse adaptées. Cette adaptation continue se fait selon les contextes locaux et nationaux, mais aussi selon les urgences et les conjonctures (économiques, sociales, politiques, environnementales) et l'évolution des rapports de pouvoir entre les parties prenantes.

Les processus d'adaptation concernent aussi la gouvernance de la RSE, variable selon les entreprises, et qui peut s'appréhender à travers les modalités suivantes : les mécanismes de dialogue, de concertation et d'inclusion à l'égard des parties prenantes développés par les entreprises, l'adhésion à des organisations et des initiatives promouvant la RSE et le développement durable, la signature de chartes et d'engagements favorables à la RSE, etc.

Dans le cadre du développement des activités minières, une pluralité de relations s'établit entre les entreprises minières et les parties prenantes, et les actions réalisées en matière de RSE en sont une illustration. Les parties prenantes, comme le relèvent Kamdjoug et Antagana (2012:156), sont des communautés d'intérêt, tant internes qu'externes, qui sont en interaction avec les entreprises à travers des relations d'échange de services, d'écoute et de dialogue. Ainsi, il résulte de ces multiples interdépendances et de ces interactions plurielles des rapports de pouvoir, de domination et/ou de collaboration. Cependant, l'exemple des quatre entreprises en question (SGO, PMC, DCS et SOCOCIM) et de leurs différentes parties

prenantes montre bien que ces rapports entre les acteurs sont loin d'être égaux, y compris dans le cadre de la conception et de la mise en œuvre des politiques et des actions de RSE. L'exemple de PMC SA et de ses parties prenantes montre à ce titre que le pouvoir décisionnel doit être partagé entre les acteurs afin d'éviter les risques de décalage ou d'inadéquation entre les décisions ou les choix en matière d'actions RSE, d'une part, et, d'autre part, les besoins exprimés et les attentes réelles des communautés minières et des groupes vulnérables. Compte tenu de l'inégalité des ressources (informations, connaissances, expertise, etc.) entre les acteurs et de leurs intérêts différents, les décisions en matière de développement communautaire reflètent d'abord les positions des acteurs dominants (en l'occurrence les entreprises minières et les représentants élus des gouvernements locaux). Or la garantie de l'inclusion de genre dans les choix en matière de RSE et d'un développement communautaire inclusif nécessite, dans le cadre de l'action publique, d'accorder aux citoyens ordinaires et aux groupes défavorisés un pouvoir délibératif.

De manière générale, les entreprises ont tendance à évaluer positivement les effets de leurs actions et réalisations, quelles que soient les finalités de celles-ci. Toutefois, tant les avis des populations et des groupes bénéficiaires que les analyses critiques portant sur les modes d'extraction (extractivisme, néo-extractivisme, post-extractivisme) permettent de relativiser les effets bénéfiques des initiatives de RSE en termes d'inclusion de genre ou de développement communautaire. D'autant que la durabilité des actions de RSE, entendue comme la capacité de maintien dans le temps, sans aide extérieure et sans épuisement des ressources existantes (Acosta 2014), n'est jamais assurée après la fin des projets miniers. Il faudrait donc que les initiatives de RSE tendent désormais vers des stratégies post-extractives durables pour faire de l'exploitation des ressources minières une bénédiction et exorciser la malédiction (ou le paradoxe de l'abondance) des ressources naturelles.

La *profitabilité* telle que définie par Baxter (2005) conduit clairement à relativiser la plus-value découlant de la RSE dans un contexte d'extractivisme minier au Sénégal. En effet, la *profitabilité* nécessite l'existence d'opportunités commerciales, d'autant qu'elle ne s'obtient que par la fabrication de produits manufacturiers à destination du grand public. Or, au Sénégal, la plupart des entreprises minières (notamment dans le secteur aurifère comme SGO et PMC SA) se limitent essentiellement au processus d'extraction de la matière première qui est ensuite exportée, transformée et commercialisée à l'extérieur. Par conséquent, la *profitabilité* de la RSE paraît bien marginale, notamment en termes de développement

communautaire. Il faudrait donc adapter à nouveau la RSE en en faisant également un outil de développement de l'ensemble de la chaîne de valeur dans le secteur minier, notamment par le renforcement des compétences des nationaux, le transfert de technologies, la formation à des emplois hautement qualifiés, le développement d'infrastructures manufacturières et commerciales au niveau national et local. L'ensemble de ces stratégies doit être sous-tendu par des politiques d'intégration transversale du genre.

Conclusion

Pour rappel, le Code minier du Sénégal (CMS), en cours d'application, ne fait aucune mention explicite à la RSE, encore moins à la RSE stratégique. Toutefois, les obligations assignées aux sociétés minières à travers plusieurs articles de ce Code établissent et engagent la responsabilité des entreprises dans différents domaines comme l'environnement et la réhabilitation de sites d'exploitation (article 29), le respect des règles d'hygiène, de santé, de sécurité, et la lutte contre le travail des enfants et les pires formes de travail (article 30), etc. Par ailleurs, la législation minière ne se limitant pas au Code minier national, elle englobe d'autres dispositions réglementaires telles que les directives et normes édictées au niveau sous-régional, voire régional et international (CEDEAO (Communauté économique des états de l'Afrique de l'ouest), OHADA (Organisation pour l'harmonisation en Afrique du droit des affaires), ITIE, etc.). C'est ainsi que, dans le cadre de la révision des normes de l'ITIE, il a été élaboré en 2019 une nouvelle norme relative au genre qui indique que la participation des femmes et des groupes marginalisés est la clé d'un secteur extractif bien géré. Cette norme comprend plusieurs exigences, à savoir :

(i) l'obligation pour les groupes multipartites de tenir compte de l'équilibre entre les sexes dans leur représentation,

(ii) la nécessité de produire dans les rapports des données sexospécifiques,

(iii) l'obligation pour les groupes multipartites de prendre en compte les problèmes d'accès et les besoins en information des différents genres et sous-groupes, et, enfin,

(iv) l'incitation des parties prenantes à documenter leurs mécanismes contribuant à l'amélioration de l'égalité des sexes et de l'inclusion sociale.

Pour ce qui est de la RSE dite stratégique, elle n'est pas une innovation au sens de nouvelle création, mais plutôt une forme opérationnelle, adaptée et mise à jour de conceptions déjà existantes de la RSE d'essence internationale et néolibérale. Dans le meilleur des cas, l'innovation dans la RSE dite stratégique reste moins liée à ses références aux différentes normes et aux

standards internationaux qu'à la place centrale accordée au dialogue entre les parties prenantes. De ce fait, le dialogue peut également être appréhendé à la fois comme un moteur et un levier incitant à l'adoption d'un ensemble de principes, de pratiques et de décisions susceptibles de favoriser davantage l'inclusion de genre et de contribuer plus efficacement au développement des communautés et des différents groupes socioprofessionnels.

Les initiatives de RSE stratégique s'efforcent déjà d'intégrer la question du genre tout en visant à contribuer au développement communautaire et national. Dans leurs rapports annuels de RSE ou durabilité, de plus en plus d'entreprises minières au Sénégal s'évertuent à bien mettre en exergue leur contribution à certains ODD. Néanmoins, dans le contexte sénégalais, les initiatives de RSE (même stratégique) dans le secteur minier présentent un certain nombre de limites et de faiblesses. D'abord, par rapport aux ODD, l'une des principales questions est de savoir comment des stratégies éphémères et ponctuelles de RSE peuvent contribuer à la réalisation de stratégies durables (sur le long terme). Frynas (2005), pour sa part, considère que le développement promis à travers les stratégies RSE est un leurre et le qualifie de « faux développement », tandis que Gamu *et al.* (2015) pointent les effets limités de la RSE dans la réduction de la pauvreté. Ensuite, dans un contexte où le Sénégal fait face à des défis multiples, multiformes et multisectoriels, les attentes des parties prenantes vis-à-vis des entreprises minières sont généralement à l'échelle de ces défis. Cela conduit souvent la plupart des acteurs, en l'occurrence les communautés d'accueil, à voir dans les entreprises minières des organes de substitution à ceux de l'État, renforçant ainsi les attentes. Les actions et les investissements réalisés par les entreprises dans le cadre de leur responsabilité apparaissent, dans ce contexte, souvent insuffisants pour les bénéficiaires face à l'ampleur des défis. De ce fait, même la RSE dite stratégique ne suffit pas encore à donner une entière satisfaction tant aux communautés d'accueil qu'aux autres parties prenantes.

Notes

1. Informations recueillies au cours des enquêtes exploratoires, des entretiens approfondis, mais aussi à travers certaines rencontres (forum RSE), des capsules de formations (cf. www.rsesenegal.com), ainsi que des documents divers.
2. Organisation de coopération et de développement économique.
3. Global Reporting Initiative.
4. Pacte mondial de l'ONU. C'est la plus large initiative RSE portée par l'ONU.
5. Société financière internationale.
6. Bureau international du travail.

7. Notion mentionnée par R. Baxter en 2005 et traduite ici en français par *profitabilité* ou *bénéficiabilité.*
8. Expression issue d'un entretien.
9. SGO, PMC SA, DCS ont toutes un siège à Dakar (capitale) et SOCOCIM Industries est basée à Rufisque (un département dans la région de Dakar).
10. Affaires corporatives et RSE ; HSE (Hygiène, Sécurité & Santé, Environnement).
11. Conseillers municipaux, maires, présidents de conseils départementaux.
12. Notamment la commission d'attribution des marchés.
13. Secrétaire général et directeurs.
14. Secrétaire permanent et coordinateur du Comité.
15. Gouverneur et/ou gouverneurs adjoints, préfets et sous-préfets.
16. Notamment dans les secteurs de l'éducation, de la santé, de l'agriculture, de l'hydraulique, du développement rural et local, etc.
17. Entretiens réalisés en août 2019.
18. Cette notion désigne toute entité ou personne pouvant raisonnablement être affectée de manière significative par les activités, les produits et les services de l'organisation, et dont il peut raisonnablement être attendu en retour que les actions affectent la capacité de l'organisation à mettre en œuvre avec succès ses stratégies et atteindre ses objectifs (source : Norme GRI).
19. Tiré d'un entretien (réalisé à Dakar en août 2019) avec un administrateur du Réseau RSE Sénégal et responsable du cabinet CFPMI.
20. Également appelée l'évaluation d'importance relative.
21. Son exploitation a débuté en 2010.
22. Source : rapport de responsabilité 2018.
23. La société mère de PMC SA, à savoir la société anglaise TORO GOLD, a fait l'objet d'une fusion en août 2019 avec le groupe australien Resolute Mining.
24. Source : rapport de durabilité 2018, p. 48.
25. Selon Ambassa et Achille (2012), cette notion renvoie à la quête permanente de meilleurs systèmes de gestion des hommes et des ressources ; elle repose sur la conduite de processus décisionnels résultant d'une négociation permanente entre les acteurs.
26. Dans le système de découpage administratif au Sénégal, la région constitue la plus grande entité. Elle est dirigée administrativement par le gouverneur et comprend des départements dirigés par des préfets.
27. Il se réunit une fois par mois et est chargé de superviser les opérations minières. Il est ainsi engagé de manière approfondie avec le staff de PMC sur les questions liées au développement de la mine de Mako.
28. Il se réunit une fois par mois et est chargé d'appuyer PMC dans la mise en œuvre de ses procédures de recrutement local et l'évaluation des performances par rapport à ces procédures.
29. Il aide PMC sur les questions relatives à la sûreté et la sécurité des communautés autour de la mine, en veillant notamment à éloigner les personnes et le bétail des zones à accès réglementé.

30. Ce mécanisme permet à PMC d'être réactif aux préoccupations des communautés locales. Les griefs sont classés en trois grandes catégories : les griefs mineurs (niveau 1), les griefs modérés (niveau 2) et les griefs majeurs (niveau 3).
31. Source : www.fondation-sococim.com
32. Conseil départemental de Thiès.
33. Maires des communes de Keur Moussa, Pout, Mont-Rolland et Diass.
34. Représentants des départements suivants : HSE (Hygiène/Sécurité/Environnement), Ressources, Finances, Génie civil, Affaires corporatives & RSE.

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Effective Knowledge Transmission and Learning in Agriculture: Evidence from a Randomised Training Experiment in Ethiopia

Hiwot Mesfin*, Yohannis M. Tessema**, Nyasha Tirivayi*** & Eleonora Nillesen****

Abstract

In this article, we discuss a study to identify an effective agricultural knowledge transfer channel for smallholder farmers in Ethiopia, using a randomised training experiment together with focus group discussions, key informant interviews and a survey. We also examine the factors that determine learning among smallholder farmers. Our results revealed that involving extension agents and model farmers leads to above-average knowledge transfer. However, learning from extension agents is significantly more effective than learning from model farmers. Additionally, we found that trust, effort, and locus of control are important determinants of learning. On the other hand, we found no evidence that farmers exert more effort when they are trained by extension agents, hence this rules out effort as a mechanism for higher learning from the extension agents. Based on these results, we conclude that, on average, the extension agent system is more effective at conveying agricultural knowledge than model farmers are and that policy-makers can use the two channels as complements rather than substitutes.

Keywords: Knowledge communication, learning, agricultural extension service, model farmer, training experiment, Ethiopia

* United Nations University – UNU MERIT, Maastricht University, The Netherlands. Email: mesfin@merit.unu.edu
** Independent Researcher, Ethiopia. Email: yohannism@gmail.com
*** UNICEF Office of Research, Innocenti, Italy. Email: yohannism@gmail.com
****UNU-MERIT, Maastricht University, The Netherlands. Email: nillesen@merit.unu.edu

Résumé

Dans cet article, nous discutons d'une étude visant à identifier un moyen efficace de transfert de connaissances agricoles pour les petits exploitants agricoles d'Éthiopie, en utilisant une expérience de formation aléatoire ainsi que des discussions de groupe, des entretiens avec des informateurs clés et une enquête. Nous examinons également les facteurs qui déterminent l'apprentissage chez les petits exploitants agricoles. Nos résultats ont révélé que l'implication d'agents de vulgarisation et d'agriculteurs-modèles mène à un transfert de connaissances supérieur à la moyenne. Cependant, apprendre d'agents de vulgarisation est beaucoup plus efficace qu'apprendre d'agriculteurs-modèles. De plus, nous avons constaté que la confiance, l'effort et le locus de contrôle sont d'importants déterminants de l'apprentissage. D'autre part, nous n'avons trouvé aucune preuve que les agriculteurs déploient plus d'efforts lorsqu'ils sont formés par des agents de vulgarisation, ce qui exclut donc l'effort en tant que mécanisme d'apprentissage supérieur de la part des agents de vulgarisation. Sur la base de ces résultats, nous concluons qu'en moyenne, le système d'agents de vulgarisation est plus efficace dans la transmission de connaissances agricoles que les agriculteurs-modèles, et que les décideurs politiques peuvent utiliser les deux canaux comme des compléments plutôt qu'en tant que substituts.

Mots-clés : transmission de connaissances, apprentissage, service de vulgarisation agricole, agriculteur-modèle, expérience de formation, Éthiopie

Introduction

Agriculture plays a vital role in the economy of most low-income countries. It is their main source of employment, national income, and foreign currency, among other outcomes. Particularly in Ethiopia, the agriculture sector employs 72 per cent of the population, constitutes 35 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and contributes 90 per cent of the foreign earnings (CIA 2020). Hence, increasing the production of the agriculture sector can serve as an engine of economic growth (Awokuse 2009).

Increasing agricultural production requires using improved techniques (technology) and the accumulation of factors of production as well as raising the efficiency of factors of production for a given technology.[1] However, given the limited extent to which arable land can be expanded, technological innovation and adoption is the main pathway for sustained growth of the agriculture sector and, concomitantly, overall economic development. Nonetheless, the adoption of improved technologies, especially in the agriculture sector, remains very low in developing countries (Duflo, Kremer and Robinson 2008; Rashid et al. 2013).

One of the main starting points for technology adoption is information and knowledge. In order to address the information and knowledge constraints that farmers face in Ethiopia, the government has established and run one of the most extensive publicly funded agricultural extension services (AES) in Africa. However, its effectiveness remains controversial and has been criticised for its hidden political motive. For example, Berhanu and Poulton (2014) argue that the Ethiopian government's commitment to the extension service emerges from its interest in securing the political support of the rural population. They further argue that the extension service's political orientation negatively affects the efficacy of the service in attaining its main role, which is to increase the productivity of farmers by providing knowledge and information and promoting new technologies.

Moreover, given its high costs, the sustainability of the Ethiopian AES has been questioned. As a remedy, recommendations have emerged, suggesting that the government can leverage social (peer) learning and reduce its investment in the AES. Theoretical studies show that there is a huge potential for peer effects in knowledge and innovation diffusion (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971; Young 2009). As a result, the Ethiopian government, as with its many other African counterparts, has institutionalised peer learning by introducing the model (lead) farmer approach. Ideally, the model farmer is a farmer who serves as a role model by taking the lead in adopting new technologies. Additionally, the model farmer is expected to transfer the knowledge he or she obtains from the extension agents to fellow farmers and convey feedback from farmers back to the extension agents.

However, the empirical literature shows limited support for the effectiveness of the lead farmer approach. For example, in their investigation of the effectiveness of model farmers in disseminating knowledge about soil and land management techniques (SLM) in Mozambique, Kondylis, Mueller and Zhu (2017) found that although the lead farmers largely adopted SLM themselves, their impact on other farmers' adoption behavior was negligible. Similarly, Ragasa (2019) found that exposure and interaction with model farmers in Malawi leads to neither awareness nor adoption of new technologies. However, she found that the quality of the model farmers, measured by the regularity of the training they received and their adoption behaviour, leads to increased awareness and adoption by fellow farmers. A study by BenYishay and Mobarak (2019) also compares the effectiveness of different communication channels in Malawi – extension agents, model farmers and peer farmers – and examines the role of incentives in facilitating learning. They show that incentivising peer farmers leads to a larger diffusion of knowledge. Interestingly, they found that the diffusion

of knowledge via model farmers was negligible with or without incentives. Similarly, another study in Ghana showed that peer learning can only be effective after the information is made available about new technologies, meaning that some expert training is required to initiate the diffusion of knowledge and innovation (Conley and Udry 2010). On the other hand, a study by Savastano and Feder (2006) ascertained the importance of the relatability of information sources in agricultural knowledge diffusion through social networks.

Given the inconclusive evidence in the existing literature, we aim to contribute to a better understanding of effective knowledge communication in agriculture. In addition, we examine the factors that affect learning. To this end, we used a randomised controlled training experiment to investigate the effectiveness of the two most common agricultural information sources – the extension agents and model farmers – in transferring knowledge in the Ethiopian context. Moreover, to obtain a deeper understanding, we also employed focus group discussions, key informant interviews and a survey to collect qualitative and quantitative data, respectively.

The existing empirical studies in Ethiopia are based on a geospatial formulation of social networks, which assumes that learning occurs through geographic proximity. For example, a study by Tessema et al. (2016), demonstrated a positive neighbourhood effect on the adoption of conservation tillage among Ethiopian farmers. A similar spatial study by Krishnan and Patnam (2013) also suggested that social learning is more effective than learning from agricultural extension agents, to bring about a wider diffusion of technology, whereas extension agents are more effective at initialising diffusion. Because these studies rely on observational survey data, their findings may suffer from endogeneity bias, limiting them from identifying causal impacts. In addition, we are not aware of any other experimental study in Ethiopia – a case we believe is interesting for its unprecedented level of investment in the extension sector but still achieving below the desired level of technology adoption.

Against this backdrop, we aim to answer the following questions:

1) Do farmers learn better from extension agents or model farmers?
2) What are the potential mechanisms?
3) What factors determine learning about agricultural technologies?

To answer our research questions, we conducted a randomised training experiment where one group of randomly selected farmers received training from extension agents and another group from model farmers. To avoid contamination due to existing knowledge, we selected a brand-new

technology, namely, 'push-pull' farming, a promising technology devised to fight stem borers and Striga, a pervasive and devastating parasite and weed in the study area. Our results showed that, on average, farmers learn better from extension agents than from model farmers. We tested whether effort is the mechanism that leads to higher learning from the extension agents (EAs). However, our results failed to provide evidence to support this hypothesis. Additionally, our results showed that trust, effort, and locus of control positively affect learning.

The remainder of this article is organised as follows. The next section provides a detailed review of related literature. We then present the research methodology, and show and discuss the results. The final section concludes with a summary and recommendations.

Related Literature

The agriculture sector, in most developing countries, is uniquely positioned for poverty reduction. This is because enhanced agricultural productivity helps smallholder farmers to move out of poverty while supplying staple crops at lower prices for the urban poor. The growth in the agriculture sector also creates a multitude of job opportunities along the agribusiness value chain and creates forward and backward linkages with the non-agricultural sectors, and thus serves as an engine for economic transformation (Christiaensen, Demery and Kuhl 2011; Pingali 2012). Conversely, this means that low productivity in agriculture could mean an inability to feed the population or produce adequate industrial raw materials, constraining the whole economy. Therefore, the development of the agriculture sector by increasing its productivity is vital for developing countries' economies. Increasing agricultural production requires the adoption of yield-enhancing technologies, which in turn requires information and know-how about new technologies (Ryan and Gross 1950; Weber 2012).

Unfortunately, the reality is that most African countries lag in their agricultural productivity and agricultural technology adoption. For example, the average cereal yield in Africa is about 1.5 tons per hectare, whereas it is about 3 tons per hectare in South Asia and 6 tons per hectare in East Asia. When we look at technology utilisation, we observe that, in 2016 for example, fertiliser use per hectare in sub-Saharan Africa was about 16 kilograms per hectare whereas in South Asia and East Asia and the Pacific it was 160 and 331 kilograms per hectare, respectively (World Bank 2020).

Many studies have been conducted to understand the low adoption of agricultural technologies. These have shown that the main challenges are embedded in the complexity of the adoption process, which constitutes

discovery and learning, cost, resource constraint and risk, and other behavioural factors. For example, Liu (2013) found that risk-averse farmers delay adoption whereas risk-takers adopt early. Other behavioural factors covered in the literature include farmers' locus of control, where internally controlled farmers have a higher adoption rate of agricultural technologies compared to those who are externally controlled (Abay, Blalock and Berhane 2017). Another factor is procrastination, where impatient farmers keep postponing the purchase of profitable inputs until the last minute and end up not purchasing them (Duflo et al. 2011).

Studies also show that resource constraints hinder the adoption of agricultural technologies. For example, Asfaw et al. (2011) found that wealth (proxied by livestock ownership and land size) and availability of labour positively drive the adoption of improved agricultural technologies. Similarly, Croppenstedt, Demesche and Meschi (2003) revealed that a lack of credit and liquidity hinder the adoption of chemical fertiliser. Additionally, in their review of the literature, Smucker, White and Bannister (2000) conclude that tenure security increases the adoption of technologies.

Information constraint, the focus of this study, has also received extensive attention in the literature. For example, the pioneering adoption study by Ryan and Gross (1950) shows that the early adopters of a high-yielding corn variety in Iowa were more educated, 'cosmopolitan' and had salesmen as their source of information.[2] The late adopters, on the other hand, used neighbours as their source of information and persuasion. Within thirteen years the corn variety was almost entirely adopted because of its superiority in yield and drought resistance. Subsequent studies have affirmed the role of education in technology adoption (for example, Croppenstedt et al. 2003; Asfaw and Admassie 2004). Similarly, learning from successful neighbours has been documented among farmers in Ethiopia and Ghana (Tessema et al. 2016; Conley and Udry 2010).

To overcome the information constraint, the Ethiopian government provides an agricultural extension service to farmers, to supply information, knowledge, and technical skills free of charge.[3] In Ethiopia, the agricultural extension service began in the early 1950s (Gebremedhin, Hoekstra and Tegegne 2006). The current government, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), has focused on expanding the service, creating one of the largest agricultural extension services in the world, with the lowest farmer-to-agent ratio. According to the Ministry of Agriculture's agricultural extension strategy document (2017), there are 56,000 extension agents and 18,000 farmer training centres (FTCs) spread across the country. As we discuss in the introduction to this paper,

the government uses both trained agricultural extension agents and model farmers to disseminate information among farmers. However, as pointed out, the service may have an additional objective, to politically influence the rural population (Berhanu and Poulton 2014; Hailemichael and Haug 2020). This aim may have a negative effect on the effectiveness of the extension service to achieve its primary objective, which is to increase technology uptake and the productivity of farmers. If farmers are sceptical of the motives of the extension agents, they might trust them less and hence could be reluctant to seek information from the agents or participate in field demonstrations of technologies. In such cases, it is imperative to look at alternative ways to communicate knowledge and information with farmers. Also, farmers might be inclined to learn from other farmers because they share similar interests, risks, and constraints, unlike those of the extension agents (BenYishay and Mobarak 2019).

Studies have evaluated the impacts of the AES, despite being constrained by the identification problem due to the non-random assignment of the extension service and potential self-selection associated with it. For instance, Dercon et al. (2009) found that AES increases consumption and reduces headcount poverty among Ethiopian farmers. They argue that improved agricultural practices and fertiliser application followed the recommendations by the AES. Similarly, Feder and Slade (1986) showed a positive impact of the Indian training and visit extension programme on the knowledge of farmers regarding high-yielding varieties of crops. Also, a review by Birkhaeuser, Evenson and Feder (1991) concluded that there is a positive relationship between knowledge acquisition and technology adoption following an extension service on both, but advise against interpreting the findings as causal. Owens, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2003) showed a positive effect of the extension service on agricultural productivity in Zimbabwe. Moreover, Pan, Smith, and Sulaiman (2018) found a positive effect of the extension service in agricultural production and savings in Uganda. Furthermore, Cole and Fernando (2012) indicate that providing farmers with continuous and demand-driven agricultural advice improves input utilisation, results in the cultivation of more profitable crops, and reduces old and ineffective pesticide utilisation. Similarly, Godtland et al. (2004) could show that farmers who attend farmers' training schools exhibit a better knowledge of integrated pest management practices and thus achieve higher productivity than those who do not attend the FTS. The literature concludes that the impact of AES is highest at the earliest stages of technologies than at later stages (Anderson and Feder 2004; Conley and Udry 2010; Krishnan and Patnam 2013).

Methodology

In this section, we present the experimental design, some descriptive statistics and the empirical estimation strategies.

Experimental design and data

To identify an effective knowledge communication channel in agriculture, and examine the roles of trust, effort, and locus of control in learning, we conducted a randomised training experiment together with focus group discussions, key informant interviews and a survey data.

We conducted the study in the lowland parts of the North Shewa zone, Amhara regional state, Ethiopia. Given its agroecology, sorghum is the main crop produced during the main rainy season. However, sorghum production is challenged frequently by stem borer and infestation by the invasive Striga plant.

Figure 1: Stem-borer larvae attacking a sorghum plant
Photo: Shumet Chakel (This picture was taken in a sorghum plot during the fieldwork in Ethiopia)

For example, stem borer and Striga account for a 30 to100 per cent yield loss in the Lake Victoria basin (Khan et al. 2000). Our survey results showed that 90 per cent and 86 per cent of the sampled farmers are affected by stem borer and Striga, respectively (see Table 1). The survey further indicated that many farmers rely on chemical application to control the pervasive pest and weed in maize and sorghum farms. The International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology (icipe), in collaboration with funding partners, introduced a farming strategy (agronomic practice) known as 'push-pull'. The practice involves companion planting, where one of the plants (namely, Desmodium) produces chemicals that repel stem-borer larvae from the maize/sorghum plant while the second plant (Napier grass) attracts the larvae, traps and kills them – hence its name, push-pull. Additionally, these plants prevent the Striga weed from growing and attaching itself to the roots of the maize/sorghum plant.

Figure 2: Striga weed crowding a maize plant and stunting the maize
Source: Plantwise Knowledge Bank (2014) (The picture is taken in Uganda)

Table 1: stem borer and striga infestation and solutions used by farmers in the study area

Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Stem borer		
In the past 3 years, have you … had stem-borer infestation? (yes 1; no 2)	0.903	0.296
… sprayed chemicals (yes 1; no 2)	0.893	0.31
… used traditional solutions (yes 1; no 2)	0.066	0.249
… used a combination of chemicals and traditional solutions (yes 1; no 2)	0.055	0.229
I had no solution (yes 1; no 2)	0.041	0.198
Striga weed		
In the past 3 years, have you … had Striga weed infestation? (yes 1; no 2)	0.86	0.348
… sprayed chemicals (yes 1; no 2)	0.085	0.28
… used traditional solutions (yes 1; no 2)	0.062	0.242
… used a combination of chemicals and traditional solutions (yes 1; no 2)	0.027	0.163
.. weeded manually (yes 1; no 2)	0.973	0.163
I had no solution (yes 1; no 2)	0	0

The fact that the farmers in the area have been actively seeking an effective way to tackle the stem borer and Striga, coupled with the newness of the technology, provided us with a perfect setting to study the effective means of communicating knowledge regarding new technology to farmers. Note that, according to the results in Table 1, all of our respondents confirmed never having heard of the technology before the training. Taking advantage of this setting, we provided training on the operation of a push-pull farm plot using two communication channels: the Extension Agent (EA) and the Model Farmer (MF). The Ethiopian agricultural extension system heavily hinges on extension agents and model farmers to disseminate information and knowledge to highly scattered smallholder farmers. This was the main reason why we selected them as the trainers of the push-pull technology in our experiment.

For this training experiment, we first provided training of trainers (TOT) to the EAs and MFs. The training was done by agronomy researchers who specialise in sorghum and maize, at the Debre Birhan Agricultural Research Centre, Ethiopia. The training involved teaching

the details of the push-pull technology, setting up successful push-pull plots, and learning about the economic benefits of the push-pull practice. The training manual was first translated into the local language (Amharic), and both the TOT and the main training were conducted in Amharic. The agronomists trained twelve EAs and twelve MFs from twelve, randomly selected Gots, in two districts: Shewa-Robit and Ataye, North Shewa Zone, Ethiopia.[4] The trained MFs and EAs then trained twelve or thirteen farmers in their respective Gots. Immediately after the completion of the training, enumerators assigned to each of the training venues administered ten-item multiple-choice questions to gauge the knowledge the farmers had acquired from the training. Next, the enumerators gathered demographic and socioeconomic information about the respondents, and information on their access to public services, including the extension service and their trust and level of satisfaction in public services. The following section presents and discusses the estimation strategy.

Figure 3: Sorghum field damaged by stem borer
Photo: Shumet Chakel (This picture was taken during the fieldwork in Ethiopia)

Estimation strategy

We start by showing our strategy for identifiying the effective knowledge transmission channel and proceed to show the strategies used to study the effects of trust, effort and locus of control. We conclude the section by showing the strategy we used to identify the determinants of trust, effort and locus of control.

Effective knowledge transmission channel, trust, effort and locus of control (LOC)

To identify the more effective knowledge transmission channel, as well as the effects of trust, effort and locus of control in learning, we used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression as specified in equation 1:

$$Knowledge_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treatment_i + \beta_2 Trust_i + \beta_3 Effort_i + \beta_4 LOC_i + \sum_{(i=1)}^{14} \beta_i X1_i + \mu_i \quad (1)$$

where, $Knowledge_i$ is the knowledge retained by the farmer *i*; β_0 is the constant term; $\beta_1 - \beta_4$ represent the coefficients of interest; $treatment_i$ is the treatment status of farmer *i* such that $treatment_i = 1$ if farmer *i* is trained by an EA, 0 if trained by model farmer; is an indicator for whether farmer *i* trusts the extension service; $Effort_i$ is a dummy indicator of farmer *i*'s effort to learn.

We measured effort by asking farmers whether they asked or answered questions during the training. Next, we generated an effort indicator to the value of 1 if the farmer asked or answered a question during the training, and 0 otherwise; LOC_i is an indicator for farmer *i*'s locus of control. To measure the LOC, we adopted the survey instrument developed by Bernard, Taffesse and Dercon (2008), where farmers answer the following question: 'Which one of the following statements do you agree the most?' The responses were either, (1) 'To be successful, above all, one needs to work very hard', or (2) 'To be successful, above all, one needs to be lucky'. We then recoded these responses such that LOC equals 1 (internally controlled) if farmer *i* chooses the first response, or 0 otherwise; $X1_i$ are other control variables, including age, sex, family size, land size, farm experience, education, TV ownership, mobile phone ownership, credit access, position held, locus of control, satisfaction in the training, effort during the training, trust attitude, self-assessed agricultural knowledge, trust in the expertise of the EAs and MFs, as well as trust in the extension system; μi is the stochastic error term.

Since the test questions used to measure the farmers' knowledge acquisition were in multiple-choice format, it was likely that some farmers might answer some questions correctly, just out of luck. To mitigate this, and as a robustness check, we also estimated the impact of the trainer type on the probability of scoring more than half in the knowledge acquisition test. To do this, we converted the outcome variable into a dummy variable named $Pass_i$ in equation 2, where it took the value 1 if a farmer's score was greater than five, or 0, otherwise, and estimated the following probit model.

$$Prob(Passi=1 \mid Z_1) = \Phi(\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Treatment_i + \alpha_2 Trust_i + \alpha_3 Effort_i + \alpha_4 LOC_i + \sum_{(i=1)}^{14} \alpha_i X1_i) \quad (2)$$

where, α_0 is the constant; $\alpha_1 - \alpha_4$ are the parameters of interest; Φ is the cumulative normal distribution function; Z_1 is the set of all righthand-side variables.

Determinants of trust, effort and locus of control

We also aimed to understand the determinants of trust, effort and locus of control. These were dummy variables (i.e. taking the values 1 and 0), hence we estimated the following probit model to uncover the determinants as follows:

$$Prob(Y_i=1|X2_i) = \Phi(\delta_0 + \sum_{(i=1)}^{14} \delta_i X2_i) \quad (3)$$

where, Y_i represents the outcome of interest variables–trust in extension service, effort and locus of control; δ_i are the parameters of interest, and $X2_i$ are the vectors of explanatory variables; Φ is the cumulative normal distribution function.

Empirical Results and Discussion

In this section, we present the statistical and econometric results. We start by showing the descriptive statistics along with balancing properties and move to present the main result, which is identifying the most effective knowledge transmission channel. Next, we investigate the role of trust and effort independently, and later we use an interaction term to test whether effort is the mechanism that leads to higher knowledge acquisition. Afterwards, we discuss the effect of locus of control on knowledge acquisition. Lastly, we conclude by showing the determinants of trust, effort and locus of control.

Effective knowledge transmission channel

We hypothesised that farmers would learn more from model farmers who might be better equipped to deliver information in such a way that would be easily accessible to their fellow farmers. Previous studies also suggest the importance of relatability of information sources in the uptake of the information (for example, BenYishay and Mobarak 2019). Moreover, as we discussed in the introduction, if the extension agents were doubling as political agents, farmers might trust them less and learn less from them. Contrarily, farmers might learn more from extension agents if they perceived them to be more knowledgeable because they had better education. Additionally, it could be the case that the extension agents were better equipped to convey the message because they may have had the pedagogical training on how to deliver agricultural knowledge to less-educated farmers in an accessible manner.

Before discussing the econometric results, we present the results of the balancing test and descriptive statistics. The balancing test indicates that we have successful randomisation with regards to most of the demographic and socioeconomic control variables. Note that 'internal control', 'extension agent know same' and 'model farmer know same' are unbalanced. We control for these effects and other variables in our regressions to test the robustness of the treatment effect estimate (we return to this discussion in the coming paragraph). As can be seen from Table 2, on average, farmers trained by extension agents scored higher than those trained by model farmers. What is interesting, however, is that farmers trained by both on average scored more than half, which could imply that both methods serve well in transmitting knowledge. Figure 4 shows the distribution of test scores by trainer type. The test score of farmers trained by model farmers more or less follows a normal distribution, whereas for farmers trained by extension agents, the distribution is skewed to the right, with more farmers scoring more than the median.

The descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 show that the average age of the participant farmers is forty-two and forty-four for the control and treatment groups, respectively. The average landholding is 0.715 hectares and 0.784 hectares; most of the farmers have either no education or basic education that enables them to read and write; 88 per cent and 87 per cent of farmers own mobile phones; 63 per cent and 67 per cent of farmers have or have held some type of position in their communities; and 44 per cent and 40 per cent own a television (these statistics are presented such that the first values are for the control group and the second values for the treatment group, respectively). Note that the proportion of females is very

low, constituting about 1 per cent of the participants in both groups. This is mainly due to the fact that very few women were household heads in the study area, and our training targeted household heads since they are in charge of making farming-related decisions.



Figure 4: Distribution of test scores by trainer type

Interestingly, more farmers reported satisfaction with the training in our control group (trained by model farmers) than in the treatment group (trained by extension agents), with about 72 per cent of farmers expressing 'very satisfied' to the following survey question: 'How satisfied are you with the training you just received?', whereas the percentage for those trained by the extension agents was 65 per cent.[5] Similarly, trust in the extension service was higher in the control group compared to the treatment, at 65 per cent and 59 per cent, respectively. Following the World Values Survey, we also measured generalised trust among the respondents by asking the following question: 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?' The response options given were: 1) 'Most people can be trusted', or 2) 'You cannot be too careful in dealing with people'. According to the survey results, 40 per cent of the respondents in the control group and 35 per cent of the respondents in the treatment group appeared to be trusting.

Table 2: balance table between control and treatment groups

Variables	**Control**	**Treatment**	**Difference**
Scores	5.621	6.484	0.863***
	(2.045)	(2.004)	(0.234)
Effort	0.462	0.529	0.067
	(0.500)	(0.501)	(0.058)
Farm size	5.076	5.084	0.008
	(1.603)	(1.769)	(0.195)
Age	42.855	44.116	1.261
	(12.444)	(12.626)	(1.449)
Sex	0.938	0.955	0.017
	(0.242)	(0.208)	(0.026)
Land size	0.715	0.784	0.069
	(0.539)	(0.755)	(0.076)
Farm experience	24.766	26.658	1.893
	(12.707)	(13.596)	(1.522)
No education	0.559	0.535	-0.023
	(0.498)	(0.500)	(0.058)
Read and write	0.366	0.394	0.028
	(0.483)	(0.490)	(0.056)
Own TV	0.441	0.400	-0.041
	(0.498)	(0.491)	(0.057)
Position	0.634	0.671	0.036
	(0.483)	(0.471)	(0.055)
Internally controlled	0.883	0.948	0.066**
	(0.323)	(0.222)	(0.032)
Training satisfied	0.717	0.652	-0.066
	(0.452)	(0.478)	(0.054)
Trusting	0.400	0.348	-0.052
	(0.492)	(0.478)	(0.056)
Know more	0.331	0.310	-0.021
	(0.472)	(0.464)	(0.054)
Know same	0.510	0.600	0.090
	(0.502)	(0.491)	(0.057)
Extension agents know more	0.655	0.581	-0.075
	(0.477)	(0.495)	(0.056)

Extension agents know same	0.214	0.335	0.122**
	(0.411)	(0.474)	(0.051)
Model farmers know more	0.531	0.452	-0.079
	(0.501)	(0.499)	(0.058)
Model farmers know same	0.331	0.471	0.140**
	(0.472)	(0.501)	(0.056)
Trust extension	0.648	0.587	-0.061
	(0.479)	(0.494)	(0.056)
Observations	145	155	300

Notes: The variables 'Extension agents know more' and 'Extension agents know same' were generated from the following survey question. 'Compared to most farmers in your village how knowledgeable are the extension agents about agriculture?' and the responses were (1) 'They know more'; (2) 'They know the same'; or, (3) 'They know less', where the base category is (3), 'They know less'. Similarly, 'Model farmers know more' and 'Model farmers know same' are generated by asking farmers the following: 'Compared to most farmers in your village how knowledgeable are the Model farmers about agriculture?' and the responses were :(1) 'They know more'; (2) 'They know the same'; or, (3) 'They know less', where, the base category was (3) 'They know less'. Similarly, education was a three-category variable where farmers were categorised as having (1) 'No education', (2) 'Read and write', and (3) 'Have some formal education'. The base category is (3), 'Have some formal education'. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Table 3 presents the regression results of the OLS model and the marginal effects of the probit model. The results show that farmers trained by the EAs gained more knowledge compared to those trained by MFs. On average, a farmer trained by EAs obtained a knowledge score that was higher by 0.86 points compared to that of farmers trained by the MFs. This difference is statistically significant even at a 1 per cent level and is robust to the inclusion of a number of demographic, social, economic, behavioural and perception factors. The probit model also yields qualitatively similar results, but the effect size is slightly bigger than the one from the OLS model. Figure 5 graphically illustrates the OLS estimates.

As we discuss in the introduction, previous studies of the diffusion of knowledge through different sources have showed mixed results. For example, BenYishay and Mobarak (2019) found a higher knowledge flow from farmers to fellow farmers than from experts to farmers in Malawi. Contrarily, Kondylis et al. (2017) could show no higher diffusion of knowledge from trained model farmers (contact farmers, as they call

them) to other farmers compared to the diffusion of knowledge from extension agents to farmers in Mozambique. The reason for the difference in the results could be the fact that, in the BenYishay and Mobarak (2019) study, they carefully selected contact farmers who were representative of the farmers in Malawi, whereas in Kondylis et al. (2017) they used the existing contact farmers (also known as model farmers). This could be an indication that the difference between the model farmers and other farmers may constrain learning and information flow, despite the policy intention that aims to use model farmers (farmers who are more productive and have a higher propensity to adopt technologies and experiment) to entice other farmers to learn and adopt technologies. Indeed, our FGDs informed us that it was those with better land quality and better resources who were often selected to be model farmers and not necessarily because of their 'better agricultural knowledge'. This perception could lead farmers to be less interested in learning from the model farmers. Based on our key informant interviews, we also found that the model farmers felt that fellow farmers 'look down on them' and that the farmers were uninterested in taking advice from them.



Figure 5: Coefficients of selected variables from the OLS regression estimation

Trust and learning

Trust plays a vital role in society, and the lack thereof could undermine the performance of an economy in several ways. Empirical evidence has shown that trust affects education, service uptake and trade, among other inputs, thereby impacting economic growth and development (Knack and Keefer 1997; Sako 2006; Bjørnskov 2012; Belissa et al. 2019).

In this section, we focus on the role of trust of the extension service in learning outcomes. We measured trust in the extension system by asking farmers how much they trusted the extension system on a scale of three: 'so much trust', 'not much trust', and 'no trust at all'. We then re-coded this into a dummy variable, taking 1 if the farmers selected 'so much trust', and 0 if the farmer selected 'not much trust' and 'no trust at all'. According to the widely accepted definition of trust by Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995), trust is 'the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other part.' According to this definition, trustors are vulnerable, meaning that 'there is something of importance to be lost', which is the case with farmers because they have to follow the advice given by the extension agents to make livelihood-determining decisions. Trust in the extension service, as we show in Table 3, is positively and significantly correlated with learning from the extension agents. Keeping all else constant, a farmer who trusts the extension service obtains about 0.50 points higher in the knowledge score. These results contradict the study by Buck and Alwang (2011), where they found no correlation between trust and learning outcomes among Ecuadorian farmers.

In fact, this finding is not surprising in the study area. During the focus group discussion, it became apparent that farmers in the area were convinced that the extension agents had increasingly taken the role of input suppliers rather than sources of knowledge and information. The farmers underscored that the EAs' main job had become distributing inputs such as chemicals at times of 'werershign' ('epidemic of diseases and weeds'), and fertiliser. Farmers also appeared to be frustrated by the inadequacy of input distribution due to limited supply and alleged corruption. They appealed for the government to work towards availing inputs in the market at a reasonable price instead of trying to provide it for free because the free supply did not benefit anyone. One discussant said:

> Once, a disease hit our farm, and the EAs brought chemicals for us to spray. However, the amount we got was too small even to cover a row, let alone

> an entire plot. When asked why they are giving us such a small amount of chemicals, the EAs told us that the only have a small supply and that they have to make sure that every farmer gets some. But we knew that was not the case. We knew where the were taking the chemicals. In the end, none of us were able to control the disease, and we faced a devastating loss of production.

Some discussants during the FGD also stated that the EAs know little about agriculture. They indicated that some EAs would not even know the types of crops by looking at the plants. One farmer said:

> I grow turmeric, but I am pretty sure that the EAs would not know what the plant is if you ask them. How could they help me improve my production if they do not know what plant I am growing?

When asked about the importance of farmer training centres and demonstration plots, in one of the villages one discussant said:

> Some years ago, the agriculture office used to have demonstration plots; these days, they have none. These days, we meet at the FTC once a month to discuss random issues, such as, '*yager guday lay lemeweyayet*', ('to discuss national issues').

In another village, farmers informed us that there was a demonstration plot often covered with various crops planted in rows. One discussant stated with amusement, 'They (the EAs) even plant the mung bean in rows. However, I planted it by broadcasting, and it looked much better than theirs; mine had longer and bigger seedpods'.

On the other hand, some of the discussants expressed that sometimes they received very useful advice from the EAs. In one of the FGDs, one discussant gave the following example:

> We were once baffled because when we spray a pesticide, our crop was dying. Then, the EAs taught us the need to thoroughly wash our sprayer in between chemical applications, as some chemicals, when mixed with another, could have an adverse effect on the plants. This piece of advice saved us from killing our plants with pesticide contaminated with other kinds of chemicals.

From the focus group discussions, it seemed the farmers were losing confidence in the extension system, including the expertise of EAs. But it is also important to note that some farmers had benefited from the advice received from EAs.

Effort and learning

The results, also reported in Table 3, show that effort is associated with higher knowledge acquisition. Farmers who exerted more effort scored about 0.76 points more than those who exerted less effort. Note that this

result shows the correlation between effort and test scores. Since it could also be the case that participants who are highly motivated to learn in the first place would be the ones who are more likely to exert effort (that is, ask or answer questions during the training), we refrained from interpreting these results as a causal relationship.

Additionally, to test whether effort is the mechanism that leads to a higher learning outcome from extension agents, we included an interaction term between effort and treatment status. This was because, for example, farmers assigned to be trained by the extension agents would be more likely to exert more effort to learn because they would expect the agents to be more knowledgeable and would want to extract as much knowledge from them as possible. The results of the interaction term, presented in Table 4, however, show no statistically significant difference in effort level between the two groups. This means that farmers in the extension agent treatment arm were no more likely to exert more effort than those in the model farmer treatment. Hence, the observed higher score in the extension trainer treatment arm could be due to better delivery of the content by extension agents. However, as it is difficult to measure the delivery technique, we were unable to provide evidence for this, and it could be an interesting area for future research.

Locus of control and learning

Another interesting result we uncovered was the role of a farmer's locus of control in knowledge acquisition. Locus of control (LOC) is an individual's sense of control over her or his life (Rotter 1990). According to Rotter (1990), individuals who believe they control what happens in their life are categorised as individuals with internal control, whereas individuals who believe that an external force determines what happens in their life are categorised as individuals with external control. Studies have shown a strong association between LOC and various outcomes. For example, Abay et al. (2017) found that farmers with internal LOC have a higher tendency to adopt new technologies compared to their counterparts with external LOC. Another study in Taiwan found that individuals with internal control tend to have less stress and higher job performance (Chen and Silverthorne 2008).

As can be seen in Table 3, keeping all other factors constant, farmers with an internal locus of control score about 1.05 points higher in the knowledge scale compared to those with an external locus of control (this result is statistically significant at 5 per cent). This appears to be consistent with a study by Piatek and Pinger (2010) that looks at the association between

LOC and wages in Germany, and shows that individuals with internal LOC earn a higher income than those with external LOC. In addition, the study finds that the mechanism through which the effect of LOC is transmitted to wage is the level of education.

Table 3: regression results from ols and probit models

Variables	**Score**	**Score**	**Pass**	**Pass**
Treatment	0.863***	0.906***	0.589***	0.797***
	(3.69)	(4.15)	(3.91)	(4.44)
Effort		0.764***		0.501**
		(3.44)		(2.89)
Farm size		0.0506		0.0555
		(0.73)		(0.97)
Age		-0.0338		-0.0237
		(-1.72)		(-1.54)
Sex		0.464		0.453
		(0.96)		(1.18)
Land size		-0.259		-0.118
		(-1.45)		(-0.81)
Farm experience		0.0207		0.0136
		(1.05)		(0.87)
No education		-0.0238		-0.201
		(-0.06)		(-0.58)
Read and write		-0.139		-0.186
		(-0.32)		(-0.53)
Own a TV		-0.372		-0.126
		(-1.68)		(-0.71)
Position		0.241		0.243
		(0.99)		(1.28)
Internally controlled		1.046**		0.671*

		(2.61)		(2.16)
Training satisfied		0.614*		0.425*
		(2.47)		(2.20)
Trusting		0.225		0.177
		(1.00)		(0.98)
Know more		0.323		0.0906
		(0.86)		(0.31)
Know same		-0.0166		-0.0103
		(-0.05)		(-0.04)
Extension agents know more		0.752		0.280
		(1.88)		(0.91)
Extension agents know same		0.152		0.0360
		(0.37)		(0.11)
Model farmers know more		0.149		0.143
		(0.38)		(0.49)
Model farmers know same		-0.214		-0.194
		(-0.55)		(-0.66)
Trust Extension		0.495*		0.490**
		(2.05)		(2.61)
Constant	5.621***	3.365***	0.0605	-1.560*
	(33.44)	(3.42)	(0.58)	(-2.02)
Observations	300	300	300	300

Notes: The reference categories for farmers' self-assessed knowledgeability, perceived knowledgeability of extension agents, perceived knowledgeability of model farmers, and farmers' education are, 'Model farmers know less', 'Extension agents know less', 'Model farmers know less', and 'Formal education', respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Table 4: Ols regression results with interaction terms

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Score	Score	Score	Score
1.Treatment	0.376		1.049**	0.601
	(1.19)		(3.01)	(1.94)
1.effort	0.705*	1.338***		0.561
	(2.18)	(3.57)		(1.28)
1.Treatment X 1.effort	0.831			0.596
	(1.85)			(1.38)
1.trust_Extension		0.980**		0.574
		(3.08)		(1.77)
1.trust_Extension X 1.effort		-0.456		-0.162
		(-0.96)		(-0.36)
1.no education			0.104	
			(0.31)	
1.Treatment X 1.no education			-0.342	
			(-0.73)	
Cons	5.295***	4.958***	5.562***	3.514***
	(24.13)	(21.42)	(21.93)	(3.49)
Other control variables	No	No	No	Yes
N	300	300	300	300

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.

Significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Determinants of trust, effort and locus of control

We display the results from the probit model in Table 5. Interestingly, none of our demographic and socioeconomic variables correlate significantly with trust in the extension system, with the exception of gender.[6] Moreover, the measure of generalised trust does not correlate with trust in the extension system, ruling out the possible explanation that, generally, more trusting farmerss would tend to show more trust in the extension service. Interestingly, however, the perception of higher knowledgeability of the extension agents strongly and positively correlated with trust in the extension service.

Farmers who believed the extension agents were knowledgeable compared to fellow farmers in the village showed about 92 per cent more trust in the extension service (this result is significant at 1 per cent). Contrarily, farmers who believed they were more knowledgeable compared to fellow farmers in their village showed less trust in the extension service. A farmer who perceived himself as more knowledgeable was about 89 per cent less likely to trust the extension service; this relationship is significant at 5 per cent. The only variable that significantly correlates with effort is 'position', which is whether the farmer has held any position in the community, such as community leadership, community elder, etc. The results show that farmers with positions seemed to exert about 38 per cent more effort compared to farmers who had never held community positions (significant at 10 per cent). On the other hand, we found that none of the variables included in our estimation appeared to affect farmers' LOC.

Table 5: Determinants of trust, effort and locus

Variables	Trust Extension	Effort	Internally controlled
Farm size	-0.0764	0.0906	-0.0955
	(-1.48)	(1.81)	(-1.24)
Age	-0.00461	-0.0146	0.00662
	(-0.32)	(-1.05)	(0.30)
Sex	0.702*	0.108	-0.337
	(1.99)	(0.30)	(-0.58)
Land size	-0.104	-0.264	0.0358
	(-0.80)	(-1.81)	(0.19)
Farm experience	0.0156	0.00280	-0.0114
	(1.06)	(0.20)	(-0.52)
No education	-0.0986	-0.532	-0.965
	(-0.30)	(-1.75)	(-1.12)
Read and write	0.108	-0.130	-1.014
	(0.32)	(-0.42)	(-1.18)
Own a TV	0.0780	-0.00794	0.421
	(0.48)	(-0.05)	(1.71)
Position	0.0379	0.381*	0.0579
	(0.21)	(2.21)	(0.22)

Internally controlled	0.489	0.311	
	(1.70)	(1.09)	
Trusting	-0.102	0.101	-0.405
	(-0.61)	(0.63)	(-1.67)
Know more	-0.888**	0.110	-0.353
	(-3.12)	(0.42)	(-0.67)
Know same	-0.244	0.208	-0.900
	(-0.92)	(0.85)	(-1.81)
Extension agents know more	0.915***	0.337	0.372
	(3.36)	(1.23)	(1.00)
Extension agents know same	0.0266	0.309	0.543
	(0.09)	(1.06)	(1.30)
Constant	-0.670	-0.491	3.442**
	(-0.94)	(-0.71)	(2.63)
Observations	300	300	300

Notes: The reference categories for farmers' self-assessed knowledgeability, perceived knowledgeability of extension agents, perceived knowledgeability of model farmers, and farmers' education are: 'farmers know less', 'extension agents know less' 'model farmers know less', and 'formal education', respectively.

Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

Connecting farmers to scientific knowledge and relevant information is crucial to fostering their productivity and economic growth at large. Cognisant of this, the Ethiopian government has established one of the largest agricultural extension services in the world. However, due to data limitations, its effectiveness as an information and knowledge transmission channel remains unclear. Additionally, as discussed in the introduction, studies argue that the unprecedented level of investment in the extension service by the government is politically motivated, and thus it is used as a tool by the government to control farmers – the majority of the population in Ethiopia. If this is the case, farmers may be sceptical of the motives of the extension agents and may discount information and knowledge that comes from the extension system.

Against this backdrop, to understand whether the extension service is an effective knowledge and information communication channel compared with advice from fellow farmers, we designed and implemented a randomised

training experiment in two districts in Ethiopia. We provided training on a new farm technology known as 'push-pull', to randomly selected farmers, using extension agents and model farmers. Next, we administered a mutiple-choice test, which was drawn from the training, to the trained farmers, in order to identify which type of trainers led to higher knowledge acquisition.

Our results showed that farmers trained by both extension agents and model farmers, on average, scored more than 50 per cent, but learning from extension agents led to a higher knowledge acquisition than learning from model farmers. We also found that those who exerted more effort obtained a higher knowledge score. Similarly, farmers who had more trust in the extension system, and farmers with an internal locus of control, acquired more knowledge. Moreover, we tested if effort was the mechanism that leads to higher knowledge in the extension treatment. However, we found no evidence that the high-learning outcome observed among farmers trained by the extension agents was driven by a greater level of effort exerted by farmers while learning from the extension agents. Thus, our finding might be because the extension agents are better at conveying information.

Based on the results of this study, we draw the following policy recommendations. Firstly, we recommend that the government should keep using both extension agents and model farmers as complementary sources of agricultural knowledge, rather than substituting one for the other. By using the two channels as complements, rather than for example using only EAs, the government could reduce its personnel expenses. Secondly, we recommend that the government should pay due attention to increasing the trustworthiness of the extension service by limiting the responsibilities of the extension agents to agriculture-related work only, and considers separating input distribution from knowledge distribution channels.

Now we discuss some of the important limitations of our study. Firstly, we acknowledge that this study focuses only on identifying an effective knowledge communication channel and understanding the learning process. This means that many other aspects of the knowledge acquisition process are left unexamined. For example, our study does not investigate the wider political and social factors that affect knowledge acquisition in agriculture. Another important limitation of our study is the measurement of locus of control and trust. Given that these concepts are complex and abstract, trying to capture them by using a single survey instrument may be inadequate. Therefore, future research should investigate the broader spectrum of the knowledge acquisition processes and use a more detailed survey and/or experimental approach to obtain more reliable data on trust and locus of control.

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Notes

1. In our context, agricultural technologies refer to new and improved techniques and inputs that can enhance agricultural productivity. However, the concept covers a wider concept. For example, Norton (2014) defines it as follows: 'Agricultural technology classically embraces research and extension, and for the most part research in developing countries has meant the development of new crop varieties and improved methods of crop management in the field.'
2. The study was conducted in Iowa, in the US, where farmers were typically wealthy. Also, the authors do not find resource as a constraint for non-adoption.
3. The history of AES dates back to the out-of-classroom education programmes of Cambridge and Oxford universities around the mid-nineteenth century. Later, the programme was developed by the land grant universities of the US to reach out to farmers and equip them with scientific knowledge for optimal farm operation (Maunder et al. 1972; True 1969). Subsequently, many other countries have adopted the AES.
4. Gots are the lowest administrative units in Ethiopia.
5. This could be due to lower initial expectation of farmers assigned to the model farmer training arm; as we show in the results of the FGD, farmers are sceptical about the knowledgeability of model farmers.
6. We observed that, compared to male farmers, women farmers showed higher trust, keeping other factors constant, significant at 10 per cent. But we view this result with caution since our observation of women was only about 1 per cent of the sample).

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