DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND THE AFRICAN PREDICAMENT

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The study of development on the African continent poses more hazards than the usual problem encountered in development studies elsewhere. This is partly due to the fact that development studies, particularly those involving regions outside western Europe, are inherently comparative. The recent wave of classifications of Africa, Latin America, and large parts of Asia as Third World countries, or into some other grouping of the poor nations of the world, may appear to offer one easy possibility for the comparative study of development in Africa. In fact, however, this mode of presentation poses serious shortcomings in attempts to assess the unique and important features which relevant for understanding Africa's development problem.

The dominant assumption in this paper is that the African region has its unique development problems which deserve separate attention. In one sense direct comparison with the rich development history of Western Europe, and of other developed regions, may in fact help to distinguish these problems much more starkly than would be the case if we were to assume that the African region is stalled in its development efforts by the same problems as in other Third World regions.

The geographical reference of the African region is usually defined with apologies. So that such apologies are not repeated all along this paper, I should delimit the area of application of this analysis of development as Africa minus the Arab North and South Africa. Even so certain caveats still need to be noted. First, although partially Arab, Sudan shares in most of the problems that confront development in the rest of Africa. Secondly, although Ethiopia should be included in the consideration of these development problem, it does not share fully in the discriminating historical characteristics which are central in the consideration of the argument here: these are experiences with the Slave Trade and colonialism. Needless to say, single nation studies

may be more empirically grounded than broad views, which sometimes border on speculative propositions on Africa-wide development. It seems to me, however, that the necessity to ferret out the African genre of development problems justifies such composite assessment as is attempted in this essay.

As protection against the possibility of the analysis of African development becoming idiosyncratic and of little relevance beyond Africa, it is important that the issues examined in studying Africa are embedded in a theoretical corpus of thought, which offers a generalized mode of comparison by introducing a standardized base-line for the consideration of developments in Africa and elsewhere whilst pointing to Africa's unique problem. Of course the aim in carrying out development studies may well be one of controlling and re-directing the programmes of development. Such efforts are usually handicapped because the problems that confront development in Africa are ill- understood. Studies that aim at increasing our understanding of our development problems therefore have an important place in African studies. Although this paper shares in the general objective of explaining Africa's backwardness, its more manifest aim is to isolate Africa's development problems in a broader effort of understanding such problems. In Part I, there is a broad review of the moods which have so far affected the study of African development. In Part II, I construct a methodology which I consider suitable for the study of African development, followed by an assessment of Africa's development problems on the basis of this methodology in Part III.

I. Moods of Development-Thinking on Africa

In a rare essay on the intellectual imagery of prospects for global development in economic thought up to the 1960's, Hans Singer (1964) shows that development theorizing since the Industrial Revolution - as reflected in the economic theories of such leading thinkers as Ricardo, Multhus, Marx, Keynes, and Schumpeter - has oscillated between optimism and pessimism, alternatively for developed economies and underdeveloped countries. These shifts in moods have been matched and sometimes preceded by changes in global economic situations before and after the Second World War.

Although Africa's encounter with development-thinking has been quite brief, really less than four decades, its moods and configurations have varied widely from indifference to optimism and pessimism - along Hans Singer's patterns of oscillation of intellectual moods. Before the fifties, the conception of development for Africa in global

terms, as the total transformation of a nation-state and as a phenomenon capable of being achieved through planned human intervention, was scanty. Africa was of course then enveloped in colonialism and its prospects were only considered in manifest association with the metropolitan and controlling nations of Europe. The arrogant (English) title of Mannoni's (1950) Prospero and Caliban sums up the prevalent notion of development for Africa before the fifties as a region with a limited possibility of followership and dependence on European models.

Indeed, in this period, before the wave of Independence in the 1960's, attention to wholesale issues of development was spotty. Academic interests were directed more to the search for involuntary and unplanned social change, and less to the prospects of full-scale development with state intervention. The emphasis was on the study of social change, understood as a response to opportunities provided in contacts with the West through colonialism. The prototype presentation in this regard in Ottenberg's (1959) famous paper: "Ibbo Receptivity to change". The social organization of the Ibbo was amenable to Western notions to progress, and their response was therefore in the direction of desired social change. Various groups, for a variety of anthropological depictions, were considered progressive on account of their traditional social organization. On the other hand, it was assumed that certain other types of traditional social organizations in Africa could not respond properly to opportunities for social change (cf. Herskovits, 1962). Robert LeVine's (1966) Dreams and Deeds provoked so much attention because it was based on this differential interpretation, even in the late sixties.

The compelling conclusion from these early studies of social changes in Africa was that development was a function, and eventually a responsibility, of society The state, as colonial organization, was not assigned any major role in these considerations of social change in the colonial setting. A close evaluation of the two leading efforts to pool together studies of social change by van den Berghe (1965) and Wallerstein (1966) would reveal that a second major characteristic of these studies is that they were largely ahistorical and hardly went beyond the colonial period to the previous era of the Slave Trade that dominated the region for several centuries before colonization. All told, these early studies of social change and development in Africa up to the fifties had a cavalier aura about them and could hardly be described as optimistic or pessimistic in mood. Such studies on the prospects of social change in Africa were not executed with any degree of commitment and dedication that would compel a definite mood.

They were carried out purely as academic exercises with the trappings of the curiosity of studying alien peoples.

It was on these limited definitions that the grander demands of modernization theory were imposed in the late fifties and early sixties, and were accompanied with total faith and commitment to the possibility of total transformation of whole states, not limited to some endowed societal aspects within them. In an important sense "modernization theory" was a policy and theory that declared faith in the capability of the newer nations of Asia and Africa to achieve, in the second half of the twentieth century, an idealized form of European attainments up to the first half of the century - always with the unspoken hope that the newer achievements would be without the moral scars of European civilization.

The unit of analysis of modernization theory was the state and any analysis of societal aspects of development was always undertaken with reference to the state. Unlike the study of the development of the West which is largely a post- factum exercise, a reconstruction of what happened in history to transform medieval society to modern nations and states, modernization theory is an ante-factum postulate of how a perfected form of nationhood would be attained through the intervention of the state, given the proper endowments. The mood of optimism which characterized modernization theory was predicated more on the strength of cold war rivalries and on the new hopes and rhetorics of Nationalism at Independence than on any thorough assessment of real possibilities. It was also helped by a general buoyancy in the world economic situation in the sixties (cf. Hyden, 1983:2).

The Africa, modernization theory was imperilled from its start. Its major problem area was the state. Africa's post- colonial states were not only frail but were threatened with disintegration by the divisions created and enacted by primordial societal forces (cf. Geertz, 1963). And yet the social and economic transformation necessary for modernization could only be achieved through the involvement of mature states. Thus, the first important problem of modernization theory in Africa was related to the understructuration of the state vis-a-vis society.

It is to the credit of modernization theorists of African development that the "Africanists" of the 1950's and 1960's saw this problem in its rightful context. But it is also a measure of the reigning optimism about the prospects of development in Africa in the

sixties that the "charismatic legitimation theorists" (including Apter, 1963; and Wallerstein, 1961) thought that the African states could be strengthened through the authoritarian assumptions and activities of one-party monopoly of power. Soon, however, by the middle sixties, with the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and the onset of the Nigerian civil war, the credibility of modernization theory (and of its subset charismatic legitimation theory) was forsaken and many of the Africanists of the 1950's turned away to other areas and other interests. As some of the remaining Africanists, like Rene Dumont (1966), Zolberg (1966), and Andreski (1968), began to sound notes of unease, the more cautious and sceptical theoretical views of Geertz (1963) and Runtington (1968) about hindrances to modernization drives came to be taken more seriously in the late sixties and seventies.

But it was not any internal adjustments that succeeded the failures of modernization theory. What captured new attention in Africa was the fancy of underdevelopment and dependency theory with its focus on the adverse effects of the biased relationships between Third World countries and the imperial and other Western nations. The shift from the dominance of modernization theory to the new emphasis on underdevelopment theory marked a new scepticism in African development efforts. Certain features of the reign of underdevelopment theory in the seventies and eighties in Africa are noteworthy. First, while modernization theory was sponsored - and received sympathetic attention from the West in the height of cold war politics - underdevelopment theory was hostile, in intent at least, to the former metropolitan nations and to capitalism generally and it encouraged thoughts of de-linking.

Secondly, although underdevelopment theory has its origins in Latin American experiences, its application and development by a number of African scholars differentiates it from modernization theory which was developed for Africa from the outside with very little input by African scholars. Apart from Samir Amin's (e.g. 1977) prolific writings on the subject, a number of Marxist- inclined African and black scholars, originally based in the liberal environment of Dar-es-Salaam, have for the first time raised issues on problems of development in Africa (cf. Rodney 1972; Ake 1978; Nabudere 1977; Shivji, 1975; Mamdani, 1976) (1).

Thirdly, these underdevelopment theorists have, by their attacks on government elites, for being exploiters, capitalists, and extensions of foreign capital, created some wedge between academic scholarship and government sponsorship of development programmes - at least outside

Tanzania. Finally, while underdevelopment theory in Africa has laid a great deal of emphasis on the international component of dependency, the African structures conjoined into this invidious international network tended to remain largely uninvestigated. In other words, the possibility of the autonomy of African social, political, and economic structures has been denied a priori. As such it has largely remained a theory of criticism, not of substantive engagement with the issues of development.

In the mid-eighties, the fast-changing circumstances of Africa have transformed the realities which had encouraged the growth of underdevelopment theory in Africa. The menace of South Africa notwithstanding, deliberation struggles are becoming less important. As the economic situation worsens, the forces of capitalism seem to be withdrawing from its once-fertile territory of Africa. The Sahelian drought disaster, increasingly shows that the issues that confront Africa have been reduced to elementary ones of food and survival. With these developments in sight, the mood in the assessment of development prospects is fast slipping into one of despair. This shifts in moods from optimism in to scepticism and now to less than pessimism unto despair seems to have exacted a toll on development-thinking on Africa. More and more the new emphasis is away from overall assessments as consideration of development from below are enjoying a boom. Goran Hyden's "economy of affection" is a sign of the times because the promises and ambitions of higher development have suffered serious relapses.

Given these spectacular fluctuations in academic moods in a span of some three decades, it must be admitted that it is a treacherous exercise to theorize on the nature of African development. However, rather than abandon thinking on the nature of development in Africa entirely, what seems called for is a mode of conceptualizing these problems so that they are not weighted by prevailing moods - be these optimism, scepticism, or despair. I have chosen the methodology of what Lovejoy (1942) calls unit-ideas to deal with this problem. As formulated by Lovejoy, and as elaborated by Robert Nisbet (1966) in Sociology, unit-ideas are the constitutive constructs that resonate the essence of a discipline. In effect, unit-ideas jointly provide the platform and backcloth to the stage on which parade the essential ideas that measures the scope and depth of the discipline. As such, unit-ideas do offer standardized norms against which particularly variations in any regions of the discipline can be measured and compared. The assumption that underlies the following exercise is that development-thinking constitutes a disis an area of specialization. It

is hope that what follows will provide an objective evaluation of Africa's development problems.

II. Unit-Ideas of Development Theory

Development theory spans many academic disciplines and includes conceptions of transformations in units as diverse as the nation-state in the social sciences and the embryo in the biological sciences. The unit-ideas that are highlighted here do reflect this diversity. These are: (i) epochs as benchmarks of development; (ii) threshold problems of development as growth crises; (iii) the environment and the historical moment of development; (iv) reciprocity and exploitation in the development process; and (v) the end-product of development.

The unit-ideas of development-thinking are not without a pattern. They may be grouped into two type: (a) three basicelements intrinsic to any programme of development; and (b) two cybernetic elements which relate the developing unit to the wider environment.

The first basic unit-idea is the base-line, or the benchmark starting point, for the development process. Secondly, there is an intervention process, a series of events either consciously engineered or ineluctably provoked by unplanned societal processes, which lead to the desired end- state of the development process. In the listing of the unit- ideas presented above, the intervention process is represented by "threshold problems and growth crises", for reasons that will be specified later. The third basic unit-idea is the end- product of the development process (2).

Apart from these basic unit-ideas, the discussion of two cybernetics unit-ideas is important for a full understanding of the development process. These relate to the management of the relationships between the developing units and the wider context in which it is implicated. The first cybernetics unit-idea has been styled here as relationship of reciprocity and exploitation between the developing unit and the wider world in which it functions. Secondly, the development impulse is helped or retarded by the historical moment and the particular environment of the development process.

With these brief indications of what unit-ideas of development refer to, we may now attempt more extended definitions of each of these unit-ideas in development-thinking.

(i) Epochs as Benchmarks of Development

Epochs are enduring social formations which emerge at points of time and history of nations and civilizations and which continue to influence thoughts and actions long after their occurrence. As benchmarks, epochs mediate between the past and the future - standing out as watersheds and thus as the base-lines for further developments. They become the historical and sociological reference points for the analysis and synthesis of behaviours and actions of individuals and groups in areas subject to the influence of such epochs (cf. Ekeh, 1983).

The Industrial Revolution (with its associated formations of capitalism) and the French Revolution have usually been regarded as such landmarks in the introduction of modernity. We may regard both of those twin Revolutions as prototype epochs. Most other epochs in the history of modern nations are the outcomes and developments from these prototype beacons of modernity. We may thus define two other types of epochs. Secondly, then, in addition to prototype epochs, there are derived epochs which flow from the prototype epochs and serve as their elaborations in structure and functioning. Derived epochs are, in effect, elaborations and refinements of prototype epochs and eventually enchance the civilizational movements - in the control of natural forces and of achieving greater human equality and freedom within nations - which prototype epochs introduce into history. Indeed the continuity and enduring significance of the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution are predominantly due to the vitality of drived epochs outside England and France. Thirdly, and different from derived epochs, there are other epochal formations which in different forms flow from the prototype epochs but which harm their areas of impact and do not contribute to the appreciation of the movements introduced by the prototype epochs. Following a usage by Myrdal (1957), I shall label these as backwash epochs. Thus in Africa, both the Slave Trade era and colonialism are related to the Industrial Revolution and emerging capitalism, but their harmful and backwash effects have enduring significance in Africa.

(ii) Threshold Problems of Development as Growth Crises

For further forward thrust to be possible, development efforts which involve national transformations especially in their economic and political spheres, run against various problems which need successful resolution. These are threshold problems in the sense that they are problems that are encountered at some points in the histories of national developments and in the further sense that the outcomes of

attempts to resolve them determine the national capability to move forward or else to stagnate or even retreat. The resolution of such threshold problems is thus a necessary, although not a sufficient, condition for national transformations. These sets of problems may only be partially pictured in the same fashion as those of the "stages" theories of development. In "stage" theories of development, such as Karl Marx's and Walt Rostow's, threshold problems are also posed for the systems under the pressure of transformation and their resolutions are necessary for achieving the desired forward thrust. However, such historical stages of development - as it is also the case with psycho-biological stages of development posited by Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget, and Erick Erichson - are sequential and follow one upon the other in a necessary fashion.

My use of threshold problems is different in this sense. Threshold problems may be seen as analytical non-sequential definitions of autonomous problem areas whose resolution will enable the developing entity to climb unto a higher level of existence. Such a postulate of threshold problems is premised on the assumption that development is crisis-ridden. Those perspectives on development processes that offer success in development programmes on the platter of gold as gradualist and painless substract from the realities of development history: every development effort is faced with growth crises and it is their resolution that provides the impulse for a forward thrust.

I identify four such threshold problems of development that require crisis resolution in programmes of national transformations as follows: (a) the integration and differentiation of state and society; (b) the hogemonization of society; (c) the development of the self; (d) and the management of culture and civilization. The threshold problems are liable to be confounded and shrouded in the long-drawn history of developments of the mature nations of, say, England, France, United States, Japan, and the Soviet Union. On the other hand the more elementary conditions in Africa will enable us to illustrate these problems in a clearer manner.

The Integration and Differentiation of State and Society

The relationship between state and society poses a major threshold problem in national development in at least four directions. First, development requires that each of these components of the nation be adequately developed to withstand the strains of national transformation. The defective structuring of any of them may retard development programmes. Secondly, national development requires that

as either the state or society advances in structure, the other should grow in some proportion along with it. The stagnation of one and the growth of the other threatens the advance momentum. Thirdly, the growth of these two components of the nation should be integrated into the same moral givens. In other words, the growth of the state should be underlined by the moral of society. Fourthly, the growth of the two also requires that they be able to carry out their differentiated tasks with reference to the needs of each other and of their common goals.

Each of these requirements and elements in the relationship between state and society is a brittle one fraught with crises. National development proceeds, as it were, on the balanced twin shoulders of the state and society. It is a dynamic relationship which changes with growth and requires frequent adjustments.

The Hegemonization of Society

National development distinctively requires that the critical elites from various sectors of society and the masses of the people be subject to the imperatives of a common hegemonic order and that the relationships between the different strata of society be integrated into this hegemonic order, which is understand in its Gramscian rendering as:

an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connections (Williams, 1960).

In mature and old nations the hegemonic order emerged with national history. In newer nations the creation of such hegemonic order must be assumed to be the responsibility of a national power elite one of whose defining characteristics is the management of hegemonic bonds. When there is absence or severance of bonds between the elite and the masses; the rich and the poor; the old and the young; town dwellers and rural peasantry; then the impulse for development is weakened and the forward thrust is in danger.

The Development of the Self

A more subtle and even slippery threshold problem concerns the

way the changes in socio-economic and political sectors during periods of transformation are matched by changes in childhood socialization programmes and thus in the resulting social character of individuals in society. In order to be sustained national programmes must rest on some requisite personality attributes. Such personality attributes might have been developed unobstructively in the past when national transformations were unplanned (cf. McClelland, 1955, 1961; Hagen, 1962). But conscious national transformations in the modern situation require intervention in childhood socialization in order to elicit the requisite social character formations, as early experiences in the Soviet Union (cf. Brofenbrenner, 1962, 1970) and the kibbutz programmes of socialization (cf. Sprio, 1958) demonstrate. Lack of change in the right direction in socialization represents a crisis of major threshold proportions.

Management of Culture and Civilization

Economic transformations, particularly in the form of industrialization programmes, command their own trans-cultural correlates. Inexorably industrialization compels its own distinct value patterns which promote its sustenance irrespective of ideological patterns (cf. Inkeles; Inkeles and Smith, 1974). We may term this cluster of emergent value and trans-cultural traits that promote, uphold, and exist along with industrialization as industrial civilization. This strain of industrial civilization must be distinguished from national cultures which exist long before industrialization takes place in any region. The degree of compatibility between industrial civilization and national cultures determines to a large extent the political fortunes of nations. The sustenance of industrialization requires that the national culture be rationalized in the direction of industrial civilization. Such rationalization helps to energize the national culture in the service of maintaining the advance momentum.

In Great Britian where economic and industrial transformation began, such rationalization was prolonged and had its own natural history. Elsewhere it has come pre-packaged. As Veblem (1954: 85) puts it in the case of Germany:

the German people have been enabled to take up the technological heritage of the English without having paid for it in the habits of thought, the use and wont, included in the English community in achieving it. Modern technology has come to Germany ready- made, without the cultural consequences which its gradual development and

continued use has entailed upon the people whose experiences initiated it and determined the course of its development.

But as it was in the case of Germany, lack of cultural rationalization could lead to such reactions as engulfed Germany in the early decades of this century. (Also cf. Fromm, 1941). The need for harmonization between national cultures and industrial civilization may well be greater in other regions outside the cultural matrix of Europe and the social consequences may also be greater. This problem becomes even more challenging in regions where there is an amalgam of cultures rather than a single national culture. Very often the attempt to jump over the step of developing national cultures, by hooking up directly with an international culture of industrial civilization, provokes deep threshold crises in development periods. @fotn tx9i; (iii) The Environment and the Historical Moment of Development

A considerable amount of the impulse and strength of any development programme flows from the environment and the historical moment in which it takes place. The environment and the historical moment of development constitute what Wolfram Eberhard (1968) labelled the world-time of development. They are the world historical imperative which control and constrain development programmes. To cite Eberhard's own example, the post- World War II period is suffused with diluted Marxist and socialist ideals and so while developing countries in the nineteenth century could boast about their capability to exploit the countryside and the peasantry, twentieth-century national developments must accept a quasi-Marxist definition of the environment in terms of a doctrine of equality which regards as unacceptable and offensive the exploitation of sections of the community, even in the service of overall development.

Even more impelling are the changes in the international environments of development. These can be differentiated into three types: First, national developments can take place in isolation, as it was the case in the beginnings of modern USSR and China, by erecting barriers, with matching autarky, separating the developing countries from international economic systems. Secondly, national developments could also be carried out in insulation, at it was in the case of Japan and as is the case of current Indian efforts at development, by erecting not physical but cultural and symbolic barriers in such a manner as to enable development objectives and goals to be sieved through them. Thirdly, apart from these Asian and Eastern European examples, most of the national development programmes in the past-War II period have been carried out in the environment of

internationalization in which national developments are embedded in the growing internationalized world system. Along with the growth of this environment is the emergence of an international order which regulate national economies and which defines the directions and limits of national development efforts.

(iv) Reciprocity and Exploitation in Development

National development involves a variety of relationships between the developing units and other national and multi- national units in the international order, many of which are already well developed. In ideal terms, as in classical theory of international trade, these relationships are those of mutual reciprocity in which both sides bargain to benefit from the relationship. There is an assumption in such postulation that the relationship of reciprocity is between equal units, with balanced structures. Where, however, these relationships are not between equal units, exploitation creeps in, tilting the balance in favour of the stronger units.

Relationships of exploitation become much more strengthened and thorough-going when the parties do not maintain a mere mutual relationship between two units but are rather involved in larger multi-unit generalized relationships, because "exploitation in generalized exchange situation is attributable to the system rather than to individual" participating units (cf. Ekeh, 1974: 204-213). Thus, the emergence of an autonomous international order enhances exploitation by raising international relationship from mutual to generalized reciprocity. When developing nations are involved in these relationships, the development efforts are seriously affected.

(v) The End-Product of Development

As national and regional developments become less and less involuntary and more and more planned and programmed, and as state intervention in national development programmes expands, the end-product of development efforts are envisaged well ahead of realization. These end-products of national developments of course include the ultimate aim of upgrading the social welfare and the standards of living of citizens. But the two leading definitions of this ultimate aim of development, that is of capitalist and socialist national orders, have become dominant contenders as the anticipated end-products of national development. In the post World War II period, developments have been prosecuted in the face of full awarness of Marxist and other theories of the development process which have

served as warning mechanisms, influencing the end-results of national development.

What this points to is a change from an epigenetic model of development, in which the nature of the end-product is determined by the intrinsic routine of the development process, to an emphasis on preformationism, in which the end-result is presumed to be pre-determined and thus known well from the start. This posture has thus become an integral part of the problem-set in development-thinking.

These then are the unit-ideas of development-thinking that will help us to evaluate the African experience: epochs as bench- marks of development, four threshold problems of development as growth crises (state-society relationships; the hegemonization of society; development of the self; and the management of culture and civilization); the environment and the historical moment of development; reciprocity and exploitation in the development process; and the end-product of development. It is fair to add that the formulation of these unit-ideas has been influenced by the problem at hand, namely, an evaluation of the crisis on the African agenda of development which poses harsher and starker questions than experiences in other regions of the world.

III. Development Problems and Development Crisis in Africa

(i) The Slave Trade and Colonialism as Backwash Epochs for African Development

In terms of the time-span of their occurrence and their continuing significance in modern modes of thought and action, the era of the slave trade and colonialism occupy the most prominent places in the social and economic history of Africa. That this has not been the case with the Slave Trade probably points to a Freudian cover and an indication of the embarrassment and sensitivity with which these prolonged epochal events, particularly the Slave Trade, are viewed in Africa, Europe and America.

The African Slave Trade and the subsequent colonization of Africa were fully related to the central events that transformed Europe into the modern world. The Atlantic Slave Trade, which reinforced the Trans-Saharan Slave Trade, arose to service the needs of merchant capitalism in England and elsewhere. The Slave Trade was brought to an end, and followed by colonialism, because the economic needs of

England and Europe has shifted from merchant capitalism to industrial capitalism which required more settled conditions than the massive disruptions which characterized the Slave Trade. As Eric Williams (1944: 210) demonstrated more than forty years ago:

merchant capitalism ... developed the wealth of Europe by means of slavery and monopoly. But in so doing it helped to create the industrial capitalism of the nineteenth century, which turned round and destroyed the power of commercial capitalism, and all its works.

Although the African Slave Trade was related to domestic slavery in Africa and eventually linked to the end-points of the Trade in the Americas, it is important to distinguish between domestic servitude and the Slave Trade qua capitalist economic exchange in assessing the respective impacts. Domestic slavery, whether in its African or American form, did contribute to the stability of society, albeit an unjust society. On the other hand the trans-Atlantic and the Trans-Saharan Slave Trade not only foisted on Africa immediate destruction of the fabric of society but also sowed the seeds of continuing crisis and underdevelopment in Africa across several centuries of time well up to the present.

The Slave Trade, with varying degrees of intensity, spanned a period of at least eight centuries. The Nigerian economic historian Joseph Inikori's (1982: 22) overall estimate of the trade is as follows:

the total export of people from sub-Saharan Africa to the Muslim world and to the European colonies can be put at ... about 30 million. Taking only the period during which exports to the Muslim world and to the European colonies ran concurrently, that is from 1500 to 1890, the total comes to ... about 22 million.

In his overall assessment of the damage done to Africa through the Slave Trade, Inikori (1982: 59-60) points:

In the end, underpopulation and the political and social distortions arising from the slave trade created conditions entirely hostile to the process of economic transformation. To make matters worse, the stimulating influence of commodity export trade could not operate as the slave trade prevented development and growth of all other forms of trade. Sub-Saharan Africa thus developed over the slave trade era as a periphery of other economies in the Atlantic area. And once that position was firmly entrenched, it tended to be self-perpetuating (emphasis added).

Indeed, we must accept the Slave Trade as a backwash epoch for the important reason that, in addition to what Inikori says of its impact, it led to social formations and social processes which continue to hinder current efforts at Africa's development. First, the Slave Trade clearly led to the intensification of domestic slavery in pre-colonial Africa (cf. Rodney, 1966) and simultaneously, implanted a strain of violence and the devaluation of human worth in African societies. In this respect, the era of the Slave Trade casts a long shadow which today haunts the prospects of law and order and the prospects for settled conditions in which the required economic transformations could take place. At the very least it can be claimed that this strain of violence which emerged in the era of slavery has persisted all through the colonial period up to the present - up to a point where violence has become institutionalized and adopted by the state.

Secondly, it is postulated that kinship in Africa arose in conditions of the Slave Trade. Although social anthropologists, who dominated the African academic scene during colonial rule well up to the fifties, showed clearly that African politics and society were dominated by kinship behaviour (cf. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940). The functionalist assumptions which dominate the discipline and its anti-historical methodology precluded from searching for the origins of kinship. The social origins of the dominant kinship behaviour in Africa must be sought in the conditions of survival duting centuries of the Slave Trade. In a situation of generalized violence and ravage, with no state structures to protect individuals and groups, it must be expected that some social structure would emerge to provide some degree of protection. It is the case that during this historical period, no other institution other than kinship has performed this role - at least not until Islam arrived in the nineteenth century in parts of the Western Sudan. In this context, kinship behaviour was therefore, a structure which emerged in reaction to the Slave Trade. Its role of offering protection for individuals and groups gives kinship an enduring characteristic which flows into its modern history.

In Africa kinship was never exclusively a domestic institution but was central to politics and therefore to the public realm. In this regard, it will be found that the greater the impact of the slave trade in any region of Africa, the bonds of kinship were liable to be stronger. Whatever pristine states were in existence during era of the Slave Trade rested on the pillars of kinship. Under colonialism, and with the expansion of kingroups and kinship systems into modern

ethnic groups and ethnicity (cf. Sklar, 1960; Wallerstein, 1960), this political character of kinship behaviour and ethnicity continues to ruin prospects for the development of modern "rational" states which are free from control by the primordial forces of kinship and ethnicity. Compared to other regions of the world, Africa stands out in the matter of the political salience of kinship behaviour and ethnicity (cf. Young, 1976, especially p. 512) - thanks to the historical legacy of the Slave Trade (3).

Thirdly, the Slave Trade era may be related to the counter- factual investigation of the absence of a feudal past from African history. In comparative world history the absence of feudal past in Africa with the probably exceptions like Ethiopia is remarkable (see Hyden 1983:10). Asia and Europe have their feudal past. If the Americas lack their own specific feudal past, they nevertheless share in the European feudal experience. Why did Africa fail to develop its own feudal past? The answer lies in the social disruptions of the Slave Trade which deprived Africa of the relative economic and cultural isolation required for the development of feudalism. The absence of a feudal past implies that Africa does not share with other regions which had histories of feudalism certain attributes of modernity that flow from well-established traditions of feudal relationships. Feudalism has been the most fertile ground for the growth of traditions of rulership. Relationships and bonds among rulers in a feudal order; the rights and obligations that define feudal relationships between lord and peasants; the discipline of office: all these elements of feudalism inform and shape the conduct of modern forms of leadership and rulership in Asia and Europe, and even in the Americas. In these areas, traditions of military prowess and decorum are transformed from their feudal origins into modern definitions of the role of the military. In sharp contrast to such regions with a feudal past, the poverty of modern African leadership is that it lacks these roots of feudal traineeship and thus cohesion in its national leaderships (Ekeh, 1985) - thanks again to the ravages of the slave Trade which prevented the emergence of any forms of feudalism in most of Africa (4).

Fourthly, and admittedly more speculatively, the Slave Trade engendered a world view and a distinct rationality that suited conditions of instability. The management of discontinuity seemed central to the proper conduct of affairs in the conditions of the Slave Trade in which whole families and villages were threatened with extinction (cf. Curtin, 1967). Such circumstances are different from those of stable conditions in which the management of continuous processes may engender the more conventional rationality which we

identify with industrial civilization. In circumstances based on the prospects of discontinuity, it may not be rational to save. On the contrary, it may be entirely rational to develop a spirit of work and consumption that is defined in terms of the here-and-now. Just as large families offered greater probability of ensuring that the kinship group would be sustained in the face of discontinuities induced by the Slave Trade and such other related natural disasters as plagues and famines, so fatalism in religious convictions offered a mode of rationality in communities with circumscribed world views (cf. Wiredu, 1980: 16-20) in an era dominated by a trade and violence whose end not even the most sophisticated ruler could understand.

In other words, their develop a rationality and a world view appropriate for conditions of violence and discontinuities during centuries of the Slave Trade. While the rationality of capitalism and industrialization deals with, and sustains, continuous processes, the rationality of the Slave Trade was fashioned to confront problems of discontinuities in social structures and social processes. Such rationality and world view and the conditions that encouraged them are hardly over two generations removed from the African present. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that in ways that could perhaps be described as sublime these realities persist and adversely affect modern development imperatives in Africa.

Compared to the long span of the Slave Trade, colonialism occupied a small layer of African history - in many cases less than seventy years. It is often imagined that colonialism is a reversal of the Slave Trade. True, colonialism sought to introduce settled order to a region virtually reduced to anarchy. It brought in its baggage of training, symbols and substantive crumbs of Western culture and industrial civilization and effectively transformed the continent as a periphery of the world system. In spite of these appearances, it was a historical impossibility for colonialism to reverse social formations and world views spanning centuries of experiences in a few decades and with minor efforts. Indeed, there is more of continuity between the Slave Trade era and colonialism than is often imagined. The sediment of the Slave Trade lies deep in the African soil, beneath the superstructural formations of colonialism.

As far as development possibilities are concerned, we may limit our assessment of the long-run significance of colonialism characterizing the development-bearing potentials of colonialism as a backwash epoch in Africa. Colonialism was from its beginnings fashioned to be, and so it remained, a recipient of industrial

civilization and not its creator or booster. The industrial and cultural artifacts of colonialism were dropped, as it were, from above and were never blended with our history and underlying world views. The result, for development, is one of social fixation, akin to the cultural fixation described for the European implantations outside Europe by Louis Hartz (1964). There is a manifest problem of immobility in technology, in industrial and bureaucratic models, in colonized Africa. Organizational and social fixation of colonialism means that "We treat with respect the organization that we inherited from colonization and we are stuck to it. There is an organizational immobility in Africa - largely because the morality and ethics that provide the stimulus for homegrown organizations in Europe for self-sustained refinement and expansion are absent from our migrated social structure" (Ekeh, 1983: 18) of colonialism as represented in the sprawling bureaucracies, hospitals, schools, railways, and industries. In other words, it is much easier to effect organizational changes in Europe, were these institutions imported from, than in their counterparts in colonized Africa.

Together, the Slave Trade and colonialism are compelling reference points in Africa's encounter with development prospects. Their continuing significance is highlighted in the fact that other unit-ideas of development-thinking on Africa gain their maximum interpretation and meaning only when considered in the context of the enduring backwash effects of the Slave Trade and colonialism. Their overall impact from the view that the Slave Trade and colonialism account for the rise of important social formations which have shaped the social, political, and economic structure of Africa. The key institutions of these social formations developed as reaction formations and have on the whole proved resistant to subsequent social and economic transformations of the African region.

(i) Threshold Problems and Growth Crises in African Development

The most distinctive and worrying attribute of development theory and practice in Africa is that as development units African nations are confronted with time-packed threshold problems and accompanying growth crises which took developed nations the leisure of centuries to resolve. While many European nations were faced with these problems in phases, usually one at a time, in the African experience all of them are conflated into one compound problem and cry for resolution under time-pressure.

The Poverty of State-Society Relationships in African Development

This crowded agenda of development in Africa is most pronounced in the consideration of the formation of the African state and of its relationship to society. As Charles Tilly (1975) and several other writers on the European state (e.g., Poggi, 1978) have shown, European nations faced these problems and had them resolved in a time spread of centuries and well before the modern age. The African experience is quite different. With incomplete and partial exceptions such as Northern Nigeria, colonialism did not incorporate pristine and indigenous state structures into the organization of the colonial state. Indeed, through various processes of demotion, incorporation, and reduction in the status of indigenous political systems. Colonialism represented the dismantling and sometimes the smashing of the indigenous state structures inherited from the slave trade era - where they existed. In other situations where state structures were not yet evident, colonialism was itself the beginning of state formation. By and large post-colonial states have emerged as extensions and expansions of the colonial state.

A few characteristics of this emergent African state may be noted as follows: First, the African state is understructured. Although the post-colonial state is relatively elaborate in its bureaucratic sphere and coercive elements of the military and police structures, it is weak in other respects, particularly in the area of legislative assemblies. Secondly, in its formation the modern African state was dissociated from the imperatives of society. As a colonial formation, the African state has hardly related its structure to the needs of society. Thirdly, although African states are, almost by definition, nation-states, there are no national societies to which they could relate. African states have had therefore to take upon themselves the hazardous task of building national societies by attacking the cultural pluralism of colonialism (cf. Zolberg, 1966; Saul, 1979; Ekeh, 1985).

These peculiar characteristics of African states have posed some critical threshold problems which are hurting Africa's development efforts seriously. These problems relate to the lack of integration and differentiation of state and society in Africa. As Smelser (1964:277) has written, "Development proceeds as a contrapuntal interplay between differentiation ... and integration". In the histories of the West, USSR, Japan and present day India, the development impulse owes a great deal to the fact that state and society are integrated into a common moral fount and therefore that public behaviours are informed by societal morality. In Africa the development impulse has been

weakened by the fact that such integration never took place. Instead the state operate outside the morality of society on the principle of amoralism (Ekeh, 1975). Similarly, the functional differentiation of the state and society - that is, the differentiation of the functions which both of these arms of the nation perform in a common programme of facilitating their common ends and of aiding each other - has not taken place. In other words, as the state grows and as society proliferates in its own diversity the resulting elements are not linked together by any profounder bonds. On the contrary there is growing antagonism between state and society. And yet national development, in its various defining sectors, needs the bonded integration and differentiation of state and society to undertake the challenges of economic and social transformation.

Indeed, this threshold problem underlies various indicators of failure that observers of the African development scene have recently registered. Whether seen from the point of view of Robert Bates' (1981) negative evaluation of the role of the african state in agricultural expansion, or of Watts' (1983:23) views that the state "was incapable of regularizing the conditions of production in northern Nigeria and often contributed directly to the vulnerability of peasants upon whom it ultimately depended", or even of Hyden's (1983) reasons for recommending retreat to the economy of affection: these issues flow from the threshold problem of the growth crisis in the relationship between state and society in Africa.

The problem is complication by the fact that the amoral state is attempting in several nations to re-build society on new and firmer moral foundations, as in the case of the military campaign for a new moral society in Nigeria's WAR AGAINST INDISCIPLINE. So much energy is spent on correcting the consequences of this crisis - corruption, *coup d'états*, violence etc - that the more tangible and substantive and visible programmes of development are handicapped. Obviously, if time had allowed, this threshold problem ought to be solved by a process of prolonged domestication before economic and social transformations are attempted. But Africa's predicament lies in the fact that time is not on its side in these development decades.

Kinship and the Hegemonization Problem in Africa

One major consequence of the amorality of the state and of the difficulties in the relationships between state and society in Africa is the absence of any national hegemonic order, "an order in which a common moral language is spoken, in which one concept of reality is

dominant, informing with its spirit all modes of thought and behaviour" (Femia, 1981:24). A Gramscian hegemonic order requires that the different sectors of society, the various classes, be conjoined and integrated into a common underlying ideological pool of motivational tendencies. "It follows that hegemony is the predominance obtained by consent rather than force of one class or group over other classes" (Femia, 1981:24).

No such hegemony has been achieved in post-colonial Africa. Instead, kinship and ethnic groups have provided regional quasi-hegemonic orders which state forces are anxious to attack and destroy. The lack of a hegemonic order has led to the grave consequence that the elites in African nations lack common moral definitions and common moral basis for their existence. The tragic consequence is one in which the elites eliminate themselves in a war of one elite against all elites. Distrust among the elite is rife. Greater still is distrust among elites from different ethnic groups and kinship systems.

The consequences of the lack of an hegemonic order are far-reaching when considered in relation to development prospects. First, because it leads to the absence of national power-elites in African nations, the national interest is not promoted and protected from exploitation. Apart from such wasting conflicts such as the Nigerian civil war and Batusti-Hutsi conflicts in Rwanda, both of which were initially conflicts between ethnic elites, fundamental distrust among the elites often leads to distortions in economic policies. To cite one prominent example: the iron and steel industry in Nigeria has had to be spread across the expanse of the country, in spite of the obvious logic of a capital-intensive industry and the economies of scale, because the elite from various areas would prefer to have a piece of the industry in their regions. The growing tendency toward Caesarianism, with internecine conflicts among the elites, flows out of the absence of a common hegemonic order in African nations. Its opportunity costs in the matter of development possibilities must be reckoned to be quite high.

Childhood Socialization and Africa's Underdevelopment

The recognition of the salient role of childhood socialization in the transformation of nations varies enormously in different regions of the world. It is clearly given considerable recognition in every nation that is now developed. In a sense, the acceptance of the dramatic significance of child training is central to the cultivation of the potential for economic transformation. That this threshold problem

has been tucked away in the province of the authority of the family does not minimize its central importance in the West or elsewhere for achievements in development. Put differently, the transformation of the developed nations of the world would not have been possible without changes in childhood socialization within the authority of the family and the resulting emergence of an appropriate social character in these nations. This "intro- spective revolution" (Weinstein and Platt, 1969), to cite one interpretation of this process, is the silent revolution that underlies development - and is as much evident in Aton Makarenko's teachings in leading to the formation of the new Soviet man as in America's baby doctor's role in producing those personality attributes that have sustained capitalism in the US. Just as Marxism has gained a voice in the discussions of the superstructural problems of economic transformation in nations, so must the tenets of the Freudian Revolution of childhood training be taken into account in the substructural preparations for development.

It is the lack of recognition of the underlying necessity of appropriate changes in childhood socialization that poses one of the most intractable problem in Africa's development efforts. The nucleated self, whose essence is aligned with desired development goals, has simply not been shaped and is not forthcoming. The pace of changes required in the new modes of economic pursuits is not reflected in corresponding changes in childhood socialization. Childhood socialization in much of Africa is still kin-bound and unrelated to development programmes. As remedial measures, several African states now spend a great deal of scare resources in training young men and women to practice the virtue of patriotism - obviously outside the recognition that "the child is father of the man".

Understandably, the significance of childhood socialization is rarely grasped by political leaders and military rulers in African nations. Childhood is largely considered to be outside the framework of national considerations: individuals attain national attention only when they have survived the travails of childhood. Even more noteworthy is the position of African development theorists and practitioners on the significance of childhood training. Stretching back to Billy Dudley's (1973) derisive characterization of the emphasis on childhood training as "diaperology", many African scholars not only fail to appreciate the significance of childhood socialization for development prospects, but are likely to dismiss it as passee, as an argument already abandoned in the U.S. and Europe.

What is involved in such condemnation may be characterized as the

fallacy of dependency determinism and is manifest and widespread in African scholarship in various ideological hues. When a paradigm is prominent in the U.S. and Europe, or Latin America, usually because it addresses a pressing problem in the society of invention, it spreads rapidly to African scholarship, even if the problem that give rise to such a paradigm is of little importance to Africa. Conversely, when a prominent paradigm in the social sciences in the West goes into decline, usually because it is no longer able to cope with new realities, it also quickly suffers a relapse in Africa, even if the problem such a paradigm is designed to solve are still pressing in Africa.

Childhood socialization was a prominent subject in the U.S. up till the fifties and sixties, largely because it helped to explain important shifts and variations in American society (cf. Wolfenstein, 1951; Riesman, 1950; Miller and Swanson, 1958). But it has, particularly in the late seventies and eighties, received less academic attention because it has attained a settled pattern. For this reason it has also gone out of fashion in African scholarship even at a time when the problems related to childhood socialization, of the need for social control and the inculcation of new values, have become ever more pressing. Such fallacy of dependency determinism is particularly pervasive in the uncritical adoption of paradigms of development in economics and is equally prevalent among non-Marxist scholars as it is in the rote adoption of European definitions of Marxist problematics of development by Afro-Marxists.

African Culture as Antithesis of Industrial Civilization

The cultural scene in African nations is one of complex diversity. Crawford Young's (1976:511) overall assessment of this cultural scene is that there is widespread in African nations:

a shared normative perspective as to the cultural neutrality of the state. This partly derives from the complete artificiality of most states, joined to the awareness of the multicultural basis of society. The ideology of nation-building in this setting involves suffusing the state with non-specific African symbols, epitomized by Mobutu's "authenticity" campaign in Zaire, the negritude of Senghor, the utilization of Swahili as a non-ethnic national culture in Tanzania.

The character of these "nonspecific African symbols" does reflect an intellectual overlay in the phenomenological interpretation of African cultures as the antithesis of industrial civilization. From the point of view of African culture-makers, as most dramatically revealed in the

Nigeria- sponsored FESTAC (Festival of Arts and Culture) in the late 1970's, African culture is not only autonomous; it is also opposed to the strain of industrial civilization (which is collapsed with, and seen in terms of Western civilization) (5) from which it must be protected. In plainer language, African culture is increasingly being seen and defined as anti-modernity.

There are features of this quest for a different and distinct culture for Africa, and of the way it is pursued, which affect development prospects on the continent. First, the cultural energies of African nations have not been harnessed and released for development purposes, as say in Japan. Indeed, development seems to be seen as an alien enterprise, to the cultivation of which indigenous culture is not required to contribute. Secondly, the erection of this demarcation between African culture and industrial civilization deprives the African experience from attaining a measure of industrial discipline in sublimated cultural and value preferences in society. Indeed it allows the elite to live at once the double life of native chieftains and of industrial and modern mandarins: thus, academic African elites are allowed to resort to polygamy on the grounds that it is enjoined by African culture and at the same time to aspire to, say, the headship of a modern university without seeing any underlying conflict in so doing. Thirdly, African culture is actually retarded from this assumption of contre-position between African culture and industrial civilization. By being rendered as anti-modern, African culture is unable to go through the process of simplification and refinement, which Arnold Teynbee somewhere labels etherization, in which culture is transformed into sublime themes. For instance, traditional elitism in Africa (which defines the roles of kings and chiefs) is prevented from further development by the requirements of antimodernity of African culture. Fourthly, given their contra-positions the reconciliation of African culture with industrial civilization has become difficult. The danger in this is that African culture is forced to change by capture, as it were, by forces of modernity. Rather than being domesticated by traditional culture, industrial civilization with its enormous international strength displaces and captures indigenous culture particularly the youth (6).

One general remark may be made about the four threshold problems. Each of them requires considerable time since threshold problems pose strategies of domestication that need more than one generation for solving these problems and the growth crises that accompany them. Such time-evaluation of the threshold problems suggests that they are more critical for late starters whose development

efforts are compressed into a shortened time-frame.

(iii) Internationalized environment of Africa's Development and the Problems of Late Developers

From its history of the Slave Trade and of colonialism, both of which spanned over five centuries, and continuing unto its contemporary history, Africa remains the most exposed, of all regions of the world, to outside influences. No other region has the unmitigated experience of having its programmes of development wholly formed in an internationalized environment - with no shades of isolation or insulation. Isolation has rarely been practiced in the history of development elsewhere and appears in any case to be outside the reach of Africa: this is so not only because African nations are not in a political position to decide on an isolationist policy but also because they lack the broad market base that would make such policy of autarky realistic. Insulation requires a dominant core culture and the mobilization of the cultural energy of a nation for the required transformation by a committed national power elite. African countries are lacking in all these respects. African development is thus left exposed to an internationalized environment.

Such an unmitigated internationalized environment, as we have in Africa, weakens the development impulse because it lacks a home-grown cultural and value base for sustained and self-perpetuating growth. In the African case culture and history are being separated from development efforts which, to repeat a previous point, are increasingly seen and defined as an alien enterprise and abandoned to internationalism. The problem with internationalized environments of development is that the capability for national transformations is a function of fluctuations in the international economic and political mood which is controlled by events outside Africa.

The negative impact of this internationalized environment of development on Africa is reinforced by two elements in the historical moment of late development in the twentieth century. First, more than ever before the structure of international economy has grown into an independent force that influences the internal fortunes of nations. The fearsome power of the multi- national corporations to coerce is not a bogey of international Marxism but a stark reality and danger of the twentieth century from which earlier development efforts were shielded. In addition, the ability of such international institutions as the IMF and the World Bank to dictate the parameters of development, while sometimes beneficial in the short run, does mean that the

initiative for development slips from the control of the national leadership - with the associated possibility that the national interest in development is left unprotected and in fact that the perilous internationalized environment of development is widened. Indeed, in the African circumstances of development, the domestication of development programmes becomes ever more distant, with this widened internationalized environment.

The second problem element in the historical moment of late development in the twentieth century results from the fact that the weight of the international economy has grown so burdensome that even countries with developed economies can no longer act to protect their separate national interests. The emergence of two super-economies in the First World, those of the U.S. and Japan, and the growing power of multinationals have led to increased regroupings in regional economies, particularly in Western Europe. This development portends the emergence of new- style monopoly-economies.

The consolidation of the European Economic Community and the pressure for its political expansion into a "United States of Europe" must be interpreted in the light of this new twist in the world history in the twentieth century. In these circumstances weak African economies are infinitely disadvantaged. If the relatively powerful European economies must be pooled together to meet the new challenges, clearly rationally it seems imperative that African economies be combined in order for them to survive in the new international economic order.

This problem is apparently well understood by governments in Africa. But experience in attempts at combinations, or even associations, shows that it is difficult to bring together states that are ill-formed - even in the face of the recognition that each of them stands to benefits from the association. Neither the West African experience (cf. Robson, 1983) nor the East African efforts demonstrate that the African predicament in view of this imminent crushing international economic domination is closer to resolution. The prospects of development under the banner of single African national economies appear to be miserable in these circumstances.

(iv) Reciprocity and Exploitation in Africa's Relationship with the International Economic Community

Once the improbable development environments of isolation and of insulation are ruled out for, the prospects for national

transformation of African nations depend almost entirely on their establishment of international relations which developing countries have to maintain with other nations, particularly with developed ones. Such international relationships may be regarded as networks between structures where the participating nations are defined as structural components of the system. It should be further assumed that the character of the international relationships, and of the internal economic order on which it is premised, is informed by the principles of unregulated capitalism - whether the nations conjoined in them are capitalist or socialist economies. This means that the participating nations are solely motivated by what they would profit from such relationships, even if it is at the expense of others. Once these assumptions are presumed as valid, the consequences of such international economic relations may be envisaged to be those of reciprocity or exploitation.

Reciprocity subsists in any international network of transactions when participating parties benefit from them on terms that sustain the continuing dependence of all of them on the relationships. This means that the separate national structures, as parties to the transactions, are not only sustained but also strengthened in the process of participating in international economic relations. In other words, for a developing nation, relationships of reciprocity with other nations means that the resultant benefits are translated into the strengthening of their structures. Conversely, there is exploitation when the international economic relations result in the strengthening of some of the parties and the weakening of the structures of others - a result that then alters the terms of the international relationships by making the exploited parties more dependent on the relationships. A crisis develops when these terms are so disadvantageous and the internal national structure so weak that the developing nation is no longer able to engage in international transactions.

When these various pieces and definitions are brought together, we are led to the conclusion that the strength of internal structure of a nation determines the benefits and costs that flow from its participation in international economic relations. A strong national structure enhances the prospects for reciprocity in a nation's transactions with other strong national structures while it enables such a nation to exploit weaker nations. We may further ground these definitions by saying that in this conception the strength of the structure of a nation may be seen in: (a) its economic organization (including its service economic sector, its banking institutions and its money market as well as its "economy of affection"); (b) the cohesion

of its hegemonic order (including a consolidated power elite that protects the national interest, in its own greedy way, against outside interests); and (c) the maturity of the state and its institutions (including its relations with elements of society).

These extended definitions should indicate the problems that African nations face when their capabilities for economic development are placed in the context of the international economic relations, within the present internationalized environment. Because the internal structures of several African nations are weak, they face problems of exploitation in international economic relations. These weaknesses appear in fragile economic establishments; in the lack of cohesion and the absence of a credible national power elite which is able to protect the national interest against foreign predators; and in the chaotic organization of the state and its institutions. The dilemma of the African nations inheres in the fact that their internal structural weakness make dependence on international economic relations both imperative and vulnerable. As the World Bank noted in 1981:

During the past two decades economic development has been slow in most of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. When, in the mid-1970s, the world economy experienced inflation and recession, nowhere did the crisis hit with greater impact than in this region.

An inevitable vicious circle sets in as international economic relations lead to exploitation of the developing nations and such exploitation weakens further the internal structures of these nations.

(v) Ideology and the Preformationist Control of Development Prospects in Africa

It is an indication of the problems that late development induces that the outcomes of national development programmes in Africa have been consistently anticipated not only with respect to probable economic consequences but even more emphatically in terms of preferred political arrangements. The salient issue that flows from this fact is that these desired end-products of development tend to control the conduct and management of development programmes in a "preformationist mould".

The first signs of this aspect of development in Africa arose with Independence nationalism, as huge programmes that appeared to be token maturity of nationhood were embarked upon in Ghana and elsewhere. Their size obviously meant that Western capitalists outside

the continent actually controlled their fortunes - in spite of its immediate implication, such as the attainment of national pride. Such sporadic giant undertakings as Nigeria's expensive AFRICAN FESTIVAL OF ARTS AND CULTURE ("FESTAC") in the late 1970s, which could easily have been trimmed down without the loss of its essence of preservation of African culture, indicate how nationalist sentiments could misdirect development efforts. It is only fair to recognize along this propensity the dilemma that Africa is over-exposed to various cultural currents and that the preservation of African cultures is seen by knowledgeable Africans as a responsible commitment on the part of African national leaderships.

It has also been held that ideological preferences have in some ways determined the shabby outcomes of development efforts on the continent in the last two decades. In a comprehensive survey of this problem Grawford Young (1982), using six measures (of economic growth, individual equality, national autonomy, human dignity, mass participation, and state capacity and performance), could not reach uniform and firm conclusions about the impact of ideology on development performance - although on balance his evidence seemed tilted in favour of capitalist states over popular socialist and Marxist-Leninist states in Africa. Goran Hyden's (1983) views have been far more definite:

Experience of socialist states in Africa indicates that a centrally planned economy is a virtual impossibility at the present level of development of the productive forces. Because of the difficulty of making headway, the formal economy of these states has begun to crumble... This suggests that African states, irrespective of current political ideology, cannot really expect to jump the capitalist phase (Hyden, 1983:29).

Relying on the salience of the themes and unit-ideas analyzed in this paper, I suspect that the questions about the relationships between ideology and development are not as cogent as they appear to be in the on-going debate on the strength of African development. There is liable to be more truth in Hyden's (1983:5) other views:

The Marxist-Leninist approach is only a more complex version of capitalism. No approach to development has proved feasible without the subordination of individuals to a cultural superstructure in which the rules of science and technology reign. The debate about alternative life-styles that goes on in Western societies takes place within the confines of such a superstructure - It is a debate among people for whom science and technology are part and parcel of a daily existence.

Although it is possible to regard the premises of these views as ill-constructed - after all India is developing and advancing without a widespread Western superstructure of science - its central message with respect to Africa should be taken most seriously: there are development thresholds below which ideological debates become irrelevant. Put differently, contrary to assertions resulting from African debates on the ideological impact of development, capitalist US and socialist USSR are more alike in organizational attainment. To point to one leading sector, a committed national power elite is as much a sine qua non of development in socialist countries as it is in capitalist nations. In this view African development problems are less than ideological - at least in the limited sense of whether socialism or capitalism is an easier route to development. Our problems lie elsewhere.

There is indeed some danger in relying on a philosophical posture of performationism in dealing with the end-result of any development programmes: the envisaged end-result comes to be treated as the means. After all, socialism is the expected historical twilight of capitalist drudgery. My fear is that the ideological trees may successfully hide away the wood of development in Africa. To cite one example: in Africa capitalism is being defined as an open-day forum for international enterprise. The "openness" in Ivory Coast, as it is in the current IMF definition of capitalism in Africa, would have no historical parallel in the capitalist West. It seems to be the case that the problem that Africa faces here is one of an over- exposed internationalized environment of development rather than one of an ideological construct called capitalism.

(vi) Conclusions: Solving Africa's Development Problems

Outside the unusually liberal environments in Tanzania, it is rare for African governments to be concerned with the broad, non-economic, problems of development that confront their nations. In these circumstances solutions emerge which are not related to the fundamental problems that confront development prospects. Indeed, such "solutions without problems" are plentiful in Africa, as governments press for immediate "solutions", almost in the abstract.

In my view, the objectives of the academic study of development in Africa should be different and higher than those of governments besieged by immediate and urgent daily problems. It has been the aim of this paper to contribute to the understanding of the underlying and hence fundamental development problems that confront Africa. The

relevance of the unit-ideas examined in the paper for offering any solutions lies in the possibility that they could help to reshape the parameters of development-thinking on the continent. Any solutions to our problems may benefit by taking into account the division of the unit-ideas into two type: basic unit-ideas that are intrinsic to any programme of development; and what I have called cybernetic unit-ideas that tie particular development efforts to external sources.

With respect to the basic unit-ideas, what is needed is for Africans and African states to seek a mastery of these aspects of the development process. While the African past - that stretches beyond colonization to the uglier era of the Slave Trade - cannot be readjusted retrospectively, its lessons must be understood firmly as problematic for our efforts at development. But there are areas of these basic elements of the development process in which deliberate commitments to achieving progress can be more directly fruitful. The importance of the elements of the threshold problems need to be debated and examined with a view to incorporating them, even in their subtlety, in the development agenda of African nations. Their solution demands patience and time: the despair that flows from failure to attain the exaggerated definitions of our capabilities for development must be made lighter through more realistic understanding of the difficulties that Africa must surmount before it can catch up with the development train into a journey of self-sustained growth. Above all else, the responsibility of the state must be underlined in any renewed attempt at resurrecting programmes of development in Africa. all the various programmatic recommendations that are now being offered as a means of overcoming the present state of lethargy (e.g., by Hyden, 1985:207-212) must be underlined by the centrality of responsible and strong states, not irresponsible and arbitrary governments in the development process. The administration of any changes in development strategies - including revisions which would de-emphasize the direct involvement of the state in economic, agricultural, and industrial programmes and which would reverse "top-down" to "bottom-up" approaches to development - requires responsible state involvement as a necessity.

With respect to the cybernetic elements of the development process, Africans and African states can only offer a limited amount of redefinition of the internationalized environment of development into which we are forced and even less of the historical moment of late development which defines the scope and possibilities of our achievements in development. In my view solutions to the problems posed by these cybernetic elements of development cannot be solved

within the individual resources of single nations, but in the regrouping of several national economies into consolidated regional economies. To mention this of course is to resurrect the specter of divisions on the continent. In any case such possibility also presupposes the emergence of national power elites who can see beyond the present and their immediate national surroundings to recognize that development problems in Africa have their own gender.

Footnotes:

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1. Ali Mazrui (1985: 295) sees two strands in the socialist intellectual movement based at Dar-es-Salaam: "By the middle of the 1970's the battle lines were basically drawn between anti- imperialists like Nabudere and Tandon, on one side, and anti- capitalists, like Shivji and Mamdani, on the other. The anti- imperialists defined the enemy as being basically external; the anti-capitalists allowed the African continent the dignity of producing its own indigenous capitalist devils, without necessarily reflecting the mechanisations of external imperialist forces".

2. The inter-relationships between these basic unit-ideas may be illustrated diagrammatically as in Figure I, with the arrows indicating the thrust of development pressure. The potential uses of this mode of analysis.

Figure I: Basic Elements of the Development Process



in gaining deeper interpretations of the development process may be imagined by considering three instances of theories of development as illustrated in Figures I.a, I.b, I.c, which are elaborations of Figure I.

Figures I.a-I.c: Basic Elements of Three Theoretical Models of Development

Figure I.a



Marxian Model

Figure I.b



Modernization Theory Model

Figure I.c



Personality Theory Model

First, the Marxist model of development takes as its base-line some historical epoch. For Marx's analysis of capitalism, this epoch was the medieval world which, following class struggles and the resolution of the ensuing societal contradictions, was transformed into capitalism. Marx of course foresaw socialism as the inevitable end-product of these ineluctable transformations. In modernization theory, the base-line is represented by tradition, with modernization strategies as the intervention process and modernity as the envisaged end-product. Finally, in Figure I.c, is displayed the elements of personality theory. Personality is the end-product of an intervention process, called socialization, which starts with the neonatel child as the base- line of the development process.

3. The editors of an impressive compilation of essays on the subject of 'slavery' in Africa, Suzanne Miers and Igor Kpytoff (1977), assume that kinship in Africa is given and that "slavery" is indeed reducible to kinship behaviour (p. 67). Since Miers and Kopytoff are sympathetic to Curtin's (1975) position on the relationship between the Slave Trade and domestic slavery and thus believe that "Given the possible volume of the internal African demand for people (i.e. domestic slaves), it may be more rewarding to begin (by) considering the external trade as an appendage of the internal 'market'", it must be assumed that they would also be predisposed to reduce the occurrence of the external Slave Trade to African kinship systems.

4. The failure of feudalism to develop in Africa is not unrelated to the exaggerated institutionalization of kinship behaviour in Africa. Feudalism by its nature is incompatible with kinship networks, particularly in the political domain. Thus, it is noteworthy that kinship behaviour is least developed in Ethiopia which is about the only important region of Africa in which feudalism did develop.

On this reasoning the claim that feudalism did develop in kinship-ridden Buganda (cf. Fallers, 1964; Mamdani, 1976) or Ashanti (cf. Rattray, 1923) may be seen as misplaced comparison with the history of other areas of the world where feudalism existed outside kinship networks. That left to its own internal and autonomous evolutionary developments - that is, without the outside encroachment of the Slave Trade and colonialism - Africa could have attained feudalism, may be inferred from the fact that a few societies were close to attaining kinship-free feudal status in pre-Slave Trade and pre-colonial Africa as, say, in Benin city-state (cf. Egherevba, 1934) and in Zululand (cf. Bryant, 1929).

5. In this respect, Leopold Senghor's major error in dealing with African culture flows from his failure to distinguish between Western culture and industrial civilization. This failure leads him to a false contrast between African culture, which he characterizes as emotion-ridden, and Western (European) culture, which he sees as an embodiment of rationality (See Senghor, 1967).

6. The Ghanaian philosopher Wiredu (1980) teaches the need to cleanse African culture of its "anachronisms" (that is, themes in the culture which have outlasted their suitability in our present social circumstances of development (1980:1)) through changes in African educational systems to achieve "a kind of training in method, the kind of training that will produce minds eager and able to test claims and theories against observed facts and adjust beliefs to the evidence, minds capable of logical analysis and fully aware of the nature and value of exact measurement" (p. 15). Among the anachronisms Wiredu is worried about is "the unlimited extension of the concept of the family" with accompanying moral fervour: "Here, then, in the kinship orientation of traditional morality, is a problem that we must recognize and face up to. It is one of the most subtle problems of anachronism in our present day society" (p. 24).

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RESUME

Les études de développement comparées réalisées en Afrique, en particulier celles qui essaient de classer les régions du Tiers-Monde dans la même catégorie accusent de sérieuses insuffisances lorsqu'elles tentent d'analyser les spécificités du problème du développement en Afrique. L'auteur affirme que l'Afrique vit des problèmes de développement qui lui sont propres et qu'il est plus facile

d'appréhender ces problèmes en comparant les expériences de la région africaine avec celles de l'Europe de l'Ouest et d'autres régions développées.

Dans un premier temps l'auteur passe en revue les différentes "tendances de la philosophie du développement en Afrique" au cours des quatre dernières décennies. Ces "tendances" sont passées d'une manière désordonnée de l'indifférence à l'optimisme puis au pessimisme comme c'est le cas pour la théorie de la modernisation des années 50 et 60. Dès le départ, la théorie de la modernisation fut confrontée en Afrique à des difficultés majeures dues essentiellement à la sous-structuration de l'Etat par rapport à la société civile.

L'échec de la théorie de la modernisation a engendré un nouveau scepticisme et orienté l'attention sur le sous- développement et la théorie de la dépendance qui souligne les effets néfastes des rapports entre les pays du Tiers-monde et l'Occident. L'apport des intellectuels africains dans la théorie du développement, l'hostilité de cette théorie vis-à-vis des anciennes nations métropolitaines et du capitalisme d'une manière générale, son incapacité à étudier les structures sociales africaines avec le même rigueur que pour examiner la composante internationale de la dépendance, et enfin sa critique des gouvernements africains et les interférences entre le monde académique et les efforts de développement des gouvernements africains, constituent les aspects intéressants de la théorie du sous-développement dans l'Afrique des années 1970 et 1980. A cet égard, la théorie du développement est restée dans une grande mesure une théorie de la critique qui n'intervenait pas d'une manière positive dans les questions de développement.

Au milieu des années 1980, les réalités qui ont encouragé le développement de la théorie du sous-développement en Afrique se sont transformées, donnant lieu au désespoir. Davantage préoccupée par des questions essentielles d'alimentation et de survie, cette théorie se détourne nettement aujourd'hui de l'évaluation globale du développement pour se pencher sur des questions de développement endogène. Compte tenu de ces problèmes engendrés par les fluctuations spectaculaires des tendances académiques, l'auteur s'attache à conceptualiser les problèmes de développement en faisant appel à des thèmes majeurs dans le cadre d'une approche méthodologique qui pourrait faciliter une évaluation objective des problèmes de développement de l'Afrique.

Les différents thèmes majeurs suivants sont soulignées dans le document (i) époques marquantes de développement, (ii) problèmes fondamentaux de développement tels les crises de croissance, (iii) environnement et moment historique de développement, (iv) réciprocité et exploitation dans le processus de développement, (v) produit final de développement. Les évènements marquants servent de lien entre le passé et l'avenir et constituent donc la base d'un développement futur. En conséquence, il y a des évènements historiques capitaux tels que la Révolution industrielle et la Révolution française.A l'inverse de ces derniers il existe des évènements historiques qui entraînent des remous et entravent souvent l'évolution positive impulsée par les évènements capitaux. En Afrique, la traite des nègres et le colonialisme entre dans cette catégorie et ont eu un impact durable qui continue à être une entrave aux efforts de développement

S'appuyant sur la thèse selon laquelle le développement est porteur de crise, l'auteur considère les problèmes fondamentaux comme une définition analytique, non séquentielle des domaines autonomes où se posent des problèmes dont la résolution permettra à l'entité en développement de s'élever à un degré d'existence supérieur. Dans ce contexte, quatre problèmes fondamentaux de développement requèrant des solutions dans le cadre des programmes de transformation nationale sont identifiés : (a) intégration et différenciation de l'Etat et de la Société; (b) hégémonisation de la Société; (c) développement de soi; (d) administration de la culture et de la civilisation. Chacune de ces composantes devrait être cultivée à des fins de développement pour faire face aux contraintes de transformation nationale. Or en Afrique, l'on n'a pas encore trouvé une solution à ces problèmes. A l'inverse d'autres régions comme l'Europe où les problèmes de développement furent abordés et résolus par étapes et au fil des siècles, l'Afrique doit faire face, dans un laps de temps très court, à des problèmes fondamentaux d'une extrême urgence et aux crises de croissance qui en découlent et qui finissent par s'amalgamer avec eux en un seul problème.