

AFRO-ARAB ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IN ANGLOPHONE WEST AFRICA: The Case of Nigeria

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I. Introduction

The very unique relationship between the Afro-Arab peoples and states can obviously be attributed to both geography and the inevitable common historical experiences. Geographically the Middle-East containing most of the Arab states can be regarded as "a land bridge between Africa, Asia and Europe" (1). About two-third of the Arab population - over 100 million - inhabit parts of Africa; and they constitute almost one-quarter of the population on the continent of Africa. It is the geographical proximity that has brought about mutually beneficial experiences of contacts through trade, Islam, cultural activities, etc. and the concomitant conflicts generated by attempts at conquest and domination. Historically the Afro-Arab relationship has been lopsided in favour of the Arabs - who perhaps due to the advantage of location and the relative possibility for easier interaction among various groups of Arabs on the one hand, and on the other, interaction of the Arabs with other civilizations bordering Asia and later Europe - have emerged much earlier than Africans as nation-states with central control over productive forces and the generated economic surplus (2).

In spite of the historical economic advantages the Arabs might have had over the Africans, and indeed more so in spite of the relatively more enormous financial might of the Arab oil producing states in our contemporary world - both the Arabs and the Africans remain objectively victims of the imperialist domination of the world economic system. It is for this reason that the Afro-Arab peoples would have to come together to restructure their economies in the interest of the masses of their respective countries rather than for the bourgeoisies of the industrial capitalist states and their local collaborators.

A popular programme for the economic development of the Afro-Arab space would necessarily reject "the Afro-European and Arab-European integration (being) presented in the form of the ambiguous concept of trilateral cooperation" (3) as a way of solving the current crisis of capitalist development. That is, a model of economic cooperation of the Afro-Arab states to be meaningful in terms of creating 'a genuinely autonomous economic space' has to be situated within a south-south perspective rather than within the imperialist global strategy implicit in the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) inspired trilateral arrangement involving the Arabs (Finance), Africa (Agriculture and Mineral Resources) and OECD - the World's leading capitalist states (technology and know-how).

The rest of the study will be covered under five sections. In the second section, an attempt will be made to delineate the scope of our study. Data sources will also be discussed in order to show their limitation for analytical purpose. The third section will cover the political environment in a very general sense from the pre-colonial to the neo-colonial period. The anglophone West African and more specifically Nigerian experience will be highlighted. The fourth section will cover the pattern of economic activities and relations between the anglophone West Africa and the Arabs in general. Some empirical data will be given to demonstrate the dependent capitalist nature of economic development in the Afro-Arab countries. A section will be devoted to appraising the resource endowments and framework for Afro-Arab economic cooperation. The likely geo-political constraints to Afro-Arab cooperation will also be highlighted. The concluding part will briefly discuss alternative policy and strategy for cooperation of the Afro-Arab peoples.

II. Scope and Limitation of Data Sources

For the purpose of our study the Arab World will be countries normally covered in Nigeria's trade statistics except Iran. Thus our analysis will refer to the Maghreb states in North Africa - Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya; the Mashreq - Saudi Arabia, Persian Gulf States, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq; and Egypt as well as the Sudan "to the South of Egypt which belongs to Black Africa and to the Arab world" (See Appendix B).

The African Continent is geographically made up of Black Africa south of the Sahara and the non-Black Africa - the Arabs

in the North of the continent. The Afro-Arab World is therefore Black Africa and the Arabs of the Mashreq, the Maghreb, Egypt and the Sudan (4). And more specifically Anglophone West Africa will include Gambia, Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Ghana and Nigeria. Thus the Francophone West Africa countries that intersperse the Anglophone territories are not covered in the regional study. This of course introduces some artificiality at the level of regional economic cooperation where territorial continuity would have served as a more natural basis for optimal economic activity. For instance the damming of River Senegal which "runs through the frequently drought - stricken Sahel region" (5) cannot be covered in our analysis, though the project which is being supported by Arab fund - S. Arabia, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi as well as by French and West German Governments (6) would directly benefit Gambia - an anglophone country which is in some sort of union with Senegal.

The main sources of statistics on anglophone West Africa are the United Nations National Accounts Year Book and World Development Report by the World Bank. The Nigerian figures are taken from the Trade Summary published by the Federal Office of Statistics. For reasons already stated above the published figures may not necessarily reflect those of all the countries that normally make up the Arab World. Thus the figures based on Nigerian sources may slightly be underestimated in comparison with say United Nations or World Bank sources.

The trade statistics - imports and exports of Nigeria with the Arab States are given according to the SITC Classification; thus allowing for the possibility of making comparison of trading patterns with other Third World countries and the industrial nations of the North. It is also to allow for inter and intra Afro-Arab trade comparison that the sectoral distribution of GDP in the selected Afro-Arab countries is given in percentage term (Appendix A). This is because it has not been possible to determine the conversion rates to a common monetary unit for all the currencies in use in the various Afro-Arab states.

It is hoped that in spite of all the above stated limitation to the scope of the study and data sources it will be possible to determine on a fairly accurate empirical basis the pattern of economic relations among the Afro-Arab states and to recommend a mutually rewarding arrangement for economic cooperation in the future.

III. The Political Economy Environment

The differences in the historical development of the Arabs and the Africans can generally be attributed to differences in the modes of production and consequently in the nature of the states that emerged during the pre-colonial, colonial and neo-colonial (contemporary) periods of their history. While the pre-colonial period would show wide dissimilarities between the Afro-Arab World in terms of socio-economic systems, state formation, culture, religion, etc., the dissimilarities would tend to narrow as a result of common experiences of Western imperialism during the colonial and neo-colonial periods. It is this imperialism that has assigned the Afro-Arab states the role of suppliers of industrial raw materials and cheap labour within the world capitalist system and the international division of labour.

1. Pre-Colonial Period

If we accept the Samir Amin Schema (7) then we can delineate "three consecutive stages: (a) primitive communism, (b) the tributary mode of production, and (c) capitalism" through which the Afro-Arab societies like 'all human societies' have had to go. The pre-colonial Afro-Arab societies within this schema can rightly be described as pre-capitalist, that is, mostly at the level of the 'tributary mode of production'.

Specifically, the pre-colonial Arab world was unlike Europe not feudal, but "a constellation of social formations articulated around a tributary mode of production" (8). In most of the Arab World the dominant feature of social formation and civilization was the long distance trade around urban settlements. This is unlike in Egypt where the dominant feature was peasant-tributary. The ruling classes of Egypt over four millenia have been able to be appropriating "an enormous surplus from the peasant peoples... thus providing the basis of civilization" (9).

In most of Africa the dominant feature of social formation was peasant tributary. Following Samir Amin's description of rural life in parts of the Arab World, the African rural life also:

"was precarious, the techniques of agricultural production were underdeveloped, the productivity of agricultural work was low, the standard of living of

the rural world was close to the subsistence level and, therefore the forms of social organization of this world were necessarily marked by a primitive collectivism. There was certainly no basis here for the appropriation of the sort of surplus which allows for a brilliant civilization" (10).

As a result of the intermediary role of Arab merchants in the triangular trade involving Europe, Africa and Asia, a few urban-mercantile centres based on long distance trade tributary mode of production developed in parts of Africa. The fortunes of these centres were for geographical reason tied up with those of the states of Maghreb which were based mostly on gold trade. Gold whose main source, prior to the discovery of America was West Africa was moved across the desert to the North from the Southern States of Ghana, Mali and Songhai in Black Africa (11). The rise and fall of these states - Arab to the North and Africa to the South could be linked to the level of trade.

It is quite significant to note that Afro-Arab relations prior to colonial domination of the two peoples was essentially mutually beneficial - at least in the West African region (12). This can be illustrated by an account credited to Traore of Mali, according to him:

"Our Emperor (...) Moussa made history in the Middle Ages by his celebrated pilgrimage to Mecca on which he took one thousand camels laden with gold. There were a thousand men in the caravan carrying as much gold as the weight of each multiplied by their total number. On his return the Emperor brought with him Arab scholars, engineers and architects who then constructed many important projects, buildings and monuments in my country, some of which can still be seen"(13).

The variants of pre-capitalist social formation in parts of the Afro-Arab World did not however create 'a level of nationhood... as intense as those of capitalist formation based on the centralization of economic power capable of creating internal market for labour, capital and merchandise (14). Pan Arabism with a common literary language and Islamic religion could not constitute a strong nation-state on the basis of tributary mercantalism and peasant formation. Pan Africanism without the advantage of a common language and religion-being only partially

islamized - was less able to constitute a nation state. It is the weakness or non-existence of nation-states capable of centralizing the appropriation of surplus from peasants, craftsmen, merchants etc. that facilitated capitalist penetration of the Afro-Arab World and consequently their domination by European colonial powers.

2. *Colonial Period*

The European contacts with the outside world and more specifically with the Arab world led to the acquisition of more advanced knowledge of mathematics, astronomy, architecture, etc. which promoted European rational and scientific thought. After the renaissance and reformation it became possible to advance scientific knowledge free of religious dogma. This by the 17th and 18th centuries already resulted in the improvement of craft production and expansion of industrial activities based on applied science and technology. Feudal agriculture production was being replaced by capitalist production. By the 19th century the search for external markets for European industrial products and raw materials to feed the European factories had intensified. Ironically the art of navigation which was to facilitate European exploration of other continents and the colonial domination of their peoples was learnt from the Arabs.

The inevitable consequence of these developments in Europe was the "shift of Mediterranean trade to the Atlantic... and consequently the direct link Europe established with Eastern Asia and Black Africa, thereby depriving the Arabs of their traditional role of intermediary" (15).

The European contact with Africa was more devastating. Formal colonisation of the continent was preceded by slave raids and sending of African people across the Atlantic to the Americas. The mass depopulation of Africa by European slave raiders were accompanied by pillage of other resources. And the continent is yet to recover from the plunder of its people by European merchants and adventurers. It was not until the "last third of the 19th century, (that) European colonial power... by and large brought slavery to an end... and stabilized both the Islamic presence and the indigenous expressions of Arab culture... Arab-African contacts institutionalized... within the larger structures of imperial European trade and political relations" (16).

The process of colonial domination in anglophone West Africa was attained at the political level through the system of indirect rule. This entailed the exercise of political control through administrative power vested in the traditional rulers or authority by the coercive British colonial power. It was through the exercise of this power that the capitalist penetration and subsequent integration of the colonial economies to the world capitalist system was achieved. The major instruments for capitalist integration included monetization or conversion of the local currency to the imperial unit in places where the economies were already monetized; imposition of tax and levies on the population as a way of accelerating monetization and thereby the appropriation of surplus and capital accumulation. The establishment of trade links through imports from the metropolis and exports of raw materials from the colony completed the process of capitalist penetration and integration to the world system (17).

It will be of interest to contrast the pattern taken by the propagation of religion in Africa by the Muslim Arabs and European Christians. As earlier noted the civilization of the Arab nation was based essentially on long distance trade around urban centres. The Arab merchants who were engaged in trade along the African routes were also mostly responsible for the propagation of Islam in many parts of Africa including West Africa. It was to the long distance trade of the Arabs that we could attribute Arabisation and nationalities in Europe, Asia and Africa. Though the Arab World is not exactly the Muslim World; nor can it be "reduced to some or other ethno-racial phenomenon, for Arabisation has mixed together many peoples with different origins and different racial components" (18). This is probably what has made the otherwise objectively superficial cooperation of the Afro-Arab countries so natural even in the face of imperialist intrigues.

Unlike Arabic Islam the experience with European Christians in Africa has been mixed. While the European missionaries have been responsible for establishing educational and medical institutions in parts of Africa some of them have also been known to collaborate actively with European merchants in the exploitation of Africa and with the colonial administration in the political domination of the people of the continent. Thus, has risen the belief that it was through the instrumentality of some missionaries that while Africa was accepting the Bible in prayers it lost the land to European settlers. The overall result is the

establishment of racist capitalist states in parts of Africa. They legitimize their existence on the basis of Christian theology.

To sustain Western values and domination the ruling elites in many parts of Africa and indeed in the Arab World have had to be trained in Western educational institutions. And according to a former Chairman of Nigeria's Federal Public Service Commission "Western education encouraged people to be extremely selfish, to raise their standard of living and to enjoy themselves at the expense of the society". He went further (19):

"... because many Nigerians got their education in Europe or America they adopted those cultures and when they returned they had to look for other sources of money to finance their new extravagant living standards... such attitudes found their way into other institutions such that even politics was seen as a means of raising personal standards of living.

"Civil servants (government officials) who travelled out got carried away by the working conditions of their foreign counterparts who had mansions and expensive cars and they strive to acquire such things when they return even though salaries are not adjusted to reflect our cost of living... this led to professionals losing interest in their jobs and seeking other ways of making quick money in order to acquire the status symbols".

We have quoted extensively from the speech of a top Nigerian who is very close to the working of the Nigerian state apparatus in order to show the mentality of the politicians, bureaucrats and technocrats who are entrusted with the affairs of state in Nigeria and other Third World countries. I believe the quotation offers some explanation for the prevalence of neo-colonial - dependent capitalist states in most of the Afro-Arab World.

Under the impetus of nationalism European colonial domination was ultimately dismantled in the Afro-Arab World. The process of decolonization also strengthened the traditional relations between the Afro-Arab peoples. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the war early in this century and the subsequent Arab nationalism against British and French colonial domination led to the emergence of 'free' Arab states at the end of the Second World War. Algeria had to resort to arms

struggle to be free from the French in the early 1960s; but the Palestines lost their rights to a nation-state through the betrayal of western imperialist powers that created the state of Israel by force in 1948.

The decolonization of Africa south of the Sahara progressed rapidly under the pressure of nationalist struggles after the second imperialist war. By the mid-1960s most African states became independent. The commitment of material and moral support to the decolonization of Africa by Nasser's Egypt was total. Egypt became a base and transit post for many nationalists from East and South Africa in the 1950s to early 1960s. Algeria and later Libya have been staunch allies to the liberation struggles that has been raging in the southern part of the continent. Unfortunately Sadat's Egypt has since reneged from the anti-imperialist struggles of the Afro-Arab peoples. While the decolonization process is yet to be completed in Namibia and Azania - apartheid South Africa as well as in Palestine the anti-imperialist struggles are being waged against the neo-colonial states in the Afro-Arab World.

3. Neo-Colonial Period

The period of transition of the colonial states to independent status was used to prepare the successor neo-colonial states in the Afro-Arab World. To guarantee the survival of the neo-colonial states the personnel to run the affairs of state were carefully chosen, trained and nurtured in Euro-American capitalist value system. Thus the post colonial states remain nominally independent politically but in essence were dependent. The ownership and more importantly the control of the major sectors of the national economies remained with the bourgeoisie of the metropolis and transnational corporations of the western capitalist states.

The most sinister manifestation of the neo-colonial presence in the Afro-Arab World is the creation of the state of Israel and sustenance of apartheid South Africa by the imperialist powers. Israel has remained since 1948 a menacing sub-imperial state in the Arab world and South Africa has been playing the same role in Africa. It is quite significant that it is precisely the presence of these sub-imperial states in each of the Afro-Arab Worlds that has hastened the Afro-Arab political solidarity, albeit at the level of rhetorics. The break of Africa with Israel after the

1973 Arab-Israeli war hinged ironically heavily on the position of Egypt. The parallel between the situations in Africa and the Arab World was invoked in a speech by President Boumediene of Algeria at the 1973 Organization of African Unity Summit in Addis Ababa. He stated (20):

"Israel now occupy one-third of the total area of Egypt, refusing to withdraw in spite of pressure on the part of international organizations and movements... insult to Africa. Occupation of Arab land was to be compared to the policies of white settler regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa, and Africa cannot adopt one attitude towards colonialism in South Africa and a completely different one towards Zionist colonisation in North Africa".

The position of Nigeria towards breaking diplomatic tie with Israel was both agonising and surprising. It was agonising because the then Nigerian Head of State General Gowon was a member of the team of ten wisemen charged with mediating between the Arabs and Israel. General Gowon "believed that if Africa was to contribute towards any mediation effort in the Middle-East conflict it should retain its diplomatic links with both sides"(21).

The surprise and disgust with Nigeria's position was contained in an Algerian Press statement which went on:

"One cannot but notice even more the position, way behind the others of Nigeria, a great African country and, what is even more surprising, a country whose head of state Yakubu Gowon, is actually the current Chairman of the OAU. As far as Nigeria is concerned that is all the more surprising since, as everybody knows - because the events are still very fresh in the memory - when that country recently suffered the painful and cruel ordeal of the secessionist attempt in Biafra, the Arab countries, including Algeria, were among the best friends and the strongest supporters of Nigeria while Israel was among the enemies of Nigeria unity and integrity. The paradox is so obvious that it is worth mentioning today" (22).

There is no doubt about the strong feelings of the Arabs against Israel and the Africans against apartheid South Africa.

Indeed it can be asserted that it is the presence of the imperialist backed states of Israel and South Africa in the Afro-Arab World that has made possible the expression of solidarity with each other by Africa and Arab states at various OAU, League of Arab States, Non-Aligned, United Nations and its agencies etc., Forums. It has led Africa to sever diplomatic relations with Israel which the Arabs reciprocated by breaking with South Africa and placing embargo on the supply of crude petroleum to the racist enclaves in Southern Africa.

Regrettably all the resolutions against South Africa and Israel calling for economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation over the past decade would remain rhetorical as long as the Afro-Arab states remain outposts of the world imperialist system. The Arabs are openly flirting with the United States and spending their fortune in the acquisition of US armaments in the hope that the US policy will become even handed as to enable them solve the nagging problem of Palestine. May be the neo-colonial states' and their comprador bourgeois elements optimism and resort to western imperialist solution to the Zionist and Racist domination of the Arabs and Africa respectively are after all consistent with their long term interest in the survival of their peripheral and dependent capitalist states.

IV. The Economic Situation

The long struggles of the Afro-Arab peoples would have to continue as long as their nation-states remain within the world capitalist system. Since the prospects of periphery capitalism transforming to self-centred capitalism is quite remote if not nil it would seem for any cooperation between the Afro-Arab states to be meaningful and popular it must entail an anti-imperialist programme involving ownership and control of the national economies and their structural transformation.

What then are the main features of the respective economies of the Afro-Arab states?

1. Structure of the Economies

Table 1 shows the distribution of the GDP of the Afro-Arab countries in the immediate post independence period or eve of independence (1960) for most countries in the Afro-Arab region.

Africa Development

Table 1: Afro-Arab World: Structure of Production, 1960 and 1981

Country	GDP (millions of \$)		Distribution of Gross Domestic Product (percent)							
	1960(b)	1981(c)	Agriculture		Industry		Manufacturing(a)		Services	
	1960(b)	1981(c)	1960b	1981c	1960b	1981c	1960b	1981c	1960b	1981c
Anglophone										
West Africa:										
Sierra										
Leone	-	1040	-	31	-	20	-	6	-	49
Ghana	1220	21260	41	60	10	12	-	7	49	28
Liberia	220	930	-	36	-	27	-	8	-	37
Nigeria	3150	70800	63	23	11	37	5	6	26	40
Gambia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Arab:										
Sudan	1160	7540	-	38	-	14	-	6	-	48
Mauritania	90	630	44	28	21	24	3	7	35	48
Yemen	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Arab Rep.	-	2770	-	28	-	16	-	6	-	56
Yemen	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PDR	-	570	-	13	-	28	-	14	-	59
Egypt	3800	23110	30	21	24	38	20	32	46	41
Morocco	2040	14760	23	14	27	34	16	18	50	52
Tunisia	770	7100	24	16	18	37	8	14	58	47
Syria	890	15240	-	19	-	31	-	26	-	50
Jordan	-	2550	-	8	-	30	-	14	-	62
Iraq	1500	-	17	-	52	-	10	-	31	-
Lebanon	830	-	12	-	20	-	13	-	68	-
Algeria	2740	41830	16	6	35	55	8	11	49	39
Libya	310	27400	-	2	-	71	-	3	-	37
Saudi										
Arabia	-	115430	-	1	-	78	-	4	-	20
Kuwait	-	24260	-	-	-	71	-	4	-	29
U. Arab	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Emirates	-	35070	-	1	-	77	-	4	-	29

a) Manufacturing is part of the industrial sector but its part of GDP is shown separately because it typically is the most dynamic part of the industrial sector.

b) Figures in italics are for 1961 not 60. c) Figures in italics are for 1980 not 81.

d) Based on net material product. e) Based on the price series.

Source: World Development 1983 by the World Bank.

The distribution of the GDP - agriculture, industry (manufacturing), and services - after over two decades (1981) of managing the neo-colonial economic system is also given in Table 1. Appendix A shows the structure of the economies on the eve of the sharp increases in the price of crude oil (1973); erstwhile artificially kept low by the imperialist transnational corporations. The immediate impact (1976) of the politically motivated anti-Israeli and anti-her allies oil price increases on the structure of the economies of the OPEC and non-OPEC states of the Afro-Arab World is also shown in Appendix A.

In 1960, Ghana and Nigeria which are important representatives of the Anglophone West African States exhibited very typical features of a colonial economy. For Ghana, in 1960 the share of agriculture in GDP was about 41%, industry - 10% and services 49%. The corresponding figures for Nigeria were agriculture - 63%, industry - 11% and services - 26%. Over two decades after independence the economies of Nigeria and Ghana still remain essentially dominated by primary economic activities - agriculture and mining; while the more 'dynamic manufacturing part' of the industrial sector remains very low. Thus in 1981, for Ghana the share of agriculture in GDP was 60%, industry - 12% of which manufacturing was just 7%, and services - 28%. The figure for Nigeria in 1981 were agriculture - 23%, industry - 37% of which manufacturing was a meagre 8%, and services - 40%. When the other primary activities - mining and quarrying are added to agriculture the share of primary activities in Nigeria's GDP was over 46% in 1981 (23).

In the Arab world the structure of the GDP shows a stronger feature of a modern economy. While the share of agriculture in 1981 ranged between well below 10% to under 40% in most countries; the share of industry remained very high in many countries - Saudi Arabia (78%), Kuwait (71%), Libya (71%), Algeria (55%) - See Table 1. And the share of the more dynamic manufacturing part of the industrial sector in GDP in 1981 was highest in Egypt (32%), and Syria (26%). When it is noted that the share of manufacturing in the GDP of imperialist industrial market economies like France and the United Kingdom fell from 29% (France) and 32% (U.K) in 1960 to 23% and 20% for France and the U.K. respectively in 1981 (24). The dynamic role of the manufacturing part in the development of the matured industrial economies may be considered as diminishing.

In these economies the services - tourism, entertainments, etc. seem to be taking increasing share of GDP.

In spite of the changes in the structural pattern of the economies of the industrial nations the historical role of the manufacturing part of the industrial sector in the development process of any economy including the agricultural and mineral rich Afro-Arab economies can only be ignored at great cost to the development and welfare of the Afro-Arab peoples.

In both the anglophone West Africa region (Nigeria) and the Arab World we can observe from Table 1 and Appendix A using the 1960, 1981 figures and 1973, 1976 ones, that the oil exporting countries have had relative increase in favour of industrial activities. The sharp increases in the oil revenues have led to huge investment activities in transport and communication projects, electricity and water systems and social services. It is however evident from the relative stagnation in the economic development of the non-OPEC nations that the industrial nations - the Western imperialist powers as suppliers of technology and know-how - were the main beneficiaries of the investment activities made possible by the oil revenue that accrued to the OPEC nations during 1973-82. Because of the so-called lack of or low absorption capacity of the OPEC and non-OPEC nations of the Third World the industrial nations were - through the instrumentality of the Western dominated financial institutions - IMF, World Bank - able to 'recycle' the supposedly surplus oil revenue to the economies of the more developed industrial western countries. The scale of the 'recycling' process and their significance as source of employment in the western industrial countries was given by the estimated merchandise imports of OPEC. According to Chicago's First National Bank - "merchandise imports of OPEC... were estimated at \$100 billion in 1979,...\$129 billion in 1980,...\$160 billion in 1981" (25).

The upshot of the foregoing analysis is that as a result of the structural and technological backwardness of the economies of both the OPEC and non-OPEC mineral and agriculturally endowed economies of the Afro-Arab World the revenue during the decade of oil boom could not be used for the mutual advantages of the Afro-Arab countries - rather it served as a basis for deepening technological and overall economic dependency of these countries on the world imperialist states. The chance was missed of strengthening the traditional solidarity among the Afro-Arab peoples on a more solid economic basis that would have been facilitated by

the surplus Arab fund and the relatively enormous but little exploited agricultural and mineral resources of the African continent.

The state of development and underdevelopment of the anglophone West African region and the Arab economies can further be demonstrated by selected socio-economic indices (See Table 2). In anglophone West Africa, Nigeria with a current population of almost 100 million makes up about 80 % of the population of the region. Incidentally Nigeria is the only substantial oil producing country in the region. Thus in terms of population size, area of territory and other resources Nigeria will be a very important link in any arrangement for economic cooperation between the region and the Arab World.

In 1981 Sierra Leone with a per capita income of US \$320 - the lowest in the anglophone region; and Nigeria's per capita income of US \$870 the highest rank very low with the Arab countries'. Tunisia US \$1420, Libya's \$8450 or Kuwait's 20,900. When the high per capita income countries' with very low population - Kuwait (1.5 million), Libya (3.1 million) are compared with say Egypt's (43.3 million) in the Arab World or Nigeria's (87.6 million) it will become more obvious why some basis must be found for economic cooperation between the resource rich regions and each population areas which can constitute virile internal regional markets for more rapid economic growth and development of the Afro-Arab Worlds.

The need for economic cooperation between the various countries and regions (West Africa, Arab Maghreb) becomes more glaring when we compare the average annual GNP per capita growth rates for the different countries. Apart from Kuwait - with one of the highest per capita income - which probably must have pursued a deliberate policy of slowing down growth rate there is a general correlation between being an oil exporting country and registering of a higher growth rate during 1960-81 (See Table 2). In anglophone West Africa Ghana with a per capita income of \$400 in 1981 had a negative average annual growth rate (-1.1) per cent during 1960-81. The comparative figures for Nigeria were per capita income of \$870 and an average annual growth rate of 3.5%.

In the Arab World Saudi Arabia in 1981 had a per capita income of \$12,600, and an average annual growth rate of 7.8%; Libya - per capita income of \$8450 and growth rate of 4.7%; while Morocco had a per capital income of \$860, a growth rate of 2.4% and Egypt a per capita income of \$650 and a growth rate of 3.5

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Table 2: Afro-Arab World: Selected Socio-Economic Indices

Country	Population (millions) Mid-1981	Area (thousand of square Km.)	ENP/\$ 1981	Capita average annual growth (%) 1960/81b	Adult lite- racy (%) 1980
<u>Anglophone West Africa</u>					
Sierra Leone	3.1	72	320	0.4	15
Ghana	11.8	239	400	-1.1	-
Liberia	1.9	111	460	-	40
Nigeria	87.6	924	870	3.5	34
Gambia	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Arab</u>					
Sudan	19.2	2506	380	-0.3	32
Mauritania	1.6	1031	460	1.5	17
Yemen Arab Rep.	7.3	195	460	5.5	21
Yemen PDR	2.0	333	460	-	40
Egypt	43.3	1001	650	3.5	44
Morocco	20.9	447	860	2.4	28
Tunisia	6.5	164	1420	4.8	62
Syria	9.3	185	1570	3.8	58
Jordan	3.4	98	1620	-	70
Iraq	13.5	435	-	-	-
Lebanon	2.7	10	-	-	-
Algeria	19.6	2382	2140	3.2	35
Libya	3.1	1760	8450	4.7	-
Saudi Arabia	9.3	2150	12600	7.8	25
Kuwait	1.5	18	20900	-0.4	60
U. Arab Emirates	1.1	84	24660	-	56

(b) Because data for the early 1960s are not available figures in italics are for periods other than that specified.

Source: World Development 1983 by the World Bank.

per cent. The relatively high growth rates of the non-oil producing Arab countries can be attributed to greater intra and inter Arab economic activities within the Arab World especially since the Israeli-Arab War of 1967.

The adult literacy per cent in 1980 as low as 15 (Sierra-Leone), 25 (Saudi Arabia), Liberia (40), and rising to Jordan (70) and the backward structure of the economies as well as the highly skewed income distribution probably give some indication of the underdevelopment of the economies and societies of the Afro-Arab World.

It is very unlikely that the state of underdevelopment in the Afro-Arab World can change as long as the economies are firmly under the ownership and control of foreign companies. If before 1973 oil producing countries were receiving only 9% of the value of the refined oil product - "the rest being shared between taxes levied by the importing countries, company margins and refining costs", by 1979 the foreign importers and intermediary received the remaining 33% of the proceeds - from refined crude oil export (26). This situation of appropriation of huge surplus from the economic activities in the Third World countries by the multinationals persist because the refining and marketing sides of the petroleum business as well as of other agricultural and mineral resources are not very often under the control of the exporting countries.

The challenge to the attempt to create a viable regional cooperation between the anglophone West Africa and the Maghreb and other Arab states is to restructure the agrarian and trading economies through rigorous industrialization projects. And the prerequisite for undertaking a radical industrialization of the economies is the indigenization of ownership and more importantly the control of the strategic sectors in the Afro-Arab economic space.

2. The Direction of Trade and Investments

Traditionally it is trade that often serves as impetus for establishing external economic relations among countries. The level of trade among nations can be used as a measure of the state of their relation. But for the "commercial ties between the Middle Eastern oil-producers and (almost) every country in Black Africa" (27) there would hardly have been any Afro-Arab trade relations (See Table 3). In 1975 the volume of exports - mostly

Table 3: Oil Exporting Countries*
Trade with Anglophone West Africa 1975

Country	US Dollars Million	
	Exports	Imports
Ghana	100	5
Liberia	26	2
Sierra Leone	19	-
Nigeria	13	1

* OPEC members:

Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates,
Venezuela.

Sources: IMF Direction of Trade quoted in E.C. Chibiwe
(See Reference) pp.60-61.

from the oil producing countries of the Middle East to Anglophone West Africa was \$158 million while their imports from Anglophone West Africa was a meagre \$8 million. This represented a substantial imbalance in Afro-Arab trade in favour of the large-oil producers. For the whole of Africa (excluding Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa) African imports during 1975 was for instance \$242 million from Iraq against total exports of \$15 million from Africa to Iraq. And for Saudi Arabia the value of African imports during 1975 was \$310 million while the African exports to Saudi Arabia was only \$96 million.

The Nigerian - Arab Trade Statistics are given in Appendix B by country and commodity sections. Table 4 shows the total value of imports and exports by Nigeria with individual Arab countries. As with the whole of Africa and the Anglophone West Africa region the Nigeria-Arab trade balance is substantially in favour of the Arab countries. While the total imports by Nigeria from the Arab countries stood at about 3.4 billion Naira (1970), 5.1 million Naira (1976) and 28.9 million Naira (1982); the exports by Nigeria to the Arab countries hardly reached half-a million Naira during the corresponding periods. The export figures were about 0.6 million Naira (1970), 0.2 million Naira (1976) and about the

same amount during 1982. It is clear from the available statistics that Nigeria-Arab trade is virtually unilateral on the part of Nigeria rather than bilateral as it ought to be.

Table 4: Nigeria-Arab Trade Statistics (Naira)

Country	Imports			Exports		
	1970	1976	1982	1970	1976	1982
Morocco	105329	5082687	7307895	12000	231664	240709
Algeria	597757	-	158	700	-	-
Tunisia	3654	-	8272587	900	-	-
Libya	2353	-	-	2040	200	-
Egypt	1597500	4241	3003082	254254	226	8109
Sudan	4658	-	600	1225	-	-
Saudi Arabia	34876	-	1534102	27890	861	-
Persian Gulf St.	50640	-	200307	1975	-	-
Syria	551	546	-	-	-	-
Lebanon	959365	34414	8506453	319801	60	-
Iraq	2737	1278	23792	7878	-	-
Total	3359420	5123166	28928976	617863	233091	248818

Source: See Appendix B.

Because Nigeria is an oil exporting country petroleum products have hardly featured (See Appendix B) in the Nigeria-Arab traded items. This is unlike the rest of the countries in Anglophone West Africa. As it is to be expected the bulk of the rather limited trade between Nigeria and the Arab World is with Arab countries on the African continent - mostly Morocco, Egypt and recently Tunisia. The only exception of a non African Arab country with substantial and long standing trade link with Nigeria and indeed the rest of Anglophone West Africa is Lebanon. The share of Lebanon in the value of Nigeria's total imports from the Arab World during 1982 was over 8.5 million Naira or almost 29.4%.

The major items of import by Nigeria from Egypt were in 1970 under Code 6 (Manufactured Goods). By 1982 items under Code 7 (Machinery and Transport equipment) were added to the list of imports from Egypt. Nigeria's rather very negligible export to

the tune of about a quarter million Naira in 1970 dropped to just about 8,000 Naira in 1982. The exported items were probably leather products.

Nigeria-Morocco trade became fairly substantial from 1976 when Nigeria imported items under Code 0 (Food and live animals - mostly fish) and under Code 2 (Crude materials - mostly fertilizers). The imported items valued at a little over 5 million Naira (See Table 4) accounted for over 99% of Nigeria's imports from the Arab World during 1976. By 1982 Nigeria had increased her imports of food items and crude fertilizers from Morocco to over 7.3 million Naira. Nigeria's exports to Morocco for the corresponding periods of 1976 and 1982 were valued at about 230,000 and 240,000 Naira respectively. Tunisia became an important source of imported food items to Nigeria during 1982 - valued at over 8 million Naira. Nigeria's export to Tunisia is almost nil.

The imports from Lebanon by Nigeria have over the years been generally diversified though at low levels in value. There was a relatively substantial increase in the value of imports during 1982 - 8.5 million Naira. The items covered included manufactured goods - over 4.8 million Naira, machinery and transport equipment - 1.4 million Naira, miscellaneous manufactured articles - about 1.3 million Naira, etc...

With Nigeria's import and export trade, each topping well over 12 billion Naira during the period of late 1970s and early 1980s it is quite obvious that Nigeria-Arab trade has been very negligible indeed. Nigeria's major trading partners were the West European, Japan and North American countries with the shares of West Germany, France, United Kingdom, USA and Japan each ranging from over 1 billion to almost 2.5 billion Naira. The Arab countries also have their trading activities along similar directions - the West European and North American countries. In spite of the recent proclamation and declaration at various Third World forums for increase in South-South economic relations the neo-colonial North-South relations remain very dominant.

Table 5 shows Nigeria's imports by commodity sections from India, China, and Japan during 1974, 1979, 1981. It is quite significant that both in terms of the total volume of trade and its rate of growth Nigeria-Asia trade has been relatively more substantial than the Nigeria-Arab trade. Neither Nigeria and the other Anglophone West African countries nor the Arab states have been able to utilize the advantage of geography and much less of

history to increase their mutual trade and general economic relations. In spite of relative distance India has been able during Nigeria's oil boom economy to expand her export of almost all items to Nigeria by more than six-fold - from about 12 million Naira in 1974 to over 74 million Naira in 1981 (See Table 5).

The Chinese and Japanese expansion of trade (exports) to Nigeria were even more spectacular. Chinese export rose more than ten-fold - from about 30.4 million Naira in 1974 to almost 320 million Naira in 1981. Similarly the Japanese export rose by more than ten fold - from 160.2 million Naira in 1974 to over 1,684.3 million in 1981. The squandering of Nigeria's oil bonanza on luxury items is well illustrated by her imported products, - transport (cars) and electrical gadgets (stereo and video equipments) - from Japan. The luxury consumer durables accounted for almost 400 million Naira of about 670 million Naira worth of imports from Japan by Nigeria during 1979. It is also significant that Nigeria's exports to all the Asian countries are relatively small. The pattern that has emerged from Nigeria's trade relations, as well as those of Anglophone African countries and indeed of the Arab states is that either in the North-South or South-South context the Afro-Arab World remains disadvantaged in the international division of labour.

3. Development Financial Institutions

From the late 1960s and more intensely during the 1970s a number of development banking institutions were established in the Afro-Arab world to facilitate the rate of economic cooperation among the Afro-Arab countries. With the huge increases in the surplus accruing to OPEC from the middle of the 1970s most of which is in the Arab States the funding of the development banks remained essentially that of the Arabs.

A number of financial and technical assistance institutions have been established (28) to make funds available on bilateral and multi-lateral basis among Afro-Arab states. The 'Banque Arabe pour le Developpement Economique en Afrique' - BADEA created during the Arab Summit in Algiers, November 1973 and which started operation in Khartoum, Sudan in 1975 has been the major source of assistance funds (29) from the Arabs to the African countries. Financial institutions of individual Arab countries have been sources of bilateral funding of projects in a number of

Table 5: (Nigeria Imports by Commodity
Sections from Selected Asian Countries)

Commodity Sections	India			China (Mainland)				Japan		
	1974	1979	1981	1974	1979	1981	1974	1979	1981	
0	946393	2536296	4116945	439955	4966181	14847064	1919194	56683042	71518415	
1	1334	186892	-	-500	-	52169	1556	-	-	
2	984162	1290589	2435009	52169	608401	1052191	1891663	2114347	4626476	
3	171903	85047	-	5348	1239	79474	17791	62067	210258	
4	-	-	273907	53	38533	606588	-	2760	527936	
5	684408	2524074	13613073	1606980	12987286	28590549	5609633	15976344	27811904	
6	3521597	2668611	8250618	15394005	59992709	93362199	72926560	169165296	334575961	
7	4632694	13758962	40093444	6154739	55001529	121175754	71407300	397992148	101167052	
8	1157881	1653712	5557764	6743045	18942455	60062258	6355919	27123850	143783819	
9	31478	17693	13614	13633	6347	87850	76975	4171146	50274	
Total	12121850	24730681	74354374	30400427	1522254680	319918633	160196597	669539001	1694272095	
Total	-	-	689932	Export	-	-	-	-	159780291	

Source: Nigerian Trade Summary (F.O.S. Lagos) as at December 31st of 1974, 1979 and 1981.

African countries. Some of the Arab National Development Institutions "for bilateral cooperation and which are oriented partially or totally towards Africa include" according to Chibiwe (30).

-The Kuwait Fund with a capital of US \$3.4 billion. The fund offers some of the most favourable terms in the world. "The loans are on average spread over a period of 10 to 25 years, with an annual rate of interest of 3 to 4%".

-The Abu Dhabi Fund with a capital of US \$500 million. Though originally set up to cater for the interests of Arab countries, it has of late "made generous contributions to developments in African countries South of the Sahara".

-The Libyan Arab Foreign Bank. The bank which has several branches in Africa has been used to channel Libyan aid to several African countries.

-The Saudi Development Fund with an initial capital of US \$2.8 billion has been the source of Saudi technical and development aid to a number of African countries.

-The Islamic Development Bank established "to serve the interests of Islamic countries" is a source of multi-lateral aid to Islamic African countries.

By the middle of the 1970s a number of African countries - thirty-three in all - including Somalia already had loan commitment/disbursement from the "special Arab Fund for Africa" to the value of US \$171.25 million (31). As it is to be expected Nigeria, an oil exporting country has not been a beneficiary of the Arab loans.

Table 6 shows the amount of loan commitment/ disbursement to individual Anglophone West African countries - except Nigeria. The loans by SAAFA - Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa - are to provide support in offsetting the balance of payments problems which many of the African countries faced as a result of the quadrupling of oil prices between October 1973 and 1974. More

loans/grants were made to African countries in subsequent years. "It is estimated that total direct Arab commitment (disbursement?) for the benefit of non-Arab Africa amounted between 1973

Table 6: Loans from the Special Arab Fund for Africa 1974/75 (US \$)

State	Value of Instalment
Gambia	350,000
Ghana	4,400,000
Liberia	1,800,000
Sierra-Leone	1,800,000
African countries	
Total	163,750,000
DR of Somalia	7,500,000
Grand total	171,250,000

Source: Table VII, E.C. Chibewe, *Afro-Arab relations in the New world Order*, Julian Friedman Publication, London 1977, p.66.

and 1979 to nearly US \$4.4 billion of which more than US \$3 billion was on concessional terms, i.e. including a grant element of at least 25%" (32).

The huge loans/grants from the oil rich Arabs to the non-oil developing countries suffering from higher petroleum prices could relief to their economic problems. Given the structure of the oil industry dominated by the transnational companies of their imperialist states it is hardly surprising that the dependent economies, albeit oil rich, of the Arab states could not alleviate the 'sufferings' of the non-oil developing countries. According to the Arabs this is unfortunate (33), "but it cannot be helped because it is for technical reasons impossible to have different prices of petroleum for different countries. Besides most of the oil trade is not in the hands of the Arabs but of the big transnational petroleum companies". Thus, money spent by the Arabs in West Africa, the rest of Africa and indeed in many parts of the world" has gone to benefit the industrial nations rather than the developing ones because it is the advanced countries which control the tools of development... dominate the international economic system, its rules and regulations, and its international institutions of trade, money and finance" (34).

In spite of the limitation put by the existing international economic order on the effectiveness of Afro-Arab economic cooperation it is still possible to identify some of the positive achievements of the most important development financial institution - BADEA in the establishment of an integrated Afro-Arab economic space.

Since BADEA started operating in Khartoum in March 1975 it has to some extent proved "a genuine and dependable partner in the economic development of Africa" (35). BADEA is not a profit making institution. According to Ayari, the Chief Executive of BADEA (36).

"BADEA ...is a development agency with a political purpose... It serves the purpose of Afro-Arab solidarity and cooperation. Its primary objective is not to invest in profitable ventures but to help development in non-Arab Africa on a broad front, taking account of economic as well as social considerations".

By the end of 1979 approved loans by BADEA "carried interest rates of between 2 and 7 % and maturities from 11 to 25 years with grace periods of between 2 and 10 years". The overall 'grant element' was 39.2%. Like many financial institutions delays in loans disbursement are experienced; though "they may often be caused by administrative problems in the recipient country" (37) It is important for the future of Afro-Arab economic cooperation to ensure that loans commitment are not only promptly disbursed but efficiently utilized on intended projects. This is the only way through which BADEA can improve on its past disbursement performance - which "represented 1.4% of commitments in 1976, 4.6% in 1977, 23.1% in 1978, 35.5% in 1979 and 45% in 1980" (38). With experience the disbursement performance of the bank is improving and hopefully with greater dedication the bank's lending to over 40 African countries which averaged about \$66 million over 1975-79 can be substantially increased in the near future.

BADEA seems to have set the appropriate pace for Afro-Arab economic cooperation in its choice of sectoral projects to which priority funding will be accorded. And the sectors that have been identified are quite consistent with those that many West African countries have chosen for priority consideration. BADEA is giving priority to projects in the following sectors (39):

- farming and agriculture, food industries;
- exploitation of natural resources;
- infrastructure;
- industries that include an adequate percentage of African 'value added';
- training of African personnel;
- development-related services such as transport and tourism.

To strengthen Afro-Arab cooperation BADEA and the ADB (Africa Development Bank) "have agreed to cooperate on preliminary project studies and in the checking and monitoring of projects financed by the two institutions" (40).

BADEA in spite of its laudable economic objective and partially fulfilled political one of solidarity among the Afro-Arab peoples against the sub-imperialist states of Zionist Israel in the Arab World and racialist apartheid South Africa on the African continent still remains in essence an instrument of neo-colonial economic development. And this probably can be attributed to the influence of Saudi Arabia active ally of the United States of America. Saudi Arabia controls almost a quarter of BADEA's authorized capital.

It is to facilitate the active collaboration of neo-colonial agencies and institutions in BADEA supported development projects that BADEA is "limited by its rules to the ceiling of \$10 million for any one loan and 40% of the total cost of a project" (41). Hence the Bank has entered co-financing arrangements with a wide range of institutions and governments in the Arab World and elsewhere. The most significant of the instruments for strengthening the integration of the Afro-Arab economic space to the capitalist dominated international economic order is the involvement of the World Bank and the OECD in the lending activities of BADEA in Africa. Thus "a formal agreement binds the Bank (BADEA) with the World Bank Group and there is close cooperation with the three members of the Group, the IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), IDA (International Development Association), and IFC (International Finance Corporation) (42).

It must be obvious from the preceding analysis of inter and intra Afro-Arab countries' trade, financial relations and general economic activities that no serious attempt is being made to create an autonomous Afro-Arab economic space. On the contrary the existing structures, financial institutions, formal

alliances, etc. are meant to consolidate socio-economic dependency of the Afro-Arab countries on the dominant industrial capitalist states. The creation of a New International Order does not seem to be on the agenda.

V. Resource Endowments and Framework for Economic Cooperation

The impetus for Afro-Arab Economic cooperation was given by the desire for solidarity at the political level following the aggressions of Israel against the Arabs and the continuing repression of the majority black Africans by a tiny minority of whites in apartheid South Africa. In order to lay a very solid foundation for Afro-Arab economic cooperation it is necessary that the resource endowments, the mechanisms and institutional framework through which the human and material resources of the regions can be mobilised should be identified.

The most important energy source in contemporary development effort is fuel energy from hydro-carbons (crude petroleum, coal). The proven reserves of oil of the Persian Gulf estimated to be about 350 billion barrels represented almost two-thirds of the reserves of the non-communist world (43). Out of this Saudi Arabia had (1973 figures) about 148 billion barrels, Kuwait and Iran 65 billion barrels each, Iraq 30 billion barrels, Abu Dhabi 29 billion barrels, the Kuwait/Saudi Arabia partitioned zone 10 billion barrels, Qatar 7 billion barrels, the other Arab Emirates 6 billion barrels and a further 50 billion barrels in Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia. It is the enormous oil reserves which has enabled the oil producing Arab States to earn so much revenue since the 1973 Israeli-Arab war and the consequent rapid increases in the erstwhile under priced oil in the capitalist dominated world market.

It is on the basis of the newly oil generated wealth that the increased international political influence was founded and which facilitated the establishment of cooperation at the political and economic levels by the member states of the Arab League and the organization of African unity.

Apart from crude petroleum the Arabs are endowed with other mineral resources. Thus for instance, seismic exploration work already revealed that Saudi Arabia's coal reserves located in the Qasim region are among the worlds largest. "In addition to these discoveries, deposits of gold, copper, nickel, zinc and iron ore abound in very large quantities (44). Phosphates that serve as

raw material for fertilizers also abound in Morocco and the Saharawi Republic. In parts of the Arab World especially those bordering the Mediterranean can be found agricultural products like fruits - grapes, dates, olives, citing, etc. and variety of vegetables.

In the context of regional development of West Africa in cooperation with the Arab World the most important resources will be the tropical crops like cocoa, coffee, rubber, palm products, etc. as well as wood, tropical fruits and vegetables. Apart from agricultural resources, in West Africa can be found substantial amount of mineral resources known to be abundant in the African continent. It is for instance known that Africa has 97% of world reserves of chrome, 85% platinum, 64% manganese, 25% uranium, and 13% copper. The continent is also endowed with bauxite, nickel, lead and almost 20% of the world hydro-electrical potential (45).

Presently it is well known that the vast resources of the Afro-Arab World is being exploited mostly by the transnationals for the benefit of the imperialist states. Even in situations like in the oil industry where political developments enabled principal ownership to be transferred to the OPEC nation-states, but because control of the more lucrative downstream activities in the oil industry - refinery, marketing transportation, etc. are mostly in the hands of foreign owned multinationals we still therefore find that the benefits accruing from oil industry operations to the indigenes of the oil producing states are comparatively minimal. And an important reason for this, in spite of increasing ownership of the resources is the effective control which the foreigners have over the industrial technologies and management practices.

In the Afro-Arab economic space the important variables for effective and autonomous economic cooperation will be resources - human and material, technology and finance. Autonomous development requires a population that is large enough to sustain a viable internal market. It is therefore critical for any viable economic cooperation that sparsely populated regions be integrated by careful choice of projects to the more densely populated areas in the Afro-Arab regions. Thus within the perspectives of South-South economic cooperation priority ought to be given to Afro-Arab bilateral economic relations over and above multilateral programmes which ultimately are calculated to consolidate world capitalist domination with its centre in the Northern Metropolis.

A development strategy based on bilateral cooperation among institutions, organizations or enterprises based in the countries of the Afro-Arab World would consequently reject the more current 'trilateral partnership'. According to Senghor (46):

"In such partnership the Europeans would contribute technology and know how, the Arabs would supply finance, and we, the African can provide labour and our substantial natural resources for development".

It is a fact of our contemporary world that 'technology' acquisition is a prerequisite for economic growth and development and that the Northern industrial powers - Europe, North America and Japan - are repository of the mostly required technology. But a 'trilateral partnership' within the Senghor's framework which is in essence part of the World Bank, IMF, OECD schema for world capitalist development cannot be an acceptable basis for Arab cooperation with Anglophone West Africans nor indeed with the rest of Africa. Such a strategy can only perpetuate underdevelopment and the poverty and ignorance of the masses of the Afro-Arab countries.

Indeed the exponents of trilateral cooperation at another level seem to view it as "an integral part of world efforts to bring about NIEO - New International Economic Order". Except such cooperation eliminates the dominance of the multinational corporation in its operation it can hardly serve as a vehicle for NIEO. It can only help to strengthen the international capitalist system based on the asymmetry of relations of the centre and periphery of the system. If Afro-Arab economic cooperation is not to be allowed to degenerate into a situation where its outcome is the emergence of sub-imperialist states - Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Nigeria, Zaire, etc - as part of the world imperialist system then a more conscious attempt has to be made to provide alternative policy options to those currently being pursued by BADEA, ABD and through the instrumentality of the Lome Convention.

We already hinted on how through formal loan funding arrangements with the World Bank and OECD, BADEA and to some extent ADB have been serving the purpose of world capitalism. The Lome Convention incorporating Africa, Caribbean and Pacific States and the European Economic Community (EEC) in bilateral trade, investment and financial arrangements is probably the most

elaborate programme by the Northern bourgeoisie and the comprador elements in a third world region to perpetuate capitalism as the dominant world system.

That the Lome convention is intended to serve the political purpose of the EEC must be obvious to any observer of the International scene. It must be more than apparent to the signatories to the convention that 'a persistent reality of international politics is that in any multinational interaction, the economically stronger nations remain always politically assertive' (47). In this context there can be no doubt that the economically weak West African region like the rest of Africa, Pacific and the Caribbean will have to serve the political end of the economically highly developed EEC.

The successive Lome Conventions - Lome I (1975), Lome II (1980), and Lome III (1985) have progressively seen the EEC take advantage of the economic weakness of the ACP, states to turn them into 'client' states to be fully integrated to the global geo-political strategy of the EEC and the NATO powers. This trend became clear in talks held in preparation for Lome III in Luxembourg in October 1983. According to reports (48):

"The ACPs are calling for more aid and the EEC on the other hand is seeking better management of the funds and want to initiate a dialogue on development policies thereby moving from financing individual projects to programme. This implies greater involvement of the EEC in the affairs of the individual ACP states"

Some of the terms of the EEC-ACP convention is not only derogatory but will effectively undermine not just the autonomous development of the economies of the ACP states but are likely to constitute very serious obstacle to bilateral South-South cooperation like the Arabs with the West African region. The ACPs request for lower prices and better conditions for purchases of surplus European farm products and which the EEC agreed to sell on what was called 'favourable terms' - though such food surplus are often given out free of charge to other developing countries (49) - is not likely to provide strong incentive for self sufficiency in food production in the ACP countries. And the effect of the Lome Convention on Third World solidarity should also be noted. According to Oseni (50):

"To the extent that the privileges are considered valuable by the selected 'beneficiaries', they would be

reluctant to support and would probably oppose any moves by group 77 to include in the NIEO any elements which would jeopardise those 'benefits' they perceive themselves as receiving under the convention, from encroachment via the adherence of new, perhaps poorer countries to the convention. Therefore rather than being a model for future North-South relations, Lome is essentially a representative of traditional sphere of influence and block politics".

It is also to be noted that rather than strengthen South-South cooperation the Arab bourgeoisie have been using their new found wealth to prop up capitalist financial institutions and to impose IMF (International Monetary Fund) type conditions on developing countries through funds which they have provided to the IMF and other West European and North American banking and other financial institutions.

How then can the huge human, financial and material resources of the Afro-Arab world be mobilised and exploited for the benefit of the Afro-Arab peoples? The neo-colonial policies of the bureaucratic and comprador bourgeoisie of Afro-Arab states have no doubt resulted in the deepening of the dependency of their economies and pauperisation of the masses. A prerequisite for any structural transformation of the socio-economic systems would have to be the realignment of the internal political power relations in the individual countries from the local bourgeoisie - the parasitic agents of neo-colonialism - to those who will serve the socio-economic interest of the population. Once a people oriented political-economy structure has been established it will be possible to create a number of bilateral economic institutions whose activities can transcend individual Afro-Arab countries or regions like the Maghreb and West Africa. The BADEA and ADB reorganized to serve national interests rather than neo-colonial ones should as financial institutions be available to fund projects and institutions that are established to strengthen Afro-Arab economic cooperation.

Specifically in order to exploit the vast human, agricultural and mineral resources of the Afro-Arab economic space, funds - surplus oil revenue being kept in West European and North American banks - should be provided to finance projects considered critical for the restructuring of the respective economies. Thought should be given for instance to setting up of

OPEC like cartels or agricultural commodities like cocoa, coffee, vegetable oil, etc. and minerals like copper, bauxite, tin, etc. If only the Afro-Arab bourgeoisie - especially of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Nigeria in West Africa - would transcend their rather spurious class interest and identify with the national interest in the construction of self reliant economies then it should be possible to abandon their commitment to the so-called stability of the world (capitalist) financial and economic systems for a new international economic order. An important step in the creation of NIEO will be the setting up of cartels for products traded in predominantly by third world countries. The Arabs should make available their funds presently being used by the IMF and other banks in the industrial nations to support OPEC type cartels.

It is hoped that the Afro-Arab States as well as the other third world countries will through a reorganised world trade in agricultural and mineral products move away from the perennial balance of payment deficit and debt financing to surplus in their international trade transactions. Thus it should be possible to embark on the more critical stage for Afro-Arab economic cooperation. That is, the setting up of joint agricultural and industrial projects. Since a realistic development of the resources of the region would depend on the acquisition of technological capacity there is bound to be some role for OECD and other northern industrial nations. Some arrangement can be worked out to purchase the required industrial technologies and for collaboration in their operation that will not lead to exploitation through excessive repatriation of capital/profit often made possible by substantial ownership and control of industrial projects and enterprises in Third World countries, by the multinational corporations.

In mapping out the strategy for the industrialization, technological acquisition and modernization of the economies of Afro-Arab States cognizance must be given to the critical roles of the energy and steel sub-sectors. The energy factor is particularly significant in the less 'energy' resources endowed parts of Africa where it has been pointed out how "the development process... put new demands for energy, with each percentage point rise in GNP bringing about a 2% in advanced industrial countries" (51). This only goes to underscore the need for economic cooperation with the Arabs by the relatively less energy endowed regions of Africa.

The steel factor becomes critical for any meaningful structural transformation of any economy based on applied technology and engineering industries. Steel is crucial for the development of an autonomous technological capacity and general economic development and national security. As a presently overcapitalised industry in the OECD countries it is becoming more difficult for reasons of marketing to acquire the production technology from the Western industrial nations. And the world market situation for steel products is likely to make western financing of new steel projects in Third World countries more difficult. The Arabs may again be able to provide fund for joint ownership and operation of steel works in economically viable regions of Africa - like Sierra Leone or Nigeria in West Africa. Products of huge projects like steel or petro-chemicals located in any of the cooperating countries or regions of the Afro-Arab world should have unrestricted access to the markets of the whole regions.

In considering Afro-Arab economic cooperation - especially within the Anglophone West Africa region - Nigeria has to be treated as a unique case. This is because Nigeria with a population of about 100 million occupying about a million square kilometers is also well endowed with agricultural and mineral resources including oil. The implication of the situation is that it is possible for Nigeria to embark on an autonomous development strategy based on selected bilateral economic cooperation arrangement with any outside power that suits her. The reality of course is that Nigeria has since political independence about 25 years ago operated as a classical neo-colonial state. The little measure of self-assertion internationally has been made possible by the availability of crude petroleum in the country and the greater revenue that has accrued to the country - especially since taking up membership of the Arab dominated OPEC oil cartel.

However because of the recent economic crisis in the country caused mainly by the reduced oil production and the price of internationally traded oil there has been call by individuals and political groups in the country for Nigeria to withdraw from OPEC. Informed Nigerian opinion on the oil industry is of course advising against such a line of action. It is a line that has been pushed by imperialist and neo-colonialist who have been very keen on the break up of OPEC - the only industry whereby due only to the forces of accident - Third World countries have managed to

acquire some reasonable share from the earnings from its operation. Because Nigeria, regarded as the weakest link in the OPEC chain, is fairly vulnerable she has become the main target of western powers who are working for the demise of OPEC. The political and economic pressure on Nigeria by World imperialist states and institutions are likely to increase as a result of the recent drop by almost 50% of the price of crude oil from about \$30 per barrel to less than \$15 per barrel between January and March 1986.

It is as a result of the recognition of Nigeria's weak position within OPEC and in the international market for oil that the Nigerian oil minister recently publicly reaffirmed Nigeria's intention to continue within OPEC. He warned that if Nigeria were to opt out of OPEC, then "OPEC could team up to price the country out of the market and frustrate all its strategies or projections on national development..." (52). To buttress the point the minister 'gave the national oil reserves of Kuwait as estimated to last up to 240 years at current production rate, Saudi Arabia 120 years and United Arab Emirate 75 years while Nigeria's reserves at current production would last for only 20 years. Given Nigeria's low proven reserves and that of other non-OPEC producers the Minister argued that since OPEC controlled two-third of the current demands, its reserves life expectation would outlast other non-OPEC producers whose reserves life span had been reduced from 22 years in 1973 to 16 years in 1985 while that of OPEC had increased from 37 years to 55 years over the same period (53).

The upshot of Nigeria's oil and economic situation in relation to Arab dominated OPEC is that of continued cooperation with the Arabs. This cooperation should be mutual given the population of Nigeria and the potential for developing bilateral agricultural and industrial projects for the Nigerian, West African, Arab and the markets of the outside world. The Nigeria-Arab Economic Cooperation remains limited because the economies - trade and finance - are firmly oriented towards the industrial economies of the North.

We already showed in the earlier section of this study that there already exists some trading activities between Nigeria and some Arab countries - Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon. The scope - number of countries and items of products - and volume of trade, industrial and construction activities need to be increased in future. And all future economic activities should be

developed within the perspective of ECOWAS - the Economic Community of West African States - and other economic regions of the Arab World.

VI. The Geopolitical Constraints

If Afro-Arab traditional relations were stabilized by the colonial powers - mainly British and French - and "institutionalized... within the larger structures of imperial European trade and political relation" (54) Soviet-American super-power rivalry has in the wake of decolonization distorted the pattern of development in Afro-Arab relations. While mutual Afro-Arab suspicion based on past activities - Arab slave raids in Africa and the more recent "French use of Black African troops to control Syrian and Lebanese uprisings in 1954 and to combat Algerian revolutionaries between 1954-62" (55) - has been replaced by mutual solidarity against imperialist agents; it has not led to any serious transformation of the socio-economic order in the individual Afro-Arab states. Hence, the former colonial powers and the USA have been able to continue their economic exploitation and political domination of most countries in the region.

But for the presence of the imperialist outposts - Israel in the Arab World and South Africa in the African continent - the limited and apparent anti-imperialist solidarity among the Afro-Arab people could not have crystallised nor be sustained. It is the presence of the imperialist outposts in the region that gave birth to Nasser's radical philosophy of the revolution - integrating the common anti-imperialist struggles of the Afro-Arab nations. Nasser spoke of the African continent as the second circle of Arab involvement in the creation of an anti-imperialist front. His concern went beyond political economic cooperation. He saw Afro-Israeli contacts in a strategic geopolitical context. These "Afro-Israeli contacts were part of a wider plan by Israel and its western backers to stage a counter encirclement of the Arab states, something which all Arabs were duty bound to combat" (55). Hence Nasser's Egypt and later Algeria and Libya have been in the forefront in successfully using "every meeting with Africans to table resolutions on Palestine and Israel's role as a tool of western imperialism". However Sadat's Egypt and the successor, Mubarak have since through the implementation of the so called 'Camp David' accord - a United States sponsored

agreement between Egypt and Israel effectively removed Egypt from the Anti-imperialist front in the Middle-East and indeed of the Afro-Arab world. Thus the prospects for basing Afro-Arab economic cooperation on a self-centred anti-imperialist programme have been undermined. To some extent the super-power rivalry which has ensured the Soviet continued military support to Syria in the Middle East is not allowing all of American intention in the Middle East to be realised.

The anti-imperialist front has similarly been undermined in the African continent. The stabilisation of the regime of Mobutu in Zaire, occasionally by force of arms by such surrogates of the United States like France and Morocco has weakened the progressive forces - the frontline states - who have remained the bulwark against South Africa the imperialist outpost in the African continent.

The imperialist forces who are bent on keeping the Afro-Arab World within their global sphere of influence have consciously and consistently undermined any international effort to undertake economic sanctions against South African and Israel. Hence, the oil embargo against the two imperialist outposts has not been very effective. This is probably not unexpected since the oil-trade, though produced mostly from the Gulf States, is not in the hands of the Arabs but of the transnational petroleum companies of the imperialist states. It is also for the same reason that the Arabs have not been able to directly aid effectively with the supply of oil at the height of the escalating prices of oil and the consequent balance of payment difficulties experienced by many African countries.

The apparent conflicts between exponents of 'liberal capitalism' and the 'free market' on the one hand and 'state capitalism' and centralized control on the other have made meaningful Afro-Arab economic cooperation almost unrealistic. The ruling classes in many of the countries in Africa and the Arab World are only interested in increasing their personal share in the incomes being generated nationally and internationally rather than in any redistribution of wealth between and within social groups and regions. They wish to perpetuate the existing unjust social system. Hence, they are so receptive to the mostly anti-people measures often proposed by the IMF and other international financial institutions for dealing with the crisis of capitalist economies.

In this respect we can for instance state that the policy of 'privatisation' of public enterprises which is a recurring IMF prescription for Third World countries seeking their financial support will objectively not promote South-South (Afro-Arab) cooperation but deepen southern dependency on the advanced Northern industrial nations. Thus the current call for privatisation of the Nigerian national airlines for example is not going to lead to a viable 'aviation industry' in Nigeria but to a dependent one through the mediation of the Nigerian state and elements of the comprador bourgeoisie. Indeed the process of privatisation of the Nigerian Airways seems to have begun in a rather cynical and quite dishonest manner.

According to the existing Nigerian law the state owned airline has monopoly for all scheduled commercial operations within and outside Nigeria. In recent years Nigerians have formed air companies to operate domestic and international routes. They claim they are non-scheduled charter airlines. That is, to say they are only available for charter since only the Nigerian airways can operate regular commercial airlines. Yet it is common knowledge that the private airlines operate at regular times on the busiest and most lucrative domestic routes. They are not competing on a fair basis with the national airlines, since they operate only on cash down basis. They therefore will not have cash-flow problem unlike the national airlines whose operations are bugged down by lack of cash. Many government departments and parastatals are indebted to the national airlines not only over months but years.

The tragedy of this 'privatisation' game is that the Nigerian law is being violated without those whose authority is to make and enforce law doing anything about it. It is ideologically convenient and acceptable and so everyone pretends as if the case for privatisation has been well made. As we have suggested the 'privatisation' policy and other policy prescriptions for dealing with the so called economic crisis is not in the socio-economic interest of the developing countries including the Afro-Arab World and the desired South-South Cooperation within an anti-imperialist new international economic order.

The optimism for imperialist development programme in some of the Afro-Arab countries seems to have been due to the so-called successful emergence of Japan as a capitalist state and also of the newly industrializing countries (NIC) - Brazil, South

Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, etc. Nothing from socio-economic and political perspectives should recommend the model of social decadence and political repression in the dependent capitalism of the NICs to the progressive forces in the Afro-Arab World. With respect to Japan's capitalist radical modernisation we will suggest it is utopian for any Third World country to believe that the Japanese model is replicable in our contemporary imperialist dominated world. The reason being according to Samir Amin (57) that 'Japan was the last country ever to achieve full development by the capitalist road, because it was the last ever to launch its development before the formation of imperialism'.

What role for the other super power - the Soviet Union in the going struggle for hegemony in the Afro-Arab World and globally? Politically the Soviet Union remains an effective restraining force to imperialist absolutism - at least in the areas of conflict - the Middle East and Southern Africa. In spite of the Soviet Union involvements in projects like construction of dams for irrigation and electricity, steel works etc. in selected Afro-Arab countries her economic influence remains seriously limited. This is irrespective of her super-power global political and economic objectives. It has to do with the historical and contemporary realities of imperialist power and presence - which has sustained the only international market for trade and finance the capitalist market. The Soviet Union and other states in the socialist block have to transact international trade and finance through the established capitalist institutions. Until an alternative can be created for the capitalist market it will be naive and unfair to expect the Soviet Union to be a serious and effective champion of economic transformation in the mostly bourgeois states of the Afro-Arab World. A non-capitalist international market for trade and finance can only emerge as a consequence of the victory of anti-imperialist and socialist forces in the mostly neo-colonial states of the Third World.

In concluding this study on the prospects for Afro-Arab economic cooperation it will be useful to briefly highlight the character of the states in the region. A common characteristic is "the cardinal role played by the state in the allocation of resources" (58). It is this role of the states in the Afro-Arab World that have made them targets of imperialist attack, coups and counter-coups which do nothing to alleviate the sufferings of the poverty stricken masses. It is through the state that the factions of the local bureaucratic/military bourgeoisie obtain

access to the resources which they plunder and squander on their hedonic lifestyles. And more tragically substantial fortunes have been transferred into the personal accounts of individuals in Western Europe and North America. The local bourgeoisie - especially of the oil and other mineral rich states shamelessly go to the international financial institutions to borrow money on behalf of states they have looted beyond the amount they are seeking to borrow.

It must be acknowledged that some of the states have acquired specific characteristics that can be attributed to the stages in the development of capitalism. A number of these states still have various communities in which precapitalist social formations are still dominant. Such communities still find common cause and affinity to their community based on religion, language, culture and other ethnic values. These commitments tend to undermine centralisation of economic and political power - a prerequisite for a virile capitalist state. The differences in the stages and types of social formations in the individual countries of the Arab-World can therefore constitute both strength and weakness in the development of economic cooperation and integration of the Afro-Arab economic space.

In order to facilitate an anti-imperialist and pro-socialist path of cooperation and development it will be necessary to create 'an internal market, for labour, capital and merchandise' (59) first in the individual Afro-Arab country, then regions and finally within the Afro-Arab economic space. It is on the basis of a people oriented development of the productive forces in the Afro-Arab World that the socio-economic well-being of the population can be catered for and that peace and security guaranteed.

Footnotes:

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1. Bukar Bukarambe, "The Middle-East: An Overview". Nigerian Forum, NIIA (Nigerian Institute of International Affairs) - Vol. 11, N°3, March 1982, p.482.

2. See Samir Amin, "The Arab Nation, Nationalism and Class Struggles". ZED Press, London, 1978 for a more detailed discussion of Arab nationalism and the rise of Arab nation states.

3. Bernard Founou-Tchuigoua, "Research Network on Afro-Arab Economic Cooperation", UNITAR-UNU-FTM Dakar, October 1984, p. 3.

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4. It is only because of the limitation of available data that the Arabs of Mauritania in the Maghreb and those in Somali are not being included in the Arab World as defined in this study.
5. Anthony Sylvester, "Arabs and Africans: Cooperation for Development", Bodley Head Limited, London, 1981, p. 154.
6. Ibid.
7. Samir Amin, "Class and nation. Historically and in the Current Crisis". Heinemann, London, 1980, p. 4.
8. Samir Amin, "The Arab Nation, Nationalism and Class Struggles", Op. cit., p.7.
9. Ibid., p.18.
10. Ibid., p.12.
11. Ibid., p.17.
12. We are not able to make a categorical statement on the benefits of Afro-Arab relation for the whole of Africa because of our limited knowledge of the negative impact of the Arab slave raids in other parts of Africa.
13. Anthony Sylvester, Op. cit., p.159.
14. Samir Amin, "Class and Nation...", Op. cit., pp.84-85.
15. Ibid., p.82.
16. Victor T. Le Vine and Timothy W. Luke, "The Arab-African Connection... Political and Economic Realities", Western Press, USA, 1979, p.1.
17. For a more detailed discussion of capitalist penetration and integration to the world system of the colonial economies see Samir Amin "Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment. Monthly Review, 1974.
18. Samir Amin, "Class and Nation..." Op. cit., p.11.
19. Alhaji Sule Katagun, retired Chairman of Nigeria's Federal Public Service Commission speaking at a newspaper party. See New Nigerian Newspaper of August 2, 1985.
20. Anthony Sylvester, Op. cit., p.197.
21. Colin Legum, "Africa Contemporary Record". Annual Surveys and Documents 1973-74. Rex Collins, London, 1974, p. A5.
22. Ibid., p.A5-6.
23. See Economic and Social Statistics Bulletin (Special Series), Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, 1984, p.4.
24. See World Development 1983, Table 3.
25. Anthony Sylvester, Op. cit. p.33.
26. Ibid., p.46.
27. E.C. Chibiwe, "Afro-Arab Relations in the New World Order. Julian Friedmann Publication, London 1977, pp.58-59.
28. Ibid., p.67.
29. Anthony Sylvester, Op. cit., p.20.
30. See E.C. Chibiwe, Op. cit., p. 67.
31. Ibid., p.66.
32. Anthony Sylvester, Op. cit., p.19.
33. Ibid., p.20.
34. Ibid., pp.18-19.
35. E.C. Chibiwe, Op. cit., p.76.
36. Dr. Ayari, the Tunisian Chief Executive of BADEA quoted in Anthony Sylvester, Op. cit., p.54.
37. Anthony Sylvester, Op. cit., pp. 62-63.
38. Ibid., p.72.

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39. E. C. Chibiwe, Op. cit., p.76.
40. Ibid., p.79.
41. Ibid., p.79.
42. Ibid., p.70.
43. E. C. Chibiwe, Op. cit., p.46.
44. See Igbuku-Otu, "The Shadows of Arab Power" in the "Punch" - a Nigerian Daily, June 27, 1985.
45. Anthony Sylvester, Op. cit., p.148.
46. Ibid., p. 152.
47. Umunna Orjiako, "The Fragility of Afro-Arab Solidarity" in Nigerian Forum, Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, Vol. II, N°3, March, 1982, p.505.
48. Kayode B. Oseni, Lome III. Talks and the Path to Self-Reliant Development in Africa. Nigerian Forum, July 1984, Vol.IV, N°7, p.164.
49. Ibid., p. 166.
50. Ibid.
51. Anthony Sylvester, Op. cit., p. 205.
52. See Tam David-West, Nigeria's Petroleum and Energy Minister - Reported speech in the New Nigerian (a daily) of August 20, 1985.
53. Ibid.
54. Victor T. Le Vine and Timothy W. Luke, Op. cit., p.ix.
55. Ibid., p. 5.
56. Ibid., p.2.
57. See Samir Amin, "The Arab Nation, Nationalism and Class Struggle", Op. cit., p.105.
58. Robin Luckham: Africa-Arab = OECD Military Relations: The Recycling of Imperialism in Dunstan M. Wai (Ed.). Interdependence in a World of Unequals, African-Arab-OECD Economic Cooperation for Development, Westview Press, Colorado USA, 1982, p. 70.
59. Samir Amin, The Arab Nation... Op. Cit., pp. 84-85.

SUMMARY

La géographie et l'histoire condamnent les Etats arabes et africains à coopérer au plan économique. L'étude de cet auteur bute sur l'insuffisance des données statistiques. Malgré cette limitation, les flux commerciaux entre le Nigéria et le monde arabe sont présentés. Comme le Nigéria est un pays exportateur de pétrole, il n'a pas bénéficié de transferts publics. Les potentialités de coopération entre les Etats des espaces arabe et africain sont très importants, mais pour les mettre en mouvement, il faudrait non seulement vaincre des contraintes géographiques mais aussi les divergences dans les stratégies d'insertion dans le système mondial.

APPENDIX A: Structure of the GDP in selected countries (% distribution), 1980

Country	G D P		Agriculture		Mining		Manufacturing		Trans.& Comm.		Others	
	1973	1976	1973	1976	1973	1976	1973	1976	1973	1976		
Morocco	100.0	100.0	21.3	19.5	3.5	5.5	17.2	16.4	4.3	4.3	53.6	54.3
Algeria	100.0	100.0	8.7	7.6	15.3	24.7	15.3	13.1	7.6	6.6	53.0	47.4
Tunisia	100.0	100.0	18.6	17.6	6.4	7.4	9.0	9.6	5.2	5.1	60.7	60.2
Libya	100.0	100.0	2.7	2.0	50.6	56.5	2.3	1.8	5.8	3.9	38.7	39.4
Egypt	100.0	100.0	29.0	27.8	0.9	-	16.4	20.8	3.5	6.5	49.3	45.0
Sudan	100.0	100.0	41.4	-	0.3	-	8.6	-	6.0	-	43.6	-
Saudi Arabia	100.0	100.0	1.2	0.9	79.0	63.0	5.1	4.5	2.7	3.3	11.9	28.2
Syria	100.0	100.0	18.2	14.0	3.2	7.6	15.8	6.0	11.1	3.6	51.7	68.7
Lebanon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iraq	100.0	100.0	11.6	-	35.3	-	9.7	-	5.4	-	41.1	-
Nigeria	100.0	100.0	29.8	23.5	17.6	24.9	4.3	5.4	3.9	3.1	44.4	43.0
Ghana	100.0	100.0	49.0	50.6	2.3	1.3	11.7	13.1	3.6	4.6	33.4	31.0
Sierra Leone	100.0	100.0	28.8	38.0	16.8	9.5	7.8	7.0	10.0	9.3	36.6	36.1
Gambia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Liberia	100.0	100.0	18.8	15.7	31.3	22.2	5.4	7.1	7.8	7.1	41.6	47.8

Source: National Accounts Year Book, United Nations, Vols. 1 - 2, 1980.

APPENDIX B1: NIGERIA-ARAB TRADE STATISTICS, 1970

Country	Total	Sections (Imports)											
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
Morocco	105,329	75,110	2,721	18,012									
Algeria	597,757				535,165								
Tunisia	3,654	150				1,562	60,356	704	500	2,954	50		
Libya	2,553	230					622	1,250			251		
Egypt	1,597,500	1,383	3	1,878		12,493	1,509,349	1,390		62,421	8,583		
Sudan	4,658	10		1,552		1,684				359	1,053		
Saudi Arabia	34,876	272				1,881	8,776	1,300		4,824	17,823		
Persian Gulf State	50,640				50,210		20			350	60		
Syria	551									30	436	85	
Lebanon	959,365	40,388	1,459	9,069		1,349	34,432	656,264	52,154	157,256	6,724		
Iraq	2,737	2,390					100	120			127		
Iran	18,048	60			16,393		308	194				1,093	

Source: Nigeria Trade Summary, Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, 1970 (December).

APPENDIX B1 (contd.)

Country	Total	Sections (exports)										
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Morocco	1,200											1,200
Algeria	700											700
Tunisia	900											900
Libya	2,040	35									116	1,889
Egypt	254,254	260		18,196						227,400		8,398
Sudan	1,225	23,347										1,225
Saudi Arabia	27,890	23,347		1,733								1,945
Per Gulf State	1,975			1,575					55	370	31	409
Syria												
Lebanon	319,801	166		313,724								5,911
Iraq	7,878			2,261						5,617		
Iran	6,801	2,500		3,901								400

APPENDIX B2: 1976

Countries	Sections										Naira
	Import										
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Total
Morocco	5082687	93913	2679972	-	-	987	513138	3841	5887	-	8386425
Algerie	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tunisia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	41683	-	41683
Libya	-	-	-	-	-	-	20000	1890	-	-	5898
Egypt	4241	-	9178	-	-	57382	551188	-	159999	1150	783138
Sudan	-	-	-	-	-	1374	-	-	3155	-	4529
Saudi Arabia	-	-	-	-	-	28430	45235	23759	73487	110421	281282
Persia-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gulf State	-	-	-	-	-	-	71964	4094	-	-	76058
Syria	546	-	-	-	-	-	59968	4612	-	-	65126
Lebanon	34414	229	-	12	270	446787	369806	573463	397997	775	1823753
Iraq	1278	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	700	-	1978
Iran	20576	500	-	1708808	-	3597	8762	151931	2140	-	1896314

Source: Nigeria Trade Summary, Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, 1976 (December).

APPENDIX B2: Contd. - Export Sections (Naira)

Countries	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Total
Morocco	231664	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1600	233264
Algeria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1371179	1371179
Tunisia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	215	215
Libya	280	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1931101	1931381
Egypt	226	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31432	31658
Saudi Arabia	861	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	169	1030
Persia-Gulf State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	727	727
Syria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lebanon	60	-	12245	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12305
Iraq	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7533	7533
Iran	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4968	4976

Source: Nigeria Trade Summary, Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, 1978 (December)

APPENDIX B3: (1976) Import Section 1982

Countries	Total	Sections										
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Morocco	7307895	3610854	-	2896250	-	-	2162	797880	158	-	-	749
Algerie	158	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	158	-	-	-
Tunisia	8272587	6761168	-	-	793082	-	-	55677	-	661940	-	-
Libya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Egypt	3003082	-	-	-	-	-	996013	340865	1445472	220732	-	-
Sudan	600	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	600
Persia-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gulf State	200307	-	-	-	-	-	110939	108878	42530	17960	-	-
Syria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lebanon	8506453	628979	-	20269	11253	12252	315702	4811014	1435547	1271437	-	-
Iraq	23792	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25792	-	-	-
Iran	249029	-	-	-	-	-	-	8151	240658	220	-	-
Saudi Arabia	1534102	16910	-	-	-	-	14116	69233	1407009	21213	-	-

Source: Nigeria Trade Summary, Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, 1982 (December)

APPENDIX B3: Contd. - Export Section 1982

Countries	Total	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Morocco	240709	-	-	252377	-	-	-	-	-	-	8352
Algeria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tunisia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Libya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Egypt	8109	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Persia-Gulf State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Syria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lebanon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iraq	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iran	510	510	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Saudi Arabia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Nigeria Trade Summary, Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, 1982 (December)

Note: Classification scheme of the import and export lists by Section code (First Digit of Item Number).

Code Items

- 0 Food and live animals
- 1 Beverages and Tobacco
- 2 Crude materials, Inedible, except fuels.
- 3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials
- 4 Animal and vegetable oils and fats
- 5 Chemicals
- 6 Manufactured goods classified by material
- 7 Machinery and transport equipment
- 8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles
- 9 Commodities and transactions not classified according to kind.