

SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON A CRITICAL THEORY OF MODERNIZATION

By

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The aim of this paper is to set out some critical and perhaps unusual thoughts concerning the theoretical frameworks evolved so far on historical development in the Third World itself. I shall begin with some critical remarks on the African and Latin American dependency theories, which should be considered as the most important and original contributions by Third World intellectuals to contemporary thinking in the fields of social and economic history. These remarks include a critique of current collective conceptions about such fundamental issues as progress, final development goals, and historical models. These concepts appear very clearly in the writings of the dependency theory as intellectual versions of widespread social demands in almost all countries of the Third World.

Out of this critique, I shall evolve some theses of my own which may lead to a sober, sceptical but perhaps better understanding of historical development in the regions which are now considered to be the world peripheries. Any analysis aspiring to do more than simply furnish a scientific-sounding vindication of certain political programmes must re-examine precisely those assumptions which have acquired the quality of self-evident phenomena in the collective consciousness of this area, thus becoming unchallengeable premises for almost all theories on progress and development. Foremost among these is the assumption that zero-growth is an absolutely negative state and that economic advancement is *per se* (1) the most important aspect of progress and development. Striving towards technological-economic progress as the embodiment of positive orientation values is considered to be the appropriate and rational attitude, one which stands above all ideological and political differences. Material progress is regarded to be both the motor and the goal of any serious development. It is symptomatic that different political and ideological groupings in Africa, Asia and Latin America adhere to a combination – seen as a natural law, self-evident and ostensibly inevitable – between technological-economic progress on the one hand and social, political, and cultural development on the other. The historical optimism of Liberalism and Marxism – a genuine characteristic of the nineteenth century – has not yet become a controversial issue to the Third World collective consciousness. The view that the historical evolution confronts every society with problems which it can actually solve has become a common intellectual belief among African, Asian and Latin American political elites.

The most significant aspect of that collective consciousness may well be the substance of its development models and their relationship to the metropolitan guide-lines of evolution. It may be claimed with some degree of certainty that this consciousness has been decisively shaped by the *demonstration effects* (2) of metropolitan culture. This taking-over of

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external orientation values occurs, however, within a socio-cultural context which emphasizes the urgent necessity of finding one's own road to development; such acceptance of final normative goals is not always a fully rational and critical process, but rather a pre-logical and pre-conscious one. Similarly to the individual super-ego, the collective pre-consciousness is formed by orientation values and normative concepts which are inculcated into the subject from outside and internalized through a long pre-logical process (3). In the case of the collective pre-consciousness of Third World societies, one may assume that the current normative development goals are derived from the culture and tradition of the metropolitan centres, which makes a rational, socially relevant examination of their desirability, intensity and breadth very difficult in concrete cases, those goals having become a sort of inevitable natural law.

At the highest level of collective pre-consciousness, two major normative goals can be ascertained which, due to their generalized character, have become part of the common store of diverse political and ideological movements. They are: —

- 1) the attainment of the technological-economic level of the present-day advanced industrialized nations by means of a forced modernization and industrialization, and
- 2) the widening and consolidation of the national state.

When a society adopts normative goals from abroad, especially in the area of leading political and social values, it requires a vindicating ideology in order to make this adoption appear as a quite natural and legitimate fact. Two basic tendencies in contemporary Third World thought have been created to legitimize the pre-consciously determined development goals, tendencies which have, besides, a very effective function as instruments of social deceit:

a) the notion that technological-industrial progress is a universal process, immanent in all cultures and hence a kind of natural law. According to this, real barriers to development (for instance a lack of natural and energy resources) and questions concerning the origins of scientific and technological innovations are played down; at the same time, a somewhat naive belief in the omnipotence of «universal» technology becomes evident, presupposing that man can find technical solutions to all problems and difficulties (4). *Walter RODNEY*, for instance, has written that development differences on a world scale are due only to social and political issues and not to a totally different endowment with natural resources among nations. According to *RODNEY*, current African underdevelopment should exclusively be considered as a result of European domination due to military and political success. Western Europe induced a flourishing, technologically well-evolved continent into its contemporary backwardness because of a temporary supremacy in power politics (5).

b) There is a tendency towards a revival of allegedly progressive aspects of a country's own traditions, particularly in the sphere of political culture, social behaviour patterns and daily life. This suggests a genuine

development strategy stressing values of old traditions adapted to new situations. In Latin America, for instance, revolutionary movements are successfully trying to take advantage of authoritarian and centralist elements of the Iberian-Catholic heritage; a similar phenomenon can be perceived in the Islamic world. Many socialist groupings in the Third World postulate a development model which links the goal of rapid modernization and industrialization to traditional values of authoritarianism and collectivism, at the same time rejecting Liberal-democratic concepts (6).

In large parts of the Third World, there is today a unique historical constellation in which tradition-related values and patterns provide an effective short-term aid in order to carry out the normative goals of the collective pre-consciousness; the encouragement of accelerated population growth (as advocated by *Samir AMIN*) (7) and the playing down of ecological problems go hand-in-hand with some traditional orientation values and appear simultaneously instrumental in forcing material progress.

The retention of traditional values in the realm of politics and culture suggests the possession of an autochthonous development model and facilitates the adoption of non-autochthonous goals in the technological-economic fields. Refurbishing traditional values, precisely in the name of accelerated economic progress, complements very well the deep-rooted prejudices of collective pre-consciousness and contributes to preserving some fragments of national identity and of independent cultural creations, thus producing the illusion of a genuinely own path to historical development. In the field of political culture, the alleged rejection of «foreign» norms and models seems most credible, preserving in this way the idea of a non-Western structure of socio-political behaviour patterns. It is difficult to avoid the impression that right up to the present, socialist and nationalist movements have confined themselves to setting up a system of enhanced centralization and anti-pluralism which utilizes collectivist norms, authoritarian behaviour patterns and traditional values in order to increase social cohesion and strengthen loyalty to the state (8).

Under cover of political and cultural autochthonism, several ideological tendencies in the Third World are clearly striving towards a high degree of industrialization, a strong and expanding state, and a high level of mass consumption as indispensable collective desires – as if these desires were elements drawn from a genuinely indigenous tradition rather than factors derived from the demonstration effects emanating from the metropolitan centres. This general phenomenon, which is called the *revolution of rising expectations*, represents the endeavour to acquire the material fruits of an industrial revolution in as brief a time as possible. Here, economic growth and technological progress adopt the quality of unchallengeable and unyielding development criteria and goals. The results of the demonstration effects are far-reaching; nationalist, socialist and socio-democratic ideologies often spend themselves on legitimizing the accelerated imitation of industrial civilization in the name of social justice and political autonomy. For this reason, one cannot dismiss the thesis that almost all so-called progressive development models in the Third World, including of course the Cuban revolution, are negatively fixed upon the

orientation values of the advanced industrial societies, whether they be organized as market economies or as state-socialist systems. The psycho-analytical concept of «negative fixation» signifies the verbal, perhaps theoretically inflated, refusal of a given model but the factual acceptance of its leading values, which then constitutes the very stable, but preconscious basis of collective thinking and behaviour. (Metropolitan countries, for instance, are blamed for all evils now existing in Third World countries, but these same societies are nevertheless trying to imitate the main features of metropolitan life).

One very important point concerning the adoption of metropolitan standards is the limitation to their so-called instrumental rationality. The guiding values of most peripheral societies are devoid of deep critical insights related to the goals of historical evolution in long-term perspective. Their orientation values have an evident affinity with merely pragmatic and utilitarian thinking, which displays a particular inclination towards profitable and efficient means, instruments and roads to development on behalf of goals which, for their part, are at the arbitrary disposal of the current ruling political forces. In the case of the African and Latin American dependency theory, its merely instrumental concept of rationality can be established by analyzing its explicit socio-historical goals – growth, progress, industrialization – which are held to be self-evident and which are considered automatically to bring about an emancipated social order (9).

In this context, the task of the social scientist is restricted to providing a semblance of scholarly plausibility and fashionable ideological wrappings for the desires and prejudices of collective pre-consciousness. Almost all peripheral development ideologies, whose theoretical deficiencies are further enhanced by their being largely confined to legitimizing growth and progress, are imitative in character and assume consequently all the disadvantages and the intellectual poverty of the pragmatic utilitarian thought that is so widespread in the metropolitan centres. Thus, both current schools of thought – positivism in the North and developmentism in the South – tend to reject any questioning of economic-technological progress as being utopian and to concentrate their efforts on an efficient instrumentalism. This means that both conservative positions and socialist programmes commonly identify a successful social order with industrial-technological progress and that problems like genuine political participation, respect for human rights and cultural creation are reduced to the quality of subordinate factors. Similarly, every consideration related to ecology is labelled a luxury which developing countries cannot afford and any attempt at reducing the demographic growth rate is regarded as a precisely calculated act of aggression by the imperialists of the industrialized nations (10).

The question about the fate of Third World societies following the exhaustion of their natural resources or a continuation over many years of the current demographic growth rate has not been adequately answered by the intellectuals of those countries. If one soberly were to consider the normative force of development goals in connection with the pragmatic, utilitarian curtailment of social, political and economic thought in the

Third World, one could establish that the entire complex of ecological and demographic problems, including possible long-term alternative concepts of historical evolution, has been reduced to a residual quantity which is subordinated to the overriding exigences involved in the realization of the goals imposed by collective pre-consciousness.

The fact that development policy alternatives to the metropolitan models — whether these be of a private capitalist or state socialist nature — have not yet become relevant, can be traced to the instrumental reduction of intellectual consciousness in most countries of the Third World. The restriction of scholarly and political thought to a mere rationality of the means and to hastily conceived strategies has had serious effects upon the formulation of sociological and historical theories, upon the preparation of party programmes, government guide-lines and models of international co-operation and upon the awareness of the functional elites in the whole Third World. The most important contributions to the African and Latin American *Dependency Theories* (11) display a marked ideological tendency to legitimize the practice of achieving accelerated economic-technological development by means of forced industrialization. This theory has certainly made a significant contribution to political science, for it has brought out relevant aspects of the dominance/dependence relationships between the world's centres and peripheries. But at the same time the theory has tended to identify dependency situations exclusively with limitations on increased reproduction, industrialization and autarchy — limitations which are supposed to have been imposed only by the metropolitan centres (12). Dependency theorists thus attribute all deficient aspects of Third World development (external control of internal dynamics, foreign control of economic and fiscal policies, specialization in the export of raw materials, regional imbalances, lack of a technologically well-grounded industry) to imperialist penetration, which is blamed for preventing «continuous economic growth» as well as all-round, dynamic development in general. It is noteworthy that the most important authors of the dependency theory agree upon the general definition of what a «successful autonomous and non-deformed development» (13) ought to be — like most politicians and cultivated people in the Third World. What is hotly debated is firstly the problem of structuring and timing economic growth and secondly the problem of the ownership of the means of production. The ultimate normative goals, by contrast, have the character of a common basis of agreement for otherwise disparate political groupings. Although these goals are not always explicitly spelled out, they can be determined either *ex-negativo* or from the context of the current discussions. The desired alternative to the present situation of allegedly «growth without development» would lie in a combination of rapid economic growth with extensive diversification of the technological-economic structures. What is meant in general is the enlargement of the domestic market, industrialization including heavy industry, maintenance of national control over basic resources, dissemination of modern scientific knowledge and the establishment of social justice on a nation-wide scale (14).

Of these, the demand for comprehensive industrialization assumes a very prominent position. The process of national liberation and autonomous development is said to be connected to the growth of heavy industry. Only this form of industrialization (rather than the establishment of consumer-goods, light and manufacturing industries) deserves the appellation of «full and authentic development» (15). The central goal of a socialist development programme has usually been defined as «the energetic encouragement of industrialization up to the establishment of a heavy industry» (16). All advocates of the dependency theory implicitly start from the assumption that far-reaching industrialization, which should overcome the stage of «mere» import substitution, represents both the only desirable development norm and the true historical goal, because heavy industry alone is «in the present phase of civilization the basic pre-requisite for a country's progressive development» (17).

Non-Marxist dependency theorists also come out in favour of similarly structured models of full industrialization, stressing the creation of heavy and petro-chemical industries and claiming that they are a *condition sine qua non* of self-sustained growth (18). Similar ideologies of progress, fixed upon full industrialization, constitute the central aspect of non-Marxist political programmes all over the world. Only the creation of a heavy industry would provide the other sectors of the economy with the necessary impetus to reasonable development and would be synonymous with overcoming dependency, the Egyptian scholar *Sahua NOUR* writes (19). It may be assumed that the normative goals set by even the «non-capitalist» road to development are also forced industrialization with capital accumulation at the expense of agriculture, primarily in order to achieve the creation of heavy industry (20).

After full industrialization, the second most important goal of the collective consciousness in the Third World is the demand for far-reaching autarchy and the expansion of the nation-state power. The achievement of a strong, centralized state is postulated as the truly autonomous development model in order to overcome dependency. By means of extensive penetration of state agencies into all sectors of society, this vigorous state is supposed to guarantee «a fully efficient utilization of scarce resources». Take-over of most functions in the areas of production and administration, concentration of all power in the hands of the executive and the establishment of an emphatically anti-pluralist, authoritarian one-party system are the characteristic features of the dependency theory and of many political movements all over the Third World. In the many cases in which both politicians and scientists adhere verbally to pluralism and democratic procedures, the main drive consists in reality in strengthening state functions and collective institutions and in weakening individual rights and efforts.

In this paper, technocratic-conservative regimes and socialist-revolutionary systems and ideas have been intentionally assimilated to the general concept of modernizing models. This is, however, not an arbitrary statement. It is possible to ascertain a real plurality of models concerning the ways and means to achieve a modern society, but there is at the same

time an equally clear uniformity with regard to the aims and objectives pursued by all important development regimes. There is, of course, the controversial issue of the ownership of the means of production and the shaping of the political constitution, but there is unfortunately no serious debate in the Third World about the relationship between man and nature or about the orientation values of modernity, which are normally perceived through an uncritical and optimistic lens (21). All politically relevant tendencies hold the same naive opinion about the almost magic force of concepts like development, progress, growth, industrialization and opening up of uninhabited regions, partake of the same prejudices on ecological issues and consider nature as the silent, passive basis for human projects. The general inhibition to discuss the negative aspects of progress and modernity suggests the existence of a very broad consensus in the whole of the Third World about the final development goals as well as about their resource endowment – a consensus which is most probably based upon false presuppositions, but which embodies the core of collective identity for many political and ideological streams. Because of these two points, it seems unlikely that any important party or movement could recommend slower economic growth or the enforcement of ecological measures which would delay the modernization and industrialization efforts. The legitimacy of revolutionary programmes and ideals depends on their claim to be a better and faster instrument for the task of surmounting underdevelopment and subduing the traditional order. Since the October Revolution in 1917, Soviet-type socialism has been reduced to a remedy against backwardness, a method destined to overcome a pre-industrial system (22).

Industrialization, modernization and strengthening the national state have become the criteria against which the success or failure of all historical processes in the world's peripheries are judged, and this *before* the distinction between «capitalist» or «socialist» orientations has been made. The term «underdevelopment» is seen as basically identical with the *distance* separating actual Third World conditions from metropolitan standards. Backwardness is defined only in comparison with the achievements of the metropolitan centres (23), this allegedly critical concept of underdevelopment sets up metropolitan parameters as the norm to be attained. Thus, Latin American and African dependency theorists, which had set themselves the task of working out a truly *independent* development model, in the decisive and long-term components of their orientation values display an irrefutable *dependence* upon the metropolitan evolution paradigm. The criteria for defining a positive performance are, for instance, accelerated development, material progress, rapid growth, dynamic process and an homogeneous social body. The negative values are stagnant underdevelopment, material poverty, slow growth, static process and social heterogeneity. Those positive values did not originate in the peripheral societies but rather in the highly industrialized nations of the North, especially in Western Europe. Because of this, it is possible to assert that a successful strategy along the lines of the dependency theory would generate a loss of genuinely characteristic aspects and truly specific factors in the peripheral societies. Revolutionary ideologies and parties are more than eager to sacrifice

cultural, regional, political and institutional specificities for the achievement of accelerated modernization. Technocratic-conservative tendencies, but especially socialist regime, have proved to be the worst enemies of pluralism, diversity and heterogeneity.

Dependency theorists aspire to use full industrialization and an enlarged state machinery as the means to effect their own, allegedly independent, road to modern development; but this road has been rendered impassable not only by imperialist penetration but also by demographic pressures, a scarcity of natural and energy resources and a persistence of traditional behaviour patterns. Latin American and African dependency schools are devoted to the vindication of accelerated modernization, strategies and models, although they cannot display any sign of an original development strategy. However, they adhere to the notion that once the deformation and retardation due to imperialism have been removed, the «real» and «organic» road towards full modernization can be restored (24). This intended *regeneration* of an ancient heritage means in reality only the refurbishing of certain political and cultural issues; in the economic and technological fields, the restoration of the glorious past is identical with a very customary westernization (25).

Outside scholarly circles, there is a similar tendency to identify a positive evolution with the imitation of metropolitan standards. In the programmes of major political parties, the emphasis until about 1950 was upon political, ideological, educational and organizational aspects. Even in the case of reformist and socialist parties, alongside their demands for agrarian reform, social justice and national defence, there was a relatively greater emphasis upon political postulates. Of course, the achievement of material progress was an important part of these programmes, but it was rather generally and vaguely formulated. Whenever industrialization was expressly addressed, it was confined to the processing of raw materials. Promoting production and marketing of raw materials was the central concern of economic programmes put forward by political parties of the Third World. One would search in vain among these party programmes for any mention of ecological problems and very seldom did one find a positive reference to population growth as a prerequisite to full development.

In today's programmes and current government statements, however, specific industry-promoting slogans and demands for industrialization have acquired a dominant position. Both in the writings of neo-conservative parties and in those of a nationalist or socialist nature, there is an unambiguous shifting away from ideological and general political aspects in favour of those elements of economic policy that are conducive to accelerated modernization of society as a whole. Party programmes are increasingly assuming the character of a simplified and politically curtailed several-year economic plan, aimed at using industrialization to achieve genuine economic independence and political sovereignty for the country concerned.

Fascination with material progress and the notion that this is actually the goal of – rather than merely a means towards – human evolution also largely characterize the core of orthodox communist models in

the Third World, as clearly witnessed by the *Cuban revolution*. Cuban leaders have praised the Soviet model of forced accumulation under Stalin as a pattern worthy of imitation, emphasizing especially its material success. In accordance with this pragmatic thinking, the question of the human costs and the problem of the goals sought beyond the experiment are buried under an avalanche of statistics which announce the growth rates in productivity (26). Other contemporary, broader commitments to comprehensive development, too, like the *Monrovia Strategy* and the *Lagos Plan of Action* (27), display a similar uncritical adoption of metropolitan standards and utilitarian-technocratic restrictions. Accelerated growth in all fields, efficient utilization of natural resources and modernization of behaviour patterns constitute the only leading orientation values, with particular stress on diminishing the distance which still separates African reality from the metropolitan paradigm. The latter's goals, values and criteria are equally taken for granted as is the reiterative presupposition that natural resources in Africa are inexhaustible.

Against this background of theoretical illusions and practical mediocrity, I propose to set forth some thesis about a critical theory of modernization.

Instead of a differentiated and sober periodization of evolution stages, Marxist philosophy of history offers a rather simple method which has proved unable to explain not only the historical development of the Third World but also to provide an adequate, empirically sustained explanation of Western European evolution. Besides this basic failure, Marxist theory is pre-consciously fixed upon the Western-metropolitan scheme and goals of historical development, presupposing that the rest of the world should in the long term imitate the Western way from primitive community through several periods of class society till full socialism. This (Hegelian) prejudice is complemented by an overly optimistic and truly uncritical view concerning material progress and technological advancement. The mania of socialist governments to demonstrate their superiority over capitalist regimes by means of higher growth rates and production outputs can be traced back to the core of original Marxism. Finally, all streams of Marxist socialism have an anthropocentric bias; extending the Jewish-Christian heritage, they implicitly but firmly believe that man is the centre and the objective (*telos*) of the entire universe and that nature with all its realms should be subordinated to human projects. Within this framework, ecological considerations play a very secondary role, if any at all.

On the other hand, the classical theories of social change and modernization share a similar onesidedness about positive orientation values and normative models of a well-achieved evolution. They view genuine modernization as an acceptable reproduction of Western-metropolitan standards; they believe that true progress means surpassing old traditions and models on the way to full westernization. They also conceive rationality only as the efficient and rapid adequation of means to some given goals, which as such are never called into question. The preservation of nature and ecological issues have no important place within their theoretical framework.

The concepts of traditionality and modernity seem, however, to be a better explanation scheme than the Marxist periodization for the purpose of marking the poles of contemporary historical evolution in the Third World. This central thesis of the modernization theory should be adopted with some reservations. The drive towards a combined process of forced industrialization, urbanization and westernization of behaviour patterns should not be considered as a general law of history applicable to all times and countries, but rather as a temporary issue occurring in numerous Third World countries and mostly during the second half of the twentieth century. The imitation of metropolitan standards – either in their Western, capitalist version or in the Eastern system of state socialism – has as many negative as positive aspects. For instance, modernization currently embraces such unfortunate features as chaotic uncontrolled urbanization, the disruption of rural life, the destruction of very reasonable economic and cultural traditions, the loss of diversity and originality, the vanishing of a genuine collective identity and the accelerated devastation of nature in the name of necessary and indispensable progress. Individual life increasingly lacks any real sense in a society dominated only by utilitarian performance criteria. Because of these points, the critical theory of modernization accepts as a matter of fact that material progress along metropolitan lines is the main effort and the supreme goal in today's Third World, but it doubts very much that the actual implementation of these values could generate a truly emancipated and harmonious social order. The most probable result of contemporary evolution in the world peripheries is an inferior copy of metropolitan achievements, supplemented by the same subjection of reason and rationality to merely utilitarian, pragmatic and uncritical efficiency principles.

The two other basic assumptions of the critical theory of modernization are:

It has proved useless to establish general laws of historical development. The evolution of every society and the particular situation of every regime can, of course, be analyzed and interpreted according to various criteria and view points, but it is presumptuous to assume that we can ascertain rules, norms, concepts and regularities that would be valid for all times and nations. Therefore, it is irrational to suppose that all societies are, in the long term, advancing towards a common goal (socialism) and that this objective should have only a positive characteristic.

Historically, the period of time to be evaluated for the Third World is rather short and hence, any judgement as to the success or failure of the plurality of socio-economic experiments becomes premature. Above all, it is quite impossible to predict the specific political constitution which could be established in the phase following the completion of basic modernization against the background of an exponentially increasing rate of demographic growth, the destruction of world-wide ecological balances and a renewed struggle for very scarce resources.

Finally, we must recognize that man is not the centre of the universe, that he is by no means the objective (telos) of the world, and that he has no right to extinguish animal and vegetal life in order to accomplish

a very dubious development programme. Exactly in the same way as no political party or movement should have the pretension of imposing its dogmas and models upon other social groups, not a simple living species – even man – should have the right to impose its structures and options upon the whole of nature.

The spread of instrumental rationality does not always correspond to the evolution of a more comprehensive rationality, whose task would be to make critical judgement not only of the means but also of the goals of every political and economic process. Contemporary history is, of course, not wanting in examples of the utmost efficiency and most advanced technology being placed at the disposal of inhuman objectives. In many Third World countries the combination of a politically non-liberal tradition with the elements of technical-industrial civilization has produced a hybrid and eclectic order which, for the sake of successful imitation of the metropolitan models in a short-term perspective, runs the danger of jeopardizing its very material foundations in the long term. This confusion of means and goals and the exclusive identification of successful development with modernization and industrialization, represent the factors which mark the triumph of a merely instrumental rationality which places human beings – as quantifiable entities – at the service of economic development rather than vice-versa.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. two of the very few studies critically concerned with this problem: Yves Laulan, *Le Tiers Monde et la Crise de l'Environnement*. Paris: P.U.F. 1974; Edward J. Woodhouse, *Re-visioning the Future of the Third World: An Ecological Perspective on Development*, in: *World Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1972), p. 1 sqq.
2. It would be apt to speak of real «fascination effects». – Cf. Torcuato S. Di Tella, *Populism and Reform in Latin America*, in: Claudio Véliz (ed.), *Obstacles to Change in Latin America*, London/New York: Oxford University Press, p. 48.
3. On the existence of a «cultural super-ego» cf. Sigmund Freud, *Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psycho-analyse*, in: Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, Frankfurt: Fischer 1967, vol. XV, p. 194; Freud, *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*, in: *ibid.*, vol. XIV, p. 501.
4. Typical for this assumption: Ramon Losada Aldana, *Dialéctica del subdesarrollo*, México: Grijalbo 1969, p. 89.
5. Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, London: Bogle 1976, *passim*.
6. Cf. Eduardo Galeano, *Las venas abiertas de América Latina*, México/Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI 1972, pp. 293–306 – The former president of Argentina, Juan D. Peron, was one of the first politicians in Latin America who linked the goal of forced industrialization and modernization with a rejection of Liberal-democratic concepts and with a revival of Spanish-Catholic guiding social values. – Cf. Juan D. Peron, *Doctrina revolucionaria*, Buenos Aires. Freeland 1973, p. 295, Peron, *la hora de los pueblos*, Buenos Aires: Pleamar 1973, p. 11 sqq.

7. Samir Amin, *Le Développement Inégal. Essai sur les Formations Sociales du Capitalisme Périphérique*, Paris: Minuit 1973, p. 313–315. Amin goes so far as to see a «disclosure of social maturity» in the demographic explosion.
8. Cf. David E. Apter, *Ideology and Discontent*, New York/London: The Free Press 1964, p. 22 sqq.
9. Cf. Darcy Ribeiro, *El Dilema de América Latina*, México: Siglo XXI, 1973, pp. 55–57; Raul Prebisch, *Transformation y desarrollo. La Grantarea de América Latina*, México: P.C.E. 1970, p. 9 sqq.; Justinian Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania. A Study on Perverse Capitalist Industrial Development*, Nairobi/London: Oxford University Press 1973, pp. 105–180; Khalil Zarniti, *Système Impérialiste Contemporain. Phénomène de dépendance et Rôle de la Bourgeoisie Nationale en Tunisie*, In: Anouar Abdel-Makek (ed.), *Sociologie de l'Impérialisme*, Paris: Anthropos 1971, p. 540.
10. Angel Fucaraccio et al., *Imperialismo y control de la población*, Buenos Aires: Periferia 1973, p. 102, 107, 118; cf. an African Testimony: Maaza Bekele, *Against the False Prophets of Apocalypse*, in: UNESCO Courier, Vol. XXVII (July 1974), p. 44 sqq.
11. Cf. a general, critical review: David Ray, *The Dependency Model of Latin American Underdevelopment. Three Basic Fallacies*, in: Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. XV, No. 1 (February, 1973); Hans-Jürgen Puhle (ed.), *Lateinamerika – Historische Realität und Dependencia-Theorien*, Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe 1977.
12. Orlando Caputo/Robert Pizarro, *Dependencia y Relaciones Internacionales*, San José: EDUCA 1974, p. 50 s; Theotonio dos Santos *Über die Struktur der Abhängigkeit*, in: Dieter Senghaas (ed.), *Imperialismus und Strukturelle Gewalt. Analysen über Abhängige Reproduktion*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1972, p. 255; Samir Amin, *Zur Theorie von Akkumulation und Entwicklung in der gegenwärtigen Weltgesellschaft*, in: Dieter Senghaas (ed.), *Peripherer Kapitalismus. Analysen über Abhängigkeit und Unterentwicklung*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1974, p. 72 sqq.
13. Theotonio dos Santos, *ibid.*, 256; Vania Bambirra, *El Capitalismo Dependiente Latinoamericano*, México: Siglo XXI, 1974, p. 137 sqq.
14. Vania Bambirra, *ibid.*, pp. 137–180; Mohamed-Salah Sfia, *Le Système Mondial de l'Impérialisme*, in: A Abdel-Malek (ed.), *op. cit.* (note 9), pp. 571–580.
15. Arturo Urquidí, *Latinoamérica y el «Crecimiento Explosivo» de su Población*, in: PRAXIS (La Paz), Vol. I, No. 1 (May 1964), p. 18.
16. Jorge Abelardo Ramos, *De Octubre a Septiembre*, Buenos Aires: Pena-Lillo 1974, p. 321.
17. Luis Vitale, *Ist Lateinamerika Feudal oder Kapitalistisch?*, in: A.G. Frank et al., *Kritik des Bürgerlichen Antimperialismus*, Berlin/W: Wagenbach 1969, p. 10; J.A. Silva Michelena, *The Illusion of Democracy in Dependent Nations*, Cambridge/M; M.I.T. Press 1971, p. 259.
18. Osvaldo Sunkel, *El Subdesarrollo Dependiente en América Latina*, in: Carlos Naudon (ed.), *América 70. Servidumbre o Independencia en la presente Década*, Santiago de Chile 1970, pp. 68–71.
19. Salua Nour, *Die «Entwicklungshilfe»*, in: José Linhard/Klaus Voll (eds.), *Weltmarkt und Entwicklungsländer*, Rheinstetten: Schindele 1976, p. 194 sqq.
20. Salim Ibrahim/Verena Metze-Mangold, *Nichtkapitalistischer Entwicklungsweg*, Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch 1976, pp. 103–112.

21. A Critical Voice out of the Third World: Ivan Illich, *Outwitting the «Developed» Countries*, in: Henry Bernstein (ed.), *Underdevelopment and Development. The Third World Today*, Harmondsworth: Penguin 1978, pp. 357–368.
22. Walter Rodney, op. cit. (note 5), *passim*; Darcy Ribeiro, *Der zivilisatorische Prozess*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1971, p. 174 sqq.; Dieter Senghaas, *Sozialismus. Eine Entwicklungsgeschichtliche und Entwicklungstheoretische Betrachtung*, in: *Leviathan*, Vol. 8 (1980), No. 1.
23. Theotonio dos Santos, op. cit. (note 12), p. 254; Samir Amin, *Zur Theorie von Akkumulation...*, op. cit. (note 12), p. 71–85.
24. Darcy Ribeiro, *El dilema de América Latina*, op. cit. (note 9), pp. 61–72; Caputo/Pizarro, op. cit. (note 12), p. 50; Samir Amin, *Zur Theorie von Akkumulation...*, op. cit. (note 12), p. 71.
25. Cf. Uwe Simson, *Typische Ideologische Reaktionen Arabischer Intellektueller auf das Entwicklungsgefälle*, in: René König (ed.), *Aspekte der Entwicklungssoziologie*, Cologne 1969, pp. 145–147.
26. Carmelo Mesa-Lago (ed.), *Cuba in Revolution*, Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press 1980; Nelson P. Valdès, *Cuba: Socialismo Democrático o Burocratismo Colectivista ?*, in: *APORTES*, No. 23, January 1972, p. 26 sqq.
27. Organisation de l'Unité Africaine/Conférence des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement, Deuxième Session Extraordinaire, Lagos 28/29 Avril 1980, *Plan d'Action de Lagos en vue de la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie de Monrovia pour le Développement Economique de l'Afrique*, ECM/ECO/9 (XIV) Rev.2.

RESUME

Cet article essaie de présenter ce que MANSILLA appelle une «Théorie Critique de la Modernisation». L'auteur débute avec l'assertion suivante : bien que la théorie de la dépendance soit la contribution la plus importante et la plus originale des intellectuels du Tiers-Monde à l'ensemble du débat sur le développement, lorsqu'on l'examine de plus près, cette théorie de la dépendance elle-même est dépendante du courant principal des théories occidentales sur le développement, théories que critique manifestement la théorie de la dépendance.

Il cite les problèmes afférant à la croissance économique et au développement technologique, la réalisation des désirs de biens matériels et la création de conditions d'existence comparables à celles de l'Occident ; de même que la croyance solidement établie par ces théoriciens qui déclarent que toute société, partout dans le monde, devra s'adapter aux mêmes lois de développement que celles prévalant en Occident. Tout ceci pour donner des exemples de cette dépendance.

D'autre part, MANSILLA rejette la conception marxiste des processus de développement.

Il soutient et se plaint du fait que nulle part dans le monde, il existe des intellectuels engagés dans le «Débat sérieux» sur les rapports entre l'homme et la nature, ou sur les valeurs qui sous-tendent les théories de modernisation. Les intellectuels du Tiers-Monde ne semblent pas porter un grand intérêt aux problèmes écologiques.

En conséquence, MANSILLA affirme que le progrès matériel suivant les lignes directrices occidentales pourrait produire «un ordre social véritablement émancipé et harmonieux». Il indique plus loin que le laps de temps qui nous est alloué est historiquement trop court pour nous permettre de juger si la pluralité des expériences socio-économiques dans le Tiers-Monde peut réussir ou pas.

Finalement l'auteur soutient que l'homme n'est pas le centre de l'Univers, et que par conséquent, il n'a nul droit d'exterminer les animaux et les plantes pour que lui puisse accomplir son «développement douteux».