THE LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION (LPA) AND THE WORLD BANK ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE IN AFRICA: A COMPARISON

By

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INTRODUCTION

The facts of Africa's poor performance in agriculture are well-known. Nevertheless some of the statistics may be worth recalling. Of all major geographical regions Africa was the only one to witness a fall in per capita food production during the 60s and 70s. While in 1960s agriculture production (crops and livestosk) barely kept pace with population growth, in 1970 the former grew at 1.3 per cent per year while the latter grew at 2.7 per cent. The situation was particularly bad in sub-saharan Africa. As table 1 shows, out of the thirty two countries on which information was available, only eight maintained or exceeded their 1969–71 levels of per capita food production. Significantly, for Africa the decline was in both food crops and export crops so that what we in fact have is not a «food crisis» but a veritable agrarian crisis. It is important to bear this in mind because the fashionable «food first» slogan may, in fact, be dangerously misstating the issues involved. In addition, where output increased, it was due largely to an expansion of the areas under cultivation. Productivity was stagnant both in terms of land and, labour (World Bank, 1981 A). What is particularly ominous about these trends is that they occurred despite major investment efforts and additional use of farm inputs. For example, the average annual growth of fertilizer consumption was 9.7 per cent and compares fabourably with 10.2 per cent in other underdeveloped regions and 5.7 per cent for the world as a whole (World Bank, 1981 A).

Table 1 – Average Index of Food Production per Capita 1977–79 (1969–71 = 100)

Angola	85	Mauritanie	75
Benin	97	Mozambique	75
Burundi	105	Niger	89
Cameroon	110	Nigeria	87
Central African Rep.	102	Rwanda	107
Chad	91	Senegal	88
Congo	81	Sierra Leone	87
Ethiopia	84	Somalia	85
Ghana	82	Sudan	105
Guinea	86	Tanzania	94
Ivory Coast	102	Togo	81
Kenya	92	Uganda	90
Lesotho	100	Upper Volta	93
Madagascar	94	Zaïre	90
Malawi	100	Zambia	99
Mali	88	Zimbabwe	100

Source: *World Development (1981 B).*

* *CODESRIA, Dakar, Senegal.*

The continuation of past trends is clearly untenable both politically and economically. Thus according to FAO (1980) projections, despite the assumption that between 1980–2000 production would be higher than in the previous two decades as a reflection of the hoped-for recovery from the depressed agricultural situation of the mid-seventies, there would be no material improvement in agricultural output per capita and the situation would be worse. While agricultural production was estimated to grow at 2.8 per cent per year during the next two decades, demand was expected to increase by 3.7 per cent and population by 3.0 per cent, a situation that can only be sustained by increased importation of agricultural products.

THE CRISIS: POLITICAL DIMENSIONS

Behind these statistics is the grim reality of undernourishment and starvation. While moral revulsion at the cost in human terms may enter political statements about the crisis, governments are not usually moved by these moral considerations. Instead, they are moved to action by the impact of the crisis on such things as fiscal viability of the state and threats to its political stability that such a crisis may pose. Let us therefore briefly look at the governments perceptions of the crisis if only to place in their proper context the politically acceptable or viable options open to African governments.

Governments expect Agriculture to perform certain very clear roles. Agriculture is supposed to earn or save foreign exchange. It is supposed to contribute to the fiscal well-being of the State. It is supposed to help brake the tide of rapid urbanization. It is also expected to subsidize the process of industrialization by providing cheaply raw materials and a major component of the «wage basket», namely food. The crisis as perceived by governments is related to the failure of agriculture to perform these roles and not to its failure to improve the living conditions of the direct producers. More specifically, the immediate reasons for concern by African governments are the following:

a) Because of its changed character and geographical incidence, the agrarian crisis threatens political stability. It is no longer characterized by the silent and politically harmless undernourishment of a politically docile or inarticulate peasantry. Rather, it has now become an urban problem symptomized by escalating food prices and regular food shortages affecting large sections of the urban working class and the nascent middle class . By affecting groups that are politically more articulate and better organized than the rural poor, the agrarian crisis has become a veritable threat to many governments and the elementary class instinct of survival has imposed upon governments the issue of food supplies. Indeed, the agrarian crisis has already given name to a new genre of military coup d'états – the co-called «rice coups» – in which food shortages have sparked political action against governments and has intensified other grievances widely held by the urban masses.

b) The agrarian crisis threatens all efforts at accumulation and economic development because (i) to assuage the relatively more explosive urban population, governments have had to use their scarce foreign exchange to import food. Since African countries do not produce most of the capital goods and intermediary inputs, the allocation of substantial amounts of this foreign exchange earnings for food imports has reduced the capacity of these countries to import these essential inputs, thus halting most investment plans and creating underutilization of the puny industrial structures (ii) as result of this foreign exchange squeeze, inflationary pressures – both locally – created or imported – have been intensified encouraging investments which are unproductive and less dependent on imports – real estate speculation, «services» etc.

c) The agrarian crisis pushes the rural population into the urban areas further compounding problems of urbanization and undermining rural recovery due to the age, sex and educational selective nature of the migration.

Such was the reality and perception of the crisis that lay behind the *Lagos Plan of Action (LPA)* adopted by the African Heads of State in 1980 and the World Bank's *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action* (henceforth referred to as the Report on Berg Report after Ellict Berg who headed the Bank's team).

GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE DOCUMENTS

Before a more detailed study of the two documents, it is necessary to clarify some general points about them. First and foremost neither of the two documents is a plan in the strict sense of the word. The LPA is a statement of intentions, a listing of objectives, an exhortation of governments to do something about a situation considered alarming. The recommendations made, while laydable in themselves are not particularly informative on what are the strategic priorities and central links in the LPA. In a similar vein, the Berg Report is a neatly-packaged appeal for further capitalist penetration of African economies and especially agriculture. Facts, figures and «case studies» are carefully marshalled to show the vices of state activities and the virtues of market forces. Apparently where these facts and figures are presumed not sufficiently persuasive, the Report does not hesitate to pose poorly veiled threats of withdrawal of financial support to African governments if they fail to comply to the new policies:

> *«African governments must... be willing to take firm action on internal problems, be more open to proposals to revise policies in the light of experience, and be willing to accept the proposition that without policy reform higher aid will be difficult to mobilize» (p. 8).*

In the spirit of the fashionable «Supply-side economics», the Berg Report proposes a disarmingly simple solution. It calls for currency devaluation and privatization of virtually all economic activities in the agriculture sector. The «Agenda for Action» is in fact an agenda for *state inaction* as *laissez-faire* is given greater reign.

FOOD VERSUS EXPORT CROPS

In no other aspect are the two documents as divergent in their views as on the question of «food self-sufficiency». In the preamble of the LPA, the African heads of state declare:

«... We commit ourselves individually and collectively on behalf of our governments to ... achieve self-sufficiency in food production and supply».

The call for food self-sufficiency comes as no surprise when some countries, especially the USA view their «food power» as one more weapon in their diplomatic arsenal.

In sharp contrast to the LPA, the Report is opposed to strategies of food self-sufficiency. The Report argues that there is no empirical validity to the widespread view that there is a trade-off between export crops production and food self-sufficiency. Indeed, the Report argues that the bulk of the evidence points the otherway: «Countries that have been doing well in cash crop production have also been among the most successful in expanding food production» (p. 62). From this observation, the report advances the argument that there is complimentarity between the two types of crops:

«Export crops are the nucleus around which extension, input supply, and marketing services are built; these also benefit food producers. Second, food production directly benefits from after-effects of fertilizer expended on the commercial lead crop. Third the existence of a commercial crop facilitates the propagation of productivity-increasing equipment. Finally, where individual farmers undertake cash crops to such an extent that they develop a food deficit (which they usually do only if there is a reasonably well-developed local or regional food trade), cash crop production creates a market that is often more secure and stable than distant urban markets» (p. 63).

But what if the complimentary argument is not valid and that instead there is a trade-off between export crops and food production? Not to worry, advises the report. With the support of spurious empirical precision, the report establishes that African countries have «distinct comparative advantage in export crop production». By an eerie coincidence these crops turn out to be precisely those that the colonialist imposed on the various African countries. We are thus now made to understand that Africa's colonial heritage and historical position in the international division of labour are economically efficient. It is strange that a report calling for a dynamic process of «accelerated development» can base its recommendation on the static doctrine of comparative advantage. It is perhaps worth noting here that the Report's opposition to African food self-sufficiency ties in very well with interests of grain-exporting countries especially the United States for whom the vertiginously mounting food deficits in Africa provide lucrative outlets for their grain surplus. For the US this would have the added advantage of further enhancing its political leverage in Africa through its «food power» which is inversely related to Africa's food self-sufficiency. Here, as in many other parts, the Reports exhibits complete disdain for whatever remains of African nationalism. The *Leit motif* of the LPA is the nationalistic assertion of the need to alter the colonial patterns of Africa's position in the international division of labour.

THE STATE AND AGRICULTURE

One striking common feature of the two documents is their naive conceptualization of state policies towards agriculture. This may be attributed to either diplomatic propriety or the wishful thinking of a benevelont technocracy. Whatever is the case, the naivety of most of the assumptions account for much of the vacuity of the recommendations put forward. Let us briefly list some of the explicit and implicit assumptions contained in the documents.

A major assumption in the LPA is that one is dealing with democratic/populist regimes whose peoples' welfare is the cornerstone of their socio-economic policies. Attached to this assumption is one that views the present crisis as simply one of production hence the preoccupation in the LPA with technical issues such as increased fertilizers, better infrastructure, more research, appropriate technologies, credit facilities etc. In egalitarian societies, it is reasonable to assume that increased food production will automatically lead to improved welfare for all members of the society. In the case of much of Africa this outcome of increased food production is far from certain. Indeed evidence already exists that even in those few countries that have enjoyed increased per capita food availability, large sections of the population have not benefitted from these increases.

One other assumption in the LPA is that the direction and speed with which government policies are formulated and implemented in OUA member states are determined autonomously within these countries. The truth, of course, is that there are many transnational actors on the African agriculture scene. There are transnational land owners, agrobusiness (in input production, marketing and production), international development aid organizations, as well as foreign governments through their national aid agencies.

Other assumptions concern the international environment within which the plan is to be implemented. On this issue the LPA clearly shows the uneasy marriage between its calls for collective self-reliance, on the one hand, and continued dependence of African economies, on the other hand. Undaunted by their endless failures to extract concessions from the developed countries (the Cancun debacle being a more recent case), the signatories of the LPA «consider that they are owed a massive and appropriate contribution by the developed countries to the development in Africa». It is apparently on the basis of this moral premise that it is assumed that half of the cost of Africa's strategy of collective food self-sufficiency will be underwritten by foreign sources of finance.

The implicit view in the Berg Report is that the state is socially neutral, its principle task being to maximize some socially accepted welfare function subject to certain constraints. Thus, when the Report is not outright condenscending towards Africa regimes, it advances policy prescriptions in a manner which gives the impression that their nonadoption in the past was simply due to ignorance or misunderstanding of certain economic theories or relationships. The class content of policies hitherto pursued by African states is nowhere broached. Surely, even the World Bank must have noticed that during the entire period analysed certain social groups – both national and transnational – have amassed or extracted immense wealth from African agriculture and that, therefore, it is not too farfetched to conclude that what leverage these groups have had on the state apparatus has been deliberately used to their advantage.

AGRARIAN CHANGE, BASIC NEEDS AND EQUITY

The LPA fervently subscribes to a «basic needs strategy» and proposes an integrated rural development strategy based on smallholders organized in co-operatives. This egalitarian objective may conflict with the widespread policy of assigning to the peasants such tributary functions as maintaining and reproduccing a labour reserve, providing economic surplus for industrialization and the discretionary consumption of the dominant social classes, supplying the non-agricultural sectors with cheap wage goods and raw materials etc. Nevertheless, it is still politically significant that the African Heads of States called for a more equity-oriented strategy especially in the light of the Bank's argument that equity considerations were largely a concern of foreign aid donors and not African governments.

Although the BERG Report mentions «Basic Needs» the main stress is on growth and not equity. The Report indeed suggests an important change in World Bank rhetoric. The Report not only advocates social differentiation and inequity. Rather surreptitiously, it manages to argue that inequity is a useful component of its smallholder-based strategy. First, the report condemns African governments' attempts to reduce regional inequity through development schemes in marginal areas. Priority attention to smallholders must be «selective-targetting those areas where the physical resource base and existing human resource and infrastructure provide the pre-conditions for rapid pay-off from additional investment» (p. 52). Even where investments in marginal areas have been successful in terms of meeting social objectives, the Report concludes, on the basis of some unstated calculations, that the opportunity cost was high. Instead the Report suggests that programmes should be devised to facilitate the migration of people from poorest regions to those which are better endowed. Here the Report totally fails to understand the political imperatives of nation-building which compel African governments to seek or, at least, appear to seek to develop marginal areas. Any country that foolishly swallows the Reports ridiculously economistic perspective of resource allocation will sooner or later find its national cohesion threatened as the neglected regions seek to do something about their plight. It seems never to have occurred to the authors of the Report that the «civil strife» they cite as one of the causes of stagnation in Africa has been partly formented by the uneven development engendered by precisely the type of regional policies the Report is advocating. A more honest statement would have called for selective allocation of resources and increased militarization of the countryside to hold the already fragile nation together.

As far as intra-regional distribution issues are concerned the widely discredited «trickle down» theory of growth is advanced unabashedly. First we are informed that in some countries agriculture is «highly dualistic» (the examples cited are Kenya, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe) with larger private firms providing major shares of market output. In such countries, «any growth-oriented strategy must include these islands of high productivity in agriculture» (p. 52). For other economies, the report argues: «In a smallholder-based strategy which places production first, larger farmers can be used to spearhead the introduction of new methods». The importance of inequality is further underlined by the Report's discussion of the Northern Nigeria agricultural development projects. As one of the factors contributing to the «success» of the projects, the Report cites «project design» and states, inter alia, the following:

> *«The project... did not ignore larger farms, which had political clout and provided an informal channel to the government for reporting successes, obstacles and failures. Eventually, the larger farms provided a demonstration (over the fence) to smaller farmers. This trickle-down theory worked because the larger farmers proved to be the greater risk-takers and thus were more innovative» (p. 53).*

Other observers of these schemes are not so certain of the «trickle-down» effect of these schemes. Nor are they so certain that the «Political clout» possessed by the larger-scale farmers is used for the benefit of all peasants. For the local elites these projects «provide immediate benefits... in terms of contracts, kick-backs on contracts, misappropriation of compensation meant for the peasants, speculative land deals, and the acquisition of land and other vital resources for capitalist farming» (Nkom, 1981). In other words the «political clout» to which the World Bank is proudly associated is used to make the «trickle-down» as miniscule as possible. It may be of interest to recall that under the leadership of Mc NAMARA some surprisingly human utterances came from the World Bank. Equity and «Basic Needs» were put on the agenda. Quite a large number of people were taken in by these changes as the Bank spread the word that its «New Style» rural development projects were deliberately targeted at reaching the «poorest 40 per cent». Elites in both the rich and underdeveloped countries were told that «growth with equity» was not only economically feasible and morally desirable but that it was politically essential to systemic maintenance. Some observers believed that Mc NAMARA's fervent advocacy for the «New Style» was a genuine attempt to come to grips with poverty whose devasting effect had been vividly demonstrated in Vietnam.

Critics pointed out the many lacune in the new strategy. First, most of the concerns voiced by the Bank's leadership directly conflicted with the Bank's primary purpose – to stimulate capitalist development – and failed to fully take into account the logic of the Bank's investment criteria. Secondly, the Bank's emphasis on systemic maintenance would preclude the social transformations essential to strategies aimed at equity and elimination of poverty. Thirdly, there was the carvenous gap between the World Bank's policy proclamations and day-to-day «business as usual» practice. World Bank projects continued to favour the more privileged sections for the rural population. These projects tended to merely convert rural development into big business for experts, consulting firms, constructors, input suppliers etc., all of whom were more confortable dealing with the privileged sections of rural society. Technologies used in the Bank's projects were not appropriate to the stated objectives of reaching the «40 per cent poor». Literature evaluating World Bank projects in the Mc NAMARA era generally suggests little evidence that recent World Bank agricultural projects did benefit the poorest farmers or have even been intended to *(1)*.

PEASANTS AND AFRICAN AGRICULTURE

African agriculture is still predominantly in peasant hands and any plan to develop African agriculture must address itself to the peasant question. As we noted earlier, the LPA favours an integrated rural development strategy based on small producers organized in cooperatives. The BERG Report also claims that the smallholder sector is to be the focus of the «growth-oriented rural development strategy». Three justifications for the emphasis on smallholders sector are given: (a) the «massive potential of the sector is yet to be realized» (b) poverty in Africa being largely a rural phenomenon, development of smallholders agriculture would contribute to the meeting of basic needs, (c) attention to smallholders is a more cost effective way to raise output than other alternatives currently allow.

The stated objectives towards peasant producers do not, of course, unambiguously specify the position of the peasantry in the whole economy nor do they establish explicitly the relations between the peasantry and other actors in the agricultural sector, namely, the state and private capital both local and transnational. The failure by the LPA to be more specific on the positions of peasants may be a reflection of African governments' ambivalence towards peasant production. Because increases in productivity of peasants is slow and the necessary extensions services costly, a number of African governments are increasingly skeptical of reliance on peasant farming. Yet, on the other hand, this option is the easiest to «tax» since it involves social groups that are not represented in the state structure. The extraction of surplus through marketing boards, unfavourable terms of trade, overvalued exchange rates and other market mechanisms has a long history in Africa and bureaucratic inertia and political expendiency would tend to favour its continuation if only for fiscal purposes. Against these beneficial aspects of peasant production, there are other aspects that render the option less favoured. One of these is that increased production is only

(1) See Feder (1981), Stryker (1979).

possible if higher producers' prices are paid to the peasants and if more public funds are allocated to this sector. Secondly, the major sources of foreign funds (e.g. the World Bank) apply investment criteria that makes most of projects aimed at peasants simply not «bankable». Thirdly the absence of social differentiation implicit in such a mode of production is not compatible with the nationwhide process of social differentiation now taking place. Fourthly the new technologies favoured by governments, TNCs and foreign aid donors cannot be easily reconciled to this mode of production. If supporters of this option dream of «appropriate technologies», masters, of the new technologies are calling for «appropriate institutions» tending to dispossess the peasantry.

The BERG Report not only calls for measures leading to greater social differentiation among the peasantry by tending to favour «progressive farmers», but would favour the free-play of «market forces». Apparently the Report would favour land registration schemes which convert communally owned land to privately owned land. Under such schemes peasants become small landowners. However as experience has shown elsewhere, the giving of land title to individual peasants has tended to facilitate the dispossession of peasants who are obliged to give away the titles due to their indebtedness or inability to finance the new techniques accompanying the land registration programmes. Sections of peasants are then made landless and either become wage-earners in the rural areas or drift towards urban slums.

FOREIGN CAPITAL AND AFRICAN AGRICULTURE

Foreigners have for more than a century now been involved in one way or other in African agriculture. Indeed, the integration of African agriculture within the world capitalist system was under the aegies of foreign colonial regimes and merchant capital. Today, large amounts of investment in agriculture are still carried out or controlled by foreign capital both public and private, bilateral or multilateral. The objectives and practices of colonial capital in African agriculture are well-known and need no detailed recounting here. Suffice it to recall that for the colonialists Africa's agriculture was a source of cheap raw materials for their industries and foodstuffs for their wage and luxury goods. It was also an outlet for the export commodities such as simple manufactured goods – textiles, bicycles, cooking oil etc. Agriculture was essentially export-oriented and export rather that food crops for the domestic market constituted the main component of «modern agriculture».

The interests of foreign capital in African agriculture, today, while containing significant residuals of colonial interests are substantially different and more complex. Consequently, foreign perceptions of the Africa agriculture crisis are today as complex as foreign interests. For some sections of foreign capital, the crisis provides an opportunity for export of food crops *(1)*. The growing involvement of the major grain marketing

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(1) According to FAO (1980) trend growth would mean an increase of Africa's grain imports 6.5 million tons in 1975 to 78 million tons in 2000 – a real bonanza – for the exporters.

companies in the provision of food to Africa is increasing as rapidly as Africa's food imports. Those fractions of capital reliant on African raw materials would want to see increased export capacities of Africa's unprocessed agricultural produce. Some like the World Bank are concerned with the effects of the crisis on political stability and see the crisis in terms of systemic maintenance. They are also concerned about threats of Africa's growing incapacity to service its mounting debt hence the emphasis on export-orientation. And still others, especially those involved in local import substitution industry see the crisis largely in terms of its inflationary pressures on wages and therefore, profitability. And finally there are input suppliers who see the increased emphasis on agricultural modernization as providing new lucrative markets for their products and technologies. Despite the divergent interests of these groups, they would all be served well by a basically capitalist agriculture, leading to increased privatization of the control of land. Fortunately for them, the beleaquered African governments are now more susceptible to pressures towards this option. The demands of both the IMF and World Bank and other foreign aid donors are for more private ownership of the means of production while, internally the failure of the types of agriculture hitherto followed makes the privatization of landownership more respectable – or, at least, worth trying.

This process of transnationalization of african agriculture is assuming various forms: joint-ventures with the state, management contracts, wholly-owned private estates and plantations, «nucleus farms» surrounded by smallholders or outgrowers etc. It should be stressed here that although some of these schemes are export-oriented, the new thrust now is the supply of the urban domestic market. The firms involved in this are not only the familiar ones like Unilever, Nestle or Del Monte. They include such mining giants as Anglo-America, Honda (Zambia's diary industry), Kaiser Aluminium (in Ghanain rice schemes) etc. They also include foreign financed «integrated rural development» projects.

Disturbingly, the LPA is deafeningly silent on the role of transnational agribusiness in African agriculture. Although half of the resources for the implementation of LPA are supposed to come from non-African sources, the LPA does not state whether these are to be public or private loans or direct foreign investment. The BERG Report is, in contrast, more explicit about the role of agribusiness, although it goes about stating the case in a rather roundabout way. It will be recalled that the agricultural strategy proposed by the Report is largely export-oriented. It turns out that, according to the Report, export crops are particularly suited to agribusiness «because the marketing skills and market connections that are often associated with foreign investment could be well utilized». Governments are further urged to give more room to agroindustrial enterprises «whose external capital and technical know-how could be applied to plantation or irrigation crops as well as used in industrial processing».

The slippery ingenuity of the Report's proposal must not blind us to the main purpose – namely the further penetration and control of African agriculture by transnational capital. Reconstructed, the logic of the strategy is as follows: One first calls for a smallholder growth-oriented strategy which is then found to be in dire need of large capitalist farmers who have the «political clout» and are innovators who the smallholders «over the fence» can emulate. Now, since the new strategy is export-oriented, the large capitalist farmers most appropriate to the strategy are transnational agribusiness firms.

What the Report envisages is a triangular relationship among African governments (which must undertake large-scale infrastructural development financed with borrowed money often from the World Bank), peasant farmers and foreign agribusiness which provides the technical know-how and managerial skills and undertakes processing and distribution of produce it receives under contract from the other two partners. These triangular agricultural schemes are now increasingly becoming familiar in Africa. They usually involve a transnational firm which has a nucleus estate surrounded by peasant outgrowers producing the same crop as that on the nucleus estate. Usually, the crop is one requiring high levels of industrial processing before being exported and the only processing plant will be that owned or managed by the TNC, which, as a result enjoys immense monopsonistic powers. In addition to purchasing, processing and marketing of the crop, the TNC will supply inputs and advice to the peasant outgrowers on what and when to plant, when to harvest etc. The advantages to the TNC are enormous. First, it is relieved of the cost of fluctuations in commodity prices by being able to shift the burden of these fluctuations on to the peasants. Secondly, the TNC need not bother about minimum wages, social security and health of the peasant since these are not its employees. Nor does it have to bother with strikes. Thirdly, since the outgrowers are «independent producers» they can make use of unpaid family labour. Finally, the outgrowers arrangement permits the TNC to make profits from agriculture without the political odium and risk associated with direct ownership of land.

WHAT NEXT?

Read together the two documents illuminate the core of the conflict between those forces that would wish a greater transnationalization of African economies and the nationalistic forces that are still striving for self-reliance and Pan-African co-operation. In various Pan-African fora African governments have jointly expressed their misgivings about and even resentment of the BERG's Report. However, the Bank's main pressures on Africa take place not at the regional level but at the national level. Given the severe crisis faced by African states, their capacity to resist World Bank pressures at the national level is at its lowest. And we now see one government after another succumbing to these pressures and readjusting their development strategies towards the ones recommended by the BERG Report – drastic reductions in social expenditures, deemphasis on basic needs and equity, primary crop export orientation, devaluation, increased privatization of economic activity, etc. Unfortunately for the World Bank, the efficacity of these policies has been rendered questionable by the deepening crisis in the «Star Performers» (Kenya, Malawi, Ivory Coast, Botswana) that the World Bank's Report puts foward as models, thus sustaining the spirit of regional co-operation and self-reliance embodied in the Lagos Plan of Action.

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RESUME

Dans cet article, l'auteur compare le «Rapport Berg» de la Banque Mondiale intitulé le Développement Accéléré au Sud du Sahara: programme indicatif d'action et le Plan d'Action de Lagos. Contrairement aux déclarations du «Rapport Berg», l'auteur soutient que les deux documents exposent deux approches totalement différentes du développement économique de l'Afrique. Alors que le Plan d'Action de Lagos cherche à instaurer une plus grande coopération régionale par le moyen d'une stratégie endogène à caractère régionale, le Rapport Berg propose une stratégie de développement extravertie, basée sur les matières premières, orientée vers l'exportation et dépendant essentiellement du capital étranger.

Étant donné la crise économique que les pays africains traversent, la Banque Mondiale est plus à même d'imposer sa stratégie de développement. Cependant la crise économique que traversent les pays donnés dans le Rapport comme modèles – Malawi, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya – montre que l'option choisie par le Plan d'Action de Lagos est toujours à l'ordre du jour en Afrique.