INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE MARGINALIZATION OF THE PEASANTRY IN NIGERIA

By

Steven A. NKOM *

INTRODUCTION

Despite her oil wealth, Nigeria's policy-makers are basically agreed that rural transformation is still the key to the country's growth and development. With about 80 per cent of the country's population living and working in the rural areas, there is no gainsaying the fact that any development strategy which does not involve the mobilization of the rural population for increased output is not only irrelevant to Nigeria but is also doomed to failure. This is quite understandable considering the fact that the country depends largely on the small-scale peasant producers for its agricultural output. In an effort to expand agricultural production, Nigeria has the option of either mobilizing the peasants as the basis for agricultural and rural development, or by-passing the peasants and encouraging large-scale commercial farming by individual capitalist farmers and the state. Although there is a general agreement on the need to consciously promote the development of the rural areas, there is no clear consensus on how to achieve it. Consequently, there are a number of different strategies vying for government attention, one of which is the integrated rural development approach.

The purpose of this article is to examine the concept and methodology of integrated rural development as a strategy for harnessing rural ressources for rural development. Taking the Funtua Agricultural Development Project in Kaduna State of Nigeria as a case study, the article seeks to examine the implications of this strategy of development for the peasantry. Considering the size and structural importance of the peasantry in the Nigerian Economy, it is maintained that the nature of peasant involvement in the sharing of the costs and benefits of development is a crucial indicator of the success or failure of such a development programme. Depending on the nature and orientation of the development programme, the peasantry (either in part or as a whole) can become either *victims* or *beneficiaries* of the development process. In other words, the strategy of development adopted by a country determines whether the peasantry will occupy a central place in the development process or will be marginalized, proletarianized and ultimately destroyed.

RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN NIGERIA

Although Nigeria is predominantly a rural country, concerted effort to develop the rural areas is a relatively recent phenomenon in the country's development process. For the first decade of her independence, Nigeria's policy-makers neglected the rural sector and concentrated the

---

* *Lecturer – Department of Sociology, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria.*

country's resources on urban industrial development. This industrial bias which informed the country's development policy led to the establishment of prestigious urban projects which had little or no relation to the country's resource endowments and whose contribution to national development remained minimal or doubtful (Oluwasanmi, 1966: 208). During this period the policy-makers saw the rural areas as a sector from which resources were to be diverted to develop other sectors of the economy since agriculture and rural development were not considered capable of providing the leverage for economic development.

While government policy continued to pay lip service to the agricultural sector as the «mainstay» of the country's economy, this was not matched with the allocation of resources to this sector. Between 1960 and 1974, Nigeria's rural sector, which makes up about 80.7 per cent of the country's population and contributes about 50 per cent of its total output, was allocated only 20 per cent of total government expenditure (Olatunbosun, 1975: 22–24). Even the little funds allocated to the rural sector were grossly under-spent. During the First National Development Plan (1962–68), about 42.8 per cent of the estimated capital expenditure earmarked for the agricultural sector was not spent while in the Second National Development Plan (1970–74), about 65 per cent of the funds were not spent (Elegalam 1980).

The wide gap between promise and performance in the agricultural sector reflects the levity and lack of commitment with which rural development has been treated by the planners. The direct consequence of this rural neglect has been a drastic decline in agricultural output and the resultant inability of the country to feed its teeming population. From 1968 to 1978, Nigeria's food import bill jumped from ₦23.39 million to a fantastic figure of ₦ 1,094 million *(1)*. The considerable drain of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings on food importation as well as the various domestic problems created by acute food shortage all combined to force the government into taking almost panic measures to increase agricultural production. Examples of these include the Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) which was launched in 1976, the proliferation of River Basin Development Schemes, and the establishment of World Bank integrated rural development projects in various parts of the country.

Unfortunately, the Nigerian policy-makers have continued to see the agrarian crisis not so much in terms of its direct implications for the immediate casualties, the peasants, but in terms of that abstraction called the «national economy». To the urban-based ruling class, increased peasant poverty which is the immediate result of the agrarian crisis is not perceived as problematic *in itself*. It is only problematic in so far as there is scarcity of food and consequent soaring food prices in the towns; in so far as there is declining foreign exchange and a rising food import bill because of a stagnating rural sector; and in so far as rural-urban migration continues to send waves of rural job seekers to swell the already large army of the urban unemployed.

---

(1) Central Bank of Nigeria: *Annual Report* for 1971 and 1979. One Naira (₦1) is roughly equal to US $ 1.65.

The conception, planning and execution of rural development programmes in Nigeria has, therefore, put the emphasis on increasing agricultural output in order to meet *national aggregate* demand rather than to improve the living conditions and welfare of the peasant producers. This conceptual framework has two implications. Firstly, it leads to programmes which directly and indirectly favour the elite or progressive farmers. Since the goal of rural policy is to achieve the fastest possible increase in aggregate output, it has been considered prudent to put more emphasis on the progressive farmers who, given the right resources, are most likely to achieve increased levels of production at a faster rate. Secondly, it leads to the adoption of technocratic approaches to rural development predicated on the belief that the injection of modem farming technologies will automatically increase agricultural productivity and overcome the inertia and low output which characterize peasant agriculture. No serious thought is given to the structural impediments to production inherent in existing production relations which severely limit the choices open to the greater majority of the peasants for increasing their level of output.

Consequently, agricultural development programmes in Nigeria during the past one and a half decades have manifested a clear bias towards large-scale, capital intensive farming by the capitalist farmers and the state in conjunction with the World Bank and other international capitalist financiers. In a reaction against this technocratic approach to rural development, J.M. BABA (1979), has argued that the large-scale capital-intense projects being established by both the government and private individuals are not accompanied by corresponding rural welfare services as well as institutional reforms designed to ensure that the peasant population benefits from these programmes.

Anybody who is acquainted with the agricultural scene in Nigeria knows that the predicament of the peasant producers can be attributed directly to the existence of an institutional framework which has made it impossible for them to obtain *real value* for their output. Therefore, an improvement in the living standards of the rural producers can best be achieved by a strategy which embarks on increasing the *real income* of the farmer from his present yield before attempting to increase *the yield itself* through technical measures. BABA (1981) has further argued that institutional factors rather than technological problems are responsible for the declining productivity of Nigerian agriculture, and that substantial increases in agricultural output can only be achieved if institutional adjustments are made in such a way as to guarantee maximum rewards and incentives to the different categories of peasant producers.

The major shortcoming of the technocratic approach is that the agro-technologies it recommends are more adapted to large-scale rather than small-scale farming units, and this explains why such capital intensive programmes are biased in favour of the medium and big capitalist farmers.

THE CONCEPT OF 'INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT'

Integrated rural development is currently one of the popular strategies of rural development being pursued in Nigeria today. This concept was first put forward in 1970 by a group of experts at a United Nations

General Assembly meeting, and since then various UN agencies such as UNESCO, F.A.O. and the World Bank have been actively involved in propagating the theory and practice of integrated rural development in the Third World (Ozo 1980). The concept was first introduced and popularized in Africa during the 1971 Moshi Conference on *Integrated Approach to Rural Development in Africa* organized by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UN, 1971). This approach to rural development is principally directed at the stagnating peasant sector of Third World economies. It seeks to stimulate progressive improvements in rural output through the optimum mobilization and utilization of human and material resources from both within and outside the rural sector.

The integrated rural development approach is informed by four major principles. Firstly, it recommends that rural development is best achieved by taking action simultaneously on «several fronts» as specific sectors of the economy in an isolated and unco-ordinated fashion. The advantage of this multi-faceted and comprehensive approach is that it brings about improvements not only in agriculture, but also in health, sanitation, infrastructure, literacy, and rural crafts and industries. Secondly, it is inspired by a technocratic vision which aims to develop the rural economy by injecting an «integrated package» of improved machinery, farm inputs, infrastructures and other technological innovations which are considered capable of providing the technical basis for increased rural output. Thirdly, the utilization of this package of inputs and infrastructural facilities presupposes a significant degree of co-operation and co-ordination between various disciplines, relevant government departments, and agencies. This co-ordination is best achieved by the establishment of a well-funded, well-staffed project authority which will monitor and administer the integrated use of resources and inputs. Fourthly, there is an implicit assumption that it is impossible and unfeasible to attempt to develop the whole rural sector of a country at the same time. Better results can be achieved, therefore, by initially selecting strategic and limited geographical zones on which to concentrate this integrated package and thereafter spreading the results and achievements of these experiments to other areas of the country (LELE, 1975).

As a concept, integrated rural development is based on a balanced model of development which embraces all dimensions of the rural economy and seeks to bring about improvements in the ecological, economic, technological, sociological and institutional aspects of the society. It also emphasizes the development of human resources and the full mobilization and involvement of the rural population in the realization of development programmes. Peasant involvement can take the form of participation in the process of planning and decision-making, in the implementation of those decisions, and in the sharing of the costs and benefits of development. Despite its lofty objectives, the crucial determinant of the viability of integrated rural development as a strategy of rural improvement is the extent to which it provides the poor peasants with the resources and opportunities they require for enhancing their productivity and welfare. This issue is taken up through an empirical analysis of the experience and achievements of the Funtua Agricultural Development Project (FADP).

DEVELOPMENT FOR WHOM? : THE EXAMPLE OF THE FADP

The establishment of integrated rural development projects in Nigeria has been championed by the World Bank. Between 1974 and 1977, the Federal Government of Nigeria in collaboration with the World Bank established five integrated rural development projects in various parts of the country, viz: Funtua in Kaduna State, Gusau in Sokoto State, Gombe in Bauchi State, Ayangba in Benue State and Lafia in Plateau State. Many more of these types of projects have been set up from 1978 to date, the ultimate aim of the Federal Government being to establish at least one integrated rural development project in each of the nineteen States of Nigeria.

The Funtua Agricultural Development Project (FADP) was established in 1975, with the objective of increasing agricultural productivity and improving the incomes and living standards of the rural population in its area of operation. It is jointly financed by the World Bank, the Federal Government and the Kaduna State Government, with an estimated planned expenditure of ₦ 36 million during its first five years of operation. The project covers an area of 7,590 square kilometres (nearly 10 % of the State's total and area), spread over 5 districts in the Funtua and Malumfashi Local Government Areas, and involves a little over 85,000 farming families (Abalu et al., 1979, p. 197).

The Funtua integrated development scheme involves the use of an integrated package of inputs and infrastructures for the transformation of the rural economy. The first aspect of this package is the development of infrastructures, soil conservation structures, and other physical parameters considered vital for increased agricultural production. In this regard the FADP planned to complete, within its first five years, the construction of a feeder road network of about 1500 kilometres, the construction of 85 earth dams and 160 ponds, and the accomplishment of a comprehensive programme of soil analysis and conservation.

The second component of the package involves agronomic research geared towards providing seed varieties and identifying and solving the major agronomic problems facing agriculture in the area. This includes fertilizer trials, seed variety trials, crop protection trials and other research programmes aimed at demonstrating the positive effects of the new imported agro-technological inputs on crop production and livestock improvement. In pursuance of this objective the FADP has two large seed multiplication and research farms at Daudawa and Malumfashi. A livestock fattening scheme was inaugurated in October 1979.

The third component is the extension programme which is responsible for disseminating the recommended package of inputs and practices to the farmers. For this purpose, the FADP planned to build seventy-seven (77) farm service centres in all parts of the project area. These farm service centres are manned by extension agents, commercial assistants and technical staff. The work of the extension agents is to transform the area's farming system by encouraging the farmers (through demonstration farms, extension visits and field show days) to adopt the new production technology recommended by FADP. Various inputs such as fertilizer, improved seeds, sprayers, and insecticides are stocked at the farm service centres for sale to the farmers by the commercial assistants. The technical staff are responsible for preparing farm management plans for those categories of farmers who require assistance in this respect.

After four years of operation the government decided to expand the integrated rural development experiment to cover all parts of Kaduna State. In connection with this, the state was divided into four zones in 1979 and in April 1980 the integrated rural development programme took off in all the four zones. The objective of this state-wide programme is to spread the benefits and achievements of the integrated rural development strategy to all parts of the state. But who, in fact, are the beneficiaries of the Funtua Project and what are the implications of expanding the project to cover the whole state?

This has been the subject of a fierce debate in academic circles as well as in the press between those who think that the Funtua experiment was a big «success» and those who think that the project was merely a grandiose and costly scheme which left the bulk of the farmers no better than they were originally. Those who belong to the first school of thought point with satisfaction to growth statistics provided by FADP indicating appreciable increases in the aggregate production of various crops in the project area. For example, the production output of sorghum recorded a remarkable increase from a pre-project figure of 90,000 tonnes to 206,339 tonnes in the 1979/80 cropping season. The production of millet jumped from a pre-project output of 48,000 tonnes to 60,480 tonnes by the 1979/80 cropping season. Maize, cowpea and pepper also recorded similar dramatic increases. The production of cotton, groundnuts and rice, however, showed a slight decline. Altogether, the yearly value of the crop output over the first four years of the project was ₦ 90.527 million. This figure compares favourably with the pre-project crop value of ₦ 50.2 million and a total estimated expenditure of ₦ 33.34 million over the four years. (Omorogiuwa, 1980).

A critical analysis of the extent to which this apparent «success» has contributed to the welfare of the bulk of small peasants has left much to be desired. The radical Governor of Kaduna State, Abdulkadir Balarabe MUSA, in 1980 rejected a loan of ₦ 100 million from the World Bank which would have formed part of the investment capital required for financing the state-wide integrated rural development programme. In a statement he issued denouncing World Bank participation in the integrated rural development programme, Governor Balarabe MUSA explained that one of the terms of the loan required vesting the management of the programme in the hands of the foreign World Bank officials. It was not, he argued, in the national interest of Nigeria to surrender to the World Bank the management of a programme which directly affects the lives and destiny of millions of Nigerian peasants. Secondly, the terms of the loan allowed the World Bank to supply 45 key staff of the project. If approved, «the renumeration of this handful of expatriate staff and their fringe benefits will cost about ₦ 12 million per annum!» (MUSA, 1980: 25). The Governor further reiterated his government's disagreement with the orientation, logistics and operations of the World Bank – managed Funtua Project. In particular, he accused the project of serving only «a handful of large-scale farmers who are basically urban dwellers... at the expense of the small peasant farmers in the villages» (MUSA 1980: 24).

The Governor's criticism was in line with various other comments on the Funtua Agricultural Project. The *New Nigerian* (a daily newspaper published in Kaduna) had, in two editorials published on the 16th and 17th of March 1978, criticized the emphasis being given to the progressive and large-scale farmers by the FADP. It warned that unless there was a change in policy, «the much-vaunted Funtua Project will probably deteriorate into another relic of a grandiose scheme which will leave the bulk of the farmers no better than they were originally and, perhaps, even worse off» (*New Nigerian,* 17–3–1978).

The Funtua Project Manager immediately replied and «congratulated» the *New Nigerian* for «opening a public debate on a matter of great importance». Using some statistics and the logic of extension theory, the Project Manager went on to disprove the claim that the FADP was «concentrating exclusively on a small group of large and progressive farmers» in its distribution of inputs and services *(New Nigerian,* 10th May 1978). *Candido,* a popular columnist of the New Nigerian, replied to the Project Manager and accused him of using statistics «to tell lies», arguing that the same data supplied by the Manager «can be used to prove diametrically opposite facts». In line with this, *Candido* subjected the Manager's statistics to careful scrutiny to show how the FADP neglected the small farmers in favour of the large-scale and progressive farmers. According to *Candido,* the statistics show that «82.5 per cent of small farmers were *not* visited by (FADP's) agricultural extension workers», and that «91 per cent of those who *did not benefit* from FADP's project came from the smallest and poorest category who form 87.2 % of all farmers». He dismissed as irrelevant the logic of the Project Manager's «gratuitous lecture on the diffusion and adoption of innovations» *(New Nigerian,* 10th May 1978).

More detailed research has shown that contrary to the World Bank's hypocritical rhetoric about directing its inputs and services at the small poor farmers, the Funtua Project and similar integrated rural development projects are designed to subsidize the medium and large-scale farmers. This is borne out by the fact that the FADP has classified all farmers in its area of operation into three categories: the large-scale farmers, progressive or medium-scale farmers, and traditional farmers. The official breakdown of the farming population according to these three categories gave 186 large farmers, 19,562 progressive farmers, and the remaining 65,738 farmers were called traditional farmers (FADP, 1979: 26–36). Large-scale farmers are those who own large land-holdings of about 40 hectares and above, employ the most modern farm inputs and implements, and operate on a commercial scale. The progressive farmers, sometimes called «mixed farmers» in some project documents, have medium-sized land-holdings of about 10 hectares and above, are responsive to project extension advice, grow improved varieties of crops, and use fertilizer, herbicides and sprayers. The traditional farmers are the small-scale peasant farmers who have small-holdings of about 3 to 4 hectares, follow traditional farming patterns and have not, apart from fertilizer, adopted the improved package recommended by the project (see Table I).

Table I: The Distribution of Land Between Different Categories of Farmers in the Funtua Project Area, 1978.

Category of Farmers	No. of Farming Families	% of Total Farmers	Average Holding in Hectares	Total Area in Hectares	% of Total Land
Traditional	74,264	86.9	3.52	261,409	53.8
Progressive	8,068	9.4	11.66	94,073	19.3
Large-scale	3,154	3.7	41.40	130,576	26.9
Total	85,456	100.0		486,058	100.00

Source: Project Manager, FADP, in *New Nigerian* 10th May 1978.

The above table shows the inequalities in land-holding which exist or have emerged in the project area. It can be seen that the large-scale farmers who constitute less than 4 % of the farming population own about 27 % of the whole land in the area. The FADP is playing a prominent role in accentuating these inequalities by operating an input distribution policy which is heavily biased in favour of those farmers with large-holdings. One of the indices of the preferential treatment being given to the medium – and large-scale farmers can be seen in the project's extension policy. The FADP encourages its extension staff to concentrate their attention on the progressive and large farmers. This is because part of their normal duties include the identification and selection of farmers who, on the basis of their land-holdings as well as their response to the FADP package, qualify to be classified as progressive or large-scale farmers. The unequal attention which the extension agents five to these categoris of farmers can be seen from the number of visits paid to each category of farmers by FADP extension staff (see Table II).

Table II: Extension Visits to Different Categories of Farmers by FADP Staff in 1978/79.

Type of Farmer	No. of Farming Families	% of Total Farmers	No. of Extension Visits	% of Total Visits
Large and Progressive	19,748	22.8	189,570	67.5
Traditional	65,738	77.2	91,131	32.5
Total	85,486	100.0	280,701	100.0

Source: *FADP Quarterly Report January – March 1979, p. 29.*

The distribution of fertilizer is equally biased in favour of the medium – and large-scale farmers. According to D'SILVA and RAZA (1980), the fertilizer is distributed in such a way that while the traditional farmers get between three and five bags of fertilizer on the average per year, the progressive farmers can get as many as twenty bags and above, while the large-scale farmers get in the region of 100 bags and above. During the 1979/80 farming year, about 2,000 tonnes of fertilizer were specifically reserved for the large-scale farmers, giving an average of 10 tonnes of assured fertilizer supply per farmer. The progressive and large farmers use this opportunity to stockpile fertilizer for sale in the open market at higher prices (D'SILVA and RAZA, 1980).

The FADP also operates a credit programme which enables some selected farmers to get certain farm inputs, especially sprayers, ox-ploughs, and sophisticated machinery, on loan to be repaid in two to three years. To supplement the credit it gives, the FADP also prepares farm management plans for the progressive and large farmers and recommends them for loans from commercial banks and other financial institutions. The project also provides tractors on loan at below market rates of interest to selected large farmers, and provides technical and commercial assistance to those farmers wishing to purchase tractors. An attempt in 1976/77 to grant fertilizer, seeds and insecticides on credit (which could have benefited the smaller peasants –) was shelved a year later due to poor repayment (SHETIMA, 1980).

The FADP's emphasis on the size of land as one of the most important criteria governing its input distribution and credit policy has given rise to land grabbing and land speculation in the area. A new class of elite farmers is fast emerging made up of retired bureaucrats, top army officers, businessmen and traditional rulers. This class of farmers employ persuasion, the lure of money, deception, and their connections with the project authority and the state to acquire more and more land from the peasant farmers in an effort to benefit from the opportunities and facilities offered by FADP. A recent study by MAHMUD (1980) shows that more and more land is passing into the hands of this class of «big farmers». He found, in particular, that 133 large farmers alone control about 14.2 per cent of the area's arable land, with three of them having an average of 1,313 acres each. The composition of this group of 133 elite farmers shows that 19 are top civil servants with the state and federal bureaucracy including a high court judge; 10 are retired bureaucrats and army officers while the remaining 104 are businessmen and rich peasants (MAHMUD, 1980,p.36).

While the FADP has, to its credit, increased the production of grains in the project area, it appears that the benefits of this increased output are not equally distributed between the small «traditional» farmers and the progressive/large-scale farmers. The improved variety of maize introduced by the FADP has, in particular, recorded a very remarkable increase. Unfortunately, this increased output has generated the problem of a market outlet for the maize. This maize variety is not quite suitable for local consumption and has not therefore entered the staple diet of the local population to any significant degree because of the people's preference for the more palatable local variety. Consequently this maize variety is produced predominantly for sale (WALLACE 1980).

During the 1978–79 buying season the FADP experienced a lot of difficulty in securing markets for the farmers' maize output. An arrangement to get the Nigerian Grains Board to purchase the surplus maize did not provide a satisfactory market outlet because «the price and quantity purchased were far below expectation» (FADP, 1979: 1). Following assurances from the Grains Board that the market for the next buying season will be better, the FADP mobilized the farmers to produce more maize. Due to lack of funds, the Grains Board could not offer the ₦ 210 per tonne which it had earlier promised the farmers. Out of an estimated production figure of 300,000 tonnes of maize, the Grains Board could only buy 3,000 tonnes at the rate of ₦ 150 per tonne, a price considered to be below the production cost. Since the Grains Board did not have enough funds to buy all the surplus maize, it adopted a policy of giving priority to those farmers who produced 50 tonnes and above. The small-scale farmers were thus forced to sell their maize at a lower price to the selected 50 tonners who in turn sold to the FADP on behalf of the Grains Board *(New Nigerian,* 9th February 1980). This marketing arrangement has therefore put the small farmers at a considerable disadvantage and further illustrates their marginalization under the World Bank integrated rural development schemes.

CONCLUSION

Nigeria's agricultural policy since 1970 has witnessed the injection of sophisticated agrotechnology and international finance capital into the rural sector under the sponsorship of the World Bank. The concrete achievements of these capital – intensive projects are yet to register any significant impact on the country's food production. Despite the achievements being claimed by these projects, OLAYIDE has shown that the estimated total crop output produced by these modern large-scale projects are only 0.7 % for maize, 0.003 % for millet, 0.04 % for sorghum, 1.3 % for rice, 0.05 % for cassava, 0.007 % for yams, 0.09 % for groundnuts, and 0.09% for beans (OLAYIDE 1979: 3). This indicates clearly that the bulk of the country's agricultural output still comes from the small-scale peasant producers.

Rather than mobilizing these small peasant farmers for increased production, the World Bank integrated rural development projects tend to benefit mainly the large-scale farmers as well as western agro-business corporations specialized in the production of fertilizers, pesticides, improved seed varieties, tractors and irrigation technology whose market is boosted by these technocratic schemes. While these sophisticated agro-technologies may provide visible signs of progress to the layman, thereby affording a good public relations image for the government in power, the concrete impact of these agro-technologies in a situation where rural structures remain untouched and unchanged raises important questions about the class basis of this technocratic approach to rural development.

It appears that the interests of the international capitalist class and those of the national bourgeoisie find a common meeting ground in these complex agricultural enterprises. On the one hand, they enable the international capitalist agro-business corporations to use the World Bank as a front for penetrating Nigeria's agricultural sector (OCULI 1980). On the other hand, these agricultural projects provide immediate benefits to the Nigerian bourgeoisie in terms of contracts, kick-backs on contracts, misappropriation of compensation meant for the peasants, speculative land deals, and the acquisition of land and other vital resources for capitalist farming. For the bulk of the peasantry however, these large-scale integrated rural development projects spell the doom of impoverishment, marginalization and proletarianization. The size of peasant holdings continues to shrink and the class of landless peasants increases as more and more of these shemes are established.

REFERENCES

1. ABALU, G.O. I et al (1979): *Economic Survey of Kaduna State: Agriculture* (Ministry of Economic Development, Kaduna State, Nigeria).
2. BABA, J.M. (1979): «Agriculture in Future Nigeria: Issues on Policy and Strategy» – *The Zaria Geographer* Vol. 8, May 1979.
3. BABA, J.M. (1981): «Towards Effective Labour Mobilization for Agricultural Development in Nigeria» – Paper presented at the *National Workshop on the Mobilization of Human Resources for National Development,* Zaria, Nigeria, 30 March – 2 April 1981.
4. D'SILVA, B. and M.R. RAZA (1980): «The Funtua Agricultural Development Project: It's Impact on the Area's Farming System» – Paper presented at the *Seminar on Change in Rural Hausaland,* Bagauda Lake Hotel, Kano, Nigeria 29 February – 1 March 1980.
5. ELEGALAM, P.O. (1980): «An Appraisal of Agricultural Policy of Nigeria during the Military Regime 1966–79» – Paper presented to the *Nigeria Economic Society Annual Conference,* 30 April – 3 May, Kano, Nigeria.
6. FADP (1979): *Quarterly Report January* – March 1979.
7. LELE, U. (1975): *Designing Rural Development – Lessons from Past Experience in Africa* (Washington: The John Hopkins University Press).
8. MAHMUD, A.Y. (1980): *Agricultural Development and Class Formation in Funtua* (B. Sc. Research Essay, Department of Political Science, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria).
9. MUSA, A.B. (1980): *Nobody is Destined to be a Beggar* (Extracts from the Speeches of A.B. Musa, Governor of Kaduna State, Government Printer, Kaduna).
10. OCULI, O. (1980): «Food and African Foreign Policy in the 1980s» Paper presented at the *Annual Conference of the Nigerian Society of International Affairs,* Lagos, February 1980).
11. OLATUNBOSUN, D. (1975): *Nigeria's Neglected Rural Majority* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press).
12. OLAYIDE, S.O. (1979): «Some Reflections on Nigerian Agriculture». *AGRI-SCOPE* No. 7, Dec. 1979.
13. OLUWASANMI, H.O. (1966): *Agriculture and Nigerian Economic Development* (Oxford University Press).
14. OMOROGIUWA, P.A. (1980): «Nigeria: Planning, Public Investment and Rural Development» – Paper presented at the *National Conference on Integrated Rural Development and Women in Development,* University of Benin, Benin City, 22–26 Sept. 1980.
15. OZO, A.O. (1980): «Integrated Rural Development in Nigeria» – Paper presented to the *National Conference on Integrated Rural Development,* (Benin City, September 1980).
16. SHETIMA, T.A. (1980): *Credit Utilization – A Case Study of Funtua Agricultural Development Project* (B. Sc. Research Essay, Department Sociology, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria).
17. United Nations (1971): *Integrated Approach to Rural Development in Africa* (New York: 1971).
18. WALLACE, T. (1980): «Agricultural Projects and Land» – Paper presented at the *Seminar on Change in Rural Hausaland,* Kano, February 1980.

RESUME

Au cours de la première décennie de son indépendance , la politique de développement agricole du Nigéria a consisté à continuer la politique coloniale de contrôle et de réorientation des efforts et initiatives des paysans vers une production agricole tournée vers l'exportation pour satisfaire les besoins en matières premières des pays de la métropole ainsi que vers la production de revenus pour l'Etat et les classes qui dirigent la machine de l'état. Vers la années 70 et 50, on a pu assister à une tentative de rupture avec le secteur agricole paysan qui stagnait, rupture qui s'est manifestée sous forme d'encouragement à des plans de production agricole à grande échelle de la part des producteurs capitalistes individuels, d'industries agro-alimentaires et d'agences de l'Etat liées aux financiers capitalistes internationaux opérant sous la couverture de la Banque Mondiale. Entre 1975 et 1980, quelques huit projets de développement intégrés à grande échelle ont été établis dans différentes parties du Nigéria avec l'aide de la Banque Mondiale. En se servant du Projet de Développement Agricole du Funtua comme exemple, l'auteur de cet article voudrait montrer que, loin d'augmenter la capacité de production des paysans producteurs, ces projets intégrés de développement rural ne font qu'aider les producteurs riches à acquérir et à employer des technologies agricoles sophistiquées susceptibles d'augmenter leur production. Il a d'autre part essayé de montrer que la distribution des inputs des services et des facilités telle qu'elle est effectuée par ce projet de développement rural intégré ne fait que privilégier les gros producteurs progressistes, accentuant ainsi les inégalités dans la région du projet. Ainsi en 1978–79, pendant la récolte, les gros producteurs progressistes qui ne constituaient que 22,8 % de l'ensemble des producteurs ont été l'objet de 67,5 % des visites des encadreurs du projet. La distribution des engrais, du crédit et des autres inputs n'a fait que suivre ce modèle. Aussi, dans la mesure où ses activités sont plutôt portées vers les propriétaires de grandes surfaces agricoles, ce projet a entamé le processus de remplacement progressif des paysans chez eux par une classe de producteurs d'élites qui viennent des paysans riches, des chefs traditionnels, de l'élite du business et des échelons supérieurs de la bureaucratie. Cette classe de producteurs fait usage de son influence, de sa position priviliégiée, des liens avantageux avec les chefs traditionnels, de la machine de l'état et de l'attrait de l'argent pour obtenir plus de terre des paysans pauvres. En 1978, alors que le projet n'avait commencé que trois ans auparavant, ces gros producteurs qui à ce moment ne constituait que 13 % des agriculteurs controlaient 46 % de toute la terre disponible dans la région du projet. Des études récentes indiquent que cette tendance croit. Pour l'auteur, cette stratégie de développement rural ne fera qu'appauvrir et marginaliser d'avantage la paysannerie au Nigéria à long terme.