

**THE EMERGING IDEOLOGICAL TREND IN THE
NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT: SOME REFLECTIONS
ON THE HAVANA CONFERENCE ***

By

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INTRODUCTION

The 6th Non-Aligned summit conference, held in Havana, Cuba, in September 1979, should go down in history as having, perhaps, crystallized the Movement's congeries of ideals and principles into one of ideological justification of the Movement in a world of continued widening gap in wealth between Western industrialized capitalist countries and the poor nations of the Third World.

This paper examines two major assumptions attendant upon this emerging ideological trend and sets out an ordering of the Movement's policy implications for world order.

The first assumption takes the world economy as an independent variable and argues that trade and economic specialization combined to underdevelop the periphery of the world. The second assumption is a product of the colonial experiences of the Movement's member-nations: that differences in economic, social and cultural structures between non-Western, ex-colonial countries of the Third World and the rich technologically advanced Western economies bias the gains from trade in favour of the advanced market economies. Concomitant to this is the process that what is produced, how it is produced and how what is produced is sold are most times beyond the control of these Third World nations (1).

Thus, while the Movement's policies and proclamations against these structural and trade anomalies range from self-reliance to changing the international economic order in a way that eliminates these biases, Non-Alignment, as a concept, has come to assume what the author refers to as a «protest-demand» ideology. This image implies a particular view of reality that touches upon such fundamental questions as (i) multinational exploitation of Third World countries, (ii) declining remuneration for Third World raw materials as compared to manufactured goods, (iii) diminishing trade relations between Third World nations and the OECD countries (substitute technological inventions and non-tariff barriers by advanced capitalist nations continue to cloud out Third World raw materials and manufactures from world markets, thus worsening savings, incomes and balance of payments), (iv) racism and apartheid, with their twin surrogates of neo-colonialism and imperialism.

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THE HISTORIC SETTING

What is known today as the Non-Aligned Movement began as a conscious reaction to Western colonialism and imperialism in the Asian sub-continent after World War II. The French had been beaten in Indo-China and British, French and American influence in Mainland China came to an end in 1949. Across the European continent the achievement and success story of Soviet Russia in its bids to create a social system devoid of Western exploitation had gained widespread recognition among colonized Third World nations. Asian nationalism quickly emerged with Ho Chi Minh, Mao, Nehru and Sukarno becoming the leading proponents of self-reliance and development from within. However, to protect and perpetuate the imperial oligarchy that the French (Indo-China), the Dutch (East Indies), the Portuguese (Gao) and the British (Singapore and Hong Kong) had established in the area, the United States, now the undisputed leader of the free world and apparently aware of the huge markets that would be lost in these regions, was forced to involve its military, economic and political influence against Asian nationalism. Thus when the Bandung Conference (the forerunner of the Non-Aligned Movement) convened in Indonesia in 1955, it set the tone of the subsequent objectives of the Non-Aligned Movement. Operating within a world dominated by the two super-powers, the Bandung Conference sought to highlight the issue of political independence, the elimination of the last vestiges of European colonialism, the development of national economies and the establishment of liberation movements.

By the time the Non-Aligned Movement formally convened at the Belgrade Conference in 1961, the original structure, purpose and direction of the Movement as demonstrated at the Bandung Conference had drastically changed. First, the Peoples Republic of China had withdrawn from this conference for obvious reasons. She was morally and ideologically committed to the Vietnamese struggle against American imperialism in Indo-China. Besides, Mao's dictum that no nation can be neutral directly contradicted the policy of neutralism that the newly emergent non-aligned African and Asian nations had adopted. Second, the twin concept of non-alignment and neutralism was used interchangeably by western scholars who had conceived neutralism (2) as the only viable device by the newly sovereign but economically dependent African and Asian states to loosen their ties with the ideologically poised Communist China. Wrote George Liska:

The realities of non-alignment and neutralism must be viewed in a double perspective, since they themselves flow from closely interwoven responses to external factors and domestic conditions. Non-alignment can be adopted on the basis of rational estimates of the conditions required for national security and domestic stability; but a policy of militant neutralism in particular is likely to be strongly affected by non-rational ideological preoccupations and by an almost too pragmatic quest for aid and status internationally (3).

The point of such received theoretical construct is not difficult to imagine. Most Third World leaders by 1961 constituted national administrative bourgeoisie whose consciousness was easily manipulated by metropolitan scholarship. Liska's point was clear: Third World development would be dependent on financial and investment handouts that will be carefully worked out between ex-colonies and their metropolises and any policy other than neutralism (which actually meant divesting all economic and political ties with the socialist countries) would be detrimental to both short and long-term development. Thus when Liska equates «militant neutralism» with «non-rational ideological preoccupations» the fate of Sekou TOURE's Guinea, CASTRO's Cuba and NASSER's Egypt bring vivid memories of the enormous punitive economic weapons at the disposal of the advanced capitalist nations.

In reality, it can be argued that by 1961, the newly independent African and Asian nations found it expedient to continue economic ties with the metropolitan countries. After all, it is not inconceivable that their transition to politically independent status that was worked out in London and Paris had been conditioned upon continued visible economic and financial presence of the ex-colonial masters. In the French African countries, for example, such structural-economic links to France are still very much evident today. They (except Guinea) are not only members of the French community but also associate members of the EEC. The economic ramifications of such unequal partnership cannot be over-emphasized. While France and other European EEC members are free to sell and buy anywhere on the basis of cost/benefit criteria, French African countries' scope for economic independence is severely limited. Trade and investment finances and manufactures are obtained largely from France. Such one-way dependence has adversely affected these nations' freedom of manoeuvre in world markets.

For illustrative purposes, tables 1–3 show the unequal trade relations between the Central African Republic, Gabon and the Ivory Coast and their major trading partners. The average share of these nations' export to France amounts to 40.9 percent in 1965, 41.5 percent in 1970 and 35.9 percent in 1975. The next major partner, the United States, controls an average of 15.6 percent, 7.5 percent and 15.2 percent respectively. These trade patterns reveal the elements of dependence. On the import side, these ex-colonial countries have practically nothing of import value to offer their major trading partners. Thus for all the figures available their import potential amounts to zero.

In recent times also, France has intervened in Chad, in the Central African Republic and had stationed troops in Senegal following the Senegalese-Franco military agreement of 1974. Thus, at the end of the Belgrade Conference on Non-alignment in 1961, it was evident that any point of view emanating from the Conference reflected those of a weak, fragmented, economically dependent Afro-Asian states. Notwithstanding its strong support for liberation and independence movements, the final communique scarcely correlated with observed reality. For instance, membership in the Movement had to belong to neither the communist nor the western military blocs; there was to be no bilateral military arrangement with a bloc country; foreign military bases were not to be entertained on the soil of member-

TABLES 1-3: Export Structure and Major Trading Partners of Selected French-speaking African States
(Million U.S. dollars)

TABLE 1 : Central African Republic						
			Percent of Partner's Imports			
	1965	1970	1975	1965	1970	1975
Total	26,363	30,579	47,181			
France	9,843 (37.7) *	15,210 (49.7)	19,818 (42.0)	0.1	0.1	0.0
Belgium	151 (0.6)	3,706 (12.1)	4,442 (9.4)	0.0	0.0	0.0
U.S.A.	3,489 (13.2)	72 (0.2)	3,918 (8.3)	0.0	0.0	0.0
* <i>Percent in Parenthesis</i>						
TABLE 2 : Gabon						
	1965	1970	1975	1965	1970	1975
Total	95,941	121,184	942,165			
France	46,470	(42.1)	(38.8)			
U.S.A.	17,557 (18.3)	4,659 (3.8)	257,256 (27.3)	0.1	0.0	0.3
W. Germany	10,308 (10.7)	8,160 (6.7)	56,110 (6.0)	0.1	0.0	0.1
TABLE 3 : Ivory Coast						
	1965	1970	1975	1965	1970	1975
Total	277,162	468,800	1,181,569			
France	104,400 (37.7)	153,130 (32.7)	320,018 (27.1)	1.0	0.8	0.6
U.S.A.	43,066 (15.5)	87,585 (18.7)	120,583 (10.2)	0.2	0.2	0.1
Netherlands	19,198 (6.9)	42,463 (9.1)	123,169 (10.4)	0.3	0.3	0.4
W. Germany	18,367 (6.6)	45,033 (9.6)	104,510 (8.8)	0.1	0.1	0.1

Source: *United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, Vol. 1, 1977.*

states while «peaceful coexistence» was to become the cornerstone of the Movement's external policy (4).

After confusing non-alignment with neutralism, bourgeois scholars sought to expand their understanding of the Non-aligned Movement by explaining its existence as an outcome of the cold war. Their argument ran thus: the world was now dominated by two super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, with their allies. Each had the nuclear capability to destroy the human race. Sandwiched between these two giants are uncommitted, underdeveloped newly independent non-European states, whose relationship with the super-powers had been conditioned by their mutual respect for state sovereignty. On the one hand, these so-called non-aligned states wish to remain flirts by keeping the super-powers stalemated so as to be able to extract possible concessions from both sides. On the other hand, the super-powers, while agreeing in principle to keep these non-aligned states militarily uncommitted, had the opportunity as never before to pitch and «commercialize» the strengths of their socio-economic systems. Thus, favourable foreign aid programs, the display of new technological inventions (the outer space race, for example), moral and material commitment to the aspirations of oppressed peoples, performances at world sports events, etc., would eventually convert these nations to either side's ideological perspective in the long run (5).

Indeed, western opinion of the Non-aligned Movement in the decade of the 1960s stemmed from the above attempts to define the Movement as opportunistic. As J. W. BURTON noted, Non-alignment came to be viewed in the West as a policy of short-term expediency which does not safeguard it against alignment pressures in the power conflict or have within it the elements of stability. It was thus never taken seriously as a long-term programme. As BURTON puts it, the Movement was seen «as a means of diverting attention from domestic problems because it allows leaders to take dramatic stances and to oppose the main giants – that is, wholly anti-Western and anti-Colonialist (6).

Yet, while bourgeois scholars sought to discredit and distort the impact of the Non-aligned Movement in international affairs, the ideological brickstones on which the Movement was founded remained alive. To the CASTROS of Cuba, the TOURES of Guinea, the Ho Chi MINHs of Indo-China, the Ben BELLAS of Algeria, it was revealed that as Third World peoples were drawn into new economic and commercial relations with the advanced capitalist economy, indigenous economic structures were forced to serve new external ends. Their incorporation into the world economy meant the extraction of both their human and physical resources. Subsistent, rural economies were converted into vast reservoir of labour to be utilized according to the fortunes of the capitalist economies. These realities became the nerve of the Non-aligned ideological thought processes that bourgeois scholars ignored throughout the decades of the 1950s and 1960s.

It was left to the decade of the 1970s for the Non-aligned Movement to revive, re-assert and institutionalize its method of approach to international issues. This method of approach clearly shifted in favour of economic issues. These issues had to be clearly defined to illuminate their ideological ramifications while international organizations provided convenient forums for elaborating its demands and protests.

SOME RELECTIONS ON THE GLOBAL DILEMMA: TRADE, CAPITAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND DEPENDENCE

In this section, we examine the substance and the «laws of motion» of underdevelopment as they draw their strength from, and are direct attributes of, the capitalist market structure. For this exercise we adopt two inter-related arguments. First, we contend that while capital, investment and technology continue to be utilized as external international factors with negative effects on Third World development, trade remains the fundamental *relational* phenomenon that determines Third World underdevelopment and dependence. Thus, where nations exhibit diminishing monetary returns for their products (in such cases, trade deficits for Third World nations are facts of life since demand for their products can be at the whim of the consumption preferences of the advanced capitalist countries) exchange reserves are adversely affected and these in turn affect the availability of capital, investment and technology. Second, the peculiar structural features of underdeveloped countries bear witness to the fact that their present state has been determined by a historical development in which external forces have played and continue to play decisive role. These external forces, thus, must be increasingly taken into consideration in the various interpretations of development and underdevelopment.

Gunnar MYRDAL and Raul PREBISCH have sought to provide theoretical explanations of underdevelopment by deducing the present state of underdeveloped countries basically and primarily from the development of international economic relations and the effects of colonization. Concentrating on the trade relationship between the advanced capitalist countries and the underdeveloped nations, they explore the unequating effects that manifest themselves in these relationships (7).

The MYRDAL thesis emphasized strongly the economic disadvantage that results for the dependent country from its relations with the metropolis. Thus, owing to the deterioration of the terms of trade for the underdeveloped countries, the development of international trade increases inequalities and elucidates the adverse effects of the economic policies of the colonizing powers on the development of backward economies. MYRDAL attributes this phenomenon primarily to the play of market forces. In his view, «the play of forces in the market normally tends to increase rather than decrease the inequalities between regions (8). In a poor country, especially, «the free play of the market forces will work more powerfully to create regional inequalities and to widen those which already exist since the centrifugal force of economic expansion, the «spread effect», is weak» (9). That there is a tendency inherent in the free play of market forces to create regional inequalities, and that this tendency becomes the more dominant the poorer a country is, are two of the most important laws of economic underdevelopment and development under *laissez-faire* (10).

In the famous PREBISCH Report (11) submitted to the World Trade Conference, Raul PREBISCH considered the main obstacles to the economic growth of developing countries as their unfavourable situation in

international trade. The deterioration of the terms of trade of these nations are direct attributes of the pattern of the international division of labour and the internal structure of the countries participating in it, and to the spontaneous changes that have taken place in this structure mainly as a result of scientific and technological progress, and partly to the deliberately scheming trade and customs policy of the advanced capitalist countries. According to the PREBISCH thesis, it is disputed that the international division of labour is able to ensure the conventional advantages of international trade and the applicability of the thesis of comparative advantages in relation to the least developed countries. The backward countries, as a result, could not carry out industrialization because the advantages of technical progress are unevenly distributed in the world economy. Thus, technical progress appears greater in industry than in the primary production.

The PREBISCH thesis reveals the specific mechanism of income drain-off through international trade by showing how the benefits of the increase in productivity in the export sectors of the underdeveloped countries are systematically transferred to the advanced importing country. The reason for this, explains SZENTES, is that the wage level in the export sectors is under pressure and so the increase in productivity results in the further expansion of production and consequently a drop in prices instead of an improvement of real wages (12). Indeed, the PREBISCH interpretation seems to put to rest all those theories which, by referring to the thesis of comparative advantages, try to prove the mutually advantageous character of the existing international division of labour between the advanced capitalist countries and the Third World.

Several conclusions appear to emerge from these theoretical explanations. First and foremost, it is established that the relations of dependence are rooted in the system of imperialism. This began in the early conquests when, in the last third of the 19th century, «classical capitalism turned into monopoly capitalism and the finance capital of the advanced capitalist countries divided the whole world into spheres of interest»(13). Today, even after the political independence of Third World nations, direct economic dependence has come to mean that all key positions of the economies of Third World nations are in the hands of, or are controlled by, foreign monopoly capital. This has ensured the direct exploitation of the population of the underdeveloped countries, the systematic appropriation and expatriation of most of the surplus produced by local labour as well as part of the surplus realized by the small commodity producers and a certain proportion of the income of the whole population (14).

Table 4 would appear to be consistent with the various interpretations advanced by MIRDAL and PREBISCH. The total trade picture between these years constitutes a token share of world trade for the Third World. On the import side, it can be noted that beginning in 1974 there was some direct relationship between a decline in the imports of the developed capitalist economies and a corresponding increase for those of the Third World countries. It is suggested here that the decline in the developed nations' imports was the result of buying less from underdeveloped nations. Tables 1–3 (p.68) did show the almost non-existent share of imports by the leading trading partners of French Africa. Our hunch is that

TABLE 4 : Share of major economic and regional groupings in total world exports and imports, 1972–1978 (in percentages)

	Imports						
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
World	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Developed Capitalist economies	72.7	72.7	71.6	67.9	69.2	68.5	68.3
Developing economies	16.6	16.7	19.0	20.9	20.4	21.6	21.7
	Exports						
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
World	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Developed Capitalist economies	71.8	70.7	64.6	66.1	64.8	64.7	67.4
Developing economies	17.9	19.2	26.9	24.2	25.9	25.7	22.9

Source: *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1979*

this trend will be found to be consistent with other Third World regions. Thus the decline observed in the imports of the developed capitalist economies means nothing less than the fact that these nations have either adopted protectionist policies or have gone through another mile-stone in technological invention.

The increase in imports for the underdeveloped countries, beginning in 1974, reveals the nature of their unequal trade relations with the advanced capitalist nations. For one thing, instead of creating national productive economies, these nations have been made to regard foreign goods as indispensable. Such increases in imports have cut deep into their incomes, thereby negatively affecting their capacity to invest or even «buy» technology from the advanced capitalist countries.

At a glance, one would have expected that the difference between the export and import percentages for the underdeveloped countries is sufficient to provide the necessary development capital. Yet, as PREBISCH

has noted, the traded commodities of the underdeveloped countries are mainly foodstuffs and raw materials which are transferred to the industrial centers of Europe and North America. Furthermore, the prices of manufactured goods, largely produced by the advanced capitalist nations, have risen disproportionately in relation to the prices of primary products. This is closely connected with the higher income elasticity of the demand for industrial products while the role played by the «demonstration effect» increases the demand for imported industrial products by underdeveloped countries.

Tables 5 and 6 illustrate a pattern that has now come to dominate the network of world trade; that is, the diminishing volume of trade transacted between the advanced capitalist nations and the underdeveloped countries. Claude AKE notes that technological progress has made the West much less dependent on primary producers as synthetic products increasingly replace raw materials. On the other hand, «trade among the Western countries has been increasing much faster than trade between the West and developing countries. Exchanges with the underdeveloped countries account for less than 20 percent of the trade of the developed countries (15).

As table 5 shows, the average percentage of the Third World share of the network of world trade for the four years amounts to only 22 percent while that of the advanced capitalist nations stood at an average of 67 percent, or some ratio of 3 to 1. Table 6 presents a similar contrast. For the four years under consideration, an average of 71 percent of the volume of total trade of all the advanced capitalist countries was transacted between them. This is in sharp contrast to the less than an average of 24 percent of their total trade transacted with the Third World.

The structure of world export and import shares of major commodity groups, by way of origin and destination, are shown in tables 7 and 8. The point to note in table 7 is that the developed market economies, with a total population of about 764 million (1976 censuses) consumed an average of 70.8 percent of these items produced while an average of only 19.1 percent of these same items was consumed by a population of almost 3 billion (1976 censuses) in the Third World. This same pattern of consumption can be noted in agricultural raw materials, ores and metals, fuels and manufactured goods. Table 8 shows world imports by way of origin. With the exception of fuels, developing countries continue to experience diminishing shares in world commodity exports. For instance, in agricultural raw materials, 40.4 percent was imported from the developing countries in 1955. By 1976, this had dropped precipitously to 27.1 percent. This appears to reveal the paradox peculiar to the developing nations' economies: their markets continue to be flooded with commodities from the advanced capitalist countries because most Third World nations find it more convenient to buy than to produce even agricultural raw materials for which they are supposed to be specialized in the international division of labour.

TABLES 5 and 6: Network of World trade by origins and destination – Value of exports and annual average, 1974–1977 (in billion U.S. dollars)**TABLE 5**

	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>DESTINATION</u>	
	World	Developed Capitalist Economies	Developing Economies
1974	838.2	588.0	173.7
1975	872.2	572.7	200.6
1976	988.3	666.2	219.4
1977	1,119.6	748.6	255.7

TABLE 6

	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>DESTINATION</u>	
	Developed Capitalist Economies	Developed Capitalist Economies	Developing Economies
1974	541.7	397.9	113.8
1975	577.2	402.0	138.3
1976	642.1	458.0	147.2
1977	729.1	517.7	172.6

Source: *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1979.*

Table 7: Structure of exports: world percentage shares of major commodity groups by destination, 1955, 1970, 1976.

		<u>World</u>	<u>Developed Market Economies</u>	<u>Developing Economies</u>
<u>Commodity Groups</u>				
All Food items	1955	100.0	72.6	18.9
	1970	100.0	72.3	18.0
	1976	100.0	67.7	20.4
Agricultural raw materials	1955	100.0	76.6	12.0
	1970	100.0	74.4	13.0
	1976	100.0	74.5	15.4
Ores & Metals	1955	100.0	74.1	14.4
	1970	100.0	76.4	11.8
	1976	100.0	66.5	16.9
Fuels	1955	100.0	60.6	26.5
	1970	100.0	75.2	16.0
	1976	100.0	75.3	17.3
Manufactured Goods	1955	100.0	53.4	32.3
	1970	100.0	68.6	20.7
	1976	100.0	64.2	25.3

Source: *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1979.*

Table 8 : Structure of imports: percentage shares by origin of major commodity groups, 1955, 1970, 1976.

		<u>World</u>	<u>Developed Market Economies</u>	<u>Developed Economies</u>
Commodity Groups				
All Food items	1955	100.0	48.7	42.6
	1970	100.0	59.0	31.8
	1976	100.0	61.7	30.9
Agricultural raw Materials	1955	100.0	49.4	40.0
	1970	100.0	58.4	30.3
	1976	100.0	61.5	27.1
Ores & Metals	1955	100.0	67.7	21.0
	1970	100.0	70.4	18.4
	1976	100.0	16.1	75.2
Fuels	1955	100.0	31.7	57.4
	1970	100.0	26.5	63.1
	1976	100.0	16.1	75.2
Manufactured Goods	1955	100.0	85.1	4.7
	1970	100.0	85.1	5.3
	1976	100.0	83.6	7.7

Source: *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1979.*

TOWARDS A «PROTEST-DEMAND» IDEOLOGY : ADVOCATING A WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER FOR MUTUAL GAIN

The foregoing analyses appear to have given added strength to the various organized expressions of discontent, by the Non-aligned Movement, to the one-sided dependence that characterizes the world economy. Whether it is the Algiers summit of 1973 or the Lome Convention negotiations or the recent UNIDO conference in India, these organized expressions have followed a consistent pattern: the poor nations have been ruthlessly exploited by the rich thereby causing many of the Third World's seemingly intractable development problems; and, the rich must now make special efforts to help the poor countries catch up by, among other things, paying high prices for their products and increasing the level of their aid.

In this section, we examine the themes of this «protest-demand» ideology as they bear upon the prevailing conventions of international economic transactions and the attempts to alter these conventions in a world of increasing interdependence. The Algerian Foreign Minister, Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA, characteristically introduced the problem thus:

The new strategy which the Third World is proposing to the international community is based on a pattern of cooperation which will give all countries the prospect of building their economies on the foundation of their own resources and make international trade the favoured instrument of an equitable world distribution of world income (16).

To comprehend the rationale of the Non-aligned «protest-demand» ideology as both a programme of action and a particular view of reality, it is argued that the claims of the Non-aligned Movement rest in part on the contention that all peoples have a right to the satisfaction of certain basic human needs and that those who have been able to do so have a responsibility to satisfy the needs of others for the sake of humanity. It is also argued that, at best, the existing international economic order, including the set of institutions, formal rules and informal conventions that govern economic transactions among nations, disregards the special problems of Third World peoples and, at worst, has fostered the exploitation of poor countries so that some restitution for past and present injustices is due. According to BOUTEFLIKA, the new strategy

... is not therefore just a matter of providing access to markets and correcting price formulation mechanisms in order to reduce the size of fluctuations in the prices of products exported by the developing countries but, rather, of transforming all the workings of international trade. Such approach presupposes a new type of relationship in which concerted action and some degree of planning on the international scale are substituted for the so-called laws of supply and demand, which, in reality, merely reflect an imposed relationship based on the respective strengths of the seller and buyer (17).

The protest factor can thus be reduced to the following variables: inequitable trade arrangements; difficulty in obtaining remunerative and stable prices for Third World's primary products; severe fluctuations that disrupt and make nonsense of Third World development plans; inflation in the developed countries which causes ever-increasing prices for Third World imports of manufactures, fertilizers and food-stuffs, thus worsening the terms of trade; the need for more and more borrowing; greater debt servicing burden. Mr. A. M. MOGWE, Botswana's foreign minister, has put some of the issues very well:

We are speaking about the exploitation on reasonable terms of our non-renewable, non-replenishable natural resources which should provide the economic basis for industrialization so that development should continue after these non-renewable resources are depleted. We are speaking about quantitative restrictions, consumption taxes, non-tariff barriers, prohibitive tariffs, countervailing duties, price equalization levies and a myriad of other restrictive devices which collectively have prevented the expansion of our exports to rich countries and thus have contributed in no small measure to the polarization of the world into rich and poor, developed and developing nations (18).

The demand factor has had a more direct impact on the role of international organizations in seeking an equitable redistribution of global resources. At the 1974 United Nations Special Session on Raw Materials and Development, the Non-aligned nations had formulated a comprehensive economic programme consisting of a Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and a Programme of Action designed to bring about the new order. The specific proposals that have been systematically presented by the underdeveloped countries, through the Group 77, are intended to permit a change of course in the international economic situation by providing the underdeveloped countries with the institutional conditions for organizing programmes that would place them on the road to development. For instance, the Group 77, representing the Movement of the Non-aligned countries in international organizations, has proposed the establishment of an international commodity agreements on those commodities produced by underdeveloped countries that would ensure them equitable and remunerative prices. A variation of this is to index commodity prices to prices of manufactured goods in order to assure that commodity prices rise no less rapidly than other prices in an inflationary world. The Group has demanded an increase in Official Development Assistance by the rich countries to the United Nations target of seven-tenths of one percent of gross national product.

The disappointing performance of the advanced capitalist countries in this regard is shown in table 9. While this table shows a consistent increase in the developed nations' GNP, the percentage of GNP allocated for Official Development Assistance remained either constant or on the decrease. Not a single year have these nations come close to the United

TABLE 9: Official Development AID (ODA) from DAC countries projected until 1980

	1960	1965	1970	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980
GNP (U.S. '000 million \$)	900	1300	2000	2600	3400	4200	5500	6900
ODA (U.S. '000 million \$)	4.6	5.9	6.8	8.5	11.3	14.6	18.3	22.8
ODA percent of GNP	0.52	0.44	0.34	0.33	0.33	0.35	0.34	0.33

Source: Adapted from *FAO Review on Agriculture and Development*, January/February 1977, p. 10.

Nations target of 0.70 percent. Other demands include renegotiating the principles of allocation of Special Drawing Rights at the IMF to give underdeveloped countries a large share; providing general debt relief in the form of forgiveness or postponement of the repayment obligations of underdeveloped countries on their external debts; granting and enlarging preferential treatment for imports for underdeveloped countries into the developed countries; asserting the right to take over foreign-owned property without regard to international legal conventions on compensations (19).

Yet, while these demands and proposals have formed the nuclei of the so-called North-South dialogue since the United Nations First Development Decade, there has been growing apprehension that the hopes raised in underdeveloped countries appear extinguished and dashed at the closing of the Second Development Decade. This apprehension was renewed with vigour at the recent Havana Conference of the Non-aligned Movement when President CASTRO of Cuba declared:

Unequal exchange is impoverishing our peoples; and it should cease. Inflation, which is being exported to us, is impoverishing our peoples; and it should cease. Protectionism is impoverishing our peoples; and it should cease. The disequilibrium that exists concerning the exploitation of sea resources is abusive; and it should be abolished. The financial resources received by the developing countries are insufficient; and should be increased. Arms expenditures are irrational. They should cease and the funds thus released should be used to finance development. The international monetary system that prevails today is bankrupt; and should be replaced. The debts of the least developed countries and those in a disadvantageous position are impossible to bear and have no solution; they should be cancelled... (20)

Even more significant, perhaps, for a lucid appraisal of the essential contradictions between developed and underdeveloped countries, the non-aligned «protest-demand» ideology has come to embody a spirit of collective revolutionary struggle against imperialism while the historical inequities that characterize the world capitalist system have nurtured a psychology of dependence in the minds of Third World peoples. Indeed, beginning with the slave trade down to the more collective nature of neo-colonialism, Third World nations provided and continue to provide the bulk of the capital and human labour (in the early periods, brute force and dictated concessions were employed by the colonialists) with which the advanced capitalist nations were able to draw up their long-term development programmes. European trading companies such as the CFAO, the SCOA, the UAC, Diamang, Union Miniere, etc., and now the multinationals under United States leadership, contributed to the expatriation of African surplus and repatriated a great proportion of Africa's wealth produced by peasant toil. As Walter RODNEY rightly intimated, the development of Europe should be understood as part of the same dialectical process in which Africa was underdeveloped (21). And, somewhat by design, the entire history of

European contacts with the Third World was characterized by the deliberate attempts to strangle efforts of Third World nations to be self-reliant and economically independent. The tables in this paper have proved enough of these assertions. It becomes clear, therefore, that the obligation of the advanced capitalist nations to meet the claims laid down by the Non-aligned Movement is probably no less similar to how President Carter once characterized American energy crisis as «the moral equivalence of war».

THE HAVANA CONFERENCE AND BEYOND: FROM PROPOSALS TO SOLUTIONS FROM WITHIN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

The Havana Conference of the Non-aligned Movement would not have succeeded the way it did if the member-states had not legitimized the call for self-reliance and the need to harness and share their enormous resources. The burden of these deliberations was placed squarely on the oil-producing Third World nations. In 1974, for instance, the oil producers had accumulated the sum of 60 billion dollars in surplus revenues and nearly all was either lent to the advanced capitalist countries or plowed back into bank deposits and debt securities (22). The breakdown of these surplus revenues is shown in table 10. The picture here cannot be said to be encouraging. At worst, the historic trend in which Third World revenues are converted into investment capital by the west appears to have been reinforced. At the Havana Conference it was evident that oil price rises had devastating impact on poor countries' economies and to have oil incomes flowing back to the industrialized world rather than into investment in their own economies contradicted the ideological rationale of the Non-aligned Movement. Thus, following a forceful plea by the Jamaican leader, Mr. MANLEY, the Iraqi President, Saddam HUSSEIN, proposed the setting up of long-term, interest-free loans by the oil-producing countries. While an oil-fund is to be established to aid the poorer nations, the idea to centralize all aids coming from the oil-producing nations was endorsed.

These proposals for solving poverty and misery from within the Non-aligned Movement were a testimony to the perceived collective strength of the Movement in the development process. Perhaps, it was justly recognized that while the bulk of the advanced capitalist nations will continue to resist compensatory measures for bridging the huge prosperity gap existing between them and the Third World, at the least, the oil-producing nations can become reliable alternatives. The will to survive beyond just the subsistence level and the determination to challenge the exploitative character of the capitalist market structure were seen as strong enough pressures for wanting to wax a non-aligned brotherhood along economic lines.

Table 10: Breakdown of the \$ 60 billion surplus revenues earned by the oil-producing nations in 1974

U.K. bank deposits and government securities	\$ 7.5 billion (12 1/2%)
U.S. government securities	\$ 6.0 billion (10 %)
U.S. stock and other equity	\$ 1.0 billion (1.7 %)
U.S. bank deposits	\$ 4.0 billion (6.7 %)
Loans to developed countries other than the U.S. and the U.K.	\$ 5.5 billion (9 %)
Loans to developing countries	\$ 2.5 billion (4 %)
World bank and IMF obligations	\$ 3.5 billion (6 %)
Eurocurrencies	\$ 21.0 billion (35 %)
Miscellaneous (including private loans, European and Japanese securities)	\$ 9.0 billion (15 %)
T O T A L	\$ 60.0 billion

Source: *U.S. Treasury Department Estimates, 1974.*

NOTES

1. These assumptions form the core analytic approaches to underdevelopment and dependence in Amin (1974, 1976, 1977); Prebisch (1959); Helleiner (1972); Singer (1974) and Szentes (1976). These assumptions have also prompted the Lome Convention negotiations and have featured prominently in both the various UNCTAD conferences and UNIDO negotiations between the advanced Western capitalist countries and the poor nations of the Third World.
2. The semantic confusion in some bourgeois concept of neutralism is obvious here. What was actually being conveyed is «neutrality» which, in classical usage, is a condition of a country at peace while others are at war. Thus neutrality was avoided for neutralism since it is known that Afro-Asians fought alongside the Allies in both World Wars.
3. George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 207.
4. These are benefits which non-alignment presumably confers on its practitioners. See *The Conference of Heads of States of Governments of Non-aligned Countries*, Belgrade, September 1-6, 1961.

5. This approach, dubbed the «Eurocentric» approach to non-alignment studies, stresses the military-geopolitical and Cold War factors and has been variously advanced in Liska (1968, 1972); Rothstein (1968); Martin (1966); Lyon (1963); Crabb, Jr., (1968).
6. J. W. Burton, (ed.), *Non-alignment*, London: Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 12.
7. Abstracts of both the Myrdal and Prebisch arguments were adapted from Tamas Szentes (1976), pp. 100–162.
8. G. Myrdal, *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Countries*, London: Methuen University Paperbacks, 1965, p. 26.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Raul Prebisch, «Towards a New Trade Policy for Development», *Report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*, New York, 1964.
12. Szentes, *op. cit.*, p. 105.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Claude Ake, *Social Science as imperialism: The Theory of Political Development*, Ibadan University Press, p. 99.
16. Part of an address to the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations which unanimously produced a resolution on the «Development and International Economic Cooperation», *Africa*, No. 52, December 1975, p. 36.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
19. These and other proposals formed the basis for negotiating the Lome Convention Agreements between the EEC and 59 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries in 1975. These proposals have also formed and dominated proceedings in such international forums as the Lima Conference on Industrialization, the Rome Resolution on the World Food Conference, the various UNCTAD negotiations, the Vienna UN Conference on Science and Technology for development (UNCSTD) and the recent UNIDO III held in New Delhi.
20. Part of the speech delivered at the United Nations by President Fidel Castro of Cuba as President of the Movement of the Non-aligned Countries at the 34th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Ediciones Especiales, Cuba, 1979, pp. 51–52.
21. Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, London: Bogle – L'Ouverture, 1972, p. 162.
22. *Newsweek*, February 10, 1975, p. 42.

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RESUME

Dans ce document l'auteur veut montrer que le changement intervenu dans l'approche par les Non-Alignés des Relations Internationales au plan idéologique au cours de la décennie des années 70, a atteint son point culminant lors de la conférence des Non-Alignés à la Havane, en Septembre 1979. Alors que la tendance générale de la perspective idéologique du Mouvement reflète des idées et des principes à propos de la manière par laquelle et des raisons pour lesquelles la communauté mondiale devrait partager équitablement les ressources globales, la Conférence de la Havane légitimait une double approche de la tendance idéologique naissante du Mouvement. Elle essaya d'abord de réitérer lucidement les problèmes fondamentaux (i) de la souveraineté sur les ressources, (ii) de l'exploitation multinationale des pays du Tiers-Monde, (iii) des relations commerciales décroissantes entre le Tiers-Monde et les pays de l'OCDE et (iv) du racisme et de l'apartheid. Ensuite, ce qui est peut-être plus réaliste, compte tenu de l'actuelle détérioration économique mondiale, la conférence de la Havane insista sur la nécessité de compter encore plus sur eux-mêmes. Ainsi, la politique de la self-reliance a pris un autre élan digne de foi au sein d'un mouvement qui doit encore démontrer une capacité collective provenant des énormes ressources dont il dispose.