NEW FOOD STRATEGIES AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN EAST AFRICA

By

Dr. Yash TANDON *

INTRODUCTION

120,000 children under five die in Tanzania annually. Of these 50,000 die of neo-natal problems (often caused by malnutrition of the mother), 30,000 die of infections diseases, 30,000 of measles and 10,000 of severe protein/calory malnutrition. In approximately 50 % of *all deaths* malnutrition is the underlying cause. This is best seen in the case of measles *(1).* At any time 25 % of the underfives are undernourished, that is, 700,000 children. About 150 children die *everyday* in Tanzania due to malnutrition either as a direct cause or as an underlying cause.

These are, of course, average figures. If at any time 25 % of the underfives are undernourished in Tanzania, in some regions the figure may be as high as 50 % or 60 %, i.e. every other child. Food production per capita in Singida, for example, is 1,800 Kcals per day compared to Tanga where it is 4,000. Again in lower income groups cases of malnutrition are more prevalent and more severe. Even within households children in the poorest families get the least, or the least nourishing food, while the men take the lion's share.

When peasants in our countries struggle for a bit of land, or better prices for the produce of the land, for them therefore it is a grim struggle of life and death. Global figures that optimistically show that mankind is on the verge of making a technological breakthrough whereby globally food production can easily outstrip population growth have no meaning for these peasants *(2).* Poverty is highly location specific. And its underlying causes are socio-political. The problem is not in the production of calories or proteins. Science has advanced so far that it is technically possible to produce enough single-cell protein over half a square mile of land to meet the needs of 350 million people *(3).* The problem is the right combination of capital, management, labour and other resource inputs *within a given socio-political system.*

It is this that we hope to analyse in the context of East Africa. The food problem is a long-standing problem. It has historical roots. But we cannot go into these roots in any detail in this paper. We shall concentrate on a very limited time-span, 1974 to 1980. 1974 was the year of the World Food Conference in Rome which was organized in the wake of large-scale famine that hit many parts of the third world. In the last six years the situation has changed very rapidly in East Africa. Governments have become more conscious of the need to intervene on food policy, whereas the struggle of the peasants, if anything, has intensified.

But first a few points of historical interest by way of background to the current food situation in East Africa.

---

* *Former Professor of Political Science, University of Dar-es-Salaam.*

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE FOOD CRISIS

It is the movement of capital *primarily* that decides the allocation of resources to production of commodities including food. This is true both globally and within the context of a national economy. As capital penetrated production in the colonial economies of East Africa at tthe dawn of imperialism it set in motion a certain rhythm of development whose priorities were determined not nationally, not *within* the colonial economies themselves, but in response to certain needs of international production.

During the colonial period, the needs of international production demanded that colonies produce industrial raw materials, both agricultural products (coffee, cotton, sisal) as well as metals, minerals and oil. For short periods when acute need was felt for cheap food from the colonies, as during the Second World War, so that wages of workers in the industrial centres of Europe could be maintained at pre-War levels, food production was encouraged in the colonies. Otherwise, in general and over the long period, land, labour and other resources of the colonies were diverted away from food into the production of industrial crops.

Such infrastructural developments as took place in East Africa during the colonial period, *and* for almost fifteen years after independence, were mainly to service either the production, transportation and marketing of industrial crops or, as after independence, the creation of import substitution industries. Extension services in agriculture, basic and applied research, credit institutions, and marketing boards were industrial crops-oriented not food-oriented.

Over 90 % of the population in East Africa was in any case rural who grew their own food for subsistence while they produced export crops for cash. The method of food production was by and large traditional, except for the large wheat farms in Kenya owned exclusively by a white settler community, and the wheat farms of Iringa in Tanzania. Certain areas in East Africa became totally devoted to export crop production and they had to «import» food from neighbouring areas. So had the urban dwellers, consisting largely of a small working class, and a somewhat larger trading community and the bureaucracy.

It is these urban dwellers and food deficit areas within our countries to the service at whom a whole paraphernalia of institutions were created – marketing boards, credit institutions, price commissions, transport network and storage facilities. No more than 20 % of total food produced in East Africa (in Uganda even less than 20 %) pass through these channels, and whatever capital is invested in food is largely invested to maintain these channels so that wage levels of urban workers may be kept low, and a trading community and the bureaucracy are properly fed. Very little capital traditionally went into food production and marketing, especially the 80 % which never went through commercial channels, and which the peasants consumed.

Periodic shortages of food that occured (as in Tanzania in 1974/75 and in Kenya in 1980/81) could be met out of imports of grains from the United States and other grain-excess countries. This suited well the farmers and grain merchants of America and Canada. It was the policy of their governments not to help food-importing nations in the production of foods that might compete with their grain surpluses. In 1966, A.H. MOSEMAN, then Assistant Administrator of the United States A.I.D. explained:

«The science and technology in foreign aid designed to increase food crop production has been rather limited. We have concentrated on the extension or transfer of our crop varieties and our own production practices. We have not focused research attention on the increase of production of crops such as rice and wheat, which have been in the surplus in the United States. This reflected the attitude of the Congress, of the American public and of American farm organisations – a handicap that is still to be overcome» (4).

To summarise, then, food was not a priority area for capital investment during the entire colonial period, and for fifteen years after independence. In fact, resources (mainly land and labour-power) were diverted away from food into the production of industrial raw materials. Such capital as did go into food went mainly to service the needs of urban dwellers and food-deficit areas. Virtually the entire peasantry (and that means practically the whole population) was left pretty much to their own devices to feed themselves. There was no food policy and no organisation for food production.

MOVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FROM FOOD TRADE INTO FOOD PRODUCTION

1974 was a turning point. Governments in East Africa seriously began to question the ability of the traditional agricultural *laissez faire* methods to feed their populations, without some kind of deliberate intervention from the state. This turning point was more clearly visible in the case of Tanzania than Kenya or Uganda. Food overnight became too serious a commodity to be left to the whims of peasants. The application of capital to food production (as distinct from industrial and export crops) became the keynote of the new era.

A similar turning point had come in Asia during 1967–71, when with widespread application of HYV's and tube wells massive increases in yields were obtained in what came to be described as the «green revolution». But 1974 was a crisis at a global level, a conspiracy of four factors.

First the major grain exporting countries (USA, Canada, Australia and Argentina) began to reduce the area planted for food. By 1972/73 world food stock had gone down to 130 million tons (lowest in twenty years). Secondly, the USSR starting from 1972/73 entered the world grain market, quietly purchasing enormous quantities of grain at low prices in order to build her reserves, and to prevent slaughtering of livestock. Thirdly, the drought of 1973/74 brought serious famine conditions in several countries in Africa at the same time. In the Sahel alone about 100,000 people were reported to have perished through famine. And the fourth was the famous energy crisis, that shot up the prices of food grains and inputs (such as fertilizers), and hurt oil-deficient low-income countries more than anybody else.

It was this fourth factor, more than any other, that made the most important impact on countries like Tanzania. By overnight depleting its foreign exchange the oil crisis reduced the ability of these countries to purchase food from abroad as and when the situation occasionally demanded. In 1974/75 Tanzania imported 446,000 tons of maize, rice and wheat and paid 783.1 m. shs (US $ 100 m.0 for it. *(5)* This was clear evidence that the system of food production in Tanzania was not dependable for feeding her population. But then should Tanzania depend on an unreliable stock of world grain reserves at ascending prices to stave off food crisis that could recur again and again and for which foreign exchange may not be available when needed?

The International community also reacted strongly to the food crisis and the resulting famine in many countries. For years warning signals were coming from many quarters (governmental as well as private) that everything was not right with the way the world was organized to feed its increasing millions. Something had to be done. One of the first things to be done was, of course, a conference.

The world Food Conference at Rome (1974) led to a reorganization of international organization in the field of food. In December, 1974 the United Nations created the World Food Council of 36 members from developed and developing countries with the task of co-ordinating and implementing the recommendations of the World Food Conference. Furthermore, a Global Information and Early Warning System was set up under the FAO. In February, 1975, under the auspices of the World Bank, the FAO, and the UNDP, a Consultative Group on Food Production and Investment in Developing Countries was set up to co-ordinate the activities of the donors, and to increase efficiency of agricultural investments in developing countries. Also set up under the FAO were a Committee on World Food Security and an International Fertilizer Supply Scheme. In 1977, the OPEC countries got together (with some others) to raise $1, 000 million to set up the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

The international capital market's principal chieftain, World Bank's Robert McNAMARA announced that he was committing US $ 7 billion to agriculture for the 1974–78 period, an 8 – fold increase over the commitment made 10 years ago when it was $ 872m. for the 1964–68 period.

International capital was promising to mobilize itself to feed the hungry of the world. Its spirit was best captured by Dr. Luigi DESERTI, Chairman of the FAO's Industry Co-operative Programme. In addressing the twelveth session of the ICP's General Committee, he reviewed the historical role the ICP had played, and then went on to explain its role in the present phase:

> *«Finally, the third phase, the one in which we find ourselves today and which corresponds more closely to the «Spirit of Toronto», to the World Food Conference Resolutions and, I dare to add, to the current*

orientation of FAO; this phase emphasizes the essential importance of the contribution of industry, the role of which is to activate the transfer of skills in management within the framework of production, processing and marketing of agricultural products, including naturally, the creation of food industries and local infrastructure in developing countries» (6).

The ICP essentially is an organisation of multinational corporations such as the Unilever, Masey FERGUSON and the Imperial Chemical Industries which are involved in the export of industrial machinery and other inputs (such as fertilizers and insecticides) for agriculture. Therefore what we were witnessing in 1974 was a massive build-up of pressure from multinational industrial corporations to oust American and Canadian trading corporations from the domain of agriculture in the developing countries. *Instead of trade and aid from excess grain reserves, it was now going to be a direct transfer of capital in the form of technology, know-how and management.*

If in the pre-1974 period food was largely a neglected sector of agriculture, except that which was grown in large estates, and if the lack of application of adequate capital to food production was the principal reason for the backward mode of its production, what is the situation now? How have the East African countries responded to what appears to be an open invitation by international finance capital to join hands with it to make these countries self-sufficient in food?

The initiative has come from international finance capital itself. In 1974, Tanzania, at the instigation of the World Bank, inaugurated two national projects aimed at achieving food self-sufficiency by 1980. The first was the *National Maize Project* whose aim was to increase the annual production level of maize from 880,000 MT in 1972 to some 1,330,000 MT by 1980. It was to be achieved through massive capital input in 950 Ujamaa Villages in 13 regions. The objective was to raise average yields from 7.5 to 11.5 quintals per hectare through application of hybrid seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and other extension services. The project was to cost US $ 38.1 million underwritten by the World Bank's IDA ($ 18m.), the Arab Bank for Economic Development in East Africa ($ 5m.), United States AID ($ 6.4m.), Government of Tanzania ($ 11.1 m.), and the Tanzanian peasants ($ 4m.).

The second was a long-term project, called the National Agricultural Development Programme (NADP), designed to reach out over the whole country over a 20 year periods. Its purpose was to uplift the present level of farming through the introduction of high-yielding varieties, rotational practices, soil conservation measures, the integration of crop and animal production and opening up of new settlement areas – ten sub-projects were to start annually (10,000 farm families each). The first phase of 2 years was to cost $ 35 million *(7).*

In Kenya, the food situation was somewhat better than in Tanzania. Of course, there were areas of serious food scarcity, even famine, but Kenya still came better off than Tanzania during the 1974/75 food crisis. The crisis, however, was not long to come. And when it came, in 1980/81, it was primarily a result of domestic factors. 1976/77 was a bumper year for Kenya, and the government purchased 6 million bags of maize, far beyond the consumption needs of the country. It should have exported at least 3 million bags, but somebody in the government bungled, and the excess grain stayed as reserve in the stores. In 1977/78 the government could not purchase any more maize from the farmers. It bagged 2 million bags, and told the farmers to sell their excess maize elsewhere. The private trade was unable to pick up the excess maize, and the farmers responded by reducing land under maize cultivation.

In 1978/79 the government began to export its excess maize, and in early 1979 it withdrew GMR seasonal credit from the farmers. From 564,700 tons in 1976, maize production for market fell to 236,300 and 237,300 tons in 1978 and 1979 respectively *(8)*. Exports nonetheless continued. By 1980 the country was hit by serious food shortages, and the government was forced to import tons of yellow maize from the United States. From a maize exporting country, Kenya overnight became a maize-importing country.

After considerable domestic as well as international pressure from the World Bank, the government in Kenya came out with its Sessional Paper on Food Policy in May 1981. The Paper defines the food situation in the country in the following terms:

> *«The rapid expansion of the population and a shortage of unexploited arable land in the main high potential areas are beginning to expose a potentially dangerous imbalance in the relationship between the national supply of and demand for food. The nation no longer enjoys the advantage of regular surpluses of foodstuffs to cushion the impact of a fall in production in years of crop failure» (9).*

The Paper projected that, given present level of production, there would in 1989 be a shortfall of 867,000 tons of maize alone, and that should these shortfalls over the decade be filled by imports, the foreign exchange requirement at current prices would be K. shs. 15,000 million (US $ 1,800m.) *(10)*

What answer did the Paper propose to this «dangerous imbalance» that threatens to grow between supply of and demand for food? The answer, it said, does not lie in imports, though for a few years imports would be necessary to satisfy both immediate shortfall and the building up of a strategic food reserve. The answer does not lie either in the expansion of acreage under cultivation because of the limitation of good arable land.

The option of diversifying land from under export crops to food crops does not exist either because the country cannot do without export earnings. The only answer is through intensive cultivation. «During the next decade,» the Food Policy Paper suggests, «expansion of food production will need to be based primarily on increases in yields». *(11)*

This essentially means injection of more capital to food production – fertilizers, insecticides, hybrid seeds, better management, more extension service, and so on. It is proposed that by 1985 agricultural credit for food should cover 1.5 million acres of maize and 250,000 acres of wheat *(12)*. An interesting innovation in the Paper, as an indication of the government's seriousness, is the proposal to set up five standing Food

Policy Committees. Four of these would be concerned with the detailed action programme in the production, agricultural inputs, processing and marketing and nutritional aspects of food, whereas the fifth committee would attempt to chart out the major mid-and long-term policy options.

THE ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEM RESTATED

We had argued in the Introduction that the problem of food production is not primarily technical or even for that matter economic, but essentially socio-political. The problem is that of finding the right combination of capital, labour, management and other resource inputs *in a given socio-political context* that has its dynamism and its own difficulties.

It is true that in India the introduction of hybrids and other capital intensive techniques in 1967 had turned «green» the fields of the Punjab in a matter of four years. But in the ultimate analysis this was possible because the socio-political side effects of the «green revolution» were somehow absorbed by the society without unduly destabilizing the political system, at least in the short run *(13)*. To be sure the techniques for increasing crop yields must be applied. There must equally be a peasantry able and willing to apply these techniques, and see visible *material* benefits out of applying these techniques (moral exhortations by themselves will not do). But above all, if as a result of capital-intensive cultivation, the poor peasantry were to be driven off the land as landless squatters in the peri-urban conurbations of major towns and cities, then the political system has to be strong or flexible enough to cushion other social effects of capital-intensive production.

THE CASE OF KENYA

In Kenya landlessness has been one of the most sensitive political factors that no government has been able so far to ignore. The Mau Mau uprisings of the early 1950's were a product of land alienation from Kikuyu peasants, and the increasing pauperisation, especially after the Second World War, of the peasant squatters who lived off white farms *(14)*. The colonial government first crushed the Mau Mau movement, and later responded to it by accepting the Swynnerton Plan in 1954 under which some of the squatters were given title holdings in the former Native Land (now Trust Land) under the county councils. The settlement of the landless wherever arable land could be found has continued ever since, and although the problem has been politically diffused, it still remains.

The Fourth Five Year Development Plan (1979–1983) estimated that there were, at the beginning of the Plan, 410,000 landless and squatter families, and 618,500 small farm families earning less than Kshs 2,200 p.a. (i.e. 40 % of the small farm families). These constituted almost half the total population of the country, i.e. every other person in Kenya *(15)*.

On the eve of independence, the colonial government, following the Swynnerton Plan, had further started a programme, which the independent government continued, of purchasing white highland farms from settlers who were leaving the country, and settling African peasant families on them. Up to now over 800,000 hectares have been purchased, some 71,000 families have been settled, and 480,000 hectares have been adjudicated *(16a)*.

What the government in Kenya (in sharp contrast to that in Tanzania) has been doing, following the colonial government, is to encourage individual ownership of land, so that the farmer has a security of tenure that would encourage him to invest labour and capital into the development of his farm, and also enable him to offer land as security to raise loans. Still only a small portion of Kenya's land has been converted to freehold or leasehold. If we leave out arid lands, then about 20 % of the land has been converted to freehold or leasehold, a further 28 % is available for registration, and the remaining 52 % is Government-owned land or Trust Land *(16b)*.

In the last fifteen years, however, two contradictory movements have been going on side by side on the land question. The first is the persistent tendency towards subdivision of the large mixed farms (900,000 ha.) that were purchased from white settler farms by groups of small farmers who had organized themselves into companies or co-operatives purely for the purpose of purchasing these farms. The desire to own and farm *individual* small plots of land has far outweighed aspirations towards collective farming. 62 % of the group farm area has thus been unofficially, and often illegally, subdivided without government control or assistance *(17)*.

But while large mixed farms have undergone subdivision, there has also been a tendency towards concentration of land among the smallholders themselves. Better-off small-scale farmers have bought off their poorer neighbours' forced to sell land to pay for school fees, or because the land was too inadequate to meet the needs of subsistence. Both the subdivision of large mixed farms, and a partial concentration among smallholders have increased the number of kulak farmers.

Today the bulk of agricultural produce in Kenya comes from small farmers defined by the Fourth Development Plan as «those with land who derive the majority, but usually not all, of their incomes from working the land» *(18)*. For example, in 1976 there were 86,389 ha. under coffee, of which 56,595 ha. were in smallholder sector, and 23, 389 under estate production *(19)*. As for maize, most of the crop, including the 20 % that goes to urban and food-deficit areas, comes from small farmers.

The small farmers are therefore actually or potentially a powerful political force. There are, however, divisions among them, and therefore they are not organized as a united political force. About 60 % of the smallholders own anything between a fraction of an acre to 1 1/2 acres, about 20 % own between 1 1/2 acres to 5 acres, about 10 % between 5 acres and 15, and the remaining 10 % over 15 acres *(20)*.

The government's declared policy is to establish the small farmer as the pivot of agricultural development. The Fourth Five Year Development Plan explains why:

«The emphasis on the small farm family derives from evidence that on the whole, small farms produce more per acre, utilize land more fully, employ labour-intensive methods of production, and are a source of subsistence as well as cash crops« (12).

In practice, the target of state assistance in the form of credit, inputs, extension services and other facilities have so far been either the large farmers or co-operatives, or the commercial smallholders. Until recently, for example, the Guaranteed Minimum Return (GMR) credit facilities were open only to farmers who had more than 15 acres of land. This therefore excluded the bulk of the peasantry. In the case of the peasantry who formed co-operatives or companies for the sole purpose of taking over large mixed farms in the scheduled areas and later to divide the land among themselves into individual plots, they had an additional problem. Since the subdivision of the land has been unofficial, their land titles are not recognized and therefore they are out of the bounds of official credit and extension services.

As between the large scale farmers and the above 15 acres-small commercial farmers, the latter receive largely short-term seasonal credit, whereas the former receive considerable long-term loans as well. Thus, for example, in 1977/78, the division was as follows: *(22)*

	Short-term loans	Long-term loans
Small-scale farmers	£ 1,013,000	£ 135,000
Large-scale farmers	£ 7,117,000	£ 5,683,000

Thus whereas the small-scale commercial farmers receive credit generally to tide them over from season to season, the large farmers receive loans to undertake capital improvements on their farms, as well as seasonal credit. The discrepancy in the proportion of credit given to the two types of farmers is interesting given the fact that the small farmers contribute as much to commercial production as the larger farmers *(23)*, leaving aside, that is, the less-than-15-acres small farmers who do not get any credit but produce for their own subsistence and for the local market.

The GMR credit scheme, with its built-in insurance, was terminated in 1979. In 1980 a new Seasonal Credit Scheme was launched without the element of insurance. The *Economic Survey* of 1980 explains the aim of the new Scheme *(24)*.

«The Scheme aims to promote expansion of maize and wheat production. It is a nation wide programme and caters for farmers with at least 4 hectares of arable land. Some K£ 30m. borrowed from the Cereals and Sugar Finance Corporation has been made available for lending during 1980. The Agricultural Finance Corporation has already received K£ 10m. to administer while the Co-operative Bank of Kenya is to handle K £5m. The new scheme is to be run on a more commercial basis than its predecessor. Farmers are to be allowed credit up to

nearly Kshs. 1,900 per hectare but are to provide security for it. The measure is expected to reduce the default rate which plagued the GMR programme. The credit will mostly be made available in the form of inputs to prevent possible diversion of funds to other uses. There will also be monitoring of the crop at harvest time...»

Thus once again capital input facilities are really open only to large-scale farmers and «large» small-scale farmers. It may be that their extension to cover a million small and very small smallholders is just an astronomical task which is simply beyond the administrative and financial capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture. A single Agricultural Officer (AO) may have under him as many as 60,000 farms in his division. There is never enough money allocated to buy petrol or repair the four-wheel drive landrovers to reach remote areas, and the AO may find himself concentrating only on large-scale farmers. Smallholdings are pretty much left to the TTA's most of whom have no technical know-how to impart research findings, technology application and management skills to the smallholders they service.

Then there is the question of recovering loans from peasants. It is virtually an impossible task even with the best of conditions. A smallholder with three acres under maize may earn say Kshs. 2,000/ – a year. To double his crop he may need credit of say Kshs 600/ – to buy hybrids, fertilizers and insecticides. If a modest interest of 8 % is charged, the 48/ – shs. interest accrued would not even pay for the petrol, let alone the daily cost of the TTA visiting his farm to evaluate his credit worthiness and the value of his land should he fail to pay his loan. Even when credit is restricted only to somewhat larger farmers, loan defaulting is a persistent problem. Already the Seasonal Credit Scheme, which came into existence partly because its predecessor the GMR scheme was getting into loan defaulting problems, is getting into the same problems. According to an editorial in the *Daily Nation:*

«Out of these problems (loan defaulting among others) the Seasonal Credit Programme was evolved. After one year or so of operation there now are claims, particularly from Government departments and parastatals who administer the credit, that the farmers are defaulting at a higher rate than in previous years and therefore interfering with the flow of funds». (25)

One answer to this is co-operatives, which should enable smallfarmers to pool their financial and administrative resources to go for larger loans and bulk supplies. But the co-operatives would have the same problem of collecting loans from individual members as do the lending banks, as the experience in Tanzania amply shows. Besides, co-operatives have become virtual synonyms for mismanagement, embezzlement of funds by officials, and sometimes outright theft, a situation arising principally because ill – or semi-literate peasant members are too easy victims of smart-alec officials.

Thus promises of support to the small farmers made by politicians and by the government in official documents remain largely illusory. We argued earlier that mere moral exhortations to small peasants are not enough to increase their productivity. They have to experience actual material advancement of their family from year to year. There are three things that the peasant fears most at the socio-economic level. One is the relative price differential between the crops he sells for cash and the things he buys in return from the market. The second, if he uses certain inputs in production, is the relative prices of the inputs and the cash crops (whether coffee or maize) that he sells in the market. And the third is the fear of being out competed or cheated by the larger farmer next door.

One of the consequences of the policy of import substitution is that the peasant is asked to pay a part of the cost. As the government itself admitted in the Fourth Development Plan:

> *«To alleviate rural poverty, favourable prices for the agricultural products and low prices for consumer goods and agricultural inputs are necessary. Past policies directed at protecting import substituting industries and of maintaining prices of domestically traded commodities above their international levels, have made it difficult to meet this objective. The resulting high prices for basic commodities such as cooking oil, clothing, maize flour, washing soap, and kerosene, maintained in the interest of the processors and marketing organisations, do not benefit the poorest families in rural and urban areas...» (26)*

According to the *Economic Survey*, «Prices paid by farmers in 1979 rose more rapidly than prices they received for their produce so that the terms of trade fell once again this time by an estimated 6 %. Overall prices received rose by only 3.7 percent compared to an increase of 10.2 percent in prices paid.» *(27)*

Under these conditions the farmers can hardly be expected to usher in a «green revolution» in Kenya. To end this section on Kenya, we would conclude that although the Sessional Paper No. 10 (1981) on National Food Policy highlighted the major technical and economic problems related to food production, distribution and nutrition, it is silent on the one issue that really counts: who is to grow food in Kenya and what material incentives would he have?

If it was theoretically possible to consolidate all arable land for large scale production of food with massive doses of HYV's, fertilizers and mechanized cultivation and harvesting, Kenya would have a «green revolution» in no time. But what would Kenya then do with the millions who would be rendered redundant on land? Kenya has chosen, rather, to satisfy the land-hunger of the people as far as possible, even at the cost of letting large wheat farms to be subdivided among the peasants and thus drop production. This was unavoidable, given the historical experience of Kenya, in order to keep the political system reasonably stable.

Having done so, Kenya found, however, that when it came to injecting more capital into food production, it could effectively be done only in relation to the remaining large-scale farmers and the larger ones among the smallholders. But even here, given the existing priorities of industrialization, and the fact that those who supply capital inputs such as seeds, energy, and fertilizers (namely, in the final analysis, multinational corporations) also seek profit in return for their capital inputs, the farmer found that his terms of trade are worsening year after year. His rate of exploitation is intensified daily.

Those among the farmers who operate with large acreages, either by telephone from Nairobi or on the spot, can recover their costs in other ways. The burden of increasing exploitation really falls on the smallholders who are glamorized in the official literature as the backbone of agriculture, nay, indeed of the whole economy. It is in all probability true that the smallholders' productivity per unit of land are higher than that of the large-scale farmers. But it is in equal probability also true that the returns to their labour are nowhere near those of the larger farmers, and nowhere near what they used to get a few years ago. In this situation of increasing relative impoverishment, it is to be expected that the bulk of the peasantry would continue to grow their own subsistence food while also growing the portion needed to feed the urban dwellers and the food-deficit areas, with all the socio-economic and physical (droughts, etc.) hazards that small farming is exposed to.

THE CASE OF TANZANIA

If the individualization of land was the hallmark of peasant movement in Kenya, in Tanzania it was its opposite – collectivization. Of course, collectivization took place in selected areas, areas that were generally backward and not fully integrated into commodity production during the colonial period. Areas such as Kilimanjaro and Bukoba which were already producing coffee for export were largely left undisturbed in the hands of individual owners, and some large estates.

A second difference between the two countries was that while individualization in Kenya came as a result of political pressure from below, collectivization, or Ujamaaization, came mainly as an initiative from the top. It is true that in the early 1960's there were some spontaneous efforts at forming Ujamaa villages in the south of the country, but these efforts were soon squashed, and after 1969 villages were mainly Party or State engineered. Still, when the response from peasants by 1974 was not too encouraging, the state intervened, hammer and tong, to bulldoze villagers into often badly planned and badly co-ordinated Ujamaa villages.

If the peasants did not openly rise in revolt then, it was because the Party ideology (as well as the instruments of state power) had diffused all possibilities of open revolt. The peasants chose instead to retaliate with economic weapons. This was a contributory cause (among others) of the food crisis that hit the country in 1974/75.

The National Maize Project that was initiated by the World Bank in 1974 found the peasants generally in bitter mood. Nonetheless, there were one or two positive aspects to the formation of Ujamaa villages. The first was that without some form of collectivization, it was impossible to service millions of peasants scattered all over the country. Ujamaaization brought them together and, for the first time peasants began, even if grudgingly in many cases, to enjoy the benefits of tapped water, village roads, primary schools, dispensaries and maize milling.

The second positive aspect of Ujamaaization was that it politicized the peasantry. Village Councils were not dumb bodies of illiterates, nor passive tools of Party hierarchy. Democratic politics at village level was a direct offshoot of the fact that peasants were now brought together, even if forcibly in many cases, and they now had no choice but to hang separately or live together.

Of the 21 regions of Tanzania, 13 of the best maize growing areas were selected for the National Maize Project: Mara, Arusha, Kilimanjaro and Shinyanga in the north; Morogoro, Dodoma and Tabora in the centre; Iringa, Mbeya, Rukwa and Ruvuma in the southern highlands; and Lindi and Mtwara in the south. Within these regions the Project was limited to 950 villages in 28 out of a total of 41 districts. As of july 1977, there were 7,134 villages registered under the villages and Ujamaa villages Act, 1975. Thus the Maize Project covered only 13.3 percent of the villages, selected especially for their high maize productivity *(28)*.

Thus, whereas in Kenya the government was forced to rely largely on large-scale farmers and large smallholders for state-aided input programme, leaving the small smallholders pretty much to their own means, in Tanzania whole villages were turned into recipients of capital input. In terms of centralization of production, Tanzania thus was several steps ahead of Kenya.

In order to ensure that villagers produced according to programme, a tight system of centralized direction and control was girdled round the villages. *At the village level,* co-operatives were abolished and whole villages were incorporated as legal entities that could borrow funds from financing institutions and be responsible for paying back the loans as well as for ensuring that Maize was produced according to plan.

The Villages and Ujamaa Villages (Registration, Designation and Administration) Act of 1975 provided for the legal incorporation of villages as multi-purpose co-operative societies with powers, through their Village Councils, of «purchasing, holding, alienating, managing and disposing of any property whatsoever...» As for any co-operative there might be in the village, it was asked to «wind up its affairs and dispose of its assets and liabilities within such time and such manner as the Minister may direct».

At the national level the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB), through whom the World Bank capital was channelled to the villages, was made directly responsible for control and supervision of food production. The Ministry of Agriculture was thus pushed into the background, and by combining the National Maize Project and the Small Farmers

Food Products into one centralized project called National Food Credit Project (NAFCREP), the TRDB was made responsible for promoting the production of not just maize but of all food crops in the country.

Thus, the local representative of international finance capital, the TRDB, and the peasantry in the villages confronted one another face to face without any mediating agencies such as the Ministry of Agriculture or the co-operatives. As one official of the TRDB explained:

«Before the Villagization programme came into force, TRDB lent cooperative movement, viz. the Regional Cooperative Unions and thence to the respective Primary Cooperative Societies.

This lengthy channel for disbursing credit to the rural areas had a number of complications, which rendered project implementation difficult.

Firstly, it created a barrier between the financing institution and the client. Whereas the Bank is supposed to supervise projects closely and be able to monitor progress on a regular and continous basis, in this case, it had to rely on the cooperative, whose financial and management problems are too fresh in our minds to warrant repetition here.

Secondly, apart from the total absence or at best poor supervision of loans, e.g. the distribution of farm inputs, construction of storage facilities, etc., the unions lacked any sense of accountability for loans disbursed through them. This rendered loans recovery inefficient. Either the unions did not keep track of loans accounts to ascertain the debtors, or even where debtors repaid loans to the unions, these were not eventually remitted to TRDB. The Unions instead used such money for their administration. This contributed greatly to the arrears amassed by the Cooperative Unions as at the time of their dissolution in 1976». (29)

The official further explained the advantages of the new arrangements. First, the TRDB itself would directly check on the viability and credit worthiness of the clients (i.e. villages). Secondly, the Village Council itself would be directly accountable for all loans given to the village. Thirdly, loan recovery would be facilitated through closing loop-holes by which peasants attempted to sell their crops through illcit markets. Fourthly, a Village Management Technicians Training Programme (VMTP) would ensure that villages were serviced by officials with knowledge of accounting, project evaluation and management techniques. And finally, it was hoped that through these arrangements regional inequalities would be scaled down.

Clearly, the new powers and functions of the Village Councils, now turned into veritable engines for promoting food production, required an extensive programme for training the Councils for these massive tasks. Early in 1975 the World Bank sent a team to study this question. The VMTP (mentioned above) was born as a result. The IDA, under Agreement 607 TA, provided a soft loan of Tshs 46.6 million (US $ 5.8 m.) out of the total financial requirement of Tshs 62.7 million (US $ 7.83 m.) for this training programme.

Here then was an experiment of vast proportions. Tanzania had gone far beyond Kenya in bringing finance capital right on the doorstep of the peasant himself, so that international capital and peasant labour would join hands to produce food for the people. Socialization of production was taking place under the hegemony of finance capital itself.

The Maize Project provided for three standard maize production improvement packages.

Package 1:

Extension services concentrated on improving husbandry methods including early planting, correct spacing and timely weeding, combined with improved composite seed and insectides, mainly 5 per cent DDT for stalk borer control and also 25 per cent DDT to combat army worm (for about 10 per cent of the cultivated area).

Package 2:

In addition to inputs of package 1, the villages are introduced to fertilizers consisting of 50 kg/ha triple superphosphate, and 100 kg/ha sulphate of ammonia. At higher altitude hybrid rather than composite seeds are used.

Package 3:

In the best maize growing area, the villages use an additional 50 kg/ha sulphate of ammonia, and in most cases hybrid rather than composite seed.

The idea was for all villages eventually to move to package 3, or at least to package 2, those backward to catch up with the advanced ones over a two – to five-year period *(30)*.

It was an experiment which has not yet been satisfactorily evaluated, and needs to be evaluated *(31)*.

One evaluative study carried out by a project officer of the TRDB concluded that the Project was not an «applaudable success» *(32)*. Peasant response towards intake of capital inputs was one clear index of evaluation.

Used Inputs	1976/76	1976/77
Fertilizers (tons)	13,220	8,650
Seed (tons)	3,580	2,160
Stalkborer insecticide (tons)	935	720
Armyworm insecticide (litres)	79,000	34,660

The TRDB had supplied far more of these inputs than were consumed. In 1976/77, for example, 20,860 tons of fertilizers were supplied, but only 41 per cent of it was used; more than half was wasted. 1,866 tons of stalkborer insecticides were supplied but only 38. 6 % of it was used. The only input that was taken in good quantity (63. 8 %) was the armyworm insecticide – 34,660 tons out of 54,320 litres supplied. Furthermore the intake of every input had fallen between 1976 and 1977; indeed that of armyworm insecticides had fallen to loss than half the previous year's intake.

What had gone wrong? The TRDB project officer gave the following reasons:

(i) Increase in price to farmers both from reduction of subsidy and increase in initial cost of inputs.

(ii) Stricter adherance to the «cash only» selling policy.

(iii)Late rains in some regions where some farmers, quite correctly did not use fertilizer and reverted to shorter term local strains.

(iv) Introduction of new fertilizers in some regions where farmers had access and were familiar with the old type, and sold at the same prices.

(v) Shortage of hybrid seed resulted in substitute varieties but rejected by farmers.

(vi)Late delivery of inputs especially Njombe seed (normally delivered near the onset of rains) and International tender (tends to be late) and amounts required not known early enough in the season.

But it was not only a question of poor input intake by the peasants. Even the control and supervision mechanism had defaulted. The project officer continues:

«These inputs were not properly administered and at variance, fraudulent losses have been reported and cannot be accounted for. In some places, these inputs were either given free or subsidized. Even if the inputs were given free, at least farmers education for agriculture for development had to be taken into account... For instance the application rates of various inputs has been left in the hands of the farmers and in most cases, farmers had the liberty to diverge inputs into other food crops or use none».

Ny own field observations later in 1978 in Kilimanjaro and Arusha confirm the above analysis. Well before the planting season had begun in the Rombo district of Kilimanjaro around mid-September, the politicians and members of the CCP had carried out a sustained political campaign in favour of the maize project. And yet only 25 out of 58 villages had responded. Among the reasons given were:

(i) Villagers thought that the TRDB was out to do business.

(ii) Village chairmen, secretaries and local traders used to profit under the old system; they used to buy big stocks of inputs from Kilimo and sell them onwards at higher prices. There was no longer any incentive for them under the new system.

(iii)Village Councils which were usually located on top of the hill could not supervise credit administration of loans taken by members possessing land for maize lower down the hill.

(iv) Peasants in lowlands had very small plots of lands because of being squeezed out by the rich peasants from up the hill, and grew maize only for subsistence. Therefore, they could not afford to take up capital inputs.

(v) TRDB as a whole and its credit facilities, despite the campaign, were not generally known to all farmers.

(vi) The previous experience of the villagers with the Kilimanjaro National Co-operative Union had not been pleasant. Some of the peasants had taken loans from the KNCU for meat, but the KNCU had not kept proper records, and ultimately all co-operative members (including those who had not taken the loans) were forced to repay the loan.

(vii) Previously peasants were given a choice of buying what they wanted. Most of them preferred to buy seeds only, and leave out the fertilizers and the insecticides. Many peasants decided they would rather use their own seeds than purchase the TRDB packages.

(viii) TRDB refused to give loans to villages that would not or could not produce maize for the market or villages that were known to have smuggled maize across the border to Kenya.

Similar reasons were given to me in the Arusha region. Most villagers did not like fertilizers. It did not pay, they said. The yield did not increase that much with fertilizers, and whatever increase in yield they gained was a result of their good crop husbandry. Why should the TRDB benefit from their hard work? Farmers wanted seeds, but the TRDB did not always supply the correct varieties. The previous year they had got mixed seeds from the TRDB. Adequate soil research was not done. What was needed in the volcanic soil of the Arusha region was nitrogen compounds, and not Sulphate of Ammonia or the triple superphosphate which the TRDB insisted they should use for the package. Farmers disapproved of the formula.

What the Tanzanian experience brings out clearly is that the production of food is not just a problem of providing the right kind of inputs to the peasants followed by extension services, bureaucratic exhortations and a hammer on the head for failure to pay back the loans. Peasants calculate the *material* benefits they are likely to get from any innovation before they launch into it. And the benefits may accrue differentially to different classes of peasants. In a village a farmer owning a large piece of land and politically powerful may take the loans from the TRDB to buy his inputs. Social pressures against him may not work to force him to pay back the loan, and either the whole village suffers or the whole village refuses to pay. As one villager explained to me: The priority for the village was to stay together as a family; the question of business (e.g. paying back loans) come second. Village Councils in Tanzania have become highly politicized, and some of them know how to handle their contradictions with the bureaucracy and the politicians. (In one village I visited, the Village Council was having a meeting and would not accept the Area Commissioner's visit).

The Maize Project itself was highly capital intensive, and very expensive in terms of foreign exchange. Out of $ 38.1 million committed for the project, $ 14,332,000 were earmarked for farm inputs, 73 % of which consisted of purchases in foreign exchange.

Ultimately the cost of the inputs were to be borne by the peasants themselves. It was arranged that upto 1980, 25 % of the cost of the project was to be paid by the peasants and 75 % by the government. After 1980, 40 % by the peasants and 60 % by the government. And after 1984, 60 % by the peasants and 40 % by the government. Thus over time an increasing portion of the burden was to be shifted directly over to the peasants.

But already during the first phase, the peasants were beginning to feel the burden of the loan. They did not feel it was necessary to pay for fertilizers when all they needed were seeds, or that they should pay for Sulphate of Ammonia and TSP when what they needed was nitrogen compounds.

In the ultimate analysis the return to capital was higher than the return to labour. In other words, the peasants were asked to produce not only *food* for the people but also *profits* for the multinationals that supplied fertilizers, seeds and insecticides. One form of energy (petrochemical essentially) was turned into another form of energy (calories), but the latter was being produced at an increasing cost of the former. From occasional imports of food, Tanzania had changed to regular importation of inputs for food. It was an instance of import-substitution agriculture. Still it did not work.

By 1981 Tanzania was back to where she had started in 1974. In early 1981, President NYERERE set off on a tour of the capitals of developed countries to ask for food for his starving people. In Tokyo he said:

> *«Up to one-third of Tanzania's 18 million people could face starvation if the drought continued and adequate food supplies were not obtained from abroad». He said: «Japan and other Western countries should come to the aid of Africa». (33)*

CONCLUSION

The problem of food scarcity cannot be isolated from the general problem of poverty of East African countries. This poverty itself has historical causes which are rooted in the system of global production of commodities, of which food is a part.

The allocation of world resources to the production of various commodities is determined primarily by the movement of capital. As far as East Africa was concerned, the emphasis upto 1974 has been on the production of industrial raw materials for export, and, after independence, on a certain amount of import-substitution small-scale industries. The emphasis has not substantially changed since 1974, but an area of agricultural production, food, that hitherto had been neglected, has now come within the purview of capital.

Kenya and Tanzania have responded differently to the demands of the new situation, and these differences are related to their historical experiences, and to the socio-political structures of the two societies. A significant factor about the socio-political structure is the individual ownership of land in Kenya, and the collectivization of the peasantry in Tanzania. The latter afforded a better prospect for a centralized system of production and control than the former. That is why Tanzania was able to launch a much more ambitious programme of food production than Kenya.

International finance capital was, of course, indifferent to what system of production prevailed in these countries. If anything, Tanzania's «socialist» system was administratively more amenable to capital penetration than Kenya's «capitalist» system. In essence, both are neocolonies, and both are capitalist. In Tanzania the peasants are exploited by the same capital under a «socialist illusion», and on the basis of a nominal «collective ownership» of land, as the peasants in Kenya under the illusion of «independent capitalism». The difference is only in form, not in substance.

Only the Kenyan system is a little more *laissez faire* than Tanzania's. When something goes wrong in Kenya, the burden can «freely» be thrown on the peasants. Thus when in 1977/78 the peasants produced more than enough maize to feed the nation, but the state could not purchase it all, the peasants were told to do what they liked with the maize. The state refused to bear burden. The next year when the peasants cut down on maize production, the state was alarmed, and exhorted farmers to go back to maize. In the Tanzanian system, the burden is still thrown on the peasants, but since it is a more centralized system, the state cannot as easily escape direct responsibility as in Kenya.

In both Kenya and Tanzania, the peasants produce their own food for subsistence. 80 % of the food produced both in Kenya and Tanzania is either consumed on the farms by the producers themselves or sold on local markets. Of course, this is never enough for the families of poor peasants who suffer perpetual and unmitigated malnutrition, or simply starve in times of droughts.

The 20 % of the food produced to feed the urban dwellers and food-deficit areas in the two countries is produced by the commercial smallholders in Kenya and the commercialized (Ujamaa) villages in Tanzania, and is delivered to these consumers on terms of exchange that are unfavourable to the peasants, and continually deteriorating. This, in fact, is one of the major and most fundamental problems of food production in East Africa.

When imperialism wanted peasants to grow export crops in East Africa towards the turn of the century, they made it materially worthwhile for the peasants to grow these crops. In Kenya where coffee growing by the African peasantry was barred by the colonial government in the interest of white settlers, the African farmers fought hard for their right to grow coffee, and it became a major issue in the political struggle for liberation. When again an import-substitution industrialization was inaugurated after independence, the government made it materially worthwhile for the comprador class to engage in industrialization by protecting them against external competition and by subsidizing their wage bills through cheap «importation» of food from the neighbouring peasant areas.

Only when it now came to producing food, the peasants have to do three things at the same time. They have to provide continuous supplies of cheap food to the towns, and the export crops growing food-deficit regions. They have to provide adequate profits for those who put in their capital in the form of tractors, seeds, fertilizers, insecticides and management. And above all, they have to maintain competitiveness against food crops produced in food surplus areas such as the United States and Canada. Food producer prices are related not to the prices of inputs that the farmers use, or expected to use, nor to the prices of the basic commodities like salt and soap that they have to purchase in the market, but to something called «import parity» *(34)*. It is supposed to ensure that farm-gate prices remain competitive in the world market.

Despite the entry of capital in food production in East Africa, food thus still remains the Cindrella of agricultural production.

NOTES

1. See Prof. Kimathi, Muhimbili, *Sunday News,* Feb. 26, 1978; and *Lisho* (Journal of the Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre), Vol. II I, p.31.
2. See, for example, the study written by members of the Hudson Institute, USA: Marylin Chou, David P. Harmon Jr., Herman Kahn and H. Wittwer, *World Food Prospects and Agricultural Potential,* New York: Praeger, 1977.
3. A. E. Humphrey, «Starvation: Chemical Engineering can help fight it,» *Chemical Engineering,* 1966, p. 149.
4. A. H. Moseman, «Science and Technology in International Agriculture,» in *Symposium on Research in Agriculture,* Feb. 1966, Warranton, Va. Washington D.C. USDA, 1966.
5. Bank of Tanzania, *Economic and Operations Report,* June, 1975, p. 4.
6. «Role of International Agro-Industry in a New International Economic Order», *Summary Report of the Industry Cooperative Programme General Committee,* 18–19 February, 1976, FAO, Rome. (Document DDI: G/76/32, 26 March, 1976).
7. World Bank, *Appraisal of National Maize Project,* Report No. 897a – TA, December 8, 1975.
8. Republic of Kenya, *Statistical Abstract,* 1979, p. 105, Table 82.
9. Republic of Kenya, Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1981 on *National Food Policy,* Government Printers, 1981, p. 2, para 1–5.
10. *Ibid,* p. 12, para 2.28.
11. *Ibid,* p. 14, para 2.34.
12. *Ibid,* p. 30, para 4.19.

13. There is an extensive literature on the green revolution in India, but few writers have touched on the important issue of how a political system is structured to absorb some of the socially destabilizing effects of the green revolution. On the destabilizing effects themselves see the debate carried out in the pages of the *Economic and Political Weekly* (Bombay), for the years 1972 to 1974.
14. See F. Furedi, «The Social Composition of the Mau Mau in the Highlands», *Journal of Peasant Studies,* I (1974).
15. *Fourth Development Plan of Kenya, 1979–1983,* Gouvernment Printer, Nairobi, Part I, p. 35.

16a *Ibid,* p. 283.

16b *Ibid,* p. 285.

17. *Ibid,* p. 249.
18. *Ibid,* p. 22.
19. *Ibid,* p. 264.
20. These figures are not derived from any documentational source, but from interviews with several people who deal regularly with the peasantry. The ILO Mission Report on *Employment, Incomes and Equality,* Geneva, 1972, gave some figures of breakdown of the peasantry on the basis of land ownership, but the figures are a decade out of date.
21. *Fourth Development Plan,* p. 53.
22. Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, *Economic Survey, 1980,* p. 102, Table 8–9.
23. For comparison see Republic of Kenya, *Statistical Abstract,* 1979, p. 104, Table 81 (c). Gross Marketed production from:

	1977	1978	(K £ million)
Small farms	208.5	183.3	
Large farms	206.0	143.8	

24. *Economic Survey, 1980* p. 103.
25. *Daily Nation,* Nairobi, February 23, 1981.
26. *Fourth Development Plan,* p. 227.
27. *Economic Survey,* 1980, p. 100.
28. The national average yield for maize was estimated at 750 kg. per ha. whereas in the Project area selected the average yield was about 1,100 kg/ha.
29. D. Y. Temu, «The implication on Rural Credit of the Dissolution of Co-Operative Unions and Co-Operative Societies and the Experience of the Tanzania Rural Development Bank in Financing Villages,» Paper presented at a TRDB Seminar, Dar-es-Salaam, December, 1977, pp. 4–6.
30. World Bank, *Appraisal of National Maize Project,* Report No. 897a – TA, December 8, 1975.
31. I toured the villages of Kilimanjaro and Arusha regions in 1978 to see for myself the degree to which the experiment was succeeding. Plans to go to some of the other regions were subverted by my return to Uganda following the Uganda-Tanzania war. Therefore observations made here are somewhat limited.
32. E. A. Lyatuu, «Food Crop Production Programme», TRDB, December 13, 1977.
33. *Daily Nation,* March 20, 1981. AP Report.
34. See Kenya Sessional Paper No. 4 (1981), *National Food Policy,* p. 16, para 3.1.

RESUME

L'article de Dr. Yash TANDON traite des nouvelles stratégies pour la production alimentaire et des tranformations sociales en Afrique de l'Est. Après avoir noté dans son introduction que l'optimisme créé par les résultats des recherches scientifiques en matière de production alimentaire n'a aucun sens pour les pauvres paysans, il estime que contrairement aux arguments souvent avancés pour expliquer la crise alimentaire que traverse le monde, les raisons fondamentales sont d'ordre socio-politique. Ainsi, dit-il, il s'agit moins de la production de calories ou de protéines que d'une meilleure combinaison du capital, de la gestion, du travail et des autres intrants, dans le cadre d'un système socio-politique donné qui a sa propre dynamique et ses propres problèmes. Parlant ensuite des raisons historiques de cette crise alimentaire, il fait remarquer que la production de nourriture à des fins strictement alimentaires n'a pas été une priorité des capitaux d'investissement pendant et quinze ans après la période coloniale. Ce n'est qu'à partir de 1974, année de la crise alimentaire mondiale, que les gouvernements des pays de l'Afrique de l'Est ont senti la nécessité d'intervenir dans la politique de production alimentaire. C'est aussi à partir de cette date que les organismes internationaux commencèrent à s'intéresser à la production de produits vivriers à des fins strictement alimentaires. Il s'en est suivi un changement de direction dans le mouvement du capital d'investissement. L'auteur passe ensuite à une analyse plus détaillée de la manière dont le Kenya et la Tanzanie ont répondu à ce qui avait l'air d'être une invitation de la part du capital international à se donner la main pour rendre ces pays autosuffisants en matière de production alimentaire. Ces deux pays ont répondu d'une manière différente compte tenu de leurs expériences historiques et de leurs structures socio-politiques. Du point de vue de la structure socio-politique, le Kenya pratique une politique de propriété privée alors que la Tanzanie a opté pour une collectivisation de la paysannerie. En conclusion, l'auteur note que malgré l'introduction du capital d'investissement dans la production vivrière, les problèmes posés par la crise alimentaire ne sont toujours pas résolus.