THE PROBLEM OF THE STATE IN BACKWARD CAPITALIST SOCIETIES

By

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The purpose of this paper is to raise some critical questions over the ways in which the state in backward capitalist formations has been perceived by radical and progressive writers. The discussion about these states has revolved largely around what is generally called the «post-colonial state», sometimes the «peripheral state», other times still, the «neo-colonial state», etc. Although this discussion has taken place within a general marxist framework, one of its most striking features is its gallop rough-shod over what would generally be considered to be fundamental marxist considerations regarding class and state, particularly in a capitalist mode of production. Undoubtedly, this is because the fundamental assumption underlying this discussion is that this type of state is qualitatively different from the state in developed capitalist formations. Consequently, the state in backward capitalist formations is perceived to present a qualitatively different problem for marxist analysis from the problem of the capitalist state as such. The task, therefore, for marxist political theory is said to be to develop a general theory of the state under such conditions.

Doubt may, however, be cast on the value of such an undertaking, divorced as it is from the attempt to sharpen our understanding of the capitalist state generally. The position here is that the state in backward capitalism is a form – or, more correctly, one of forms – of the capitalist state and that an adequate theory of the state in such conditions (if this were at all possible) must at the same time be an adequate theory of the capitalist state generally considered. The problems presented by the capitalist state – the nature of the relation between «base» and «superstructure»; social classes and the state ; the objective basis of the state and the mode of its operations ; the nature and specificity of its autonomy, etc.. – are also problems of the state in backward capitalist formations. The fact that answers to such general questions are likely to be different for different socio-historical contexts does not amount to differences of a fundamental nature. These specificities are often as similar as they are different and present a problem more in the nature of forms of the capitalist state which may be accomodated within a general theory of the capitalist state.

Analysts are correctly wary of giving the false impression that the state in backward capitalism can be adequately accounted for by simply inserting it into a theory of the capitalist state exclusively derived from the West European experience. But to present this type of state as being utterly different from that of the capitalist state in the West is perhaps a much graver mistake which partly accounts for a false assessment of the state forms found in the type of societies under consideration. The view that the state forms to be found in backward capitatlism are forms of capitalist states and should therefore be incorporated, theoretically, into a general marxist theory of the capitalist state, is premised on the facts that the states referred to

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in the literature rest on structures which are predominatly capitalist that is, where the capitalist mode of production exists and these states cannot be said to be in the control of revolutionary workers and/or peasant vanguard parties or movements.

THE POST-COLONIAL STATE PROBLEM

«The essential problem» of the post-colonial state, according to Hamza ALAVI who first attempted an explicit formulation of it, is that it is «not the instrument of a single-class» *(1)*. This is so because the state in post-colonial societies «is not established by an ascendent native bourgeoisie but instead by a foreign imperialist bourgeoisie» *(2)* in order to establish its dominance over all the social classes in the colony. This fact has brought about a distincly new problem for what ALAVI understands to be the «classic-marxist theory of the state» because this theory was based on experiences in West Europe where the state has been the instrument of a single ruling-class. This distinction provides ALAVI with the grounds for raising what he considers to be some «fundamental questions about the classic-marxist theory of the state» *(3)*.

First, the relationship between class and state has been «rendered» «more complex» by the post-colonial situation. Reminiscent of Fanon is ALAVI's argument that in post-colonial societies the indigenous bourgeoisie is lacking in creativity and the very juridico-political institutions necessary for class-rule are instituted by the bourgeoisie from the metropole during colonialism. Second, the state that is inherited subsequently at independence is «overdeveloped», vis-avis the socio-economic structures upon which it rests. The weakness of social classes in post-colonial societies leaves the way open for the military and bureaucracy (the two institutions of state that ALAVI concentrates on) not only to consolidate into an oligarchy but, more importantly, to surbordinate all social classes to itself. But, third, this is not all: political independence represented only a tactical retreat by the metropolitan bourgeoisie and its interests, along with those of the landed classes and the national bourgeoisie are now promoted and mediated by the «overdeveloped» state. The post-colonial state is therefore the instrument of three distinct classes whose interests are not exactly mutual but nor are they fundamentally antagonistic. Fourth, in strengthening the entrenched military-bureaucratic oligarchy and mediating between the three interests, the post-colonial state is made to participate directly in the production process under the banner of national development in a manner that the capitalist state elsewhere has not done. These factors combine to establish not merely the generally recognized relative autonomy of the capitalist state but a «distinct relative autonomy» of the post-colonial state from socio-economic forces. The post-colonial state, therefore, enjoys a centrality which cannot be explained by classic- marxist political theory. In ALAVI's view this centrality of the «overdeveloped» state enables it to dispense with the usual mediatory institutions such as political parties, regular elections, politicians, etc.., of the bourgeois state.

ALAVI draws a distinction between those post-colonial states which were directly and those which were indirectly ruled by metropolitan bourgeoisies and, correctly, points out that a considerable amount of detailed and comparative research is necessary before a rigorous description of the post-colonial state can be advanced. His own essay, in the first instance, is offered as an example of the post-colonial state in conditions developed under direct colonialism. But even so, the characterization of the problem of the post-colonial state outlined above is given as typical of the «post-colonial» world – «The essential features which invite a fresh analysis are by no means unique» *(4)*.

Two closely related points about the discussion over the state in backward capitalism may be noted here. First, a difference in emphasis may be detected in the literature. There are those writers, such as ALAVI, SAUL *(5)*, HEIN and STENZEL *(6)*, etc.., whose concern is to theorize the «problem» of the post-colonial state and the emphasis for them is therefore primarily the nature and function of the state. The other group of writers are primarily concerned with the broader question of development or underdevelopment and the state enters their discussions because they see the state as the crucial factor in development. Typical of this group are Archie MAFEJE *(7)* and Clive THOMAS *(8)*. As will be seen later, this latter group presents a more carefully argued view of the state in backward capitalism, although at the general theoretical level both groups approach the question of the state from the perspective of underdevelopment theory.

Second, this general theoretical affinity accounts for the remarkable degree of agreement regarding essentials. Generally, writers in both groups agree that the state in backward capitalist formations cannot be analysed in the way that the state in developed capitalism has been analysed by marxists; *(9)* that the state stands above society and therefore, for some writers the forms of state seen in such societies profoundly ressembles the bonapartist state Marx described in the *Eighteenth* Brumaire; *(10)* that the states' participation in production marks it off from the capitalist state elsewhere, etc. Both LEYS's *(11)* and GIRLING's, *(12)* critical remarks over some aspects of ALAVI's formulation are notable exceptions to the widespread consensus regarding the «problem» of the state in backward capitalism. Nowhere, however, is there a conscious attempt to reformulate the question of the state under such conditions.

THE PROBLEMS WITH THE FORMULATION

The «problem» of the state under conditions of backward capitalism is far from convincing. To be so it would be necessary for these theorists to show that (i) *the origins* of these states explain their *present* necessity and, (ii) that the *quantity* of detailed differences that may be said to separate these states from the state under conditions in advanced capitalism amount to differences of a *qualitative* nature. In the discussion under consideration neither of these questions has been directly broached and therefore the answers to them are at best ambiguous.

The answer to the first question would appear problematic for at least two reasons: first, to point to the origins of a phenomenon is not necessarily to say anything about its subsequent developments (contrary to the widespread nineteenth century view). The original necessity of the «post-colonial state» (i.e., the necessity of the colonial state) is a necessary factor in any comprehensive analysis of the state in backward capitalism, but it is not sufficient to explain its subsequent development and its present necessity. It is most indialectical to hold to the contrary. Even so, for many writers once the necessity of the colonial state is explained the assumption is that the necessity of the present state form is also explained.

Second, it should be remembered that imperialism – which for most writers explains everything about the Third World, including the various state forms therein – is not an independent phenomenon. It has always been linked to specific modes of production (such as slavery and capitalism). In the capitalist mode of production imperialism has taken different forms, forms dependent upon the phase of capitalist production and accumulation (e.i., primitive accumulation, monopoly capitalism). Imperialism is, so to speak, a dependent, not an independent variable and therefore does not speak for itself, it begs the question, it cannot be taken *sui generis*. The imperialist phenomenon which lies behind the original necessity – and certainly constitutes part of the present necessity – of state forms in backward capitalism, needs to be traced back to the mode of production and the phases of that mode in which it has its being. In terms of the state in backward capitalism, therefore, the really explanatory category of a general nature is capitalism itself.

If the argument, however, is that the sheer quantity of detailed differences between the state in developed and backward capitalism are such that they effect a qualitative difference, then the elements which are necessary to effect such transformation must be outlined. For example, in his discussion of transformation of a mode of production into another, MARX speaks of «merely quantitative differences beyond a certain point pass (ing) into qualitative changes » *(13)* and although in this particular part of his discussion he did not elaborate upon the crucial phrase «beyond a certain point», he was nonetheless careful to outline the elements necessary for such a transformation, namely, the quantity of means of production owned by the personified capitalist and the quantity of labour-power he controls. This has not been done in the discussion over the state in backward capitalism.

More generally, one of the most striking and far-reaching shortcomings in the thesis under discussion is that none of the writers seems to be aware of the fact that what they regard as the «classic-marxist theory of the state» constitutes only a starting point for a more systematic theory of the capitalist state since at no point did classic marxism attempt to construct such a theory. The «classic marxist theory» does not appear to them to present any problem of its own. The fact, therefore, that the state in developed capitalism is as much a problem for marxism as the state under conditions in underdeveloped capitalism, is missed by these analysts who operate with a rather simplistic notion of the state in developed capitalism.

The situation is reinforced by the utter neglect of debates elsewhere around the capitalist state but this is hardly surprising since there is in the thesis what amounts to a denial of the state in backward capitalism and the state in advanced capitalism having much in common.

Much the same may be said about the debate around the state in advanced capitalism; here there is a general neglect of the state in backward capitalism, sometimes with the ambiguous implication that either this type of state is utterly different from the state in advanced capitalism or that there is no difference at all between them. One result of this mutual neglect is that sometimes similar problems are treated as if they are completely new problems. Not only is it important to link the two debates, but it is also important to draw upon the insights achieved in the more advanced discussion over the state in developed capitalism in order to arrive at a better understanding of the state under backward capitalism. Since such an attempt cannot take place in a vacuum and since criticism is a definite step towards correcting and improving theory, it is useful to proceed by looking more closely at the two central points in the formulation of the «problem» of the state in backward capitalism – namely the relation between class and state and the centrality of the state – and to relate these to the general theoretical framework in which this debate is taking place.

CLASS AND STATE

The lack of a homogenous, single, national and independent ruling-class, the overbearing dominance of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy over society and the weakness of all social classes sums up the characterization in this debate of class and state in backward capitalist societies. The strength of the formulation is that it points quite unequivocally to some of the obvious links that exist between state action in such societies and the interests of foreign capital; certainly, no government in these societies can afford to refuse due respect to international capital within its national boundaries. It may well be, however, that these conditions are descriptive of a far more profound situation taking place in capitalism as a whole but which expresses itself clearest in backward capitalist formations because economic and political actions have a higher degree of visibility than is the case in advanced capitalism. Second, it is important to bear in mind that by describing an economic condition we do not think that this automatically explains political life, nor that changes in the economic functions of the state wholly explains the totality of the role of the state in a given society. Thus, although the formulation under discussion points to some of the limitations of the state under backward capitalism and to some of the functions of such states, the formulation cannot be accepted as adequately explaining the necessity nor all the more important function of the state.

First, at its most abstract, the formulation does not help us to understand how classes in national contexts relate to the state. This is more true of the first group of writers on the «post colonial state» than of the second group mentioned above. Both groups, however, stress the importance of the military-bureaucratic elements (which are not in fact classes) as the really

important internal class components in relation to the state. Thus, Shivji speaks of the development of the «bureaucratic bourgeoisie», Cournanel of «la bourgeoisie d'Etat» *(14)* etc. Generally, then, the really important class component is situated *outside* of the national social formation, namely, foreign bourgeoisies. When attempts are made, however, to relate developments to internal class interactions, it has proved necessary to fall back onto the «classic» marxist lines of analyses, if discussion is to pass beyond the military – bureaucratic oligarchy and foreign bourgeoisies. More recent and insightful discussions have taken note of this situation and the works of MAFEJE and THOMAS are particularly important in this regard *(15)*. More generally, however, the discussion of the relationship between class and state in backward capitalism is restricted to the characterization outlined by ALAVI.

One unfortunate consequence of this neglect of national dynamics in the discussion has been that some theorists see the relation that exist between the state and the working classes in backward capitalism in a distorted manner. For example, according to HEIN and STENZEL the working classes in the «peripheral state» do not have any meaningful effects upon state action since they hardly participate in national politics *(16)*. Others argue that there is a privileged stratum of the class which must be seen as part and parcel of the dominant faction of the national bourgeoisie/petite-bourgeoisie and international capital *(17)*. Another error regarding class and state is perhaps best expressed by THOMAS who argues in favour of an alliance of classes (against imperialism) led by the national bourgeoisie or petite-bourgeoisie towards a «non-capitalist path» to development which is in the interest of the exploited classes. Why this should be the result of such an alliance is an open question because those classes leading the alliance would be acting against their objective interests.

Even if it were a valid argument that the relation between class and state in backward capitalist social formations is such that the actions of the state and social activities in these formations have little to do with each other, it is worth noting that similar but less aggressive claims have been made regarding class and state in advanced capitalism too. The strong unity of the ruling-class that is perceived to exist in advanced capitalism (without further ado) is a reflection of a misconception regarding marxist political theory. For example, Poulantzas' notion of the «power bloc» (constituted by various elements due to the fractional nature of capital) reflects a far more complex relation between class and state than ALAVI and others would care to admit. Furthermore, the internationalization of capital, with the predominance of US capital since the last War, has seriously hampered the capability of some nation-states to defend and promote the interests of their national bourgeoisies *(18)*. In other words, the sharp contrast set up between the heterogenous and dependent ruling-classes in backward capitalism and the independent, homogenous ruling-classes in advanced capitalism in the formulation of the «problem» of the state in backward capitalism is a false one and is not particularly helpful in distinguishing between states differently located at different phases of capitalist development (a point to be returned to later).

The point in brief is that there is a need to establish, theoretically, the relation between class and state *within the confines* of the nation-state. This must go beyond the usual bureaucratic-military and foreign bourgeoisie configuration with the recognition that class analysis cannot begin and end at the superstructural level of the state. This call finds its justification in the fact that capital being (as Roger MURRAY puts it) a political opportunist, has not abandoned the nation-state as its primary base (for protection, a framework appropriate for accumulation, etc..) whilst seeking new organizational means, often beyond the control of individual states, to extract more surplus-value. Furthermore, it is still at this territorial dimension that the struggle between capital and labour continues to be fought out and if the class struggle is to be seen as the «motor» of change, then, the nation-state, which capital continues to use as both a starting-point and a port of last resort, cannot be taken as lightly as it has been in both the discussions on the internationalization of capital and that on the state in backward capitalism.

Finally, although the simplicity of the formulation helps to highlight in rather dramatic fashion some of the functions and limitations of the state in backward capitalism it fails by this very token to show some of the obvious creative aspects of these states and, more importantly, the formulation fails to identify the nexus of contradictions which provides these states with a necessity. To be sure, the formulation does contain some notion of this: the «post-colonial state», etc.., is said to find its necessity in the existence of three classes' interests. But, interestingly enough, these classes do not stand in a relation of antagonism to each other: their interests are said to be fundamentally mutual and only coincidentally conflicting. Thus, if the state does not emerge as a result of the class struggle either at a national or international level but as a result of the essentially harmonious conditions that obtains between national bourgeoisie, landed aristocracy and international bourgeoisie, and does not find its present necessity in class contradictions, then, an important question comes to the fore-front – why the existence of the state at all? This leads to a wider discussion of the theory of underdevelopment to which this discussion will return later.

THE CENTRALITY OF THE STATE

There can be no denial of the argument that the post-colonial state, or the state in backward capitalist formations, is central in its operations; indeed, as LEYS has remarked, this type of state is also extensive in this regard. The really important point, however, is that this centrality is not derived from the state being «post-colonial», as the formulation has it, but from the fact that it is a form of capitalist state existing during the monopoly phase of capital which tends to effect interventionist state forms. Although the centrality thesis is an obvious one it is nonetheless important to explain briefly its necessity and thereby show that this has nothing to do with its being «post-colonial» but everything to do with the fact that it is a capitalist state form.

First, the state has always played a «central» role in capitalist society. The very inception of capitalism necessitated a state with a central role in the mercantalist absolutist state which was used to forge the conditions for primitive accumulation and assisted the emerging bourgeoisie to consolidate itself as a class. Using the example of England, MARX showed that it was the state – both reflecting the contradictions in society and at the same time being the point where partial resolutions are found – which took the necessary steps (by passing legislation to restrict the working day) that placed the onus on elements of capital to attempt to increase productivity by intensification of labour and application of machinery. This marked the shift from the production of absolute surplus-value to relative surplus-value and the «real» as opposed to the «formal» subsumption of labour to capital.

In correspondence with these developments the liberal-democratic state-form emerged which, as POULANTZAS has noted, best suited the fractional nature of laissez-faire capitalism. The predominance of the capitalist mode of production meant the establishment of a process of production purely for commodities for exchange and the atomization that this process led to, became, for MARX, a generalized situation throughout society *(19)*. There arose the need, therefore, for a central body to act as a cohesive factor in the social formation, or, rather, a central body which will present itself as such and be generally accepted as such. Crucially, the antagonism between those who are separated from the means of production and are therefore having to sell their labour-power to subsist and those who are able to buy this labour-power due to their ownership and control of the means of production, necessitates the existence of a body which would appear to stand above the resulting conflict whilst infact acting in a manner that is partial to the one of the parties. The liberal state-form that developed in this nexus of contradictions established the perception of subjects as individuals and not as classes, thereby emphasizing the market-relationship (for equality) between capitalist and labourer and blurring, or hiding, or occluding, the relationship (of inequality) that obtains in the primary sphere of production *(20)*. In its «central» functions the liberal state also established the Utilitarian «edifice of rights» as the juridicial framework for the safe accumulation of capital.

Second, the centrality of the state vis-a-vis the economy has become much clearer under monopoly capitalism. This is so primarily because the state, in order to assist capital in its struggle with labour, has found if necessary to enter the sphere of production itself as an owner of means of production. This does not mean that the state sheds its regulatory and juridico-political functions; it continues to perform these, but in addition it now attempts to establish a measure of formal control over production so as to limit the inherent crises in capitalist production, to minimize its effects, and make more effective the state's «mediation» between capital and labour. The «planning» of the economy therefore becomes a crucial priority for the capitalist state and the participation of workers in «planning» output becomes an important part of the state's overall management ideology.

It may be argued, then, that the «distinct relative autonomy» that the centrality of the state is supposed to demonstrate, reveals, on the contrary, the relative weakness, or dependence of the state in backward capitalism on the economic «base». This is most clearly seen in the limited effect of state action on the production process. Briefly, as indicated earlier, the action of the state was of crucial importance in the transition from the production of absolute to relative surplus-value in Western capitalism – and the production of relative surplus-value on a general scale is one of the two elements that established for MARX the «specifically capitalist mode of production». The action on the part of the state that stimulated such a dramatic change in production revealed the state as the point where, as POULANTZAS argues, contradictions in a formation are condensed and find partial resolution. The relative autonomy of the capitalist state was thereby clearly demonstrated: although the contradictions which the state attempted to resolve first emerged and developed at the level of production, it was at the level of the state that resolution had to be sought, given the atomization/fractionalism of capital. In backward capitalism the state has repeatedly taken similar steps to resolve contradictions at the level of the production process-labour laws, etc. – but these do not have the same effects on production as occured on Western capitalism, thus revealing the greater dependence of the state in such conditions on the economic base.

The centralism that is claimed for the state in backward capitalism, therefore has always been a prominent feature of the capitalist state, although at the laissez-faire phase of capitalist production the state in its liberal form, was restricted to specific areas of production (legislation which affected the relations between capital and labour and therefore competition) and circulation (fiscal, etc., regulation). It should be noted too that because the discussants of the state in backward capitalism do not show any awareness of the fact that there may be phases of the capitalist state corresponding (or otherwise) with phases of capitalist production and accumulation, they tend to latch onto an essentialist view of the capitalist state, that is, the liberal state. This, of course, is consistent with their view that there is an unproblematic classic-marxist political theory. The contrast, then, between the non-contralized state – essentially the liberal-democratic state which hardly obtains anywhere any longer – and the centralized state in backward capitalist formations sets up a false dichotomy based on a superficial reading of the situation. Indeed, in some instances the state in developed capitalism is far more «central» in its functions than the state in backward capitalist formations – if centrality means the degree to which a state becomes involved in the socio-economic arrangements of a society.

THE LIMITATIONS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT THEORY

A critique of the formulation of the «problem» of the state in backward capitalism is at the same time a critique of underdevelopment theory because, explicitly or implicitly, the discussion has taken place within the wider and more general theoretical framework established by underdevelopment theory. Although this theoretical position, as popularized by A.G. FRANK, Samir AMIN and others, never achieved total accep-

tance, it seriously rivalled and replaced orthodox development theory in most progressive and radical quarters. More recently, however, a strident marxist critique of underdevelopment theory has been mounted in various fields, the details of which cannot be recounted here *(20)*. It may be more relevant to note that the discussion around the state in backward capitalism has reproduced, wittingly or otherwise, much of the assumptions and failings of this theoretical framework.

A few examples may be listed here. First, the over-simplified, categorical distinction between «post-colonial» or «peripheral» and «capitalist» (meaning developed capitalist) states, reflects the rigid distinction between «developed» and «underdeveloped» or «metropolitan» and «peripheral» societies, a distinction which does not allow for the differences in the phases of capitalist development that actually exist in these formations. As indicated earlier, those analysts who attempted to look closely at specific social formations in the «periphery» found underdevelopment theory something of an embarrassment *(22)*. Second, the frequent absence of marxist categories and concepts – such as social classes (based on the separation of the labourer from the means of production in capitalist society) and the class struggle, modes of production and phase of capitalist development, etc. – and their replacement by radical humanistic ones such as «man», «freedom of makind» and so forth, takes us back to a position not essentially different from that which the underdevelopment school started, viz., development theory. Both schools assume and find «evidence» to conclude that a fundamental difference exists between the state in Third World and Western societies as expressed in the all too familiar dichotomies – «industrial»/«non-industrial», «developed»/«developing», «democratic»/«pre-democratic», etc.., and those mentioned above. This is of course a paradoxical situation, because the primary aim of radical underdevelopment theory was to show that «development and «underdevelopment» are but the two sides of the same coin, capitalism. The uncritical acceptance of the paradigm established by orthodox development theory, led radicalism to similar broad conclusions on some important questions.

Third, there is a strong radical nationalism inherent in the discussion which seems all the less obvious because of the simultaneous stress placed on Third World internationalism. For example, there is the general bemoaning of the supposedly uncreative national bourgeoisie in backward capitalist formations and socialism is then perceived as the only viable alternative to capitalism, not because of the outcome of class struggles in these formations, but because the national bourgeoisie will never be able to develop the productive forces following capitalist methods. This line of reasoning begs an important question: if capitalism could develop the productive forces, would capitalism be then prescribed and if not then why not, since the whole issue seems to turn on which mode of production is able to lead to «development» – understood largely as being what is perceived to be in existence in the West. It is from this perspective too that the prescription of a national class alliance in favour of the exploited classes put forward by some theorists must be viewed.

Finally, the most basic assumption of underdevelopment theory – as the works of LACLAU and BRENNER in particular have ably demonstrated – is that changes in society occur as a result of market-relations.

It is true that in discussing the question of change from one mode of production to another in pre-capitalist societies, MARX argued that the world market, in the first instance, is of great importance in bringing such societies into the capitalist system of exchange. But for MARX the really determinant factor, in the last instance, involved in transforming a mode of production to the capitalist mode was not to be found in the nexus of relations extraneously established at the level of circulation of commodities, but conditions *within* these pre-existing, pre-capitalist social formations at the time contact is made with the world capitalist system of exchange. These pre-capitalist conditions refer to the question of class structure and class struggle and the crucial issue is therefore how these relate or respond to the intervention from outside. In MARX's view, therefore, the procedure is different from that in the underdevelopment thesis: instead of starting and ending with the process of circulation, MARX saw this process as only the starting-point for an investigation of tranformation. BRENNER very correctly emphasizes that the mature MARX of *Capital,* unlike the young MARX of the *Communist Manifesto* (who WALLERSTAIN, FRANK, etc. were correct in rejecting) did not see the capitalist mode of production spreading automatically, unhindered, over the globe. The extent to which, or whether at all, the capitalist mode of production was established was not only determined by the dissolution-effect of exchange and its concomittant stimulation of commodity production but on the «solidarity and internal structure» of the very pre-capitalist modes and formations themselves *(Capital,* iii, p. 332).

Interesting as it would be it is not really of moment here to follow through this debate, suffice it to point out that the fundamental assumption on the part of underdevelopment theorists that the market-relations, as distinct from the relations of production established at the dimension of the productive process proper, (and which are located within specific social formations) are responsible for change, has had a profound effect on political analysis. HEIN and STENZEL, for example, argues, similarly to Fanon, that the objective function of the «peripheral state» is merely to act as a conductor for the dynamics of the world market to the national level. For AMIN «... one should not reason in terms of nations, as if the latter constituted independent entities... In reality, the class struggle takes place not within the context of the nation but within that of the world system» *(23).* It is hardly surprising, then, that discussions over politics and the state in backward capitalism has been carried out largely at the level of the *superstructure alone,* a procedure MARX abandoned early in his career. Whenever, too, the economic «base» is referred to it is usually market relations which are described and the production process merely assumed. Hence the conclusion that inequality is not so much a relation between classes in specific social formations as a relation between nations. AMIN puts it thus :

> – Since the relations between the centre and the periphery of the system are relations of domination... should not the world system be analysed in terms of bourgeois nations and proletarian nations, to use expressions that have become common? *(24)*

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

The aim has not been to deny that states in advanced and backward capitalist formations do not differ in important ways. Nor has it been the aim to deny that market relations are important. The very fact that the contemporary capitalist world is described as partly «advanced» and partly «backward» – meaning the full and complete establishment of the capitalist mode of production as evidenced by the existence of free labour and the production of relative surplus-value on the one hand, and on the other, the *partial* establishment of the capitalist mode of production and the widespread existence of commodity production on the technical basis of pre-capitalist modes of production – suggests that there must be some considerable differences between the latter and the former. The argument here takes cogniscence of this but stresses that the differences do not amount to qualitative differences which consequently present problems for marxist political theory that are essentially different from those presented by the capitalist state as such. It is important, therefore, that the «problem» of the state in backward capitalism be reformulated and in attempting a tentative, preliminary effort here it may be important to first indicate some differences that exist between «advanced» and «backward» capitalist state-forms.

In the first place, there is perhaps a higher degree of visibility of state actions, etc., in backward capitalist formations than in advanced ones. The reasons for this may be multiple: the absence of institutions appropriate to contemporary requirements of «developing» economies, the subordinate place of these countries in the international division of labour, the pressures placed on the state as a result of nationalist promises, etc. In short, these factors often place the state in backward capitalism in a position where it is seen as the only point where important decisions may be taken. For example, it is noticeable that in countries where the economy is based almost entirely on a single commodity, any downward trend in the world market has an immediate effect on state action because social and political as well as economic considerations are involved. Whereas there are various layers in developed capitalism which may cushion the ill effects of a crisis (such as starvation) in the backward capitalist world this is the exception.

A second example of the differences between the state in advanced and backward capitalism is the degree to which the state in the latter case is called upon to either create new institutions or utilize existing ones in novel ways. The political party, for instance has been used not only as an ideological institution (reproducing the necessary legitimacy of a regime, aggregating demands, etc.) but also as a coercive institution (implementing government policies, policing the workplace, etc.), in some backward capitalist formations *(25)*. In other places the state has found it necessary to participate in the production of an ideology appropriate to rapid accumulation – such has been the case in parts of Africa since political independence in the 1960s *(26)*.

In these situations, however, the degree to which the state may be visible or may be called upon to create new institutions, etc., depends on the degree of class development (as may be evidenced by the structure arising out of the differentiation between owners of labour-power and owners of means of production) and the intensity of class consciousness (as may be evidenced by the quality as well as the presence of workers' organizations, etc.). This makes it difficult, if not foolish, to speak of the whole of the backward capitalist world as if it is a homogenous unified whole. Differences between countries in Asia, Africa and the Americas may often «disappear» in the ideology of «third worldism»; but these differences stand out in the conflicting policies they follow because these policies reflect interests of classes located within the confines of nation-states. This in itself acts to strengthen and intensify nationalism – yet another difference in terms of degree between advanced and backward capitalist state behaviour – which, although partly the inheritance of colonialism, is closely intertwined with class structure and perceptions in specific formations.

There are, therefore, some differences of a secondary nature between the state in the two types of capitalist formations, particularly as relate to functions. We do not however say that because the functions of the liberal-democratic and the social-democratic state-forms are different that one is capitalist and the other not. Furthermore, there was also a difference in the original necessity of *some* states in backward capitalism and the advanced capitalist state but the origins of the former in some cases out of the imperialist factor does not mean that the international market constitutes the only necessity for contemporary states in conditions of backwardness. The development of social classes and the coming of political independence marked «real» development in the sense that the necessity of the state came to be situated within specific formations themselves.

As has been indicated earlier, the necessity of the capitalist state lies not only in the sphere of circulation (see HOLLOWAY and PICCIOTTO) *(27)* nor only in the productive process (see POULANTZAS) *(28)* but in the *general* contradictions that obtains in the capitalist mode of production and capitalist society. Thus, the contradictions that arose in the productive process itself between capital and labour over surplus-value resulted in the state's intervention in that sphere. Admittedly, during the laissez-faire phase of capitalist production the state attempted to resolve or manage these contradictions at the level of the market, that is, the conflict between the two parties was tackled in legislation as if it were a problem emanating from the contract between buyer and seller, not as a conflict arising from the fundamental distinction between owners of the means of production and owners of nothing save labour-power; again, refusing to recognize that the money-relation between the two parties is in fact a capital-relation.

Given the establishment not only of capitalist exchange but also of commodity production on a large scale in the formations described as «backward» but also «capitalist» and that with class development and political independence, classes stand to a significant extent, in relation to each other as owners of means of production and owners of labour-power, then the necessity of the state-forms that obtain are to be sought, as in advanced

capitalism, not only at the dimension of circulation, but also in that of production. What is involved here is not whether production is taking place in terms of absolute or relative surplus-value – important as this point obviously is – but whether, given that capitalist exploitation exists, it can still be found only in the sphere of circulation, that is the world capitalist market. The answer to this determines whether analysts of developments in most Third World countries concentrate on market relations as distinct from relations of production. The answer determines too whether the analysts looks at internal class developments and struggles and the question of accumulation in terms of the nation state.

With these remarks it may be worthwhile to give a concrete example so as to illustrate the main gist of the argument. The example offered is that of developments in Jamaïca – as an example in some senses of a typical Third World state, etc., – where the state-forms that there have been are less ably explained in terms of «post-colonial», «peripheral», etc., and should be in terms of phases of capital accumulation, class development and struggle.

AN EXAMPLE: THE STATE IN JAMAICA

The progressive reforms of the social-democratic People's National Party, which came to office under Muchael MANLEY's leadership in 1972, have placed Jamaïca on the political map again after ten years of post-colonial development which drew little outside comment largely because, like most of her neighbours, Jamaïca has long been a very safe place for international capital. Indeed, the continued inflow of foreign capital into the Jamaïcan economy after political independence was dependent not only upon the stability and credibility of the state but largely upon the fact that it did not intervene directly in the social and economic arrangements of the country. This important fact which distinguishes «post-colonial» states of this type from those which have been patently interventionist can best be explained within the context of the specificities of Jamaïca's history, particularly from the 1880s, rather than simply restricting analysis to her relations with the world market.

In the first place, if the post-colonial state model is assumed, there has been a condition of what POULANTZAS has called «non-correspondence» between the state in post-colonial Jamaïca and the economy. Whereas in most states in backward capitalism a repture, or break, however minimal, is noticeable at political independence, in the Jamaïcan case, there is no evidence of such a rupture other than the formal legal status of political independence. In other words, continuity in the form of state that had long existed in the country was maintained. This situation has been explained in terms of the lack of a pre-colonial past to which politicians could look for alternative patterns of political organizations and legitimacy, but this argument is not convincing *(29)*. The correct answer to this must rather be sought in the context of class contradictions and the ways in which these expressed themselves at the level of the political organization. In general terms, it may be said that as the Crown Colony system –established in 1866 as a result of abolishing the free Assembly–was steadily liberalized from the 1880s

so as to allow greater representation by the propertied classes, the jurdico-political ideology of liberalism also began to take hold in both the dominant and the dominated classes in the formation. From 1944, when universal manhood suffrage and the two party system were firmly established alongside the well organized and disciplined unions, Jamaïca has had what Apter would call a pragmatic, turn-over and «non-ideological» political system. It has been able to absorb and channel whilst controlling protest and discontent and to pre-empt much of the country's radical elements by incorporating parts of their programmes into those of the parties.

But the development of such a political order in Jamaïca finds its basis in the development of a national bourgeoisie competent and confident in establishing its hegemony over the productive classes – albeit, with the support of a willing imperial Britain. This social process is well documented in various ways from its early antecedents in the slavery period (when the land was almost totally monopolized and the concentration of slave-ownership was the greatest in the Americas) to the present in which a sizeable proletariat, proletarianized peasantry, a petite-bourgeoisie and a national bourgeoisie can be said to have taken definite shape and form *(30)*. The period from the 1880s to the 1930s (a period which deserves much more attention than it has received) the bourgeoisie established itself as a distinct class on a national scale over the productive classes. Savings from the professions, government services and trade provided the means whereby the antecedents of this class came to own land at a time when banana was highly profitable *(31)*. As a result of the First World War the cane-sugar industry received a revival in the Caribbean and the long abandoned estates which could not compete against mechanized beet-sugar production in Europe, came back into production, many in the hands of new owners *(32)*. The presence of foreign capital in the economy before the 1950s was therefore limited, but with the development of the bauxite industry, with its sophisticated technology, and the tourist trade from these years, foreign capital has become an increasingly important factor. The rapid increase in government spending after the last War also motored this development *(33)*.

The period of liberalization of the state coincided, not accidentally, with the emergence and consolidation of the national bourgeoisie and, not surprisingly, a political faction emerged which was drawn in the main from the professions rather than from the capitalist elements themselves *(34)*. The colonial state-form that existed was steadily changed so as to provide a juridico-political framework appropriate to the development of this class. This process was accompanied by state encouragement of a frugal yeoman peasantry *(35)*. To this end primary education was entirely at the state's expense from 1892 and impressive quotas were awarded to secondary school whilst for a number of years a university college was opened and functioned. Education, it was argued, should be made relevant: the teaching of the three Rs was to be accompanied by instructions in agriculture, domestic science' etc.., in the belief that education was the crucial stimulas for economic and other developments. The activities of the state in this area stimulated the formation of the oldest teachers' organization in the region – the Jamaïca Union of Teachers, founded in 1894 – to oppose

much of the states's educational policies and to champion their own particularistic interests *(36)*. The state itself directly encouraged the formation of associational groups, the most notable being the Jamaïca Agricultural Society in 1895, in an attempt to improve the agricultural knowledge of small farmers *(37)*.

Between 1962–1972 the Jamaïcan post-colonial state continued to function in much the same way as the colonial state had done, that is, providing a secure and acceptable framework for capital accumulation and to keep clear of the directly productive sectors of the economy. In the decades of the 1940s–50s the PNP, under the influence of the radical left *(38)*, declared itself a «socialist» party dedicated to what it understood as a «mixed economy». No sooner it came to power, however, in 1955 and the PNP, now rid of its left element, made clear its intention to do everything in its power to ensure the smooth running of the economy on the same lines as before – but with greater efficiency. This new note of efficiency involved Premier Norman MANLEY, going out of his way to invite foreign capital into the country on an entirely laissez-faire basis. Thus, by the 1960s both political parties (the PNP and the Jamaïca Labour Party, JLP) had come to agree that the role of government was to provide safe political support for both local and foreign investments and accumulation. Consequently, only style and voice, organizational features and audience distinguished the parties before the resurgence of radical social-democracy under the leadership of Michael MANLEY in 1972.

The state provided the necessary framework for accumulation not only by maintaining the excepted jurdico-political framework but also by active encouragement to investors and providing the necessary infrastructure. Immediately after World War II the state sought to encourage both foreign and local capital to invest in non-agricultural production. For example, from 1947 a number of specific incentive laws were enacted covering textile, cement and various other manufacturing industries. The incentives were of course low taxation and guarantees that the Government would never set obstacles in the way of investors. The Export Industries (Encouragement) Law, 1956, assured investors that the Government would not stop such industries as would be established under the statute from applying capital intensive techniques even though the unemployment rate was well above 25 % at the time and opposition from some quarters could be expected *(39)*. Although there was little need to encourage investment in the bauxite industry (by Kaiser, Reynolds, Alcoa, Alcan) nonetheless the Government passed the 1950 Bauxite and Alumina (Encouragement) Law giving added incentives. These of course were added factors in the preference of Jamaïcan bauxite mines as compared to those of British Guiana (now Guyana) where the «communists» were seen as posing a serious threat. Risk-taking was minimized with state assistance and the state made no overture to enter the productive sector itself.

In the post-war years, Girvan has noted, two important factors stand out in the economic development of Jamaïca: the dominant role that bauxite has come to play and with this the concomittant dominant role of foreign capital in the economy, and, second, the rapid growth in government expenditure, especially between 1953–1966. The rate of governement investment, however, for this period grew from 1 % to 2 % only.

Both GIRVAN and JEFFERSON have shown that the considerable growth in state spending went into providing roads, improving education, building bridges, etc.. For example, the 1963 (Independence) Five Year Plan, drawn up by the present Leader of the Opposition who was then Minister of Development Planning in the Labour Government of Sir Alexander BUSTAMANTE, conceived of government spending in terms of stimulating the economy in a «Keynesian» fashion; the Plan was to «provide employment opportunities and boost consumer demand as a stimulus for increased output» *(40)*.

The success of this form of state in Jamaïca depended also on the favourable growth of the economy. For example, the real growth in per capita income was 4.3 % per annum for the period 1950–68 and whilst foreign capital was pouring into the economy over this period for most of it much of the surplus labour was leaving the country for the UK, Canada and the USA. Towards the end of the 1960s, however, the growth rate decreased – from 1950–60 it was 5.4 % whilst by 1968 it had fallen to 2.9 % – and emigration, particularly to the UK, came to a near stop. The effects of such developments began to tell first in Kingston, where the population grew from 203,000 in 1960 to 376,000 in 1970 and where the crime rate took a sudden upward turn accompanied with political gang warfare.

A second important factor which distinguished the state in Jamaïca in the immediate post-colonial period was the absence of economic and political nationalism, particularly in the forms that nationalism have been expressed in Asia and Africa. In an interestingly written piece Louis LINDSAY has argued that the «period of transition from colonial status to formal independence generated nothing which can properly be labelled as a nationalist movement» *(41)*. The gist of the point is correct, viz, that the so-called «nationalist» period of Jamaïcan history, 1938–62, cannot be described by its «nationalist» fervour because this was almost totally lacking. The PNP was called a «national» party because after some debate the leaders and founders did not wish to give the impression that the new party represented any particularistic interest; most certainly it was not meant to convey any sense of «nationalist» or «nationalism» *(42)*. The JLP founder and leader for many years, the late Sir Alexander BUSTAMANTE, for a long time had no interest in political independence for Jamaïca because, as he told his followers this would mean «brown man's rule» over the black majority of the population *(43)*. LINDSAY presents this situation as if there is something wrong with it (no doubt because he himself represents the new Jamaïcan nationalism) but the absence of nationalism in the country cannot be looked at in this purely ideological manner if we are to appreciate why this has been so.

The absence of nationalism may well be expected given the lack of conflict between national and international capital. The bourgeoisie did not see the state as an instrument to assist it directly in the accumulation of capital (as has been the case in most African post-colonial states) because this class had already developed sufficiently to take care of itself and to establish its own links with foreign capital. The areas that national and international capitals operated in within the country were different: bauxites,

insurance, telecommunications, tourism, urban transport have been areas in which foreign capital dominated; commerce, agriculture, manufacture, rural transport, etc.., have been the areas of concentration for national capital. In the areas that foreign capital dominated, KIRTON has noted that majority representation has long been accorded to national capitalist (for example, the banks) by virtue of their being capitalists rather than to satisfy any nationalist urge. The fact therefore that local and foreign capitals have not been engaged in open competition may no doubt account for the lack of conflict between them and hence the lack of political nationalism in the «nationalist» period and the first decade of political independence.

These features of the Jamaïcan state have been giving way to regular features of the interventionist state-forms which have become commonplace in both developed and backward social formations since the last War. Given the present condition of work on the developments taking place in Jamaïca it is not possible to unambigeously identify the cause underlying this shift in state-forms. The international capitalist crisis which has been partly responsible for effecting a radicalization of the foreign policies of many Third World countries (including Jamaïca's) and the desire of the more successful elements of the Jamaïcan capitalist class to enter areas of the economy previously dominated by foreign capital will, however, feature prominently in any eventual comprehensive evaluation of the situation. The rising costs of production in the sugar industry has made it difficult for it to compete on the world market and the fall in sugar price and the Sterling have deepended the crisis for the industry. Consequently, the sugar interests in the country have found it necessary to appeal to the state not only to negotiate a more stable arrangement for their products but also to facilitate financial assistance *(44)*. It would appear too that the presence of foreign capital, particularly in the very favourable conditions under which it operates, places some obstacles to the further development of the Jamaïcan bourgeoisie at this point *(45)*. The option of pulling out and investing elsewhere which is opened to international capital is not such an attractive alternative for the more successful elements of the Jamaïcan bourgeoisie (those in construction, manufacture, etc., as against those in agriculture) given its size, capability, etc., as HARRIS has pointed out. The areas available inside the country for expansion are therefore of crucial importance as reflected in the growing corporate concentration of capital that REID has noted *(46)*, and must be fought over.. But since foreign capital is likely to carry the day, given the present rules of competition and the total distribution of power national capital must call upon the state for its active support. Although the appeal to nationalism has a much wider social basis it is nonetheless its utility against foreign capital that gives it its present status.

In addition, these developments are being influenced by (and in turn influencing) the development of working-class consciousness and militancy. New demands are being made for the reallocation of lands in the countryside by a largely agro-proletariat *(47)*. In a recent World Bank report on the Caribbean by two of its «experts» it is the fact that workers are able to force the state to take certain progressive measures that is seen as being responsible for the current slow rate of capital accumulation in the

area *(48)*. The recommendation of the «experts», like those of the think-tank of the Trilateral Commission *(49)*, involves a cut-back on democratic practice which entails greater state expenditure on social reforms.

The present conjuncture created by the social contradictions in the formation established new conditions for the Jamaïcan state to grapple with in its attempt to maintain the social order. The new state-form that is emerging is one that is more capable of responding to the *varying* and *conflicting* demands of capital, on the one hand, and on the other, those of labour. In this situation the relative autonomy of the state is enhanced but this autonomy is not distinct from that enjoyed by the state in advanced capitalism. In an essay of this kind it is not possible to treat the various factors which would show the nature of the shift from a liberal-democratic to a social-democratic state-form in Jamaïca; it will therefore suffice to mention briefly some of the more important reforms introduced by the PNP Government since 1974 as an indication of this shift.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE MANLEY REFORMS

First, these reforms have gone a long way in rationalizing the terms that govern the relations between employer and employee. For example, equal pay for men and women has been established by legislation; employers are now obliged to pay redundancy wages to workers based on the length of service; agricultural workers must now be paid on a three-day basis during the non-reaping season. The controversal Labour Relations and Industrial Disputes Act, 1974, (based on the notorious 1972 Tory Industrial Relations Act in the United Kingdom) made it necessary for them to be a given period of notice before strikes can be called by unions whilst at the same time it has established that recognition of unions is obligatory on the part of employer. In the same year a national minimum wage was established for the first time throughout the country (at J 20.00 dollars per week for a forty-four hours week). These laws attempted to systematize practices that had been present over a long period but lacked legal uniformity. Hitherto the employer and the employee were left almost entirely to set the terms of employment without interferance by the state and this, naturally, gave way to considerable disparity throughout industry and agriculture – for example, there were still pockets of labour not unionized even although trade unionism made its first aggressive appearance in the country in the 1890s *(50)*. AKIN to these reforms has been the Government's attempt to promote (along with the more progressive elements of national capital) workers' participation so as to boost productivity and also to minimize conflict at the workplace.

Second, these reforms reveal a concern to promote economic nationalism which has been absent from state policy. This has had a two-fold expression: first there are the measures that have been taken to give the state some degree of control over foreign capital operating in the country. For example, whereas the US and Canadian firms involved in the bauxite industries owned between themselves over 200,000 acres (or 7 % of the country) on a freehold basis, the Government has affected measures so that

now the state owns the land and rents it back to the companies for definite periods. This does not, however, amount to the nationalization that many nationalists demanded. For instance, 15,000 acres of these lands are still in the hands of the companies because these acreages «contain the plants and buildings, roads, railways and ports; that is, land which is integral to the mining and processing operations» *(51)*. The state now owns, however, the usual 51 % of mining operations and has options to purchase shares in any aspect of any processing plant whilst the companies are guaranted forty years' supply of the ore.

The new economic nationalism is marked, secondly, by the outright nationalization of some important industries or the purchase of majority shares by the state. These have taken place in fields where foreign capital operated independently or had a clear dominance over national capitalist interests. Thus, for example, some banks (for instance, Barclays) have been taken over by the state; the radio, telephone and urban transport (of Kingston) which were all dominated by foreign capital have been nationalized. The setting-up of the State Trading Corporation to act as importing house for a number of crucial imports (for instance, chemicals and some foodstuff) has also affected some national capitalists. The state, however, has tended to leave national capital generally alone or to assist it as much as possible to ensure, as MANLEY has made clear, that there must be «a visible local presence in all major undertakings» *(52)* if national sovereignty is to have a meaning at all.

This form of nationalism does not infact challenge the presence of foreign capital. Indeed, as MANLEY has repeatedly stressed, there is ready recognition that there is an important place in the economy for foreign capital, particularly in the bauxite and alumina industries where advanced technology and capital intensive techniques are necessary – and the former is still beyond the capability of national capital and no doubt will be for some time until the new Bauxite Institute begins to have some effects on bauxite technology. MANLEY, therefore, envisages that his Government will continue to use «judicious... control mechanisms» in dealing with foreign capital because in «this way one can secure policies that are broadly consistent with national objectives» *(53)*.

This economic nationalism that the state now champions received its clearest formulation by Jamaïcan radicals in the early 1970s and is, therefore, not entirely new in Jamaïca. What is new is that it is now coinciding with the interests of one or more fractions of the bourgeoisie and it has become the main thrust of state policy. For much of the 1970s Jamaïcan radicals have been concerned with the question of foreign control of some major areas of the economy. This position is to be found chiefly in the works of GIRVAN and JEFFERSON who have variously argued that national capital ought to be protected by the state and be assisted positively to move into areas that foreign capital has been controlling. In GIRVAN's view foreign capital should be «a complement to structural change» *(54)*. For others, such as LINDSAY and BACKFORD, the crucial question has been the need to «mobilize» the people and to arrive at an ideology that will guide towards the eradication of persistent poverty *(55)*.

For MANLEY, who has always been quite frank about the aims of his Government, the political ideology necessary to speed Jamaïca on the road towards development is «democratic-socialism». This involves a rejection of the «capitalist model of socio-economic and political organization» and establishing a «mixed» economy which is committed «to the view that there is a clear and honourable role for the responsible businessman working in partnership with the public sector of the economy» *(56)*. The contradictions evident in these aspirations are, of course, not unusual for a social-democratic leader. The important point is that under the banner of socialism the PNP Government is leading the Jamaïcan state in its transformation from a liberal-democratic to a social-democratic form, which has become common in capitalist – developed as well as in some backward formations, particularly in West Europe.

The purpose of this example of changing state forms in Jamaïca is not merely to prove empirically – by showing an exception to a general rule as in a logical argument – that the formulation of the question of the state in backward capitalist formations is false. The case has already been argued theoretically and the Jamaïcan case is offered so as to substantiate the suggestion that class development and struggle as a result of capitalist exploitation and accumulation constitute the primary elements for marxist analysis of politics in backward as well as in advanced capitalism. This does not deny the importance of the sphere of circulation, the market-place, but it does attempt to place the emphasis at the level of production and hence exploitation, or the «capital-relation» as opposed to the purely «money-relation».

CONCLUSION

The general view throughout has been that the discussion around the state in backward capitalist social formations is limited and limiting because it seeks to establish a number of false dichotomies – between «capitalist» and «post-colonial» «peripheral», etc., states; between the unproblematic capitalist state/marxist political theory and the problematic nature of the state in backward capitalism. In so doing, the various trends of the discussion serve to highlight certain exaggerated features of *some* states in backward capitalism; undoubtedly, the discussion elucidates aspects of the state's limitations vis-a-vis international capital, although, of course, these limitations of the nation-state are not exclusive to states in conditions of backward capitalism. Locked as the discussion is into the more general theoretical structure of the underdevelopment/dependency school, recognition of the importance of classes and class struggles in these societies are at most formal because MARX's concept of exploitation, derived from an analysis of the process of production, is transformed into a «principal» contradiction between nations. The necessity for the present state forms that obtain in the backward capitalist formations is lost in a general discussion of the market on a world scale. Developments are seen as being entirely extraneous to national contexts. Quite clearly, an adequate understanding of the state-forms that obtain in these formations necessitates the breaking-down of misleading dichotomies and perception of capitalist formations – developed or otherwise – in terms of phases of capital accumulation and

possible corresponding state-forms that may emerge. One of the first steps in this direction involves the «disengagement» from theories that concentrate on exchange of commodities rather than on the process of the production of commodities prevalent in particular societies.

FOOTNOTES

1. Hamza Alavi, «The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh», *New Left Review*, No. 74, July/August, 1972, P. 61.
2. *Ibid.*, P. 60.
3. *Ibid.*, P. 61.
4. *Ibid.*, P. 59.
5. John Saul, «The State in Post-Colonial Specities: Tanzania», R. Miliband & J. Savage, (eds.), *The Socialist Register 1974*, (London: Merlin Press, 1974).
6. A. Hein & W. Stenzel, «The Capitalist State & Underdevelopment in Latin America: The Case of Venezuela», *Kapitalistate*, 2/1973.
7. A. Mafeje, Science, *Ideology and Development: Three Essays on Development Theory*, (Uppsala: The Scandanavian Institute of African Studies, 1978), particularly chapter 2.
8. Clive Thomas, «Class Struggle, Social Development and the Theory of the Non-Capitalist Path», M. Palmberg, (de.), *Problems of Socialist Orientation in Africa*, (Uppsala; The Scandanavian Institute of African Studies, 1978).
9. See, for example, Thomas, *Ibid.*, pp. 22–3; also, S. Amin *Un-Equal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism*, (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1976), especially pp. 343–50, and, S. Langdon, «The State and Capitalism in Kenya», *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 8, January/April, 1977.
10. Notably, Issa G. Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1975), and, C. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism, 1964–1971*, (London: Heinemann, 1975), Chapter 7.
11. C. Leys, «The Overdeveloped» Post-Colonial State: A. Re-evaluation», *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 5, 1976; see also, M. Von Freyhold, «The Post-Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version», *Ibid.*, No. 8, 1977.
12. Sherry Girling, «Comments on Hamza Alavi», *Kapitalistate*, 2/1973, pp. 49–51, offers some useful comments although the piece has its own problems.
13. K. Marx, *Capital*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), Vol. 1, P. 292.
14. A. Cournanel, «Ideologie et Developpement en Guinée», *Africa Development*, Vol. ii, No. i, 1977, pp. 63–88, Cournanel, however, does not place his work within the underdevelopment framework.
15. Mafeje, *op. cit.*, ch. 2; Thomas, in Palmberg, *op. cit.*
16. Hein & Stenzel, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
17. See for example, G. Arrigh & J. Saul, «Socialism & Economic Development in Tropical Africa», *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 6 (2), 1968; also, A. Peace, «The Lagos Proletariat: Labour Aristocrats or Populist Militants?», R. Sandbrook & Cohen, (eds.), *The Development of an African Working Class: Studies in Class Formation and Action*, (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1975), for a critique of the labour aristocracy thesis and J.S. Saul's reply, «The Labour Aristocracy' Thesis Reconsidered», *Ibid.*

18. See, for example, the literature on the «internationalization of capital» and the «world market», C. von Braunmuhl, «On the Analysis of the Bourgeois Nation State within the World Market Context: An attempt to develop a Methodological and Theoretical Approach», John Holloway & Sol Picciotto, (eds.), *State and Capital: A Marxist Debate.* (London: Edward Arnold, 1977); also, N. Poulantzas, «The Internationalization of Capital and the Nation State», in his, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism,* (London: New Left Books, 1975.
19. Marx expressed the point thus:
In the form of society now under consideration (capitalist society) the behaviour of men in the social process of production is purely atomic. Hence their relations to each other in production assume a material character independent of their control and conscious individual action. These facts manifest themselves at first by products as a general rule taking the form of commodities. K. Marx, *op.cit.*, p.96.
20. *Ibid.*, chapters 7, 8 & 9.
21. See, R. Brenner, «The Origins of Capitalist Development: A critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism», *New Left Review,* 104, July/August, 1977; also the earlier major critique of A. G. Frank by E. Laclau, «Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America, «*New Left Review,* 67, May/June, 1971 and the rather terse treatment by Ben Fine, «On the Origins of Capitalist Development», *New Left Review,* 109, May/June, 1978. In addition, Ann Phillips, «The Concept of Development» and P. Kennedy, «Indigenous Capitalism in Ghana», both in, *Review of African Political Economy,* 8, January–April, 1977, are important contributions. H. Bernstein «Sociology of Underdevelopment versus Sociology of Development», Bernstein et al, *Development Theory: Three Critical Essays,* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, forthcoming) is also rewarding reading whilst H. Goulbourne, «Some Problems of Analysis of the Political in Backward Capitalist Formations», Goulbourne, (ed.), *Politics and State in the Third World.* (London: Macmillan, 1979), seeks to apply the emerging mode of analysis to politics.
22. See for example, M. Mamdani, *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda,* (London: Heinemann, 1976), Introduction; also, E.A. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919–1939,* (London: Heinemann, 1973), Conclusions.
23. See, S. Amin, *op. cit.*, pp. 358–9.
24. *Ibid.*
25. See, H. Goulbourne, «The Role of the Political Party in Tanzania since the Arusha Declaration, 1967», Goulbourne, *op. cit.*, also Cournanel, *op. cit.*
26. H. Goulbourne, «Some Aspects of Ideological Functions in the Development of the Post-Colonial State in Tanzania», *Africa Development,* Vol. iii, No. ii, 1978. In *Capital* Marx went to some length in making the point – a point inadequately made in my article just referred to – that capitalist ideology is both produced and reproduced at the level of production itself. Sometimes, however, there is the appearance that these functions are restricted to the «superstructure», the formal world of ideas, which gives support to the socio-economic base. There can be little doubt that in advanced capitalism this is the case generally. In the context of backward capitalism, however, I believe that it is possible, due precisely to the backwardness that exists and the need to develop the productive forces rapidly, the state may be called upon to assist indirectly in the production and reproduction of ideology appropriate to the present phase of accumulation.
27. J. Holloway & S. Picciotto, «Capital, Crisis and the State», *Capital & Class,* 2, 1977; also their «Introduction: Towards a Materialist Theory of the State», *State and Capital.*
28. N. Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes,* (London: New Left Books, 1975), pp. 123–141.

29. See for example, T. Munroe, *The politics of Constitutional Decolonization: Jamaïca 1944–62,* (Kingston: Institute of Social & Economic Research, 1972), pp. 175–8.
30. See, for example, D. Robotham, «Agrarian Relations in Jamaïca», C. Stone & A. Brown, (eds.) *Essays on Power and Change in Jamaïca,* (Kingston: Jamaïca Publishing House, 1977); also, W. K. Marshall, «Peasant Development in the West Indies since 1838», *Social & Economic Studies,* Vol. 17, No. 3, September, 1968.
31. See, Gisela Eisner, Jamaïca, 1830–1930: A Study in Economic Growth, (Manchester University Press, 1961), particularly, chapter 10, 12, 14 and 15.
32. Eisner, *op. cit.;* also, G.E. Cumper, «Population Movements in Jamaïca, 1830–1950», *Social and Economic Studies,* Vol. 5, No. 3, 1956; also, Stanley Reid, «An Introductory Approach to the concentration of Power in the Jamaïcan Corporate Economy and Notes on its Origins», Stone & Brown, *op. cit.*
33. See, C. Kirton, «A Preliminary Analysis of Imperialist Penetration and Control via the Foreign Debt: A Study of Jamaïca», Stone & Brown, *op. cit.*
34. Between 1844 and the First World War the elected members of the Legislative Council were nearly all from business and planter circles but the War had a profound effect on people's consciousness and the idea became widespread that there should be greater participation in the public life of the country, within the established framework – with the exception of Marcus Garvey who called for more drastic changes. As a result, the elections of 1919/20 saw the emergence in national politics of a number of professional men (lawyers, clergymen, etc.) and semi-professional men (particularly schoolteachers). See, J. Carnegie, *Some Aspects of Jamaïca's Politics, 1918–38* (Kingston: Institute of Jamaïca, Cultural Heritage Series, 1973).
35. A perusal of the daily papers in Jamaïca in the 1890s make this point abundantly clear; for example, *The Daily Gleaner,* and *The Colonial Standard & Colonial Dispatch.* (1892).
36. See, H. Goulbourne, «Teachers and Politics in Colonial Jamaïca: The formation of the Jamaïca Union of Teachers, 1894», *Caribbean Studies,* (forthcoming).
37. See for example, *The Journal of the Jamaïca Agricultural Society,* Vol. i, January, 1897; also, *Jamaïca Dispatches and Correspondence, 1894–1900,* Colonial Office 137, No. 560, Dispatch 234, letter from Sir Henry Blake, Governor, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated, 3 July, 1895.
38. See, Richard Hart, *Forward to Freedom,* (Kingston: People's Educational Organization, 1952), also, Rex Nettleford, (ed.), *Manley and the New Jamaïca: Selected Speeches and Writings, 1938–1968,* (London: Longman Caribbean, 1971), particularly the extended introduction by Nettleford.
39. See, Owen Jefferson, *The Post-Car Economic Development of Jamaïca,* (Kingston: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1972), chapter 5.
40. Norman Girvan, *Foreign Capital & Economic Underdevelopment in Jamaïca* (Kingston: Institute of Social & Economic Research, 1971), P. 131.
41. L. Lindsay, *The Myth of Independence: Middle Class Politics and Non-Mobilization in Jamaïca,* (Kingston: Institute of Social & Economic Research, Working Paper No. 6, 1975), p. 49.
42. The lack of nationalism goes a long way into the Jamaïcan past, for example, it was the free Assembly which asked the British Parliament to set up a Crown Colony in the country in 1866. In the new conditions of the immediate post World War I, EFL Wood, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, found, on his visit to Jamaïca to test political opinion, that the elected representatives, although highly critical of the Governor, was entirely unwilling to discuss ways of reforming the colonial political order. See, Hon.E.F.L. Wood, *Report on a Visit to the West Indies and British Guiana.* CMD. 1879 (London: HMSO, 1922).

43. See, Munroe, *op. cit.*
44. See for example, M. Manley, *National Self-Reliance, Phase 1,* (Kingston: Agency for Public Information, n.d., but this is the transcript of Government's economic policy outlined on 19 January, 1977), p. 2.
45. For an excellent discussion of this and related points see, D. Harris, «Notes on the Question of a National Minimum Wage», Stone & Brown, *op. cit.*
46. S. Reid, *op. cit.*
47. See, Robotham, *op. cit.;* also, R. Frucht, «Caribbean Social Type: Neither Peasant nor Proletarian», *Social & Economic Studies,* Vol. 16, No. 3, 1967.
48. A.A. Ayub & E.D. Cruikshank, «The Political Economy of the Caribbean», *Finance and Development,* Vol. 14, No. 4, December, 1977.
49. See, M.J. Crozier, S.P. Hantington and J. Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the trilateral commission,* (New York: New York University Press, 1975).
50. See, G. Eaton, «Trade Union Development in Jamaïca», *Caribbean Quarterly,* Vol. 8, No. 1, 1962, and Vol. 8, No. 2, 1963; also, R. Hart, *The Origins and Development of the People of Jamaïca,* (Kingston: Trade Union Congress Education Department, 1952).
51. *Jamaïca and the Bauxite Companies: What the Agreements Mean,* (Kingston: Agency for Public Information in collaboration with the Jamaïca Bauxite Institute, nd.), p. 2.
52. Manley, *op. cit.,* p. 108.
53. *Ibid.*
54. Girvan, *op. cit.,* p. 265.
55. See, Lindsay, *op. cit.,* and G. Beckford, *Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), especially, p. 232; for a different view of from that of Lindsay's, see, T. Munroe, «The People's National Party, 1938–1944: A view of the Early Nationalist Movement in Jamaïca», unpublished Msc. Thesis, Department of Government, University of the West Indies, Mona, 1966; also, Munroe, *The Marxist Left in Jamaïca 1940–1950,* (Kingston: Institute of Social & Economic Research, Working Paper No. 15, 1977).
56. Manley, *op. cit.,* p. 4.

RESUME

Dans cet article, l'auteur étudie le problème de l'Etat dans les sociétés capitalistes sous-développées. Il rejette d'emblée l'argument facile qui soutient que le problème de l'Etat dans les pays capitalistes sous-développés est fondamentalement différent de celui de l'Etat dans les pays capitalistes développés. Pour l'auteur, l'Etat dans les pays capitalistes sous-développés n'est qu'une des formes de l'Etat capitaliste et que toute théorie de l'Etat dans ces conditions doit, pour être valable, pouvoir expliquer la théorie de l'Etat capitaliste en général. Il développe ses arguments dans deux grandes parties essentielles : une première partie théorie dans laquelle il fait d'abord une analyse globale du problème de l'Etat à l'époque post-coloniale pour ensuite étudier tour à tour les problèmes de la formulation, les rapports Class-Etat, la Centralité de l'Etat, les limites de la théorie du sous-développement et proposer une autre approche du problème. Dans la deuxième partie, il s'appuie sur le cas de la Jamaïque avec les réformes de MANLEY pour étayer les thèses qu'il vient de développer.

S'agissant du problème de l'Etat à l'époque post-coloniale, il fait remarquer qu'à la différence du problème de l'Etat dans les pays développés, l'Etat dans les pays sous-développés après la période coloniale n'est pas l'instrument d'une seule et unique classe mais de trois classes distinctes dont les intérêts bien que n'étant pas entièrement mutuels ne sont cependant pas fondamentalement antagonistes. L'auteur estime ensuite que dans la mesure où le problème de la reformulation des spécificités de l'Etat dans les pays sous-développés se pose, il convient d'accorder une attention particulière aux questions théoriques suivantes :

1. Les origines de ces Etats expliquent-elles nécessairement leur état actuel ?
2. La somme des différences dans les détails conduit-elle à une différence de qualité ?

Quant au rapport entre l'Etat et les Classes, il est marqué dans les pays capitalistes sous-développés par l'absence d'une classe dominante homogène, unique, nationale et indépendante, par la domination excessive de l'oligarchie militaire bureaucratique dans la société et par la faiblesse de toutes les classes sociales. Le rapport Etat/Classe dans les pays capitalistes sous-développés est rendu complexe par un ensemble de facteurs que l'auteur énumère dans son analyse. Il aborde ensuite le problème de la Centralité de l'Etat en faisant remarquer que la position ainsi occupée par l'Etat dans les pays capitalistes sous-développés tient moins à sa création après la période coloniale qu'à sa qualité d'Etat capitaliste qui a existé pendant la période de la phase de monopole du capital caractérisée par l'interventionisme de l'Etat. Dans la cinquième partie de son article, il introduit le débat sur les limites de la théorie du sous-développement, analysant et critiquant les différentes théories qui ont essayé d'expliquer le phénomène du sous-développement. Après avoir dégagé les différences fondamentales entre les caractéristiques de l'Etat dans les pays capitalistes développés et celles de l'Etat dans les pays capitalistes sous-développés et suggéré une autre approche théorique pour l'étude du problème de l'Etat dans les pays capitalistes sous-développés, l'auteur étudie le cas du développement de la Jamaïque et des réformes de MANLEY pour illustrer ses arguments.