

# Agricultural Cooperation and the Development of the Productive Forces: Some Lessons from Tanzania

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## I

This paper discusses the relationship between agricultural cooperation and the development of its productive forces. We take Tanzania's policy of 'Ujamaa' and the associated villages (agricultural producer cooperatives) as the example for our analysis. The argument presented is that to begin with cooperation in agriculture is essential for the overall development of the productive forces in African economies, but it is not a sufficient condition for this development in so far as the development of local industry—particularly that which manufactures instruments of labour—is either negligible or totally absent. Secondly, we argue that for these conditions to exist, that is for cooperation to act genuinely as a lever for the sustained development of the productive forces (hence within a specific form of industrialization), there must be a definite political framework whose social base is the class/classes with an objective interest in revolution.

The agricultural sector in central capitalist social formations has been penetrated by the capitalist mode of production in a manner characteristic of the uneven development of capitalism itself. Samir Amin, for instance, distinguishes three phases: the first one in which the role of agriculture is to supply the nascent capitalist sector with manpower and raw materials to help realize primitive capitalist accumulation; the second in which agriculture is left out of the rapid growth of productive forces in the industrial sector; and the third when agriculture itself becomes not only the supplier of raw materials for industry but also the recipient of various industrial products which will serve as inputs for the transformation of the mode of production in agriculture itself.<sup>1</sup> In a similar manner, P.P. Rey mentions three stages in the articulation of capitalism with 'the modes of production in which agriculture and petty craftsmanship are closely associated'.<sup>2</sup> His stages coincide rather well with Amin's, but put more emphasis on the role of landed property in the articulation process.

It is only during the latest stage, then, that the development of technology transforms agriculture in any meaningful manner as is testified by the rapid growth of productivity in this sector experienced by most capitalist societies at the centre (although, to be sure, many underdeveloped areas remain in the countryside of those societies where peasant relations of production still resist capitalist penetration). In the social formations of the periphery, on the other hand, stage three has not generally been reached (except marginally and in a distorted way, as for instance in India's so called Green Revolution) due to the particular nature of the articulation between the capitalist and pre-capitalist modes in those societies. The necessities of accumulation on a world scale, and the complex nature of the totality formed by the central and peripheric social formations, make it both difficult and unnecessary for capitalism to transform the rural societies in the same way that it did in Western Europe (or North America in altogether different conditions). These limits, both economic and political, inherent in the capitalist mode of production in the age of imperialism will probably not allow most of the periphery social formations to reach stage three at all, and a socialist revolution is thus necessary to achieve any significant improvement in the harmonious development of the productive forces.

In Africa, this problem of the productive forces in agriculture multiplies a hundredfold. Here, not

only is agriculture the overwhelming economic sector in terms of the population's involvement—hence the socio-economic transformation presenting itself essentially as a transformation of rural life—but the tools and skills available in this sector are extremely primitive in relation to the historical period in which they happen to be involved. The era of colonialism has at best stultified the productive forces found in Africa at the initial period and at worst has actually caused them to degenerate by eliminating vital skills and various industrial activities already achieved in Africa by the time colonization began.<sup>3</sup>

In an economy such as Tanzania's where the general development of the productive forces in agriculture does not exceed the level of the 'two acres and a hoe' described in the agricultural literature, cooperation is the only way of introducing a higher form of division of labour through; (a) increasing the surface of cultivated land; (b) developing skills through specialization, (c) pooling resources for the purchase of machinery, implements and inputs in general that would be above the capacity of any one small producer, and (d) planning the total manpower resources by allocating them over extended periods so as to reduce and eventually do away with the underutilization of labour at slack periods which is so typical of peasant agriculture (this of course can only be achieved once and for all by the widening of employment opportunities outside agriculture itself). Furthermore, since the development of the productive forces specifically includes the development of the general abilities of the producers themselves, cooperation—if successful—should enable progressive ideas to take root more firmly in all aspects of peasant life and through cooperative self-management and decision-making give the direct producers more control over State apparatus at the local level, thus enhancing their participation in running the economy at national level. Obstacles on this road are numerous, of course, since the very underdevelopment of the productive forces and their scattering over the countryside create a considerable degree of opacity between the decisions and their results which will not be eliminated until production is *socialized* in the real sense of the term.<sup>4</sup>

But cooperation as such does not have a clear-cut class character. It takes on its class characteristics from the general strategy of development in which it is inserted, which is in turn an expression of the interests of the ruling class (or alliance of classes) in each particular social formation. It should be needless to point out that only the domination of the proletariat in alliance with the toiling peasantry (and progressive elements from other classes) can determine that overall socialist character of agricultural cooperation (the same would be true of nationalization in industry). It is a well known fact that many governments in Africa, and the Third World in general (even during the colonial period), have favoured agricultural cooperation in order to; (a) increase their political control of the rural producers, and (b) increase the surplus extracted from them at least cost. The mere existence of agricultural cooperation is thus by no means proof of a truly socialist strategy.

The historical experience of the Chinese Revolution has shown that the harmonious solving of the contradictions existing *inter alia* between agriculture and industry have a vital bearing on the expanded growth of the productive forces in both sectors. 'Walking on two legs' is, then, just as basic an element of socialist strategy as 'self-reliance' is and, in fact, the absence of the former all but nullifies the latter. Either the inexistence of an industrial base leads to the stagnation of productive forces in agriculture or—more often—to a heavy *de facto* reliance on imported technology and expertise which reinforces the links with imperialism.

The lack of industrial sectors in African economies has often grounded many attempts at bringing about 'rural development' including the rarer attempt at producer cooperatives. Reliance on imported tools and technology has time and again caused the failure of many projects, as the supply of such tools and technology has failed to be sustained over time for various reasons, or the tools have proved unsuitable for the local physical conditions, and many other complications that have been discussed many times.

The model of development adopted by People's China for the combined and integrated growth of

the agricultural and industrial sectors—and to which an amazing number of ‘development strategists’ both in western and Third World countries pay lip service without in the least intending to emulate it—stresses the decentralization of projects and their management at the lowest possible level, thus promoting the diffusion of modern technology in the countryside and furthering the masses’ control over it and subsequently their creative contribution to it. The indispensable frame for the successful application of this strategy has, of course, been the collectivization process which led from individual family farming through mutual aid teams and producer cooperatives to the creation of People’s Communes. The different stages of the transition have always been marked by an increased participation of the masses in the class struggle, both against re nascent differentiation in the countryside and against the threat presented by the entrenchment of a State bureaucracy. The process of collectivization is thus not a formal or ‘organizational’ solution to the problems of the peasantry but a manifestation of the ever present class contradictions in the society and the necessary way to solve them. It is first and foremost a *political* process.

We are far from the ‘solutions’ proposed by experts such as those of the World Bank, who at various times in the early years of Tanzania’s independence recommended several types of ‘rural development’ policies which all failed. Perhaps it is appropriate here to remind ourselves of these experiences if only to show up the technical aspect of their failure. Through the ‘transformation approach’ recommended by a World Bank mission,<sup>5</sup> Tanzania, soon after independence in 1961, started some 23 ‘settlement schemes’ on which were settled more than 3,400 rural families.<sup>6</sup> These were very capital intensive projects; the total cost after the two years they lasted (before they were abandoned as a failure) was more than Shs 18 million, and this is excepting the vast administrative and other expenses incurred outside the individual schemes themselves.<sup>7</sup>

The capital inputs on this case could not be justified by the productivity that finally resulted from the investment. Above all, however, the machinery imported was quite often dormant—due either to a lack of spare parts and various other technical ingredients or the skill necessary to use or repair the machinery properly. Thus the lack of an indigenous technical foundation made it difficult for production to rise and for the imported machinery to have a multiplier effect on the production process as a whole.

Another attempt by the government to create ‘block farms’ with the assistance of Israel and other aid donors soon met the same fate. The idea was to acquire tractors which would plough large areas of land, which would also be sprayed aeri ally if necessary, but which would then be divided into small plots to be taken care of by individual peasants.<sup>8</sup> Again this degree of mechanization could not be maintained for long and its results were anything but impressive.

All these deficiencies are of course in addition to the inappropriateness of the social organization for the projects—for although at the technical level resources had been pooled together, the production process was actually individual in character. Thus there never developed the social organization that is essential if the technical innovation is to bear any long term fruits.<sup>9</sup>

We shall therefore go on to examine Tanzania’s attempt to create producer cooperatives and how they relate to the question of the development of the productive forces.

## II

The policy of ‘Ujamaa Vijijini’ (Socialism and Rural Development) launched by President Nyerere after the adoption of the Arusha Declaration by TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) in 1967, has received considerable attention from scholars and commentators from various parts of the world, and no more than a sketch of its theoretical and ideological background will be given here.<sup>10</sup> As developed by the party leadership, and most elaborately by President Nyerere himself, the policy of

Ujamaa aims at organizing the Tanzania peasantry in self-reliant productive units where the major means of production would be held in common and the returns shared according to every member's contribution in labour. The model approximates rather closely to the classical definition of an agricultural producer cooperative, although in the official Tanzanian ideology the roots of the policy are said to be found in the traditional practices of cooperation among members of extended families, clans or traditional village units in Africa.<sup>11</sup>

It should be noted that there is a strong 'villagization' component in this policy, i.e. it is considered desirable to organize the peasants into village units of a substantial size, contrary to the settlement patterns prevailing over most areas of Tanzania. This component has tended to become more and more dominant in recent years, culminating with the present villagization drive aimed at regrouping the entire Tanzanian peasantry into large villages by 1976. At times this villagization component has been a much more prominent factor in the implementation of Ujamaa villages than the organization of collective production, local officials being satisfied with the mere regrouping of peasants into one village after having stuck the 'Ujamaa' label onto it.<sup>12</sup>

The policy recognizes three stages in Ujamaa development: stage one (the formative period) represents the grouping of villages in one place with communal production non-existent or minimal; stage two should be reached when the village constitutes a viable economic unit and the villagers have learnt to live and work together; and in stage three the village is to be registered as a 'producer and marketing cooperative society', meaning, in principle, that most of the production is now carried out on a collective basis and organization is sufficiently advanced for the unit to have legal recognition. In fact, as pointed out by several authors<sup>13</sup>, the attribution of villages to these three categories is quite haphazard and some villages can be officially classified as belonging to stage three when there is hardly any communal production at all.<sup>14</sup>

The spread of Ujamaa villages (whatever the reality covered by this designation) has been very uneven in the country's regions as can be seen in Table 6A. In some regions the overwhelming majority of the population has 'gone Ujamaa', whereas in others the proportion is between 1 and 2 per cent. The present villagization policy, started in 1971 in Dodoma, in Kigoma in 1972, and extended to the whole country in September 1973, has added to the ambiguity. For instance, it is not clear whether the new 'development villages' (the official designation for the villages formed by regrouping the population) are supposed to emphasize the collective aspect in production or not. In Dodoma district where the move started earliest and where practically the whole population has been grouped in large villages—at times as large as 5,000 people—all these units have been labelled 'Ujamaa villages'. Actually, the development of collective farming seems to be just as varied in these planned villages as in the earlier more sporadic forms, and it is probably too early to make a comprehensive statement at this stage.<sup>15</sup>

Another element needing emphasis is the steady trend away from participation and initiative at grass-roots level and the ever greater concentration of power in the hands of the bureaucracy. Although the official policy stresses the need for the initiative in starting an Ujamaa village to be entirely in the hands of the peasants concerned, authoritarian decisions from above have by no means been rare, and varied pressures combining threats with promises have often been at the basis of the decision to form Ujamaa villages. Another factor not to be underestimated has been the competition between various groups of peasants for government aid.<sup>16</sup>

The villagization programme has accentuated these features, and starting a village is no longer seen as an autonomous decision emerging when given groups of peasants have reached a certain level of consciousness, but as the implementation of a decision taken at national level and put into practice by the regional and district authorities according to a rhythm of their own. The specious argument that villagization is compulsory for 'nation building' purposes whereas collective production can be decided only by the villagers themselves, is belied by the example of Dodoma where in the drought-stricken areas villagers can have access to famine relief only if they can prove to have put in a certain number of

work days in the collective field. A recent statement by the President (18 February 1975) that members in Ujamaa villages should be carefully scrutinized and their commitment evaluated before being allowed to join, is not likely to be anything other than a pious wish given the reality described above.

TABLE 6A

## NUMBER OF UJAMAA VILLAGES AND TOTAL MEMBERS BY REGION

<i>Region</i>	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Arusha	25 5,200	59 14,018	92 19,818	95 20,112	110 25,356
Coast	56 48,300	121 93,503	185 111,636	188 115,382	236 167,073
Dodoma	75 26,400	246 239,366	299 400,330	336 378,915	354 504,952
Iringa	350 11,600	651 216,200	630 207,502	659 243,527	619 244,709
Kigoma	34 6,700	132 27,200	129 114,391	132 114,391	123 111,477
Kilimanjaro	9 2,700	11 2,616	24 5,009	24 4,934	14 3,176
Mara	174 84,700	376 127,371	376 127,370	271 108,068	111 233,632
Mbeya	91 32,900	493 64,390	713 98,571	715 103,677	534 86,051
Morogoro	19 6,000	113 10,513	116 23,951	118 19,732	96 25,509
Lindi	285 70,673	592 203,128	626 175,082	589 169,073	339 218,888
Mtwara	465 173,027	748 371,560	1,088 441,241	1,103 466,098	1,052 534,126
Mwanza	28 4,600	127 18,641	211 32,099	284 49,846	153 40,864
Ruvuma	120 9,000	205 29,433	205 29,430	242 42,385	184 62,736
Shinyanga	98 12,600	150 12,265	123 15,292	108 12,052	134 18,425
Singida	16 6,800	201 51,230	263 59,420	263 59,420	317 141,542
Tabora	52 16,700	81 18,408	148 25,115	174 29,295	156 28,730
Tanga	37 7,700	132 35,907	245 77,858	245 77,957	255 67,557
W. Lake	22 5,600	46 9,491	83 16,747	85 13,280	77 15,968
Rukwa	—	—	—	—	121 24,988
Dar es Salaam	—	—	—	—	25 4,713
TOTAL:	1,956 531,200	4,484 1,545,240	5,556 1,980,862	5,631 2,028,164	5,008 2,560,472
Average per village:	272	345	357	360	511

*Note:* figures in the top row refer to the number of villages, while those at the bottom refer to the total population in the villages.

A very important consequence of the growing commandist trend in the bureaucratic implementation of the Ujamaa policy has been that democratic decision making about production targets, division of labour and sharing of the returns which should all be included in the village plan, has been too often removed from the villagers themselves and entrusted to 'experts' from district or regional headquarters. The wealth of knowledge of, and adaptation to, the local environmental conditions which lie dormant

among the peasantry cannot be drawn upon and the foreseeable result is that unrealistic decisions are taken and imposed (through persuasion or compulsion) upon the peasants, with negative or even catastrophic results in production output. This in turn increases the passivity of the peasants who feel that they are working 'for the government' and put the minimum effort into their communal production, saving all their energies for their individual plots.<sup>17</sup>

This situation, of course, is by no means unknown in other countries, including the 'socialist ones', and finds its roots in the class structure of the society in question. As far as Tanzania is concerned we cannot here go into a further analysis of this class structure,<sup>18</sup> but we must point out certain characteristics of the relationship between the bureaucracy and the peasantry: the power of the bureaucracy is largely justified ideologically by the fact that they are the possessors of a type of 'knowledge'—i.e. Western technocratic—from which the peasants are radically estranged. They are 'experts'. The constant display of this 'knowledge' is thus a necessity for the reproduction of this relationship of command and subservience. Trying to engage in a dialogue with the peasants would considerably weaken the position of the bureaucracy, for it would more often than not disclose the purely ideological nature of this 'knowledge' and its irrelevance to concrete development tasks.<sup>19</sup>

The introduction of modern technology in the villages will thus be faced with the consequences of this situation. New agricultural practices, new implements, etc., are presented from above to the 'ignorant' peasants as steps which are progressive in themselves, with little prior study of local conditions. Tractors, for instance, are the object of a bureaucratic display of 'modern agricultural techniques' and sent to villages which have for one reason or another met the favour of the district officials or appear to them as being particularly deserving (a notorious example is that of a village lucky enough to have an M.P., or some other high official, among its members<sup>20</sup>). Very often, costs are not taken into consideration, returns are very low due either to the nature of the crop or to the lack of other inputs which would be necessary to achieve higher yields (weeding and harvesting are very frequent bottlenecks), and the only result of their introduction is to have increased the leisure time of the villagers during the cultivation period.

This use of means of production as 'prizes' or 'rewards' to villages which the bureaucracy favours can have as its only result the further estrangement of the villagers from modern technology—always received from above—and planning, since information on costs and productivity are never made available to them beforehand.<sup>21</sup> For instance, a village which has been allocated say, ox-ploughs, will find itself penalized in comparison with its neighbours who would have 'enjoyed' the benefit of having a tractor at their disposal, even if the use of the tractor brought a loss in financial terms. This attitude is emphasized by the bureaucracy who often look down upon 'primitive' implements such as ox-ploughs and consider mechanization a conspicuous sign of progress. On the other hand, villages which have earned the displeasure of the bureaucracy will find themselves with neither inputs nor technical assistance and will not be able to make full use of resources which might be just as promising.

This vertical relationship, which always places the peasants at the receiving end in passive dependence, must be considered the major obstacle to any rural development strategy in Tanzania, and it is certainly a more important one than environmental constraints or the low ideological level of the peasant masses. It is fairly obvious that with the limited capital resources at the country's disposal, labour must be relied upon as the major productive force in the Tanzanian countryside and its better organization is the key to any further success. Only the villagers themselves are in a position to assess their manpower resources and democratically direct them towards the most valuable activities. It is necessary to put the planning process into their own hands and let them have access to the information vital for this process. It should be the role of the local cadres to give them this information and help them reach viable targets instead of bossing them around. It is only within this democratic framework that the development of productive forces, making the best use of the scarce capital resources, can be set in motion.

There is some doubt as to whether this can actually be achieved in the present Tanzanian class context without revolutionary change.

### III

In order to assess the difficulties to be overcome in the process of developing the productive forces in Tanzania's countryside, it is necessary to focus on meaningful units of analysis. We will make the district our main focus. Districts are generally fairly homogenous geographically and socially and their importance has been all the more enhanced with the decentralization process embarked upon in 1973. Since it is obviously impossible to give a description of all the districts of mainland Tanzania, we will deal with three, on account of both the variety of environments that they represent and the availability of data on Ujamaa villages.

#### (a) *Lushoto District*

Lushoto district (Tanga region) represents a fairly typical example of the overcrowded highlands of north eastern Tanzania which also include Moshi, Rombo and Pare districts in Kilimanjaro region, and part of Morogoro district in Morogoro region. Its highland part consists of the mountain block of West Usambara which is an island of high-rainfall country in an otherwise dry plain environment. Apart from a dry area in the north eastern corner, mainly the Mlola division, rainfall is generally sufficient to permit two grain crops per year and even three in the most humid zones (Bumbuli and Soni divisions). The mountains, once selected by the Germans for their very promising agricultural potential, have become an area of increasing erosion. Furthermore, the soils are not very favourable for coffee—the main cash crop—compared with the rich volcanic soils of Kilimanjaro, for instance, and after the coffee boom of the early fifties, returns have decreased almost to insignificance.

Most peasants have coffee plants in their banana plots but devote very little attention to them outside the harvesting season. Tea and vegetables have been introduced as substitute cash crops but they are only suitable for certain areas and the main problem remains that of competition between land requirements for cash and food crops. Holdings per family are around four acres and do not allow more than subsistence production; furthermore, the habit of dividing land equally among all male children has led to extreme fragmentation. In part, this pressure on the land has been resolved temporarily through constant emigration, particularly of young men to towns and perhaps more substantially to the less fertile plains. As a whole then, the tendency has not been towards the accumulation and concentration of land resources; such accumulation as there has been locally has taken the form of merchant's capital—and already one finds a fairly wealthy trading class concentrated in the 'trading centres'.

The creation of Ujamaa villages has been rather slow in the district due mainly to the fact that the villagization component of the policy does not apply. Contrary to the pattern prevailing over most of Tanzania, the Shambaa live mainly in clustered villages, often built on steep slopes so as to leave flatter land for cultivation.<sup>22</sup> Land scarcity is such that in certain areas practically no sizeable collective field can be created without alienating land from individuals.

The following are a few examples of villages in the district:

(i) *Mayo (Bumbuli Division)* created in 1969, had, in 1973, two acres of vegetables for 120 members. There were two working mornings per week, but since it is obviously impossible for all the members to be in the field at the same time, a working day actually represented not more than 80 to 100 man-hours at most. The product for the field between 1 January and 30 April 1973 was Shs 1,605.12. If we assume that these four months total 32 working days, the produce per working day is only about Shs 50.00, i.e. less than fifty cents per member.

(ii) *Kwa Nguluwe (Bumbuli Division)* created in 1972 with 71 adult members, had selected as its collective *shamba* (cultivated field) a large tract of uncultivated and unproductive waste land. They cultivated a quarter of an acre of onions in 1972 and nothing at all in 1973, devoting their time to non-agricultural activities.

(iii) *Malibwi (Mlola Division)* created in 1970, had, in 1973, a ten-acre maize *shamba* for 500 registered members (this number includes children, and productive members can be estimated at around 130). In 1971 they produced 4 sacks of maize, valued at Shs 160.00, and in 1972, 10 sacks valued at Shs 400.00. In 1973 the harvest was nil 'because of drought'.

It can easily be seen that these figures are much too low to attract the existing members, not to speak of the potential ones. Taking into account the environmental conditions, i.e. the mountainous nature of the district, tractorization is hardly applicable, except maybe in a few rare instances of flat valley lands. Development of the productive forces has thus to be seen initially as consisting mainly of intensification of labour, improvement of skills, and the use of various ingredients in the labour process (fertilization, irrigation, quality control of seeds, soil conservation, etc.). Obviously such steps cannot bring substantial results in the existing socio-economic framework which makes for drastic fragmentation of land resources, chronic unemployment/underemployment, concentration of efforts on export crops and close domination of the producers by the parasitic traders and bureaucrats who, as in the case of the 'marketing cooperatives' and 'marketing boards', tend to be one and the same. In other words, therefore, the lack of such policies and the very limited possibility of their success, should they ever be attempted, are defined in the last instance by the political economy, not of Usambara as such, but of the country as a whole.

The role Ujamaa villages can play within the present context is obvious: by providing the opportunity to combine the labour force of relatively large numbers of people they can introduce an increased division of labour, specialization, and all that goes with them. At the moment, however, one sees very little division of labour in the villages—partly because nearly all of them have too few co-operative resources and partly because their production as such can hardly be considered sufficiently organized for development. In most cases, Ujamaa work consists simply of the juxtaposition of individual efforts which, moreover, are insignificant even as far as the individual peasant is concerned. For instance, in Mayo Ujamaa Village each member is allocated a given task on the small plot (e.g. cultivating a ridge of about six square metres) and he can do it at a time of his choice. Once the task is accomplished his name is entered in the register by the secretary.

Following the emphasis of the leadership generally, the villages understandably concentrate on producing export crops—even when, as in this case, natural conditions are more favourable for other crops. Lushoto district has ample potential for vegetables, fruit and dairy products. Looked at from the standpoint of internal economic needs, these would probably be more appropriate than coffee—but as is well known, export promotion makes for a very irrational pattern of production. In any case, as long as the Ujamaa *shamba* remains so ridiculously small, communal production will remain nothing but symbolic.

The question of land conservation is of course vital. In the colonial period the authorities tried to enforce conservation measures through compulsion; peasant resistance was strong<sup>23</sup> and the measures could not be implemented. It is unlikely that the present bureaucracy can do better, given the same socio-economic conditions, and in fact some parts of the district (e.g. Mlola Division) have almost reached a point of no return as far as erosion is concerned. The success of anti-erosion measures can only be based upon the general level of agricultural skills which had already been developed traditionally—irrigation, manuring, mulching, etc.—and particularly upon the transformation of the mode of production. It is within such a transformation framework that the problem of unemployment/underemployment would also be tackled. The placing of agricultural production on a scientific footing would be the basis of the development of non-agricultural activities, which nevertheless would be integral to



agriculture. At present one sees in the villages a few haphazard activities: Malibwi, for instance, has a metal working unit which produces watering cans, most of which are sold in Lushoto town since their unitary price is beyond the reach of most peasants. In general, at the moment, the reservoir of traditional skills is not only not stimulated and developed, but is in most cases not utilized at all. Thus one finds many unemployed masons, bricklayers, carpenters, tailors, etc., in a situation where the natural resources are plentiful and the need for their products, judging from the poverty of the mass of the people, is definitely there.

Apart from the smallness of each Ujamaa village—as far as the production process is concerned—the lack of a political programme to bring social transformation in the country as a whole precludes the possibility of integrated activities and plans across a number of villages in the district. Thus resources and skills are fragmented to the extreme and individual efforts to end exploitation or irrational forms of organization at the local level cannot but be immediately frustrated. The very nature of the relationship between the bureaucracy and the peasantry leads to competition between villages rather than cooperation—each village trying to get more favours for itself, the ultimate result is invariably that the peasantry cannot be an immediate force *vis-à-vis* the bureaucracy and are therefore incapable of extracting resources from the bureaucracy, except for those which the latter unevenly and haphazardly dish out.

The critical issue, therefore, is that at the moment the Ujamaa villages cannot escape from the general socio-economic web which militates against the development of the productive forces. As we have seen, the Ujamaa units are an infinitesimal part of the Usambara economy, and their organization and planning are too backward to warrant a process of development in the villages different from non-Ujamaa activities. In fact, it might even be argued that the introduction of symbolic production activities simply detracts valuable time and material resources from desired and useful activities and hence, in that sense, is a hindrance to the development of the productive forces.

#### (b) *Sukumaland*

Sukumaland is the large cotton belt engulfing six districts<sup>24</sup> immediately to the south of Lake Victoria. It is generally flat terrain, interrupted only sporadically by small hills. Natural vegetation has largely been destroyed by extensive cultivation and cattle rearing, and one finds large stretches of land totally devoid of even the smallest shrubs. In part, this is a result of the large concentration of cattle in the area—for there are more cattle per unit of land in Sukumaland than in any other area in Tanzania. But perhaps a more important reason for this is the gigantic expansion of the area under cultivation that has been going on in Sukumaland during the last three decades.

Soils are relatively good and rains are also average—conditions which have given the area a considerable capacity to support both animal and crop husbandry on a scale hardly equalled by any other area in the country.<sup>25</sup> Hence the area carries a relatively high population density.<sup>26</sup>

Since colonial days, Sukumaland has assumed greater and greater importance in the economy of the country as a whole, as cotton has come to take an ever greater proportion of export earnings.<sup>27</sup> Cotton production, as a smallholder crop, was introduced into the area by the German administration at the turn of the century. After the Second World War the British laid very great emphasis on cotton cultivation in Sukumaland and tried a series of 'development' projects aimed at raising productivity.

For historical reasons pertaining to the political status of the Colony, and because of the meticulous attention required in cotton production, the colonial government never attempted any of the large-scale projects requiring large investments in this area, despite the pressing need for cotton by British industry. Instead, efforts were channelled almost exclusively into improving the productivity of the smallholder farmer. Above all, efforts have been concentrated on expanding the total land area under cotton cultivation.

The immediate consequence of these efforts has been the rapid expansion of the average proportion

of land under cotton per household. At the end of the war, there was less than an acre of cotton per household on the average; now the figure is about three and a half acres—just over a third of the total cropped area on the average. This expansion has, of course, been at the expense of food crops grown in the area, particularly since cotton, unlike coffee for instance, is never inter-planted with other crops. Nevertheless, a further consequence has been the even more rapid expansion of Sukumaland. Because of this incursion of cotton into subsistence production and the need to maintain large tracts of land for the huge cattle herds, the population in the area has been constantly shifting into neighbouring areas which are less densely populated. In fact, this shift was at first consciously induced by the colonial government in the fifties through a 'resettlement' plan which moved a large proportion of the people from the more densely populated districts of Mwanza and Kwimba into the neighbouring districts, chiefly Geita. Since then, 'Sukumaland' has gradually expanded, as both cotton and cattle have moved with the population into the neighbouring regions of Tabora, Kigoma, Mara, etc.

The overall result of this has been a tenfold increase in cotton production. But this increase has resulted solely from the expansion of acreage under cotton;<sup>28</sup> the peasants' productivity having by and large remained stagnant despite concerted efforts to exhort them to plant and harvest early, to weed and burn stocks properly, to use insecticides and fertilizers, and so on. Although the area has received by far the highest concentration of field assistants from the various technical ministries, and although various official projects have been attempted there, neither cotton husbandry nor productivity have improved appreciably.<sup>29</sup>

A crucial aspect of this failure to improve productivity has been the negligible impact which the rapid commercialization of production in the area has had on the instruments of labour. The local beneficiaries of this commercialization have been essentially those engaged in intermediary activities—chiefly transporting and trading of all sorts. Such surpluses as have been appropriated by these elements have not found their way back into agricultural production but—where they have not been wasted in conspicuous or bureaucratic consumption—have been invested in the urban areas in non-productive spheres such as houses for rental, shops, petrol stations, etc.

Furthermore, as far as the producers themselves are concerned, this commercialization has not led to a rapid process of social differentiation as has been the case elsewhere. There definitely has not emerged a substantial *kulak* class with a firm base in land and cotton production, instead one has a fairly strong class of both Asian and African traders who are very wealthy and expanding their activities everywhere except in production.

Cotton cultivation has therefore remained a peasant crop, and most work is done by household labour using mainly hand tools. Increasingly, however, ploughs and tractors are playing a bigger role—but again this has resulted from attempts by the traders to maximize their profits through having a firmer grip over those who produce the wealth. Tractor hiring has become a very lucrative business for tractor owners.<sup>30</sup> The productive forces thus continue to be at a very low level because of this social structure. The importance of fertilizers and insecticides is continually stressed by the authorities but again without much success since the resources of the actual producer are so limited as a result of his exploitation by the trader—not to speak of the unequal exchange between his product and industrial goods on the international market.

We have already referred to the 'block farms' that were started by the independent government in the sixties in Sukumaland with a view to creating farm sizes that would allow mechanization and in some cases, aerial spraying. Since, in actual fact, production in these farms continued to be individual in character there could not develop the social organization necessary for the technical organization to bear long term fruits; and in any case, as we have seen, this technical capacity in a situation of under-development was bound to be extremely limited both in the long and short run.

With the launching of the policy of Ujamaa villages in 1967, several of these units began to emerge in Sukumaland more or less spontaneously. As elsewhere in the country, these units were very varied

in nature—some had a substantial degree of communality while others performed co-operative activities more or less in a symbolic manner, some were reasonably well organized while others were in total disarray. We shall now concentrate on Mwanza district as a case in point. Table 6B summarizes the growth of these units in the district.<sup>31</sup>

With the introduction of an official policy of Ujamaa, attention increasingly focused on the established villages. These units began to receive priority in the allocation of government resources, field assistants were increasingly stationed in them and in some cases came to be seconded permanently to individual villages. The tractors that had been used in the previous attempt to establish 'block farms' were in some cases handed to individual Ujamaa villages, but in most cases were retained by the authorities to be loaned free of charge to successive villages during the cultivation season. The immediate problem that arose with this 'tractorization' was, once again, that of breakdowns. Often tractors were grounded just at the time when they were needed most, and often, too, the reason for this would be the lack of a simple spare part which nevertheless had to be ordered abroad. At times, however, even when such spare parts were readily available, the skills and experience required did not exist at grass-root level—as usual no plans had been made to train at least a few peasants in the rudiments of tractor maintenance. Hence the physical presence of tractors in any Ujamaa village did not necessarily mean that the production process was mechanized.

TABLE 6B  
UJAMAA VILLAGES IN MWANZA DISTRICT

	<i>Villages</i>	<i>Households</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Children</i>	<i>Total</i>
1969/70	16	822	1,027	769	1,548	3,344
1970/71	42	1,493	1,689	1,367	4,171	7,227
1971/72	76	3,053	3,043	2,164	7,088	12,295
1972/73	75	3,343	3,519	2,387	7,973	13,879

Nevertheless, another issue that cropped up as far as mechanization was concerned was the correlation between the tractor's capacity to cultivate land and the labour force required to carry out the other productive processes on land not touched by the tractor. For, in this case, the tractor could only plough the land and make ridges, but weeding, applying fertilizers and insecticides, and above all picking and grading the cotton, continued to be done manually.<sup>32</sup> Thus, where mechanization expanded the area under cotton cultivation, these processes became unbearable for many small-and average-size Ujamaa villages. The average size of Ujamaa villages in the district is 45 households with limits of 7 and 263 households.

Because of the emphasis put on cotton by the authorities, most villages naturally have tended to put more of their land under cotton, hence exhausting their capacity to mobilize their labour resources. We encountered a village of less than twenty households which, with the generous assistance of government tractors, had cultivated so many acres of cotton that not even five times their number would have been able to weed the field efficiently and harvest the crop. In the end, more than half of the crop had to be left to rot in the fields.<sup>33</sup>

This problem was of course multiplied by the inadequate organizational ability of these units to effectively mobilize their labour resources for cooperative activities at this early stage when the benefits of such activities are as yet unclear to the participants. Based on a sample of nine villages in Mwanza region, it was found in 1969/70 that the proportion of utilized to available labour on cooperative activities was 52.9 per cent for males and 56.6 per cent for females (with the lowest turn-out for some months being 52.4 per cent and 24.9 per cent for males and females respectively).<sup>34</sup>

Indeed, the problem of production in the Ujamaa villages has been an issue at national level, for in most cases it has been found that while single fields cultivated by them are very large, in actual fact they are insignificant in terms of the labour force available to them. This, however, is not simply a

question of the peasants being deceived by the apparently large size of their collective endeavours, but essentially it is a question of the extent to which the peasant can depend on the cooperative farm when, invariably, its organization is most uncertain, and experience has taught him that 'development' projects initiated by the authorities always fail, and that it is he who suffers most from the failure. His caution is therefore quite understandable.

In a sample of 24 villages in the district, it was found that in 1973, 42 per cent of the villages did communal work for three days in the week, 21 per cent for four days, 8 per cent for five days, and only 4 per cent for six days per week.<sup>36</sup> Needless to add, the length and intensity of the working day are equally varied. In the 75 villages in the district, a total of 7072 acres of communal plots was cultivated in the 1971/72 season, which means that on an average there were 45.2 acres per village and 0.9 acres per person who took part in Ujamaa work<sup>36</sup>—an average that is definitely much below the average production in the area even when one takes into account the fact that villagers in nearly all cases also had substantial private plots.<sup>37</sup>

As far as the application of fertilizers and insecticides is concerned, the formation of Ujamaa villages has had some positive effect. This is because the authorities have been able to enforce their instructions more effectively; the chemicals are delivered to the villagers as a matter of course (the villagers are compelled to pay for them when they market their produce), and the actual presence of government staff in some of the villages has the effect of making sure that instructions are followed—particularly if the villagers, as is always the case, are expecting other forms of government assistance (e.g. education, health, water supply, famine relief, etc.). Yet, it cannot definitely be claimed that productivity in these units has increased in any substantial manner—at least if the present inability of the villages to attract many new members is anything to go by.

Thus, once again, we see that it is the social structure that is the basic cause of the low level of the productive forces and, particularly, of the lack of any significant progress. The Ujamaa villages as production units within this structure cannot be expected to avoid this general problem. Undoubtedly, the extent to which Ujamaa organization and production have developed cannot be compared with the Lushoto case. The efforts to increase cotton production on the part of the authorities have meant that Ujamaa must be implemented more seriously here. Yet the ultimate results are hardly different from those encountered in Lushoto. In so far as the approach of the bureaucracy is that of issuing instructions and dishing out more or less haphazard technical assistance, in so far as this bureaucracy is essentially parasitic on the production process, and in so far as the producers are closely dominated and exploited by a commercial class with no interests in the production process itself, then the development of the productive forces cannot but be minimal, despite enthusiastic officials, and in some cases a population which is just as enthusiastic to implement the new policy of Ujamaa.

### *(c) Handeni District*

Handeni District (Tanga Region) is on the eastern edge of the huge dry plateau that covers most of central Tanzania. Environmental conditions are very adverse to agricultural development; rainfall is low and unreliable—between 700 and 1000 mm—and there is little groundwater. Population density is about 10 per square km. The area has been subject to many severe food shortages in the past: one researcher<sup>38</sup> has numbered 22 years of food scarcity in the period from 1925 to 1972, i.e. almost one year out of two, and of these 13 years were considered particularly severe. Thus the major agricultural problem of the district is to provide enough food for its inhabitants from year to year. There is some doubt, so far, as to whether this can be achieved.

As is frequent in drought-stricken districts, the pressure from above to start Ujamaa villages was very strong in Handeni as early as 1968. From the point of view of the officials, it is easier to supply water and famine relief, and to exercise control, if the population is grouped in villages. It was made compulsory to be an Ujamaa village member if one wanted to get famine relief—although this measure

was not always strictly adhered to in practice. By 1974 there were 82 Ujamaa villages in the district with 40,600 people representing almost 27 per cent of the district population.

Obviously, lack of land is not a problem in the area. The major constraint is time; it is vital for the villagers to cultivate an area as large as possible so as to counteract the effect of disastrous yields due to possible failure of the rains, and to do so as quickly as possible before the beginning of the rainy season. On the other hand, another major constraint will then be labour, since early planting almost necessarily means more weeding. The question of crop selection is also crucial; maize is the major staple in the district, but it is not as drought resistant as, say, millet or sorghum. On the other hand, the latter are very susceptible to attack by birds, so that much time-consuming watching must be done in the fields before harvest.

The problem of cash crops for the district has never been solved satisfactorily. One exception is sisal in villages such as Kabuku Ndani but these villages are hardly representative of the district and will not be dealt with here. The colonial authorities tried to enforce the cultivation of cotton but this always met serious resistance from the people since it meant diverting labour from the cultivation of food crops thus increasing the risk of famine, and for very little return indeed. In 1973, it was found<sup>39</sup> that only about 4.4 per cent of the Ujamaa land was under cotton in central Handeni, and only 2.4 per cent in eastern Handeni. Some researchers think that crops with higher unitary prices, such as tobacco, might prove more attractive to the villagers since 'they give such high returns that the harvest of one year can make up for the failure of the next'.<sup>40</sup> So far, however, tobacco nowhere reaches even 1.00 per cent of the total communal acreage.<sup>41</sup>

So, for some time to come, it is probable that the villages will mainly concentrate on food crops with the aim of achieving self-sufficiency. Even in this area, however, very little improvement in productivity has been realized. In fact, one researcher<sup>42</sup> gives figures for the average yields in communal plots as 1.8 times lower than on individual fields. He attributes this fact to the competition between labour requirements on individual and communal fields, where the individual fields always get the better share.

If the intensity of labour is lower, do the villagers at least make use of their larger numbers to cultivate more extensive areas? The answer here again is no. According to the same study, the average cultivated by one member is 0.3 acres for the district as a whole and, rather significantly, the higher the number of members the smaller the average cultivated per person. Komsala Ujamaa Village, with only 25 members, cultivated 54 acres in 1972 (i.e. 2.16 acres per person), whereas Kwekikhwembe, with 340 members, cultivated 24 acres (0.08 acres per person), and Mkata, with 713 members, only 110 acres (0.15 acres per person). It should, of course, be borne in mind that the number of members correlates only imperfectly with the actual attendance. In one village, the average number of attendants per week between January (cultivating season) and the first two weeks of June (just before harvest) fluctuated as follows:<sup>43</sup>

January	85.5	April	51.8
February	58.2	May	43.7
March	69.5	June	35.0

The very low returns on labour can explain this lack of enthusiasm: for a sample of 33 villages in the district it was estimated that the average yearly income per member—at prevalent producer prices—would have been only Shs 11.25.

It seems that the main reason for this stagnation, apart of course from the unfavourable environmental conditions, is that very little transformation of the productive process has taken place and new inputs have been either non-existent or under-utilized. Relatively little emphasis has been put on tractorization, probably because the risks of failure are so obvious. Instead, the use of oxen has been emphasized since 1971 and two training centres were set up in the region. The results however have been disappointing.<sup>44</sup> It appears that too little time was devoted to training the farmers, for whom ox-

ploughing is an entirely new exercise. Even elementary care in feeding the oxen was neglected, so that many of them were too weak to work and eventually died (tsetse flies also represent a serious obstacle). Moreover, the attitude of officials towards the use of oxen is ambiguous; many of them would prefer tractors which they consider to be a better index of progress (see part II above) so that 'the worst of both worlds' is realized. Mechanization is either not there or unprofitable (one case is known in western Handeni where the same tractor was supposed to be ploughing the land in two villages, Msaje and Nkama, at the same time—places separated by 80 km of bad roads<sup>45</sup>) and ox-ploughs are not properly taken advantage of and do little good, if any.<sup>46</sup>

Much has been written regarding the innumerable problems that Tanzania's Ujamaa villages face as institutions. The issues that have been discussed most often are those concerning the almost complete lack of economic planning and organization, the shortage and haphazard nature of government technical assistances and the dire need for political guidance (see part II above). From a national point of view, however, the most crucial question has been the failure of the Ujamaa policy to make any positive impact on rural production.

Obviously, the low level of production and of the rate of progress in rural Tanzania cannot be explained outside an analysis of the existing social structure and of the manner in which the economy is linked to the international capitalist economy. Hence the fact that this particular policy has not proved to be a substantial basis upon which improvement in rural production could be generated arises from the failure of the policy to address itself to the fundamental problems of social structure and economic integration. In essence, therefore, the issue is really political: to be able to sufficiently mobilize and organize the masses in a manner which would extricate the economy from its domination and exploitation by international capitalism, requires a class base and an ideological perspective which hardly a single African government can be credited with at present.

It is therefore not accidental that the various attempts to bring about 'development' have generally failed to accomplish worthwhile results. As we write, the policy of Ujamaa villages has already begun to lose its official limelight and judging by the measures taken for the rural areas, especially since 1974, it is doubtful if the policy is going to last for long in practice. Increasingly the problems of a dependent and dominated economy have grown to such proportions that drastic measures have had to be resorted to in place of the gradual efforts to create producer cooperatives. By the end of 1973—i.e. just seven years after the policy of Ujamaa villages had been launched—the twin issues of declining foreign exchange reserves and shortage of foodstuffs due to the stagnation of the agricultural sector and worsening terms of trade for agricultural produce on the world market, had become too critical to be contained within existing policies.

What the Ujamaa village policy has tried to do is to raise rural production through political exhortation and enlargement of the peasants' scale of operations. Apart from cooperation, the policy has held constant the amount of technology available in these units, the idea being simply to combine the resources in the hands of the peasants for more rational utilization. It will be recalled that this policy was formulated in the light of the failure of earlier rural policies—particularly the 'settlement scheme' and 'block farms' approaches. These earlier policies had followed the line that it is only by rapid capital injection that rapid progress in rural production can be made, forgetting, as we have already seen, both the necessity for appropriate forms of social organization, and the structural requirements for the continued availability of those capital inputs. The resultant policy went to the other extreme—caring only for cooperative organization without providing for the technical strength without which even this form of social organization cannot be sustained for long.

The experience gained in the attempts to implement the policy so far, is that first, the units do not show any consistent improvement in production and hence in their members' standard of living. This fact leads to numerous social conflicts which are, of course, aggravated by the lack of enlightening ideological leadership from the officials. Therefore the units have a high tendency to disintegrate, a fact

which obviously makes it more difficult to convince other peasants to form similar units. Hence success has been most difficult, whether one looks at implementation from the perspective of individual Ujamaa villages or that of implementing the policy in the entire rural economy.

The official response to this—and particularly to the problems of food shortage and declining foreign exchange reserves—has been to move from ideological exhortation to physical compulsion. At the beginning of 1974, it was suddenly decided to begin compulsory villagization—resettlement of the entire rural population into new areas where it is easier for officials to see to it that the bureaucratic instructions regarding agricultural production are followed by the peasants. Needless to add, the emphasis now is just on ‘production’, and the concept of cooperation has therefore lost much of its earlier prominence.<sup>47</sup>

Judging from past experience, it can hardly be expected that the new approach will solve the existing contradictions and lead to increased economic and social development. If anything, the attempts to increase export crops in the rural areas will only intensify the social contradictions basic to a dependent and dominated economy.

The argument presented here, therefore, is that the development of the productive forces under the system of underdevelopment (as everywhere) is first and foremost a political question. We therefore refrain from offering ‘solutions’ regarding the technical organization of cooperative production. For the failure to maintain tractors in Ujamaa villages, the lack of chemicals and better seeds, the failure to provide the peasants with political and technical guidance, are all structural problems arising both from the nature of the economy and the social basis of political power, hence they cannot be solved by any suggested improvement of ‘techniques’.

As far as mechanization is concerned, the process is bound to continue to be one-sided and thus to fail to bring about any genuine overall development of the productive forces until an indigenous industrial base is constructed in these countries. For developing the agricultural sector of the economy necessarily means strengthening the industrial base at the same time, and as rapidly as possible (since time is vital), and beginning to make full use of the country’s resources both in the industrial and the agricultural sectors. This process will definitely bring upheavals in the social structure, for it will be indispensable to mobilize the large masses of the people instead of leaving the decision-making process in the hands of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie—and this is a feat that the ruling classes in Africa just cannot accomplish.

Recognizing the problems that often arise when mechanical production is introduced in rural Africa, some have concluded that mechanization *per se* is inappropriate: ‘The governments of developing countries must realize that the continuance of hard labour in agriculture is not shameful but a rational response to the prevailing circumstances.’<sup>48</sup> This is nothing but a defence and rationalization of those ‘prevailing circumstances’, for the masses of Africa definitely need mechanization so as to increase their cultivable area, increase yields, reduce fatigue, and so on—only the political organization needed for this is at the moment absent.

Others have urged much more ‘cautious’ mechanization: for instance, Dumont has suggested that the tractor should come only in stages—the first steps being directed at increasing the quality of work with hand tools and improvement of these hand tools themselves; then attempts should be made to introduce insecticides and fungicides, manures and fertilizers. He says, ‘When the spread of these new means of production has allowed a fairly significant yield level to be reached, and when the knowledge of husbandry and mechanical knowledge are raising it more quickly, then one can think of the tractor’.<sup>49</sup> These reformist approaches have been tried both by the colonial governments and their successors without any measurable success.

The underlying assumption of these ‘solutions’ is the idea that Africa is still at an early socio-economic level, long left behind by the developed countries. Analysing the failure of the colonial government to institute mechanical farming of groundnuts in Tanganyika, one author asked: ‘Is it possible for

Africa to go direct from the Middle Ages to the twenty-first century? Can you cut out the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, which was its aftermath?<sup>50</sup> The fact is that Africa is in the second half of the twentieth century, like Europe, America and the rest of the world—and not in the Middle Ages. As has now become a cliché, development and underdevelopment are two sides of the same process of capitalist expansion.<sup>51</sup>

This is not to suggest that the most complex aspects of mechanization, chemicalization, etc., ought to be introduced immediately all over Africa and that hand tools, ploughs, etc., have no role to play. That this is not so should be clear from the earlier discussion. The basic point made here is that a certain political framework is necessary if technical processes of various kinds are to bring about an overall development of the productive forces and thus improve the living conditions of the masses.

#### Footnotes

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- 6 J.R. Nellis, *A Theory of Ideology: the Tanzanian Example*, Nairobi, 1972.
- 7 The story of these schemes has been retold many times, see, for instance, A.O. Ellman, 'The Introduction of Agricultural Innovations through Cooperative Farming', *East African Journal of Rural Development*, vol. 3, no. 1, 1971; L. Cliffe and G.L. Cunningham, 'Ideology, Organisation and the Settlement Experience', in L. Cliffe and J. Saul (eds.), *Socialism in Tanzania*, vol. 2, Dar es Salaam, 1973; and N. Newinger, 'Village Settlement Schemes,' in H. Ruthenberg (ed.), *Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania*, Munich, 1968.
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- 12 cf. P. Raikes, 'Ujamaa Vijijini and Rural Socialist Development', East African Universities' Social Science Conference, 1973; H. Mapolu, 'The Social and Economic Organisation of Ujamaa Villages', M.A. thesis, 1973 (mimeo).
- 13 cf. the case of Ikwiriri Ujamaa Village in H. Mapolu, [12].
- 14 cf. unpublished research papers by sociology students in Dodoma district.
- 15 cf. P. Raikes, *op. cit.*, and M. von Freyhold, 'Rural Development through Ujamaa', Dar es Salaam, 1972, for all the problems cited.
- 16 cf. P. Raikes, 'Village Planning for Ujamaa', *Taamuli*, 1972.
- 17 See [16].
- 18 cf. the various studies by I. Shivji, *Tanzania: the Silent Class Struggle*, Dar es Salaam, 1973 and *Class Struggle in Tanzania*, Dar es Salaam (forthcoming).
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- 21 cf. Raikes, [16].
- 22 On the general problems of development in Lushoto district, see M. Attems, in H. Ruthenberg (ed.), *op. cit.*; and L. Cliffe, W. Luttrell and J. Moore, 'The Development Crisis in the Western Usambaras' in L. Cliffe et al. (eds.), *Rural Cooperation in Tanzania*, Dar es Salaam, 1975.
- 23 cf. L. Cliffe, 'Nationalism and the Reaction to Enforced Agricultural Change in Tanganyika during the Colonial Period', in L. Cliffe and J. Saul (eds.), *op. cit.*
- 24 The districts are Mwanza, Geita, Kwimba and Magu in Mwanza Region, and Shinyanga and Maswa in Shinyanga Region.
- 25 cf. D. Conyers et al., 'Agro-Economic Zones of Sukumaland', BRALUP Research Report, no. 16, Dar es Salaam, 1970.
- 26 The density is 63 persons per km<sup>2</sup> for Mwanza Region (the highest among Tanzania's regions) and 21 persons for Shinyanga Region.
- 27 Cotton now contributes about 30 per cent of all agricultural export earnings, and Mwanza and Shinyanga regions contribute about 75 per cent of the country's cotton produce.
- 28 cf. BRALUP, 'Preliminary Report of the Sukumaland Interdisciplinary Research Project.'
- 29 Cotton yields in Tanzania for 1971/72 were 205 pounds per acre, compared to an average of 241 for Africa as a whole, 243 for Asia, 296 for E. Europe, 479 for North America, and 645 for W. Europe: *Cotton World Statistics*, July 1972.
- 30 Ox-ploughs are not very popular since their ability to cultivate the land well enough for cotton is more limited.
- 31 H. Mapolu [12], p. 68.



- 32 According to the *Tanzania Cotton Growing Handbook* prepared by the Lint and Seed Marketing Board and the Ministry of Agriculture, the labour requirements for an acre of cotton in Sukumaland are: 8 man-days to 'sessa', 11 man-days to ridge, 2 man-days to sow, 4 man-days to tie-ridge, 4-6 man-days to weed per weeding, 2 man-days to apply fertilizer, half a man-day to spray. Picking and grading takes 60 pounds per man-day and 40-100 pounds per man-day respectively.
- 33 This was quite common particularly from 1968 to 1970 all over Tanzania.
- 34 R.D. Sharma, 'Manpower Utilization in Ujamaa Villages', Ukiriguru Research and Training Institute Report.
- 35 H. Mapolu [12], p. 85.
- 36 [12], p. 70.
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- 39 [38].
- 40 M. von Freyhold, *op. cit.*
- 41 S. Sumra, *op. cit.*
- 42 [41].
- 43 [41].
- 44 [41].
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- 50 A. Wood, *The Groundnut Affair*, London, 1950, p. 245.
- 51 cf. A.G. Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*, New York, 1967.