

Some aspects of ideological functions in the Development of the Post-Colonial State in Tanzania

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Introduction

Although the importance of politics and ideology in the much discussed « novel experience » of Tanzania are generally recognized, they are very rarely — and this is particularly true of ideology — the subjects of rigorous analyses. There can be little doubt, however, of the fact that the ideological question is crucial in the internal developments of the post-colonial state in African societies such as Tanzania. Such political and ideological developments require situating within a wider and more rigorous analytical framework than this paper, given its scope, is able to offer. The present effort must therefore be understood as being a preliminary analysis of the function of ideology in the specific context of the Tanzanian experience which will necessarily require greater theoretical elaboration.

1. The Problem

The ideological factor in the Tanzania social formation derives its importance from its role within the specificity of the experience of the classes comprising that formation. This is not to say that this role cannot be understood from a general understanding of ideology, but simply to stress that the particular expression ideology assumes in Tanzania can best be appreciated if placed within the context of a specific social practice. The point may be expressed another way : ideological functions in Tanzania, as in other social formations, are derived from the fundamental contradictions characteristic of that society. It follows, therefore, that a potentially fruitful analysis of ideology takes as its starting point the contradictions evident in the society being analysed.

This has not been the general practice of those who have considered the question of ideology in Tanzania. Studies which touch upon or deal directly with the questions, tend to assume that ideology can be treated as a neutral instrument which may be taken and used indiscriminately. For example, Benien hailed the Arusha Declaration as

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being « an ideology for Africa » (1), as if ideology is like a knife which can be used to cut with and therefore it is a question of finding the correct ideology for a given situation. On the 'left' the situation has not been any better: Cliffe and Saul, as representatives of early 'leftist' trends in Tanzanian academic life, reduced the question of ideology to an unspecified set of abstractions. Still for others the question would appear to be reducible to a general, and necessarily vague, question of international finance capital. There is, in short, a conspicuous lack of a thorough-going analysis of ideology which takes as its starting point a materialist perspective of the class contradictions and struggle in Tanzania (2). This point has particular bearing on the efforts of those who take as their unit of analysis the political thought of President Nyerere (3). The President is usually treated as if he lived, worked and thought in a vacuum; he is usually presented as if he is an island in himself. Such treatments, of course, ignore Nyerere's own stress on the close relationship between society, economy and polity. His preoccupation with the very real socio-economic and political problems of Tanzania from which his political views derive are not perceived as part of the cognition process (4).

The general view that consequently from the literature is one that further mystifies rather than clarifies the question of ideology. With respect to the specific case of the Tanzanian social formation this question is usually presented within theoretical frameworks which are inadequate for the task of generating questions which can signal any significant advance in our understanding of that formation. So far then as a general or formal definition of ideology is possible and useful, ideology is best regarded as being the reconstitution of an imaginary relationship at a specific level of social existence. This understanding of the question is, of course, derived from the works of Louis Althusser and Nicos Poulantzas (5) and is adopted not without some caution because some of the logical outcomes of this formulation are wholly misleading. It cannot be denied, however, that this perception of ideology, particularly *if restricted* to capitalist formations, marks a distinct advance in a materialist understanding of the complexities involved in the 'base/superstructure' problem. The limited scope of this paper does not allow for the development of these points but it is important to indicate the relevance of this understanding of the question for the purpose at hand.

Firstly, the formulation takes us away from a presentation of ideology as being a simple and direct representation of the 'real' and therefore rejects the crude dichotomy between the 'real'/'unreal' as found in the formulations articulated by Lukacs and Korsch who, amongst others, have kept alive the Hegelianism of the young Marx. Ideology as a specific aspect of a social practice must be perceived as being very real indeed but this does not mean that it is 'true'; the question, however, need not necessarily be related to the empirically defined 'truth'/'falsity' problem found in the historicist formulation. What are therefore reflected — if this is the best way to express the point — are not in fact the real relations themselves but an existing false understanding of those relations.

This may be illustrated by Marx's own analysis of the first encounter between labour and capital in the market when the former appears as seller (of labour power) and the latter appears as purchaser (of labour/time). In this encounter the two agents enter the market as 'equals', as 'bare individuals' and they exchange equivalents. Yet, this encounter, with its apparent equality, 'hides' the fundamental contradiction between capital and labour which exists prior to this isolated encounter and which is fundamental to their wider social relations. Thus bourgeois juridico-political ideology blurs, hides, the distinction underpinning the apparent equality. The scene of transaction, therefore, appears as « in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man ». But this does not nullify the fact that this 'phenomenal form', as Marx calls it, exists : Tanzania can be fruitfully approached in this manner ; certainly, it cannot be categories. The rather simplistic notion that arises from this formulation of the question that ideology is a sort of instrument which can be manipulated to more or less move people to do or not to do a particular set of social action, is not particularly analytically useful.

Secondly, the formulation under consideration — particularly as elaborated by Poulantzas — allows for a more theoretically adequate understanding of the complexity that ideology is in capitalist social formations. This is perhaps the strongest point in Poulantzas' presentation of the question. Ideology, for him, has a specific region which exercises some autonomy, although determined in the last instance by the economic ; it is a « relatively coherent ensemble of representations, values, beliefs » (6) and different aspects of ideology — the moral, political, religious, economic — may dominate the rest depending on the combination in a specific mode of production. In the feudal social formation, although the political was the dominant region in the formation it was religious ideology which tended to dominate the various aspects of ideology, not the political. Under capitalism, on the other hand, the dominant region within the ideological was, at a particular phase, the juridico-political, under monopoly capital economic ideology is tending, in Poulantzas, view, to dominate. It is characteristic of the dominant region of the ideological that it not only hides the fundamental contradictions in capitalist society but it also hides the fact of its dominance. This dominance may be identified by the degree of borrowing by other ideologies from a particular aspect, for example, borrowings from religious ideology under feudalism and borrowings from the juridico-political under capitalism.

An important consideration that flows from this discussion is the fact that for Poulantzas there is one, single ideology perceivable at particular periods of a given mode of production. There are at any one point in time, a number of ideologies co-existing — in capitalist formations there may be expected to be bourgeois, working-class, peasant, petit-bourgeois, etc., ideologies. In such a formation the dominant ideology need *not necessarily* be bourgeois ideology as it would appear in the historicist formulation of the problem. Almost invariably a mixture of feudal, bourgeois, petit-bourgeois ideologies may be expected to form the ideological at any one time. The dominant ideology, for

example bourgeois ideology in such a formation, will be 'contaminated' by the sub-ensemble of ideologies in the society and will not therefore exist in a 'pure' form.

Such a presentation is invaluable in any endeavour to understand the question of ideology in a post-colonial state such as Tanzania where ideology appears to play an important role in the social formation. The formulation helps us to raise some relevant questions made necessary by the fact that the social formation being looked at exists within a post-colonial situation. Thus, the idea that one may expect to find an impure bourgeois ideology, for example, in the metropolitan 'centres', properly handled, can help us to hypothesise more usefully about the *mixed* nature of ideology of the formation under consideration. This leads to the whole question of 'petit-bourgeois ideology' but although this concept can be useful it is not wholly adequate to deal with the question of ideology in the Tanzanian social formation, because to characterize ideology in Tanzania merely as 'petit-bourgeois' is insufficient. For, although this supposed fragmented class is expected to project a correspondingly fragmentary and eclectic ideology these features of ideology in Tanzania *necessarily* leads also to a consideration of the effect of imperialism on ideological construction.

A third aspect of this formulation which is of importance to this paper is the view that ideology has a « specific objective level » in the social formation and that it therefore has identifiable functions (7). The stress on the 'function' of ideology in Althusser and Poulantzas is such that some of their critics have correctly pointed to the high functionalist understanding of ideology which may possibly arise from their presentations of the question (8). Even so, the function of ideology cannot be ignored and what is therefore more useful is to determine the status that 'function' has as a criterion for the definition of ideology, rather than to abandon it, even though it may appear to bring us close to an empirically defined functionalism.

Ideology attempts to ignore, and exclude the contradictions operative at another dimension of social life. Ideology in class society thereby *attempts* to resolve these contradictions at its plane of social existence; it attempts to get people to see themselves as parts of a harmonious whole and to such an extent ideology may be logical, consistent and coherent. Indeed, such is the integrative, cohesive function of ideology that a dominant ideology usually forces the oppressed classes to carry out their ideological struggle within the framework set by that ideology.

In the specific case of the Tanzanian social formation the cohesive function of ideology is a necessary one due to historical developments — of course, not all particular to that formation. The new *governing* faction which assumed formal political powers, were forced to be creative if they were to surmount these problems and one implication of this was that the development of ideological functions in Tanzania took on an active and dynamic characteristic, so much so that to a considerable degree an occlusion of its objective function has been achieved.

2. Ideological Functions in Tanzania

In more specific terms some of the most important aspects of the functions of ideology in the Tanzanian social formation have been to (i) create a new unity of the social formation itself, (ii) establish a new framework within which the concept of work would appear acceptable to the productive classes and, (iii) foster a significantly modified concept of the state. These relate to the function of political ideology which is the dominant region of ideology in the Tanzanian formation and therefore tend to dominate the other areas of it. These do not exhaust the specific functions of ideology in this formation but they may be tentatively stated as being the more important aspects. These three specific instances of ideological functions may be treated separately for analytical purpose but in practice they are of course closely intertwined and do not enjoy the autonomy or independence the presentation would appear to attribute to them.

(i)

One of the social effects of the backward state of Tanzanian economy was that with the nationalist struggle for political independence in the 1950s, there was an almost total unity of social classes behind the banner of TANU. What little opposition there was the Party was able to surmount more easily than if there had been a greater degree of social differentiation in the society of the kind prevalent in some former West African colonies. Indeed, in some non-African colonies the process of constitutional decolonization took as long as two or more generations to mature not merely because the colonialists were reluctant to relinquish power but more importantly because of the intra-class conflict in the colonies themselves over the very issue of independence. Tanganyika did not go through such a process as Nyerere himself recognizes — « The fact is » he wrote and has repeated in various places and forms, « historical circumstances favoured Tanganyika » (10) in this particular respect.

But the degree of unity which was achieved during the nationalist period seemed destined to break-down at the impact of political independence after 1961. For although independence did not bring about fundamental changes in the socio economic arrangements of the country, it did have very important effects upon them. Very quickly the undeveloped class formations both started and held back by colonialism began to develop as government institutions expanded, as localization of aspects of the civil service occurred and as education and other career-orientated fields developed and offered opportunities to hitherto blocked segments of the class that had assumed political power. In short, the nationalist unity crumpled by the degree to which the 'petit-bourgeoisie', or the 'nizers' or the 'bureaucratic-bourgeoisie' (11) (however described) began to develop and distinguish itself from the depressed working class in the towns and the mass of the peasantry. Contradictions between the classes and within the 'petit-bourgeoisie' itself began to find political expression — the very terrain on which the struggle for independence had been fought.

Being a relatively inexperienced governing faction the leadership reacted harshly — at least initially — to this crisis of unity, imposing drastic measures to ensure control, particularly after the army mutiny in 1964 which supplied the leadership with the opportunity to forcefully nip in the bud any alternative source of power in the society, such as the trade union movement. But the Tanzanian leadership may be distinguished from most African political leaderships by its sense to seek for a more lasting social peace not by force but by ideological means; thus, whilst political force may have been used to restore a working unity, its continuation could only be safeguarded by the ideological weaponry of the state.

One of the main characteristics of the ideological level in the Tanzanian formation therefore is the notion of social and political unity; if at the more practical level of day-to-day existence the formation reveals its rifts and contradictions, at the ideological plane these do not appear. In his early and important essay, *Ujamaa : The Basis of African Socialism*, Nyerere, who himself articulates the tenets of this ideology clearest in Tanzania, argued that the main characteristic of traditional African society, which he wished to see having a bearing on contemporary developments in the country, was unity. This unity was expressed in the spirit of 'ujamaa', or 'familiarity' which would also be the source of the new unity he sought for the new Tanzania. The new social order was to be informed by values to be found in the traditional African family. Even after the Arusha Declaration the word retained this meaning for Nyerere who stressed that 'ujamaa' was specially chosen to describe the socialism that Tanzania wished to follow it was chosen because « it brings to the mind of our people the idea of mutual involvement in the family as we know it (12). For Nyerere the family in African traditional society was a harmonious unit within which there was no fundamental rift reflecting particularistic interests; the interest of the individual was also the interest of the whole. For Nyerere, therefore, the individual in pre-colonial (pre-capitalist) African society enjoyed an equality with his fellows because there were no class interests « I doubt if the equivalent for the idea of 'class' exists in any indigenous African language; for language describes the ideas of those who speak it and the idea of class or 'caste' was non-existent in African society » (13). Rather, it was the 'extended family' which was the basis or the foundation of the social order that obtained and was informed by the mutual feeling members of a family are assumed to have for each other.

Taking these propositions as the starting-point of his social-political philosophy, Nyerere has repeatedly emphasized that in the attempt to build socialism, defined as ujamaa, Tanzania would be opposed to « doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man »; (14). Nyerere found this conflict « intolerable » because it is fundamentally antagonistic and divisive. This position has remained a basic principle in Nyerere's social thinking even though its presentation has been sometimes modified. This basic political position has had profound effects on the development of the state ideological apparatuses in Tanzania, such as the political party and the ideology of political participation

has been served by it. Two illustrations may serve to make the point clearer.

The stress on unity helps to present all Tanzanians, irrespective of the determinate structural position they occupy in the society, as equals in their relations to the means of production; all are described as workers and consequently the antagonistic underlying relation between capital and labour is perceived as non-existent because all participants in a given concern are involved in a common enterprise. This view very much resembles the marginal utility theory which held that both labour and capital receive what they brought to the enterprise or, the post-industrial society 'theories' of sociologists such as Dahrendorf, which identify a common interest in the economy by all. The situation in Tanzania has been stated more explicitly and particularly in relation to the economy. For example, Job Lusinde, a Minister, told a group of NDC Managers in 1970 that public enterprises « are owned by the public who include workers of the enterprises themselves » (15). The worker, generally, is presented and encouraged to see himself as 'owner' or 'partner' not merely an 'employee' of a given public enterprise. The Presidential Circular, N° 1, of 1970 conceived of workers being eventually regarded as « fully respected partners » because, presumably, nationalization entailed « community ownership » (16). The legal form which is currently utilized to express property ownership (nationalization) plays the function of blurring the contradictory relation between labour and capital, whatever form capital may take in this specific context. Of course, this is not unique to the Tanzanian case, but given the relative political positions between the classes in Tanzanian society, this may be more effective than elsewhere.

Secondly, the unitary perspective that ideology provides also has serious implications at the political level. Platt (17), among others, has correctly stressed the fact that in Nyerere's conception of the polity there is no room for conflicting groups; in the President's view of society and polity a harmonious relationship exists so that one all-embracing group — the party (TANU/CCM) — is sufficient to accommodate all possible views. The Party which claims and is seen to represent the wishes of the people as a whole also serves as the forum for the 'arguing until we agree' perception of democracy that Nyerere endorsed in his early polemical pieces. For example, in one such paper, « The African and Democracy » (18), he postulated that democracy need to take the two-party form it has taken in western countries and therefore the prescription of these forms for Africa was incorrect and betrayed an insensitivity to indigenous democratic practices. Discussion, equality and freedom were African characteristics and Nyerere has always argued that these should be given institutional forms in a developing Tanzanian state. Thus, in his *Guide* to the commissioners who were asked to look into the mechanics of establishing a one-party state in Tanzania, The President specifically emphasized that although there would be « maximum political freedom for all » this freedom would have to be exercised « within the context of a single national movement » (19). The Commission was not asked to consider, the President pointed out, « whether Tanganyika should be a one-party state.

That decision », he made clear, « has already been taken » (20). Many liberals would see here a profound distrust by Nyerere of one of their most cherished principles, namely, the freedom of association in order to represent particularistic interests and perhaps more importantly to ensure democratic practices in a political community.

The development of the ideological apparatuses of the state in Tanzania reflects and gives concrete forms to these ideas. Perhaps the best example of this is the development of the Party as the sole actor of its kind in the political arena. The Interim Constitution in which the one-Party state is enshrined declares that :

All political activity in Tanzania, other than that of the organs of state... shall be conducted by or under the auspices of the Party (21).

This was more than simply giving legal/institutional form to a *de facto* situation; the constitutional change effectively blocked any possibility of formal, institutional opposition emerging to jeopardize the unity of the social formation. Another glaring example of the institutionalization of unitary ideas is that of the trade union movement which was effectively brought under the control of the Government and Party so that consequently the two roles which usually, if only symbolically, represent the underlying conflict between capital and labour, the Minister of Labour and the Secretary-General of the trades union movement, are merged by virtue of one functionary combining both contradictory roles simultaneously. It is probably here that the notion of one-ness expresses itself most clearly in an institutional form and at the same time convinces itself that these contradictions no longer obtain.

Even after the creation of a unity at the ideological level and the obvious effect of this on the ideological apparatuses, deep rifts existed in the Tanzanian social formation because the mode of production remained predominantly capitalist, with subordinated features of pre-capitalist and socialist modes. But the apparent success of the new unity at the level of the ideological led many leaders, it would appear, to over estimate the extent to which this was true also at the primary dimension of social life. Realization of the fact that this was not the case by the most conscious element of the leadership led to the enunciation of the Arusha Declaration in 1967 : particularistic interests had to be subjected to wider interests. Some commentators have viewed this as a positive sign as regards the 'good' intentions of the leadership but this is hardly the point at all : it is not a case of whether the leadership had 'good' or 'bad' intentions; rather, it was a situation in which they were taking steps to 'correct' a situation in the direction they would have preferred to see developments taking. More recently also Nyerere, always far ahead of his colleagues, intimated that there may be *internal* enemies who Africans will have to fight if the economic as well as the political independence of Africa is to be realized (22). Depending on the degree to which the President is prepared to take

this line of argument it may be possible to argue that he is seeing a crack in the unity he has stressed over the years and the stamp of which institutions in Tanzania bear.

In terms of the question at hand, however, there can be little doubt that at the ideological level a unity is reconstituted. The effect of this region on the primary level of contradictions, the ultimately determinant economic, is evident — the notion of unity does seem to have a very real, definite, effect on the relations existing at that level. Individuals are not only perceived to 'live' this unity, to a significant degree they do in fact 'live' this unity. In a sense, then, the Hegelian perception that what exists is not necessarily real, washed of the philosophers concern over 'existence' and 'essence', may well have a meaning: in other words, to 'live' the unity is not to say that this unity negates the fundamental contradictions in 'reality'. It is in this sense too that ideology can be said to exercise a measure of relative autonomy, *vis-à-vis* the economic 'base' and the political 'superstructure'.

(ii)

The fundamental problem faced by an underdeveloped class in a neo-colonial situation, is not political in the first instance but economic and becomes political precisely because this weak/underdeveloped class does not have the resources to fully assert itself predominate and thus establish its hegemony over the classes. It therefore resorts to the political sphere to enhance and develop. In Tanzania this situation was compounded by the fact that the « *petit-bourgeoisie* » as a whole suffered from the fact that those with the greater share of economic power at independence were not (ethnically) Africans and therefore struggled with the African factions rather than enhanced 'petit-bourgeois' strength. This had the effect of strengthening the governing faction, politically and thrusting upon it the double task of subjugating the various factions and, secondly, improving on the colonial system in providing a stable political system which would ensure safe accumulation. But the problem of how to ensure the rapid generation of surplus entailed that the state should enter directly into the economy, rather than simply providing the Benthamite edifice of (legal) rights for the safe conduct necessary for such accumulation. This problem which faces many dominant classes in post-colonial states usually express itself in terms of 'economic development' or 'growth' with economists being concerned with the 'take-off point' of such 'developments'. Presented then with the need to create appropriate factors to ensure the creation of surplus, if this class were to develop or to even maintain itself, the more conscious elements of the class perceived correctly (in terms of class perceptions) that there was a need not only for cohesion of the social formation but also to put this cohesion to good economic use. Again, the manner in which the Tanzanian *petit-bourgeoisie* tackled this question marks it off from most African social formations which the governing factions were faced with similar problems in the 1950-60s. Whereas most of these classes broached these questions in an emphatically pure/vulgar economic manner, with their social practices repeating some of the grossest excesses of early capitalist accumulation in the West combined with a political barbarity the

barbarians would have shivered at, the Tanzanian petit-bourgeoisie has laid a great deal of stress on the ideological functions of the state. Thus, in terms of the specific question of accumulation the petit-bourgeoisie tackled it by attempting to build a social ethic within which the concept of work was to take pride of place.

Whether or not it was meant to confront historical materialism (which asserts the primacy of matter, ultimately, over ideas) Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of the Capitalism*, does point to an important factor within the development of capitalism. The Calvinist ethic that God rewards each individual in this world according to the measure of his work gave the accent to hard work in an ideology appropriate to the capitalist mode of production. In other words, the ideological presentation of work in capitalism as a rewarding activity was and remains a necessary factor if surplus is to be achieved and discipline enforced. Under pre-capitalist modes of production the attitude to work was not perceived as being so important to the individual largely because he was not individualized nor was he removed from the means of production in the manner that he is under capitalism. In the specific case of Tanzania, it remains a question for investigation as to the degree to which capitalist values penetrated what is usually poorly described as 'traditional' values. This question is not made any more easy by the fact that pre-capitalist modes developed and maintained values which are not inimical to capitalism. However, with regards to the work ethic there would appear to be a great need still to create one more favourable to the capitalist mode of production that currently obtains. The very fact, of course, that the productive forces are backward means that the relations of workers to work is likely to remain backward in a number of important ways. Briefly then, the problem of how to speed-up the process of accumulation has led the dominant class in Tanzania to tackle the task of creating a work ethic appropriate to the ends in view.

At the ideological level, therefore, work in Tanzania is presented as being a moral virtue whilst lack of work evidences moral shortcomings. The man who does not work is portrayed as an 'exploiter', as 'lazy', as a 'loiterer'. In *Ujamaa* Nyerere stressed that 'loitering' in traditional African society was « an unthinkable disgrace; everybody », he emphasized, « was a worker » (23). The 'worker', in his view, cannot be simply contrasted with the 'employer', he must also be contrasted with the 'loiterer' or the 'idler'. In traditional African society, therefore, the security men enjoyed derived from the fact that « it was taken for granted that every member of society — barring only the children and the infirm — contributed his fair share of effort towards the production of its wealth » (24). In the Arusha Declaration itself these points received greater refinements; Nyerere argued that :

In our country work should be something to be proud of, and laziness, drunkenness and idleness should be things to be ashamed of (25).

He went on, in talking about 'good policies' for the country to stress that no one should be allowed to sponge off others because this was exploitation of friends and relatives and at the wider social dimension :

Likewise, nobody should be allowed to loiter in towns or villages without doing work which would enable him to be self-reliant without exploiting his relatives (26).

These statements elaborate the unitary perception the President has of society in what he understands as 'traditional' Africa and they are also his prescriptions for the new Tanzania under socialist construction. But in his view the society also has a duty towards the individual — it is duty bound to provide work for him. In his speeches and writings Nyerere has remained very aware of the importance of the question of an appropriate work ethic to what he conceives of Tanzania as doing and repeatedly he has stated that work constitutes one of the three elements necessary in the production of wealth. Two points may serve to both illustrate the general argument here and Nyerere's own attitude over the years.

To achieve a modern socialist society, as conceived by the leadership, it is seen as necessary to discipline the work force. In the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere recognized that the « biggest requirement is hard work » and reasoned that urban workers working for forty-five (45) hours per week and between forty-eight to fifty weeks in the year were insufficient — « For a country like ours these are really quite short working-hours », he concluded. In his view, the « normal (my emphasis) thing is to begin with long working hours and decrease them as the country becomes more and more prosperous » for to start with such short working hours is really to imitate developed societies which themselves begun with much longer hours when they started to develop (7). Undoubtedly the underlying basis of the argument is correct because labour is the creator of wealth and if the need is to generate surplus then the labour — time of the worker must be reconsidered by the participants in this particular context of primitive accumulation.

In the Declaration the stress is placed on rural, not urban, development because it is the peasantry which produced the surplus — a point which calls for examination of the peasantry as a more productive class than the urban working class which produced industrial substitutes and a reconsideration of the political potentials of the two classes as a result. Yet, in terms of work, Nyerere felt that even in the villages people were not working as much as they could — apart from the women. He pointed out that :

The energies of the millions of men in the villages and the thousands of women in the towns which are at present wasted in gossip, dancing and drinking could contribute more towards the development of our country than anything we could get from rich nations (28).

The discipline, however, that Nyerere calls for is encouraged, in the first instance, to come from workers themselves, rather than be imposed. This necessitates and entails that the worker internalizes and 'lives' this discipline himself. In *Freedom and Development*, Nyerere writes that — « all have to work together, and all of us have to accept the discipline we impose upon ourselves. It must be joint discipline... But in accepting this discipline *we must remain free men, implementing our own decisions* » (29).

Moreover, the President has come to believe that the best way to ensure that workers achieve high productivity, particularly in the public sector, is to encourage workers' participation. In his own view « true industrial discipline does not exclude the workers in an industry from participation in the enterprise, or from a responsibility for its improvement (30). Indeed, the « true discipline in a workplace should be easier when the workers understand what they are doing... » (31). Means should therefore be instituted to ensure that workers do participate in decision-making regarding planning, marketing, etc., in particular, the worker should be acquainted with the 'work targets' of the enterprise and he should know how his division of labour fits into a greater whole. But this did not mean that workers had interests which were different from those of management, indeed, the Workers' Councils which were set up to effect these aims reflected in their composition Nyerere's unitary view of worker and management in an enterprise.

As with the unity of the social formation, labour cannot be allowed to go unsubjected to discipline should the individual fail to respond positively to self-discipline. Consequently, failure to be engaged in work, in production in one way or another, has not been viewed without displeasure by the institutions of state. In opening the Chinese-aided Friendship Textile Mill in 1968, Nyerere remarked :

It seems that some people in this country have taken the emphasis on people in the Arusha Declaration to mean that there can be slackness in work, and that people in supervisory position can do nothing about it. Nothing can be further from the truth. The Arusha Declaration demands more discipline, not less (my emphasis) (32).

Thus, the President made it clear that although maximum output cannot be achieved without workers imposing their own discipline on themselves should they fail to do so, « then there must be hard industrial discipline imposed by management » (33). Although at one time Nyerere commented that unemployment is no problem for Tanzania, in recent years youth have repeatedly flocked to the towns from the rural areas in search of urban employment because the regime has not been able to convince youth that its proper place of work is in the countryside. Failure to gain employment in urban areas has been met with a ready response from the state, so that from time to time the coercive arms of the state, the police and militia, are called out by

the Party to round-up the unemployed and return them to the villages where their labour is needed. In this situation the ideological and the coercive arms of the state, combined to achieve a desired result. This could also be said of the policy of setting up ujamaa villages for which Tanzania has earned an international reputation : again, when persuasion failed the force was, reportedly, applied to get people to move into such villages. It is important to note also that the setting-up of ujamaa villages represents perhaps the most important method used in Tanzania to discipline the work force in the countryside. Ujamaa, therefore, was partly geared also as bringing elements of the peasantry together in closer units which made them more united as a workforce and more accessible as a producing stratum of the peasantry. This was particularly important in a country which did not experience the plantation systems to any significant extent.

(iii)

The proclaimed 'ideology' of Tanzania is 'socialism' but the obvious variance between this and the predominant mode of production that exists has led to a great deal of debate in some quarters over the question whether Tanzania is indeed a socialist country, but this is not at issue here for it leads to questions which go beyond the stated aims of this paper. Nyerere himself has never claimed that Tanzania is a socialist country but rather that there is a commitment to build socialism and to foster a socialist outlook in the country. It is however, useful to consider briefly what the leadership means by "socialism" and how this understanding — often referred to as 'ideology' — has its own ideological function.

Nyerere's *Ujamaa* opens polemically with the statement that « Socialism — like democracy — is an attitude of mind » (34) and in defending this thesis he pointed out that it is feasible to have socialists who are millionaires and poor men who are, in attitude, capitalists. There is a strong condemnation running through the tract of what are considered to be capitalist values such as hoarding, acquisitiveness and lack of care for the poor. In Nyerere's view « society itself should look after « those without » and this was « exactly what traditional African society succeeded in doing » (35). Both 'rich' and 'poor' were secured in that society and therefore ujamaa, or Tanzanian socialism is aimed at achieving such ends. Nyerere has not departed from this view of socialism although in the Arusha Declaration this received the elaboration that socialism is also « a way of life » but only because it is first 'an attitude of mind'. What was 'new' in this regard with the Declaration is that Nyerere now took deliberate steps to give organizational form to this 'attitude of mind'. The socialism Nyerere sees Tanzania striving towards has utter disregard for « doctrinaire marxism » and for capitalism ; this socialism is characterized essentially by its eclectic nature — there are elements which can be traced effortlessly to the early socialist, the British fabians and more recent social-democratic trends in West Europe and there is also a strong sense of christian values interspersed. Nyerere's intense conviction of these values and his attempts to provide them with an African foundation gives a dis-

tinct political colour to what would appear to be a contradictory set of values.

The 'ideology of socialism' succeeds to a significant degree in transforming the (ideological) presentation the state received under colonialism. Whereas the liberal democratic state presented itself as representing the 'general interest' but in fact through its institutions mediated between the various antagonistic interests of the dominant class (es) the colonial state made no pretence, initially, to be 'representing' the people/nation but accorded preferential treatment, such like the state under feudalism, to the various factions depending on economic as well as racial status. With political independence, however, the 'bare individual' of bourgeois juridico-political ideology was able to better make his appearance — each individual now had 'equal rights' before the law and the principle of 'one man, one vote' became an actuality. But the changing situation which expressed itself first at the political level also involved changes at the level of the ideological; but such ideological changes, since they came via the political, had to be superimposed. Consequently, the individual is not only a 'bourgeois individual' but also a 'social' or 'socialist' individual: in the crucial areas of work and political participation the individual is partly transformed' from being the rather selfish, Benthamite atom into one which has a social responsibility. At the level of the state itself, representation is not particularistic but general, or, more, precisely, the state is presented as coming close to representing Rousseau's 'general will'; interests become universalized. Where factions seek representation therefore justification must be understood to be derived from socialist norms if they are to be considered legitimate.

Perhaps an equally important aspect of the ideology of socialism' in the formation under discussion is that it functions so as to eradicate all evidence of class domination. Poulantzas has correctly pointed out that one of the most important features of bourgeois ideology is that it excludes all evidence of domination either by the dominant region of that ideology or by the pre-dominant class or faction (36). This situation is in sharp contrast with pre-capitalist formations — for example, in the feudal formation the dominance of the aristocracy is not hidden, but on the contrary, proclaimed in the prevailing ideology and defended and 'explained' by reference to the 'sacred' the 'divine' or the 'natural'. In a socialist formation, also, the fact of domination is made explicit, that is to say the state is declared to be the instrument of a specified class; it is described as a 'dictatorship' and it derives its legitimacy from the fact that it is the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. Bourgeois ideology is distinct in the respect therefore that it conceals/concludes, the fact of class domination and people are not presented as members of particular classes but as individuals which, although correct and necessary for the mode of production that predominates, nonetheless slides over the equally important fact of the socialization process.

Similarly, in the Tanzanian social formation the 'ideology of socialism' denies the existence of any domination and inserts 'individuals' into a unitary whole; they are perceived as being parts of a harmonious solidaristic whole. Nyerere himself finds « doctrinaire socialism » as indicated earlier, « intolerable » because it posits a condition of antagonism

in the social order. The prevalence of populist political language and behaviour largely arising out of the nationalist struggle, further helps to exclude all traces of domination in the dominant ideology of the social formation. Consequently, political ideology stresses the importance of 'the people' or the 'masses' and the state is projected as one of 'workers and peasants', but, crucially not as one of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. For the state to declare itself as such would be to cut across the unitary presentation the social formation receives in the 'ideology of socialism' which has its own consistency and coherence. The ideological presentation of the role of the state is therefore similar to the Hegelian presentation in which the state is the realization of freedom.

Conclusion

The conditions prevalent in the post-colonial state impels the political to dominate over the economy and society and although this is not peculiar in the era of monopoly capital the specific turns developments in particular post-colonial state take may show significant divergence from a dominant trend. In Tanzania the dominant class has established to a considerable degree its hegemony over the dominated classes by using the apparatuses of state but its success has been due largely to that class' use of political ideology. Thus, there appears to be an 'over-politicization' of social and economic factors, as well as an 'over-ideologicalization' of both the socio-economic and political levels. Unfortunately, the narrow scope of the paper and the constraints under which it has been written do not make possible an analysis of some of the important implications these comments raise, the presentation must therefore be regarded merely as preliminary points for a discussion.

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17. Pratt, *op. cit.*
18. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, pp. 103 ff.
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20. *Ibid.*
21. *Interim Constitution of Tanzania*, EPCT (Dar es Salam : Government Publications Agency, 1976 ed.), p. 7, this was amended in 1975 so that TANU was recognized as being supreme over state organs also ; the new CCM Constitution (1977) makes the Party « the sole political party exercising supreme authority over all state organ », p. 4.
22. Perhaps the best example of this departure in the President's speech at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, « The Process of Liberation », reprinted in, *Daily News*, 18 November, 1976, p. 4.
23. Nyerere, *Ujamaa*, p. 4.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
25. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism*, p. 247.
26. *Ibid.*

27. The quotations in this paragraph are to be found, *Ibid.*, p. 244.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 245.
29. Nyerere, « Freedom and Development », in, *Freedom and Development* (Dar es Salam : OUP, 1973), p. 70.
30. Nyerere, Presidential Circular No. I, 1970, *op. cit.*, p. 154.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
32. Nyerere, *Freedom and Development*, p. 49.
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RÉSUMÉ

Dans ce papier, l'auteur discute, en conclusion, la question fondamentale de savoir si l'idéologie devrait être traitée comme un instrument neutre, applicable à toute formation sociale, quelle que soit sa nature, indistinctement. Ou, au contraire, elle découlerait de la nature de la société concernée et des contradictions qui la caractérisent. Pour sa part, l'auteur, s'alignant, entre autres, sur Poulantzas, soutient ce dernier point de vue et pense que l'idéologie tanzanienne et son rôle dans la société sont les produits des contradictions fondamentales de la formation sociale post-coloniale tanzanienne.

Définissant l'idéologie, en sociétés capitalistes, et cela suivant la ligne de Poulantzas, comme :

- a) *Un ensemble complexe et cohérent de représentations, valeurs, croyances, comprenant, entre autres le moral, le politique, le religieux, l'économique, disposant, à chaque moment dans le temps, d'une zone spécifique exerçant une certaine autonomie, bien que déterminée, en dernier ressort par l'économique ;*
- b) *Cet ensemble jouissant d'un niveau objectif spécifique dans la formation sociale concernée et, dès lors, exerçant des fonctions identifiables ; l'auteur analyse les fonctions qu'exerce l'idéologie tanzanienne dans la société post-coloniale tanzanienne. D'après lui, les aspects les plus importants des fonctions exercées par l'idéologie tanzanienne sont de trois ordres :*
 - 1) *Créer une unité nouvelle de la formation sociale tanzanienne ;*
 - 2) *Etablir un nouveau cadre dans lequel le concept de travail serait accepté par les classes productives ;*
 - 3) *Développer un sens nouveau du concept d'Etat.*

L'auteur conclut en notant qu'en Tanzanie, la classe dominante (la petite bourgeoisie) a établi son hégémonie sur d'autres classes en partie par l'utilisation de l'appareil étatique de coercition, mais sa réussite est fondamentalement due à l'utilisation intense de l'idéologie politique. Ainsi en Tanzanie, note-t-il, il semble y avoir sur-politisation de facteurs économiques et sociaux et sur-idéologisation des aspects socio-économiques et politiques.