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# AFRICA DEVELOPMENT AFRIQUE & DEVELOPPEMENT

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Africa Development/Afrique et Développement,  
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## Contents / Sommaire

### **Lawrence M. Sommers and Assefa Mehretu**

Trade Patterns and Trends in the African-European  
Trading Area: Lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa from  
the Era of the Lome Accords 1975-1988.....5

### **Kwame Boafo-Arthur**

Europe 1992: A Challenge to Sub-Saharan  
African Development.....27

### **A. I. Asiwaju**

Borders and Borderlands as Linchpins for Regional Integration  
in Africa: Lessons of the European Experience .....45

### **Momar Coumba Diop et Mamadou Diouf**

L'administration sénégalaise, les confréries religieuses  
et les paysanneries .....65


### **Tenkir Bongor**

The State, the Peasantry and Rural Class Formation  
in Prerevolutionary Ethiopia.....89



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ment substituer "l'ajustement structurel" à la "pacification" coloniale.

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# Trade Patterns and Trends in the African-European Trading Area: Lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa from the Era of the Lome Accords 1975-1988

Laurence M. Sommers  
and Assefa Mehretu\*

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*Résumé: La majeure partie des échanges internationaux se passe dans la zone d'échange Afrique-Europe (ZEA). Au cours des dernières décennies, les deux sous-régions les plus développées de la région, à savoir, la Communauté Européenne (CE) et la Zone Européenne de Libre-Echange ont vu leurs échanges se développer aussi bien à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur de la ZEA alors que les trois autres sous-régions de ce groupe, l'Europe de l'Est, l'Afrique du Nord et l'Afrique Sub-saharienne enregistrent une baisse relative de leur participation. La croissance et les avantages commerciaux escomptés pour les deux sous-régions africaines conformément à la Convention de Lomé, ne se sont pas matérialisés. Des mutations considérables se sont produites au niveau de la géographie économique de la ZEA. Les ajustements sur le plan spatial ont varié entre l'implosion en Europe autour du noyau central de la Communauté Européenne et une poursuite de la désintégration dans les périphéries africaines. Les sous-régions de l'Afrique du Nord et de l'Afrique Sub-saharienne restent dans la périphérie de l'Europe de l'Ouest dont elles sont de plus en plus tributaires alors que leurs échanges inter-régionaux connaissent des taux de croissance en baisse.*

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## Introduction

The African-European Trading Area (AETA) is one of the most intimately linked trading areas in the world with over 75% of the international trade of the component subregions taking place within it. The European Community (EC) is by far the most dominant subregion of AETA with 55% of the GDP (1987) and 77% of total world exports (1988) and 75% of imports (1988) of AETA (Table 1). When figures for the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) are added to EC totals, the two subregions would represent 63% of the AETA's GDP, 89% of the exports and 86% of the imports. If current plans to complete the economic integration in 1992 are carried out, the economic and trade influence of the AETA by EC will undoubtedly be even greater. The possibility of EC and EFTA countries joining to create the European

Table 1 - Size Characteristics of the Afro-European Trading Area

Region	Pop. 89 Mill	% of Region	Area Bill Sq. Km	% of Region	GDP 87 Bill %	% of Region	Tot. Exports \$ Bill 1988	% of Region	Total Imp. \$ Bill 1988	% of Region	Exp. to EATA \$ Bill 1988	% of Total Export
EC	325.90	23.83	2.25	4.13	4149.15	55.09	1064.70	76.70	1084.30	74.84	807.12	75.81
EFTA	32.20	2.35	1.34	2.46	591.18	7.85	177.20	12.76	183.98	12.70	136.83	77.22
EE	402.20	29.40	24.22	44.48	2517.46	33.42	98.55	7.10	106.37	7.34	73.57	74.65
NA	117.30	8.58	5.76	10.58	149.69	1.99	25.09	1.81	36.22	2.50	18.82	75.01
SSA	490.20	35.84	20.88	38.75	124.64	1.65	22.67	1.63	37.95	2.62	19.92	87.87
Total	1367.80	100.00	54.45	100.00	7532.12	100.00	1388.21	100.00	1448.82	100.00	1056.26	76.09

6

Source: IMF 1989; PRB 1989; World Bank 1989.  
GDP estimate for EE available only for Hungary, Poland and USSR.

Economic Space (EES) would further enhance the dominant role of western Europe in AETA as well as in the rest of the world<sup>1</sup>.

This paper deals with three issues related to the patterns of trade in AETA. The first is to characterize the evolutionary history of subregional economic, political and territorial organizations in AETA and how this background continues to reflect on the structural attributes of unequal trade relations. The second is to study changes and trends in AETA's interregional trade beginning in 1975 when the first Lome Convention (Lome I) was signed<sup>2</sup>, and to evaluate the progress made on the objectives of the various interregional trade arrangements geared to benefit the African subregion. The third is to outline the future developmental and interregional trade implications for the African subregions, especially as the EC and EFTA continue their dominance within a federated EC in 1992<sup>3</sup>.

The composition of the five subregions of AETA is as follows:

- 1 - EC includes twelve member countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom);
- 2 - EFTA is composed of Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland,
- 3 - EE includes Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, formerly East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the USSR,
- 4 - NA consists of the Mediterranean countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, and
- 5 - SSA includes all African countries except those of NA and South Africa. The terms *trading area* and *subregion* would henceforth be used respectively to refer to AETA and any of the component groupings as defined above.

### **Subregional Formations in Europe**

Western Europe used its dominant global position to form a variety of spatial arrangements that were considered necessary to extend its natural resource base, global markets and political prestige<sup>4</sup>. Proprietary territorial perceptions in colonial times first led European countries to respond to

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- 1 Lodge, J. (ed) - *The European Community and the Challenge of the Future*. London: Pinter Publishers, 1989, pp. 223-300.
  - 2 Lister, M., - *The European Community and the Developing World*. Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing Company, 1988, pp. 56-61.
  - 3 Cecchini, P. - *The European Challenge: The Benefits of a Single Market 1992*. Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing Company, 1988 or under the rubric of EES.
  - 4 Parker, G. - *The Logic of Unity: A Geography of the European Economic Community*. London: Longman, 1975, pp. 3-4.

centrifugal forces and expand their geographic spheres throughout the world and later to withdraw when centripetal forces propelled by pull factors in Europe and push factors in the colonies overcame the initial rationales of imperialism. In the three centuries that it took to come to full circle in terms of territorial policy, western European countries experienced several world and regional territorial arrangements ranging from centrifugal global imperialism to centripetal regional implosion with integration in Europe<sup>5</sup>.

The latest phase in European territorial organization is predicated on the desire to form a common market for western Europe. Although the continent was not unanimous in achieving this goal<sup>6</sup>, most of the principal powers in western Europe were convinced that a European common market was indispensable for their global position in economic development and trade<sup>7</sup>. It took World War II and the active involvement of the United States and its proposal of a Marshall Plan for Europe to demonstrate the benefits of a common market<sup>8</sup>. The aftermath of the war, the impact on troubled economies, and the advantages to be gained in eliminating or reducing trade barriers underlined the need for European integration. This and other historical, political, geographic, and economic imperatives finally convinced six continental members of western Europe to form a union<sup>9</sup>.

The genesis of joint efforts to facilitate trade dates back to the "Zollverein" customs union movements of central Europe in the mid to late 1800s. Proposals for a federal union of democracies of the North Atlantic as well as for a Pan-Europe were made in the 1920s and 1930s<sup>10</sup>. In 1921, the three small countries of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg became the first to actually eliminate trade barriers beginning with the initiative of tiny Luxembourg in 1921 and culminating in the enactment of the Benelux Economic Union. This union began with the lowering of tariffs between the three countries in the inter-war period. This initiative became a major stimulant to the more encompassing integration moves in western Europe in the post World War II period.

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- 5 Forbes, D. K. - *The Geography of Underdevelopment: A Critical Survey*, London, Croom Helm, 1986, pp. 3-14; Parker 1975, *op.cit.*, p. 4; Senghaas, D. - *The European Experience: A Historical Critique of Development Theory*. Dover, NH. Berg Publishers, 1985, pp. 66-69.
  - 6 Parker 1975, *op.cit.*, pp. 17-19.
  - 7 Cecchini 1988, *op.cit.*, pp. 69-106; Pinder, John - "The Single Market: A Step Towards European Union". *The European Community and the Challenge of the Future*. Edited by Juliet Lodge. London Pinter Publishers, 1989, pp. 94-95. Population Reference Bureau (PRB) - *World Population Sheet*, Washington, DC: PRB, Inc, 1989.
  - 8 Goldstein, M. E. - *America's Foreign Policy: Drift or Decision*, Wilmington, DL: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1984, pp. 55-56.
  - 9 Parkers 1975, *op.cit.*, pp. 1-19.
  - 10 Goudenove-Kalegi, C.R. - *Pan Europe*, New York: Knopf, 1926; Streit, C.K. - *Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the North Atlantic*. New York Harper, 1939.

The weakened economic condition of individual nations in western Europe at the end of World War II and United States' interest in rapid west European recovery led to cooperative efforts among countries to improve trade and overall economic development. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), established in 1951, led to the customs union of the six original members of the EC as outlined in the 1957 Treaty of Rome agreement known as the Common Market or the European Community (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, West Germany and Italy). Other organizations were formed to facilitate cooperation such as the Council of Europe (CE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), Western European Union (WEU) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). As the scope of cooperation increased so also did the membership of EC which rose from 6 to 12 members with the addition of Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.

The growth and economic importance of the EC led to the formation of two other European economic and/or political subregions, both of which came about in reaction to the EC or western Europe in general. The first is the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) which initially embraced countries in Europe that were not included in the original six EC countries. Since EFTA's objectives were merely to stimulate trade between its members and to reduce deleterious trade diversion effects of the EC, without requiring supranational protocols, EFTA was most attractive to non-EC countries from Sweden to United Kingdom to Portugal<sup>11</sup>. EFTA's territory was gradually reduced over the years as some of its former members such as the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland, subsequently joined the EC. Currently, the EFTA bloc is held together by a foreign policy of neutrality illustrated by Sweden and Switzerland, and by World War II non alignment treaty obligations as in the case of Austria and Finland. Norway's withdrawal of its application to join the EC helped maintain the EFTA block which evolved into a major trading partner of the EC (Lodge 1989, *op.cit.*, pp. 237-239).

The EE subregion was organized after World War II under the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (OMEA or COMECON) with some degree of patronage by the Soviet Union. The EE countries, which are currently undergoing drastic transformation in their domestic and subregional politics and economics, have had relatively weak levels of industrial development and foreign trade as compared with those of EC and EFTA. The background to the formation of the EE bloc is different from the other European economic blocs in two ways. First, it followed the creation of the Warsaw

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11 Clout, H., M. Blackwell, R. King & D. Pinder - *Western Europe: Geographical Perspectives*. London: Longman, 1985, pp. 17-18.

Treaty Organization (WTO or Warsaw Pact) in 1955 which was formed in response to NATO<sup>12</sup>. Second, COMECON also included in its membership non-European countries such as Cuba, Mongolia and Viet Nam. since the rationale for COMECON's existence is disappearing, new forms of subregional organizations are shaping up in EE.

### **Subregional Formations in Africa**

The spatial reorganizational change that took place in western, northern and eastern Europe in response to the EC did not occur in Africa. There have been two principal reasons for the lack of a workable African subregional integration. First, unlike their European counterparts, the two African subregions (NA and SSA) represent divisions resulting from antecedent physical and cultural factors such as the Sahara desert and the Islamic religion. Second, Africa has been constrained by territorial divisions imposed by colonialism. The centrifugal expansion of and political influence by European countries were marked by the balkanisation and dismemberment of the African continent during the colonial scramble in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Colonialism divided Africa into territorial units, purely reflecting proprietary interests of the principal colonial powers, ethnic, cultural and physical entities. This left Africa strewn with a constellation of mostly small countries that have little economic and political viability for success in today's world.

Following the independence movements of the late 1950s and early 1980s, there were attempts to consolidate the continent and create some sort of reintegration among the numerous African countries which would otherwise remain impoverished and backward<sup>13</sup>. But, early interests for pan-African unity quickly fell victim to the nationalistic euphoria of newly achieved sovereignties. Just as was the case earlier in Europe, in Africa also, any framework which implied a loss of political sovereignty was quickly dismissed. With the establishment of the Economic Commission for Africa, subregional integration gained a brief lease on life as the focus shifted to the development of customs unions and common markets<sup>14</sup>. However, this plan

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12 Goldstein 1984, *op.cit.*, pp. 401-405.

13 Green, R. H., et al. 1967:- "The Child of Lome: Messiah, Monster or Mouse? The Political Economy of EEC Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States: Contributions to the Undertaking of the Lome Convention on North-South Relations", Edited by F. Long, New York: Pergamon, Press, 1980. Green, R.H. & K.G.V. Krishna - *Economic Cooperation in Africa Retrospect and Prospect*, Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1967.

14 Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) - *Background Paper on the Establishment of an African Common Market*, Addis Abeba, ECA, 1963; Green et al. *op.cit.*, 1967. Hazlewood, A. - *African Integration and Disintegration*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Holland, M. - *Introduction to the European Community in the 1980s*. Cape Town: Juta and Company, 1983.

failed because of prevailing colonial links and domestic concerns both of which were too powerful to allow pan-African ideals to take hold.

North Africa (NA) became even more isolated from the rest of the African continent as it turned its face toward Europe and enjoyed a much closer economic relationship with that area by supplying goods and labor. Divided effectively from SSA by the Saharan desert girdle, NA also displays greater internal homogeneity in religion, ethnicity, language and culture. More recently, the closer affinity of NA states has been accentuated by similar stands in Middle Eastern politics. But postcolonial moves for closer economic and political subregional integration among NA countries were not successful despite Egypt's initiatives in the 1960s, and Libya's subsequent push for a United Arab Republics. Recent developments with respect to positions on peace with Israel further polarized the subregion resulting in occasional cold wars among NA countries. Nevertheless, the religious and ethnic homogeneities of the North African states, the collective political identification with Middle Eastern political dynamics espoused by the Arab League, to which NA countries belong, and the physical proximities to Europe gave this subregion a more integrated approach in its international economic position. In the process, the importance of the Saharan physical divide between NA and SSA has been strengthened.

Subregional integration in SSA was even more elusive. All sorts of political problems made it impossible for the subregion to embark on pan-African reintegration ideas advanced during the euphoric 1960s. In west Africa, a score of integration arrangements, most of which were formed with the help of the former colonial powers, such as France, simply floundered<sup>15</sup>, British attempts to form the federation of Rhodesia and Nyassaland did not succeed because of African suspicion of metropolitan interests behind the proposal<sup>16</sup>. A functioning and promising East African Economic Community collapsed because of member complaints that benefits of integration were not equitably shared<sup>17</sup>.

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15 Mytelka, L.K. - "A Genealogy of Francophone West and Equatorial African Regional Organization". *Journal of Modern African Studies* 12 (1974), pp. 297-320. Okigbo, P.N.C. - *Africa and the Common Market*. London Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd, 1967.

16 Sills, H.D. - "The Break-Up of the Central African Federation" - *African Affairs* 73 (1974), pp. 50-62.

17 Mugomba, A.T. (1978) - "Regional Organizations and African Underdevelopment: The Collapse of the East African Community". *Journal of Modern African Studies* 16 (2), pp. 261-272.



Both the Organization of African Unity (OAU)<sup>18</sup> and the ECA still believe that economic integration is the only way for Africa to enter a more dynamic process of development<sup>19</sup>

Sharing the benefits of integration has also been a contentious issue<sup>20</sup>. In eastern and southern Africa, the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African states (PTA) and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) are ongoing experiments although the latter organization has political underpinning that are unique to countries that border Africa<sup>21</sup>.

#### **North-South Trade Patterns and Potentials in AETA**

There is a considerable variation in market potentials among the various AETA subregions. The total population of AETA is nearly 1.4 billion. Only about a quarter of this population lives in the economic core subregions of the EC and EFTA, the two richest blocs which together comprise about two-thirds of the AETA's GDP. The EE, which forms the middle tier in economic strength, composed of NA and SSA contains close to 45% of the population of the AETA but only a miniscule 3% of the GDP (Table 1). In terms of international trade, the dominance of the EC is even more marked. In 1988, the EC accounted for about 75% of the international trade of AETA. The combined 1988 trade of EC and EFTA was approximately 90% of AETA's total. The EE accounted for only 7% of the international trade in 1988. Africa's contribution was a mere 3% (Table 1).

The overall premise with regard to interregional trade relations in the AETA is that the EC is the dominant core around which have been organized peripheral subregions with varying degrees of interaction with the core. Using export data processed from the international Monetary Fund

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- 18 Organization of African Unity (OAU) - *Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development of Africa 1980-2000*, Geneva: The International Institute of Labour Studies, 1981. Organization of African Unity (OAU) - *Africa's Submission to the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Africa's Economic and social Crisis*. Addis Abeba: OAU Secretariat, 1986.
  - 19 Adedeji 1982; OAU, 1981, *op.cit.* Some positive signs for subregional cooperation recently have appeared although they are too poorly developed to bring about fundamental economic integration. In west Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is trying to make a limited form of subregional integration although individual countries largely remain economically dependent on their former colonial powers.
  - 20 Renninger, J. P. (1982) - *The Future Of Economic Cooperation Schemes in Africa with Special Reference to ECOWAS*. In T. M. Shaw, et. *Alternative futures for Africa*, pp. 153-177, Boulder, CO. Westview Press.
  - 21 Leys, R. & A. Tostensen - "Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: The Southern African Development Coordination Conference". *Review of African Political Economy* 23 (1982), pp. 52-71; Mehretu, A. - *Regional Disparity in Sub-Sahara Africa: Structural Readjustment of Uneven Development*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989, pp. 131-132.

(IMF) direction of trade statistics for countries included in the study, interregional trade matrices have been developed and analyzed<sup>22</sup>. Interregional trade flows within the AETA accounted for over 75% of the world trade in both 1975 and 1988 (Tables 1, 2a and 2b), making in AETA an important trading bloc for all its component subregions. In the case of SSA, the AETA market is even more significant. In 1988, about 88% of SSA's export went to the AETA (Table 1).

The dominance of interregional trade by the EC is demonstrated by four distinct characteristics. First, in 1988 the EC accounted for over 75% of the value of all interregional exports and imports in AETA. The EFTA subregion is a poor second with about 13% of the exports and 14% of imports of AETA's value of interregional trade. EE, NA and SSA subregion together share the remaining in per cent of the interregional trade in 1988 (Table 4b). Second, the intraregional trade within the EC is by far most important of any other trade flows in the AETA, comprising of 60% of all interregional trade in 1988 (Table 4b). Third, the EC and EFTA, which contain the richest countries of the region, are by far the best interregional trade partners with trade flows between them ranging between 9 and 11% of the 1988 total interregional trade (Table 4b). Fourth, only the EC subregion enjoyed a consistent positive balance in interregional trade exporting more into the region than importing from it. All others, with the occasional exception of the EE subregion, showed negative balances in which magnitudes for imports from AETA were higher than for exports into the trading area (Tables 2a, 3a and 4a).

The role of the EC in the Euro-African Trading Region has been of major interest among politicians and development specialists<sup>23</sup>. Of particular concern has been the relation of EC with former colonial territories collectively known as the African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP). NA and SSA are two of the ACP subregions on which there has been considerable focus to advance economic development and commerce. There was a fear that the development of the common market in the European Community would adversely affect trade and development in the NA and

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22 International Monetary Fund (IMF) - *Directions of Trade Statistics*. Washington, D.C. IMF, 1982, 1987, 1989.

23 Long, F. (ed) - *The Political Economy of EEC relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States: Contributions to the Undertaking of the Lome Convention on North-South Relations*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1980. Twitchett, C.C. - *Europe and Africa: From Association to Partnership* Westmead, UK, Saxon House, 1978. Von Geusau, F.A.M.A. (ed) - *The Lome Convention and a New International Economic Order*, Leyden, Netherlands, AW, Sijhoff, 1977.

Table 2 - Interregional Trade in the Afro-European Trading Area  
2a: Trade Flows 1975 (in millions of dollars)

From/To	EC	EFTA	EE	NA	SSA	Total
EC	181593.00	31532.00	15816.00	10145.00	6997.00	246083.00
EFTA	22888.00	9245.20	4715.50	637.50	821.20	38307.40
EE	9698.00	4191.40	0.00	1286.80	232.10	15408.30
NA	7802.00	200.70	1571.70	25.60	202.40	9802.40
SSA	5738.00	396.30	343.30	163.30	1483.10	8124.00
Total	227719.00	45565.60	22446.50	12258.20	9736.80	317725.10

2b: Interregional Trade Coefficients - 1975

From/to	EC	EFTA	EE	NA	SSA	Total
EC	0.5715	0.0992	0.0498	0.0319	0.0220	0.7745
EFTA	0.0720	0.0291	0.0148	0.0020	0.0026	0.1206
EE	0.0305	0.0132	0.0000	0.0041	0.0007	0.0485
NA	0.0246	0.0006	0.0049	0.0001	0.0006	0.0309
SSA	0.0181	0.0012	0.0011	0.0005	0.0047	0.0256
Total	0.7176	0.1434	0.0706	0.0386	0.0306	1.0000

Source of raw data: IMF 1982

EE intraregional trade not available.

Table 3 - Interregional Trade in the Afro-European Trading Area  
3a: Trade Flows 1980 (in millions of dollars)

From/to	EC	EFTA	EE	NA	SSA	Total
EC	385171.00	71462.00	23185.00	22842.00	23058.00	525718.00
EFTA	59156.20	16440.80	7515.80	1636.00	1337.30	86086.10
EE	25253.50	8841.30	0.00	1589.30	1091.90	36776.00
NA	20916.00	988.10	1590.10	126.00	230.20	23850.40
SSA	22174.00	2891.60	1004.80	323.30	1837.00	28230.70
Total	512670.70	100623.80	32395.70	26516.60	27554.40	700661.20

3b: Interregional Trade Coefficients - 1980

From/to	EC	EFIA	EE	NA	SSA	Total
EC	0.5497	0.1020	0.0331	0.0326	0.0329	0.7503
EFTA	0.0844	0.0235	0.0107	0.0023	0.0019	0.1272
EE	0.0360	0.0126	0.0000	0.0023	0.0016	0.0525
NA	0.0299	0.0014	0.0023	0.0002	0.0003	0.0340
SSA	0.0316	0.0041	0.0014	0.0005	0.0026	0.0403
Total	0.7317	0.1436	0.0475	0.0378	0.0393	1.000

Source of raw data: IMF 1982, 1987

EE interregional trade not available.

**Table 4 - Interregional Trade in the Afro-European Trading Area**  
**4a: Trade Flows 1988 (in millions of dollars)**

From/to	EC	EFTA	EE	NA	SSA	Total
EC	633937.00	113621.00	24460.00	17850.60	17249.00	807117.60
EFTA	99286.35	25072.93	9483.24	1609.31	1377.73	136829.56
EE	26638.80	7766.00	0.0	2823.20	906.50	38134.50
NA	16104.60	700.60	1476.40	421.00	118.00	18820.60
SSA	15486.90	966.87	590.40	293.80	2585.90	19923.87
Total	791453.65	148127.40	36010.04	22997.91	22237.13	1020826.13

**4b: Interregional Trade Coefficients - 1988**

From/To	EC	EFTA	EE	NA	SSA	Total
EC	0.6210	0.1113	0.0240	0.0175	0.0169	0.7907
EFTA	0.0973	0.0246	0.0093	0.0016	0.0013	0.1340
EE	0.0261	0.0076	0.0000	0.0028	0.0009	0.0374
NA	0.0158	0.0007	0.0014	0.0004	0.0001	0.0184
SSA	0.0152	0.0009	0.0006	0.0003	0.0025	0.0195
Total	0.7753	0.1451	0.0353	0.0225	0.0218	1.0000

Source of raw data: IMF 1989.

EE interregional trade for 1988 is \$ 35,437.50 million.

Excluded from matrix for computational consistency in Tables 5, 6 and 7.

SSA subregions<sup>24</sup>. In order to prevent such an outcome, the EC and ACP states provided guidelines for development and trade relations for interdependent development<sup>25</sup>. This led to a series of conventions known as the Lome I, Lome II and Lome III which were signed in 1975, 1979 and 1984 respectively<sup>26</sup>. The overall goal of the conventions included improvement of interregional as well as intraregional trade and stabilization of export earnings for ACP states<sup>27</sup>.

Tables 5 and 6 indicate interregional trade magnitudes for absolute and relative growth patterns respectively in AETA. Considering absolute growth rates in trade, Tables 5A and 5B show average annual growth figures for 1980-88 and 1975-88 periods respectively. Three patterns emerge. First, in the 1980-88 period, the NA and SSA subregions suffered negative rates of growth in interregional trade flows whereas the European subregions enjoyed positive rates, with the exception of the EE-EFTA flow (Table 5a). Second, although the 1975-1988 period indicates largely positive interregional trade growth rates, the European subregion experienced robust double digit annual growth rates as compared to mostly single digit to negative rates for NA and SSA (Table 5b). A third pattern differentiates rates of growth of trade among European subregions as compared with trade among African subregions. In the 1975-1988 period, the EC, EFTA and EE experienced trade growth among them from 7 to 26% annually (Table 5b). On the other hand, trade growth among NA and SSA ranged between negative 3 to a positive 6% (Table 5b).

Table 6a to 6d demonstrate the relative positions of the various subregions of AETA with respect to trade growth beginning with the 1975 data. Table 6a contains expected value of interregional trade in 1988 derived by multiplying interregional trade coefficients (shares) matrix (Table 2b) by the total interregional trade figure for AETA in 1988 (Table 4a). Table 6b contains differences between expected (Table 6a) and actual (Table 4a) 1988 interregional flows. Table 7a expresses "gains" and "losses" as percentage figures assuming that interregional flow coefficients in 1988 remained at their 1975 level (Table 2b). Tables 6b and 7a show that the interregional trade shares in AETA declined from their 1975 level for most interactions except for trade flows among and between EC and EFTA. EE, NA and SSA

24 Ravenhill, J. - "Europe and Africa: An Essential Continuity" - *Europe, Africa and Lome III*. Edited by R. Boardman, T. M. Shaw & P. Boldatos New York: University Press of America, 1985.

25 Ravenhill, J. - "Asymmetrical Interdependence: Renegotiating the Lome Convention". *The Political Economy of EEC Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States: Contribution to the Undertaking of the Lome Convention on North-South Relations*, Edited by F. Long. New York: Pergamon Press, 1980.

26 Lister 1988, *op.cit.*, pp. 58-109.

27 Lister 1988, *op.cit.*, pp. 169-174; Long 1980, *op.cit.*, pp. ix-xii).

all "lost" in potential exports with magnitudes ranging from \$6 to \$13 billion, which account for 30 to 67% of their respective exports into AETA (Table 7a). The expected 1988 interregional trade pattern based on the 1980 interregional trade coefficient matrix (Table 3b) is shown on Table 6c and 6d. The figures obtained indicate even larger deviations between expected and actual 1986 flows with high magnitudes in "lost" interregional trade potentials for all subregions except for EC and EFTA (Table 7b).

### **What are the Prospects for Africa's Trade With Europe After 1992?**

In 1992 the European community (EC) is scheduled for a more complete economic federation<sup>28</sup>. Trade barriers are scheduled to be entirely eliminated between the participating members. Labor is expected to flow between member countries more freely. Representatives of member countries meet regularly to discuss a variety of economic, political and social issues. The 1992 federation will further the economic development of a United States of western and southern Europe.

This means that the 1992 federation of EC will place the EFTA, EE, NA and SSA subregions in new regional patterns of trade and labor flows with various degrees of peripheral participation<sup>29</sup>. Regardless of EFTA's original mission to enhance trade and development among its membership<sup>30</sup>, its relations with the EC seem to be getting stronger not only because of defections of some of its members to join the EC but also because of the increasingly higher magnitudes of its interregional trade with the EC<sup>31</sup>. Over the 1975-1988 period, the largest growth in interregional trade in the AETA has been that between the EC and EFTA (see Table 5b). Indications are the EC and EFTA will experience even more future integration in their markets. The implication of a stronger EC market for EE trade are uncertain although recent changes in eastern Europe could result in new spatial alignments for markets as a result of the reunification of the two German states. In 1988, the EE subregion exported to the EC and EFTA almost as much as it did to its constituent countries. Scarcity of historical data for trade among EE countries precludes conclusions on trends but it does appear that trade destined to and from the EC will be considerably more prominent than in the past. As East Europe proceeds to democratize its politics and liberalize its economies, it most likely will take advantage of its geographic proximity to the EC and EFTA. This may produce significant dividends for EE, but

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28 Cecchini 1988, *op.cit.*, pp. 91-102; Lodge 1989, *op.cit.*, pp. 225-300.

29 Williams, A. M. - *The Western European Economy: A Geography of Post-War Development*. London: Hutchinson, 1988, pp. 51-59.

30 Ilbery, B. W. - *Western Europe: A Systematic Human Geography*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 109-111.

31 Clout 1985, *op.cit.*, pp. 17-19; Williams 1988, *op.cit.*, pp. 34-40.

Table 5 - Rates of Change in Trade Flows  
 5a: Average Annual Rate of Growth in Interregional Trade 1980-1988

From/To	EC	EFTA	EE	NA	SSA	Total
EC	0.08	0.07	0.01	-0.03	-0.03	0.07
EFTA	0.08	0.07	0.03	-0.00	0.00	0.07
EE	0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.10	-0.02	0.00
NA	-0.03	-0.04	-0.01	0.29	-0.06	-0.03
SSA	-0.04	-0.08	-0.05	-0.01	0.05	-0.04
Total	0.07	0.06	0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.06

5b: Average Annual Rate of Growth in Interregional Trade 1975-1988

From/To	EC	EFTA	EE	NA	SSA	Total
EC	0.19	0.20	0.04	0.06	0.11	0.18
EFTA	0.26	0.13	0.08	0.12	0.05	0.20
EE	0.13	0.07	0.00	0.09	0.72	0.11
NA	0.08	-0.19	-0.00	1.19	-0.03	0.07
SSA	0.13	0.11	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.11
Total	0.19	0.17	0.05	0.07	0.10	0.17

Note: Computations of Tables 5a and 5b on Table 2a, 3a and 4a.



**Table 6 - Actual and Expected Interregional Trade Differentials - 1988**  
**Ga: Expected 1988 Dollar Flows on 1975 Coefficients (millions)**

From/To	EC	EFTA	EE	NA	SSA	Total
EC	583444.24	101309.87	50815.58	32395.10	22480.82	790645.81
EFTA	73537.37	29704.11	15150.54	2048.24	2638.45	123078.71
EE	31158.92	13466.64	0.00	4134.39	745.72	49505.67
NA	25067.22	644.83	5049.75	82.25	650.30	31494.35
SSA	18435.75	1273.28	1103.00	524.67	4765.09	76101.78
Total	731643.50	146398.74	72118.87	39384.65	31280.37	1020826.13

Note: Computation of Table 6a based on Tables 2b and 4b

**6b: Differences between 1988 Actual and 1988 Expected Using 1975 Coefficients (million of dollars)**

From/To	EC	EFTA	EE	NA	SSA	Total
EC	50492.76	12311.13	-26355.58	-14744.50	-5231.82	16471.99
EFTA	25748.98	-4631.18	-5667.30	-438.93	-1260.72	13750.85
EE	-4520.17	-5700.64	0.00	-1311.19	160.78	-11371.17
NA	-8962.62	55.77	-3573.35	338.75	-532.30	-12673.75
SSA	-2948.85	-306.41	-512.60	-230.87	-2179.19	-6177.91
Total	59810.15	1728.66	-36108.83	-16386.74	-9043.74	0.00

Note: Table 6b is computed by subtracting Table 6a from Table 4a.

6c: Expected 1988 Dollar Flows Based on 1980 Multilateral Coefficients (millions of dollars)

From/To	EC	EFTA	EE	NA	SSA	Total
EC	561173.68	104116.34	33779.31	33279.58	33594.78	765943.19
EFTA	86187.44	23953.37	10950.12	2383.57	1948.38	125427.87
EE	36793.01	12881.30	0.00	2315.53	1590.84	53590.68
NA	30473.50	1439.61	2316.69	183.58	335.39	34748.77
SSA	32306.34	4212.91	1463.94	471.03	2676.41	41130.63
Total	746933.96	146603.53	48510.07	38633.28	40145.30	1020826.13

Note: Computation of Table 6c based on Table 3b and 4a.

6d: Differences between 1988 Actual and 1988 Expected Using 1980 coefficients (millions of dollars)

From/To	EC	EFTA	EE	NA	SSA	Total
EC	72763.32	9504.66	-9319.31	-15428.98	-16345.28	41174.41
EFTA	13098.91	1119.56	-1465.88	-774.26	-570.55	11406.59
EE	-10154.21	-5115.30	0.00	507.67	-684.34	-15446.18
NA	-14368.90	-739.01	-840.29	237.42	-217.39	-15928.17
SSA	-16819.44	-3246.04	-873.54	-177.23	-90.51	-21206.76
Total	44519.69	1523.87	-12500.03	-15635.37	-17908.17	0.00

Note: Table 6d is computed by subtracting Table 6c from Table 4a.

**Table 7 - Relative Gains and Losses in Interregional Trade - 1988**  
**7a: Percent Gain/Loss Based on 1975 Trade Coefficients**

From/To	EC	EFTA	EE	NA	SSA	Total
EC	7.96	10.84	-107.75	-82.60	-30.33	*2.04
EFTA	25.93	-18.47	-59.75	-27.27	-91.51	10.05
EE	-16.97	-73.41	0.00	-46.44	17.74	- 29.82
NA	-55.65	7.96	-242.03	80.46	-451.10	- 67.34
SSA	-19.04	-31.69	-86.82	-78.58	-84.27	- 31.01
Total	7.56	1.17	-100.77	-71.25	-40.67	0.00

Note: Computation of Table 7c based on Tables 4a and 6b.

**7b: Percent Gain/Loss Based on 1980 Trade Coefficients**

From/To	EC	EFTA	EE	NA	SSA	Total
EC	11.48	8.37	-38.10	-86.43	-94.76	5.10
EFTA	13.19	4.47	-15.47	-48.11	-41.12	8.34
EE	-38.12	-65.87	0.00	17.98	-75.49	-40.50
NA	-89.22	-105.48	-56.91	56.40	-184.23	-84.63
SSA	-108.60	-325.73	-147.96	-60.32	-3.50	-106.44
Total	5.63	1.03	-34.71	-67.99	-80.53	0.00

Note: Computation of Table 7b based on Tables 4a and 6d.

most such gains may be made at the expense of the peripheral and disintegrated subregions of NA and SSA.

In spite of Lome I, II and III and preceding conventions to improve North-South interdependence, the future does not seem to hold much promise for the African subregion with existing subregional formations. Table 7B reveals the smallness and insignificance of NA and SSA trade with EC and EFTA countries. The Table also shows that single digit positive relative (percentage) shifts in interregional trade "gains" for EC and EFTA resulted in high double to triple digit negative relative shifts in interregional trade resulting in "losses" for NA and SSA. This means that small swings in EC and EFTA markets, especially those that may imply trade diversion from Africa, would likely lead to relatively large losses in foreign exchange earnings in Africa. The relative proximity of NA to the EC core may, in the future, be more favorable to increased trade between the two subregions as compared to EC-SSA trade. These trends are, to some extent, shown by Table 7B in which relative negative shifts in trade for NA (see both row and column vectors) are smaller than those for SSA. There are many reasons for this. First, with the poorer Mediterranean countries of southern Europe now embraced in the EC, the NA subregion fills the gap for semi-peripheral status on account of its proximal location. Second, NA is more favorably endowed in energy sources than SSA, providing greater potentials for trade with EC and the other European subregion of AETA. Third, the absorptive capacity of NA for industrial investment is significantly higher than that of SSA because of the former's stronger and relatively more stable structural base and higher level of purchasing power. Finally, the relative closeness among NA nations, principally due to OPEC and the Arab League, provides advantages in dealing with Europe as a bloc. SSA holds few such cartel or political cards in its dealings with Europe.

Africa, with its fragmented market and competitive and duplicative commodities<sup>32</sup>, and without the benefit of strong cartel power, would continue to suffer from relative deprivation in its interregional dealing with its European trade partners. The EC countries found that with market integration, the rate of their productivity rose and their competitive position vis-a-vis the US and Japan improved immensely. This should provide a lesson to SSA and NA. The small countries in western Europe, like Belgium, that led in the push for economic integration, now rate higher in production and effective market size than the whole of SSA<sup>33</sup>. They are

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32 Adedeji, A - "Development and Economic Growth in Africa to the Year 2000; Alternative Projections and Policies", *Alternatives Futures for Africa*, Edited by Timothy Shaw, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982.

33 IMF 1982, 1987, 1989, *op.cit.*

benefiting from the advantage of larger economic markets. With present conditions of structural deficiencies and dismembered markets, NA and SSA countries would not effectively gain bargaining positions in international markets. With expanded markets, not only can SSA and NA subregions be more efficient in producing their staple commodities, but also they can enhance their competitive positions to attract new growth industries in secondary as well as tertiary activities.

### **Conclusions**

The increasing economic and spatial integration of the EC will produce a variety of adjustments for trade and development at three spatial scales: (1) European, (2) Afro-European, and (3) global. First the spatial impact in Europe refers to adjustments that have been going on and will continue to take place with respect to relations between the EC, EFTA and EE. The EFTA has been reduced to only six countries since some of its former members joined the EC. One of its present members, Norway, defeated by popular referendum an option to join the EC but is seriously considering a reapplication for membership. Although EFTA lost some territory in the 1975-1988 period, its trade with the EC grew by the highest rates compared to those for all the other trading subregions including trade within the EC (Table 5b)<sup>34</sup>. Indications are that EC and EFTA markets will merge even more. Actually, negotiations are taking place at present to create a European Economic Space (EES) which would coalesce EC and EFTA markets. The situation of EE minus East Germany is uncertain. Whatever the outcome of their political and economic changes, EE countries, including the Soviet Union, will likely expand their economic relations with the EC. The need for development funding will soon compel the Soviets to liberalize their markets and create an environment for closer dealings with the West in general.

The second spatial adjustment resulting from the economic federation of the EC will be at the level of the entire trading area of AETA. Based on their geographic proximity and common attributes of culture and advanced economies, the EC and EFTA would play a dominant role in the AETA. EE would occupy a semi-peripheral status in Europe. The African subregions of NA and SSA would be even more marginalized. NA, because of its geographic proximity and mineral and agricultural resources, would be

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34 Lodge 1989, *op.cit.*, p. 237.

relatively favoured in its economic relations with the European core. SSA, at least in the short run, would be disadvantaged because of their relative geographic remoteness, political instabilities, structural deficiencies and general economic malaise<sup>35</sup>.

The third and final spatial economic adjustment, resulting from the strengthened EC trading block, is global in scale. The economic federation of EC and resulting subregional adjustment in Europe affecting EFTA and EE would enable Europe to assert its sphere of influence and dominate its portion of the globe as the US and Japan would continue to reshape theirs in view of the unfolding post-glasnost global system of center-periphery relations. Europe would be the core of one of the three "pan-regions" using Africa and part of Asia as its raw material and cheap labor periphery. The US and Japan may strengthen their own respective domains in Latin America and Asia and Oceania respectively<sup>36</sup>.

The total developmental impact of spatial adjustment at all three geographic scales is a major question for the 1990s. An important issue is whether the economic federation of the EC, and perhaps enlarged by the addition of EFTA, would be advantageous or deleterious to growth and development in the other subregions. There are two possible interpretations of the lessons from the Lome accords. The first is that the Lome accords did not achieve the desired results. The second is that they prevented even more disastrous consequences from happening. But, if the objective has been to improve the relative standing of Africa in the North-South trading system from 1975 onwards, the accords have achieved very little<sup>37</sup>. The African subregions of NA and SSA, unless they realize the benefits of an integrated approach to improve their economic future, will certainly face further stagnation and increasingly weaker roles in their trade relations with an increasingly united and stronger Europe<sup>38</sup>. The time is here to rethink about Africa's own economic unity on at least subregional basis. The decision in 1991 by the OAU Heads of State to establish an African Common Market comes at a critical stage in Africa's development. Although there will be

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35 Senghass 1985, *op.cit.*, pp. 66-69.

36 Taylor, P. J. - *Political Geography: World-Economy, National-State and Locality*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1989, pp. 45-51. Wallerstein, I. - European Unity and its implications for the inter-state system". *Europe: Dimensions of Peace*. Edited by B. Hettne. London: Zed., 1988, pp. 1-36.

37 Forbes 1986, *op.cit.*; Hoogvelt, A.M.M. - *The Third World in Global Development*. London, Macmillan, 1987. Lister 1988, *op.cit.*; Twitchett 1978.

38 Cohen, R.B. - "The New International Division of Labour, Multinational Corporations and Urban Hierarchy". *Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist Society*. Edited by M. Icar & A.J. Scott, London: Nethuen, 1981; Forbes 1986, *op.cit.*, pp. 77-91. Gilbert, A. Latin America - "The World Recession and the New International Division of Labour", *Tijdschrift voor Econ. en Soc. Geografie*, 77 (1986), pp. 368-77. Wallerstein 1988, *op.cit.*

*Africa Development*

considerable difficulties ahead to realize an Africa-wide economic integration, the declaration of intent should buttress subregional entities such as the ECOWAS and PTA to forge ahead.

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\* Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48823, U.S.A.

# Europe 1992: A Challenge to Sub-Saharan African Development

Kwame Boafo-Arthur\*

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*Résumé: L'Afrique est confrontée à de sérieux problèmes comme la dette et les contraintes de son service, des prix bas pour ses produits d'exportation, la baisse de l'aide extérieure, un taux d'intérêt élevé, des infrastructures faibles et une instabilité politique. L'Afrique au Sud du Sahara ne pourra jouer son véritable rôle dans le marché interne de l'Europe 1992 que si les différentes stratégies de réforme économique en cours améliorent sa capacité d'exportation. Il est urgent que les parties tiers lèvent les contraintes aux investissements contenues dans les conventions de Lomé. Il faudra beaucoup insister sur la diversification commerciale et la création de facteurs incitatifs pour la réhabilitation des produits d'exportation existants. Les efforts de promotion de l'exportation doivent être complétés par des négociations sérieuses pour des concessions commerciales et autres réalistes et contraignantes de la part de la CEE. Il est également important d'augmenter la mobilisation des ressources ainsi que le commerce intra-africain et régional. Bref, c'est sur les aspects internes du développement que les pays Africains doivent maintenant mettre l'accent. Sans d'importantes améliorations sur ces aspects, l'espoir de l'Afrique sub-saharienne d'entretenir des rapports commerciaux avantageux avec une Europe unie sera vain.*

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## Introduction

In March 1985, the Council of the European Economic Community (EEC) called on its executive wing, the European Commission (EC) to prepare a comprehensive programme with a specific timetable for the establishment of an internal market in Europe. Consequently, in June 1985, the Commission published a White Paper containing 300 legislative proposals, later reduced to 279, on the internal market. In December 1985, the EEC member states passed the Single European Act (SEA), which became effective in July 1987. The legislation is to facilitate the creation of a European internal market by December 31, 1992.

This legislation ushered the European Community into a new and dynamic phase which is bound to have far reaching socio-economic effects on sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The countries of this sub-region have binding relations with the European Community through their membership of the EEC-ACP group. In fact, of the 66 ACP countries, 44 are from SSA. Issues affecting SSA countries invariably affect the remaining non-African members of the ACP group and vice versa. The links between SSA countries and the EC have recently been strengthened with the adoption of the Lomé IV



Convention in December 1989. Like the previous conventions, the emphasis is on trade concessions and financial and technical aid to SSA.

This paper discusses the implications of the internal market for Europe and the challenges they pose to the socio-economic development of sub-Saharan Africa. The central question is: what should Africa's response to Europe 1992 be? Our contention is that, SSA's competitiveness in Europe 1992 will be dependent on successful domestic economic restructuring with emphasis on the rehabilitation and expansion of the traditional export sectors, diversification of the existing export base and vigorous promotion of trade, investment and intra-regional or African trade.

First, we discuss the rationale for the SEA and its potential impact on the EC. This is done to underline the strong economic underpinnings of the internal market, the international economic competition it seeks to invoke, and hence the necessity for SSA countries to pursue viable economic policies. Second, we examine briefly, SSA's relations with the EC under the Lome Conventions. We believe that SSA's reaction to the internal market will be influenced to some extent by this relationship. Positive responses, however, will depend on how some of the bottlenecks in the existing relationship that tend to frustrate third party investment in ACP countries are eliminated.

Preparations towards Europe 1992 have coincided with the unexpected breaking of the Eastern bloc. How this will affect Africa's capabilities to meet the 1992 challenge is also examined. Finally, the dimensions of possible African response to the developmental problems of sub-saharan Africa and the challenges posed by Europe 1992 are discussed.

### ***The European Community and the Single European Market***

The concept of a large single internal market for Europe was envisioned by the European signatories to the treaty of Rome in 1957. In the preamble to the treaty, the six nations declared their intention of laying the foundations for an enduring and closer union between European peoples through systematic removal of all political and economic barriers. They agreed to the establishment of a common market and a common external tariff for all goods; common policies to be devised for agriculture, transport, labour mobility and other important sectors of the European economy. These were in line with the major goal of the Community which according to Article 1 of the treaty was to ensure the achievement of a harmonious development of the economy within the whole Community, a more rapid improvement in living-standards and closer relations between the member countries<sup>1</sup>.

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1 On the Treaty of Rome and the common market concept, see A.E. Walsh & John Paxton (eds.), *The Structure & Development of the Common Market*. (Hutchinson, London, 1968).

Article 8A of the SEA also states: 'the internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured...'<sup>2</sup>. The SEA is thus a re-statement of the objectives of the Treaty of Rome. The singular differences between the 1957 and 1985 positions are the urgency now attached to the latter and the determination to see it through. This is reflected in the deadline of December 31, 1992 for the implementation of the single European market. The SEA seeks to do the following;

- removal of all internal border controls, especially eliminating delays at frontiers for custom purposes and related administrative burdens for companies and public administrations;
- elimination of technical barriers to trade by applying the principle of mutual recognition of standards, the harmonization of technical standards with respect to health, safety, consumer protection and the environment;
- opening up of government procurement to competitive bidding;
- recognition of professional qualification within the Community;
- harmonization of indirect taxes (eg. value added and excise) and,
- liberalization of capital movements and related liberalization of financial services<sup>3</sup>.

The question arising from this is: what instigated this new urgency and commitment to an internal market by the end of 1992?

The impetus for Europe 1992, as it has become known, appears to be the outcome of the great concern expressed about economic and technological stagnation in the member countries of the European Community. It is felt that through the internal market, EC companies operating on a wide market will be able to carry out the necessary research and development, a precursor to improved technological advancement. The reason as Jacques Pelkmans and Peter Robson note is that:

*... the member states were finding themselves individually specialized more and more on low-technology, stagnating sectors of industry, and failing to adjust intersectorally towards medium-technology and more particularly high technology sectors with the vigour of Japan and the US. To many observers, it appeared that the EC's refusal to make*

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2 Cited in Ehlerman, C.D., 'The Internal Market following the signing of the Single European Act', *Common Market Law Review*, (24), 1987, pp. 363-364.

3 See Gita Bhatt, 'Europe 1992: the quest for Economic Integration', *Finance and Development*, June 1989, pp. 40-42.

*timely industrial adjustment was encouraged by the fragmentation of its internal market*<sup>4</sup>.

A single market is therefore intended to enhance Europe's capabilities in competition with strong economies such as the US and Japan. The internal market will lead to effective and efficient channelling of resource flow of labour, capital and materials to 'areas of maximum economic advantage'. Of immediate economic significance, however, is that the programme will create a united market of 320 million consumers. Since there will be no obstacles to the movement of goods, services and capital, growth in various sectors are envisaged. In fact, a single market will immediately transform the EC into the world's second largest economy after the US.

A major study titled *Research on the Cost of Non Europe*, and popularly called the Cecchini Report, analyzed the economic prospects of the internal market by focussing on the cost of 'non Europe', namely how much it will cost Europe if the internal market is not formed.

The direct gains from the removal of barriers to trade is a low 0.2-0.3% of GDP. The elimination of barriers to production in the form of protective public procurement, different national standards and regulations has an anticipated gain of between 2.0% and 2.4% of GNP. The indirect effects reflected in gains from economies of scale, intensified market competition and market integration are 2.1%, 1.6% and between, 2.1 and 3.7% respectively. Judged on the basis of 1988 prices, the overall gain is expected to be between 170 and 250 million Ecu per annum<sup>5</sup>. The Cecchini Report concluded that a completely free and competitive internal market could in the course of five to six years create between 2-5 millions jobs, raise the EC's GDP to 7% and reduce consumer prices by between 4.5-6%<sup>6</sup>. As of June 1990, considerable progress had been made in the areas of border controls, technical standards, public procurement; and in the free movement of labour, capital and financial services. Clearly, the underlying factor for the internal market is the quest for European economic power reminiscent of the pre-1945 era. As argued by Hans-Jorg Rudlof, 'the European challenge in to

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4 Jacques Pelkmans and Peter Robson, 'The Aspirations of the White Paper', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. xxv, No. 3, March 1987, p. 181, 5, Gita Bhatt, op. cit. p. 40.

5 All figures except in the last line are expressed at 1985 prices and relate to seven member states. The aggregate result is scaled up in terms of the 12 member states. The last line expresses 1988 GDP. The seven member states (Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Belgium and the Benelux) account for 88% of the GDP of the EC-12. For further information on the cost of Non-Europe, see Paolo Cecchini, 'Study Analyzes Impact of 1992 Internal Market', *Europe* Oct. 1988, p.18ff.

6 See Gita Bhatt, op. cit. p. 41, and *Europe*, Oct. 1988, p. 16.

restore the Europe of 1914 when Europe was the biggest economic power in the world...'<sup>7</sup>.

While the aim is not to assume imperial status, it is undeniable that world economic and political power move side by side. Besides the potential economic benefits, there is a veiled political dimension to the whole economic push. Politically, the SEA has given the community a significant push towards its ultimate goal of political integration. Economic unity and stability, it is hoped will create the necessary conditions for political integration, there is also an underlying quest for world power. With regard to this, Hans-Jochen Vogel, the leader of the German Social Democratic Party declared:

*... We will need the Single Market to be able to face competition with other important trade partners in the world. But more importantly, we are convinced that only in this way will Europe be able to increase its strength as an international power and capacity for self-assertion*<sup>8</sup>.

The existence of the EEC-ACP accord and the sort of influence the Community wields in Sub-Saharan Africa will be further enhanced by the anticipated economic impact of the internal market; Given the close relationship between economic power and political influence in the international system, the success of the internal market is expected to manifest itself in Europe's renewed global power.

In sum, very significant and far reaching steps have been taken by the EC in an attempt to meet its December 1992 deadline, for the creation of an internal market. It is obvious that the internal market is a challenge to the economic dominance of the US and Japan. In the light of the developmental problems facing many developing countries and the stress on international economic competition in Europe, however, a more serious challenge faces SSA countries. The challenge is rendered more daunting by Europe's failure to adequately address its external trade policy under the SEA and the recent developments in Eastern Europe. Even though Mr. Willy De Clercq, the EC Commissioner for Foreign Relations hinted that many developing countries will not be asked to make reciprocal concessions<sup>9</sup>, the fact still remains that the EC has not streamlined its relations with SSA under the SEA.

Notwithstanding De Clercq's assurance on concessions for the developing world, the primary goal of the single market which is to reinforce the

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7 See Hans-Jochen Vogel, 'The Political Dimension of the European Single Market', *The International Spectator*, vol. xxiv, No. 1 January-March 1989.

8 See *New York Times*, April 3, 1990, pp. A1 and C1.

9 See David Buchan, 'EC Clarifies External Implications of 1992 Program', *Europe*, November 1988, p. 14.

competitiveness of European Industry must be underscored. It must be stressed further that third country producers (especially the developing world, would still have to face stiff competitions among themselves, with individual European producers, with advanced countries like Japan, the US and the Newly Industrializing countries (NIC).

In view of the low level of development in SSA countries, it could be safely assumed that any unfair trade competition or any negative effects in terms of international trade war is bound to affect the most vulnerable of EC's partners - the sub-Saharan African countries. Would it be wise then for sub-saharan African countries to count on non-binding assurances on concessions in the internal market? The clue seems to lie in the failure to explicate on the form EC-ACP relations will take when the single internal market is finally established.

It must be noted that the existing EEC-ACP relationship was the outcome of negotiated agreement which is supposed to be binding on the EC, since the SEA drastically reforms aspects of the Treaty of Rome, the rules governing existing relations must of necessity change. The fact is, instead of SEA exports going to a Community with fragmented market with often different rules by 1992, there would be a single market, and hopefully, uniform rules. Whereas the conditions under which African exports entered EC markets were mutually arrived at under the Lome Conventions, there has been no binding agreement on the conditions under which African exports will enter community market in 1992. In the light of the history of the relations under the Lome Conventions, would it be enough for SSA to depend on the existing accords to guide its trade and other relations with the Community after 1992? Answers to these questions call for brief examination of what the Lome Conventions are and what they are not.

#### **EC-sub-Saharan African Relations**

The Community and SSA relations trace their origin to the Treaty of Rome which established the Community in 1957. The Treaty included special provisions (part IV) which inaugurated a new association in 1958 between the original six members of the Community and their overseas and colonial territories. The purpose of the association as spelt out in Article 131 of the Treaty was "to promote the economic and social development of the countries and to establish close economic relations with them and the Community as a whole". The members of the Community subscribed to the idea of closed and exclusive relationship. It was evident that commercial motivations were overriding factors when deciding the inclusion of the dependencies as associate members. In fact, France which originally mooted the idea of association and made it a condition for their own membership of the

EC had to concede the right of other member states to establish business ties with the territories under her control<sup>10</sup>.

By the early 1960s, most of the associated territories had attained independence. The association proved over the years to be a remarkably useful and a firm base through which the Community could steadily extend its influence in Africa. Thus, the Yaounde I Convention was signed to ensure the continuity of the ties between the newly independent countries and the EC<sup>11</sup>. Britain's entry to the Community in 1973 paved the way for the inclusion of Commonwealth African countries and led to the signing of the Lome I Convention in 1975 between the Community and 46 ACP countries. The provisions of this multilateral agreement included cooperation in the fields of trade, aid, investment, industry and stabilization of ACP export earnings<sup>12</sup>.

By the end of the first convention in 1979, the initial euphoria over the possible developmental impact of the relations had given way to cautious optimism. Nevertheless, in 1980, the original five-year convention was renewed (with some modifications) by the Community and 58 ACP states as Lome II. In December 1984, the ten EC member nations and 65 ACP countries signed the Lome III Convention<sup>13</sup>. On December 15, 1989, the new Lome IV Convention was signed between the 12 members of the EC and 66 ACP countries. One major feature of Lome IV is the extension of the duration of the convention from five years to ten years.

Running through the conventions are three distinctive features covering aid, stabex and trade<sup>14</sup>. Under the conventions, the Community is obliged to give a certain negotiated amount of aid to ACP countries through the European Development Fund (EDF). This amounted to 3,390 million Ecu and 5,400 million Ecu under Lome I and II conventions respectively. However, inflation, population growth and the expansion of the ACP countries reduced aid under Lome II (as compared with Lome I, by about 20% per

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10 See Majorie Lister, *The European Community and the Developing World*, Gower Publishing House, England, 1988, p. 15.

11 Ibid.

12 John Ravenhill, *Collective Clientelism: The Lome Convention and North-South Relations*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1985, p. 1.

13 See Twitchett, *A Framework for Development*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981, pt. 1 and Cecil Rajana, Lome II and ACP-EEC Relations, *Africa Quarterly*, vol. xx Nos. 1-2.

14 For detailed and informative analysis of the conventions, see C. Stevens, 'EEC and Africa', *African Contemporary Record*, 1983/84, pp. A203-205; 'The EEC's Year in Africa', A.C.R., 1984/85, pp. A163/170; 1985/86, pp. A208-215, and Tony Hill, 'Whither Lome? A Review of the Lome III negotiations', *Third World Quarterly*, (3) July 1985, pp. 661-681.

ACP citizen<sup>15</sup>. Under Lome III and IV, an amount of 8.5 billion Ecu<sup>16</sup>, and 12 billion Ecu<sup>17</sup> respectively, were allocated to the ACP countries.

Another salient feature of the Conventions concerns Stabex regulations. Under this, the Community makes up for short falls in the export earnings of selected commodities from ACP countries. An ACP country qualifies for stabex assistance if external earnings from a listed commodity falls by 7.5% below the average price in the community market over the previous four years<sup>18</sup>. A commodity under stabex must account for 7.5% of export income for a particular country and 2.5% of export income of the poorest ACP countries. Through this mechanism, many sub-Saharan African countries have benefited from stabex transfers. Lome II introduced SYSMIN, for minerals. Certain minerals were excluded but Lome IV expanded Sysmin coverage to include gold and uranium. Trade concessions for the exports of sub-Saharan African countries is another prominent feature of the relations. Over 99% of SSA exports enter the Community market duty-free.

Over the years, however, the ACP countries have been frustrated by the rejection of demands for increased aid per capita in real terms, improved stabex and trade liberalization. Generally there have been disappointments because of Lome's failure to meet the developmental needs of SSA. In spite of the signing of Lome IV, the EC's failure to guarantee the existing relations in the 1985 White Paper on the modalities for the establishment of the European internal market tends to undermine the relationship.

Although the special relationship seems to be losing its attraction for the Europeans on account of changed international economic conditions, there is no reason to believe that the existing pact will be abrogated by either party in the foreseeable future. The reasons are that, the threat of OPEC style commodity producers cartel which was cause for alarm in some European circles in the 1970s, no longer exists. Furthermore the relationship as Ravenhill argues, 'continues to produce tangible benefits for many of its parties'<sup>19</sup>. For the ACP countries, it is in the form of guaranteed assistance in spite of the generally dwindling external capital inflows to the Third World, while for the EC, it is the assured access to markets and raw materials. It is certain, however, that the EC is guaranteed access to certain minerals and commodities (Table 1). Access to minerals of ACP countries as covered by Sysmin under Lome IV underlines the importance the EC attaches to the guarantees. Stabex and Sysmin offer, not only a form of social insurance for

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15 Jeffrey Herbst, 'Theories of international Cooperation: The Case of the Lome Convention, *Polity*, vol. xix, No. 4, Summer 1987, p. 638.

16 See *West Africa*, 25 February, 1985, p. 362.

17 *The Courier*, No. 119, 1990, p. 1.

18 J. Herbst, op. cit. p. 639.

19 Ravenhill, op. cit. p. 4.

the ACP but also an insurance policy for the patron helping to increase the security of future supply of raw materials<sup>20</sup>. The fact is, commodities not exported to EC markets do not attract stabex or sysmin transfers in case of shortfalls in price.

**Table 1 - ACP share in EEC Imports of Raw Materials  
(1976, in percentage of extra EEC imports)**

95 - 100	Uranium 90 - 85-
85 - 90	Pineapples, palm nuts, and kernels
80 - 85	Groundnut oil
75 - 80	-
70 - 75	-
65 - 70	-
55 - 60	Groundnuts, raw sugar, sisal, wood, aluminium ore
50 - 55	Copper ores and concentrates, alumina
45 - 50	Groundnuts cake
40 - 45	Coffee
35 - 40	Refined copper
30 - 35	Manganese
25 - 30	Tea, tin
20 - 25	-
15 - 20	Beef, bananas, palm oil, raw cotton, phosphates, iron ore
10 - 15	Rice, rubber (natural), skins, diamonds
10 - 15	Copra, raw tobacco, unrefined aluminum, zinc, chrome, crude petroleum

Source: Ravenhill John, *Clientelism....* op. cit. p. 39.

In spite of the trade concessions as well as stabex and aid provisions under the Lome Conventions, SSA's developmental problems persist. In fact, the convention was hailed as a 'new model for relations between developed and developing states, compatible with the aspirations of the international community towards a more just and more balanced economic order'<sup>21</sup>, but the much anticipated economic or developmental break-through for SSA is yet to materialize. Contrary to expectations, the gap between the North and South has widened and investment levels have not risen<sup>22</sup>.

The fact is that the prolonged developmental problems of SSA countries have adversely affected the regions overall performance in world commodity and manufactured trade. For instance, economic growth and living standards of SSA countries have deteriorated over the past decade. The dependence on primary commodities has made most of them vulnerable to external shocks.

20 Ibid. p. 41.

21 Preamble to the first Lome Convention, cited in Ravenhill, op. cit. p. 1.

22 Roger C. Riddell, *Foreign Aid Reconsidered*, p. 94.



The debt burden has become unbearable and the consequent economic stagnation has engendered political instability and social fragmentation.

These developmental problems have contributed to a steady fall in SSA's share of EC market since 1975 when the first Lome convention was signed. Before 1975, the ACP held 8% of EC market but this fell to 6.5% ten years after Lome<sup>23</sup>. A World Bank study has also shown that SSA exports, in relation to other Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have slumped in both volume and total earnings as shown in Table 2.

**Table 2 - Sub-Saharan African Export Performance  
(1970-1986). Average Annual Percentage Change**

Export Vol.	1970-1979	1980-1984	1985	1986	1987
Africa	- 0.7	- 2.7	- 4.6	1.7	2.7
Other Idcs	3.0	7.1	3.1	5.8	9.4
Export earnings					
Africa	13.1	- 6.1	- 3.1	9.5	3.6
Other Idcs	22.3	4.0	- 1.3	1.6	22.9

Source: World Bank/UNDP, *Africa's Adjustment Recovery and Growth: Trends and Perspectives in the 1980s*, (Washington D.C.) March, 1989

In the 1970s, there was only 1 percentage increase in Africa's export volume while that of other developing areas was 3%. The difference widened in the 1980s. For instance, while the increase for Africa in 1987 was 2.7, that for the other developing areas was 9.4. Export earnings, as the table shows, also reflect the same differences. In 1987, Africa registered 3.6 percentage change in export earnings while that of other developing areas was 22.9.

By 1987, average export earnings for SSA countries was only 64% of their 1980 levels. This was in spite of a 16% rise in export volume<sup>24</sup>. Since most of the economies depend on one or two primary commodities, decline in export prices always herald serious dislocations in national development plans. Most of the countries depend on four main crops-coffee, cocoa, cotton and sugar. Together these crops constitute about 70% of total agricultural export from SSA (Table 3).

23 See Matthew McQueen and C. Stevens, 'Trade Preferences and Lome IV: Non-traditional ACP Exports to the EC', *Development Policy Review*, Vol. 7, 1989, pp. 239.

24 Joshua Greene, 'The Debt Problem of Sub-saharan Africa', *Finance and Development*, June 1989, pp. 9-12.

**Table 3 - Share of main commodities in total agricultural exports of sub-Saharan Africa, 1944-1984 (percentage)**

Commodity	1944-1966	1969-1984	1978-1980	1984
Coffee, cocoa and cotton	46	54	63	66
Coffee, cocoa and sugar	51	58	69	72
Coffee, cocoa, copra & tobacco	56	61	72	78

Source: OECD Development Centre, *Crisis and Recovery in Sub-saharan Africa*, (Paris, 1985), p. 51

With such narrow export base, every negative price fluctuation affects external cash inflow and therefore development programmes. This situation has been aggravated by the low level of flexibility in the production system. As a result, African countries are not able to benefit much, in times of higher prices and suffer most when prices slump. Trade concessions have had little impact on export promotion because of the lack of efforts to enhance production capacities and the over dependence on primary products.

It must be stressed, however, that the nature of the various Lome Conventions have contributed to SSA's inability to break from the primary commodity dependence syndrome.

Generally, it is assumed that under the terms of the Lome convention, there are no barriers to SSA exports to EC markets. In reality, there exist some tariff and non-tariff barriers. Calls for the removal of these barriers during negotiations for Lome III went unheeded and Lome IV also did nothing about it. For instance, textiles and fish flies from Malawi and strawberries from Kenya continue to face daunting barriers in EC markets<sup>25</sup>.

Further constraints are indirectly imposed by the existence of the 'safeguard mechanism' and 'the rules of origin' clauses in the convention. The EC reserves the right to invoke the safeguard mechanism clause if in its opinion, SSA exports have the potential of seriously disrupting EC markets. Simply, the safeguard mechanism restricts the range of goods that the ACP countries can currently export to the Community. Even though this clause is yet to be invoked, its existence deters would-be third party investors in Africa as there are no guarantees for their products in EC markets.

The rule of origin clause strengthens the safeguard mechanism clause. It specifies the percentage of the final products' components that must

25 See Tony Hill, *op. cit.* p. 662. On the interesting story of fish from Malawi made from feathers and attached to hooks, see Adrian Hewitt, "Malawi's First Eight Years of Co-operation with the EEC: The Result of the Lome Convention", *ODI Working Paper*, No. 12, 1983.

originate from either the ACP or EC member country before it qualifies to enter EC market. On the one hand, it appears EC companies are reluctant to invest in SSA countries because of political instability in most countries and fear of low economic returns on investment. On the other hand, the existence of these clauses seem to scare non-EC investors. With regard to foreign investment it appears the ACP countries are in a no win situation. The best SSA countries can do is to re-negotiate with the EC on the 'safeguard and rules of origin mechanism'. Successful negotiations of these clauses will possibly lead to increased investment in various sectors by third parties. Additionally, governments could come out with attractive investment policies to lure foreign entrepreneurs. This is imperative because SSA need to improve upon the manufacturing sector and through that minimize the dependence on the export of primary products. It must be noted that investments in the manufacturing sector over the last decade were low. As such its contributions to external earnings were marginal. As compared to other developing areas, SSA's share in global manufacturing is very low. The World Bank notes that between 1965 and 1986, the ratio of manufacturing value added (MVA) to GDP for SSA has been stagnant around 10% while it has increased from an average of 20% to 30% for all developing countries<sup>26</sup>. Many reasons account for this but a significant disabling factor in the context of EC-ACP relations is the very little external aid expended on this sector. External assistance to manufacturing industry was 'less than 12% of the total official aid to Sub-saharan Africa at the start of the 1980s; it has fallen sharply since then and the trend appears set to continue'<sup>27</sup>. As a result of this trend, ACP export of manufactured goods to EC market fell from 6.6% in the 1970s to 1.5% in 1988<sup>28</sup>. At present EC sponsored projects in SSA are agricultural biased. Sub-saharan African countries will be able to maximize their gains from the manufacturing sector and compete in Europe only if appropriate policy prescriptions aimed at improving the sector are taken. A push could also be given to domestic industrial entrepreneurs. Given the low level of capital formation and technological development, the EC could be of immense help by increasing investment in this sector and also by relaxing the safeguard mechanism and the rules of origin clauses of the Lome Convention. This will guarantee export avenues to third parties interested in this sector.

Furthermore the much vaunted preferential treatment for ACP exports has also suffered over the years. This is the result of the lowering of the

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26 World Bank, *World Development Report*, 1986, pp. 184-185.

27 Roger C. Riddell, 'A Forgotten Dimension? The Manufacturing Sector in African Development', *Development Policy Review*, vol. 8, 1990, p. 5.

28 *South*, January 1990, p. 17.

general level of EEC custom duties and the signing of special arrangements with other countries. So far as the Lome preferences are concerned, the African Development Bank notes that 'less than 30% of ACP exports to the Community are treated more favourably than exports of other countries'<sup>29</sup>. Exports of tropical products which originally had favourable treatment are bound to suffer because of the newly instituted general trade liberalization for such products from other regions. Since this effectively reduces the margin of preferential treatment under the Lome Convention, ACP states will surely lose. To some extent then, SSA's trade relations with the EC after 1992 will be influenced by the nature of the preferential treatment and the capabilities of individual countries to enhance production capacities.

The accession of Spain and Portugal to EC membership poses another challenge to SSA countries. Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal and Ghana have gradually developed their canned tuna industries. About 63% of the aggregate canned tuna produced by these countries and Fiji, Mauritius and Solomon Islands enter EC market. Spain and Portugal are among the leading canned tuna producers in Europe. However, until their accession to membership of the EC in 1986, they were not exporting to EC market because of Community tariff of 24% and 9.6% imposed on Spain and Portugal respectively<sup>30</sup>. These tariffs have been eliminated since 1986. Sub-saharan African producers now compete with Spain and Portugal. The odds against SSA countries (in terms of accessibility, communications etc.) will be greater when all internal barriers to trade within the EC are removed by 1992.

The unexpected collapse of communism in Eastern Europe threatens to affect external aid flows from some donors to SSA. In fact, the Lome IV committed 12 billion Ecu to the ACP countries but this has not lessened the apprehensions of many countries about the possible diversion of development assistance from Africa to Eastern Europe. The breakdown of communism has effectively eliminated trade and other barriers between the EC and the former Soviet satellites. Various western companies with support from their governments are seriously exploring trade and market links with the COMECON countries at the expense of SSA countries. According to Nigel Twose, London Director of the Panos Institute, there are 'clear off-the-record indications from a number of European governments that Eastern European economic reform will be at the expense of aid to Africa and the rest of the Third World'<sup>31</sup>. For instance, the EC has voted \$4 billion in support of Poland's economic reforms and aid pledges have been made to Hun-

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29 African Development Bank (ADB), *African Development Report*, 1990, p. 39.

30 M. McQueen and C. Stevens, *op. cit.* p. 242.

31 Cited in Baffour Ankomah, 'The 1990s: An African burning point', *African Business*, March 1990, p. 10.

gary and Romania. These are in addition to serious attempts to incorporate Eastern European countries into a broader European economic scheme. The Italian Prime Minister, Giulio Andreotti openly expressed his willingness to rechannel aid meant for the Third World to Eastern Europe<sup>32</sup>. The Community also seeks 'closer collaboration' with COMECON countries because they represent a considerable market<sup>33</sup>. Draft agreements on trade and economic co-operation have already been signed by the EC with the Soviet Union, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland<sup>34</sup>. It seems therefore that the development of the fledging democracies in Eastern Europe will be at the expense of assistance to SSA countries. This will surely affect the volume of development assistance SSA countries receive from bilateral and multilateral sources. There is no doubt therefore that the ability of these countries to develop their economies will be further constrained by events in Eastern Europe. Even though the opening up of Eastern Europe will possibly lead to greater demand for tropical products, SSA countries will find it difficult to take advantage of that because of the same development problems, the constraints imposed by the Lome Convention and the possible diversion of development assistance to Eastern Europe.

### **African Responses**

African countries have however, responded to the developmental crisis by the adoption of various policies. These responses when carefully followed, will greatly enhance economic growth and improve upon Africa's competitiveness in the European market. First, efforts at the widening of the export base have been intensified by many countries. For instance, there has been an appreciable growth in non-traditional exports comprising of canned tuna, leather products and vegetables to EC markets<sup>35</sup>. Although the overall contributions to GDP by these exports are small, prospects are bright if the momentum is maintained.

One area that holds immense promise for African development in the long term is intra-African trade. Attempts to promote intra-African trade (which predate the decision to establish a single market in Europe in 1992), have led to the formation of various regional economic groupings such as the economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), made up of 16 countries in the sub-region and formed in 1975 and The Preferential Trade Area (PTA) comprising 15 countries in Eastern and Southern Africa formed in 1982. It must be noted that intra-African trade is less than 5% on

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32 See *Ibid.* pp. 5-6 and *African Business*, February 1990, pp. 10-11.

33 Hans-Jochen Vogel, *op. cit.* pp. 5-6.

34 ADB, *African Development Report*, 1990, p. 41.

35 *Ibid.* p. 109.

the average<sup>36</sup> and there is practically no trade between the West African countries and their East African counterparts. The formation of these trade blocs with the sole aim of promoting economic cooperation and intra-African trade will boost self-reliance and trade. In 1984 for instance, total intra-regional imports in the West African sub-region increased to \$943 million, from \$396 in 1976, an increase of approximately 139%. During the same period, total exports rose from \$490 million to \$891 million, a rise of approximately 82%<sup>37</sup>. This humble beginning could be built upon. However, effective intra-regional trade has been hampered over the years by several factors. These include the nature of African economies which are non-complementary, but competitive raw materials and agricultural products. Weak or limited infrastructural facilities such as transport and communications, the existence of multiple currencies, the existence of other competing sub-regional economic unions such as the francophone Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) and the Mano River Union (MRU), and disharmonious legal and administrative set up, are other problems undermining intra-regional trade<sup>38</sup>.

Concerted efforts and practical policies that will guarantee effective intra-regional trade are needed. Finding lasting solutions to most of the problems bedeviling intra-African trade will help in minimizing Africa's dependence on European markets and boost south-south cooperation.

Many countries have also adopted internationally sponsored structural adjustment programmes aimed at improving their economies and ensure steady development. Various studies have shown that those countries with such programmes have better chance of stimulating economic growth and hopefully, overall development than those without<sup>39</sup>. However, one must carefully evaluate such optimistic prognosis in the light of what is actually happening in countries that have adopted such programmes. It is on record that only 9 out of 30 African countries with SAPs in the early 1990s are working satisfactorily<sup>40</sup>. The fact is that the social consequences of such strategies have in most cases tended to be negative. In short, the structural adjustment programmes have not provided the needed solutions to Africa's

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36 McQueen and Stevens, *op. cit.* pp. 242-245.

37 Julius E. Okolo, 'Obstacles to increased intra-ECOWAS trade', *International Journal*, XLIV, Winter 1988/89, p. 178.

38 For further explication on the dimensions of these constraints, see Julius Okolo, *op. cit.* pp. 185-210.

39 For detailed discussions on aspects of the performance of countries undergoing Structural Adjustment Programmes, see Charles Humphreys and William Jaeger, 'Africa's Adjustment and Growth', *Finance and Development*, June 1989, pp. 6-8 and Saleh M. Nsouli, 'Structural Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Finance and Development*, Sept. 1989, pp. 30-33.

40 ADB, *African Development Report*, 1990, p. 123.

developmental problems. This point was well conceded by the Chairman of Ghana's Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). Flt/ Lt. J.J. Rawlings when he declared

*I should be the first to admit that the economic recovery programme... has not provided all the answers to our national problems*<sup>41</sup>.

African countries need to do a lot more in terms of restructuring their economies, promoting industrialization, improving the manufacturing sector, boosting regional trade and diversifying the economic base in order to meet some of the challenges posed by the decision to set up a single European market. In fact, African development could be enhanced and its competitiveness improved by increased trading among African countries. In addition, the pursuit of sound initiatives aimed at providing congenial political and economic atmosphere to attract capital from within and without Africa will be in order.

### **Conclusion**

There is no doubt about the enormity of the developmental problems confronting sub-Saharan Africa. These range from debt and debt servicing obligations, difficulties generated by low commodity prices, declining external assistance, high interest rate, weak and deteriorating infrastructure and political instability. Since Sub-saharan Africa, like other third parties must compete for market in Europe 1992, the prospects of the region benefiting from the internal market, (even if the existing preferential treatment under the Lome accords are maintained), depend critically on the successful resolution of most of the developmental problems.

Even though some serious economic restructuring steps have been taken by some countries, the fact still remains, however, that no rapid and easy solutions exist, especially where drastic restructuring of the economy and re-orientation of economic policies are concerned. It must be stressed that sub-saharan Africa's full potential in the internal market of Europe 1992 will be reached, only if the various economic reform strategies being carried out improve its export capacity. There is also an urgent need for the removal of constraints to investments by third parties inherent in the Lome Conventions. Given the depth of the problems, it is too early to judge whether positive change will emerge ultimately from the various strategies.

The only consolation for SSA countries is that 1992 in itself is problematic because nobody knows how successful it will be. Its impact on Africa will therefore vary demanding upon its outcome. For the interim, however, strong emphasis on trade diversification, provision of incentives

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41 See *African Business*, March 1990, p. 11.

for the rehabilitation of existing export products, and export promotion drive must be coupled with serious negotiations for realistic and binding trade and other concessions from the EC. Internal resource mobilization and intra-African or regional trade must also be stepped up. In short, African countries should now place primary emphasis on the internal aspects of development. Without substantial improvement along these lines, sub-Saharan Africa's hopes of beneficial trade with Europe will remain a dream, come 1992.

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\* Department of Political Science, University of Ghana



# Borders and Borderlands as Linchpins for Regional Integration in Africa: Lessons of the European Experience\*

A. I. Asiwaju\*\*

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*Résumé: L'Afrique ne peut valablement relever le défi de l'Europe 1992 que si elle s'attaque directement au problème des frontières des Etats-nations actuels. Les frontières et les territoires frontaliers sont encore considérés comme des zones de tension malgré l'existence d'activités, d'intérêts et de ressources humaines et matérielles communs. Pour que l'intégration économique réussisse il est nécessaire que les frontières cessent d'être considérées comme des remparts mais plutôt comme des ponts. D'après la nouvelle approche appelée "micro-diplomatie sous-nationale", une coopération officielle est possible entre les autorités locales. Cette stratégie qui est fondée sur les réalités historiques et géographiques d'un territoire sous-national donné (réseaux de rapports informels gérés par des protocoles de coopération) prouve que les efforts pour l'intégration économique internationale impliquant les communautés frontalières valent la peine d'être faits. Elle permet un contrôle et une gestion plus faciles et éventuellement des niveaux d'agrégation au plan continental et sous-continental. L'ancienne idéologie d'amour-propre national doit être remplacée par une autre doctrine fondée sur des rapports fonctionnels et de soutien mutuel entre les gouvernements et les peuples de part et d'autre des frontières sans qu'ils ne perdent leur souveraineté nationale.*

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*Europe and its separate states must not only ensure, each at its level, that internal regions are coordinated, but also work towards co-operation with external regions, that is with regions outside European state system. The policy of cross-border co-operation has no sense if it is limited merely to countries within the European Community which have already begun to integrate. It must be extended to other countries, too, whether or not they belong to the E.E.C., whether or not they belong to the Council of Europe... (J.M. Quitin, *European Co-operation in Frontier Regions*, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1973, p. 41).*

There is perhaps no other single theme that has dominated public debate about Africa's future than the implications of "Europe 1992" for the con-

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continent. The perception of the Single European Act coming to full effect in that year has been especially sharpened by the outbreak of the democratic revolutions in Communist Europe in November 1989, leading to the virtually irreversible process, not only of the evolution of "a Greater Europe" but also of the termination of the Cold War and the systematic dismantling of obstructionist ideological borders between the West and the East.

However, as easily illustrated by the extremely illuminating two-day high-powered international seminar on "European Community After 1992: Consequences for Africa", held in Lagos from the 14th to the 15th June 1990 under the auspices of Nigeria's Ministry of External Affairs, the debates have focussed more on matters of effect than those of fundamental cause. While a great deal has been said and written on the urgency of regional integration on the model of the EEC, far less than desirable attention has been paid to the more critical casual factor of the nation-state territorial structure and the border problematics.

Europe 1992 is "Europe Without Frontiers". Africa cannot respond effectively to the challenges without having to directly confront the question of the borders of the nation-states, which have given rise to the need for regional integration in the first instance. There has to be a concerted effort at converting those borders from their prevailing postures as ramparts into a new veritable function as bridges. Africa's searchlight for lessons in the European historical experience must transcend the EEC to embrace a firm grasp of knowledge about the extremely important complimentary role of the Council of Europe with particular reference to the handling of the strictly territorial and border dimensions of the evolution of the European Community.

The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to an international economic integration strategy which, while still being ignored by policy makers and planners in Africa, has in recent decades gained in importance and achievements in Europe and is currently being actively recommended for the adoption of governments in North America<sup>1</sup>. Rather than keeping rigidly to the approach whereby development is always initiated from the top, usually through the operation of usual type sovereignty-preconditioned multinational inter-governmental organizations, the new strategy is in the effective utilization of micro- or grassroot-level initiatives and their policy potentials; it operates within the framework of the more limited inter-governmental organizations in which local or provincial authorities along

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1 See, e.g., Niles Hansen, "European Transboundary Cooperation and Its Relevance to the United States - Mexico Border", *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, 49(3) 1983, 336 - 343. This article provides the bulk of the information on European transborder transactions for our paper.

international boundaries play key roles as agents of international cooperation. In this new context, the unit of action is not whole continents or their main subregions, as in the case of the more familiar-type multilateral inter-governmental organizations; it is, instead, the border<sup>2</sup> regions or borderlands defined characteristically as the "sub-national areas whose economic and social life is directly and significantly affected by proximity to an international boundary<sup>3</sup>."

While each of such "sub-national areas" may be planned and developed within contexts of individual nation-states, observable geographic, demographic, cultural, economic and historical links and interpenetrations with the "sub-national areas" on the other side of the given international boundary make the national less realistic and less desirable than the international transboundary approach to planning. This imperative for local planning across an international boundary has given rise to the use of a new policy instrument and tool of analysis in international relations referred to, for want of a better term, as "sub-national micro-diplomacy"<sup>4</sup>. The use of this mode has allowed for formalized cooperation among local authorities, based on pre-existing network of informal relations between communities across the binational boundaries and covered directly or indirectly by provisions of co-operative treaties between nation-states along the specific borders.

There are obvious advantages which the use of "sub-national micro-diplomacy" has over the alternative of the more established macro-level diplomacy. Apart from addressing itself to the issue of borders and their functions, so basic to all discussions of international cooperation, the new strategy makes for relatively easier demonstration of relevance of international economic integration efforts to the geographical and historical realities on the ground. Indeed, as has been noted, transboundary economic cooperation at inter-governmental level normally results from the formalization of

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- 2 'Border', 'Boundaries' and 'Frontiers' are contested concepts; but for the purpose of this paper, 'the three' will be taken as synonyms and used to refer to the *Line* of demarcation between any two sovereign states. 'Border regions', 'Borderlands' and 'Frontier zones' will be the reference to the sub-national areas on both sides of the binational line of demarcation.
  - 3 Niles Hansen, *The Border Economy: Regional Development in the Southwest*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1981, p. 19.
  - 4 For a systematic use of this concept, see Ivo D. Duckacels, "International Competence of Sub-national Governments: Borderlands and Beyond" in O.J. Martinez (ed.) *Across Boundaries: Transborder Interaction in Comparative Perspective*, El Paso: Western Texas Press, 1986 11 - 30; and also his *The Territorial Dimension of Politics Within, Among and Across Nations* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1986 and Ivo D. Duckacels, D. Latouche and Garth Stevenson (eds), *Perforated Sovereignities and International Relations: Trans-Sovereign Contacts of Sub-national Governments* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1988).

the informal network of relations, which have existed for decades and, in some cases, centuries at the level of communities or culture area astride binational boundaries.

This advantage enables transboundary cooperative efforts to respond better to criticisms which generally deride macro-size inter-governmental organizations for international cooperation as something essentially remote from the people. In this regard, it is pertinent to refer to one of the series of insightful observations in an ECOWAS-Commissioned study conducted by the ECA on "Economic Integration in West Africa" to the effect that "international efforts at economic cooperation in the subregion are, for now, largely an affair of government, and not quite of the people<sup>5</sup>." And if, as the study has correctly asserted, "economic cooperation is for the people<sup>6</sup>", there cannot be a more logical starting point than the borderland communities. Such communities have suffered more than their counterparts in other sub-national areas from the obstructionist effects of borders; they are, therefore, better situated to appreciate the value of transboundary socio-economic planning and development.

Besides, borders constitute the locus for most of the interchanges between the limitrophe nation-states demarcated by them. Accordingly, borderlands should be viewed and treated as the most suitable grounds for training and testing the sincerity of nation-states and governments committed to international cooperation including efforts at regional economic integration. The relative smallness of the area and of the inter-governmental organization involved makes for greater ease of effectiveness of control and monitoring.

Finally, the use of "sub-national micro-diplomacy ultimately allows for continental and sub-continental levels of aggregation. In other words, there is the macro dimension of this essentially micro-level operation. This point is supported by evidence not only of the widespread nature of the phenomenon of borderlands and small nations which in Africa, as in Europe (as we shall presently examine), have the attributes of border regions<sup>7</sup>. Such available evidence further emphasizes the importance to be attached to the recognition of borderlands as vital units of regional planning at international levels. Some observers of the European efforts at transboundary cooperation see such cooperation as "a significant step towards eventual European

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5 U.N.-ECA, *Strengthening Economic Integration in West Africa*, (ECA, Addis Ababa, 1984), Paragraph 181.

6 Based on the model of Switzerland as a typical example, all member-states of ECOWAS are, e.g. of predominantly 'border' characteristics. These include not just small-sized states like Benin, Togo and The Gambia or the land-locked Sahelian states of Niger, Upper Volta and Mali. There is also Nigeria, the biggest of the states in the sub-region, with 15 of its present 21 constituent states directly linked with the international boundaries.

7 Hansen, 1982; op.cit.

economic and political integration"; and Niles Hansen, arguing with particular reference to the US-Mexico border, has commented quite usefully that the European experience "should prove instructive for ... other countries where common border region problems and opportunities are still neither understood nor appreciated adequately in the respective national capitals"<sup>8</sup>.

Whatever our sensitivity about comparisons which make Europe the reference point for Africa, it is fair to consider the border regions on the latter continent as essentially a replica of those on the former. In Europe, as in Africa, with particular reference to the Western Subregion, neighbouring border regions represent areas of distinct official Languages, national histories and cultures as well as differing economic systems and administrative organizations.

This is not surprising since the border, which spawned the borderlands of Africa in the first instance, were creations of European imperialists who drew and, for a long time, managed them on the model of the borders of their own respective metropolitan countries. As has been discussed in several scholarly works<sup>9</sup>, the borders of modern Africa are so much European superimposition that all the legal instruments for dealing with them have remained exactly the same 'Agreements', 'Treaties', 'Protocols' and 'Notes' which the particular European powers established between or among themselves at the time of the drawing and the maintenance of the colonial boundaries.

The rulers of independent African states which, at least in territorial structural terms, are for the most part no more than successors of the former European colonies, have to this extent maintained the *status quo*: Not only were the legal instruments inherited; the institutions, personnel and the mode for dealing with the subject of boundaries have remained basically the same European antecedents or their derivatives. Little wonder then that border relations in Africa have continued to feature the same kind of mutual jealousy, conflict and tension; and have continued to be managed within the framework of the same kind of diplomacy and laws that govern such relations in Europe of the nation-state. Structurally, the borders of Africa pose

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8 See, e.g., I. Brownlie, *African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia*, C. Hurst and Co., London and University of California Press, 1979; A.C. MacEwen, *International Boundaries of East Africa*, Oxford University Press, 1971 and J.C. Anene, *The International Boundaries of Nigeria, 1885-1960*, Longman, Ibadan History Series, 1970.

9 Relevant works include W.I. Zartman, "The Politics of Boundaries in North and West Africa", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 3, August, 1965, pp. 155-173 and the more comprehensive Saadia Touval, *The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa*, Harvard University Press, 1972.

as much obstacle to international cooperation efforts as have been known of their counterparts in Europe.

African and Africanist scholars are quick to point out that the borders of modern African states are artificial; they were arbitrarily drawn with little or no regard for pre-existing entities; they have split up unified culture areas and natural zones or distinct ecosystems. From the viewpoint of the comparison in this paper, the crucial point that is often missed in all these familiar remarks is that in all such matters the borders of nation-states in Africa are really not different from the European ones<sup>10</sup>. It has been argued elsewhere, for example, that the phenomenon of artificially partitioned culture areas is as much a feature of borders and borderlands in Africa as they have been in Europe and the wider world of European-type nation-states<sup>11</sup>.

In France, for example, the ethnic structure of the state is, in spite of the centuries of centralist-state tradition, not in any essential sense different from the structure of the independent states that have grown out of her former African colonies. With particular reference to the issue of partitioned culture areas astride the borders and the corresponding internal multiethnic situation of the state, Peter McPhee has most aptly observed in a recent work that:

*the territorial map of France does not correspond to an ethnocultural map, either within the hexagon or along its borders. To the northeast the border slices into the Flemish-ethnic entity (the rest of which is to be found in the adjacent area of Belgium). In the South, the border cuts through two Iberian lands: the Basque country (Euskadi) and Catalonia (each shared with Spain). Corsicans speak Italian dialects. Lower Brittany has a million people using the Celtic language. There are at least ten or twelve million who know something of Occitan. Inversely, the territorial map of France does not include the French-speakers of Belgium and the Bernois Jura. Franco-Provence is spoken between St.*

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10 It is, for example, a matter of great fascination to compare the responses of the Catalans, "an ethnic group, neither French nor Spanish" to the parallel socialization processes by France and Spain in the Cerdanya Valley arbitrarily divided into two by the Franco-Spanish border in the Eastern Pyrenees on the one hand; and, on the other, the Yoruba, also an ethnic group neither French nor English, arbitrarily divided into two by the Anglo-French Nigeria-Dahomey colonial boundary in Western Yorubaland. See Peter Sahlin, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (U.C. Press, Berkeley, 1989) and A.I. Asiwaju, *Western Yorubaland Under European Rule, 1889-1900: A Comparative Analysis of French and British Colonialism* (New Jersey, Humanities Press, 1977).

11 A.I. Asiwaju, ed. *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884-1984*, C. Hurst, London, 1985, Chapter 12: "The Global Perspective".

*Etiennes and Fribourg, Grenoble and Lers-le-Sannier, even in the Val d'Aosta*<sup>12</sup>.

The phenomenon of shared populations and related natural resources, important in any discussion of transboundary economic cooperation, was widespread in Europe - as can be very easily illustrated by the numerous instances on the borders of Switzerland, Italy, Yugoslavia, Turkey and so on. These European instances are replicated by the several parallel instances in Africa.

The features of a border region, such as we have tried to summarize, make it respond well to its typical and functional definition as an area of national and cultural interface, a region of social and economic interpenetration in which the functions and influence of the state on the one side of a given boundary normally fade gently into the sphere of its neighbour. This has to be in view of the fact of shared human and material resources and associated activities and interests spanning the border.

But in spite of this fact, the policy vision of the situation in Europe up to the 1960s was more or less as it is today with most states of Africa where borders and borderlands have continued to be viewed largely in conflict and tension terms. The notion of sovereignty (as expounded in the thoughts of 18th Century European political philosophers) and the rather exclusive use of diplomacy and international law as sole instruments for dealing with international relations, including those affecting common borders and border regions, have continued to be emphasized at the expense of positive efforts at international cooperation. Political concerns, particularly those relating to state security, are viewed as far more important than issues of economic cooperation and overall social welfare. In Africa, as in Europe of the pre-world Wars era, most states are faced with threats of instability; and this fact has come to exercise a commanding influence on the more or less permanent state of tension along most of the borders.

This paper draws attention to the situation in Europe where the position has eased somewhat within the last two or so decades. This change has been due to a conscious and collaborative effort on the part of the nation states. Rather than continue to view borders in terms of conflict and tension, the new attitude in Western Europe has allowed for a new approach which now places emphasis on the more positive issues of transborder cooperation, planning and development. Borderlands have come to be viewed in terms of human needs and material developmental possibilities. Contrary to the disposition of the traditional diplomatic approach, by which the often distantly

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12 Peter McPhee, "A Case Study of International Colonization: The Francisation of Northern Catalonia", *Review*, III, 3, Winter 1980, pp. 400 - 401.

based national governments monopolized control, the new strategy allows such borderlands problems that are local to be so studied and resolved. It is realized, for example, that regional planning and development by any national government is impossible without adequate consultation with national authorities on the other side of the border. It is especially impossible for a local or regional community or authority in a border area to undertake coherent local development programmes without consultation with and possible input by counterparts on the other side of the border. What is said about development extends to issues of security, including the question of law enforcement, in the border areas.

In such a changing condition, the old ideology of national self-interest is being strongly persuaded to yield place to an emergent alternative doctrine of mutual necessity and functional relationship between peoples and governments on both sides of a border. National sovereignty and associated international boundaries are not abandoned, but encouragement is given for borders to function less as lines of division and exclusion than as points of contact and mutual inclusion. In Europe, the cradle of nation-state and borders, transborder informal linkages which have been inspired by the fact of shared human and material resources straddling several of the borders, have been accorded formalized and internationally legalized status in recent years. Through processes and developments which have spanned the last twenty or so years, the member states of the Council of Europe, which embraces the whole of Western Europe, have between 1979 and 1982 endorsed the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation Between Territorial Communities or Authorities<sup>13</sup>. The Convention is a major triumph of 'micro-diplomacy'; and the implementation of its provisions would be the final demonstration of the incomparable advantage of international socio-economic integration at the grassroot level.

The Outline Convention is indisputably the most important result of the series of experiments in international socio-economic cooperation at the local level. The Convention and its antecedents issued out of a persistent search for regional and local solutions to regional and local problems. Success has depended at every stage on the support of the border communities themselves; and, as Hansen has correctly observed, "even though economic development is the stimulus to transboundary cooperation, such efforts can be facilitated by the presence of similar linguistic or ethnic groups on both sides of the border"<sup>14</sup>. In this regard, it is pertinent to emphasize the leading

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13 Council of Europe: *European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation Between Territorial Communities or Authorities*, No. 106 of the European Treaty Series, Strasbourg, 1982.

14 Hansen (1983; *op.cit.*)



role of the people along and across the Rhine valley where, as in Africa, "borders represent more the results of past conquests and diplomatic arrangements than natural geographical barriers"<sup>15</sup>.

The interest of the local people was so easily enlisted because in Europe, as elsewhere, national governments generally prove negligent or negative in their attitude to the affairs of their border regions. National governments, often based at considerable distance from the borders, generally vacillate in dealing with problems affecting these sub-national area because "the only institutionalized means of communication across borders was international law and diplomacy"<sup>16</sup>. This is often compounded by usual bureaucratic red-tape of state officials. Central governments, especially those of centralist states like France, impeded transborder cooperation "because of fear that the sovereignty of the nation-state would be compromised". The social, economic and political marginalization of border regions which generally result from this style of handling by national governments, often left the border communities with the impression that their salvation can only lie in their own hands.

In the circumstance in which border communities in Europe found themselves, the need for self-reliance was too obvious to require being preached about from outside. In a situation of economic neglect, such as is so clearly reflected in the influential 'location theory' and 'growth pole' literature<sup>17</sup> which commonly stress the disadvantage of border regions in matters relating to industrial location and international trade; and in situations where border communities must cope with problems of conflicting official mandates, resulting from manifestations in border regions of the differing political, legal, administrative, economic and cultural traditions and institutions of the nation-states in contact, the local people often have no choice but to rely on their own steam. Here lies the significance of the informal linkages which generally characterize border relations. In the absence of officially sanctioned mechanisms, sufficiently informed and adequately sympathetic toward the special requirements of the border regions, the informal network was the only mode left for the local people in order for them to get around the problems of the border. These often include the barrier effects which generally stand in the way of border peoples wanting to take obvious 'ad-

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15 Ibid.

16 This point is generally observed by nearly all scholars - Ellwyn Stoddard, Oscar Martinez, Niles Hansen, John House, etc. - who work on the United States-Mexico border relations.

17 For a detailed discussion of the literature and application of these spatial theories to border regions, see Niles Hansen (ed), *Growth Centres in Regional Economic Development*, Free Press, New York, 1972. There is a summary of the views in his latest book on *Border Economy*, op.cit., chp. 2. ("The Nature of Border Regions").

vantage of potential complementarities in public services and facilities as well as potential scale and agglomeration economies"<sup>18</sup>.

Not surprisingly, then, the experiments in transboundary cooperation, which preceded the establishment of the European Outline Convention, were all results of local initiatives. They include such organizations as the Regio Basiliensi created in 1963; the Euregio, launched in 1970; and the Conference of Upper Rhine Valley Planners begun in 1979. The others are the federal-type Association of European Border Regions, based in Bonn, Western Germany; the Committee for the Promotion of Alpine Region Cooperation with headquarters in Turin, Italy; the Liaison Office of European Regional Organizations based in Strasbourg, France.

The Regio Basiliensi, one of the early examples of these transboundary cooperative efforts, was directly inspired by both the business and civic elites in Basel, Switzerland, who felt the need to do something positive about the increasingly pronounced economic marginalization of the city, due largely to its location at the northwest corner of Switzerland<sup>19</sup>. But, as we have already hinted, the border situation made it impracticable for any coherent planning to be undertaken for Basel without due cognizance taken of the city's status as a trinational agglomeration with parts in the adjacent areas of Northwestern Switzerland, Upper Alsace in France and "Sudbaden" in Germany. Indeed, for a more complete view of the planning needs of the area a good note was taken of the wider regional setting of the city. Regio Basiliensi then came to have as the area of its operation the entire historical 'Regio' which is defined as "the European border area of the Upper Rhine between the Jura, the Black Forest and the Vosages and has more than two million inhabitants"<sup>20</sup>.

In the words of Dr. Hans Briner, the founder and Secretary General of Regio Basiliensi, "Its purpose is the planning and encouragement of economic, political and cultural development of this trinational area"<sup>21</sup>. Funded through contributions initially made by private business and the concerned Swiss Cantons, Regio Basiliensi was founded on centuries of traditions of "close cultural and economic ties", most of which antedated the birth of France, Germany and Switzerland as nations. Alemanic, a German

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18 Hansen, *op.cit.*

19 For detailed information on 'Regio Basiliensi', see Hans J. Riner, 'Coordination of Regional Planning Across National Frontiers: Regio Test Case - Switzerland/France/Germany'; "General Information", Basel, Sept. 1981 and H.P. Schmid, "The Transfrontier - Impact of Nuclear Power Stations in Basel-Region ('Regio', Germany/France/Switzerland), all documents supplied by the Service de Coordination Internationale de la Regio, Basel, Sept. 1981.

20 Service de Coordination Internationale de la Regio, p. 1; also Briner, "Coordination of Regional Planning...", p. 3.

21 *Ibid.*

dialect, is the common local language. The preservation of this common history and culture has been stated as an objective for the "coordinated planning and harmonization in the individual regions"<sup>22</sup>.

Regio Basiliensi's achievements are quite impressive. Quite apart from its series of surveys and recommendations on coordinated transportation and its environmental impact studies with particular reference to the implications and consequences of the nuclear plants located in the area, Regio Basiliensi has provided the brain behind the creation of the Basel-Mulhouse airport, built with Swiss money but located on French soil and jointly managed by both countries. Of crucial importance are studies of the opinions of the local people as the proper basis for the transboundary cooperation efforts in the trinational area.

The Euregio founded in 1970, constituted another early example of transboundary cooperation in Europe<sup>23</sup>. Essentially a federation of three pre-existing associations of municipalities in the German-Netherlands border region, the Euregio operates through a joint international secretariat and a parliamentary council. The main objectives are "to develop common policies and programmes in socio-cultural and economic matters and to promote the principle of a genuine European transborder region, priority being given to the development of a single transborder region, not two border sub-areas"<sup>24</sup>.

The Conference of Upper Rhine Valley Planners, which was launched in 1979, represented a major endeavour to promote large-scale transboundary planning on an informal level. While the focus of the Conference has been on issues affecting West Germany, France and Switzerland, a fact that would have made it a mere duplication of the Regio Basiliensi, the Conference's interest is made to cover the whole area of the Rhineland from Basel to Frankfurt. Again, like Regio Basiliensi's, the Conference's main impact has been in terms of the detailed analyses it has sponsored on such shared environmental issues as water and air pollution and undesirable urban pattern. There are also studies of planning in several matters including land use, economic and demographic trends, and transportation.

The Association of European Border Regions, based in Bonn, advanced the trend of federation already noted in our discussion of both the Euregio and the Conference of Upper Rhine Valley Planners. It consists of fifteen border region organizations most of which belong to the Rhine Valley. Of

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22 Ibid.

23 Information on Euregio is derived from Hansen (1983).

24 Council of Europe, Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe: *Report on Transfrontier Cooperation in Europe*, No. CPL (15) 6, Strasbourg, 1980, cited in Hansen, *op.cit.*

similar structure and function is the Committee for the Promotion of Alpine Region Cooperation based in Turin, Italy.

The European Outline Convention should be considered as the logical conclusion of this whole business of upward movement for transboundary cooperation in Europe. It is by far the most comprehensive and all embracing. For us in Africa, the Convention represented a noteworthy example of how to build an international socio-economic cooperation at the level of a whole continent or any of its major subregions upon solid local foundations. The Council of Europe, which produced the Convention, was the first and, with twenty-one member states, it is still the largest Western European political organization to be formed since the traumatic experience of the Second World War. Founded in 1949, the Council operates through a Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers which functioned as its deliberative and executive organs respectively. The Committee of Ministers decides on recommendations submitted to it earlier by the Assembly or the Committees of government experts that may be set up from time to time. The decisions take the form of recommendations to governments or formal conventions or agreements. Member states who ratify these decisions are legally bound by them.

Given the intense and widespread nature of transborder cooperative movements and organizations in Europe, it is not a surprise that the subject has been a matter of an ever increasing interest to the Council. Accordingly, a number of organizations has to be created within its framework and given assignments specifically related to the question of international cooperation in border regions. The two most notable of such Council of Europe organizations are European Conference of Ministers responsible for Regional Planning and the Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE), and later being the only such body in Europe which represents local and regional authorities in their relations with international institutions. On transboundary cooperation, the Council of Europe is guided not only by its own appropriate institutions; there is as well a constant link with the various transboundary cooperations, especially those enrolled in LOERO at Strasbourg.

Because of its intimate link with, and direct knowledge of the aspiration of local communities, including those in border areas, the CLRAE has proved the most vital organ of the Council of Europe and one which has done more than any other body to give rise to the Outline Convention. It did not just encourage central governments to recognize the need for transborder cooperation; more importantly, "it has emphasized that the organization of such cooperation requires the close participation of elected representatives of border regions and municipalities". CLRAE's direct involvement with border regions has left it without any iota of doubt about the fact that such regions and authorities are the loci where problems of international coopera-

tion are most keenly felt. CLRAE is, therefore, the organ which has driven the point fully home with the Council of Europe that regional planning and development in a border region is completely unrealistic without a systematic consultation between planning authorities on both sides of the boundary. The Committee's view of transboundary relations as a process of five progressively complex phases of information exchange, mutual consultation, active collaboration, harmonization of planning and integration of planning has had its strong impact on the notion of progression manifest in the Outline Convention and its Appendix.

The Outline Convention was passed by the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly in 1979; and on 21 May, 1980 in Madrid, it was opened for signature. It has now been signed by Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and West Germany. There are, altogether, 12 articles plus an appendix containing five draft "Model Inter-State Agreements" and six model 'Outline Agreements, Statutes and Contracts Between Local Authorities'.

The provisions of the Convention oblige each signatory member state "to facilitate and foster transfrontier cooperation between territorial communities or authorities within the jurisdiction of other Contracting Parties" (Article 2). The purpose of the Convention was to achieve "concerted action designed to reinforce and foster neighbourly relations between territorial communities or authorities within the jurisdiction of two or more Contracting Parties" (Article 2:1). Although each signatory member state retains as always its sovereign rights on matters of international relations, there is an undertaking by each "to resolve any legal, administrative or technical difficulties liable to hamper the development and smooth running of transfrontier cooperation" (Article 4).

The draft model agreements between states or between local authorities are to assist such states and authorities to conclude supplementary agreements that will facilitate the execution of the provisions of the Convention. Sixteen broad areas of transborder cooperation have been identified on the basis of existing experience. These include urban and regional development; transport and communications; energy; nature conservation; water conservation, education, training and research; public health; culture; leisure and sports; mutual assistance in disaster; tourism, commuter labour; economic projects; improvement in agriculture, social facilities and miscellaneous issues. (Article 6 of the second Model Inter-State Agreement on Transfrontier Regional Consultation).

The European experience in transboundary planning, such as we have just sketched, may be considered relatively too short to become an authoritative reference point. In fact, the Outline Convention was not ratified by France, understandably the most reluctant and the last Council-of-Europe

member to do so, until 1984. However, the history and the substantial achievements of the Convention as a treaty with a firm rooting and foundation in the geographical realities on the ground and the resultant spontaneity of support by the signatory powers must be viewed as good and reliable enough indicators of success<sup>25</sup>. In any case, the urgent need in Africa for an alternative strategy which would make current efforts at regional economic integration more relevant and more demonstrably meaningful to the predominantly rural and local peoples of the continent (so well represented by the border communities) oblige us to take a specially serious note of the European experience.

It is already worthy of the attention of Africa that in spite of traditional attachment to the notion of sovereignty and the use of the usual type of diplomacy and international relations, including international economic cooperation, the governments of Western European countries, most of them members of Council of Europe, have mobilized their concerted effort for a new kind of diplomacy that allows local and regional authorities on the borders of the nation-states to function as agents of relations and cooperation between them. The era of borders that divide and separate thus appears to be giving way to a new era of borders that join<sup>26</sup>. As the informal linkages across European international boundaries are accorded formalized status, the discrepancy and gaps between the boundary-maintenance policy of nation-states above and the boundary-disregarding attitudes and behaviours on the ground are being reduced, if not eliminated. There is in this new development a demonstration effect which gives us in Africa an opportunity not only for a comparable adjustment of policy to the realities of relations on our borders. There is also a new chance to recover what was lost at the time of the establishment of the friction-stanced boundaries, viz., the pre-colonial concept of boundaries as zones of mutual contact<sup>27</sup>.

We have already pointed to the structural and functional similarities between borders and border regions of Europe and those of Africa. There is, therefore, no doubting the fact that the human and material resources for achieving transboundary cooperation in Africa are not any less than those in

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25 For an assessment of the impact, see Alois Partl, "The International Development of Transfrontier Cooperation: Achievements and Prospects: Implementation of the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation Between Territorial Communities and Authorities", 3rd European Conference on Frontier Regions; Barmen, 4 - 6 Sept. 1984.

26 For some application of the paradoxical concept of borders as institutions that both join and divide, see John H. Haddox, "The Border: A Place to Live, A Place to Learn", Faculty Research Award Lecture, University of Texas at El Paso, 1982; and Peter Brown and Henry Shue, (eds.), *The Border That Joins*, Rowman and Littlefield, New Jersey, 1983.

27 A Synthesis of the views of this pre-colonial African concept of boundaries is contained in A. I. Asiwaju, "The Concept of Frontier in the Setting of State in Pre-Colonial Africa", *Presence Africaine*, Nos. 127/128, 1983.

Europe. The border regions of Africa may and do vary not only from those of Europe but from one another in terms of local details. Nevertheless, the prospects and problems are substantially the same. With particular reference to the question of transboundary cooperation, Africa has all, and perhaps even more than what it has taken in Europe.

First is the fact of abundant human resources. This point can be simply illustrated by the widespread presence of peoples and communities of the same culture on both sides of every border. The present writer's recently completed research on this subject provides some conclusive evidence: the detailed checklist of African border culture areas shows that each of the one hundred and three international boundaries on the continent features this type of 'population overhand'<sup>28</sup>. The proverbial neglect of border areas, a pronounced feature of the African situation featuring a general absence of industrial activities and urbanization processes, has aided the accentuation of the primordial cultural pull and intra-group relations across the borders<sup>29</sup>. The sense of rejection and disregard for the borders in partitioned culture area of Africa is probably greater than in industrialized and relatively individualistic societies of Europe. The peoples of Africa, those at the borders not exempted are known for their reservations, expressed in many instances in the form of armed resistance, against European colonial establishment, including the establishment of the colonial boundaries. Against this background, it is easy to see how the culture areas astride such boundaries have been conducted to domesticate, if not totally neutralize, the locally judged 'harmful' effects of the alien cultures and differing states mandates criss-crossing at the borders.

The ethnic ties across African borders are often reinforced by the interlocking character of the border settlement pattern. Here again, the details vary between the two border situations in focus but the substance of the matter is once more the same. Thus, whereas urbanization along borders is a major issue in transborder relations in Europe, there is perhaps no location

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28 Examples of 'Partitioned Africans' include the Yoruba and the Borgu astride Nigeria-Benin Boundary, the Hausa across Nigeria/Niger, the Ewe of Ghana/Togo, the Wolof of Senegambia in West Africa; the Somali of Somalia/Ethiopia/Kenya/Djibouti in Northwest Africa; the Maasai of Tanzania/Kenya. The Alur of Uganda/Zaire, Kongo of Zaire/Congo/Angola; The Cokwe and the Lunda of Angola-Zaire in Central and East Africa; the Chewa-Ngoni of Zambia/Malawi/Mozambique, the Name and Ba-Tswana of Angola-South Africa and Botswana/South Africa respectively - all of Southern Africa. Each of these culture areas is sufficiently large to constitute units for transboundary regional planning.

29 This point is brought out with repeated emphasis in the case studies included in the book on *Partitioned Africans*. The Yoruba example received some publicity on January 9 - 10, 1983 when the Ooni of Ife and four prominent Nigerian Yoruba Oba paid a two-day visit to the Alaketu of Ketu, joined by the Onisabe of Sabe, two Yoruba Oba in the Peoples Republic of Benin (see the Report by A. I. Asiwaju in *West Africa* of Feb. 28, 1983).

outside the singular case of Brazzaville (Congo) and Kinshasa (formerly Leopoldville, in Zaire) where settlements of standard urban sizes are found in twin-type location along any African bi-national boundary. However, there are equivalent medium-sized urban centres not directly on the boundaries but within the confines of the borderlands, not to count the innumerable village-level communities, of the same type of dual location along several African borders<sup>30</sup>. As in Europe, there is the same degree of interdependence in social and economic matters and a comparable degree of informal linkages between the communities across the borders. In a number of instances, as Mills has been able to discover in his study of the Nigeria-Benin case, the frontier village communities are experiencing a remarkably high rate of growth<sup>31</sup>, enough to justify the advance attention of experts concerned with border environmental questions.

African border communities and local authorities face the same kind of social, economic and political problems that had stimulated development from the informal to formalized transborder relations in Europe. Quite apart from questions relating to shared land and related natural resources, which call for transborder planning, there are actual experiences of governments in border areas which point attention to the need for joint action. Examples abound of rural development programmes of governments on one side of the border, falling short or becoming inadequate precisely because the services, provided for the nationals on the one side of the border could really not be made inaccessible to their kin on the other side. A situation like this has, for example, generated complaints by the Zambian government about Mozambican and Malawian Chewa and Ngoni kinsmen who over-burden the medical, agricultural and educational facilities provided under the state's rural integrated scheme for kinship groups resident on the Zambian sides of the boundaries with these neighbouring states<sup>32</sup>.

The description of the policy potentials in Africa will be incomplete if it does not include some statements as to whether or not there are in Africa institutional infrastructure or frameworks with a level of capacity which has enabled the Council of Europe to play the role known of it in the Europe

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30 Examples of border settlements of interlocking location include such prominent Nigerian cases as Badagry and Porto Novo, Imeko and Ketu, Bussa and Nikki along the Nigeria-Benin Border; the two Daura, and Katsina and Maradi on the Nigeria-Niger boundary and other dual villages on the Nigeria-Cameroun border.

31 See L.R. Mills, "The Development of a Frontier Zone and Border Landscape along the Dahomey-Nigeria Boundary", in *The Journal of Tropical Geography*, Vol. 36, June 1973, p. 44.

32 S.H. Phiri, "Some Aspects of Spatial Interaction and Research to Government Policies in a Border Area: A Study in the Historical and Political Geography of Rural Development in the Zambia/Malawi and Zambia/Mozambique Frontier Zone (1970-1979)", Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Liverpool, 1980.



case. There is, of course, no doubt the fact of numerous intergovernmental organizations in the continent; but for the purpose of the concern in this paper, there appears no better choice than the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The human and material resources necessary for the adoption of a transboundary planning and coordination have been found to be a truly African-wide phenomenon. What is required is an organization with a political leverage at the level of the entire continent itself. Aside the current anxiety about OAU's commitment to its own preservation and survival, there is no doubt about its capacity to play the roles analogous to those of the Council of Europe. If adequately informed and advised, the OAU can resolve to aid the promotion of borders that join in the same way as it has resolved to maintain the boundaries as they were at the independence of member states. The same concern for continental unity, peace and overall development which decided the resolution for the *status quo* in 1963 is today all the more compelling for another decision to devalue the barrier effects of the boundaries. African equivalents of the European Conference of Ministers Responsible for Regional Planning and especially the CLRAE can be easily added to the existing organizations with the OAU.

Given the fact of the immense possibilities for transboundary planning in Africa, the question then arises as to what should be done to translate the potentials into actual policy. Several considerations easily come to mind; but perhaps the most important and urgent relates to the need for a massive and systematic public enlightenment programme. This is necessary to bring about a desirable change in the attitude and outlook of the political and bureaucratic elites at all levels, including those of the border regions themselves. The special emphasis on the local political and bureaucratic elite is placed if only to call attention to the extent to which Africa has lagged behind trends in Western Europe and some other parts of the wider world, notably North America, in spite of the point about comparable resources. For whereas in Western Europe and say, the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, informal linkages across borders have for long involved local authorities on both sides of borders<sup>33</sup>, in Africa, cross-border informal linkages have remained for the most part an affair of the members of the border communities and their traditional rulers without the involvement of their local governments or

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33 Studies of informal linkages involving local, political and business elites along non-African borders include the "Regio" series in Europe. The United States-Mexico researchers are more impressive in number, and they include William D'Antonio and William H. Form, *Influentials in Two Border Cities*, University of Notre Dame Press, 1965; J.W. Sloan and Jonathan P. West, "Community Integration and Policies Among Elites in Two Border Cities: Los Dos Laredos" in *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 18, 1976, 451-474 and "The Role of Informal Policy-Making in United States-Mexico Border Cities" in *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 58, No. 2, June 1977, pp. 277-282.

local administrations<sup>34</sup> manned by the Western-educated elite. This point is especially manifest in situations such as those which prevail along all the four landward borders of Nigeria where, as elsewhere in West Africa, an officially English-speaking federalist state is in daily encounter with French-speaking centralist neighbours; and local governments as such in the one state are in direct juxtaposition with the local Administrations of its adjacent neighbours<sup>35</sup>.

To ensure success of the public enlightenment programme, the need for a new approach to borderlands research is more than obvious. This calls for a specially collaborative effort. Routinely, the recognition of borderlands as distinct regions compels the use of multidisciplinary instrument for their study. This point is all the more pressing since the view of development and cooperation taken in this paper is one of complete integration, not limited to trade and market. Encouragement should therefore, be given for teamwork involving experts of appropriate research orientation and interests in the related disciplines of the humanities, social sciences, law, environmental design (with particular reference to environmental impact studies of border situations), education, public health, agriculture and the natural sciences<sup>36</sup>. The second level of collaboration relates to institutions focussing on the various borders or distinct segments of particular borders and border regions. Such institutional collaboration must connect relevant research centres both within individual nation-states and those of their neighbours across the borders<sup>37</sup>. This bi-national dimension is especially demanded by the need to

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34 This special feature of African border relations will be discussed in the paper - "Informal Linkages Across Borders: The African Experience" - to be presented at the International Seminar on "Problem-Solving Along Borders: A Comparative Perspective, Centre for Inter-American and Border Studies of UTEP in March 1984.

35 The Concept of 'Local Government' denotes a degree of local autonomy that does not form part of the feature of "Local Administration"; it is, therefore, usual to use the first in reference to local or regional authorities in federal states and the latter for equivalent units in centralist states.

36 For a sample effort, see A.I. Asiwaju and Adeniyi, P.O. (eds.) *Borderlands in Africa: A Multidisciplinary and Comparative Focus on Nigeria and West Africa* (Lagos: University of Lagos Press, 1989).

37 For a more detailed elaboration of the writer's thoughts on research as a tool for the achievement of Transborder cooperation in Africa, see his *Artificial Boundaries*, an Inaugural Lecture delivered at the University of Lagos, Nigeria, in December 1984 and published same year. Subsequent developments in research and policy on border questions in Africa, with particular reference to Nigeria, have been detailed in the 'Preface' to the English/French bilingual re-issue of the Lecture, under the imprint of Civiletis International (Publishers) in New York. In Nigeria, perhaps the most important development on the policy scene has been the establishment of the National Boundary Commission with its emphasis on peaceful resolution of conflicts and promotion of transborder cooperation and confidence-building. The selling of the idea to other African countries is anticipated.

adequately inform policies on bi-national relations, good neighbourliness and international cooperation.

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**\*\* Professor of History at the University of Lagos and, currently Commissioner (International Boundaries), National Boundary Commission, The Presidency, Lagos, Nigeria.**

# L'administration sénégalaise, les confréries religieuses et les paysanneries\*

Momar Coumba Diop  
Mamadou Diouf\*\*

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*Abstract: In Senegal, the rural area is the place par excellence where the various forms of legitimacy such as the shifts in the policy of the integration of the peasantry find expression. Although there are numerous rural institutions geared towards the reproduction of the political system through the establishment of a rigorous managerial system of the rural area, the cooperative movement was the preferred vehicle which defined the role of the peasantry in the construction of a national state. Following the colonial legacy, the marabouts play a significant role in the mobilization of the rural people through their participation in the various institutions. These joint rural interventions by the state and the marabouts were based on patronage and characterized by corruption, squandering and overstaffing. Presently, a new agricultural policy, geared towards the reorientation of rural development has been launched. Its objective is to reduce state intervention to the role of a catalyst and facilitator of the private sector. Which group constitutes the private sector in the rural areas? Since independence, most peasants have been living in dire poverty. As of now, there is no sign whatsoever that this tendency will be reversed in the short term.*

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Le monde rural est le lieu par excellence où s'expriment les différentes légitimités à l'oeuvre dans l'espace sénégalais, les dérapages de la politique d'intégration et les enjeux pour le contrôle et la participation au pouvoir. L'outil privilégié de l'intégration des paysanneries fut le mouvement coopératif. Les sociétés de prévoyance coloniales ont été les racines du mouvement coopératif mis sur pied au moment de l'indépendance. Elles avaient pour tâche d'assurer la fourniture en semences à des paysans supposés irresponsables afin de permettre le fonctionnement sans accroc de l'économie arachidière, conformément à la politique de mise en valeur qu'inaugure, en théorie au moins, le plan Albert Sarraut de 1920.

Au lendemain de l'indépendance, l'Etat s'est vu investi d'un rôle important dans l'activité économique, se traduisant, dans le monde rural, par les mesures d'Etatisation des circuits arachidières. L'intervention de l'Etat s'est

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\* L'essentiel de notre analyse porte sur le bassin arachidier wolof, les pays du Ndiggël (recommandation religieuses)

manifestée par la mise en place progressive de multiples organismes chargés de la commercialisation agricole et de la vulgarisation. Le mouvement coopératif devait mobiliser la population rurale, réaliser le développement agricole national et le socialisme africain. Une telle orientation n'a fait que préciser le rôle dévolu à la paysannerie dans la construction de l'Etat national. Compte tenu du poids de l'arachide dans l'économie, les premières réformes ont été relatives à cette culture et ont abouti, en 1966, à la création de l'Office National de Coopération et d'Assistance pour le Développement (ONCAD).

Dans la foulée des réformes soutenues par l'idéologie du socialisme africain, d'autres sociétés d'Etat furent créées comme la Société d'Aménagement et d'Exploitation des Terres du Delta du Fleuve Sénégal (SAED), la Société Nationale de Commercialisation des Oléagineux (SONACOS), la Société de Développement des Fibres Textiles (SODEFITEX), la Société pour la Mise en Valeur de la Casamance (SOMIVAC), la Société de Développement de l'Elevage dans la Zone Sylvo-Pastorale (SODESP), la Société de Vulgarisation et de Développement Agricole (SODEVA), la Société de Développement Agricole et Industriel du Sénégal (SODAGRI), la Société des Terres Neuves (STN). La multiplicité de ces sociétés d'intervention a débouché sur la mise en place d'un système rigoureux «d'encadrement» du monde rural.

Si la finalité de ces structures était d'augmenter le revenu paysan et les rendements, on peut s'interroger sur leur efficacité réelle. En effet, ces deux objectifs n'ont pas été atteints et, fait plus significatif, des déficits de plus en plus importants ont été constatés. Cette situation s'explique par le fait que leurs objectifs n'étaient pas seulement économiques. Ces organismes se sont comportés en milieu rural selon une logique «d'encadrement» des paysanneries. Ces dernières devaient se conformer aux normes définies par un système qui a organisé ce que tous les observateurs dénoncent aujourd'hui : les gaspillages, la corruption, le recrutement d'un personnel pléthorique et souvent incompetent. Les sociétés d'encadrement du monde rural ont été utilisées au service exclusif d'un système politique qui ne cherchait qu'à se reproduire. La fonction de contrôle politique des paysanneries semblait passer avant la gestion «rationnelle» de ces sociétés d'Etat. Elles ont été en réalité utilisées dans le cadre de la construction et de la consolidation de l'hégémonie du président Senghor; leur rôle de patronage se développa très tôt au détriment de leurs performances économiques.

Comment expliquer celle situation? Face à la nécessité de gouverner des populations peu intégrées, l'Etat s'est appuyé sur des relais de son pouvoir en milieu rural. Tout laisse à penser que les sociétés d'Etat font partie du système de contrôle politique. Compte tenu des sommes importantes mobilisées, elles se sont trouvées au centre d'une stratégie onéreuse d'administration des paysanneries. Le parti de Léopold Sédar Senghor

pénétrant les populations de manière très résiduelle, l'Etat a été obligé de renforcer le contrôle politique des populations, système dans lequel la position des marabouts a été déterminante. Cette forme de gestion est un héritage colonial dont les mécanismes méritent d'être rappelés pour permettre une meilleure compréhension du fonctionnement de l'Etat.

### **La trajectoire musulmane**

Dès la période de la traite négrière surtout au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle la violence, les razzias désorganisent la production et la vie quotidienne des populations. L'insécurité et la perte de crédibilité idéologique des classes dirigeantes dans la Sénégambie septentrionale poussent des leaders musulmans à intervenir sur la scène politique pour contester la légitimité du pouvoir des chefs traditionnels. Ils se fixent alors comme objectifs d'enjoindre à ceux-ci d'observer, au besoin par la force, un Islam purifié. En même temps ils cherchaient, à partir de leur base d'origine, à étendre leur contrôle économique, politique et doctrinal sur certains espaces. Pour la première partie de ce programme, des révolutions théocratiques musulmanes ont été mises en échec surtout dans les Etats wolof et sereer. Mais, l'Islam comme force sociale organisatrice et administrative des communautés musulmanes s'était imposé dans une bonne partie de l'espace sénégalais en marge de l'administration «traditionnelle». Par leurs lois, leur prospérité économique et la protection efficace de marabouts charismatiques, ces importantes communautés paysannes ont contaminé les ensembles sociaux dans lesquels elles s'étaient développées (voir par exemple les régions septentrionales du pays wolof, le Haut-Sénégal/Niger).

L'offensive coloniale allait être à la fois le frein à leur expansion, à leur contestation des «autorités traditionnelles», mais aussi le ressort d'un développement considérable, se présentant sous une forme nouvelle, celle de la confrérie. L'Etat colonial, en imposant un cadre institutionnel nouveau dans cet environnement politico-social, allait offrir aux confréries, comme le mentionne Cruise O'Brien, la possibilité «de se présenter en termes de psychologie sociale comme une solide barrière protectrice contre deux formes assez différentes d'arrogance d'ordre culturel et même racial»<sup>1</sup>.

Dès leur existence en tant que catégorie sociale distincte hostiles, collaborateurs ou indifférents à la question politique les marabouts ont toujours été dans l'espace sénégalais des guides spirituels et des administrateurs de

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1 D. Cruise O'Brien, «La filière musulmane : confréries soufies et politiques en Afrique Noire», *Politique Africaine*, 4, 1981 : 7. Même si l'islam a été en compétition avec le prosélytisme chrétien dans les pays dits animistes, son influence est de nos jours massive à l'échelle du pays. Sur le plan politique, des élites chrétiennes continuent cependant à bénéficier des dosages ethno-religieux qui organisent la distribution du pouvoir au sein de l'Etat.

communautés paysannes. Dans les périodes de crises économiques et de troubles militaires, ils ont, par leur charisme, prestige, renommée et par les armes assuré la protection de leurs *taalibe*. Il est légitime de poser le problème de la contrepartie à cette protection. Celle-ci est idéologique et matérielle, surtout à partir de la période coloniale avec l'intégration des sociétés sénégalaises dans le circuit de l'économie capitaliste. La protection a donc une dimension de domination et d'exploitation; et dans la longue durée, d'appauvrissement, notamment dans les terroirs maraboutiques. Cependant, au cours de la période 1930-1968 qui correspond à un essor constant de la production arachidière, l'investissement paysan dans cette spéculation agricole correspondait réellement à leurs intérêts.

La période coloniale par son contexte, marque un tournant décisif et précise, dans un cadre nouveau, le rôle dévolu aux marabouts par l'administration. Plusieurs raisons président à cette transformation. La politique administrative coloniale a été élaborée concurremment à la croissance de la production arachidière. Son objectif principal fut l'augmentation constante de la production de cette culture commerciale dans le cadre de l'économie paysanne domestique. Celle-ci, qui se fonde sur le village, contribuait à l'entrée de ces unités collectives de production dans l'économie de traite et le circuit moderne capitaliste. Le maintien des structures existantes, à cause de la culture annuelle excluait toute forme d'investissement important. J.-M. Gastellu souligne très bien ce phénomène lorsqu'il écrit:

*la culture industrielle produite au Sénégal... est une culture annuelle ; il n'est nullement nécessaire d'entretenir des plants pendant plusieurs années, et partant aucun investissement «lourd» n'est indispensable à la production. De ce fait il est tentant de laisser la production entièrement à la charge du producteur, de façon à obtenir le produit au moindre coût des facteurs: Le surplus pouvait dès lors être récupéré à des stades ultérieurs, en aval de la production: par la commercialisation, par le transport et par la transformation du produit agricole<sup>2</sup>.*

De cette situation surgissent deux caractéristiques: l'absence d'implantation spatiale de la population de la société dominante, le quadrillage des producteurs par le réseau des maisons commerciales, d'une part, et de l'autre, l'absence d'investissement dans le secteur de la production et la surcapitalisation des affaires commerciales et bancaires<sup>3</sup>.

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2 J.-M. Gastellu (1981), *L'Egalitarisme économique des Sereer du Sénégal*. Paris, ORSTOM : 337.

3 A. Vanhaeverbeke, *Rémunération du Travail et Commerce extérieur : Essor d'une Economie paysanne exportatrice et Termes de l'Echange des Producteurs d'Arachides du Sénégal*, (Thèse, Université de Louvain) : 195-200.

Si au plan économique, le colonisateur a eu le souci de préserver les structures existantes de la production les communautés villageoises il y a eu une attitude différente au plan politique du fait même de la domination. La politique française devait se substituer à l'autorité des monarchies. Cette destruction du pouvoir politique et administratif des chefs traditionnels était nécessaire pour supprimer ces «intermédiaires» à qui il fallait verser des «coutumes», offrir des cadeaux en vue d'entretenir des relations diplomatiques indispensables aux transactions commerciales. Pour autant, on ne pouvait se passer d'«intermédiaire» en voulant maintenir le statu quo dans les villages et éviter tout changement important que l'administration ne pourrait ni maîtriser ni contrôler.

La nature de l'administration mise en place dans tel ou tel pays (mais aussi à l'intérieur d'un même pays) répond à des données écologiques et économiques. Pour le Sénégal, existaient deux zones reliées par une infrastructure de communications dont la vocation essentielle était l'acheminement de la production arachidière vers les ports chargés d'assurer l'évacuation des produits en direction de la métropole. En termes économiques, il y a les zones de production (les communautés villageoises) et les centres portuaires d'évacuation et d'administration (les villes côtières: Dakar, Rufisque, Saint-Louis). Cette différence, à une exception près (Kaolack), s'exprime dans le statut administratif des différentes zones. En effet, l'organisation administrative coloniale française avait défini trois types de territoires auxquels correspondent des organisations politiques et administratives différentes. Ces zones comprennent : les pays annexés, les pays de protectorat et les territoires de l'ancien Soudan français rattachés au Sénégal par le décret du 17 octobre 1889. La colonie du Sénégal relevait du premier type mentionné ci-dessus, qui se subdivisait en deux catégories:

- a) les communes constituées et de plein exercice avec les «originaires», les citoyens qui participaient à une vie politique parlementaire et municipale;
- b) les territoires d'administration directe non constitués en communes et formant sous le nom de «cercles» un certain nombre de circonscriptions administratives regroupaient des personnes ayant un statut de sujet français.

Cette présentation impose deux conclusions qui ont comme fondement l'antinomie «originaires» (citadins assimilés) et «sujets» (ruraux dominés). La première est l'existence d'un double système administratif qui établissait une coupure empêchant, dès la consolidation du système colonial, toute expression politique au niveau de l'ensemble de la colonie. La deuxième conclusion est la possibilité de participation politique et administrative des «originaires» et l'administration «directe» des sujets.

Pendant, la qualification de «directe» accolée à l'administration des «sujets» ne doit pas faire illusion. La nécessité de maintenir le statu-quo au niveau du village exclut toute intervention administrative. La question est donc de savoir comment intégrer les communautés villageoises formant can-



tons et cercles coloniaux après la destruction des pouvoirs «traditionnels» dans le nouvel espace colonial. Au niveau du canton était maintenu l'ancien personnel politico-administratif des monarchies placé dans un dispositif contrôlé par le colonisateur. Les commandements de cercle étaient le monopole d'un personnel d'origine métropolitaine.

La fonction essentielle du chef de canton était fiscale. Il faisait le recensement de la population imposable et surveillait la perception des impôts par les chefs de villages. Le personnel politique métropolitain de son côté prenait les décisions les plus importantes et veillait à leur application qui était du ressort du personnel d'origine locale. Cette organisation montre, comme le suggère Ph. Couty, que :

*le colonisateur n'essaya pas de substituer aux structures anciennes une administration nouvelle, mais il tenta de placer la chefferie traditionnelle dans un dispositif bureaucratique qui confirmait ses privilèges tout en lui ôtant sa liberté d'action*<sup>4</sup>.

Quelle place les marabouts occupaient-ils dans ce nouveau système? Si l'on considère qu'ils contrôlaient eux-aussi des communautés villageoises et que le développement de leur emprise sur une partie importante de la société sénégalaise a suivi l'expansion coloniale, plusieurs réponses peuvent être formulées. Intéressés par l'arachide, les marabouts comme les paysans sont intégrés dans l'économie de traite; moins discrédités que les anciennes familles aristocratiques, ils sont plus écoutés par les paysans. De même, ils sont plus aptes à fournir un appui idéologique au colonisateur pour légitimer sa domination. Leur pouvoir, dans les communautés paysannes est, de par sa nature, différent de celui des chefs de cantons et de villages. Ces derniers, pris dans la logique coloniale mais aussi celle de leurs intérêts, furent obligés en général d'avoir recours à la coercition, pour obtenir quelque chose de leurs administrés<sup>5</sup>. Cette logique était complètement étrangère aux valeurs en cours dans les cercles. Le marabout, par son charisme, peut tout obtenir par la persuasion ou le *Ndiggël*. En ce sens, il a été plus efficace que les chefs indigènes. Il se présentait ainsi, par ses possibilités, comme le partenaire désigné d'une colonisation se voulant efficace, profitable et sans investissement.

Le colonisateur va donc, dès la fin de la première décennie du XXe siècle, utiliser le modèle d'autorité maraboutique au profit de l'action ad-

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4 Ph. Couty (1969), «Compte rendu du livre de M. Klein, *Islam and Imperialism in Senegal: Sine Saloum 1847-1914*, Edinburg, Edinburg University Press, 1968», Dakar, ORSTOM, 2 p.

5 Il y a eu des exceptions notables, notamment dans le Siin et la Bawol. Il est clair cependant que les aristocraties qui ont sauvé leur pouvoir se sont accommodées à une logique de violence sur laquelle elles avaient très peu prise.

ministrative. Les marabouts jouèrent le rôle d'auxiliaires en se présentant, en grande partie, comme courroie de transmission des décisions coloniales. Le caractère très simplifié de l'administration leur permettra de s'aménager une place à côté des chefs de cantons et commandants de cercles. N'occupant aucune charge administrative, mais reconnus par l'autorité coloniale (par souci du profit, du maintien de l'ordre et de la paix sociale), ils vont permettre à l'Etat colonial par leur médiation, d'atteindre les sociétés rurales. Ils vont dévoyer le caractère impersonnel typique de toute administration en traduisant les directives politiques et administratives en termes sociaux (la parenté et la famille comme paradigme) ou idéologiques (mise en exergue du rôle dirigeant du marabout).

Le réseau maraboutique supplée la sous-administration coloniale. Le marabout amortit les interventions de l'appareil administratif en atténuant les aspects coercitifs de la domination coloniale. Il était la seule notabilité qui, par ses interventions auprès des autorités coloniales, pouvait faire différer le paiement des impôts, obtenir des aides et interventions. Il était le seul capable sans recours à la violence de favoriser la politique économique des autorités coloniales en mettant en avant les principes idéologiques de dévouement et de soumission. La hiérarchie maraboutique, par sa nature rendait intelligible la structure administrative coloniale en la «naturalisant» puisqu'elle est étrangère à la culture du pays. Par ce processus de reformulation en termes sociaux et idéologiques, elle dispensait les autorités coloniales de la mise en place d'une structure lourde en milieu rural et dont le fonctionnement, en butte avec la psychologie des paysans, aboutirait à une pratique administrative fondée essentiellement sur la violence. D'autant plus que l'autonomie des marabouts vis-à-vis du système administratif colonial contrairement au personnel local les faisait apparaître comme ceux qui oeuvraient pour le seul bien des paysans. Ce type d'intervention de l'administration coloniale a fait dire à plusieurs chercheurs qu'il s'agissait d'un système d'*indirect rule*, caractéristique de la colonisation britannique en Afrique occidentale. Ce jugement est discutable. En effet, il ne faut pas dissocier les deux types de structures et d'organisations spatiales qui coexistent dans la même colonie d'un côté, de l'autre une administration et un jeu institutionnel se voulaient métropolitains. Ces éléments sont combinés à la reformulation d'une administration directe par les marabouts circonscrivant le rôle des commandants de cercle et chefs de cantons non dans la collecte des impôts mais leur centralisation.

En général, les marabouts incitent les populations à accepter les décisions coloniales et résolvent les problèmes sociaux, juridiques et fonciers des communautés villageoises selon les seules lois reconnues dans ce milieu, les lois islamiques. Ce rôle leur est reconnu parce qu'ils ont reterritorialisé et soudé, sur de nouvelles bases, des communautés traumatisées par la traite négrière, les guerres civiles et l'offensive coloniale.

Si le pouvoir colonial utilisa leur modèle d'autorité et leur réseau de clientèle dans sa politique, il ne les officialisa pas et ne les reformula pas sous forme de droits coutumiers comme dans le système d'indirect rule. Tout au plus, le pouvoir colonial tenta-t-il de faire des marabouts des notables qui sont partie intégrante de la vie coloniale. Ce qu'elle réussit à quelques rares exceptions près (cas de Médina Gounass).

Bien sûr on peut se demander s'il y a ou non compensation matérielle de l'Etat colonial aux marabouts, mais aussi du paysan aux marabouts. Concernant le premier aspect, la littérature mentionne des pensions, interventions financières, aides et décorations au titre de la Légion d'honneur pour services rendus. Pour le second aspect, il y a là aussi toute une littérature qui fait apparaître les marabouts comme des exploitateurs ou une classe de féodaux. Les études de D. Cruise O'Brien, J. Copans et C. Coulon ont remis en cause, d'une manière décisive, ces accusations, même si et nous sommes d'accord avec eux «les confréries ont besoin de l'Etat (colonial et post-colonial) comme la société paysanne a besoin de l'Etat dans l'économie de marché avec les frictions et la méfiance mutuelle que cela implique»<sup>6</sup>. En effet, «les marabouts mettent les paysans au travail pour le marché français»<sup>7</sup> et «assurent le maintien de l'ordre social au profit non seulement de la confrérie elle-même, mais de l'ensemble politico-social sénégalais»<sup>8</sup>.

En ce sens, ils tirent un profit très important de l'économie de traite et participent, d'une manière subalterne, à l'exploitation du paysan par le capital colonial, plus précisément, au partage des fruits de cette exploitation. De même J. Copans montre que «le taalibé (mouride) travaille peu pour son marabout et c'est un travail peu productif»<sup>9</sup>. Ces prestations (champs de marabouts) permettent néanmoins aux marabouts de constituer un groupe social non productif et plus aisé, ce qui correspond à leur position plus importante dans le champ idéologique. Ils doivent aussi se servir de cette puissance financière pour résoudre des problèmes sociaux. Se met alors en place un système très complexe de redistribution partielle, les marabouts jouant le rôle d'une assistance sociale. Cette redistribution, capitale dans le rôle du marabout, assigne à ce dernier une place encore plus importante dans la société rurale. Dans les sociétés musulmanes, cette fonction est assumée par des détenteurs de légitimités traditionnelles ou familiales.

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6 D. Cruise O'Brien, article cité : 24. Voir aussi C. Coulon, *Le marabout et le prince. Islam et pouvoir au Sénégal*, Paris, Pédone.

7 J. Copans (1980 : 228), *Les marabouts de l'arachide*, Paris, Le Sycamore.

8 J. Copans (1980 : 232).

9 J. Copans (1980 : 154).

### **Les marabouts face au projet post-colonial**

Notables très en vue durant la période coloniale, quel rôle devait leur assigner l'Etat indépendant du Sénégal ? Dès les luttes pour l'Indépendance, ce problème se pose, d'abord en termes politiques. W.G. Johnson<sup>10</sup> a montré que la coupure entre «originaires» et «sujets» est aussi une coupure entre la vie politique et les valeurs africaines. Il précise que cette situation a débouché sur la logique de la politique d'assimilation et de défense des «originaires», sur l'absence de toute expression politique nationale. Ce qui entraîna la consolidation des liens d'interdépendance entre marabouts et paysans. Deux personnalités politiques incarnaient cette antinomie : Lamine Guèye et Léopold Sédar Senghor. L'intérieur (c'est-à-dire les marabouts et les paysans) surgissait sur la scène politique et négociait sa place dans le futur Etat indépendant. Le discours moderniste des nouvelles élites était moins rassurant pour leur situation présente. La recherche du contact direct avec les masses rurales pouvait remettre en cause leur place privilégiée dans le système colonial.

La défense de cette position privilégiée justifie les alliances des marabouts lors du référendum de 1958, ou du «coup d'Etat» de 1962 et leur soutien à la politique «volontariste» des huit premières années de l'indépendance. Le maintien du statu quo colonial conservait au marabout ses prérogatives et ses privilèges, dans un contexte nouveau. C'est désormais la question politique qui détermine le jeu administratif. Le clientélisme reprend vigueur et devient la matrice de l'organisation politico-administrative. La réciprocité des prestations socio-économiques entre Etat et marabouts circonscrit un espace dont l'enjeu est le contrôle des paysans, «classe fondamentale» de la nouvelle idéologie. Les institutions administratives en milieu rural se présentent donc obligatoirement comme un cadre formel et vide<sup>11</sup>.

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10 Voir à ce sujet l'excellente étude de Wesley Johnson (1971) : *The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal : The Struggle for Power in the Four Communes, 1900-1920*, Stanford, Stanford University Press. Du même auteur on peut lire «The Senegalese Urban Elite 1900-1945», in P. Curtin (ed) *African and the West : Intellectual Responses to European Culture*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1972 : 139-188.

11 Plusieurs études ont illustré à des degrés divers cette continuité notamment : J. Barker (1971), «The Paradox of Development : Reflections on a Study of Local-Central Political Relations in Senegal», in M.F. Lofchie (ed) *The State of the Nations*, Berkeley, University of California Press : 47-63 ; L. Behrman (1970), *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal*, Cambridge University Press ; Cottingham Clément (1969), *Clan Politics and Rural Modernization : A Study of Local Political Change in Senegal*, Ph.D. dissertation, Berkeley, University of California at Berkeley ; D.Cruise O'Brien, «Co-operators and Bureaucrats : Class Formation in a Senegalese Peasant Society», *Africa*, october 1971 : 263-278 et *Saints and Politicians : Essays in the Organisation of a Senegalese Peasant Society*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Et pourtant dès l'indépendance, les nouvelles autorités ont voulu créer une administration de développement «endogène»<sup>12</sup>. Leur souci majeur fut de remettre en cause le rôle médiateur des marabouts et d'instaurer une relation directe avec les paysans. Elles vont se doter de moyens considérables dans leur volonté d'encadrer les paysans. La loi du 13 janvier 1960 restructura les divisions administratives du Sénégal devenu une République (Cf. loi 60-15 du 13 janvier 1960; JORS du 29 janvier 1960 : 75). Comme le mentionne A. Ndéné Ndiaye, «elle créa une fonction nouvelle : le gouverneur et transforma celle de chef traditionnel en chef d'arrondissement»<sup>13</sup>. Il précise cependant que cette création s'accompagnait de certaines restrictions : il n'y avait pas d'administration directe du gouverneur sur les autres responsables administratifs en poste dans les régions. Le lien administratif direct était maintenu entre ces derniers et le pouvoir central. Le gouverneur n'avait que des tâches de contrôle et d'impulsion. Quant au chef d'arrondissement, ses attributions, clairement définies, avaient pour but de le préserver du comportement du chef de canton et de le transformer en «fonctionnaire du développement»<sup>14</sup>. Le problème le plus important soulevé par A. Ndéné Ndiaye est celui posé par le décret du 22 décembre 1961 qui visait à donner plus de pouvoir au gouverneur en plaçant les fonctionnaires présents dans les régions sous son autorité hiérarchique. Il affirme cependant que ce «décret est passé presque inaperçu dans l'histoire de notre législation»<sup>15</sup>.

Parallèlement à l'organisation administrative, l'Etat va mettre sur pied des structures de mobilisation populaire et de participation : l'Animation Rurale, la vulgarisation agricole, le système coopératif, l'Office de Commercialisation Agricole (OCA). Toutes ces institutions marquent l'entrée de l'appareil d'Etat dans la région, le département et l'arrondissement. Elles visent dans un «pays à vocation agricole», à dessaisir les autorités mises en place par l'administration coloniale, mais aussi les marabouts, dans une tentative de mobilisation populaire des paysans. On a beaucoup insisté sur le fait que l'enjeu économique était de soustraire la filière arachidière aux traitants. Il faut cependant noter le caractère multi-ethnique de ce groupe. Ce trait donne à la démarche gouvernementale sa dimension politique : aménager des possibilités de se créer une clientèle grâce au patronage ; mettre en danger tous ceux qui ont pu accumuler de manière autonome (traitants des quatre communes) et aménager des sites d'enrichissement et de corruption.

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12 A. Ndéné Ndiaye, «Le rôle du chef de circonscription, une conférence d' A. Ndéné Ndiaye», *Le Soleil*, 24-9-1982 : 9.

13 Idem, p. 9.

14 Idem, p. 9.

15 Idem, p. 9.

Concernant le fonctionnement de ces institutions, on pourrait se référer à plusieurs sources pour les cerner : pour le gouverneur, la réponse d'A. Ndéné Ndiaye est éloquente, lorsqu'il évoque le décret de décembre 1961; pour le chef d'arrondissement, il s'agit surtout de faire payer les dettes, d'envoyer les enfants à l'école, de prendre des commandes d'engrais. Quant aux coopératives villageoises et intervillageoises, J. Copans et Ph. Couty ont montré qu'elles n'avaient qu'une fonction d'intermédiaires entre l'Etat (économie nationale) et les paysans (économie locale), par la collecte de la production et la distribution des moyens de production. Selon ces deux auteurs, elles ne possèdent pas un caractère productif<sup>16</sup>.

Cette volonté des nouvelles autorités administratives va échouer pour plusieurs raisons, à la fois politiques et économiques. Dans son analyse du pays sereer, J. - M. Gastellu arrive à cette conclusion que le gouvernement «a perpétué le régime économique antérieur, dont le caractère essentiel était d'obtenir le produit arachidier au moindre coût des facteurs»<sup>17</sup>. La coopérative, simple magasin de stockage devint le champ d'expression des conflits politiques nationaux au niveau du village. Au niveau politique, deux raisons majeures sont à évoquer. La première est la nature clientéliste de l'Etat et les conflits politiques, idéologiques et de personnes en son sein, ainsi qu'à celui du gouvernement et du parti au pouvoir. La seconde réside dans l'élimination de Mamadou Dia. Cet épisode marque la fin de l'épisode de mise en place d'une administration de type moderne de participation populaire telle qu'elle se dessinait lors du premier colloque sur «Développement et Socialisme»<sup>18</sup>. Le rôle joué par les marabouts au bénéfice de L.S. Senghor va être capital, renforçant ainsi le principe clientéliste établi à leur profit dès le référendum de 1958.

### **Les péripéties du mouvement coopératif**

La preuve de ce tournant est le discours produit par l'ensemble de la hiérarchie administrative en direction du monde rural. Il est la réplique exacte sinon la reprise, en des termes modernes, du discours maraboutique. Il se fonde sur une idéologie développementaliste se voulant identique à ce qui est considéré comme le centre de l'idéologie confrérique: l'exaltation du travail. Cette coïncidence a été rendue possible par le cadre strictement for-

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16 J. Copans, P. Couty, J. Rôh, G. Rocheteau (1972), «Doctrine économique et pratique du travail chez les Mourides», in *Maintenance sociale et Changement économique au Sénégal*, Paris, ORSTOM.

17 J. -M. Gastellu (1981: 365). Voir aussi J. Barker, «Political Space and the Quality of Participation in Rural Africa : A Case from Senegal», *Revue Canadienne des Etudes Africaines*, 1987, No. 1.

18 «Développement et Socialisme», Colloque sur «les Politiques de Développement et les diverses Voies africaines vers le Socialisme», Dakar, 3-8 décembre 1962. Paris, Présence Africaine, 1963. Voir plus particulièrement l'intervention de M. Dia : 421-433.

mel de la structure administrative du Sénégal indépendant. De plus les marabouts, par leur rôle dans le réseau de clientèle politique vont nommer des députés, des maires (ceux-ci cherchent leur aval), établir un lien direct avec le chef de l'Exécutif ou ses collaborateurs les plus proches, en court-circuitant les instances administratives au niveau de la région ou du département. Les autorités administratives locales sont obligées de leur «faire acte d'allégeance» pour pouvoir se maintenir en place.

Le discours politico-administratif né de ce contexte n'aurait pu que reprendre les principes de dévouement et de soumission par l'affirmation de l'osmose, de la symbiose entre hiérarchie maraboutique et hiérarchie administrative. La typologie des droits et devoirs tournerait autour:

- du respect de la hiérarchie et de la situation;
- de l'assistance qui en découle;
- de la mise en valeur du contrat d'assistance liant chaque village à l'appareil administratif;
- de la proclamation du principe de réciprocité.

Le cadre formel et la faiblesse de l'emprise de l'administration sur le monde rural permettront aux marabouts d'investir, par le biais de leurs *taalibé*, les institutions telles que les coopératives. Ils vont désormais, indirectement occuper des fonctions modernes.

Là aussi, à la logique administrative contrôle, gestion et développement se substitue une logique de clientèle. Par ses thèses, sa dynamique et son idéologie, de même que par la non remise en cause d'une économie fondée sur l'arachide, les nouvelles élites inscrivaient leur action dans la perpétuation ambivalente d'une triple sédimentation: «traditionnelle», coloniale, et post-coloniale, chacune avec sa logique et ses contradictions propres. Elles généralisaient ainsi pour favoriser l'intégration, à partir de la dynamique maraboutique, le système de distribution des ressources en échange de soutiens politiques. Les fonctionnaires étaient concernés par les mêmes facteurs surtout au niveau des régions et recherchaient le patronage du marabout local aux dépens de l'application de directives administratives.

On assiste à la coexistence de deux systèmes s'épaulant mutuellement et reliés par le patronage. L'un constitue l'appareil d'Etat s'exerçant sur les villes et chef-lieux de département et l'autre reposant sur les marabouts et le contrôle qu'ils exercent sur les paysans, deux systèmes de domination à des échelles et selon des modalités différentes. L'un est contrôlé par la classe dirigeante au niveau national et l'autre par les classes dirigeantes subalternes à l'échelle régionale.

L'Etat indépendant n'a donc pas pu procéder dans les dix premières années à la mise en place d'une administration capable de restructurer la société. Au contraire, il a accentué l'existence de deux pôles d'encadrement social et administratif en donnant plus de vigueur aux systèmes de domina-

tion et de contrôles sociaux antécoloniaux (surtout maraboutiques) et à leur version coloniale. Une telle démarche mérite quelques explications. Comme plusieurs auteurs l'ont indiqué, le problème principal de la plupart des États africains est de gérer des populations paysannes faiblement intégrées. Dans de nombreux pays, la légitimité des gouvernants est si faible que beaucoup n'obtiennent une soumission des populations que grâce à la répression et à la négociation ou l'achat d'allégeances de groupes ou d'individus, procédures que R. Sandbrook désigne par «soutien mercenaire»<sup>19</sup>.

De telles pratiques empêchent, bien souvent, le renforcement des normes bureaucratiques et anonymes dont les administrations ont besoin pour conduire les changements inscrits dans les plans de développement. Les résultats, au plan économique, sont encore plus catastrophiques et mériteraient une analyse plus approfondie. Le contexte des politiques d'ajustement rend plus actuelle la réflexion sur la nature de l'État. Il ne s'agit évidemment pas de reprendre, en lui donnant une coloration sénégalaise, le débat qui, au début des années 70, a mobilisé tant d'énergie autour de la question de l'État ou de son rôle dans l'activité économique, il ne s'agit pas non plus de reprendre le thème du désengagement de l'État. Avant de savoir si l'État doit se désengager ou non, il convient de s'interroger sur la nature de cet «objet dont tout le monde parle sans savoir ce qu'il est»<sup>20</sup>. Or, l'analyse de la nature de l'État africain, de ses pratiques de domination et de reproduction débouche souvent sur l'examen d'une question difficilement contournable, celle du pouvoir personnel. Quelles sont les conséquences de cette forme de gouvernement sur les économies des pays dans lesquels elle se pratique? R. Sandbrook a décrit avec beaucoup de précision de telles conséquences<sup>21</sup>.

Dans un tel contexte, la mauvaise gestion peut devenir fonctionnelle. C'est ainsi que, par exemple, le mouvement coopératif a été dévié de ses objectifs pour devenir une structure au sein de laquelle divers groupes ont cherché à réaliser des objectifs contradictoires:

- l'État cherche à contrôler l'économie arachidière, à promouvoir des programmes de modernisation agricole et à extraire une plus-value de l'économie rurale;

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19 R. Sandbrook (1987), «Personnalisation du pouvoir et stagnation capitaliste», *Politique Africaine*, 26, juin : 23.

20 J. Copans (1987), «Une crise conceptuelle opportune», *Politique Africaine*, 26, juin : 2.

21 R. Sandbrook (1985), *The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.



- des politiciens s'y appuient pour construire leur clientèle politique en s'assurant un accès facile au crédit et aux autres ressources de la coopérative<sup>22</sup>;
- les notables ruraux et chefs religieux, de leur côté, s'y adossent pour renforcer leur autorité et leur prestige<sup>23</sup>;
- les paysans qui perçoivent le mouvement coopératif comme un instrument Etatique beaucoup plus orienté vers la collecte de la récolte d'arachide que comme une structure destinée à promouvoir leur propre développement.

Les fondements théoriques du mouvement coopératif sont exposés dans la circulaire 32 (Cf. JORS du 2 juin 1962 : 952-955 ; circulaire n 32 PC du 21 mai 1962) de Mamadou Dia<sup>24</sup>. Dès l'année 1950, L.S. Senghor et M. Dia précisaient que la coopérative est l'institution clef du socialisme africain et que les coopératives villageoises, unités économiques élémentaires, doivent combiner traditions africaines et valeurs démocratiques. Les premières, manipulées, prendront systématiquement le pas sur les secondes, pour des raisons politiques.

La mise en place du réseau des coopératives fut la priorité nationale pour plusieurs raisons clairement exprimées dans la circulaire 32 :

- le mouvement coopératif, est l'instrument majeur pour parvenir au socialisme africain, idéologie du régime;
- il doit donner à l'Etat les moyens de nationaliser le commerce de l'arachide et d'obtenir le contrôle d'un secteur clef de l'économie;
- il doit servir d'instrument privilégié pour moderniser et diversifier l'économie rurale largement dépendante de l'arachide;
- il doit servir à maintenir le soutien politique des masses rurales et distribuer le patronage et les bénéfices matériels aux populations rurales.

A long terme, il s'agira de supprimer la tutelle de l'Etat sur les coopératives, de confier les responsabilités administratives et de gestion aux paysans, de favoriser l'évolution des coopératives arachidières vers des coopératives multifonctionnelles et multisectorielles de développement, et

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22 D. Cruise O'Brien (1975).

23 D. Cruise O'Brien (1975); J. Copans (1980) ; C.T. Sy (1969), *La Confrérie sénégalaise des Mourides*, Paris, Présence Africaine.

24 S. Gellar (1987) «Circular 32 Revisited Prospects for Revitalizing the Senegalese Cooperative Movement in 1980's» in John Waterbury & M. Gersowitz (eds) *The Political Economy of Choice and Risk in Senegal*, London, Frank Cass Co. L'étude de S. Gellar a considérablement influencé notre analyse.

d'instituer l'intégration verticale à travers la création d'unions locales, régionales et nationales.

L'évolution multifonctionnelle et multisectorielle envisagée dès le départ (céréales, légumes, viande, produits laitiers etc.) devait permettre de revenir sur la trop grande dépendance vis-à-vis de l'arachide. Sur ce plan, l'échec est patent, la tendance coloniale s'est renforcée : le maintien et la gestion de la filière arachidière est au centre de la problématique de la stabilisation, puis de l'ajustement structurel. L'aspect multifonctionnel devait permettre de résoudre les problèmes de crédit aux paysans et la satisfaction des besoins de consommation, de transport, d'investissements et de services économiques.

Il était donc envisagé, dès le départ, que les coopératives plus que l'Etat ou le secteur privé devaient devenir la force économique et le moteur du développement rural. Le résultat final poursuivi était l'émergence de communautés rurales autogérées, premières unités de base de l'administration locale, et centres de décisions et d'interventions économiques et sociales pour les villages regroupés. Les unions locale, régionale et nationale parachevaient l'édifice en prenant en charge l'administration et la gestion des équipements et services contrôlés par le gouvernement durant la tutelle.

L'idéologie coopérative confrontée aux systèmes politiques et sociaux et à l'héritage des sociétés de prévoyance coloniale explique l'élargissement des possibilités de manipulation par les marabouts, les chefs traditionnels et les politiciens. Trois phases:

- 1960-62: la mobilisation paysanne;
- 1963-65: la réorientation et la stagnation;
- fin 1970: les années 1980: le retour timide au cadre de la circulaire 32.

L'accueil des paysans au mouvement coopératif fut favorable. L'animation rurale, les Centres d'Expansion Rurale (CER) se mirent à les organiser et à les mobiliser pour atteindre les objectifs de la politique du gouvernement. Ils aidèrent plus particulièrement à briser le manque de confiance et la méfiance vis-à-vis de toute administration. A la différence de l'approche intégrée, l'approche des Centres Régionaux d'Assistance au Développement (CRAD) responsables de l'administration des semences, de la marche du programme agricole, de la distribution des crédits de consommation et de la centralisation des récoltes collectées par les coopératives sera autre. Très tôt les agents de cette structure, dont les fonctions devaient revenir aux paysans après leur alphabétisation fonctionnelle et leur maîtrise de la comptabilité, font preuve de mauvaise volonté et détournent l'argent des paysans. S. Gellar a montré que;

*Les agents du CRAD acquièrent très vite une réputation de corrompus et de soumission aux désirs des politiciens puissants, des notabilités rurales, aux chefs religieux cherchant à divertir les crédits et autres ressources*<sup>25</sup>.

Et, tout en étant en conflit avec les idéaux coopératifs, les CRAD, hautement politisés, permirent au parti dominant d'établir un formidable réseau de clientèle dans le monde rural. Dès le début, la coïncidence notabilités locales/direction des coopératives fut très claire. Un exemple : Cheikh Mbacké était président de la coopérative de Mbacké, Bassirou Mbacké de celle de Diourbel, Ibrahima Niasse de celle d'une des zones de Kaolack<sup>26</sup>. L'élimination de M. Dia a accéléré la manipulation.

- 1963-1966: le triomphe des «marabouts de l'arachide»

La stagnation est évidente dès 1963, même si les coopératives augmentèrent leur part dans la commercialisation des arachides. L'approche «technocratique» insistant sur l'augmentation de la productivité et les innovations technologiques devient la panacée; elle entraîne la fermeture des sections de consommation des coopératives et la fin des ambitions multifonctionnelles. La situation évolua donc vers la forme des Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance. La tutelle s'accrut au lieu de déperir. L'Etat fixe les prix, distribue les semences, fournit le crédit, supervise la comptabilité des coopératives et détermine les priorités locales de développement; c'est la fin du développement intégré. Le retour à la centralité de l'arachide marque un retour aux réseaux clientélistes traditionnels et religieux. La baisse du prix au producteur d'arachide en prévision de la suppression de la subvention française à l'exportation de ce produit sera mal ressentie par les paysans. Ils la perçoivent comme une baisse des prix d'achat, accentuée par le transfert du coût des opérations de commercialisation de l'OCA vers les paysans. L'effet fut démobilisateur, la coopérative n'offrant plus d'avantages matériels, les paysans se réfugient à nouveau dans les réseaux de clientèle.

- 1966-1980: un organisme de patronage: l'ONCAD

La création de l'Office National de Coopération et d'Assistance pour le Développement (ONCAD) répondait au souci de rationaliser et de coordonner les opérations de commercialisation des arachides. C'est ainsi que l'Office a absorbé les coopératives et les CRAD. La fin des années 70 marque l'impopularité croissante de l'ONCAD et du mouvement coopératif. Les

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25 S. Gellar, op. cit. : 129.

26 R.L. Tignor, «Senegal Cooperative: Experience 1907-1960» in J. Waterbury & M. Gersovitz (eds), *The Political Economy of Choice and Risk in Senegal*, London, Frank Cass Co, note 1 : 122.

changements fréquents de politique de l'Etat, la distribution tardive des semences et des intrants, la corruption, les méthodes brutales de recouvrement des dettes, la réduction des crédits de soudure entraînent le malaise paysan. Les marabouts prennent en charge certaines revendications, renforçant du même coup leur emprise sur le monde rural et consolident leur capacité de marchandage de leur soutien, avec l'efficacité accrue de leur réseau de clientèle. Trois années successives de sécheresses et un endettement chronique en expansion, font monter la tension. On assiste au déclin continu de la participation des paysans au mouvement coopératif. Les nouvelles structures, les Agences Régionales de Développement ne laissèrent aucune place à la participation paysanne. En août 1980, après des débats houleux et de nombreuses controverses, l'ONCAD fut dissout.

- 1980: la nouvelle politique de consolidation

Selon S. Gellar, cette nouvelle orientation politique est «non le résultat d'une discussion, un débat sur l'ampleur et les formes du mouvement coopératif, mais sur le contrôle et la redistribution des bénéfices générés par l'économie arachidière et les coûts induits par la réforme»<sup>27</sup>. Les tentatives de regroupements des coopératives (1 par communauté rurale) furent corrigées à la demande des gros producteurs et des marabouts.

La résistance des notables et des leaders locaux du parti au pouvoir qui voulaient maintenir le contrôle le plus strict sur les ressources en provenance des coopératives, a freiné la mise en place du mouvement coopératif, en combinaison avec l'encadrement politique des masses. La création des Unions de Coopératives Agricoles (1978), d'éleveurs (1980) et de la Fédération Nationale des Coopératives (1980) à qui sont dévolues les fonctions de l'ONCAD doivent, en principe, relancer le mouvement coopératif. Si les obstacles politiques sont surmontés, il y a une possibilité d'opérer des changements qualitatifs mais de sérieux handicaps demeurent:

- la situation financière désastreuse de l'Etat ne permet pas de transfert de ressources importantes à leur bénéfice<sup>28</sup>;
- le contrôle de certaines fonctions par les huileries réduit les recettes financières des coopératives, notamment les profits générés par la commercialisation;
- à cause de leur mode d'opérations, de l'échelle de leurs activités, les unions de coopératives ne sont pas capables de générer les ressources nécessaires pour soutenir un salariat important. Et parce qu'ils travaillent en collaboration étroite avec les notables, les agents des

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27 S. Gellar, op. cit. : 138.

28 Voir par exemple, J. Collin, *Rapport au conseil national de l'UPS sur la situation financière*, 11 janvier 1969, 25 p. + annexes.

Unions tiennent souvent compte de leurs choix et préoccupations pour la distribution des richesses et équipements. Ils ont peu d'autonomie pour arrêter ou remettre en cause les décisions prises par les notables qui contrôlent les Unions au niveau régional et national.

Avant les réformes de 1980, le contrôle (et la participation dans le mouvement coopératif) est exercé par les coopératives de commercialisation de l'arachide: 85 % des membres appartenaient à ce type d'institutions et 70 % de ceux-ci vivaient dans les régions de Thiès, Diourbel, Sine-Saloum, Louga, les pays du Ndiggël. La prédominance du Bassin arachidier, selon les auteurs cités dans cette étude a donné un style d'administration très politique puisque construit autour de relations de clientèle maraboutique coïncidant avec le clientélisme politique.

Certaines régions (Casamance, Sénégal Oriental, Fleuve), comme les activités non arachidières, étaient restées en dehors du mouvement coopératif. Les sociétés de développement régional qui intervenaient dans les périmètres irrigués les avaient maintenues à l'écart. En 1983, avec la mise en place de groupements villageois de production, l'appartenance au mouvement coopératif devint possible.

### Les mouvements de base

#### *La recherche de l'autonomie*

C'est là que l'on décèle des signes de mutations. Les groupements de production permettent en effet une meilleure intégration régionale et contrebalancent l'hégémonie des Wolof et du bassin arachidier. Ils peuvent surtout désarmer le régionalisme pour une meilleure prise en compte et une organisation locale<sup>29</sup> des populations en lieu et place de leur envahissement par des projets de développement ramenant souvent avec eux leur propre main-d'oeuvre et rapatriant leurs bénéficiaires vers la capitale. Rompre l'isolement, tel doit être le credo, car c'est dans ces régions que se sont développées les associations indépendantes, celles des femmes et des jeunes. S. Gellar note que:

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29 Dans le cadre des tentatives de consolidation d'une telle organisation, l'action des ONG fait l'objet de critiques radicales, dénonçant l'illusion d'un «développement par ces organismes de projets» ou «la bourgeoisie des per diem» secrétée par ces organisations. Voir sur cette question Abdoulaye Bathily, *Sahel: Préoccupations régionales et Problèmes de Développement*, Dakar, CRDI, 1990, 41 p. Ces critiques sont en partie fondées mais ne résolvent pas un problème central : comment faire face à la faillite des classes dirigeantes et à une opposition désorganisée et incapable de promouvoir un programme économique alternatif à celui de l'ajustement structurel ? Cette question est d'autant plus intéressante à analyser que les groupes qui prétendent contester la logique de l'Etat sur la base des projets dits islamistes n'ont pas réussi à desserrer de manière significative l'emprise des confréries religieuses sur les couches populaires, notamment wolof.

*bien qu'étant d'un apport décisif dans le processus de production, les femmes, les jeunes célibataires furent exclus du mouvement coopératif qui reflète ainsi les structures traditionnelles de prise de décisions*<sup>30</sup>.

Le gouvernement a joué le jeu en organisant les jeunes à part avec le Groupe Opérationnel Permanent d'Etude et de Concertation (GOPEC) et les femmes avec d'abord l'Animation féminine, puis les groupements féminins<sup>31</sup> sous la tutelle du ministère du Développement Social. Les associations indépendantes, créées entre 1975 et le début des années 80, ne sont ni affiliées aux ADR, ni au mouvement coopératif. On peut citer le Foyer des jeunes de Ronkh (delta du Fleuve), la Fédération de Bakel, qui s'opposa pendant de longues années à la SAED<sup>32</sup>, les associations paysannes en Casamance, celles d'anciens travailleurs émigrés en France. Elles rompent radicalement avec la perspective coloniale et celle des années ONCAD:

- elles ne sont ni dominées par les notables, ni par l'arachide;
- elles sont animées ou plus ouvertes à la demande des femmes et des jeunes qui y jouent un rôle non négligeable dans le processus de production et de prise de décision;
- au-delà de l'augmentation de la production et de sa commercialisation, elles promeuvent des projets sociaux pour améliorer la qualité de la vie dans les villages;
- elles sont financées par la cotisation des membres, les réinvestissements des profits et l'appel aux dons;
- au lieu d'accepter la tutelle de l'Etat, elles négocient avec lui et ses agences et sollicitent les interventions des ONG pour une assistance technique et financière.

Leur participation au mouvement coopératif pourrait être porteuse de transformations radicales en élargissant leur champ d'activité, en stimulant la démocratisation et en instaurant une compétition saine pour le leadership. Elles doivent servir de base pour la confection et la mise en oeuvre des PRDI (Plan Régional de Développement Intégré). En effet, même si les

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30 S. Gellar (1987) : 151.

31 Les groupements féminins ont vécu en 1992 une profonde crise de fonctionnement liée à des tentatives de restructuration de leur direction nationale la Fédération nationale des groupements de promotion féminine, forte de milliers de membres par Ndioro Ndiaye leur ministère de tutelle. L'enjeu de cette reprise en main était apparemment la destitution de leur présidente Aïcha Diène Guèye au profit d'Aminata Mbodj. Voir sur cette question : *La Tribune*, 9, 30 déc. 1991 : 4; *Le Témoin*, 69, 19 nov. 1991 : 4 et 89, 7 avril 1992 : 9.

32 Adrian Adams (1977), *Le long voyage des gens du Fleuve*, Paris, Maspéro et du même auteur (1985), *La terre et les gens du Fleuve*, Paris, l'Harmattan.

agences de développement sont réceptives aux doléances des paysans, elles ne peuvent réaliser les objectifs économiques et sociaux à leur place. Aujourd'hui, il s'agit de repenser l'alphabétisation fonctionnelle, de la mettre en oeuvre pour mobiliser les paysans. Les réseaux politiques disponibles pour les paysans n'ont jamais permis de soulever des problèmes liés à la production et aux transformations nécessaires pour leur assurer des revenus incitatifs.

Le programme de développement technique a été constamment remis en cause par la politique des prix et de commercialisation qui n'a jamais été coordonnée avec une politique de production. On demande aux paysans de s'endetter (sans vraiment leur ouvrir le crédit) pour financer la modernisation avec une politique des prix assurant une très faible marge bénéficiaire.

La politique agricole a servi, dans une large mesure, à alimenter plusieurs forces sociales<sup>33</sup> qui étaient en mesure de négocier leur rôle dans la gestion d'un contexte politique dans lequel la classe au pouvoir tentait de construire son hégémonie. Les partenaires de l'Etat ont négocié leur participation au fonctionnement du système politique en s'efforçant de la rendre payante. Cette stratégie repose sur des jeux complexes de mécanismes régulateurs assurant l'intégration des comportements des acteurs.

La critique des effets dévastateurs de cette démarche de l'Etat telle qu'elle est faite dans les documents officiels insiste sur la «gestion négligente», les «orientations confuses» et d'autres facteurs liés à l'inefficacité des opérations des entreprises publiques. La «mauvaise gestion» n'est pas le seul élément explicatif de cette situation.

Pour comprendre une telle inefficacité, il est indispensable de prendre en considération la logique du système politique qui en est la source. Dans le cadre de sa politique de gestion des populations paysannes, l'Etat a favorisé l'émergence de forces sociales qui ont détourné à leur profit une partie importante de sa politique agricole : marabouts et autres gros producteurs, fonctionnaires etc. Toutes les réformes intervenues au Sénégal depuis l'indépendance dans le monde rural, n'ont pas réellement mis en cause les privilèges de ces groupes. L'Etat opère des ponctions importantes sur les revenus paysans grâce au contrôle de ces derniers par les relais marabouti-

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33 Voir sur cette question : M. C. Diop et M. Diouf, *Le Sénégal sous Abdou Diouf, Etat et société*, Paris, Karthala, 1990 ; Nim Caswell, «Autopsie de l'ONCAD : la Politique arachidière au Sénégal 1966-1980», *Politique Africaine*, 14, 1984 : 39-73. Le lecteur pourra aussi se reporter aux analyses relatives à la corruption publiées dans la presse locale, particulièrement dans *Sopi*, l'organe du Parti démocratique sénégalais (PDS) entre les élections de février 1988 et avril 1991, date de l'entrée au gouvernement de dirigeants de ce parti. Voir aussi *The Gambia News Letter* (Organ of Opinion and Information of the Stockholm Branch of the Organisation of Gambians in Sweden), 1/2-1987 : 11.

ques qui, dans leur ensemble, ont participé à l'exploitation des paysanneries et au maintien du système politique global.

On constate cependant, depuis la fin des années 70, que le gouvernement a mis en place un train de mesures devant se traduire, entre autres, par une réduction sensible de la participation de l'Etat dans l'économie. Ces nouvelles orientations, dictées en partie par les bailleurs de fonds, ont débouché sur la publication en 1984 de la Nouvelle Politique Agricole (NPA) entraînant une importante série de mesures institutionnelles destinées à réorienter le développement rural et à promouvoir une plus grande «responsabilité» des producteurs. Plusieurs réserves ont déjà été faites sur certains aspects de la NPA (semences d'arachide, engrais et intrants, retenues à la source sur les arachides commercialisées, etc.). Notre propos n'est pas de les reprendre ici, mais d'analyser quel peut être l'impact du système politique que nous venons de décrire sur cette politique agricole.

Il est question de réduire l'intervention de l'Etat à un rôle de catalyseur et d'impulsion en faisant appel aux organismes privés. Une question mérite d'être posée: qui constitue le secteur privé dans le monde rural? Plusieurs observateurs notent qu'il est composé des principaux bénéficiaires de «l'ancienne politique agricole», cette clientèle hétéroclite que l'on désigne à travers l'expression de privilégiés ruraux. A ce sujet, les sources officielles<sup>34</sup> notent avec insistance l'extrême rapidité avec laquelle plus de 4.000 sections villageoises ont été mises en place dans le cadre de cette politique agricole, rapidité qui pourrait signifier que les dirigeants de ces sections sont ceux des anciennes coopératives. Si un tel contrôle était confirmé, on pourrait se poser des questions sur son impact sur la nouvelle politique:

- quel sera l'impact de la NPA sur les relations entre l'Etat et les paysanneries?
- la NPA amènera-t-elle l'Etat à modifier fondamentalement ses rapports avec sa clientèle rurale traditionnelle et à mettre en place ses propres instruments de gestion politique directe des populations paysannes?
- cela va-t-il se traduire par une modification fondamentale du système politique?
- l'arbitrage est-il possible entre l'Etat, les privilégiés ruraux et les paysans pauvres au profit de ces derniers?

Il est difficile de répondre, de façon définitive et satisfaisante, à ces questions, mais il est par contre possible de faire un certain nombre de con-

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34 Cf. France/Ministère des Relations Extérieures (Coopération et Développement), (1985), *Déséquilibres structurels et programmes d'ajustement au-Sénégal*, vol. I : 33.



stats permettant de renseigner sur l'évolution possible de ces relations. Les performances économiques de l'Etat sont déterminées par la nature de son système politique. Sans une modification substantielle de celui-ci, il n'est pas possible de changer la configuration sociale à l'oeuvre dans le monde rural sénégalais. L'abandon de l'idéologie du «socialisme africain» et la réduction sensible du poids des sociétés d'Etat dans la politique agricole impliquent-ils une nouvelle ère dans les relations entre l'Etat et les paysaneries? Pour les paysans moyens et pauvres, les sources officielles ont clairement défini les nouvelles règles du jeu en ce qui concerne les semences, l'équipement agricole, les intrants. Mais qu'en est-il des paysans riches, des gros producteurs et des bureaucrates?

Le dépérissement des sociétés d'Etat a privé ces groupes d'une importante vache à lait, mais ne risque-t-il pas de l'autre côté de renforcer certains privilèges acquis? Compte tenu des difficultés que connaît le milieu rural sénégalais, ces groupes, grâce à leurs liaisons financières et politiques, peuvent renforcer les positions acquises dans le cadre de l'ancienne politique<sup>35</sup>.

La NPA ne réduira pas de manière significative les revenus des intermédiaires et autres groupes de pression évoluant dans le monde rural. Dans ces conditions, elle ne parviendra pas à éliminer les biais introduits dans le monde rural depuis l'indépendance par les différents groupes de pression qui constituent la clientèle politique rurale de l'Etat. Le document publié par le gouvernement en mars-avril 1984 sur la NPA insistait sur la nécessité de maîtriser les aspects sociaux de la production. Il était question d'éviter la répétition des pratiques ayant favorisé le détournement des objectifs du mouvement coopératif. Ces pratiques sont en relation directe avec le système politique. Le contexte politique qui a dévié le mouvement coopératif de son objectif n'ayant pas beaucoup évolué, il serait hasardeux de penser que les principaux acteurs de la nouvelle politique acceptent «les principes de solidarité, d'entraide mutuelle, de gestion saine et de participation démocratique à la réalisation d'un but économique et social commun»<sup>36</sup>. Les comportements que les décideurs essaient de corriger (importance des abattements et des fraudes dans les différentes filières de commercialisation, attentisme, individualisme) ne constituent pas les manifestations

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35 Sur cette question, voir Elliot Berg, *Ajustement ajourné : la Réforme de la Politique économique du Sénégal dans les années 80* (Résumé en français rédigé pour l'USAID), oct. 1990 : 8-15.

36 Voir Sénégal/Ministère du Développement Rural (1984), *La Nouvelle Politique Agricole* : 23 ; Elliot Berg (1990). Pour une analyse plus systématique de la politique agricole de l'Etat sénégalais, voir les études de François Boye, Matar Gaye et Oussouby Touré dans le numéro spécial de la revue *Sociétés-Espaces-Temps* (I, 1, 1992) consacré à la crise de l'agriculture africaine.

d'une quelconque dysfonction. Ils sont la rançon que le système politique a dû payer pour exister. En tout Etat de cause, si on tient compte des conflits d'intérêts et des pesanteurs structurelles qui existent au sein des paysanneries, la notion d'objectifs communs perd toute sa pertinence.

C'est pourquoi on peut se demander si le recours aux agents économiques en dehors de la «sphère Etatique» aura des effets bénéfiques pour l'ensemble des paysans. Dans ces conditions, il n'est pas sûr que le recours aux organisations villageoises et au secteur privé aura des effets positifs sur la production et les revenus paysans.

Depuis l'indépendance, la majorité des paysans se trouve dans une situation de pauvreté absolue. Nous ne voyons actuellement aucun indice permettant de croire à un renversement de tendance à court terme.

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\*\* IFAN et Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines, Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar/Sénégal

# The State, the Peasantry and Rural Class Formation in Prerevolutionary Ethiopia

Tenkir Bongor\*

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*Résumé: La dynamique des rapports agraires est souvent le résultat du caractère interne de l'Etat et de ses rapports avec le Capital. L'apparition de l'Etat après 1941 est conçue comme la consolidation d'un Etat tributaire éthiopien. La question de la transition agraire, au lieu d'être une simple réaction à l'accumulation de capital au centre, se situe au niveau du processus d'expansionnisme éthiopien induit, de l'autonomie relative de l'Etat par rapport au capital, des relations étroites entre l'économique, le politique, l'idéologique et le culturel et de l'autonomie de toutes ces dimensions. Le problème fondamental de l'étude de la transition agraire en Ethiopie concerne l'émergence d'un Etat central autocratique grâce à la consolidation des rapports tributaires de production sans les changements concomitants dans les forces et rapports de production. De même, l'autonomie relative de l'Etat par rapport à l'impérialisme limita la pénétration du capital au commerce plutôt qu'à l'infrastructure et au capital productif. Ces deux facteurs limitèrent le développement de nouvelles forces de production et caractérisèrent la spécificité de la structure agraire de l'Ethiopie d'avant 1974.*

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## Introduction

It has now almost become a truism to assert the existence of an agrarian crisis in Africa. Minor regional variations notwithstanding, the abysmal failure of African agriculture to raise land and labour productivity to fulfil its role in the development process is now well documented in country studies and for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole<sup>1</sup>. The problem has afflicted countries with sizeable levels of non-agricultural exports, economic and military aid and/or accumulated international debt. Given the overriding dominance of directly land-based resources to the livelihood of the masses

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1 For a recent theoretical analysis and surveys of some countries see Lawrence, (1986). For a comparative assessment between regions, countries and non-African ones, see the series on *World Development Report* by the World Bank. In 1965-1983 annual per capital agricultural output in sub-Saharan African declined by -0.8%.

of the population<sup>2</sup>, the manifestation of the problem, especially in the urban areas, has been an important component of the crisis of the state

Ideologues of the bourgeoisie consistently call for 'getting the internal and external prices right' to reflect scarcities. Removal of subsidies, devaluation, charging economic cost to social services, trimming the public sector especially marketing parastatals, have now become the new orthodoxy of the theory and practice of development<sup>3</sup>. Radical dependency theorists locate the root of the agrarian crisis in the formation and law of motion of capital as a world phenomenon and its stunting effect on the periphery of the world system. Although challenged by the upsurge of capital accumulation in the newly-industrialized countries, their powerful critique of the marginalists (and their implicit assumption of the capitalist mode of production as a necessary and sufficient condition for development) is now well established<sup>4</sup>. Classical marxist theorists drawing largely from the economic history of Western Europe, validate their thesis of the development of capitalism by drawing attention to the ongoing process of accumulation and self-sustaining industrialization in a number of economically important regions outside Europe<sup>5</sup>.

Historically informed political economy studies on pre - and post-colonial Africa indicate the specificity of the agrarian class formation, either in the absence or in the process of formation of articulated agrarian classes. With the relative scarcity of labour in relation to land, the introduction of polltax, the growing of cash crops (sometimes in conflict with the demand of colonial planters) and plantation employment, the colonial state set out to 'organize' the conditions for the exploitation of the peasantry<sup>6</sup>. Under-

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2 According to the World Bank's survey, only high-income oil-exporters, all in the Middle East, experienced higher rates of population growth than sub-Saharan Africa. However, given the resource reserve bases of Zaire, Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria etc., which make up more than 50% of sub-Saharan population, demographic pressure on food is a manifestation of the distorted pattern of development rather than the cause, on which Malthusian alarmists prefer to focus attention.

3 It is our contention that the causes of Africa's underdevelopment have to be sought in the specificity of the interaction of the pre-colonial social formation with the demands of colonialism, the crises of the state to which it gave rise in the post-colonial period and the restructuring of capital at the centre. These issues are discussed in various papers in Arrighi and Saul, (1973 and 1979), and Lawrence, (1986) with reference to Africa. This article takes (Saul: 1973 & 1979) as a point of departure in trying to locate the specificity of the Ethiopian state and the theoretical and methodological issues in the analysis of rural studies.

4 See Frank, (1967), Baran, (1960); Wallerstein, (1974) and for the later formulations Kay, (1975); Palma, (1978).

5 This is demonstrated by Warren, (1972); Schiffer, (1981); Laclau, (1974).

6 For the theoretical and specific aspects of this issue, see Cliffe, (1977, 1978); Bernstein, (1979); Arrighi and Saul, (1973 and 1979). A very provocative study of these issues and their implications for accumulation in sub-Saharan Africa is found in Hyden, (1984, 1985).

standing the agrarian crises in Africa requires the specification of the dynamic of the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial state and society structures as is theorized for capital in the formation of strategic class alliances for planning and independent development<sup>7</sup>.

At the level of Ethiopia as a whole, a number of analysts characterize the state and society as feudal (Crummey: 1980, 1981; Cohen: 1974; Markakis: 1978; Gilkes: 1975; Hobben: 1964). An economist in the unformalized debate entitles his work *The Feudal Paradigm as a Hindrance to Understanding Ethiopia* (Ellis: 1976). Deducing from changes in the relations and forces of production in selected areas in the mid-sixties and their increasing link with the world market, others give equal if not a predominant position to capitalism (Stahl: 1973; Bondestam: 1974; Cliffe: 1974). The social conflict between non-capitalist production relations on the one hand and the rapidly expanding mechanization of agriculture since the early 1970s on the other, prompt another writer to invent the term 'mechanized feudalism' (Gilkes 1975: p. 169). Taking the feudal mode as a special case of transition from tributary modes in the European social formations, Amin applies the tributary mode to Ethiopia as in other African social formations (Amin: 1974; 1980). Murry and Stahl argue along similar lines in their analysis with the latter restricting it prior to the advent of the new technology inputs in the mid-sixties.

Another main theme of agrarian studies in Ethiopia is the supposedly different agrarian structures in the north and the south. 'Pure feudalism' is restricted by some to the 'land-lord tenant' relations in the South (Crummey: 1981; Gilkes: 1975). Others conceptualize elements of capitalism within the same relations (Cliffe: 1974; Stahl: 1973), assigning pure feudalism to the 'lord peasant' agrarian system under 'communal' forms of land tenure in the north.

When cast in the cultural and historical trajectories of the African continent (Diop 1974, 1987, 1989; Amin 1974, 1989), the relation of the state and the peasantry has its own problematique which cannot be resolved by dismissing it as not being feudal (Anderson: 1978 p. 411; Ellis: 1976); by identifying it as feudal in as much as it possesses all the major elements of feudal societies of Western Europe of Japan (Cohen: 1974).

The so far unformalized debate on state and society in general and that of agriculture in the particular case of Ethiopia encompasses a wide range of

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7 For a rigorous theorization of these in relation to modes of production problems of periodization locating the dominance on the relations of production, see Hindess, (1975) Meillassour (1973: 81-90; and 1978: 127-58) asserts the forces of production as 'dominant' in the transition to class societies in the context of pre-colonial Africa. See also Dobb, (1981); Mukhia, (1983); Wickham, (1983) for the concretization of the mode of production with respect to Europe, India and China respectively.

positions at the level of synthesis. However, very little analysis of the structural components upon which they are generalized exists. Neither the specificity of the models in its/their Ethiopian variant nor the problem they pose within the wider context of non-capitalist non-socialist modes or an historical appraisal of the dynamic of the agrarian structure are dealt with in any considerable detail. Following this introduction, the next section builds the static and dynamic characteristics of agrarian relations in Ethiopia as a prelude to the analysis of the state and the peasantry.

### **The historical evolution of agrarian relations in northern and southern Ethiopia**

In the Abyssinian section of the Ethiopia Empire, the hierarchy of the dominant class consisted of the *Neguse Negist* (King of Kings - Emperor) at the highest level. Under were regional warlords taking the title of *Neguse* (King) when their resource base and power vis-a-vis their overlord (Emperor) was strong, or *Ras* (Head) or *Dejazmatch* (Guard of the Rear) at other times<sup>8</sup>. A regional warlord may have under him a number of sub-regional warlords and their subordinates designated as *Shums* (Officer), *Melkegna* (administrator), or *Gultegna* (a more general term referring to one with entitlement of gult right defined below). Each maintained *Ashkirs* (literally servants) with little differentiation between household, economic, political and military functions, particularly at lower levels. The Emperor, members of his immediate family and occasionally well-established warlords, constituted the *mesafint* (princes), the lower-level gentry, *mekianint* (officers), and the rank-and-file soldiers, *wetadirs*. The most numerous social class, *balager* (literally one who lives in the countryside) was subdivided between *gebbars* (one who pays *gibr* - tribute) on the one hand, and the various submerged non-*gebbars baria* (slaves), *ketkach* (smiths), *teyib* (potters), *faki* (tanners), on the other.

Whereas the geographic size and the distribution of hierarchical power waxed and waned<sup>9</sup>; the more stable and perhaps important institutions in understanding the agrarian relation are *rist* and *gult*. *Rists* are inheritable ancestral plots, the rights of which are believed to have emerged from *akgni abat* (founding pioneer father in the first cultivation of the land) (Nadel: 1946; Hobben: 1964; Bauer: 1977). *Rist* designated continuity in the posses-

8 This summary relies on Perham, (1969); Addis Hiwot, (1976); Gilkes, (1975); Mahteme Sellassie Wolde Meskel, (1949-50); Markakis, (1974); Gebre Wolde Engdaworg, (1961). For a summary on the medieval and modern initial history of Ethiopia, see Ullendorf, 1973; Jones and Monroe, 1978; Bahru, 1991.

9 Apart from these, there were also titles pertaining to the particular regions, such as *Bahre Negash* (King of the Sea) to the environs of the Red Sea; *Wag shum* to a region called Wag. In Begemder, a *gultegna* was known as *fereseigna* (cavalry warrior [Mahteme Sellassie Wolde Meskel, (1949-50); Markakis, (1978: 84).

sion of land. It pertains not only to individually operated plots, but also to clan (*risti diesa*) and village lands (Nadel: 1946; Ambaye: 1966). A *gult* may be designated as the smallest tribute area presided over by the *gultegna*<sup>10</sup>. Both *gebbars* and those in the hierarchy of the dominant class possessed *rist*, and were known as *ristegna* or *balerist*. The *gultegna*, however, was not only a *ristegna* but also 'richer' and 'stronger'. This relative wealth and superior social position of the *gultegna* is epitomized by the saying translated from Amarigna<sup>11</sup>: 'The rich man with his *gult* and the poor man with his *rist* and *gult* is for the great warrior, *rist* is for the weak' Markakis: (1974 p. 84).

The *gultegna* as the greatest warrior in the locality, administered justice, collected tribute, maintained law and order, raised a levy of soldiers<sup>12</sup> for local use and higher authorities, and oversaw corvee labour. In the performance of these duties to the overlord, he obtained a *gult right* to administer and collect tribute (products, slaves, trade tax), part of which was passed hierarchically to his overlord. *Gult* right was the principal basis for the extraction of surplus in kind and labour (Murray: 1976; Markakis: 1974; Pankhurst: 1968; Mahteme Sellasie: 1949/50). It pertained not only to the lower echelons of the dominant class, but also to members of the royal family, regional warlords and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. These were administered by *Melkegnas* on behalf of the higher authorities, and by the *semonegna* for the Church (Bairu: 1974; Haile Gebriel: 1972).

*Gults* were granted or recognized *de facto* in lieu of officialdom and services (state and Church), and such *gulte* given on a permanent basis were known as *rist gult*. Considering the instability of the Abyssinian dominant class, however, even *rist gults* transferred from one family to the other frequently (Grumme: 1981; Hobben: 1964). Caulk remarks:

*in the absence or very limited development of non-farming occupations, part-time soldiering enabled a peasant not only to escape from being*

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10 Due to the continual fluidity of power centres in both geographical and dynastic terms on the one hand, and the difficult terrain and the resulting poor communications, especially during the rainy season, on the other Horvath in his study of urbanization in pre-twentieth-century Ethiopia, states 'potential integration dissolves on an annual basis' Horvath, (1969: 218).

11 In a micro study in northern Ethiopia (Gojjam), Hobben in his now classic and first detailed study of the *gult* system writes, 'In battle above all men could distinguish themselves by feats of bravery and loyalty for which they could hope to be rewarded with official rank and land grants. The land grants, known as *gult* in Amharic, involve the conditional granting by the rulers of judicial, tributary and corvee labour rights over a parish or part of a parish to loyal subordinates of 50-100 families' Hobben, (1964: 11)

12 The state language of Ethiopia, native to most numerous nationality in Ethiopia, the Amara.

*prey to others, but also to participate in plunder (Caulk: 1978, p. 466)*<sup>13</sup>.

Arbitrary and multiple exaction by the dominant class and the political instability that accompanied it are said to have hindered accumulation by the peasantry. In the mid-nineteenth century: Plowden observed, 'these incessant commotions have had the effect of paralyzing the powers of the country, trade enjoyed no security and labour abandoned' (Pankhurst: 1966, p. 92).

Regarding the south, recent micro studies suggest that ecological diversity and varying social organizations may have led to differing land rights among the peasantry<sup>14</sup>. From a careful anthropological study using oral sources in the Oromo-settled part of Wellega (in western Ethiopia) prior to the conquest period, a land system in the process of developing along the lines in the north emerges (Hultin: 1977). Lineal descendants of the first *abalefa* (father of the land) had a holding right *kabbi* (to hold) as they belonged to the senior ancestral member of *balba guda*. The terms of use were mediated through the *abalefa*. Other more recent migrants both Oromo and non-Oromo acquired access to land as *copsisa* (tenant). In lieu of this right, they worked on the land of the superior *abelefa*. *Balbala Guda*, *abalefa*, and *kabbie* could be likened to *akgni abbat*, *balerist* and *rist* in the north. Slaves, war captives and artisans held similar positions in their exclusion from their possession of land rights. However, apart from the extraction of product and labour surplus from the *copsisa*, war captives and slaves, the democratic and participatory apparatus of the *gedda*<sup>15</sup> system based on functional division (administrative, judicial, military) according to the age cycle may not have subjected members of the *abalefa* to the payment of enforced tribute.

In the Gamo area, where land was plentiful and held collectively, the eldest son inherited his father's land while others obtained allotments for clearing and use from elders called *orshata* assemblies (Kluckholm: 1968). Near the Omo river, the Mursi were even a chiefless society (Turton: 1973).

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13 Prior to the establishment of a regular army just preceding the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1936, the *wetadir* (soldiers) were recruited from 'all walk of life' Pankhurst, (1966, 1968); and Gaulk, (1972, 1979).

14 The *gebbars* were segmented between those who offered part-time soldiering with full or part exemption from tribute payment, and those who surrendered the full obligations [Mahteme Sellassie Wolde, (1949-1950/50: 110).

15 The South consisted of peasant cultivators in the sense of their having had a long period of sedentarisation/peasantisation among the Kembatta, Wellaita, Sidama, Gurage, Kefta, and the Oromos of Herrerge and others, the relevance of which is discussed subsequently for clarity, see Pankhurst: (1968); and Mahteme Sellassie Wolde Meakel, (1945-1959). Lacking source materials from the south, the analysis is very tentative, requiring further micro studies, as is done for Derrasa (Gedeo) MacClellan, (1978); and part of Wollega (Hultin: 1977).



Among the *Gurage*, the *rist* (*yab afer* - land of the father) land system excluded *non-gurages* unable to trace ancestral lineages (Shack: 1967; p. 91). By contrast, over the Harer Plateau, which was nearest to maritime trade, save the Eritrean and Tigre Highlands, with the city state of Harer as its centre, an economy based on coffee developed into an elaborate system of land registration, cash tenancy and international trade (Fankhurst: 1968; Abir: 1964).

From the sketchy reconstruction of the economy and land system of the south in the pre-conquest period, it emerges that the agrarian system may have ranged from the apparently classless society among the Mursi to the relatively monetised, export-oriented economy and the privatization of land around Harer. In contrast to the ideological uniformity under the Ethiopian Orthodox church and access to advanced military technology in the north, the south exhibited much more diversity in its ecological, ethnic and socio-economic cultural settings. Where a dominant class was emerging, as in Keffa<sup>16</sup>, it was not organized even loosely under central authority as in the north<sup>17</sup>.

Whereas the agrarian structure in the north developed more or less autonomously, that in the south may have been altered as a result of its conquest. The impact of this conquest on the pre-existing social formation and land system may never be clearly known as there is little documentary or quantified evidence<sup>18</sup>. However, the conventional claim that Shewan conquerors 'expropriated'<sup>19</sup> the land, redistributed one-third to the government, one-third to the indigenous *balabats* (chiefs), and one-third to the Church (Niecko: 1980; Gebrewold: 1961) is dissimilar to the forces and relations of production in the agrarian system of the conquerors (northern Shewa). The primary mode of surplus extraction was tribute and plunder both in the north and south (Mahteme Sellasie Wolde Meskel: 1949/50, pp. 109-112)<sup>20</sup>.

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16 For more on the *gedda* system, see Asmerom Legesse, (1963: 1-29).

17 Quoting European missionaries in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, Abir mentions five highly organized despotic monarchies between the Ormo and the Didessa, and proposes that this might probably have been a culmination of a process by which the authority of a successful war leader or of a traditional office-holder was strengthened gradually Abir, (1964: 109).

18 For the gap in military technology and the difference in social organization at the end of the nineteenth century, see Gebre Sellassie, (1968), Levine, (1974), and Shack, (1966).

19 This Shewan conquest of the south is described by the imperial chronicler, who fails to record any substantive information on trade, culture or technology of the south Tsehafe Teezaz Gebre Sellassie, (1968). Historian and political activists variously interpret the process as reunification, expansionism and even colonialism.

20 Recently - based on oral history from elders - McLellan states of the agrarian history of Sidamo in this period, 'The near absolute monopoly over labour possessed by *gebbar* holders hindered the development of *gelad* (estate) land; without available tenants, holders of *gelad* tended to let it lie idle, earning rent from grazing but adding little to its tax base'

As the *gulteгна/fereseгна* in the north and the *nefteгна/shelaka* in the south blended military, administrative and judicial functions, the extent of product and labour time left to the peasantry was determined by non-economic coercion. Where soldiers were quartered, the *gebar* was not only a tribute payer<sup>21</sup>, but also a domestic servant and an appendage of soldiers in time of war for he could be forcibly mobilized for portage if not allowed to carry arms (Pankhurst: 1968).

The completion of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway and expansion of trade with the then Italian colony of Eritrea, however, impinged on agrarian relations towards the commutation of labour services by money, differentiated dues to the local and regional warlords, tenancy and the payment of tribute in money. Together with the expansion of coffee and the change in the consumption habit of the state class, made possible from imports in lieu of the exports, the hitherto *gebar* system was under increasing pressure towards monetisation. During the same period - 1928 and 1935 - attempts were made to change the basis of the state administration from the payment of tribute to the *gulteгна* and *nefteгна* to land tax based on its fertility (Mahteme Sellasie: 1949/50). The military, economic and political functions of the warlords were to be separated as also rent and tax. By doing so, the state in Addis Ababa aimed to shift part of the surplus labour of the peasantry directly to the central state<sup>22</sup>.

However, in so far as the *nefteгна* and *gulteгнаs* ruled according to custom unmitigated by any new control from below and that the commoditisation of agriculture was via trade rather than productive capital, the impacts of the agrarian reforms on peasant productivity may not have been substantial. Moreover, the regional warlords not only collected and retained a sub-

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receipt of rent for grazing and the cost of administration, on the one hand, and tax to the government, on the other. It was not unusual for such lands to revert as *gebretal* (repossessed by the state upon failure to pay tax).

- 21 The data compiled by Mahteme Sellasie are subject to a wide margin of error with respect to the extent of land under the various tenurial systems. This is because of the use of sources provided by the regional warlords. They lived very far from the areas, and thus their knowledge was not accurate. This was true especially of the unmeasured lands far from settlements (in climatically hostile areas prone to tropical diseases) for the Highland sedentarists.
- 22 This point is taken by Markakis: 'The immediate effect of the land policy on the southern peasantry was felt in the realm of tribute rather than in the transformation of tenure, the nature of which has been defined only gradually over the course of several decades' [Markakis, 1978: 113]. The occupying forces were given a number of *gebbars* according to rank. Pankhurst records 21,000 *gebbars* as being given to a *Ras*, 300 for a *Fūawari* (Chief of the front Guard) 150 for *kegnazmatch* (Chief of the right flank) and 10-20 ordinary soldiers (Pankhurst: 1968).

stantial portion of the tribute and plunder, their authority was backed by the provincial soldiers who were under their command<sup>23</sup>.

The working out of the trend towards the centralization and modernization of the state apparatus was rudely interrupted by the Italian occupation of Ethiopia in 1936. Through the exaction of *asrat* (title), importation of capital and consumer goods and the corvée labour system which they inherited from the regime they overthrew, the Italian colonialists laid an extensive network of roads, public buildings and nascent industries. From practical non-existence, 3,000 kms of all weather roads, an estimated 2,000,000 sterling pounds worth of road machinery and about 1,500 commercial vehicles, many of them lorries (Perham: 1969; Pankhurst: 1978; Talbot: 1952), laid the second phase of infrastructure towards the commercialization of agriculture, earlier stimulated by the construction of the Addis Ababa a Djibouti Railway and trade with Eritrea<sup>24</sup>.

Following the defeat of fascism and Haile Sellasie's return backed by the British forces, imperial authority instituted a national army<sup>25</sup> trained and supported by British and other European countries and a standard set of land taxes due to the centre and for the first time to be mediated by fully salaried officials. These were formalized in Proclamations of 1943 and 1944 (IEG: 1969). The effects of the change in agrarian relations from tribute to cash payment to the centre and with it the emergence of a proto-landlord class is in the separation of rent and tax is a subject not yet explored by micro-level studies<sup>26</sup>. In the south where in the early 1930s, 40% of the registered land

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23 The process of centralization in the emergence of the semblance of the modern state under imperial absolutism from the last two decades of the nineteenth century to the 1974 Revolution are discussed in (Addis Hiwot, 1975; Ferham, 1969; Clapham, 1969; Markakis, 1974; Halliday: 1981; Bahru, 1986; Dessalegn, 1989).

24 In 1901, at the celebration of the anniversary of the Battle of Adua, Menelik's chronicler reported the presence of 145,000 arm bearing soldiers from the south of the country (Guebre Sellasie: 1968, p. 308).

25 See Haile Mariam Larebo: 1989; on the agrarian policy of the Italians during their occupation of the country.

26 This was perhaps the most important phase of the recent political economy of the country comparable to Menelik's annexation of the south. For the first time in the country's history, with a monopoly of better armed soldiers both in terms of organization and technology, the Emperor retained effective control of the military making it possible for him to bring the regional warlord under his direct political command. This was made further easier by the Italo-Ethiopian War which decimated most of hitherto powerful *gullegnas* and *neftegnas*. For previously, while decentralization was being challenged by the superiority in men and arms of Menelik in the closing years of the nineteenth century. 'The contention between the nobility and the monarchy had been primarily for the control of the revenues from the districts and the segments in them... to make their governorship life-long tenures, the warlords found it necessary to keep on the throne weak Emperors who could be easily dissuaded from exercising the powers of their office' [Merid Wolde Argay, 1971: 354]. For several of this political arrangement in the constitution of the 'modern state' beginning under Menelik (1986-1913), and its crystallization in the

in measured areas was 'government' lands (Mahteme Sellasie: 1949/50, p. 109-111), their transformation from *maderia* (tribute right in lieu of service to the state) to *gebretel*<sup>27</sup> or for private was perhaps more straight forward. Although *sisso* tribute rights were granted to local *balabats*, it may not have been impossible to claim and register under the names of powerful *balabats*<sup>28</sup>. As the *gebbars* (peasants) were 'given' to *neftegnas* in the ensuing conflicting claims for land between the *gebbars*, *neftegnas* and *balabats*, the dominant ideological, political and economic position of the latter is likely to have determined the outcome. The more so where the new salaried state officials were recruited from among the *gultegnas* in the north and *neftegnas* in the south (Clapham: 1969). Under the new registration, apart from the strictly state lands (*hudad weregenu*, *tiklegna*) a substantial part of land hitherto held by *gebbars* may have reverted to state officials. In parts of the proto-peasant areas of the south, where vast areas of unsettled and grazing lands were *gebretel*, their successive allotment to civil and military officials by closing access to land reclamation by the peasantry led to the increasing rate of tenancy in the south.

With increasing sedentarisation and demographic pressure in a relatively peaceful era of the post-1941 state, the peasantry's right of becoming *akgnis* (reclaiming new lands) was restricted by grant/purchase accorded to state officials and later in conjunction with the commercial bourgeoisie both in the north and south. The private ownership of land legally defined the relation between the state and the new class of 'legally' constituted landowners. In this transitional period these emerging 'landlord relations' reduced the security of tenure of the former *gebbars*. The surplus due to the 'landlord' was defined by law however without a concurrent changes in the forces of production, there was no substantive change in relations between the former *gebbars* and the new landlords. Until 1964, the *gultenas* in the north collected land tax from *ristegnas*, part of which they retained for themselves (Lawrence and Mann: 1966). Although the administrative and tax reforms and the civil code in a period of over twenty years (1941-1965) attempted to define legally agrarian relations, the determination of the political over the legal and economic is borne out by the official recommendation of the FAO agrarian experts in 1965 which among other things called for 'the abolition

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post-1941 period, see (Markakis, 1974; Perham, 1969, Addis Hiwot, 1975, and Clapham, 1969; Halliday, 1981; Bahru, 1986; Dessalegn, 1989).

27 The only such study at a micro level mainly constructed from extensive oral interviews, argues that the new tenancy areas were on 'measured' *qelad* land used for grazing at the margin of sedentary agriculturalists mainly on the climatically hostile 'lowlands' which the sedentary peasants were forced to settle on following demographic pressure and the cultivation of cotton [McLellan, 1978: 167-80].

28 Lands upon which no tax was paid because they were unsettled and/or used for grazing, where the cost of administering dues was higher than the rents.

of services' (Lawrence: 1966)<sup>29</sup>. Moreover, the transition was by no means complete as they hastened to add:

*... the time has already come when it will be possible without undue dislocation and with considerable administrative advantages to convert the vast majority if not all of the existing forms of tenure to one form of individual ownership, the right and obligations of which can be clearly defined by law (Lawrence: 1966).*

The emerging 'proto-landlords' even maintained private prisons and administered 'justice' in their still 'tribute' area (Stahl: 1973, p. 27); Markakis: 1974, p. 27) in the 1960s and early 1970s.

### **The state, the peasantry and class formation in pre-1974 Ethiopia**

Studies of the political economy of the poor countries have been concerned with the relations of non-capitalist formations to the penetration of capital under the aegis of colonialism/imperialism and the tendencies thereof in the post-colonial period. Ethiopia's emergence as a semi-colony<sup>30</sup> of imperialism during the colonial scramble, save for its brief occupation by Italy in 1936-41, on the one hand, and the specificity of the history of its social formation discussed in the preceding sections, on the other, introduce two important variables. These specificities and the formation of the 'absolute state'<sup>31</sup> in the post-1941 period are of critical importance in locating the problematique of the agrarian transition, elementalised into its politics, culture, economy and ideology.

Characterization of the dominant mode of production in general, and agriculture in particular, in Ethiopia as feudal has been made on the basis of the prevalence of a peasantry in contradistinction to pre-colonial Africa (Cohen: 1974) and the cultural separation between peasants and the dominant class (Gamst: 1973). This is said to form a socio-economic system that can be described as feudal as it has the major elements of the feudal societies of western Europe and Japan (Gilkes: 1975), including feudal landlordism and feudal conquest (Legesse: 1980). Others distinguish between periods and regions of the polity. Lambton restricts feudal to the pre-1941 period (Lambton: 1971, p. 223). The introduction of land tax by the

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29 In the highly densely populated region of Sidamo, a recent study of this phenomenon documented a transfer of 20.000 hectares of land with tribute entitlement to a local chief to the royal family under private holding [McLellan, 1978: 181].

30 Under the Civil Code [Lawrence and Mann, 1966], landlords were legally entitled to claim up to 66% of the gross produce of sharecroppers.

31 It is in the same period that the country attained its current geographical/political territory. For details of this period of conquest and expansion, and its relations with foreign powers, see [Addis Hiwot, 1975; Bahru, 1986].

Central Government (applicable to both north and south) and the emergence of landlord-tenant relations to the post-1941 period in the south represented an advance (sic) over the form of feudalism practised in the north, leaving the northern peasants as small holders and the southern ones as landless proletarians (Markakis: 1974, pp. 25 and 41). Similarly, the southern agrarian structure with 'free labourer' is referred to as non-feudal (Cliffe: 1974).

Confining his analysis to pre-twentieth-century Abyssinia, Addis Hiwot traces Abyssinian feudalism to the last four or five centuries (Addis Hiwot: 1975, p. 26). According to him, the surrender by *gebbars* (peasants) of surplus to those who fought (*mekuanint* - *gultegna* the lower aristocracy) (*kahnat* - the priestly) were the same as the three fundamental elements that dominated tenth-century European society. The agrarian system in the south-east and south-west, on the other hand, is designated as: ... 'a classical system of feudal serfdom' (Addis Hiwot: 1975, p. 31)<sup>32</sup>. Like others who take the feudal position, he raises but does not problematise the social and economic dynamic of the formation.

Recognizing Ethiopian cultivators as peasants, the social hierarchy of Abyssinian society and elements of the cultural gap between the *gebbars* and *gultegnas*, some similarity with west European and Japanese feudalism is suggested. Nevertheless, at the level of superstructure, the pre-twentieth-century Abyssinian social formation is likened to other African 'tributary'<sup>33</sup> formations (Stahl: 1973; Murray: 1976) since it lacked the social and economic dynamics of transition. Crummey observes the striking similarity of Bloch's abstraction of feudal society - the dependence of the pre-1935 Abyssinian state on the produce of the land, the similarity of the *gults* to fiefs as institutions of ruling class support, the warrior ethos of Abyssinian society, the patron-client relations between *gultegna* and *gebbbar*, and the fragmentation of authority. However, when situating his analysis within a mode of production framework, the control of land by the Abyssinian

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32 For the social and political basis of the absolutist state in Europe, see [Marx and Engels, 1970: 164, 165] Anderson, 1978. In the only serious attempt so far to locate the social basis of the Ethiopian 'modern state' Addis Hiwot argues, "Unlike the Europeans and Japanese, and so much like its Czarist counterparts, the modern state arose in Ethiopia not as an agency of social-economic change but as a method, as an apparatus of administration and government with remedious resources and capacity for repression. For the express role of the modern state in Ethiopia is the defence of the status quo" [Addis Hiwot, 1976: 79] See also Bahru: 1986, Dessalegn: 1989]. Our position regarding the specificity of the 'modern state' with respect to agrarian transition, is elucidated subsequently.

33 He wrongly refers to the peasantry in the south as landless peasants [Addis Hiwot, 1975: 31]. We have argued that notwithstanding the cultural and national domination in the pre-1941 period, the agrarian relation was not very different from the north in so far as it depended on the appropriation of tribute under similar levels of the forces of production.

peasantry, the appropriation of surplus by the *gultegnas* in the form of tribute rather than rent, and the strict property relations that the latter entails, leads him to discern 'a significant departure from the European feudal mode of production' (Crummey 1981, p. 128).

He is hesitant to use either the tributary or Asiatic modes. The former is inadequate for while describing the nature of surplus extraction, it fails to specify the relations of production. The Asiatic mode is rejected for its internal inconsistency<sup>34</sup>. The feudal mode is said to be the only viable referent and proposes an analytical construct of class. This is based on the distinction between those who lived off the surplus and those who produced. Crummey also stresses the elaborate difference of behaviour in the social hierarchy, the continuity of class relations and dynastic rule through time as constituting sufficient conditions to pose class relations in Abyssinian society. Having posed class relations, however, he does not read class action in the social formation when he states:

*Within the wider comparative network, the lack of rigid stratification and the intimacy of class contacts helps to explain the notable lack of peasant movements in the period under review. Class conflict there undoubtedly was, but in our period it rarely expressed itself openly, and certainly never in spectacular uprisings (Crummey 1981: p. 136).*

Based on a comparison of the Abyssinian social formation's superstructure with Europe, two well-known Ethiopianists (Markakis: 1974; Perham: 1969) reject the application of feudalism. In the words of the latter historian,

*... although the word feudal is freely used of Ethiopia, there never developed in that country a hereditary class of nobility able to exhort contracts about its powers and rights from its kinds (Perham: 1969, p. 161).*

Markakis states:

*the power of the monarch to give and rescind office and status represented the main obstacle to the entrenchment of a truly feudal class in traditional Ethiopia (Markakis: 1974, pp. 38-9).*

Ellis rejects the 'feudal paradigm' because of the prevalence of an independent peasantry subject to the state in the payment of taxes (applicable to the post-1941 period) and not serfs in the north, and:

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34 The tributary mode has been analytically distinguished on the basis of the relative separation of the ruling class from the process of production in the feudal mode, compared to its total separation in the former [Wickham, 1983: 186]. For more analytical examination of the tributary mode, see [Amin, 1982, and Murray, 1975].

... the lack of feudal ties of services and obligation between the conquerors and the vanquished peasants which made the tenure in the south one of occupation rather than overlordship (Ellis: 1976, p. 284).

Anderson also rejects the application of the feudal mode to pre-twentieth century Ethiopia due to the absence of private ownership of land and the property relationship it entails in the European transitions (Anderson: 1978, p. 411)<sup>35</sup>.

The literature on the mode of production in Ethiopian agriculture draws substantially from the superstructural similarity of European feudalism and the Abyssinian social formation. The debate also raises the matter of difference with respect to the condition of the dynamism of European and Abyssinian feudalism, without, however, attempting to explain them<sup>36</sup>. The incorporation of the south into the Empire and its impact on the agrarian structure of the latter, the agrarian reforms from above and the penetration of foreign capital since the early twentieth century, are not systematically analyzed to delineate the Ethiopian social formation.

The most important aspect of the Ethiopian social formation relevant to illuminating the state, the peasantry and their dynamics, is the *gebbar* system. The reproduction of this system over a millennium with the control of land resources by the peasantry, the limited division between town and country, the fluidity of vassalage/tenement, and the accompanying low level of primary accumulation<sup>37</sup>, are at the core of the problems and its transition. The wider parameters of this problem are circumscribed by the geographically changing locus of the Empire, the indeterminate power equilibrium between, imperial, regional and sub-regional authority within a generally unstable social formation located away from maritime trade<sup>38</sup>. It is these relationships and their probable causes and effects which are fundamental in explaining the resemblance of the *gebbar* system to the central models of

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35 For the concept of the Asiatic mode, see [Marx, 1964; Hindess and Hirst, 1975; Mellotti, 1982.

36 In seventeenth-century Abyssinia, when imperial power attained a large measure of authority and relatively stability, there was both private ownership and registration of land [Pankhurst, 1968: 289].

37 Dobb in his well-known work on the European feudal system, says that within its shell, the urban economy of the Middle Ages contained feudalism which was indissociable from maritime transport and exchange. The changing effects of demography (the supply, demand of labour) and the forces of production (resulting in changes in agricultural productivity, farm-cropping patterns, new techniques) interacted locally, regionally and internationally, setting the dynamics in the relations of production rather than their continual reproduction [Dobb, 1981, Mukhia, 1983; Banaji, 1977].

38 We do not have adequate source material to substantiate comparisons with other sedentary, non-irrigation agricultural systems in the distant past. The culturally loaded, primitive, is substituted by primary.



feudalism (European and Japanese) the Abyssinian social formation's point of departure and the specificity of its dynamism in relation to internal expansionism and incorporation into world trade.

Summing up a survey of Ethiopia's history, referring to the power balance within the centre and regions, Perham comments:

*The two elements remained in a permanent tension, the balance swayed from one decade to another, and through the six hundred years or more of which we have reliable knowledge neither side until this century seems to have gained upon the other (Perham: 1969, p. 268).*

The changing power balance within and the continuity of the social formation as a whole ensured the reproduction and the ideological cohesion of the Christian empire and its *gebbar* agrarian system *vis-a-vis* outside invaders. However, the internal economic, social and political integration was constrained by the autonomy of regions and sub-regions which was a function of the poor transport and communication systems on the one hand, and the level, organization and distribution of the means of coercion on the other. Whereas the hierarchical *gultegnas* maintained *ashkirs* (home soldiers/servants) at all levels (Gilkes: 1975), most of the fighting forces at the inter- and intra -, local, regional and imperial levels were levied from '... all walks of life' (Pankhurst 1968, pp. 554-6). Their supply depended on plundering and/or provision by loyal vassals (Caulk: 1978).

The simplicity and similarity of the level of the arms technology, the power to levy *ashkirs* of similar fighting calibre recruited from among the peasantry at different levels in the hierarchy and the poor system of transport<sup>39</sup> over the northern Ethiopian Highlands appears to be the basis for the contingency of the decentralization of power and the sources of its incessant instability<sup>40</sup>. These structured the *gebbar* agrarian system and the resultant dominance of the relations of production in the social formation, defining its core elements and the limits of its dynamism. In so far as the two predominant forms of surplus extraction from the peasantry, tribute and plundering, were arbitrary and their lower and upper limits were circumscribed by the necessity of the reproduction of the peasantry and the size of the warrior class with no determinate medium- and long-term stability, the *gebbar* system articulated the relations and forces of production. The hegemony of hierarchical lords effected through the recruitment of

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39 This aspect of the political economy of the region in terms of enclaves, littoral and internal empires and their relations with trade routes, especially arms, is discussed in [Murray, 1976].

40 In some parts a caravan could travel for only six kilometers per day [Abir, 1964]. Another researcher on urbanization in pre-twentieth-century Ethiopia, designates Abyssinian emperors as 'royal nomads' [Akaly, 1967]. See also [Horwath, 1969].

their own *ashkirs* required the lateral expansion of their tribute area<sup>41</sup>. Under these circumstances, the ownership of land by the dominant warrior aristocracy was not a necessary condition for its reproduction.

The interaction of topography and the level and the organization of the means of coercion conditioned the continual indeterminate distribution and fluidity of power. Within this social formation, while appropriating surplus in the form of tribute and plunder<sup>42</sup>, the relations of production may have stifled the commoditisation of agriculture and the social division of labour within agriculture and between agriculture and non-agriculture. The *gabbar* agrarian system with its two principal classes, the *gultegna* and the *gebbar*, differed from other pre-colonial formations in Africa in the prevalence of a subject peasantry and a dominant warrior class reproduced through the agricultural surplus extracted from the peasantry for over a millennium.

We can thus try to explain the specificity of the Ethiopian social formation and its deviations from the central models of feudalism; in the non-requirement of the possession of land by the warrior class for the reproduction of agrarian relations, the provisionality of the entitlement of *gult* rights, the very restricted extent of commodity production, the limited division between town and country, the low level of the social differentiation of the peasantry, the fragility of the state in the process of its reproduction and the waning of its legitimacy - in short, the conditions which reproduced material stagnation. In so far as the static characteristics of the feudal mode of production<sup>43</sup> are conceptualized to locate the dynamics of its social economy - the control of both land and peasant labour by the dominant classes and the change in agrarian relations in response to externally and internally induced variables (demography, trade, conquest) - as a basis of agrarian transition, its application to the Abyssinian social formation especially prior to the last two decades of the nineteenth century is unhelpful either as a theoretical construct, or as a basis for social action.

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41 Instability caused by the attempted intrusion of non-Christian contenders for power, European imperialism, and the scramble for local, regional and imperial lordships within the empire.

42 While the peasantry may have had a choice between being a *gebber* and *ashkir* to a *gultegna*, in time of war the choice was very theoretical, for in the words of Caul, '... part-time soldiering was almost the only way a farmer could escape for a time from being prey to others by participating in the plunder' [Caulk: 1978: 466].

43 The well-known economic historian of Ethiopia comments, 'Peasant poverty was plenty due to crop failure, ravage of locusts, death of oxen, depredation of troops. Furthermore, that people may have been dissuaded from storing surplus grain by the fear that the existence of stores would merely be an invitation to the soldiers or tax-gatherers to increase their exaction' [Pankhurst, 1968:216]. For a vivid analysis of the same process in 1900-1930 in northern Wallo, see [McCann, 1987].

The Abyssinian emperor's nominal power over the regional warlords, the endemic wars and continual change of *gultegnas*, the very low levels of long-distance trade in agricultural commodities and urbanization set it apart from the Asiatic empires. The classical and primitive communal modes do not obviously fit. The other recently theorized modes - lineage (Terry: 1972), African (Coquery-Vidrovitch: 1978), domestic (Sahlins: 1972), peasant (Banaji: 1972), and Colonial (Banaji: 1972, Alavi: 1975) are at variance with the Abyssinian social formation described earlier. Adherents of the transitional mode (to capitalism) (Stahl: 1973; Cliffe: 1974); Bondes-tam: 1974) have yet to demonstrate conclusively the dynamics set in motion by capital in Ethiopian agriculture; encompassing changes in land and labour productivity, accumulation and their impact on regional and national economics<sup>44</sup>.

The tributary mode in which surplus product is derived from the land and appropriated through tribute and plunder (Amin: 1980; Murray: 1976) is the nearest to capturing the articulation of the relation and forces of production in the Abyssinian social formation in the pre-Menelik period.

Lack of source materials do not allow us to undertake any serious synthesis of the southern social formation prior to their conquest. With the conquest of the south which meant: the decisive sway in the balance of power to the emperor; the centralization of the state apparatus (national taxation, army and bureaucracy); the incorporation of the empire into the world market via merchant capital; the separation of tax and rent and part of the peasantry from its means of production (land) and the increasing control of the labour process by the 'proto-landlords' (especially in the coffee-growing regions) without, however, a radical change in the forces of production; the tributary mode was propelled towards petty commodity production both in the north and south.

The central problem in the analysis of agrarian transition in Ethiopian agriculture is, unlike others where absolutist central state power emerges as the '... rule of the feudal nobility in the epoch of the transition to capitalism, the end of which signalled the advent of bourgeois revolutions and the emergence of the capitalist state' (Anderson: 1978, p. 42), that it came as a consolidation of tributary relations of production without the concomitant changes in the forces and relations of production. The dominance and consolidation of centralized state power in Addis Ababa especially in the post-1941 period, the Italian colonization of Eritrea and the construction of the Franco-

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44 For a rigorous theorization of modes of production, especially non-capitalist ones, the theoretical and empirical conditions of their transition, see [Hindess and Hirst, 1975; Dobb, 1981; Carter, 1978; Meillassoux, 1973, 1978; Vidrovitch, 1978; Balibar and Althusser, 1979; Mukhia, 1968; Laclau, 1974].

Ethiopian railway, undermined the two basic constraints in the dynamics of the Abyssinian social formation: its temporal distance from the world market<sup>45</sup> and the fluidity of the regional balance of power.

The two key variables, the emergence of the absolutist state as a consolidation of the tributary mode and the entry into the world market via merchant capital as a semi-colonial state and thus with a relative autonomy<sup>46</sup>, from imperialism, themselves result of the resolution of conflicts between European colonialism and Abyssinian expansionism, set the parameters of the dynamism and constraints of its transition and its articulation<sup>47</sup> with the capitalist mode via trade.

The apparent dichotomy in agrarian system - the relatively higher proportion of independent peasant holdings in the north and of tenant holdings in the south<sup>48</sup> - are variant forms of class relations of a tributary state

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45 In 1974, in a country of over 30 million people, total capital assets in non-peasant agriculture and manufacturing industry totalized US\$25m and 136m respectively [Dessalegn, 1985: 31-3]. In the same year, 65% of exports consisted of coffee and 15% of the remainder was accounted for by hides and skins as by-products of subsistence consumption in peasant agriculture [PMGSE, 1982: 402]. While part of the estimated annual production of 200.000 tons of coffee is partly produced as a cash crop by peasant holdings in Sidamo and Harerge, a large part of the rest comes from 'forest' trees where the main input is labour for picking [Teketel, 1971: 262]. A network of 7.900 kilometers of all-weather roads in the country as a whole is 1 kilometer per 240 sq. kilometers of land [PMGSE, 1982: 358]. Describing the level of foreign capital in Ethiopian agriculture on the eve of the Italian occupation, Pankhurst writes that there were well over a dozen foreign-owned farms, the majority in the capital mostly supplying fruit, vegetables and poultry to the urban elite of foreigners and Ethiopians [Pankhurst, 1968: 209]. According to Perham, Ethiopia in 1935 was economically very little changed from what she had been in the tenth century [Perham, 1969: 180].

46 In 1984/1985, long before the colonization of Eritrea and the Franco-Ethiopian railway, the prices of wheat, barley, beans and lentils were one-eighth, one-tenth, one-ninth, and one-sixth in Adua (northern Ethiopia) of the prices in Paris [Pankhurst, 1968: 192].

47 The relative autonomy of the state (a certain degree of independence) in relation to social classes, and revolution as an historical specificity, was theorized by [Marx, 1970: 576]. For other formulations with regard to class formation under colonialism, and its implications for the relative autonomy of the state from metropolitan capital and indigenous social classes in the poor countries in the post-colonial period, see [Alavi, 1972; Leys, 1976; Saul, 1979]. We have used it in a different context by locating the relative autonomy of the Ethiopian modern state since the colonial scramble from imperialism preserving the tributary mode in production, and its incorporation into the world market via trade. The notion captures the preservation of the tributary agrarian relation, the level of accumulation it implies, and the provision of military and economic 'aid' to retain it as a raw-material-exporting imperialist satellite.

48 Almost all agrarian studies and the derived policy prescriptions focus on tenancy and its preponderance in the south compared to the north following Abyssinian expansion in the closing years of the nineteenth century. Analysis of the state, the peasantry and the forms of its incorporation into the world market, demonstrate that the forms of sharecropping which emerged in the post 1941 period with changes in the relations of production, were more a reflection of land labour ratio between the highlands and the adjacent lowlands, on the one hand, and within the highland areas both in the north and south, on the other. As

rather than the expressions of the degree of feudalism or capitalism as some writers have asserted (Stahl: 1973; Cliffe: 1974). The expansion of the tributary state and the 'radical' superstructural and agrarian reforms it introduced from 'above' were the realization of the increasing relative dominance of the absolutist state over the regional *gultegn*s, namely, within the state, in Abyssinia and the southern social formations. In so far as these measures were not, however, a revolutionary culmination of the new relations of production deriving from changed forces of production and class formation as in the European transitions, they cannot be construed as capitalist or entirely feudal<sup>49</sup>.

The change from the appropriation of surplus labour in the form of tribute mainly in kind to taxation by the state and share cropping rent to the 'proto-landlords', was a formalization of the economic obligation of the *gebbar* (both in the north and the south) to the state and his overlord on the one hand, and of the latter to the state on the other. Landlordism in the making defined the economic and political relation of the state and the *gultegn*al-*tegrna* by at least formally locating the political, military and judicial function at the discretion of the centralizing state; By doing so, it began to change the basis of the *gebbar* system - towards the requirement of the private ownership of land - a process fundamental to the dynamics of the core feudal model. Nonetheless, the penetration of capital being mainly merchant in nature and with the continuation of a similar labour process in agriculture and the formalization of *gult right* to tax and share cropping tenancy rather than a change in the labour process itself, the agrarian reforms from above attempted to move the communal basis of land possession towards privatization. However, this was without the requisite technical basis (physical, infrastructure, research) which was fundamental in the transition of the rich capitalist countries, the social differentiation of the peasantry in Asia and Latin America and the expanded commoditisation of agriculture elsewhere in Africa under colonial rule (Kitching: 1980; Bahduri: 1976; Patnaik: 1972, 1976; Howard: 1981).

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such, it is a reflection of the form of surplus extraction between the peasantry and increasingly autonomous proto-landlords on the path towards centralization of the state apparatus (taxation, military, bureaucracy). Neither was tenancy restricted to the south, nor is it even a wide measure of absolute and relative poverty, as most poor/landless peasants were in the north, and tenants in both regions constituted proportionately more of the middle and rich peasants. For the problematisation of this issue, the empirical data and their implications for agrarian transition, see T. Bonger, 'The New Technology, Agrarian Reform and Peasant Differentiation in Ethiopian Agriculture in 1966-1980, with special reference to the Arsi Region', unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1987.

49 For a concept of articulation between the relations and forces of production, within and between more than one mode of production, see [Carter, 1978; Bradby, 1975; Althusser and Balibar, 1979].

Since the onset of the post-independence period in 1941, however, with increasing demographic pressure, a relatively peaceful era<sup>50</sup>, the changing basis of the appropriation of surplus labour, the expansion of commodity production and physical infrastructure, a combination of lack of access to land by the peasantry (both in the north and south) through being *akgnis* and its allotment as grant/purchase by the functionaries of the state, the tributary basis of agrarian relation was in the process of change towards share cropping. In so far as the *gebbar* system was the principal agrarian relation with *unlimited* access to the product and labour surplus of the peasantry, 'land-ownership' may have become necessary only in the post-war period, as McLellan has demonstrated in one area (McLellan 1978). Whereas the historic *gultegnas* expanded their surplus through the lateral expansion of their tribute areas, the new functionaries of the state in the post-1941 period did so in the possession of 'unoccupied'<sup>51</sup> land of actual or potential cultivable areas mostly in the 'proto-peasant' areas in the south, but also partly in the north. However, the expropriation of land the appropriation of surplus from the peasantry were limited by the slow development of commodity production on the one hand, and by low productivity and a high man/land ration on the other. In the high land/labour ratio regions<sup>52</sup>, the availability of labour rather than land set the limit of appropriation (McLellan: 1977); Pankhurst: 1968, Markakis: 1974). With land possession by most of the peasantry in the north and to some extent the south, and its relatively high supply in the 'proto-peasant' regions, the levels of agricultural tenancy within the largely hitherto existing labour process was a reflection of the relative land and labour ratio and to some extent the degree of class dominance by the proto-landlords in parts of the south, rather than of feudal or capitalist relations of production.

The two predominant social classes in Ethiopian agriculture were the peasantry and the 'proto-landlords', with the latter anchored in the state apparatus from the royalty down to the lowest administrative unit. The territorially expanded, centralized and functionally differentiated post-1941

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50 The supremacy of imperial power in arms, and the increased security in the period during the colonial scramble by Menelik, is described thus: 'An American traveller observed that the name Menelik meant safety, and that the rulers of the provinces rose to show respect when they saw the seal of the king' [Marcus, 1969: 454].

51 In view of its occupation by Shewan *neftegnas* and the wide technological gap in arms with the conquered social formations, the dominant state class in the south held more sway over the peasantry (with perhaps more 'privatization' of the hitherto *gebbar* holdings), although rebellion was by no means absent, as in the uprising of the Gedeo in Sidamo [McLellan, 1978]. For the process of privatization, see [Wetterhall, n.d.; Cohen, 1976; Pausewang, 1978; Bondestam, 1974; Dunning, 1970; Gilkes, 1975, and Lawrence, 1966].

52 With regard to the peasantry in the Highlands, such areas in the adjacent Lowlands were hazardous with a high incidence of malaria and animal diseases which is why they were not populated in the first place.

Ethiopian state was a legitimization of the domination of the peasantry as a whole via the changing agrarian relations, and the political, ideological and cultural hegemony of its Abyssinian parentage over the people of the south. At the level of its economic decomposition, the incorporation of the empire into the world market (with the exchange of agricultural surplus for the amenities of modern consumption goods), without significant change in the labour process, resulted in small but politically important new social classes - the urban proletariat (in state utility services and in industries owned by foreign capital), the salariat and mercantile petty bourgeoisie fractionalized into corporate and regional section<sup>53</sup>. The pre-1974 state was thus the site of the intersection of conflict between *the state and the peasantry as a whole*, the political, ideological and cultural hegemony of the Abyssinian social formation on the peoples of the south, and of the conflict between the traditional dominant and the emerging new social classes - the latter located in the lower echelons of the modern state and the sectors of the economy catering to the home market.

The rapid demise of the *ancient regime* and the seizure of power by one fraction of the petty bourgeoisie (the military) is a reflection of the constricted transition from the tributary mode and the fragmentation of civil society that it entailed. As a resolution of the conflict between the old and a fraction of the new social classes, the 1974 revolution was radical in dismantling the economic and political bases of the *ancient regime's* tributary agrarian relations in favour of a uniform land use tax by the peasantry. However, in so far as it is a revolution *within* the state<sup>54</sup> and given the pre-1974 transition from the tributary mode of production, its capacity to develop the productive forces for accumulation in agriculture and initiate a transition to socialist relation of production is dependent on the resolution of conflict between the hegemony of the dominant and dominated nationalities on the one hand, and the democratization of state to overcome economic, regional and cultural fragmentation of society by the tributary class formation on the other.

### Conclusion

The relative autonomy of the state from colonialism/imperialism, which limited its articulation with capital in exchange, on the one hand, and the parentage and emergence of the absolutist state as a consolidation of the Abyssinian tributary mode rather than as a culmination of the development

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53 For class formation in the social formation, especially in the post-1941 period, see [Markakis, 1974].

54 For the concept of revolution within the state in the context of Japan's Meiji restoration, Turkey's Ataturk, Nasserist Egypt, etc. see [Trimbuger, 1977].

of the feudal mode and the social classes therein, on the other, leads us to argue that the predominant mode of production in pre-1974 Ethiopian agriculture as a whole was a transitional one from tributary to petty commodity production.

In Asia, Latin America and Africa, the mode of production debate is problematised around the role of the colonial state in initiating the breakdown, and in most cases to some extent the transformation of the non-capitalist modes, without, however, successful classical transitions to agrarian capitalism and industrialization. In Ethiopia, incorporation into the world economy with the relative autonomy of the state (the specification of which was outlined above) from imperialism limiting the penetration of capital to the sphere of trade rather than infrastructure and productive capital, constricted the development of new forces of production while reforms from above resulted in changes in agrarian relations from tribute to absolute ground rent. This is a fundamental specificity of the Ethiopian agrarian structure: crucial to an adequate delineation of the apparent schism in agrarian structures in the north and south, the evolution of social classes, the identification of the trend towards the social differentiation of the peasantry, accumulation, distribution and the theorization of the pre-1974 state.

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*Africa Development*

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\* School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

## ERRATA

We would like to apologize for the many errors contained in Tinker Bonga's paper entitled "The State, the Peasantry and Rural Class Formation in Pre-revolutionary Ethiopia" published in *Africa Development* Vol. XVII No. 2, 1992. The following is the list of the errors and the corrections.

Page #	Para #	Line #	Error	Correction
89	Note 1	3	not "capital"	capita
90	Note 2	4	"the" missing	..of the sub-
90	Note 2	2	"African" missing	African population
91	Note 7	1	"and" missing	... and problems
92	Sub-title 2	Note # 8 missing	Ethiopia	
	2	3	"him" missing	Under him were
		17	gebbars	gebbar
92	Note 8	1	Not 1976	Addis Hiwot 1975
	2	5	"," missing	trade "," tax
		4	Grumney	Crummey
	Note 10	4	potential	political
	12	1	to ..... most	the second most
94	3	7	kabbi"	kabbie
	Note 13	3	Gaulk	Caulk
	Note 15	2	Kefta	Keffa
		6	Fankhurst	Pankhurst
	Note 19	5	Historian	Historians,
96	1	4	gebar	gebbar
97	2	3	title	tithe
	3	7	"class" is	cancel class
	Note 23	3	Ferham	Perham
	Note 26	8	century	"," after century
	Note 26	13	several	reversal
98	1	12	hudad	"," after hudad
	2	7	period	periods
		7	these	the emerging
		8	gebbars	gebbar
		8	The surplus	Since the surplus
99	Note 29	2	20.000	20,000
101	2	7	gultegnas	gultegna
103	Note 40	3	Akaly	Akalu
	Note 40	3	Horwath	Horvath
105	4	2	emerges	emerged
	Note 44	4	1968	1981
108	1	18	ration	ratio

### Bibliography - error reference tabulated by name of author

111	Banaji	1:1	not "25002"	2502
	Bauer	1:1	not "social"	Social
	C. Vidro	1:3	"State .. Ethiopia"	Work is by
				Crummey
112	Gebre Sellassie		not "region"	reign
	Haile Mariam Larebo		"The .... 1941"	" " missing
	Leys	not "Reveleation"	Re-evaluation	
	Marx	not "Hobsbawn"	Hobsbawn	
	McLellan		inverted comma for	title missing
	Mesfin Wolde Mariam		inverted comma for	title missing
	Meillasoux		inverted comma for	title missing
	Pataik		inverted comma for	title missing

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## Contents / Sommaire

**Lawrence M. Sommers and Assefa Mehretu**

Trade Patterns and Trends in the African-European Trading Area:  
Lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa from the Era of the Lome Accords  
1975-1988

**Kwame Boafo-Arthur**

Europe 1992: A Challenge to Sub-Saharan African Development

**A. I. Asiwaju**

Borders and Borderlands as Linchpins for Regional Integration  
in Africa: Lessons of the European Experience

**Momar Coumba Diop et Mamadou Diouf**

L'administration sénégalaise, les confréries religieuses  
et les paysanneries

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The State, the Peasantry and Rural Class Formation  
in Prerevolutionary Ethiopia

ISSN 0850 3907

