

AFRICA DEVELOPMENT AFRIQUE ET DÉVELOPPEMENT

Vol. XLVIII, No. 3, 2023

Papers from *CODESRIA's Meaning-making Research Initiatives (MRI)*

Articles issus des *Initiatives de recherche pour la construction du sens (MRI)*



**AFRICA DEVELOPMENT
AFRIQUE ET DÉVELOPPEMENT**

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Towards Unpacking the Origin and Development of Eswatini (Swazi) Irredentism

Hlengiwe Portia Dlamini*, Manka'ah Mafor Awasom-Fru**,
Lenhle Precious Dlamini*** and Sirri Awasom-Fru****

Abstract

This article sets out to examine the origin and development of Eswatini irredentism in southern Africa as a neglected theme in African scholarship. Eswatini irredentist disputes, albeit unresolved, have been a subject of mere peripheral allusion in southern African scholarship. The global importance of irredentism as a phenomenon in international relations since the end of the Cold War makes this study imperative. How the smallest and landlocked state on the Southern African mainland can audaciously and persistently make territorial claims against its giant South African neighbour is intriguing, paradoxical and worth investigating. The study methodology involved the use of archival documentation, newspaper articles, government gazettes, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGD). This study revealed that Eswatini irredentism is ethnic nationalism *par excellence* and its roots were nurtured by the imperial order and South Africa before Eswatini's independence. After independence in 1968, Eswatini irredentism blossomed on historical and ethnic foundations, and was tolerated and fanned by South Africa as a strategy of surreptitiously establishing an Eswatini Bantustan for the resettlement of ethnic Eswatini people and other blacks. The post-apartheid South African governments did a volte-face and rejected persistent Eswatini irredentist claims *in toto* nourished by the Sobhuza Testament.

Keywords: apartheid, Eswatini irredentism, Eswatini Bantustan, post-apartheid South African governments, Sobhuza Testament

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Résumé

Cet article vise à examiner l'origine et le développement de l'irrédentisme d'Eswatini en Afrique australe en tant que thème négligé dans la recherche africaine. Les différends irrédentistes de l'Eswatini, bien que non résolus, ont fait l'objet d'une simple allusion périphérique dans la recherche sud-africaine. L'importance mondiale de l'irrédentisme en tant que phénomène dans les relations internationales depuis la fin de la guerre froide rend cette étude impérative. Comment le plus petit État enclavé du continent d'Afrique australe peut audacieusement et constamment revendiquer des territoires contre son voisin géant sud-africain est intrigant, paradoxal et mérite d'être étudié. La méthodologie de l'étude comprenait l'utilisation de documents d'archives, d'articles de journaux, de gazettes gouvernementales, d'entrevues approfondies et de discussions de groupe. Cette étude a révélé que l'irrédentisme de l'Eswatini est un nationalisme ethnique par excellence et que ses racines ont été nourries par l'ordre impérial et l'Afrique du Sud avant l'indépendance de l'Eswatini. Après l'indépendance en 1968, l'irrédentisme de l'Eswatini s'est épanoui sur des bases historiques et ethniques, et a été toléré et attisé par l'Afrique du Sud comme une stratégie d'établissement subreptice d'un bantoustan d'Eswatini pour la réinstallation des Eswatiniens ethniques et d'autres Noirs. Les gouvernements sud-africains post-apartheid ont fait volte-face et rejeté les revendications irrédentistes persistantes de l'Eswatini dans leur ensemble nourries par le Testament de Sobhuza.

Mots-clés : apartheid, irrédentisme d'Eswatini, bantoustan d'Eswatini, gouvernements sud-africains post-apartheid, Testament de Sobhuza

Introduction

This article attempts to explore the origin, development and persistence of Eswatini irredentism in Southern Africa as a neglected theme in southern African scholarship. The Kingdom of Eswatini is the smallest state in southern Africa, with a land area of just 17,364 square kilometres and a population of 1,5 million (2020). It is a landlocked country that is almost entirely surrounded by South Africa with a small remaining section bordered by Mozambique.¹ Since independence in 1968, the Eswatini monarchy has been engaged in a continuing effort to redefine the boundaries of Eswatini as a result of irredentist efforts to achieve what Esterhuysen (1982:181) dubbed 'Greater Swaziland', at the expense of giant South Africa,² which has a population of over 58 million people and a total land area of 1,213,090 square kilometres. This irredentist tendency poses a problem in international relations because it is a direct challenge to the international principle of *uti possidetis juris*,³ which rejects any changes in colonially inherited boundaries.

Eswatini irredentism is an exceptional and puzzling phenomenon in African scholarship because of the miniscule size of the country and its relentless persistence to date.⁴

Eswatini's irredentist disputes, albeit unresolved, have not received scholarly attention beyond mere allusions to their existence. The global importance of irredentism as a phenomenon in international relations since the end of the Cold War (Cederman, Rüegger and Schvitz 2019) makes this study imperative. How the smallest and landlocked state in southern Africa can audaciously and persistently make territorial claims against its giant South African neighbour since independence is intriguing, paradoxical and worth investigating.

Conceptualising Eswatini Irredentism and Methodology

Modern usage of irredentism 'denotes territorial expansion based upon ethnic, national or historical rationale' (Ambrosio 2001:2). Irredentism is conceptualised in this article as the attempt made by a sovereign state to 'redeem' territories and peoples it considers its own from another state (Hutchinson 2019; Kolstø 2019; Carment and James 1995; Chazan 1991). It is the effort 'made by existing states to annex territories of another state that their co-nationals inhabit' (Ambrosio 2001:2). Irredentism is constructed on the nationalist belief that a territory belonging to another country should be annexed for reasons based on ethnicity and history. Irredentism can be contrasted to territorial expansionism in that irredentism claims to take back land that 'rightfully' belongs to a nation, whereas expansionism advocates annexation regardless of whether the territory belonged to the nation in the first place or not (Kulczycki 2016; Smith *et al.* 1998).

Irredentism represents one of the causes of inter-state conflicts in Africa (Ogbu and Olakunle 2019; Twagiramungu *et al.* 2019) and Eastern Europe after the Cold War (see Ambrosio 2001), and this phenomenon makes nation-building seem a continuous process after independence. That is why Kromm (1967:359) observes that most nation-states are teleological entities in theory, because 'they have an ultimate goal' of changing and expanding their territory beyond the colonial borders and 'they exist in order to achieve it'. This is true of the Kingdom of Eswatini, whose goal since independence in 1968 has been to bring all the Eswatini peoples in southern Africa⁵ into a single nation-state under the Eswatini King, the *Ngwenyama* (meaning 'lion'), and the Queen Mother, the *Ndlovukazi* (meaning 'she-elephant').

The methodology for this study is qualitative: we used archival documentation, government gazettes, newspaper articles, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGD). We cross-checked sources

against each other to validate them. Archival sources covered a wide range of issues on Eswatini irredentism but newspapers and oral sources were useful in filling gaps of the more contemporary periods of Eswatini history not (yet) available in the archives. Oral sources were vital in this study in giving us an insight into the royal ideological and policy penchant for irredentism.

We selected participants on the basis of their knowledgeability, availability and willingness to participate in the study using the purposeful sampling technique (Palinkas *et al* 2015). We depended on ten participants from both Eswatini and South Africa, all aged between fifty and seventy-five years. We constituted three focus groups of five to seven participants and used English and SiSwati as convenient working languages. Oral data was collected between November and December 2019. In keeping with ethical guidelines (see Walford 2005), we obtained the consent of participants and guaranteed to respect their privacy and confidentiality by pledging not to disclose their identity given the sensitivity of border issues.⁶

Statement of the Research Problem and Research Questions

Scholars have not explored Eswatini irredentism in any detailed and comprehensive manner beyond simply alluding to it. They tend to provide an uncritical narrative of South Africa's 'acceptance' of Eswatini's insistence on correcting the poorly demarcated colonial boundaries that balkanised the Kingdom of Eswatini during the colonial era, without situating the phenomenon within the appropriate irredentist theoretical framework (Ndlovu 2018; Griffiths and Funnell 1991). There has been no scholarly endeavour to explain South Africa's enthusiasm, after Eswatini's independence in 1968, for contemplating the unconstitutional transfer of swathes of territory to Eswatini, a foreign state, and its subsequent change of mind in 1982.

How can Eswatini irredentism and South African tolerance thereof, and its persistence in the post-colony, be explained? Why did South Africa flip-flop on the question of Eswatini irredentism? These questions point to the fact that Eswatini irredentism, which has largely been ignored, needs a more thorough scholarly investigation to unveil its contours, logic and prospects. Irredentism has gained increasing importance in international relations since the end of the Cold War and this justifies the study of Eswatini irredentism as an important phenomenon in Africa.

This article is premised on the following research questions:


- What were the colonial circumstances that favoured the development of Eswatini irredentism?
- What triggered Eswatini irredentism after independence in 1968 and why was it tolerated by apartheid South Africa?

- Why did the post-apartheid regimes totally reject Eswatini irredentism and why did the Eswatini monarchy persist in making irredentist claims the cornerstone of its foreign policy towards South Africa?

Colonial Background to the Rise of Eswatini Irredentism

The dismantling of the Eswatini kingdom

The Eswatini kingdom is the handwork of a succession of Dlamini kings,⁷⁸ of which the greatest, according to anthropologist Hilda Kuper (2018:17), was Mswati II (1840–1868). Under Mswati II's reign, the Kingdom of Eswatini attained its apogee, stretching from the area between the Crocodile River in the north and the Pongola River in the south, and between the Lebombo Mountains in the east and the boundary on the eastern Highveld in the west. The colonial encounter with the Kingdom of Eswatini resulted in its territorial shrinkage because of the manoeuvres of the Boers and the British in the nineteenth century (Map 1).



Map 1: The Boundaries of the Kingdom of Eswatini fixed by European Conventions in the 1880s

Key

- The stretch of Mswati II's kingdom
- The reduced size of Eswatini after European boundary demarcation

Source: Extracted from Maps of Swazis in Southern Africa,
<https://images.search.yahoo.com/search/images>. Accessed 20 March 2020.

The Boers and the British signed a succession of conventions and treaties with the Swazi monarchy, defining the country's boundaries. Suffice to state that the Pretoria Convention of 1881, for instance, recognised self-government for a section of the Eswatini kingdom, which the Boers had annexed and renamed as Transvaal, today's Mpumalanga Province.⁸⁹ This convention endorsed Eswatini's territorial losses in the Transvaal, which represented the districts of Ermelo, Lydenburg and Klein Vrystaar, the River Pongola and the Tongoland area.

Britain and the Boer (Transvaal) Republic signed the London Convention in 1884, which confirmed Eswatini's boundaries (Stevens 1963: 328). The Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1891 fixed Eswatini's border to the east at 26°51', which involved ceding a small portion of Eswatini territory to Portuguese Mozambique (Stevens 1963:328).

Eswatini was declared a British Protectorate in 1903 following the defeat of the Boers in the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). The precolonial Eswatini kingdom was therefore divided into three parts under different administrations: the first was the reduced Kingdom of Eswatini under the Eswatini monarchy, which became a British Protectorate; the second was the section of Eswatini under South Africa; and the third was the section of Eswatini under Portuguese Mozambique (Stevens 1963: 328). The result of these imperial territorial manoeuvres was that a substantial population of the Eswatini people ended up residing outside the Kingdom of Eswatini in South Africa. This colonial truncation of the Eswatini Kingdom is considered illegal from the Eswatini perspective and constitutes the basis for contemporary arguments for the restoration of Eswatini's original historical borders.⁹ It was possible to make these arguments because the Eswatini people preserved their unity and national identity before independence despite colonial manoeuvres.

The Imperial and South African Factor in keeping Eswatini Unity and National Identity intact before Independence

The powers of the Eswatini monarchy were left largely intact after the successive encounters with colonialists because of their collaborationist attitude. The Eswatini traditional warriors assisted the British to defeat ethnic groups like the Pedi, who were troubling them. As payback, the British did not dismantle Eswatini leadership in the way they subjugated the Zulu under the Natal colonial government (Kuper 2018).

The London Convention of 1884, which confirmed the reduced size of the Eswatini kingdom, did not stop the Eswatini king from exercising his royal influence over all his people in South Africa. Of great significance

to the development of Eswatini unity under their king was Article 2 of the 1884 Convention, which empowered the Swazi monarch, King Mbandzeni (1875–1889), and his successors, to continue to manage Eswatini native affairs and to appoint Eswatini chiefs in places where Eswatini people were located in South Africa (NAR, UK: FCO 141/17462, Forced eviction 1912–58). The free hand of the Eswatini king to manage the affairs of Eswatini peoples in South Africa was further strengthened by the South African Union Constitution, which allowed the Eswatini traditional authorities to continue exercising their influence in South Africa as if the two territories were one.

From the beginning of the 1910 Union of South Africa, the incorporation of Eswatini and the other High Commission Territories into South Africa was envisaged. This incorporation clause seems to have made the South African authorities believe that Eswatini would ultimately be integrated into South Africa. Given that Eswatini was literally encircled by South Africa and there was no frontier divide between the two countries, the Eswatini monarch was allowed to continue to rule the Eswatini people in South Africa without any obstruction. It was the exclusive responsibility of the Eswatini monarchy to appoint Eswatini chiefs in South Africa to manage native affairs.¹⁰ South Africa and Eswatini were in theory one country and the Eswatini people in the two countries were one under the *Ngwenyama* and the *Ndlovukazi*.

The loyalty of the Eswatini people in southern Africa to the *Ngwenyama* and the *Ndlovukazi* of the Kingdom of Eswatini was impeachable. Kuper summarised this situation in the 1930s as follows:

...outside the territory in Barberton, Carolina and Piet Retief Districts [in South Africa] are large groups of [Eswatini] loyal subjects who inform their king, Sobhuza, of any important events, occasionally send him tribute, receive emissaries from him, ratify the appointments of their local chiefs. (Kuper 1947:1–2)

All Eswatini people in South Africa and the Kingdom of Eswatini periodically met at the Royal Kraal in Lobamba (Eswatini) to participate in the annual December and January *Incwala*, or First Fruits Ceremony, in honour of their king,¹¹ and the August and September Umhlanga Reed Dances,¹² in honour of their Queen Mother. Both ceremonies took place at the traditional and spiritual capital city and residence of the Queen Mother at Lobamba in the Kingdom of Eswatini (see Ebewo 2011; Kuper 1972). These unbroken traditional and historical linkages perpetuated a strong bond between Eswatini people inside and outside the Eswatini kingdom and sustained the spirit of the Eswatini nation.

Eswatini Independence and the Development of Eswatini Irredentism

Britain pushed ahead with the independence agenda for the Kingdom of Eswatini in the 1960s at the expense of its incorporation into South Africa, as had been originally envisaged by the 1910 South African Union Act. Britain, therefore, issued Diplomatic Note No 170 of 5 May 1967 to the South African government concerning the finalisation of the boundary between South Africa and Eswatini. King Sobhuza II was worried that any move to establish definitive boundaries with South Africa, as the British wanted, would result in the loss of swathes of the Eswatini territories to South African control (NAK, DO 1019/147, Boundaries between Union of South Africa). He requested the South African government to hold the matter in abeyance for a better solution. Eswatini gained independence on 6 September 1968, with the South Africa-Eswatini boundaries dissecting the Eswatini nation.

An important item on King Sobhuza's agenda after Eswatini attained independence was the adjustment of the boundaries between his country and South Africa in order to incorporate ethnic Eswatini in South Africa into his kingdom. Sobhuza, like the Somalis in the aftermath of their independence,¹³ ensured that a provision was entrenched in Eswatini's independence Constitution for the retrieval of its territories lost during the colonial era. The Constitution of Eswatini Statutory Instruments 1968, no. 1377, Chapter I (2), S. 15 stated:

The territory of Swaziland [Eswatini] comprises all the land that immediately before 6 September 1968 comprised the former Protected State of Swaziland together with such *additional land as may from time to time be declared to form part of Swaziland with such other areas as may from time to time be declared by Act of Parliament to form part of Swaziland* [our emphasis].

In its Chapter V, S. 42, the 1968 Constitution stated: 'The State shall endeavour to settle the "land issue" and the issue of land concessions expeditiously so as to enhance economic development and the unity of the [Eswatini] people.'

While recognising the boundaries of independent Eswatini as corresponding to the Eswatini Protected Territory under the British rule, the Constitution also left the door open for additional territories to be incorporated into Eswatini through the Act of Parliament. This constitutional clause was of high irredentist value because it implied that Eswatini's colonially inherited boundaries were not definitive and were

susceptible to further modifications for ethnic and historical reasons. The provision in the independence Constitution targeted Eswatini people who had been separated from the Kingdom of Eswatini by colonialism, who could return to the motherland at some future time.

King Sobhuza II's ambition to acquire South African territory after independence on ethnic and historical grounds represents Eswatini irredentism *par excellence* because it involved a call for the union of Eswatini people in the Kingdom of Eswatini with those of South Africa who had been partitioned by the colonial order. This act challenged the colonial status quo. Walter S. Jones (1996), in his seminal essay on *The Logic of International Relations*, asserted that the occurrence of irredentism can be located in the demarcation of boundaries, which ignored the natural cohesion of ethnicities or groups. He stated that political lines or boundaries designed during the colonial period were often not congruent with ethno-geographic regions and this explains the whole story of imperial boundary-making in colonial Africa in which peoples of the same ethnic stock were arbitrarily separated. Sobhuza II's ambition was to rectify what he considered 'a fatal historical error' of separating his people and placing them under different colonial administrations (NAK, DO 1019/147, Boundaries between Union of South Africa; Interviews, Eswatini and South Africa, November/December 2019).

There was nothing exceptional in Africa about the Eswatini situation of having its people balkanised and placed under different nation-states. Scholars of boundary studies in Africa (Austen 2001a; Jones 1996; Asiwaju 1984) have posited that Africa's colonially inherited boundaries are generally arbitrary and artificial. Despite the recognition of this fact, African leaders appeared to have been powerless before the problem in the aftermath of independence. Ralph Austen (2001a) noted that:

...whatever the grounds upon which colonial maps were drawn, it [was not] easy to propose an alternative cartography [after independence] which would better suit the natural or historical features of Africa, whether the landscape and indigenous states or ethnicity, now recognized as a fluid and often arbitrary set of markers....

In the face of this difficulty, African leaders, from the beginning of the independence period, decided that the only borders in Africa that should be recognised, and within which the new nation-states should function, should be the colonially inherited borders. The principle of retaining colonially inherited boundaries was accepted by the leaders of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) at their 1964 meeting in Cairo and enshrined in

Article 2 of Resolution 16(1). The OAU stipulated that Africa's borders constituted a 'tangible reality' and African leaders pledged 'to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence' (OAU, Charter of the OAU).

The key international principle that framed the position of African leaders on post-independence boundaries is the *uti possidetis juris*, or the 'intangibility', principle (AUBP 2013:9–10; Lalonde 2002; ICJ 1986:567).¹⁴ This principle simply means that colonially inherited boundaries are unchangeable. Boundaries inherited from the colonial period must be retained as *faute de mieux*. Brownlie, a leading authority on African boundaries, underscored the importance of respecting the colonial status quo as follows:

If the colonial alignments [boundaries] were discarded, alternative alignments would have to be agreed upon. Such a process of redefinition would create confusion and threats to the peace. Even if the principle on which revision was to be based were agreed upon, there would be considerable difficulty in applying the principle to the ethnic and tribal complexities of African societies. (Brownlie 1979:123)

The respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each African state was echoed as safe political ground for all independent African states and was endorsed by the United Nations. On attaining independence in 1968, Eswatini became a member of the OAU and the UN, meaning it had subscribed to the principle of *uti possidetis juris*. What was King Sobhuza II to do vis-à-vis the new international order in which independent Eswatini found itself?

It is essential to understand that the principle of *uti possidetis juris*, or 'intangibility', of colonially inherited boundaries does not preclude African states from adjusting their international boundaries, as long as this is undertaken by mutual agreement. Eswatini and South Africa were free to adjust their borders as they wished if this was done mutually. Since international boundary adjustments are the sovereign responsibility of nation-states, any definition, clarification or maintenance of a boundary must be agreed by the concerned parties in order to be legally valid (Chukwura 1975:56). Any work on the physical definition of a boundary that is undertaken without the direct or indirect consent of a neighbouring state or the other party may not prove to be legally valid and can provoke conflict (AUBP 2013). Eswatini and South Africa engaged in bilateral talks after Eswatini's independence to achieve land adjustment in favour of Eswatini; this was legal and not contrary to the spirit of the *uti possidetis juris* as long as both parties consented to such a deal.

South Africa's Concessions to Eswatini Irredentist Claims During the Apartheid Era

South Africa conceded to Eswatini irredentist claims during the apartheid era because this fitted its apartheid ideology of establishing Bantustans. The geographical location of Eswatini in the belly of South Africa meant it could be accommodated perfectly in this project. The Bantustanisation, or homeland, policy was a central element of the apartheid system, which involved the permanent removal and separation of the black people in South Africa from white areas, and confining them in enclaves referred to as Bantustans, or homelands. These Bantustans were to be nominally independent in the long run and were to serve as labour reservoirs, housing the unemployed and releasing them when their labour was needed in white South Africa (Evans 2012; Guelke 2010).

Once a Bantustan was established and granted nominal independence under its African ruler, its designated citizens would have their South African citizenship revoked. This would be replaced with the citizenship of their homeland and they would no longer be legally considered South African citizens (Evans 2012). Each Bantustan would constitute a nominal state with its own political system and economy, and would rely on its own labour force. These autonomous states would then co-exist alongside white South Africa in a spirit of friendship and collaboration.

Eswatini had the potential to be a model Bantustan, because of the Africanity and prestige that King Sobhuza II enjoyed among the black Eswatini people, its geographical location as a landlocked enclave inside South Africa, and the prospects of expanding it to receive more blacks. South Africa therefore set to transfer swathes of its territory surrounding the Kingdom of Eswatini with predominantly Eswatini ethnic groups to King Sobhuza II. Under this agreement, Eswatini would more than double in size and would emerge as an enlarged Bantustan for the reception of other black South Africans. The establishment of an Eswatini Bantustan was an essential component of the project of building the apartheid edifice of the separation of races (Booth 2019; Rak 2017; Stevens 1972:98–100). When South Africa was pursuing its Bantustanisation policy in the 1970s and early 1980s, the independent Kingdom of Eswatini was part of its calculation. The South African government declared four of the Bantustans 'independent': Transkei, 1976; Bophuthatswana, 1977; Venda, 1979; and Ciskei, 1981. South Africa was as frantically committed to surrendering large parts of its territories to Eswatini to create an Eswatini Bantustan as King Sobhuza II was to incorporating the Eswatini people of South Africa into his kingdom since they constituted an ethnic continuum.

In diplomatic terms, South Africa wanted to demonstrate to the international community that it had a black ally in the Kingdom of Eswatini and was co-operating with its leadership to address longstanding border issues. James Hall (2005:1) wrote:

Desirous to show the world it had an ally in a black African state; Pretoria cooperated in the border adjustment issue [with Eswatini]. The plan was to make [Eswatini] a kind of 'Bantustan'; 'a homeland' where all South African Swazis would become citizens, wherever they lived in South Africa. As was the case with other tribal homelands of the time (which were never recognised by the international community), this would have made South African Swazis legal aliens in the country of their birth, and would have made it easier for authorities to control their travel, employment and residency.


South Africa would proceed to dump ethnic Eswatini and other blacks into the Eswatini Bantustan after establishing it. This was the real purpose of South Africa's planned transfer of portions of its territory to Eswatini.

This type of land transaction was not something that could be conducted openly without raising questions from the critical South African public and the international community. The land deal was popular with the Eswatini monarchy because it involved the aggrandisement of the size of the Kingdom of Eswatini and they did not see any problem with that (Interviews, Eswatini and South Africa, November/December 2019). But in South Africa, it could not be popular because any political act of the apartheid regime was treated with scorn and suspicion, nationally and internationally. The South African public was unlikely to endorse the transfer of any part of South African territory to another sovereign without asking questions.

The apartheid regime preferred to handle the land deal secretly with the Eswatini government. The secret negotiations, which started in earnest after Eswatini's independence, culminated in round table talks in July 1981 between the representatives of the two governments. The South African territories envisaged for transfer to Eswatini were located on the north-western, eastern and western parts of Eswatini (NAK, UK: FCO 58/2849, Possible border adjustment).

The north-western territory included the KaNgwane Bantustan located in South Africa's Mpumalanga Province to the west. KaNgwane had 385,000 hectares and extended up to 40 kilometres from Eswatini's west to the north-east border, fitting like a cap over the country's northern area. The eastern section comprised Ngwavuma, which lies to the east in present-day South Africa between the Lebombo Mountains and the sea. Ngwavuma is about 413,200 hectares. If handed over to Eswatini, this territory would once again reunite geographically the Kingdom of Eswatini

with the Indian Ocean. Eswatini would no longer be a landlocked country, but would encompass what is now South Africa's KwaZulu-Natal province, south of the Mozambique border to Lake Sibaya. The western section is the Nsikazi area, a 65-kilometre by 30-kilometre curved strip of land which is not contiguous with Eswatini or the other disputed lands. The strip extends north from White River in South Africa's Mpumalanga province (NAK: UK: FCO 58/2849, Possible border adjustment).



Map 2: Swatches of South African territory agreed to be ceded to Eswatini in 1982

- South African territories to be ceded to Eswatini
- Towns
- River
- International boundary
- Provincial boundary
- Proposed boundary 1880
- Railways
- Projected railways
- R.S.A. Republic of South Africa

Source: Adopted from Griffiths, I. and Funnell, D. C., 1991: 53

Under the land transfer deal, Eswatini, with a population of about 650,000, was to absorb about 854,000 more persons from the KaNgwane Bantustan, plus about 96,000 from the sparsely populated Ngwavuma (Republic of South Africa Census of Population 1980; Ndlovu 2018). It was estimated that the total number of people largely of Eswatini ethnic extraction to be incorporated into the Kingdom of Eswatini was approximately one million, which was more than the population of Sobhuza II's Eswatini (Republic of South Africa Census of Population 1980; Ndlovu 2018). The colonial-era territorial gerrymandering had left more Eswatini people outside Eswatini than within it.

An international agreement between the governments of South Africa and Eswatini relating to boundary adjustments on the basis of historical and ethnic grounds was finally reached on 28 April 1982. In the preamble of the agreement, it was stated, *inter alia*:

Whereas both governments are aware of the national, cultural and historical affinities which linked all Swazi [Eswatini] people, and

Whereas both Government acknowledge that the people of Swazi origin who are today citizens of the Republic of South Africa were deprived of Swazi citizenship by an accident of history, and

Whereas the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland [Eswatini] desires to unite the Swazi people;

In terms of the Agreement the two governments agree that the international boundary between the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland [Eswatini] would be adjusted so as to include into the territory of the kingdom of Swaziland the areas of KaNgwane and Ingwavuma. (NAK, DO 1057/159)

Following the initialling of the agreement, the governing National Party of the Republic of South Africa, at its annual congress in 1982, defended the agreement with Eswatini on the basis that the proposal thereof was twofold, namely:

- (a) To rectify an historical error by finally determining borders which previously existed on a doubtful basis for once and for all and also thereby bringing together a hitherto divided nation, together[sic] in one state; and
- (b) The unification would indemnify the South African Government from creating an independent Swazi state in the Republic of South Africa, apart from the Swazi state in Swaziland. (NAK, DO 1057/159)

In June 1982, an agreement was finalised with the South African government under which thousands of square kilometres of South African territory would be ceded to Eswatini. The South African government clearly stated that this would enable the creation of an 'Eswatini state'. The 'Eswatini state' was

a euphemism for an Eswatini Bantustan, like its counterparts established in the 1970s and 1980s in South Africa. The land deal was gazetted in the South African Gazette of 18 June 1982 and became public.

Almost immediately, the proclamation met a furore of opposition, which ended up in the courts, which declared the land transfer illegal (SARS/DSG: 1983). The South African judiciary killed the land transfer deal in which the South African and Eswatini governments had invested so much since independence.

King Sobhuza II died on 21 August 1982 after the collapse of the land deal. His funeral ceremony took place on 3 September 1982. It was a mammoth crowd-pulling event, bringing to the royal headquarters regional dignitaries and Eswatini people from inside and outside the Kingdom of Eswatini (Matsebula 1983). The grandiose funeral impacted heavily on the royal house, which felt the necessity of continuing relentlessly with the union of the Eswatini people as a way of honouring Sobhuza's life struggle. The royal house conceived a project, known as the Sobhuza Testament, aimed at continuing Sobhuza's struggle for the reunification of the Eswatini people, which was essentially irredentist since it challenged the colonial frontier status quo. It was believed that the Sobhuza Testament had to be followed to guarantee the wellbeing and continuity of the kingdom (FGD: Eswatini and South Africa, November/December 2019). The renewed fortitude of the royal house to pursue the Sobhuza Testament was not met with enthusiasm from South Africa, owing to a shift in its focus to the tumultuous political developments related to the moribund apartheid regime (Clark and Worger 2016). Eswatini had to wait for a black majority government to resolve the border adjustment problems with South Africa.

Eswatini Irredentism in the Post-apartheid Era

When the ANC assumed power in April 1994, King Mswati III welcomed this development with optimism because Eswatini had previously contacted the exiled ANC government in Lusaka and they had promised to resolve the border disputes once in power (NAK, CO 1048/707...). But the issue of ceding South African territory to a foreign country was not something easily contemplated by any democratically elected government because of its unconstitutionality and unpopularity with South Africans. Border adjustment was a political liability for any government, and the ANC rejected it on the grounds of its unconstitutionality and non-conformity with the doctrine of *uti possidetis juris*.

Eswatini did not agree and was bent on obtaining its territories from South Africa in line with the Sobhuza Testament. It did so by constituting a

succession of five-yearly renewable Border Restoration Committees with the task of negotiating the return of Eswatini's territories.¹⁵ The South African government and media considered the establishment of these successive committees, with their avowed aim of retrieving 'Eswatini lost territory' from South Africa, as an overt act of aggression and provocation, and a *casus belli* (FGD: Eswatini and South Africa, November/December 2019).

The Eswatini government confronted the first black majority government of President Nelson Mandela with the border adjustment problem for consideration. Discussions resumed at various levels, culminating in a state visit of King Mswati III to South Africa in November 1995. The Eswatini monarchy indicated that its government had appointed a Border Restoration Committee to look into the matter of restoring Eswatini territory that was attached to South Africa, and requested the South African government to set up a similar committee. The two border committees would then enter into negotiations in an endeavour to overcome the border adjustment impasse between the two countries (NAK, DO 1057/159, Boundaries of Swaziland). The Eswatini government duly informed its South African counterpart of its own members of the Border Restoration Committee and requested the South African government to do so also and indicate a suitable date on which the first meeting of the two committees would take place. South Africa failed to establish any border adjustment committee.

In 1996 Eswatini renamed its Border Restoration Committee the Border Adjustment Committee, with Prince Khuzulwandle as its chairman (NAK, CO 1048/706). The name change from 'restoration' to 'adjustment' was informed by the South African government stance that it was impossible to restore traditional African nation-states to their original boundaries without redrawing the entire political map of the continent and creating unprecedented chaos. Eswatini therefore took a more moderate position, requesting simple 'adjustments' of its boundaries with South Africa to make the reunification of the Eswatini people a reality (NAK, CO 1048/706). South Africa simply ignored all correspondence from Eswatini related to the border adjustment issue. Hall (2005) noted that Prince Khuzulwandle expressed disappointment with South African president, Thabo Mbeki, for his snobbism, 'in a rare display of public pique for royal diplomats, who are usually noted for their discretion'.

South Africa finally decided to meet with its Eswatini counterparts on 7 November 2005 at Ezulwini, in Eswatini, to look into the border adjustment issues. The head of the South African delegation, Dr Mathews, stated that an adjustment of colonially inherited borders was not feasible and that South Africa would disappear as a nation-state if it had to concede

territories to its neighbours on ethnic and historical reasons. He stated that both Eswatini and South Africa were once conquered and the agreements, which were internationally binding, were signed by the conquerors. The two countries should work towards achieving greater integration within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) framework (NAK, CO 1048/705...). South Africa's emphasis was on regional integration rather than border adjustment, meaning that the two states were miles apart over the border adjustment issue.

During the next border adjustment meeting between South Africa and Eswatini, on 17 February 2006, Prince Khuzulwandle insisted that South Africa should consider adjusting its borders and read out the position of King Mswati III. The statement read:

This... is a brief account of ... [Eswatini's] case on the question of the [Eswatini]/South African boundary line. *The position of His Majesty's Government is that the two countries do not have an agreed boundary line. The existing so-called boundary line is not acceptable to [Eswatini] as it was never formerly determined in accordance with acceptable international norms.* In any event, the existing boundary line leaves a whole chunk of territory outside the lawful control and jurisdiction of the [Eswatini] Government. It also has rendered a large portion of the [Eswatini] people separated from their main stock in [Eswatini]. (NAK, CO 1048/707)

South Africa simply reiterated that it was not prepared to revisit the boundaries inherited from colonialism but was interested in discussing regional co-operation and integration with Eswatini.

Before assuming her position as the African Union's Commission Chairperson, South African Minister of Home Affairs, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, visited Eswatini on 16 September 2012. She warned African countries to avoid starting new conflicts by attempting to correct the mistakes made by the colonial powers in the creation of borders between states. Dlamini-Zuma emphasised the importance of resolving border disputes through negotiations and within the context of international law. She pointed out that the founding fathers of the OAU had deliberated at length and resolved that the borders between African states should be kept the way they were at independence (Simelane 2014).

The Eswatini government ignored Dlamini-Zuma's admonition and went ahead to appoint members of the country's Border Adjustment Committee in 2013 after the expiry of the mandate of the previous one. The appointment was interpreted as Eswatini's determination to stubbornly pursue its ambition of recovering from South Africa its territories lost during the colonial era. Titus Gwebu, of the South African newspaper, *The Sunday*

Independent (9 November 2013), reiterated the position of South Africa vis-à-vis the Eswatini land claims. He wrote:

...the [Swazi] Boarder Adjustment Committee...is tasked with obtaining large sections of South Africa for incorporation into Swaziland [Eswatini]. *South Africa has never acknowledged the Swazi King's territorial claims to Mpumalanga and KwaZulu Natal* [our emphasis]. King Mswati wants to control all areas in Mpumalanga where Swazis reside and wants to extend Swaziland eastwards to the Indian Ocean, taking all of KwaZulu Natal that's in the way. Political observers feel that Swaziland is more likely to be incorporated into South Africa one day than King Mswati's is likely to double his realm by expanding into South Africa....

Two main issues arise in this submission: first, South Africa's non-recognition of Eswatini's territorial claims; second, the prospect of South Africa's total ingestion of Eswatini as a long-term project.

A new Eswatini Border Determination Committee was appointed in 2018 after the expiration of the mandate of the old. The committee was renamed the Border Determination Special Committee (BDSC) to emphasis the point that its objective was to determine where the actual borders between Eswatini and South Africa should be (*Eswatini Sunday Observer*, 4 March 2018). The Eswatini monarchy was, in essence, pursuing the Sobhuza Testament regardless of whether South Africa listened to it or not.

Conclusion

We have explored the origin and evolution of Eswatini irredentism as a field of scholarly endeavour that has been marginally addressed by scholars. That a minuscule landlocked state like Eswatini consistently and vociferously made territorial demands on its gigantic, more populous and economically vibrant neighbour, on which it depends almost entirely for its survival, might beggar the imagination and comprehension of many scholars. What therefore could be the origin and real motive of Eswatini irredentism? Some scholars have posited that most irredentist disputes have their origins in the struggle to control vital resources and peoples (see, for instance, Kamazima 2017; Yoon 2014; Assal 2006; Mbembe 2000). This is plausible.

But Eswatini irredentism is far from being economically motivated. It falls within the category of ethnic nationalism—the desire to incorporate Eswatini peoples based in South Africa into the Kingdom of Eswatini for ethnic and historical reasons. This is similar in certain respects to irredentism in Eastern Europe, where Serbia and Croatia embarked upon irredentist projects following the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. Serbia attempted

to detach Serbian nationals from both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to create a 'Greater Serbia'. Similarly, Croatia struggled to annex Croatian regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina into 'Greater Croatia' (Ambrosio 2001:2). The basis of this expansionism was clearly ethnic.

Eswatini irredentism is built on a complex of imperial factors that conspired to keep the colonially balkanised people of Eswatini as a united bloc under the Eswatini monarchy before independence. The unbroken unity of the Eswatini people during the colonial era served as a springboard for post-independence Eswatini irredentism.

After independence in 1968, Eswatini irredentism flowered on a solid foundation and apartheid South Africa attempted to exploit it by framing it within the logic of territorial apartheid in the shape of its Bantustanisation policy. South Africa was on the path to establishing an Eswatini Bantustan by subscribing to King Sobhuza II's quest to create a 'Greater Eswatini' when demonstrations and the courts torpedoed it in 1982. King Sobhuza II's death in 1982 and the tumultuous developments related to the demise of apartheid in South Africa compounded Eswatini's irredentism, but these developments did not signal its end.

Post-apartheid South Africa rejected it *in toto* on the grounds of constitutional and international law and opted for greater regional integration. This was unacceptable to the Eswatini monarchy, which was determined to pursue its irredentist ambitions. The monarchy was fired up by the Sobhuza Testament formulated after the king's death. This testament was an oath taken by the Eswatini royal house to honour King Sobhuza by fighting for the unity of the Eswatini people to ensure the continuity of the nation and the appeasement of the ancestors. Post-apartheid Eswatini irredentism is therefore simply an act of fealty to King Sobhuza II's dream of establishing a 'Greater Eswatini'.

There is room for border scholars to explore how to establish a compromise between the South African quest for greater regional integration and Eswatini's ambition to create a 'Greater Eswatini'. The way out might be to study whether the Eswatini-South Africa border divide serves any purpose at all and who really benefits from it.

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Notes

1. Eswatini shares 70 per cent of its borders with its giant South African neighbour while the remaining 30 percent is shared with Mozambique.
2. The irredentist policy of claiming territory in South Africa for Eswatini on historical grounds is not popular with public opinion in Eswatini as expressed in the media. It is interpreted as an exercise in futility and a waste of tax payers' money. Eswatini irredentism is therefore sensitive and interviewees preferred to remain anonymous lest they would be perceived as anti-monarchist.
3. For more on the principle of *uti possidetis juris* see Busquets (2020) and Shawt (1997).
4. On 13 March 2020, Prince Guduza, the Chairman of the Eswatini Border Determination Special Committee (BDSC), a body officially constituted by King Mswati III to negotiate the return of 'Eswatini territory in South Africa', announced that the issue was a national priority. He brandished maps of precolonial Eswatini that showed that South Africa's administrative capital of Pretoria and large portions of the Gauteng, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal Provinces belong to the Eswatini nation (*Times of Eswatini*, 15 March 2020). He insisted that South Africa should return these territories to Eswatini on justifiable historical and ethnic grounds.
5. Eswatini irredentism vis-à-vis Mozambique is not developed in this paper because it was never vigorously pursued owing to the Portuguese presence and the emergence of new identities among the Eswatini people of Mozambique.
6. The royal pursuit of territory from South Africa is unpopular with private media, civil society and the underground People's United Democratic Movement (Pudemo). People do not want to be associated with the border problems for fear of being labelled as belonging to the opposition, with implications for their privileges and security.
7. The Eswatini kings descended from the Dlamini family line. The people of Eswatini are one of the Nguni groups that constituted part of the great Bantu migrations into southern Africa. Under the Dlamini family, the Eswatini people moved down the east coast and settled around Maputo in Mozambique. The Dlamini dynasty traces itself back to King Dlamini I (also known as Matalatala) (c. 1435–1465). Since the genesis of the reigning Dlamini dynasty in the Kingdom of Eswatini, power has always been shared by the Queen Mother and the King. Ngwane III is often considered to be the first king of modern Eswatini; he ruled from 1745 to 1780 (Kuper 2018).
8. Transvaal territory, in what is today the Mpumalanga province in South Africa.
9. It is acknowledged that the term 'original borders' is problematic because traditional African borders were fluid and constantly changing owing to migration dynamics and other domestic and inter-group changes. By 'original borders' we refer to the size of the Kingdom of Eswatini under King Mswati III.
10. This practice continued into the postcolonial era (Farwell 1976, Feinstein 2005, confirmed by anonymous interviewees). Some of these interviewees accompanied the *Ngwenyama* to South Africa for the installation of Eswatini chiefs.
11. The annual December and January *Incwala* ceremonies.

12. *Umhlanga*, or the Reed Dance ceremony, is an annual Swazi and Zulu event. In Eswatini, tens of thousands of unmarried and childless Swazi girls and women travel from the various chiefdoms in the whole of southern Africa to the Ludzidzini Royal Kraal at Lobamba to participate in the eight-day event (see Ebewo 2011, Mabuza 2007, Kuper 1972).
13. Before them, in 1960, the Somali irredentists had made provision in their Constitution for the return of all ethnic Somalis outside the fatherland. The people of Somalian ethnic extraction stretch into the sovereign neighbouring states of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. The Somali people were divided by the colonialists like the rest of the African continent. Independent Somalia was unwilling to recognise the political boundaries drawn by the colonialists. Under Siad Barre's regime, the Somali flag had a five-pointed star, representing the northern and southern regions of the Somali Republic and the 'unredeemed territories' in Kenya's North-Eastern Province, Ethiopia's Ogaden Province and Djibouti (Thomson 2000: 23; Paola 1999: 104).
14. Its full Latin form reads: *uti possidetis juris, uti possidetis juris* which translates into 'as you possess in law, so you shall possess in law'.
15. The border restoration committees were established successively from 1994 to 2003, 2003 to 2008, 2009 to 2013, 2013 to 2018 and 2018 to 2023 (see Appointment of Special Committee to handle matters relating to Adjustment to the Boundaries between Swaziland and the Republic of South Africa and Mozambique, done on 6 March 1993 by Mswati III, Legal notice No. 155, 1st September 1995); Proclamation No. 8, 2003, The Establishment of the Border Determination Special Committee; Swazi Government Gazette, Vol. XLVII (no. 50), June).

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The Migration and Informal Market Nexus: A Study of Nigerien Forex Traders in Benin City

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Abstract

This article attempts to understand how migrant communities in the global South shape and contribute to the establishment and operation of niche sectors and informal markets in receiving states. The article examines the impact that a community of migrants from Niger Republic have had on the foreign exchange market in Benin City, Edo State, Nigeria. The analysis is situated within the postcolonial framework while drawing on sociological frameworks and methodological tools (ethnography). By analysing the narratives of Nigerien migrants in Benin City, this article unpacks the characteristics of the migrant forex niche, the interaction between the formal and informal forex businesses in the market, as well as the interplay between migrants and locals in the community. We argue that the nexus of intra-African migrations and informal niche markets leads to spatial, political, economic and social transformations that challenge the significance of formal markets and the limitations of undocumented status.

Keywords: migration, South-South migration, Niger, Nigeria, Benin City, Edo State, forex, informal markets, migrant niches, West Africa

Résumé

Cet article tente de comprendre comment les communautés de migrants dans les pays du Sud façonnent et contribuent à la création et au fonctionnement de secteurs de niche et de marchés informels dans les pays d'accueil. L'article examine l'impact qu'une communauté de migrants de la République du Niger a eu sur le marché de devises à Benin City, dans l'État d'Edo, au Nigeria. L'analyse se situe dans le cadre postcolonial tout en s'appuyant

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sur des cadres sociologiques et des outils méthodologiques (ethnographie). En analysant les récits des migrants nigériens à Benin City, cet article met en lumière les caractéristiques de la niche des migrants sur le marché des changes, l'interaction entre les entreprises de change formelles et informelles sur le marché, ainsi que l'interaction entre les migrants et les habitants de la communauté. Nous soutenons que le lien entre les migrations intra-africaines et les niches informelles conduit à des transformations spatiales, politiques, économiques et sociales qui remettent en question l'importance des marchés formels et les limites du statut de sans-papiers.

Mots-clés : migration, migration Sud-Sud, Niger, Nigéria, Benin City, État d'Edo, change de devises, marchés informels, niches de migrants, Afrique de l'Ouest

Introduction

How does a migrant community create a market niche for itself within a state? Migrants engaging in South-South migrations contribute immensely to the economies of the countries to which they migrate. The differentiation between citizens and non-citizens is enshrined in the practice of states in the postcolonial international system. This creates limitations to how non-citizens can access opportunities or gain competitive advantage within domestic borders and in local economies.

Undocumented migrants cannot access the formal economy and, as a result, informal sectors or markets become the space in which they operate. However, due to the dichotomy between formal and informal markets, these contributions are not easy to understand or evaluate. This article comprehensively focuses on understanding how particular migrant communities in the global South shape and contribute to the establishment and operation of niche sectors and informal markets in receiving states and the impact this has on the reconfiguration of markets and communities.

Guyer (1997:221, 229) understands the niche market as 'semi-bounded spaces of exchange in which suppliers provide specialised goods or skills to buyers with particular requirements' and 'the combination of multiplicity, finely graded hierarchy, relentless competition and ordered social process'. We employ this comprehensive definition in our understanding and use of the term 'niche' in this article. Eckstein and Peri (2018) study the formation and transformation of migrant niches in the US, focusing on the interplay of social and political dynamics and using the tools of sociology and economics to understand those dynamics. They define a market niche as a specific line of work found in a single community, occurring when migrants are concentrated in an occupation or a segment of an occupation.

In their study, Eckstein and Peri identify that migrant niches have existed for centuries, can revitalise local economies, reduce indigene out-migration or induce local unemployment.

Our research uses ethnography to understand and draw conclusions from the migration and informal market nexus, with a particular focus on the informal forex niche we encountered in Benin City, Nigeria. Instead of focusing on an economic analysis of the forex market, we use ethnography to document the sociocultural and political dimensions of the market, which goes in hand with Kane and Leedy's (2013) argument that it 'offers a more complex reading of decision making, motivations, and the trans-local/ transnational relations of migrants'. This objective contributes to the ethnographic study of informal forex markets in the global South. Our central argument is that the nexus of intra-African migrations and informal niche markets leads to spatial, political, economic and social transformations that challenge the significance of formal markets and the limitations of undocumented status.

Benin City is the capital of Edo State, located in southern Nigeria. The city was the capital of the ancient Benin kingdom and one of the most powerful kingdoms in ancient West Africa. According to Ozo (2009), Benin City was 'one of the major traditional urban centres in West Africa prior to the British colonial rule'. The origin of the city dates to the twelfth century. As a result, the city has historically been an economic and a political hub in the region, making it an attractive destination to migrants from all parts of Nigeria. Ozo (2009) describes how precolonial Benin City had open traditional markets, including Eki-Oba (Oba market), Agbado, Eki-Uselu and Eki-Okpagha, which had zones (*owa*) divided into areas based on function or specialisation. For example, the blacksmiths were on Igun Street, medicine men were concentrated on Ewaise Street and weavers were on Idunmwunowina Street. This shaped the urban character of the city and the market niches that came to be established. These specialised zones continued to exist but have experienced a metamorphosis, as explained later.

Benin City became an urban settlement in 1900 because of the emerging colonial economy (Onokerhoraye and Omuta 1986). It was also during that time that small-scale shops operated by the local Bini people were established. However, the differentiated market zones remained, regardless of the advent of these shops. Ozo (1986) attributes the increase of migrants in Benin City in the 1970s to the oil boom and the increase in oil revenue. Ozo holds that migrants chose Benin City over other parts of Edo State because of the availability of vacant housing; changes in regional configurations, where the Midwest was carved out of the old western region and Bendel State

was split into Edo and Delta State; and the establishment of a university in the city. Magnus and Eseigbe (2012), in their study of urbanisation in Edo State, have attributed the inflow of migrants to the creation and growth of local government and the availability of socioeconomic infrastructure, which also increased the number of internal and transnational migrations to Benin City.

The research questions this article sets out to answer are defined in the subsection that follows, after which we present our theoretical framework, where we examine relevant literature and present the theoretical context of the paper. This is then followed by a section on the research findings and a discussion of these, where we go into further detail on the characteristics and context of the forex markets in Benin City. The article concludes with a discussion on the significance of this research.

This article seeks to answer the following questions:

1. What are the characteristics of the foreign exchange (forex) market niche established and maintained by Nigeriens in Benin City?
2. What are the social and economic transformations that have occurred because of this niche market and what do these transformations signify?

Theoretical Framework

Relevant Literature

African migration is often depicted as a movement from the continent towards the global West. However, African migration is not homogenous. In fact, there are more Africans migrating within the continent than there are migrating out of the continent; about 8.4 million migrants, 2.8 per cent of the total population of West Africa, move around the region (IOM 2013). This is the largest group of migrants on the continent and also the highest number of intraregional migrants (Saul and Pelican 2014).

Even though the Scramble for Africa led to the colonisation of the continent and creation of borders in what was largely a borderless region, migration within the West African sub-region has persisted, with movement from one country to the other occurring in part due to the presence of 'transfrontier ethnic groups'—ethnic groups who exist across countries, such as the Yoruba in Nigeria and Benin Republic, or the Hausa in Niger and Nigeria. Transfrontier ethnic groups are one of the reasons why borders are abstract and inefficient and, as a result, the West African sub-region is often considered to be a single cultural and socioeconomic unit, where trade and services are intertwined across countries and border-crossing is an important part of people's lives and livelihoods (Olsen

2011). According to Olsen (2011), more people are moving into and within the African continent, and though the pattern of movement is not straightforward, there has been an increased variety of actors. For example, married skilled women are now among African migrants moving to a larger range of destinations. Most West African migrants travel within the region, often to neighbouring countries that are members of the Economic Council of West African States (ECOWAS).

Migration in West Africa is strongly influenced by, and continues to be associated with, trade (Olsen 2011). An example is the north-western border of Nigeria, which it shares with the Republic of Niger. This has been an important hub for cross-border trading activities and integration of markets that has led to sociocultural and historical ties between both nations (Samaila 2011). Despite colonialism and boundary delineation, informal commercial relations based on ethnic and cultural ties have continued to exist between both countries. According to Samaila (2011), the informal sector has developed as a result of excessive regulation, price distortions and the corruption of post-independent governments. However, a counter-argument attributes the origins of the informal sector to precolonial times, stating that informal trade within the West African region is rooted in precolonial traditions and that extensive trading networks existed long before the arrival of colonialists and the creation of state boundaries (Samaila 2011).

Potts (2008) argues that the key characteristics of the informal sector have long been a part of pre-capitalist cities, not only in Africa but throughout the world. However, what has changed is the scale and importance of the sector as an employer of labour and a source of livelihood (Potts 2008). Although the so-called informal sectors were in existence in African cities as far back as the 1960s, it was not until 1973 that the term was coined by Keith Hart while he was studying income-generation activities in the slums of Accra, Ghana (Bob-Milliar and Obeng-Odoom 2011).

According to Potts (2008), the informal sector has been viewed through a skewed lens, as an appendage to the formal sector in developing nations, which in time would be absorbed by the formal sector. This has led to the characterisation of the informal sector as pre-capitalist, often dependant on family labour, also called the 'subsistence' or 'peasant' sector, in societies dominated by agriculture. In later terminology, and ominously, it would be called the 'marginal sector', as opposed to the more desired capitalist mode of production of the formal sector, which was described as 'modernising', dynamic, progressive and capital intensive (Potts 2008). The language used to describe the informal sector ('backward, traditional, low productivity,

low technology, low incomes, low capital use and low levels of investment') reflects the skewed perception of it particularly in colonial societies and economies (Potts 2008). This has various policy implications, including the view that the informal sector is dispensable, or at least transitional, until modernisation and a shift to a more sophisticated, technology-based and capital-intensive system of production and employment are achieved. Another implication is that the informal sector is considered illegal since many businesses and people employed in the sector are neither registered nor recorded by the state. The sector has thus been typified as a breeding ground for criminals and possible political instability (Potts 2008).

Regardless of the negative perceptions, the informal sector continues to be beneficial for Africans within and outside the continent. A large share of the remittances that flow into developing countries come through informal channels, including cash transfers through courier companies, friends, relatives or the breadwinners themselves. It is estimated that between 35 to 75 per cent of all remittances received by developing countries enter through these channels (Freund and Spatafora 2005). Grosse (1994) asserts that these informal channels exist where there are restrictive regulations on the access to foreign currency in legal markets. He argues that unofficial foreign exchange markets are a logical offshoot of the informal sector and thrive in countries where 'underground economies' are prevalent. The dynamics of the informal markets for currency largely depend on the availability of foreign currency, which, according to Grosse, is driven by remittances from nationals in the diaspora as well as through tourism and businesses (Grosse 1994).

There is a knowledge gap in the area of informal forex markets in Benin City and in Nigeria because much of the available research focuses on macroeconomic data. This is because macroeconomic data from formal sectors is more readily evaluable and quantifiable than data from informal sectors. We also identify this as an impact of colonialism: there has been a tendency to view systems that are outside of Western conceptualisations of markets as negative. However, we see the informality of the forex market as a positive attribute because it operates despite the limitations of the state and is a form of resistance to the hegemony of citizenship, nationality and economics.

Theoretical Context

We situated our work within postcolonial theory, the collective school of thought that is concerned with accounting for the political, aesthetic, economic, historical and social impact of European colonial rule around the world from the eighteenth through to the twentieth century (Freund

and Spatafora 2005). While postcolonial theory does, in fact, assume many shapes and interventions, its essential claim still remains that it might be impossible to understand the modern world without first understanding its relationship with the history of imperialism and colonial rule (Mains *et al.* 2013). Postcolonialism allows for the deconstructing of colonial prose, which is: 'the mental set-up, the symbolic forms and representations underpinning the imperial project' (Mbembe 2006), while allowing for the elaboration and critique of the power dynamics that are evident whenever the concept of 'the other' arises (Jackson 2012).

The colonial legacies of racial stereotypes, education and political and socioeconomic systems are still relevant to migration as they continue to structure differential access to citizenship and rights within both sending and receiving contexts. This, in addition to the unequal nature of power relations between countries, also influences migration flows as well as how migration is experienced and lived out (Koh 2015). Analysing migration, specifically South-South migrations, within the postcolonialism context allows us to question the concepts that have arisen out of colonialism, such as 'centre' and 'periphery' (Koh 2015). Discussing migration within this context also allows for the disruption of the 'hegemonic discourse of migration', which is marked by a purely Eurocentric stance that the West and the global North have an absolute monopoly on civilisation and emancipation and are thus the most desirable destinations for migrants from the global South (Gatt *et al.* 2016).

The colonial prose, as Mbembe (2006) describes it, is also reflected in the contemporary global economy, where we see an unequal dependence between the developed (coloniser) and developing (colonised) economies. This disparity, and the structural disparities that have led to disproportionate levels of poverty in the developing world, have their roots in colonial history (Narayan 2005). The discourse on and about aspects of the economy has also been tainted by the colonial prose, as is evident in the work of Potts (2008). He aptly captured the dichotomy between the formal and informal sectors, where the formal sector is represented as desirable and what African and other colonised societies should aspire to, and the informal sector is undesirable and just a stepping stone on the path towards formalisation and development.

Jackson (2012) asserts that it is necessary for any empirical work that assesses informal markets to seek and address the extent to which misrepresentations of the market are accepted, not only by policy-makers but also by those in the informal sector. Our research challenges two main misrepresentations: first, that African migration flows mainly towards the

global North; second, that informal markets are mere stepping stones to a purely capitalistic system. As Roitman (1990) explains, and as we have shown through the works of Samaila (2011) and Potts (2008), informal markets are the products of historical networks of trade and accumulation that have evolved and mutated as new resources are accessed, and as national and global economic factors change (Roitman 1990).

Sambajee and Weston (2015) advocate for the use of postcolonial theory as an analytical tool when researching entrepreneurship in Africa. They also emphasise the use of methodological approaches that are humanistic and culturally informed to question the representations of African entrepreneurship on the world scene. Our work adopts these recommendations and goes further, to centre the experiences of intra-African migrants who are also entrepreneurs. Like Sambajee and Weston (2015), we have chosen to situate this work in the postcolonial school of thought because we aim to contribute to the dismantling of the colonial prose, specifically as it pertains to the discourse on South-South migrations and the perceptions of informal sectors in Africa. Rather than a macro approach, we have chosen, as our contribution to the body of work that already exists in this field, a micro approach to this study. This allows us access to personal accounts from individuals who have participated in migration within the West African region and in the informal sector, specifically in the informal market for foreign exchange in Benin City.

Research Findings

The foreign exchange market in Nigeria is regulated by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). Initially an officially pegged exchange rate system, between 1970 and 1985, it now exists as a market-determined system. Today, the exchange rate of the naira (NGN) is based on demand and supply, with the United States dollar (USD) being the intervention currency (Central Bank of Nigeria 2019b). The unofficial foreign exchange market exists where demand for foreign exchange meets an unofficial supply. Kubo (2018) explains that the unofficial market is identified by direct deals between ‘non-financial firms’ and the presence of private enforcement mechanisms. In unofficial markets, sources and uses of foreign exchange are often illegal, with trading overseen by unauthorised buyers and sellers. This contrasts with official markets, which are overseen by legal sources and authorised dealers who work within restrictions set and backed by governmental institutions (Kubo 2018). We use ‘unofficial market’ and ‘informal market’ interchangeably in this article to refer to the currency market that operates outside the margins set by the Nigerian government.

Selling or buying currency in the informal forex market comes with many risks when foreign currency is delivered, or payments are not made. In their work on the informal currency market in Kano State, Nigeria, Hashim and Meagher (1999) identified the structure and organisation of Wapa, an informal market in the city. They found, among other peculiarities unique to the market, that:

1. Many of the currency traders worked out of a *shago* ('shop' or 'office' in Hausa), with many traders often working out of one shop.
2. Currency traders were broadly split into three categories: the big, middle and low-level operators.
3. Most of the bureaux de change (BDCs) operating at the market were not registered with the official Corporate Affairs Commission but usually operated under parent organisations.
4. The currency operators organised themselves in a union that functions as both a business and interest organisation.

While conducting field research in Benin City, we visited three markets that are known hubs for currency trading: Sakponba, New Benin and Ring Road. Sakponba Market is the largest currency market in Benin City listed on the CBN's database. Among 4,641 registered BDCs in Nigeria, fourteen are in Benin City, and of that number ten are located on or around Sakponba Road (Central Bank of Nigeria 2019a). Sakponba Road lies off the Ring Road, a central hub that is adjacent to the Oba's (king's) palace and forms the cultural heart of Benin City. The street is lined on both sides with boutiques, pharmacies, churches and restaurants, making it a highly commercial area. As discussed in the introduction, Benin was historically divided into special functional zones and Sakponba Road was the *owa* for blacksmiths and bronze casters, but it has metamorphosed to become the epicentre of forex in Benin. Before moving to forex, Nigerien migrants there sold bronze, gold or copper jewellery. In order to gain a share in the market, they initially sold gold.

According to Grosse, studies of 'black markets' often use macroeconomic data to analyse welfare implications, with the formal market as the only alternative to the black market, or focus on the relationship of the informal market exchange rate and inflation with the official rate. This is the reason Grosse focuses on micro data in his study of the structure and function of the Jamaican and Peruvian informal markets, unpacking the supply and demand, exploring the motivations of the research participants and discussing the exchange rate as 'the outcome of their activities'.

The methodology we used included market observations and one-on-one and group interviews with traders at the forex niches in the three markets. Our research utilises both ethnography and empirical research to document community and individual experiences, as well as migrant experiences, the informality of the market and the forex niche. This contributes where the literature has focused either on non-African case studies or on macroeconomic data only.

We conducted interviews with over forty people, some of them Nigeriens but also people from Northern Nigeria who are established traders and locals who work in the market. Our interview questions addressed the motivation to migrate to Nigeria, as well as their arrival, settling and integration into the local community. With locals, we sought to understand their view of the space occupied by the Nigerian migrants in the market and community. In addition, we spoke to experts and local leaders who could best inform us on the transformations of the city and the markets. In line with postcolonial theory, we chose to utilise informal, unstructured interview styles, ensuring that the conversation was driven by the interviewees.

Sakponba Road

Due to its size and importance as a centre of forex trading in Benin City, Sakponba Market is the focal point of the Nigerian forex niche. The informal forex market on Sakponba Road is concentrated between Ezeoba and Aruosa streets, where a branch of the First Bank of Nigeria and a Western Union money transfer office are also located. Most of the currency trading takes place in a massive multistorey complex that houses several BDCs, in an area known as Hausa Quarters.

From our interviews, we traced the emergence of the informal forex market back to the late 70s and early 80s. Chief Obasoge N'Igun Ugboha of Benin, the traditional ruler of the area whose palace is also located on Sakponba Road, informed us that a market had always existed in that area. According to his estimation, the changing of foreign currency in Sakponba started 'over 30 years ago' in the early 90s. This date was contested in another interview, in which a long-time currency operator said that he had started trading foreign currency in 1988. In his words: 'I started trading BDC in 1988 until now. When I arrived in 1983, no one was trading BDC yet, people started trading foreign currencies at some point after my arrival in Benin City. I was part of the people who began trading in foreign currencies in Benin.' Another currency trader who came to Benin City in 1979 from Niger in search of work confirmed this, saying, 'There was no BDC when we first came here.'

It was difficult getting a precise date for when Nigeriens began moving into the area. However, it emerged from interviews with older members of the Nigerien community that they were not always involved in forex. A landowner who rents his property to traders in the market confirmed this, saying that the people who came from the North to do business in the Sakponba Market initially sold livestock, clothing and gold before they started trading in currency. According to him, their numbers grew slowly and, as more Binis moved abroad, the forex business began to expand. As the businesses expanded, more Nigeriens migrated to join their family members and these networks established a market niche over time. This indicates that the migrations of both Nigeriens and Bini people created and transformed the configurations in the informal forex market.

Nigeriens in Benin City

As earlier stated, domestic and regional migrations are the most predominant forms of migration within West Africa, with Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Ghana being key destinations (Aker 2018). About 84 per cent of emigrants from West African countries migrate within the region (Teye, Awumbila and Benneh 2015). This is perhaps due to the 1979 ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Establishment, which eased the process of migration within the region. The signing of the Protocol on Free Movement coincided with the oil boom in Nigeria, which made the country a popular destination for migrants from across the region, including Nigeriens. As much as 15 per cent of Nigeriens reportedly migrate to Nigeria; in 2014 the total number of Nigerien migrants moving into Nigeria was pegged at 87,529 (Awumbila *et al.* 2014). Nigerien migrants did not consider the global North when leaving Niger. To them, Nigeria is a desirable destination and they were happy to bypass larger cities such as Lagos and Abuja in favour of Benin City.

From interviews with Tanimu Ibrahim, the regional zonal chairman and vice chairman of the Haut Conseil des Nigeriens de l'Exterieur (an organisation that represents Nigeriens living in Nigeria), two Nigerien ethnic groups are predominant in Edo State: the Hausa and the Zabarma. Both ethnic groups seem to have settled in different trade niches. The Zabarma dominate the informal currency market, while the Hausa engage in other trades such as the buying and selling of scrap metals, clothing and foodstuff, and working as security guards.

Teye *et al.* (2015) highlight some of the difficulties migrants experience at the borders of some ECOWAS member states, including harassment and being asked to make unofficial payments before access is granted into the

countries. However, over the course of our interviews, we gathered that the Nigeriens travelling into Nigeria enjoyed a straightforward process if they had the relevant papers. The required documents to cross the border include passports, ECOWAS travel certificates, and/or resident permits. Although most Nigeriens living in Benin City we encountered are undocumented, some possess all three documents, while others use the ECOWAS passport, their Nigerian passport or the ECOWAS certificate to enter the country. Nigerian migrants seem to move easily across the Nigerian border with their travel documents. However, we learned that it was once possible to travel into Nigeria without official documentation.

It is hard to give a precise number of Nigeriens in Benin City. According to Alhaji Haildou Boureima, the official representative of Nigeriens living in Edo State, they number in the thousands. He told us that after Kano and Lagos states, Edo State has the highest number of Nigeriens in Nigeria. In his words, Edo is 'perhaps the fourth or fifth state with the largest number of Nigeriens'. The path from Niger to Benin City was not a straight one; many of the migrants stopped over in other states before arriving at Benin City. Our findings show that many the Nigeriens in Benin City came to Lagos State first, where they engaged in trading goods or worked odd jobs. Those who went straight to Benin City often already had family in the city, usually a brother, who was already engaged in some form of business. Another observation we made was that some migrants came to Nigeria to learn or further their Quranic education. A few informants indicated that they had left Niger in search of greener pastures; others had businesses back home that they continued to run with the help of family and friends.

Nigeriens have since established roots in Benin City, starting families and buying property. This has led to spatial and social transformations in the city, as Nigerian migrants are now known to inhabit specific areas in the city in addition to their domination of the informal forex market. Many have integrated into the society and have adopted the commonly spoken Pidgin English fluently. Only a few express the desire to return home even though their businesses are not as profitable as they used to be due to the worsened state of the Nigerian economy following the global collapse of oil prices (Nwonu 2017). Generally, labour migrants in most ECOWAS countries work in the informal sector due to a combination of their low educational level and the lack of opportunities in the formal sector in host countries. Across the sub-region, migrants from Mali and Niger tend to have the lowest levels of Western education, and those Nigeriens who are currency operators in Benin City learned the trade from others, that is, through informal means. Many of the people we spoke to had engaged in

other trades before they started trading in foreign currency and, as a result, they had diverse backgrounds. As migrants moving within ECOWAS to further their entrepreneurial goals, the realities of Nigeriens in Benin City are effectively postcolonial.

The Informal Forex Market in Sakponba

The informal market in Sakponba Market is a complex ecosystem that thrives on a symbiotic relationship between currency operators, the suppliers of foreign currency, the courier operators and the customers. The currency operators are largely from Niger and are of the Zabarma ethnic group. Sakponba Market has a Sarkin Zabarmawa, a title given to the man considered to be the leader of all Zabarma in the city. Those originally from Benin City, the Bini and the Esans, tend to dominate the 'transfer' business, an informal method for sending and receiving remittances and goods to Nigeria.

As one interviewee explained it, 'What I do is receive money from people abroad and pay their family members. Our connection with the Nigeriens is that we change money from them.' Like official money transfer services, customers waiting to receive money from abroad are given a code. Money is disbursed only after the code is confirmed by the agent. This transfer business is the main supplier of foreign currency to Sakponba Market, according to our findings. Money and items are sent from Europe to agents who collect a certain percentage as commission. The courier operators often share offices with the currency traders, and those who are engaged in money transfers import packages from abroad and send packages outside Nigeria. We found that most of the customers engaged in this market are related.

The Nigerien currency traders also function as informal banks, sometimes holding onto large amounts of cash in foreign currency on behalf of customers and transfer agents. As Chief Obasoge N'Igun Ugboha explained to us, 'It's easier to get money from [the Nigeriens] compared to that bank procedure, the bank bureaucracy; for instance, I can call one of them now and say I need \$10,000 and he will have it but to go to the bank is not easy.' There is also the presence of 'dealers', who act as middlemen between the transfer agents and the currency operators. Those who deal with foreign currency in Benin City are the Igbo who supply the naira that the agents need to trade. The amount of money supplied can rise up to NGN 20 million or NGN 40 million in a day. Courier and transfer agents will often represent specific countries or cities, mostly in Europe. For example, one can find an agent who deals solely with transfers from Turin, Italy. One of our interviews was with a man who deals in euros coming from Italy, Germany and Austria.

Due to the sensitive nature of the business, we could not get an exact figure on the money that goes through the market or the personal earnings of traders in the market. From our interviews, a wide range of earnings emerged. One currency operator reported making between NGN 50,000 to NGN 100,000 a day. Weekly earnings were generally pegged at NGN 500,000 for individuals. Another informant in the transfer business gave us a rough number of trading with a million euros on a weekly basis. While conducting an interview with an agent, he told us that one customer had just concluded a transaction with him of about EUR 15,000. That agent earns EUR 30,000 on a good day, another trader reported similar earnings in a week.

A considerable percentage of remittances flowing into receiving countries come through informal non-banking channels, thereby supplying foreign currency to the parallel market as opposed to the Central Bank (Banuri 1989). Money brought in through the transfer system can involve transporting physical currency across borders. This may have evolved to evade the high cost of sending money to Africa, particularly when the remittances are being sent to rural areas. Using money transfer operators (MTOs) such as Western Union and MoneyGram also attracts charges, which people seek to avoid by using the informal transfer operators. We were informed that large sums of money come into and leave Benin City daily through flights coming from and going to Lagos. Our informants told us that flights come in from Europe weekly, with passengers often carrying the cash undetected. Individuals typically may not carry more than EUR 10,000 on their person when leaving the European Union without charges, but, as we learned, some customers send in up to EUR 50,000 in cash.

One of the traders we spoke with informed us that he has kept close to EUR 12,000 for a client living in Europe, which he disburses to relatives based in Benin City, as instructed. This is somewhat like the 'hundi' (hand payment) system in Pakistan and Myanmar. Banuri (1989) notes that the informal market in Pakistan rapidly expanded due to the influx of remittances from Pakistani workers in the Middle East. Workers brought hard currency back home with them on visits, and some of them also utilised informal exchange dealers. Usually connected to friends or family back home, these dealers worked by giving the name and address of a family member to the dealer, whose partner (in Pakistan) would then send that person a cheque or money order for the right amount. Ali (1981) noted that, in Bangladesh, money reached customers quicker when they used non-bank channels.

Only ten businesses on Sakponba are officially recognised and have trading licences issued by the CBN, even though there are hundreds, possibly over one thousand, forex traders within that market alone. One currency trader told us that it was not compulsory to trade under a licence, even though there are many benefits that come with having one, including the fact that it protects businesses and gives legitimacy to traders. BDCs with licences can also buy foreign currency directly from the CBN at a lower rate. For example, the Central Bank may sell USD 1 to registered BDCs at NGN 357, but that rate would be NGN 362 in the parallel market. Registered BDCs are entitled to receive about USD 75,000 from the CBN weekly. However, they are also required to pay an annual fee to the CBN.

The chief of the area noted that some of the unlicensed businesses operate under those that have licences to trade. A currency trader with a licence confirmed this, saying that his licence ‘covers some people’ who do not have theirs. Other traders form partnerships to get the licence, because acquiring one is an expensive process involving millions of naira. A currency trader who operates one of the few licensed BDCs in Sakponba Market described the process to us: ‘NGN 7,000,000 is used to “settle” people, register, etc., after which NGN 35,000,000 must be put in the business account.’

The process of getting a licence can take two years. However, this trader suggested that tribalism within the Nigerian bureaucracy ensures that certain people can complete the registration process quicker than others. Because of the difficulty of the registration process, the number of undocumented or unregistered traders is higher than those who are registered, thus making it harder to quantify the economic impact of their businesses. The statistics might not be quantifiable but it is clear that the unofficial market is making contributions to the development of Benin City and Edo State in general. The inflow and exchange of foreign currency handled by Nigerian migrants is essential for the day-to-day livelihood of both indigenes and migrants. The fact that the informal sector is bringing in money shows their contribution, and this is what a postcolonial lens allows us to see.

The informal forex market in Benin City is made up largely of undocumented Nigerian migrants; as a result, their narratives show the magnitude of their contributions to community-led markets and the local economy in West Africa. According to Jackson (2012), informal markets are still largely under-researched at the community and individual level and our research takes up this challenge. Case studies on informal forex markets have been carried out by scholars like Grosse and Wiegand on Jamaica, Belize and Peru, for example (Grosse 1991, 1994; Wiegand 1994).

Currency traders in Benin City have organised themselves under a banner, the Wazobia Traders Union. Wazobia is a term in Pidgin that captures the diversity of the Nigerian population. It is a fusion of the word 'come' in Nigeria's three major languages: Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa. Like al-Amanat of Wapa in Kano, the Wazobia Traders Union in Benin City is a business and an interest organisation with a clear structure. Each market in which currency traders operate has a chairman. Members pay a levy and have identity cards. They also have access to a security network, the need for which emerged after a string of robberies targeting BDCs in Sakponba Market. While Wazobia is open to everyone in the foreign exchange business, including the transfer agents, it is composed mostly of Nigeriens. The establishment of Wazobia in Benin and the influence of Nigeriens in the politics of the organisation is another indication of the transformations that are occurring as a result of the link between migration and informal markets. Undocumented migrants who are members of Wazobia are empowered to participate in the social and political activities of the organisation and to protect their business interests in the market.

Wazobia aims to mitigate the many risks that are involved in the informal currency market where large volumes of money circulate informally on a daily basis. The Market Chairman of Wazobia, who is Nigerien, explained that security poses a serious challenge for them, which is why shop owners in the market are required to pay a daily levy for police protection. Robberies are among the worst aspects of the business, affecting traders and locals living in the area. According to Chief Obasoge N'Igun Ugboha:

At times, we have to run away, at times they block the roads; no one comes in and goes out and then they shoot sporadically so that they can do whatever they want to do. At times, we find two or three lifeless bodies from the shoot outs. Today, the rate of robbery seems to have reduced, perhaps due to the efforts of Wazobia in getting security agents that are specifically assigned to Sakponba Market.

There is no insurance for the monies being traded in the market. As a result, transfer agents risk losing huge sums of money either during robberies or when they leave it with Nigeriens for safekeeping. The business is largely based on trust. However, there have been instances where Nigeriens have allegedly fled with money left in their care. We encountered someone who had recently lost EUR 8,000 in a day in this way. There are slight tensions between the migrants and the locals, which have risen due to perceived privileges that the locals believe the Nigeriens enjoy, including the belief that the Nigerien-dominated union covers up for their countrymen when they suddenly disappear with money that has been entrusted to them.

One of the transfer agents we interviewed shared the frustrations he has with Wazobia and their lax approach to dealing with cases of theft. He said, 'You would give them thousands of euros and come back the next day to hear that the person with your money has absconded and when you ask around, they all deny knowing the person who has gone with the money.' This same trader also lost NGN 5,000,000 when the money he was expecting from Europe was intercepted at the border and the person carrying it was arrested by officials. Due to these losses, a growing number of traders and agents now prefer to keep daily earnings in the bank where they can be at peace knowing their money is secured in the vault. Security remains an issue for those in the transfer business. As a policeman told us, 'this transfer stuff is not legal so they cannot report stolen money to us'. The circulation of fake currencies/notes is another risk for the locals, both for customers who come to sell or buy money and those engaged in the foreign exchange business.

The Diaspora and the Parallel Currency Market

Our interviews revealed the connection between the migration of people from Benin City to Europe and the growth of the foreign exchange market in the city. In the early 80s, Binis who returned from trips overseas often brought back cash, which they had to change in Lagos because there was no foreign exchange market established in Benin City. When they were not able to travel back home themselves, they would send foreign currency back through friends and family. Another way they established financial connections was by establishing businesses. All the people engaged in transfer that we spoke to had business partners in Europe. One of them said, 'If things are not going well there [in Europe] we won't be getting money, the whole market cannot exist without those in Europe.' Another told us that it is impossible to start or get leverage in the informal currency market without knowing someone in Europe.

The migration of indigenes from Edo State to Europe has been well documented. Migrants, particularly women, began emigrating to Italy in the 1980s, following a demand for unskilled labour in the country. Italy has been noted to be the only European country with a clear female majority among the legally residing Nigerian population (IOM 2006). Other popular European destinations are the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, Belgium and Austria. Over a decade later, the mark of this outward migration on Benin City is still felt through the cars and houses financed with money from Europe as well as the crowds of people we saw in Sakponba Market sending parcels to Europe or waiting to receive money from transfer agents.

This shows that two types of migration are behind the growth and transformations of the informal forex market in Benin City: the migration of Benin indigenes to Europe in the 1980s, and the migration of Nigeriens to Benin City in the late 70s and early 80s to the *owa* at Sakponba Road and eventually, the establishment of other markets in Edo State. Without the migration of indigenes to Europe, there would be a shortage of foreign currency to fund the forex trade in the market and without Nigerien migrants, the forex market would not have proliferated the way it has. Studying the link between these migrations and the market is an area where future research can be expanded.

These transformations reflect the changes occurring in both Nigeria and Niger. In Nigeria, and specifically in Benin, outward migration of Nigerians increased, as did remittances and cash inflow from the Diaspora. In Niger, beyond seasonal migration for agricultural work, Nigeriens also began outward migration to look for jobs in other sectors and many of them became permanent settlers in cities like Benin City, where they found a demand for forex trading.

Discussion

Our research on the Nigerien community's engagement in forex makes key contributions to case studies on migration and niche sectors in West Africa, informal forex markets, intra-African migrations and Nigerien experiences of economy in Nigeria, South-South migrations, and the processes through which undocumented migrants resist the oppressiveness of borders, citizenship and economy. The forex niche in Benin shows us how traditional specialised functional markets zones have evolved, impacted by trans-border migrations, the culture of emigration in Benin and a high demand for and exchange of foreign currency. Benin City is attractive to forex traders because of the large scale of remittances that migrants send from Europe to their families in Edo State. The forex niche, in which the majority of the traders are undocumented and unregistered, thriving and settling, is an example of how undocumented migrants challenge norms and rules stemming from international law that limits the space migrants can occupy within the state.

Our research reinforces the argument that informal markets represent a resistance against the hegemony of international migration legal rules and norms, economics and colonialism that have created dichotomies between formal and informal, legal and undocumented or unregistered markets. Our work also highlights that the informal forex market, like other types of informal markets, is community-driven. The community

plays a pivotal role in the city's development through remittances from indigenes in the diaspora, who send home money and thus keep the forex businesses afloat, and Nigerien forex traders in Benin City who send money to their families back in Niger. An area for further research is the interaction between indigenes, the migrant community, national and transnational stakeholders and the power dynamics that take shape in these interactions within the market.

A limitation of our theoretical framework, which focuses on centring informality, is the risk of idealising the informal market and neglecting the disadvantages that informality may bring. For example, our research showed that the unregistered forex traders were exposed to more risks than those who were registered. Unregistered forex traders were more likely to disappear with funds from indigenous investors in the forex market than registered traders were. The security and trust in the market is also affected by this risk, which may negatively impact the future of the forex niche in Benin City. It is important to discuss the significance of informality alongside its potential weaknesses or risks.

Our methodological approach also had limitations. We carried out observations of the market that were useful in understanding the market dynamics. However, our semi-structured interviews and our positionality as women in a male-dominated space drew attention to us. Initially, when we embarked on the research, we did not meet resistance because we came through trusted and respected traders in the market, but this changed as the research progressed. When it was clear that we were largely focusing on the Nigerien community, we began to notice that people became hesitant until they had permission to speak to us from the president of the Nigerien community in Benin, the president of the Wazobia Traders Union or the leaders of the other markets. This limited how far we could take our conversations and the number of people we could interview about their forex businesses.

We carried out extensive observations and interviews in Sakponba Market, but our research in Mission Road and New Benin markets was not as extensive. This was because the latter markets are extremely small and rely on Sakponba structures extensively. Also, we had stronger networks in Sakponba, and as a result we were able to build trust with the traders we encountered there. Future research could perhaps expand into other markets in the country. Additionally, interview questions were often influenced by our perceptions of the realities on the ground. As a result, we found that impromptu conversations were much more insightful than pre-arranged questions. Due to the undocumented nature of most of the

traders in the market, we were unable to get the exact size of the Nigerien forex trading community, which limited our ability to estimate the size of the three markets and quantify the impact of the market on the local economy. For this, we relied not only on the narratives of the migrant community but also on those of the indigenes, other traders and leaders in the city.

Another challenge of the research was maintaining a balance between ethnography and theory. Because our ethnographic research focused on a specific niche area (Nigerien migrants doing foreign exchange in Benin City), we found that we had to rely largely on ethnography, and in order to create a balance with theory, we needed to take a transdisciplinary approach. As a result, our theoretical analysis drew from a wide range of works in economics, sociology, anthropology, migration studies, etc. Additionally, the lack of historical context on the migration of Nigeriens to Benin City was a drawback. Our interviews gave us a sense of how the community of forex traders came into existence, but it was difficult to find documented historical records or academic analysis anywhere. This is the reason we interviewed the cultural and historical custodian of Sakponba Market, Chief Obasoge N'Igun Ugboha of Benin, who gave us a point of reference for its history.

Finally, gender relations and the role of women in the informal forex market is an area we believe can be expanded in the future. We interviewed a few women in our research but because the Nigerien forex traders are predominantly men, we did not really dive into the impact of gender in the processes of the market.

Conclusion

In this article, we focused on understanding how a migrant community established a niche sector, what the characteristics of the niche are, and what transformations have occurred in the market as a result of the migrants and the niche. In order to do this, we used ethnography to document the sociocultural and political dimensions of the market. Our research focused on the Nigerien forex market niche in Benin City as a case study to understand and draw conclusions on the migration and informal market nexus.

Using postcolonial theory, we see that the dichotomy between formal and informal sectors in developing countries is a result of colonialism. Even though informal sectors contribute substantially to employment and remittances, formal sectors are positioned as central to high levels of investment, development and productivity. A postcolonial approach allows

us to shed this perception. Informality is not a negative attribute, in fact it is a significant part of the ways Africans and other people in the global South resist the limitations and hierarchies institutionalised by colonialism. The continued presence of informal markets in cities across Africa is a testament to this fact, and also to the importance of informal cross-border trade in African societies, which even the formalisation of trade systems cannot shake. Migrants are a fundamental part of the existence of informal markets and are proof of the historical networks of trades that have existed for centuries.

Our research also discussed the transformations that occurred in Benin City from the time of specialised functional zones in precolonial Benin City, which was transformed by the oil boom that attracted migrants to the city in the 1970s, including Nigeriens, particularly the Zabarma. The transformation was also driven largely by the outward migration of Bini and Esan people to Europe around the same time, which created the demand for and supply of foreign exchange services, which Nigeriens provided. The demand for forex spread beyond Sakponba into other parts of Benin, and thus the market grew beyond its original spatial dimensions. The forex market has also developed beyond forex into courier services and money transfer that mimics MTO services.

Further transformations occurred due to the increase in size of the migrant community and the establishment of Wazobia Union. The combination of the large representation of Nigeriens in the union, as well as the differentiation between the forex niche led by Nigeriens and the transfer niche led by Bini indigenes, created shifts in the market. New asymmetries of power and exclusion developed in the market as a result. The proliferation of unlicensed businesses in comparison to licensed ones also transformed the configuration of the market, creating hierarchies between those recognised by the state and those who are 'illegal'.

A successful niche market will impact the next generation of Nigeriens born in Nigeria who participate in the market created by their parents. Also, a thriving niche means that the link between Niger and Benin City will continue, as more migrants choose to come to the city for job opportunities, although our observations indicated that the economic recession in 2016 impacted the forex niche negatively and slowed down the rate of migration between Niger and Benin City a bit.

This research on the Nigerien community's engagement in forex makes key contributions in case studies on the nexus of migration and niche sectors in West Africa. It also contributes to studies on informal forex markets, intra-African migrations and Nigerien experiences of economy in Nigeria.

Understanding the experiences of Nigerien migrants in Benin City can inform policy-makers on the challenges and advantages of informal markets and the interaction between formal and informal structures.

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The Impact of Structural Violence on Women's Capacity to Fully Participate at Candidate and Electoral Management Levels in Zimbabwe

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Abstract

This article focuses on 'hidden' institutional violence, also known as structural violence, and gender divisions in electoral processes in Zimbabwe. Structural violence occurs when one category of people is accorded an unequal status in relation to other categories of people. The main argument presented in the paper is that, in Zimbabwe, structural violence renders the implementation of gender equality in electoral governance nugatory. Political party structures and systems are designed and conveniently used to exclude women from political participation. The article analyses selected cases involving women's involvement at the candidate and electoral management level. The study made use of interviews, particularly key informant interviews, and semi-structured interviews, as its main data-gathering methods. Focus group discussions were also utilised. The findings revealed that a myriad of structural and institutionalised constraints prevent women in Zimbabwe from fully participating in political and electoral processes. These institutionalised structures have a disproportionately negative impact on women's political ambitions compared to men's. The article concludes that promoting gender equality in the area of politics and decision-making as well as in society as a whole is a long and complex process. Any initiatives to remedy these inequalities must be strategic and long-term oriented.

Keywords: women, gender equality, structural violence, political participation

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Résumé

Cet article porte sur la violence institutionnelle « cachée », également connue sous le nom de violence structurelle, et les divisions entre les sexes dans les processus électoraux au Zimbabwe. La violence structurelle se produit lorsqu'une catégorie de personnes se voit accorder un statut différent de celui d'autres catégories de personnes. L'argument principal présenté dans le document est qu'au Zimbabwe, la violence structurelle rend inopérante la mise en œuvre de l'égalité des sexes dans la gouvernance électorale. Les structures et les partis politiques sont conçus et opportunément utilisés pour exclure les femmes de la participation politique. Le document analyse une sélection de cas de participation des femmes tant dans les candidatures que dans la gestion électorale. Comme principales méthodes de collecte de données, l'étude a utilisé des entretiens, en particulier avec des informateurs clés, et des entretiens semi-structurés. Des discussions de groupe ont également été mises à contribution. Les résultats ont révélé qu'une myriade de contraintes structurelles et institutionnalisées empêchent les femmes au Zimbabwe de participer pleinement aux processus politiques et électoraux. Ces structures institutionnalisées ont un impact négatif disproportionné sur les ambitions politiques quand on les compare à celles des hommes. Le document conclut que la promotion de l'égalité des sexes dans le domaine de la politique et des instances décisionnelles ainsi que dans la société dans son ensemble est un processus long et complexe. Toute initiative visant à remédier à ces inégalités doit être stratégique et orientée dans le long terme.

Mots-clés : femmes, égalité entre les genres, violence structurelle, participation politique

Introduction

The concept of structural violence is rarely considered in discussions of the Zimbabwean political process; instead, direct violence has been viewed as the primary form of violence (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2014). Structural violence may be conceived of as the infliction of psychological harm and physical harm or deprivation through violent socioeconomic or political structures (Gilman 1983). Additionally, structural violence is seen as 'the physical and psychological harm that results from exploitative and unjust social, political and economic systems' (Gilman 1983). In other words, 'structural violence is a by-product of the historical process of social, economic and political change'.

Whereas direct violence involves the use of visible force, structural violence does not require one to see the harm in operation or to say that someone intended its use (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004). Among

the features of structural violence is its embedding in socioeconomic and political systems.

Many human rights reports on political participation in Zimbabwe have focused on direct violence because the perpetrator is easy to identify and the extent of damage measurable (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2014). Direct violence, which includes organised violence and torture, denotes the use of physical force and is typified by intimidation, murder, torture, rape, arrest and detention, among other forms of abuse (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2014). Both before and after independence in 2018, Zimbabwean societies faced the threat of organised violence and torture during electoral processes. The problem has not diminished, despite efforts made by different stakeholders, such as human rights organisations and human rights systems, and the existence of regional and international human rights conventions (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2014).

Although Zimbabwe has signed and ratified a number of international and regional instruments that call for gender equality in all aspects of life, the country has not fared well in advancing the participation of women in politics in spite of these instruments. This is despite the fact that women in Zimbabwe constitute the majority of the voters, mobilisers, campaigners and political party members. According to Maphosa, Tshuma and Ncube (2015), this discrepancy between the perceived and actual reality of women's participation in politics is not accidental but founded on a systemic and calculated manoeuvre by politically dominant males to open up the political space when necessary and convenient for them. Maphosa *et al.* (2015) further argue that the participation of women in politics has been more an issue of manipulation than a genuine attempt to promote gender equality and equity, and that there is a glass ceiling for women in terms of how far they can go up the political ladder.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) guarantees everyone's right to participate in the government of his or her country without discrimination on the basis of gender. The SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (2008) article 12 provides for a 50 per cent threshold for women in decision-making positions. The Zimbabwean Constitution section 56(2) states that women should have equal opportunities to those of men in all spheres, including political participation. Zimbabwe still lags behind in advancing the participation of women in governance, as this paper will show. Maphosa *et al.* give an example of this in a speech attributed to the late former president, Robert Mugabe, who when commenting on the then Zimbabwean vice president Joice Mujuru's purported political ambitions, said:

We are experiencing it for the first time in ZANU-PF and for that matter it's a woman who is saying, 'I want to take over that seat'. (Maphosa 2015, quoting Reuters 2014)

In this article, we argue that power dynamics and power relations at multiple and interconnected levels are among the factors that underpin inequality and gender disparity in political participation, in general, and specifically in standing as a candidate. We further argue that despite the marked progression in equality legislation, current implementation of the legislative frameworks does not pay sufficient attention to women's political needs at candidate and electoral management level, resulting in structural inequality, which is augmented by an inherent structural violence within political processes and procedures.

The article is mainly in four parts: The first part conceptualises structural violence and women's participation in political processes in Zimbabwe. The second part is a description of the methodology and data collection methods. The third part presents and discusses the findings of the research, focusing on the primary fault lines of women's exclusion from electoral processes and how these are gendered, as well as lessons learnt from other jurisdictions. Lastly a discussion on prerequisites for creating greater inclusion in political participation concludes the paper.

Structural Violence and Women's Participation in Political Processes in Zimbabwe

Structural violence refers to a form of violence whereby some social structure or social institution may harm people by preventing them from satisfying their basic needs (Ouedraogo and Ouedraogo 2019). The phrase 'structural violence' was coined by Johan Galtung in his path-breaking 1969 article, 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research'. He described it as a pervasive form of violence that is 'built into' structures, institutions, ideologies and histories (Galtung 1969; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2014). In analysing women's experiences within the political arena, the theory of structural violence provides a useful framework for identifying and understanding the violations of women's right to political participation. Galtung asserts that 'Structural violence, as opposed to personal or direct violence, is indirect in that there may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure.' The violence is built into a structure and manifests as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances (Galtung 1969).

Structural violence theory provides a nuanced structuralist analysis of the relationship between structures and agency. 'Violent' structures result in an unequal distribution of resources, which actively constrains agency (Winter

2012). For structural violence theorists, the distribution of power through structures, whether it is called exploitation or violence, enhances the agency of some but at the expense of the agency of others (Winter 2012). This was described by Mahatma Gandhi as the ‘worst form of violence’ (Rodgers and O’Neill 2012).

According to Winter (2012), unequal access to resources, political power, education, health care and legal standing counts as structural violence. Equally, when society’s social institutions are characterised by exploitation, political exclusion and unequal access to resources, the structural forces often create a system of winners and losers in which the losers can only hope for redress (Rowson 2012).

In Zimbabwe, systematic deprivation results in conflicting preferences and interests between the winners and losers competing for the same resources. Structural violence is embedded in the socioeconomic and political arrangements of the day, which provide unequal access to resources, political power, education and health care. Structural violence often manifests in power inequity, poverty and the denial of basic human rights (Ho 2007). One pervasive form of structural violence is discrimination against women, an issue that has been tackled at various levels—international, regional and local—but which, despite measures to eliminate or at the very least ameliorate its adverse effects on women’s lives, remains embedded in the fabric of social, political and economic life.

Article 7 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) calls upon state parties to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country. CEDAW generally affirms the importance of equal participation and the full involvement of women in all efforts and the need to increase women’s role in decision-making. Gender equality in political participation and decision-making at all levels is thus a fundamental aspect of modern democratic governance (Cheeseman and Dodsworth 2019). Political participation can be defined in terms of the extent to which citizens can exercise their constitutional right to engage in political activities (Maphosa *et al.* 2015). This paper perceives political participation as any ‘activity that has the intent of effect of influencing government actions either by directly affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make the policies’ (Sidney, Schlozman and Brady 1995).

It is crucial to observe that there are different types of participation. Functional participation occurs when people take part in decision-making processes and are likely to contribute to discussion. Active participation

occurs when people contribute more or less directly to decision-making process via negotiation procedures. Passive participation occurs when people are not involved in decision-making processes but are merely informed of decisions (Maphosa *et al.* 2015). In the light of this conceptual framing of participation, this paper examines the conceptual and material bases of women's exclusion from the mainstream political structures, despite their clearly demarcated constitutional and legal entitlements to be active participants in these structures and in decision-making. While the paper recognises the broad nature of political participation and its multidimensionality, it however restricts its analysis to women's involvement at the candidate and electoral management level.

Methodology

The study from which this paper is drawn was framed within a rights, sex and gender paradigm. The 2013 Zimbabwe Constitution¹ has comprehensive human-rights provisions that assert, emphasise and protect women's rights. In terms of section 2 of the 2013 Constitution, all laws in conflict with the Constitution are invalid to the extent of their inconsistency with the Constitution. This is amplified by section 56, which outlaws discrimination on multiple grounds. With regard to sex and gender, section 80(1) re-emphasises the equality of women and men in all spheres and section 80(3) provides 'that all laws, customs, traditional practices that infringe the rights of women conferred by this Constitution are void to the extent of the infringement'. What this study sought to do was ascertain how and why, despite such clear constitutional provisions, women's political rights remain severely curbed and circumscribed.

To uncover the hidden barriers to women's full and effective political participation, our main methodological approach was based on women's law. Women's law is a form of feminist jurisprudence that focuses on the content of law, its deconstruction and analysis, to ascertain how, against what are frequently prevailing male standards, women fare in the world of work and life in general (Stewart 2011). This approach explores the reality of women's lives and, from this perspective, it investigates and interrogates the law (Bentzon, Hellum and Ncube 1998).

The women's law approach takes women as the starting point, exploring their experiences in relation to law and their rights, with a view to explain, understand and analyse women's legal rights in order to improve their legal position in life. The women's law approach involves the collection of empirical data about women's lived realities (Bentzon *et al.* 1998). This study utilised a qualitative methodology that was geared towards capturing

the perceptions and experiences of female politicians, with the ultimate aim being to examine the impact of structural inequalities on their capacity to fully participate in politics as candidates. The study made use of interviews, particularly key informant interviews, and semi-structured interviews, as its main data-gathering methods. Focus group discussions were also utilised. The interviews were carried out between October 2019 and May 2020.

Key informant interviews were used to gather information from selected political party members, civil society organisations and commissions. The selection for political party interviews was based on the informants' position within their political parties, their level of influence in their political parties, and the issues they raised during parliamentary debates. This method was also used to involve those who were uncomfortable contributing to group discussions, as well as to follow up on key people who had valuable contributions to make and to gain an in-depth understanding of issues raised that required further detailed discussion for clarification.

The civil society organisations that were selected were those involved in electoral processes, such as voter education and the capacitation of women to actively participate in politics. The rationale behind their selection was their perspective on women's participation. The Gender Commission (ZGC), Human Rights Commissions (ZHRC) and National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (ZNPRC) were selected because their mandate is to monitor electoral processes and thus they had an important perspective on women's participation.

Focus group discussions were used to gather data from the main political parties' women's wings, to gain a clear understanding of the structures within their political parties and how those structures either support or are against the active participation of women. The pitfall of this method is that political parties are often governed by the party whip system; thus in a group set-up the tendency is to give politically correct responses rather than reflect the prevailing situation. This method was therefore complemented by other methods, such as individual interviews and the methods discussed below.

Data collection was slowed down by the COVID-19 pandemic. Zimbabwe's lockdown measures started on 30 March 2020. The researchers had to adapt by making use of online meetings and telephone interviews, since face-to-face interviews were restricted. Data collection was thus continued using alternative methods of engagement. These methods proved to be, in terms of content, as useful as face-to-face interviews, as evidenced by the data obtained. However, what was missing was the ability to view the interviewees' facial and bodily reactions to the questions asked, and to visually assess the responses that were given.

Findings: Primary Fault Lines of Women's Exclusion in Electoral Processes and how they are Gendered

Due to a myriad of structural and institutionalised constraints, which include a complicated electoral system, economic power imbalances between men and women, patriarchal social relations and the gendered violence that has characterised election periods, women in Zimbabwe have not been able to fully and equally participate in political and electoral processes. This has had a disproportionately negative impact on women's political ambitions compared with men's. Political representation by women, particularly in Parliament and local government, has been limited, which is contrary to the provisions in the 2013 Constitution. According to the Zimbabwe Gender Commission (ZGC), although women constituted the majority of voters in the 2018 general elections, their participation as candidates was limited. At primary election level for different political parties, only 15 per cent of the female candidates succeeded in representing their parties at the National Assembly elections. In the actual election, only 12.4 per cent were elected outside the women's quota for the National Assembly. This situation prevails in Zimbabwe despite the country being party to the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, under the auspices of which it was agreed that there be a balance between women and men in decision-making so as to strengthen democracy. It is also a requirement under article 13 of the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development that women have equal opportunities with men in political representation and other decision-making positions.

The electoral processes in Zimbabwe are characterised by exclusion and gender inequality. Since independence in 1980, the Zimbabwean population has experienced eight general elections in which women, on the whole, have had little involvement apart from their traditional role as the electorate. Women's representation in elected office in any given country is determined and influenced by a number of factors. Key among these are the design of the political and electoral systems, the degree to which decision-making processes are institutionalised, and the broader economic and cultural developments in society (Mlambo, Kapingura and Meissner 2019). However, modern democracy is still dominated by political parties. Thus, political parties and the processes by which they are governed play a key role in determining the degree to which women participate in political and public life and the quality of their engagement. For this reason, political parties are often referred to as the 'gatekeepers' of women's political participation. Factors that affect the supply of female politicians are institutional. Chief among them are political systems that

operate under rigid daily and weekly time schedules and do not take into consideration women's domestic responsibilities (Mlambo, Kapingura and Meissner 2019).

Women's electoral participation is often hindered by a variety of political, legal, social, economic and cultural barriers. A consultative dialogue held at the offices of the Women's Coalition in Zimbabwe on 13 July 2017, on the common constraints women face in their bid to be actively involved in electoral processes, revealed that even after selection as candidates, women seeking decision-making positions can be constrained by different factors. These include a lack of financial support and time for campaigning, because of difficulties in balancing family and public life, a lack of confidence about relevant skills, and fewer connections to politically relevant networks. Additionally, the 'working' environment of state political institutions is not 'gender-friendly', for example, in the sitting times in Parliament, inflexible schedules of political party meetings and the lack of childcare facilities, which deters some women from considering entering political life. This is discussed in more detail below.

Political Environment

Electoral Violence

Political violence, institutionalised intimidation, a 'thugocracy', lawlessness and the inability to accept defeat have marked Zimbabwe's political landscape (Zengenene and Susanti 2019). Article 1 of the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women defines Violence against Women (VAW) as 'any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life'. VAW therefore can have many different manifestations that may affect women's active participation in the political realm. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that everyone has the right to take part in the government of his or her country, directly or through freely chosen representatives, and to have a right of equal access to public service in his or her country. Understanding the dynamics of violence, politics and gender is critical to protecting that right (Bardall 2018). According to Bardall (2018), political violence defines political institutions and power relations not only between competing ideological groups but also between the sexes.

The nature of electoral competition, particularly the extent of violence accompanying elections and how the electoral system is organised, determines how far women can go as candidates. As feminist scholars have long argued, political systems are often patriarchal, resistant to change and violent when challenged (Brechenmacher 2017). The impact of physical political violence in driving women out of political competition is a factor that deserves and has been the subject of special studies of its own. However, it falls beyond the purview of this study. In Kenya, for example, post-election violence in 2007 included sexual violence, which in some cases targeted women politicians. Important to note is that even the violence perpetrated against women outside the electoral realm in the private sphere, such as domestic violence, serves to instil in women the chilling message that if they do not remain silent they will be harmed. While politicians of all genders encounter threats and intimidation, the research shows that female candidates and politicians face unique risks. They are often targeted because of their identity as women (Brechenmacher 2017).

Section 133K² of the Zimbabwe Electoral Act, Chapter 2:13 on 'Special penalty for politically-motivated violence or intimidation' provides for penalties to be imposed on any person who is involved in politically motivated violence or intimidation. 'Intimidation' is defined in section 133A as follows:

- (a) Inflicting or threatening to inflict bodily injury upon a person; or
- (b) Abducting a person or detaining a person against his or her will; or
- (c) Causing or threatening to cause unlawful damage to a person's property; or
- (d) Withholding or threatening to withhold from a person any assistance or benefit to which that person is legally entitled; or
- (e) Illegally doing or threatening to do anything to the disadvantage of a person.

The Act provides for stiff penalties for those involved in electoral violence or intimidation. However, despite the fact that electoral processes in Zimbabwe have been characterised by gender and politically motivated violence directed against aspiring women candidates, a negligible number of perpetrators have been arrested let alone convicted for having orchestrated gender-specific politically motivated violence against female political opponents. Apart from retaliation from male political opponents, women aspiring to be electoral candidates indicate they have also encountered violent backlashes from their spouse or relatives who generally feel threatened by women's new-found power to challenge other men in elections. This violence, emanating from both the public and private spheres, has the effect of deterring women from participating in electoral processes for fear of reprisals from political

opponents and close family members. Failure to understand the gendered nature of violence results in a failure to grasp the forces that shape these power structures (Bardall 2018).

The violence experienced by aspiring candidates can be in the form of sexual harassment, serious assault, rape, threats to withdraw financial support, or even divorce (from a spouse). Following such violence, the fear of being blamed and shunned by spouses, relatives and the community at large for having brought it upon themselves, and the shame and very low rate of success in the prosecution of politically motivated rape, most aspiring women politicians decide not to report such crimes (IFES 2018)

Voter Registration Processes

According to the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) Report (2018), women voters and aspiring electoral candidates are often excluded from electoral processes because of the proof of residence requirement for registration as a voter. This requirement is of itself a form of structural violence. This was confirmed by the women interviewed, who said that documents like household utility bills, and letters from landlords or from village heads for rural women, are mostly in the names of male household heads. Landlords usually have leases with the man of the household and village heads traditionally recognise men as the occupants of communal land, under customary law. While for single, divorced and widowed women the documents may be in their names, some married women said the landlords or traditional leaders who are supposed to write letters on their behalf may belong to a different political party and so may refuse to write the letter, thereby thwarting the women's political ambitions.

Cases of physically challenged women who were not be able to walk long distances to voter registration points were also raised. These women have been disenfranchised in the past. Registering to vote and voting are often accompanied by long waiting times or significant travel distances that conflict with women's prescribed gender roles. Such constraints were said to be particularly problematic for women with disabilities, pregnant women, elderly women and women from minority groups who may live further from central registration areas. The history of Zimbabwean elections shows a tendency to recognise only permanently disabled women in the ordinary voting process. They have not made provisions for women in advanced stages of pregnancy or those required to be on bed rest, those with heart problems and elderly women who may not be able to walk for long distances.

Voter Education

Key informants stated that voter education is a critical factor in enhancing women's participation in elections, particularly if it emphasises the right of women to be elected. It also helps women to make more informed and responsible choices. They said voter education should include information on voting rights, the political system and candidates as well as information about where and how to vote. Participants in focus group discussion also said that voter education rarely reaches the grass roots, i.e., household, cell and ward level, because voter education implementers target areas that are easily accessible by motor vehicle. One participant said: '*Ngatiitei chidaka daka chekubata munhu wese.*' ('You should make every effort to reach everyone.')

While it is the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission's (ZEC) constitutional mandate, in terms of section 238 (h), to conduct voter education prior to elections, interviews revealed that the Commission has conducted little or no voter education at all in some places. This lack affects women more as they form the majority of people critically unfamiliar with electoral processes, such as voter registration, nomination of candidates, campaigning and the laws and policies regulating such processes. An official from ZEC said the lack of adequate funding hampers their efforts to reach out to everyone. He stated further that, in terms of the Constitution, they are mandated to carry out continuous voter education, but due to financial constraints they have been limited to only periodical voter education.

The Roles and Responsibilities of Political Parties

The 'Gatekeepers' Phenomenon

It is not only the state institutions that need to be held to account for women's poor participation in electoral governance. Kayuni and Chikadza (2016) studied the role of party chairpersons and secretaries in Malawi as gatekeepers for women's access to political positions. They established that these gatekeepers largely determined women's entry into elected positions and into positions within the party hierarchy. Political parties and men within political parties are the major 'gatekeepers' in determining who will be candidates in elected office. They play a critical role in advancing or impeding women's participation in decision-making bodies. Women face male 'gatekeepers' within political parties who are bent on protecting their political turf. These 'gatekeepers' control decisions about who will be nominated to run for office, what positions candidates will be given on party lists, and who will receive support during the campaign and after the

election. Within the parties, tokenism in appointments as well as blocked channels of access to circles of leadership have been a major element in gender relations between party members (Pogeson 2012).

Through the process of candidate selection (where and which candidates are taken on by the party for election), women face a number of obstacles. Men are generally viewed as more viable and better candidates and are given preference over female candidates. Further, the pool from which political parties search for candidates tends to be dominated by men, such as the trade union officials and local councillors who typify candidates in the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party in Zimbabwe.³ Men are the major determinants of political action and inaction generally concerned with the perpetuation of the power of the state. Thus, when women compete with men for access to political power, they do so on the terms already established by men for competition among themselves (Pogeson 2012).

In a resolution on women and political participation, the UN General Assembly urged all state parties to:

Strongly encourage political parties to remove all barriers that directly or indirectly discriminate against the participation of women, to develop their capacity to analyse issues from a gender perspective, and to adopt policies to promote the ability of women to participate fully at all levels of decision-making within those political parties.

The internal selection processes of political parties are fundamental in determining their gender composition. Most parties proclaim gender equality in their Constitution and manifestos, but the reality is that the internal party leadership still favours men (Pogeson 2012).

Zimbabwe has a mixed political representation system, including direct representation on a constituency basis, proportional representation, a quota system and appointments on a political basis. This makes navigating the system and even selecting where and how to seek political participation challenging. For example, in proportional representation systems, such as in the Senate in Zimbabwe, where a zebra system operates in regard to general candidates, which is supposedly intended to ensure increased representation of women who, in terms of Section 120 of the 2013 Constitution, must be selected from party lists where males and females alternate on the list, a female candidate must head the party list. However, even in this context the position of women on the party list is crucial: if they are not placed in winnable positions they will not be elected. Even when women possess the characteristics that make for good candidates, through the use of invisible power they often are not encouraged to step forward to become candidates.

Women are also less likely to present themselves as candidates, because through socialisation and hidden power they often see themselves as lacking the skills necessary to perform well in politics. Sometimes women hesitate to become involved in party politics, preferring rather to participate in social movements that are less structured and more goal-oriented, such as Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA).

Nomination of Candidates

Political party members interviewed revealed that the pre-electoral phase that involves recruiting and nominating candidates is probably the most crucial process for ensuring that women participate in politics as candidates. It was noted that the gender gap widens significantly as candidates for political office move from being eligible to becoming aspirants to finally being nominated by the party. It therefore becomes important for parties to incorporate rules that guarantee women's representation. While the two main parties in Zimbabwe—ZANU-PF and MDC—have written and formal commitments in their party Constitutions and manifestos that guarantee women political participation, the research revealed that these commitments are rarely implemented. When it comes to proposing candidates for elections, political parties do not adhere faithfully to the letter and spirit of their own Constitutions and manifestos. This institutionalised behaviour is further compounded by the lack of mechanisms to compel political parties to comply with constitutional provisions to ensure the implementation of the equality principle in drawing up party lists.

Women interviewed from the political parties said it had been difficult to devise strategies for them to break into the inner circle of power, and even more difficult to hold the party accountable because the leadership was non-committal towards gender equality. According to Maphosa *et al.* (2015), women have always been aware of their unfavourable position in politics. Maphosa cites an event that happened in August 1999, when the ZANU-PF Women's League, at its Victoria Falls meeting, threatened to boycott the 1999 Party Congress if one of their members was not included in the Party Presidium. The women said if there were no drastic changes at the Congress, women would remain confined to gender-ascribed roles of producing children and singing praise songs for men. They would remain as mere window-dressing in politics with the chief role of mobilising votes for men (Maphosa *et al.* 2015; Machipisa 1999). The demand for women's inclusion, however, did not come to fruition as the Presidium at the Congress ended up being all male, comprising President Robert Mugabe, vice presidents Simon Muzenda and Joseph Msika, and Chairman John Nkomo.

There is a pattern of systematic structural behaviour that excludes women from appointment to political party leadership even more in presidential elections. Most recently, the MDC violated its own Constitution by eliminating a qualified and clearly eligible woman from party leadership, as was held in the case of the *Movement for Democratic Change, Nelson Chamisa and Morgan Komichi v (1) Elias Mashavira, Elias Mudzuri, Thokozani Khupe and Douglas Mwonzora Judgment No. SC 56/2020*.

Gender Equality Provisions were said to be Evident on Paper but Less So in Practice

One Female Councillor said:

Hamuna mikana (there are no opportunities) for women *mumaparty* (in political parties). Party constitutions are not followed. I have been a Councillor since 1998, *dai mikana irimo* (if opportunities were there), by now I should be a Member of Parliament (MP)

It emerged through the focus group discussions that across the whole political spectrum there is structural violence and it primarily affects women. The politicking in Zimbabwe is such that candidates are voted into office on the basis of party affiliation and reward and not on demonstrable competency.

The focus group discussions with women from the main political parties' (ZANU-PF and MDC) women's wings all echoed the same sentiment, that there is a politics of exclusion for women and it is imbedded within the structures of all the political parties:

Men often use the strategy of sidelining female candidates, and this resonates across the main political parties, ZANU PF and the opposition, who tend to field female candidates in constituencies that they know the political party has weak support. Female candidates will lose as voters select their representative based on partisan political party basis and not competency of the candidate.

This structural violence against female candidates maintains an uneven political field, as evidenced by the strategies that are used to sideline women. An assessment of the political party structures reveals that female political party members occupy inconsequential positions.

Awareness of Party Governance Structures

The structure and organisation of political parties can be an obstacle to the participation of women. On the issue of whether respondents were aware of their respective party's governance structures, whether there were rules on gender equality within the political parties and if the rules were well

understood and adhered to, respondents stated that there were rules on gender equality within the political parties. These rules were, however, said to be on paper and less evident in practice.

On the issue of whether political parties educate their members on political processes and whether there is a measuring system to ensure gender equality, respondents opined that some parties have a women's league, youth league and main wing, which are a kind of measuring system. Women can participate in the women's league, but men form the majority of the main wing, which is where party policies are made. Respondents stated that while opportunities are equal on paper, they do not translate into equal representation for women.

Election Campaigns

Even if a woman becomes a candidate there are problems of a gendered nature in campaigning. Respondents stated that fear of electoral violence deters most women from effectively participating in politics. The nature of Zimbabwean politics, which is often characterised by violence and emotional abuse, was cited as one of the reasons few women compete for public office. Most women shy away from violent spaces, and as a result more men participate and are thus available to be voted for.

Section 133C of the Electoral Act on 'Preventing political party or candidate from campaigning' stipulates that:

a person who, through intimidation prevents or obstructs or attempts to prevent or obstruct a political party or candidate from campaigning in any election shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding level ten or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years or to both such fine and such imprisonment.

Women candidates at National Assembly level, when interviewed, stated that they failed to effectively participate in election campaigns through their political parties not because of open prevention, which could be easily detected, but rather through indirect discrimination. They raised the issue of funding. Running a campaign, starting with the primary election, is an expensive venture. They said that their political parties are not eager to fund the election campaign of a woman candidate as they feel she does not stand a chance in a contest with a male opponent from another political party. As a result of financial incapacity, women rarely win at primary election level, meaning that few progress to participate in the national elections. They fail right at the beginning of the race.

Access to Resources for Election Campaigns

The research revealed that female candidates often lack time, due to their role in society, to be actively involved in election campaigns. They do not have access to economic resources to finance their election campaign, compared with their male counterparts. Their lack of time can be attributed to the gendered division of labour in a society which imposes burdens on women that are not normally faced by men. Women often face a triple burden when participating in politics. They have a responsibility to their work or profession, to their family, and if they become involved in politics they are effectively taking on a third full-time job. Most societies fail to organise in a manner that enables men and women with families to share these responsibilities, particularly considering that child-rearing responsibilities tend to fall disproportionately on women. Prescribed gender roles, such as women's propensity to assume larger responsibility for childcare and domestic work, often leaves women with little time to engage in political activities.

Furthermore, the general feminisation of poverty and lack of control over resources limits women's ability to travel as candidates, voters, party campaigners, poll workers or election observers. This limited control over economic assets also impacts women's ability to run for office as they, unlike men, often lack the financial capital necessary for the adequate funding of their election campaigns.

This raises the question whether there is equitable distribution of resources during electoral processes. It also brings one to question whether candidates (male and female) are financed. Respondents stated that financial resources are vital for one to pitch a successful campaign. One female respondent said:

People vote according to what they are eating (sic) and not what they are told. Those with money they don't campaign, they buy votes with their money.

Another female participant said;

Generally women do not have money that matches that of men. A few women may have but they are in the minority.

Interviews revealed that without adequate financial and sociopolitical capital, most women will not be able to achieve real political power. Thus, together with the understanding of the structural impediments to women's participation in politics and decision-making, emphasis was placed on the need to mobilise resources for women to effectively participate in politics and decision-making. Some respondents were, however, of the view that confidence is the most important resource in politics. One male participant said:

In politics, it is mandatory for women to have confidence in themselves as candidates and as voters. They should have confidence to fight for other women.

Gender Stereotyping

One of the all-pervading structural barriers and a source of implicit structural violence that retards women's participation in electoral processes is the issue of gender stereotyping. Structural violence directly affects women, and is maintained through gender socialisation and gender stereotyping, all of which insidiously identify women as inferior, influencing their actions at all levels (Ouedraogo and Ouedraogo 2019). In Zimbabwe, strong traditional and patriarchal values cause society to frown upon women who enter the political arena as election candidates. Such women are often deemed to be too 'masculine' in behaviour and attitude and generally labelled as rebels who are deviant, uncultured and of loose morals.

The media also plays a role in deterring women from involving themselves in electoral processes as it tends to focus on women candidates' private lives rather than their capability. According to Ossome (2013), not even powerful women in leadership are spared; the media is awash with sexually nuanced 'lessons' regarding the culturally acceptable ways in which female politicians ought to behave in public. More often than not, the media portrays women as sexual objects incapable of political and public leadership. Fearing this adverse publicity of their private lives, a phenomenon rarely encountered by male candidates, female candidates opt out of election races to preserve and protect their personal integrity. It is also usually the case that there is blanket invisibility of women political candidates in elections because only male candidates are given party or state-assisted exposure in the print, electronic and mass media.

Most respondents were of the view that the media plays a crucial role in determining the success or failure of an electoral candidate's campaign. The type of media coverage a woman candidate receives therefore determines her fate. Women candidates lamented that immediately prior to and during elections they were, in most cases, portrayed by the media in a bad light, unlike male candidates. Women candidates interviewed from the ruling party, ZANU-PF, said that their male counterparts in most cases received widely positive coverage in both print and electronic media. In some cases where the media purported to cover women candidates, the focus was not on their political aspirations but rather their sexuality or personal lives—for example, that they were going through a divorce or had been divorced twice before.

When it comes to women voters, the opportunity to access the information necessary to make an informed choice at the ballot box was said to be curtailed by the absence of a free media environment. Zimbabwe's media framework has never been gender mainstreamed and has always been skewed in favour of the political party in power, both before and since 1980. Despite the government gazetted regulations in 2018 permitting opposition parties reasonable access to the state-controlled electronic media, this came too late to have any meaningful impact, especially for the opposition and women candidates, who then and now rarely make the news headlines except in negative stereotyping targeting.

Table 1: Women in Parliament in Selected African Countries

Country	Percentage in National Assembly	Total number of seats	Percentage in the Upper House/ Senate	Total number of seats
50–65%				
Rwanda	61.3%	49/80	38.5%	10/26
40–49.9%				
Namibia	46.2%	48/104	23.8%	10/42
South Africa	42.7%	168/393	35.2%	19/54
Senegal	41.8%	69/165	-	-
35–39.9%				
Mozambique	39.6%	99/250	-	-
Ethiopia	38.8%	212/547	32.0%	49/153
United Republic of Tanzania	36.4%	145/393	-	-
Burundi	36.4%	44/121	46.2%	18/39
Tunisia	35.9%	78/217	-	-
30–34.9%				
Uganda	34.9%	160/459	-	-
Zimbabwe	31.9%	86/270	43.8%	35/80
Angola	30.0%	66/220	-	-

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union Data (Women in Politics: Situation on 1 January 2019)

Lessons Learnt from other Jurisdictions

In Africa, women remain seriously under-represented in decision-making positions across the continent. Hervo-Akendengué, Public Information Officer of the United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI) cautioned that:

The election of Madame Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to the Presidency of Liberia, and dedication of President Kagame of Rwanda to women's decision-making can give the impression that mentalities have changed on the continent. In fact, a lot remains to be done. (UN 2007: 4)

Table 1 shows African countries ranked according to the percentage of women in unicameral Parliaments or the lower House of Parliament, reflecting elections/appointments up to 1 January 2019.

Quota System

An increasing number of countries the world over are currently introducing various types of gender quotas in public elections. In Africa, countries that have had a high percentage of women in decision-making positions use a form of quota system. According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), the core idea behind quota systems is to recruit women into political positions and to ensure that they are not merely tokens. The use of quotas (particularly at the national level) is expanding in sub-Saharan Africa. Data from International IDEA further shows that more than twenty African countries have adopted mandatory or voluntary quotas. Some African countries have constitutionally mandated quotas (Rwanda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe), while others have voluntary political party quotas (South Africa, Mozambique). The following are types of gender quotas in use across Africa:

1. Reserved seats (constitutional and/or legislated)
2. Legal candidate quotas (constitutional and/or legislative)
3. Political party quotas (voluntary).

Mozambique and South Africa use voluntary party quotas to guarantee that a certain percentage of women are selected as political candidates. Namibia also uses voluntary party quotas and legislated quotas at the sub-national level, which has seen the number of women increasing at both national and sub-national level. Rwanda and Uganda use legal quotas, under which the targets apply to all political parties. Dahlerup (2005) states that the use of quotas is increasingly influenced by international recommendations and cross-country inspiration. She further states that it seems important,

however, that quotas are not just imposed from above, but rest on a grassroots mobilisation of women and the active participation of women's organisations, as quotas themselves do not remove all the barriers and obstacles that hinder women's participation. Rather, if implemented, they can lead to an increase in women's representation, which raises women's political visibility and may encourage other women to engage in politics.

Electoral Systems

Electoral systems play a significant role in creating a more conducive environment to women's entry into parliaments. The most favorable electoral system for increasing women's participation is proportional representation (PR). This system ensures that each electoral district has more than one member. Each party presents a list of candidates for multi-member districts, and there is proportional representation as opposed to winner takes all. Other systems include the constituency-based system, First Past the Post (FPTP) and mixed systems. A range of electoral systems are used across Africa. South Africa, for instance, uses PR, whereas Tanzania has a constituency-based system. Currently, Seychelles, along with Zimbabwe, has a mixed PR and constituency-based system. Zimbabwe has sixty seats in the House of Assembly reserved for women selected on the basis of provincial party tickets and general constituency results as well as the zebra PR system in the Senate.

Women's Caucus

One problem women face is that they may be scattered in legislatures among different parties and thus are not able to exert concerted action on issues affecting women at large. Thomas (1994) states that: 'Women who are organised into a caucus can serve the same purpose as a "critical mass" of women, even where women do not make up a significant portion of the legislature.' According to the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) Fact Sheet (2007), women's caucuses are able to extend influence over several realms simultaneously. Some African success stories of making use of the women's caucus platform include, but are not limited to, Morocco, Rwanda, Malawi and South Africa.

Women's caucus groups have been instrumental in ensuring that women across political divides come together and fight for their cause. The success of Rwanda is also attributed to the transitional period, in which women who were in Parliament in 1996 came together and formed a cross-party women's caucus, the Forum of Women Parliamentarians, known for its

French acronym, the FFRP. It consisted of female members of Parliament from the upper and lower houses, those who represented political parties and those who were elected on the 'women's ballot'. These women then worked together across party lines on issues of common importance. The FFRP focused on many issues, one of them being capacity-building. In the last few years, its focus increasingly has been on legislative responsibilities and constituency service, reviewing existing laws and introducing amendments to change discriminatory statutes, examining proposed laws with a gender-sensitive lens, and conducting meetings and workshops with women's groups to make them aware of and advise them on legal issues.

According to the NDI Women's Caucus Fact Sheet (2007), the other two countries with noteworthy achievements with women's caucuses are Uganda and South Africa. The Uganda Women Parliamentarians Association, formed in the 1990s, has been instrumental in lobbying for gender equality clauses in the Ugandan Constitution, including provisions on non-discrimination on the basis of sex, equal opportunities for women, a quota for women of one-third of local government seats, and the establishment of an Equal Opportunities Commission. In South Africa, the women's caucus has worked together not only for gender-sensitive policies but to make their experience as female MPs better. The South African Women's Network was instrumental in establishing a daycare centre in Parliament and made sure that Parliament speeches were delivered in gender-sensitive language.

Conclusion: Prerequisites for Creating Greater Inclusion

Promoting gender equality in the area of politics and decision-making as well as in society as a whole is a long and complex process. Gender stereotypes and gender inequalities are deeply embedded at all levels of society, thus any initiatives to remedy these inequalities must be strategic and long-term oriented. Structural inequality in this paper is seen as a system of privilege and inequality, created and maintained by interlocking societal institutions (Ouedraogo and Ouedraogo 2019).

This article established that women are often subjected to structural inequality, which results from male domination, gender stereotypes and the lack of opportunities and decision-making power. The outcome is the non- or under-participation of women in politics at all levels.

For Zimbabwe to achieve a more balanced political participation of women and men, to effectively comply with its Constitution and international gender equality commitments, women need to feel safe. The

state, through its agencies, should guarantee peace and security of female political aspirants and for the majority of voters, mobilisers and campaigners, who are mostly women.

The independent commissions (more specifically the Gender Commission) have the potential to influence the implementation of gender equality in electoral governance, but they lack the sanctioning mechanism. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC)⁴ has no power to force parties to comply with gender equality in selecting candidates who contest in elections. The lack of enforcement mechanisms minimises the impact of the work of the other independent Commissions.

Where an electoral candidate perpetrates hate speech, in particular discriminatory or disparaging remarks against any class of persons as prohibited under section 56 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe and the Electoral Act, ZEC should not hesitate to have the person arrested and his candidature cancelled so as to increase women's confidence in the electoral system. The political exclusion of Zimbabwean women in the last forty years, notwithstanding available provisions on gender equality, points to the success of male control and men's continued domination of political processes. It must, however, be noted that while legislation can help mobilise public opinion and shift societal attitudes, it also depends on effective enforcement mechanisms. If justice systems are slow and inaccessible and police forces remain sources of insecurity rather than protection, legal reforms that put the onus on criminal justice mechanisms are likely to offer limited redress (Brechenmacher 2017). What drives unequal representation in politics is complex. There is therefore a need for greater understanding of harmful gender norms and norm change strategies to promote more equitable systems and to tackle insidious structural violence (George 2019).

Notes

1. Zimbabwe amended its independence Constitution for the 20th time in 2013 and produced a completely reformed and largely human-rights compliant Constitution (Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No 20) Act 2013), hereinafter the 2013 Constitution.
2. The section quoted is part of a raft of measures introduced to deal with intimidatory practices and violence in relation to elections.
3. The party grew out of trade union bodies, although over the years its character has changed and it has split into a number of different and warring factions. Internal disputes over leadership and party assets continue. Such are the dynamics that they require separate study. Suffice to say here that women have been and still are caught up in the factions.

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***Carapa procera*, femme et économie des ménages dans les communautés diola de la Basse Casamance, Sud du Sénégal**

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Résumé

Les conditions socio-économiques des femmes sont souvent difficiles dans les zones rurales. Pour subvenir à leurs besoins, cette catégorie sociale s'appuie sur l'exploitation d'une partie de la biodiversité végétale. En Basse Casamance, *Carapa procera* fait partie de ces plantes dont l'exploitation est culturellement réservée aux femmes, mais qui améliore aussi les revenus et l'autonomisation financière de ces dernières. Ce travail met en évidence les implications culturelles et économiques de *Carapa procera* pour les femmes. Pour réaliser cette étude, la taille de l'échantillon a été déterminée grâce à la méthode Dagnelie. Deux questionnaires différents sont administrés à chaque groupe cible. Ces questionnaires sont complétés par un *focus group* impliquant des personnes-ressources dans les différentes localités de la zone d'étude. Cette démarche a donné des résultats intéressants. En effet, sur le plan socioculturel, l'étude a révélé que *Carapa procera* par le mode de propriété, de transmission et le savoir est considéré par les communautés comme un patrimoine pour les femmes. Mieux, dans ce contexte économique difficile, ce patrimoine est une source de revenus essentielle pour les transformatrices. L'exploitation de celui-ci peut leur rapporter jusqu'à 250 000 CFA/an. Ces revenus sont destinés à la prise en charge des dépenses du ménage, d'où l'importance de cette espèce pour le quotidien des ménages, la réduction de la pauvreté et l'autonomisation des femmes.

Mots-clés : *Carapa procera*, Femmes, Patrimoine, économie des ménages, Basse Casamance

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Abstract

Women's socio-economic conditions are often difficult in rural areas. In order to provide for their needs, this social category relies on the exploitation of part of the plant biodiversity. In Lower Casamance, the *Carapa procera* is one of these plants whose exploitation is culturally reserved for women but also improves their income and financial empowerment. This work highlights the cultural and economic implications of *Carapa procera* for women. To carry out this study, the sample size was determined using the DAGNELIE method. Two different questionnaires were administered to each target group. These questionnaires are completed by a focus group involving resource persons in the different localities of the study area. This approach yielded interesting results. Indeed, on the socio-cultural level, the study revealed that carapa provides through the mode of ownership, transmission and knowledge is considered by the communities as a heritage for women. Better still, in this difficult economic context, this heritage is an essential source of income for the women transformers. The exploitation of this heritage can bring them up to 250,000 CFA/year. This income is intended to cover household expenses, hence the importance of this species for the daily life of households, poverty reduction and the empowerment of women.

Keywords: *Carapa procera*, Women, Heritage, Household economy, Lower Casamance

Introduction

Contexte

Les années 1970 et 1980 rappellent le douloureux souvenir de la sécheresse dans les pays de la zone soudano-sahélienne. Cette période est marquée par une réduction de la pluviométrie de l'ordre de 30 pour cent en Basse Casamance Saos (1987:6).

De même, les activités agricoles se sont effondrées dans cette région sud du Sénégal. En effet, le déficit pluviométrique précédemment évoqué a porté un sérieux coup au système agricole avec l'abandon des rizières. En réalité, le processus d'acidification des sols (Montoroi 1996:113) et de salinisation de la nappe a rendu une partie des rizières impropres à l'exploitation agricole. Les rendements ont baissé de plus de 15 pour cent dans certaines localités (Curtis *et al.* 1991:11). Le secteur est plongé dans une crise sans précédent et l'insécurité alimentaire s'est installée durablement.

Les populations ont perdu ainsi une partie de leurs revenus (Curtis *et al.* 1991:9). Elles sont prises dans un engrenage infernal. La pauvreté intéresse un grand nombre de familles. Celles-ci doivent trouver des stratégies pour assurer leur survie.

Pour faire face, les populations s'appuient sur la biodiversité végétale. Celle-ci consiste à exploiter les produits forestiers non ligneux (PNFL) pour compenser les défaillances de l'agriculture (Ndao 2018:9). Par ce biais, plusieurs espèces sont exploitées dans les différentes forêts de la Basse Casamance. Aujourd'hui, ces produits forestiers non ligneux jouent un rôle important dans les revenus des ménages Ndao (2018:13). Parmi ceux-ci, *Carapa procera*, qui conserve encore une place significative, a la particularité de générer des revenus conséquents surtout pour une certaine catégorie sociale d'où son intérêt pour cette étude.

Problématique

En zone rurale, la situation économique de la femme s'est davantage dégradée. Les sources de revenus sont minces et ces dernières s'appuient sur l'exploitation de la biodiversité végétale pour subvenir à leurs besoins. Ainsi, de nombreuses espèces sont exploitées dans les formations végétales de la zone soudanienne. Celles-ci procurent de la nourriture, des médicaments, divers services écosystémiques et surtout des revenus pour les populations. Par contre, *Carapa procera* est une plante particulière, car il revêt des aspects à la fois socioculturels et économiques liés aux femmes. Ce qui soulève la problématique des rapports de la biodiversité et du genre dans la gestion des ressources forestières.

Carapa procera a fait l'objet de plusieurs travaux de recherche, mais le constat reste le même. Sur tous les travaux antérieurs relatifs à la question de l'espèce *Carapa procera* que nous avons consultés, l'accent est plus mis sur les aspects socio-économiques et botaniques que sur le genre. Pourtant, considérant les services générés par cette espèce et les convoitises qu'elle éveille dans les communautés de la Basse Casamance du Sénégal, il y a nécessité d'engager un regard scientifique sur le genre. En effet, l'exploitation de *Carapa procera*, bien que traditionnellement exercée par les femmes, fait de plus en plus intervenir aussi les hommes et participe de façon significative à l'économie des ménages. Cependant, en quoi cette espèce est-elle particulière pour les femmes des communautés en question ?

Cet aspect n'est pas suffisamment mis en valeur dans la littérature. L'intérêt de ce travail est de susciter la réflexion autour des rapports biodiversité-genre, plus particulièrement entre *Carapa procera* et la femme en Basse Casamance, afin de mieux prendre conscience de la nécessité de protéger l'espèce. Elle s'articule autour de deux questions principales :

- L'espèce n'est-elle pas considérée comme un patrimoine des femmes dans les communautés Diola de la zone d'étude ?
- En tant que patrimoine, quelle est la contribution de cette espèce dans l'amélioration des revenus des ménages ?

État de la question

La recherche bibliographique a permis de faire le point sur les travaux concernant cet arbre. Plusieurs sont répertoriés et analysés. Ils sont regroupés en deux catégories prenant en compte divers aspects de l'espèce *Carapa procera*.

Les aspects botaniques : ce sont des études descriptives sur les peuplements de *Carapa procera*. Globalement, les études traduisent la fragilité des peuplements de *Carapa procera* en Afrique de l'Ouest. D'après Sanogo (2015:20), les peuplements de *Carapa procera* sont menacés de disparition à cause de la concurrence d'autres espèces commerciales (coton, karité), de la faiblesse de la régénération naturelle (faible fructification et ramassage des graines) et du vieillissement des peuplements (Sanogo 2015:68). Aussi, s'intéressant à la régénération naturelle du *Carapa procera* dans ses travaux, Sanogo (2015:77) constate que les graines ne tolèrent pas la dessiccation lors de la germination. Ainsi, il se focalise sur les conditions optimales de germination et de conservation des graines de *Carapa procera* afin de développer des techniques pour promouvoir sa culture et sa domestication en général. Il recommande de maintenir une teneur en eau des graines supérieure à 35 pour cent pour conserver les capacités de germination des graines. Dans le même ordre d'idée, Nonviho (2015:86) a mis le focus sur les caractéristiques chimiques des graines de *Carapa procera* et sur son potentiel en tant que bio-insecticide. Lokokuande *et al.* (2017:39) ont travaillé sur des méthodes de prévision de la production. Les résultats révèlent qu'il est possible de prédire la production de graines de *Carapa procera* et par conséquent de gérer de façon durable les stocks.

Les aspects socio-économiques : ils font référence aux usages de cette espèce dans différentes communautés. L'importance d'un arbre se mesure à l'aune des services qu'il procure à la société. De ce point de vue, *Carapa procera* est un arbre plein de vertus médicinales. C'est à ce titre qu'il est exploité au sud du Mali et du Sénégal. Ainsi, Weber *et al.* (2010:349) décrivent les processus d'extraction de l'huile dans les deux pays. Ils reviennent aussi sur les usages thérapeutiques et bio-insecticides. Dans la même veine, Gueye *et al.* (2010:364) reprennent certains usages et insistent sur la commercialisation de l'huile. Celle-ci génère des revenus conséquents pour les populations. Par contre Djihounouck (2010:22) s'est investi sur les considérations culturelles qui entourent *Carapa procera* en Basse Casamance. Cet arbre entre dans l'accomplissement de plusieurs rites de la communauté.

À ces aspects botaniques, économiques et culturels, nous intégrons le genre et l'impact socio-économique de *Carapa procera* pour les ménages. L'aspect

genre n'est généralement pas suffisamment pris en compte dans bon nombre d'études sur les autres produits forestiers non ligneux. Néanmoins, quelques travaux remarquables sont notés sur des espèces forestières comme *Detarium senegalense*, communément appelé ditakh au Sénégal. Il s'agit entre autres des travaux de Mbaye (2006:115), qui montrent de façon progressive la pertinence d'une base d'information sur la cueillette en brousse, en se servant des outils de la géographie et d'un produit forestier, *Detarium senegalense*, provenant d'un parc sélectionné dans le Delta du Saloum. Quelle est la réalité qui se manifeste à travers l'organisation d'une activité de cueillette, relativement discrète, dont le fonctionnement dépend d'abord des logiques des populations locales ? Dans sa thèse, l'auteure remarque l'importance de la cueillette de *Detarium* parmi une diversité d'activités spécifiques aux Niominka des îles du Saloum (Sénégal). Aussi, à travers la mise en évidence de la diversité des systèmes de revenus des paysans, qui ne se limitent pas aux principales activités primaires, Mbaye (2006:189), prend en compte la dimension genre dans les systèmes de production et/ou de prélèvement dans les îles Gandoul. La valeur économique des produits forestiers non ligneux notamment *Detarium senegalense* et leur potentialité au sein de la population riveraine sont mises en exergue. L'importance socio-économique du ditakh pour la population des villages de Bétenty, Bossinkang, Sippo, et les deux Djinack (Bara et Djatack) a également été signalée par Diop (2013:10). À ce propos, l'auteure écrit que : « Dans les zones de production du Sénégal, principalement dans la région de Fatick, le ditakh constitue un produit important dans l'économie d'exploitation. Il constitue en outre la principale source de revenus des populations ». Le même constat est fait par Ndao *et al.* (2014:140-143) qui note qu'en milieu rural, plus particulièrement dans la commune rurale de Niaguis, située dans la région de Ziguinchor, l'activité de cueillette des produits forestiers non ligneux permet à la population de combler les déficits alimentaires et de fournir des apports financiers. En effet, compte tenu de leur exploitation, de leur transformation, mais aussi de leur commercialisation, ces produits forestiers contribuent de manière significative à la réduction de la pauvreté et de la faim en milieu rural. Ndao *et al.* (2014:128-143) donne ainsi à travers son étude d'importants enseignements sur l'exploitation des PFNL et leur rôle dans la lutte contre la pauvreté et la faim en milieu rural.

Objectif général

Cette étude est donc une contribution à une meilleure connaissance des implications socio-économiques de *Carapa procera* dans les communes rurales en Basse Casamance.

Objectifs spécifiques

De façon plus opérationnelle, deux objectifs sont poursuivis dans ce travail :

- Montrer les rapports socioculturels entre *Carapa procera* et la femme dans les communautés concernées.
- Estimer l'apport de cette plante en termes de revenus pour les femmes.

En réalité, nous demeurons convaincus que la biodiversité à travers *Carapa procera* est un atout certain pour les populations de façon générale, et pour les femmes particulièrement.

Pour atteindre ces objectifs, deux hypothèses de travail sont formulées :

- Dans le contexte de la Basse Casamance, la gestion de *Carapa procera* serait culturellement réservée à la femme.
- Aussi cette espèce serait-elle une source de revenus importante pour cette catégorie sociale de la zone d'étude.

Clarification des concepts

Trois concepts importants sont utilisés dans le cadre de ce travail et nécessitent de préciser leur sens. Le premier d'entre eux est celui du « genre ». En effet, la perception la plus répandue du « genre » renvoie à des considérations biologiques. Il traduit alors une ligne qui sépare l'homme et la femme. Ces considérations se prolongent dans la sphère sociale et déterminent les positions de chaque individu dans la société en fonction de son sexe ; ce qui a pénalisé les femmes en les excluant de certaines opportunités. Le concept a évolué au début des années 1970. Historiquement, il est repris par les féministes qui revisitent les rôles hommes/femmes. Le concept de « genre » ou « *gender* » (en anglais) est désormais compris comme « une manière de se référer à l'organisation sociale de la relation entre les sexes » (Scott 1988:126). Le journal *La tribune des droits des femmes* de janvier 2009, cité par d'Almeida (2009:9), définit le genre comme un ensemble de rôles fixés par la société et culturellement variables, que les hommes et les femmes jouent dans leur vie quotidienne. Pour Diallo (2013:68), c'est « un concept qui met donc l'accent sur les rôles sociaux qui sont appris à travers le processus de socialisation et qui changent selon la localisation et l'époque. Le genre relève donc de la culture ». Simone de Beauvoir, dans *Le deuxième sexe* (1949), cité par Chaperon (1997:1), souligne cette distribution des rôles programmée par les sociétés et les inégalités homme/femme qu'elle engendre. Toutes ces définitions insistent sur la répartition des tâches sur des bases biologiques, les inégalités homme/femme qu'elle induit dans les sociétés. Ce concept de genre vise à démontrer dans quelle mesure ces considérations peuvent être corrigées pour atténuer les discriminations et renforcer l'égalité des chances

entre les hommes et les femmes. Dans ce travail, nous souscrivons à cette perception du genre, d'autant plus que la gestion de *Carapa procera* intègre à la fois les hommes et les femmes et contribue à réduire les inégalités homme/femme par le biais des ressources qu'il génère au profit des femmes.

Carapa procera dont il est question est un arbre qui appartient à la famille des Méliacées, du genre *Carapa*. C'est une espèce tropicale à climat chaud et humide. Elle est une espèce esciophyte partielle, c'est-à-dire qu'elle exige peu de lumière dans les premières années de sa croissance, mais une fois bien développée, elle demande une quantité importante pour croître rapidement (Guillemot 2004:4). Les nombreuses études faites sur cette espèce montrent qu'elle est présente dans toutes les forêts d'Afrique tropicale. Sa distribution va de l'équateur au rift d'Albertine, jusqu'au Mali pour sa limite la plus septentrionale (Weber 2010:344; Guillemot 2004:4; Sanago et al. 2015:19). Au Sénégal, elle est principalement présente dans les régions SW et SE du pays. La région de Ziguinchor, bénéficiant d'une pluviométrie > 1 000 mm/an, présente des conditions écologiques favorables à son développement. Les différentes parties de l'arbre, des racines aux écorces, servent à la préparation de divers produits (médicaux, cosmétiques, etc.). Son intérêt réside dans le fait que son exploitation impacte l'économie des ménages, d'où la nécessité de définir ce concept. L'économie des ménages fait référence à la gestion quotidienne des ressources de la cellule familiale. Dans nos sociétés, la place assignée à la femme dans le fonctionnement de ce système est primordiale. Elle est au cœur de son fonctionnement en ce sens qu'elle développe un ensemble de stratégies pour se procurer de la nourriture et de l'argent pour le ménage. Elle participe en partie à l'injection des ressources issues de ses différentes activités, parmi lesquelles l'exploitation de *Carapa procera*. Dans ce travail, elle est comprise comme toute activité de production ayant pour but la prise en charge de la famille.


Présentation de la zone d'étude

Le site de l'étude est un ensemble de localités situées en Basse Casamance dans la région de Ziguinchor au Sud-Ouest du Sénégal. Il est constitué de 7 villages (Mlomp Blouf, Thionck-Essyl, Ediamath, Mlomp Kassa, Loudia Diola, Djembéring, Bouyouye) répartis de part et d'autre du fleuve Casamance (Carte 1) et recoupant trois territoires traditionnels (Blouf, Kassa et Dyawatt) avec un parler distinct (Pélissier 1966:380; Cormier-Salem 1992:23). Les villages de Thionck-Essyl (12°47'08" nord, 16°31'18" ouest), de Mlomp (12°49'44" nord, 16°31'39" ouest) et d'Ediamath (12°44'25" nord, 16°28'12" ouest), situés dans la commune de Mlomp, font partie du territoire traditionnel Blouf, qui correspond à la partie située

sur la rive nord du fleuve Casamance jusqu'à la frontière avec la Gambie. Administrativement, le Blouf appartient au département de Bignona et correspond à l'arrondissement de Tendouck au Sud-ouest, situé à 40 km environ à l'Ouest de Bignona.

Au sud du fleuve Casamance, notamment dans le département d'Oussouye, se trouvent les villages de Bouyouye (12°26'38" nord, 16°45'16" ouest) et Djembéring dans la commune de Djembéring. Ces villages correspondent au territoire traditionnel Dyawat (Cormier-Salem 1992:23) situé au sud-ouest de la région de Ziguinchor, plus précisément dans l'arrondissement de Cabrousse. La commune rurale de Djembéring est limitée au nord par la commune rurale de Kafountine, au sud par la République de Guinée-Bissau, à l'est par l'océan Atlantique et à l'ouest par les communes rurales de Mlomp, Oukout et Santhiaba Manjacque (Carte 1).

Les villages de Loudia Diola (12°30'49" nord, 16°36'12" ouest) et de Mlomp Kassa (12°33'11" nord, 16°35'39" ouest) appartiennent à la commune de Mlomp et correspondent au territoire traditionnel du Kassa, constitué des communes rurales de M'lomp et de Oukout. Elles sont limitées par les communes rurales de Kafountine et Mangagoulack au nord, celles Santhiaba Manjacque et de Nyassia au sud, celles de Djembéring et d'Enampor respectivement à l'ouest et à l'est (Carte 1).



Carte 1 : Localisation de la zone d'étude

La zone est entièrement dans l'espace tropical. Le climat est de type soudanien côtier (Sagna et Leroux 2000:16). Il est marqué par une longue saison sèche (novembre-mai) et une courte saison pluvieuse (juin-octobre). La région est l'une des plus pluvieuses du pays avec 1 300 mm/an en moyenne et une tendance à la hausse depuis la décennie 1990 Diémé (2019:181). La chaleur est permanente avec une moyenne annuelle de 29° C.

Le relief est constitué de deux unités distinctes : les bas-plateaux (- 40 m d'altitude) et les bas-fonds. Les sols se répartissent des plateaux vers les bas-fonds en passant les pentes. Ainsi, sur les plateaux, se distinguent les sols ferralitiques, poreux et riches en argile (15 à 20 %). On y pratique la culture du mil, de l'arachide et du maïs. Sur les pentes on trouve les sols ferrugineux, gorgés d'eau provenant du Continental terminal. C'est le domaine du maraîchage. Les bas-fonds sont tapis par les sols hydromorphes constitués entre les vasières et les tannes. C'est le domaine de la riziculture.

Ces sols ont des valeurs culturales certaines. Cependant, ils sont sujets à plusieurs facteurs de dégradation (salinité, érosion et urbanisation).

La végétation est de type forêt demi-sèche dense caractérisée par des espèces subguinéennes dont les plus représentatives sont *Khaya senegalensis* (Caïlcédra), *Azizelia africana* (Linké), *Parinari excelsa* (Mampato), *Ceiba pentandra* (Fromager), *Chlorophora regia* (Iroko), *Antiaris africana* (Tomboiro), *Detarium senegalense* (Ditakh) et *Erythrophloeum guineense* (Tali). Dans l'estuaire, la mangrove à *Rhizophora* et à *Avicennia* prend le relais sur une superficie d'environ 100 000 ha. La végétation est en régression depuis au moins deux décennies, sous l'effet des défrichements, des coupes anarchiques, des feux de brousse et de la sécheresse (Gueye 2000:13). Mais de récentes études montrent que la reconstitution de cette unité paysagère est en court (Andrieu & Mering 2008:116).

Sur le plan humain, le peuplement majoritairement constitué de Diola qui constituent 57,8 pour cent de la population. Ce groupe ethnique est constitué de plusieurs sous-groupes caractérisés par un parler, une dénomination et une localisation distincts (Cormier-Salem 1992:23). Hecquard (1852), cité par Kébé (2006:39), fut le premier à donner une classification des groupes de ce grand ensemble ethnique. Il rencontra, près de l'embouchure notamment, sur la rive gauche du fleuve Casamance, les Floups ou Feloupes, et les Banjars plus à l'Est. Bérenger Féraud dénombrera neuf groupes diola tandis que Maclaud au début du XXe siècle, en énumérera dix¹. Plus tard, compte tenu des données linguistiques, Thomas, cité par Cormier-Salem (1992:23), élabore des subdivisions plus fines. Il distingue sur la rive nord du fleuve Casamance les Bliss Karone et les Fogni, tandis qu'au sud se trouvent les Floup (région d'Oussouye), les Diamat (Youtou-Effoc), les Dyawat (Djembéring), les Haer

(Kabrousse), les Diola de la Pointe Saint-Georges (Kagnout-Mlomp), et les Diola Brin-Seleky, auxquels il ajoute les deux groupes apparentés, les Bayot et les Bainunk. Les Blouf, les Kassa et les Fogni constituent les sous-groupes Diola les plus représentatifs numériquement. Sur ce groupe principal dioula se greffent d'autres composantes ethniques du pays, dont les Mandingues (11,1 %), les Pulaars (10,5 %), les Ouolofs (3,9 %), les Manjacques (3,5 %), les Balantes (2,9 %), les Mancagnes (2,4 %), les Sérères (2,7 %), etc. (ANSD/SRPSZ, 2015:12). Ce qui fait de la zone d'étude une mosaïque de peuples. Cette zone est l'une des rares où l'exploitation de *Carapa procera* est encore une réalité, d'où son intérêt pour cette étude.

Méthode

L'exploitation de *Carapa procera* implique plusieurs intervenants. Trois groupes cibles ont été identifiés pour les besoins de cette étude : les ménages, les transformatrices et les personnes-ressources. Pour déterminer la taille de l'échantillon des ménages, la méthode de Dagnelie, reprise par Gbemavo *et al.* (2014:71) et Assogba *et al.* (2017:20) a été adoptée. Elle s'écrit ainsi :

$$n = \frac{U_{1-\alpha/2}^2 \times p(1-p)}{d^2}$$

n la taille de l'échantillon à considérer dans l'ensemble de la zone d'étude.

$U_{1-\alpha/2}$ est la valeur de la variable aléatoire normale aléatoire pour une valeur de probabilité de α ($\alpha = 0,05$; $U_{1-\alpha/2} = 1,96$) et d la marge d'erreur fixée à 5 %.

p est la proportion d'individus connaissant et ayant fait usage de l'espèce *Carapa procera*.

Cette méthode consiste à effectuer une enquête exploratoire dans la zone d'étude. Ainsi, 30 personnes ont été choisies de façon aléatoire dans le village le plus représentatif et le plus actif dans l'exploitation de *Carapa procera*. Le village de Thionck-Essyl a retenu notre attention.

Ce travail exploratoire a permis de déterminer la proportion p (83 %) d'individus ayant un rapport quelconque avec *Carapa procera*. À partir de la valeur trouvée, la taille de l'échantillon est déterminée avec une marge d'erreur de 5 pour cent (tableau 1) et répartie en fonction du poids démographique de chaque village de l'étude.

L'échantillon des transformatrices a été déterminé par une démarche composite. En effet, compte tenu d'un certain nombre de contraintes (refus, rareté, taille inconnue de la population cible), nous avons décidé de porter l'échantillon total à 90 individus répartis par quotas en fonction du poids

démographique de chaque localité (tableau 2). Pour les localités dont le nombre d'individus à enquêter est inférieur ou égal à 1, un quota de 5 leur a été ajouté.

Ensuite, après cette répartition, la méthode non probabiliste appelée « boule de neige » a été appliquée. Elle consiste à identifier un certain nombre d'individus correspondant à la population d'étude. Il leur est demandé de répondre au questionnaire et ensuite de citer parmi leurs connaissances d'autres personnes appartenant également à la population d'étude afin de les interroger à leur tour. Cette méthode est très efficace et souvent la seule permettant de constituer un échantillon quand la population est rare, difficile d'accès ou sa taille inconnue, comme c'est le cas des transformatrices dans les villages de l'étude.

Pour les personnes-ressources, des entretiens sous forme de *focus groups* ont été effectués avec des personnes-ressources comme les chefs de village et notables dans les différentes localités.

Le choix des différents sites de l'étude n'est pas fortuit. L'aire de répartition géographique correspond à la Basse Casamance (sud-ouest) et au Sénégal oriental (sud-est). Ces régions présentent des conditions permettant le développement de *Carapa procera*. De plus, la région du Sénégal oriental ne s'adonne pas à la production de l'huile de *Capara procera*. C'est pourquoi nous lui avons préféré la Basse Casamance où les considérations socio-économiques sont encore vivaces.

Tableau 1 : Échantillonnage des villages de l'étude

Villages	Population par village (n)	Effectif interrogé par village (% par village X nombre de personnes interrogées : 100)
Thionck-Essyl	8 388	41
Mlomp	2 659	13
Ediamath (Djiguoth)	406	2
Mlomp	5 531	52
Loudia Diola	317	3
Djembéring	2 619	94
Bouyouye	229	8
Total	20 149	213

Source : données ANSD 2013; calcul : Mbaye *et al.* 2019

Tableau 2 : Échantillonnage des transformatrices dans les villages de l'étude

Villages	Nombre d'habitants	Nombre d'habitants (%)	Nombre de questionnaires/ localité
Bouyouye	229	1	6
Djembéring	2 619	13	11
Mlomp Kassa	5 531	28	22
Loudia Diola	317	2	6
Mlomp Blouf	2 659	13	11
Thionk-Essyl	8 388	42	34
Total	19 743	100	90

Source : données ANSD 2013 ; calcul : Mbaye *et al.* 2019

Ce travail est organisé en trois parties. La première fait référence à la problématique et à la méthodologie. La deuxième présente une analyse des résultats de l'étude. La troisième partie discute des résultats de l'étude avant de terminer par une conclusion.

Résultats

L'application de la méthodologie a permis d'obtenir des résultats intéressants. Ceux-ci sont analysés avant d'être discutés dans la dernière partie de ce travail.

Carapa procera, un arbre caractéristique de la Casamance

La flore de la Casamance est très variée. Elle est constituée d'arbres et de plantes remarquables, dont certains ont une valeur particulière. Parmi ceux-ci, *Carapa procera* est l'une des plus emblématiques. La particularité de cet arbre relève de deux éléments. Le premier est relatif à sa distribution géographique. En effet, l'aire de répartition géographique de *Carapa procera* au Sénégal est restreinte. Elle est circonscrite entre la Basse Casamance et le Sénégal oriental c'est-à-dire l'actuelle région de Kédougou. Cette partie du pays dispose d'un environnement physique (sols, pluviométrie) favorable au développement de l'arbre. D'ailleurs, les plus fortes densités de peuplement de *Carapa procera* se trouvent dans ces régions sud. Le second fait référence à l'étroitesse des rapports entre l'arbre et la communauté, à tel point qu'il s'identifie au groupe ethnique Diola. Celui-ci détient le monopole de son exploitation au Sénégal. Ce rapport n'est pas fortuit. En effet, l'histoire explique ce rapport. La présence de cet arbre en Basse Casamance remonte loin dans le temps. Selon M. Djiba A., une de nos personnes-ressources interrogées à Thionck-Essyl :

La présence de cette espèce sur les terres occupées par les Diolas ne saurait être située de façon exacte. Elle pourrait être liée à la présence des premiers habitants de la Basse Casamance à savoir les Barbars². Ces derniers auraient quitté l'Éthiopie pour migrer successivement vers le Soudan, le Mali, le Kédougou avant de s'installer définitivement en Basse Casamance. D'après la tradition orale, ce peuple, partout où il s'installait, des plants de *Carapa procera* y ont été retrouvés [...]. Quoi qu'il en soit ce peuple originaire de l'Éthiopie, avait adopté cette plante et l'aurait introduite en Basse Casamance.

Ce récit témoigne du long cheminement entre l'arbre et les communautés qui l'ont adopté et acclimaté, au point que l'évocation de cet arbre et de ses dérivés renvoie immédiatement à la Basse Casamance et aux communautés Diola.

Une forme de transmission traditionnelle à la charge des femmes

La place des femmes dans le système de propriété est souvent secondaire. Cependant, la gestion et l'exploitation de cet arbre semblent être une affaire réservée aux femmes.

Carapa procera : un patrimoine des femmes

En plus d'être un arbre emblématique de la Basse Casamance, *Carapa procera* se distingue des autres par sa répartition en fonction du genre. En effet, parmi les individus propriétaires de cet arbre, la majorité est constituée de femmes. Elles sont 56,3 pour cent à se déclarer propriétaires contre 44,7 pour cent d'hommes (Figure 1). La gestion de cet arbre est un des rares domaines de propriété où l'empreinte du genre féminin est la plus affirmée.

En outre, cette proportion est plus élevée dans la réalité, car dans le cas où les hommes sont propriétaires, la gestion et l'exploitation des peuplements reviennent aux femmes de la famille.




Figure 1 : Répartition par genre des propriétaires

Source : Enquêtes Mbaye *et al.* août 2019

Une transmission favorable aux femmes

À propos de *Carapa procera*, trois modes d'acquisition traditionnelle sont identifiés. Certains sont acquis par «héritage» ou par un «don», d'autres ont été plantés «plantation» des pieds de *Carapa procera*. Le classement des propriétaires par forme d'acquisition et par genre a permis de dresser la figure 2.




Figure 2 : Répartition des formes d'acquisition par genre

Source : Enquêtes Mbaye *et al.* août 2019

Ainsi, parmi les individus ayant acquis *Carapa procera* par «héritage», les femmes sont majoritaires avec 68 pour cent des effectifs contre 32 pour cent pour les hommes. Il en va de même pour les propriétaires ayant planté leurs pieds de *Carapa procera*. Les femmes constituent 67 pour cent des effectifs contre 33 pour cent seulement pour les hommes. Enfin, il semble que les acquisitions par «don» sont exclusivement réservées aux femmes.

La prééminence des femmes dans les formes d'acquisition s'explique par la tradition. En effet, l'héritage est mis au profit des femmes de la famille. À ce propos, Gueye (2010:361) affirme qu'à Thionck-Essyl, «les pieds de *Carapa* naturels ou plantés sont très souvent des propriétés familiales et l'héritage est uniquement réservé aux femmes de la famille».

Nombre de pieds par exploitant

Le nombre d'individus par exploitant est relativement faible. La grande majorité dispose de moins de 4 pieds de *Carapa procera*. Le plus grand nombre de pieds par exploitant se trouve dans les villages du nord. Ainsi, 15 pour cent et 7 pour cent exploitent respectivement à Mlomp Blouf et Thionck-Essyl plus de 8 pieds de *Carapa procera*.

Cette répartition par exploitant (Tableau 3) s'explique par le fait que le peuplement est plus dense dans les villages du nord (Mlomp Blouf et Thionck-Essyl). D'ailleurs, ces villages concentrent les plus grandes productrices d'huile de *Carapa procera*. Par contre, le nombre restreint de pieds par exploitant est lié au fait que le peuplement est éparé dans les villages du sud. Plus de 70 pour cent d'entre eux ne disposent pas de plus de 4 pieds.

Tableau 3 : Nombre de pieds de *Carapa procera* par exploitant dans les villages de l'étude

Localités	moins de 4	4 à 8	8 et plus	Total
Loudia Diola	81	19	0	100
Mlomp Kassa	97	3	0	100
Ediamath	100	0	0	100
Mlomp Blouf	74	11	15	100
Thionck-Essyl	78	15	7	100

Source : Enquêtes Mbaye *et al.* août 2019

La transformation de la graine, un savoir-faire des femmes aînées

La figure 3 représente les classes d'âge qui s'activent dans l'exploitation de *Carapa procera*. Elle prend en compte les acteurs impliqués dans la chaîne de transformation. Cette chaîne est contrôlée à tous les stades par les femmes. Les exigences culturelles de la production de l'huile de *Carapa procera* font que l'activité a longtemps été confiée aux femmes d'un âge avancé ayant cessé de procréer. L'analyse du tableau 3 confirme cette réalité. En effet, les transformatrices sont d'un âge avancé dans les villages où l'activité est la plus intense. Ainsi, dans les villages de Thionck-Essyl, Mlomp Blouf, Mlomp Kassa et Loudia Diola, la majorité des transformatrices a dépassé l'âge de 45 ans. D'ailleurs, les femmes âgées de plus de 65 ans constituent 50 pour cent des effectifs à Mlomp Kassa, 45 pour cent à Thionck-Essyl, 40 pour cent à Mlomp Blouf et 33 pour cent à Loudia Diola.

Les plus fortes proportions de jeunes s'observent à Bouyouye avec 43 pour cent de femmes âgées de moins de 35 ans, 38 pour cent à Djembéring et 33 pour cent à Loudia Diola. Cette classe d'âge n'apparaît pas à Thionck-Essyl, Mlomp Kassa, Loudia Ouolof, Djembéring.

Le poids des quinquagénaires et des sexagénaires est important dans la transformation des graines de *Carapa procera*. Dans ce secteur, le caractère laborieux du travail d'extraction et surtout le poids de la tradition empêchent les jeunes femmes de s'engager dans cette activité. Cependant, dans le Sud,

notamment à Bouyouye, où la proportion de jeunes femmes s'adonnant à la production est plus importante, le poids de la tradition est moindre et les jeunes sont attirées par les revenus qu'elles tirent de la commercialisation de l'huile de *Carapa procera*.

Cette implication des jeunes dans la transformation des graines de *Carapa procera* ne se justifie pas par un intérêt pécuniaire, mais plutôt par une volonté d'assister les vieilles femmes dans ces travaux, qui nécessitent beaucoup d'énergie physique. D'ailleurs, les activités des jeunes sont plus notées lors du pilage et grillage des graines de *Carapa procera*.




Figure 3 : Structure par âge des transformatrices/villages

Source : Enquêtes Mbaye *et al.* août 2019

Importance économique de Carapa procera dans les villages de l'étude

Les plantes jouent un rôle important dans la vie des communautés. *Carapa procera* est un arbre d'une grande valeur culturelle et économique pour les femmes des différents villages de l'étude.

Une production faible

Le ramassage des graines de *Carapa procera* se fait entre les mois de juin et septembre dans la période où les mangues mûrissent. Il implique les femmes et parfois des hommes quand le peuplement est dans un site sacré réservé aux hommes. C'est le seul stade où les hommes sont associés à l'exploitation de cet arbre. Il arrive aussi que volontairement, l'homme décide de ramasser pour son épouse pour l'appuyer.

L'analyse de la figure montre une diversité de situations. En moyenne, les femmes ramassent moins de 5 seaux de graines par campagne. Ainsi, excepté Mlomp Kassa (14 %), au moins 43 pour cent des exploitants de chaque

village collectent moins de 5 seaux de graines/campagne. Bouyouye détient la plus forte proportion d'exploitants collectant moins de 5 seaux de graines, soit 69 pour cent, suivi de Thionck-Essyl (55 %) et de Mlomp Blouf (50 %). Ils peuvent être qualifiés de « petits exploitants » et sont les plus nombreux.

Par contre, les plus grands collecteurs sont répartis entre Thionck-Essyl (25 %), Mlomp Blouf (25 %) et Djembéring, dont le nombre de seaux de graines ramassées dépasse 15/exploitant. Ce sont les « grands exploitants ». Entre les deux s'intercalent les transformatrices de moyenne envergure. Ils constituent entre 15 pour cent et 50 pour cent des productrices selon les localités (Figure 4).




Figure 4 : Nombre de seaux de noix collectés par transformatrice dans les différentes localités

Source : Enquêtes Mbaye *et al.* août 2019

La variation du nombre de seaux ramassés dépend de plusieurs facteurs. Entre autres, citons :

- l'âge des populations : en fait, plus la population est jeune, plus la productivité est importante ;
- le nombre de pieds par exploitant : avoir plusieurs pieds de *Carapa procera* à exploiter peut favoriser l'abondance des récoltes de graines ;
- enfin, le nombre de personnes exploitant le même peuplement. En effet, les peuplements appartiennent à une famille dont les membres se partagent les ressources. Un tel système réduit les quantités ramassées par exploitant même si la production est importante.

Les volumes d'huile extraite assez faibles

Les volumes produits varient d'une période à une autre, d'un lieu à un autre ou encore d'un exploitant à un autre. Ils sont généralement faibles et inférieurs à 10 litres. La proportion de cette catégorie de transformatrices varie entre 25 pour cent à Mlomp Blouf (figure 5) et 71,4 pour cent à Mlomp Kassa.




Figure 5 : Volume d'huile par transformatrice et par localité

Source : Enquêtes Mbaye *et al.* août 2019

Ainsi, elles sont 21,4 pour cent à Mlomp Kassa, 50,0 pour cent à Loudia Ouolof, 51,1 pour cent à Thionck-Essyl et 57,1 pour cent à Bouyouye à obtenir entre 5 et 10 litres d'huile de *Carapa procera* par campagne.

Les grandes transformatrices, c'est-à-dire celles dont la production est comprise entre 20 et 30 litres, constituent 40 pour cent des effectifs à Mlomp Blouf, 20 pour cent à Thionck-Essyl, et 7,7 pour cent à Mlomp Kassa et Djembéring.

Dans les villages de Thionck-Essyl et de Mlomp Blouf, 15 et 5 pour cent des transformatrices arrivent à obtenir entre 30 litres et 40 litres. Ces zones sont les plus abondantes en termes de production.

L'exploitation de *Carapa procera*, une activité à haut niveau de revenu pour les femmes

Les quantités de graines collectées sont faibles. Les volumes d'huile produite sont également faibles, car la majorité des productrices n'extraient pas plus de 10 litres. Par contre, l'huile a une valeur ajoutée très importante, d'où son importance pour les femmes.

Variation des prix par localité

Le prix de vente de l'huile de *carapa* varie entre 7 000 FCFA et 9 000 FCFA le litre (tableau 5). C'est l'intervalle de prix le plus fréquent dans les différentes localités. Ainsi, 45 pour cent, 55 pour cent, 75 pour cent et 60 pour cent des individus respectivement à Thionck-Essyl, Mlomp Blouf, Mlomp Kassa et Djembéring pratiquent cet intervalle de prix. Les prix les plus élevés

sont pratiqués à Thionck-Essyl, avec parfois plus de 11 000 FCFA le litre. Les prix les plus bas sont pratiqués à Mlomp Kassa et Djembéring, où respectivement 10 pour cent et 15 pour cent des enquêtés pratiquent des prix inférieurs (<) à 5 000 FCFA. Ce tableau est révélateur des disparités de prix d'une localité à une autre.

C'est dans les zones où *Carapa procera* est le plus abondant que le prix de l'huile atteint parfois des niveaux très élevés. Mais cela peut également s'expliquer par le fait que la demande est tellement forte qu'elle installe une augmentation des prix ou une surenchère.

Tableau 5 : Variation des prix de vente par localité

Localité Prix/L	Moins de 5 000	5000- 7000	7000- 9000	9 000 – 11 000	Plus de 11 000	Total
Thionck-Essyl	0	40	45	10	5	100
Mlomp (Blouf)	0	35	60	5	0	100
Mlomp (Kassa)	10	25	55	10	0	100
Loudia Diola	0	0	75	25	0	100
Djembéring	15	15	60	0	0	100

Source : Enquêtes Mbaye *et al.* août 2019

Revenus annuels liés à la vente de l'huile de Carapa procera

L'huile extraite des graines, faisant l'objet de transformation de la part de certaines femmes, est connue pour ses nombreuses vertus (médicinales, médico-mystiques, insecticides, insectifuges, etc.) et est très prisée par les populations. Elle est commercialisée au niveau des différents marchés locaux et son prix ne cesse de grimper face à une demande grandissante qui se heurte à ses difficultés d'accès. Ainsi, les résultats révèlent que les revenus annuels des productrices sont très variables. Après traitement de l'information, nous constatons que 27,5 pour cent des transformatrices gagnent moins de 50 000 FCFA, 45 pour cent gagnent une somme comprise entre 100 000 FCFA et 50 000 FCFA tandis que 20 pour cent d'entre elles gagnent entre 150 000 FCFA et 200 000 FCFA. Une petite fraction (1,3 %), c'est-à-dire les grosses productrices, gagne plus de 250 000 FCFA par campagne. Considérant ces revenus, on comprend bien l'importance de *Carapa procera* dans l'économie des ménages de la zone d'étude. Si la filière était mieux organisée, elle aurait procuré des revenus plus conséquents, équitables et réguliers pour les femmes transformatrices, d'où la nécessité de travailler à organiser les femmes en association.




Figure 6 : Revenus annuels par transformatrice

Source : Enquête Mbaye *et al.* août 2019

Destination de *Carapa procera*

La figure 7 montre que le marché local est le plus important de tous avec 76,2 pour cent des effectifs. En effet, pendant longtemps la production fut destinée à la consommation locale. Cela se comprend aisément, car l'huile est un élément important dans le dispositif culturel et sanitaire des populations. Elle constitue la trousse de secours des populations. Ainsi, l'huile est utilisée avant de recourir à la médecine moderne. C'est pourquoi son utilisation est très répandue dans les localités de production.

Ziguinchor (10 %) et Dakar (3,8 %) constituent les deux autres marchés de consommation de l'huile de *Carapa procera*. Aujourd'hui, ces marchés prennent de l'ampleur au point que les villages de production épuisent rapidement leur stock. Ce qui se traduit par les prix élevés sur le marché.

Contribution des revenus à l'échelle familiale

Dans les villages de l'étude, les femmes s'adonnent à plusieurs activités économiques. Celles-ci tournent autour de la riziculture, de la cueillette de produits forestiers non ligneux et de la pêche. L'exploitation de *Carapa procera* est l'une des activités les plus génératrices de revenus et dont les bénéfices restent entre les mains des femmes. D'ailleurs, souvent, l'exploitation de *Carapa procera* est la seule source de revenus de ces femmes dont la plupart sont sans emplois.




Figure 7 : Les marchés de distribution de l’huile de *Carapa procera*

Source : Enquête Mbaye *et al.* août 2019

Les revenus sont destinés à la prise en charge des besoins de la famille. Une analyse de la figure 8 montre que 76,2 pour cent des revenus de *Carapa procera* sont destinés aux besoins de la famille, 12,3 pour cent, aux frais de scolarité des enfants et 11,5 pour cent aux dépenses de santé. Cette répartition est une moyenne, car la proportion allouée à l’une des rubriques varie d’une localité à l’autre.




Figure 8 : Usages des revenus de *Carapa procera*

Source : Enquête *et al.* août 2019

Discussion

Les femmes sont relativement discriminées dans divers aspects de la vie socio-économique (Elias & Fernandez 2014:290). Elles sont reléguées au second plan en matière de gestion foncière et de pouvoir de décision. Pourtant en Basse Casamance, il existe des parcelles où elles exercent une certaine souveraineté. Ce travail a mis en évidence la relation entre *Carapa procera* et le genre. La discussion se fera sous deux rapports.

Un patrimoine concédé aux femmes

Dans le domaine du *Carapa procera*, les propriétaires (53,3 %) sont majoritairement des femmes. De plus, la tradition accorde le privilège à celles-ci en matière d'héritage et l'exclusivité de la transformation des graines en huile. Cela nous pousse à considérer cet arbre comme un patrimoine géré par les femmes. Cet aspect patrimonial ressort dans plusieurs études. En effet, en Haute Guinée, Touré (2018:15) présente l'arbre à néré (*Parkia biglobosa*) comme un patrimoine collectif, mais réservé aux femmes. De même, dans la commune de Mangagoulack (Sénégal, Ziguinchor), cette espèce est également perçue comme un patrimoine communautaire, dont l'exploitation, en particulier la cueillette, implique tous les membres du ménage, même si les femmes restent les principales concernées (Goudiaby 2013:60). Au Burkina Faso, Ouedraogo (2012:31) souligne que l'implication coutumière des femmes dans la collecte et le traitement du karité est la caractéristique la plus marquante du produit. À son avis, le karité est un des rares biens détenant une valeur économique qui demeure sous le contrôle des femmes soudano-sahéliennes. Webber *et al.* (2010:349) aussi déclarent dans leurs écrits que l'extraction de l'huile de *Carapa procera* est «l'affaire des femmes». En effet, à force d'exploiter cette espèce, celle-ci est finalement associée aux femmes qui exercent un droit de propriété et d'usufruit sur l'espèce en question Touré (2018:8). Dembélé *et al.* (2015:4) ajoutent que les femmes présentent un degré élevé de consensus³ sur l'espèce et sa graine. Celle-ci entre dans la fabrication de divers produits cosmétiques très prisés par les femmes. Ces différents aspects permettent de révéler l'étroite relation entre l'arbre, ici *Carapa procera*, et le genre féminin. Seulement aujourd'hui, avec la montée de la valeur marchande des produits forestiers ligneux et la crise agricole dans la zone rurale, ce patrimoine est de plus en plus convoité par les hommes, réduisant ainsi les revenus des femmes, comme le soulignent Tchatat et Ndoeye (2006:32) et Touré (2018:7). Ce dernier va plus loin et note que cet intérêt nouveau de la part des hommes réduit également considérablement l'accès des femmes à cette ressource sur les terres familiales.

Un patrimoine source de revenus pour les ménages

Le manque d'emploi est phénomène criant dans la zone d'étude, surtout pour les femmes d'un certain âge. Grâce à l'exploitation de *Carapa procera*, ces femmes peuvent gagner jusqu'à 250 000 FCFA/an, voire plus. Cela constitue un revenu substantiel pour elles et leurs ménages. C'est cet aspect qui intéresse les hommes. En réalité, avec la crise des cultures vivrières et commerciales, les hommes s'impliquent dans un des segments de la filière (ramassage ou commercialisation). Les sommes récoltées sont destinées à la prise en charge des frais de santé, d'équipement et de scolarité des enfants. Ce faisant, l'exploitation des produits forestiers non ligneux en général et de *Carapa procera* en particulier joue un rôle important pour l'économie des ménages de la zone d'étude. De ce point de vue, nos résultats sont similaires à ceux établis dans plusieurs travaux de recherche sur l'espèce *Carapa procera* et sur d'autres produits forestiers non ligneux. Ainsi, Gueye *et al.* (2010:363) et Webber *et al.* (2010:351) s'accordent sur le potentiel économique de *Carapa procera* respectivement au sud du Mali et en Basse Casamance (Sénégal). Dans le même sillage, Ndao (2018:11-12) évalue l'apport de la cueillette dans l'économie des ménages à Niaguis. À propos de *Parkia biglobosa* et de *Detarium senegalense*, Mbaye (2006:206), Goudiaby (2013:64), Diatta (2018:203) et Diémé (2019:244) admettent l'importance de la contribution de ces PFNL dans les revenus des ménages en zone rurale. En effet, selon Mbaye (2006:105), la cueillette constitue une part importante à la satisfaction des besoins des ménages ruraux. En d'autres termes, elle participe à l'élimination de la pauvreté, surtout dans ces zones enclavées. Dans cette activité, le rôle de la femme apparaît clairement en première position sur toute la filière, depuis la cueillette, en amont, à la mise en filière en zone de brousse, jusque vers les marchés urbains, qui constituent de grands consommateurs, absorbant la plus grande partie des quantités exploitées. Entre 2001 et 2004, le plus gros marché de PFNL à Dakar, le marché syndicat de Pikine, enregistre à lui seul les 73 pour cent du ditakh écoulé à partir du delta du Saloum, particulièrement dans les îles Falia, Moundé, Diogane (Mbaye 2006:207). Les recettes sont *a priori* au profit de la femme exploitante et ses enfants qui l'accompagnent aussi dans l'activité en général. L'argent est souvent utilisé pour les besoins du ménage (denrées alimentaires, fournitures scolaires, vêtements, etc.). Diop (2013:17) abonde dans ce sens et révèle que la commercialisation des produits forestiers, en l'occurrence le ditakh, constitue une source importante de revenu pour les ménages des villages des îles Socés, situées dans la partie sud des îles du Saloum (Bétenty, Bossinkang, Sippo), et les deux Djinack (Bara et Djatack), qui en produisent une grande quantité. En effet, dans ces localités, l'exploitation

des PFNL permet de combler des déficits alimentaires et de fournir des apports financiers au niveau de la population, et elle participe à la réduction de la pauvreté et de la faim en milieu rural (Ndao *et al.* 2014:128). En milieu rural, une grande partie de la population dépend de ces produits pour sa subsistance. Ces produits jouent un rôle important pour le bien-être de la population. Ces activités permettent aussi de lutter contre certains phénomènes comme l'exode rural : « La cueillette des produits forestiers non ligneux constitue le principal facteur qui retient les jeunes dans les villages. Elle diminue l'exode de ces derniers dans la région de Ziguinchor et en particulier dans la communauté rurale de Niaguis. » (Ndao *et al.* 2014:130)

Outre les PFNL, les femmes en milieu rural s'activent également dans la commercialisation de produits arboricoles. Ceux-ci fournissent des revenus non négligeables. La part de l'exploitation des espèces fruitières sauvages dans les revenus des ménages ruraux est également remarquable (Djihounouck *et al.* 2018:370).

Thiandoum (2014:243), qui s'est intéressée à l'arboriculture du manguiers dans le pays Safène (espace périurbain entre les villes de Dakar, Thiès et Mbour) sur la nationale 1 atteste ce fait. Elle note que la commercialisation des mangues est une activité monopolisée par les femmes en pays Safène. Les retombées sont réparties entre les dépenses quotidiennes (43 %), les besoins personnels (31 %) et la prise en charge des enfants (26 %), car 90 pour cent des femmes interrogées sont des mariées avec des charges. Leurs époux, sont pour la plupart des paysans qui ne gagnent pas suffisamment pour assurer un bon épanouissement financier au sein de leur foyer. Dans la structuration de l'origine des revenus des ménages, ceux issus de la commercialisation des mangues occupent 12 pour cent (Thiandoum 2014:250).

Cette contribution est particulièrement conséquente chez les couches les plus vulnérables y compris pour l'État (Goudiaby 2013:10 ; Mbaye 2006:77 ; Diémé 2019:244). C'est pourquoi nous considérons que la biodiversité est d'une importance capitale pour les ménages de la zone d'étude. Elle peut renforcer le processus d'autonomisation de la femme et constituer un outil efficace pour la lutte contre la pauvreté, comme l'ont souligné Ouédraogo *et al.* (2013:351). Par contre, le potentiel pour *Carapa procera* ne s'exprime pas entièrement, car l'exploitation est encore artisanale et informelle. La filière est quasi inexistante comparée à l'anacarde. Ce dysfonctionnement est à corriger, d'autant plus que le manque d'organisation de la filière profite aux intermédiaires et non aux transformatrices. Des mesures doivent être prises pour un profit équitable comme le suggèrent Webber *et al.* (2010:351) et une gestion durable des ressources dans le respect de la biodiversité floristique locale.

Conclusion

En somme, cette étude a permis de tirer des conclusions sur *Carapa procera*. Cet arbre est essentiellement exploité par les femmes pour l'extraction de l'huile. Elles sont propriétaires majoritairement avec 56,3 pour cent des effectifs. La tradition des communautés diola concernant cet arbre privilégie la transmission de la propriété de *Carapa procera* aux femmes. De ce point de vue, nous pouvons dire que l'exploitation de cet arbre est profondément liée aux femmes. Il est par conséquent un patrimoine pour ces dernières, qui en assurent l'exploitation même si la concurrence des hommes se fait de plus en plus sentir.

De même, à l'instar des autres produits forestiers non ligneux, *Carapa procera* joue un rôle important dans l'économie des ménages. La commercialisation de son dérivé phare, c'est-à-dire l'huile, peut rapporter jusqu'à 250 000 FCFA/an aux femmes transformatrices. Avec cette somme, elles prennent en charge les dépenses du ménage. *Carapa procera* contribue donc à soutenir les ménages, à réduire la précarité et favoriser l'autonomisation des femmes.

Par contre le potentiel de *Carapa procera* n'est pas totalement exploité en Casamance. Le caractère artisanal et le manque d'organisation de la filière empêchent de rentabiliser de façon optimale et durable l'exploitation. Au niveau étatique et local, les différents acteurs devraient travailler à explorer d'autres propriétés des dérivés de cet arbre et à organiser la filière en vue de soutenir l'économie rurale à travers le renforcement de capacités autour d'une activité jusque-là dévolue aux femmes. Par ailleurs, cette organisation de la filière doit passer impérativement par la modernisation du secteur c'est-à-dire fournir aux femmes des moyens modernes d'extraction de l'huile de *Carapa procera* qui permettront de réduire leur temps de travail et de favoriser une meilleure productivité. De la sorte, cela permettra d'améliorer et de rendre décentes les conditions de vie, de travail, mais également d'accroître la valeur marchande de l'huile extraite des graines.

Notes

1. Berenger Feraud, Les peuplades de la Sénégalie. Cité par Roche (1985).
2. Barbans : peuples originaires d'Éthiopie.
3. Consensus : Le consensus désigne la fréquence élevée de citations d'une espèce ou d'une de ses parties par ses usagers (Ambe 2000:46).

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Beyond Poverty: Why are Some Children more Vulnerable to Commercial Sexual Exploitation than Others?

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Abstract

The commercial sexual exploitation of children (CSEC) is a conscience-wrenching problem that has become a pandemic feature of Zimbabwean society. Studies on CSEC have invested significant attention on identifying the factors that cause and perpetuate CSEC. There is a general consensus among studies that poverty is the main cause of CSEC. However, it is argued in this study that while the singular, dominant and generalised narrative that poverty is the main cause of CSEC is helpful, its deficiency is that it does not explain why some children are more vulnerable to CSEC than others. In order to address this question, this study examines how individual, family and societal risk factors cumulate in peculiar ways to make some children more vulnerable to CSE than others.

Résumé

L'exploitation sexuelle commerciale des enfants (ESEC) est un problème déchirant qui est devenu une caractéristique pandémique de la société zimbabwéenne. Les études sur l'ESEC ont accordé une attention considérable à l'identification des facteurs qui causent et perpétuent l'ESEC. En général, les études s'accordent que la pauvreté est la principale cause d'ESEC. Cependant, il est soutenu dans la présente étude que le récit unique, dominant et généralisé selon lequel la pauvreté est la principale cause de l'ESEC est utile, mais il n'explique pas pourquoi certains enfants sont plus vulnérables à l'ESEC que d'autres. Afin de répondre à cette interrogation, la présente étude examine comment les facteurs de risque individuels, familiaux et sociétaux s'agrègent de manière particulière pour rendre certains enfants plus vulnérables à l'ESI que d'autres.

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Introduction

Studies on the commercial sexual exploitation of children (CSEC) agree that poverty is its primary cause (Albanese 2007; Bambara 2011; Compaore 2007; Coulibaly 2010; ECPAT 2014; ILO 2001; Perschler-Desai 2010). CSEC is 'one of poverty's most egregious outcomes' (Hoot *et al.* 2006:129) because absolute poverty forces children to 'make a conscious choice to earn money by selling sexual favour' (Perschler-Desai 2010:112).

In 2014, the Zimbabwe National Council for the Welfare of Children (ZNCWC) conducted a study on CSEC in Zimbabwe. The study found that children became victims of CSE because of familial poverty (87.7 per cent), breakdown of the family unit (23.5 per cent), gender based violence (7.2 per cent) and orphanhood (23.8 per cent). Seventy-five per cent of the children who participated in this study also expressed the view that poverty is the main cause of CSEC. For example, when asked why she became a victim of CSE, Angela (not her real name; this study uses pseudonyms throughout) said that: 'I am not here by choice; I am here because of poverty'. Responding to the same question, Ellen said that 'it was poverty which left me with prostitution as the only way to life'.

However, while the narrative that poverty is the main cause of CSEC is useful, it has a huge deficiency in that it misses the nuances and intricacies of CSEC, which this study seeks to address. This study found that certain groups of children are more vulnerable to CSE than others because of the peculiar accumulation of risk factors. If the peculiarities of how risk factors accumulate and force children to engage in sex work are examined on a case-by-case basis, it becomes clear that there are cumulative circumstances that make some children more vulnerable to CSE than others. For example, while it is true that children who are out of school are vulnerable to CSE, a deeper examination reveals that within this group, certain children are more vulnerable than others because of the peculiar accumulation of risk factors. These include how risk factors emerge from and interface with social, economic and cultural contexts and how they accumulate and affect children differently. It is therefore important to try and understand how risk factors cumulate to the point where they can leave children with commercial sex work as 'the only way to life'.

This is explored through the voices of the children and other stakeholders who participated in the study. The children who participated in this study were aged between 9 and 16 years old. Studies on CSEC found that the age at which most children become victims is between 12 and 14 years (Walker-Rodriguez and Hill 2011). However, in recent years, girls as young as 9 years old have also become victims of CSE (Palmer and Stacey 2002).

Theoretical Framework

This study is situated in childhood studies, with a particular focus on children's agency and wellbeing. This conceptual framing is important because it moves away from conceptualisations of how children are 'acted upon' by CSE. It focuses on the aspirations of children and how they articulate, perceive and respond to their circumstances. This enables children to contribute to the shaping of policies and programmes that promote their wellbeing and that of the larger society. Most African societies are characterised by the belief that children have limited rights, capacity and authority to fully participate in society (Ofosu-Kusi 2017). These moral notions of childhood can decimate the reflexivity and agency of children. Traditionally, conceptualisations of childhood and the lives and experiences of children were examined through the views of society's adult population. The result was that children's views were largely excluded from research processes. However, in recent decades, there has been increasing recognition of children as 'social agents' who have the agency to construct their own lives and to make sense of their social worlds. Children are 'active makers of social life' who exercise their agency to gain independence, to escape dysfunctional family and societal contexts and to seek to improve their material conditions (Ofosu-Kusi 2017). They have the agency to 'construct normality' in the midst of physical, material and emotional vulnerability (Manyeli 2017).

In recent decades, social interventions have been re-designed on the basis that children have agency and that they have the right to actively participate in decision-making processes (Bordonaro and Payne 2012). However, despite these positive developments, the question of children's agency continues to face enormous challenges. Bordonaro and Payne (2012) argue that children's agency is 'ambiguous' and 'convoluted', especially when applied to children who are victims of CSE because they are often perceived by society as repugnant. There is constant conflict between the acknowledgement of children's agency in social research and the antithetical moral notions of childhood that are embedded in societies (Bordonaro 2012). As a result, the voices of children are 'seldom heard' (Hoot *et al.* 2006:129).

Studies also note that there are structural issues that erode the agency of girl children in particular. For example, structural violence, poverty and inequality have a 'gendered face', which affects men and women differently and disproportionately. Gender inequalities and relationship dynamics can create extreme forms of sexual vulnerabilities for children (Bhana 2017). African societies are characterised by hegemonic masculinities that legitimise

men's power over women and children. In countries such as South Africa, notions of male sexual entitlement and patriarchal dominance have fuelled vile sexual violence and abuse against women and children (Moosa and Bhana 2019). In order to realise their agency, girl children must be allowed the space to influence the situations around them, because they have the capacity to contest and act on their circumstances (Bhana 2017; Campbell and Mannell 2016).

Methodology

The study was conducted in Mabvuku, Epworth, Hatcliffe, Dzivarasekwa, Caledonia and Beit Bridge communities in Zimbabwe. These are high density urban communities, which were selected because of the prevalence of CSEC. The study was conducted over 14 months.

The study used methodological and ethical approaches that are child-focused and sensitive, recognising that children are 'reflexive participants' who 'are central informants of their own life worlds' (Christensen and James 2008: xx). Its methodology was designed with the understanding that it must be appropriate for the participants and their social, political and cultural contexts. It was also designed in a way that children were not mere respondents, but participants who played an active role in the interpretation and shaping of the research process. The methodology encapsulated multiple data collection techniques that are child-centred. This allowed the capturing of children's language, experiences and perspectives. It also allowed flexibility in the collection of data and the triangulation of research findings. A planning and training workshop was conducted during the first phase of the study. It was during this workshop that the researchers were trained and familiarised with all components of the research process. The semi-structured Interview Guide and the Code of Conduct were validated during the workshop.

Desktop research was conducted during the second phase. Existing data on CSEC in Zimbabwe were gathered from varied sources such as newspapers, books, research reports, government documents and journals. This was followed by field research. The research was conducted using three methods: a reconnaissance study, observations and in-depth interviews. The reconnaissance study was used to informally gather information about various aspects of CSEC in Zimbabwe. These include: what children and communities think about CSEC; where and why CSEC is prevalent; what makes children vulnerable to CSE; the practices that are involved in CSEC; the experiences of children who are victims of CSE; and existing interventions against CSEC.

The reconnaissance study enabled the researchers to gather information that was difficult to gather through formal interviews. It also enabled the researchers to form and build relations with children, community members and leaders, sex workers and government institutions. The reconnaissance study was followed by observational visits to bars, nightclubs, *mashabhini* (shebeens) and brothels. The objective was to gain an appreciation of the 'ecosystem' of CSEC, with a focus on where and how it takes place, the practices that are involved and societal attitudes towards CSEC. Focused observation was directed towards the victims, the perpetrators and the facilitators or collaborators of CSEC. Rich information was gathered through this method.

The observational site visits were followed by in-depth interviews. The interviews were conducted with victims and survivors of CSEC; sex workers; the media; parliamentarians; community members and leaders; civil society organisations working on children's rights; the police; the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare; truck drivers; and the owners, staff members and patrons of bars, night clubs, brothels and *mashabhini*. The sampling of participants was dependent on the characteristics of the context such as access and vulnerability of participants. Purposive and snowball sampling methods were used to recruit child participants and sex workers because of the characteristics of this population. Criterion sampling was used to recruit community leaders and participants from civil society organisations and government institutions. Their experience and engagement with CSEC was used as the key criterion. Different methods were used to access participants, especially child participants. Child participants were accessed through referrals, key informants and civil society organisations and government departments whose work focuses on children's rights and wellbeing. Communities were accessed through community leaders.

The participants were chosen because of their capacity to provide valuable information and perspectives for the study. Children who are survivors of CSE provided experiential information about the circumstances that made them vulnerable to CSE, their experiences with CSE and how they escaped from CSE. Sex workers were chosen because of their special knowledge about CSEC and their capacity to help the researchers gain access to child participants. Community members, civil society organisations, truck drivers and the owners, staff members and patrons of bars, night clubs, brothels and *mashabhini* provided information about the factors that make children vulnerable to CSE, the places where CSEC takes place, the perpetrators of CSEC, what society thinks about CSEC and the interventions against CSEC.

The Zimbabwe Republic Police, especially the Victim Friendly Unit, has a special responsibility in the fight against CSEC. The Unit was established to police sexual crimes that are committed against women and children. Police officers provided information about what is being done by the police in the fight against CSEC, the challenges that the police encounter in this fight, the areas where CSEC is prevalent, and what makes children vulnerable to CSEC. Parliamentarians provided information about the causes of CSEC and what Parliament has done and should do to effectively fight against CSEC. The inclusion of diverse participants – 126 participants in total – enabled the study to appreciate the ecosystem of CSEC from diverse perspectives. The participants provided enough information to fully examine and understand the phenomenon of CSEC in Zimbabwe. After interviewing 126 participants, the researchers realised that the research project had reached data saturation stage. Any further collection of data would yield redundant information. Table 1 shows the categories of participants and the number of people who were interviewed per category.

Table 1: Interviews

Category of participant	Number of participants
Victims of CSEC	52
Survivors of CSEC	2
Parliamentarians	2
Police officers (Victim Friendly Unit)	10
Sex workers	12
Truck drivers	3
Community leaders	4
Community members	18
Civil society organisations	2
The media	1
The Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare	2
Owners and staff members of bars, night clubs, brothels and shebeens	18
Total number of interviews	126

Research Ethics

It is important to establish and observe research ethics, especially when conducting research with children who are victims of CSE. Researching on CSEC raises social, religious, cultural, ethical, legal, methodological and practical dilemmas. Before undertaking this research project, the researchers attended a workshop in Harare, Zimbabwe, organised by CODESRIA. During the workshop, it was emphasised that all research projects should observe research ethics and that, when conducting research which involves children, researchers should seek informed consent from the parents or guardians of the participants (Laws and Mann 2004; Twum-Danso 2004). However, this ethical requirement is difficult to apply to research projects on CSEC. This is because some of the children do not have parents or they are often located geographically far from their parents or guardians. But for those who have, seeking consent from their parents or guardians can cause many risks for them. Under such circumstances, informed consent should be sought from the children themselves. This explains why, during the planning phase of this study, the researchers sought to establish whether children who are victims of CSE can be interviewed, and whether they are capable of giving informed consent.

Scholars have debated whether children are capable of giving informed consent. King and Churchill (2000:42) argue that parental consent should be waived in circumstances where request for it might put the child at risk of harm. Rittenhouse and Felicini (2015) argue that when conducting research with children who are victims of CSE, their participation should always be based on informed consent. They further argue that although researchers can provide full information about the research, it is not possible to guarantee that children will understand it, even where clear and simple language is used. The consensus among scholars is that children can be capable of giving consent, but it is difficult to tell whether the consent is informed (King and Churchill 2000; Morris *et al.* 2012). Bourke and Loveridge (2014) argue that it is not possible to fully obtain informed consent from children because they are unlikely to comprehend the complex nature of the research; they therefore believe that children should be offered on-going opportunities to express informed consent and dissent.

Other scholars argue that the ability of children to give informed consent should be assessed on a case-by-case basis because it depends on the peculiarities of the research context and each child's experiences and expectations (Graham *et al.* 2013; King and Churchill 2000; Morrow and Richards 1996). However, whether the consent is informed or not, child

participants must be made fully aware that their participation is voluntary and that they have the right to change their mind, to withdraw from the interview and to answer questions selectively (Alderson and Morrow 2004; King and Churchill 2000; Mishna *et al.* 2004). It is important for information to be provided to children in ways that are appropriate to their age, competencies and cultural contexts (Ruiz-Casares and Thompson 2016).

The researchers established that most studies on CSEC conducted interviews with children. For example, in their review of studies on CSEC conducted in sub-Saharan Africa, Hounmenou and Her (2017) found that 52 out of 72 studies conducted interviews with child victims. In the ZNCWC's 2014 study on CSEC, children were interviewed without having sought consent from their parents or guardians. The study argues that 'acquiring parental/guardian permission is not a reasonable requirement given the characteristics of the population under study' (ZNCWC 2014:9). Perschler-Desai (2010) interviewed victims of CSEC during a research project on teenage prostitution in Southern Africa; and Hoot *et al.* (2006) interviewed 70 children during a study on CSEC in Ethiopia.

It was against this background that consent was sought from the children who participated in this study, and not from their parents or guardians. In the consent-seeking process, the children were provided with all the information about the research. They were informed that participation is voluntary, confidential and anonymous, that consent is an ongoing process and that they reserve the right to withdraw from participation at any stage of the interview process and to decide to answer certain questions and not others. They were also informed about the purpose of the research and how the information will be stored, used and disseminated. The researchers noted that the children easily understood expert terms such as 'voluntary participation', but they could not easily understand terms such as 'confidentiality' and 'anonymity'. In order to address this problem, the researchers explained these terms using more familiar and context-specific terms. A multi-stage ethical clearance approach was adopted in order to safeguard the rights, wellbeing and interests of participants. Official government clearance was sought and obtained. Clearance and informed consent were also obtained from local authorities, the police and community leaders in the areas where the interviews were conducted.

There are multiple risks associated with research on CSEC. Children who are victims of CSE may experience psychological and emotional trauma during and after interviews (Twum-Danso 2004). For this reason, a number of ethical guardrails were used to ensure that children were adequately protected from any harm that could arise as a consequence

of their participation in the study. First, all researchers who conducted interviews had prior knowledge and experience of conducting research with children. The researchers also received rigorous professional training on how to conduct research with children who are victims of CSE, including how to identify signs of discomfort and trauma and what to do should participants show these signs. These steps were stipulated in a comprehensive Code of Conduct, which was developed and validated during the planning and training workshop. Second, a child-friendly semi-structured interview guide was used throughout the interviews. However, the researchers were encouraged to be flexible because general guidelines lack the capacity to address the complexity and reflexivity of working with vulnerable populations (Pittaway *et al.* 2010:78). Third, the researchers mapped out and developed a register of governmental and non-governmental actors whose work focusses on providing support and services to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse. The register was used to establish referral pathways. A psychologist was engaged to identify and handle the social, emotional and psychological issues that arose during interviews. A budget was set aside to deal with such eventualities, especially to facilitate referrals. Fourth, the lead researcher monitored and evaluated the entire research process to ensure that research ethics were strictly observed by all researchers. Fifth, where necessary and possible, the victims were accessed through government departments, civil society organisations, key informants and parliamentarians who previously engaged or assisted them. Sixth, the research questions were framed and asked in line with the principles and practices of childhood research.

Findings

This section seeks to establish why some children are more vulnerable to CSE than others. This includes establishing why, within certain groups of children in related circumstances, some children can be more vulnerable than others. It uses case studies of child participants to establish how they became victims of CSE. It also uses the views of other participants of the study.

Children who are out of School

Children who are out of school are vulnerable to CSE (Albanese 2007; Bang *et al.* 2014; Chase and Statham 2004; Estes and Weiner 2005). Children drop out of school because of circumstances such as lack of resources, the challenges of walking long distances to school, bullying, prejudice and domestic problems such as the need to take care of family members, particularly the terminally ill (Perschler-Desai 2010). In Zimbabwe, many

of the children who became victims of CSE either dropped out of school or never attended. In 2017, the government moved 73 children who were victims of CSE from Hopley and Epworth to places of safety, 71 of whom had dropped out of school due to financial hardships (Mupfumira 2017). The 2014 ZNCWC study noted that 97.3 per cent of the child participants never attended school.

In this study, 85 per cent of the children who were interviewed dropped out of primary school (see Table 2). Of these, 80 per cent did not go beyond grade 3, 20 per cent did not go beyond grade 5, and 13 per cent never attended school. Only 2 per cent were attending school, but they often missed classes and examinations because of the physical, emotional, social and psychological demands and consequences of commercial sex. Eighty-seven per cent did not have a birth registration certificate.

Table 2: Reasons for dropping out of school

Main reason	Children affected
Lack of school fees and other essentials necessary for education	45%
Pregnancy, forced/early marriages	21%
Religious/cultural beliefs that do not value formal education	18%
Bullying/abuse by teachers and other students	1%
Lack of interest in education	2%
Taking care of family members	3%
Lack of schools in the local area	2%
Lack of birth registration certificate	4%
Witchcraft	1%
Stigmatisation/prejudice	3%

Children who are out of school have different degrees of vulnerability to CSE. Children can be out of school, but safe from CSE. While being out of school is a factor that makes children vulnerable to CSE, it is when this factor interacts with other risk factors that children can become further vulnerable to CSE. This study found that out-of-school children who live in urban and peri-urban areas are more vulnerable to CSE than those who live in rural areas. Within this group, those who live in transit towns, mining towns and extremely poor high-density suburbs are more vulnerable than those who live in medium and low-density suburbs. Within this group, those who seek and engage in income generating activities, especially vending, are more vulnerable than those who have parents or guardians who take care of their needs.

Out-of-school children who live in the aforementioned areas are more vulnerable because most of these areas are characterised by the 'normalisation' of sexual harassment, sexualisation of women and girls, (gender based) violence, substance abuse, rape, (organised) crime and unregistered places of entertainment such as shebeens and bottle stores. The demand for sex with children is higher in these areas than it is in rural areas and low-density suburbs. In some of the areas where the research was conducted, the researchers witnessed some children who were strip dancing in beer halls and bottle stores. During the strip dancing, men were making sexually related comments about the children. After strip dancing, the children are often picked and sexually exploited in return for money and other forms of 'payment'.

The researchers observed that many of the members of these communities regard CSEC as 'normal', even though they believe that it is a repugnant practice. CSEC has 'become normal' to them because it happens all the time and there is no sustained appetite from governmental and non-governmental actors to eliminate the problem. This belief, which is reinforced by victim-blaming attitudes, has eroded their appetite to report perpetrators of CSEC to the police and other authorities. Some of them can even direct visitors to places where they can have sex with 'fresh women'.

It is therefore riskier for rural children who are out of school to migrate to these urban and peri-urban spaces, especially in search of income generating opportunities. Seventy-seven percent of the child victims who participated in this study migrated from rural areas where they were 'struggling but safe from CSE'. All of them became victims of CSE when they came to urban and peri-urban areas. It is therefore important to implement interventions that reduce the migration of children who are in difficult circumstances from rural to urban and peri-urban areas. Rural development is one way of achieving this goal.

Homeless Children

Homeless children are the most vulnerable to CSE. Within this group, those who live on the streets are particularly vulnerable compared to those who are in children's homes or other formal institutions. For example, Tatenda remarked that 'I have gone through every terrible situation which a human being can experience under the sun. I think that even hell itself is not as bad as the situations which I have faced in my life'. Ethel stated that 'I have heard people saying that the worst thing which can happen to a child is to become a prostitute. I don't see it that way. I have gone through hell'. While

other children tend to engage in commercial sex work without necessarily having to make a 'conscious decision', the majority of homeless children make the decision to engage in commercial sex work. This is primarily because they tend to get to a point where they are convinced that they have nothing else to lose.

Victims of Child Labour

Victims of child labour are vulnerable to CSE. However, this study found that those who work as street vendors or domestic workers are more vulnerable. Within this group, those who are out of school and work without the knowledge, consent and attention of their parents or guardians are the most vulnerable because of the lack of supportive and protective social ties. The knowledge that such children do not have social ties makes their 'employers', the relatives and visitors of their 'employers' and some community members to take advantage of them, including sexually abusing them. Seventy-one per cent of the children who participated in this study worked as domestic workers or vendors. It was clear from their responses that the lack of social ties made them highly vulnerable to CSE.

For example, Vimbai worked as a domestic worker in Mabvuku, Harare. For the first two years of her work, she worked with the knowledge and consent of her mother, and was also going to school. Her mother was a single mother. Vimbai decided to work because she wanted to take care of her mother and siblings. Her mother and 'employers' agreed that 80 per cent of her salary should be directly paid to her mother while 20 per cent should be used for her school fees. During this period, Vimbai's 'employers' constantly communicated with her mother and seemingly 'everything was going on well'. However, the situation changed when her mother died because this left her without any protective and supportive social ties. Her employers suddenly changed the way they treated her. They withdrew her from school and reduced her salary on the grounds that as a child, she did not need 'a lot of money'. They physically and verbally abused her. The situation became unbearable to the point that she left the job and engaged in commercial sex work because she had nowhere to go.

Children who work as domestic workers are also vulnerable to sexual abuse by their 'employers'. Explaining how one of the child victims whom she interviewed got exposed to CSE, Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga, a member of parliament who is renowned for fighting for women's rights, stated:

So, she walks into this home and the first person who abuses her is the man of that house. She is found being abused by the man of that house and the

woman of that house kicks her out and says “*wakatobhadharwa* [you were already remunerated] because you have been sleeping with my husband” (Parliament of Zimbabwe 2017).

Children who work as street vendors are also vulnerable to CSE. Perpetrators take advantage of the children by giving or promising them money and other material things. For example, Chipo, who is based in Beit Bridge, became a victim when she started to sell samosas and fruit and vegetables to generate income for her family. Chipo’s mother was also a street vendor. However, Chipo was 12 years old her mother was disabled by a stroke and this forced Chipo to engage in street vending whenever she was not in school. The situation deteriorated to the point that Chipo was forced out of school and she became a full-time street vendor. A certain male ‘customer’ then started to behave as though he cared about Chipo’s wellbeing. He bought Chipo’s items almost every day and told her to keep the change. Chipo thought that the man was a caring customer. One day, the man invited Chipo to his house; the unsuspecting Chipo agreed. When she got there, she was given ‘a lot of gifts’, which she accepted. He promised to ‘rescue her from poverty’ if she accepted what he wanted. By this time, Chipo was already feeling indebted to the man because of what he had done for her. She also wanted to continue receiving the ‘gifts’. As a result, she accepted to sleep with him. This happened for about six months. The man eventually went to South Africa in search of job opportunities, and another man came and told her that ‘I can organise men who can sleep with you and give you money’. This is how she became a victim of CSE. Chipo was aged 14 at the time she participated in this project. Children who practice street vending, especially those who are out of school and/or are not monitored by their parents or guardians, are at greater risk of CSE.

Orphans

While orphans are generally vulnerable to CSE, those who have no relatives who are committed to take care of them are more vulnerable. This is because they are at the risk of being moved from one family to the other. Their access to education gets constantly disrupted as they move between schools, they get exposed to ‘convoluted socialisation’ and to different forms of abuse, making it somewhat inevitable for them to believe that no one loves them. Rutendo narrated the excruciating circumstances that ‘bludgeoned’ her following the death of her parents in a tragic accident in 2015, when she was 9 years old. Her paternal relatives scrambled for the material resources that were left by her parents. She recounted that:

They took away everything and left me with nothing, except the clothes I was wearing. No family wanted to live with me. I was kicked towards all directions like a ball. I would live with a particular family during the morning, spend my evening with a different family and sleep under the roof of another family. I would live with 3 to 4 families within 24 hours.

No family or individual was committed to sending her to school. Instead, she became a domestic worker for the families she lived with. She eventually ran away, lived on the streets and engaged in commercial sex work.

Children who live with Stepmothers

Children who live with their stepmothers are more vulnerable to CSE than those who live with their stepfathers. While stepfathers can be abusive, children who live with their stepfather get love, support and protection from their mother. This reduces their vulnerability to abuse, including sexual exploitation. In this study, the children who lived with their stepmothers told heart-wrenching stories of abuse and neglect. They did not experience love, affection, empathy or a sense of belonging at either the family or community level. As a result, they fled negative and abusive home and community environments in search of love, support and acceptance elsewhere. They found themselves living and working on the streets, living in abandoned buildings or shacks, living with strangers, placed in foster care, or working as domestic or farm workers. Despite all the challenges associated with CSEC, some of the children stated that there are times when they get the love, empathy and acceptance that they failed to get when they were still living with their families and relatives. However, the 'love, empathy and acceptance' is feigned and intended to make the children emotionally and materially dependent on the abusers.

Children who Take care of their Parents and Siblings

This study found that there are children who decide to engage in commercial sex work to take responsibility for their parents and siblings. Children who are orphans and whose parents are terminally ill or disabled (especially the eldest ones in the family) tend to be more vulnerable to this responsibility. While speaking about CSEC in Zimbabwe during a motion in the National Assembly, Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga stated that when she asked child victims why they got into commercial sex work, one of them stated that 'I have a little sister of mine who is two or three years and we live in a shack. If I do not go and get the 25 cents, and put it together so that I can buy bread tomorrow, she may actually die of hunger'

(Parliament of Zimbabwe 2017). Similarly, a victim who was interviewed by *The Chronicle* stated that:

I was 10 years old when my mother died in 2012 and my father followed two years later. As the eldest child, I was left with the sole responsibility of taking care of my siblings. My friend who was already into sex work invited me to Ngundu and she introduced me to a Malawian truck driver who became my regular client...I am now a full-time sex worker who has to fend for my 2-year-old son and two young brothers aged 13 and 11 (Netsianda 2017).

The finding that some children engage in sex work not for their own sake but for that of their parents and siblings is noteworthy and important. This is because it debunks the mainstream narrative by society that children who engage in commercial sex work are irresponsible, aberrant and repugnant. If society understands how some of the victims of CSE sacrifice themselves for the sake of others, attitudes may change. In the case of some children, the situation was so desperate that their parents implicitly or explicitly asked them to go into commercial sex work to generate income for the family. For example, Tariro said that 'my mother knows that I am into sex work. She is a dedicated Christian. I never thought that she would accept dirty money. But she accepts the money because that is the only way she can live. My money is dirty, but at least it is giving life to someone'.

Children of Sex Workers

Children whose mothers are sex workers are particularly vulnerable to CSE. However, within this group, those who live with or regularly visit their mothers are the most vulnerable. Twelve per cent of the children who participated in this study are children of sex workers, which is indicative of this category's vulnerability to CSE. Children who live with their mothers are more vulnerable because of many factors. The main factor is that they are constantly exposed, in many ways, to the language, practices and even struggles of sex work. For example, because in most cases sex workers conduct their activities from their homes and the majority live in a single room, it is common for mothers to have sex in the presence of their children.

These children also get exposed to CSE because their mothers often use them to conduct transactions with their clients. This includes collecting money or passing messages to the clients. In some cases, it includes preparing food and bathing water for the clients. For example, Joylin fetched her mother's clients, brought them home and cooked for them. Because of these practices, children casually relate with the clients of their mothers and get immersed in the 'cultures' of sex work. This creates an environment

that makes it easy for them to be sexually exploited without the knowledge of their mothers. In April 2018, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Health, the Portfolio Committee on Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and the Women Affairs Portfolio Committee visited Chiredzi on a fact-finding mission on CSEC. Speaking during the meeting, a sex worker who entered into sex work at the age of 12 years stated that:

Some of us saw our mothers making easy money by selling their bodies, so we thought that the business was lucrative. I heard that other children were kicked out by their mothers who were into prostitution because they had grown up, and the mothers felt they were disturbing their boyfriends (Mafirakureva 2019).

The Case Study below Shows how Children of Sex Workers Become Vulnerable to CSE

Prudence

Prudence was 14 years old at the time that she participated in this study. She was born in one of the rural areas in Masvingo. Her mother is a well-known sex worker in Beit Bridge. Initially, Prudence lived with her grandparents in the rural area. During this time, she was safe from CSE. However, when her grandparents died, she was forced to relocate and live with her mother in Beit Bridge. Prudence and her mother lived in a very small room. Most of her mother's clients are long distance truck drivers. The mother conducted sexual transactions in the presence of Prudence. Prudence recounted how she saw and heard her mother and her clients 'doing their things'. In some cases, the mother fought and argued with her clients over misunderstandings related to payment. Disgruntled by her mother's engagement in sex work, Prudence confronted her mother a number of times, asking her to quit sex work.

The mother's response was blunt. She told Prudence that 'You came out through my vagina and the money with which I am taking care of you is coming through my vagina. If I stop sex work, you will die of hunger'. Prudence was going to school but she eventually lost interest because of her experiences at home and because other children jeered due to her mother's involvement in sex work. Prudence knew many of her mother's clients. Some of the regular clients brought her 'gifts', many times without the knowledge of her mother.

One day, one of the clients who usually brought her some 'gifts' came looking for her mother, who was not at home. She had travelled to her rural home where she was not reachable by telephone. Prudence told him that

her mother was not around. He responded 'your mother is not around, but this should not be a problem because you are here. You are now ripe; I will give you US\$20'. Prudence did not know how to respond. As she was still gathering her thoughts, the man handed her a US\$20 note, which she instinctively accepted. He started to make sexual advances. He slept with her. That is how she became a victim. Her mother began to accuse her of 'interfering with her business' and asked her to leave and take responsibility of herself. Prudence left her mother's place and engaged in full-time commercial sex work. During the time that she participated in this study, she was living with her friend.

Children who have 'no-one who understands them'

Children who do not have anyone, or who believe that there is no-one to care or empathise with them, especially when they are going through overwhelming circumstances, are more vulnerable to CSE. Children who come from poor and dysfunctional families but are able to get empathy from other sections of society are less vulnerable to CSE. It is therefore particularly important that if a child cannot get empathy from family and/or relatives, they get it from other sections of society such as teachers and community leaders and members. Children need to have someone who hears their 'silent' voice. This plays a very important role in protecting them from CSE, even if it may not change their material circumstances. It is very important for different sections of society, especially teachers and community leaders, to speak to children and try to understand their social and economic situations. This is especially important if they notice unusual behaviour or signs of stress. The case study below demonstrates the importance of social empathy towards children, particularly for those who are in difficult situations.

Anna

Anna lived with her aunt in Mabvuku. She was enrolled in grade 4 at a local school. However, her aunt got to a point where she was unable to meet the costs of Anna's education. Anna could not entertain the thought of dropping out of school. She had the dream of becoming a medical doctor and she knew that education was the only way that would enable her to achieve that dream. She thought of ways of raising money for her education. She worked for a neighbour as a part-time domestic worker. Before she went to school, Anna would go to the neighbour's house and work. She would do the same when she came back from school. At home, Anna's aunt

expected her to perform all the chores and use part of her money to pay bills and buy groceries. At school, Anna often missed classes because she was overwhelmed with work. She also missed some of the examinations because of her circumstances. Her teachers and classmates thought of her as a lazy and irresponsible child. They also ostracised and ridiculed her. Her teacher scolded her, saying that she was 'the oldest and laziest child in the class'. Anna did not tell her teachers and classmates what she was going through at home. She also did not tell her aunt what she was going through at school. She believed, from the way she was perceived and treated, that no-one understood her. It was at this point that she came across a man who 'showed that he cared for me'. The man asked her about what she was going through. He gave her the money to meet her costs of education. The man eventually asked her to 'give back the favour'. This is how she ended up being sexually exploited in return for money and other things. She eventually ran away from home and engaged in sex work.

Victims of Child Marriages

Seventeen per cent of the children who participated in this study are survivors of child marriages, who got married when they were aged between 11 and 14 years. The circumstances that caused them to get married varied, including the need by their parents to raise resources through bride price, religious reasons and the need to evade appalling circumstances at home. One of them was married to 'appease the avenging spirit' of a man who was killed by her brother. These children left their marriages for reasons that include (alleged) infidelity, gender based violence, abuse, and interference by family and community members.

Among those children who left their marriages, some are more vulnerable to CSE than others. Those who cannot go back to their parents or guardians are particularly vulnerable, especially if they have children from the marriage. What makes them more vulnerable is the need to raise resources to take care of themselves, and especially their children. For example, Dadai stated that:

When I walked out of the marriage, I had a child and I was also pregnant. I could not go back to my family because they were against my decision to quit the marriage. I came to Harare where I tried to look for a job but I failed to get one. It was also difficult for me to work because of the pregnancy. It was at this point that I decided to join this [sex work] industry.

Conclusion

It is true that poverty is a major factor that makes children vulnerable to CSE. However, this singular, dominant and generalised narrative is deficient because it misses the intricacies and nuances of CSEC. It is true that children who are victims of CSE are predominantly from economically insecure backgrounds. However, children can be poor but safe from CSE. Why is it that poverty causes the commercial sexual exploitation of some poor children but not others? The deconstruction of the poverty narrative helps us to understand that some poor children are more vulnerable to CSE than others because of the peculiar ways in which risk factors accumulate, within and beyond poverty. Giving a poignant account of the circumstances that make some children more vulnerable to CSE than others, Tinotenda stated that:

Imagine that you are a child, you have lost both parents, you dropped out of school because no one could pay your school fees, you have no food to eat or clothes to wear, you have no one to take care of you, you do not even have any social or spiritual support to strengthen and encourage you, you have been rejected by the extended family and the society such that you can as well reject yourself, you have no house to stay, and you cannot get employed because you are a child and you are not educated. To be realistic and honest, under these circumstances, sex work is not a choice, but the only option which is available to you. You either have to take it and survive or leave it and die.

This account shows, in line with the findings of the study, that children become more vulnerable to CSE when poverty is enmeshed with other individual, family, social and societal circumstances. It is therefore important to understand how the ecosystem of CSEC works. This enables stakeholders such as the government, the regional and international community and civil society to understand the interventions that are helpful and where they are needed the most.

This study has established the cohorts of children that are the most vulnerable to CSE. In terms of children who are out of school, those who are based in urban and peri-urban areas (especially in transit towns, mining towns and extremely poor high-density suburbs) are more vulnerable than those who are based in rural areas. Those who migrate from rural to urban areas become more vulnerable than those who remain in rural areas. In terms of victims of child labour, those who work as street vendors or domestic workers are more vulnerable. Those who work in rural contexts are less vulnerable than those who work in poor and crowded urban and peri-urban contexts. Among those who work as domestic workers, those who work

without the knowledge, consent and support of their parents or guardians are more vulnerable because of the lack of supportive and protective social networks. In terms of victims of child marriages who would have walked out of their marriages, those who are not willing or able to go back and live with their families or guardians are more vulnerable. This is especially if they have one or more children from the marriage. In terms of children of sex workers, those who live with their mothers are more vulnerable than those who live with their paternal or maternal relatives, especially in rural areas. Those who visit their mothers, especially regularly, are also more vulnerable. This is because these children get exposed to the language, practices and struggles of sex work. Homeless children are the most vulnerable. This is because they live in the most excruciating of circumstances. This forces them to seek material things by every means possible, including sex work. Most of the homeless children are orphans or come from families that are dysfunctional. Children who live with their stepmothers are more vulnerable than those who live with their stepfathers. This is because the former are often abused by their stepmothers, while the latter get support, love and protection from their mothers.

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‘She is so Pretty, Look at her Hair’: Perspectives on the Racialisation of Mixed-Race Persons in Ghana

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Abstract

This article interrogates the processes of the racialisation of hair and skin colour of ‘mixed-race’ Ghanaians in the specific context of Ghana. The article draws on the findings of a larger qualitative multisite study that explored the lived experiences and identity construction of Ghanaian mixed-race persons living in Ghana and Canada. Informed by race and racialisation theories, the article argues that hair politics cannot be discussed without considering how skin colour and gender also contribute to shaping the racial categorisation of mixed-race individuals in Ghana. The authors show how Ghanaian society ‘others’ and racialises mixed-race Ghanaians (for example, through school regulations on hair and hair style); how mixed-race individuals navigate the racial gaze, discourses and practices around their body; how they reproduce and challenge racialised considerations and imaginaries; and how they perform their own racial identities through their hair. The article links these narratives with the ideals of white racial hegemony that permeate society. Acknowledging mixed-race Ghanaians’ experiences of privilege, the authors argue that the valuation of their whiteness by the majority population is not straightforward and does not lead mixed-race individuals to self-identify as whites. Mixed-race Ghanaians, rather, have fluid experiences in terms of privileges and discrimination based on context and interactions.

Keywords: hair, mixed-race Ghanaians, racialisation, skin colour, identity politics, whiteness, colourism, gender, intersectionality

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Résumé

S'appuyant sur les résultats d'une plus vaste étude qualitative multisite qui a exploré les expériences vécues et la construction identitaire des personnes ghanéennes « mixtes » vivant au Ghana et au Canada, cet article interroge les processus de racialisation de la couleur des cheveux et de la peau des Ghanéens « mixtes » dans le contexte spécifique du Ghana. Renseignées par les théories de race et de racialisation, nous soutenons que la politique capillaire ne peut être discutée sans tenir compte de la manière dont la couleur de la peau et le genre contribuent également à façonner la catégorisation raciale des personnes « mixtes » au Ghana. Nous montrons comment la société ghanéenne désigne comme « autre » et racialise ces Ghanéens (par exemple, par le biais de réglementations scolaires sur la chevelure et la coiffure) ; comment ils et elles naviguent à travers le regard, les discours et les pratiques raciales autour de leur corps ; comment ils et elles reproduisent et défient les considérations et les imaginaires racialisés ; et comment ils et elles interprètent leurs propres identités raciales à travers leur chevelure. Nous relierons ces récits aux idéaux d'hégémonie raciale blanche qui imprègnent la société. Reconnaisant les expériences de privilège des Ghanéens « mixtes », nous soutenons que l'évaluation de leur blancheur par la population majoritaire n'est pas simple et ne conduit pas les individus « mixtes » à s'identifier comme blancs. Les Ghanéens « mixtes » ont plutôt des expériences fluides en termes de privilèges et de discrimination basées sur le contexte et les interactions.

Mots-clés : cheveux, Ghana, identités « mixtes », racialisation, couleur de peau, politique identitaire, blancheur, colorisme, genre, intersectionnalité

Introduction

With your colour alone, a lot of people are like 'She is soo pretty, look at her hair, aii! If I had your colour errrh!' That alone makes me feel big and makes me feel that yeah, me too, I have advantages from my colour. People admire me for my colour alone and I am very happy with that. (Amanda, 18-year-old German/Ghanaian woman resident in Ghana)

You see, growing up I never paid attention to this thing called colour. Yes, I was fair and men like fair women, women with long hair and so on. These things I had so without even trying. I was always getting men expressing interest. (Louisa, 69-year-old British/Ghanaian woman resident in Ghana)

The racialisation of hair and skin colour in Louisa and Amanda's statements above, and the underlying ideology of colourism built within them, set the tone for this article, which throws light on and unpacks ways in which racial meanings are attached to multiracial bodies in Ghana. As we examined

data collected from a study that explored the lived experiences and identity construction of mixed-race Ghanaians, our attention was drawn to the sheer volume of comments made by respondents about their hair. For girls and women, in particular, the handling of hair, especially within the school setting, was often emotive, hotly contested and constructed in such a way that they felt 'othered'. Theoretically, we cannot separate a discussion of hair from its 'owner'; thus, in exploring 'mixedness' (Varro 2008) we draw connections between hair and skin colour. Johnson and Bankhead (2014) have argued that 'hair mediates the effect of skin colour'. An analysis of processes of racialisation should thus pay attention to how discourses surrounding a person's hair are tightly intertwined with other aspects of the person's phenotype, especially her skin colour. Although the article's main focus is on the hair of mixed-race Ghanaians, we include testimonies that throw light on racial meanings and structures of power and privilege given to other corporeal aspects of the mixed-race person, such as skin tone, body shape and facial features. In this article we attempt to show how hair is racialised, and how the present-day Ghanaian racial gaze is influenced by history, colonialism and global beauty ideals.

Contemporary mixed-race Ghanaians, and mixed-race Africans in general, have received little or no research attention, especially with reference to their hair. There is a vast literature on black hair, particularly in the black diaspora (Thomas 2013; Ellis-Hervey *et al.* 2016; Mercer 1987; Johnson and Bankhead 2014; White 2005) and in South Africa (Erasmus 1997; Alubafi, Ramphahlile and Rankoana 2018; Madlela 2018; Netshia n.d). However, less is known about its significance for mixed-race people, especially in Africa. Our paper contributes to scholarship on hair politics and colourism, and to the emerging body of literature on mixed-race Ghanaians (Adomako Ampofo 2004; Darkwah and Adomako Ampofo 2008; Akyeampong 2006).

The existence of an underlying beauty ideal rooted in Ghana's colonial history and Western imperialism, as well as shifting cultural and political influences, affect the way mixed-race Ghanaians manage their hair, navigate their 'otherness' and negotiate their identities during their life. Jemima Pierre (2013) has argued that whiteness is an important site of racialisation in Ghana and a way to demonstrate the sustained global significance of racial hierarchies and white supremacy (Pierre 2013:106). Being associated with white people in a country where the majority population is racialised as black, Ghanaians who are mixed-race are admired and often described as *obroni*, an Akan word which designates people racialised as 'white'

in Ghana, but which currently goes beyond phenotype to include most foreigners of non-African heritage, including black African Americans, Chinese, Lebanese, Syrian migrants and visitors to Ghana.

In addition to various shades of skin colour defined as white in Ghanaian culture, *obroni* refers to a certain lifestyle, way of dressing, financial standing, manner of speaking and social status. The positionality and experiences of mixed-race Ghanaians within this racialised frame of categorisation demonstrate the relevance of studying whiteness in colour and race discourses as it articulates with beauty ideals and aesthetics, social class, social status and gender.

How this ideology affects the identity of mixed-race people in Ghana is also of interest. The introductory quotations by Louisa and Amanda clearly show the interconnections between skin colour, long hair and social perception. In this article, we draw links between mixed-race individuals, their hair and colourism as it plays out in the Ghanaian context, and briefly touch on the phenomenon of skin-bleaching as an aspect of the hegemony of white beauty ideals and their associated effects.

Through the narratives of mixed-race women and some men we illustrate how they identify themselves through their hair type, the politics around how their hair was 'managed' during their childhood, and how Ghanaian society otherises and racialises them through the categorisation of their hair type, school regulations, and the opportunities they derive due to their appearance. The narratives of mixed-race participants show that in Ghana, hair and skin colour are important signifiers that are used to mark difference. We argue, following Pierre (2013), that the current racialisation of mixed-race Ghanaians is linked to the country's colonial history and to contemporary ideals of white racial hegemony that permeate Ghanaian society.

In the next segment of this article, we present background information that sets the context for understanding the positioning of 'mixedness' in Ghana and the embodied experiences of mixed-race Ghanaians. Then we present the theoretical underpinnings and methodology of the study. Thereafter, we examine the research participants' narratives in the light of the literature on black hair, colourism and ideals of beauty and the meanings and perceptions assigned to the hair and skin colour of mixed-race individuals. We discuss four main themes: the racialisation of hair, hair and Afro-centred identity politics, hair regulations and management, and colourism and beauty ideals.

The Positioning of Mixed-Race People in Ghana: Historical Perspectives

The inscribing of mixed-race individuals in Ghana's history is linked to European and British trading interests from as far back as the late fifteenth century. From that period onwards, they became an important part of the coastal landscape, serving as brokers and mediators in the Atlantic slave trade and the colonial economy (Asante 2016). Europeans initially focused on this group for education and training, favouring them over black Africans for jobs. Due to their proximity to the European and British colonisers, they acquired the social capital that gave them access to local structures of power and influence (Lever 1970). Many of their descendants became members of the Gold Coast's professional class in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and are an integral part of the contemporary Ghanaian elite (Agyeman and Amoako-Gyampah 2019); several still have Dutch, Danish and German ancestry and surnames.

We may attribute some aspects of contemporary Ghanaian attitudes towards people of mixed racial backgrounds to this historical context. The British and Europeans who traded on the coast did not settle on Ghanaian territory, which was then known as the Gold Coast, yet the children they conceived with local women, who in a way inherited some of their privilege and power through their blood lineage and carried their names, possessed the means and social capital to reach high echelons of society.

It is important to note that the respondents for this study do not directly belong to the social group described above. They are mostly first-generation Ghanaians with one European, Asian or Arab parent, who are all categorised as 'white' in Ghana (Omi and Winant 1994). As shown in the study, mixed-race people with such heritage are seen as a homogenous group of *obroni* in Ghana. In the section that follows, we discuss the theoretical foundations of the study and present the methodology.

Theoretical Underpinnings : Understanding Race and Racialisation

In this section we explain the theoretical concepts we employ, such as race, racialisation and colourism; we justify our use of 'mixed-race' as a concept and a category of identification, and we present our methodology. Discussions that centre around the concept of race require elucidation. Here we enter somewhat murky waters due to the extensive and often contentious discourses around race and concepts derived from it (Hochman 2019; Omi and Winant 1994; Gonzalez-Sobrino and Goss 2019). There are questions around the 'reality' of race, which most scholars perceive to be a social

construction and not a biological given. Following from this, the use of its derived concepts, such as 'racialisation', 'mixed race', 'racial formation', 'biracial' or 'multiracial', is problematic, since 'races' do not exist. Races might not exist, but the term continues to be used and even defended by mixed-race activists (Hall 2007). This is partly because the reality of racism and racial discrimination concretely impacts on the lives of people who are racialised – they are categorised in racial terms by 'gazers' (Paragg 2015). Further complicating the social construct of race is its fluidity, which changes in form and meaning and transforms through space and time (Mahtani and Moreno 2001).

The term 'racialisation' has gained currency in the social sciences mainly because it emphasises the constructed and processual nature of race. In this article, following Gonzales-Sobrinho and Goss (2019: 505), we define 'racialisation' as 'the process of conferring racial meaning or identification to social groupings that were previously racially unclassified'. We also agree with Hochman, who claims that it is not races that are formed through the process of racialisation, but racialised groups. This process involves power and power relations: powerful groups racialise 'others', but groups also self-racialise; and self-racialisation may occur in individuals as well as in groups (Hochman 2019). The hierarchisation of groups and individuals based on skin colour involves gazing at others in a process of body 'dissection' (see Fanon 2008; Haritaworn 2009). In her work on mixed-race Canadians, Paragg (2015) also notes the power of the gazer: 'The external racial gaze imposes fixed racial categories onto people who belong to racialised groups. Reading people through "the act of looking" exerts power over the one who is "looked upon" and named (2015:26).

Based on the above lines of reasoning, we seek to throw light on how racial meanings are conferred and recreated on people of mixed-race heritage within the Ghanaian social landscape. Our use of 'mixed race' in this article is also done in full awareness of its contentious nature, and we do not intend to reify race by using the term, knowing that the act of 'naming' a social group as 'mixed race' in fact racialises them. However, we follow the practice in the burgeoning area of mixed-race studies/critical mixed-race studies that actually recognises 'mixed race' as a category of identification connected to identity politics in many places of the world (Daniel *et al.* 2014). We therefore acknowledge the importance of race as a factor of discrimination (Hirsch 2019; Joseph-Salisbury and Connolly 2018; Paragg 2017), as well as the agency of individuals in the performance of their racial identity. As Storrs argues: 'Racial identities are not simply imposed on individuals, but are achieved through interaction, presentation, and manipulation' (1999:200).

In addition to race and racialisation theories, Kimberlé Crenshaw's (1989) intersectional theory highlights the complexity of mixed-race Ghanaian participants' lived experiences of privilege and discrimination. Intersectionality, rooted in black feminism, takes into cognisance the articulation of race, ethnicity, social class, nationality, gender, ability, migrant status and religion, and how they interact with and influence each other in individual and group social realities within multiple systems of oppression. Intersectionality is used to theorise the relationships between different forms or axes of power, vulnerabilities and social inequalities, and how they create unique experiences for people (Bilge 2010, 2020).

Our paper draws mainly on race and racialisation theories, and is inspired by intersectional theory, to examine the linkages and interconnections between the experiences of mixed-race Ghanaians. We look at how their race, gender, ethnicity, colour and social class interact to produce complex articulations of privilege and discrimination along axes of power that are grounded in the specific historical continuities and discontinuities afforded by globalisation processes (Rocha and Yeoh 2021). We suggest that being of mixed race in Ghana and having comparatively 'softer' or 'silky' hair and fair skin creates privileges. However, the participants' embodiment of whiteness might also be experienced as a stigma because of its association with colonial oppression, among university-educated persons who are reflective and articulate about their position in a postcolonial context (Storrs 1999). In addition to Pierre's definition above, we follow Van Zyl-Hermann and Boersema's definition of whiteness, which, while it acknowledges the domination of colonial systems of power based on white hegemony, allows spaces of negotiation and redefinitions grounded in socially situated contexts – what Asante (2016:90) has called 'glocalised whiteness':

Whiteness is here understood as a configuration of power, privilege and identity consisting of white racialised ideologies and practices, with material and social ramifications. This focus on racialisation and how power and privilege are bound up with the social construction of identity – that is, on the distinct yet connected constitutive elements of whiteness – is an important conceptual move. It allows us to begin to answer questions of how race operates in postcolonial contexts and how its power and meaning-making is contested' (Van Zyl-Hermann and Boersema 2017:652).

As whiteness is not simply valued in a straightforward and univocal way in postcolonial Africa, the embodiment of whiteness in mixed-race participants also creates mitigated approval in society. It intersects with other axes of power (such as class and gender) to create complex sets of privileges and disenfranchisement at micro and macro levels of analysis.

Methodology: Researching Mixed-Race Experiences

A head of hair impacts greatly on an individual's perceived beauty, colour and general self-image. Discourses on hair and ideologies of colourism are often gendered, with the perception that women spend more time and money on caring for their hair, which contributes to their subjectivity as beautiful (Banks 2000; Dosekun 2020; Patton 2006; Phoenix 2014). In this regard, how significant is hair for mixed-race Ghanaians? What meaning is attached to it? What is the role of gender? How does context inform social constructions and perceptions about 'mixed' hair and how does it factor in its racialisation? These are the questions that this article seeks to address.

We found that a qualitative framework was useful in addressing our research objectives, as it allowed us to unearth the lived experiences of mixed-race people¹ regarding the social perceptions of their hair. We collected life histories to delve deeper into individual's lived experiences from childhood to adulthood. This method encourages reflexivity (Bauer and McAdams 2000; Freeman 1993) as it enables the individual to reflect on how s/he is defined, perceived and shaped by social contexts. Through the narrative of participants, our methodology also contributed to illustrating how the Ghanaian population perceives mixed-race Ghanaians.

We used the snowball sampling method to recruit participants, initially through our contacts and networks of mixed-race Ghanaians, who in turn introduced us to others who self-identified as such. The difficulty with finding Ghanaians of mixed race led to a selection of participants from comparatively middle- to upper-class backgrounds. We acknowledge this as a limitation that shaped the type of results we obtained.

The data was collected between June and December 2019. Participants were drawn from different parts of the sixteen regions of Ghana, the majority coming from Accra, Ghana's capital. The data collection was informed by an intersectional lens, in that we paid attention to the entanglements of race, nationality, citizenship, location and gender, whereas the analysis focused on racialisation processes. The themes that were discussed in the interviews covered experiences of growing up as a mixed-race person in Ghana, schooling, life at home, and friends and family including extended family members. Other themes we explored were national affiliation and experiences of citizenship and racial identity. For the purpose of this article, the analysis focuses on perceived skin colour, hair type and texture, hair management, regulatory mechanisms in educational institutions, and issues of inclusion and exclusion.

We conducted a total of twenty-two life-history interviews with individuals who identified themselves as mixed-race persons in Ghana. The age of the participants ranged from as young as twelve to seventy-three. The young ones were interviewed in the presence of their parents after they had voluntarily expressed interest in taking part in the study. Informed consent and voluntary participation were ensured. Many of the participants were students, some were workers and there were a few retirees. We interviewed mainly first-generation mixed individuals; seventeen respondents identified as female² and five as male.

Even if four of the five men interviewed in this study made comments about their hair, hair remains a gendered topic and there were attempts at disregarding the issue. For example, the interview with Kobina, a sixty-six-year-old male participant of Lebanese and Ghanaian descent, illustrated the difficulties in addressing this theme with mixed-race men:

Interviewer: Does your hair give you any advantages?

Kobina: Oh no, I don't think so. Okay well my hair is part of my body, so you never know (laughs).

The above response suggests that, for Kobina, hair is an unnecessary, nonsensical question, possibly alluding to the fact that he did not attach importance to it. Most of our analysis is thus rooted in the narratives of female participants, except for a few insights into identity issues and racialisation processes, which affected both men and women.

Most participants' mothers were racialised as white with the majority of the fathers being identified as black. Ethical clearance was secured for the study from the University of Cape Coast's Institutional Review Board. The data was manually transcribed, coded and analysed using Miles, Huberman and Saldana's (2013) qualitative data analysis framework. We now turn to an analysis of the data, supported by the relevant literature.

Black Hair, 'Mixed' Hair

In the light of the specific history of 'mixedness', we focus on data that examines hair and its significance for black and mixed-race women. We later introduce the notion of colourism in an attempt to show the interconnectedness of the concepts and situate them in the Ghanaian context.

In traditional African societies, from the Ancient Nile Valley civilisations to the movement of Africans to the Western world, hair has been a significant aspect of life, with spiritual, social, cultural and

aesthetic dimensions (Johnson and Bankhead 2014:87). Africans had symbolic hairstyles that were connected to their tribal traditions. In the early fifteenth century, hairstyles in West African societies served as a carrier of messages. Hairstyles could communicate age, marital status, ethnic identity, religion, wealth, rank and geographic region (Byrd and Tharp, cited in Netshia, 2017). These cultural messages were carried over to the diaspora, but were suppressed by slave-owners, who shaved off the hair of enslaved African men upon their arrival because they considered the hair of Africans to be unattractive. The women were made to cover their hair with rough fabric (Johnson and Bankhead 2014). The negative connotations around the dense, tightly curled hair of African peoples and the racialisation of black hair have been traced to this era.

Black hair is a politically charged subject, with hairstyling and haircare routines governed by social, cultural, religious, economic and political factors (Madlela 2018). Hair has been interpreted as one of the most tangible signs of racial difference apart from skin colour (Mercer 1987). Nyamnjoh and Fuh (2014) state that it is linked to personal and social identity, mainly defined by Western ideals, and might be regarded as a form of creativity and expression. It is a complex, multifaceted and politicised issue that intersects with gender, 'race' and class (Erasmus 1997; Thomas 2013). Like skin bleaching, there is a huge multinational industry that supports and fuels hair and its styling, not only within the black world, but globally. Hair is a universal symbol, a way of expressing one's individuality (Ellis-Hervey *et al.* 2016). Women (and men) of all 'races'³ and ethnic groups can relate to the trials of dealing with their hair, worrying about styling it, colouring it or changing its texture (Thompson 2009).

Racialising Hair, Embodying Whiteness

As observed by Erasmus (1997), hairstyling and hair politics are fluid and ever changing according to sociohistorical processes. Thus, from the late nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century, the desire for types of silky and straight hair that were acceptable according to white hegemonic beauty standards caused black women the world over to go through a lifetime of making their frizzy hair straighter with the hot comb⁴ and, later, through chemical relaxing. These methods of treating hair were widely available, through globalisation and international capitalist trade, including on the African continent and other parts of the African diaspora in the Caribbean and South America. Straightened hair was considered proper, neater and more acceptable within corporate settings and society in general. 'Nappy' or 'frizzy' hair was abhorred (Chapman 2007; Dione

Rosado 2004). Straight hair was seen as an identification with whiteness and provided privilege to people of mixed-race backgrounds, as the following narratives show. In fact, most of the seventeen women involved in the study had a lot to say about the texture of their hair:

The hair at the back is whiter than the hair at the front which is more kinky, and the middle is like a mixture [...] My sister too has it, especially the back hair. It tends to be silkier and then the one in front is kinkier, but generally, like, the general texture of my hair is ... I've seen more kinky versions of it and I have seen more of the silky, so I think it's like in the middle sort of. (Lola, 22 years, Ghanaian/Moldovan)

Amanda shared similar views on hair texture. She described her hair as a 'half white and half black' mixture:

It is kinky, it is curly. Okay I have different hair types with my hair. Actually, this side of my hair is very straight. My mum would say this is *obroni* and mixed race. Then I have some part of my hair very hard. She is like, 'That is your Ghanaian hair'.

Amanda's description of her hair emphasises her mixed ancestry, rooted in a narrative of racialised nationality. Here, hair texture is constructed as an ethnoracial identification marker first by Amanda's mother and then by Amanda herself, who adopts the same pattern of valuation and devaluation of her hair, dissecting her head into the part with Ghanaian racial markers and the part with white ethnicity markers. Defining hair as 'half Ghanaian' and 'half *obroni*' conflates racial ideologies with national identity. It also points to a perceived ethnoracial difference between mother and daughter.

Just as skin colour comes in different shades, hair comes in a variety of textures. Such shades and textures, when racialised, create opportunities for some and vulnerabilities for others. Johnson and Bankhead (2014: 88) argue that mixed-race black individuals in the US were given lighter tasks on the plantations and within the homes of slave-owners due to their comparatively lighter skin colour and 'fine features'. These privileges afforded by whiteness contributed to darker black people valorising lighter skin and sleeker hair as a means of gaining access to social and economic mobility and power (Johnson and Bankhead 2014:88). This perception is grounded in systemic racism and global white supremacist systems and still informs contemporary racial identity performances, such as passing⁵ (Ahmed 1999; Storrs 1999).

In the context of postcolonial Ghana, 'silky' hair also opens up privileges associated with whiteness, since it is a white ideal of feminine beauty. For example, twenty-three-year-old Kukua, of Chinese/Ghanaian heritage, living in Ghana, remarked that the texture of her hair plays a major role in

how people perceive her. While she describes herself as having frizzy hair, her brother has 'wavy Chinese hair', but also dark skin. Kukua thus valorises her brother's hair, but it seems to lose some of its potency because his skin is dark and people identify him as Indian, which he dislikes.

Even though whiteness is a category of identification that tends to be broad and inclusive in Ghana, all 'white' groups are not the same and are not positioned equally in the hierarchy of desire. Louisa, the sixty-nine-year-old British/Ghanaian, explains her perspective:

I just want to say that mixed-race individuals are not the same. European mixed-race are different from Asians, and the Americans. This is because they are of different backgrounds and looks. For example, the looks of a European mixed-race is totally different from the Asian so the experiences might be different. For example, in Ghana we are very much used to the European or American mixed race and not the Asians so if one is asked to choose between the two the former will be preferred.

Like Kukua's brother, fifty-four-year-old Lee, a woman who has a Ghanaian mother and Chinese father, also has very silky and long hair which, she claims, has been inherited by her children (their father is a black Ghanaian). Due to her looks and perceived embodiment of whiteness, as a young girl Lee was exempted from all house chores and was treated as a trophy child, in comparison to her black Ghanaian half-siblings. In this case, social class might have been one of the reasons Lee received favours that her half-siblings did not have. However, only two out of the twenty-seven respondents alluded to class as a factor in racialisation processes. For example, Otolina (thirty-five years old, Ukrainian/Ghanaian) stated that poorly educated Ghanaian women who married white men cultivated a sense of superiority in their children, which fed negative perceptions about mixed-race people in Ghanaian society. In other words, such mothers 'spoiled' their mixed-race children. Otolina implied that white and well-educated Ghanaian mothers tended to be more critical of white privilege and brought up their children 'well', respecting Ghanaian moral standards. Social class thus also emerged as a factor of differentiation in mixed families in Ghana.

Afro Hair, Natural Hair and Afro-Centred Identity

Hair and its styling are symbols of identity and national affiliation African societies and the diaspora. Most of the women and a few of the men we interviewed talked about how they styled their hair. While fifty-eight-year-old Pomaa kept her hair short, Alice wore hers in 'sister locks', a form of

hair locking ('dreadlocks') in which the natural hair locks are smaller in size than the locks popularised by artists such as Bob Marley. Some women had hair extensions. However, they kept their hair, all the styles had a meaning that was very often tied to identity politics. Hairdos were also monitored by parents and institutions such as schools, which added a layer of complexity to the (glocal) politics of hair for mixed-race persons.

The 1960s struggle for social justice through the American Civil Rights Movement led to changes in Black American hair styles. Many Black Americans began styling their hair in what became known as the 'Afro', to celebrate their black identity. This 'natural' hairstyle does not involve the use of chemicals, and goes against practices of hair straightening that were, and still are, widely used. Mercer (1987) argued that black hairstyling may be interpreted as a popular art form that articulates a variety of 'aesthetic solutions' to a range of problems created by ideologies of race and racism. Currently, there is a plethora of hairstyling techniques and styles available for black people globally, ranging from sleek wigs, relaxing creams, cosmetics for natural and braided hair, and artificial and natural hair extensions to create the type of long hair look that is generally associated with 'white' hair. This, of course, is supported by a huge multinational industry for hair products.

The hair question is complex, not simply a matter of the usage of natural versus fake or processed hair; nor is it a straightforward dichotomy between the acceptance of an African (or black) self, versus the internalisation of westernised beauty ideals. Black hair styles keep changing and people have several choices to pick from, making novel looks and identities possible. The question of identity in relation to hair is even more complex when referring to mixed-race individuals who are sometimes identified as black – as in the context of the US – or as white, in postcolonial Africa. In both contexts, however, hair styles facilitate group inclusion or exclusion – sometimes in subtle ways, at other times, more provocatively. As seen above, when one person's hair is categorised as half white and half black, there is always the possibility that people will use the 'other' half to exclude them from their group.

It emerged from the study that age and experience informed how mixed-race people wear or style their hair. Most of the mature female participants had experienced long journeys trying to navigate the various beauty standards, gendered norms and racial ideologies that structured how they perceived and performed their hair. Some had resorted to short natural hair (unprocessed, with no chemicals) and 'sister locks', the neater version of dreadlocks. The oldest participant, Sada (seventy-three years, Ghanaian/

Lebanese) and Poma (fifty-eight years) were in this category. Sixty-year-old Alice also maintained locks. The desire for and attention to natural hair can be linked to the natural hair movement that is currently gaining ground in North America and among other diasporic populations in the global West (Craig 2002; White 2005; Johnson and Bankhead 2014)⁶ following the valorisation of black and African subjectivities (see for example, the *négritude* movement, Senghor 1966).

Hair was also significant in the male participants' identity. Twenty-three-year-old Katha, who has a Russian mother and a Ghanaian father, had much to say about his hair regarding its texture and styling. He wore an Afro haircut, which he described as being 'more on the African side':

Interviewer: Do you always wear your hair like that?

Katha: I started wearing it Afro after Senior High School, and then in university ... Combing it every day is a lot of work. Because of how kinky it is, it makes it hard to comb. I have to wet it and use cream for it to be easy to comb. But if I comb it every day, it will break.

These ways of men and women performing identity and expressing belonging to a group – in these cases, African and Ghanaian – through hair styles may be attributed to the desire to *appear* more African for mixed-race Ghanaians, whose Ghanaian identity is constantly challenged by the majority black population. As Erasmus said, 'All hair is always worked on, and constantly processed by cultural practices' (Nyamjoh and Fuh 2014: 55); but we could add that it also serves as a means to shape one's body to fit into certain ideologies, thus nurturing politics of belonging.

Hair Regulations in the School Environment: Impact on Mixed-Race Individuals

Another theme that emerged in this study relates to the management of hair in schools. Though the school is a microcosm of society and an environment of regulation, the school context provided a picture of how mixed-race children were othered and racialised based on their hair. This part of their lives was significant in processes of identity construction. Many of the experiences involving participants' hair described in this section took place in boarding schools at the second cycle level, where children live for a good part of their youth and must navigate school regulations on appearance and hygiene as well as social life with their teachers and peers during the day and in the evenings. These were mainly painful experiences that made them aware of their racial 'difference'.

Most schools in Ghana require that all students, male and female, keep their hair natural and short. Sometimes the schools exempt mixed-race children from this regulation on account of their long and/or silky hair. As shown in the narratives, this situation creates tension and friction in peer groups, especially among students who resent the fact that the students who look 'whiter' are exempted from the rule:

In secondary school there was discrimination even among the mixed-race ooh. Those with very straight hair and Caucasians were asked to keep it while those with curly hair like mine were asked to cut it. (Pomaa, 58 years, Irish/Ghanaian)

Well, uhm, the schools I went to, I always had a lot of trouble with my hair because they've always wanted me to cut my hair and so my parents literally fought for me to keep my hair. So because of that there were a lot of tight restrictions like I always had to tie my hair in a bun, braid it and then tuck it in, like constantly, all the time, so my mom had to know how to do it. (Lola, 22 years, Moldovan/Ghanaian)

And in JHS [Junior High School] we all had to cut our hair, which was a bit traumatic for me because I put a lot of identity on my hair. Because people used to compliment my hair when I was growing up. So, when it was gone, I felt I had lost something. So, I had short hair for six years, from JHS 1 to SHS 3. (Otolina, 35 years, Ukrainian/Ghanaian)

There are several issues from the above narratives that need to be unpacked. First, it appears that the mixed-race respondents' experiences with their hair were uncomfortable at best, and even, in Otolina's words 'traumatic'. Hair issues seemed to increase the complexity of their everyday hygiene routines, involving several people and various levels of authority. Hair was also significant enough to involve 'fighting' to keep it long, which further differentiated mixed-race students from other black Ghanaian students, who then employed various strategies to punish them for their privilege. On the other hand, the participants unanimously stated that they were referred to as 'white' or '*obroni*' in school and were admired for their hair. This shows that types of hair perceived as 'white' have the potential to become a form of social capital for mixed-race individuals.

Long curly hair represents an advantage in Ghanaian society. It brings status and recognition to its bearer. The straighter the hair, the 'whiter' it is, and the more privilege the mixed-race individual has access to. In the school context, as elsewhere in Ghanaian society, regulations are bent to preserve this form of capital. Even parents are ready to 'fight' against the system to keep the hair of their mixed-race children intact, as it becomes a symbol of the family's wealth, status and prestige. As mentioned, some Ghanaian parents regarded their mixed-race children as their 'trophy children', and

straight, or 'silky' hair became an integrated part of the racialisation of their bodies, as white and Western. Hair is thus part of a racial 'package' that includes skin colour and is associated with moral and intellectual values deemed 'superior', such as higher academic facility, financial wealth and punctuality.

However, possessing mixed ancestry is not enough to put mixed-race children above other children in school. We can see from Pomaa's narrative that there was a hierarchy in the classification of mixed-race children's hair. The longer and straighter the hair, the more privileges the children were given by the school authorities. This hierarchisation of hair based on colour and texture is a form of colourism that takes its root in white Western imperialism, but it is also shaped by the Ghanaian historical context and contemporary immigration landscape. For example, although Chinese entrepreneurs have been established in Ghana since its independence and earlier on the shores of Takoradi, it is only recently that they have started to be otherised as a group (Ho 2012:67). If they were still considered 'white' at the time of the study, the participants' narratives show that Chinese features, such as 'slanted eyes', were increasingly perceived as 'less beautiful' than body features constructed as 'white European'.

Unruly, Thick and Difficult: Managing Mixed-Race Hair

From their study based in the UK, Joseph-Salisbury and Connelly (2018) wrote: 'If your hair is relaxed, white people are relaxed, if your hair is nappy, they are not happy.' Their argument reflects how 'black hair' has become a site of postracial social control. Even though the contexts of racial relations in the UK and in Ghana are different, this study resonates with our findings. It appears that in Ghana, where the majority population identifies as black, the citation also applies.

Difficulty in managing the hair of mixed-race individuals emerged strongly in our study. As young children, some experienced painful combing and braiding sessions, mainly by their mothers. However, the evidence collected does not confirm the anecdotal claim in Ghana that white mothers of mixed-race children do not know how to manage their children's hair. Pomaa's white mother braided her hair:

Interviewer: How did you manage it when you were younger?

Pomaa: With great difficulty, just because my hair used to be extremely thick, quite coarse and it grows rapidly. Always uneven. My mother braided it. I do not know where she learned it from, maybe someone taught her. My hair was very unruly, and I do not think I liked my hair at that time. I wanted it to be more obedient.

In contrast, Emefa (seventeen years' old, with a Ghanaian mother and a white German father), expressed dissatisfaction with the way her mother had handled her hair when she was younger:

Emefa: My mum did my hair by braiding it or doing a ponytail. She used to comb out my curls. I did not even know I had curly hair because most at times my hair was frizzy and straight and the curls would not really show.

Interviewer: Were you happy with the way your hair was styled as a child?

Emefa: As a child I did not really care, but right now, when I think about it, I realise they used to do my hair the wrong way, I ask my mum that 'Mummy why did you not learn about my hair?' And this probably damaged my hair.

Interviewer: So, you think your mum was not competent enough to take care of your hair?

Emefa: I think she did the best she could. At least she did not cut it off. She tried her best to keep my natural hair without perming it.

Both black and white parents, however, faced difficulty in managing the perceived unruly hair of their mixed-race children. For example, sixty-year-old German/Ghanaian Alice, who has a white mother and a Ghanaian father, was impatient with the idea that white mothers are unable to manage the hair of their mixed children. Her mother, like Pomaa's, managed her hair easily, even though work constraints compelled her to frequently delegate the task of braiding her hair to the house-help. As seen, some Ghanaian mothers, such as in the case of Kukua and Emefa, struggled with their daughters' hair. Emefa further reported that her white dad also learned how to do her hair. This is insightful since hair management and styling is very gendered and mostly handled by mothers, whether black or white.

The perceived unruly nature of mixed-race hair reflects a form of mystification of 'black' hair at the global level, and complexifies (and racialises) the idea of competence attached to hair management. White mothers were expected to experience more challenges managing the hair of their mixed-race children, because it is situated beyond their cultural competence. As Louisa contended: 'From my interactions with mixed-race families, I have come to the realisation that if the mother is black, the children are able to learn the language and other traditions faster than when the mother is a white.' However, in reality, black Ghanaian mothers also experienced difficulties. Parents thus had to learn how to navigate 'mixed-race' hair in its complex articulations with identity politics, racial capital, social expectations and institutional rules and regulations.

Having examined issues regarding the hair of mixed-race people in Ghana, we now turn to a discussion of the ways skin colour and mixed-race hair intersect through the framework of colourism.

Hair, Colourism and Beauty Ideals

The correlations between hair, skin colour, identity and beauty ideals emerged strongly in our study. Colourism ideologies reproduced ideals of beauty for mixed-race individuals grounded in white hegemonic standards. Colourism, for Hunter (2007:237), is the ‘process of discrimination that privileges light-skinned people of colour over their dark-skinned counterparts’.⁷ The persistence of colourism in Ghana through the centuries is linked to an intricate system that Yaba Blay (2011) and Jemima Pierre (2013) define as ‘white supremacy’ (the ideology that supports the superiority of white persons) fuelled by ‘commodity racism’⁸ (Chin 2015). Accordingly, the mixed-race participants’ narratives highlighted the advantages of embodying light skin and other phenotypical traits racialised as white in Ghana. Akua, a twenty-six-year-old German/Ghanaian woman had this to say about her skin colour and the status it bestowed on her:

People call me ‘half-caste’, like, most at times, I go out with my friends at night and when we go to these fancy, fancy places, funnily enough, they favour the light skin girls more than the black. So, when you get there, they will not even bother to stop us like, ‘Oh, you won’t enter’, they will just open the door and let you enter.

‘Fancy, fancy places’ here refers to expensive nightclubs in Accra, which are usually policed. Akua revealed that the bouncers do not insist that light-skinned girls adhere to the club’s regulations regarding dress code, as the following example shows:

So, when you get there, you are supposed to wear high heels to enter. Me, knowing I am fair, I can wear sandals and they will allow me in. But let a dark girl wear sandals they won’t allow her in.

Interestingly, Akua does not necessarily identify herself as a light-skinned person. She calls her complexion ‘chocolate’, but others perceive her as a light-skinned person *in relation to* darker-skinned young Ghanaian women. In addition to her complexion, she has ‘aquiline’ features and ‘soft’ hair, which has the effect of ‘whitening’ her skin colour. On the advantages of having light skin, Akua added:

People around you make you feel like there are advantages to it, they make you know that a majority of the Ghanaian guys now want girls who are light-skinned, so they can have pretty kids or pretty children, features like, maybe

curly hair, nice nails, feet, all these things. Black men actually think that if you are light-skinned or you are half-breed or anything it is a good thing.

From Akua's narratives, it is clear that, in the Ghanaian context, colourism conveyed social benefits because her skin appears lighter in colour than that of black Ghanaian girls, even though she does not define herself as light-skinned. Her hair texture also contributed to her 'passing' as white(r). Pomaa, Emefa and Chantelle also mentioned that they were often sought by photographers for modelling assignments because of their hair and skin colour. Pomaa has been featured on billboards in Accra.

Interviewer: Now back to the issue of advertisement. Do you think it is about your skin *colour* or your hair?

Pomaa: Oh, it is my hair ... He has been filming me for adverts. My first advert was for a bank. The bank showed him how the person should look like. They gave him a picture of a woman who was not biracial but fair with grey hair. He said he looked and looked. Honestly, I can count the number of women of a certain age with grey.⁹ It has been more of my grey hair than my skin colour. If it is about my skin colour, they would have given me a different role. It is always about my hair.

Like Pomaa, seventeen-year-old Emefa has been sought out to model clothing, a situation she perceived as a form of favouritism. She argued, 'I model for some photographer who asked me to model for him; and my friend asked why, and he said: "Oh, she is mixed and I want mixed-race girls to model."' Chantelle reported modelling for an advertisement for a hotel in the country. Thus, young and old mixed-race people secured modelling opportunities as a result of their 'mixedness'. The intersection of the women's skin colour, hair and gender that corresponded to beauty ideals in Ghana became a form of social capital, as it brought them modelling opportunities on the one hand and confirmed the continued normalisation of white dominance on the other hand.

Embodying Whiteness: 'Are the Negatives More than the Positives?'

As seen, the bodies of mixed-race women are the focus of much admiration in Ghanaian society. However, mixed-race individuals are also confronted with discrimination and even bullying. Their racialisation affects different dimensions of their lived realities and shifts depending on social interaction. Chantelle, a nineteen-year-old Ukrainian/Ghanaian, describes an instance when her schoolmates thought she had received high marks because of her skin colour:

Yes, and I think there was also a time when, I think they made all of us, everybody did bad in an exam, I think I did good and the whole class was angry and attributed my performance to my colour. They argued that they gave me the mark because I was an *obroni*.

Louisa recalls being bullied at school so much that, at one point, she became shy about her skin colour. Selina, a thirty-four-year-old woman whose parents are Lebanese/Ghanaian and Scottish/Ghanaian, had a similar experience:

Outside my family there was a constant need to belong. I always had to justify that I am a Ghanaian. Schooling was no different. It was quite difficult, especially in secondary school. There were a lot of offensive tags like '*tsoobi*' (doll), 'go to your country', and so on. It got to a point I had a confidence issue. I felt like I do not belong to any of the races.

Selina's narrative shows the downside of privilege for mixed-race individuals in Ghana, where the flip side of admiration is envy:

There are times that because some view fairness as beautiful, they will give preferential treatment. This same colour attracts negativities like envy and dislike. For example, if two ladies go for a job interview and the lighter one is selected, the obvious thing people will say is that she got selected because of her complexion. Meanwhile it might not be the case. Some see light-skinned women to be morally weak because they are always being chased by men. So, I think sometimes when I think about all these, I am tempted to think that the negatives are more than the positives.

Due to negative experiences in encounters with darker-skinned Ghanaians throughout her life, Louisa reflected:

Ghanaians are racist. They think all Ghanaians are supposed to be dark-skinned and so, having a mixed one, you do not fit.

Conclusion

In this article, we have examined the significance of hair for mixed-race Ghanaians living in Ghana at different levels of analysis (micro and macro), and its interconnection with skin colour and paradigms of whiteness. We have looked at how hair is racialised, zooming in on the specific context of the school setting. We have highlighted its importance in performing afrocetric identities. The way parents 'managed' their mixed-race children's hair and their relative racial and cultural competence was also discussed. Finally, we explored how the hair and skin colour of mixed-race women fits into 'glocalised' beauty standards in Ghana, using the perspective of colourism.

Mixed-race people in Ghana were referred to as *obroni*. The data shows that whiteness is constructed in particular ways that are not all positive. It is attributed to, and valued in, mixed-race bodies differently, depending on context and social interaction. The variety in treatment meted out to some mixed-race individuals could be interpreted as the reflection of a complex and uneasy relationship between Ghanaians with groups of people they racialise as white. The dark-skinned Ghanaians' gaze towards mixed-race persons tends to reproduce the category 'white people' and its inherent power relations, possibly exacerbating the ambivalences, difficulties and complexities from the colonial past and the contemporary problems of underdevelopment and foreign aid. In this study, the racialisation of mixed-race people was based on appearance, and was mainly produced through discourses and practices focused on hair type and skin colour. Other non-physical traits associated with whiteness included financial wealth and beauty, but also, questionable morals, in particular when applied to women.

The mixed-race participants thus grappled with different aspects of their racialisation experience, often informed by Western beauty ideals. In Ghana, they differently embodied the symbolism of white supremacy, some of them being next to white foreigners of European origin in the hierarchy, while others were not considered more special than black Ghanaians, mainly due to their darker skin tone or the 'frizziness' of their hair. In school, where 'othering' processes played out clearly, they were both favoured and traumatised by their hair experiences. Although most Ghanaian mixed-race participants enjoyed being admired for their hair and skin colour, they also received opprobrium and discrimination, particularly when they were given preferential treatment.

The mixed-race participants in our study found themselves in an ambiguous position in reference to the category of *obroni* in Ghana, because they embodied whiteness to varying degrees. Their skin colour and hair texture were central to their positioning in this hierarchy of white privilege. Some accepted their position of privilege and self-racialised as *obroni*, whereas others detested the term and reacted against it regularly, especially when their Ghanaianess was probed and contested. Intersections based on class, nationality and colour, as well as the age and level of education of respondents, informed the degree of reflexivity found in their narratives.

We have attempted to situate the racialisation of mixed-race people within Ghana's history of colonisation by white Europeans. The Ghanaian admiration of fair skin and both their desire for and hatred of mixed-race individuals derive from the colonial legacy and its subsequent engendering of a worldview of white superiority and power. This situation is reinforced

by global racialisation processes, identity politics, civil rights movements and the vast international cosmetic industry, which has created products that enable people with dark skin to 'lighten up', process their hair in a wide variety of ways, and transform themselves into people of lighter complexion, and enjoy the related societal benefits. Mixed-race individuals fit into these dynamics in ambiguous and complex ways.

The racialisation of the Ghanaian mixed-race participants in our study intersected with colourism, complexifying their access to privilege and power, especially because it is informed by the immediate comparison of individuals' skin tones and hair textures.¹⁰ However, the reality of white racial hegemony made them aware that their *obroni* status in Ghana is a construction that does not necessary hold in the global setting. In fact, all participants stated that while in Ghana they were labelled as *obroni*, they were racialised as black or coloured when they travelled to Western countries and thus lost the privileges attached to their perceived whiteness.

We hope that our paper, in this era of #BlackLivesMatter and black racial consciousness-raising, contributes to interrogate the concept of 'race' and disrupt its fixedness in a 'black society' like Ghana, where ethnicity holds sway. Similar to Jemima Pierre's work (2013) on the 'predicament of blackness', our paper draws attention to the global political economy of race and racialised processes where white privilege, power and supremacy continue to reign and shape the rest of the world. As Rocha and Yeoh contend:

Mixed-race racisms and racialisation processes bring into focus the untidiness of race as a concept that is continually redrawn by the interplay between fixed hierarchical notions of race on the one hand and the fluidity of intermixing inherent in mixed-race identifications on the other (Rocha and Yeoh 2021:6).

Notes

1. Mixed-race people in this paper refers to the progeny of phenotypically white, Asian or Arab people and black Ghanaians.
2. We are conscious of the bias that arises from interviewing a majority of female participants. Narratives on the themes of perceptions and types of discrimination indicated that there might be a marked discrepancy in the lived experience of men and women, as supported by the literature on the topic (Bettez 2010; Joseph Salisbury 2019; Lafond 2009).
3. We are fully aware that 'race' is a social construct and not a valid category of analysis. This has been paraphrased from Thompson 2009.
4. In fact, one of the study participants now aged 60 recalls using the hot comb as an adolescent.

5. The situation whereby a light-skinned person of black heritage chooses to integrate in and identify with white social groups.
6. There are several Internet sites on You Tube and Pinterest that inform the reader about natural hair. On trends in West Africa, see for example <http://www.beautygeekng.com/2017/03/20/7-nigerian-natural-hair-bloggersvloggers-know>. Retrieved 13 June 2020.
7. Charles (2012) has pointed out that colourism also occurs among whites.
8. Chin (2015) explains 'commodity racism' as a system in which race and commodities mutually reinforce each other.
9. Pomaa's statement refers to the fact that many older middle-class women in Ghana tend not to 'show' their grey hair, preferring to dye it, or wear wigs or extensions that cover their grey hair.
10. There are other factors that could combine in an unequal, discriminatory colourist system (such as body size, social class, wealth, level of education), which this study does not consider.

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Disputas de e por espaços político-identitários: o rap e os movimentos sociais em Cabo Verde

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Resumo

Independente desde 1975 e democrático desde 1991, Cabo Verde não escapou às vagas de protestos urbanos que na segunda metade dos anos de 2000 assolaram as capitais africanas. O *rap*, percebido como a nova expressão de protesto dos jovens urbanos, consolida-se nos anos de 2000 como um dos principais atores no cenário político cabo-verdiano e torna-se num importante veículo de mobilização e construção de uma cultura urbana de resistência. Este artigo, que tem como base uma pesquisa etnográfica nas cidades da Praia (Ilha de Santiago) e do Mindelo (ilha de São Vicente), busca responder a 3 questões: 1) como o *rap* tem evidenciado as contradições identitárias e sociais; 2) como ele se tem articulado com os outros tipos de movimentos sociais; 3) qual o lugar das mulheres no *rap*?

Palavras-chave: *hip-hop/rap*, identidades, protestos, movimentos sociais

Abstract

Independent since 1975 and democratic since 1991, Cabo Verde has not escaped the waves of urban protests that plagued African capitals in the second half of the 2000s. *Rap*, perceived as the new expression of protest by urban youth, consolidates itself in the 2000s as one of the main actors in the Cape Verdean political scene and becomes an important vehicle for mobilizing and building an urban culture of resistance, amplifying these issues. This article, based on an ethnographic research in the cities of Praia (Santiago Island) and Mindelo (São Vicente Island), seeks to answer three questions: 1) on how *rap* has shown the identity, social and urban contradictions; 2) how it has articulated with other types of social movements; 3) what is the place of women in *rap* and street politics?

Keywords: *hip-hop/rap*, identities, protests, social movements

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Abstract

Indépendant depuis 1975 et démocratique depuis 1991, le Cap-Vert n'a pas échappé aux vagues de protestations urbaines qui ont touché les capitales africaines dans la seconde moitié des années 2000. Le rap, perçu comme la nouvelle expression de la contestation par la jeunesse urbaine, se consolide dans les années 2000 comme l'un des principaux acteurs de la scène politique capverdienne et devient un vecteur important de mobilisation et de construction d'une culture urbaine de résistance, amplifiant ces enjeux. Cet article, basé sur une recherche ethnographique dans les villes de Praia (île de Santiago) et Mindelo (île de São Vicente), cherche à répondre à trois questions : 1) comment le rap a montré les contradictions identitaires, sociales et urbaines ; 2) comment il s'est articulé avec d'autres types de mouvements sociaux ; 3) quelle est la place des femmes dans le rap et la politique de la rue ?

Mots-clés : hip-hop/rap, identités, protestations, mouvements sociaux

Introdução

Na discussão plenária do projeto de pesquisa, realizada na Costa de Marfim, em abril de 2019, o historiador Chikouna Cissé, partindo do exemplo do *rap* senegalês, nos desafiou a refletir sobre o papel do *rap* na consciencialização identitária e política em Cabo Verde. Esta interpelação nos remeteu à postura ambígua do cabo-verdiano, em termos identitários, com o continente a que pertence, ao ponto de muitos cabo-verdianos não se reconhecerem como africanos. Onésimo Silveira, antigo Presidente municipal de São Vicente, teceu a seguinte afirmação:

Nós, mesmo contra a vontade de muita gente, vamos ter que integrar uma África que instintivamente passamos a vida a rejeitar. Eu nunca passei tão mal no meu país como quando, depois de reestruturar a praça Estrela, distribuí quiosques aos vendedores da Costa de África. Havia gente que me ia ver, na Câmara, para perguntar o que eu andava a fazer ou o que é que pretendia fazer, e uns interpelavam-me na rua, para dizer, “cuidado, não vais lá meter os manjacos, se não vais ter problemas”. E isso, meu caro amigo, não é só uma questão de São Vicente. O mesmo se passa nas outras ilhas (...). E quando vejo um homem como José Tomás Veiga a dizer que nós não temos nada a ir buscar à CEDEAO, Cabo Verde deve abandonar a CEDEAO – isso é coisa que eu li. Eu ouvi gente do MpD a dizer que nós não temos nada que ir buscar à CEDEAO, nada temos lá a fazer (...). Ainda em Lisboa, como começámos a negociar a parceria especial com a União Europeia, patrícios nossos bem posicionados me disseram: “Ainda bem, assim vamos nos libertar dessa coisa da CEDEAO”. Eu, às vezes, ainda

me dei ao trabalho de explicar: “Cabo Verde só tem valor para a Europa enquanto formos uma plataforma de penetração dos países da CEDEAO.” (Lopes 2014a:203)

Fruto de um processo histórico de colonização mental, a ambiguidade cabo-verdiana, não sendo caso único da realidade pós-colonial africana, consolida-se com a mudança do discurso do Estado colonial português, que encontrou na tese do luso-tropicalismo de Gilberto Freyre o seu sustento ideológico e uma suposta legitimidade histórica. Para Adriano Moreira, um dos ideólogos do benefício histórico do colonialismo missionário português e defensor, nos anos de 1960, da integração de Cabo Verde em Portugal na condição de ilhas adjacentes, o arquipélago “projeta-se com um perfil específico, definindo-se como uma valiosa plataforma de articulações entre a Europa e a África, porque pertence às duas áreas” (Moreira 2014:286).

Apesar de no contexto africano, Cabo Verde ser considerado como um dos poucos países com uma identidade nacional adquirida, o povo das ilhas, segundo Gabriel Fernandes, é “ambivalente que vive sob a marca da carência. O nosso próprio processo de busca de identidade é algo que denuncia essa nossa fragilidade ontológica (...). O cabo-verdiano busca, o tempo todo, a sua identidade, e se assim se comporta é porque ele ainda não se encontrou” (Lopes 2014b:209). Se, tanto a geração nativista como a geração regionalista a foram buscar no lusitanismo,¹ a geração nacionalista, que teve em Amílcar Cabral a sua maior referência, foi buscá-lo em África (Semedo 2006), procura essa hoje recuperada pela parte do movimento *rap* cabo-verdiano.

Para Ela (2013 [1994]), os jovens africanos encontram-se em rutura com as elites intelectuais e líderes políticos, optando por uma linguagem cujo desenvolvimento obedece a uma lógica informal. Lima (2015) advoga que o *rap* cabo-verdiano faz parte dessa linguagem subalterna, visto constituir-se como uma nova forma de afirmação identitária e de protesto oculto, bem como uma lente com a qual é possível ler as contradições da sociedade cabo-verdiana. Ele permitiu a reconstrução identitária de muitos jovens, sobretudo aqueles integrados em ações de ativismo, possibilitando a rejeição da identidade atlântica inventada pelo movimento Claridoso, apropriada e reproduzida ainda hoje pela classe política (Lima & Robalo 2019).

Por isso, entendemos que estudar os movimentos sociais a partir do *rap*, sobretudo o de cariz identitário, vai de encontro ao apelo feito por Ela (2013 [1994]) ao afirmar que os cientistas sociais africanos deveriam estar atentos aos novos tipos de cultura urbana emergentes em África. Assim, concordamos com Lima e Robalo (2019) quando afirmam que o estudo do *rap* (ou o seu uso como fonte de pesquisa) fora da ótica eurocêntrica e comprometido com aquilo que Ela (2013 [1994]) denominou de antropologia do próximo, cria

condições de distanciamento do síndrome elitista (Robalo 2016), observado na maior parte das análises sobre a identidade cabo-verdiana que, de certa maneira, prende o pesquisador às lógicas de reprodução intelectual formal científico-ocidental.

Este artigo resulta do projeto “Jovens, espaço urbano e sociedades em movimento: um olhar sócio-antropológico sobre os movimentos urbanos em Cabo Verde”, financiada pelo programa *MRI CODESRIA 2018/2019* e estrutura-se da seguinte forma: apresentação da abordagem episte-metodológica; definição do *rap* enquanto plataforma pan-africana; mapeamento das disputas político-identitárias pela inclusão étnica e suas decorrências; discussão sobre o legado de Cabral e o *rap* cabo-verdiano enquanto movimento social.

Nota episte-metodológica

Estudar etnograficamente os movimentos sociais cabo-verdianos a partir do olhar do *rap*, não centrado num artista, grupo ou bairro específico, mas que toma todo o fenómeno e a cidade como campo de pesquisa levanta alguns desafios metodológicos. Logo, num primeiro momento, a abordagem *de perto de dentro* parece ganhar uma maior pertinência. Isto porque configura-se como uma proposta metodológica que nos possibilita apreender os “padrões de comportamento, não de indivíduos atomizados, mas de múltiplos, variados e heterogêneos conjuntos de atores sociais cuja vida quotidiana transcorre na paisagem da cidade e depende de seus equipamentos” (Magnani 2012:260).

Redy Lima (2015), um dos pesquisadores deste projeto, tem utilizado esta abordagem, em que a partir do termo “circuito” busca transcender as dinâmicas de bairro, privilegiando o trânsito dos grupos pela cidade como forma de apreender a criatividade no modo de apropriar o espaço público. Contudo, adverte que mobilizar teorias elaboradas no ocidente para compreender e explicar fenómenos urbanos emergentes fora desse contexto pode não ser o mais adequado.

O documento de trabalho do CODESRIA (Slater 1995 e Aina 1998) chama a atenção sobre esse assunto, ao apontar a indiferença para com os conhecimentos teóricos produzidos fora do mundo ocidental nos discursos da globalização que suportaram as políticas de ajustamento estrutural introduzidas na segunda metade dos anos de 1980. Interiorizada por grande parte dos pesquisadores africanos integrados nas tribos científicas (Ela 2015a [2007]) dos centros de pesquisa euro-norte-americanos, a África pós-colonial continuou a ser reproduzida como um imenso laboratório de experimentação europeia (Ela 2015b [2007]).

Contornar esta situação, segundo Ela (2014 [1989]), passa pela destruição do muro de silêncio erguido em torno de Cheikh Anta Diop e do seu trabalho de reconquista da iniciativa histórica do conhecimento africano, uma vez que o mundo não se cinge ao ocidente. Não se trata aqui de um trabalho de glorificação de um passado mais ou menos grandioso, mas do despertar da consciência cultural do papel relevante desempenhado pelo pensamento africano na história da humanidade.

Esta postura só ganha legitimidade científica se tomarmos em consideração os conselhos de Carlos Cardoso sobre a necessidade do pesquisador africano começar a produzir uma teoria crítica, não no sentido que lhe foi dado pela escola marxista europeia, mas “no sentido de transcender o discurso e os quadros teóricos propostos pelo ocidente para compreender e perceber as coisas” (Cardoso 2011:311). Isto remete-nos a um segundo desafio, de construção daquilo que Santos (2002) denominou de pensamento contra-hegemônico, mas que, na esteira do pensador e ativista quilombola Antônio Bispo dos Santos, chamamos de conhecimento contra-colonial. Um tipo de conhecimento orgânico, oposto ao pensamento sintético eurocêntrico, mesmo na sua visão académica alternativa pós-colonial e/ou de-colonial. “A diferença entre o pensamento colonialista e o contracolonialista. E estou dizendo contracolonialista e não decolonialista. E por isso que digo isto? Se qualquer um de vocês chegar em um quilombo e falar de decolonialidade, nosso povo não entenderá. Mas se disser contra-colonialismo, nosso povo entende” (Santos 2019:24).

Todavia, na construção ou na africanização de uma agenda de pesquisa endógena há que estar ciente dos perigos da sul-americanização intelectual e o papel desempenhado pela etnografia ocidental no subdesenvolvimento do conhecimento africano (Ela 2014 [1989]). Urge, então, a necessidade da produção de uma antropologia do próximo, entendido como um tipo de abordagem que “já não se trata de examinar por encomenda (...), mas de aprender a conhecer por dentro os povos a que pertence” (Ela 2013 [1994]:28).

Esta forma de fazer pesquisa nos confronta com questões epistemológicas sobre a legitimidade do uso do conhecimento científico para fins de emancipação social e política, questões essas que se enquadram numa discussão mais ampla sobre o papel que os pesquisadores africanos podem ou não desempenhar no campo da política e da intervenção na esfera pública. Assim, tomando a ciência como um ato político (Ela 2014 [1989]) tentamos pôr em prática um saber, que sem recusar o escrutínio do rigor e da cientificidade, possa contribuir para uma ação política engajada e militante, fora das influências partidárias, neocoloniais e neoliberais, orientada para a discussão e a concretização de uma agenda emancipatória.

A realização deste projeto teve em conta estes ideais e foi desenvolvido entre os meses de agosto de 2019 e março de 2020 nas cidades da Praia e Mindelo, dividida em dois momentos: um primeiro, de carácter exploratório, entre agosto e outubro de 2019 e um segundo, mais aprofundado, entre os meses de janeiro e abril de 2020. Além das inúmeras conversas informais mantidas, efetuamos 18 entrevistas semiestruturadas e 4 discussões de grupo (com um total de 32 pessoas).

O rap enquanto plataforma pan-africana

O *rap* é hoje descrito como uma plataforma pan-africana (Clark 2018), visto ter-se tornado na expressão cultural mais poderosa em África, por onde as velhas identidades africanas foram desconstruídas e reconstruídas (Saucier 2011). Não obstante alguns ativistas traçarem um paralelo entre a cultura do colonizador e a comercialização da cultura *hip-hop* (Clark 2018), as evidências empíricas indicam que para muitos jovens africanos ele se transformou na voz de mudança e representação de um futuro de esperança e de unidade africana (Saucier 2011).

Introduzido em Cabo Verde na segunda metade dos anos de 1980, em formato do *break dance* ou *b-boying* impulsionado pelo filme *Breakin'* (1984), o *hip-hop* logo passa a fazer parte da paisagem sonora das praças centrais das duas maiores cidades do país. Em ambas, vários pioneiros deste movimento eram filhos de pessoas envolvidas na luta de libertação e pertencentes à OPAD-CV, um dos dois movimentos juvenis criados pelo PAIGC.

Apesar de muito consumido pelos jovens, sobretudo os da classe privilegiada ou aqueles que estão em contacto com a diáspora cabo-verdiana, o *rap* era ainda pouco explorado nos anos de 1980. O seu desenvolvimento acontece no início dos anos de 1990 enquanto imitação da cultura urbana americana. Na Praia, a geração a seguir à pioneira, em que se destacam, entre outros, grupos como Niggas Badiu, Black Power, Tchapie, apesar de forte influência dos *beats* caribenhos, começaram desde cedo a desenvolver um trabalho de (re)construção de uma identidade de resistência.

Este ciclo do *rap* praiense ficou também marcado pela influência do *rap* brasileiro, com destaque para Gabriel O Pensador, que esteve na origem da criação da música *Matchuburro*² pelas Tchapie, uma versão invertida da música Loira Burra e que se constituiu momentaneamente como símbolo de resistência feminina contra a submissão no namoro, pelo menos em termos discursivos. Os temas eram variados, mas, como salienta em entrevista Victor Duarte, *rapper* mindelense hoje radicado na Dinamarca, “as ideias eram acerca de assuntos sociais, mas havia, também muitas coisas filosóficas”.

No Mindelo, como nos conta o Dj Letra em entrevista, nos primeiros anos o *rap* desenvolveu-se de forma mais agressiva, muito influenciada pelo estilo desviante e desafiador do *revolutionary gangsta rap* americano. Comparado com o da Praia, o *rap* mindelense nasceu como um fenómeno transurbano e com uma forte consciência coletiva, tendo introduzido, ainda nos anos de 1990, o conceito do movimento inspirado em grandes coletivos americanos como Wu-Tang Clan, em que uma das grandes preocupações era ter representado todos os elementos constituintes dessa cultura.³

Assim como foi descrito por Clark (2018) em relação ao *rap* produzido, nos anos de 1990, nos restantes países africanos, no Mindelo, muito mais do que na Praia, o papel do MC⁴ enquanto intelectual de rua foi uma evidência desde os primórdios e grupos como Hip Hop Art e Lod Skur, ambos pertencentes à segunda geração do *rap*,⁵ funcionaram como escola de consciencialização social de rua, tendo sido um dos principais desencadeadores do processo de retoma da construção da identidade africana pós-movimentos juvenis do partido único.

Na Praia, entre os finais dos anos de 1990 e a primeira metade dos anos de 2000, o *rap* começa a territorializar-se nas periferias e a associar-se à violência dos gangues (Lima 2015) e grupos como Wolf Gang ou Karaka ganham visibilidade. Essa altura ficou também marcada pelo ressurgimento do *break dance* impulsionados pelo filme *You Got Served* (2004), com destaque para grupos como TC ou Black Style, mais tarde gangues de rua. Nesse período, as consequências sociais das políticas de ajustamento estrutural começavam a fazer-se sentir, o que, na linha do observado por Diouf (2003), fez emergir também em Cabo Verde geografias de resistência e de delinquência.

As entrevistas indicam que os novos protagonistas da cena *gangsta* mundial representados por artistas como 50 Cent e Eminem contribuíram para que o processo de (re)americanização do *rap* praiense, mas também do mindelense, entrasse nesse período num novo ciclo. No Mindelo, segundo os entrevistados, embora não se pudesse falar de uma relação direta entre o *gangsta rap* e a violência, salvo algumas exceções, as brigas eram quase que exclusivamente líricas. É de ressaltar que este ciclo do *rap* marcou também a sua politização e além dos grupos do *gangsta rap*, destacaram-se grupos como os República ou GPI, tendência desenvolvida mais tarde e de forma mais crua e contundente por *rappers* como Hélio Batalha na Praia e Gol Wayne no Mindelo.

Rappers como Pex, Batalha e o grupo Sindykatto de Guetto a qual pertenceu, Pomba Preto, FARP, entre outros, surgiram na Praia na segunda metade dos anos de 2000 como uma das caras dessa mudança. Jorge Andrade, conhecido na cena *rap* nacional como Kadamawe, foi um

dos grandes mentores desse ciclo, ao introduzir no universo *rap* a mistura ideológica e identitária do pan-africanismo cabralista e garveyrasta, assim como uma estrutura organizativa inspirada no PAIGC e nos *Black Panthers Party*. Através do coletivo Ra-Teknolojia contribuiu para a (re)interpretação da ideologia *Thug Life* de Tupac, base do processo de (re)construção identitária, assim como a introdução do conceito *rap* consciente⁶ tanto na Praia como no Mindelo, embora, segundo os entrevistados no Mindelo, o *hip-hop* mindelense já nasceu consciente.

Além da influência de Kadamawe, também contribuíram para esse processo as seguintes entidades: o coletivo *Rappers Unidos*, promovido por DJ Letra no ano de 1997, com vista a unir os *rappers* mindelenses numa única família do *hip-hop*. Em 2012, em parceria com uma das poucas representantes femininas do *rap* cabo-verdiano, criaram a exposição RAPt prospetiva, a funcionar como um arquivo do *rap* mindelense; a associação Movimento Hip-Hop, liderada por uma ativista⁷ antes radicada em França, cujo trabalho foi de socialização dos princípios do *hip-hop* redefinidos por KRS-One; o movimento Shokanti, coletivo liderado por um *rapper* radicado nos EUA, que, através do projeto de liderança comunitária, influenciou a associação *Djuntarti* na criação na Praia do Festival Hip Hop Konsienti; a associação *Fidjus di Cabral*,⁸ coletivo pan-africanista radicado na Holanda, que apoiou em 2010 a *Djuntarti* a organizar a primeira *Marxa* Cabral, um ato de insubordinação simbólica a assinalar o dia de assassinato de Cabral, juntando no centro histórico da Praia todos os elementos do *hip-hop*; o historiador Kwesi Tafari, que através da organização de cursos e leituras coletivas dos textos de Cabral contribuiu para o aprofundamento das teorias da revolução junto de *rappers* e ativistas praienses; a Plataforma Gueto, um movimento social negro criado por *rappers* cabo-verdianos radicados em Lisboa, que juntamente com dois dos autores deste projeto organizaram um conjunto de eventos de consciencialização política na Praia; e as ideias revolucionárias de Mirú, ativista dos *Nation of Islam* residente no Mindelo.

É patente a grande influência da diáspora cabo-verdiana nesse processo, em que, através do *hip-hop*, buscaram manter vivos os ideais do pan-africanismo, esquecidos pelas figuras da independência (Barros & Lima 2012), criando uma espécie de identidade negra global (Clark 2018). Estas entidades foram também um dos grandes responsáveis para aquilo que Lima (2012) designou de indigenização do *rap* cabo-verdiano.

Clark (2018) considera que o *hip-hop* americano contém ele próprio elementos de cultura africana, uma vez que, além dos seus cinco elementos iniciais carregarem traços africanos, vários foram os ícones americanos que usaram *samples* de artistas tradicionais africanos. A mesma autora cita um

conjunto de estudos que demonstram paralelos entre a função social da figura do *griot* e a figura do *rapper* africano. Ainda assim, Charry (2012) entende que o *rap* como escolha expressiva dos filhos da geração pós-independência não surgiu de uma tradição africana, mas como imitação direta do *rap* dos EUA. Para ele, foi com a terceira geração que esta lacuna ficou preenchida, ao conectarem organicamente com as diversas tradições africanas. No Senegal, por exemplo, Appert (2011) constatou que na elaboração da figura do *griot*, os *rappers* descontextualizaram a música tradicional e os gêneros de discurso e o recontextualizaram no *hip-hop*. Em simultâneo, numa relação intertextual com o *hip-hop* norte-americano, o *griot* foi colocado em diálogo com a produção cultural diaspórica africana, construindo desta forma uma música que é ao mesmo tempo local, transnacional, indígena e diaspórica.

Em Cabo Verde, podemos falar de um processo idêntico de recontextualização. Esta discussão foi trazida pelo coletivo Ra-Teknolojia e surgiu num trabalho de história de autoria de Madjer Moniz que, segundo Lima (2020), busca semelhanças entre o *batuku*⁹ e o *hip-hop*, partindo da ideia de que o *finason*¹⁰ está para o *batuku* como o *rap* está para o *hip-hop*. Por exemplo, autores como Clark (2018) consideram que com o comércio negreiro, o homem negro africano escravizado foi distribuído pelo mundo e, com ele, a sua cultura que, fruto de encontros com culturas locais, foi-se fundindo, transformando e africanizando o panorama musical global.

Cabo Verde, enquanto hipermercado do comércio negreiro erigido no século XV, a cerca de 500 km da costa ocidental africana, surge como um desses lugares de desterro e de passagem de africanos escravizados, inicialmente para a Europa e posteriormente para as Américas. Foi, portanto, o primeiro lugar onde o *griot* se metamorfoseou, dando lugar ao *finason*, mais tarde introduzido nas sessões do *batuku*. Por exemplo, um importante elemento de semelhança entre as músicas e danças tradicionais africanas e a cultura *hip-hop* são as sessões de *cyphers*, muito presente no *batuku*. Com base nestes pressupostos e no trabalho etnográfico desenvolvido desde 2010 junto de *rappers*, Lima (2020) tomou o *rap* como herdeiro direto do *griot* e uma versão urbana, juvenil, fundamentalmente masculina e sofisticada do *finason*, na mesma linha como o *tassou* é encarado pelos *rappers* senegaleses.

Nos últimos anos, além do *batuku*, têm-se utilizado *samplers* e batidas de músicas tradicionais e, desde os anos de 1990, as letras são em língua cabo-verdiana. Como aponta Clark (2018), o uso das línguas africanas foi um dos primeiros indicadores da sua indigenização e o desenvolvimento de uma identidade pan-africana. Outro indicador é a utilização nas músicas de figuras nacionalistas africanas. No entanto, ao contrário de outros contextos

africanos, onde há incorporação de instrumentos tradicionais (Appert 2011), nas ilhas isto não acontece, apesar da tendência recente do uso de bandas, se bem que mais visível no *rap* comercial. Contudo, tem havido uma apropriação da estética das músicas tradicionais, particularmente do *batuku* e *funaná* (Robalo 2016) que, de certa forma, indica esta incorporação.

Ainda que tenham sido raros os intercâmbios ou colaborações entre *rappers* locais e os do continente, timidamente tem havido alguma conexão, em termos políticos. Em 2010, por exemplo, o *Djuntarti* participou no Waga Hip Hop Festival, no Burkina Faso. Hélio Batalha produziu uma versão da música Povo no Poder de Azagaia, ambos fundamentais no contexto do levantamento popular nos dois países. Em 2016, este mesmo *rapper* teve uma participação na música *Desahogo*¹¹ do *rapper* equatorial-guineense Negro Bey. Igualmente, a partir de 2017 alguns *rappers* participaram no intercâmbio político com a África do Sul promovida pela Escola Nkrumah para o pan-africanismo.

De forma geral, o que percebemos é que a partir do *rap* os jovens vêm questionando o legado colonial, permitindo uma releitura da história do arquipélago enquanto património cultural africano. Assim, ao representar o cabo-verdiano como uma identidade racializada, fez renascer o debate em torno da conexão entre classe, espaço, raça, cultura e memória.

As disputas por inclusão étnica e as decorrências identitárias pós-coloniais

Em janeiro de 2020, Ga Da Lomba e Kuumba Cabral lançam *Afrokabuverdianu* e, como nos explicaram em entrevista, a ambiguidade do título foi uma forma irónica de fomentar o debate sobre a crise de identidade que, nas suas palavras, tem provocado divisões externas (cabo-verdianos contra *mandjakus*¹²) e internas (*badius*¹³ contra *sampadjudus*¹⁴).

Embora esta pesquisa se tenha iniciado em 2019, o tema tem estado no centro das atenções dos pesquisadores que realizaram o projeto. Em 2012 um de nós organizou um grupo focal, na Praia, onde, na altura, um jovem teceu a seguinte afirmação: “Não estamos em África, porque não vamos a África nem de carro nem de bicicleta. E quanto à questão de sermos africanos ou portugueses, nós somos uma mistura de africano e português. Não há muito o que se dizer. E somos africanos no contexto estritamente político”. Na pesquisa exploratória realizada no Mindelo, em outubro de 2019, constatamos esta tendência.

São Vicente foi criada com uma ideia elitista. Amílcar Cabral estudou em São Vicente. Grandes pensadores cabo-verdianos estudaram em São Vicente.

Então, nós éramos os filhos da casa mais bem tratada, porque fomos o último. Então, nós temos mais influências europeias do que africanas. Quando se começou a viver em Mindelo, a escravatura já estava quase a ser abolida. Não foram os escravos que vieram para aqui, foram cabo-verdianos e colonos. Isso parece que nos dá uma imagem de arrogantes, mas não é. (Ativista social, entrevista realizada no Mindelo, em março de 2020)

Subjacente a estas duas afirmações encontra-se a ideia de que, ao contrário dos outros países africanos, em termos culturais, Cabo Verde encontra-se mais próximo da Europa, visto que tal como os arquipélagos portugueses e espanhóis, apresenta-se como expressão “de uma projeção do seu património cultural” (Moreira 2014:287).

Esta perceção, partilhada por muitos cabo-verdianos, foi-se construindo ao longo da história. De acordo com Fernandes (2013), os primeiros passos para a inclusão étnica e mediação colonialista dão-se no século XVI quando um grupo de homens negros requer ao rei o direito de participar nos ofícios da Câmara. Afirma que a pretensão desse grupo se baseava na vontade de pertença no grupo branco dominante, sustentando a sua justificação no argumento de estarem mais bem capacitados para o combate à fuga dos escravizados. Para este autor, este argumento sinalizava uma espécie de auto-combate e, por conseguinte, uma auto-negação, por nós interpretado como a primeira manifestação de rejeição de África.

A segunda surge com o processo de construção do termo *badiu*, no século XVIII, em plena crise do sistema escravagista, para designar a população das comunidades autónomas de Santiago, constituídos maioritariamente por escravizados auto-libertos (Silva 1996). Aproveitando os ataques corsários, muitos africanos refugiaram-se no cume das montanhas e nos vales profundos de difícil acesso, passando a viver em liberdade, longe dos trabalhos forçados e dos maus-tratos dos seus donos (Carreira 2000 [1972]) e essa designação tinha como objetivo, por um lado, estigmatizar um conjunto de pessoas com uma identidade africana fortemente vincada e, por outro, a mobilização de um projeto de (re)escravização ou de assalariamento forçado (Silva 1996).

O século XIX fica marcado por outros processos de diferenciação sócio-raciais. São Vicente, utilizado como espaço de reserva de pasto dos morgados das ilhas de Santo Antão e São Nicolau, só foi devidamente ocupada no terceiro e último ciclo de povoamento do arquipélago, devido ao receio de ser tomado pelos corsários ou pelas armadas francesa, inglesa ou norte-americana que rondavam o arquipélago (Silva 2005). Numa conjuntura marcada pela ilegalização progressiva do sistema escravagista em 1815 e proclamação da independência do Brasil em 1822, Portugal foi obrigado a reinventar as cidades litorâneas africanas e Cabo Verde, pela sua

localização geográfica e percurso histórico, apresentava-se com as melhores condições de servir de placa giratória de mercadorias no atlântico médio (Fernandes 2016).

Com a revolução industrial europeia em pleno andamento, tentou-se criar condições para a transplantação para São Vicente de um projeto urbano europeu moderno que pudesse recentrar a capital provincial de Cabo Verde no norte do arquipélago. Com esta finalidade, “em julho de 1838 recebe o decreto ministerial e portaria régia a autorizar a mudança da capital da Praia para São Vicente” (Almeida 2014:15). O projeto argumentava que São Vicente possuía condições de melhor salubridade quando comparado a Santiago, considerada uma ilha doente (Rodrigues 2011), incivilizada e atreita a revoltas (Silva 1996) e, tal como as outras ilhas do arquipélago, povoada maioritariamente por negros forros (Carreira 2000 [1972]).

A maior preocupação dos promotores do projeto era colonizar a ilha através de uma nova remessa de imigrantes europeus provenientes dos Açores e com eles, nas palavras de Silva (2005), a fundação de um Cabo Verde branco a norte. No entanto, embora tivessem desembarcado em Santiago algumas famílias brancas da metrópole com destino a São Vicente, a ilha acabou por ser povoada por famílias brancas e mestiças de Santo Antão, São Nicolau e Fogo. Por necessitarem de mais pessoas, a contragosto tiveram de aceitar camponeses sem terra, degredados insulares e marginais, por serem aqueles que se mostraram “disponíveis, até porque, mal integrados nas suas ilhas de origem, não têm nada a perder com a mudança” (2005:53).

São Vicente foi também povoada com escravizados, embora Moacyr Rodrigues assinala que pelo fato desses serem na sua quase totalidade crioulos ladinos, começaram desde cedo “a distanciar-se, em muito, da cultura afro trazida pelos seus avós da costa, exibindo já uma cultura mestiça (...) de matriz cabo-verdiana” (Rodrigues 2011:36). Por outro lado, ao nascer já com uma estrutura de cidade e devido ao papel do seu porto na navegação internacional, no seu contato com outras gentes, fez com que desenvolvesse uma sociedade paradigmática ou como o define um dos nossos entrevistados, uma sociedade paradoxal: “eles não dizem que são europeus, porque, as pessoas de São Vicente, para além de vaidosas, elas são orgulhosas. Aí, há uma contradição nos seus comportamentos. Se chegar cá um português: ‘branco de m..., vem lá da sua terra para vir mandar em nós’. Eles sabem que os portugueses não os reconhecem, porque na hora do visto nenhum de nós é europeu” (Ativista cultural, entrevista realizada no Mindelo, em outubro de 2019).

É de referir que “São Vicente absorve como um omnívoro cultural, tudo quanto por ela passa (...). A própria arquitetura do Mindelo apresenta peças de estilo vincadamente *british*” (Silva 2005:128). Sendo assim, não

é de descartar uma possível influência da arrogância inglesa na atitude para com os portugueses. A instalação de várias companhias comerciais inglesas na ilha, mesmo não contribuindo para que o projeto sonhado tivesse vingado, fez dela um dos pontos vitais do comércio mundial, substituindo as cidades portuárias de Santiago (Silva 1996). Contudo, a sua prosperidade e dinamismo durou pouco e eram evidentes os sinais de crise portuária e o consequente declínio urbano da cidade. Este fato criou um “nostálgico mito de um passado de abundância e fartura que sonhamos sempre ver reproduzidos num qualquer tempo futuro, nosso ou dos nossos descendentes (...) eternizado através de uma das mais belas mornas do repertório nacional: Tempo de Canequinha” (Almeida 2014:27).

Além da decadência da cidade, o período do fim do século XIX e início do século XX fica também marcado pela decadência da sociedade morgadia, base económica de sustento dos filhos da terra e, com isso, o controlo das relações com a administração colonial se transforma num recurso-chave de mediação (Anjos 2000). De acordo com Fernandes (2013), a institucionalização do moderno regime colonial com a partilha de África decretada na conferência de Berlim de 1884-85 e o ultimato inglês obrigaram Portugal a um reposicionamento. Nesse contexto, salienta que como forma de afirmar a sua identidade nacional, Portugal teve de escapar do espaço europeu e buscar alianças com os africanos tidos como mais civilizados, levando ao reposicionamento identitário dos intelectuais descendentes dos morgados através da exploração do jogo simbólico-discursivo.

Para Anjos (2013) é com a instalação do Liceu Seminário na ilha de São Nicolau que se inicia esse processo. Os Nativistas, nome como o primeiro movimento político-literário ficou conhecido, sofreram influências do nativismo brasileiro, mas também da maçonaria portuguesa (e europeia, especialmente inglesa e francesa) e dos EUA e essa pluralidade de influências fez com tivessem encarnado diferentes entendimentos conceptuais e sentimentais (Semedo 2006). Se, por um lado, defendiam intransigentemente a alma portuguesa dos cabo-verdianos (Fernandes 2013), por outro, militavam em organizações pan-africanistas em Lisboa e colaboravam nos jornais por estas publicados (Semedo 2006). Eram, portanto, um movimento identitário ambíguo, visto que o significado moral e político por eles defendidos surge como consequência da hostilidade com que os nativos eram tratados, pelo que não era contra a Pátria, mas a expressão de uma aspiração nobre à valorização dos filhos da terra (Campos 1913 *apud* Semedo 2006).

É, entretanto, com a geração regionalista, conhecida como movimento Claridoso, que a identidade mestiça ou atlântica é intelectualmente consolidada. O principal objetivo desses intelectuais era demarcar-se da

produção poética dos Nativistas. É de realçar que este trabalho intelectual surge numa altura em que o Estado Novo passa a defender os benefícios da missão evangelizadora e civilizadora portuguesa. Perante esse cenário, cabia aos Claridosos o trabalho de reabilitação de “uma das mais importantes estratégias emancipatórias, a dupla interlocução, suscetível de possibilitar à elite local a manutenção e/ou reforço, seja dos dispositivos de negociação e de influência dos órgãos do poder, seja ainda dos canais de comunicação com a população local” (Fernandes 2013:33). O que estava em jogo, para além da disputa sobre as “coisas públicas”, era também a necessidade de um reconhecimento de “superioridade étnica intelectual em relação aos povos das demais colónias” (Anjos, 2000:196) que se pretendia civilizar. Contudo, é de ressaltar que esta suposta superioridade já era sentida pela elite, visto que Cabo Verde não era formalmente considerado uma colónia.

Ao enaltecer uma identidade mestiça, além de exaltar uma cultura e um povo que a colonização portuguesa tomava como simplesmente negro, buscavam também delimitar fronteiras identitárias entre os cabo-verdianos e as restantes populações ultramarinas, reproduzidos na atual relação com os imigrantes negros oeste-africanos. Logo, a operacionalização hoje do termo *mandjaku*, referido por Onésimo Silveira, prende-se com a necessidade de estabelecer uma hierarquização (Lima & Robalo 2019) e uma oposição entre a identidade cabo-verdiana e a africana.

Nos finais de 1990 o *rap*, sobretudo no Mindelo, chamava a atenção para esta questão. Embora fortemente influenciado pelo *rap* americano, como aponta Victor Duarte, pelo fato da realidade da ilha ser diferente, apropriava-se do estilo e a agressividade do *rap* combativo dos EUA e relatava aquilo que se via nas ruas: “no início, falava do que via e, sim, fazia as minhas reflexões sobre a sociedade, já falávamos sobre coisas da política, sobre aspetos raciais, até falávamos da estupidez que era chamarem os senegaleses e os guineenses de *mandjakus*”.

A nível interno, segundo Elsa Fontes, o movimento Claridoso criou também um sentimento de “superioridade cultural”, o que fez com que a diferenciação entre o *badiu* e o *sampadjudu*, enquanto representação subjetiva da intelectualidade mindelense, tivesse reatualizado os discursos do século XIX “quer por razões políticas, quer administrativas, quer mesmo pela cor [ou melhor tonalidade] da pele” (Fontes 2007:107). Esta imagem negativa do *badiu*, embora muitas vezes ditas em tons de brincadeira, como nos foi contado por uma ativista cultural, configura-se como uma forma de diferenciação sócio racial: “Houve uma altura em que se ia à Praia, quando eu era mais pequena, as pessoas diziam-me mesmo: traz-me um macaco na volta, a brincar, contavam muitas piadas destrutivas em relação de *badius*”.

O legado de Cabral e a emergência do *rap* enquanto movimento social

A viragem identitária para África dá-se com a abertura do Liceu da Praia, quando um grupo de ativistas nacionalistas, usando a poesia como arma, buscaram fazer a transferência e popularização das ideias pan-africanistas das matas da Guiné-Bissau para Cabo Verde. Através de uma frágil rede clandestina vinham “esclarecendo, sobretudo camponeses do interior de Santiago, sobre o significado do que os colonialistas chamavam de terroristas e sobre a possibilidade da independência como solução para os problemas das secas e mortandades pela fome” (Anjos 2013:124). Esta geração, que funcionava como uma espécie de facção político-literária do movimento de libertação liderado por Amílcar Cabral, pretendia colocar em prática aquilo que o seu líder sugeria como sendo “as novas bases de inclusão que permitissem ao subalterno contornar o quadro de anulação do homem, encontrar as vias ascendentes da sua cultura e criar um homem novo dentro de si” (Fernandes 2013:38).

Gabriel Fernandes enaltece o fato de que pela primeira vez emite-se no arquipélago “claros sinais de uma inclusão às avessas, ou seja, no grupo dominado negro, e não no dominante branco. A África reaparece como o novo referencial do crioulo cabo-verdiano” (Fernandes 2013:38). No entanto, entendemos que o apelo de Amílcar Cabral à necessidade de uma reconversão cultural do homem cabo-verdiano através da reconquista da sua personalidade africana (Cabral 2013 [1970]), poderia estar relacionada com a tomada de consciência de que os cabo-verdianos não se viam de todo como africanos. Como aponta José Carlos dos Anjos, a poesia dessa geração era um lugar de encarnação do sujeito colonizado como sentido despersonalizado. Assim, o golpe desferido contra a geração claridosa acaba por ser um golpe adiado, um sujeito que não é “nem branca, nem negra, nem mais apenas mestiça e lamenta a indefinição, enquanto aguarda a potência que surgirá” (Anjos 2013:127).

De modo a demonstrar que a personalidade cabo-verdiana é africana, Cabral (2014 [1969]), possivelmente inspirado em Cheikh Anta Diop, buscou desenvolver um trabalho de desmistificação dos mitos fundacionais da nação construídos pelas gerações anteriores. Para isso, deu-se ao trabalho de apresentar evidências arqueológicas sobre a origem das ilhas, apresentado como resultado de um deslocamento de um pedaço de terra da região senegalesa de Cabo Verde, parte oeste da cidade de Dacar. Feito isso, era necessário desconstruir a ideia de uma suposta identidade afro-portuguesa do homem das ilhas, embora reconheça nele alguma influência da cultura portuguesa. Nos seus discursos procurava enfatizar a ancestralidade oeste-africana do povo das ilhas, já que o conjunto de etnias que constituía maioritariamente a sua herança cultural é originário da zona compreendida

entre o rio do Senegal e a Serra Leoa. Estes fatos, segundo Cabral (2015 [1963]), explicam porque é que em Cabo Verde se desenvolveu uma tradição de luta anticolonial e antirracista, espelhada no espírito de rebeldia e de resistência cultural da sua população, sobretudo daquele considerado *badiu*. Logo, era de crucial importância utilizar este saber revolucionário endógeno no processo de consciencialização do cabo-verdiano para a luta, acreditando que com isso estaria a contribuir para a sua (des)assimilação ou (des)aculturação imposta pelo colonialismo missionário.

É de notar que, até meados do século XX, o território cabo-verdiano era essencialmente rural. Com a intensificação do processo migratório do campo para a cidade no período de secas e fomes da primeira metade do século XX, o termo *badiu* urbaniza-se e passa a servir como forma de diferenciação operada pelos residentes do Plateau, que representava “a pequena capital de uma branquidade sitiada por uma crescente periferia negra” (Anjos 2013:121). Simbolicamente, esta situação criou uma dicotomia entre *riba* Praia e *baxu* Praia (Lima 2011), levando os jovens identificados como *baxu* Praia, a colocarem em prática um jogo de inversão simbólica do estigma.

*Un dja nu bem/Dja nu bem di traz/Pa nu bem rabenta mo pistola/Pamo pa frenti ke kaminhu/Pa mo nos propi ke badiu/Si nhos kre o nhos ka krel/Anoz propi ke badiu/Si nhos kre nhos manda boka/Anos propi ke badiu/Ki bem la di pe di kau buska/I si nhos buska nhos ta atxa pamo nu ka tem konta ku nos vida/E so nhos zinga nu ta pinga/Txuba ta txobi agu ta kori kobon ta rabenta i mar tanbel/nu tem medu xinti medu/Nu tem medu boka mundu/droga ta sirkula pa Europa es ta fla me badiu/Droga ta sirkula pa merka es ta fla me badiu/O fazi bu ka fazi tudu kuza e badiu/E noz propi ke badiu/Pe na txon faka na mo alegria na kurason/Badiu brabu.*¹⁵ (Badio brabu, Nigazz Badio 2006)

A situação do Mindelo nessa altura não era diferente, reproduzindo também a divisão em dois pólos (Rodrigues 2011): a *morada*, cidade colonial e a *fralda*, periferia. Entretanto, convém realçar que, ao contrário da Praia, Mindelo emerge como uma cidade industrial carvoeira, em que o camponês foi rapidamente transformado em proletário (Silva 2005). Com a decadência, a cidade entrou num profundo marasmo, só recuperado em parte após a independência, quando os novos quadros com origens sociais nas classes administrativas e comerciais dos tempos coloniais substituíram os poucos cargos estatais existentes na ilha.

A partir de 1975, a cidade da Praia, enquanto capital de um Estado independente, precisava dar o salto de capital provincial para capital de um país soberano. Para tal fez-se necessário construir um aparelho administrativo centralizado, que o transformou no grande pólo de atratividade dos novos quadros de todas as ilhas, abrindo novas disputas de mediação (neo)colonialista,

uma vez que os cargos estatais davam acesso à gestão dos programas de ajudas para o desenvolvimento (Anjos 2013). Como observa Elungu (2014 [1987]), a nascença do Estado independente africano não foi capaz de descolonizar o modelo da cidade enquanto fator civilizatório importado da Europa e, por isso, foram rapidamente metamorfoseados em locais de residência dos agentes do Estado e das sociedades económicas, já que o poder estatal se transforma num dos principais instrumentos de poder económico.

Assim, com a necessidade de mão-de-obra, sobretudo na área da construção civil e do comércio, a Praia sofre uma grande explosão demográfica, intensificada nos anos de 1990 com a reabertura do país ao mercado global (Lima 2011). Não sendo uma realidade nova, este processo de urbanização, ao não ser acompanhado de uma política habitacional completamente eficaz passa a ser formalmente reconhecido, na Praia, mas também no Mindelo, como assentamentos informais, representando 80% do espaço urbano (ONU-Habitat 2013).

Entendemos que este modelo dual de cidade formal e cidade informal assumido, por se basear num paradigma eurocêntrico de análise do fenómeno urbano, não reflete estritamente a atual realidade urbana cabo-verdiana. Malgrado possamos admitir que, no caso mindelense, pelo seu passado histórico, ele possa se adaptar, entendemos que, como salientam Teixeira e Bartholl (2015), espelha uma posição analítica de mão única, do centro para a periferia. Ou seja, uma forma de miopia epistemológica, cujo principal sintoma é a negação do protagonismo dos sujeitos da periferia na produção do espaço e na sua própria emancipação, além da consideração do periférico como um subproduto das relações hegemónicas, como algo marginal e, portanto, economicamente menos eficiente ou improdutivo, socialmente perigoso, politicamente conservador e moralmente desajustado.

É por isso que os nomeamos de territórios em resistência e, pelo fato de estar em constante movimento e transformação (Zibechi 2015). Por um lado, por não corroborarmos com a ideia de que a concentração espacial nas áreas urbanas africanas é motivada apenas pela sua capacidade de atração, mas, e, especialmente, por se apresentar como uma fuga a condições de ainda maior privação – zonas rurais (Castells 1983 [1972]). Entretanto, no caso cabo-verdiano, como em muitas outras realidades africanas, não existiu uma rutura total entre o urbano e o rural, visto que se complementaram. Aliás, a dicotomia formal-informal tem também a ver com essa situação. Por outro, por tomarmos margem como um conceito que permite a percepção, a definição e a avaliação de fenómenos essenciais, como identidade, criatividade juvenil e cultural ou de participação sociopolítica (Pardue 2013), em que o *rap* surge como um dos seus expoentes máximos.

Embora o sistema de morgadio tenha sido oficialmente extinto em 1864, na prática permanece inalterado durante todo o século XIX (Borba 2013) e parte do século XX. Com a independência, em 1975, a autora citada afirma que o partido-Estado fez uma tentativa de reforma agrária que teve algum impacto em Santiago e no Fogo; porém, em outras ilhas, entre as quais Santo Antão, a forte desconfiança das populações camponesas, somada ao laço de compadrio e clientelismo entre proprietários e camponeses reproduzidos ao longo da história, impediu que tal se efetivasse. Ainda assim, Furtado (1993) considera que houve alterações importantes, em que o abandono ou venda de terra por parte daqueles que Carreira (2000 [1972]) designou de morgados modernos, proporcionou o aparecimento de um maior número de novos proprietários, entre os quais muitos emigrantes.

Para Borba (2013), a não materialização da política de reforma agrária criou uma espécie de estado de exceção jurídica nos anos de 1990, com a abertura ao sistema do multipartidarismo e a imposição de uma política de ajustamento estrutural, fazendo com que em algumas regiões do país, as terras voltassem para o domínio dos antigos proprietários coloniais. A ausência de políticas públicas mais inclusivas, obrigou esta população a ter de buscar na cidade meios alternativos de sobrevivência, reproduzindo ali as contradições subjacentes ao sistema de morgadio (Lima 2011).

No Mindelo, este fenómeno, assim como a disputa dos cargos administrativos dos quadros na capital do país, ficou explícito na fala de um dos entrevistados:

Em Santo Antão todas as pessoas que têm curso vão para Praia as que não têm vêm para São Vicente (...). Elas vêm para aqui e são recebidas com todo o amor e carinho, mas não há trabalho. Então, o que fazem? Vão construir as suas casas de lata, por isso é que, neste momento, São Vicente é a ilha com mais casas de lata. (Líder do movimento *Sokols*, entrevista realizada no Mindelo, em outubro de 2019)

Estes temas estão presentes nas narrativas do *rap* desde os anos de 1990, embora se note hoje uma maior presença de exploração destas contradições urbanas, sobretudo da dicotomia centro/periferia, no *rap* da Praia. Para os *rappers* mindelenses entrevistados, não é que não seja algo visível e sentida, entretanto, o fato de Mindelo ser uma cidade menor e com menos acumulação de capitais do que a Praia, poderá ser a base de explicação dessa ausência.

Para os ativistas entrevistados no Mindelo, apesar da presença nos últimos tempos de alguma ação política fora da esfera partidária, em que é destacado o movimento *Sokols*, tem sido o *rap* o principal ator de demonstração pública do descontentamento social e juvenil na ilha. Todavia, para os

rappers com quem conversamos, o movimento *rap*, pelo menos no Mindelo, não configura um movimento social, uma vez que lhe faltam os outros elementos que compõem a cultura *hip-hop*. A falta de organização e uma consciência política coletiva são outros argumentos apresentados.

Acho que falta um pouco daquela estrutura histórica e social, (...) eu oiço muitos *rappers* daqui a falarem de desemprego, que é uma situação que se vê, é uma situação que todos sofrem, todas as pessoas têm alguém conhecido que está no desemprego, portanto, é uma situação que se vê (...) estou a dizer mais a nível, por exemplo, de (...) um tipo de *rap* que não fale apenas aquilo que se vê na realidade, mas que vai mais além disso, que fala de questões mais fundamentais relacionadas com o socialismo, com o marxismo... (Artista visual, entrevista realizada no Mindelo, em março de 2020)

Um de nós, partindo da premissa wieviorkana dos movimentos sociais, entendeu que apesar do *hip-hop* se inscrever nos chamados movimentos sociais globais, pelas razões acima indicadas, seria um pouco forçado falar dele enquanto um movimento social.

Entendo-o mais como um anti-movimento global, de entre outras características, pela sua tendência sectária e dificuldade em organizar ações sociais e políticas fora da esfera institucional, bem como de construir um campo de força na sociedade civil e uma identidade coletiva a partir de interesses comuns, combinando princípios de solidariedades e sociabilidades horizontais, a partir da edificação de uma base referencial de valores culturais e políticos compartilhados pelo grupo, participando direta e indiretamente da luta política – não partidária – do país e contribuindo, desta feita, para o desenvolvimento e transformação da sociedade civil e política (Lima 2012: 291).

Importa aqui ter em conta que esta análise foi feita num espaço-tempo específico. O autor referia-se ao *rap* praiense numa altura de intensa disputa por afirmação social e identitária entre o chamado *rap* consciente e o *gangsta rap*, embora ambos tivessem África como referência mítica. Por outro lado, vivia-se um período eleitoral em que muitos grupos e *rappers* de referência se deixaram facilmente instrumentalizar pelos dois maiores partidos.

É importante ter em conta que diferentemente do contexto senegalês ou burquinabê, só para citar alguns exemplos, em que o movimento *hip-hop* é politicamente engajado (Clark 2018), em Cabo Verde, esta politização só agora se está a consolidar. Mesmo que a maioria tende a se identificar com o socialismo e o pan-africanismo, na prática, defendem as cores do PAICV e do MpD, numa lógica puramente mercantilista (Lima 2012). No entanto, há aqueles, como Seiva, *rapper* mindelense, que se descreve como militante da UCID¹⁶ e, logo, entende a sua participação nos comícios partidários como um ato de consciência política.

Em África, mas também em outros contextos geográficos, os partidos desde muito cedo souberam enquadrar o *rap* na sua agenda política (Clark 2018), o que de alguma maneira contribuiu para a sua despolitização. Alguns afirmam que apesar de reconhecer o importante papel desempenhado pelos partidos na divulgação do *rap*, uma vez que perceberam desde o primeiro momento o seu potencial de mobilização popular, sobretudo juvenil, ideologicamente não se sentem confortáveis em atuar num palco promovido por aquele que no dia a dia é seu adversário.

Quando vais lá eles pagam-te. Não estou aqui para apontar o dedo a nenhum *rapper*, porque cada qual vive e ganha a sua vida como pode. Não é algo que os políticos fazem como se os apanhassem inocentes. Não, eles sabem bem. Eles têm algo a ganhar com isso. Há muitas pessoas que ganham dinheiro nos comícios. É um uso de ambos os lados. Agora, eu nunca senti uma boa vontade de nenhuma entidade política em relação ao *rap*. (Victor Duarte, entrevista realizada pelo Facebook, em março de 2020)

Este assunto, como apontado por Lima (2012), não é consensual no circuito *rap* e despoleta sempre uma acurada discussão sobre a autenticidade do *rap* entre os autoproclamados *rappers* conscientes e os tidos como comerciais. Amon-Rá, *rapper* das FARP entrevistado em 2012, entende que nas campanhas políticas as pessoas vêem o *rap* como uma parte de animação e não como um mensageiro, visto que ali os MC são eles e, portanto, são as suas mensagens a serem ouvidas. Contrariamente, Gol Wayne, um dos *rappers* mais politizados do atual circuito *rap* mindelense, diz-nos em entrevista que independentemente do palco em que se está a atuar, o que interessa é a mensagem que se deixa, uma vez que a maior parte do público que ali se encontra não tem fervor partidário, mas ali se desloca para assistir a este ou aquele artista.

A grande questão de fundo nesta disputa tem a ver com o fato do *rap* cabo-verdiano configurar-se ou não como um movimento social. Manuel Castells entende que na conceptualização dos movimentos sociais, sobretudo os de cariz identitário, urbanos e globais, como é o caso do movimento aqui estudado, há que se ter em conta três princípios constituintes:

Identidade refere-se à autodefinição do movimento, o que ele é, e em nome de quem se pronuncia. Adversário refere-se ao seu principal inimigo, conforme o expressamente declarado pelo próprio movimento. Objetivo refere-se à visão do movimento sobre o tipo de ordem ou organização social que procura no horizonte histórico da ação coletiva que promove. (Castells 2003 [1997]:86)

Deste ponto de vista, consideramos que o *rap* cabo-verdiano, sobretudo o de matriz pan-africana, mesmo que não declarado, se constituiu como um movimento social pelas seguintes razões: preocupa-se com as questões sociais

e políticas e tem como referência uma identidade histórica africana; apropria-se do discurso cabralista para falar em nome do africano subalternizado; tem como adversário a elite política local que acusa de, por estar aliada à oligarquia global, explorar o seu irmão africano; busca através das suas narrativas e ações contribuir para a descolonização das mentes, de modo a alcançar a renascença africana, entendida como o único meio de alcançar a libertação total do povo africano. Isto significa que a experiência adquirida nos territórios em resistência lhe forneceu uma política de identidade e nos princípios do pan-africanismo encontrou ferramentas úteis para a reconquista da sua personalidade africana. Assim, ao reposicionar-se social e politicamente, articulando as suas ações com outros movimentos, estão a criar condições para a transformação de toda a estrutura social.

Compreendemos assim o *rap* como uma intelectualidade orgânica de rua, uma nova figura social e política cabo-verdiana de inclusão e mediação pan-africana. Isto porque, de um lado, destacou-se na mediação nos processos de paz no contexto da violência dos gangues e como veículo de transformação dos gangues em organizações de rua. De outro, tornou público os discursos infrapolíticos contra um sistema de Estado-bipartidário pós-colonial e nocivo aos interesses do cidadão comum e serviu de fundo sonoro às grandes movimentações de rua que, segundo Clark (2018), marcaram o continente africano nos últimos anos.

É preciso lembrar que Cabo Verde, como afirma Varela (2008), na atual governação global neoliberal, iniciada nos anos de 1990, continua a suportar os condicionalismos económicos impostos pelas instituições financeiras internacionais. Sofre, também, através das agendas dos programas de ajuda para o desenvolvimento, condicionalismos políticos. Uma análise mais profunda da Agenda de Transformação apresentada durante a governação do PAICV ou o Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento Sustentável seguido pela atual governação do MpD evidencia isso mesmo. Nesse sentido, alguns jovens ativistas de movimentos pan-africanos, incluindo *rappers*, afirmaram no ano das comemorações dos 40 anos da independência do país que, o que se comemorava na verdade era os 40 anos de dependência. Portanto, a expressão de boa governação que normalmente se utiliza para classificar Cabo Verde, segundo Varela, apresenta-se como vazia e relativa, já que serve também, paradoxalmente, para designar muitas transições políticas africanas consideradas de sucesso, ainda que não tendo como base processos ditos democráticos. Por outro lado, em vez de dar mais força aos Estados-alvo, encerram-nos num ciclo vicioso de dependência, apesar da dita ajuda ao desenvolvimento estar a diminuir.

Notas finais

Nesta pesquisa partimos da ideia de que o *rap* cabo-verdiano se configura como um movimento social pan-africano que articula elementos tanto globais como locais. Apesar de ter surgido na chamada cidade formal, foi nos territórios em resistência que se consolidou e ganhou significado local, inicialmente no Mindelo e posteriormente na Praia.

Ao descontextualizar das músicas tradicionais o conteúdo revolucionário característico do período da luta de libertação e do partido único, tornou-se na maior referência dos jovens indignados com a realidade social e política, sobretudo a partir dos anos de 1990. Posicionando-se como a voz dos oprimidos, ampliou os discursos destes, interpelando diretamente o poder instituído.

Ainda que em alguns contextos africanos os *rappers* mais rebeldes sejam perseguidos, em Cabo Verde, onde o acesso aos recursos é limitado e as épocas eleitorais vistas como oportunidades de aceder a uma parte destes recursos, muitos tendem a autocensurar-se em determinados períodos. Esta situação leva a que sejam por vezes percebidos como anti-movimentos sociais (Lima 2012). Contudo, o trabalho de campo mostrou que, não obstante esta realidade, o *rap* é hoje muito mais politizado, sobretudo o que se produz na Praia.

Entre os anos de 2005 e 2018, como em todo o continente africano (Clark 2018), registaram-se nas ilhas várias manifestações de rua. Em março de 2015, por exemplo, um dos levantamentos populares com maior impacto político no país contra o Estatuto dos Titulares dos Cargos Públicos teve forte presença física dos *rappers* e várias das suas narrativas foram reproduzidas nos cartazes do protesto.

Apesar do *rap* feminino ter estado presente e com alguma visibilidade desde os anos de 1990, sobretudo na Praia, mantiveram-se depois na retaguarda, ressurgindo nos anos de 2010, em ambas as cidades. Na Praia, a consolidação do *gangsta rap* a partir dos finais dos anos de 1990, tendencialmente mais misógino, poderá explicar essa ausência. O mesmo se poderá dizer do *rap* mindelense nos anos de 1990. Entretanto, o surgimento de um tipo de *rap* com um conteúdo mais afrocêntrico, a partir dos finais dos anos de 2000, poderá estar na base desse ressurgimento, embora em muito menor número quando comparados com os rapazes.

Notas

1. Sobre este assunto ver Anjos (2000, 2013), Fernandes (2013) e Semedo (2006).
2. Macho burro.
3. Inicialmente eram cinco os elementos do *hip-hop*: breaking; graffiti art; djing; beatboxing; e street knowledge. Mais tarde, o *rapper* norte-americano KRS-One promoveu a sua redefinição, juntando mais quatro elementos: street language; street fashion; e street entrepreneurship (entrepreneurism).
4. Mestre de Cerimónias.
5. Grupos como Nigga Sem Vida, Ice Company, Bairro Norte, Black Side, entre outros fazem parte da primeira geração do rap mindelense.
6. Esta questão remete à discussão sobre a autenticidade do *hip-hop* que, segundo o estudo de Kembrew McLeod's (Clark 2018), significa representar-se a si próprio, a sua realidade e sua cultura, especificamente as culturas *underground* e urbana do gueto. Inclui também a compreensão sobre o seu legado e a defesa dos seus valores fundamentais.
7. A continuidade desse trabalho é desenvolvida hoje pelo *Street Force Motivation*, um movimento de promoção do ativismo social com recurso à arte e ao desporto.
8. Surgiram no ano de 1993 na Praia com o nome de D.L.T.T. e em 1997 com a entrada de novos elementos mudaram para Cikatriz Crew. O nome *Fidjus di Cabral* surge enquanto coletivo em 2003, já na Holanda.
9. Expressão cultural característica da ilha de Santiago, que exprime uma vivência emocional de um indivíduo ou de um grupo. Como mensagem, procura consciencializar para a vivência sociocultural da comunidade com a finalidade de esclarecer e reforçar a vida comunitária, estimulando a solidariedade social, reforçando a coesão social e resistindo culturalmente.
10. Parte de uma sessão de *batuku* em que se cantam geralmente de forma improvisada, baseada em provérbios e máximas populares.
11. <?> Desabafo.
12. Nome como homogeneamente os imigrantes do continente africano, em especial os da costa ocidental, são denominados em Cabo Verde.
13. Termo cuja denominação em língua cabo-verdiana radica da palavra portuguesa vadios, utilizado para designar, inicialmente os africanos autolibertos da escravatura na ilha de Santiago e os pretos forros de todas as ilhas e posteriormente, os camponeses do interior de Santiago.
14. É o termo utilizado pelos naturais da ilha de Santiago para denominar os originários da ilha do Fogo, que depois foi ampliada para os nativos de outras ilhas que não as de Santiago e da ilha do Maio, mais particularmente as situadas na parte norte do arquipélago.
15. Um, chegamos/Chegamos por detrás/Para arrebrandarmos como um revólver/Porque para frente é que é o caminho/Porque somos mesmo *badius*/Que veio do chão dos valentes/E se provocarem levam que não temos medo de morrer/Chove e as águas

correm pelas ribeiras e terminam no mar/Temos medo de sentir medo/Temos medo do que dizem de nós/As drogas circulam pela Europa e dizem que é culpa dos *badius*/As drogas circulam nos Estados Unidos e dizem que a culpa é do badiu/Fazes ou não fazes levas na mesma a culpa/Somos de fato *badius*/Com os pés fincados no chão e uma faca na mão, mas com alegria no coração/Badio é mesmo rude.

16. O único partido além dos dois maiores com assento parlamentar, surgido na diáspora cabo-verdiana na Europa em 1977, mas apenas reconhecido formalmente nos anos de 1990. É um partido que tem a sua maior base militante em São Vicente.

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L'État et la santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap au Cameroun

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« L'invalidé n'est pas issu d'une race à part, il est une métaphore de la condition humaine. »

– Murphy 1990:17

Résumé

À partir d'une approche socio-historique et anthropologique, cet article veut répondre aux questions suivantes : pourquoi la santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap est-elle « oubliée » dans les dispositifs institutionnels ? En quoi cet oubli informe-t-il sur les valeurs accordées à la personne dans notre contexte social et politique contemporain ? En quoi la prise en compte de la santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap est-elle un enjeu de citoyenneté ? En s'inscrivant dans une perspective structuraliste et intersectionnelle, il veut comprendre et analyser les dynamiques sociales et historiques qui expliquent cette omission institutionnelle de la personne en situation de handicap dans l'élaboration des politiques publiques relatives à la santé sexuelle au Cameroun.

Abstract

From a socio-historical and anthropological perspective, this article aims to answer the following questions: Why is the sexual health of people with disabilities “forgotten” in institutional arrangements? What does this oversight tell of the values conferred to the person in our contemporary social and political context? How is taking into account the sexual health of people with disabilities a citizenship issue? By adopting a structuralist and intersectional perspective, the article seeks to understand and analyze the social and historical dynamics that explain this institutional omission of people with disabilities in the development of public policies relating to sexual health in Cameroon.

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Introduction

Le concept de santé sexuelle naît dans les années 1970 au lendemain des luttes féministes qui mettent en évidence la nécessité pour l'individu de disposer de son corps. L'Organisation mondiale de la santé définit la santé sexuelle comme

Un état de bien-être physique, mental et social dans le domaine de la sexualité. Elle requiert une approche positive et respectueuse de la sexualité et des relations sexuelles, ainsi que la possibilité d'avoir des expériences sexuelles qui soient sources de plaisir et sans risque, libres de toute coercition, discrimination ou violence. (OMS 2020)

Cette définition établit la reconnaissance de la santé sexuelle comme un droit humain. En tant que tel, ce droit induit une reconnaissance de l'autre dans sa singularité ainsi que le caractère inaliénable de ce droit. Pour les personnes en situation de handicap, on pourrait considérer « *la sexualité comme le moyen d'une prise d'autonomie.* » (Giami 2016:95) Accéder à une sexualité libre et épanouie représente un des moyens de reconnaissance des droits individuels et de cette reconquête de l'autonomie.

Au Cameroun, les programmes de santé reproductive sont beaucoup plus anciens que les programmes de santé sexuelle. En effet, la santé sexuelle va se développer avec la lutte contre la pandémie du VIH/Sida au milieu des années 1980. Ce contexte sanitaire global se conjugue avec la mise en œuvre des mesures d'ajustement structurel et des programmes de planning familial, lesquels sont financés par l'aide internationale au développement.

Selon le ministère de la Santé, les prêts ou dons extérieurs ont permis de financer les activités sanitaires à hauteur de 65 milliards de francs CFA en 2015. Il note par ailleurs que « les ressources financières allouées à la santé sont insuffisantes, ce qui favorise une dépendance aux financements extérieurs » (SSS 2015). Cette dépendance se traduit dans les politiques de santé sexuelle déployées par l'État sur le terrain.

La santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap reste l'un des parents pauvres des politiques publiques, pourtant elles représentent 5, 4 pour cent de la population générale, donc plus d'un million de personnes. Elles sont confrontées à la rareté des offres d'éducation adaptées, de même qu'au faible nombre de spécialistes de la santé (Minsanté DRH 2020).

En fait

L'État contribue pour une part déterminante à la production et à la reproduction des instruments de construction de la réalité sociale. En tant que structure organisationnelle et instance régulatrice des pratiques, il exerce

en permanence une action formatrice de dispositions durables, à travers toutes les contraintes et les disciplines corporelles et mentales qu'il impose uniformément à l'ensemble des agents. (Bourdieu 1994:156-157)

À travers la mise en œuvre d'une politique de santé sexuelle sensible à la question du handicap, l'État rend cette partie de la population visible et contribue ainsi de façon décisive à l'intégration de ce groupe spécifique dans l'ordre sexué de la société.

Pourquoi la santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap est-elle « oubliée » dans les dispositifs institutionnels ? En quoi cet oubli nous informe-t-il sur les valeurs accordées à la personne dans notre contexte social et politique contemporain ? En quoi la prise en compte de la santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap est-elle un enjeu de citoyenneté ?

À partir d'une approche conciliatrice de l'anthropologie et de la sociologie historique de l'État, cet article veut analyser les dynamiques sociales et historiques qui expliquent cette omission institutionnelle de la personne en situation de handicap dans l'élaboration des politiques publiques relatives à la santé sexuelle au Cameroun. En s'inscrivant dans une perspective structuraliste et intersectionnelle, il part de deux hypothèses principales : la première postule que le handicap, comme construction culturelle de l'exclusion, contribue à l'invisibilité des personnes en situation de handicap dans les politiques de santé sexuelle.

La seconde, quant à elle, soutient que l'extraversion des politiques publiques de santé sexuelle dans un contexte caractérisé par la domination des programmes de santé verticaux ne favorise pas la prise en compte des besoins spécifiques des personnes en situation de handicap dans le domaine de la santé sexuelle. Cette situation contribue à l'oubli de la santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap au Cameroun au sein des institutions politiques.

Au Cameroun, le système de santé est construit sur le modèle pyramidal, malgré le principe de décentralisation reconnu depuis la constitution de 1996 et réaffirmé dans la loi fondamentale du 21 avril 2008. Jusqu'à aujourd'hui, les décisions sont prises à Yaoundé et mises en œuvre dans les régions.

Les recherches de terrain reposent sur des guides d'entretien et des grilles d'observation conçues préalablement sur la base d'hypothèses et d'une revue de la littérature sur la question du handicap et des politiques publiques. Les enquêtes de terrain se sont déroulées à Yaoundé, capitale politique du Cameroun et siège des institutions, de septembre 2019 à février 2020.

L'échantillonnage de type raisonné est constitué des responsables institutionnels en charge de la santé sexuelle et reproductive du ministère de la Santé publique (3), du ministère de la Promotion de la femme et de la

famille, du ministère de la Jeunesse, du ministère des Affaires sociales (3) et d'assistants sociaux (5). Ces interlocuteurs privilégiés de notre enquête nous ont permis, à travers leurs pratiques professionnelles et leur compréhension des normes institutionnelles, d'accéder au niveau microsocial aux raisons pour lesquelles les personnes en situation de handicap, malgré leur présence dans leur portefeuille d'activités, sont absentes lorsqu'il s'agit d'activités relatives à la santé sexuelle.

Ces différents acteurs ont pu nous entretenir sur leur expérience professionnelle relative à l'inclusion des personnes en situation de handicap dans les programmes. De plus, il a été question de comprendre pourquoi, de leur point de vue, les personnes en situation de handicap étaient les grandes absentes des projets relatifs à la santé sexuelle.

Une observation des documents de politique sectorielle montre une récente prise en compte des personnes en situation de handicap dans le document programmatique de l'État. De plus, une observation systématique des messages publicitaires relatifs à la santé sexuelle promus ces cinq dernières années, couvertes par le document programmatique de l'État, ainsi que les vidéos de discours officiels relatifs à la jeunesse et à la santé sexuelle nous ont permis de comprendre que malgré l'inclusion des personnes en situation de handicap dans l'agenda des politiques de santé, la citoyenneté sociale des personnes en situation de handicap reste un défi.

Cet article est organisé en trois parties : la première analyse la santé sexuelle comme un enjeu d'intégration sociale pour les personnes en situation de handicap, la deuxième aborde la construction socio-historique des politiques de santé sexuelle au Cameroun. La troisième, quant à elle, démontre que la santé sexuelle est un enjeu de citoyenneté sociale des personnes en situation de handicap au Cameroun.

La santé sexuelle : un enjeu d'intégration sociale pour les personnes en situation de handicap

Robert Murphy, anthropologue américain, évoque les répercussions sociales de son handicap en ces termes : « Si cette affection physique est digne d'attirer l'attention, c'est qu'elle a pris la forme d'une affection de mes relations sociales, aussi réelle que la paralysie de mon corps » (Murphy 1990:16).

La notion de santé sexuelle et reproductive peut laisser penser à un assujettissement de la sexualité à la procréation. Comme le remarque Sylvia Tamale, théoriser les sexualités africaines suppose l'affranchissement de certaines prénotions, parmi lesquelles figure l'idée selon laquelle les êtres humains ont des relations sexuelles pour se reproduire (Tamale 2011:11).

Analyser la place de la santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap dans les politiques publiques de l'État consiste à sortir le sexe du domaine du privé et de l'intime pour en faire un enjeu politique. Le sexe «est accès à la fois à la vie du corps et à la vie de l'espèce. On se sert de lui comme matrice des disciplines et comme principe des régulations» (Foucault 1976:192).

La santé sexuelle permet d'explorer la reconnaissance des capacités des personnes en général et des personnes en situation de handicap en particulier. La santé sexuelle postule une reconnaissance des imaginaires et des pratiques sociales relatives au corps. En partant du postulat selon lequel «Le corps métaphorise le social, et le social métaphorise le corps. Dans l'enceinte du corps, ce sont symboliquement des enjeux sociaux et culturels qui se déploient» (Le Breton 2002:157), la prise en compte de la santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap peut représenter une reconnaissance de la différence et une égale considération pour l'ensemble des citoyens.

La situation de handicap comme défaut d'agencement des forces cosmiques

À partir de matériaux ethnographiques issus de plusieurs continents, Maurice Godelier en déduit que dans la pensée humaine, «Il faut toujours plus qu'un homme et une femme pour faire un enfant» (Godelier 2007:164). La situation de handicap interroge sur l'agencement des forces cosmiques au moment de la conception. Dans les sociétés camerounaises, c'est le même principe de l'intervention des forces cosmiques qui préside au moment de la conception (Pradelles de Latour 1991 ; Ombolo 1990 ; Abéga 1995). Le handicap moteur et/ou visuel, parce qu'il remet en cause une approche fonctionnelle du corps, amène à interroger les manières qu'ont les sociétés humaines de penser la venue des enfants au monde. Le corps est donc inséré dans un univers symbolique qui, selon les cultures des sociétés humaines, préexiste à l'avènement du corps. La santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap met en jeu deux principes : l'identité et l'égalité.

L'identité réfère à ce qui rend différents les individus les uns par rapport aux autres. Il peut s'agir du sexe, de la race, de la condition physique, de la condition sociale, etc. Le principe d'égalité, quant à lui, renvoie aux différentes dispositions juridiques qui permettent à un État de s'assurer que l'ensemble des citoyens peuvent prétendre aux mêmes droits sans distinction aucune. Il s'agit de voir comment l'État du Cameroun travaille à la production de cette égalité entre les citoyens en situation de handicap et ceux qui ne présentent aucune invalidité.

Le droit des personnes en situation de handicap comme production culturelle

Une anthropologie de la fabrique du droit montre que les règles, bien qu'elles s'inscrivent dans un ensemble de conventions garantissant les droits humains, ne sont pas neutres. Elles sont aussi le produit des représentations des acteurs qui les édictent. Comme le remarque Jean Leca, malgré le sens juridique que recouvre le concept de citoyenneté, il résulte d'une construction sociale :

Ces conceptions ne dépendent pas de la (bonne) volonté des législateurs et des autres acteurs, elles sont elles-mêmes socialement et politiquement fabriquées. Les problèmes soulevés ne sont donc pas seulement des problèmes de théorie normative ou logique, ils dépendent de la façon dont s'est constitué le capital cognitif disponible dans une société. (Leca 1991:162)

Le capital cognitif est l'ensemble des ressources issues de la socialisation des acteurs sociaux leur permettant de recevoir de sélectionner d'organiser les informations et de les transformer afin de fournir un système de sens et de représentations en mesure d'influencer leurs pratiques. Cette définition s'inspire des définitions bourdieusiennes du capital culturel et du capital symbolique.

Les composantes de ce capital cognitif pour le Cameroun sont : le patrimoine socio-historique relatif à la santé sexuelle des populations hérité de la période coloniale et perpétué plus ou moins fidèlement aux lendemains des indépendances, l'extraversion caractéristique des politiques publiques de l'État en matière de santé sexuelle, laquelle se traduit par l'absence de regard sur soi, ainsi que les conceptions traditionnelles relatives aux personnes en situation de handicap.

La construction socio-historique des politiques de santé sexuelle au Cameroun

L'avènement de la santé sexuelle comme catégorie politique et médicale se traduit par quatre principales tendances : l'hystérisation du corps féminin, la pédagogisation du sexe de l'enfant, la socialisation des conduites procréatrices et la psychiatrisation du plaisir pervers. Le corps de la femme est considéré comme « intégralement saturé de sexualité » (Foucault 1976:137) ; la pédagogisation du sexe de l'enfant permet de lutter contre l'onanisme en Occident ; la socialisation des conduites procréatrices, « socialisation économique par le biais de toutes les incitations ou freins apportés, par des mesures "sociales" ou fiscales, à la fécondité des couples » (Foucault 1976:138). La psychiatrisation du plaisir pervers (Foucault 1976:138).

La santé sexuelle est donc saisie par les sciences médicales, l'économie et la société. La politisation de la santé sexuelle s'inscrit dans un objectif de gouvernement des corps et de productivité économique des États (Foucault 1976). La logique économique prédominante en période coloniale contribue à la mise en œuvre d'actions sanitaires validocentrées et capacitistes.

Colonisation et exclusion des personnes en situation de handicap

La situation coloniale, écrit Balandier, a « un fondement raciste plus ou moins avoué, plus ou moins manifeste » :

La société colonisée subit la pression de tous les groupements constituant la colonie, tous ont sur elle prééminence en quelque matière, et ressent d'autant mieux sa condition de subordination. Pour ceux-ci, elle est essentiellement un instrument créateur de richesse (alors qu'elle ne retient qu'une très faible part des revenus malgré son nombre). (Balandier 2001:21)

En tant que telle, elle est productrice de l'exclusion du colonisé en général et de celle du colonisé en situation de handicap en particulier.

L'on ne saurait assumer les représentations sociales et les pratiques politiques relatives au handicap au sein d'anciennes sociétés colonisées en ignorant les contextes coloniaux, néocoloniaux et post-coloniaux de la production du handicap. Pour Helen Meekosha, « les spécialistes des études sur le handicap mentionnent rarement la violence du Nord. Pourtant, les processus de colonialisme, de néocolonialisme et de post-colonialisme ont entraîné un grand nombre de personnes handicapées dans le Sud » (Meekosha 2008:2). En examinant le patrimoine socio-historique de la santé sexuelle, on peut constater que la santé sexuelle n'est pas la priorité de la puissance coloniale. Cette dernière est préoccupée par la disponibilité de la main-d'œuvre et non par la santé sexuelle de la population. La prise en charge des maladies sexuellement transmissibles est justifiée par leur impact potentiel sur la fertilité des femmes et des hommes. Dans cette perspective, le regard porté sur la santé sexuelle des colonisés est essentiellement instrumental. Même si la situation de territoire sous mandat de la SDN du Cameroun laisse entrevoir des obligations particulières de la puissance administratrice vis-à-vis de la Société des Nations (Lachenal 2017), il n'en demeure pas moins que la situation de domination du colonisateur sur le colonisé occasionne des abus. À titre d'exemple, l'une des épidémies débilitantes qui marquent la colonisation française au Cameroun est la trypanosomiase humaine. Un réexamen de la lutte contre la trypanosomiase humaine au Cameroun par les historiens et les anthropologues soulève des questions à la fois éthiques et médicales (Tantchou 2008 ; Lachenal 2017). Dans la région du Mbam, d'anciens patients seront « réveillés mais aveuglés » (Tantchou

2008:177) à la suite du traitement reçu de l'équipe d'Eugène Jamot. Le cas des aveugles de Bafia dans la région du centre du Cameroun (Tantchou 2008 ; Bado 2011) nous remet dans la perspective de la violence structurelle qui caractérise le rapport de l'administration coloniale avec les catégories considérées comme non productives pour l'économie coloniale.

La sexualité des colonisés est souvent pensée et représentée par le colonisateur sous l'angle de la bestialité. Le rapport au corps des colonisés ne fait l'objet d'aucun tabou. Il est le lieu de la théorisation de la supériorité raciale : « le corps de l'«Autre» est pensé simultanément comme symbole d'innocence et de dépravations multiples : un corps qui excite autant qu'il effraie. » (Blanchard *et al.* 2018) En somme, la santé sexuelle des populations colonisées n'est pas considérée comme un sujet de réflexion méritant la mise en œuvre de politiques spécifiques. Les théorisations sur le sexe des colonisés traduisent l'idéologie de la domination coloniale construite autour des préjugés racistes et sexistes (Tamale 2011).

Le handicap entre compassion et rejet en situation coloniale et aux lendemains des indépendances

Dans la politique coloniale, le sujet en situation de handicap est considéré de prime abord comme non productif et donc sans intérêt. Lorsqu'il fait l'objet d'attention, l'objectif est de montrer la supériorité de la médecine coloniale et/ou missionnaire par rapport aux médecines endogènes (Debarge 1934). La compassion est le principal registre mobilisé par les organisations religieuses. Grâce à leurs réseaux internationaux d'amis, elles vont pouvoir mobiliser des fonds pouvant permettre le suivi et la prise en charge des personnes en situation de handicap. Ces dernières vivent dans une situation de liminalité (Van Gennep 1981 ; Murphy 1990) dans les villages. Les villages de lépreux sont constitués et c'est au sein de ces lieux que les familles vont pouvoir naître et se construire (Bargès 1995 ; Bargès 2008).

Les personnes en situation de handicap bénéficient du régime de l'assistance médicale indigène et du soutien des organisations philanthropiques internationales qui œuvrent dans le domaine. Le cas de la lèpre est édifiant à cet effet. Assimilée à une impureté, elle fait partie de ces maladies dont l'administration coloniale veut mettre hors de sa vue. Des efforts seront faits pour la rendre invisible dans les grands centres administratifs. Les organisations religieuses chrétiennes vont inscrire leurs actions sanitaires en faveur des lépreux dans la dimension apostolique de leur mission.

La figure de la lèpre en contexte colonial est donc celle de la marginalité dans laquelle se trouvent les personnes souffrant de maladie invalidante et de déficiences physiques et mentales.

L'action des organisations religieuses en contexte colonial vise essentiellement à épargner aux personnes en situation de handicap la mendicité. Au Cameroun, l'on peut constater que chaque centre urbain a sa léproserie, située la plupart du temps à la périphérie de la ville, loin des centres commerciaux et des yeux des étrangers de passage.¹ Comme le remarque Mary Douglas, dans l'analyse qu'elle fait de l'influence des conceptions du pur et de l'impur sur la construction de l'ordre social, « Certaines valeurs morales sont défendues et certaines règles sociales définies par des croyances en une contagion dangereuse » (Douglas 1966:3). La prise en charge des lépreux et des lépreuses montre bien cette ambiguïté du regard de l'administration coloniale et des organisations religieuses vis-à-vis des personnes en situation de handicap.

La situation coloniale montre une combinaison des variables de l'exclusion sociale et politique. Nous sommes dans une triple discrimination : la première est liée à l'absence même de l'idée d'une santé sexuelle pour le colonisé en général, la deuxième est la chosification et l'exotisation à outrance du corps des colonisées. La troisième, fondée sur les paradigmes économiques de la rentabilité, conduit l'administration coloniale à exclure de son champ d'intérêt les personnes en situation de handicap. L'abandon des personnes en situation de handicap aux organisations religieuses montre comment l'exclusion sociale est remplacée par la réintégration spirituelle (Foucault 1972:16).

Aux lendemains des indépendances, les personnes en situation de handicap tardent à être visibles pour les politiques de santé en général et celles relatives à la santé sexuelle en particulier. Le Cameroun est décrit comme un État nataliste dans les années 1970 et 1980 (Gubry 1988). Du point de vue légal, on observe un ensemble de dispositions visant à encourager la natalité. Mais ces dispositifs juridiques sont diversement respectés au sein de la population.

À partir des années 1980, on observe qu'une élite s'en affranchit pour se préoccuper de sa santé sexuelle (Gubry 1988). L'autorisation de vente des contraceptifs aux œstrogènes grâce à la loi n° 80-10 du 14 juillet 1980 favorise progressivement une émancipation de la société. La naissance de la commission nationale de la population en 1985 permet de mettre en œuvre des résolutions concernant l'information, l'éducation de la population « sur les bienfaits de la parenté responsable » (Gubry 1986:191). Outre cela, la commission nationale pour la population crée dans chaque région un « centre d'information et de conseil sur la procréation », dont le rôle est « d'informer les individus et les couples sur la manière d'espacer les naissances, de protéger la mère et l'enfant, de permettre aux individus et aux couples de choisir en toute connaissance de cause la taille de leur famille, et de lutter contre la stérilité » (Gubry 1986:191).

La reconnaissance des droits sexuels des personnes en situation de handicap

La convention sur le droit de la personne handicapée n'est rendue effective qu'en 2008. Elle a le mérite de soulever la question de la santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap et d'enjoindre aux États de veiller au respect des droits sexuels des personnes en situation de handicap.

L'Organisation des Nations Unies émet la convention sur les droits de la personne en situation de handicap en mars 2007. Cette convention est devenue effective le 8 mai 2008. Aujourd'hui, 20 pays l'ont ratifiée, 163 pays l'ont signée. Le Cameroun figure parmi les pays qui l'ont signée, mais ne l'ont pas ratifiée.

Cette convention reconnaît le droit à la santé des personnes en situation de handicap dans son article 25, qui porte sur la santé. Les paragraphes a) et b) stipulent que les États

- a) fournissent aux personnes handicapées des services de santé gratuits ou d'un coût abordable couvrant la même gamme et de la même qualité que ceux offerts aux autres personnes, y compris des services de santé sexuelle et génésique et des programmes de santé publique communautaires ;
- b) fournissent aux personnes handicapées les services de santé dont celles-ci ont besoin en raison spécifiquement de leur handicap, y compris des services de dépistage précoce et, s'il y a lieu, d'intervention précoce, et des services destinés à réduire au maximum ou à prévenir les nouveaux handicaps, notamment chez les enfants et les personnes âgées. (ONU 2008:19)

Le paragraphe d) du même article parle du principe de non-discrimination des personnes en situation de handicap dans les services de santé. La convention prévoit cela à travers une formation des professionnels de santé aux droits humains et à une meilleure connaissance de la spécificité des personnes en situation de handicap. En effet, il est attendu des États parties de cette convention qu'ils

- d) exigent des professionnels de la santé qu'ils dispensent aux personnes handicapées des soins de la même qualité que ceux dispensés aux autres, notamment qu'ils obtiennent le consentement libre et éclairé des personnes handicapées concernées ; à cette fin, les États Parties mènent des activités de formation et promulguent des règles déontologiques pour les secteurs public et privé de la santé de façon, entre autres, à sensibiliser les personnels aux droits de l'homme, à la dignité, à l'autonomie et aux besoins des personnes handicapées. (ONU 2008:19)

Au Cameroun, depuis la loi n° 83/013 du 21 juillet 1983 relative à la protection des personnes handicapées et son décret d'application n° 90/1516 du 26 novembre 1990, il aura fallu treize ans pour que soit créé un comité national pour la réadaptation et la réinsertion socioéconomique des personnes en situation de handicap avec le décret 96/379/PM du 14 juin 1996.

Le rôle des programmes d'ajustements structurels et de l'infection à VIH dans la naissance d'une politique de santé sexuelle

«Le principe de cohérence n'est pas satisfait par un ajustement purement cognitif et technologique. [...] il doit être compatible avec les valeurs politiques dominantes, elles-mêmes naturalisées.»

— Douglas 1986:90

Les programmes d'ajustements structurels en 1986, combinés à la lutte contre l'infection à VIH/SIDA, font de la santé sexuelle un impératif. Entre 1986 et 1991, on constate la mise en œuvre d'un programme d'éducation sexuelle : « L'objectif visé est la lutte contre la propagation des maladies sexuellement transmissibles et les autres dangers liés à une vie sexuelle trop précoce. Le programme couvre tout le territoire national » (Gubry 1986:191-192). Ce programme de santé sexuelle est adressé à l'ensemble des Camerounais. Force est cependant de constater qu'aucune disposition particulière à ce programme ne permet de voir toutes les catégories de la population, en particulier les personnes en situation de handicap.

La santé sexuelle n'apparaît donc pas dans les politiques de santé publiques avant les programmes d'ajustements structurels avec leurs corollaires de politiques de limitation des naissances. Pour rendre ces injonctions socialement acceptables, c'est plutôt la notion de régulation des naissances qui sera adoptée.

La faiblesse des connaissances sur les questions sexuelles engendrées par la situation de handicap

Chez les personnes en situation de handicap, «les questions de sexualité se posent de façon différente selon les types de déficiences avec, d'une part, les "déficiences intellectuelles" et, d'autre part, les "déficiences motrices" » (Giami 2016:94). Ce qui suppose des dispositifs adaptés selon le type de déficience identifié. Concernant le handicap moteur chez les hommes, Murphy constate :

L'invalidité paralytique constitue, au demeurant, une émasculatation de nature plus directe et plus totale. Pour un individu de sexe masculin, l'affaiblissement

et l'atrophie du corps menacent toutes les valeurs culturelles attachées à la virilité : force, activité, vigueur et courage [...] les affections de la moelle épinière ont un effet dévastateur supplémentaire sur la virilité : outre la paralysie, elles provoquent couramment un degré d'impuissance ou de dysfonctionnement sexuel (Murphy 1990:136-137).

Outre cette spécificité masculine, il faudrait aussi s'intéresser aux exigences d'une vie sexuelle épanouie chez les femmes présentant le même type de déficience. Une assistante sociale remarque que cette question n'est pas souvent abordée de façon ordinaire. Elle note, d'une part, qu'elle a été confrontée à des situations d'abus sexuels sur les filles handicapées moteurs. D'autre part, elle note que les femmes ont du mal à avoir un partenaire socialement reconnu¹. La situation de handicap est diversement vécue chez les hommes et chez les femmes. Ces dernières ont une estime de soi faible par rapport aux hommes, même si ces derniers se sentent diminués dans leur virilité.

La construction des politiques de santé nécessite une approche complexe tenant compte de la diversité des situations de handicap. Ces préoccupations sont aussi à l'ordre du jour lorsqu'il s'agit du handicap visuel, dans la mesure où il est non seulement question d'adresser la question de la santé sexuelle au regard de la spécificité du handicap, mais aussi en ce qui concerne les besoins sexo-spécifiques des personnes en situation de handicap.

De manière particulière, traiter de la santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap visuel ou encore de celles ayant un handicap moteur suppose de mettre en place des dispositifs spécifiques. De ce point de vue, l'intersectionnalité, en ce que cette approche permet de mettre en relation des variables dépendantes et d'identifier les variables indépendantes dans les processus d'exclusion sociale, peut contribuer à la mise en œuvre de dispositifs raisonnés de prise en charge de la santé sexuelle.

La santé sexuelle : un enjeu de citoyenneté sociale pour les personnes en situation de handicap

La citoyenneté sociale peut se définir comme

Le fait de pouvoir disposer d'un minimum de ressources et de droits indispensables pour s'assurer une certaine indépendance sociale. [...] ne pas être dans une relation unilatérale de sujétion à l'égard d'autrui, ne pas être dans la dépendance de l'assistance qui fait que de faibles ressources vous sont octroyées sur la base d'une déficience. C'est donc la question de pouvoir disposer d'un socle de ressources pour entrer dans un système d'échanges réciproques, pouvoir nouer des relations d'interdépendance et ne pas rester pris dans des rapports unilatéraux de sujétion. (Castel 2008:135)

La santé sexuelle devient donc un moyen d'interaction sociale et politique entre les personnes en situation de handicap et les institutions de gouvernement. Nous examinerons les actions menées par l'État pouvant favoriser un meilleur accès aux soins de santé sexuelle. Il s'agira notamment d'aborder l'inefficience de la carte d'invalidité, l'ineffectivité de la stratégie sectorielle de santé 2016-2027 pour les personnes en situation de handicap, et nous nous appesantirons sur le caractère valido-centré et capacitiste de la santé sexuelle au Cameroun.

L'inefficience de la carte d'invalidité pour l'accès aux soins de santé sexuelle

Au Cameroun, la loi n° 83/013 du 21 juillet 1983 relative à la protection des personnes en situation de handicap instaure la carte d'invalidité et définit les droits des personnes handicapées dans les domaines de l'emploi et de l'assistance sociale. Le décret d'application n° 90/1516 du 26 novembre 1990, quant à lui, définit les droits sociaux et économiques des personnes en situation de handicap, notamment dans les domaines de l'éducation et de la formation professionnelle³, d'aide sociale (financière, matérielle, médicale). L'aide sociale à la santé est ici reconnue comme l'un des engagements de l'État à l'endroit des personnes en situation de handicap.

L'analyse de la santé sexuelle comme enjeu de citoyenneté sociale des personnes en situation de handicap se fait à travers la stratégie sectorielle de santé édictée par le ministère de la Santé publique, les actions concrètes menées par les ministères des Affaires sociales, le ministère de la Promotion de la femme et de la famille et le ministère des Affaires sociales. L'un des exemples est la lente mise à la disposition des personnes en situation de handicap de la carte d'invalidité, un des instruments de la reconnaissance sociale de la situation de handicap d'une personne. C'est en 2005 que le ministère des Affaires sociales recommence le processus de délivrance de la carte d'invalidité après une dizaine d'années d'interruption de la délivrance dudit document, pourtant nécessaire à l'accès aux droits économiques et sociaux contenus dans la loi n° 83/013 du 21 juillet 1983 relative à la protection des personnes en situation de handicap. Parmi ces droits, l'on peut citer l'accès aux services de santé des personnes en situation de handicap. La carte d'invalidité est pourtant le document administratif qui constitue la reconnaissance officielle d'une situation de handicap et contribue donc à la citoyenneté sociale de la personne en situation de handicap. Dans la pratique, les professionnels de santé sont peu sensibilisés à la question de la carte d'invalidité et n'encouragent pas leurs usagers en situation de handicap à y recourir⁴.

L'ineffectivité de la stratégie sectorielle de la santé 2016-2027 pour les personnes en situation de handicap

Ce document de prospective identifie les tendances lourdes dans le domaine de la santé et définit à moyen terme les objectifs pour les atteindre. Il permet aussi à l'État d'identifier les besoins et d'élaborer des stratégies pour y répondre. Un des constats remarquables effectués par les auteurs de ce document est l'absence actuelle d'une politique harmonisée et adaptée pour les personnes en situation de handicap.

Un des défis du système de santé à relever est d'assurer une prise en charge adéquate des cas de maladie, des déficiences et des handicaps, voire d'offrir un accès équitable aux services et aux soins de santé de qualité. Conformément au choix stratégique effectué dans le secteur de la santé, il sera important de développer à la fois les soins de santé primaires et les soins spécialisés. (DSS 2016:86)

De plus, les auteurs remarquent l'inexistence des mesures engagées pour un accès des personnes en situation de handicap aux soins de santé en dehors de la carte d'invalidité qui, lorsqu'elle existe, n'est pas toujours prise en considération par les prestataires de soins.

« La prise en charge des cas dans la majorité des formations sanitaires n'est pas effectuée de manière adéquate. Cela s'explique par l'inexistence des référentiels, mais aussi par leur non application lorsqu'elles existent. » (DSS 2016:86) Cela s'inscrit dans un contexte général de fragilité de la gouvernance des institutions de soins. Le caractère « inhospitalier » (Jaffré & Olivier de Sardan 2003) de la pratique de la médecine laisse peu d'opportunité à la mise en œuvre des mesures en faveur de l'inclusion des besoins spécifiques et sexo-spécifiques des personnes en situation de handicap. À ce contexte de la délivrance des soins dans les services publics il faut ajouter celui de l'organisation générale du système de santé qui ne favorise pas une participation des citoyens à la base, dont les personnes en situation de handicap. C'est la raison pour laquelle la stratégie sectorielle de santé reconnaît la nécessité d'une décentralisation effective pour une prise en charge efficace et efficiente des besoins spécifiques des personnes en situation de handicap. La décentralisation des interventions de prise en charge du handicap reste lettre morte, pourtant elle figure parmi les éléments stratégiques de la politique de santé. On peut le remarquer dans les documents produits pour la décennie 2016-2027.

Stratégie de mise en œuvre 4.2 : Décentralisation des interventions de prise en charge du handicap

La décentralisation permettra de répondre plus efficacement aux besoins des personnes handicapées. De manière spécifique, il sera question de créer des centres spécialisés avec des équipes multidisciplinaires de prise en charge du handicap au niveau opérationnel (celles-ci comprendront les associations des personnes handicapées), de renforcer le dépistage des handicaps et la réhabilitation précoce des handicapés, de développer des mécanismes de prise en charge des handicapés mentaux à tous les niveaux de la pyramide des soins. (DSS 2016:91)

En outre, les auteurs recommandent une approche multisectorielle pour une meilleure prise en charge des personnes en situation de handicap.

« Il s'agira aussi de développer et d'accompagner les communautés en leur donnant les moyens nécessaires pour assurer la gestion du handicap au niveau communautaire et de promouvoir la collaboration multisectorielle (MINAS⁵, MINSANTE⁶, MINPROFF⁷) pour la gestion du handicap. » (DSS 2016:91)

L'on peut voir ici une approche intégrée de l'action de l'État pour l'accès des personnes en situation de handicap aux soins de santé. Jusqu'à aujourd'hui, la décentralisation des services de santé n'est observable que dans le cadre de la prise en charge des maladies encadrées par des programmes verticaux de santé (VIH/SIDA, tuberculose, paludisme, etc.).

Dans le contexte actuel de la santé globale, le Cameroun bénéficie d'apports financiers extérieurs dans le cadre des programmes verticaux. Pour une meilleure visibilité de l'aide internationale et du programme subventionné, il existe au sein du ministère de la Santé des points focaux dont le rôle est non seulement le recueil des informations, mais aussi la répercussion au niveau intermédiaire et dans le district des avancées, tant du point de vue de la recherche sur la question de santé concernée que sur les nouvelles formes de prise en charge.

Les acteurs du ministère de la Santé ne font pas mention d'une stratégie spécifique relative aux personnes en situation de handicap. Le point focal santé de la reproduction, prévention de la transmission du VIH de la mère à l'enfant et du VIH, déclare à cet effet :

La santé sexuelle et reproductive des personnes en situation de handicap est un volet que je dirais d'emblée négligé au sein du ministère de la Santé publique. À mon humble avis, pour avoir participé depuis plus de cinq ans à l'élaboration des plans stratégiques de la santé maternelle néonatale et juvénile, sur le plan stratégique national de lutte contre la mortalité maternelle, au plan national opérationnel en relation avec le planning familial et autres plans stratégiques comme celui de la lutte contre les fistules et bien d'autres... Il ne me souvient pas déjà avoir entendu ou bien avoir participé à la prise en

compte de la spécificité des personnes vivant avec un handicap dans ces plans stratégiques. À ma connaissance et fort d'un certain nombre de documents stratégiques, la prise en charge de la spécificité des personnes vivant avec le handicap n'est pas prise en compte au sein de la direction de la famille où se trouve la sous-direction en charge de la santé de la reproduction. Pour avoir côtoyé pendant plus de cinq ans la direction de la santé familiale, que ce soient les services en charge de la santé de la reproduction et du genre, que ce soit les services en charge de la santé de la mère, que ce soit les services en charge de la santé de l'enfant, il ne me souvient pas que la question des personnes vivant une situation de handicap ait été évoquée lors d'une quelconque réunion⁸.

Cette absence de directives particulières pour la santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap montre comment le tabou social sur la sexualité des personnes en situation de handicap circule comme tabou politique et institutionnel.

En dehors du ministère de la Santé, quelques ministères, à l'instar du ministère des Affaires sociales (MINAS) de celui de la Promotion de la femme et de la famille (MINPROFF) et le ministère de la Jeunesse mettent les personnes en situation de handicap au cœur de leur préoccupation. Mais on peut noter que la question du handicap reste encore marginale dans leur portefeuille d'actions. Ces différents ministères s'intègrent dans les grandes priorités gouvernementales et selon la contingence des pandémies⁹.

Tout comme le gouvernement, ces institutions sont restées sur le modèle colonial en réduisant leur politique en faveur des personnes en situation de handicap à une action sociale dont le seul but serait de les sortir de la mendicité¹⁰. Cette orientation est régie par des préjugés qui ont tendance à faire de la personne en situation de handicap une charge pour la société. Elle n'est pas considérée dans son intégrité physique, morale et intellectuelle. Le silence des institutions sur la santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap est le reflet du peu d'engouement à l'international pour cette question spécifique.

En l'état actuel, la plupart des documents de politiques publiques reconnaissent les carences de l'action étatique dans le cadre des questions spécifiques aux personnes en situation de handicap.

C'est le cas du *Document de politique nationale de la jeunesse*. Dans la section « Jeunesse, Communication et TIC », le ministère de la Jeunesse fait allusion au risque d'exclusion des jeunes en situation de handicap si les technologies de l'information et de la communication sont inadaptées à leur situation :

La situation actuelle dans ce domaine est caractérisée par une offre insuffisante d'informations spécialisées en faveur des jeunes et leur faible implication dans la production médiatique, l'absence d'une offre d'informations spécialisées

dans les médias visuels pour les malentendants, les sourds et les sourds-muets (langage des signes à la télévision) et dans la presse écrite pour les aveugles (journaux en braille). Les liens entre médias, technologie de l'information et de la communication et mondialisation étant étroits, ces problèmes exposent les jeunes, surtout ceux souffrant de certains handicaps, au risque d'acculturation et de déracinement. (MINJEC 2006:37)

Malgré l'existence de ce document de politique nationale de la jeunesse, les observations réalisées entre juillet 2019 et février 2020 montrent une faible, voire une inexistante prise en compte des déficiences dans les campagnes de sensibilisation relatives à la santé sexuelle. À titre illustratif, les messages publicitaires diffusés dans les télévisions ne sont pas disponibles en audiodescription pour les malvoyants. De même que le message n'est pas délivré en langage des signes pour les sourds et malentendants, les discours présidentiels à la jeunesse le 10 février et celui à la nation du 31 décembre ne font pas l'objet d'une traduction simultanée en langue des signes. Les personnes sourdes, malentendantes et malvoyantes sont totalement exclues de ces rituels qui fondent la vie de la nation et contribuent au sentiment d'appartenance.

La santé sexuelle comme métaphore d'un État valido-centré et capacitiste

La manière dont les politiques publiques en santé sexuelle se saisissent de la question du handicap informe sur la citoyenneté des personnes en situation de handicap. Dans la pratique, la citoyenneté sociale des personnes en situation de handicap est réduite au régime d'assistance qu'offre la carte d'invalidité. Ces citoyens sont relégués au rang de cadets sociaux auxquels l'on dénie une sexualité comparable à celle des citoyens ne présentant pas de déficiences répertoriées dans le lexique du handicap.

L'État du Cameroun ne saurait se dédouaner de cette obligation, dans la mesure où la question du handicap est aussi consubstantielle à la naissance des sociétés humaines. Ces dernières ont souvent marginalisé les personnes en situation de handicap à travers les représentations sociales présentes dans les données ethnographiques. De même, les matériaux issus de la culture immatérielle montrent, de manière générale, que la différence induite par le handicap est toujours conceptualisée socialement comme une situation inédite en dehors des normes de la vie sociale ordinaire¹¹.

Des observations réalisées dans la ville de Yaoundé montrent comment les personnes en situation de handicap, notamment des femmes, sont parfois amenées à faire connaître à leurs congénères qu'elles ont une vie sexuelle. À l'occasion d'une dispute entre une femme en situation de handicap et ses collègues revendeuses de vivres frais, on entend la dame dire «*je suis femme*

comme toi. J'ai un homme comme toi avec lequel je passe mes nuits. Il vient même d'ailleurs parfois ici! Qu'est-ce qu'elle croit même!¹²!» Cette déclaration met en avant cette autonomie sur le plan sexuel très peu reconnue à cette femme par ses congénères. Cette affirmation insiste sur le fait qu'être en situation de handicap ne signifie pas être asexué.

Ce sont donc des catégories sociales précises qui reviennent dans les discours et dans les documents relatifs à ces différents programmes. Les personnes en situation de handicap sont totalement invisibles dans les différentes communications. Il est donc sous-entendu qu'elles font partie de la population générale et que de ce fait elles en sont les bénéficiaires. D'où l'absence d'une politique de santé sexuelle inclusive pour les personnes en situation de handicap et donc le déni politique de leurs droits sexuels.

Dans l'imaginaire, les personnes en situation de handicap sont considérées comme des citoyens passifs tout comme les femmes. De plus, cet imaginaire les représente essentiellement comme des charges, d'où la prépondérance des actions gouvernementales visant à les former aux activités génératrices de revenus. Pourtant, l'on constate à l'échelon international que l'on passe du paradigme de l'assistance à celui du droit des personnes en situation de handicap (Meekosha & Dowse 1997:50). La dépendance des politiques locales au fonds internationaux peut aussi expliquer en partie cette absence des personnes en situation de handicap dans la mise en pratique de politiques équitables accessibles à tous.

Conclusion

Cet article voulait répondre aux questions suivantes : Pourquoi la santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap est-elle « oubliée » dans les dispositifs institutionnels ? En quoi cet oubli nous informe-t-il sur les valeurs accordées à la personne dans notre contexte social et politique contemporain ? En quoi la prise en compte de la santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap est-elle un enjeu de citoyenneté ?

À partir d'une analyse culturelle inspirée de l'anthropologie structuraliste ainsi que d'une approche intersectionnelle, ce travail montre comment la situation de handicap en tant que construction culturelle de l'exclusion conduit à un oubli de la santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap au sein des institutions étatiques. Les différentes crises économiques (choc pétrolier, programmes d'ajustements structurels) et sanitaires (infection à VIH SIDA) ont permis peu à peu à la santé sexuelle de faire partie des politiques publiques. Une approche intersectionnelle permet de comprendre qu'une minorité invisible, dans un tel contexte, est doublement marginalisée

parce qu'invisible du concept même de la sexualité et invisible du point de vue de la budgétisation des politiques publiques des politiques de santé.

Au-delà de cette dépendance vis-à-vis de l'aide internationale au développement, la construction politique de la santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap est tributaire des représentations que les acteurs politiques ont de cette catégorie de la population. Ainsi, malgré la prise en compte des personnes en situation de handicap dans les stratégies sectorielles de santé, la pratique institutionnelle se caractérise par un silence des acteurs sur ces questions. Les recherches effectuées chez les acteurs institutionnels ont montré que ceux-ci réalisaient que la santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap ne faisait pas partie des sujets abordés lors des réunions de routine et des actions prioritaires stratégiques sur le terrain. D'où l'importance du capital cognitif, que nous avons défini comme l'ensemble des ressources issues de la socialisation des acteurs sociaux leur permettant de recevoir, sélectionner, organiser les informations, et de les transformer afin de fournir un système de sens et de représentations en mesure d'influencer leurs pratiques. Le discours écrit devient silencieux et inopérant dans la pratique. Malgré la ratification par le Cameroun de textes internationaux, la reconnaissance dans les documents de stratégie gouvernementale de la marginalisation des personnes en situation de handicap, les pratiques institutionnelles ne connaissent aucun ajustement mélioratif.

Ces faits rejoignent l'approche structuraliste de Mary Douglas selon laquelle les institutions fonctionnent par analogie. Comme la société élabore des régimes d'exclusion des personnes en situation de handicap, l'État perpétue ces différents régimes d'exclusion.

Aujourd'hui, la budgétisation sensible au genre est désormais acquise dans la mise en œuvre des politiques publiques au Cameroun. Si son interprétation est plurivoque, il n'en demeure pas moins que l'engagement de l'État pour une budgétisation sensible au genre contribue à la citoyenneté sociale des femmes. La mise en œuvre de cette approche résulte des injonctions internationales. Pour ce qui est des personnes en situation de handicap, il n'existe pas au niveau international de telles injonctions à la prise en compte de la budgétisation sensible à la situation de handicap.

La prise de conscience de cette faille concernant la santé sexuelle des personnes en situation de handicap pourrait contribuer à une approche intersectorielle pouvant permettre la conception des budgets sensibles aux diverses situations de handicap. Une telle action serait dans le prolongement de la reconnaissance de la citoyenneté sociale des personnes en situation de handicap enclenchée par l'instauration de la carte d'invalidité.

Notes

1. La léproserie de la Dibamba est située au bord de la rivière du même nom à 19 kilomètres d'Akwa, quartier du centre urbain des affaires. À Bafoussam, dans l'ouest du Cameroun, la léproserie de Lafé Baleng est située en dehors du centre-ville.
2. Entretien réalisé en décembre 2020.
3. Dispense d'âge, reprise de classe, appui pédagogique, prise en charge financière, aide à la réadaptation du poste de travail et à la reconversion professionnelle, insertion professionnelle, emploi protégé.
4. Entretien réalisé en janvier 2020 avec un point focal en santé de la reproduction.
5. Ministère des Affaires sociales.
6. Ministère de la Santé.
7. Ministère de la Promotion de la femme et de la famille.
8. Entretien réalisé le 28 octobre 2019.
9. La pandémie à coronavirus est devenue la priorité de ces différents ministères depuis mars 2020. On peut voir les SMS, envoyés aux ménages camerounais. Cela est fait sans s'assurer par exemple que les personnes en situation de handicap visuel disposent de logiciels dans leur téléphone leur permettant de décrypter le message envoyé.
10. Entretiens réalisés en décembre 2019 et en février 2020.
11. Voir le conte des Pères blancs « L'Aveugle », récit recueilli au Cameroun, le conte Mundang recueilli par Séverin Cécile Abéga intitulé « Le Lépreux » dans son ouvrage écrit avec Luc Mebenga Tamba, *Les contes d'initiation sexuelle*.
12. Observation réalisée en novembre 2019.

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Les articles soumis pour la revue *Afrique et développement (AD)* doivent être soumis via notre système de soumission électronique (<https://journals.codesria.org/index.php/ad>) au format Ms Word. Il faut éviter un formatage excessif du texte. Les cartes, diagrammes et graphiques devront être envoyés sous forme de prêt à cliquer. Les données utilisées pour la conception des diagrammes et graphiques devront également nous parvenir.

Les auteurs doivent utiliser le système de référence de Harvard (auteur–date), par exemple :

Il est intéressant de noter que... le mot « tribu » n'existe pas dans les langues indigènes d'Afrique du Sud (Mafeje 1975 : 254).

La liste des références doit répertorier tous les travaux cités dans le texte par l'auteur. Consulter le guide *CODESRIA recommandations aux auteurs*, disponible sur notre site web : www.codesria.org pour plus d'informations sur la présentation de la liste de références.

Un résumé de 150 à 200 mots, indiquant la problématique de recherche ainsi que les principaux résultats et conclusions, doit accompagner l'article. Les articles qui ne se conforment pas à ce format verront leur traitement retardé.

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