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Investment in Security Forces and Human Development Challenges in Africa: Lessons from Nigeria's Experience

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Abstract

This article addresses the question of how investment in state security forces has affected the capacity and interest of African states to deal with other human development challenges, using Nigeria as its empirical core. In particular, the Nigerian state's response to contemporary security challenges in the country, such as insurgency and terrorism, kidnapping, and herders–farmers conflicts, provides the basis for the discussion. Based on secondary data analysis, the article argues that enormous resources have been invested in security forces in Nigeria since independence in 1960, at the expense of fixing other basic human development challenges such as widespread misery and poverty, poor healthcare facilities, low life expectancy, low literacy, high levels of unemployment, and monumental corruption especially among high profile individuals, organisations and governments. The article emphasises the cost of counter-insurgency in terms of huge budgetary allocations to the security forces, especially how this has crowded out resources from other human development challenges in the country.

Résumé

En utilisant le Nigéria comme noyau empirique, cet article aborde la question de l'investissement dans les forces de sécurité de l'État et comment cela a affecté la capacité et l'intérêt des États africains à faire face à d'autres problèmes de développement humain. En particulier, la réponse de l'État nigérian aux problèmes actuels de sécurité du pays, tels que l'insurrection et le terrorisme, les enlèvements et les conflits entre éleveurs et agriculteurs, fournit la base

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de la discussion. Sur une analyse de données secondaires, l'article affirme que d'énormes ressources ont été investies dans les forces de sécurité au Nigéria depuis l'indépendance en 1960, au détriment d'autres problèmes fondamentaux de développement humain tels que la misère et la pauvreté généralisées, la médiocrité des installations sanitaires, la faible espérance de vie, le bas taux d'alphabétisation, un taux de chômage élevé et une corruption phénoménale, en particulier des individus haut placés, les organisations et le gouvernement. L'article souligne le coût pour contrer l'insurrection en termes d'allocations budgétaires aux forces de sécurité, en particulier de la façon dont cela a privé de ressources d'autres défis de développement humain dans le pays.

Introduction

In all societies, the pursuit of security always involves certain security trade-offs or costs, which means that other goals that could have been pursued with the resources devoted to security are being sacrificed (Schneier 2006; Adu-Amanfoh 2014). The opportunity cost of security, particularly regime security, seems to be high in African countries, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, where numerous and diverse human development challenges, such as widespread misery and poverty, poor healthcare facilities, low life expectancy, low literacy, high levels of unemployment; and monumental corruption especially among high profile individuals, organisations and governments are competing for limited resources. It is important therefore that nation states in Africa strike a balance between these competing demands when investing in security.

Going by the marginal value approach to determining how important security is at any one time, it is easy to see within the African context that security is only one of many policy objectives competing for scarce resources, and is subject to the law of diminishing returns (Baldwin 1977 cited in Adu-Amanfoh 2014: 18). Furthermore, the political class and other powerful groups in the society are skillful in turning virtually every political, economic and social matter relating to the quality of governance into a security problem (Alemika 2015). In addition, some of the investments made in the name of security are often diverted into private pockets, while some of the counter-measures arising from such investments often only provide a sense of security, without actually improving security (Schneier 2006).

Against this backdrop, this article utilised secondary data to address the question of how investment in law enforcement and state security forces has affected the capacity and interest of African states to deal with other human development challenges, using Nigeria as its empirical core. In so doing, it asked the following questions: What is the nexus between security,

development and governance? What are the major threats to security in Nigeria today? What underlying structural factors contributed to the level of insecurity in the country? What has been the response(s) of the Nigerian state (in terms of investment in security forces) towards tackling these security threats? How has the response(s) of the state affected its capacity and interest to invest in other vital areas of service delivery in the country? What measures should governments take to sustain and improve on the progress made in forging links between governance and security on the African continent?

In answering these questions, the next section conceptualises security, governance and development to facilitate an understanding of the nexus between them. This is followed by a section that analyses the socio-economic context of insecurity in Nigeria, with a view to promoting understanding of the underlying structural factors associated with insecurity in the country and the theoretical framework of the article. Then the article analyses major security challenges facing Nigeria before concentrating on the influence of investment in security forces on other human developmental challenges. The last section presents the conclusion and recommendations on how to sustain and improve on the progress made in strengthening the links between governance and security on the African continent.

Conceptualising security, governance and development

Security

Security in its broadest meaning refers to 'the protection of human existence in all ramifications' (Odekunle 2010: 79). This can be operationalised to mean 'protection from danger, violence, fear, and want that impair or capable of impairing the full development and existential wellbeing of *citizens*' (Alemika 2015: 2, emphasis added). The emphasis in this operationalisation is important because it suggests that citizens, not the nation-state or the military should be the object of security practices. According to the World Development Report (2011), citizen security refers to both 'freedom from physical violence and freedom from fear of violence' which applies to 'the lives of all members of a society (whether nationals of the country or otherwise)', in all ramification of their 'interactions with the state and other members of society' (*ibid.*: xvi).

In the Hobbesian sense of the term, security is 'not simply the absence of war but absence of the threat of war' (Hobbes 1968: 186). 'Security', according to Spitzer (1987: 47) 'is said to exist when something [harmful] does not occur rather than when it does' (cited in Shearing 1992: 401). This

means as Schneier (2006: 11) observes, 'all security is in some way about prevention. It is about '*preventing adverse consequence from the intentional and unwarranted actions of others*' (emphasis in original).

In this article, the term 'security' refers to a whole range of technologies and practices provided to guarantee the safety of lives and property of members of society, not only by state security forces (such as the police, army, navy and air force) but also by non-state security organisations (such as vigilante groups, neighbourhood watch groups, private security companies (PSCs), etc.) competing in the public space. This definition recognises that security is an activity to be performed not only by state security forces, but also by non-state actors such as PSCs. Furthermore, the article aligns with the human security concept whereby security is an:

> all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and basic necessities of life, and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being (OECD DAC Guidelines 2000, cited in Hussein, Gnisci and Wanjiru 2004: 14).

In other words, human beings and their living standards – not regimes, not nation states, not the military – are the object of security at any given point in time.

Governance

The management of security, including decisions on what amount of resources to invest in law enforcement and security forces as well as in the network of institutions to be involved with security provisioning, is a matter of governance. Governance has to do with the 'responsible use of political authority to manage a nation's affair' (Clarance 1993 cited in Abdullahi 2013: 122). It could also be described as a set of values, policies and institutions through which the society manages economic, political and social processes at different levels, on the basis of interaction among the government, civil society and the private sector (Jibrin 2016). Governance, according to Galadima (1998 cited in Jibrin 2016: 148) is:

> the process of organizing and managing legitimate power structures, entrusted by the people to provide law and order, protect fundamental human rights, ensure rule of law and due process of law, provide for the basic needs and welfare of the people and the pursuit of happiness.

In other words, governance involves the appropriate administration and management of social institutions, including security forces, for the

development of society. It is largely about appropriately defining the institutionalised means for attaining culturally defined goals of society and putting mechanisms in place to ensure that such goals are attained only via the institutionalised means for the general good of mankind.

Development

If security, as broadly conceived, is 'the protection of human existence in all its ramifications', then development pertains to the 'continuous improvement in the quality of life and existence, which is increasingly evenly distributed among the overwhelming majority of the population' (Odekunle 2014: 52). Any situation or condition, such as widespread hunger and starvation, inadequate healthcare facilities, lack of job opportunities, and high levels of corruption, that interferes with the standard of living and the quality of existence of ordinary members of the population is a human development challenge. It is also a human development challenge, as well as a security threat, if a country's economy continuously grows in terms of GDP and Per Capita Income as has been the case in Nigeria, but the majority of the populace continues to live in abject poverty, misery and joblessness. If this situation continues, no amount of investing in law enforcement and security forces will bring about the desired peace and security in the society.

A close look at the nexus between security, governance and development

Several studies have shown that security, governance and development are intertwined and interdependent concepts (World Development Report 2011; Alemika 2015; Hussaini 2016). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) made an interesting attempt at linking security and governance issues when it maintained that 'the security of people and the security of the state are mutually reinforcing' (OECD DAC Guidelines 2000, cited in Hussein, Gnisci and Wanjiru 2004: 14). This statement suggests a positive association between security and the quality of governance in such a way that security can be seriously undermined when the network of security institutions are poorly managed and coordinated, and therefore not responsive to the needs of community members. At the same time, a high level of insecurity can undermine governance and bring a nation to a dead-end.

As Dr Goodluck Jonathan, former Nigerian President, recently observed, 'no investor *except those that invest in arms and ammunitions* will invest in an atmosphere of insecurity … what improves the economy is confidence and what makes investors have confidence is peace' (African Independent Television News, 26 June 2017, 8pm, emphasis mine). Insecurity, as the

OECD observes, constitutes barriers 'to political, economic and social development' (cited in Alemika 2015: 20), for 'nothing seems to threaten the survival of mankind in Africa more than insecurity' (Eteng 2016: 35). On the other hand, endemic human development challenges such as mass poverty, hunger and starvation, high level of unemployment and illiteracy, spread of diseases, etc. can overwhelm a government to the extent that the state is unable or unwilling to guarantee the security of its citizens.

The United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP 1994) submission that 'Human security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity' (cited in Hussein, Gnisci and Wanjiru 2004: 13) nicely connects the concepts of security and development. The broad understanding of dimensions of human security (encompassing economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security) reflects almost all the key components of human development. In this sense, human security, as Hussein, Gnisci and Wanjiru (2004) observe, is synonymous with human development. Therefore, anything that affects security affects development and vice-versa.

The connection between security, governance and development becomes clearer when human security is approached from the perspective of the poor. According to a World Bank Report (2000), *Voices of the Poor: Crying out for Change*, security for the poor means the need to secure stability of income, predictability of their daily life, protection from crime, and continuity in their daily lives (*ibid.*; Hussein, Gnisci and Wanjiru 2004). By including the need for income stability and continuity in daily lives in the list of their top security priorities, the have-nots across the regions of the world recognise that development is implied in security.

Beyond the poor, the 2014 Human Development Report also suggests that security, governance and development are interconnected such that:

> High achievements in critical aspects of human development, such as health and nutrition, can quickly be undermined by a natural disaster or economic slump. Theft and assault can leave people physically and psychologically impoverished. Corruption and unresponsive state institutions can leave those in need of assistance without recourse (cited in Okafor, Apeh and Madugu 2015: 132).

Considering the interconnected nature of the relationship between security, governance, and development, it is difficult to say and hard to decide on which of the three should come first in order of importance. It seems reasonable however, to maintain as Shearing (1992: 400) does, that security is a 'foundation order' on which other orders, such as the political and the economic order, depend. As Ambassador Major-General Francis Adu-Amonfor (Rt'd) observed during the conference on Money, Security and

Democratic Governance in Africa in Bamako, 'you can only provide human security in an enabling environment which can only be guaranteed by the security forces. If we don't have peace, how do you invest?' The political elite in Africa have often deployed this kind of explanation to justify the huge money spent on security forces, to the detriment of other pressing human development needs.

Understanding the context of insecurity in Nigeria

Nigeria's investment in law enforcement and security is best appreciated when situated within the broader historical, political and socio-economic context of insecurity in the country. Through historiography, we know that pre-colonial Nigeria was a conglomeration of several traditional societies operating as separate entities with distinct forms of social organisation, culture, political structure, economic institutions and religious beliefs (Ogundiran 2005). Such societies were governed by traditional rulers within the framework of empires, kingdoms and city states, and each society had institutionalised means of dealing with security challenges in ways that were indigenous and satisfactory to majority of its people (Alemika, Amucheazi, Oyebode, and Yahaya 2010; Suchi 2013). Voluntary associations such as the age-grade system, women's societies, secret societies and the council of elders, were for example, popular mechanisms for dealing with security threats (Alemika *et al.* 2010). Also, the communal character of social life in pre-colonial times favoured the nurturing of a high sense of moral value among the people which helped prevent individuals from threatening the peaceful atmosphere necessary for social interaction (Suchi 2013).

In the context of the entanglements of pre-colonial Nigeria with regional and transcontinental commercial networks, economic relations and the pursuit of group and individual interests shaped and conditioned migrations, inter-group relations, power politics, socio-political formations, institutions, beliefs and cultural innovations in the region (Ogundiran 2005). The interaction between the hitherto diverse and heterogeneous societies of the region and European imperialism, which according to Gofwen (2004: 24) 'reached its peak with the historical metamorphosis of capitalism into its monopoly stage' is an important explanatory variable for understanding modern Nigeria and the contemporary security challenges facing the country.

In demarcating the boundaries of modern Nigeria and the social basis of its integration, for example, the colonial power holders (fascinated by their ulterior economic, political and evangelistic motives), did not carry the Nigerian stakeholders along with them (Tamuno 2012). This reality of history complicated matters for the peoples of the region on the eve of political

independence particularly, because colonial policies and programmes failed to allay fears of domination of minority ethnic groups by the majority ethnic groups in the emerging Nigerian society (Tamuno 2012). The post-colonial capitalistic development strategy adopted by indigenous politicians fostered the spirit of individualism which was counterproductive to the wellbeing of the nation particularly because it brought along with it new forms of security threats that were hitherto unknown in the Nigerian society. The new security environment that emerged, especially in the post-Cold War era, in many West African countries is characterised by great diversity, ranging from conventional challenges such as resource and identity conflicts, intra-state ethno-religious and regional conflicts, to growing threats from piracy, narcotics and human trafficking, kidnapping, transnational organised crime, and violent extremism, among other challenges (Sesay and Kayode 2016).

The Nigeria we know today is a vast, multi-ethnic and plural society with an estimated population of over 190 million people, most of whom are youth. It is composed of over 371 ethnic groups with the Hausa–Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba as the majority and the others as minorities in terms of numerical strength (Alubo 2006). The people are spread across six geopolitical zones (South-South, South-West, South-East, North-Central, North-West and North-East), 36 States with a Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, and 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs). These geopolitical zones however are a matter of recent political classification, as the country is geographically divided between three broad regions, the North, the Middle-Belt and the South. Despite the democratic political structure in Nigeria, the Global Fund for Peace, an American independent non-profit research and educational organisation that works to prevent violent conflicts and promote sustainable peace in the world, ranked Nigeria fourteenth out of the 177 countries in its 2015 index of failed states (Minti 2016).

Economically, Nigeria has the largest proven reserves of natural gas (180.5tn cubic feet) and the second largest proven reserves of crude oil in Africa after Libya; approximately 37.1bn barrels for 2015 (US Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics, cited in Africa Investment Report 2016: 2). Following a rebasing of the economy in April 2014, Nigeria ranked as the biggest economy in Africa (Suchi 2014; Suchi 2016b). Despite this giant stride, a new global report – the 2017 Resource Governance Index – revealed that the country lags behind 16 other African countries in the governance of its oil and gas industry (Asu 2017). With the recent crunch in oil prices in the global market, the Nigerian economy was officially in recession in 2016 (until the end of the third quarter of 2017) as GDP contracted by -1.7 per cent (Ajefu 2017; Ekpo 2017). As

a consequence, the population is still battling with the rising cost of food prices and general stagflation, high unemployment level, growing inequality, a rising debt profile and general hardship among the masses (Amaefule 2017; Ekpo 2017). As the Professor of Economics and Director-General of the West African Institute for Financial and Economic Management, Akpan Ekpo puts it, 'The Nigerian economy, after 57 years of political independence, remains underdeveloped, backward and characterized by great poverty, high unemployment, delayed infrastructure as well as poor basic amenities' (2017: 51). It is in this context that the country is faced with new forms of security threat such as Boko Haram terrorism, rising cases of kidnapping, proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs), the herders–farmers crisis, threats of secession, piracy in the Niger Delta and attacks on oil installations, armed robbery, and human trafficking, among other threats (Eteng 2016; Hussaini 2016; Minti 2016).

Predictors of insecurity in West Africa: a theoretical framework

In both theoretical and empirical literature, several factors (internal and external) ranging from economic, political and religious to social have been identified as precipitators of insecurity in the West African sub-region (Alemika 2015; Sesay and Kayode 2016; Eteng 2016; Onu, Onuche and Onaji 2016; World Development Report 2011). In Nigeria for example, Alemika's (2015) empirical study found that violent conflicts are generally precipitated by ethnic, religious and electoral grievances, although the salience of these factors has varied across cities. In West Africa as a whole, Sesay and Kayode (2016: 64) argue that the manipulation of states' weaknesses by warlords, corrupt government officials, and shady business and mercenary networks in the unstable context of the immediate post-Cold War era has provoked acute insecurity in the sub-region. Drawing on Musah (2009), they argue that West Africa's 'complex security challenges' are associated with at least three broad factors:

> The first set incorporates the region's natural resource endowments, the vulnerabilities inherent in its geographical location, and environmental and demographic factors. The second source of insecurity relates to internal and international governance processes. Finally, regional and external geopolitics exert distinct pressures on the region's security architecture (Musah 2009 cited in Sesay and Kayode 2016: 65).

On the specific situation of Nigeria, Eteng (2016) emphasises the interplay of political, religious and economic factors, especially poor leadership, manipulation of religion and a high level of unemployment, respectively, as the underlying causes of insecurity in the country. Hussaini's (2016)

study found that the emergence of Boko Haram was associated with the manipulation of religious teachings and beliefs, the existing disconnect between government and the governed, the prevalence of social and economic injustices, the near-total collapse of public education, massive unemployment, proliferation of SALWs, massive underdevelopment and the economic collapse of the north despite the availability of resources, as well as human rights abuses and extra-judicial killings of members of the sect by security forces, the lack of unity occasioned by intra-fighting amongst the hitherto homogenous communities in the north, and the global terror epidemic and internecine wars within Nigeria's neighbourhoods (Hussaini 2016). Relatedly, Onu, Onuche and Onaji (2016: 86) argue that the 'lack of long-term solutions to social, economic and governance issues, as well as the failure to promote inclusive policies targeting the most vulnerable groups, is at the root of persistent increase in violence and crime'.

Considering the diversity of factors identified in the literature as contributing to insecurity in Africa, this article adopts as a theoretical framework the approach of the World Development Report (2011) to conflict, security and development which emphasises that 'risk of conflict and violence in any society (national or regional) is the *combination* of the exposure to *internal and external stresses* and the strength of the "immune system," or the social capability for coping with stress embodied in *legitimate institutions*' (World Development Report 2011: 7 emphasis in original). This theory is considered suitable for explaining the underlying factors associated with insecurity in Africa because it links very nicely the challenge of insecurity with governance and other human development challenges. The approach's emphasis that both state and non-state institutions are important in the provision of not just security and justice but also economic opportunities for citizens, is equally noteworthy. In a nutshell, this theoretical framework is useful because it suggests that countries and sub-national areas with the weakest institutional legitimacy and governance are the most vulnerable to violence and instability, and the least able to respond to internal and external stresses.

In adopting this theoretical approach, this article believes strongly in the efficacy of the *human security* concept in informing investment in security. Within the framework of the human security concept, especially as popularised by the Commission on Human Security in 2003, we know that protecting vital freedoms and people from critical and pervasive threats and situations, based on their strengths and aspirations, as well as creating systems that give people the building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood is a priority in tackling insecurity in Africa.

Furthermore, when the international community deploys the concept of human security, it does so not only to emphasise that the protection of individuals is a strategic concern for national as well as international security, but also to suggest that security conditions for people's development are not bound to traditional matters of national defence or law and order, but rather encompass all political, economic and social issues enabling a life free from risk and fear (Hussein, Gnisci and Wanjiru 2004). This idea of what security entails is not new to Africa because the communitarian cultural values and practices that constituted the social basis of integration of pre-colonial African societies were in themselves a form of human security in the true sense of the word. However, colonialism radically changed the social structure of many African states, including their security systems, in ways that do not quite fit the African context. The individualistic capitalist economic and political system foisted on many African societies in their interactions with Europe altered the foundation of collective security inherent in their societies.

Nevertheless, there have been recent attempts, at least in principle, to develop new and innovative security paradigms specifically relevant to Africa, in line with the international community's notion of human security (Hussein, Gnisci and Wanjiru 2004). One of such attempts is reflected in the 1991 OAU's (now AU) Kampala document *Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa,* which maintains that:

> Security embraces all aspects of the society including economic, political and social dimensions of individual, family, community, local and national life. The security of a nation must be constructed in terms of the security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of his/her society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights (cited in Hussein, Gnisci and Wanjiru 2004: 15).

The provision of such a 'comprehensive package' of 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' in the context of Africa is hardly the monopoly of the state. It is only within the framework of hybrid governance theories (and not state-centric theories) that we can easily understand and explain investment in law enforcement and security in Africa because hybrid governance recognises that in areas of limited statehood or regions in which the state is not capable of providing security to the population, state institutions operate alongside informal non-state institutions that exercise public authority and provide different kinds of services, such as security (Schmelzle 2011; Meagher 2012).

My study on non-state policing in Karu, Central Nigeria for example, suggests that community members accepted policing by vigilante groups as legitimate because of questions of what is available, affordable, accessible and

effective (Suchi 2014). Vigilante groups in Nigeria not only complement the state police but vigilantism also offers ordinary citizens the opportunity to directly participate in the governance of their security.

Thus, hybrid governance theory recognises that many nodes are involved in the governance of security, and the state is but only one node of a broader, more diverse 'network of power' (Castells 1997: 304) which extends to 'markets in policing and security services unfolding *beyond* government' (Loader 2000: 342, emphasis in original). Since many nodes are involved in the governance of security as this perspective suggests, investing in law enforcement and security should not be limited to state security forces, and should also not end in crowding out investment in other vital areas of service delivery.

Analysing contemporary security challenges in Nigeria

Several studies have shown that Nigeria's insecurity problem in recent times is diverse and multi-dimensional in nature, causes and effects (Eteng 2016; Hussaini 2016; Minti 2016; Sesay and Kayode 2016). Contemporary security challenges in the country range from threats of kidnapping/attacks on oil installations, armed robbery, cultism and Boko Haram terrorism, to the herders–farmers crisis, proliferation of SALWs, drugs and human trafficking, and threats of secession. Others include the glut in the world oil market, transnational organised crime, cybercrime, money laundering and currency counterfeiting, maritime piracy, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea, slow dispensation of justice and prison congestion (Eteng 2016; Hussaini 2016; Minti 2016; Sesay and Kayode 2016).

Due to constraints of space, this article briefly analyses three of these problems namely, Boko Haram terrorism, the threat of kidnapping and the herders–farmers crisis which, along with other economic and political crises, have given rise to or constituted the current high level of insecurity in the country (Bello 2017; Eric, Umeh and Akpa 2017; Olugbile 2007).

These problems appear to be gaining currency across the political landscape and the media largely because of the reality of their existence, the frequency of their occurrences, and the magnitude of their effects on human security in Nigeria. Although the effects of all three can be felt across all regions of the country, Boko Haram is largely concentrated in the North, kidnapping in the South, and herders–famers conflicts in the Central region.

Of these three security threats discussed, Boko Haram terrorism appears to be the one major recent security challenge that has attracted the most attention from the public, both locally and internationally, at least in the past seven years. Boko Haram has attacked Nigeria's police and military, politicians, schools,

religious buildings, public institutions and parks, and civilians with increasing regularity since 2009. The attacks became more systematic and frequent in 2014 during the build-up to the 2015 general elections (Suchi 2016a).

Although their stronghold and attacks have been largely concentrated in the north-eastern part of Nigeria, the negative impacts of Boko Haram activities are being felt globally. According to Minti (2016: 11) 'Nigeria gained international prominence as one of the most terrorized countries in the world with the emergence of Boko Haram'. Minti (2016) discussed how the group *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad* which literally means 'Brethren of Sunnis united in propagation and the pursuit of holy war' started sometime in 2000 as a small clique of youths at Indimi mosque located along Damboa road in Maiduguri metropolis, Borno State, but later metamorphosed into an international terrorist organisation popularly known as Boko Haram. Hussaini (2016: 23) describes Boko Haram and their activities in terms of 'homegrown terrorism … whereby individuals or groups carry out attacks or attempt within their native or adopted country or society'.

In late 2014, the insurgency had taken the lives of more than 13,000 people and hundreds of thousand Nigerians have been displaced. Data from the Global Terrorism Index of the Institute for Economic Development and Peace indicated that in 2014 alone, Boko Haram killed more (6,644) people than the Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS) (6,073), earning for itself the reputation of being the most deadly terrorist group in the world (Hussaini 2016).

> In the same year, Nigeria accounted for 23 percent of global terrorists' death and ranked second to Iraq, which top the chart with 30.4 percent of global terrorists' related death. Similarly, the group carried out 31 suicide attacks across Nigeria, where a total of 431 people were killed in Maiduguri alone. The most deadly attack in the year was on 15th May, 2014 where a total of 315 people were killed in a single attack at Gamboru town of Ngala LGA (Hussaini 2016: 23–24).

Early in 2015, one of the worst ever attacks by Boko Haram, according to Amnesty International, took place in Baga and Doron Baga, Borno State in which no fewer than 2,000 people were killed besides the massive destruction of property (Soyinka 2015). Due to the sequence of terrorist attacks in the year, Nigeria ranked third in the 2015 Global Terrorism Index after Iraq and Afghanistan, with a death toll of 6,118 in 662 attacks (The Fund for Peace, cited in Minti 2016: 15).

Minti's (2016) study revealed that the scourge of terrorism in the north-eastern part of Nigeria has altered the demographic composition of the society by stirring mass exodus of people to areas considered less prone to violence, leading to the proliferation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps, with

attendant human development challenges. It further revealed that terrorism is capable of bringing the Nigerian economy to its knees through the destruction of critical installations and facilities such as oil pipelines, electricity, schools, police stations, etc. as well as the erosion of inter-communal trust and the destruction of social capital that is vital to peaceful coexistence and the polling of energies of communities for national development. In addition, the threat of terrorism has negatively impacted enormously on Foreign Direct Investment upon which Nigeria heavily relies (Minti 2016).

Another major security challenge currently facing Nigeria and worthy of consideration here is the threat of kidnapping. Between 2004 and 2009, kidnapping of foreign and Nigerian oil workers for ransom, along with bombing of oil installations and attacks on security agencies were frequent and more alarming than Boko Haram today (Alemika 2015; Minti 2016). Within that period, kidnapping was only common in the South-South and South-East of the country but has now become a nation-wide phenomenon that knows no barriers in the selection of victims and spread (Eteng 2016). Alemika's (2015) study revealed that the most likely victims of kidnapping were oil workers, foreigners, Nigerian politicians and relatives, business tycoons, religious leaders, professionals and children of the rich who are often only released after a negotiable ransom has been paid. Available police statistics in a previous study indicated that in 'January 2008–June 2010, more than a thousand and two hundred cases of kidnapping were recorded' (*ibid.*: 21).

Furthermore, in the first quarter (January–March) of 2016 alone, a total of 492 cases of kidnapping were recorded in Nigeria, involving 662 hostages/victims, 38 casualties (covering victims, suspects and sundry), 118 arrested suspects, over 3.6 billion naira ransom demanded and over 212 million naira ransom paid (Eteng 2016). A few examples of some of the kidnap gangs identified in Eteng's (2016) study include: a confederate of individual kidnap gangs who menace the coastal areas of the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea, often targeting moving vessels; the Ansaru kidnap group which has been described as having some religious/ideological (terrorist) interest; the BUBA kidnap ring which menace the north-west region, a varying grade of Fulani cattle men who presently combine herding with kidnapping, and a 'plethora of amateurish kidnappers that presently dot the entire landscape of Nigeria from North to South and East to West' (Eteng 2016: 42). A recent wave of kidnapping in the North-Central region of the country, particularly along the Abuja–Kaduna road has often involved eminent citizens, especially politicians, as victims to the extent that Nigerian lawmakers no longer consider it fashionable to use official number plates on their vehicles because of fear of being kidnapped (Ameh, Baiyewu and Dauda 2017).

Apart from kidnapping, the herders–farmers crisis seems to be a recurrent phenomenon in recent times, particularly in the North-Central region of Nigeria. From southern Kaduna to Taraba State and in Benue, Kogi, Nasarawa, Plateau, as well as Adamawa and Zamfara in the far north, incidences of such clashes are not uncommon. Of late, skirmishes of herders–farmers clashes have also surfaced in the South-East, South-South and the South-West, leaving no region immune (Alubo 2006; Eteng 2016). These crises with their attendant devastation remain a major source of concern to all peace-loving citizens in the country.

Investment in security forces and human development challenges in Nigeria

In view of the devastations caused by contemporary security threats in Nigeria, it is pertinent to examine how the Nigerian state has responded to the problem, particularly in terms of investment in security forces and how this has affected the capacity and interest of the state to deal with other human development challenges such as rising food prices and low purchasing power of the ordinary citizens due to massive poverty in the country, the high level of unemployment, lack of access to basic infrastructure and amenities (including basic healthcare), the rising cost of quality education, and the widening gap between the few 'haves' and the majority 'have-nots'.

Onu, Onuche and Onaji's (2016) study revealed that the various government responses to internal crisis eruptions in Nigeria include: troop deployments to crises ridden areas; the setting-up of commissions of enquiry to look into the outbreaks and their causes, which has always been an attempt to improve the diversity of government; the establishment of programmes to address cases of unemployment and poverty; the establishment of National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) which deals with medical recovery and relief in emergency responses, etc. Of all these measures, the deployment of troops to crisis areas and equipping the security forces generally appear to constitute the largest capital investment that often goes by the name 'security votes.'

In the first place, Nigeria is blessed with many security and law enforcement agencies, all of which are maintained and sustained from the limited economic resources available. These security organisations and law enforcement agencies range from the military (consisting of the army, navy and air force), which is primarily responsible for protecting the country's territory and integrity from external aggression, state security and intelligence organisations such as the Department of State Security and

the National Intelligence Agency, to paramilitary policing organisations such as the Nigeria Police Force, Nigerian Customs Service, the Nigerian Immigration Service and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps. Others are anti-corruption law enforcement agencies such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission. This list does not include the judiciary and the prisons which are basically charged with the administration of the criminal justice system.

Assuming we take anti-corruption grafts, the judiciary and the prisons out of the equation and focus specifically on the military, state security services and the paramilitary security forces which are largely involved with the management of the security challenges analysed above, it is reasonable to argue that huge investments have been made in the security forces since Nigeria's independence in 1960. In particular, the nearly two decades (1999–2017) of uninterrupted democracy in the country witnessed the upsurge of multiple security challenges, including insurgency and terrorism that might have warranted such investments. The question still begging for an answer however is whether citizens' security has actually improved in the country.

If the recent experience of economic recession is something tangible to go by, one can argue that the ongoing war on terror in Nigeria is crowding out investment in other vital areas of service delivery such as quality healthcare delivery and education, human skills development, job creation and poverty reduction. According to Hussaini (2016: 31), 'the Nigerian government has spent over five billion US dollars in prosecuting the war on terror, resources which could have been invested in the productive sector of the economy'. As Professor Isaac O. Albert observed at the International Dialogue on Money, Security and Democratic Governance in Africa, 'what the Nigerian government spent on the war against Boko Haram is enough to build a new North-East Nigeria' in the same way the money spent on military operations during the Ogoni crisis of the 1980s as a result of oil spillage in the Niger Delta was enough to create a new Niger Delta in the country.[1]

Furthermore, going by the huge percentage of the annual budget allocated to security agencies on a yearly basis in Nigeria, one cannot help suspecting that insecurity is costing Nigeria so much, often at the expense of forgone alternatives such as infrastructure and human capital development (Oguamanam 2016 cited in Onu, Onuche and Onaji 2016). In this regard, Minti's (2016: 14) submission helps to reveal the huge financial burden that terrorism has imposed on Nigeria:

> Starting from the huge yearly allocation to security and expenditure on the amnesty programme, the country in the 2016 budget allocated ₦919 billion to security units, including the Niger Delta Ministry/Amnesty Programme. This figure is more than half of Capital Expenditure budgeted at ₦ 1.688 trillion, after deducting debt servicing. Again, the allocation is larger than total allocation to critical sectors of the economy such as Agriculture (₦29.7b), Education (₦ 369.6b), Health (₦221.7b) and Industry (₦10.6b) … Allocations to these sectors totaled only ₦724.8b. Consequently, resources that could have been used for national development are deployed for crime control.

To worsen the situation, Nigeria's recurrent expenditure has consistently exceeded capital expenditure on infrastructure and public facilities (BudgetiT 2016). The present administration seemed to recognise this reality by allocating a relatively huge amount (2.24 trillion naira) to capital expenditure out a total budget of 7.44 trillion naira in 2017. In explaining why there was a delay in signing the budget, Acting President Prof Osinbajo pointed out that:

> To demonstrate our commitment to following through our economic recovery and growth plan, the 2017 budget allocates over 2tn to capital expenditure, principally infrastructure. For instance, we are committing over N200bn to improve transport infrastructure such as roads and rail; over N500bn to investments in works, power, and housing; and N46bn to Special Economic Zone projects to be set up in each geopolitical zone (Adetayo 2017a: 21).

In other words, the Acting President recognised that the lack of adequate basic infrastructure and amenities such as roads, railways, power and housing, as well as jobs, are major developmental challenges competing for attention and resources in Nigeria.

Of particular relevance here is the ministerial allocations of the 2017 budget which indicated that the Ministry of Power, Works/Housing got 586.534 billion naira for both capital (553.713 billion naira) and recurrent (32.821 billion naira) expenditures. The Ministry of Interior received 471.597 billion naira for recurrent expenditure and another 63.760 billion naira for capital expenditure. The Ministry of Education received 398.686 billion naira for recurrent expenditure and another 56.720 billion naira as capital vote. The Ministry of Defence got 330 billion naira for recurrent expenditure and another 139.294 billion naira as capital vote. The sum of 241.709 billion naira went to the Ministry of Transportation for its capital expenditure which got 14.810 billion naira for capital spending. The Ministry of Petroleum Resources received 63.222 billion naira for its recurrent expenditure and another 6.793 billion naira for capital vote (Ameh 2017: 53).

Even at that, the above breakdown indicates that close to one trillion (977.651 billion naira) of the total allocation goes to security (the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defence), most of which is for recurrent expenditure. Often the problem with this is how to guarantee that the bulk of this allocation does not end up in private pockets.

Thus, a major consequence of insecurity is the depletion of limited resources in the name of recurrent expenditure on fighting insurgency. In the particular situation of north-east Nigeria, the government also witnessed unprecedented loss of revenue that affected about 80 per cent of the farming population in the region (Minti 2016). Apart from this negative effect on the economy, the Boko Haram insurgency also led to massive displacement of people and the proliferation of IDP camps, closure of most public schools and massive loss of lives and property, which all complicated the challenges of human development in the region.

The ongoing concerted crackdown on Boko Haram by both Nigerian troops and the Multinational Joint Task Force has no doubt degraded the capability of the terrorists to the barest minimum but at a very high cost. Hussaini's (2016) study, for instance, revealed that the coordinated attacks by Boko Haram have been greatly abated while blockades on all supply routes of the group have been enforced. The resultant effect of this effort is that 15 LGAs of Borno State hitherto under the control of Boko Haram terrorists have been liberated and rescued hostages are being taken to IDP camps or host communities and respective LGA headquarters, where they are being guarded by Nigerian forces and catered for by the NEMA, the State Emergency Management Agency and other foreign and local donors.

Without mincing words, sensible investment in security requires that African countries move beyond efforts at maintaining the nation-state and improving regime security, and start focusing on addressing the complicated human development challenges currently facing most parts of the continent. This way, the entire region with all its diversity, complexity and heterogeneity would not continue to occupy a place in the world that is 'nearly synonymous with failure and poverty' (Ferguson 2006: 5).

Conclusion

This article has addressed the question of how investment in law enforcement agencies and state security forces has affected the capacity and interest of the Nigerian state to deal with other human development challenges. Although various studies have suggested that Nigeria's insecurity problems are diverse in number, the article focuses on analysing of Boko Haram

terrorism alongside kidnapping and herders–farmers conflicts, showing their magnitude in terms of scale and consequences. The cost of counter-insurgency, in terms of huge budgetary allocations to the security forces is emphasised, and especially how this has crowded out resources from other human developmental challenges in the country.

Based on the discussion, we can conclude that enormous resources have been invested in law enforcement and security forces in Nigeria from its formative years, often at the expense of investing in other basic human development challenges such as quality education, healthcare facilities, job creation and provision of basic infrastructure that are essential to citizens' security. A combination of internal and external strains, such as poor governance and corruption, weak democratic and justice institutions, poor management of limited economic resources, ethno-religious and electoral grievances and porous borders, among other factors, have meshed together to create the current state of insecurity in Nigeria.

To curtail the problem and prevent even more disastrous security threats, the present administration and subsequent governments in the country must go beyond the rhetoric of 'the change mantra' which is attractively anchored on improving security, tackling corruption and revitalising the national economy, to urgently addressing the untold hardships that the recent economic recession has brought upon many Nigerians through practical policies and programmes that will cushion the impact of the recession. One of the ways to achieving this is to recognise that improving security goes beyond matters of national defence or law and order. It encompasses all economic, political and social issues, enabling a life free from risk, fear and want.

The lesson for other African countries from the Nigerian experience is this: equipping the military without addressing the hunger and misery in the country will only be counter-productive. What is required of African states is to strengthen their respective immune systems or social capability for coping with stress embodied in legitimate institutions through good governance.

In order to make investment in law enforcement and security forces more potent while producing fewer side-effects for other human development challenges, such as inadequate healthcare facilities, high levels of illiteracy and unemployment and massive poverty, not only will African states always need to strike a balance between regime security and human security but also should incorporate non-state policing/security organisations and actors into their security architecture, and properly regulate their activities. In addition, states should foster collaboration and exchange of intelligence between state and non-state security forces.

Note

1. Prof. Isaac Olawale Albert of the Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan made this point in a contribution at the International Policy Dialogue on Money, Security and Democratic Governance in Africa at Bamako, Mali in October 2017.

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