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**Special Issue on
Transforming Global Relations for a Just World**

**Numéro spécial sur
Transformer les relations internationales pour un monde juste**

Guest Editor / Rédacteur invité

Vusi Gumede

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Africa Development is a quarterly bilingual journal of CODESRIA. It is a social science journal whose major focus is on issues which are central to the development of society. Its principal objective is to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas among African scholars from a variety of intellectual persuasions and various disciplines. The journal also encourages other contributors working on Africa or those undertaking comparative analysis of the developing world issues.

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Editorial

Vusi Gumede*

The world we live in is not only volatile and uncertain; it appears to be increasingly becoming, if not already, a dangerous place. It is in this context that the dominant paradigm, which is based on the hegemony of neoliberal perspectives that have shaped development or caused underdevelopment, and is informed by *accumulation by dispossession* (Harvey 2005), is being challenged. Capitalism, or monopoly capitalism to be specific to the current conjuncture, benefits a few at the expense of the many. The predominance of the United States of America and European countries has maintained the peripheralisation of the global south. This has added salt to injury – the ramifications of the many centuries of brutal enslavement, colonialism, imperialism, plunder and the exploitation of the global south, and Africa in particular, have been followed by further plunder, imperialism and coloniality.¹ The skewed distribution of power, globally has ensured that the interests of the so-called developed countries trump effective and inclusive development in the global south. The world disorder that is in place has to change. Global relations should be transformed. A just world must be made a reality.

This special issue of *Africa Development* interrogates the dynamics of global relations for a just world. The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) partnered with the World Social Science Forum 2015 on the theme of ‘Transforming Global Relations for a Just World’. The papers in this special issue cover the following areas: changing imperatives of international development; emerging powers and impact on international development; the reform of international finance institutions and the growth-development nexus debates. In addition, some papers analyse the origins, contexts, complexities and contradictions of the lopsided global order and their effects on development and implications for Africa’s development.

Without a doubt, the obtaining global disorder is characterised by high levels of inequality, poverty, misery, environmental degradation, diseases, hunger and pervasive injustice, as many have argued or even demonstrated.

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These trajectories have been informed and reinforced by power asymmetry between the global north and the global south, with the former clinging tenaciously to the privileges and power that they derived through colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, and, now, coloniality.

The globalisation processes have been defined by the logic of the market, free trade and deregulation, thus leading to the primacy of capital and its hegemony over all the other factors of production. An increasing feature of global capitalism is financialisation, which involves the development of sophisticated financial tricks such as shares, bonds, mutual funds, certificates of deposits, equities, derivatives, toxic assets and so on, issued by various banks, financial institutions, stock brokerages, insurance providers, credit rating agencies and government-sponsored profiteering entities (as some articles in this special issue discuss). While these products have increased the volume and velocity of money in circulation, they have served to further global interests, within and between countries, manifested by inequalities through payment of bonuses and benefits to corporate executives who constitute a small percentage of global income earners.

The contradictions inherent in global capitalism have led to several cyclical crises which, paradoxically, are altering the balance of economic power in favour of the global south. The shift in the geography of power from the north to the south calls for new debates on how global relations and social processes can be transformed to ensure comprehensive justice. This becomes more pertinent in view of the democratic deficits that still characterize the global governance architecture in a supposedly multipolar world, especially on issues of trade, finance, environment, security and development in general.

Within the context of Africa and or Africa's development, a number of questions remain unanswered. One of the fundamental questions confronting us is: why has the African continent remained behind other continents, particularly in terms of human development and or wellbeing? I think the starting point in an attempt to address this fundamental question of Africa's development or Africans in general is that the various unpleasant experiences of slave trade, colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism have combined to condition the mind of an African to feel inferior and seemingly incapable of creative endeavour – this is not to say that such experiences must be the primary preoccupation and should constrain the ability to determine Africa's desired destiny. As Karl Polanyi (1944) argues, experiences of slavery dehumanize and disempower the victims, even for successive generations. Frantz Fanon (1961) has more to say about this (Fanon 1961: 67).² As many have argued, the totality of the historical experience of

the African continent and peoples of African descent should be taken into account when dealing with the challenges and solutions pertaining to the further renewal of the African continent and for the advancement of the wellbeing of Africans wherever they are.³ Pakiso Tondi (2005:301) puts it aptly that, 'European imperialists employed various strategies that were all intended to depersonalize and empty [us]...' We must indeed reclaim our tempered or damaged souls, as Ama Mazama would put it. Put differently, Africans and those of African descent should retrieve lost glory and reclaim stolen legacy. As argued elsewhere, the thorough understanding of African histories and detailed immersion into the African archive should facilitate processes towards recovering the stolen legacy and reclaiming the lost glory. Cheikh Anta Diop, among others, opened the canvass for us.

Among the fundamental constraints to Africa's development is the lack of appropriate policies. The lack of appropriate policies is also associated with poor reforms, as Gumede (2011) explains. Thandika Mkandawire (2001), in the context of Africa as a whole, has argued that there is indeed a challenge of policies, especially social policies. Samir Amin (1972),⁴ on the other hand, has been explaining what kind of a development model could work better for Africa (and the world at large) – indeed, there have been various attempts to come up with 'home-grown' development approaches. Adebayo Adedeji (2002), for instance, has discussed the various strategies and plans that Africa crafted, which have unfortunately been compromised by what he has termed the Development Merchant System – a deliberate design by the global capitalist order to perpetuate a socio-economic and political system that advances the interests of the west and maintains the peripheralisation of the African continent. Adekeye Adebajo (2010) attributes, convincingly, the challenges confronting Africa to the 'curse of Berlin' and the 'bondage of boundaries'. Claude Ake (1996), among others, demonstrated, the constraints imposed by the development approach that Africa followed. Indeed, the debate about what has limited development in Africa continues: the most recent appraisal by Thandika Mkandawire (2015) of various perspectives that have claimed to identify the 'African problem' is a case in point.

As hinted above, the central concern for the further development of the African continent has to do with a socio-economic development approach pursued so far, largely because the approaches for advancing development that have been employed in Africa have largely been borrowed elsewhere (Gumede 2011). As the opening paragraph of this introduction indicates, the dominant approach is the neoliberal economic agenda or dogma which is mainly based on market fundamentalism that has been prone to crises, the

recent case being the ongoing global economic recession, and it perpetuates and accentuates inequalities. Therefore, Africa needs its own socio-economic development approach, informed by a new vision for the African economy. I have described the new approach, or philosophical framework, for socio-economic development in Africa as an African Economic Renaissance⁵ (see Gumede 2013) and I have proposed that the following should be the main aspects of an alternative model: robust social policies, effective industrial policies, entrepreneurship, state ownership and (lastly) intra-African trade.⁶

Arguably, it would be important to look back, perhaps through the works of Walter Rodney, Cheikh Anta Diop, Samir Amin and Paul TINYAMBE Zeleza, among others, to study how socially and economically Africa was organised before colonisation or colonialism. Adebajo (2010:3) put it interestingly that 'in order to understand contemporary events and for a better future one must inevitably understand the past'. Theophile Obenga has extensively documented the 'past' we must be proud of while Kwesi Kwaa Prah, among others, has succinctly captured the 'past' we must never forget. With regard to the early African economy, for instance, it was characterised or has been described as communalistic, not communistic. According to Rodney (1973), communalism refers to a way of life and or philosophy and or approach where production is done in common and the produce shared equally. Amin (1997) characterised such an economy as pre-mercantilist. Ayi Kwei Armah, Chinweizu Ibekwe and Valentine Mudimbe, among others, have made a case against borrowing foreign notions such as communism or Marxism.

It is probably necessary to indicate that when I argue about 'going back', particularly pertaining to the approach to socio-economic development. I am not suggesting that we should go back in order to replicate exactly what was done many centuries back because of contextual nuances as the reality of globalisation must be factored in. Indeed, there is a need to think innovatively instead of trying to copy what other countries do. Many countries in the African continent are increasingly copying or trying to copy the Chinese social and economic development model. Arguably, replicating the Chinese model would not work well for the African continent for many reasons, chief among them being the reality that the contexts are different.

There are also many social problems in the African continent. Some of these are of course common all over the world. However, Africa has many civil wars that are avoidable. There is a big problem of conflicts and the need for peace in the African continent. It is hard to develop society in such conditions. Some scholars have written about this, modelling the role of conflict to economic development. One cannot possibly develop society

effectively while there is conflict. Education is also a challenge, despite large investments into educational sectors in the African continent. The outcomes remain a challenge in terms of skills development, level and quality of education. Take South Africa, for instance. There is a large number of graduates that are unemployed.

There are also challenges that relate to institutions and political systems in the African continent. Moreover, there is always some kind of external influence or interference as the works of Thandika Mkandawire and Adebayo Adedeji, among others, have shown with regard to economic development in Africa. Libya is generally used as a recent case of this issue where the African continent was not given an opportunity, sufficient opportunity, to resolve the crisis or the challenge in Libya. Instead, external role-players came in and worsened the crisis. There is a bigger problem now in the Sahel region all the way down to Nigeria and other parts of that world. Some people argue that the reason Boko Haram seems so prominent now can be linked to what has happened in Libya, for instance, the complete breakdown of society and the ease with which arms flow across the Sahel region, coupled with problems in Mali and other areas.

More fundamentally, as indicated earlier, the African continent remains at the periphery, to use Issa Shivji's formulation (2009), largely because of the global power distribution. The manner in which economic power, social power, political power and otherwise are distributed keeps the African continent at the bottom. As indicated earlier, Adebayo Adedeji has characterized the mechanism that keeps Africa at the bottom as the 'Development Merchant System'. So, the manner in which power is distributed globally is a big challenge. The notion of the 'colonial matrices of power' that decolonial scholars (see, for instance, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Akhona Nkenkana in this special issue) have advanced speaks to a structure which ensures that the global south broadly remains at the bottom and the West remains at the top. It is also in this context that we should always treat narratives, from the West about Africa with circumspection. As Achille Mbembé (2001:3) would put it, 'narrative about Africa is always pretext for a comment about something else, some other place, some other people...Africa is the mediation that enables the West to accede to its own subconscious and give a public account of its subjectivity.' Therefore, we must interrogate narratives such as the 'Africa rising' narrative, which is essentially a narrative of the West and its allies.

Articles in this issue of *Africa Development* do a great job in expanding on the issues I have highlighted and in addressing the theme as well as pertinent aspects of this special issue. Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni addresses the question

of how Africa was conceived of as an *idea* and integrated into the evolving Euro-North American-centric modernity. He categorises and describes genealogies of coloniality in the eight broad and overlapping epochs in the production of Africa that impinged on Africa's development in various direct and indirect ways. The eight epochs that Ndlovu-Gatsheni deals with are: the *paradigm of discovery and mercantilist order* running from the fifteenth century to the eighteenth century dominated by the slave trade and mercantilism; the *post-1648 Westphalian order* that inaugurated the exclusion of Africa from sovereignty; the *1884-5 Berlin consensus, scramble for and conquest of Africa* that concretized the dismemberment and fragmentation of Africa; *colonial governmentality* that was characterized by production of African colonial subjectivity; the *post-1945 United Nations decolonization normative order* that amounted to the accommodation of Africa in the lowest echelons of the modern world system; the *Cold War coloniality* that polarised Africa ideologically and reduced it to a theatre of proxy hot wars; the *post-Cold War triumphalism of neoliberal order* that Francis Fukuyama (1992) articulated as 'the end of history and the last man'; the *post-9/11 anti-terrorist* period that produced a new securitisation order; and the current *coloniality of markets and new scramble for Africa*. Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues that Africa is today still struggling to free itself from the constraining global colonial matrices of power that have been in place since the time of colonial encounters.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni's article presents a broad theoretical framework that Akhona Nkenkana adapts to examine gender transformation in the context of the transformation of global relations for a just world. Applying a decolonial perspective, Akhona Nkenkana broadly examines gender transformation instruments and narratives about gender empowerment as far as genuine gender transformation is concerned. Akhona Nkenkana's point of departure is that the 'modern' world system and its global order have remained fundamentally patriarchal. She argues that the liberation of women must not be about the incorporation of women within the patriarchal system. For Akhona Nkenkana, decolonising gender, distilling from Maria Lugones' theoretical framework, is to enact a critique of racialised, colonial, and capitalist heterosexualist gender oppression as a lived transformation of the social. As she argues, 'we should be able to understand that the instrumentality of the colonial/modern gender system is subjecting both men and women of colour in all domains of existence and therefore allows us to reveal that the gender transformation discourse is not just a women's emancipation discourse but rather efforts of both men and women to overcoming the colonial global structure that is subjectifying in different ways' (p39). Therefore, the change of the system and its structures, which are essentially patriarchal, is the main mechanism that will bring

about possible equal futures for women in Africa, as her case studies of Rwanda and South Africa show.

Devan Pillay makes a strong case that the 'Africa rising' narrative is misleading, reminding us, indirectly about what Achille Mbembé says regarding 'narratives about Africa'. The 'Africa rising' narrative, Devan Pillay argues, draws the people of Africa into a false sense of promise – of 'development' and 'decent' jobs for all – that can never be delivered by the current economic growth paradigm. He appeals for a radical rethink to break out of the cycle of deepening inequality, dispossession and ecological devastation. Devan Pillay also addresses the behaviour and effects of capital: it develops but also destroys; if left to its own devices, its destructive power is incalculable. Pillay's article situates the 'Africa rising' narrative and the challenges of growth and development within the context of the global *poly-crisis*. Pillay demonstrates, among other things, that the world we live in is increasingly and irreversibly falling apart because of monopoly capitalism. The article is a convincing case for transforming global relations for a just world.

There are two articles that deal with Africa's relations in the context of the role of the global south in transforming global relations for a just world: Phineas Bbaala examines Africa-China relations while Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo looks at Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). It is indeed very important that an analysis of the global south is undertaken or that the various initiatives that purport to bring about a new world order are analyzed. It would seem that the transformation of global relations for a just world can only be led by the global south. Africa, as part of the global south, has an important role to play in the transformation of global relations so that the whole of humanity benefits from the fruits of whatever progress is made. It might very well be that the global south needs its own vision and its own approach to development, instead of Africa pulling alone.

Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo reflects on the dynamics of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) states' political economy and implications to Africa's continuous efforts to search for new developmental paradigms. Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo addresses the following important questions: What are the BRICS states specifically proposing to the existing world order and the global south in the areas of paradigms of economic and social development and systems of governance? What do BRICS countries have in common? Can this commonality be instrumentalised and converted in favour of African progress? What is the ideological foundation of their solidarity? Within the pragmatism and ideology related to this solidarity, are the BRICS states proposing new development schemes from the failed old top-down, the 'free' and anarchical market-based, linear, and the middle-

class one-size-fits-all model of social and economic development? Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo concludes that to have a significant impact in Africa, activities of BRICS should be shaped and guided by bottom-up perspectives. He notes that BRICS strongly calls for shifts of paradigms in the world order. Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, however, has doubts whether BRICS can bring about a new world order given that BRICS seems to be working within existing paradigms instead of explicitly charting a new development path for the global south.

Phineas Bbaala examines the relationship between Africa and China, answering the question of whether Africa-China relations are benefitting Africa in any tangible manner. Phineas Bbaala highlights that 'notwithstanding China's long solidarity with Africa throughout the liberation struggle, and its contribution to the continent through foreign direct investment, infrastructure development, trade and bilateral aid, some of its recent engagements with the continent have raised questions of neo-colonialism tantamount to those in the North-South relations' (p93). In other words, are the new Sino-Africa relations mainly driven by China's hunger for Africa's natural resources and its search for international markets for its manufactures, and business opportunities for its multinational corporations? Phineas Bbaala demonstrates that the new Sino-Africa economic relations, although still largely 'win-win' could soon plunge into 'win-lose' relations in favour of China.

Samuel Oloruntoba examines the nature and scope of capitalism, in almost a similar manner as Devan Pillay and Yash Tandon do – see their articles in this special issue. Samuel Oloruntoba locates the growing inequalities in the world within the global politics of financialisation in which the transnational capitalist class (TCC) adopts a reactionary ideology of neoliberalism to further their interest through the creation of massive fictitious wealth, maintenance of stranglehold on domestic and international policy institutions and spreading of the 'illogic' of the sanctity of the market. As many have argued, including Devan Pillay and Yash Tandon in this special issue, Oloruntoba argues that capitalism in its current form is unsustainable for the global human society and that the structure of power that informs and maintains the current order must therefore be transformed to foster inclusive development. Oloruntoba concludes that there is an inextricable link between financialisation of capital/capitalism and global inequality.

This special issue ends with a hard-hitting rendition by Yash Tandon on imperialism and development. Yash Tandon, drawing from his works of many decades on 'development' argues that: in our epoch, resistance against imperial domination is the first law of motion of development. Tandon

examines the various aspects of the development theories and practices of 'development' and concludes that economic theories are actually ideologies and those propounding such theories are ideologists. Tandon also makes use of specific cases or case studies to sharpen his main argument and support the conclusion reached. The discussion is situated firmly in the context of the harsh reality of imperialism. The West, Tandon argues, suffers from an acute case of amnesia when it comes to recognising imperialism and its role in destroying the cultural, economic and social roots of Africa's evolution into self-sustaining and respected member of the international community. Tandon makes a point that the fundamental reason why the 'African economy is shattered' is because of the so-called 'free trade' dogma. This and other points captured in his article support or inform his main argument that 'development is resistance'.

In conclusion, it indeed seems that there are numerous efforts to transform global relations. The global south must not relent. Africa must push harder. Leadership is one of the most critical ingredients for successfully pursuing the overdue transformation of global relations. As I have been arguing, it is not just 'leadership' that is needed. Rather, what is very much needed is 'thought leadership'. The needed thought leadership should be coupled with critical consciousness. Thought leadership is about the leadership that is based on progressive ideologies, beliefs and orientations that have significant pragmatic and positive impact appeal. Critical consciousness, on the other hand, should be linked to decolonising the minds of Africans, as Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, Molefi Kete Asante, Ama Mazama and Chinweizu Ibekwe, among others, have argued. Knowledge production is therefore an important component in the pursuit of the desired transformation of global relations and the fundamental re-configuration of the global disorder to ensure a just world. For Africa, the transformation of global relations has to be informed by the ideals of African renaissance within the framework that pan-Africanism provides for as Ras Makonnen argued in the 1970s.

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The draft Call for Papers was put together by Samuel Oloruntoba, one of the contributors in this special issue, and a few others made inputs to the draft before I finalised it and sent it out. I also would like to acknowledge Alexander Bangirana for assisting in various ways in ensuring that this special issue became a reality. Thanks also to the contributors to this special issue for cooperation particularly in attending to various editorial and technical issues I raised as the editor and those raised by CODESRIA, over and above promptly attending to reviewers' inputs

Notes

1. Decolonial scholars describe coloniality as the legacy of colonialism – colonial systems and structures that survive beyond the so-called era of colonialism. For instance, coloniality is said to be primarily in three spheres: coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of being
2. Frantz Fanon (1961:67) puts it well that ‘colonialism, by a kind of pervasive logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts it, disfigures and destroys it.’
3. See, for instance, works Molefi Kete Asante and Archie Mafeje, among others.
4. There are many works of Samir Amin that have been explaining problems with the development paradigm that Africa has followed. See for instance, Amin, S., 1972.
5. African economic renaissance implies that Africans should decide on the African economy and or the socio-economic system that works for them. The point of departure is that Africans have had, prior to colonialism and imperialism, an economy and an economic system that worked well for them. For more, see Gumede, V. (2013).
6. For detailed explanation of the socio-economic development model I have proposed, see Gumede, V. (2013). There is ongoing work to elaborate the proposed model with a focus on the twenty-second century because some of us think that Africa has missed the twenty-first century. We in fact argue that as the twenty-first century slowly draws to a close it will, socioeconomically, be remembered as one that firmly established the ascent of the Asian sub-continent and economies like the People’s Republic of China, Republic of Korea, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and also the secondary rise of South American and Latin nations (e.g., Federative Republic of Brazil, Republic of Chile, United Mexico States).

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Genealogies of Coloniality and Implications for Africa's Development

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Abstract

How Africa was conceived as an idea and integrated into the evolving Euro-North American-centric modernity is a tale of genealogies of colonialities and African resistance(s). Genealogies of coloniality span eight broad and overlapping epochs in the production of Africa that impinged on its development in various direct and indirect ways. The eight epochs distilled are the *paradigm of discovery and mercantilist order* running from the fifteenth century to the eighteenth century dominated by the slave trade and mercantilism; the *post-1648 Westphalian order* that inaugurated the exclusion of Africa from sovereignty; the *1884-5 Berlin consensus, scramble for and conquest of Africa* that concretised the dismemberment and fragmentation of Africa; *colonial governmentality* that was characterised by production of African colonial subjectivity; the *post-1945 United Nations decolonisation normative order* that amounted to the accommodation of Africa to the lowest echelons of the modern world system; the *Cold War coloniality* that polarized Africa ideologically and reduced it to a theatre of proxy hot wars; the *post-Cold War triumphalism of neoliberal order* that Francis Fukuyama (1992) articulated as 'the end of history and the last man'; the *post-9/11 anti-terrorist order* that produced a new securitization order; and *the current coloniality of markets and new scramble for Africa*. The article posits that African development's trials and tribulations are deeply embedded within these overlapping epochs that were accompanied by epistemicides, genocides, usurpations, appropriations and disruptions. Africa is today still struggling to free itself from the constraining global colonial matrices of power that have been in place since the time of colonial encounters.

Résumé

La façon dont l'Afrique a été conçue comme idée et son intégration dans la modernité centrique évolutive Euro-nord-américaine est une histoire de généalogies coloniales et de la/des résistances(s) africaines. Les généalogies coloniales ont traversé huit époques vastes et qui [...] se chevauchent dans

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la production de l'Afrique ayant empiété sur son développement de diverses façons, directes et indirectes. Les huit époques distillées sont le *paradigme de la découverte et l'ordre mercantiliste* qui s'étend du 15^e au 18^e siècle dominé par la traite des esclaves et le mercantilisme ; *l'ordre Westphalien post-1648* qui a inauguré l'exclusion de l'Afrique de la souveraineté ; le *Consensus de Berlin 1884-1885, la ruée et la conquête de l'Afrique* qui ont concrétisé le démembrement et la fragmentation de l'Afrique ; *la gouvernamentalité coloniale* qui était caractérisée par la production de la subjectivité coloniale africaine ; *l'ordre normatif post-1945 des Nations Unies* relatif à la décolonisation qui consistait à l'accommodement de l'Afrique en bas de l'échelle du système du monde contemporain ; *la vie en colonie à l'époque de la Guerre froide* qui a polarisé l'Afrique sur le plan idéologique la réduisant en un théâtre de guerres chaudes par procuration ; *le triomphalisme post-Guerre froide de l'ordre néolibéral* que Francis Fukuyama (1992) avait qualifié comme étant « la fin de l'Histoire et du dernier homme » ; *l'ordre anti-terroriste post-11 septembre* qui a entraîné un nouvel ordre de titrisation ; et *la colonialité actuelle des marchés et la nouvelle ruée vers l'Afrique*. L'article pose l'hypothèse selon [...] laquelle toutes les tribulations du développement de l'Afrique sont profondément ancrées dans ce chevauchement d'époques qui étaient accompagnées d'épistémicides, de génocides, d'usurpations, d'affectations et de bouleversements. Aujourd'hui, l'Afrique a encore du mal à se libérer des matrices globales coloniales et contraignantes du pouvoir qui existent depuis l'époque de la confrontation coloniale.

Introduction

A critical engagement with genealogies and lineages of coloniality is part of an effort to write the 'history of the present' in Africa. It is also a concern about how Africa was problematically and forcibly integrated into the evolving Euro-North American-centric modernity and its capitalist system over the last 500 years. At a methodological level, a genealogical approach enables a systematic analysis of continuities and discontinuities simultaneously taking full account of temporalities of ideas, systems, institutions and orders across time. This is useful in understanding how coloniality unfolded as a central leitmotif of modernity, imperialism, colonialism and capitalism. For Africa, writing 'the history of the present' entails dealing with an interrupted historical continuity. Euro-North American-centric modernity as a broad discursive terrain that produced the slave trade, imperialism, colonialism and other systemic, structural and coercive external impositions constituted an epic form of disruption of the historical development of the continent. The disruptions were accompanied by epistemicides, linguicides, and genocides. Caribbean decolonial theorist and poet, Aime Cesaire (1955 [2000]) captures the disruptions referred to very well when he explains what became of our societies, our being and our political economies.

Pal Ahluwalia and Paul Nursey-Bray (1997:2) reinforced the thesis of disruption of African development trajectory when they argued that 'African history was denied or appropriated; African culture belittled; the status and standing of Africans as human beings was called into question'. Therefore the Foucauldian idea of 'an uninterrupted continuity' does not apply to Africa (Foucault 1984:83). Africa is largely a product of active operations of colonial matrices of power that were well defined by the Peruvian sociologist, Anibal Quijano (2000a, 2000b, 2007), as invisible imperial designs. To gain a better understanding of the history of the present in Africa and the genesis of postcolonial African development challenges, one has to dig deeper into complex systems of thought, complicated historical processes, constitution and configuration of specific modern/imperial/colonial structures of power that produced Africa as a cartographic entity, an idea, a reality; as well as particular reproduction(s) of African subjectivity as deficient and dependent. A comprehensive critical decolonial historical analysis of genealogies and lineages of coloniality has to be traced historically from the colonial encounters of fifteenth century. At the same time, a phenomenological methodology becomes handy in capturing those intimate details of the lived experiences of African people who subsisted under Walter D. Mignolo (2000, 2011) termed the 'underside' of Euro-North American-centric modernity.

This article, in dealing with Africa's development, discerns eight broad and overlapping epochs beginning with the age of colonial encounters right up to the contemporary period dominated by coloniality of markets/logic of monopoly capital. The article is made up of three broad sections with sub-sections. The first section provides a background on how Africa was integrated into the evolving modern world system. The second section examines each of the eight genealogies of coloniality and elaborates on the lineages from the time of early colonial encounters in the fifteenth century to the present age of coloniality of markets. The last section is the conclusion which emphasises the need for forging ahead with the unfinished projects of decolonisation of the modern world system and deimperialisation of the global/international order. Broadly, the article reveals how global imperial designs and colonial matrices of power actively work to disrupt and constrain African development trajectory. Today, African development remains a dependent process.

The Genesis of Coloniality

As defined by Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2007), coloniality is a global power structure. It is different from colonialism because it 'refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well

beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations' (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 243). Coloniality 'is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and every day' (Maldonado-Torres 2007:243).

Genealogically speaking, coloniality is founded on theft of history. Theft of history for Africa translated into theft of its future. The theft of history partly explains how Africa, which is acknowledged as the cradle of humankind, ended up as the most marginal continent in world affairs. Christopher Ehret (2002:3) underscores the fact that 'Africa lies at the heart of human history. It is the continent from which the distant ancestors of every one of us, no matter who we are today, originally came.' Today, Africa is locked in an enduring 'paradigm of difference' that downgrades its stature in world affairs and questions its contribution to human civilisation, progress and development (Mudimbe 1994:xii). Even though the African continent and its people collectively known as the 'Africans' are the most written about, they still remain the least understood of the world's people. This reality provoked Achille Mbembe (2001:9) to argue that: 'The upshot is that while we now feel we know nearly everything that African societies and economies are not, we still know nothing about what they actually are.'

The paradigm of difference is central leitmotif of coloniality which reproduced an Africa that was and is considered 'unthinkable.' Georg Wilhelm Fredrich Hegel emphasized the 'unthinkability' of Africa, arguing that 'Africa proper does not belong to humanity' and 'is difficult to comprehend, because it is so totally different from our own culture, and so remote and alien in relation to our own mode of consciousness. We must forget all the categories which are fundamental to our spiritual life, i.e. the forms under which we normally subsume the data which confronts us; the difficulty here is that our customary preconceptions will still inevitably intrude in all our deliberations' (Hegel 1998:176-177). He urged Europeans who wished to understand Africans to 'put aside all our European attitudes' so as to 'abstract from all reverence and morality, and from everything we call feeling' because 'nothing consonant with humanity is to be found in his character' (Hegel 1998:177).

This Hegelian argument is surprising because Africa has the longest history of encounters with those who wrote about Africans. Africans had encounters with the Greeks, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, Persians, Phoenicians, Arabs and many others (outsiders/foreigners) long before the so-called 'discovery' of the so-called 'New World' (Latin America) by Christopher Columbus in 1492 (Bennett 1984). This reality explains why unlike Latin America, no European or other race claimed to have 'discovered' Africa (Soyinka 2012:27).

Historically speaking, the reality of a long interaction of Africa with the outside world even prior to the rise of modern Europe poses the challenge of where do we begin to trace the genealogies of coloniality. Egypt, which Cheikh Anta Diop (1981; 1987) spent an entire academic life studying and explaining as the most celebrated and most developed African civilisation, even prior to the rise of Greek civilisation, experienced a catalogue of colonial invasions. The same is true of North Africa that even became part of the Roman Empire by 146BC before it was later colonized by the Arabs in the seventh century. This early cultural and colonial encounters produced what became known as the Mediterranean commerce that became dominant until the fifteenth century when it was overtaken by the TransAtlantic commerce (Fernandez-Armesto 1987). Can we therefore trace the genealogy of modern coloniality to this period? The historical reality is that prior to the fifteenth century the cultural and colonial encounters that obtained did not leave a 'profound or epochal legacy for either of the two continents' (Oyebade 2000: 413).

This article, therefore, traces the genealogy of coloniality in Africa from the fifteenth century for two main reasons. In the first place, the dawn of Euro-North American-centric modernity that gave birth to a modern world-system that decolonial theorists understood as constitutively racially hierarchised, patriarchal, sexist, imperial, colonial, capitalist, Christian-centric, hetero-normative, asymmetrical and modernist traceable to 1492 (Quijano 2000a; 2000b; 2007; Mignolo 2000; 2011; Grosfoguel 2007; 2011, 2013; Maldonado-Torres 2014). In the second place, 'Europe's renewed interest in and subsequent intercourse with Africa from the fifteenth century onwards had long-lasting and revolutionary effects on the continent' (Oyebade 2000: 413). The fifteenth century witnessed a rise of a particular Euro-North American-centric modernity that was underpinned by a world-system and an international economy.

Ontologically speaking, a new racial discourse of defining and classification of people – racially hierarchizing them, and then colonising and ruling over, dominating and exploiting those that were deemed racially inferior emerged. Those who became victims of the politics of alterity became legitimate subjects for enslavement. Compared to the Roman Empire that was underpinned by the idea of inclusiveness and the logic of the *humanitas*, the post-fifteenth century Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and later British, French, Germany and Italian empires were informed by the logic of differentiating the *humanitas* from the *anthropos*. But in Rome, in the spirit of *humanitas*, the Romans never questioned the humanity even of those people they designated as *barbarians* (Goffart 1980; Etherington 2011; Mamdani 2013: 76-84). This reality led Mahmood Mamdani to argue that:

If there is a parallel to the Roman capacity to absorb local elites as the empire expanded – in the process turning Rome itself into a multicultural centre – that parallel is provided by the Ottoman Empire and not the modern Western Empires of Britain and France (Mamdani 2013:84).

Both empirical historical evidence and decolonial theory indicates that the dawn of Euro-North American-centric modernity in the fifteenth century produced a distinctive world-system that was not only underpinned by a world economic system known as capitalism, but by racism as an organising principle. The modern world-system referred to as 500 years old is one founded on what Ramon Grosfoguel (2013) termed the ‘four genocides/epistemicides of the long 16th century’, namely, the conquest of Al-Andalus that was accompanied by destruction and dispersal of Jewish and Muslim people; the invasion, conquest, and colonization of indigenous people of the Americas; the enslavement of black African people and their transportation through the ‘Middle Passage’ to labour in the plantations; and the patriarchal motivated attacks on women that included burning alive of Indo-European women who were accused of witchcraft.

Coloniality, therefore, emerges within Euro-North American-centric modernity discursive terrain as a negative side that survived the dismantlement of direct colonialism to exist as a global power structure underpinning the asymmetrical global system of power operative in the present. Quijano (2000a:342) defined coloniality as ‘one of the specific and constitutive elements of global model of capitalist power’; and he elaborated that, ‘It is based on the imposition of a racial /ethnic classification of the global population as the cornerstone of that model of power, and it operates on every level, in every arena and dimension (both material and subjective) of everyday social existence, and does so on a societal scale.’

In summary, one can argue that the post-fifteenth century modern world was constituted by six core elements. The first is known as the world-system that is constituted by coloniality of power and is structurally asymmetrical. The second is called the *global or international order/European world order* constituted by imperialism and coloniality. Kwame Nimako and Glenn Willemsen (2011:13) defined the world order this way:

‘European world order’ refers to an international political-economic system that emerged between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries and laid the foundation for an international legal framework and system, including maritime and company law as we know them, that came to be dominated by European states and people of European descent around the world.

The third element is termed the *international economy* constituted by capitalism. As part of this international economy:

Europe was the location of ideas, design, planning and innovations; Africa was the source of captive Africans for enslavement; the Caribbean and the Americas were the sites of production, and Europe again of consumption of the goods produced by the enslaved (Nimako and Willemsen 2011:13-14).

The fourth element is a *techno-scientific epistemology*, which is hegemonic and fundamentalist to the extent of claiming not only to be disembodied and unsituated but also neutral, truthful and universal (Grosfoguel 2007). The fifth element is that of a *hierarchized conception of being* constituted by racism and Eurocentrism. The final feature was that of Christian-centric modern world, which made it intolerant of other religions.

Taken together, they constitute a particular *Euro-North American-centric modern civilization*. This civilization, its systems and orders, as noted by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000:3) did not rise 'up *spontaneously* out of the interactions of radically heterogeneous global forces, as if this order were a harmonious concert orchestrated by natural and neutral hidden hand of the market' as such classical thinkers as Adam Smith wanted us to believe. Enslavement, conquest, colonization, dispossession, domination, repression and exploitation characterised the dragging of Africa into Euro-North American-centric modernity. Fundamentally, the Euro-North American-centric modernity produced two scripts. The first is a 'public script' that emphasised modernity's ability to overcome all obstacles to human progress and promised emancipation, civilisation and development. This script, as noted by Sylvia Wynter (1995:5), sold modernity as 'glorious achievement'. Decoloniality exposes the 'hidden script' of modernity known as coloniality. Here I am using James C. Scott's (1990) concepts of 'public transcripts' and 'hidden transcripts' to highlight the two faces of modernity. Coloniality as hidden script enabled racial classification of human population, enslavement of non-European people, primitive accumulation, imperialism, colonialism, apartheid and neo-colonialism. To Wynter (1995:5) this script is that of 'history's monumental crimes' that encompass genocides, epistemicides as well as 'ongoing ecological disaster unprecedented in human history.'

Eurocentrism is part of the hidden script in the sense that it is articulated as part of civilizing mission, emancipation and development. In reality, Eurocentrism is the foundation of politics of alterity that produced what the Nigerian decolonial scholar, Chinweizu (1975), articulated as 'the West and the rest of us'. At its centre is what William E. B. Dubois (1903[1994]) termed the 'colour line'. The leading existential Africana philosopher, Lewis R. Gordon, argued that: 'Born from the divide of black and white, it [colour line] serves as a blueprint of the ongoing division of humankind' (Gordon 2000:63). He elaborated that:

The color line is also a metaphor that exceeds its own concrete formulation. It is the race line as well as the gender line, the class line, the sexual orientation line, the religious line – in short, the line between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ identities (Gordon 2000: 63).

Eurocentrism is ‘expressed in the most varied of areas: day-to-day relationships between individuals, political formations and opinion, general views concerning society and culture, social science’ (Amin 2009:179). It exists as a condescending worldview that accords history to Europe, complete and sovereign being to Europeans, confer the right to judge others to Europeans as well as racial superiority to Europeans. The Ethiopian historian TeshaleTibebu (2011:xv), just like Quijano, identifies what he termed ‘Columbian modernity’ as the discursive terrain within which Eurocentrism, colonialism and coloniality emerged.

Columbian modernity, as noted above, is founded on what the distinguished anthropologist Jack Goody termed ‘the theft of history’. This theft of history unfolded as a ‘European game’ of usurpation of world history. This means that the unfolding of Euro-North American-centric modernity across the non-European world was accompanied by theft of and usurpation of human history, resulting in re-articulation of human history from a Eurocentric imperialist historiographical narrative (Zezeza 2005; Depelchin 2005). Through the process of theft and usurpation of world history, Europe put itself on a new and high pedestal as the centre of the modern world from which the ‘world is described, conceptualised and ranked’ (Mignolo 2005: 33). This usurpation of world history unfolded in terms of colonisation of space, time, knowledge, being and even nature (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b). Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (1997) termed this Euro-American narration of human history the ‘Athens-to-Washington’ discourse.

Once African history was stolen, African people lost that agency to make history outside of a discursive framework created by Euro-North American-centric modernity. To borrow an important point from Karl Marx’s *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, I posit that while African people continued to make history after the colonial encounters and even under direct colonialism, they were no longer able to do so outside coloniality (Marx 1898: 12). Coloniality was not a circumstance they had chosen to make history under. This is why Zeleza (2005:1) concluded that ‘African history has yet to rid itself of the epistemic violence of imperialist historiography.’

Euro-North American-centric modernity impacted on the very question of human ontology as well. The very shift from God-centred society to a Man-centred society laid a foundation to ‘discovery’ and conquest of non-European people. Magobe B. Ramose (2003:464) traced the rise of ontological

differentiation of humanity to Aristotle's definition of 'man' as a rational animal. This immediately gave birth to the 'reason and unreason' boundaries in the definition of being. This Aristotean differentiation was applied when the imperialists came into contact with such people as Africans, indigenous people of the Americas, and others found outside Europe. They had no reason and therefore they were not different from animals. Rene Descartes' dictum of 'I think, therefore, I am' did not help matters; rather it confirmed the Aristotean definition of being. The next contour of alterity became that of 'civilisation' versus 'barbarism'. On this, Ramose argued that:

This line between civilisation and barbarism was an extension of the boundary between reason and unreason. The conqueror claimed the status of being the possessor of a superior civilisation. [...] The conquer was civilised and the African was the barbarian. [...] The line between civilization and barbarian thus established the relationship of superior and inferior (Ramosé 2003: 464).

The third contour of alterity took the religious terminology of 'fidels' versus 'infidels'. This drawing of lines that determined and defined identities as well as power differentials produced what Maldonado-Torres (2007:245) termed the 'imperial Manichean Misanthropic skepticism' that exists as a narrative of doubting the very humanity of black people. Maldonado-Torres elaborated that the skepticism was 'not skeptical about the existence of the world or the normative status of logics and mathematics. It is rather a form of questioning the very humanity of colonized peoples' (Maldonado-Torres 2007:245). Within these racially-driven human encounters, African being became re-articulated by the Western opinion-makers as a disabled one constituted by deficits and lacks. This articulation of non-Western subjectivity and being is well captured by Grosfoguel:

We went from the sixteenth century characterisation of 'people without writing' to eighteenth and nineteenth century characterisation of 'people without history,' to the twentieth century characterisation of 'people without development' and more recently, to the early twenty-first century of 'people without democracy' (Grosfoguel 2007: 214).

All these imperial skepticisms accumulatively resulted in what Bonaventura de Sousa Santos termed 'abyssal thinking' constituted by invisible 'abyssal lines' separating humanity into 'zone of being' for whites and 'zone of non-being' for black people (Santos. 2007: 45-53). Thus since the time of colonial encounters, non-western people found themselves struggling to regain their lost ontological density and to cross the 'abyssal lines' into the 'zone of being'.

Historicizing the Genealogies and Lineages of Coloniality

The first genealogy of coloniality, historically speaking, can be rendered as *the discovery paradigm and mercantilist order*. It is one of the earliest central categories in the unfolding of Euro-North American-centric modernity. Understood from an African historical perspective, the discovery paradigm and mercantilist order began to envelop Africa in 1415 when Portugal invaded the Moroccan port of Ceuta (Newitt 2010). Ceuta formed a bridgehead for further Portuguese imperial expansion that challenged Muslim dominance in North Africa in place since the seventh century. But broadly speaking, the discovery paradigm and the mercantilist order that covers the period from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries inaugurated a commercial shift from the Mediterranean-centred economy to the Atlantic-centred economy, linking western Africa, the eastern coasts of North Africa and South America as well as the Atlantic coastline of Europe and north Africa (Newitt 2010: 1). At the same time that the Spanish Atlantic sphere was being extended to the Pacific, the Philippines and China, the Portuguese were creating the Indian Ocean sphere that was extending to the East Indies. Eventually four continents of Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas were linked together through interdependent economic activities, migrations of people and slaves, as well as 'cultural interplay of religions and ideas from all four continents' (Newitt 2010:1).

Analytically, the discovery paradigm and the mercantilist order was constituted by five core elements: exploration, 'discovery', cultural/colonial encounters, trade, and human trafficking. The leading external imperial powers were first Portugal, Spain, Holland, and later joined by Britain, France and others. The Arabs were also very active in what became known as the slave trade. Active on the ground were explorers, merchants and missionaries. The leading explorers were James Bruce, Mungo Park, David Livingstone; Henry Morton Stanley; John Hanning Speke and many others. To the historian Walter Rodney, those described as explorers were in actual fact early scramblers for Africa. This is how he put it: 'Make no mistake about it, gentlemen like Carl Peters, Livingstone, Stanley, Harry Johnston, De Brazza, General Gordon and their masters in Europe were literally scrambling for Africa. They barely avoided a major military conflagration' (Rodney 1972:140).

Besides explorers were such merchant companies as the Dutch East India Company formed in 1621, British Company of Royal Adventurers Trading in Africa formed in 1660; French West Indies Company/Senegal Company formed in 1664; British Royal Africa Company formed in 1672; and others also dominated the mercantilist order and were actively involved in the slave trade. Some of the companies had powers to institute colonisation. One can

also argue that the discovery paradigm and the mercantilist order unfolded in the form of a 'frontier' from the occupation of some isolated islands such as Madeira and the Azores in the first place in 1419 and 1431 respectively, the Cape Verde Islands in the 1460s, and the Guinea Islands in the 1470s to the establishment of coastal forts and slave trade stockades like that of Goree Island in present day Senegal (Newitt 2010:6-8). By 1482, the fortress of Elmina was established by Diogo de Azammbuja and later many other fortresses were built in the India Ocean.

The expansion to the Indian Ocean commenced with the two voyages of discovery. The first by Bartholomew Diaz in 1488 and the second by Vasco da Gama in 1498 and his successful circumnavigation of the southern tip of the African continent until he reached the East Indies. To get a clear grasp of the unfolding of the paradigm of discovery and the creation of a mercantilist order, one needs to get the sequence of historical events clearly. The beginning is with invasion of Ceuta in 1415. This was followed by the Portuguese landing on the shores of Senegal in 1441 and a Portuguese raiding party capturing ten Africans on the west coast to sell them on the Lisbon slave market. The next event was the Portuguese colonisation of the Island of Sao Tome 1473 and the establishment of sugarcane plantations that needed slave labour. The establishment of a fortress at Elmina in 1482 that was visited by Christopher Columbus in the same year is another important event because it made him to realize the habitability of those zones that were said to be inhabitable and influenced his later grand designs. Diogo Cao's claim to have discovered the mouth of the River Congo in 1483 enabled Portugal to establish links with the rich Kingdom of Kongo in central Africa.

Bartholomew Diaz's voyage of 1488 enabled him to sail around the southern tip of the African continent. The other important event is that of Columbus's voyage that eventually took him to the Americas in 1492. It was followed soon after by Vasco da Gama's voyage of 1498 that took him to the East Indies. The signing of the Treaty of Tordesillas by Spain (Castile) and Portugal in 1494, whereby they attempted to divide the world into Portuguese and Spanish colonial enclaves and spheres of influence is another important event in the series of historical unfolding of the paradigm of discovery and the inscription of mercantilist order. Two points emerge here. The first is that Columbus's voyage of 1492, a date that is figuratively used as marking the dawn of Euro-North American-centric modernity must be understood as part of a sequence of historical events that involved Portuguese penetrating Africa (Boorstin 1983:157). The second is that the sequence of events outlined above must be understood in combination as marking the unfolding of the expansion of Europe to the Americas, Asia, Caribbean and Africa.

Two examples provide a good measurement of the consequences of the paradigm of discovery and the practices of the mercantilist order. The first is that of the slave trade of which James Walvin (2013:11) understood to have shaped the modern world in profound ways: 'The key features of the modern world which we now take for granted (the human face of the Americas, the food-ways of the world, the questions of lingering poverty across swathes of sub-Saharan Africa – all these and many more) have historical roots which take us back to the story of slavery and the Atlantic slave trade.' The second is that of the Kingdom of Kongo and the Portuguese. A lot has been written about the impact and consequences of the slave trade; suffice it to say that it was a major feature of the mercantilist order revealing the negative aspect of the unfolding of Euro-North American-centric modernity, which is why Johannes Mende Postma in his book *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600-1815* (1990: 1) argued that, 'The slave trade itself produced one of the most embarrassing chapters in human history, which has haunted historians, moralists and economists ever since.'

The Kingdom of Kongo was one of the earliest African political polities that were destroyed by its encounter with Portugal in the fifteenth century. The conversion of leaders of Kongo to Christianity, including changing African names to European ones and Europeanisation of their court, did not protect their subjects from enslavement by the Portuguese. This led the Bakongo king Nzinga, a Mvemba in 1526 (who had changed his African name at baptism to Dom Afonso: 1) to formally complain to the Portuguese government about how the Portuguese merchants 'daily seize our subjects, sons of the land and sons of our nobleman and vassals and our relatives' leading to depopulation of the Kingdom of Kongo (Davidson 1961:147-148).

This complaint fell on deaf ears. Eventually, the Portuguese physically invaded the Kingdom of Kongo in 1665 and killed the Bakongo king and reduced it to vassalage that included sending tribute in the form of slaves who were then exported to Portuguese plantations in Brazil (Chinweizu 1975: 29-30). The slave trade continued for over three hundred years, severely affecting development in Africa. Walter Rodney in his influential book, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (1972) correctly traced the development of how Europe underdeveloped Africa from the fifteenth century and emphasised the role of the slave trade in this process. Indeed, the paradigm of discovery and the mercantilist order constituted an important genealogy and is part of lineages of coloniality that cannot be ignored in any attempt to write a history of the present in Africa.

The eventual abolition of the slave trade and the rise of what became known as 'legitimate trade' did not release Africa from the deepening nexus

of the evolving and exploitative capitalist modern international economy (Law 1998). The onset of Industrial Revolution in Europe increased their appetite for raw materials and markets. The abolition of the slave trade coincided with the shift in Europe and North America from mercantilism to industrialism. Industrialists were interested in other commodities such as gold, diamonds, palm oil and others, different from commoditized human being (slaves) that was the mainstay of mercantilism. The increasing demand for raw materials and markets coupled with some strategic considerations informed imperialism and colonialism. The next contour of coloniality worth exploring relates to the Westphalian order that unfolded from the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648.

The Post-1648 Westphalian Order and the Exclusion of Africa from Nation-state Sovereignty

Institutionally speaking, Euro-American-centric modernity is credited with the production of the modern nation-state as superior and enduring form of organisation of power and people. The birth of the modern nation-state is traceable to the end of the Thirty Years War, particularly to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. The signatories of the Peace of Westphalia agreed on three principles. The first was the principle of state sovereignty. The second was the principle of equality of states. The third was the principle of non-intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another (Alan 1986; Linklater 1996). At Westphalia was born the institutionalization and 'norming' of a particular modern world order as a juridical political formation (Hardt and Negri 2000). The dominant European states by then, namely, Germany, Spain, France, Sweden and the Netherlands agreed to recognise and respect each other's sovereignty while they were involved in violating those same principles outside Europe.

What must be noted is that by the sixteenth century the concept of a nation-state was emerging in Europe as a new kind of human association (Oakeshott 1975). For Africa, the period from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries was dominated by a plethora of organisational forms of human associations ranging from hunter-gathering societies, chiefdoms, kingdoms, dynasties, kinship, to clans and many others (Fortes and Evans Pritchard 1970; Ajayi and Crowder 1974; Warner 2001). It was also during this same period that in Europe human population was being classified in accordance with race and being hierarchised to the extent that African subjectivity was written out of the human order.

Imperial reason founded on racism and Eurocentrism consistently reproduced Hegelian-Conradian-Hugh Trevor Roper racist discourse of an Africa that was non-existent beyond being enveloped in darkness. It is not surprising that under the Westphalian order, African people were not

considered part of humanity that was expected to any form of sovereignty. The polities that existed in Africa during the constitution of the Westphalian order 'did not count as states according to the criteria adopted by the European state system' and such excluded entities were considered available for appropriation 'subject only to their capacity to conquer the incumbent power holders by those which did count' (Clapham 1999: 522). It is not therefore surprising that European men set many times since 1648 to order the world without including African people right up to the post-1945 period. The British journalist-cum-historian, John Keegan, highlighted how European men had met four times in the modern age to re-order the world without the presence of Africans and Africans from the Diaspora. This is how he put it:

Four times in the modern age men sat down to reorder the world – at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 after the Thirty Years War, at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 after the Napoleonic Wars; in Paris in 1919 after World War I, and in San Francisco in 1945 after World War II (Keegan 2002:1).

Perhaps due to the strong hold of racism and Eurocentrism, Keegan ignored in his list of sittings that European men also sat at the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885 to agree on how to share Africa among themselves. For African people, the Berlin Conference impacted profoundly on their lives and constituted an important genealogy and lineage of coloniality as it inaugurated not only the scramble for Africa but also the cartographic constitution and configuration of Africa. Even though the notion of self-determination was later debated at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and adopted as the Fourteenth Point of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, it was not meant to cover Africa that was under colonialism. It meant to resolve the issues and problems of Eastern Europe that were arising from dissolution of multinational empires such as the Ottoman that gave birth to what became known as the 'Eastern Question' (Anderson 1966). But for Africa, it is important to deal with the impact of the Berlin Conference as a major component of coloniality and reveal its profound impact on the African present.

The Berlin Consensus of 1884-5: The Scramble for Africa and Conquest

The Berlin consensus was an agreement among European powers to divide Africa among themselves. While the institutionalisation of the slave trade became the first manifestation of the negative of Euro-North American-centric modernity, the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 enabled the scramble and colonialism (Crowe 1970; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 20213a:45-50). The scramble for and partition of Africa among European powers amounted to an open disregard and disdain for the African people's dignity, rights and freedoms

(Mazrui 2010:xi). The Berlin Conference was hosted by the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck who is credited for unifying Germany. The unifier of Germany presided of the process of the partition of Africa. This irony led Ali Mazrui to argue that:

It is one of the ironies of the great German leader Otto von Bismarck that he helped to unify Germany in the nineteenth century and initiated the division of Africa soon after. The unification of Germany led to the emergence of one of the most powerful Western countries in the twentieth century. The partition of Africa, on the other hand, resulted in some of the most vulnerable societies in world history (Mazrui 2010: xi).

The Berlin Conference introduced and defined the rules of the partition of Africa among European powers. Use of treaties and concessions bearing the signatures of African kings and chiefs must not be taken to mean that African leaders consented to colonisation. The treaties were obtained fraudulently through trickery, chicanery and outright lying by European negotiators and agents. The case in point is the Rudd Concession of 1888 that was claimed to have been signed between the agents of the British South Africa Company (BSAC) and King Lobengula Khumalo, the last leader of the Ndebele Kingdom in southern Africa in the immediate post-Berlin Conference period. What obtained later is that the pre-literate Ndebele king had not understood the terms of the treaty that were written in English and there was a difference between what was shared with the Ndebele king verbally and what was contained in the written treaty (Brown 1966; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). When the true facts of the Rudd Concession were later understood by the Ndebele king, he immediately and vehemently repudiated it and even sent some Ndebele chiefs to Britain to formally register the repudiation to the Queen Victoria of England (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). It must also be emphasised that even if African leaders refused to sign the treaties, that would not have mattered because imperialism and colonialism were violent processes, not negotiated projects. At another level, it must be made clear that the treaties were meant to prevent conflict among European powers rather than seeking African consent.

The nineteenth century became an age military conquest of Africa, occupation and settlement. The possession of guns gave Europeans an advantage over the African people to the extent that they celebrated the Maxim gun in colonial poetry and song. By 1914, the whole of Africa had been brought under colonial rule violently except for Liberia and Ethiopia (Pakenham 1991). The partition and colonisation of Africa, as noted by Mazrui, 'unleashed unprecedented changes in African societies: political, economic, cultural, and psychological' (Mazrui 2010: xii). African people

of different ethnic backgrounds were forcibly enclosed into one of the demarcated colonial boundaries of the colonial state. At another level, some African people with common ethnic background were randomly fragmented into different colonial states. Adekeye Adebajo correctly characterised the essence of the Berlin Conference in this dramatic manner:

Berlin and its aftermath were akin to armed robbers forcibly breaking into a house and sharing out its possessions while the owners of the house – who had been tied up with thick ropes – were wide awake, but were powerless to prevent the burglary. It would be hard to find examples in world history in which a single meeting had had such devastating political, socioeconomic, and cultural consequences for an entire continent (Adebajo 2010:16).

The Berlin Conference dramatised and confirmed the fact that Europeans did not consider those people found in Africa to be human beings that deserved to be treated with dignity. The logic that informed the slave trade also informed the partition of Africa. It is a logic of dismissing not only the humanity of African people but of considering them to be a 'present' that was 'absent' in considerations of world affairs. This logic was informed by what James M. Blaut (1993:15) called the 'myth of emptiness' which was constituted by four major Eurocentric propositions: that Africa was empty of people; that where people were found they were mobile, nomadic and wanderers without any sense of political sovereignty and territorial claim; that African people had no idea of private property; and finally, that African people lacked rationality.

The long-term consequence of the Berlin consensus is that African people found themselves enclosed in territorial boundaries that were decided in Europe. Whatever political attempts to exercise their political agency, it has to be performed within 'iron cages' or 'bondages of boundaries' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Mhlanga 2013). The curse of Berlin as Adekeye (2010) calls it, remains a long-standing form of coloniality because it is permanently inscribed on the boundaries of African states that African leaders accepted as inviolable in 1963 at the foundation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which later changed name to the African Union (AU). Ricardo Rene Leremont (2005:2) correctly noted that the present 'borders of African states we fixed by European colonialists during a narrow window of time (essentially from 1878 to 1914)' and that in the 1960s, African leaders 'reified' these borders. The problem was compounded by the fact that the colonial powers that met at Berlin in drawing borders acted 'like some demented tailor who paid no attention to the fabric, colour or pattern of the quilt he was patching together' (Soyinka 1994:31).

Colonial Governmentality and Reproduction of African Subjectivity

At the centre of colonial governmentality in Africa one finds British direct rule that shifted to indirect rule; Portuguese Luso-tropicalism and French assimilation and association as dominant colonial forms of administration. These different namings of colonial governmentality spoke to variations rather than difference in logic and purpose. Thus, broadly speaking, colonial governmentality was constituted by six core elements. These were violence, defining subjectivities, inventing tradition, appropriating/exploiting resources and people, dominating/repressing people, and ruling in accordance with the interests of the colonial settlers and metropolitan centre. Achille Mbembe (2000) clearly deciphered the three major roles of violence in colonial governmentality, whereas Mahmood Mamdani perfectly articulated the core elements of 'defining' and 'ruling' as two major leitmotifs of colonial governmentality.

Violence of colonial governmentality takes the form of 'foundational violence', that is, a form of violence that is at the centre of military conquest. Mbembe (2010: 10) elaborates that this foundational violence 'helped create the very object of its violence' which is the conquered people that had to be coerced to accept colonial governmentality. The second form of violence is 'legitimation' violence that provides the colonial order 'with a language and self-interpreting models' (Mbembe 2010:11). The final form of violence is 'maintenance violence' which had to be constantly replicated 'in the most banal and ordinary situations' and its function is to 'ratify' and 'reiterate' (Mbembe 2010:11).

Besides use of violence, Mamdani (2013) understood colonial governmentality to be driven by the logic of 'defining' and 'ruling' those who became victims of colonisation. This colonial project of 'defining' and 'ruling' was partly informed by long-standing racial social classification of human population as well as pragmatism in the construction of a colonial order that was not too expensive to the empire. The outcome in the British colonies was a bifurcated colonial state that produced a bifurcated subjecthood of 'citizens and subjects' (Mamdani 1996) as a variant of what Albert Memmi (1957) termed 'the colonizer and the colonised'. Mamdani noted that the practices of defining and ruling cascaded from the fear of the 'Indian disease' where the attempt to introduce direct colonial rule premised on eradication of difference between the coloniser and the colonized provoked active resistance among the colonised (Mamdani 2013).

The important point arising from Mamdani's analysis is that 'The management of difference' which 'is the holy cow of the modern society, just as it is central to modern state-craft' is traceable to the colonial administrative

‘transition from direct to indirect rule’ (Mamdani 2013:2). It was in the process of shaping and management of difference that ‘invention of tradition’ emerged as part of colonial order. The concept of ‘invention of tradition’ was coined by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983) in their influential edited volume entitled *The Invention of Tradition* that sparked heated debates. The colonial inventions included reproduction of African identities as authentically tribal and codification of such invented subjectivities into colonial law to back up colonial politics of ‘divide’ and ‘rule’. Defining entailed ‘inventing’ subjectivities whereby ‘the native is pinned down, localised, thrown out of civilisation as an outcast, confined to custom, and then define as its product’ (Mamdani 2013:2-3). Mamdani’s analysis provides a sophisticated rendition of ‘colonial governmentality’ in his engagement with the colonial ideas of Sir Henry Maine as a colonial ideologue:

Through a theory of history and a theory of law, he distinguished the west from the non-west and a universal civilization from local custom. In the process, he distinguished the settler from the native, providing elements of a theory of nativism: if the settler was modern, the native was not; if history defined the settler, geography defined the native; if legislation and sanction defined modern political society; habitual observance defined that of the native. If continuous progress was the mark of settler civilization, native custom was best thought as part of nature, fixed and unchanging. The native was the creation of theorists of an empire-in-crisis (Mamdani 2013:6)

Under colonial governmentality, the colonised African people were forced to lose their African subjectivity as they were reproduced by the colonial paradigm as objects. In the process, what was lost was African ‘personality’ as a form of sovereign subjectivity. Consequently, Africans continue to suffer from alienation and dispossession that was imposed through a combination of colonial assimilation policies, indirect and direct rule, forced particularism and ghettoization, and even ‘dilution in a nameless universalism’ as understood by Cesaire (Gallagher 2009: 34). The proposed therapy by Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1986) and Chinweizu (1987) is that of ‘decolonising the African mind’, which is proving to be very difficult in a context where coloniality is still actively working to hail Africans into embracing coloniality as a dominating worldview.

The Post-1945 United Nations Decolonisation Normative Order and Cold War Coloniality

The post-1945 United Nations sovereignty order emerged from two world wars (1914-1918) and (1939-1945). It effectively carried over the Westphalian sovereignty order only re-proposing it as an inclusive global norm that

included: first the smaller states of Eastern and Central Europe that previously were part of multinational empires. During the interwar years (1918-1939), Africa was far off from being considered for enjoyment of sovereignty. It was still enveloped in the paradigm of difference. What disturbed the inter-war years' paradigm of difference was Adolf Hitler, the leader of Germany, who advocated Nazi racist ideology and imported the paradigm of racial difference that was reserved for the colonies into the centre of Europe, resulting in what became known as the 'Holocaust' (Cesaire 1972: 36).

It was the practice of racism at the centre of Europe rather than its practice in the colonies that provoked western powers to take such actions as the production of the Atlantic Charter; the Nuremberg Trials; the formation of the United Nations; and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Hitler's crime was that of using coloniality and racism, which was designed for those people in the 'zone of non-being' and practice it at the centre of the 'zone of being'. This is why Cesaire argued that:

Nazism before it was inflicted on them, that they absolved it, shut their eyes to it, legitimized it, because, until then, it had been applied only to non-European peoples; that they have cultivated that Nazism, that they are responsible for it, and that before engulfing the whole edifice of Western Christian civilisation in its reddened waters, it oozes, seeps, and trickles from every crack (Cesaire 1972:36).

Hitler's application to white people of colonial procedures and technologies of subjectivation aroused the Western world to the dangers of narrow nationalism and racism as though they had not practicing it against non-western peoples for centuries (Du Bois 1947:230). For Africa, post-1945 United Nations sovereignty order provided Africans with a platform to critique and expose the hypocrisy and double-standards of Western colonial powers (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2001). Therefore, the struggles for decolonisation proceeded as claims for inclusion of Africans in the post-1945 human rights normative order. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was closely studied by African freedom fighters and its linguistic inventories were used to put pressure on Europe to decolonise Africa.

When decolonisation was eventually realised in the 1960s onwards, the reality was that postcolonial states were admitted to the lowest echelons of the hierarchised and asymmetrically-organised global international system. Consequently, the decolonisation process ushered into the post-1945 modern world order a group of the world's weakest and most artificial states (Clapham 1996). The post-1945 United Nations sovereignty order succeeded in accommodating some of the anti-systemic movements that had arisen in the peripheries of the Euro-American-centric world system, creating a myth of a decolonized postcolonial world (Grosfoguel 2007: 219).

The Cold War (1945-1989) that co-existed with the African decolonisation trajectory was a form of global coloniality that dramatised the emergence of two competing imperialist empires, one claiming to be spreading international socialism and the other to be defending western capitalist-Christian civilization. Capitalism and communism are related creatures of Euro-American modernity. Capitalism is expected to be succeeded by communism in the Marxist linear rendition of changing modes of production. The United States of America (USA) and the now defunct Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were both imperialist and colonialist, while both also posed as supporters of decolonisation (Tlostanova and Mignolo 2012). Inevitably, the anti-colonial liberation struggles became imbricated in post-1945 superpower ideological struggles. Postcolonial Africa became a terrain for some of the most brutal and 'hot wars' sponsored by the superpowers in such places Angola and Mozambique.

Both the USA and USSR interfered in African affairs, with the former supporting some of the most notorious African dictators such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire – as long as he claimed to be opposed to communism – and the later supporting equally notorious dictators like Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, as long as he claimed to be a Marxist revolutionary. At the economic level, the USA and its Western partners opposed and undermined any development initiative that was not authorised by the Bretton Woods institutions and, worse still, all those that were informed by communist thought. Consequently, Africans were 'thus impeded from exercising the basic and fundamental right to make decisions about the future' (Adedeji 2002: 4). Adebayo Adedeji, a former Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), identified what he called 'the operation of the development merchant system (DMS) under which foreign-crafted economic reform policies have been turned into a kind of special goods which are largely and quickly financed by the operators of DMS, regardless of the negative impact of such policies on the African economies and polities' (Adedeji 2002). What emerges clearly here is that what Adedeji describes as DMS carries coloniality which actively works to deny agency to Africans to chart an autonomous path of development.

Post-Cold War Triumphalism of Neoliberal Order

Francis Fukuyama (1992: xi) argued that the end of the cold war indicated that first, there was 'a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government'; second, 'that liberal democracy may constitute 'the end point of mankind's ideological evolution' and the 'final form of human government' (end of history); and third, that 'liberal democracy was arguably free from such fundamental internal contradictions'

unlike earlier forms of government, hence it was the future. But historically speaking and from an African side, by the late 1970s African economies underwent prolonged recession. The Washington Consensus emerged as a Western initiative of managing the economic recession. Western welfarism informed by Keynesianism was replaced by neoliberal principles that privileged market forces in the struggle against inflation.

The Washington Consensus was constituted by a set of ideas and institutional practices that began to dominate the world economy from the 1970s onwards. At the centre of the ideas and institutional practices unleashed by the Washington Consensus was a neo-liberal development merchant system. David Harvey (2007:2) emphasised that 'neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade'. In the neoliberal thought, the role of the state was reduced to that of creating and preserving an institutional framework appropriate for the free operation of the logic of the market (Harvey 2007:2).

What was distinctive about neoliberal advance was its anti-statism philosophy which culminated in the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in Africa. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) directly intervened in African economies through impositions of what became known as 'conditionalities' that eroded the social base of the postcolonial state and exposed it to attacks by the poor African people (Laakso and Olukoshi 1996). The imposition of SAPs took away the little that was remaining of African people's control over economic policy. The Washington Consensus and the neo-liberal order it supported inaugurated what can be termed coloniality of markets. But before turning to the analysis of coloniality of markets, it is important to analyze the consequences of another global event that impacted on Africa, which is that of the 9/11 (September 11, 2001) terrorist attack on the USA.

The Post-9/11 Anti-terrorist and Securitisation Order

In the wake of September 11, Africa began to feature prominently in Western discourses of security in general and the emerging US's anti-terrorist security paradigm in particular. Africa became increasingly indentified as home of weak and failing states that pose a threat to global security. It was Robert I. Rotberg who emphasised that the 'problem of failed nation-states' transcended the 'previous humanitarian dimension' even though 'the phenomenon of state failure is not new' (Rotberg 2002:127).

It is important to emphasise that in the post-9/11 period, Africa which has been previously approached as a development and humanitarian case, immediately became framed as a security concern. It became a global risk area ('terror thrives in Africa's rich ruins') (Abrahamsen 2005:65). The consequences has been that the powerful USA and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners have not only been justifying establishment of military bases (for example, the US Africa Command [AFRICOM]) on African soil as part of US's global anti-terrorism strategy, but have also been abusing the noble principles of the Right to Protect (R2P) to intervene in particular African affairs and directly playing a role in the removal of hated African leaders from power (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b).

The perfect example has been the NATO military intervention in Libya that resulted in the killing of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in 2012. This direct military intervention in Libya, a country that is richly endowed with oil, raised questions about the connections between this event and the new scramble for Africa's natural resources. The USA and its partners have used the discourses of exporting democracy and human rights as covers for the pursuit of long-term imperial/colonial interests. These issues are captured in Horace Campbell's *Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya* (2013) where he highlights how military force is continuously being used to impose the USA and its partners' will on the rest of the world. The global financial crisis that rocked Europe and America has added to the rise of a new scramble for Africa's resources as part of recuperation.

Coloniality of Markets and the New Scramble for Africa

The leading European philosopher, Slavoj Zizek (2009) declared that capitalism and neoliberalism died twice – as a political doctrine and as an economic theory, first being shaken by the terrorist attack on the USA in 2011 and second, being adversely affected by a capitalist global financial crisis of 2008. Based on these two arguments, Zizek advocated for a return to the socialist path as the future. The reality on the ground indicates that capitalism has managed to transcend the two storms. Capitalism is continuing on its deployment of the long-standing strategy of primitive accumulation as part of deepening exploitation of large parts of the of the world while, along the way, raising speculative interests of finance capital and industry to even higher levels involving selling and buying of money itself (Mbembe 2012).

Because of high levels of mechanisation and technologisation of industry, labour has lost its value as a well-spring of capitalism (Mbembe 2012). This is taking place within a context of increased cultures of consumption. But what are scarring are the continuous tensions between the inexorable march of

capital and the long-standing struggles for popular democracy and distribution. It is this reality that indicates that coloniality of markets, that is, reduction of every valuable thing, including knowledge and life itself, to a commodity and judging its value through marketability. Coloniality of markets is also meant to capture the current triumphalism of capital involving intensified identification of new site of accumulation and investment over and above the popular human demands for better life and material security (Mentan 2010: xi).

Coloniality of markets is today driving the new scramble for Africa's natural resources at a time when there is also an increasing Afro-enthusiastic discourse of an Africa that is 'rising', which celebrates increasing demands for African raw materials as a sign of economic growth instead of deepening coloniality (Melber and Southall 2010; Taylor 2014). The celebrated so-called 'Africa rising' phenomenon is taking place at a time when there has been an increased number of competing powers over Africa's natural resources including Brazil, India, China, Russia on top of those from Europe and North America. Development based on the intensification of resource extraction by diverse partners rather than industrialisation is nothing but a manifestation of coloniality of markets.

Conclusion

Genealogies and lineages of coloniality dealt with here indicate that the world system has remained resistant to decolonisation and the world orders it has been proposing and producing are impervious to deimperialisation. This reality explains why development in Africa remains one of the most enduring challenges. Decolonisation did not produce a genuinely postcolonial world in which Africans took charge of their developmental trajectory. African development has been made dependent in orientation. The Bandung paradigm of development that was premised on decolonisation was frustrated and defeated by global colonial matrices of power. What is needed is for Africa, together with the rest of the global south, to intensify the unfinished decolonisation struggles, while remaining extremely vigilant about the subversive global imperial designs that continue to sustain an asymmetrical world system and continue to reproduce a subaltern position for Africa.

Decolonisation must robustly engage with Euro-North American-centric epistemology that continues to sideline knowledge from other parts of the world that is more relevant to the realities of the struggling peoples of Africa. The long-standing notions of being founded on racial classification and hierarchisation of human population must be totally rejected. Only if and when these three holy cows of Eurocentrism were dethroned would it be possible for new humanity to be born, a new pluriversal world become possible and development be realised.

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No African Futures without the Liberation of Women: A Decolonial Feminist Perspective

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Abstract

Coloniality of gender speaks to the perennial question of the liberation of women from various forms of oppression. The ‘modern’ world system and its global order have remained fundamentally patriarchal. This implies that any initiative aimed at creating African futures has to address the fundamental question of the liberation of women. Liberation of women does not speak to the incorporation of women within the patriarchal system. The first step, as Thomas Sankara said in his 1987 speech, is to understand how the patriarchal system functions, to grasp its real nature in all its subtlety, in order to work out a line of action that can lead to women’s genuine emancipation. Decolonising gender therefore becomes a necessary task so that answers to what should be done are formulated from the perspective of asking correct questions. Decolonising gender is to enact a critique of racialized, colonial, and capitalist heterosexualist gender oppression as a lived transformation of the social (Lugones 2010). As such, decolonizing gender places the scholar in the midst of people in a historical, peopled, subjective/intersubjective understanding of the oppressing-resisting relation at the intersection of complex systems of oppression. To a significant extent, it has to be in accord with the subjectivities and intersubjectivities that construct and in part are constructed by the situation. This article deploys decolonial feminist ideas of Thomas Sankara, among others, to push forward the frontiers of the struggle for the liberation of women as a constitutive part of initiatives of creating African futures. Its central argument is that women’s liberation struggle should not be reduced to efforts of incorporation of women within the patriarchal, colonial and imperial modern system/s women seek to reject. Making use of Maria Lugones’ theoretical framework, we should be able to understand that the instrumentality of the colonial/modern gender system is subjecting both men and women of colour in all domains of existence and therefore allows us to reveal that the gender transformation discourse is not just a women’s emancipation discourse but rather efforts of both men and women to

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overcome the colonial global structure that is subjectifying in different ways. The change of the system and its structures, which are essentially patriarchal, is the main mechanism that will bring about possible equal futures for women in Africa, as case studies of Rwanda and South Africa show in the article.

Résumé

La colonialité du genre traite de la lancinante question de la libération de la femme des différentes formes d'oppression. Le système du monde « moderne » et son ordre mondial sont restés fondamentalement patriarcaux. Cela implique que toute initiative visant la création d'un futur africain devra régler la question fondamentale de la libération de la femme. La libération de la femme ne prend pas en compte l'incorporation de la femme dans le système patriarcal. La première étape, comme le disait Thomas Sankara dans son discours de 1987, consiste à comprendre comment le système patriarcal fonctionne, pour appréhender sa véritable nature dans toute sa subtilité, afin de mettre au point une ligne d'action qui conduirait à la véritable émancipation de la femme. Décoloniser le genre devient donc une tâche essentielle devant permettre que les réponses à la question relative aux mesures à prendre soient formulées dans l'optique de poser des questions correctes. Décoloniser le genre c'est promulguer une critique de l'oppression sexiste hétérosexualiste, racialisée, coloniale et capitaliste en tant que transformation vécue du social (Lugones 2010). Ainsi, décoloniser le genre place le chercheur au cœur de la population suivant une interprétation subjective/intersubjective historique et variée de la relation oppression-résistance à la croisée de systèmes complexes d'oppression. Dans une large mesure, il doit être en accord avec les subjectivités et les intersubjectivités qui construisent et sont en partie occasionnées par la situation. Cet article déploie, entre autres, les idées féministes anticoloniales de Thomas Sankara, afin d'étendre les frontières de la lutte pour la libération de la femme comme étant un élément constitutif des initiatives en faveur de la création d'un avenir africain. Son argument de fond est que la lutte pour la libération de la femme ne doit pas être réduite aux efforts d'incorporation de la femme dans le/les systèmes patriarcaux, coloniaux et impériaux modernes que les femmes rejettent. Faisant appel au cadre théorique de Maria Lugones, l'on devrait être en mesure de comprendre que l'instrumentalité du système de genre colonial/moderne est en train d'assujettir les hommes et les femmes de couleur dans tous les domaines de la vie. Par conséquent, il nous révèle que le discours sur la transformation sociale n'est pas seulement axé sur l'émancipation de la femme mais plutôt sur les efforts conjoints à la fois des hommes et des femmes à surmonter la structure coloniale globale qui est subjectivante de différentes manières. Le changement de système et ses structures, qui sont essentiellement patriarcales est le principal mécanisme qui entrainera un avenir juste pour la femme Africaine, comme l'ont démontré dans l'article les études de cas au Rwanda et en Afrique du Sud.

Introduction

The central assertion of this article is that the creation of futures of Africa should entail the liberation of African women. It posits that the course of gender transformation has remained the weakest in the drive for African futures and this is as a result of the unchanging global power structure, which Africa finds itself in, which is marked by hierarchies on the basis of gender, race, religion, class and others. The article further problematizes the manner in which the discourse of gender transformation is pursued in general, and in Africa in particular, as it remains deeply embedded within the patriarchal snares where ultimately the efforts are mainly to incorporate women in the same patriarchal system rather than pursuing radical transformation that seeks to destroy the systems and structures of patriarchy. The article therefore questions the so-called gender transformation based on just numerical representation without looking at fundamental systematic and structural transformation of patriarchy.

The African Union (AU), in its efforts of determining and defining Africa's futures, has come up with a document envisioning African futures known as Agenda 2063. Agenda 2063 is said to be a call for action, a strategic framework and roadmap to achieve continental development goals. It is said to be representing a collective effort and an opportunity for Africa to regain its power to determine its own destiny, and is underpinned by the AU's vision to build an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, an Africa driven and managed by its own citizen and representing a dynamic force in the international arena. It is within this background that this article locates its conception of what African futures mean.

Gender equality, especially the rights of women, occupy an increasingly important place in the global and African political discourse and, by implication, have significance for the development discourse as enshrined in the ideals of the futures and visions of Africa. However, very little is known on how the gender instruments adopted by the AU and domesticated by member states are used in the pursuit of Agenda 2063. The realization of African futures through gender equality remains quite blurred. Olga Martin (2013:7) notes that the growing recognition of the leadership role of women in all spheres of development, including their participation in decision-making at the international, regional and national levels, is reflected in the creation of platforms of action related to gender. It is in this context that the AU has developed a gender policy and other instruments that focus on addressing gender inequalities and adopted a new resolution in 2011 that calls on countries to take concrete steps to increase women's political participation and leadership and report back to the United Nations (UN) Secretary General.

Gender and Patriarchy

Despite the fact that Africa's organs of state and governance have jointly deployed various efforts towards women emancipation, measures such as numbers of women in parliaments and in high positions of states and governance have not translated to genuine liberation of women. Instead, the results of the efforts made are transpiring as efforts of incorporation of women within the patriarchal system they reject or a process of 'menization' of women whereby men and their roles in societies are used as a benchmark to measure the transformation of women. The extent to which a woman performs a 'man's job' is deemed to indicate that women have been emancipated.

The clarification of the question of gender is not only important but fundamental too; its importance lies in the clarification of gender transformation beyond the numbers game that distorts the fundamental problem of gender and women oppression. The effort of gender transformation must seek to answer a fundamental question whose preoccupation is to understand the system or order that defines the oppression of women; for it is in the understanding of such an order that a possibility of charting alternatives for better futures can be explored.

Thomas Sankara (2007) noted in a commemoration of International Women's Day on 8 March 1987 that:

Posing the question of women in Burkinabe society today means posing the abolition of the system of slavery to which they have been subjected for millennia. The first step is to try to understand how this system functions, to grasp its real nature in all its subtlety, in order then to work out a line of action that can lead to women's total emancipation (Sankara 2007).

Sankara makes a direct connection between subjugation of women in the post-colonial and the slavery periods, thus suggesting that colonial rule was just a phase in a long duration in the making of the global matrices of power termed 'coloniality'. This is a useful observation because it brings into sharp relief the connections between coloniality of being and coloniality of power (economic in slavery and political in colonial rule) in the making of a world and nation without women (Nkenkana 2014). Sankara notes this connection of coloniality of being and coloniality of power when he says:

We must understand how the struggle of Burkinabe women today is part of the worldwide struggle of all women and, beyond that, part of the struggle for the full rehabilitation of our continent. The condition of women is therefore at the heart of the question of humanity itself, here, there, and everywhere (Sankara 2007).

Arguably, Sankara correctly locates the gender discourse within the broader system that defines it. As indicated earlier, he argues that in order that gender transformation is made possible, we should understand how the system functions, to grasp its real nature in all its subtlety, in order then to work out a line of action that can lead to women's total emancipation. Therefore, an understanding of the manner in which gender is defined, particularly its transformation within the broader system that Sankara is alluding to is to precisely understand the global power structure with which gender is contextualized, structuralized, systematised and defined.

The patriarchal system that gives challenges to a future that limits the true liberation of women is enshrined in the broader global power structure within which the African future is generally entrapped. The dynamics of power structure across the globe as underpinned and shaped by the colonial-androcentric-neo-traditionalist matrices of power, that were described by Grosfoguel (2007:220) as colonial, racial, patriarchal and hegemonic, continue to hamper initiatives aimed at achieving gender transformation. In functioning within such a structure of power, identity and knowledge, Africa faces a very high risk of reproducing the same future that it is trying to address in as far as gender transformation is concerned. The challenge of gender transformation is enmeshed in power, knowledge and notions of being shaped by colonial and patriarchal orders.

Decolonizing gender therefore becomes a necessary task so that answers to what should be done are formulated from the perspective of asking correct questions. Decolonization of gender, as defined by Maria Lugones (2010), is to enact a critique of racialized, colonial, and capitalist heterosexualist gender oppression as a lived transformation of the social. As such, it places the scholar in the midst of people in a historical, peopled, subjective/intersubjective understanding of the oppressing-resisting relation at the intersection of complex systems of oppression. To a significant extent, it has to be in accord with the subjectivities and intersubjectivities that construct and in part are constructed by the reality that Maria Lugones (2010: 746-747) presents. As indicated earlier, the paper is, conceptually and theoretically, informed and underpinned by decolonial feminist theory as explained by Maria Lugones. Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2011) indicates that decoloniality is not a singular theoretical school of thought but a family of diverse positions that share a view of coloniality as the fundamental problem in the current modern age. Maldonado-Torres (2007) explained coloniality as global power structure that is related but different from colonialism.

Global Power Structures and Gender

The problematic raised in this paper is that the manner in which gender transformation is articulated and pursued in Africa is imprisoned within a global patriarchal power structure and system that is not amenable to the full success of such an agenda. The asymmetrical architecture of global and African power structures and their patriarchal tendencies therefore continue to impact on the course futures of Africa are being advanced. It is for such reasons that this article advances a decolonial and a non-patriarchal agenda for pursuing the futures of Africa with which both men and women are equal role players. The unquestioned systems and orders that define African futures remain a fundamental problem to advance the course of liberation of women and just societies in Africa. The reason these systems and structures should be questioned is precisely the fact that their logic is found from the historical logic that has created the unequal world we are dealing with today.

Therefore, a historical conceptual context giving logic to this article is advancing, as highlighted by Maria Lugones, an understanding of the dichotomous hierarchy between the human and the non-human regarding a dichotomy of colonial modernity. Capturing the need for a historical context when looking at the discourse of gender transformation, Maria Lugones states that:

The reason to historicize gender formation is that without this history, we keep on centering our analysis on the patriarchy; that is, on a binary, hierarchical, oppressive gender formation that rests on male supremacy without any clear understanding of the mechanisms by which heterosexuality, capitalism, and racial classification are impossible to understand apart from each other. The heterosexualist patriarchy has been an ahistorical framework of analysis. To understand the relation of the birth of the colonial/modern gender system to the birth of global colonial capitalism – with the centrality of the coloniality of power to that system of global power – is to understand our present organization of life anew Maria Lugones (2007:186-187).

The history referred to by Lugones helps us to understand the legacy and the depth of inheritance of the colonial system that Africa and its futures continue to grapple with today. Toyin Falola (2005) captures the state of Africa and its predicament of inheritance of colonial development. Toyin Falola, augmenting Maria Lugones on the importance and justification of understanding the historical context of current phenomena in Africa, notes that:

Contemporary Africans have a right to be angry, but they must also probe into the reasons for institutional failure, the roots of which lie in colonial past. They

must question the inherited forms of government, economy and relations between Africa and the West. They must situate the African condition in a global context: a poor continent supports the industrialised West with its labour, raw materials, markets and service payments on debts, among other mechanisms that transfer wealth abroad. They must situate African politics in the context of colonialism: modern political institutions are derived more from the colonial past than the precolonial... The postcolonial seeks its roots in the colonial, alienated from the precolonial and established local traditions. The modern country was modelled after the 'colonial country': black governors merely replaced the white ones... We must also raise the issue of power and autonomy in the global context: to what extent can Africa self-develop? Africa was self-developing before the colonial intrusion. With violence, colonialism created new frontiers, developed new political and economic objectives, and ordered people around. When colonialism was over, Africa began to think about development in colonial, Western terms (Toyin Falola 2005:4).

Toyin Falola and Maria Lugones, among others, fittingly capture the main issue that this article is centred on. The futures remain affected if the system and structure inherited from the past have not changed in Africa. There is evidence to such. And some of the evidence is presented in this article in form of case studies from Rwanda and South Africa. It is the change of the system and structure that is patriarchal that will bring about possible equal futures for women in Africa.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) and Maldonado-Torres (2007), along the lines of Toyin Falola and Maria Lugones, argue that the fundamental challenge in the context of the obtaining African reality is that, since the time of colonial encounters, Africans have not yet been able to take full charge of their own fate although they are not completely at the mercy of global imperial designs that are in place since the time of conquest. Africa and Africans have been at the crossroads since the time of colonial encounters in the fifteenth century. Going against the global imperial designs of domination, exploitation and racism has proven to be a lifetime struggle for Africans.

The essence of African struggles as articulated by Fanon (1968) has been to forge new categories of thought, to construct new subjectivities and create new modes of being and becoming. Such a vast struggle cannot be fought in one site (as if it were political theatre only) but in various domains and realms simultaneously simply because global imperial designs and colonial matrices of power have permeated and infiltrated every institution and every social, political, economic, spiritual, aesthetic, cultural and cognitive arena of African life (Maldonado-Torres 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013).

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013:3) summarises the predicament of Africa and Africans in a term called 'postcolonial neocolonised world' – referring

to the structural, systematic, cultural, discursive, and epistemological pattern of domination and exploitation that has engulfed Africans since the conquest. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) argues that the new postcolonial nation is historically a male-constructed space, narrated into modern self-consciousness by male leaders, activists, writers, in which women are often cast as symbols or totems, as the bearers of tradition.

Therefore, as articulated by Maria Lugones, Toyin Falola, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Maldonado-Torres and others regarding the inheritance rather than transformation, the manner in which the system and structure of Africa's future is configured limits the articulation and pursuit of gender transformation. The inherited structure produces hierarchies with which the world in general and Africa in particular functions and among such hierarchies is patriarchy, as indicated earlier. The patriarchal structure which is found across systems of power in Africa and the world at large poses a challenge with regard to the necessary gender transformation.

Oyewumi (1997:7) argues that gender has been a foundational category upon which social categories have been erected since early times. Hence, gender has been ontologically conceptualised. The category of the citizen, which has been the cornerstone of much of Western political theory, was male, despite the much-acclaimed Western democratic traditions. The argument that gender is caught up in the global power structure that perpetuates the hierarchies that are a barrier in the systematic transformation of gender is found in the concept of ontological conceptualization of gender as Oyewumi has outlined:

Understanding the place of gender in pre-colonial societies is pivotal to understanding the nature and scope of changes in the social structure that the processes constituting colonial/modern Eurocentred capitalism imposed. Those changes were introduced through slow, discontinuous, and heterogenous processes that violently inferiorised colonized women. The gender system introduced was one thoroughly informed through the coloniality of power. Understanding the place of gender in pre-colonial societies is also pivotal in understanding the extent and importance of the gender system in disintegrating communal relations, egalitarian relations, ritual thinking, collective decision-making, collective authority and economies. And thus in understanding the extent to which the imposition of this gender system was a constitutive of the coloniality of power as the coloniality of power was constitutive of it. The logic of relation between them is of mutual constitution. But it should be clear by now that the colonial, modern, gender system cannot exist without the coloniality of power, since the classification of the population in terms of race is a necessary condition of its possibility (Oyewumi 2011:10).

Oyeronke Oyewumi makes a fundamental point in identifying gender as a colonial category and that the concern is not so much to displace culpability for contemporary male dominance to the British colonisers, but rather to begin to recognise and tease out the ways in which the colonial legacy has been internalised and is being reproduced. The degree to which colonial categories have been internalized and have become very much a part of everyday life, even as the culture itself refuses to recede completely but continues to assert itself, is an important issue (Oyewumi 2011:11). Indeed, the liberation of women in Africa is caught up in what Maria Lugones termed the darker side of modern/colonial gender system.

Rethinking Gender

Gender transformation that will bring about the desired African futures must not be limited to reporting 'progress' of gender without looking at fundamental systematic and structural transformation of patriarchy. A need for a rethinking of gender transformation that goes beyond numerical representation to fundamental structural transformation is required. This part of the article imagines gender beyond statistical representation and provides pointers of how such an exercise could be done. The article asserts that a fundamental problem resulting in the misinterpretation of systematic and structural conditions perpetuating gender inequalities is a focus on women as the subject of change in gender transformation and/or mainstreaming and a focus on fitting women into the status quo rather than transforming the status quo.

Anne McClintock (1995) makes an important point, with which a context of the contemporary phenomenon of gender transformation discourse is explored, as she locates the problematic of gender transformation in the broader context of nationalism;

All nations depend on powerful constructions of gender. Despite many nationalists' ideological investment in the idea of popular unity, nations have historically amounted to the sanctioned institutionalisation of gender difference. No nation in the world gives women and men the same access to the rights and resources of the nation-state. Rather than expressing the flowering into time of the organic essence of a timeless people, nations are contested systems of cultural representation that limit and legitimize peoples' access to the resources of the nation-state.... Nationalism has typically sprung from masculinised memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinised hope..... Nationalism is thus constituted from the very beginning as a gendered discourse and cannot be understood without a theory of gender power (McClintock 1995: 353-355).

The importance of Anne McClintock's argument lies in the broadening of understanding the implications of African futures in as far as women are concerned. This argument helps us understand broadly the implications gender transformation has and the ramifications of African nationalism as the driver of African futures to the historical construct of the global power structures.

Lewis Gordon (1996:7) asserts that patriarchy as it currently exists in Africa must be understood within the context of Africa's peripheral and dependent position within the global power structure (capitalist economy). Gordon (1996) borrows from Frantz Fanon's idea that the African bourgeoisie desires to mimic its counterparts in the metropole, thus functioning as subordinate mirror image of the colonial bourgeoisie (Fanon 1963:149). This also draws from Nkwame Nkrumah's idea of neocoloniality – the idea of continued colonial power designs that seek to subordinate independent states and their political class to the interests of the former colonial empires (Nkrumah 1965). In this sense, the African elite are haunted by the scandal of subservience, wretchedness and subordination.

African advancement of gender transformation must understand that gender is not absolute. It is a manifestation of different systems and structures, be it social, economic, cultural or spiritual within society. The re-writing of African history that continues to disregard women is something that Africa's pursuit of its future should guard against. McFadden (2000) states that the notion of gender is no longer an idea that can be dismissed as 'western' and/or 'other' by an older, formerly hegemonic nationalist discourse, particularly with regard to race and identity. Gender has instead begun to occupy an increasingly central place as a political thinking tool, particularly in terms of comprehensively re-defining African realities within the numerous locations. It is throwing up new discourses that sometimes speak more covertly to unfinished historical tasks relating to our search for freedom as black women and black men (McFadden 2000:1).

Oyeronke Oyewumi (2011), among others, argues that in order to understand the structures of gender and gender relations, we must start with Africa. Also, in order to develop valid theories of gender, all types of experiences from around the world must be documented. That is, if structures of gender emerged out of particular histories and social contexts, we must pay attention to the continuous ways in which gender is made and remade in everyday interactions and by institutions. In this sense, then, gender is actually more about gendering – a process – than about something inherent in social relations. Given this, therefore, it is very clear that effort towards appropriating social relations without unpacking the gendering

process which is embedded in the system and structure of patriarchy is to mis-define gender and its transformation.

Augmenting Oyewumi's point mentioned above, Maria Lugones notes that:

The elements that constitute the global, Eurocentred, capitalist model of power do not stand in separation from each other and none of them is prior to the process that constitutes the patterns. Indeed, the mythical presentation of these elements as metaphysically prior is an important aspect of the cognitive model of Eurocentred, global capitalism (Lugones 2008:3).

Clearly, the understanding of Maria Lugones is that in constituting a social classification, coloniality permeates all aspects of social existence and gives rise to new social and geocultural identities. Quijano (2001:1) makes a similar argument that:

With the expansion of European colonialism, the classification of geocultural identities such as European, Indian, African, etc was imposed on the population of the planet. Since then, it has permeated every area of social existence and it constitutes the most effective form of material and inter-subjective social domination. Thus, 'coloniality' does not just refer to 'racial' classification. It is an encompassing phenomenon, since it is one of the axes of the system of power and as such it permeates all control of sexual access, collective authority, labour, subjectivity/inter-subjectivity and the production of knowledge from within these inter-subjective relations (Quijano 2001:1).

Therefore a continuous separation of these encompassing phenomena perpetuates their insignificant efforts in as far as gender transformation discourse is concerned. It is in this context that an analysis of intersection of indicators such as gender, race and class would allow us to redefine the problematic of Africa and Africans and women in particular. It will help us to understand beyond the numbers game the fundamental problem of African challenges. A proper definition of such issues would then allow us to move forward better in addressing such issues.

Decolonising gender, as Maria Lugones (2010) argues, is to enact a critique of racialized, colonial and capital heterosexualist gender oppression as a lived transformation of the social. To a significant extent it has to be in accord with the subjectivities and inter-subjectivities that partly construct and in part are constructed by the reality that Maria Lugones (2010:746-747) notes:

To think the scope of the gender system of eurocentred global capitalism, it is necessary to understand the extent to which the very process of narrowing of the concept of gender to control of sex, its resources and products constitutes gender domination. To understand this narrowing and to understand the intermeshing of racialisation and gendering, it is important to think whether the

social arrangements prior to colonization regarding the 'sexes' gave differential meaning to them across all areas of existence (Lugones 2008: 12).

A decolonial gender transformation for advancing African futures should be that which takes into account Thomas Sankara's fundamental problematique of the meaning of women's emancipation mentioned earlier. Maria Lugones (2008), in support of Thomas Sankara, argues that an articulation of the colonial/modern gender system, both in the large strokes and in all its detailed and lived experiences will enable us to see what was imposed on us as a people. Maria Lugones allows us to see even further on the subtlety of the system that Sankara observed. That, in fact, the instrumentality of the colonial/modern gender system is subjecting both African women and men in all domains of existence. Maria Lugones in helping us understand the intersections of gender in our society notes that:

We need to place ourselves in a position to call each other to reject this gender system as we perform a transformation of communal relations (Lugones 2008:1).

The state of the global power structure and its limitations in advancing gender transformation, the limitation of African futures as manifesting in the misinterpreted problematic discussed above allow us to arrive at what Lugones (2008) terms 'colonial/modern gender system'. It is important to note that Lugones' framework may very well be critical of the categorical/essentialist logic of modernity and be critical of the dichotomy between women and men, without seeing coloniality or the colonial difference. Such a framework would not have, and may exclude, the very possibility of resistance to the modern, colonial, gender system and the coloniality of gender because it cannot see the world as accurately as the world is. It is in this context that the Paris Latin American Women's group, as captured in Iman et al (1997) had to say:

To believe that by switching from one mode of production to another we destroy, not only women's oppression but an entire conceptualisation of the world, of the state, of power, women, children, education is to castrate Marxism by reducing it to a very crude form of economism in order to avoid calling into question, first of all, the power, hierarchy and vertical structure of our political organisations and the power which our dear male comrades have held throughout history (Iman et al 1997:201).

This implies that gender subordination requires to be located not merely in the dynamics of production (or of particular modes) but in a 'net of cultural habits' which are in turn sustained as an activity of both sexes (Haug in Iman et al 1997:201-202). Iman et al (1997) emphasize the multi-layered relationships within which women's oppression is produced and reproduced.

Gender relations permeate the whole of society; they are structures as well as daily practices. They are always in motion and contested. They are full of contradictions and anachronisms. They are themselves always produced anew. Their foundation is the division of labour in the production of life and the means of living. Thus, the status of women will improve only with the elimination of the system that exploits them, as Thomas Sankara (1997) opined.

Guided by decolonial conceptions of the global matrix of power encapsulated in three levels (i.e. coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of being) it is important and fundamental to define the African futures in the context of gender within the context of the different notions of the global matrix of power. This way, an analysis and conception of gender shall not be narrowed down to just an oppression of one by the other but rather the conception of the intersection of gender, race and class and the conception of gender as a systematic and structural phenomenon inherited from the colonial forms of power.

As outlined earlier, the limitations emanating from the coloniality of gender are at play today and manifest in very shallow ways of belittling the discourse of gender and emancipation of women to incorporation within the patriarchal system, emancipation of women through the numbers game that suggest that to have more women is to resolve the fundamental power relations challenge that is embedded in the system and structure that is gendered, racial and unequal. These efforts, while important, do not provide a clear view of what the futures of Africa could be in as far as gender transformation is concerned. It is not clear whether these efforts provide the shifting poles between men and women.

The alternative must define the discourse of gender within the decolonial humanist perspectives where an analysis of gender is not confined to its victims but rather the structure and the system that has deprived both men and women humanity and victimized them in one way or the other. Decolonial humanism, in as far as gender is concerned, must move beyond the use of males as subject of humanity with which women should be measured against.

Rethinking gender through decolonial humanism must use the tools of analysis of coloniality (coloniality of power, knowledge and being) and unpack such tools and what each means in as far as gender and its transformation is concerned. It is in using such tools of analysis that we begin to seek the humanity through decolonial humanism. This is done so that the image of men that define humanity in the modern colonial world is not taken as a given but deconstructed beyond normalization of gender hierarchy.

The Case of South Africa and Rwanda

This section of the article briefly provides evidence of the miss-defined problematic of gender in Africa. Case studies focus on South Africa and Rwanda because these two countries are often purported to be good examples regarding gender transformation. The turning point of these two countries are seen significantly in 1994, when for South Africa, for the first time in history, black Africans are afforded equal status to that of whites and for Rwanda we see a population perishing because of genocide.

Bennet (2014) argues that since the Rwandan genocide in 1994, women have come to play a more important role in the formal sector although the majority of Rwandan women still work in subsistence farming. Women occupy some of the most important government ministries and make up more than fifty per cent of the country's parliamentarians. Rwanda, which has a population of 11.4 million, must have at least 30 per cent of members of parliament as females. In the late 1990s, the Rwandan government passed groundbreaking legislation on topics that are typically considered 'women's issues'. These laws gave women the right to own and inherit land, the right to open a bank account without the authorization of a male figure, and afforded special rights and protections to children. Furthermore, the African Development Bank (2008) notes that in Rwanda, women account for 55.2 per cent of the 4,492,000 economically active population. Women have low rates of employment (34.6 per cent) in the formal public sector. With 83.6 per cent participation in agriculture, women are very engaged in the sector as independent farmers, wage farmers and unpaid family labour.

However, it is important to note that in the aftermath of the genocide, Rwanda found itself a country composed of 70 per cent women because the genocide had been perpetrated by and largely toward men. There were simply fewer men due to death, imprisonment and flight. Killings also targeted civic leaders during the genocide. Out of more than 780 judges nationwide, for example, only twenty survived. Prior to 1994, women only held between 10 and 15 per cent of seats in Parliament. Out of sheer necessity, and a desire to rebuild their country, women stepped up as leaders in every realm of the nation, including politics. Given this, one can conclude that what can fundamentally be attributed to the progress of Rwanda is an unfortunate circumstance that the genocide left the country in. These unfortunate circumstances give Rwanda limited options but to utilize the available human resource whose majority is women. It is under this fundamental circumstance that the progress of gender equality and transformation in Rwanda could be attributed to. The policies towards rebuilding Rwanda after 1994 had to take into cognisance the demographic structure of the country after the genocide.

Therefore, one posits that it is not just in the policies where the gender transformation progress in Rwanda can be attributed – as indicated above, the nature of the demography of Rwanda after the aftermath of genocide played a tremendous role. This argument is permissible given that the parliamentary representation of women in Rwanda before 1994 ranged between 10 and 15 per cent, for instance (Bennet 2014). Rwanda's gender transformation progress is important because it does, indeed, speak to the fundamental issues of system and structure even if this is out of circumstances that are unfortunate. So it is not just in statistical representation in parliaments and other institutions that Rwanda's progress can be attributed but the fundamental restructuring of its population structure as a result of genocide.

Similar to Rwanda is also a celebrated story of South Africa's progressive gender transformation accomplishment. The South African constitution of 1996 has been exemplary as far as gender equality goes because it established the Commission for Gender Equality. There is also a women's ministry in government to ensure that, indeed, transformation takes place. The commission and the ministry are aimed at promoting respect for gender equality and the protection, development and attainment of gender equality.

Indeed, South Africa is recognized by many as one of the most progressive, forward-thinking, countries when it comes to gender, if viewed through the lens of its new policies and laws. Yet, despite commendable accomplishments that have been registered in terms of equality laws and structures, lived experiences continue to ring alarm bells given untransformed gender relations on numerous areas of life. Some advancement has been made, while other issues stagnate or even regress. For example, more women are in leadership positions in the South African government than in most other governments in the world (*Worldwide Guide to Women in Leadership*, 2008). Yet, at the same time, South Africa has one of the highest rates of rape in the world (see, for example, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2001). And there are numerous reports about appalling domestic violence against women and children. It is clear that a need to move beyond the symbolic to the substantive is required.

Conclusion

African futures remain a possibility subject to reconfiguration of the system and structure of power that has remained patriarchal. The African Union has an important role to play. The modern world system and its global order have remained fundamentally patriarchal and this means that any initiative

aimed at creating African futures has to address the fundamental question of the substantive liberation of women. The first step, as argued by Thomas Sankara, is to understand how the patriarchal system functions, to grasp its real nature in all its subtlety, in order to work out a line of action that can lead to women's genuine emancipation. Decolonizing gender therefore becomes a necessary task so that answers to what should be done are formulated from the perspective of asking correct questions.

Colonial/modern gender system, a concept that helps in understanding the instrumentality of the colonial/modern gender system is subjecting both men and women of colour in all domains of existence, allows a case to be made that the gender transformation discourse is not just a women's emancipation discourse but rather efforts of both men and women at overcoming the colonial global structure that is subjectifying all sexes in different ways. Guided by decolonial conceptions of the global matrix of power, it is important to define the African futures in the context of gender within the context of the various notions of the global matrix of power. This way, an analysis and conception of gender shall not be narrowed down to just an oppression of one by the other but rather the conception of the intersection of gender, race and class and the conception of gender as a systematic and structural phenomenon inherited from the colonial forms of power.

Many countries, including Rwanda and South Africa, remain cases to be studied extensively and deeper than just looking at statistical representation when addressing issues of gender transformation. The importance of digging deeper than the numbers game or statistical representation cannot be overemphasized.

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The Global Economic Crisis and the Africa Rising Narrative

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Abstract

As seductive as the Africa rising narrative is, this article argues that it is misleading. It draws the people of Africa into a false sense of promise – of ‘development’ and ‘decent’ jobs for all – that can never be delivered by the current economic growth paradigm. A radical rethink is needed to break out of the cycle of deepening inequality, dispossession and ecological devastation. The ‘modernisation’ paradigm based on incessant production and consumption can only meet the needs of an enclave within a sea of poverty, pollution and plunder. Africa is regarded by transnational corporations and their governments as the last piece of virgin territory left to exploit for maximum returns. This search for new avenues of accumulation must be understood in the context of the intertwined global socio-economic as well as ecological crisis, where capital acts as a spreading virus. It develops but also destroys; if left to its own devices, its destructive power is incalculable. This article situates the Africa rising narrative, and the challenges of growth and development, within the context of the global poly-crisis. It examines the economic and ecological dimensions of this continuing crisis, and asks whether Africa’s future prospects lie with mimicking the industrial development paths of Europe and North America, which leads to enclave development, or in forging a new holistic developmental path that avoids the pitfalls of dispossession, environmental injustice and rising social inequality.

Résumé

Aussi séduisant que puisse être le récit sur l’émergence de l’Afrique, cet article soutient qu’il est trompeur. Il entraîne les populations africaines dans la fausse voie d’une promesse – de « développement » et d’emplois « décents » pour tous – que le paradigme de la croissance économique actuelle ne peut jamais satisfaire. Une nouvelle réflexion radicale est nécessaire pour sortir du cycle

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de l'approfondissement de l'inégalité, de la dépossession et de la dévastation écologique. Le paradigme de la « modernisation » fondé sur la production et la consommation incessante ne peut que répondre aux besoins d'une enclave dans une mer de pauvreté, de pollution et de pillage. L'Afrique est considérée par les sociétés transnationales et leurs gouvernements comme le dernier lopin d'une terre vierge abandonnée à exploiter pour un rendement maximal. Cette recherche de nouvelles pistes d'accumulation doit être comprise dans le contexte des crises socio-économique et écologique mondiales étroitement liées, où le capital agit comme une propagation de virus. Il se développe mais détruit également; s'il est livré à lui-même, son pouvoir destructeur est incalculable. Cet article situe le récit sur l'émergence de l'Afrique et les défis en matière de croissance et de développement dans le contexte de la poly-crise mondiale. Il examine les dimensions économiques et écologiques de cette crise persistante, et pose la question de savoir si les perspectives d'avenir de l'Afrique résident dans la reproduction des modèles de développement industriel de l'Europe et de l'Amérique du Nord, qui conduisent à un enclavement du développement ou au choix d'une nouvelle voie de développement holistique qui évite les pièges de la dépossession, de l'injustice de l'environnement et la montée des inégalités sociales.

Introduction

After *The Economist* announced a decade ago that Africa was a lost continent, provoking intense criticism from Africans, western media including *The Economist*, *Financial Times* and *Time magazine* have in recent years swung the other way: African countries have amongst the highest GDP growth rates in the world, and investors are flocking in. This Africa rising discourse has been welcomed by African elites. In the case of South Africa, the elite is using the Africa rising discourse to argue for accelerated growth in South Africa to create jobs (through amongst other things lowering wages and labour standards).

As many have argued (see Fioramonti 2014), the Africa rising discourse, whilst seductive, is misleading. Firstly, where growth is based on reliable statistics, the high spurts are from a very low base, and often say little; secondly, where there is some statistical backing, it records massive growth in the extractive sectors, which do not take into account the overall net loss to Africa of its resources going abroad; and thirdly, it is a truism that narrow GDP growth, loved by investors who only see returns for themselves, can mean little or nothing to the lives of ordinary people. Indeed, often growth in mining activities or the building of dams (or indeed the setting up of export zones for global conglomerates) can result in the loss of livelihoods of people displaced from their land (or whose land is contaminated – the most graphic example being Shell's oil explorations in the Ogoni region of Nigeria).

While few can deny the importance of what some call ‘pro-poor’ economic growth (UNDP 2014), this needs to be measured more accurately, taking into account negative externalities, to see the net effect on a country’s economic wellbeing. It also needs to measure its developmental impact – the extent to which the fruits of growth are redistributed in a universal manner, rather than to a few well-connected elites.

Africa is regarded, by western and Chinese¹ corporations and their governments – on behalf of capital² – as the last piece of virgin territory left to exploit, for maximum returns. This search for new avenues of accumulation must be understood in the context of the intertwined global socio-economic as well as ecological crisis, where capital acts as a spreading virus. It develops but also destroys; if left to its own devices, its destructive power is incalculable.

This article situates the Africa rising narrative, and the challenges of growth and development, within the context of the global poly-crisis. It examines the economic and ecological dimensions of this continuing crisis, and asks whether Africa’s future prospects lie with mimicking the industrial development path of Europe, which leads to enclave development, or in forging a new holistic developmental path that avoids the pitfalls of dispossession, environmental injustice and rising social inequality.

The Global Crisis

The 2007-8 financial crisis, which persists in many ways, emerged alongside increased recognition of a global ecological crisis, the chief characteristic of which is the climate crisis. These inter-connect with other economic and socio-political crises, and are rooted in a centuries-long process of ‘accumulation by dispossession’. In other words, an industrialisation/urbanisation process that at the one end produces abundance in terms of material goods and services (the accumulation imperative), while at the other end it requires the dispossession of people’s land and livelihoods, the commons (including public assets) and the natural environment.

The promise of the last two centuries of ‘modernisation’ and development for all is certainly alluring. It is the aspiration of most governments and peoples mesmerised by the indisputable benefits of continuously improving technology and the value of things produced from nature. However, this model is now under serious question as the social and natural/ecological ‘limits’ to economic growth become increasingly evident, if disputed.³ The current phase of neo-liberal hyper-capitalism, which has washed over most other forms of capitalism, has intensified the commodification of all that is valued. Today, wealth is measured not in terms of the intrinsic value of

things and relationships, or for Karl Marx their use-value to society, but in terms of their exchange value (what they can be bought and sold for, particularly for the few large corporations that straddle the world). It rests on the exploitation of human beings as well as rapidly depleting fossil fuels, pollution of various kinds (in particular carbon emissions), and other forms of environmental damage caused by incessant production, consumption and urbanisation.

A crisis is usually deemed a crisis by those in the midst of it, experiencing its effects. The poor, hungry and exploited majority of the world's population, it could be argued, have been in crisis for much of the twentieth century – stripped of their land and means of subsistence, and forced to sell their labour or beg and steal to eke out an existence, often in health-threatening working and living environments, including being placed close to the polluting waste of industry. From an ecological perspective, the natural world or ecosystem (including other living creatures) has been in various stages of crises as industrial development crowds out non-human animals, forcing them into fenced-off parks and zoos, hunted and sought for trophies, while the destruction of forests, pollution and emissions threaten the very existence of earth as we know it. The latter has only become a concern for the privileged and powerful when it threatened their own system of production and consumption – but only grudgingly, and partially. Many are still in denial.

However, when there is a crisis of profitability, such that the wealth of the rich and powerful is directly threatened, only then is a 'crisis' truly proclaimed. This is even more so when the rich and powerful at the centre of global capitalism – in North America and Western Europe – are affected, which was the case during the recent financial crisis.

The financial crisis has had a direct impact on the real economy, with low consumer demand leading to a crisis in manufacturing, and millions of job losses throughout the world. This crisis, which began in 2007, rapidly displaced the ecological crisis gripping the world a few months previously (particularly when oil prices began to approach the \$200-a-barrel level). While climate change conferences temporarily put the natural limits to growth back on the global agenda, with lowering oil prices and the rising of fracking for gas alternatives, the minds of the world's governments are insufficiently focussed to produce a binding commitment to lowering carbon emissions and move decisively towards a non-nuclear renewable energy regime.

High oil prices, the threat of depleted fossil fuels (particularly oil) to run the modern economy, oil spills, the destruction of rain forests, the

displacement of millions of rural dwellers for the building of dams to supply industry, the rapid decline of bio-diversity, rampant carbon emissions and pollution such as acid rain and acid mine drainage (which endanger the health of both humans and the eco-system) and natural disasters caused by climate change – all of these and many other ecological disasters are rarely or weakly linked to the economic/financial crisis, and the socio-political consequences of both.

In other words, when we speak of a ‘global crisis’, it is necessary to conceptualise the inter-connected economic, ecological and socio-political crises. Indeed, as Foster (1999: 195) observes, the word ‘ecology’, coined by Ernst Haeckel in 1866, has the same Greek root *oikos* for household, out of which grew the word ‘economy’. Neo-classical economics, as Karl Polanyi (1944) argued, have sought to dis-embed economics from society, as well as nature, to produce what the political economist Ben Fine⁴ has called economics imperialism – the subordination of society and nature to a narrow, mathematised and dismal pseudo-science. The poly-crisis points to the necessity to re-embed and subordinate the economy to society and nature.

These crises are rooted in a centuries-long process of what David Harvey (2005), following Rosa Luxemburg, calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’ – the dispossession of people’s land and livelihoods, of the commons, of the natural environment. This process began as merchant capitalism in fourteenth century medieval Europe (Mielants 2007) and, through the dispossession and plunder of people and resources in Africa, the Americas and Asia, wealth was accumulated in Western Europe, providing the capital for the industrial revolution of the seventeenth century. This, of course, required further waves of colonial plunder and dispossession in the search for cheap labour, resources and markets for an ever-expanding global regime of accumulation.

Capitalism, in other words, is characterised not merely by the marvels of innovation, entrepreneurship, modernisation, higher standards of living and increasing consumer choice. This is only one side of the coin, which the insiders enjoy. More accurately, capitalism is a system of uneven or *enclave* development – namely, a world system comprising islands of privilege and power, surrounded by seas of alienated poverty, pollution and plundered resources. The promise of ‘modernisation’ and its ‘neoliberal’ or free market variant, that expanded growth will eventually bring ‘development’ to all the world’s population, has proven to be more myth than reality. Instead, poverty and inequality between and within nations have increased significantly (Bieler et al 2008). Capitalism, as Marx once said, develops

and destroys. It simultaneously enriches (the few), and impoverishes (the many). The development of Europe and later North America rested to a significant extent on the underdevelopment of the rest of the colonised world (the peripheral or semi-peripheral countries) (Wallerstein 1979 and Frank 1966).

The recent and still-persisting 'financial' crisis has evoked a variety of responses: from the very narrow, one dimensional approaches (free market and Keynesian-lite) which see the crisis purely as a financial one, to broader Keynesian-Marxist approaches which conceptualise the crisis as economic, rooted in the stagnation of the real economy (particularly the manufacturing falling rate of profit), to the very broad, multi-dimensional eco-Marxist approaches which see the crisis as a complex interaction between economic, ecological and social crises that has its roots in a pattern of industrialisation that relies on the exploitation of fossil fuels – what Altvater (2006) calls 'fossil capitalism'.

The Financial or Economic Crisis

In Marxist terms, an economic crisis refers to deep-seated, system-threatening breakdowns in the accumulation process. Economic crises can be short-term (for example, the Asian crisis of 1997) or long-term (the Great Depression of the 1930s). The current financial crisis is not financial in origin, but has its roots in the stagnation of the real economy (Foster and Magdoff 2009; Brenner 2009; Arrighi 2007). This is due to the falling rate of profit, as a result of two things. Firstly, the *struggles of subordinate classes*, including the working class at the workplace, as well as the working class and other classes in society at large, to extract as much of the surplus produced as possible, either directly from the employers through higher wages and benefits, or indirectly from the state through higher taxes to fund a higher social wage (in the form of public health care, education, subsidised transport, subsidised food, welfare benefits and other social services).

The second factor, closely inter-related to the first, is *inter-firm competition*, both at the national and the international levels. Rising costs make firms uncompetitive in relation to their competitors, unless they are subjected to the same rising costs. Increased competition spurs innovation and the accumulation process, giving rise to a crisis of 'over-production', which drives down the unit price of commodities. This exacerbates the crisis of profitability, forcing firms to cut back and leading to the under-utilisation of productive capacity. Firms go bankrupt, workers are laid off, and stronger firms take over weaker ones, leading to the monopolisation of capital⁵ (Baran and Sweezy 1968).

One way out of the cycle of declining profitability, at least temporarily, is to find cheaper sources of labour elsewhere, cheaper raw materials and new markets for excess products. Drawing on David Harvey, Beverly Silver (2004) identifies various 'fixes' that capitalism uses to navigate its way out of continuous crises of profitability. These include the spatial fix, where capital moves to cheaper and cheaper locales of production; the product fix, where capital moves from one niche product to another, chasing increased profitability (for example, from textiles to automobiles to information technology); and the technology fix, where, through innovation, labour-saving technology increases the productivity of labour. These fixes, however, address the accumulation crisis only partially or temporarily.

As in the past, a crisis in profitability in manufacturing boosts the financialisation of capitalism. However, in the context of a more globalised economy and new computer technology at their disposal, investments in 'fictitious' capital to increase profit rates rapidly overtake investments in the real economy. In the US, the heart of global capitalism, the percentage of financial profits over total domestic profits in 2007 was just below 40 per cent, compared to well below 20 per cent in the early 1980s and below 15 per cent in the 1960s (Foster and Magdoff 2009: 93). By contrast, manufacturing profits steadily declined from over 50 per cent of domestic profits in the late 1960s to less than 15 per cent in 2005 (Foster and Magdoff 2009: 55).

In summary, the financialisation of capitalism is not the cause of the capitalist crisis, but was itself *a response* to the crisis of the 1970s (Brenner 2009 and Arrighi 2007). This is what Beverly Silver (2004) calls the financial fix. Inherently crisis-ridden, this 'fix' spawned a number of short-term crises in different parts of the world over the past two decades, including the US savings and loan crisis (1989-91), the Japanese asset price bubble collapse (1990), the Scandinavian banking crisis (early 1990s), the European exchange rate crisis (1992-3), the Mexican debt crisis (1994-5), the East Asian crisis (1997), the Russian crisis (1998), the Argentinian meltdown (2001), and the dot com bubble burst (2001). The current financial crisis, which hit the core developed countries directly, is the deepest since the Great Depression.

Foster and Magdoff (2009), in an extension of the Sweezy and Baran analysis, characterise the new stage of capitalism as monopoly-finance capitalism. It is based on ever-increasing concentrations of capital, under the rule of mega-financial institutions that straddle the globe, where manufacturing firms are intermeshed with financial firms and investments. Despite the anger against these institutions for 'causing' the financial crisis,

governments in the US and Europe are reluctant to take decisive action against them, regarding them as 'too big to fail'. Indeed, executives of these institutions continue to pay themselves enormous salaries and bonuses, with much talk but little action against them. This is unsurprising, given the fact that core government elites are themselves part of what David Rothkopf (2009) calls the "superclass" – six thousand people in a planet of six billion who, in addition to powerful governments and international finance, also run transnational corporations and global media houses.

Fossil capitalism is a system of accumulation based on mass consumerism (the creation of everlasting wants), but because of rising global inequality and stagnant or declining real wages, these new wants cannot be satisfied because potential consumers do not have the means to purchase the commodities produced. The only way out is increased indebtedness – household debt in the US has increased from 62 per cent of GDP in 1997 to 92 per cent of GDP in 2005 (Foster and Magdoff 2009: 47). Consumer debt as a percentage of disposable income increased from 62 per cent in 1975 to 127 per cent in 2005 (Foster and Magdoff 2009: 29). This mirrors the increased indebtedness of the US economy as a whole, as it borrows on the financial markets to maintain its position as a global hegemon – by fuelling its war machine (a form of military Keynesianism), preserving its legitimacy through social and internal security spending, continuing to provide subsidies to threatened industries (particularly agriculture) and, of course, bailing out the banking system.

The end result of over two centuries of 'accumulation by dispossession' (Harvey 2005) is a system of uneven development, with rising inequality both at the national level, in general, and at the global level. The core of this world system are the rich, developed countries on the one hand, whose wealth and power rest largely on the under-development of the formerly colonised world – the periphery and semi-periphery. This division occurs within countries, with a core of formalised work and a periphery of informal and unemployed labour, mostly living in urban or peri-urban slums. According to Samir Amin (2008), the proportion of 'precarious and pauperised' members of the working classes (broadly defined to include formal and informal workers and the unemployed) has over the past fifty years risen from less than one quarter to more than one half of the global urban population.

Economic globalisation has, since the 1980s, simultaneously enlarged the periphery within the core countries (within increased informalisation of work and unemployment, and a declining social wage), as well as enlarged the core within the periphery and particularly within the semi-periphery (countries such as Brazil, South Africa and India, and increasingly China),

as capital moves around globally. However, with a few exceptions such as the now ‘developed’ status of east Asian countries like South Korea, the overall global picture of uneven, enclave development remains intact, at least for the foreseeable future. This is despite ostentatious claims by national elites, such as in India, that their country will be ‘fully developed’ within the next thirty to fifty years – conveniently ignoring that 95 per cent of its workforce is informalised labour (Bieler et al 2008), while in the rural areas ‘development’ has deepened the misery of rural people, causing a massive increase in farm suicides and the rapid rise of Maoist groups championing the cause of the rural poor in tribal forest areas (Perry 2010).

The Ecological Crisis

These islands of privilege are, of course, modelled on western patterns of consumption – particularly that of the US. The mainstream US commentator, Thomas Friedman (2008), warns about ‘too many Americans’ in the world today – meaning too many hyper-consumers, influenced over the past decades by American mass media (particularly films, advertising, television shows and magazines) that celebrate the ‘American Dream’ of unsustainable consumption based on the creation of incessant wants (as opposed to real needs). Friedman warns against ‘America’s affluenza’, ‘*an unsustainable addiction to growth*’ (2008:54, my emphasis).

The Americum is a unit of 350 million people with an income above \$15 000 and a ‘growing penchant for consumerism’, particularly American-style energy-sapping living spaces, cars, fast foods and levels of un-recycled garbage. Current growth and consumption trends suggest that by 2030 the number of Americums will have increased from two to eight or nine – at least a fourfold increase within the space of between thirty and forty years: in other words, from 700 million people to over 3 billion – half the current world population. Of course the total population will also have grown (some say to about 7-8 billion by 2030).

If the crisis of accumulation is temporarily arrested, and global growth and ‘prosperity’ increases as suggested, these ‘carbon copies’ of American consumerism could threaten the very foundations of that prosperity. If based on fossil fuels, it will inevitably run into the natural limits of growth, because the expansion of Americum production and consumption will require the colonisation of at least three more planets.

The inter-related triple threats of rising pollution, the rapid depletion of natural resources and declining biodiversity are increasingly being acknowledged as threats to the survival of the earth as we know it. There is little doubt that human intervention, in the form of industrial (fossil)

capitalism, has brought us to this point.⁶ Despite international efforts such as the Brundtland Commission on environment and development in 1983, the Rio Summit in 1992, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on climate change and the 2002 UN World Summit on Sustainable Development (or Rio+10) in Johannesburg, amongst many other interventions, the process of environmental degradation in recent decades has accelerated, rather than receded. The notable exception has been the partial restoration of the ozone layer, after international efforts to ban ozone-depleting substances contained, amongst others, in aerosols and refrigerators.

If capitalism remains the dominant social order, we can expect unbearable climate conditions, an intensification of social and ecological crises, and ‘the spread of the most barbaric forms of class rule, as the imperialist powers fight among themselves and with the global south for continued control of the world’s diminishing resources. At worse human life may not survive” (Angus 2009:232). But – at least in the short run – as ecological breakdown accelerates, the dominant classes will survive, living in protected enclaves.

Rising Global Inequality

As Piketty (2014), the UNDP (2014) and Oxfam (2015) show, the current model of hyper-capitalism, based on the self-regulated market model, has increased inequality significantly over the past thirty years, both within countries and between countries (notwithstanding the rise of China and India as economic powers). At the global level, one per cent of the world’s population owns half the world’s wealth. The bottom half of the world’s population – mainly in developing countries – own as much as the richest 85 people in the world (Oxfam 2014). This has accelerated inequality over the past thirty years, and is unprecedented, and reverses gains made in many countries after the second world war. As Oxfam shows, inequality has increased in most countries of the world, including the relatively more socially protected countries of the EU. In most cases, women bear the brunt of rising inequality, and they form the bulk of the informalised workforce.

If the global picture of uneven global development still maintains the essential features of the core-periphery model, it is sobering to reflect on the massive inequalities that have accompanied the increased informalisation of labour within developed countries (see Bieler et al 2008). As Oxfam (2015) notes, the share of national income of the top one per cent in the US has doubled from 10 per cent in 1980 to 20 per cent in 2014. That of the 0.01 per cent has quadrupled. Regarding the UK, Oxfam (2015:1) says, ‘inequality is rapidly returning to levels not seen since the time of Charles Dickens’. The US and UK are the prime advocates of neoliberal Anglo-

American capitalism, which has since the Reagan and Thatcher revolutions of the 1980s seen the gradual erosion of social and labour protections, welfare provision, economic liberalisation, de-regulation and tax reductions – forced on the developing world, in particular Africa, through the structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank and IMF (Peet 2009).

However, if the US and UK are examples of neoliberal hyper-capitalism, China's ostensibly more developmentalist alternative model has seen the top 10 per cent earning nearly 60 per cent of all income – making China reach inequality levels similar to that of South Africa, 'the most unequal country on earth and significantly more unequal than at the end of apartheid' (Oxfam 2015:1). Indeed, China and South Africa show how pervasive the neo-liberal, globalised model of capitalism is – it mutates and takes on different forms, from developmentalism to the green economy – but maintains an essence based on the freedom of the virus of capital (called 'foreign investment') to spread everywhere (Satgar 2014).

Nevertheless, despite the rising levels of inequality, champions of the dominant growth model argue that, world-wide, poverty has decreased.

The decoupling of the wealth of the few from the poverty of the many underpins the ideological discourse of the past thirty-odd years. It wheels out 'the poor' in defence of market-based solutions to 'poverty', backed by statistical data showing that, indeed, poverty has decreased. However, the World Bank's poverty line is pitched at \$1.25 a day, and some research showing a rise of the 'middle class' in Africa using \$2 a day as a base line, with an 'upper class' starting from \$20 a day (Tschirley et al 2014).

The UNDP's call for a return to full employment, characterised by the continued migration out of rural areas and into cities, is based on the assumption that the conditions of the post-war boom can be replicated. This is highly optimistic, and ignores the broader context of full employment in the developed world in the context of under-development and super-exploitation in the former colonies. This was, as noted before, enclave development on a global scale.

The UNDP seems to tacitly acknowledge that full employment is a distant dream, and advocates more robust forms of universal social protection along the road to that ideal end point. It is here that it makes valuable observations that social assistance of various kinds did not wait until countries were well off. Indeed, in many European countries (such as Norway, Sweden and Denmark) as well as small countries like Costa Rica and South Korea, robust and universal forms of social protection (including education, public health and social security) were carried out when countries were at the equivalent level of between \$1,500 and \$2,000 per capita income.

As global conglomerates strive to dominate the food chain, and threaten food security, access to land remains a critical issue. Cuba has shown what can be achieved through the promotion of community organic food gardens in urban areas. This can be another form of local economic activity that undercuts the stranglehold of supermarket chains and agri-business, and allows poor communities to have a greater say in their own food security. In Africa, where the majority of people still live in rural areas, active support for small-scale farming and subsistence farming is critical.

Holistic Development Visions

Today, there is increasing recognition that alternatives, if they are to serve ALL the world's people, and preserve the natural environment for current and future generations to enjoy, must be substantive and go beyond the interests of only the state and the market. In other words, in contrast to the dominant paradigms of statist or free market development, there is a need for a *society*-focused development path, such as what is being (or has been) attempted in the Indian state of Kerala, or in countries like Bolivia.⁷ By 'society' is meant unleashing the power of ordinary citizens as agents of their own destiny, where the state and market are subordinate to societal (or the people's) general interests. The challenge is to build a participatory political and economic system for people in harmony with nature. Indeed, even the small mountain country of Bhutan has lessons to offer, as it navigates out of its feudal past into a multi-party democracy and the challenge of pursuing Gross National Happiness (GNH) based on balanced development. Bhutan's GNH Index offers a deep and extensive methodology to measure development in all its dimensions, and all development plans must first be subject to a GNH audit.⁸

In addition, there are a range of other local economic alternatives being practiced in communities around the world, including co-operatives, community gardens, and socially-owned renewable energy projects, which can be learnt from. The Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) also offers alternative conceptions of regional trade, based on co-operation, solidarity and even bartering (where for example Cuba trades doctors for Venezuelan oil), rather than cut-throat competition. While these regimes may not all be fully democratic, they have made significant progress in improving the well-being of subordinate classes compared to other countries in the region (see Kellogg 2012).

Arguably, the most advanced and democratic of this new wave of Latin American governments offering alternatives is Bolivia. Its indigenous president, Evo Morales (2009), who was re-elected in 2014 with another healthy majority, offers this inspiring vision:

For us, what has failed is the model of 'living better' (than others), of unlimited development, industrialisation without frontiers, of modernity that deprecates history, of increasing accumulation of goods at the expense of others and nature. For that reason we promote the idea of Living Well, in harmony with other human beings and with our Mother Earth.

While advocacy work from above - to convince statisticians, government officials and other opinion formers about the follies of the GDP paradigm, and the need to consider alternatives - is important in the fight to undermine the art of paradigm maintenance, history tells us that, more often, radical change comes from below. Struggles against elite dominance usually bring to the fore new visionary leadership that can either break new ground, or become co-opted into the dominant paradigm. To prevent the latter, as Gandhi and later the feminist movement warned, activists must be the change they want to see. This involves personal transformation and continuous introspection, as well as a deep participatory politics, where leaders are always held accountable to their organisations, members and communities.

Conclusion

As seductive as the Africa rising narrative is, this article argues that it is misleading. It draws the people of Africa into a false sense of promise – of 'development' and 'decent' jobs for all – that can never be delivered by the current economic growth paradigm. A radical rethink is needed to break out of the cycle of deepening inequality, dispossession and ecological devastation. The 'modernisation' paradigm based on incessant production and consumption can only meet the needs of an enclave within a sea of poverty, pollution and plunder. Only the people, from the bottom up, can ultimately break this cycle. The movements of indigenous people in alliance with labour movements and other sectors of civil society are sources of inspiration in this regard.

While it is disappointing to many that the current GDP growth paradigm has managed to re-assert itself after the 2007-9 financial crisis, an understanding of the social and natural limits to growth will lead to a realisation that the art of paradigm maintenance has its own limits. It is up to activists and movements to seize these moments and work to build broad-based alliances around common struggles. The counter-narrative is increasingly capturing the imagination of significant actors around the world. Capitalism, and its logic of incessant growth, is killing the planet. That realisation, combined with increasing anger about rising social inequality, is becoming a rallying call to action.

Notes

1. There is also a small but increasing presence of Indian firms in some African countries.
2. By capital is meant material wealth valued in money terms for investment purposes. Following Marx, it is an impersonal force that has its own accumulation logic, separate from the subjectivities of capitalists, who try and ride its waves but do not always control its destiny – indeed, they may themselves be victims of its creative-destructive powers (see Istvan Meszaros (1995), *Beyond Capital*, Merlin Press) and Harvey (2014)).
3. David Harvey (2014) acknowledges the environmental contradiction amongst his seventeen contradictions of Capital. However, unlike many environmentalists, he is more sceptical about the natural limits to growth argument. He believes that thus far capital has always found ways to turn limits into barriers that can be overcome – hence the rise of the green market niche.
4. These remarks were made at a Global Labour University workshop in Johannesburg, October 2009.
5. The regular emergence of new competitors to challenge existing dominant firms (or, in South Africa's case, the break-up of monopolies such as the Anglo-American Corporation during the post-apartheid era), and hence reduce monopolisation, does not contradict the underlying trend towards monopolisation, as new competitors either become absorbed by, or themselves absorb, the dominant firms – or firms such as South Africa's banks and cellphone service companies collude to keep prices high (hence the need for state regulation, often ineffective, to enforce competition).
6. This does not negate the fact that some climate change is also caused by natural phenomena – however, scientists have pointed to a direct correlation between rising carbon emissions and climate change.
7. For more information see Heller, Patrick, *The Labor of Development: Workers and the Transformation of Capitalism in Kerala, India*, Cornell University Press: 1999 and *Bolivia Reborn* (http://cojmc.unl.edu/bolivia/rules_toc.html). Bolivia has in recent years come under severe pressure to pursue more conventional extractive growth models, to meet the developmental needs of its people (given the failure of the developed countries to compensate it and Ecuador for preserving the rainforests, and thus reducing carbon emissions and climate change). This poses a severe challenge to its constitutional commitments around environmental preservation – and underlines the need for a coordinated effort by developing nations to pursue alternatives paradigms.
8. Interview with the GNH Planning Commission head, Dr Thinley, December 2013.

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Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) and Africa: New Projected Developmental Paradigms¹

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Abstract

This article reflects on the dynamics of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) states' political economy and its implications for Africa's continuous effort to search for new developmental paradigms. The core questions addressed in the article are: What are the BRICS states specifically proposing to the existing world order and the global south in the areas of paradigms of economic and social development and systems of governance? What do these countries have in common? Can this commonality be instrumentalised and converted in favour of African progress? What is the ideological foundation of their solidarity? Within the pragmatism and ideology related to this solidarity, are the BRICS states proposing new development schemes to replace the failed old, top-down, anarchical, market-based, linear, and one-size-fits-all model of social and economic development? Based on the dynamics of the BRICS grouping and the movements of its members, it is argued that the emerging markets and economies in the Global South, regardless of the ideological contradictions and internal structural political weaknesses among its members, implies that the business-as-usual approach in the practices of the institutions of international political economy and world politics is no longer the only pragmatic way of conducting business. To have a significant impact in Africa, BRICS's activities should be shaped and guided by the bottom-up perspectives. BRICS strongly calls for shifts of paradigms in the realm of the world power and for qualitative state intervention in the management of the invisible hand of Adam Smith.

Résumé

Cet article se penche sur la dynamique de la politique économique du Brésil, de la Russie, de l'Inde, de la Chine et de l'Afrique du Sud (BRICS) et ses

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implications dans les efforts continus de l'Afrique pour la recherche de nouveaux paradigmes de développement. Les questions fondamentales abordées dans l'article sont: Que proposent particulièrement les BRICS à l'ordre mondial actuel et aux pays du Sud en matière de paradigmes de développement et de systèmes de gouvernance économique et sociale? Qu'est-ce que ces pays ont-ils en commun? Ce caractère commun peut-il être instrumentalisé et converti en faveur de progrès pour l'Afrique? Quel est le fondement idéologique de leur solidarité? Dans le pragmatisme et l'idéologie liés à cette solidarité, les BRICS proposent-ils de nouveaux schémas de développement pour remplacer l'ancien modèle de développement social et économique, raté, descendant anarchique, fondé sur le marché, linéaire et uniforme? En se basant sur la dynamique du groupe BRICS et des mouvements de ses membres, certains soulignent que les marchés et les économies émergentes de l'hémisphère sud, quelles que soient les contradictions idéologiques et les faiblesses structurelles politiques internes entre ses membres, montrent que l'approche de statu quo dans les pratiques des institutions d'économie politique internationale et de politique mondiale n'est plus la seule voie pragmatique en matière d'affaires. Pour avoir un impact significatif en Afrique, les activités des BRICS devraient être conçues et guidées par des perspectives ascendantes. Les BRICS appellent fortement à des changements de paradigmes en matière de puissance mondiale et à l'intervention qualitative de l'Etat dans la gestion de la main invisible d'Adam Smith.

Introduction

This article is a critical reflection of the dynamics of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) states' political economy and its implications for Africa's continuous effort to search for new developmental paradigms. Although it is theoretically and conceptually reflective, the arguments advanced are shaped by African cultural, economic, historical and political experiences.

The core questions are: What are the BRICS states specifically proposing to the existing world order and the Global South in the areas of paradigms of economic and social development and systems of governance? What do these countries have in common? Can this commonality be instrumentalised and converted in favour of African progress? What is the ideological foundation of their solidarity? Within the pragmatism and ideology related to this solidarity, are the BRICS states proposing new development schemes from the failed top-down, 'free' and anarchical, market-based, linear, one-size-fits-all model of social and economic development? The article addresses these questions.

Emergence of the New Economies in the Global South

With the emergence of the new economies in the Global South, I argue that there is no law of gravity or natural law that stipulates the claim that some countries will never grow and progress. As these countries are in the process of 'graduating' from their status of underdevelopment to a transitional phase towards the consolidation of their status of new emerging economies, some issues are being raised about the impetus and the origins of this new dynamic and the nature of the relationship between the free market forces, the state and the society within the global capitalist economy. Each of the BRICS countries still has a large proportion of its population that is poor, unemployed and cannot effectively participate in the political process because they are considered politically disabled.

In 2001, Jim O'Neil, the former Chief Economist and Chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management at the London Office of Investment Banking Group, in a research report paper entitled 'Building Better Global Economic BRICs', coined the acronym BRIC to signify Brazil, Russia, India and China as the new fast-growing economic powers in the world.² In 2008, Mark Atherton predicted that by 2050, the BRIC nations would dominate the globe.³ Nearly 60 per cent of the total increase in world output in 2000-2008 took place in developing countries and transitional countries, half of which occurred in the BRICS; while their share of global GDP during the same period rose 16 to 20 per cent.⁴

Based on the dynamics of the BRICS grouping and the movements of its members, it is argued that the emerging markets and economies in the Global South, regardless of the ideological contradictions and internal structural political weaknesses among its members, imply that the business-as-usual approach in the practices of the institutions of international political economy and world politics is no longer the only pragmatic way of conducting business. These new political actors claim that the paradigms and the policies based on 'savage capitalism' which is extremely exploitative as articulated by the old industrial powers, are responsible for the failures of the global political economy and its tragic social and environmental consequences.

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the dynamics of international political economy have been challenged by the ways nation-states and people are reacting to the imperatives of such an economy, especially the new technical management style and new usage of the dominant social paradigms (technology, science and the free market). The demands on the states and other institutions to accelerate social progress the

world over have intensified. These demands have been influenced by the forces related to international and national judicial activism, civil societies, popular movements and state reforms.

The law of colonial or imperialist vertical centre of gravity of power, which was conceived as 'natural' is being shaken. For instance, since 2010 China has become the number two economy globally, replacing Japan. In 2011, Brazil overtook Britain as the world's sixth largest economy. Brazil's objective is to soon displace France at fifth position. And it has been forecast that India, the tenth largest economy as of 2011, will change its rank by 2020. In the next two decades, it is predicated that, with the exception of the United States, BRICS will replace France, Germany, and, once again, Japan. These shifts will have a significant impact on the African developmental paradigms.

Regardless of the perspectives that one might choose analytically, it is necessary to consider the nature of the BRICS' solidarity as an important policy tool in Africa. The origin of this solidarity has to be examined structurally and historically within the dynamics of world politics, which are ideologically creating a hybrid transition in which there is no single entity with monopolistic power or any state, individual or corporation with hegemonic governance, authority and legitimacy to create any new linear order.

I argue that the shifts declared by BRICS through its summits and other meetings only will not and/or cannot guarantee that through the membership of South Africa, Africa as a whole would likely change her place holistically within the liberal world economy and the existing nature of the international division of labour. For the BRICS' actions to be positively felt in Africa, there would first be a need to establish substantive political reforms prior to BRICS' policy implementation. For instance, if African nation-states and people and their social agencies could transform their technically-defined 'representative democracies' or 'illiberal democracies' into real functioning social democracies in which people participate effectively in the political process; can force their states' institutions and decision makers to take advantage of the new spaces in world politics and move forward.

Using a historical-structuralist approach with a comparative perspective, I raise an issue for these countries' methods of structurally conceiving and perceiving south-south relations; how they re-define politics, and how they deal with the old elements of the dominant social paradigms. These approaches put an emphasis on causal relations among the political actors and their systems.

Within the above approach and its philosophical assumptions and claims, the world is a system and an organic whole whose behaviours are

conditioned by the actors' locations and how they came to exist in the system. The actors and the subsystems do not act similarly. Their specific functions and attributes are conditioned by their locations within the system. The system is not just the sum of its elements. It is more than what is tangible. In order to understand why a system behaves the way it does, we have to ask the questions of the origins of its elements, examine the nature of the relationship among them, and discuss the nature of the interactions between the system itself and other phenomena within or around its larger environment

Within the systems analysis, I interpret history as a changing phenomenon that is not predetermined by any circumstances or forces. I build my arguments in finding correlations between historical facts and the structures of the African contemporary society. Within the structures of the African societies, I put more emphasis on the political institutions or the states and their relations to Immanuel Wallerstein's world system (1974, 1980, and 1989). Furthermore, my interests in historical causation of social phenomena and critical examination of their structures are shaped by social constructivism. Adler (1997, 2002) and Fearon and Wendt (2002) take the social world of agreed upon collective social values seriously in their analyses.

Another important feature of the world system since the end of the twentieth century has been the movement of states and people's struggles toward their redefinition of themselves. This redefinition has been taking different forms and shapes in almost every part of the world. The substance of this redefinition and its significance depend on the dynamics of the local political configurations, who the actors are, what their alliances are, how a given people and state have become part of the world system, the location of these actors in the international political economy, what they are bringing into the global market. This process of redefinition is facilitated by the means and forces of liberal globalisation.

Additionally, since the end of the twentieth century, the capitalist economy has been operating more forcefully toward the controlled dynamics of both regionalism and globalism. While capitalists at the regional level have tendencies to advance some national and cultural interests in the process of making their surplus or acquiring and protecting their capital, the globalists tend to see the world more on the perspectives of the so-called free market. Regionalism is more associated with geo-politics and history than globalism, which has claims and tendencies of promoting 'universalism' from a perspective of a world without borders. Regionalists are more sympathetic to protectionism. Furthermore, while capitalist regionalists

accept the existence of other poles of influence in other parts of the world, the globalists tend to emphasize on the universal human values.

In May 2011, the World Bank published a report called 'Multipolarity: the New Global Economy'. According to the World Bank, emerging countries like Brazil, Russia, Indian, China, and South Africa will induce clear signs of change in the socio-economic power relations (World Bank 2011). Multipolarity is a measurement of the distribution of power concentrated in several poles of power, those poles being the great powers. BRICS are projected as becoming great powers along the United States and the European Union.

On 14 June 2014, while many leaders were preoccupied with the World Cup in Brazil and the situation in Ukraine, the G-77 summit took place in Bolivia. It celebrated the 70th anniversary of non-alignment. This grouping now counts 130 members. Russia is being invited to join this organization. The final declaration called for a new world order; and it supports the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). They also intend and plan to eradicate poverty by 2030. Evo Morales of Bolivia went further and requested the suppression of the Security Council of the UN. In March 2013, in Durban, South Africa, the leaders of BRICS also agreed that the election for the next WTO Director-General should have a candidate from a developing country.

The South-South agenda is to project the creation of a multipolar approach and strategies to development. Thus, multipolarity is about a system of multiple global and regional powers, which exist simultaneously. It is about the dispersal of powers. A multipolar approach underlines the decentralisation of world resources and their better management, and their fair distribution. It calls for more people's participation in the reconstruction of their economies, which implies that it puts more emphasis on building communities rather than the 'idolatry' of individualism. Furthermore, it calls for the reconceptualisation and establishment of new international partnership/cooperation based on the win-win theory.

A multipolar perspective to development implies the coexistence of several equally used and respected spaces or locations of power with similar value systems. It can be advanced through dialogical relations between the subject and object of learning. It calls for the development of social welfarism and the implementation and respect for the laws of the ecology. This perspective is framed within four laws of ecology, which are: 'everything is connected to everything else'; 'everything must go somewhere'; 'the nature knows best'; and 'there is no such thing as a free lunch' (Smith 2009, pp. 2-3). Things do not happen in a vacuum.

History and Goals of BRICS

In analysing the BRICS' genesis, I identify the philosophical elements of its projected developmental model. Some may view BRICS as a global actor, as *sui generis*. Some people think that it is yet an 'unidentified political object'. How much unique is it? And how much 'unidentified' is it in the world of the states and international capitalism?

The history of BRICS states has to be located in the efforts of developing countries to try to build alliances and coalitions in order to confront oppression and underdevelopment. It has to be examined within the frame of the struggles of many members of the UN that have been trying to re-define their sovereignty and their capitalism. Through its summits, the BRICS' main objectives and the mechanisms through which these objectives were intended to be translated into policies can be identified.

The visions of each of these states are also important as they can inform us about the kind of political world and development they intend to produce. Vision is essentially a philosophical concept. It is an ideal concept in which one creates a plan for the self with a long-term purpose that ought to be beneficial to the collective self as well. In a nation-state, there is no vision if its leaders do not know where they are taking a given country to and where the country is coming from. As a philosophical concept, it implies futurism and progress.

In the past, various attempts were made by new politically independent nation-states located in Africa, the Americas, Asia and the Middle East during the Cold War international relations and politics to challenge the policies and the politics of industrialised countries, which were considered as negative political forces impeding the progress to take place in the former colonial countries. It is in the name of so-called free market dogma and free trade as articulated by the WTO that Western industrialised countries and the US still dominate the world economy.

The Bandung Conference in 1955, which was held in Indonesia, is the first remarkable point in which an official statement was made to voice collectively against imperialism and colonialism. It is out of the spirit of this conference that members of the UN promised to make a new political activism, which created the organisation of non-aligned states. Two major sponsors of the conference, India and China, are also the co-founders of BRICS. Despite the ideological differences among them, they thought that their common enemies were stronger than their ideological differences. Their peripheral locations in the dynamics of the global political economy and the vision of tomorrow led them to minimize their historical, cultural, ideological and political differences.

Although non-alignment as a movement of the weaker nation-states in the international scene claimed to be ideologically neutral in world affairs, it was de facto an ideology in itself. It was articulating a collective way of thinking about world politics, which during the Cold War, was shaped by enormous contradictions. Its strengths were demonstrated at the level of the UN General Assemblies but its weaknesses were expressed at the level of the world economy's functionality and international security. For various national security imperatives and the free market demands, many members of the Non-Alignment Movement allied themselves with the states that oppressed them. However, despite its weaknesses, it contributed toward the advancement of the concept of the Global South.

The idea of the South can be traced to the 7th Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1975 in which a resolution concerning development and international cooperation was adopted. Section V of this resolution dealt specifically with cooperation among developing countries. In 1978, the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation in the UN Development Programme was established by the General Assembly. Its primary mandate was to promote, coordinate and support South-South and Triangular cooperation in the UN system and globally.⁵ In short, it should be noted that the concept of the Global South has geographical, political, historical and economic connotations and meanings.

With Russia, a former super power during the Cold War era, as a co-founder of BRICS, which is also geographically located in the North, what kind of South-South grouping is this new organization? In December 1999, a group of countries known as G-20, represented by the ministers of finance and central bank governors had first met subsequent to the Asian financial crisis, the meeting brought together the major industrialised countries, the European Union and the representatives of the major developing economies.⁶ Brazil, India, China, Russia and South Africa were among the countries represented in the meeting. Former Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martin proposed the G-20. His main goal was to set up a group in which members have solid functioning economies for cooperation and consultation on matters pertaining to the international financial system. However, he is not known for being a progressive leader.

Although the BRICS states were initially interested in talking about specialised investments, banking practices and new ideas about new financial strategies to be used toward the advancement of their economies, the declarations from the summits reflect a broad agenda, which includes paradigm shifts from the old stagnated development programmes, a new political orientation about social progress, and the nature of the global power.

The main reason for creating this new club was based on an underlying perception that the economic crisis of the world would not be solved by the industrialised countries which are also to blame as being part of the problem as they have been advocating economic reforms with orthodox austerity programmes whose consequences led to the collapse of many economies and the states in the Global South.

In their annual summits, the leaders of the BRICS have been discussing the issues related to the status of the international economy and finances. As Cynthia Roberts indicated:

In 2006, as BRICs Mania gathered momentum, the four governments, at the initiative of the then former Russian President Vladimir Putin, collectively lifted themselves from the pages of investment reports to hold their first foreign ministers' meeting on the sidelines of the annual UN General Assembly session. After a second meeting of the four foreign ministers in New York in September 2007, the BRICs launched a consultative process at the level of deputy foreign ministers to foster regular contacts and multilateral diplomacy.⁷

After the World Financial Crisis of 2008, the leaders of the BRIC states had their first summit meeting in Yekaterinburg in Russia and declared these goals:

To achieve more influence in world governance forums, how their nations could contribute to improving the world economic situation and, by working together, could reform international financial institutions. Their financial declaration called for the establishment of a multipolar world order.

According to the Russian Foreign Ministry in 2008, active efforts by the BRIC to reform the world financial system were some of the factors that led to a decision at the G-20 Washington Summit in November 2008 to include emerging economies in an enlarged Financial Stability Forum.⁸ The second Summit took place on 16 April 2010 in Brasilia and the Third in Sanya, China on 14 April 2011, during which South Africa was invited. Their final declaration of the 2011 leaders' summit supports what was indicated earlier:

It is the overarching objective and strong shared desire for peace, security, development and cooperation that brought together BRICS states with a total population of nearly 3 billion from different continents. BRICS aims at contributing significantly to the development of humanity and establishing a more equitable and fair world.... We are open to increasing engagement and cooperation with non-BRICS states, in particular, emerging and developing countries, and relevant international and regional organizations.... Accelerating sustainable growth of developing countries is one the major

challenges for the world. We believe that growth and development are central to addressing poverty and to achieving the MDGs. Eradication of extreme poverty and hunger is moral, social political and economic imperative of humankind and one of the greatest global challenges facing the world today, particularly in Least Developed Countries in Africa and elsewhere.... We review the progress of the BRICS cooperation in various fields and share the view that such cooperation has been enriching and mutually beneficial and that there is a great scope for closer cooperation and the further development of its own agenda. We are determined to translate our political vision into concrete action and endorse the attached Action Plan, which will serve as the foundation for future cooperation. We will review the implementation of Action Plan during our next Leaders Meeting.⁹

The above declaration indicates the priority items and the projection of new perspectives to deal with economic development through the eradication of poverty and not the old approach of alleviation of poverty. Another important dimension involves democracy.

In a one-day meeting (the fourth summit) of 29 March 2012 in Delhi, the leaders of BRICS, notably Dilma Rousseff of Brazil, Dmitry Medvedev of Russia, Manmohan Singh, Hu Jintao of China and Jacob Zuma of South Africa, discussed closer trade links and a new bank. The fifth BRICS summit was held on 17 March 2013 in Durban, South Africa, under the theme: 'BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialization'. The summit outcome documents known as the eThekweni Declaration and Action Plan were adopted at the conclusion of the Summit. 5 leaders agreed on the establishment of:

- (a) New Development Bank with the initial capital contribution to the bank that should be substantial and sufficient for its effectiveness in financing infrastructure;
- (b) The contingent reserve arrangement (CRA) with an initial size of US\$100 billion. The CRA would help BRICS countries forestall short-term liquidity pressures and further strengthen financial stability;
- (c) The BRICS Think Tanks Council and the BRICS Business Council. The BRICS Think Tanks Council will link respective Think Tanks into a network to develop policy options such as the evaluation and future long-term strategy for BRICS.

On 15 July 2014, the five leaders' meeting in Fortaleza, Brazil, agreed to locate their newly established Development Bank in Shanghai (China) with a capital of US\$50 billion, rising to US\$100 billion. This was conceived in terms of lending policies and the role of the stakeholders as having an alternative perspective as compared to practices and policies of the existing financial systems of the World Bank (with its US\$232 billion) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The BRICS reiterated their

proposition to creating an alternative financial institution to the World Bank. At the same time, in its Delhi Declaration, BRICS agreed to expand the capital base of the World Bank and other multilateral institutions to ensure global economic stability. It is important to compare and contrast some specific economic variables in order to have a sense of how BRICS would advance 'a multipolar, equitable and democratic world order'¹⁰ that it claims while there are still major political, cultural and economic policy differences among them.

A Brief Comparison of Economic and Political Dimensions of the BRICS States

Some comparative trends are necessary to discuss what these states have or do not have in common. The imperatives of the world of nation-states and those of their citizens, and their complex relationships are still prevailing. While the world of the states means sovereignty, national security, citizenry, well-defined territoriality, the world of citizenry means rights to life, which embodies all the cognitive liberties. BRICS claim to articulate a visionary state system that has to emancipate people toward these rights.

As of 2013, the BRICS group accounts for 26 per cent of the world's landmass, 42 per cent of the global population, nearly 28 per cent of the global economy and 40 per cent of the global GDP (\$18.486 trillion). Intra-BRICS trade is growing at an average of 28 per cent annually and currently stands at about \$230 billion.¹¹ BRICS countries also have accounted for over 50 per cent of global economic growth in the last decade. However, BRICS is not yet known in African ministries of planning and development, let alone in the African business circles, rural areas and non-governmental sectors. It is hoped that South Africa will be able to bring the BRICS' agenda to African political and economic debates through the African Union's activities, Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

Economic position and its political involvement in international affairs determine much of the state's place and its status in world affairs. The supranational space that the BRICS states have created functions in a world that is dominated by the imperatives of neoliberal globalisation and their consequences in developing countries, such as large unemployment, lumpen-intellectualisation, political instability and rampant poverty. At the same time, civil society is also consolidating itself while democratic consolidation is zigzagging in many developing countries, despite some economic growth.

Brazil has come into BRICS with confidence as a mixed economy with strong state interventionism in the factors of production. It has been developing an independent foreign policy since Lula. It wants to become a global power. It has become the sixth largest economy, overtaking that of the United Kingdom. Its trade has increased faster between itself and other BRICS states, as stated by Dwyer (2001: 27): 'In a single decade the BRIC states – Russia, India and China – have gone from being responsible for 3.42% in 2000 to 18.3% in 2010 of the total Brazilian trade with the world. Of special relevance is China, which now represents nearly 15% of Brazil's total foreign trade.'

In 2011, Brazil had the second GDP per capita of \$11,600 after Russia with \$16,700 and a GDP of \$2.284 trillion after India with \$4.463 trillion. Brazil also had GNP of \$2,144,884,440,510 with a GNP per capita of \$9,390. Although, as of 2011, Brazil's GDP per capita was still a third of that of United Kingdom, its economy overtook that of the United Kingdom as the world's sixth largest economy. It rose 2.7 per cent as compared with that of the United Kingdom 0.8 per cent.

Brazil has about 20 per cent of the world's fresh water supply. It is one of the few countries in the world that is still able to increase its agricultural frontier. Research plays a major role in increasing agricultural productivity. It has a comparative advantage in growing and exporting food. Brazil is self-sufficient in energy production. Brazil's total commercial exchanges with BRICS in million US Dollars between 1990 and 2010 were gradually increasing, from \$52,075 in 1990 to \$383,636 in 2010, more than any other country in the new grouping. BRICS as a percentage of all Brazilian trade has jumped from 3.42 per cent in 2000 to 18.3 per cent.¹² Brazil has the ambition of becoming a superpower in South America, as well as a strong power within the UN system. With its large population of 203,429,773 in 2011 and population growth of 1.13 per cent and a growing middle class, Brazil has a large market of everything that its economy can produce.

China joined the WTO in 2001 after several years of probation. It has access to more resources associated with membership. Since 2010, China has become the number one economy in terms of quantitative output of both its export-import. It displaced Japan, which has become number three. Both China's GDP and GNP of \$11.3 trillion and \$410,221,684,440,510 respectively are the largest in the world. However, its GDP per capita of \$8,400 is smaller than that of Russia, \$16,600, Brazil with \$11,600 and South Africa with \$11,000 as of 2011. China has invested heavily in Brazil and South Africa. In 2011, China became the largest foreign investor in Brazil.

In 2011, China spent more in industrialisation plus manufacturing (about 47 per cent) than any other country member of the BRICS. The second country was Russia with 37 per cent, and India was the last with 26 per cent. South Africa was close to Russia with 31 per cent. China's exports and imports in 2011 are larger than any country within BRICS states with \$0.897 trillion and \$41.664 trillion respectively. Although its foreign investments are based on the cost-benefits related to capitalism, they are state-based.

China's ambition is to become the number one economy. Its power is reflected in its investments in the world, including in the old axes of power, the US and Western Europe. Almost every power is conducting business with China as it offers cheaper labour, the market and the determined citizens and the state to progress. With its population of 1,336,718,015 as of 2011, China has a large reservoir of agents of change. Its security resources' needs, which are the combination of energy and strategic minerals, are higher than that of any country within the group.¹³

With the slowdown of the Chinese economic growth of about 7 percent in 2015 and its stock market crash in July 2015, its government responded on August 10, 2015 in allowing its controlled currency to depreciate 2 per cent to the United States dollar (US \$). China is embracing what President Xi Jinping called 'new normal.' However, with the magnitude of its foreign investments and its trade activities worldwide, this slowdown situation is not likely to lead to the devastation of Chinese economic status that some in the West are forecasting.

India had a GDP of \$4.463 trillion, higher than those of Russia, Brazil and South Africa and also with the GNP of \$4,159,721,220,009, higher than those of Brazil, Russia and South Africa. Its GDP per capita was lower than that of any country in the group, \$3,700, and a GNP per capita of \$1,330 as of 2011. Indian total exports and imports in 2011 were \$298.2 billion and \$451 billion, respectively. Exports were higher than those of Brazil and South Africa, but smaller than those of Russia and China. In the combined industrialisation and manufacturing, India and Brazil had almost the same amount of spending at almost 26 per cent. In the area of development and research, India spends about 0.80 per cent lower than South Africa, which spends about 0.93 per cent. It needs not to be emphasized that more than 60 per cent of the Indian population is still characterised massively as poor.

South Africa is the smallest economy of all in the combination of GDP and GNP. For instance, its GDP and GNP were \$554.6 billion and \$517.93 billion respectively in 2011, while its GDP per capita was \$11,000 and GNP per capita was \$6,090. However, in the areas of education and health,

for instance, South Africa has been doing better than Russia, Brazil and even better than India and China in health areas. Additionally, South Africa is the fourth-largest source of gold and diamonds and has more than three quarters of global platinum reserves.

BRICS' Agenda for African Development

The BRICS states do have an agenda for the countries involved to challenge the policies and the structures of the existing systems and the status of other countries that could also benefit from their 'protective' policies. However, the agreed upon regional policy framework and the political philosophy that constitute the foundation of this agenda are complex as the BRICS states have not proposed a tangible and practical unified ideology to be used toward the actualisation of its policies.

In the world of global liberalism, the main questions would be: What are the free best trade practices or best preferential arrangements among the BRICS countries which value fairness? How would their trade systems contribute to build democracies in Africa? How would the economic activities of BRICS, especially free trade relations, foreign investments, technological transfer, the construction of infrastructures contracts, through South Africa, reach the African villages and people, and transform their low production capacity, improve their management of the rural resources and advance the needed sustainable self-sufficiency schemes upon which local economies can be built?

BRICS states are challenging a post-American unilateral world as well as a non-polar world articulated by the mid-size economic and political powers. They are repeatedly calling for diversifying global services away from the US dollar toward a global currency and have begun experimenting by using their currencies for regional commerce.¹⁴ It is through globalisation that this agenda is likely to be realised. However, it cannot be done through the existing neoliberal globalisation. There is still a need to reconstruct new globalisation paradigms in trade practices and in democratic governance, which should lead to more citizens of the BRICS participating in this organisation's activities in integrating the market into the economy and in controlling the free market.

Through the BRICS' claims, it is not clear what ideology they might pursue to promote multipolarity. There are also historical rivalries between some of them and their conflicts also are due to their positions in the global system. China, for instance, perceives itself as the most important player in the global system, as it works toward challenging the US place. South Africa perceives itself as a young respectable player with potential to play a solid

role in world affairs but has not been mature enough and has not acquired the wisdom needed in international relations except in Africa.

Brazil, India and South Africa are liberal democracies, while Russia is in a non-liberal democratic transition, and China is still socialist, with a market economy based on Marxist and Maoist perceptions of world politics. The Chinese Communist Party works on the premise of centralised democracy.

Russia and China are more suspicious of the American-European power intrigues than Brazil, India and South Africa. Therefore, Russia and China project more the place of state sovereignty and national security thinking in their attitudes and policies than other members. However, all are strong nation-states with their own national policy agendas and all wish to change their political statuses in regional and international arenas.

Although they share some common attributes and higher political and economic goals, the domestic, internal, social class conflicts, the manner in which labour organisations operate and how each state is responding to the demands of democratisation will challenge their good intentions.

The role of South Africa is determinant in the mobilisation of resources that can be used beyond South African national interests. Furthermore, the inclusion of South Africa, which has a smaller economy, may imply that the major players have some strategic interests to advance in Africa. Thus, this inclusion could be viewed more as a political move than only simplistically an economic ambition.

However, South Africa's Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, stated: 'We will be a good gateway for the BRIC states. While we may have a small population, we don't just speak for South Africa, we speak for Africa as a whole¹⁵.' President Jacob Zuma recently stated: 'South Africa's and the continent's future prosperity is increasing linked to the BRICS economies and that the grouping is well placed to decisively assist in tackling our development deficits'.¹⁶

Obviously, South Africa is a smaller economy and smaller manufacturing within the grouping. But the national and regional demands on South Africa are relatively larger than in other countries. Although there is no survey made on how other African states would expect South Africa to perform, I can only anticipate that other countries would like South Africa to play a central role in investments, job creation, fiscal policies, free movement of goods and services, technological transfer, wage parity between men and women – all economic, commercial and financial activities that would be beneficial to other African economies beyond the Southern African Development Community. It is not clear how BRICS, through South African economic and political actors, will be able to integrate intra-

African trade and economic development schemes, which operate through regional communities or organisations such as the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, Economic Community of West African States, Economic Community of Central African States, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, West African Economic and Monetary Union, Arab Maghreb Union and Mano River Union, and positively transform their activities for the benefit of all.

I hope that South Africa will not be reduced to a dumping ground of cheap goods and services that would originate from the other power members. Although the issue of equal treatment of each member is alluded to in all of the BRICS' declarations, as a nation-state centred organization and its realism, its actions are essentially power-based. It is through its democratisation that I hope BRICS can reach other African countries. As to the potential benefits that the whole African continent could gain from the BRICS, there is no concrete strong data multilaterally to suggest that there is any correlation at the moment between their trade arrangements and policies and their redistributive capabilities of goods and services. At the level of bilateral relations, this kind of assessment is plausible.

Conclusion

Although the BRICS states now constitute Africa's largest trading partners and investors, the question of their political ideologies and that of their political regimes will determine how this grouping will impact Africa. It has to contribute to solving the unfinished story of the African pan-African economy and pan-African governance. Currently, neoliberal globalisation and its policies have been the enemies of such a project. It is only through a pan-African political economy that poverty in Africa can be eradicated.

The BRICS' story is one of powerful institutions and its developmental perspectives are generally a combination of the top-bottom with a dose of decentralisation. To have a significant impact in Africa, BRICS' activities should be shaped and guided by the bottom-up perspectives.

Notes

1. Finally, is the BRICS only repackaging the heterodox policies of the 1980s and the 1990s? The answer is clearly no. It strongly calls for shifts of paradigms in the realm of world power and for a qualitative state's intervention in the management of the invisible hand of Adam Smith.

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Emerging Questions on the Shifting Sino-Africa Relations: ‘Win-Win’ or ‘Win-Lose’?

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Abstract

Orthodox scholarly discourse on the theme of Sino-Africa relations has tended to accentuate the efficacy of the South-South alternative to development, chiefly as the vehicle for mitigating the developing countries’ peripheral status in the global order. Literature has accused the North-South economic relations of favouring the former. In search of justice and fair play in international political and economic relations, most African countries started ‘looking east’, mainly towards China. Notwithstanding China’s long solidarity with Africa throughout the liberation struggle, and its contribution to the continent through foreign direct investment, infrastructure development, trade and bilateral aid, some of its recent engagements with the continent have raised questions of neo-colonialism tantamount to those in the North-South relations. The new Sino-Africa relations are being viewed by many as mainly driven by China’s hunger for Africa’s natural resources and the search for international markets for its manufactures, and business opportunities for its multinational corporations. The article argues that the new Sino-Africa economic relations, although still largely ‘win-win’, could soon plunge into ‘win-lose’ relations in favour of China.

Key Words: Global justice; China; Africa; resources; market; neo-colonialism

Résumé

Le discours savant orthodoxe sur le thème des relations sino-africaines avait tendance à accentuer l’efficacité de l’alternative Sud-Sud pour le développement, principalement en tant que véhicule permettant d’atténuer le statut périphérique des pays en développement dans l’ordre mondial. La littérature a accusé les relations économiques Nord-Sud de favoriser le Nord. La plupart des pays africains, en quête de justice et d’équité dans les relations

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politiques et économiques internationales, ont commencé à « regarder à l'est », principalement vers la Chine. Nonobstant la solidarité longtemps exprimée par la Chine à l'égard de l'Afrique à travers les luttes de libération et sa contribution dans le continent à travers l'investissement étranger direct, le développement des infrastructures, le commerce et l'aide bilatérale, certains de ses récents engagements avec le continent ont poussé certains à soulever la question du néo-colonialisme par comparaison avec les relations Nord-Sud. Les nouvelles relations sino-africaines sont considérées par beaucoup comme principalement animées par la soif de la Chine de tirer meilleur parti des ressources naturelles de l'Afrique et par sa recherche de marchés internationaux pour ses manufactures, ainsi que les opportunités d'affaires pour ses multinationales. Cet article soutient que les nouvelles relations économiques sino-africaines, bien que toujours largement « gagnant-gagnant », pourraient bientôt devenir des relations « gagnant-perdant » en faveur de la Chine.

Mots clés : justice mondiale, Chine; Afrique; ressources; marché; néo-colonialisme

Introduction

Sino-Africa relations are a subset of the much broader South-South relations which have assumed increased prominence over the last six decades. Following many years of exploitation, economic injustice and underdevelopment, many African countries started looking east, particularly towards China, India, the Asian Dragons (also called Asian Tigers), namely Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, and other countries such as the Soviet Union with whom they seemed to have common interests in the global economic relations. Further, the world's top emerging economies – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) – have also moved to strengthen ties among themselves and other developing countries to present a new bloc capable of challenging injustices within the South-South relations and in the North-South relations.

In the backdrop of three decades of a robust economy, China has emerged as the single member of the BRICS with more economic interaction with Africa. Over this period, China has emerged as one of the most powerful industrial powers on the surface of the planet. The Chinese economy has grown relentlessly for more than thirty years with an astonishing 9.3 per cent gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate between 1989 and 2011, relatively defying the global recession in the process (Jones 2013:6). Consequently, in 2010, China overtook Japan to become the second biggest economy in the world after the United States. In order to fuel the robust industrial sector at home and sustain its growth streak, China has had to abash its inward-looking policy for a *Zouchuqu* (Going Out) policy, primarily designed to gain access

to global resources and markets. Africa, a continent endowed with an array of scarce natural resources, such as oils and gases, minerals, and virgin forests, was identified by China as particularly suited for its economic objectives. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit held in Beijing from 4 to 5 November 2006, which attracted 48 African countries and 42 African heads of state (Chun 2009) demonstrated the popularity of China's foreign policy, at least among the elites, in Africa. Today, China boasts of several trade-related deals with most African governments that have culminated in Chinese multinational corporations' involvement in the extractive industry, construction, agriculture, manufacturing and commerce on the continent. Through these and other economic activities, China has been feeding its resource-hungry industries with raw materials, while accessing African markets for its goods and services.

However, although Sino-Africa contact spaces such as the FOCAC, the Strategic Partnership and others are said to emphasise 'win-win' diplomatic relations, they could subtly serve as Trojan horses of China's resource and marketing interests in Africa, thereby raising the question of neo-colonialism in the relations. In any case, economic relations can have different possible results on partners. For instance, they can be 'win-win', 'win-lose', 'lose-win', or even 'lose-lose'. A 'lose-lose' economic relationship cannot be entered into knowingly or consensually because it is against principle of profit maximisation. Rational economic partners seek to maximise their share of benefits from their relationships. However, this is only possible where there is equality and absence of the exploitation or dominance motive. The object is a 'win-win' relationship. In its absence, either the first or the second party gains or loses more than the other. This creates either a 'win-lose' or 'lose-win' situation. With respect to international economic relations, the North-South relations were deemed 'win-lose', hence the fostering of 'win-win' relations through South-South cooperation of which the Sino-Africa relations are a part.

This article attempts to assess whether Africa's economic relations with China are truly 'win-win' or 'win-lose' instead. In this case, the author commences by ruling out the 'lose-win' possibility on the grounds of the hare-tortoise growth comparison between China and Africa over the last couple of decades. The article attempts to evoke further debate on the questions of equality and justice in global economic relations. It deliberately exposes some of the emerging challenges to the enhancement of equal economic relations in Sino-Africa relations in the wake of the changing global dynamics. In the final analysis, the objective is, therefore, to arouse a broader and deeper discourse on South-South relations in general.

Theoretical Perspectives

In order to competently deal with the questions emerging in the relations between China and Africa, one needs the guidance of theory. Historically, academic platforms in Africa have theorised on how economic relations between developed and developing countries have tended to tilt in favour of the former. Some of the most serious arguments on the subject have taken the twist of the neo-Marxist dependency theories popularised by the United Nations think-tank, the Economic Commission for Latin American Countries (ECLAC) and some individual scholars in the late 1950s. Andre Gunder Frank, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, Walter Rodney and Kwame Nkrumah are among those who took a frontline position on the subject. The theory which was initially introduced as an explanation and remedy for the chronic underdevelopment and backwardness of Latin American countries due to their unequal relations with the United States, later dominated international academic platforms.

For more than five decades, the African, Asian and Latin American scholarship has investigated and written on how Europe had undermined development on their continents through slave trade, colonialism and later on, neo-colonialism. As Walter Rodney put it:

Western Europe and Africa had a relationship which ensured the transfer of wealth from Africa to Europe. The transfer was possible only after trade became truly international; and that takes one back to the fifteenth century when Africa and Europe were drawn into common relations for the first time – along with Asia and the Americas. The developed and underdeveloped parts of the present capitalist section of the world have been in continuous contact for four and a half centuries. The contention here is that over that period Africa helped to develop Western Europe in the same proportion as Western Europe helped to under develop Africa (Rodney 1972:84-85).

The starting point was that global inequalities were caused by an unfair economic system arising from resource extractive colonialism and imperialism that the Northern colonial powers had imposed upon the developing regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America. They argue that much of the economic underdevelopment found in developing countries was a direct result of these countries' connection to the economic systems of the industrialised countries of the North. They contend further that the economic resources of the developing countries were being drained northwards to the metropolises of the capitalist world, thereby making the African, Asian and Latin American countries dependent states.

Kwame Nkrumah's version of 'Neo-colonialism' and Andre Gunder Frank's 'Metropolis-Satellite' thesis of North-South associations form the

appropriate theoretical perspective for analysing the Sino-Africa relations. Nkrumah identifies the larger part of the developing world as historically entrenched in an exploitative association with the North. In his view, a state can be said to be a neo-colonialist or client state if it is independent *de jure* and dependent *de facto* (Nkrumah 1968: 1-7). By this, he contends that even after independence, former colonies in Africa, Asia and Latin America, remain under the control of the capitalist-imperialist forces composed of the developed countries in the North. He argues that these capitalist forces, in search of international capital, continue to exert control over their former territories through international trade, aid and investment policies tailored to sustain the movement of resources from the developing countries. As sources of raw materials, and markets for the developed countries, the developing countries had thus become client states.

After World War II, countries in the North reformed the capitalist-imperialist system culminating, firstly, in the elimination of the 'old-fashioned' system of operating colonies exclusively answerable to one capitalist-imperialist state and, secondly, in the replacement of 'national' imperialism by 'collective' imperialism (Nkrumah 1968:2). By national imperialism, Nkrumah refers to the form of imperialism in which one country exerts its control over its colonies. However, imperialism becomes collective when one former colony is at the mercy of the many countries controlling the capitalist-imperialist system. Although, China played a key role in the independence of African states by challenging the global capitalist system, questions have now emerged as to whether its current scramble, with the North, for Africa's resources does not add to the continent's 'collective imperialism'. Since collective imperialism also creates a conducive environment for what Nkrumah considers as the 'Trojan horses' of neo-colonialism (Biney 2012), any analysis of Sino-Africa relations requires one to go beyond tradition and the naked eye. While multinational corporations (MNCs), bilateral and multilateral aid institutions, and overseas technical advisors usually play an important developmental role in developing countries, they can also be used as Trojan horses tasked with the responsibility of blurring and extending neo-colonial influences across the developing world. Nkrumah argues that 'internationalisation' or 'syndication' helped the United States to fulfil two *sin qua non* conditions of expansion into the European market and the developing world market, and of militarising its economy on the pretext of increased global threats (Nkrumah 1968: 6). However, as Ali Mazrui suggests, globalisation can have positive and negative effects. It is negative when it allows itself to be handmaiden to ruthless capitalism ... deepens the divide between the haves and have-nots (Mazrui 2004 cited in Biney 2012).

Closely related to Kwame Nkrumah's version of 'Neo-colonialism', is Andre Gunder Frank's 'Metropolis-Satellite' thesis. Concerned with the underdevelopment of Latin American countries in the aftermath of independence, Frank analyses their association with the developed economies in the North. He begins with an argument that the underdevelopment of Latin American countries (at the time) was the result of its centuries-long participation in the process of world capitalist development (Frank 1966: 7) which had led to their massive de-capitalisation. He sees the global capitalist system as a chain of constellations of *metropoles* and satellites ... [running all the way] from its metropolitan centre in Europe or the United States to the furthest outpost in the Latin countryside (Ibid: 6). In the development of underdevelopment in Chile, Frank noted that Chile had become increasingly marked by the economic, social, and political structure of satellite underdevelopment (Ibid: 7). He sees the increased polarisation of developing countries' economic, social and political structures as effective means for continued satellisation. Therefore, one should understand the term, 'development of underdevelopment' as a connotation of the progression of satellisation and its damaging effects on Latin America and the rest of the developing world. The resource-based relations Africa has had with China over the last decade, which promotes exportation of raw materials and importation of finished products with very little, if any, technological transfer, and the indiscriminate adoption of the Chinese development model, may not only have a de-capitalisation effect, but could also make the continent China-dependent over the long-term. Notwithstanding other schools of thought on the current state of Sino-Africa relations, what is incontestable is the fact that in the wake of China's economic revolution, fostered by the *zouchuqu*, Chinese capitalism is in the fast lane.

Although the common understanding has been that the developing countries would only succeed in overcoming underdevelopment and poverty by fundamentally restructuring the unequal exchange characterising the North-South linkages through the promotion of South-South relations, new evidence is beginning to suggest the emergence of neo-colonialism within the broad South-South relations and, particularly, in the Sino-Africa relations. Results of a survey conducted in Zambia in 2009, show that on aggregate, 41.8 per cent of the Zambian respondents 'agree' or 'strongly agree' that China practices neo-colonialism in African countries (Hess and Aidoo cited in Bello et al: 2014: 244-273).

Empirical Perspective

Since the end of the civil war, the Chinese industrial sector has had increased appetite for raw materials. Consequently, China's role in international trade

has been on the increase. Notwithstanding the chequered growth experiences of the decades proceeding the dawn of the new millennium, China's share of world merchandise imports has wheeled from a measly 0.6 per cent in 1948 to 10.6 per cent in 2013.

Sino-Africa trade has been rising throughout the last decade. The period 1999-2009 recorded an average of 28 per cent growth in Sino-Africa trade, measured by monetary value adjusted for inflation. This period also saw the Sino-Africa trade value increase twelve-fold (Haugen 2011:157-176). Consequently, in 2009, Africa became China's number one trade partner (PRC, 2013:3). The 2010-2013 period has particularly seen an upswing in Sino-Africa trade volume from US\$157 billion in 2010 to US\$160 billion in 2011 and US\$200 billion in 2013 (Antony 2013:134-149). However, an examination of what China exports to Africa and what Africa exports to China shows that, on one hand, manufactured goods, machinery, textiles and clothing and chemicals dominated China's exports to Africa. Alden shows that in 2005, machinery and transport equipment, and manufactures alone accounted for the greatest chunk of China's exports to Africa at US\$8 billion and more than US\$16 billion, respectively.

In value terms, by 2013, China's imports/exports aggregate had swollen to US\$4, 159 billion. This represented US\$1,950 billion imports value and US\$2,209 billion exports value. In the same year, China became the world's biggest merchandise trader followed by the United States whose imports and exports totalled US\$3,909 billion (WTO 2014:15-25). Table 1 shows the world's leading exporters and importers of merchandise in 2013.

Table 1: Leading Exporters and Importers in World Merchandise Trade in 2013

Exporters	Value (In Billion US\$)	Importers	Value (In Billion US\$)
China	2209	United States	2329
United States	1580	China	1950
Germany	1453	Germany	1189
Japan	715	Japan	833
Netherlands	672	France	681
France	580	United Kingdom	655
Republic of Korea	560	Hong Kong	622
United Kingdom	542	Netherlands	590

Source: Based on WTO, International Trade Statistics, 2014

As shown in Table 1, China is not only the world's top exporter of merchandise but also the second biggest importer after the United States. With respect to Africa, Sino-Africa trade totalled US\$222 billion in 2014, an upsurge of 6 per cent from 2013. This represented US\$117 billion and US\$105 billion worth of imports and exports, respectively (Standard Bank 2015). In the same year (2014), China recorded a US\$12.5 billion trade deficit in its trade with Africa.

Although some scholars, such as Ayodele and Sotola (2014), have correctly argued that China's trade deficit with Africa is not due to its oil imports from the continent on account of the fact that only 9 per cent of China's oil imports come from the continent, it is important to note also that China's resource imports from Africa are not restricted to oil. Trade data show that although China's export value to Africa has risen geometrically from below US\$10 billion in 2000 to over US\$60 billion in 2010, Africa's export volume to China in non-oil and mining products, on the other hand, has only grown numerically during the same period. This means that although Africa exports more than it imports from China, its exports are generally raw materials (Hanusch 2012: 492-516). For instance, in 2010, mineral commodities accounted for about 64 per cent of Africa's exports to China (Alves, 2013: 207-226). This means that commodities dominate Africa's exports to China while finished goods dominate China's exports to Africa. Table 2 shows the distribution of China's direct investment in Africa, by sector, at the end of 2011.

Table 2: Distribution of China's Direct Investment in Africa by the End of 2011

Agriculture-related	2.5%
Wholesale and Retail	2.7%
Science, Technology and Geological Prospecting	4.1%
Leasing and Business Services	5.0%
Manufacturing	15.3%
Construction	16.4%
Mining	30.6%
Finance	19.5%
Real Estate	1.1%
Others	2.8%

**Source:* Based on Figures by PRC, Information Office of the State Council White Paper, 2013.

When the data in Table 2 is aggregated, the resource sector dominates China's direct investment in Africa. For example, mining (30.6 per cent), construction (16.4 per cent) and science, technology and geological prospecting (4.1 per cent), which are all resource-related investments, account for 51.1 per cent of China's direct investment to the continent. Even the remaining sectors are in many ways connected to resources. It is also important to note that resource-rich African countries play a major role in China's trade deficit. For instance, although Sub-Saharan Africa has maintained a trade deficit with China, fewer than a half of the countries (notably Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Equatorial Guinea) have a trade surplus with China (IMF 2013: 5). Precisely, 17 out of 53 African countries enjoy mounting surpluses owing to their rich oil and mineral endowments, while the majority face widening deficits due to their enormous importation of Chinese goods (Muyakwa 2009: 7).

Although there have been some policy initiatives, such as China's preferential tariff scheme, aimed at promoting the export of finished goods from Africa to China, very little has been achieved owing to a number of factors. Firstly, although the number of African product lines granted zero-tariff status had increased from 454 in 2007 to 478 in 2009, resource products such as copper, cobalt and marble constituted the bulk of the tariff-free import value (Eisenman 2012: 793-810 and Van Beek 2012: 389-408). And, secondly, African countries' non-resource exports to China such as textiles, cotton, salt and sulphur, raw hides and skins, coffee and tea, and fish and crustaceans could not compete on the Chinese market (Ibid). Thirdly, China's carnivorous appetite for Africa's commodities has not given the continent a chance to diversify into manufacturing. Currently, most resource-rich countries on the continent can easily be diagnosed with 'Dutch Disease', a term coined by *The Economist* magazine in the 1970s to describe the appreciation of the Dutch currency and a reduction in its non-oil exports after it discovered oil and gas deposits in the North Sea in the 1960s. Therefore, the current Sino-Africa trade pattern is perfectly orienting the continent towards long-term dependency on China on both sides of the trade equation.

Another important interesting pattern in Sino-Africa relations is that whereas China's exports to Africa are distributed widely, its imports from the continent are highly concentrated in a few resource-rich countries. In 2009, data showed that while China obtained \$ 100 million from exports of goods to 38 African countries, it spent the same amount on imports from only 23 African countries (Haugen 2011: 157-176). On the one hand, about 60 per cent of China's exports are destined for six African countries and are

distributed as follows: South Africa (21 per cent), Egypt (12 per cent), Nigeria (10 per cent), Algeria (7 per cent), Morocco (6 per cent) and Benin (5 per cent) (AfDB 2011: 14 and Van de Looy cited in Biggeri and Sanfilippo 2009: 31-54). On the other hand, an enormous 70 per cent of China's imports from Africa come from only four countries, namely: Angola (34 per cent), South Africa (20 per cent), Sudan (11 per cent) and Republic of Congo (8 per cent). Whereas manufactures dominate the exports to populous African countries, fuels and mining products, and agricultural products constituted the lion's share of China's imports from resource-rich African countries. These data indicate that the search for markets and raw materials are the two foremost factors in China's relations with Africa. Therefore, although African countries could benefit from the intensification of relations with China, their fortunes are restricted by their low no-commodity exports to China. Meanwhile, since Africa provides the raw materials and the market for Chinese manufactures, China's benefits from this relationship is two-fold (Grauwe et al 2012: 15-45), and, therefore, superior.

A continent struggling with escalating unemployment rate and abject poverty, Africa's efforts towards value-addition and diversification, which have in the past been blamed on the colonial past, may equally be blamed on this emerging neo-colonialist economic order in Sino-Africa relations. This argument is echoed by Henning Melber, who contends that Sino-Africa relations were a reproduction of the classical skewed pattern: raw materials on the one side (Africa) and (value-added) manufactured goods on the other (China). From this perspective, it is clear that the coming of new players, like China, has not brought about any significant transformation to the traditional global relations (Melber 2013:437-450) anchored on exploitation, territorial inequality and injustice.

However, the continent's infrastructural development has particularly benefited from Chinese aid and the resources-for-infrastructure (RFI), also called infrastructure-for-resources (IFR) or the 'Angola Mode' agreements. Economic data show that by 2010, about 2,180 Chinese companies had spread their commercial interests across Africa while nearly 8,000 development projects, financed by China, were underway. These projects were mainly in areas of investment that have long gestation periods such as electricity power stations, ports, airports, freeways (Li et al 2012, cited in Melber 2013:437-450), among others. From the year 2000, the RFI deals, have been on the rise. In this arrangement, resource-rich African countries need not worry about their lack of creditworthiness as China is willing to construct the infrastructure in exchange for natural resources. Using the Export and Import (ExIm) Bank of China, China has applied this mode

to finance infrastructure development in some African countries: US\$4.5 billion to Angola in 2004 in exchange for oil supplies; US\$3 billion to Gabon in 2006 in exchange for manganese exploration rights and US\$9 billion to the DRC in 2007/08 in exchange for cobalt mining development (Alden and Alves 2009: 9). Other deals were the US\$4 billion oil-drilling license signed between China and Nigeria in 2006. In return, Beijing was to construct a rail system and some power stations for Nigeria (BBC 2006 cited in Alden and Alves 2009: 9). Although some Chinese sources of official trade and investment data, such as the Information Office of the State Council and Xinhua, have tended to show how much Africa was benefiting from these Chinese infrastructure deals and foreign direct investment (FDI), they have not adequately presented the other side of the coin. By the same token, most of the sources in the North have been unable to adequately appreciate the benefits accruing to African countries from Chinese investments.

An analysis of China's resources-based infrastructure projects in Africa should, as a starting point, acknowledge the fact that the 'Angola Mode' provides African countries with a no-traditional method of infrastructure development financing. Unlike the North's traditional development financing mode in which African countries borrow hard cash to be repaid in monetary form over a period of time, in the 'Angola Mode', Chinese multinationals construct the needed infrastructure using the African country's resources as security. Once a deal has been signed, China is allowed to import particular resources while helping the exporting country to develop its key infrastructure, usually power plants, transport and telecommunications, which they would have problems to finance with their own means or the highly tied traditional multilateral loans. It is also important to recall that China itself utilised this mode of development financing to acquire industrial technology after its civil war. For instance, in 1977, China agreed a deal with Japan in which the latter was to supply high technology to be repaid using coal and oil (Arase cited in Norfund 2011:5). The following year, China acquired a US\$10 billion credit line from Japan to finance the importation of heavy industrial equipment. China was to pay by exporting US\$10 billion worth of coal and oil to Japan (Takamine 2006:7 cited in Norfund 2011:5). China's reformist leader, Deng Xiaoping, one of the protagonists of this mode of financing once remarked:

In order to hasten the exploration of our coal and petroleum, it is possible that on the condition of equality and mutual benefit, and in accordance with accepted practices of international trade such as deferred and instalment payments, we may sign long-term contracts with foreign countries and fix several production sites where they will supply complete sets of modern

equipment required by us, and we will pay for them with the coal and oil we produce (Norfund 2011:4-5).

Many African countries, especially those coming out of decades of internal turmoil such as Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo have found this mode of financing suited for accelerating their post-war reconstruction. Table 3 is a summary of some of the African countries that have benefited from China's RFI deals in recent years.

Table 3: Some Major Resource-based Infrastructure Projects in Africa Financed by China, 2001-2007

Country	Year of Commitment	Resources Involved	Construction Project
Congo Rep.	2001	Oil	Congo River Dam
Sudan	2001	Oil	El-Gaili Power Station
Angola	2004	Oil	Power, Transport, ICT and Water Portions
Nigeria	2005	Oil	Power Turbine Plant at Papalanto
Guinea	2006	Bauxite	Souapiti Dam Project
Gabon	2006	Iron	Belinga Oil Reserve
Zimbabwe	2006	Chromium	New Coal Mines and Power Stations
Ghana	2007	Cocoa	Bui Dam Hydro-Power Project

Source: Extract from C. Cassel et al, Building African Infrastructure with Chinese Money, 2010

However, although Africa has become China's second largest overseas construction project contract market and the fourth largest investment destination (PRC 2013:3), most of these engagements are seemingly designed in a way that does not yield African countries long-term economic advantages.

Firstly, the RFI mode that China and African countries have gone into is not adequately anchored on technological transfer to the latter. Although China used this mode of financing to transfer industrial technology from Japan and other countries, most African countries seem more interested in seeing the erection of the actual physical infrastructure than in acquiring appropriate Chinese technologies for their own sustained economic development.

At the same time, there is very little China is doing to help African countries develop appropriate technology that can be used by the micro, small and medium enterprises, and by small-scale farmers involved in productive

activities. Despite African governments signing infrastructure and investment deals with China, most African entrepreneurs still lack basic financial capacity, and small-scale and intermediate technologies to enable them participate meaningfully in adding value to their own countries' resources. Instead, it is the Chinese multinationals that have dominated infrastructure development and the extractive industry. As Alves (2013: 207-226) puts it, the expansion of the RFI loans to Africa enables Beijing to promote the expansion of its construction companies abroad while accessing strategic resources. Although Chinese-financed projects in Africa employ Chinese machinery, this does not necessarily amount to technological transfer because no local capacities are being developed to enable Africans acquire skills and technologies. The peripheral role played by Africans in Chinese projects adds to the problem. Most of the technical jobs in these projects are performed by Chinese workers while African workers perform mainly those functions that do not enable them acquire critical skills such as loading and offloading, pushing of wheelbarrows and preparation of food at project sites. Consequently, Africa is bound to remain dependent on China in the long-term. This scenario suits China in both the short term and the long term as it is assured of a sustained dominant economic position on the continent.

Secondly, the degree of involvement of Chinese firms in Africa's infrastructure projects also signals the revolving nature of the Chinese project finances. The bidding process for the resource-backed infrastructure projects is devoid of transparency and competitiveness, with Chinese firms deliberately favoured. For example, in 2006, when the ExIm Bank extended a US\$4 billion loan to Angola for its post-war reconstruction in exchange for 10,000 barrels of oil per day, only 30 per cent of Angolan firms could be allowed to tender for the works because of a condition in the deal which required that 70 per cent of the works be set aside for Chinese firms (Naidu et al 2009:87-115). This is not only a technological transfer barrier, but an effective method of curtailing African enterprises from growing to a level where they could one day challenge the positions held by the Chinese multinationals on the continent. This view is shared by the famous international scholar and author on Sino-Africa relations, Chris Alden, who, *inter alia*, writes:

As an 'economic competitor', China is engaged in a short-term 'resource grab' which, like some Western counterparts, takes little account of local needs and concerns, whether developmental, environmental or with respect to issues of human rights. Coupled with Chinese manufacturing and trade wherewithal, this approach suggests that African development gains are being challenged, if not undermined by Chinese competitiveness (Alden 2007: 6).

Since most of the development projects are signed confidentially between the Chinese government officials and African leaders, Melber (2013: 437-450) is correct in suggesting that in most cases, resource deals between China and African countries tend to benefit China and its business accomplices at the expense of the ordinary people in the resource-rich countries, who continue to live under abject poverty and deprivation despite their proximity to precious resources. In Zambia, government security wings announced in mid-May 2015 that they were investigating the leakage of a state security document following a revelation by the country's leading independent newspaper, *The Post*, on 9 May, that the Zambian government had concealed a US\$ 192 million loan it secretly contracted from China to improve state security (*The Post*, 2015). Zambia's President, Edgar Lungu, reacted by stating that government could not reveal how many guns it intended to buy. However, while the elite in the country's power structures could benefit from such secretive deals, the poor masses are left to endure the resulting socioeconomic deprivation.

Alden (2007) suggests that China in Africa could also be categorised as a 'coloniser'. The interpretation of China as a 'coloniser' is based on the view that China's new engagement with Africa is a part of a long-term strategy aimed at displacing the traditional northern orientation of the continent by forging partnerships with African elites under the rubric of South-South solidarity (Ibid). Alden further argues that once China has successfully dominated the continent, it could use its position to put African countries under Chinese control. In its new foreign policy, China has placed the need for raw materials to feed its buoyant industrial sector while searching for international markets. This particular set-up, could rightly qualify some African states as China's client states, thereby justifying the neo-colonial howls in the beleaguered current Sino-Africa economic relations. This is in spite of China not having operated any colony.

Notwithstanding the above descriptions of China, Alden (2007) argues that, China could also be understood as Africa's 'development partner'. Alden explains 'China as a development partner' in terms of the various efforts by China itself, driven by its economic needs, to share with Africa and other developing countries its development experiences. In this respect, China has used bilateral aid to support Africa's social and economic sectors. A continent whose underdevelopment has been blamed on its century-long exploitative interaction with Europe, Africa has found solace in Chinese investments and development aid. As at 2013, over 2,000 Chinese enterprises of varying sizes and economic persuasions were doing business in 50 African countries and regions (PRC 2013:5). They are mostly involved in mining,

oil and gas exploration, construction, agriculture, manufacturing, resource processing, finance, commercial logistics and real estate (Ibid). Recent years have particularly seen an expansion of Sino-Africa educational and cultural exchanges, the emergence of new business areas like financial services, increased investments in agriculture and recalibrated long-term supply agreements for infrastructure to cover new social offsets not seen in deals hitherto (Alden and Large 2011: 21-38).

Knotty Questions in Sino-Africa Relations

In a nutshell, the question of whether the new Sino-Africa relations are 'win-win' or 'win-lose' can be summed up by a condensed reflection on the following issues, some of which have already been introduced in the preceding text.

Twenty-first century Scramble for Africa

Parallel to the eighteenth century scramble for Africa by Europe, there is a widely-held view that China is seeking relations with African countries purely to exploit the abundant resources of the continent and feed its firms back home with the raw materials they need, with little or no interest in Africa's development. With this demand for raw materials in the home industry engaging into overdrive, China needs swift methods of material acquisition. Consequently, while the North will expect hard currency from its investments or loans, China is happy to accept alternative methods of payment (Teunissen 2005, cited in Gasser 2010: 5-6) such as the Angola Mode. China is extending RFI loans to African countries in order to expand its overseas construction companies and connect them to key resources (Alves 2013: 207-226).

A notable difference between the twenty-first century Scramble for Africa and the earlier version is said to be the former's adoption of a 'soft power' strategy. The term 'soft power' was coined by Joseph Nye in 1990 when explaining the reducing importance of the use of 'hard (coercive) power' in the post-Cold War global order and the rising importance of non-coercive tools of foreign policy ... to get others to want what you want (Nye 2009: 160, cited in Fijalkowski 2011: 223-232). In Joseph Nye's view, the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals and policies are important non-coercive (or soft power) instruments that it can use to obtain what it wants from the new international political and economic order (Zaharna et al 2014:9). Through the use of 'soft power', it is possible for a country to exploit another through attraction. China has been accused of using this strategy to sign resource deals with African countries. Its

foreign policy principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in another country's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence, which appeal to most African countries may be considered as 'soft power' crafts. The rapid establishment of Confucius institutions across Africa by the Chinese Government has also been viewed as a 'soft power' strategy by some commentators. Zaharna et al (2014:9) see the rapid spread of the Confucius institutes, whose mission is the spreading of Chinese language and culture, as parallel to the cultural diplomacy of the North whose institutions such as the British Council, and the American Centre have, for decades, been used in promoting their countries' cultures and languages overseas. At the end of 2013, there were 440 Confucius institutes in 115 countries and regions in the world (Ibid).

As noted earlier, while the Angola Mode has helped some African countries in developing their infrastructure and in creating employment, concern has arisen because not only is the true value of such resources not well known, but the continent is also losing the opportunity for value addition. This is making it difficult for the African countries to attain the far-fetched dream of economic diversification, leaving them as enclaves for raw materials, facing limited opportunities for sustained development (Kamwanga and Koyi 2009:7), leading to deindustrialisation, rising unemployment and poverty while sustaining Africa's dependency on China. With regard to the new scramble for Africa, it has been observed that:

Africa is still paramountly an uncharted continent economically, and the withdrawal of the colonial rulers from political control is interpreted as a signal for the descent of the international monopolies upon the continent's natural resources. This is the new scramble for Africa, under the guise of aid and with the consent and even welcome of young, inexperienced States. It can be even more deadly for Africa than the first carve-up, as it is supported by more concentrated interests, wielding vastly greater power and influence over governments and international organisations (Nkrumah 1965:109).

As observed by Geda et al (2013:118-138), another problem with the boom in Africa's commodity exports to China is that of the 'Dutch Disease'. With the economic rent from commodity exports, driven by the Chinese demand, the manufacturing sector in Africa faces stagnation. Ironically, African countries have resorted to importing from China, what they should be producing locally. The slowdown in China's growth rate in the last couple of months, has already begun to reduce the export earnings and causing currency depreciation in many resource-rich African countries.

Unfair Trade Practices

Some Chinese nationals stand accused of taking over certain economic lines preserved for the capital-starved and self-employment seeking locals in market stands. The selling of cheap Chinese goods has exacerbated the situation, thereby pushing out of business even those locals who had been allocated stands. Local producers of basic goods such as handicrafts, fruits and vegetables are facing stiff completion from Chinese nationals selling low-quality-low-price goods. Zambia's former Trade, Commerce and Industry Minister, Dipak Patel once pointed out this dilemma: 'Does Zambia need Chinese investors who sell shoes, clothes, food, chickens, eggs in our markets when the indigenous people can (several, cited in Alden 2009: 49). However, this problem has not only been reported in Zambia. Elsewhere, it has been reported that China's competition on the African market is having some harmful effects on certain sectors. For example, in countries such as Lesotho, Madagascar, Kenya and South Africa, sectors like clothing have faced very stiff competition from cheap Chinese products to the extent that some local firms have had to scale-down their operations and lay off some workers (Warmerdam and Van Dijk 2013: 271-295).

Another emerging problem is that of reported dumping effects by China. Surely, as China continues in its economic top gear, and as the African countries continue to rely heavily on commodity exports, the new problem of South-South dumping is likely to take a more serious toll on the continent's industrial sector. Already, the cheap Chinese goods could be killing the nascent industry on the continent. This problem is not limited to consumer goods alone because Africa has also become an end user of both simple and sophisticated Chinese technology. Although, one of the most deeply-rooted attitudes towards technology in industrial countries is the belief that technologies are value-free and transferable [and that] they are associated with values only in the ways they are utilised (Turok 1979: 88), one does not need to sleep over it. Clearly, some of the practices in Sino-Africa relations expose the weaker African economies to technological dumping effects and the nurturing of a Sino-dependency syndrome among African countries and peoples.

In countries like Zambia, Chinese investments have been accused of lacking transparency and fair-play. As an opposition leader at the time, Zambia's Michael Sata (now late), accused the Chinese of having used corruption to acquire the Chambeshi Copper Mine and the Sinazeze Coal Mine. He also accused the Zambian government of dubiously giving Chinese investors in the mining sector a generous 15-year tax exemption, and of excusing Chinese-owned mines from performing any corporate

social responsibility activities (Sata 2007: 6-7) when no similar incentives were extended to local and other investors.

Labour Exploitation

China's economic operations in Africa have come into conflict with the labour movement on the continent on many frontiers. These range from poor remuneration coupled with long working hours, to hazardous work environment, and blatant abuse of workers' rights. With the increase in construction activities in Africa by Chinese firms, Alden reports the failure to substitute African workers for Chinese workers in the recent flurry of Chinese infrastructure projects across the continent, be they technicians, or un/semi-skilled labourers, is an important oversight with economic as well as political implications (2009: 45). The quest for low production costs seems to be the main motivation for this practice. The Chinese investors have, perhaps discovered that it is cheaper to pay a Chinese worker in Africa than an African worker. According to one study, Chinese labourers are paid US\$1 a day in Angola (as well as receiving food and housing) versus the US\$3-4 that non-Chinese companies are obliged to pay Angolan labourers (cited in Alden 2009:45). China has responded to this concern by increasing the number of Africans employed by its business firms and construction projects while complaints about low wages remain largely unattended to. In some cases, strange episodes of accidents and abuse of workers have been reported in Chinese-owned firms and projects.

Workers in Chinese-owned firms around Africa have complained of hazardous work environment and lack of occupational safety. In the DRC, Chinese mining companies have been found to violate both labour and environmental standards. In the mining region of Katanga, Chinese mines were cited for using child labour and for substandard health and safety conditions, forcing the DRC government to deport 600 Chinese nationals involved in the mining activities (Alden and Alves 2009: 18). In Zambia, similarly, Chinese-owned mines have been found culpable of endangering Zambian workers. An explosion at the munitions factory serving Chambishi (mine) in April 2005, which killed 46 Zambian workers (Alden 2009:74) is just one example.

Non-Interference

Through its non-interference policy in the affairs of other sovereign nations, China is accused of protecting totalitarian regimes and hurting human rights in Africa. In fact, some scholarly commentators hold the view that, due to

this policy, China is willing to establish cordial relations with any African country regardless of its governance record. For this reason, China's presence in countries such as Sudan, Niger Delta, and its support to Zimbabwe seems to give solidarity to bad governance on the continent. Some human rights activists have cited China's relations with Sudan and Zimbabwe as examples of how far Beijing can go in propping up unpopular leaders (Campbell 2008). Posing questioning on China's commitment to the principle of non-interference, in some war-torn resource-rich parts of Africa such as South Sudan, Chinese multinationals have been accused of financing the purchase of military weapons, helicopters, vehicles and war jets for the government forces, which have been used in committing crimes against humanity (Large 2007 and Taylor 2007 cited in Obi 2013). In 2007, Zhang Guoha, an executive director at the China Nuclear International Uranium Corporation (Sino-U), was kidnapped and later released, allegedly, by the armed group, Niger Movement for Justice (MNS), on suspicion that the multinational was financing the government's military weapons used to suppress the Tuareg uprising (*The China Monitor* 2007:19 cited in Obi, 2000: 93-109). A car bomb explosion by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) on 29 April 2006, which coincided with Chinese President, Hu Jintao's visit to Nigeria and the granting of four oil drilling licenses to Chinese oil companies by the Nigerian government valued at US\$4 billion, was followed by a statement to media houses by the rebel group demanding the immediate departure of the Chinese companies from the Niger Delta (Obi 2009:93-109). These and other similar events in other parts of Africa have cemented an opinion among some Africans that China will balk at nothing in trying to promote and protect its economic interests in Africa.

On their part, African leaders pledged to uphold peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights, and sound economic management as conditions for sustainable development when they adopted the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001 (NEPAD cited in Hodzi et al 2012:79-103). In view of China's reported activities on the continent, this may remain a pipe-dream.

Conclusion

Any fair comparison between North-South and Sino-Africa relations should show that, in both cases, resources have played a key role. This article argues that Sino-Africa relations have faced both good and challenging times. The period from the mid-1950s to the late 1970s, during which China actively supported the liberation struggle on the continent, reflects the very best days of 'win-win' relations between China and Africa. During this time, Africa got the support

it required in its struggle for independence, while China got the continent's support on the frontier of 'One China' policy. Africa also elevated China's significance on the global stage as a spokesperson for the developing world.

However, as the article argues, the period from 2000 to date, during which Sino-Africa relations have been re-established with a refocus on a business-like contact, has endured running commentaries of a decade of divided opinion. During this period, Africa has derived economic benefits from the relationship, mostly in the form of export opportunities for its commodities, infrastructure development and foreign investment. However, Sino-Africa relations have also seen the emergence of certain neo-colonial questions requiring answers. These emanate from the unfolding social, economic and political order that points to a new pattern of exploitation in which Beijing, as a southern metropolis, is competing with the North for the resources of the African countries and for the marketing of its manufactures. On account of the evidence and arguments presented and the theories employed in this article, a conclusion is reached that the new Sino-Africa economic relations, although still largely 'win-win' at the moment, could soon plunge into 'win-lose' relations in favour of China.

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Politics of Financialisation and Inequality: Transforming Global Relations for Inclusive Development

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Abstract

Inequality remains one of the most fundamental challenges of the contemporary world. It has become a global phenomenon which affects the underclass, the deprived and the poor both in the global north and south. Despite the advancement in technology which has fueled economic growth and fostered cross-national mobility of factors of production, inequality and its twin, poverty, remain major issues of inquiry among scholars, consideration for policy makers and concern for the poor. Most studies on inequality have been preoccupied with the economic forces. This article locates the growing degrees of inequality in the world within the global politics of financialisation in which the transnational capitalist class (TCC) adopts a reactionary ideology of neoliberalism to further their interest through the creation of massive fictitious wealth, maintenance of stranglehold on domestic and international policy institutions and spreading of the illogic of the sanctity of the market. I argue that capitalism in its current form is unsustainable for the human society. Consequently, the structure of power that informs and maintains the current order must be transformed to foster inclusive development. Despite the resistance to such transformations by the members of the TCC at the core, the process is inevitable due to the internal contradictions within the system itself, the emergence of new loci of power from different regions of the world and increased revolutionary pressures from below. Overall, the article concludes that there is an inextricable link between financialisation and global inequality.

Résumé

L'inégalité reste l'un des défis majeurs du monde contemporain. Elle est devenue un phénomène mondial qui affecte les classes inférieures, les démunis

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et les pauvres tant dans les pays du Nord que dans ceux du Sud. Malgré les progrès de la technologie qui ont alimenté la croissance économique et favorisé la mobilité transnationale des facteurs de production, l'inégalité et sa jumelle, la pauvreté, restent des questions d'intérêt majeur parmi les chercheurs, les décideurs politiques et une préoccupation pour les pauvres. La plupart des études sur les inégalités se sont préoccupées des forces économiques. Cet article situe les degrés croissants d'inégalité dans le monde dans la politique mondiale de financiarisation dans laquelle la classe capitaliste transnationale (CCT) adopte l'idéologie réactionnaire du néolibéralisme pour poursuivre leurs intérêts à travers la création d'une fictive richesse immense, le maintien de la mainmise sur les institutions politiques nationales et internationales et la propagation de l'illogisme du caractère sacré du marché. Je soutiens donc que le capitalisme dans sa forme actuelle est insoutenable pour la société humaine. En conséquence, la structure du pouvoir qui informe et qui maintient l'ordre actuel doit être transformée pour favoriser un développement inclusif. Malgré la résistance à ces transformations par les principaux membres de la CCT, le processus est inévitable en raison des contradictions internes au sein du système lui-même, l'émergence de nouvelles instances de pouvoir dans les différentes régions du monde et les pressions révolutionnaires croissantes, à partir de la base. Dans l'ensemble, l'article conclut qu'il existe un lien inextricable entre la financiarisation et l'inégalité dans le monde.

Introduction

The global capitalist system has witnessed massive transformations and changes over the past four decades. The changes have been informed by the shift in both theoretical nuances and policy at the core and periphery of global capitalism. Although there has been some improvement in the global economy in terms of the reduction in the numbers of people living in absolute poverty, inequality has increased in-country and between countries (Stiglitz 2012). These problems have in turn been exacerbated by high rates of unemployment; dwindling fortune of workers in terms of wages as share of corporate profits; intensification of regime of 'accumulation by dispossession'; shift from production and manufacturing to financialisation; excessive profits and bonuses for corporate executives; technicisation of production processes and change from community values to individualism (Guillen 2014; Nolke Heires and Bieling 2013).

The change in the nature of global capitalism from production to financialisation is not a natural evolutionary process. Rather, it was a deliberate art of political coalition among the group of pseudo-capitalists called '*capitalist rentiers and financists* who have derived massive benefits from the current neoliberal hegemony and financialisation' (Bresser-Pereira

2010:500). Bresser-Pereira describes capitalist rentiers as non-active capitalists such as stockholders who own no business enterprises in which they work, or contributes to their profits or expansion. On the other hand, he describes financists as the executives and traders who manage financial organisations or trade on their behalf, earning salaries and performance bonuses (p.500). Harvey (2007) provides a detailed historical account of how conservative intellectuals, business and political elites at the core of global capital such as the United States of America, Britain, Germany and Canada framed and institutionalised the global hegemony of neoliberalism as a political economic force which controls how global capitalism operates today. In what Wade (2013) calls the 'art of power maintenance', the US, despite the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, seeks to maintain the dominance of the neoliberal economic paradigm both at home and abroad.

Despite this resistance, I argue that capitalism in its current form is unsustainable for the human society. Consequently, the structure of power that informs and maintains the current order must be transformed to foster inclusive development. Notwithstanding the resistance to such transformations by the members of the TCC at the core, the process is inevitable due to the internal contradictions within the system itself, the emergence of new loci of power from different regions of the world and increased revolutionary pressures from below.

This article engages with the following questions, through the theoretical lenses of International Political Economy (IPE) and the theory of global capitalism (Robinson 2004): What is financialization and its link with the hegemony of neoliberal economic order? How have the financialisation processes contributed to inequality? What are the emergent alterations in the structure of global power that provides hope for transformation of global relations? What are the imperatives and the mechanisms for fostering such transformations? In the main, the article shows that there is an inextricable link between financialisation and global inequality.

Financialisation and the Hegemony of Neoliberalism

The theoretical foundation of the contemporary global capitalist order with its penchant for market orthodoxy took root in the 1960s when development economics was replaced by neoclassical economics (Gilpin 2001). Proponents of this variant of economics such as Alfred Marshall, Leon Walras and Vilfredo Pareto focused their theoretical explanation regarding the functioning of the economy on the attainment of equilibrium points. They consider the value of labour and the wages that the workers earn in terms of its marginal productivity. Contrary to the concerns of classical

economists such as David Ricardo and Jeremy Bentham for income equality and utilitarianism, neoclassical economics gives credence to capital and profit (see Marshall 1961; Pareto 1971).

In what Fine (2009) has aptly described as ‘Zombie Economics’, neoclassical economics became intertwined with mathematical abstraction and modelling under the steady guide of economists such as Paul Samuelson. As Bresser-Pereira (2010:500) notes, ‘neoclassical economics became a form of meta-ideology which legitimises mathematically and “scientifically” neoliberal ideology and deregulation’. By this devotion to mathematical abstraction, it delegitimises other social sciences disciplines such as sociology, anthropology and political science thus denying itself the needed multidisciplinary perspective and approach to understanding the challenges of the society. As Montgomerie (2008:233) argues,

attempts to draw ‘scientific’ conclusions require the adoption of many assumptions about individual and state behavior (mainly that both are rational acting utility maximizers) and an evaluation of change by molding social relationships discrete categories of dependent and independent variables... critical approaches reject these orthodox assumptions and methods by analyzing markets as constellations of social relationships.

The failure of the post-Keynesian principles of full employment to sustain economic growth, the collapse of state-owned enterprises and the economic crisis of the 1970s laid the basis for the enthronement of neoliberal economics in its most virulent form, which continues till today (Fine 2009). Both at the micro and macro levels, concern for profitability and cost efficiency became the dominant consideration in the formulation of economic policy. With the possible exception of Germany, most developed countries ensured that their industrial production sectors relocated to regions of low costs of labour in Asia, particularly China. In the place of industrial production was the emergence of new financial sheriffs and smart innovators of short-term financial products such as swap options, derivatives, bonds and securities with a promise of high return on investment within a short period of time.

The massive reforms in the public sector in United States of America and Britain under Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher were based on neoclassical economic principles of efficiency, equilibrium and profitability. The 1980s witnessed a gale of privatisation of state-owned enterprises, deregulation, deunionisation and a drive towards the financialisation of the economies of developed countries. A replica of these reforms was the Washington Consensus that James Williamson saw as the panacea to the debt crisis of Latin American countries (Williamson 1990). The structural adjustment programmes which African countries were made to adopt from

the 1980s also fall in this category. For detailed account of the structural adjustment programmes on African economies, see Soludo and Mkandawire (1999) and Olukoshi (1998), among others.

Riding on the historic wave of neoliberalism and globalisation, financialisation has become an important feature of the regime of accumulation that has defined the global capitalist system over the past three decades. Scholars have interrogated this episodic phenomenon from various perspectives which range from the development of new financial products; change in the core mandate of commercial banks from lending to arbitrage functions; substitution of manufacturing with financial markets; and, general redirection of economic activities from the real sector to intangible products as well as the primacy of the interests of shareholders and company executives at the expense of other stakeholders, especially labour (Zwan 2014; Nolke, Heires and Bieling 2013; Guillen 2010; Palley 2007). Palley (2007:2) sees financialisation as 'a process whereby financial markets, financial institutions, and financial elites gain greater influence over economic policy and outcomes'. He also notes that 'the principles of financialisation are to elevate the significance of the financial sector relative to the real sector; transfer income from the real sector to the financial sector and increase income inequality and contribute to wage stagnation' (p.2 cited in Zalewski and Whalen 2010). Epstein (2005, cited in Dore 2008: 1097-1098) sees financialisation as 'the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies'. Dore (2008) identifies four changes that have taken place in the global economy on account of financialisation over the past thirty years. These changes include:

an increase in the proportion of the income generated by the industrial/post-industrialized economies, which accrues to those engaged in the finance industry; the growth in and the increasing complexity of intermediating activities, very largely of a speculative kind, between savers and the users of capital in the real economy; the increasingly strident assertion of the property rights of owners as transcending all other forms of social accountability for business corporations, the increasing efforts on the part of government to promote an 'equity culture' in the belief that it will enhance the ability of its own nationals to compete internationally (Dore 2008: 1098).

The pursuit of geopolitical interests through financialisation has informed the use of international institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as well as private rating agencies to maintain the current dominance of global finance. Stiglitz (2002) narrates how the US Treasury, the IMF and the World Bank work in tandem with

one another to design and project economic policies which suit the interests of the country as global policies. Even though the latest global economic crisis has generated so much debate about the limitations of a financialised global economy, the US has continued to keep the current structure of power, preferring to use taxpayers money to bail out the so-called too big to fail banks and corporations.

Wade (2013) has demonstrated how the US government objected to the efforts of the General Assembly of United Nations to seek for reform the global financial system through the Stiglitz Commission on financial reforms of the international monetary and financial system in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. According to Wade, in objecting to the mandate of this Commission (where developing countries could have a say), the US insisted that it is only the IMF and the World Bank that have the capacity and responsibility to deliberate and take actions on global financial matters. The failure of these two institutions to prevent the crisis means nothing to the US as long as its interest remains covered and protected. Such reluctance on the part of the US further demonstrate the overbearing influence of conservative financial oligarchy and their lobby groups on the financial policy-making apparatus in the country. Given the dominant position of the US in global economy, this has implications for policy direction and possible solution to the problems of poverty and inequality (Stiglitz 2010)

Financialisation and Global Inequality

There is an inextricable link between financialisation and global inequality. This link is reinforced by the changes in the structure of finance capital, technological innovations, ideological orientations and values as well as the dynamics of global capitalism. While the above are the general conditioning factors, it must be emphasised that there are varieties of capitalism across countries and regional contexts. Thus, the experiences of Nordic countries are remarkably different from those of the Anglo-America world in the way financialisation has affected inequality. These differences are also noticeable in the periphery of global capitalism like Africa, where weak capacity for capital accumulation ensures greater degree of vulnerability to financialisation-induced crises.

Minsky (1990a, cited in Zalewski and Whalen 2010) uses the binary concept of managerial capitalism and managed-money capitalism to explain the changes in the structure of finance, the process of accumulation and the overall macro-economic performance and how these connect with inequality. Zalewski and Whalen (2010) elaborate thus:

During the period of managed capitalism, the financial structure was conservative with low debt levels and attenuated speculative impulses. Many leading corporations exercised considerable market power; and because they enabled them to generate sufficient cash flows to self-finance capital accumulation, they were generally insulated from shareholder demands. Moreover, macroeconomic conditions were largely stable and, aside from an occasional mild recession, the United States avoided serious economic disruption. Collectively, these forces led to a substantial accumulation of wealth that was more equitably distributed throughout society than in earlier decades (Zalewski and Whalen 2010:760).

Zalewski and Whalen further note that the aforementioned changes created the conditions from which managed-money capitalism emerged as 'the confluence of greater wealth, accelerating inflation, deregulation, and financial and technological innovation in the 1970s led to disintermediation as funds flowed from bank deposit accounts to mutual funds and securities' (p.760). As these processes evolved, the traditional roles of banks changed from bank-based to market-based systems, with the latter creating incentives for excessive risk-taking. Because the market-based system responds to and is fueled by innovation, company executives receive high pay and bonuses including compensation with stock options. In a bid to satisfy shareholders and boost equity values, wages of workers as well as their welfare become the first casualty. These lead to 'greater inequality and financial instability in the economy' (Zalewski and Whalen 2010:762). Guillen (2014) establishes the link between financialisation and financial profit. He sees financial profit as a kind of 'extra-ordinary surplus-value' which is appropriated by monopoly-financial capital by means of the monopolistic control it exerts on the issue and circulation of fictitious capital' (p.451).

The hegemony of the finance-dominated accumulation regime fosters inequality through emphasis on development of financial aspects at the expense of real products. As industry becomes dominated by banks and decline sets in industrial profits, finance capital seeks new ways of expression through the creation of new short-term products that can lead to high rate of returns. The internal contradictions that characterise this process inevitably lead to circles of booms and bursts, crisis and recovery, growth and decline and the attendant crisis of global capitalism. These contradictions are manifestations of the power of monopoly finance capital to see regulation as a disincentive to accumulation at the firm level as well national prosperity. The failure of regulation inevitably leads to crisis, (see Stiglitz 2010) which normally necessitates the imposition of austerity measures, the withdrawal of social services and the weakening of the capacity of the welfare state to support the poor and the vulnerable members of the society.

The change in the structure of the global economy from production to financialisation also has implications for low-skilled workers as well as small-scale industrial owners who now lack access to loans and credit. Using the Gini-coefficient that has been estimated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for some sets of countries to measure disposable household incomes, Zalewski and Whalen (2010:764) find that 'overall, the movement toward a greater reliance on financial markets has been accompanied by an increase in inequality'. Due to ideological orientations of political leaders, long-term tradition on the composition of the society and the differences in shared value of responsibility for decision-making, the varieties of capitalism among the Anglo-American world, the Nordic countries and Eastern European countries become obvious. In the study by Zalewski and Whalen, the rate of inequality in the Anglo-American world such as Britain and the United States of America is far higher than the Nordic countries. Correspondingly, the power that the United States exerts on the IFIs has ensured that type of capitalism that the country operates is transported to many developing countries of Africa, Latin America and Asia.

The weak base for capital accumulation in many developing countries makes their situations dire as it significantly increases their levels of inequality. Apart from the wide gap in within-country inequalities, the differences in the degree of capital accumulation and the depth of financial inclusion between developed and developing countries also foster between-country inequality in which case the developed countries have more per-capita income than developing or least developed countries. To summarise this section, it is argued that the increased financialisation of the global economy has created and accentuated conditions that foster between and within country inequalities.

Shifting Boundaries of Power and Alternatives to Financialisation

The decline in the industrial capacity of the United States of America and many of the member countries of the European Union represents the particularistic feature of capitalism. The search for higher degree of accumulation through reduction in the costs of operations, coupled with low rate of return on investment at the core of global capitalism has led to shifting boundaries of centres of industrial powers. The rise of China and the emergence of other industrial powers like India, Brazil and, to a large extent, South Korea present distinct possibilities for varying alternatives to the hegemony of finance-led global capitalism. Unlike the United States where the economy remains unduly financialised, the emerging countries

combine industrial production, technological innovation and agricultural revolution to boost economic growth. Countries such as Brazil, which did not follow the Anglo-American orthodoxy of full liberalisation, have succeeded in reducing poverty and inequality (Oloruntoba 2015).

The latest global economic crisis has clearly shown the limits of a financialised economy such as the European and US economies. Whereas these economies went to their lowest levels of growth and deficit in more than seventy years, the emerging countries showed resilience as they did not only successfully mediate their ways through the crisis, but have continued to grow (IMF 2011). Although China's rate of growth has declined in the past one year, the growth rate remains remarkably higher than the EU and US where financialisation still holds sway. Despite the inherent limitations of the Africa rising narrative (see Fioramonti 2014; Oloruntoba 2014), the continent has also been growing despite the crisis.

One of the challenges of financialised economies is the failure of regulation. The finance monopoly capital of the contemporary times has framed a narrative of 'too big to fail' in order to ensure that banks and corporations that are badly managed end up getting bailed out by the state in the event of crisis. The failure of regulation both at the domestic and international levels gives room for opportunistic and excessively risky behaviours by corporate executives in banks, investment and hedge-fund companies, which hurt household, national and the global economies. As Bresser-Pereira (2010:501) argues, 'the 2008 global crisis began as financial crises in rich countries usually begin, and was essentially caused by the deregulation of financial markets and the wild speculations such deregulation makes possible'.

It would appear that the emerging economies are avoiding this trap. Gallagher (2014) shows how emerging countries such as China, Brazil, India and others deployed the right mix of policies to exert control over the movement of capital in the period before and after the latest economic crisis. These policies effectively helped to limit the negative effects of the crisis over the respective economies. The relative stability and steady growth that these countries have experienced and continue to experience to a qualified extent, on account of creative regulation of capital, could spur a bandwagon effect to other newly industrialising countries. As noted earlier, the salience of power and consideration for geostrategic interests of the United States will compel the country to resist sudden displacement of the current regime of accumulation through financialisation. Such resistance is already playing out in the various moves of the United States to check-mate the rising influence of China. The control that the US exercises over the US dollar

as the international currency as well as in the IMF provides the country with political leverage to resist any change in the current order. However, various factors combine to turn the possibility that the new constellation of power of emerging countries present into a reality of transforming global relations and reducing global inequality. The next section deals with the issue of transforming global relations and reducing global inequality.

Imperative of Transforming Global Relations for Inclusive Development

The preceding sections have described the way financialisation of the global economy has fostered inequality both within and between countries. There are compelling reasons to transform global relations in such a way that global inequality will be reduced. These reasons have both historical and contemporary imports. Historically, the US had operated a variant of capitalism that ensured steady growth and shared prosperity among the citizens. Particularly, the Fordist regime of accumulation, which led to the 30 glorious years of capitalism from 1948 to 1977, was characterised by regulated financial markets, financial stability, high rate of economic growth and a reduction of inequality (Bresser-Pereira 2010:504). Stiglitz (2012) shows how the current regime of financialisation has divided the society between the haves and the have-nots, and between the richest one per cent and the 99 per cent who are struggling to survive. The fear that the majority of the population will not be able to afford education, and the resultant propensity to build dynasty of poverty both in the US and other parts of the world, necessitate a change from the current neoliberal paradigm.

Since power and interests are involved, the necessary change may not come easy. However, new political forces can emerge, especially with support from the middle class, that will force these changes in the US and elsewhere. The current rate of inequality in the US, especially in its racial essence, is not sustainable in the long run for peaceful co-existence in that society. Thus, political action is required to ensure that the gap between the rich and the poor is bridged through appropriate social policies, especially in education and health.

The imperative of transforming global relations is reinforced by the changes in the global geography of power in which emerging countries are now forming various alliances backed by relevant institutions. In particular, the decision of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) group of countries to establish the BRICS Development Bank may be a watershed in the ongoing realignment of forces for the reconfiguration of global power relations – the BRICS countries signed an agreement to set up a

bank with a \$100 billion liquidity reserves of \$50 billion, with each country contributing \$10 billion. The agreement also includes the establishment of a Contingency Reserve Arrangement in the first effort to balance the world financial order (Totten 2014). Apart from these concrete steps, the BRICS countries have also called for diversification in the portfolio of currency of international trade. They have also gone beyond mere rhetoric to engage in what Totten calls dollar-less BRICS energy deals, currency swaps and foreign direct investments. There is no doubt that these countries are well positioned to effect the changes in the global relations of financial powers at these auspicious times. Their cumulative contributions to the global economy as well as population invest them with the moral obligation to undertake this onerous task. As Totten (2014) notes, the BRICS countries collectively account for nearly \$16 trillion in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 40 per cent of the world population. As each country acts to maximize its own utility, the emerging economies of the BRICS nations can create a paralleling international financial system ultimately challenging the hegemony of the current western-dominated system.

The role of China in engendering the transformation in global relations of power is particularly significant. Given the country's rate of economic growth, its demand for minerals and other commodities as well as availability of surplus fund for investment abroad, China has been forming alliances and entering into trade and investment partnerships in all developing regions of the world, particularly Latin America and Africa. The close relationship that exists between China and Russia, which is demonstrated in their mutual commitment to topple the US dollar as a currency of international trade, are strong prospects for the decentralisation of global finance. The US may pre-empt the implications of de-dollarisation of international transactions on its economy and act such that the overdue reforms of the IMF are carried out without much further delay. The country also has an option of engaging in belligerent attitude towards China and Russia as well as seeking to break the BRICS alliance through divide and rule tactics. However, no matter the option that it takes, a new momentum that will lead to changes in the current financial order has started and this is likely to continue in the near future.

The significance of these new alliances and realignment of forces to reduce global poverty and inequality is the alternative that it presents to the current regime of accumulation that is based on financialisation. With the possible exception of South Africa with high degree of mineral exports and liberalised policy on capital flight, the BRICS countries owe their growth to industrialisation and manufacturing exports. To a significant extent, they also deviate from the mainstream orthodoxy of free market and

capital accounts liberalisation. Rather, they followed the path of cautious and calculated engagement with the globalisation processes.

Scholars have expressed concern over likely problems that may emerge from the BRICS alliance. For instance, Desai and Vreeland wrote in the *Washington Post* of 14 December 2014 that intra-country quibbles, lack of coordination, disputes at the WTO, absence of capacity for monitoring and surveillance, but, importantly, the structural disparity between the Chinese economy and those of other members of the alliance as the most likely reason why the BRICS Development Bank might not be able to make the expected changes in the global financial order (Desai and Vreeland 2014). Their skepticism was also borne out of the failure of previous regional initiatives such as the *Corporacion Andina de Fomento* (CAF) or Development Bank of Latin America which was formed by the Andean nations in the 1960s, the Chiang Mai Initiative of the Asian countries of 2000s and the Bank of the South established in 2009.

Desai and Vreeland note in respect of the dominant position of China in the BRICS that ‘the structural disparity between China and the rest of the BRICS members (the Chinese economy being larger than the economies of all other BRICS combined) is at the heart of the matter for any BRICS institution. China’s dominant position makes coordination in terms of operations and funding priorities difficult to imagine (Desai and Vreeland 2014). Despite these fears, there is no reason to expect a failure. What is important is for the BRICS member countries to guard against possible deliberate attempts by the US to sabotage the well-meaning efforts to transform the global financial relations.

There are several ways in which this can be achieved. First, is the recognition that what is at stake is power, hegemony and domination. Although the Anglo-American world is in decline, at least economically, the control that they exert over the global institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO remains intact. The need to maintain this control explains why the much-needed reforms at the IMF remain in limbo. The role of the US in this ‘art of power maintenance’ remains very critical (Wade 2013). Conservative political elites in the US remain hostile to any form of change in the current global order. As Desai and Vreeland note in their analysis of the prospects and challenges of the BRICS Development Bank, the US Congress only mentions the proposal for the reform of the IMF in the context of another issue. Even when this was mentioned, the proposal was rejected. In other words, the US Republican Party-dominated Congress is not particularly interested in supporting any meaningful reform of the IMF.

As mentioned earlier, the US also resisted the proposal of the sixty-third President of the United Nations General Assembly towards reform of the financial system back in 2008. For instance, in objecting to the decision of Migne d' Escoto, the sixty-third President of the United Nations General Assembly, to set up the Commission of Experts on Reform of the International Financial and Monetary System, the US delegate to the June 2008 conference argued that:

our *strong view* (emphasis mine) is that the UN does not have the expertise or mandate to serve as a suitable forum or provide direction for meaningful dialogue on a number of issues addressed in the document, such as reserve systems, the international financial institutions and the international financial architecture.

The US position fits well with how Arrighi (2004) and Braudel (1992) conceive financialisation. Guillen (2014:452) echoes the view of these scholars thus:

It is postulated that financialisations are not recent phenomenon of contemporary history, but have historically been linked to periods of hegemonic transition, where the hegemonic power of the moment as historical and contemporary phenomenon where the hegemonic power of the moment attempts to use its monetary and financial domination to preserve its position. Such is the case with the United States, the driving force behind contemporary financialization.

Given this reality and the abundance of evidence to support US's tactics to block progressive change, the BRICS countries must recognize the dynamics of geopolitical interests and respond accordingly. Recognition of this dynamic will also ensure that the BRICS countries manage any inevitable infighting that may arise in the discharge of both responsibilities and enjoyment of benefits of the new Bank. The governance structure of the development bank, which precludes new members joining the bank from going beyond certain thresholds, is a step in the right direction.

Resistance to the opposition of the US to the reforms of the international financial relations will require building alliances and cooperation with other developing countries, especially in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Global south cooperation and solidarity in the form of the Bandung accord of 1955 and the Group of 77+China is imperative. Such cooperation is needed to bolster greater support and inject additional resources to the BRICS Development Bank. Some of the countries in the global south that are not yet part of BRICS have substantial external reserves, sovereign wealth funds and pensions that are currently held in US banks and in US dollars. These funds can be withdrawn, converted to another currency and channelled to

the BRICS Development Bank, thereby increasing the quantity of money available to boost development.

Apart from the stated goals of the new BRICS Development Bank to help countries in difficult economic situations, another way they can help in transforming global financial relations is to ensure that they follow a different path in managing the mobility of capital. As Gallagher (2014) has argued, BRICS countries have, to a large extent, engaged in capital controls before and during the last global economic crisis. The decision of the BRICS countries to de-dollarize international trade through the use of other currencies should also be followed through.

Conclusion

The article has examined how financialisation of the global economy has fueled global inequality over the past four decades. The change from the Fordist regime of accumulation to a new form of financial oligarchy, especially at the core of global capitalism, has global implications. The inherent contradictions in the financialised global economic structure inevitably lead to crises. Such crises, as a UN Report shows, are ‘demonstrations of failure at many levels-of theory and philosophy, of institutions, policies and practices, and less overtly of ethics and accountability’ (UN, 2009:1). Continuation of the economic practices that foster inequality is favoured by powerful forces whose interests are satisfied by the current economic structure both at the firm and national levels is problematic. The role of the US in maintaining the current global economic order is particularly emphasised in the article.

The article also argues that the necessary change in the global geography of power from the Anglo-America controlled capitalist system to a more diversified one under BRICS could portend great possibilities for transforming global relations. The establishment of the BRICS Development Bank and the seemingly firm determination of the BRICS countries to de-dollarize their international transactions present a bright prospect for altering the current global economic power structure a way that will have multiplier effects on efforts geared toward reduction in global inequality.

Given the link between deregulation, capital account liberalisation and global economic crisis, it is imperative that regulation should be taken more seriously. The last global economic crisis brought to the fore the imperative of effective regulation of capital both at the domestic and international levels. At the national level, the capacity of the state should be strengthened to regulate capital in a way that will ensure a right balance between accumulation and investment in productive sectors of the economy. A right balance also needs to be ensured between the state and the market.

The last global economic crisis laid bare the fallacy of market perfection and efficiency. Furthermore, the role of the central bank in the national economy should also be defined in such a way that it engages more critically in supporting overall macro-economic performance rather than simply targeting inflation or interest rates (UN 2009). At the international level, the need to restructure the international financial institutions cannot be over-emphasised.

As the IMF has proved incapable of correctly pre-empting or effectively addressing the crisis of global capitalism, a new global financial architecture in form of a World Finance Organization whose motive force is effective regulation of capital and optimum allocation of financial resources for development should be created. In this regard, the proposed world body can also be responsible for exercising control over illicit financial inflows from developing to developed countries.

Regardless of how entrenched the power of the transnational capitalist class is in maintaining the current levels of inequality, it will be in their long-term enlightened self-interest to work toward the reduction of inequality. Apart from the inevitable violence that may result from the continued impoverishment of the subaltern classes, inequality among and within countries disrupts the maximisation of social well-being for all citizens. Inequality will also continue to fuel migrations from regions of low development to regions of high development with all the attendant consequences regarding inevitable increases in security and social spending. Lastly, moving from financialisation to a manufacturing-based economy with high labour intensity content is one sure way to reduce inequality. Where they exist at all, the current industrial policies in Africa, as elsewhere, are unduly capital-intensive and technology-driven. Given the low rate of skill acquisition in most parts of the continent, it is imperative to formulate industrial policies that promote low capital and high labour-intensive manufactures (Motsosi 2015). This way, low-skilled people can be employed, and hence lead to the reduction in inequality.

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Development is Resistance

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Abstract

The main the argument of this article is that, in our epoch, resistance against imperial domination is the first law of motion of development. How did I come to this conclusion? I came to it through a critical look at the existing theories of development, and through my active participation in over fifty years of Africa's struggle to 'develop'. The article looks at various aspects of the theory and practice of 'development', focusing mainly on the theory as expounded by economic theoreticians for the last three hundred years. The article also makes use of specific cases or case studies to sharpen its main argument and support the conclusion reached. The discussion is situated firmly in the context of the harsh reality of imperialism. The west suffers from an acute case of amnesia when it comes to recognising imperialism ... and its role in destroying the cultural, economic and social roots of Africa's (admittedly slow) evolution into self-sustaining and respected members of the international community. Today, Africa's economy is shattered – devastated – by the so-called 'free trade' dogma. I can say with some degree of authority as a political-economic historian that there has never existed anything called 'free trade' – never.

Résumé

L'argument principal de cet article est que, à notre époque, la résistance contre la domination impériale est la première règle de l'action de développement. Comment suis-je arrivé à cette conclusion? J'en suis arrivé à travers un regard critique sur les théories de développement existantes, et ma participation active à plus de cinquante ans de lutte pour « développer » l'Afrique. Cet article aborde divers aspects de la théorie et de la pratique du « développement », en se focalisant principalement sur la théorie telle qu'exposée par les théoriciens économiques au cours des trois derniers siècles. L'article se fonde également sur des cas spécifiques ou des études de cas pour étayer son argument principal et soutenir la conclusion. Le débat se situe bien dans le contexte de la dure

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réalité de l'impérialisme. L'Occident souffre d'un cas aigu d'amnésie lorsqu'il s'agit de reconnaître l'impérialisme ... et son rôle dans la destruction des racines culturelles, économiques et sociales de l'évolution de l'Afrique (certes lente) vers des membres autonomes et respectés de la communauté internationale. Aujourd'hui, l'économie de l'Afrique est brisée – dévastée – par le soi-disant dogme « de libre-échange ». Je peux dire avec une certaine autorité en tant qu'historien politico-économique que il n'a jamais existé quelque chose appelé « libre échange » – jamais.

Introduction

Development is not reducible to 'growth'. In fact, 'growth' and the 'GDP' (Gross Development Product) are laughable concepts. They are paraded by academic economists (sadly also in the universities in Africa and the South) as well as by institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as their key concepts for measuring 'development'. Unpack (or to use a fancy word – 'deconstruct') 'growth' and 'GDP', and you will find a can of worms.

Study the GDP of, for example, the US and the UK. The more bombs they produce and deploy – mostly outside of their own countries – the more their GDP grows!¹ The US is fighting 74 different wars ... that the government will publicly admit. ² Every time the US unleashes war, its GDP grows ... and so does the misery of the rest of the world. And when the latter countries rebuild their economies (often by American corporations, as in the 2003-11 Iraq war), it is now these countries that show increased GDP! It is truly bizarre.

There are billions of people on earth that have inadequate access to food, fuel, housing and medicines; and yet the world's GDP grows by the year. By official reckoning, Africa has been 'enjoying' an enviable 6 to 7 per cent growth a year for the last several years, and yet millions of people are 'internal refugees' – denied elementary access to means of survival – whilst thousands perish in the Mediterranean. At the time of writing this article, the European Union was drawing up plans for military attacks on Libyan targets to stop migrant boats – to cut the 'supply side', as they say. Britain was drafting a UN Security Council resolution that would authorise it to bomb vessels used by human traffickers around Libya – offshore and inshore. And so it goes – the more Europe bombs the more Europe's GDP increases!

Another 'laughable' addition to the GDP of the world is the drugs trade. Statistics about profits from the drug trade are largely difficult to secure because of the trade's illicit nature. In its 1997 *World Drugs Report* the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimated the value of the market at

\$4 trillion, ranking drugs alongside arms and oil among the world's largest traded goods.³ An online report published by the UK Home Office in 2007 estimated the drug market in the UK at £4-6.6 billion a year.⁴ In 2013, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency made 1,501,043 arrests for drug law violations.⁵ And so it goes ...the more arrests are made and people thrown into jail, the more the United States' GDP grows! What can be more ridiculous as a measurement of 'growth' or 'development'? It is not just laughable – it is tragic!

All Economic Theories are Ideologies

All economic theories, without exception, are ideologies. As such, they have a certain descriptive content based on social, economic and political realities on the ground, and also a normative content – on how society or economy should be organised. The descriptive part is subject to empirical verification. It is the normative content that distinguishes one ideology from another, for that is derived from a subjective assessment of one's values guided by one's circumstances. When an ideology is shared by a group or a collection of people, it acquires the identity of that group – class, race, gender, religion, and so on. The interesting thing for social historians is that the dominant classes have always managed to hide or obscure their class identities and the ideological content of these theories. This is not through deliberate manipulation by the educational and media infrastructure (although that too), but essentially because the ruling classes genuinely believe that their economic theories are 'scientific' and beneficial to everybody.

There is a vast literature on this subject, and therefore I will be brief and limit myself to demonstrating – in broad strokes – the fundamentally Eurocentric (or Euro-American-centric) basis of the dominant economic theories that have reigned ever since the rise of capitalism as a world system, some five hundred years ago. I do not particularly like to go into the history of economic theory (because this might be a familiar subject to many of the readers of this article), but it is important that we go through this for the sake of those who are not familiar with it – in order to clearly lay out the ideological terrain that is at the root of the developmental crisis of our times.

From the Physiocrats to the 'Chicago School'

The ideology of this epoch is spawned and spread by the dominant ruling classes that control global capital. Significantly, this ideology has remained more or less intact over the last 300 years. In the eighteenth century, the mainly French economic thinkers collectively known as the *Physiocrats* argued that agriculture was the basis of all wealth. But in the nineteenth

century, and in particular since the Napoleonic Wars in which England defeated France, the English managed to beat the French in being the first nation to industrialise, and to spread its mercantile empire throughout the global system.

Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776) more or less codified and systematised the mercantilist-colonialist argument. He argued, essentially, that left to the free market, its 'invisible hand' will allocate national and global resources to their most efficient, an argument further refined by David Ricardo with his theory of comparative advantages.

America, then a colony of England, was persuaded by the English to specialise in the production of agricultural commodities (cotton, tobacco, etc.), where, the English argued, its 'comparative' advantage lay – leaving it to England to do the manufacturing. Alexander Hamilton, among others, challenged the theory, and out of this was born the American School of economics rooted in Hamilton's economic principles, which was that America needed, also, to industrialise, and therefore needed its natural resources at home and not exported to 'mother' England. Hamilton was what we would call today a 'nationalist'.

Frederick List, a German who lived in America in the 1820s, adopted Hamilton's ideas and argued that the English classical theory would deny Germany a chance to industrialise. Having industrialised, England was now 'kicking the ladder' over which it had climbed so that nobody else could compete with it. The Listian principles provided the ideological argument for Germany to challenge the 'free trade' principles and in favour of state support (in the form, for example, of subsidies and tariff protection) to German industry in the 1860s and beyond. List is the founder of what later came to be identified as the 'German historical school of economics'.

The Americans and the Germans used the Hamilton-Listian principles to undertake what we today would call an 'anti-imperialist struggle' – resistance against the domination of England and Europe. However, as soon as America and Germany became industrial nations, they, in turn, became imperial nations themselves. Hamilton and List were quickly put into the dustbin of economic theory. The United States and Germany have today become the champions of 'free trade' theory, the very ideology they challenged when it was propounded by England.

While the 'classical' economic theory was challenged by Hamilton's American School and List's German School from a nationalist perspective, it was also challenged by another German – Karl Marx – from a class perspective. Industrialisation was all very well, Marx argued, but the owners of capital were exploiting the workers and appropriating the surplus value in an endless

pursuit for profit and accumulation of wealth. In the face of this double assault - nationalist and workerist - the English had to go back to the drawing board to invent another theory. Towards the end of the nineteenth century came the 'neoclassical economics' - commonly associated with Alfred Marshall who tried to formulate 'economic science' as a counter to the 'political economy' of Marx. The labour theory of value (of Adam Smith and Marx) was displaced in favour of the 'marginal utility theory of supply and demand'.

The search for an anti-Marxist economic theory led to the spawning of other ideas, such as the 'Austrian School' most commonly associated with Ludwig von Mises and methodological individualism - deductive economics based on axiomatic truths about human behaviour.

None of the economic theories (classical, neoclassical, Hamiltonian, Listian, German historical school, Austrian school, among others) came to save Africa from savage colonisation.⁶ Why not? Because they were all ideologies to serve the imperial interests of the ruling classes in Europe and America. Even then, furthermore, these economic theories were not enough of an ideological cover for Africa's predation. They had to be embellished by a missionary ideology - 'the white man's burden' to 'civilize' Africa.

In his *General Theory* (1936), Keynes challenged the assumptions of classical and neoclassical economists and offered an alternative paradigm based on direct state intervention in the economy to counter the negative effects of free market economics. But Keynesian economic theory was also an ideology that served the imperial interests of England.⁷ It should be clear to the reader that all these economic theories (including Keynesian) masquerading as 'science' were essentially self-serving Eurocentric ideologies. When it came to colonising Africa, neither the 'nationalist' ideas of Hamilton and List, nor the state-interventionist ideas of Keynes mattered. They did not apply to Africa. There was a racist dichotomy to their ideas - emancipatory when it came to Europe, America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and *apartheid* South Africa, and imperialist when it came to the rest of the world.

Fast forwarding to our own times - from the mid-1980s to about 2007/8 - Keynes' ideas were reduced to the margins of economic theory.⁸ The dominant economic theory came not from Europe but America. The 'Chicago School of monetarist economics', commonly associated with Milton Friedman, now became the dominant economic theory. Friedman replaced Keynes as the leading ideologue for capitalism and imperialism. According to the monetarist theories, the cyclical or aberrant disturbances in the economy were purely short-term (not structural or what I would call 'systemic'). These, Friedman argued, could be addressed by proper monetary policies. There was no need to overhaul the entire global economic system - it was working

just fine. There was no need for state intervention in the economy (this was 'communist ideology'); left to itself the market was working well. If there were countries that were out of trade balance, all that was needed were some well-packaged austerity and IMF-enforced austerity measures.⁹

The Chicago school of economics went back to Ricardian Classical and Marshallian Neoclassical economics with further refinements employing growth models, econometrics, and game theory. Everything was 'scientific', measurable, and governed by the 'invisible' hands of good old Adam Smith. Among others, the ideas of David Ricardo, Bertil Ohlin, Jacob Viner and Harry Johnson were taken out of the closet to provide spurious historical 'authority' to creditor-oriented monetarists.

Neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus

This dominant mode of Euro-American-centric economic thinking became part of the universal 'truth', now called neoliberalism. After Thatcher and Reagan came to power in Britain and the US respectively, these 'truths' became the instruments to pry open the rest of the world to the command of the dominant Anglo-Saxon capital. This was 'globalisation'. The free market had full sway. The regulatory mechanisms of the Keynesian-New Deal era (such as the Glass-Steagall Act) were set aside for banks and other financial institutions to engage in no-holds-barred accumulation of profits. Money became the means to make more money without passing through the phase of production.


In the hands of the IMF and the World Bank, these economic 'truths' were imposed on the debt-stricken countries of the South as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), fittingly called the 'Washington Consensus' - a consensus designed within the cloistered walls of Washington. Once again, as so many times before, the Eurocentric collective predatory system was imposed on the South. Then fell the Berlin Wall in 1989. In the ensuing Western triumphalism, whatever regulatory mechanisms existed to control capital were dismantled. This put in a dominant position a rent-seeking financial sector whose insatiable pursuit of money accumulation led to all kinds of Ponzi schemes.¹⁰

The neoliberal ideology continues to shape the economic policies of the dominant countries - the US, Germany, Britain, France and Japan - and the institutions of global economic governance - principally the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. Among the neo-Keynesians, Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Kruger are decorated as Nobel Laureates, along with 'welfare economists' like Amartya Sen. These are joined by a host of other economists and theoreticians, among them, for example, the revived German Historical School, structuralist economists, ecological economists, gender economists,

institutional economists, biophysical economists – each group adding a dimension to exposing the inequities of the dominant neoliberal paradigm - in an eclectic alliance of the so-called orthodox and heterodox, but still essentially Euro-American-centric ideologists.

The main political-economic Euro-American-centric tendencies describing themselves as ‘development theory’ can be presented graphically as in Diagram 1.

Diagram 1: Main Political-Economic Theories and Tendencies



Two conclusions can be drawn. One, these 300-year-old ideologically conservative or at best reformist mainstream or ‘normal’ political-economic theories have brainwashed generations of economists (sadly also in the ‘best universities’ of the global south). They are the ideological glue of imperialist theories and are essentially exploitative and racist. They have to be completely demolished and delegitimised for the system they uphold also to be delegitimised.

Two, a major challenge for the theoreticians of not only the global south but also of the marginalised peoples and sub-nationalists of the north is to provide an alternative definition of development.

Development is a Process

Development is a process. The process is resistance – relentless opposition to the imperial system... until liberation. This has been the story of the liberation struggles against colonialism and imperialism in the South for over a hundred

years. I might add that there are now pockets of resistance even in the North against the above-described dominant ideological tyranny, though some of these – such as in Greece – are still in the early stages of their resistance. The Syriza-formed government is mobilising the people to challenge, to resist, the austerity programme and ideology of the dominant imperial powers of Europe and their triad institutions – the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. What will come out of this ‘war’ between the European political-financial establishment and the people of Greece is still an open question. In the United Kingdom, the 7 May 2015 election has put in the frontline the Scottish National Party (SNP) that, like Syriza, has challenged the austerity-based ideology of the ruling Conservative Party; it has also opened the space for Scottish independence.

Let me elaborate this concept of development as resistance further. In contrast to the OECD’s ‘delivery concept of development’ as an act that pours money and technical assistance into the ‘poor’ recipients that are assumed not be able to think, act, plan or implement for themselves, without being monitored and evaluated by the donors, I argue that development has essentially two components.

One, development is self-defined. It cannot be defined by outsiders. Within the national framework, it is defined in an evolving democratic process as part of the national project. In this long evolutionary development process, decision-making and control over national resources pass into the hands of the population and their democratic institutions.

Two, development is a process of self-empowerment. As the struggle for gender equality, for example, teaches us, development is a long process of struggle for liberation from structures of domination and control, including mental constructs and the use of language. This struggle is waged between nations, within nations, within communities, and even within households.

If you read the above two points again, you will see that the definition fits the situation not only in the global south, but also in nations like the Greeks’ and the Scots’ in Europe, and ‘the nation of Islam’ in the United States.

Learning from Nyerere

I might add that I am not saying anything original. I have learnt from a practitioner (not a mere theorist) of development – namely, the late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania, and the founding spirit behind the South Centre. In all his active political life (1958 to 1999) he wrote on what he practiced – a genuine ‘philosopher king’.¹¹ These are some of his ideas on the subject:

- Development is a process; it starts from within the individual, communities and the nation;
- It is the realisation of the potential for self-support and contributing to society;
- It involves the building of self-confidence;
- It aims at leading lives of dignity, which include gainful employment that helps individuals to meet basic needs, security, equity and participation. These lead to self-fulfilment;
- It is freedom from fear of want and exploitation;
- It is freedom from political, economic and social exploitation;
- It is the continuous struggle for the right and access to decision-making that affects the life and livelihood of the individual, the community, the nation and the region.

These ideas form the ideological glue of development. Borrowing from Nyerere, and against the background of the struggle for emancipation from colonial and imperial economic exploitation and national oppression, development from a Southern perspective may be defined by the following formula:

$$\text{Development} = \text{SF} + \text{DF} - \text{IF}$$

where:

- SF is the social factor – the essential well-being of the people free from want and exploitation;
- DF is the democratic factor – the right of the people to participate in decision-making that affects their lives and livelihoods;
- IF is the imperial factor – the right of a nation to liberation from colonial and imperial domination, which follows from the right to self-determination.

To put it succinctly, development, in its most inclusive sense, means the satisfaction of the basic material and social needs of the people (especially those most vulnerable) through a system of governance that is democratic and accountable to the people, and through eliminating imperial interventions in developing societies. One might argue that these are also the goals of all self-respecting economic theoreticians in the west, and of all the institutions of global governance – such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO. But when you look at how their so-called ‘development goals’ are to be achieved, it should be obvious that these theorists and these institutions have not moved one inch from the 300 years of imperial ideology – an ideology that has changed in form and text but never in substance.

And what is the substance of imperial theories? In its present form, it boils down to the following formula:

Development = Growth + Wealth accumulation+ trickle down where:

- Growth = open markets + foreign investments + good governance (as defined by developed country donors and the multilateral agencies that they control);
- Wealth accumulation = ensuring that the rich continue to get richer and are able to amass fortunes;
- With trickle-down effect of some of the benefits of growth to the poor.

It is fair to add, however, that the imperial countries that follow the 'social democratic model' have a variation of the growth model in their own countries, expressed, in simple terms, as the following:

Development = Growth + Open markets + wealth accumulation + Good governance + Redistribution

Where:

- Growth = Open markets + foreign investments ;
- Wealth accumulation = Ensuring that the rich continue to get richer and amass fortunes;
- Good governance (as defined by the donors and the multilateral agencies that they control);
- Redistribution = Taxing the rich to give to the poor (usually taxing the less poor and the middle classes, for the rich employ lawyers and accountants to hide their wealth and outwit the tax collector).

But this formula does not work even in the West – let alone in their poor caricatures in the global South. The world has become more unequal over the last 50 years than over the preceding one thousand. The OECD's 2011 study – 'Divided we Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising' – revealed that globally the rich-poor gap has widened in the last decade. Between nations this is clearly evident. But even within advanced countries – including the 'egalitarian' states such as Germany, Denmark and Sweden – the rich-poor income and welfare gap is growing.

What it does not say is that there is no possibility of 'distributive solution' within the present system that is structurally engineered to produce inequality. The revolutionary political and social forces, even in the west, are weakening in relation to the power of global corporations and a global bankocracy.

Development as Defined for the Global South

The formula from the Southern perspective (Development = SF + DF - IF) is not only national, but also regional and even continental. It is also the basis for expanding it to South-South cooperation. Here too, Nyerere made a unique contribution. He was not only a great nationalist leader, but also a visionary Pan-African and third world leader. In the 1980s, he chaired the South Commission set up by the developing countries. The political rationale and teleological direction of the South Commission Report was succinctly summarised by Nyerere in these five headings:

1. Development shall be people centered;
2. Pursue a policy of maximum national self-reliance;
3. Supplement that with a policy of maximum collective South-South self-reliance
4. South-South self-reliance;
5. Build maximum South-South solidarity in your relations with the North;
6. Develop science and technology.

So much for the theory: let us come to the reality on the ground.

The Reality of Imperialism

We must first come to terms with the concept – and reality – of imperialism. If one has not understood imperialism, one has understood nothing about the relationship between the North and the South, or between the West and the rest.¹²

Western Denial of the Reality of Imperialism

Paradoxically, people in the West, including well-meaning NGOs and people otherwise sympathetic to Africa, have difficulty recognising the reality of imperialism. They are in a state of denial about imperialism. I have sought to find an explanation in both Western culture and history to illuminate this mental blockage, but I have not come up with a good answer. For example, I have often wondered why Hitler is described in almost all Western literature as a 'fascist' but never as an imperialist. Could it be that calling Hitler an imperialist is too perilously close to looking at a mirror image? Today, many Westerners, including intellectuals, deny the existence of imperialism. Let me illustrate this from my own experience. In November 1995, in Maastricht in the Netherlands, I was engaged in a public debate with Herman Cohen, a former US Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs, and at the time

in the governing executive of the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA).¹³ The debate was on 'democracy and governance' in Africa. When I used the word 'imperialism' to describe the situation in Africa, Cohen countered by saying I was 'anachronistic', and that imperialism was simply 'a figment of Tandon's imagination'. I did not have to answer him; Africans amongst the audience gave him several concrete examples of imperialism. One of these people was Aminata Traore, one-time Minister of Culture and Tourism in Mali. She told Cohen that she was disappointed that as a top official of the Global Coalition for Africa he had no understanding of imperialism or the reality of Africa.

In another instance, in February 1997 I attended a conference in Oslo on Agenda 21 (i.e. sustainable development). I shared the platform with the influential consultant to the Brundtland Commission, Lloyd Timberlake.¹⁴ He was at the time also the Director of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. He countered my description of the present reality in Africa as dominated by imperialism by suggesting that I was 'out of date', and that he had not heard the word imperialism 'for the last thirty years'. At first I was astonished, but then I realized that the audience - largely Norwegian - was probably in agreement with him. I had to tread carefully in order not to alienate my friends in the audience. So, without challenging Timberlake directly, I suggested - using an idiom I borrowed from my environmentalist friends - that because England can use Uganda's resources, its 'ecological footprint' is much bigger than Uganda's. I doubt if he understood my point, for he stared at me vacantly. He did not understand that this was because whilst Uganda had become 'independent', England, as an imperial country, continued to exploit and consume Uganda's resources and so had a bigger 'footprint'. I wondered: how does one 'educate' a person who is in a state of denial about the global political environment? Why should Timberlake's ecological environment be so real to him but not the political imperial environment? How did he manage to separate the two?

Imperialism and Neo-colonialism Defined

Imperialism is a particular kind of relationship that arose in the wake of colonialism. It may not be reduced to any kind of asymmetrical power relationship. Could the relations between the USA and Europe, for example, be described also as imperialist? No. Why not? Because although they have unequal power, at the global level they are both imperialist powers; they are partners and competitors at the same time. For instance, American and European companies compete in the telecommunications market. But if Zimbabwe, or Iran, or Cuba (or Syria, Somalia or Venezuela) 'step out of line', the US and the European Union will gang up to bring 'order' -

cut off their gas and water, as it were, to 'bring them back into line'. No, imperialism is not any relationship between two unequal powers. It is a historically created phenomenon; you cannot discuss it in the abstract. Concretely, the imperialist nations compete and collaborate to maintain a system of production and consumption based on the exploitation of the rich resources - including labour - of the South.

Lenin's definition of imperialism as the 'highest stage of capitalism' is a good analytical extension of the Marxist theory of Capital up to 1880s and beyond. Students of international relations, especially those from the South, might want to read Lenin's classic text on imperialism¹⁵. Below I lay out imperialism's main characteristics as defined by Lenin:

1. Concentration of production and monopolies
2. The new role of banks
3. The emergence of finance capital and the financial oligarchy
4. Export of capital
5. Division of the world among capitalist associations
6. Division of the world among the great powers
7. Imperialism as a special stage of capitalism
8. Parasitism and decay of capitalism

Imperialism is not a fleeting phenomenon; it is part of our present reality. Fifty years after Lenin's book, Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of Ghana, wrote a book (whilst still President) entitled *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*. This is what he wrote in the introduction: 'The neo-colonialism of today represents imperialism in its final and perhaps its most dangerous stage... The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality, its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside'.¹⁶

Fifty years since Nkrumah's book, neo-colonialism – as defined by Nkrumah – is still with us. If anything, imperialism has become even more aggressive. Why? Because it is now under serious challenge from younger generations of third-world peoples and social activists, even in the West.

Selected Case Studies of Resistance against Imperialism

Palestinian Resistance against Americo-Jewish Imperial State

The state of Israel is a Euro-American creation. Its birth has four undeniable historical roots. One is the persecution of the Jews in Europe for centuries, culminating in Hitler's holocaust. The second is the export (dumping) of

this centuries old European problem to the Arab Middle-East – a process that began in the 1880s but ended in the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. The third is the institutional backing of the creation of Israel by the United Nations. Very few countries of the South were members of the UN. India voted against the resolution, and so did the then already sovereign Arab states. Virtually the whole of Africa was still under European colonial rule. The Palestinians were not consulted. And the fourth is the massive military power supplied to the Jews by the West to oust Arabs from their homelands in Palestine.

The state of Israel was born in blood and violence –sadly some of us know little about the second book of the Torah – the Exodus – and the hardships 600,000 Jews suffered in escaping from slavery in Egypt in 6th Century BC. In our time, Israeli security forces have killed at least 700,000 (some say a million) Palestinians in their quest for statehood. During the Six Day War in 1967, Israel captured the West Bank and Gaza Strip from Jordan and Egypt, and since then Israel has not stopped colonising the rest of Palestine.

Under the 1948 division of the land of Palestine, the Jews and the Palestinians were to create their own states. But this – the ‘two state’ formula – was a deception. As a young man I grew up believing in the cause of the Jews for a state of their own, especially after reading Leon Uris’s ‘*Exodus*’. Later, as a young Socialist, I read about the kibbutz and moshav (agricultural cooperatives) movement, and I dreamt of visiting one of these cooperatives. I never made it. In 2012 I was finally able to go Palestine. I was in Ramallah for over a week. And what I saw simply shattered me. In the 1980s and 1990s, I used to go to South Africa (from Zimbabwe where I lived) invited by the underground resistance movement. I can say with complete honesty that what I saw in Ramallah, East Jerusalem, and Jericho was far worse than *apartheid* South Africa. The Palestinian Authority (PA) was hopelessly ineffective in addressing the basic problems of the people (such as access to water, and the right to visit families and relatives across the hundreds of Israeli barriers and check-points they had to cross). The PA was spineless when it came to ‘negotiating’ with Israel – or the ‘Quartet’ of ‘mediators’ that was led by the United States.

Development of Palestine, unequivocally put, is resistance against the Americo-Jewish Imperial State. As *apartheid* South Africa had ceased to be morally unsustainable, so today *apartheid* Israel has lost moral legitimacy.¹⁷

Resistance by a Sanctioned Country - the Case of Iran

Western sanctions against Iran began in 1979 – some thirty years ago. The sanctions are quite comprehensive. The West has frozen an equivalent

of \$100 billion of Iran's money in foreign banks since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The US total economic and financial embargo includes:

- Sanctions on the energy sector, which provides about 80 percent of government revenues;
- Sanctions on the sale of aircraft or repair parts to Iranian aviation companies;
- Sanctions on Iranians engaging in any transactions with American citizens;
- Information embargo, including on the state broadcasting authority. The US and the West do not want the rest of the world to hear the Iranian side of the story;
- Sanctions on major Iranian electronics producers;
- Sanctions on internet policing agencies such as the Iranian Cyber Police;
- Sanctions on companies doing business with Iran. Any United States property held by blacklisted companies and individuals are subject to confiscation.

The US is supported by its North America Treaty Organization (NATO) 'coalition of the willing' states:

- The EU has comprehensive sanctions measures covering trade and financial and other services (e.g., shipping);
- Canada has put a ban on Iranian national property deals, a ban on arms and oil technology, as well as a ban on investments in Iran;
- Australia has imposed financial sanctions and a travel ban on individuals and entities involved in Iran's nuclear and missile programs;
- Switzerland has banned trade with Iran in dual-purpose arms and products used in oil and gas sectors, and a ban on financial services;
- Japan has banned some Iranian banks and investments in Iran's energy sector, and has frozen the assets of some individuals (but interestingly, Japan has not imposed a trade ban on oil, for
- South Korea has imposed targeted sanctions on 126 Iranian individuals and companies.

As for Israel, it has declared Iran an enemy state. At the center of it is the issue of nuclear weapons. Iran claims it wants the nuclear energy to supplement its depleting oil resources. The US and Israel claim that Iran wants nuclear power to wage war. They claim that Iranian nuclear potential is a threat to 'global peace and security'. And so, the sanctions cannot be lifted until the nuclear issue is first resolved to the satisfaction of US, Israel, and Europe.

There is no question that sanctions are hurting Iran's economy. On the other hand, Iran has cleverly used sanctions as a means to restructure its oil

deals with other foreign companies. Iran has set up a system of 'buyback contracts'. The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) makes an agreement with foreign corporations to jointly explore and develop an oil field. The NIOC remains in full control of the project. When the contract expires – usually after five to eight years – the Iranian state becomes the sole operator, keeping all revenues from further sales. And if a dispute arises between NIOC and the oil company, the matter might be taken out of the hands of the disputants by an Islamic court.¹⁸

This is in sharp contrast to the system forced on Iraq by the US. Under a 'production-sharing agreements' (PSA), the Iraqi state technically owns the oil, but its control is nominal. The PSA is just another name for the classic colonial form of concessions. It gives the foreign company monopoly rights to develop and manage an oil field for between twenty-five and forty years. During this period the terms of the contract are fixed and cannot be legally altered by Iraq. The reserves are entered into the company's balance sheets as the assets of the company, which is entitled to decide on the rates of their extraction (that is, their depletion) and other production details as it see fit. There is no upper limit on profits. If disputes arise, these are solved not in Iraq's courts but in international arbitration tribunals.¹⁹

Of course, Western trade and financial sanctions have left a big hole in Iran-Western relations, but that hole is significantly filled by the BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – as well as other smaller countries of the South. They do not share Western enthusiasm for sanctions against Iran. Oil is a major resource. Iran is able to barter oil for goods and services from non-Western countries. India, for example, pays for Iranian oil imports in rupees. This is potentially damaging to the supremacy of the 'mighty' US dollar.

The US Empire is not blind to this 'other reality'. Nor, indeed, is Iran oblivious to the need for some kind of compromise. In the recent (2014-15) negotiations among Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the Security Council – the United States, Russia, China, France, United Kingdom – plus Germany), there appears a window of opportunity for some kind of compromise. Iran agreed to roll back parts of its nuclear program, and an increased amount of international inspections, in exchange for relief from sanctions. However, at the time of writing this paper, there have appeared differences in the interpretation of what was actually agreed, and how the process was expected to move forward. At the center of this controversy is whether the sanctions are to be lifted in their entirety (Iran's position) or in phases (US position). But, of course, everybody knows that behind this blockage lies the lobbying power of Israel in the United States.

For Iran, there is no question of bending to the will of either Israel or the United States. That is not the road to its development.

It is the West that unilaterally decoupled Iran from the world economy. But Iran has survived. Iran's defiant resistance has paid off. After many false starts since 2006, on July 2015 Iran and the six world powers – the US, the UK, China, Russia, and Germany (P5+1) finally signed a deal. Iran agreed to limit its nuclear activity and to give the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) full access to its nuclear facilities. In return the West agreed to lift the sanctions that have been in place since 1979. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel called it a 'stunning historic mistake'. Iran's President Hassan Rouhani called it a 'historic deal' that opened a new chapter in Iran's relations with the world.

So what do we learn from Iran? The answer is clear – it is resistance against imperial dominance... not surrender to the will of the Empire. The West had thought that sanctions-induced economic austerity would give rise to disaffection on the part of ordinary Iranian people, and thus eventually to a 'regime change'. The West had been harboring this illusion for thirty years. All these years, the West had learnt nothing of the deeply rooted anti-imperialist sentiment of the Iranian people. Also, the mainstream economic theoreticians have learnt nothing that when it comes to the relations between the Empire and the Global South, development is resistance to imperial domination.

EPAs – East Africa's Resistance against European Imperialism

African countries achieved their political independence at various times after a long – and often violent – struggle against the European imperial powers. However, economic independence still remains an unachieved goal. Let us recall Nkrumah: *'The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality, its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside'* (Ibid).

Soon after francophone countries gained their political independence in the 1960s, the Europe Union (EU) got them to enter into an economic agreement at Yaoundé in 1963. In 1969 (to cut a long story short) the EU then signed a separate agreement with the three East African countries (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) called the Arusha Agreement. The EU also signed similar agreements with other former colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific. During the 1970s, the EU decided to bring all these African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries into a common trading and financial system. The system was further tightened in 2000, with the Cotonou

Agreement between 79 ACP countries and the EU. All these former colonies were now in a tight neo-colonial grip of the European Union. The Cotonou Agreement (CA) is, to this day, the principal framework agreement between Europe and Africa. Signed in 2000 the CA was designed to last for a period of 20 years (up to 2020).

Despite the acknowledged principle of 'equality and mutual respect', the CA is an 'unequal treaty'. It is basically an agreement between two asymmetrical 'power blocs', the (real) power of the 15 (now 27) countries of the EU speaking with one voice coordinated from Brussels, pitted against the (fictitious) power of the 79 ACP countries speaking with many voices: the EU's per capita GDP is about US\$20,000 in 2009, compared to about US\$9,000 in some Caribbean countries to less than US\$100 in the poorest African countries. Whilst the EU has a highly coordinated policy towards the ACP, the only coordination for the ACP (if this is what it must be called) takes place in the ACP House in Brussels. The Economic Commission (EC) provides for the maintenance of the ACP House, and *per diems* for ACP delegates to attend international conferences. Thus the ACP secretariat are supported and financed by the very body – the EC – with which they enter into negotiations about the future of their countries' economies.

Coming to the regional level, the East African Community (now expanded to include Rwanda and Burundi) has its Secretariat in Arusha. Slightly over 60 percent (\$78.17 million) of the EAC budget for 2014-15 was funded by the donors and 32 percent (\$41.9 million) by the five EAC governments. It is therefore not surprising that the EAC Secretariat – as well as the aid-dependent governments of the five countries – has been under unceasing and relentless pressure from the EC to hasten the process of signing the EPAs.

However, ever since the signing of Cotonou in 2000, the people of East Africa have been resisting the EU-imposed *diktat* over their governments. In 2007, for example, the Kenya Small Scale Farmers Forum (KSSFF) filed a case against their government arguing that the EPAs would put at risk the livelihoods of millions of Kenyan and East African farmers. On 30 October, 2013, the High Court ruled in KSSFF's favour. The Court directed the Kenya government to establish a mechanism for involving stakeholders in the on-going EPA negotiations, and encourage public debate on this matter. (The Government has substantially ignored this decision). The KSSFF is supported by a number of civil society organisations in East Africa – foremost among them the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) and the Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI). These organisations work closely with members of

parliaments of the five East African Countries and of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA). They also work with the Geneva-based South Centre (the policy think tank of the Global South). The South Centre has provided detailed technical analysis that showed that the East African countries faced serious de-industrialisation if they signed the EPAs.

In 2012 the EC Trade Commissioner came to East Africa with an EPA text in his pocket confident that the East African Ministers of Trade and Industry would sign the agreement. Two days before his arrival, however, the EALA passed a resolution cautioning the Ministers against signing the agreement until all contentious issues were resolved. This resolution was binding on the Ministers. The EC Commissioner decided that the Ministers or the EALA did not matter. He phoned the President of one of the five countries that at the time was chairing the East African Summit of Heads of State – a normal imperial practice to overturn the democratic will of the people. (Democracy and good governance, it is important to note, are fluid concepts when it comes to Imperial-Neocolonial relationship). The EC Commissioner was astonished that the President gave him no audience; he had to return to Brussels empty-handed. The people had won ... at least in 2012.

Following this humiliating defeat, the EC increased its pressure at all levels – at Brussels, at East African national capitals, at the EAC Secretariat in Arusha, at the private sector with vested interests in signing the EPA agreement, and at the various Heads of States. The EC succeeded; but partly. It managed to get the EPA ‘concluded’ and ‘signed’ by the East African bureaucrats in Brussels in September 2014. In March 2015, however, the East African civil society organisations and the Kenya Small Scale Farmers Forum met in Nairobi, once again cautioning their governments against signing the EPAs without full consultation with various stakeholders and ratification. The struggle continues as we go to press.

Conclusion

First, development is not reducible to ‘growth’, or to statistical numbers. Development, above all, is a process. It is the process of people acquiring control over their own destinies. When these are denied by exploitative or oppressive forces, these must be resisted. Second, Africa’s political leaders are under illusion to believe that ‘development aid’ or ‘foreign direct investments’ will get them out of their development crisis. *It is important to understand what ‘capital’ is, how it is generated, and what its real function is. Money is a system of credits; and capital is past savings used for enhanced production. Both money and capital create masters of those who have these and slaves of those who do not. It is as simple as this.*

As the article has demonstrated, the Empire is not a figment of imagination. It is real. Most economists (as opposed to political economists) do not recognise the reality of imperialism. It is not there in their vocabulary or in their thought processes. Economic theory is an abstraction from reality. All economic theories, without exception, are ideologies. Speaking as an economic historian, I can say with some authority that there has never been anything called 'free trade' or 'fair trade' – never, not even in the so-called 'golden period' of the English mercantile system.

The dominant classes have always managed to hide or obscure their class identities and ideologies. It is our task to expose the fallacy behind the self-serving and the fundamentally Euro-American-centric basis of current dominant economic theories. These theories have to be completely demolished and delegitimised for the system they uphold also to be delegitimised.

As discussed in the paper, the developed or industrialised countries are not interested in the development of the countries of the South. They are only interested in their own development – through exploiting the labour and resources of the South. *Trade is War*. Over the last five hundred years – from slave trade to colonial trade to trade in our times – trade has been a relentless war of the imperial countries against the nations of the South. All development under conditions of exploitation and oppression is RESISTANCE. This still remains the case today as Africa seeks to liberate itself from the scourge of neo-colonialism. In our epoch, resistance against imperial domination is the first law of motion of development.

Notes

1. The United States spends more per year on the military than the next thirteen countries combined – \$711 billion compared to \$695 billion spent by China, Russia, UK, France, Japan, India, Saudi Arabia, Germany Brazil, Italy, South Korea, Australia and Canada. <http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-03-30/debunking-gutting-military-storyline>
2. <http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/05/u-s-currently-fighting-74-different-wars-that-it-publicly-admits.html>
3. "World Drug Report – Global Illicit Drug Trends". Unodc.org. Retrieved 2011-11-26.
4. <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110220105210/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/rdsolr2007.pdf>
5. <http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/Crime#sthash.MoRPe8St.dpuf>
6. The only exception to this was the Marxist theory that interpreted history from a class and political-economic, materialist perspective
7. For a good, comprehensive – but desperately neo-Keynesian – analysis of this, see Nayak, Satyenda. 2013. *The Global Financial Crisis. Genesis, Policy Response and Road*

Ahead, Springer, 2013. For a more critical appraisal of Keynes see Tandon, Y. *Trade is War*, OR-books, 2015, pp 56-57

8. They were resurrected in the post-2007 financial-economic crisis by the so-called 'heterodox' theorists - what I call the 'heterodoximos' theorists. (see chart)
9. The Greeks and before the Greeks, the peoples of the global South, have been fighting these 'austerity'-led Economic 'restructuring', but at the time of writing, the power-holders of the banking system and the dominant classes within the Imperial states, have not yielded an inch of ground to the Greeks.
10. A Ponzi scheme is an investment operation where the 'operator' pays out to those who invest in the scheme not from real-time investment (and thus from profits) but from capital invested into the operation by new investors. This is the logic of the 'money credit system' - and exposed as a fraud.
11. See the excellent series on African political thinkers put out by the Centre Europe - Tier Monde (CETIM). In the Introduction to the one on Julius Nyerere I elaborate on why I think Nyerere was a Philosopher King. CETIM, 2015, pp 10-11.
12. Parts of this section is derived from my *Trade is War*, OR-Books, 2015.
13. The GCA was created around 1993, a brainchild of former World Bank President Robert McNamara. Its objective was 'to ensure that Africa remains high on the international agenda, to facilitate greater understanding of the development challenges faced by the continent, and to promote agreement on necessary actions to be taken by both African governments and their international partners. The GCA's agenda is focused on the broad themes of a) peace and security; b) governance and transition to democracy; and c) sustainable growth and integration into the global economy.' See <http://web.worldbank.org/Website/External/Countries/Africaext/0>. Nothing much is heard of the GCA anymore; it was simply a 'figment of the imagination' of Western imperialists like the World Bank that they could 'do the development' on behalf of Africa.
14. In 1983 the United Nations set up the World Commission on Environment and Development, headed by Gro Harlem Brundtland, the former Prime Minister of Norway. The Commission is also known as the Brundtland Commission
15. First published in mid-1917 in pamphlet form in Petrograd. See *Lenin (1963), Lenin's Selected Works, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers*, pp. 667-766. I should add that Lenin's pamphlet was not entirely an original work. Lenin acknowledged his debt to, among others, J.A. Hobson's *Imperialism: A Study* (1902).
16. Kwame Nkrumah (1966), *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, International Publishers, p. ix.
17. As I write these lines, The Vatican announced that it would formally recognise Palestinian statehood.
18. See Alexander Brendendorff and Christian Ule, "Changes bring new attention to Iranian buyback contracts", *Oil & Gas Journal*, 1 November 2004.
19. See Platform IPS, War on Want, Global Policy Forum, Oil Change, NEF (2005), *Crude Designs: The rip-off of Iraq's oil wealth*, Platform. (Download available from www.platformlondon.org.)

