African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2008, pp. 1–31
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(ISSN 0850-7902)

Rethinking Security in the Age of Uncertain Globalisation: NEPAD and Human Security in Africa in the Twenty-First Century[1]

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Abstract

Globalisation can hardly be said to have caused Africa's contemporary predicaments. However, it is clear that it continues to exacerbate them by posing diverse challenges to local and global governance and security. This paper demonstrates how the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), launched in 2003 to promote security and development, may be another hoax in Africa's search for appropriate development models, especially given the character and fall-outs of globalisation on the continent. It raises several critical questions regarding the relevance and practicality of the vision and mandate of NEPAD vis-à-vis Africa's innumerable security challenges. What, for instance, are the 'new' security challenges facing Africa in this age of globalisation, and how well equipped is NEPAD to addressing them? What are the key human security issues in Africa's developmental complexities, distinct from or similar to existent ones on regime and/or territorial security? What are the implications of globalisation in Africa's capacity to implement NEPAD's visions and priorities in the areas of security and development? In conclusion, the paper reveals that there is little hope that NEPAD would serve Africa's security needs better, whether it is now or in the future.

Resumé

Il n'est guère possible de dire que la mondialisation est la cause des situations difficiles qui prévalent en ce moment en Afrique, mais elle continue

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sans nul doute à les exacerber en posant de multiples défis liés à la gouvernance ainsi qu'à la sécurité nationale et mondiale. Cet ouvrage montre comment le Nouveau Partenariat pour le Développement de l'Afrique (NEPAD), qui a été lancé en 2003 pour promouvoir la sécurité et le développement, pourrait être un canular de plus pour l'Afrique dans sa quête de modèles de développement appropriés. Particulièrement si l'on tient en compte le caractère et les répercussions de la mondialisation sur le continent. Ceci amène à poser plusieurs questions cruciales sur la pertinence et l'aspect pratique des visions et missions du NEPAD à relever les innombrables défis sécuritaires de l'Afrique. On pourrait se poser les questions ci-après: Quelles sont les 'nouveaux' défis liés à la sécurité auxquels l'Afrique pourrait être confrontée à l'ère de la mondialisation et est-ce que le NEPAD est bien outillé pour les relever? Quelles sont les questions clés de la sécurité humaine relatives aux complexités du développement de l'Afrique, différentes de ou identiques à celles existantes et qui sont liées à la sécurité des régimes en place et/ou des territoires? Quel est l'impact de la mondialisation sur la capacité de l'Afrique à mettre en oeuvre les visions et priorités du NEPAD en matière de sécurité et développement? Pour finir, l'ouvrage révèle qu'il y a très peu d'espoir que le NEPAD aide à mieux satisfaire les besoins, que ce soit les besoins actuels ou futurs de l'Afrique en matière de sécurité.

Introduction

Africa has consistently evoked the image of a 'deeply troubled' continent on an inescapable path towards self-obliteration (Richards 2003; Bracking and Harrison 2003; French 2004; Gberie 2005: 337-342). At a time when other regions of the world are counting their achievements no matter how miniscule, Africa is backtracking on virtually all human development indicators. Its peoples are known to be far poorer today, living on a daily income level below one dollar, than in the 1960s when many of them gained independence. The continent's share of global trade is pegged around two per cent, contributing even less (about one per cent) to total global economic output.[2] Apart from the tiny fraction of the national elites in different African countries that have helped themselves to stupendous riches deriving from endemic corruption, while the majority of the people live in chronic poverty. Africa reveals a worrisome nexus between poverty and conflict (Fayemi and Hendickson 2002: 67) as the continent is also the worst hit by unprecedented social carnage and civil wars (Jackson 2000; Bassey 2003; Boulden 2003; Abdullah 2004; Akindes 2004; Alusala 2004; Bischoff 2005; Jaye 2005; Richards 2005)

forcing almost twenty per cent of its total population, or over 150 million people, to be trapped in conflict zones according to the African Development Bank (Ilorah 2004: 226).

Five decades down the post-independence road, the momentum of development that was enthusiastically pushed during the first decade of independence has dissipated, now replaced by appalling socio-economic, environmental and political conditions. But then, side-by-side with these disturbing nightmares are modest advancements, most notably recorded in the political sphere with the conduct of multiparty elections in about forty-two countries across the continent. In retrospect - and despite the limitations inherent in Africa's political transitions - the sheer number of countries that have made the difficult transition from full-blown military/civilian authoritarian regimes to various shades of multiparty civilian have rekindled hope that the continent can still be redeemed. Such complexities of, and contradictions in, Africa's recent socio-economic and political experiences prompted the editorial in the Commonwealth Journal, *The Round Table*, to inquire whether the so-called giant strides in Africa are 'merely straws in the wind' or 'rearguard actions in a war the continent ... is losing, a war against poverty, disease, misgovernment and consequent military carnage' (Field 2004; Cooper and Pugh 2002; Jaye 2003; Clover and Cornwell 2004; Taiser and Matthews, 2004; NEPAD 2005).[3]

In part, the continent's myriad woes have been blamed more on the post-colonial miscarriage of governance than the complicity of external forces. In those diagnoses privileged by multilateral donors and financial institutions, for example, Africa's consistent poor performance is linked closely to 'insufficient investment aggravated by poor management' (Ilorah 2004: 226). When occasionally the role of external actors is acknowledged, their various dimensions and far-reaching impacts are only partially flagged. Writing on Africa's place in world politics, for instance, Taylor and Williams insisted that the discourse of the continent's marginality 'is a nonsense' since 'the continent has in fact been dialectically linked, both shaping and being shaped by international processes and structures' (2004: 1). Paul Nugent reportedly warned that such patronising and glossy conclusions about Africa have become most 'unreflective' as they hardly place the material conditions of the continent in any kind of historical context (Cited in Gberie 2005: 338). As Ihonvbere (2000) noted earlier, by brushing aside the historical footage to Africa's contemporary developmental failures, 'the victims of current

predicaments and conditions are blamed or represented as hapless and willing actors in the process of reproducing underdevelopment and dependence'.

This paper takes its point of departure from the concern that it would be far more catastrophic to give up on the ongoing search for viable developmental alternatives and trajectories for Africa in the twenty-first century. A further point is that the continent's failure to improve the welfare and living conditions of its peoples is not so much because efforts have not been made in the past. Since the 1960s, several creative blueprints for development have been implemented, although unfortunately, they have not yielded good results because they were designed and implemented based on misguided and fallacious grounds (Diescho 2002: 8-9; Ilorah 2004: 235-238; Mbaku 2004: 391-392). Here, the crucial reference is the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) launched in 2003 to promote security and development throughout the continent. Although a relatively infant initiative, NEPAD has received a lot of attention, most especially outside Africa.

The idea behind NEPAD must be understood against the imperatives and challenges of globalisation which is now celebrated as the new magical wand for equitable global development. What is more evident for Africa however are the flipsides of globalisation: rising unemployment, social dislocation, collapse of productive sectors, etc., all undermining and destroying the capacity of many developing countries to efficiently manage their affairs. Globalisation is also deepening, in multiple fundamental ways, the scissors dilemma of security and development that it is no longer feasible to retain the dominant narratives of 'security' focusing principally on regime and territorial security without taking cognisance of human security imperatives. This paper demonstrates how NEPAD, framed in the context of globalisation, may be another hoax in Africa's search for appropriate developmental paradigms. In short, given the character and fall-outs of globalisation on the continent, there is little hope that the conception and implementation of NEPAD would serve Africa's security better in the future. The paper raises several critical issues relating to the relevance and practicality of the visions and mandates of NEPAD vis-à-vis the management of Africa's myriad conflict and security challenges. What are these 'new' security challenges in this age of globalisation, and how institutionally equipped is NEPAD towards addressing them? What are the substantive human security issues in Africa's security and developmental equation, and how are they distinct

from or similar to those focusing on regime and/or territorial security? How is globalisation implicating, good or bad, Africa's capacity to implement the visions and priorities of NEPAD with regards to security and development? The rest of the paper is devoted to: (i) Globalisation and its Uncertainties: Shifting Paradigms in African Security; (ii) the Changing Discourse on Security: From State to Human Security; (iii) NEPAD and the Fictionalisation of Human Security in Africa; and finally (iv) Alternative Futures and Challenges of Human Security in Africa.

Globalisation and its Uncertainties: Shifting Paradigms in African Security

The various facets and impacts of globalisation, especially regarding Africa, cannot be contemplated in this short reflection. A good point of departure would however be to bear in mind that the current globalisation did not cause Africa's contemporary predicaments even though it continues to exacerbate them. The logic driving Africa's developmental problems can be traced to a variety of external and internal factors, beginning from the manner and processes through which the continent was absorbed, forcefully, into global capitalism from the mid-1500s. Some of the highlights of the African experience during that long colonial moment have been identified by Ihonvbere (2003: 3-4) as including the experience of slavery; the termination of endogenously driven patterns of state and class formation; the imposition of colonial rule; the balkanisation of the continent and the imposition of alien values, tastes, and institutions; the creation of a repressive corrupt, unproductive, unstable, and illegitimate state; the creation of a highly fractionalised, factionalised, dependent, corrupt, and weak elite; the domination of the African economy by profit-and-hegemony-seeking transnational corporations dedicated to making profit at all cost; the total denigration of local cultures, values, and institutions, and the introduction and promotion of primordial differences and suspicions; and finally, the structured incorporation of the African economy into the periphery of the global division of labour and power as vulnerable, dependent, underdeveloped, weak, and largely raw material-producing region. In virtually all post-colonial African countries, there remain vestiges of colonial rule, most notably those manifesting themselves in the contradictory manner in which state-society relationships evolved and are maintained (Fawole 2004: 297-303).

Although there is substantial intellectual interest in and fascination with the circumstances and conditions that have kept the post-colonial

state in Africa alive, it is partly by interrogating it in all its ramifications that contemporary African security problems and challenges can be unravelled. Arising from this, the first point is that the post-colonial state has survived on the continent because it has held on precariously to the 'authoritarian and social licenses' to govern by creatively adapting itself, hardly altering or compromising the raw power at its disposal (Ihonvbere 2000). Second, with the character of its composition, the political elites in charge in different post-colonial African states paid more attention to their own survival than to the welfare and security of their people. By the 1990s, insecurity became accentuated due to the growing inability of the political class to continue to mobilise domestic support and external patronage. This period provided the backdrop for many of the violent conflicts and civil wars in Africa, most of which have roots in a complexity of colonial and post-colonial social, leadership, resource, personality, class, ideological, ethnic, territorial, and religious divisions (Herbst and Mills 2003: 7; Bassey 2003: 43).

How globalisation is affecting Africa generally has become a topical subject in the social sciences over the last decade (Cooper 2002; Hughes 2002; Juhasz 2002; Meagher 2003; Morton 2004; Swyngedouw 2004). By way of caveat, there is a need to acknowledge that different historical moments experienced globalisation in different ways. What may be unique about the current one can be explained in terms of its scope (global spread), *intrusivity* (the degree of penetration) and *intensiveness* (the resultant changing effects). Specifically for Africa, the delivery and impacts of these various globalisations have remained essentially the same. As colonialism, it represented political and administrative domination mainly to facilitate extraction and accumulation. After independence, globalisation manifested itself as imperialism by helping to deepen accumulation even further, allowing the persistence of human indenture, magnifying the inequality of capitalist expansion and generally provoking violent disorders (Bracking and Harrison 2003: 6-7). During the 1980s, globalisation was represented by the activities of the IMF/ World Bank under the neo-liberal Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP).

Today, globalisation is leading to the contraction in time and space, the ease of capital mobility and radical transformations in the organisation of human affairs and social life (Bischoff 2005: 7-11; Held 1997: 251-267). In most African countries, each phase of globalisation has helped to nurture and reinforce the other, especially by accelerating the decline or collapse of welfare and social security safety nets. Thus while those

who celebrate globalisation highlight the phenomenal increase in the movement of peoples, coupled with unprecedented flows of goods, services and capital around the world (Ajayi 2004), those critical of it insist that the agency of globalisation is too destructive as it widens social disconnections and social dislocations leading to frequent and intense violent conflicts (Held 1997: 257-8). While it provokes a 'return to familiar conditions of subordination' (Clapham 1996: 24), the Ugandan political analyst, Catherine Odora Hoppers, described the current phase of globalisation and the neo-liberal ideology driving it as simply a 'continuation of the war that began with colonialism and never ended' (Hoppers 25, 2, 2000: 149). What globalisation is doing to Africa in particular, and to most developing countries of the South, is intensifying

> age-old group antagonisms: sublime racial politics, regional economic disparities, and worsening global poverty ... It disguises the true nature of the North-South divide and generates the illusion that to transcend differences is to overcome it. Globalisation does not and cannot foster equity because its technology is driven by the same exploitative trade regimes which it supposedly called out of order (Obono 2004: 90-91).

In '*Globalisation, Equity and Development: Some Reflections on the African Experience*', Olukoshi (2004: 32-42) recognised the legitimate worry deriving from globalisation as he showed how the world is seeing the worst and most extensive process of social exclusion ever known, occurring side-by-side with the 'single-minded, ideologically-motivated retrenchment [and de-energising] of the state and the erosion of its capacity' (2004: 24, 27). Thus, at the same time that developed countries are putting in place robust policies to cushion the side effects and threats from globalisation, they are dissuading, even coercing, their weaker counterparts in the South from pursuing their own independent interests on the pretext that the state must roll back its presence and allow the market to mobilise and allocate social capital. Since 'decay seems to outweigh renewal', therefore, Olukoshi warned that the biggest challenge facing Africa consists of 'renewing and retooling the State in order to enable it to resume a meaningful role in the developmental process' (2004: 39). Obviously, this is where the irony about globalisation and African security problematic most reveals itself: at the same time that globalisation is undermining the capacity of the state, the state itself is still expected to play a major role in the stability and security of the continent.

Unfortunately, the twenty-first century has ushered in a profound sense of anxiety that security and development could escape Africa (Chandler 2004). Going by today's benchmark as contained in the UN Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targeting the reduction of poverty by half, scaling-up access to safe drinking water and achieving universal basic schooling by 2015, there are indications that Africa may not even be on track yet (ARB 2003: 15099-15134; Mepham and Lorge 2005). While such concerns have placed Africa on the top of the agenda of the international community, especially the G8 countries, a consistent pattern of deception seems to pervade the policies and actions of these countries as they refuse to acknowledge or even discuss the root causes of Africa's underdevelopment located in their low capacity and limited access to global resources and opportunities. One example that readily comes to mind in this respect is the on-going African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) pursued by the United States. According to Carol Thompson (2004) AGOA is providing neither growth nor opportunity for African economies, not just because only six African countries have benefited from the initiative, but also that it offers much less in terms of 'shared values' and 'shared responsibilities'. She demonstrated how western insincerity is leaving Africa in the doldrums while the rich countries spent $300 billion in 2003 alone on farm subsidies; almost six times more than on development aid (2004: 472). Mepham and Lorge (2005) advised the G8 countries to put their houses in order by stopping harmful practices creating gaps in western rhetoric and actions towards Africa, especially with respect to the nature of aid and conditionality, discriminatory international trade regimes, the fuelling and exacerbation of armed conflicts and the strengthening of repressive regime by supplying them with arms and military equipment, financing corruption and conflicts, and their contribution to adverse climate change (Olsen 1998, 2002, 2004).

Until now, the wealthiest countries of the world have feigned ignorance of the perilous consequences and wider repercussions of the accentuation of Africa's catastrophic developmental problems. This explains, in part, why the response by Western countries is now distinguished by 'a continual schizophrenia' on whether policy towards Africa should be based on a set of 'goods', that is, increased investment, aid, a liberalised trade regime, or on a set of 'bads' (Herbst and Mills 2003: 31) such as the HIV/AIDS scourge, war, crime and refugee flows, the spread of disease, trafficking of persons, arms and illicit drugs, and glo-

bal terrorism (Farah 2002; Abrahamsen 204b; Addo 2004; Botha 2004; Keenan 2004; Lyman and Morrison 2004; Mentan 2004; Mills 2004; Mepham and Lorge,2005: 9). Encouraged by convergence in the development and security policies (Willet 2004: 101) the set of 'bads' seem to be gaining ascendancy after 9/11 leading to a shift from development/ humanitarianism to a category of risk/fear/threat. Securitisation is, in turn, driving policies of containment, or policing, and promoting a strange version of trusteeship-style responsibility to 'quarantine disorder'. The securitisation of development is strongly demonstrated through the United States-led global anti-terrorism movement. From a different perspective, however, this global effort may in fact further undermine human security in Africa as the discourse of anti-terrorism is used to intimidate opponents of government in different countries (Farah 2002; Keenan 2004; Lyman and Morrison 2004). It is also not a coincidence from the way it is pursued, that the war on terror is becoming synonymous with poverty alleviation, making them two sides of the same policy coin. Furthermore, the securitisation of Africa is becoming another political strategy for rallying and unifying domestic constituencies behind government at a time of vociferous anti-government oppositions, and by so doing, to produce a sense of prioritisation and urgency not necessarily to justify increased development assistance but other political exegeses (Abrahamsen 2004: 680-682; Deegan 2004; Cawthra 2004: 27-28).

What is undeniable from the analysis above is that globalisation is posing new challenges to local and global governance, especially as it affects the management of global public goods: health, education, employment, human security, to mention a few (Federici 2000; Graham and Poku 2000; Cooper 2001; Juhasz 2002; Lawson 2003; Meagher 2003; Forge 2004; Morton 2004; Federici and Caffentzis 2004). Adebayo Adekanye drew attention to those human and social aspects of globalisation that have been thrust onto the global security (and research) agenda, including:

> ... rising poverty and rising incidents of conflict, rising migration and refugee flows, increasing environmental stresses and strains, demographic pressures on resources, deterioration in human security provisions, the diffusion of military technological know-how, skills and expertise of sub-state actors, proliferation of illegal arms, drug trafficking, money laundering, and international terrorism - all of which have combined to constitute the new security issues and concerns of contemporary times (2004: vi).

At the same time, new models of governance and security are required which rescue the state in Africa from its current precarious situation. This nexus between governance and security is a core question examined in Claude Ake's *The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa*. As he rightly noted, threats to democracy in Africa are the same ones accelerating the process of social decay and political instability, and undermining peace and security in the continent. The most deadly threat of all comes from how the process of globalisation is changing 'traditional assumptions to the effect that the nation-state is the inevitable basic political organisation of humankind' while 'undermining the nation-state and its relevance, leaving its future in doubt'. As the 'repository of sovereignty', 'the nation-state is now forced to contest power with sub-state and super-state political formations that have neither a root nor legitimacy'. He further showed how globalisation is causing the 'annulment of the social' by privileging the market over the state (Ake 2000: 26-28). By allowing the market to play a much greater role over and above the state, and removing the conditions that 'make the public possible', globalisation is undermining the state as the most important organisation of power on the continent (Nnoli 2003: 23-25). Indeed, it is difficult to contemplate an alternative framework to the State, certainly not the imperfect and anonymous market. Perhaps, then, the search for creative ways to make the state more relevant to the yearnings and aspirations of the people should be the most urgent priority of our time (Vasu 2005). At the same time, there should be a complementary reinvigoration of the civil society in terms of demanding its rights and serving as watchdog against the excesses of the state. Thus, re-energising the state and civil society are two sides of the same coin as they open up the issue of how the state should treat the people and what concurrent obligations the people have towards the state. This is an issue that will be explored further in the context of an assessment of the viability of NEPAD to respond to human security challenges and problems in contemporary Africa. Whereas globalisation has transformed the security landscape in Africa, old ways of managing security have been slower and less innovative in following suit (Bush and Keyman 1997). This much is clear from the paucity of any credible response to the resurgence of provocative identity-related conflicts on the continent, particularly from the 1990s onward. This is the template for the call to abandon, or at the very least, expand existing parameters of security beyond the present focus on state/regime/territorial

security to include specific human security priorities and concerns (Pettman 2005: 137-150).

The Changing Discourse on Security in Africa: From State to Human Security

Inadvertently, globalisation has opened a wider epistemological and policy window for rethinking and responding to Africa's myriad security problems and challenges in the twenty-first century. At the epicentre of these far-reaching changes is that traditional boundaries between state and civil society, and among different states, are breaking down or transforming in far less predictable ways. Dominant conceptions of security can no longer hold given the complexities of unfolding global relations. With new security threats emanating from non-traditional military sources: population growth, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, drug trafficking, transnational criminality, the violation of cultural and indigenous rights, there is no better time to commence sober and critical reflections on the shape, form and content that security discourses and practices are going to assume in Africa over the next decades (Vayrynen 1995: 259-260). This is against the background that the continent has become a major flashpoint of bloody civil wars and protracted low-intensity conflicts since the Cold War safety valves provided by the United States and the Soviet Union are no longer in place. These new conflicts are occurring within states with their 'primary locale ... found where there is a combination of entrenched poverty, an excessive dependence on natural resource exports, and poor economic governance and state weakness' (Clover 2004: 8-9). It is very difficult to distinguish new types of conflicts as they are all characterised by criminal impunity, wanton violation of human rights, humanitarian emergencies such as massive internal displacements and refugee flows, collapse of livelihood sources and municipal facilities, the spread of communicable and life-threatening diseases, the proliferation and widespread use of small arms and light weapons, to mention a few. They are largely driven by a variety of militaristic ideologies that incubate a frightful regime of terror and insecurity over time (Boyd 2005: 117; Abdullah 2004). Almost a decade ago, one study indicated that 'armed conflict is surely one reason why at least 250 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa- nearly half of the population- are living below the poverty lines' (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996: ix). There is a legitimate fear that identity and resource-induced conflicts could undermine whatever modest progress has been achieved on the continent at this moment when national security

infrastructures are so weak as to allow renegade groups to thrive. These new African wars are assuming a pattern of viciousness, impunity, plunder and profiteering.

Since there is 'considerable ambiguity and confusion about just what kind of security system' is most appropriate for Africa, Ajulu (2004: 265-282) argued that a desirable framework for security in Africa must dwell more on human security, that is, the welfare of the individual, and by extension, the community, as against threats to regimes and the territoriality of nation states. After attention was drawn to 'human security' by the UNDP in its *Human Development Report of 1994*, this concept is regaining global salience with emphases on the core values of human freedom and human fulfilment. UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan distinguished between what he called 'territorial sovereignty' and 'individual sovereignty', the latter defined in terms of the 'fundamental freedom of each individual ... enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights ... not to protect those who abuse them' (Cited in Oberleitner 2005: 194). According to the co-chairs of the Human Security Report, Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, human security means 'protecting vital freedoms - fundamental to human existence and development. It pays particular attention to protecting people from severe and pervasive threats, both natural and societal, and empowering individuals and communities to develop the capabilities of making informed choices and acting on their own behalf'[4] (Cited in Oberleitner 2005: 187). Human security is therefore about

> safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterised by freedom from pervasive threats to people's right, their safety or even their lives ... It is an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focussing exclusively on security of territory or government. Like other security concepts - national security, economic security, and food security - it is about protection. Human security entails preventive measures to reduce vulnerability and minimize risk, and taking remedial action when prevention fails (Sabelo 2004: 299; cf. David Hubert 1999).

Boyd (2005: 115) defined human security as 'the ability to pursue those choices in safe environments broadly encompassing seven dimensions of security - economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political'. Kanbur (2002: 93) conceptualised human security in terms of vulnerability and voicelessness associated with poverty in the face of

unresponsive local and national institutions. Without real peace, as Boyd (2005: 116) pointed out, there are no prospects for development or equality. Real peace, quoting Ursula Franklin, is understood to mean

> ... more than the absence of war. It is also the absence of fear; fear of the knock on the door in the middle of the night, fear of hunger and helplessness, fear of the absence of justice. Peace is, then, the presence of justice for all, peace means respect for all human needs as well as the condition that force, in all its forms, is not an instrument of national or international policy (Boyd 2005: 119).

Peace, generally understood in terms of ending widespread and continuing violence, is limited by its emphasis on physical violence, involving bodily harm or the destruction of properties, without cognisance of structural violence, involving less visible constraints on human potential due to economic and political structures (Galtung 1969: 167-191). Based on conventional wisdom, issues having to do with broad-based recovery (involving improvements in the incomes and human development indicators of the majority of people) hardly feature in the discourse of violence and insecurity. By implication, this narrow and short-term security concern usually paves the way for shoddy and half-hearted interventions that leave too many issues unresolved. In countries where prolonged atrocities have been committed against the civilian population, for instance, human security concerns are barely pursued after peace processes have been consummated and a new government sworn in (ARB, March 2004: 15663-15698). In such countries, international humanitarian efforts mobilised during civil wars quickly dissipate, leaving them distressed and at risk. This concern for the long-term needs of post-war countries prompted the proposal by the International Crisis Group in its report on Liberia and Sierra Leone that longer periods, between 15-25 years, of sustained international support for post-war countries was necessary if they were not to slide back into bloody civil wars (Manning 2002). It is also in this context that Addison (2003: 3-5) proposed that the emphasis should go beyond rebuilding shattered or collapsed infrastructure to investing in 'social capital, including the trust that creates informal safety nets' and by so doing, altering the behaviour of critical national actors (Harris 2004: 5-10).

The quest to appropriately redirect security towards human-centred concerns raise several problems. First, human security is still a heavily contested concept in terms of definition, scope and utility. Thus, there is still a lot of suspicion and criticism over the tendency to overstretch the

traditional notion and boundaries of security; much the same way that 'environmental security' entered the security lexicon almost a decade ago. A second critique is that human security is far too universalistic, thus raising false priorities and hopes around the securitisation of human beings. By maintaining existing boundaries, orthodoxy restricts 'security' to the political survivability of states and regimes to the exclusion of equally important economic, environmental, cultural and non-political threats. Also, by placing the state at the epicentre of the design of security architectures, existing paradigms suggest that non-political threats 'become integral components of our definition of security only if they become acute enough to acquire political dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state institutions, and regime survival' (Vayrynen 1995: 260). Not least is the limitation that human security cannot be fully achieved for as long as the quest for peace and security are linked with the authoritarian values and motivations of political leaders who exercise power with impunity (Sabelo 2004: 306; van Niekerk 2004). Adele Jinadu (2000) offered further perspectives on how human security suffers when custodians of the state seek to retain and extract compliance through the instrumentality of coercion. He explained how the problematic of peace and security is 'intrinsically bound up with human nature, especially the dialectics of the social psychology of human interactions, under conditions of scarcity and choice'. Accordingly, the problem of peace and security 'cannot and should not be divorced from the dialectics of domination and subjection, in other words from considerations of superordinate/subordinate relations at the community, national and global levels' (Jinadu 2000: 1-3). The crucial question, as he pointed out, is '[If] humankind cannot create a perfect society, given human nature and the reality of scarcity, as well as the difficult and contentious questions of choice which scarcity poses, what needs to be done to create a less imperfect society? Under what conditions can such a less imperfect society be expected to emerge and thrive?'

Against the background of the complex welfare and safety problems experienced in Africa, improving human security as a condition of existence which has both quantitative and qualitative aspects, has far-reaching policy implications for the contrived post-colonial state (Thomas and Wilkin 1999). Indeed, human security calls into question which type of state is more able to enhance human security, and whether, in fact, states themselves are a potential solution to human insecurity or a major part of the problem. In the circumstances that the post-colonial

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state in Africa is itself struggling to perform its most basic functions, there is no guarantee that the human security needs of the vast majority of the citizens can be met, not to talk of being satisfied. Even if one accepts that the post-colonial state as presently composed in Africa is not in a position to 'monopolise the concept and practice of security' (Oberleitner 2005), the follow-up question to ask is where then should the state acceptably belong in the process of reconstructing the security landscape to bring in and accommodate human security? Ironically, the immediate wisdom is to accept that the project of enhancing human security cannot possibly progress or be accomplished without the active participation of the state. Since the state cannot be excised, therefore a human security approach means both refocusing the state as well as providing within it a congenial environment that allows for the promotion and protection of the well-being and safety of the population as equally important goals (Graham and Poku 2000).

The above necessarily leads to another important issue: the impossibility of separating human and regime securities from the process of democracy building and consolidation, as well as development in Africa (Jinadu 2000: 4, 9). As a categorical imperative, peace and security provide a critical theoretical, moral, political and philosophical benchmark in the core assumptions of justice and equality that can be used to measure and approximate how societies are moving or drifting further away from the ideal (Ake 2000: 9). As the Cold War ushered in a renewed interest in governance issues and reforms, what seems wrong is how these governance issues are driven more from without than within, thus limiting critical imperatives such as the need for local content and a sense of inclusion and ownership (Cawthra 2004: 30-31). A shift in focus to human security would reverse this situation, pave the way for a better understanding of the major sources of threats to human security, and stimulate the quest for appropriate reformulation of strategies for addressing them. This was the framework within which Willet (2004: 114) suggested viewing state-society relations differently, especially because the capacities required to enhance human security in Africa are quite different from those that focus almost exclusively on the security of the state, regime or military security. The overall challenge is to cultivate and 'shape a security paradigm that captures the need to reach out in defence of people as well as the states' (Oberleitner 2005: 190-191).

How African states are able to grapple with and respond to pressing issues that impinge on the welfare and survival of its vast population will determine the present and future qualities of human, social and national security on the continent. The choice for countries of the South, according to President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, 'is not whether to engage with globalisation or not but how to engage with it' (cf. Griggs 2003: 76). It is partly an attempt to answer the question of 'how' that the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was established in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 2001. It is important to recapture, no matter how briefly, the historical context to this new initiative beginning from when the defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was created in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1963. Since that time, several major issues and common concerns have occupied African countries. For example, to promote unity and solidarity among members of the Organisation; coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence; eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and promote international cooperation. In retrospect, it is a tribute to the OAU that by the time it was formally dissolved radical transformations had occurred within the African political landscape as evident in the complete termination of colonial rule and minority rule in apartheid South Africa. Although other problems persisted, or in some cases, multiplied (Packer and Rukare 2002: 371 ff.), the enthusiasm for a new continental framework to give further impetus to Africa's developmental goals and aspirations was demonstrated by the speed with which the Constitutive Act of the African Union (CAAU) entered into force within two years. The AU mandate explicitly included issues relating to promoting and defending African common positions on issues of interest to its peoples; encouraging international cooperation; promoting peace, security and stability, as well as democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance; promoting and protecting human and people's rights, establishing the necessary conditions which would enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy; promoting cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples, and finally, working with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent (cf. Levitt 2003: 40-41, 55;

Griggs 2003; Matthews 2001, 2003). Like its precursor, the African Union also adopted the principles of sovereign equality and interdependence, respect for borders, peaceful resolution of disputes, establishment of a common defence policy, non-interference, peaceful coexistence, and self-reliance, among others. The CAAU went further to identify other key principles such as the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security; promotion of gender equality; respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance; promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic development; respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities; and finally, condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government (Levitt 2003: 41-42). These obviously are very significant additional mandates. But then, again, they have placed a huge question mark over the capacity, resources and even the political will at the disposal of the new organisation to achieve them (Tieku 2004; Forge 2004: 29). It is more in this regard that legitimate fears have been expressed that the same legal, procedural, fiscal and environmental constraints that hampered the OAU may also decapitate the new African Union.

Considering the grave implications for peace and stability in the continent, it is understandable that security concerns featured prominently in the enabling framework of the AU. It must be recalled that at the time the Constitutive Act was endorsed in 2000, the African continent was already choking from almost a dozen protracted internal conflicts and civil wars (Field 2004: 19). To give effect to these concerns, the Peace and Security Council (PSC)[5] of the AU became the first initiative to be established, in July of that year, with a broad mandate to intervene in the affairs of states to preserve peace and the rule of law. The protocol establishing the PSC also made provided for a Panel of the Wise, a sub-regional early warning systems linked to a regional 'situation room' at the AU headquarters, the African Standby Force and a Peace Fund (Shannon 2004: 41-62; African Union 2005: 1). Apart from the PSC, the AU agreed to the idea of a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDA) proposed by Nigeria (Shannon 2004: 21-22)[6].

The blueprint creating NEPAD derived its strength from the AU.[7] NEPAD acknowledges good governance as a basic requirement for peace, security and sustainable political and socio-economic development; African ownership and leadership; and broad participation by all sections of the society. It anchored the development of Africa on its own resources and the resourcefulness of its people; on creating partnerships between and among African peoples; on accelerating regional and continental integration, building the competitiveness of African countries and the continent; on forging a new international partnership that changes the unequal relationship between Africa and the developed world; and finally, on ensuring that all partnerships with NEPAD are linked to the Millennium Development Goals and other agreed development goals and targets. African leaders that signed up to NEPAD resolved to 'eradicate poverty and to place our countries, individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic on equal footing'.[8] They acknowledged that poverty can only be effectively tackled through the promotion of democracy, good governance, peace and security; the development of human and physical resources, gender equity; openness to international trade and investment; allocation of appropriate funds to social sector; and new partnerships between government and the private sector, and with the civil society (par. 20, pp. 7-8).

To achieve its twin objectives of poverty eradication and economic development (par. 5, p. 3), NEPAD identified four areas of core emphasis: Democracy and Good Political Governance, Economic and Corporate Governance, Socio-Economic Development, and the African Peer Review Mechanism (par. 6, p. 3). Member countries also expressed their determination to 'increase ... efforts in restoring stability, peace and security in the African continent, as these are essential conditions for sustainable development, alongside democracy, good governance, human rights, social development, protection of environment and sound economic management'. They pledged to direct efforts and initiatives to 'move quickly towards finding peaceful solutions to current conflicts and to build Africa's capacity to prevent, manage and resolve all conflicts on the continent' (par. 9, p. 4). They accepted 'a binding obligation to ensure that women have every opportunity to contribute on terms of full equality to political and socio-economic development in all our countries' (par. 11, p. 4), while undertaking to 'do more to advance the cause of human rights ... to end the moral shame exemplified by the plight of women,

children, the disabled and ethnic minorities in conflict situations in Africa' (par. 10, p. 4).

NEPAD prioritised eight codes and standards that should be observed by member countries 'within their capacity capabilities', i.e. 'minimum requirements, given a country's capacity to do so' (par. 17, p. 6). These priorities - with the potential to promote market efficiency, to control wasteful spending, to consolidate democracy, and to encourage private financial flows - include: a code of good practice on transparency in monetary and financial policies; code of good practice on fiscal transparency; best practices for budget transparency; guidelines for public debt management; principles of corporate governance; international accounting standards; international standards on auditing; and finally, core principles for effective banking supervision (par. 18, p. 6-7). Finally, NEPAD affirms the need 'to build on the promising foundation, working with our development partners and the wider international community to: forge new forms of international co-operation in which the benefits of globalisation are more evenly shared; create a stable international economic environment in which African countries can achieve growth through greater market access for their exports; the removal of trade barriers, especially non-tariff barriers and other forms of protectionism; increased flows of foreign direct investment; and debt cancellation'. NEPAD is touted, especially abroad, both as the most ambitious framework for 'moving the African continent from crisis to renewal in the past forty years' and as 'one last hope for Africa to reverse its slide into irrelevance' (Hope 2002: 397-389, 402; Diescho 2002).

Going by the letters and spirit of NEPAD, one can reasonably conclude that it covers most of the important aspirations of Africans (Mbaku 2004: 393). The framework acknowledges that peace, security, and democracy are important preconditions for economic development, including attracting much-needed foreign investment (Hope 2002: 392). This peace and security initiative is, in turn, based on three related elements: promoting long-term conditions for development and security; building the capacity of African institutions for early warning, as well as enhancing their capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts; and institutionalising commitment to the core values of the New Partnership for Africa's Development through the leadership. To build Africa's capacity to manage all aspects of conflict, NEPAD focuses on strengthening existing regional and sub-regional institutions in four key areas: prevention, management and resolution of conflicts; peacemaking,

peacekeeping and peace enforcement; post-conflict reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction; and combating the illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons and landmines.

These principles, objectives and action plans are bold and beautiful in print (Chabal 2002; Diescho 2002; Kanbur 2002; Melber, Cornwell, Gathaka and Wanjala 2002; Waal 2002; Hammerstad 2004; Herbst 2004; Matthews 2004; Malcomson 2004; Mbaku 2004; Adesina 2005). The temptation is to give NEPAD a chance to mature further before subjecting it to critical evaluation on the basis of its avowed objectives and achievements. But there are preliminary observations germane to its creation and existence so far that could serve as a useful guidepost for short-term and mid-term reviews. Olukoshi (2003: 21-25) identified one major limitation of NEPAD as arising from its over-reliance on myths to sell itself to the public; myths that essentially represent a misreading of African past and recent experiences, but are gaining the status of truth with deliberate repetition. Four of such myths revolve around: (i) the idea that 40 years of independence in Africa has been characterised by a universal and uniformly dismal socio-economic record which NEPAD is now designed to correct; (ii) the claim that the initiative represents the first comprehensive programme to emerge from within Africa for resolving the developmental problems of the continent; (iii) the even more pretentious claim that it is the first truly African-owned framework for redressing the socio-economic and political difficulties of the continent; and (iv) the erroneous impression that NEPAD is the first truly market-friendly initiative to have emanated from African leaders (see also, Herbst and Mills 2003).

Together, these myths have been developed to sell the neo-liberal logic on which the existence and legitimacy of NEPAD is dependent. This 'obsession with neo-liberalism and its willingness to integrate Africa into what is essentially an unjust global trade system' has been criticised on different occasions, including during the African Social Forum held in Bamako, Mali, in January 2002 (Mbaku 2004: 394). This pandering to the logic of a thoroughly discredited neo-liberalism that has failed Africa in the past is unfortunate. On the basis of its avowed commitments to neo-liberalism there is little hope that NEPAD would be able to mobilise sufficient autonomy and action to challenge or seek a comprehensive reform of the existing global political economy largely responsible for Africa's many predicaments. What seems to be happening is that the designers and operators of NEPAD are content with diligently falling in

line rather than making any serious effort to amplify Africa's rights, for instance, to fair trade. At a time when consensus is building overwhelmingly within and outside that the global political economy has been unfair and unjust to Africa, it is curious that NEPAD is still calling for further integration through the instrumentality of trade liberalisation and the formation of free markets. Unfortunately, no matter which rosy form it is presented in, neo-liberalism can only accelerate and accentuate the deep-seated crises of development facing societies in Africa as it draws more and more people into poverty, rather than relieve them from it, as it promises (Mbaku 2004: 394). By leaning so heavily on neo-liberalism and market forces, NEPAD will be stalling if not subverting the expansion of welfare opportunities for the ordinary African as it creates room for profiteering (Matthews 2004: 503). It might also mean NEPAD is sacrificing the human rights of African peoples to the 'whims of a volatile and untrustworthy global capital' (Mbaku 2004: 396). The worst scenario from the neo-liberal agenda of NEPAD, according to Mbaku (2004: 401), is that it is offering the West an opportunity to continue the exploitation of Africa which began almost five hundred years ago (Olsen 1998, 2002, 2004).

A closer look also reveals an even more sinister ambiguity in terms of the character and parameters of the proposed 'partnership' between NEPAD and the wealthier donor countries and institutions. Presently, NEPAD is claiming a development rhetoric which retains the political and economic governance processes elsewhere in the West as the model of what it means to be 'developed'. By pushing in this direction, the operators of NEPAD are not even thinking that there may well be other paths to development different from the one that the West is working hard to impose on Africa. Regardless of the claim to African ownership, NEPAD is still manipulated behind the scenes by its so-called development partners pushing for a strange type of partnership that further undermines the capacity of Africans to determine their own destiny and future (Matthews 2004: 497-500). It is this kind of partnership that is driving the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) implemented since 1999 by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, after admitting that the celebrated Structural Adjustment Programmes of the 1980s turned out to be a disaster (Hope 2002: 400).

One of the most scathing criticisms of NEPAD is therefore that it is a 'western wolf in African sheepskin'. Rita Abrahamsen (2004a: 1454) suggested this label to underscore the initiative's subservience to western

powers and values despite the rhetoric of ownership. According to her, 'partnerships are little more than conditionality by another name'; a form of advanced liberal rule 'that increasingly governs through the explicit commitment to self-government and agency of the recipient states'. It is also 'a form of advanced liberal power' working 'not primarily as direct domination and imposition, but through promises of incorporation and inclusion'. Recognising that their 'over-prescriptive and interventionist development models' have not worked satisfactorily, the West is retreating to the position that 'they are no longer in the business of telling poor countries what to do' (Abrahamsen 2004a: 1453-4). To appreciate the potency of the subtle form of power inherent in this partnership, Abrahamsen revisited the discourse on the logic of power relations but differently from the way it is usually understood as the capacity of certain actors to control directly the actions of others. She re-framed this new interpretation by adding a fourth aspect to the tripod of power proposed earlier by Lukes. According to Lukes, power manifests in three forms: (i) power employed by one actor over another; (ii) non-decision as a form of power characterised by the ability to shape political agendas and prevent issues from entering public debate; and (iii) the most insidious exercise of power involving the shaping of people's perceptions, cognitions and preferences in ways that may be contrary to their own interests but making them accept and work for the existing order of things, including their own domination.

The fourth dimension of power introduced by Abrahamsen incorporated 'governmentality as a form of power'. By governmentality, Abrahamsen was alluding to the 'the conduct of conduct', 'a particular modern form of power that is characterized by an increasing reliance on pastoral care and techniques of normalisation and consensus, as opposed to more overtly coercive forms of power' (2004a: 1458-1459). As political interventions designed to produce particular modern subjects, partnerships from the perspective of governmentality allows governments in weaker recipient countries the opportunity to learn to practice their freedom 'responsibly' in a way that capacity building is simultaneously empowering and disciplinary, in that both constitute and regulate the identities, behaviour, and choices of their target countries' (Abrahamsen 2004a: 1462). Accordingly, this type of partnership is not simply a trick of deception, or a rhetorical device, but has very real productive power which makes partnerships to function as 'a form of advanced liberal governmentality that increasingly governs through the explicit

commitment to self-government and agency of African states' without necessarily losing the traditional notion of power as domination (Abrahamsen 2004a: 1463).

The allusion to partnerships is manifested concretely through contemporary donor practices as certain sections of the African elite and bureaucracy come to internalise the neo-liberal values of governance and even develop toolkits that will not be radically different from those usually developed in the think tanks of the West. An immediate example is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which was approved in Cape Town in July 2003, as a 'mutually agreed' and 'voluntary' instrument for self-monitoring 'to ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance' (Abrahamsen 2004a: 1459). As Chabal (2002: 462) has informed us, 'NEPAD must ... be understood as a commitment on the part of the current (and not so new) elites in Africa to the present "democratic orthodoxy" in order to guarantee a transfer of resources to Africa: a continuation with, rather than a break from, the type of relations that has guided the continent's engagement with the international community since independence'.

Alternative Futures and Challenges of Human Security in Africa

The paper has demonstrated that the discourse on security in Africa has altered significantly in the last two decades; against the background of the termination of the Cold War and given the powerful contradictions deriving from the present global regime of globalisation. Regarding the global attention to human security as a new security focus for Africa, the paper showed that it is still a long way before the concept becomes a credible framework side-by-side with established notions of security based on regimes, state and territoriality. Another point is that the underlying assumptions of globalisation, and of NEPAD, based as they are on neo-liberalism, cannot serve the cause of human security, even as it continues to undermine regime security, state security and territorial security. The final point is that given the pressing imperative for new security models for Africa, closer attention should be paid to those issues that portend grave and direct danger for African peoples rather than, say, to the state, regime or territory.

What then are the alternative futures for Africa regarding meeting the present challenges of human security? The first point to bear in mind

in this regard is that threats to human security no longer derive solely from the military actions of states, even though this is deriving new significance in the context of global anti-terrorism as shown below. Arguably one of the most substantive problems facing Africa today has to do with the ebbing capacity of the state to mobilise and deliver public good in a manner that is as fair and equitable as possible to bring economic, political, environmental, health and cultural benefits to the people. In the future, then, new security issues concerning Africa would include rising poverty and rising incidents of conflict, rising migration and refugee flows, cross-border criminalities, increasing environmental stresses and strains, demographic pressures on resources, deterioration in human security provisions, the diffusion of military technological know-how, skills and expertise of sub-state actors, proliferation of illegal arms, drug trafficking, money laundering, and international terrorism (Adekanye 2004: vi). Others would include the implications of growing social and economic exclusion and the general marginalisation of the people, political disenfranchisement, illicit human and drug trafficking, social insecurity, environmental degradation, unemployment, youth violence, epidemic and health issues, including the notorious HIV/AIDS pandemic, piracy, ethnic and religious conflicts; in short, issues that touch on the lives and day-to-day survival of peoples in different countries within the continent (Ostergard 2002: 333-350).

How African countries are able to cope with these myriad problems will determine whether or not the future will be bright or pale. Unfortunately, there is limited room for optimism even as individual countries demonstrate remarkable resilience in tackling the problems highlighted above. This brings to mind the African adage that 'if you cannot help me, then do not complicate my situation'. The import of this adage is best illustrated by one of the most formidable challenges deriving from the times that we live in: the implications of the global fight against terrorism initiated and led by the United States. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 2001, Washington promptly redefined its worldwide rule of engagements around anti-terrorism; a development that has brought Africa - a continent with considerably more Muslim populations than the Middle East - into visibility on the global geo-strategic map of the United States which has recognised this large population as prone to radical Islam (Botha 2004: 3-10). Although individual governments at the sub-regional and regional levels may slowly latch on to the global anti-terrorism campaign, they

would be doing so more through external prompting than any independent/ unilateral assessment of the dangers posed to them by terrorism. Even then, as they reluctantly join the global anti-terrorism movement, only intangible and imitative commitments are expected of them.[9]

Because Africa's counter-terrorism initiative will more likely be externally driven, it may be difficult to separate it from the individual interests of sponsoring powers.[10] Addo (2004: 18) noted that '[The] challenging issue currently is whether efforts made so far have been effective or credible enough in preventing and combating terrorism, and if other equally relevant alternatives exist for dealing with terrorism in Africa given other developmental challenges faced by the continent'. The scenario that plays out therefore is one in which support for Africa will be conditional upon progress, as determined by the West, made to complement the global (read: United States) anti-terrorism campaign. Quite correctly, this type of demand on Africa by the West is nothing new. What is perhaps different is that it is assuming greater visibility and potent implications for human security on the continent as illustrated by the growing tendency by governments facing staunch oppositions to label them as terrorists and to use the language of anti-terrorism as a pretext for 'official' clampdowns and repression. In such countries, state repression and anti-terrorism becomes two sides of the same coin thriving on each other. As troubled governments become more repressive and authoritarian, they could count on support from the major sponsors of the global anti-terrorism movement simply by establishing some linkage, no matter how thin, between domestic opposition and one or the other pathologies of popular terrorist organisations. This tendency, in turn, would lead to a new and dangerous paradox: as African governments sign up to the global anti-terrorism project, the ordinary population may find themselves at even greater risk.

Notes

1. Revised version of paper presented at the 11th CODESRIA General Assembly, Maputo, Mozambique, 6-10 December, 2005 on the theme: Rethinking African Development: Beyond Impasse, Towards Alternatives. The original version of the paper was written during residency as Visiting Leventis Cooperation Scholar to the Centre for African Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, UK, from September to December 1995.
2. See www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/africa1.htm.
3. 'Editorial: Africa - Making Democracy Work', *The Round Table*, 93, 375, July 2004: 307-310.

4. See also 'Outline of the Report of the Commission on Human Security', http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/Outlines/outlines.pdf (accessed on November 16, 2005).
5. For details on the Protocol Relating to the Establishment o the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AUPSC), Durban, South Africa, July 9, 2002, see Levitt, 2003: 161-186.
6. For details of the Draft Kampala Document for the Proposed Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) Kampala, Uganda, May 23, 2001, see Levitt, 2003: 227-248.
7. AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex 1: 2.
8. AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex 1: 1.
9. But then there is an OAU Convention on the Prevention and Elimination of Terrorism adopted in October 2002 at the Summit in Dakar, Senegal (Addo 2004: 11-19).
10. Several external efforts are currently in place: British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT), Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities (RECAMP), African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA), and the Global Rapid Deployment Force sponsored by the G-8 (Addo 2004: 18).

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African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2008, pp. 32–54
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(ISSN 0850-7902)

Africa's Quest for Long-Term Development: Does NEPAD Provide the Necessary Policy Framework?

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Abstract

The evasive nature which characterizes Africa's development is something familiar to all. Various ambitious development strategies, implemented since the 1970s, have brought little hope for the reversal of Africa's developmental malaise. The formulation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001 and its adoption by the African Union (AU) as the continent's blueprint policy document for development engendered a lot of optimism. This optimism resulted partly from the willingness of African governments to voluntarily undertake what the continent's development partners - the G8 - perceived as 'credible policies' for resuscitating the ailing economies of the continent, and partly from the promise of assistance in the form of accruing ADE and IDE, debt forgiveness and access to western markets. There is a growing consensus among development experts that the provision of such opportunities would alleviate many of the structural constraints in Africa, consequently catalyzing long-term development. While NEPAD's emphasis on promoting peace, security, democracy, and good governance is commendable, it is however argued that its propensity to gear development solely along neo-liberal lines is problematic in a continent that is grappling with the disappointments of the market-based structural adjustment programmes (SAP).

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The paper advocates the adoption of viable regional integration schemes that nurture Africa's fragile industries, diversify its predominantly primary production-based economies, promote self-reliance and minimise dependence on external agents. This, it is argued, is a better framework for Africa's long-term development.

Resumé

Le caractère évasif dont le développement fait l'objet en Afrique est quelque chose de familier. Bon nombre de stratégies de développement ambitieuses mises en œuvre depuis les années 1970 n'ont donné que très peu d'espoir de juguler le malaise développemental dans lequel l'Afrique se trouve. L'élaboration, en 2001, du Nouveau Partenariat pour le Développement de l'Afrique (NEPAD) ainsi que son adoption par l'Union africaine (UA) en tant que schéma directeur continental pour le développement avaient permis d'être optimiste. Cet optimisme était dû, d'une part, à la volonté des gouvernements africains d'adopter délibérément ce que les partenaires au développement du continent – le G8 – considéraient comme étant des 'politiques crédibles' pour ressusciter les économies africaines qui périclitent. D'autre part, cet optimisme découlait de la promesse d'assistance sous la forme d'un ODA et FDI accrus, d'une élimination de la dette, et d'accès aux marchés occidentaux. Les experts en développement s'accordent de plus en plus sur le fait que la création d'opportunités de cette nature pourrait aider à lever bon nombre des contraintes structurelles qui existent en Afrique et, par ricochet, servir de catalyseur pour le développement durable. Même si l'accent que le NEPAD met sur la promotion de la paix, de la sécurité, de la démocratie et de la bonne gouvernance est digne d'éloges, d'aucuns soutiennent que sa tendance à poursuivre les objectifs de développement seulement à l'aide de moyens relevant du néo-libéralisme pose problème dans un continent qui se débat encore avec les désillusions causées par les programmes d'ajustement structurel (PAS) basés sur le marché.

L'article plaide pour l'adoption de plans d'intégration régionale viables qui consolideraient les industries africaines assez précaires, permettraient de diversifier les économies principalement caractérisées par les activités du secteur primaire, favoriseraient l'autosuffisance et minimiseraient la dépendance à des agents extérieurs. D'aucuns croient que c'est la meilleure façon d'assurer un développement durable à l'Afrique

Introduction

The formulation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001 and its subsequent adoption by the African Union (AU) as the continent's blueprint policy document for development have excited hopes and optimism. These hopes are justified against a backdrop

of failures of previous development strategies to reverse Africa's declining economic fortunes. This paper examines the capacity of NEPAD and the AU to generate long-term development. It argues that while the aims of NEPAD are laudable, its overwhelming thrust to direct Africa's development solely along neo-liberal paths is problematic, given the dismal record of previous neo-liberal development programmes. It opines further that the starting point for long-term development in Africa is the promotion of regional and sub-regional integration that mobilises domestic resources and minimises dependence on the international market. In placing these and related arguments in context, the paper highlights the extent of Africa's developmental crisis, explores the origins of NEPAD, and revisits the debate on NEPAD's ability to establish an auspicious policy framework for African development.

Africa's Crisis and NEPAD's Antecedents

Africa's decadence and negative indicators are all too familiar to be recounted in detail. In brief, Africa is the only continent in which living conditions have been deteriorating in the last thirty years (Guest 2004, Giddens 1999). Currently between 40 and 60 per cent of its 800 million people live below the poverty line - earning less than the UN threshold of $1.00 a day. Africa has high rates of unemployment, illiteracy, mortality and low rates of per capita incomes, real wages and savings. Malnutrition, HIV/AIDS and other diseases, along with inadequate health facilities, have combined to reduce life expectancy in the region. Public access to modern communication infrastructure such as the internet, telephones and satellite television is low compared to other regions (UNDP 2004: 183). Africa's overall economic performance is low, leading to external borrowing, heavier debt burden and reliance on international aid. In the midst of such crushing adversities, overseas development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investments (FDI) have declined. For example, Africa's share of world trade has plummeted from 2.7 per cent in 1990 to just 2 per cent in 2002 (UNCTAD 2004), underscoring its declining importance and marginalisation in the global economy. The upsurge of neo-liberal globalisation following the demise of communism in the late 1980s has not helped Africa either. On the contrary, competition and liberalisation attending globalisation have presented further developmental challenges to Africa. This, along with the inability of Africa countries to diversity their economies, has heightened the region's vulnerability and uncertainty (Thomson 2000: 168).

Political conditions in Africa are not better either. Governance is beset with corruption, nepotism and neo-patrimonialism, which together have compounded the continent's development challenges (Chabal 2002). Human right violations and election rigging are rife notwithstanding the widespread adoption of democratic constitutions. Additionally, Africa holds the (in)famous accolade as an epicentre of seemingly intractable intra-state conflicts (Adedeji 1999, Laremont 2002). Worse yet, it has a truncated capacity to manage its environment, increasing its vulnerability to the devastating effects of famine, droughts and floods. Guest (2004: 6) perhaps correctly captures this scenario in noting that 'when the rains fail [Africans] go hungry. And when the rains are too heavy ... they lose their homes'. By every indication, Africa's developmental prospects are seriously circumscribed, raising serious doubts about its ability to meet the UN millennium development goals, including halving poverty by 2015. Africa, indeed, appears as the 'hopeless continent' (Crewe and Aggleton 2003: 142). It is this condition that NEPAD seeks to reverse. Importantly, NEPAD aims to address Africa's poverty and related structural constraints to place the continent firmly on the path to sustainable development. The formulation of NEPAD could therefore not have come at a better time and high optimism could not have been unexpected.

Yet, NEPAD is not the first development programme Africa has followed in the quest for development. To be sure, NEPAD's antecedents include import substitution industrialisation (ISI), the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) formulated in 1980 and structural adjustment programmes. None of these, however, made meaningful impact on development. Inspired by the assumptions of the dependency paradigm, attributing the South's underdevelopment to the exploitation of capital and the generally oppressive nature of the international economy, import substitution was adopted by a number of African countries during the 1960s and 1970s to exert state control over development but also to minimise dependency on the external global market. Although subsequently discredited as an explanatory tool, the dependency approach nonetheless gained popularity in the developing world. In Africa, import substitution found expression in the proliferation of public enterprises that dominated nearly all sectors of public life - from agriculture to infrastructure; from banking to marketing and from education to transportation (Nellis 1986: 17-20). While such enterprises temporarily created jobs and theoretically curtailed import bills, they

were on the whole a failure. Many enterprises were overstaffed, underperformed and inefficient. Consequently, they hardly broke even, let alone made profits and survived on state subsidies. Rather than spurring development, public enterprises entrenched neo-patrimonial politics and became avenues for soliciting elite support (Herbst 1990: 38). The inherent inefficiency in public enterprises and the bankruptcy of ISI as an approach to development became palpable during the economic recession of the 1970s.

The oil crisis of the 1970s and 1980s and the consequent depression in the international economic system spawned a dramatic escalation of Africa's debt. The crisis caused the predictable retreat of private banks (the London Club), which had until then been Africa's main source of credit. The intervention of the international financial institutions (IFIs) and bilateral creditors (the Paris Club), from the 1970s signalled the inexorable demise of ISI as a strategy and statism as an ideology. In return for credit, the IFIs formulated SAPs as the dominant development paradigm. Essentially, SAPs embodied a set of neo-liberal and market-oriented policies, including deregulation, decontrolling, de-subsidisation, devaluations, downsizing and privatisation. In entrenching the market, SAPs also redefined and, in fact, confined the state's role in development to merely 'creating an enabling environment' for the expansion of the private sector depicted as the engine for growth. In retrospect, policy prescriptions and restrictions under SAPs were informed by the World Bank (1981) report, also known as the Berg Report (named after its principal author, Elliot Berg). In contrast to the underlying assumptions of ISI, the Berg Report attributed Africa's crisis to internal causes, including bad governance, over-bloated bureaucracies, state control of exchange rates and marketing as well as its generally overextended nature. Adjustment policies were therefore meant to curb the state's role by transferring its power of distribution to the market thereby undermining its overwhelming control in the economy. The ultimate concern of SAPs was to resuscitate Africa's ailing economies and enhance its debt repayment capacities.

Truncating the traditional role of the state and exciting a mix of anxieties and uncertainties, SAPs faced initial continental resentment, part of which was reflected in the formulation of the Lagos Plan of Action. The LPA was to be an alternative to SAPs whose panoply of obtrusive conditionalities was perceived as intrusive but also inhibitive to long-term development. The LPA aimed to engineer development around

core regional programmes, dominant among which were collective self-reliance; mobilisation and utilisation of Africa's resources; and regional integration. The state was to be the centrepiece of development in this process (Nyong'o 2002). Together, the LPA's prescriptions were to moderate Africa's precarious dependence on the global market and mitigate its associated largely negative perennial effects. Yet the laudable proposals of the LPA never really saw the light of day. Among other reasons, the LPA lacked implementing structures both at national and regional levels. Moreover, the LPA more or less came to represent a loose set of principles and declarations, which never really wielded power to compel compliance (Shaw 1991, Ikome 2005). Also, weakening the claims of the LPA was the declining fortunes of socialism, which hitherto provided an alternative development path, but which was rapidly losing credence as pro-market reforms were initiated in Russia and Eastern Europe. Importantly, SAPs showed a stronger capacity to attract much needed ODA and FDI than did the LPA. At a time of growing indebtedness and deepening economic crisis, the financial incentives associated with SAPs proved extraordinarily decisive in the contest with the LPA for dominance.

SAPs have since the mid-1990s been interjected, in fact augmented, by new auxiliary programmes designed to facilitate the compliance with the former's conditionalities. One of such policies is the highly indebted poor countries initiative (HIPC). Formulated by the G8 in 1996, the HIPC scheme identified forty-one countries, thirty-three of which are in Africa, as poor and needing debt remission. Debt remission was, however, not unconditional. Prospective beneficiaries were required to have successfully implemented SAPs for at least six years and should have been burdened with a debt whose value was more than 250 per cent and 280 per cent of the country's exports and national revenue respectively. Countries disqualified by the conditions needed to borrow more and sink deeper into debt in order to attain the threshold of eligibility (Akokpari 2001). Although the debt-to-export and revenue ratios were subsequently reduced to 150 and 250 per cent respectively following criticisms and outcry from international NGOs, especially Oxfam and Jubilee 2000, the conditionalities still excluded a good number of African countries. In the end, debt cancellation under the HIPC became more rhetorical than real. Only a few African countries, including Uganda, Ghana and Mozambique, enjoyed partial remission. Five years on, the

HIPC scheme was eclipsed by the huge euphoria that greeted the formulation of NEPAD.

NEPAD and Africa's Development: The Debate

NEPAD emerged as an amalgam of three separate development programmes formulated between 2000 and 2001 in South Africa, Senegal and in the Ethiopia-based Economic Commission for Africa - ECA (Ngwane 2002). In South Africa, President Thabo Mbeki developed the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery (MAP), which aimed at addressing Africa's debt and general recovery. MAP enjoyed the support of Presidents Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. Around the same time, the Senegalese President, Abdoulaye Wade, had formulated the OMEGA Plan, which enjoyed the support of French African countries, was concerned with building regional infrastructure and educational projects. The third was the Global Compact for Africa Recovery (GCAR), initiated by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, through a mandate from African Ministers of Finance in 2000. The GCAR incorporated the idea of peer review. Sharing fairly common visions on development, the three initiatives were merged in July 2001 at the AU Summit in Lusaka, Zambia, into the New African Initiative (NAI). At the Lusaka summit, a 15-member Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC), representing all the regions of Africa and chaired by Nigeria, was appointed to oversee the implementation of the programme. Three months later, on 23 October 2001, NAI was renamed NEPAD at a meeting of Heads of States in Abuja.

The objectives of NEPAD were obvious given Africa's egregious development challenges. However, a cursory recap of these aims is essential to place the current analysis in context. Among other things, NEPAD seeks to eradicate poverty as a prelude to sustainable growth and development; encourage employment creation; diversify productive activities to enhance Africa's international competitiveness; increase Africa's access to western markets; and to promote cooperation and integration in Africa (www.nepad.org). In pursuing these objectives, NEPAD identified certain key priority areas, including the maintenance of peace and security through good governance; increased investments in areas like agriculture, communication, tourism, health and education; mobilisation of resources to be achieved through increased resource transfer to Africa via increased ODA, FDI and debt reduction

(www.nepad.org). These objectives are pursued through the various organs and structures established under NEPAD. The AU is to provide the overall supervisory direction to ensure synergy between its operations and that of NEPAD. Thus, with NEPAD, a new development programme was born, but the critical question is whether it is capable of salvaging Africa from its despondency and set the stage for long-term development. This question has provoked profound polemics that features two diametrically opposed schools of thought - the Afro-optimists and the Afro-pessimists.

The Afro-optimists

Optimists, composed essentially, but not exclusively of the proponents of NEPAD, see it as opening a new chapter in African development. This view presents NEPAD as the hope for turning back the clock of decay in Africa (Posthumus 2003). Optimism about NEPAD is predicated on a number of implicit and interrelated assumptions. First, NEPAD represents a tacit recognition by Africa of the existence of a developmental crisis and the need to tackle it. By extension, Africa admits that the origins of its crisis are internal and are linked to insecurity, conflicts and bad governance. This thinking stands in sharp contrast to earlier positions depicting Africa's challenges as externally generated. Consequently, Africa seeks, in NEPAD, measures that directly address the internal constraints to development. Proponents of NEPAD argue that the acknowledgement of the severity of a problem and the preparedness to tackle it is itself a step towards an ultimate solution.

Furthermore, optimists hold that as a partnership with developed countries, NEPAD has the ability to attract much needed external aid to Africa. This expectation is nursed against a background of declining ODA and FDI to Africa since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberation of Eastern Europe's economies. For example, in 1992, the OECD pledged more than $45 billion to the 24 countries in the Eastern European-based Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In that year, the OECD's total pledge to Africa with 53 countries was $34 billion (Kraus 1994: 256; Chege 1996: 6; Katsouris 2000: 6-7). Although total ODA to Africa was $28 billion in 1990, this plummeted to $16.4 billion in 2000 (Asante 2003: 16). Similarly, FDI to Africa has on the aggregate declined, for example, from $8.1 billion in 1996 to $6.1 billion in 2000. Although this rose to $13.8 billion in 2001, it fell again to $7 billion in 2003 (Harsch 2003: 16). In general, whereas ODA and FDI to other regions

of the world increased, those destined for Africa decreased. NEPAD is expected to fetch Africa $64 billion in aid annually if Africa's development partners meet their obligations (*The Economist* 22 June 2002: 44). Hopes in NEPAD are thus premised on its promise to increase overseas investments and aid to Africa over current levels.

Optimism on NEPAD is, moreover, predicated on the expectation of instigating good governance, whose elusiveness has left damaging implications for Africa. For example, the absence of good governance practices has been identified as one of the fundamental causes of Africa's stagnation (World Bank 1981). For this reason, even overly critical observers of NEPAD commend it for recognising the salience of good governance in development and highlighting its pursuit as a central goal (Landsberg, 2005). NEPAD's key instrument for inspiring good governance is the much heralded African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM is a process to which African states submit to periodic review to determine their adherence to principles of good governance set out by the AU during its 2002 July Summit in Durban. The review is done by a seven-member Independent Panel of Eminent Persons (IPEP), which conducts countries through various stages of the review process. The review process, however, is not an end in itself; rather it is an exercise to judge countries but also to assist them to identify policy lapses and create the necessary mechanisms to rectify them. The ultimate goal is to assist governments to improve upon public policies relating to governance. Submission to the review process is voluntary, but failure to sign up leaves negative dents on the governance credentials of countries. Conversely, submitting to the review process serves as a diplomatic baptism into international creditworthiness.

Although the effectiveness of NEPAD in general and the APRM in particular to inspire good governance is questioned (Bond 2003, Taylor 2003, Akokpari 2004), it is claimed to at least bring some moral pressure to bear on countries signing up to it. A favourable governance review report theoretically increases a country's chances of benefiting from the G-8 'enhanced partnership'. This includes gaining access to financial aid and western markets as well as receiving debt remission. By contrast, a damning report jeopardises a country's chances of accessing such crucial development aid. Other incentives for good governance linked, albeit indirectly, to NEPAD are the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) passed by the US government in 2000. AGOA enables 37 of the 53 African countries to access US markets on meeting liberalisation

conditionalities. The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) also established by Washington in 2003 qualifies eight sub-Saharan countries to access part of the $5 billion in the account. Qualifications under both AGOA and MCA are dependent on upholding practices of good governance. Thus the passing of the APRM test and the consequent benefits it generates serve as strong incentives for states to aspire to acceptable governance practices.

The AU/NEPAD drive towards minimising political insecurity through evolving new security architecture in Africa is another positive agenda inspiring optimism. The new security architecture is to be driven by sub-regional organisations and governed by the 'African solutions to African problems' slogan. The focus on sub-regional formations is informed by a number of interrelated factors, including the retreat of western governments from direct peacekeeping operations, coupled with the inability of the nascent AU to deal with Africa's conflict. The AU/NEPAD security regime seeks to strengthen the capacities of regional organisations in conflict containment, management and resolution through maximising the use of domestic but also external resources. NEPAD has already served to attract external resources from Africa's development partners towards peace and security. For example, having recognised NEPAD as Africa's main development framework, the US has supported every UN resolution on conflict management in the region. Beneath the multilateral level, Washington has worked directly with regional organisations to resolve conflicts. It has, for instance, collaborated with the Kenya-based Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to get Sudan's warring factions to negotiate peace. Similarly, it has cooperated with the AU and the UN in resolving the conflict in Darfur.[1] As well, it has been involved in the establishment of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) under which close to 9,000 African soldiers were trained for emergency peacekeeping and peace-enforcing duties on the continent. ACRI has since been replaced by the Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance - ACOTA (Handy 2003).

Britain and France have also developed the African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme (APTSP) and the Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP) respectively. Known collectively as the P-3 Initiatives, these projects are aimed at enhancing Africa's capacity in conflict management thereby reducing its dependence on the West for peacekeeping requirements (Berman and Sams 1998). The EU and the US have assisted the Economic Community

of West African States (ECOWAS) logistically in the latter's peacekeeping operations in the sub-region. For example the UK assisted ECOWAS's peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, while France provided the first armed response to the Ivorian conflict in the face of fledgling ECOWAS's diplomatic efforts. Africa's western partners have also given assistance to South Africa in its peace initiatives in Burundi and the DRC. In short, NEPAD provides opportunities for cooperation between Africa and western countries in strengthening the fragile security structures on the continent, although it must be noted that these various assistance efforts have been limited to logistics.

Above all, the AU and NEPAD seek to promote regional integration whose importance to Africa's development cannot be overstressed. Previous approaches, including import substitution and structural adjustment, have brought unmitigated disappointments to Africa. Moreover, as Africa stands at the threshold of further marginalisation in a post-Cold War multipolar world dominated by trading blocs (Gilpin 2000: 302), regional integration is widely seen as the answer to its underdevelopment and active participation in the global economy (Adedeji 1976; World Bank 1981). NEPAD's approach is to strengthen regional formations and subsequently create an African common market as envisaged under the 1991 Abuja Treaty. In summarising some of its positives, Koyi (2002: 55) argues that NEPAD provides an avenue for Africa to engage and negotiate with the west for a new place in the international political economy as well as creates opportunities for the region to take ownership of its development process. Together, these factors underscore the efficacy of NEPAD and why the programme raises optimism regarding Africa's long-term development.

The Afro-pessimists

While NEPAD theoretically promises to set Africa on a development course, it also imparts contradictions and ambiguities, which together raise fundamental questions about its ability to meet its stated objectives. These questions have also become the basis for criticism and pessimism. Although presented as a programme of partnership, the relationship between the west and Africa is criticised for lacking the reciprocity, complementarity or symbiosis that characterise genuine partnerships. On the contrary, it is a fundamentally skewed partnership reminiscent of the relationship 'between a rider and a horse' (Ngwane 2003: 3), or a benevolent and a beggar (Orakwue 2002). Accordingly, the NEPAD

acronym is either often derided as meaning a 'new partnership for Africa's domination or destruction', or pronounced humorously as 'KNEE-PAD' to depict Africa's preparedness to stay longer on its knees while pleading for aid (Orakwue 2002). In fact, Asante (2003: 14) describes the partnership more succinctly as a 'partnership of unequal partners'. These reservations evoke doubts about the genuineness of the partnership between Africa and the G8.

Admittedly, much of these negative comparisons and analogies about NEPAD derive from the unending suspicions about the programme's origins. In contrast to its portrayal as a home-grown project, NEPAD is frequently seen as a construction of the west (Adesina 2003, Bond 2003: 12, Tamele 2003). This critical view argues that a genuinely formulated African programme will eschew the neo-liberal prescriptions embodied in NEPAD, which more or less are the very policies constraining the region's development (Govender 2003). Beset with poverty and adversity, moreover, a truly formulated African development programme would evolve people-centred and poverty-targeted policies, which are visibly missing in NEPAD (Giyose 2003). NEPAD presents a neo-liberal framework, patterned along textbook economics and expected to work from a classical point of view. But worldwide experience shows that textbook economics are not written for economies in decline such as those in Africa, which defy basic neo-classical logic. A neo-liberal programme centred on the market, informed by the logic of trickle-down economics and with a plethora of conditionalities such as NEPAD, can only exacerbate rather than ameliorate poverty and underdevelopment.

If the origins and nature of NEPAD, along with the partnership it evokes with the west, are suspiciously dubious, the commitment of Africa's partners to meet aid obligations is an even bigger source of pessimism. Africa's unmitigated past disappointments with western aid deals substantiate this. In 1986, for example, the UN developed a four-year recovery programme, the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PARRED) 1986-1990. This programme embodied pledges by the international creditor community to provide assistance to Africa. However, the tepid response from the international community condemned UN-PARRED to a premature demise. Again, in 1991, the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF) was adopted under which the international creditor community was to commit 0.7 percent of its GNP as ODA to Africa. On their part, African countries

committed themselves to economic and democratic reforms. However, in return for Africa's wholesale adoption of SAPs and submission to multiparty elections by the close of the decade, only the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden provided 0.7% or higher of their GNP as ODA to Africa. In fact, aggregate ODA to Africa actually plummeted from $28.6 billion in 1990 to $16.4 billion in 2000 (Bentsi-Enchill 1997; Asante 2003: 16). Here, too, donor pledges went unfulfilled.

Similarly, as noted already, the HIPC programme initiated in 1996 brought little debt relief to the region. Africa's latest disappointment came from Gleneagles, Scotland, where the G8 met in July 2005. The AU had expected a massive increment in aid, unconditional debt cancellation and bigger access to western markets given public declarations of the G8, in particular the US and UK, to help Africa out of its quagmires. However, at the conclusion of the meeting, the G8 only adjusted aid figures from the current $25 billion a year to $50 billion by 2010. Experts estimate that Africa requires $100 billion in development aid and a minimum annual growth rate of seven percent (more than double the current growth rate of between two and three percent) if it is to meet the UN millennium goals (Short 2002). Moreover, of the 18 countries which received some debt cancellation, only 14 were African in contrast to the AU's expectation of total and unconditional remission of the region's debt. As well, little was achieved by way of increasing Africa's access to western markets. Indeed, Africa has a limited ability to compete in western markets where agriculture and other industries are heavily subsidised even if granted unfettered access (Keet 2002). The intermittent trade wars between the EU and the US; Japan and the US; the US and the Caribbean over banana exports; and the ongoing EU disagreements with China over the latter's textiles exports to the former highlight the mercantilist tendencies of western countries. Despite professions to extroversion and market fundamentals, western common markets are innately protectionist (Rugman 2001: 10) and loathe to implement trade policies that are potentially injurious to their industries. Accordingly, there is little evidence to suggest that meeting donor conditionalities under NEPAD will necessarily attract ODA and FDI.

As noted earlier, NEPAD's acclaimed potential to promote good governance, through the innovative APRM, is another source of optimism. However, this optimism is misplaced for at least two reasons: First, as indicated already, submission to the APRM is voluntary. Countries which

initially signed up can opt out if the process proves intrusive. Second, and more important, the AU lacks the muscle to compel countries to either sign up to the review process or to comply with standards of good governance. This is a major limitation that has left the AU and APRM as a lame leviathan. Four countries - Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius and Rwanda - were reviewed in 2004. However, consistent with the APRM's lack of compulsion, the review process focussed not on whether the stated standards of governance were adhered to, but whether the countries '[were] moving towards these goals' (*Africa Research Bulletin*, 2004: 15629-30). The incapacity of NEPAD and the AU to generate good governance is also evident in continuous allegations of corruption and nepotism involving top government officials in Africa, and grotesque human right restrictions and abuses in Zimbabwe and Swaziland nearly four years after the adoption of NEPAD and the APRM. Nor have NEPAD and the AU been able to completely stem conflicts and wars in Africa. On the contrary, in spite of successes in ending conflicts in Angola and Mozambique, others have continued to rage. Darfur, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continue to present challenges to the AU, while peace in the Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sudan remain fragile at best. Other disturbing internal tensions such as in Zimbabwe continue to test the ability of the AU to restore sound governance practices on the continent.

Also, the threat of military intrusion into politics has not completely abated in spite of the AU's declared disdain for unconstitutional changes of governments. Although a military coup was averted in Equatorial Guinea in May 2004, one did occur in Mauritania in August 2005. And while they are commended for championing a new peace and security architecture, the AU and NEPAD impart an ambiguous, often contradictory, stance on some aspects of conflict management. The AU failed to stop the repeated military aggression of Rwanda against the DRC as well as deal with blatant instances of stage-managed elections such as occurred in Togo in May 2005 (Klingebiel 2005: 41) which hold critical implications for stability and security. Election results have continued to be contested, highlighting the fragility of democracy. These lapses and sources of tension are not only an indictment on the AU, but also question the ability of NEPAD to deliver good governance.

The overwhelming neo-liberal orientation of NEPAD is a further source of concern. But this posture is informed not only by the global dominance of neo-liberalism as an ideology, but importantly by the

assumption tracing Africa's crisis to mainly internal factors. This belief constitutes the core beliefs of the IFI on Africa and explains the persistence of the former in prescribing irresistibly neo-liberal and market-based solutions. Yet, the generally pauperising effects of SAPs, but also the preponderance of economic crisis, deflates optimism about NEPAD. In West Africa, for example, where economic decline and impoverishment have been massive, NEPAD is either unknown, considered an exclusively South African agenda, or a personal Mbeki project. Similarly, Osei-Hwedie (2003) has noted that having just emerged from war, Angola has become more preoccupied with internal reconstruction and development than with NEPAD. The trajectory of debt and economic decline has rendered countries introverted and largely concerned with finding solutions to internal economic problems. Countries are extroverted only towards potential sources of assistance such as the west. Agyeman-Duah and Daddieh's (1994) contention that Africa's foreign policies, particularly towards western countries, are aimed principally at soliciting external assistance, is as valid today under NEPAD as it was over a decade ago under SAPs. Thus failing to generate tangible relief in a region facing massive socioeconomic adversities, NEPAD is hardly a credible programme for long-term development.

Africa's Hope: Pragmatism Beyond Rhetoric

In the face of repeated unfulfilled western promises and the inability of previous strategies to induce development, Africa's hopes lie in a development model that minimises dependence on external agencies. I surmise that this model is to be found in regional integration. There are compelling reasons for regionalism in Africa. Among other reasons, Africa is threatened with further marginalisation in the global economy; it has fragmented populations with only five of the 53 countries on the continent having a population of more than 30 million and over a quarter with a population of less than three million. Integration creates bigger markets and stimulates large scale production (Nyong'o 1990: 12). This in turn mitigates Africa's dependence on the world economy, its status as a supplier of raw materials and an importer of manufactured goods (Asante 2007: 29). In addition, regionalism insulates Africa's nascent industries against international competition. For these and related reasons regional integration is an imperative. Integration holds the key to unlocking the door to Africa's development. The AU rightly recognises this necessity and presents regional integration as a cardinal objective of

NEPAD. However, the AU's call for regional integration has not been accompanied by clear specifications regarding the form of regionalism envisaged for the continent.

The fragility of Africa's economies and its increasing marginality in the international political economy necessitate a regionalist approach that elevates Africa and augments its capacity as an active (as opposed to a marginal) participant in the global economy without aggravating its external dependence. Indeed, Africa requires a special form of integration. It is generally acknowledged that the abatement of the Cold War has ushered in a second wave of regionalism aptly described as the 'new' regionalism. This is contrasted with the first wave or 'old' regionalism, which dominated the integration discourse and practice between the 1950s and 1980s (Lee 2003: 28). Informed by Cold War politics and dominated by the state, the old regionalism was concerned with the economic and political security of states (Hettne 1999; De Melo and Panagriya 1992: 1; Wyatt-Walter 2000: 79-80; Gilpin 2000: 58). The new regionalism, in contrast, pursues objectives that transcend the narrow confines of ideology and security to include a holistic definition of development that includes environmental protection, human security and regional self-sufficiency, among other things. Moreover, in contrast to the old, the new approach to regionalism recognises the critical importance of non-state actors, including informal sectors in the regional integration process.

Yet, in unpacking the new regionalism, at least four competing forms are discernible, including (i) open regionalism, (ii) the WIDER approach,[2] (iii) regionalism from below, and, (iv) the external guarantors' model. Some of the key assumptions of these are briefly summarised here. Open regionalism is informed by neo-classical assumptions. It presents the market as the key driving force of integration. Consequently, it calls for the dismantling of trade barriers and making states more extroverted. In this regard, open regionalism is consistent with neo-liberal globalisation as it facilitates the incorporation of states into the wider global trading system (Soderbaum 1996: 1-2). By its assumptions, open regionalism with its intrinsic neo-liberal agenda imparts damaging implications for integration in Africa. The imposition of the market-led SAPs in the 1980s was an attempt to make African states more outward looking at the expense of promoting intra-regional trade. Lee (2003: 32) argues that the free trade policies followed in the 1980s under SAPs cost African

countries much revenue and generated further economic crisis. She argues further that:

> during the [1980s] the IMF and World Bank explicitly discouraged market integration because it was seen as being counterproductive to the neo-liberal orthodoxy that enhanced the power of the capitalist core to have unlimited ability to export to the African periphery in the name of efficiency and competition (Lee 2003: 32).

By promoting engagement with the international system, open regionalism has a tendency to perpetuate the skewed and already disconcerting international division of labour under which Africa is encouraged to augment its capacity to produce primary agricultural raw materials and minerals while severely truncating its options towards industrialisation. In conforming to the neo-liberal inclinations, therefore, NEPAD is explicitly opting for open regionalism.

The WIDER approach sees the new regionalism as a multidimensional process that leads to the homogenisation of political, social, cultural and economic policies of states (Soderbaum 1996: 1-2). It proceeds on the premise that globalisation and regionalisation are part of a process of structural change occurring at the global level (Hettne 1999: 2). WIDER sees globalisation as a force escalating 'market-driven disorder and turbulence not only on the level of the world but also in local systems' (Hettne et al., 1999: xxxi). As a prescription for this 'disorder' the WIDER approach promotes regionalism from below rather than the state-led approach often initiated from the top. Thus, regionalism is seen as a process by states to increase regional trade and interdependence to serve as a counter-hegemonic force to globalisation (Hettne 1999: 6). In this sense, regionalism offers a path for marginalised regions in Africa, Latin America and in the Arab world to establish large integrated regions that create a new and different global world from the globalisation-generated 'global disorder' of the post-Cold War era (Amin 1999: 54, 62). The prescriptions of the LPA in 1980 calling for collective self-reliance through the mobilisation of regional resources, and curbing reliance on the global market, are consistent with the WIDER approach to integration and development.

Like WIDER, regionalism from below, (also referred to as 'new regionalism') sees regional integration as a counter-force to globalisation. It presents regionalism as a process driven not only by states but also by non-state actors, including informal sectors such as cross border trading activities (Marchand et al., 1999: 900). Globalisation produces winners

and losers with the latter in the majority. Marginalised in the mainstream of economic activity, losers under globalisation retreated into the informal sector. Regionalism from below acknowledges the phenomenal expansion of the informal sector on account of the failure of the state to meet popular expectations. It therefore calls on developing countries to shun the state-dominated European Union model of integration in favour of non-state approaches to regionalism. Accordingly, regionalism from below incorporates non-state actors and strengthens regional networks in formal and informal trade (Lee 2003: 37). Further it seeks to utilise the opportunities, creativity and innovations of the second economy in the regionalism project. Given the growing size of the informal sector, this version of regionalism is recommended for Africa. With the rapid displacement and replacement of the state by the market under the globalisation-liberalisation regime as the mover of development, and with the former's truncated ability to deliver basic social services, the informal sector is set to become an important agent in Africa's development.

The 'external guarantor's model', (EGM) advocates a partnership between developed and developing countries in establishing regional integration schemes in the latter. It argues that international agencies such the World Bank, IMF, and creditor countries should have greater influence on Africa's regionalism by acting as guarantors to prevent the reversal of politically unpopular microeconomic programmes (Helleiner 1999: 118). The EGM is reminiscent of France's role in the French West African Monetary Union, l'Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA). In this union, the common currency of the UEMOA, the CFA, is linked to the French franc with Paris serving as the guarantor and supervisor. NEPAD seeks to establish a similar supervisory role for Africa's creditors who, in addition to ensuring compliance with conditionalities, also ensure the judicious use of disbursed credit. The immediate implications of this are obvious. The EGM holds mixed blessings for Africa. Whereas it could instigate good governance practices, it could also - as with the experiences with SAPs - potentially entail intrusive and pauperising conditionalities that could worsen Africa's development challenges.

At a critical juncture in its development experience, Africa requires regionalism that combines the best possible opportunities for accelerated development. As Keet (2002: 38) rightly argues, Africa requires 'rounded internally integrated and more soundly-based production economics'.

To this end, Africa should de-emphasise the open regionalism intrinsic in NEPAD. As noted earlier, open regionalism is extroverted and fosters greater incorporation of states into the capitalist economy, something that has, at least with the experience with SAPs, not helped the course of African development. Moreover, open regionalism creates little opportunities for diversifying the narrow and agricultural-based economies of Africa. Nor is the external guarantor's model of integration good for Africa. With conditionalities, the active involvement of neo-liberal institutions and actors would certainly incline Africa towards open regionalism. A more development-friendlier form of regionalism is that which combines elements of the WIDER approach and regionalism from below. These are predominantly introverted approaches to regionalism that mobilise domestic resources, recognise the importance of the huge and expanding informal sector, and above all fit formal and informal structures into the development effort. While recognising the salience and complementary role of external aid, these approaches place emphasis on collective self-reliance. Such approaches to regionalism offer better policy frameworks for long term integration and development. Excessive dependence on the international system as prescribed by open regionalism is inimical to long term development in Africa.

Conclusion

NEPAD has been hailed by its proponents for giving Africa a lifeline for development. This view is advanced against a background of the failure of past approaches to salvage the continent. Optimism for development is also premised on a set of logical assumptions about NEPAD, including its potential to attract aid and investment; to instigate good governance; to address Africa's perennial conflicts through a new security architecture; and its drive to promote regional integration. However, the paper has demonstrated the limits of these arguments. It noted among other things that NEPAD fails to address poverty, one of Africa's most daunting challenges. Also, its heavy reliance on external agencies truncates its ability to generate development given the west's appalling record of meeting aid obligations to Africa. In addition, there is no certainty about NEPAD's ability to instigate good governance through the APRM. The APRM is a voluntary process devoid of any real mechanisms to compel compliance with good governance practices. These and other inherent limitations of NEPAD rob it of a genuine claim to be a framework for Africa's long term development.

The importance of regional integration in Africa was emphasised, against a background of its balkanisation, vulnerability to further marginalisation in the world economy, and the need to insulate its nascent industries against international competition. Africa requires a development agenda that captures the objective exigencies of the region. Regionalism provides the framework for evolving such a programme. Yet, while acknowledging the importance of regionalism, Africa requires considerable caution in embracing the new wave of integration. To be sure, the new regionalism embodies various versions some of which can potentially thwart Africa's development. Open regionalism and the external guarantor's models, for example, are not the options for Africa as these imply a stronger incorporation of Africa into the global economy. Whereas a complete de-linkage from the global economy as advocated by the dependency paradigm in the 1970s is preposterous, Africa requires a regionalist approach that seeks to nature fragile industries, diversify its predominantly agricultural economies, promote self-reliance and minimise dependence on external agents. Combined elements of the WIDER approach and regionalism from below can establish this framework.

Notes

1. The US single-handedly provided financial support in the neighbourhood of $300 million towards humanitarian efforts in Darfur and has assisted in airlifting Rwanda and Nigerian monitors to the region.
2. WIDER is the acronym for the World Institute for Development and Economic Research of the UN University in Helsinki, Norway. The Institute undertook studies on integration in the early 1990s to understand the dynamics of the new wave of regionalism after the Cold War. In contrast to classical integration theory the WIDER study sought to examine the role of economic, social, cultural and political issues in the integration process. Out of this seminal study emerged a set of assumptions and prescriptions that came to be referred to as the WIDER approach.

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African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2008, pp. 55–70
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(ISSN 0850-7902)

NEPAD and African Development: Towards a New Partnership between Development Actors in Africa

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Abstract

The model required to drive socio-economic development in Africa, and the relationship between the state and the private sector based on that model, have sparked much controversy among African analysts. Some question the relevance of other successful models of development, such as in the liberal West or in East-Asia, to the African context. Others criticise all models of development that are "alien" to African cultures and conditions hence rejecting the NEPAD model on this basis. This paper argues that although NEPAD does not present a detailed model of the relationship between the state, the private sector and civil society in Africa, some of its theoretical underpinnings suggest a balanced framework that should prompt African scholars to search for new models that do not necessarily imitate already successful ones but respect the particularities of each African state.

Resumé

Le modèle requis pour tirer le développement socioéconomique en Afrique ainsi que le lien qui existe entre l'Etat et le secteur privé, conformément à ce modèle, ont été à l'origine d'une grande polémique au sein des analystes Africains. D'aucuns discutent sur la pertinence, pour l'Afrique, d'adopter des modèles de développement couronnés de succès, soit dans un contexte

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libéral occidental, soit en Asie de l'Est. D'autres s'adonnent à la critique de tous les modèles de développement 'étrangers' aux cultures et aux réalités de l'Afrique et rejettent dans la même lancée le modèle préconisé par le NEPAD. Ce document soutient que même si le NEPAD ne fait pas une présentation détaillée du lien qui devrait exister entre l'Etat, le secteur privé et la société civile en Afrique, quelques unes de ses explications théoriques préconisent un cadre équilibré qui inciterait les experts Africains à chercher à élaborer de nouveaux modèles qui n'imiteraient forcément pas ceux déjà couronnés de succès, mais de modèles qui respecteraient plutôt les spécificités de chacun des Etats africains

Introduction

Development strategies in Africa are biproducts of a certain historical moment with its social, economic and political conditions as well as the dominant or leading development thought of that moment. While the Lagos Plan of Action was the product of a state-led and collective self-reliance mode of development, NEPAD, coming more than twenty years later, reflects the post-Washington consensus model of development. The debate within the latter model is no longer about whether the state should intervene in the development process. It is rather about the mechanisms of such intervention and the best relationship between the state, the private sector and civil society for achieving development. Nevertheless Africa is still in a need of a new development model that can provide a partnership framework between the three main development actors.

In its own theoretical framework NEPAD seeks such a model, but can NEPAD really provide an effective model of development in Africa? This paper examines that broad question by posing the following more specific research questions:

- What was the model of development aspired to by previous African development plans? Was the relative failure of such plans related to problems with the theory or with the implementation?

- Does NEPAD present a genuinely new model of development that avoids the shortcomings of previous development plans? What has NEPAD achieved in this respect in the last four years?

- To what extent can the African Peer Review Mechanism, which aims at sharing the best development practices among African countries, contribute to the development of these countries?

Accordingly the first part of this paper briefly discusses the developmental role of the state in Africa since independence, the second part examines the main development initiatives in Africa prior to NEPAD and their contribution to addressing the African development predicament, and the third part discusses NEPAD's perspective on the partnership between development actors in Africa.

State and Development in Africa: The Sacred Leviathan

Different explanations have been presented to explain the African development crisis that has prevailed since the end of the seventies. For some the explanation is to be found in the theory of the post-colonial state. In this view the post-independence African state retains many of the features of the colonial state, especially the state's dominant role in the political and economic realms, and is characterised, as Jean Bayart argues, by the "politics of the belly", which refers to the networks of clientalist relations that control the post-colonial state (Bayart 1993). This interpretation served as a theoretical premise for structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that aimed, as many African analysts maintain, to undermine the role of the state and had the effect of making the weak states of Africa even weaker, leading, as Bade Onimode (1995) put it, to the strategic erosion of the state in Africa. For Mkandawire and Soludo the neo-liberal theoretical premise of SAPs, which depicts the state as the source of all evils, is simplistic. Demonising local elites and seeing their policies as merely the result of agency do not reflect the actual causes of the economic predicament in Africa. Besides the SAPs did not take into consideration that the institutions needed to perform the adjustment tasks are either weak or totally absent (Mkadawire and Soludo 1999). For Tade Akin undermining the role of the state has affected its legitimacy and increased its suppressive role, leading to even greater exclusion of some social groups (Akin 1999: 79-109), while for Helmi Sharawi the retreat of the state has resulted in spreading corruption, as introducing free-market economies fuels the impulse for self-enrichment. Accordingly the institutionalisation of corruption has replaced the rule of law (Sharawi 2001: 35-38. Thus the main criticisms of the neo-liberal paradigm, as reflected in SAPs, identify the downplaying of the role of the state, the underestimating of the weaknesses of African state institutions, the social repercussions of the erosion of the role of the state and the role of free market in promoting corruption as the key factors that make this paradigm counter-productive. It will be important

to keep these arguments in mind when considering the theoretical premises of NEPAD .

In the contrary view the state is the centre of gravity around which African development thinking should revolve despite the fact that the current model of the state in Africa cannot serve as an engine for economic development, since most African states fall prey to special interests that render it an "elitist phenomenon" (Kasongo 2003: 128). On the other hand very little has been written on the potential role of the private sector or on the prospects of public-private partnerships (PPPs). In the post-independence era this may have been justifiable, as state domination ofeconomic planning and development led to a relatively weak and small private sector. Moreover since the 1980s the highly criticised SAPs, favoring market mechanisms at the expense of the state, have led to the private sector being demonised by many African analysts and blamed for key aspects of the African economic crisis. Few have been concerned with the fact that state policies, either by not providing an encouraging environment for investment or through reliance on clientalist networks, have led to the flight of African private capital out of the continent. According to James Wolfenson, the former president of the World Bank, 37 percent of the private capital of African business is invested outside the continent compared to 3 percent in the case of Asia and 17 percent for Latin America (Wolfenson 1998: 9).

As for the role of civil society African scholars, while admitting its role in promoting development, have had many reservations about that role. For Yusuf Bangura (1999) civil society in Africa is not really "civil", that is, it is not based on inclusive participation but on narrow interests. Similarly much has been written on civil society's relationship with western donors and how this relationship affects its supposed role in promoting "good governance", as well as on the lack of coordination between civil society organisations across the continent (Beckman 1993; Abdel Rahman 2004). Little has been written on the potential development role of civil society, especially community-based organisations (CBOs) working at the grassroots, despite the fact that this role has increased due to the retreat of the state from the provision of public services since the 1980s (Chimanikire 2003).

Most alternative models of development proposed by African analysts depend on ones that have succeeded elsewhere. As Mkandawire (2001: 1) bluntly argues:

> most of the analyses about African states that have led to so much despondency about prospects of development are based on invidious comparison between African states in crisis and idealized and tendentiously characterised states elsewhere. This invidious comparison has occulted the African state, making concrete analysis of its character less important than the normative statements about what it should be. The "ought" has proved more interesting than the "is"; turning debates on the state in Africa into the most pontifical and teleological of any theme in Africa.

Various models have inspired analysts. For Kasongo, for example, Africa should adopt European-style "social democracy", a model, he argues, that will be more compatible with the collective social nature of African societies than the liberal capitalist model. On the other hand, following the success of the developmental state model in East Asia, a debate began in African development circles on how this model could be replicated in Africa.

In these debates there are different understandings of the developmental role of the state, especially with regard to the relation between the state and the private sector. A developmental state, according to Mkandawire (2001), is one whose ideology is "developmentalist". This kind of state conceives its mission as one of ensuring economic development and its elite has the capacity to establish an 'ideological hegemony' and implement economic policies effectively, something that entails the autonomy of the state from social forces and private interests (Mkandwire 2001: 2-3). Edigheji (2003) adds other elements to the definition: the promotion by the state of market-enhancing rather than market-repressing economic policies and a clear division of labour between the state and the private sector under the overall guidance of a super-ministry or state agency (state-informed public-private partnership).

Edigheji also highlights the different versions of developmental states according to developmental theorists and scholars. As he points out, while some scholars adopt a strong statist interpretation of the developmental state, emphasising the importance of the state governing the market, others prefer a model based on consensus-building and complementarity between the state and the private sector (Edigheji 2003: 3-8). Thus the debate has sometimes shifted from searching for a functional model of development in Africa to debating successful models

of development elsewhere, without even agreement on the description of such models and the reasons behind their success.

To sum up, African scholars tend to support a leading role for the state in the development process, even while criticising the predatory, elitist and repressive features of the current African state. Some support the reinvention of the African state to make it both developmental and democratic. Some recognise that it is not only the *role* of the state that is decisive in the development process but also its *capacity*. This depends on strong and effective state institutions with autonomy from special interests that would exploit the state for self-enrichment. One needs also to admit that the state is no longer the sole development actor in African countries. Accordingly a clear division of labour between the three main development actors is needed.

Development Initiatives before NEPAD: A Critical Review

If the elements of state capacity, autonomy and partnership with development actors are indeed central to African development, to what extent have these elements been addressed in African development plans from the Lagos Plan of Action up to NEPAD? A review of African development plans before NEPAD reveals that there were significant gaps in dealing with these elements. When the African development predicament emerged at the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties, African governments responded with the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA). As a product of its historical moment the LPA reflected the African development thought of that time, with its emphasis on collective self-reliance and state-led development. In this view the state was the leading actor and should bear the burden of elaborating the social, economic and cultural policies that enable the mobilisation of the resources and capabilities of the country. The LPA also emphasised the role of the state in the fair distribution of both development burdens and benefits. Although it did not explicitly discuss the role of the state in development, the LPA made it clear that the state was both part of the development crisis and the main agent for its resolution. The strategies that had been adopted by African states were, according to the LPA, mainly responsible for the crisis.

Although the LPA provided for African integration, it did not adequately address the crucial elements for African development discussed above, namely, capacity, autonomy and partnership. While concentrating on sectoral programmes, the Lagos plan did not adopt a detailed strategy

for building the capacity of domestic institutions in African countries. The plan also dealt with the African development predicament as a mainly, if not purely, economic crisis; corruption and clientalism were not major concerns. Thus it was not only the lack of external support that led to the less than successful implementation of the LPA but also the internal flaws of the plan itself.

The United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD) adopted by the twenty-first Ordinary Summit of the OAU in July 1985 avoided some of the LPA's shortcomings. It emphasised the central role of the state in the development process but added the need for building the capacity of state institutions to enable it to perform this role. UNPAAERD also asserted the importance of the private sector, but confined itself to stating that '[t]he positive role of the private sector is also to be encouraged through well-defined and consistent policies' (Art. 11ei). At the end of the 1980s the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) proposed the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme (AAF-SAP), one of whose main arguments was to debunk the SAPs' promotion of a minimal role for the state. It argued that privatisation was failing due to the lack of an efficient, robust private sector in most African countries and the resulting danger of domination of African economies by foreign capital. Four imperatives needed to be applied, the framework stated, to the path of adjustment: strengthening and diversifying Africa's production capacity, improving the levels and distribution of people's incomes, adjusting public expenditure to meet people's essential needs and providing institutional support for adjustment with transformation. While many African scholars celebrated AAF-SAP for its critique of SAPs and its attempt to elaborate an alternative plan based on mobilising national resources and supporting regional integration, others did not regard it as a real alternative framework and criticised it as state-centered. In response Adebayo Adedeji, then General Secretary of the UNECA and the main architect of AAF-SAP, argued that it proposed a balanced non-ideological vision that neither called for wholesale state intervention nor promoted total reliance on markets (Onimode 1995: 138-140).

AAF-SAP's attempt to develop an alternative framework to SAPs was complemented by the Arusha Conference on Popular Participation in Development in 1990, which adopted the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation. The charter introduced

the idea of partnership between the state and civil society for promoting development based on popular participation. According to the charter civil society organisations can and should mobilise the African masses to effectively participate in negotiating and debating development policies, while also serve as an oversight tool to review the extent to which the state is committed to implementing its development policies (Economic Commission for Africa 1990). The charter proposed establishing a dialogue forum between state and civil society organisations in every African country to institutionalise this partnership (Economic Commission for Africa 1990). Given the ambitious populist strategy of the African charter, it was little wonder that it was enthusiastically welcomed by African civil society organisations. However the charter fatally lacked an implementation mechanism, and as a result this idealistic plan went nowhere.

To sum up, the African development plans of the eighties and nineties concentrated on establishing an alternative development strategy to SAPs, a strategy in which the state would play a central role in the development process. Some of these plans realised that there had to be reform of public management systems and capacity building for state institutions, while others relied on a partnership between the state and civil society to achieve a people-centered model of development. However these plans were sceptical about the role of the private sector; while admitting a private-sector role theoretically and claiming to want to encourage this role, no action plans were adopted to achieve the integration of the private sector in African development strategies.

NEPAD and African Development: Partnership and Division of Labour

The ideological orientation of NEPAD, and its perspective on the role of the state in the development process, cannot be understood without considering the shift in thinking that has taken place in the neo-liberal institutions, especially the World Bank, in recent years. During the 1970s and 1980s these institutions demonized state intervention in the economy, but by the late 1990s they began to admit that the state had a role to play and that its capacity to do so needed to be enhanced. This change came from inside the neo-liberal institutions themselves. At the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz led the move away from the “Washington consensus”, with its rejection of state intervention, when he criticised neo-liberal theory for not recognising the important role of the state in enhanc-

ing human capital and promoting development. What Stiglitz proposed was a mode of partnership between the state, the private sector and civil society. For him an effective development strategy 'must include components aimed at developing the private sector, the state (the public sector), the community, the family, and the individual' (Stiglitz 1998:24; see also Onis and Senses 2003).

This self-critique was a result of various factors, but the most prominent was the failure of SAPs in Africa compared to the "economic miracle" that took place during the same period in several East-Asian countries in which the state played an important role. A significant landmark in the changing neo-liberal thinking was the 1997 World Development Report, (World Bank 1997: 6) which noted that the most successful modern development models were ones in which the state balanced the role of markets in order to correct market failures and maintain social justice:

> Reducing or diluting the state's role cannot be the end of the reform story. Even with more selectivity and greater reliance on the citizenry and on private firms, meeting a broad range of collective needs more effectively will still mean making the state's central institutions work better. For human welfare to be advanced, the state's capability — *defined as the ability to undertake and promote collective actions efficiently* — must be increased. This basic message translates into a two-part strategy to make every state a more credible, effective partner in its country's development: *Matching the state's role to its capability and raising state capability by reinvigorating public institutions*. This means designing effective rules and restraints to check arbitrary state actions and combat entrenched corruption. It means subjecting state institutions to greater competition to increase their efficiency. It means increasing the performance of state institutions, improving pay and incentives. And it means making the state more responsive to people's needs, bringing government closer to the people through broader participation and decentralization. Thus, the Report not only directs attention to refocusing the state's role, but also shows how countries might begin a process of rebuilding the state's capability.

A similar orientation was proposed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which has promoted the logic of public-private partnerships. This requires trust-building between the state and the private sector so that their relations can be based on complementarity instead of competition, with the aim of building an institutional framework for the development process that does not hinder

the role of the market and at the same time does not ignore the social aspects of development (OECD 2003).

However these examples do not necessarily mean that a dramatic shift is underway in neo-liberal theory. As Erma Mawdsley and Jonathan Rigg concluded after reviewing World Development Reports from the late 1970s through to 2002, 'the substantial shift towards more participatory language and approaches, while welcome, is still underpinned by utilitarian values, in which a depoliticized version of "empowerment" is valued primarily for its contribution to the main goal of economic growth' (Mawdsley and Rigg 2003). Nevertheless the emerging post-Washington consensus indicates the demise of the state-market dichotomy and the rise of a debate that is not concerned with state intervention per se but with the form and extent of that intervention and with building the capacity of the state to match its development tasks .

Returning to NEPAD, many analysts and commentators share the view that its ideological orientation is based on the neo-liberal mode of development (Tandon 2002; Arthur 2003). However this orientation reflects the post-Washinton consensus; it does not explicitly aim at eroding the role of the state, as claimed by some African analysts, but instead advocates a partnership between state, market and civil society, with the main emphasis on the first two actors. NEPAD's language concerning the roles of the state and the market represents a compromise between the language of the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP), which emphasised the role of the state and the importance of building the capacity of its institutions (Department of Trade and Industry 2001) and that of UNECA's Compact for African Recovery, which praised the role of the private sector and advocated a healthy private sector as a solution for Africa's economic predicament (Economic Commission for Africa 2001). These two documents, with the addition of the OMEGA plan, were the main sources of NEPAD's thinking.

The compromise language of NEPAD is clear throughout the document. While it praises the neo-liberal development model and argues that the increasing commitment of African states to market-oriented economies is a sign of hope and progress (NEPAD 2001: par. 7), it also notes that the role and capacity of the state are matters of concern. According to the document, 'the weak state remains a major constraint on sustainable development in a number of countries. Indeed, one of

Africa's major challenges is to strengthen the capacity to govern and to develop long-term policies' (NEPAD 2001: par. 23). Accordingly capacity-building for state institutions is given a high priority, at least theoretically, in the initiative:

State capacity-building is a critical aspect of creating conditions for development. The state has a major role to play in promoting economic growth and development, and in implementing poverty reduction programmes. However the reality is that many governments lack the capacity to fulfill this role. As a consequence many countries lack the necessary policy and regulatory frameworks for private sector-led growth. They also lack the capacity to implement programmes, even when funding is available. It is for this reason that targeted capacity-building should be given high priority. Programmes in every area should be preceded by an assessment of capacity, followed by the provision of appropriate support (NEPAD 2001: par 86-87).

In line with this some practical steps have been taken to build the capacity of African institutions, one of which was the fourth Pan-African Conference of Ministers of Public Service, held in May 2003, which adopted a Programme on Governance and Public Administration aimed at ensuring that African governments have the capacity to govern effectively and deliver public goods (NEPAD 2002: 73). It is also now an official objective of NEPAD to establish a technical unit in each African country, administered by African experts rather than experts from international financial institutions, to help build institutional capacity in all state institutions .

The question remains, what will be the actual impact of such initiatives on the capacity of African institutions? Is NEPAD already beginning to lose momentum and interest among African analysts and, more importantly, among the African people? While hundreds of papers have been written on NEPAD, very few are concerned with the implementation steps needed to esnure state capacity-building. There is a danger that NEPAD may gradually drift into being little more than a series of routine meetings and celebrative gatherings that accomplish little and do not attract the attention of many.

Regarding the issue of state-private sector partnership, some practical steps have been taken. NEPAD is clear in urging 'dialogue between the government and the private sector to develop a shared vision of economic development strategy and remove constraints on private sector development' (NEPAD 2001: par. 164). In this spirit the NEPAD

Business Group (NBG) for Africa was created on the margins of the International Conference on Financing for Development in March 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico. The NBG has undertaken a number of initiatives that are currently at different stages of implementation, including the Investment Climate Facility for Africa, the development of a Small Medium Micro Enterprises (SMME) Strategy for Africa and the Seal of Good Corporate Governance (NEPAD 2003/2004: 40-41).

Other national NEPAD business initiatives have been formed. In South Africa the NEPAD Business Group has developed four "covenants", namely, Corporate Governance, Corporate Social Responsibility, Elimination of Corruption and Bribery and Accounting and Auditing Practices (NEPAD 2002: 67). NBGs in Lesotho, Nigeria and Kenya have recently followed suit (NEPAD 2003/2004: 41).

The Role of Civil Society in Public-Private Partnerships

While the partnership between the state and the private sector, and the initiatives taken to promote the role of the latter, have received a lot of attention, both rhetorically and practically, in the last four years, the question of the role of civil society has not attracted the same level of concern. Those documents that discuss the role of civil society tend to put emphasis on the integration of the sector in the NEPAD process as a channel for popular participation rather than on civil society's potential as a partner in development. Thus, as a way of approaching civil society activists and addressing criticism over the lack of popular participation, the NEPAD Secretariat has held a number of conferences to promote the involvement of community-based organisations (CBOs) in NEPAD implementation. However true partnership between the state and civil society needs to establish a dialogue between the two actors for discussing development policies and priorities and specifying the developmental role that civil society, especially CBOs, can play in meeting the needs of local communities.

Some partial initiatives have been taken to address this issue. One example is the cooperation between the NEPAD Secretariat and the International Fund for Agriculture Development to support to promote the participation of farmers' associations in policy formulation for increased productivity and enhanced market access. Nevertheless NEPAD's vision in regard to civil society participation in development remains less ambitious than previous initiatives, especially those related to the African Charter for Popular participation in Development.

The African Peer Review Mechanism and the Sharing of Best Development Practices

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has the potential to be an effective mechanism for sharing best practices in the relationship between government, business and civil society. However the debate over the APRM has so far focused on issues such as sovereignty, African solidarity vs. peer pressure to promote good governance, punitive vs. non-punitive actions in dealing with non-compliance and big states vs. weak states (Cilliers 2002, 2003; Akokpari 2003; Tawfik and Kajee 2005). Little attention has been given to the potential of the APRM in highlighting the laws, institutions and practices that need to be reformed to develop a better climate for both public-private partnerships (Farlam 2005), although a central connotation of "peer review", as derived from the OECD, is the sharing of best practices.

It is against this background that the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) conducted a study on public-private partnerships to assess some African experiences in that regard. Their assessment shows that the most successful partnerships have been characterised by thorough planning, good communication, strong commitment from both parties and effective monitoring, regulation and enforcement by government. The study also shows that governments need appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks to build capacity at various levels to plan, draft, implement and monitor successful partnerships. However it was noted that no single judgment can be made on public-private partnerships; under the right conditions, and in the right sectors, PPPs can offer value for money to governments and good opportunities for investors, but governments need to undertake thorough feasibility studies, develop appropriate and rigorous regulatory frameworks, tackle corruption and demonstrate strong political commitment (Farlam 2005: 43-65).

Conclusion

Towards a New Partnership between Development Actors in Africa

NEPAD, like previous African development initiatives, has its shortcomings, but it also opens up new opportunities for creating a balanced relationship between the state and the market, promoting the capacity of state and civil society institutions and increasing the autonomy of the state by combating corruption and curbing the domination of special

interests. On the other hand the initiative depends heavily on foreign capital for its implementation, and it does not say how it will match people-centered development with private sector-led growth (Anangwe 2002). While some African scholars strive to defend the role of the state in Africa against the market fundamentalism of the "Washington-consensus" paradigm, others have recognised that the way out of the African economic predicament is to be found in some form of market-friendly state interventionism (Kamdiza, Maltosa and Mwanza 2004). A development paradigm that depends only on the state only is not adequate for socio-economic development, but depending totally on the market cannot maintain a fair distribution of resources or help fight poverty. One can also argue that what Africa needs is not just a market-friendly state interventionism but also a *society-friendly* private sector. Balancing the two models requires governments to fight corruption, ensure transparency and develop technical expertise to negotiate the terms of cooperation with the private sector and the private sector to act with social responsibility and play its role in African renewal. In the light of this equation there is no contradiction between the traits of an active developmental state, namely capacity and autonomy as underlined by Mkandawire, and partnership between the state and the private sector.

Achieving this balance will not be an easy task. For much of the last half-century mistrust has characterised the relationship between the state and the private sector and between the private sector and the society. NEPAD is not a complete answer to this problem, as it does not offer a comprehensive, detailed paradigm that benefits from the role of the private sector, takes the social aspects of development into consideration and ensures international support. However some theoretical aspects of the initiative can be elaborated to form the basis of such a paradigm. While NEPAD emphasises the role of the private sector, it does not ignore the need to build state capacity. The challenge remains one of implementation, especially at a time when NEPAD may have began to lose momentum. African scholars should move to the next step by specifying what NEPAD needs to do and how the initiative can be applied in every African state .

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African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2008, pp. 71–97
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(ISSN 0850-7902)

Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Analysing Nigerian Reactions to the Asylum Offered Former President Charles Taylor of Liberia

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Abstract

On July 5, 2005, exactly two years after the asylum offer to Charles Taylor in Nigeria became public knowledge, President Obasanjo was at the Assembly of the 5th Ordinary Session of the Heads of State and Government of the African Union, in Sirte, Libya, calling for protection against the harassment of Nigeria by some sections of the international community 'over the country's refusal to surrender former Liberian President, Mr Charles Taylor, to face trials at the International War Crimes Tribunal'. But from the inception, the Nigerian public had virulently opposed the asylum idea. Still, government received Charles Taylor in Nigeria on August 11, 2003. Why? Why was public opinion unable to reverse the state's policy? Using the methodological tool of content analysis, this article identifies the bases of public opposition to the asylum offer, which involves principally a general disdain for the person of Charles Taylor, given his antecedents. Regardless, the Nigerian government went ahead and provided asylum to Charles Taylor, putting what it considered Nigeria's interest first. The government adopted, therefore, a mode of moral judgment that was antagonistic to that of the people whom it is ideally supposed to stand for. The article concludes that the dynamics which characterise the art of statesmanship, in which the primary

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responsibility is the survival of the nation-state, overpower the potential of public opinion to exert decisive pressure, since the bulk of the public is believed to be largely inarticulate or uninformed.

Resumé

Le 5 juillet 2005, exactement deux ans après que le droit d'asile accordé à Charles TAYLOR ait été révélé au public, Président Obasanjo prenait part à l'Assemblée de la 5ème Session Ordinaire des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement de l'Union Africaine, à Syrte, en Libye, pour lancer un appel pour la protection du Nigeria contre les harcèlements en provenance de certaines franges de la communauté internationale, dus «au refus du pays de rendre l'ancien Président Libérien au Tribunal Pénal International». Cependant, dès le début de l'affaire, l'opinion publique nigériane s'était farouchement opposée à l'idée de l'asile. Néanmoins, le gouvernement avait reçu Charles Taylor au Nigeria le 11 août 2003. Pourquoi? Pourquoi est-ce que l'opinion publique n'a pas réussi à changer la décision prise par l'Etat? A l'aide d'outils méthodologiques d'analyse du contenu, cet article essaie d'identifier les raisons qui ont poussé l'opinion publique nigériane à s'opposer à l'asile accordé à Charles Taylor. Il s'agit principalement d'un mépris généralisé pour Charles Taylor en raison de ses antécédents. En revanche, le Gouvernement avait privilégié ce qu'il considérait être l'intérêt du Nigeria, en exigeant une autre forme de jugement moral différent de ceux des individus, et décida d'accorder le droit d'asile à l'ancien Président du Liberia. L'auteur conclut l'article en déclarant que la dynamique qui caractérise l'art de la diplomatie, dont la responsabilité primordiale consiste à assurer la survie de l'Etat-Nation, l'emporte sur la capacité de l'opinion publique à exercer une pression décisive, étant donné que la plus grande partie de la population est supposée être incapable de s'exprimer ou est mal informée.

Introduction

In 1816, the Virginia-based American Colonization Society asserted that there was a need to resettle some of the1.5 million blacks, most of whom were freed slaves, somewhere in Africa if there was not to be a social crisis. Present-day Liberia became the choice and some of the freed black slaves began emigrating to it from 1822. These returnee African-Americans who became Americo-Liberians, together with the autochthonous people, achieved independence for Liberia on 26 July 1847.

Things went wrong from the beginning as the settler Liberians constituted only five percent of the population. Perceiving themselves as a superior group, they arrogated to themselves the 'civilising mission' of the 'inferior' indigenous group, by propagating discriminatory policies under predominantly migrant Liberians' dominated governments. For over a century, between 1847 and 1980 when Samuel Doe became President, only Americo-Liberians had ruled Liberia. The 95 percent of the population who were indigenous resented this situation. Hence, when he staged his coup and, albeit temporarily, halted the political dominance of the settler group, Doe won popular support.

Samuel Kanyon Doe had ridden on the crest of popular support from all segments of the indigenous Liberian population after his April 12, 1980 'revolution' to become President of over two million Liberians at the age of 30. No sooner had he settled down to office than he embarked on the elimination of all forms of opposition, whether real or perceived. Hence, of the seventeen of those who had staged the coup in 1980, including Samuel Doe himself, Thomas Wey Syen, Thomas Quiwonkpa, Abraham Kollie, Nicholas Podier, Fallah Vanney, Jeffery Gbatu, Larry Bortey, Harrison Penue, Robert Sumo, Harrie Johnson, Harry Zuo, Jacob Swen, Albert Toe, Nelson Toe, William Gould, and Kolonsh Gonyon (Omoninjo 2003: 19); by 1990, Doe had eliminated sixteen. A decade after he became President, life in Liberia had become unsafe and all the popular politicians joined forces calling on Doe to quit.

Charles Taylor was a Baptist Church preacher in Liberia before Samuel Doe appointed him to his cabinet. His portfolio placed him in charge of the procurement of government requirements. Relations between the two turned sour. Taylor was indicted for stealing 800,000 Liberian dollars and took flight to the US. Although detained, he escaped from jail before the US authorities could extradite him. He landed in Libya where he received military training. Backed by Libya, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, he launched an attack on Doe on December 24, 1989, marking the beginning of the conflagration that engulfed Liberia until recently. In the course of the conflict, former President Samuel Doe was murdered by the Yormi Johnson-led rebel faction of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia on September 9, 1990.

Charles Taylor was inaugurated as Liberian President on August 2, 1997, after Liberia had tinkered with an interim government and other peace initiatives between 1992 and 1997. But the peace which this engendered was only tentative as the crisis resumed as from September,

1999. Once again, it was reasoned that like Doe, Taylor must be the Liberian problem personified, and for Liberia to have peace he must be removed because, as expressed by Nigeria's President Obasanjo, 'Charles Taylor may stay here and say he will fight to the finish and if Charles Taylor fights to the finish, there will be no peace' (Eze 2003:2). Taylor was removed via an asylum offer by Nigeria.

If there is any Nigerian government foreign policy gesture that has in recent times generated considerable public outcry, it is the issue of Nigerian involvement in Liberia. It is one foreign policy undertaking that has had a profound effect on a generality of the citizenry of Nigeria, if only because it was public knowledge that Nigerian soldiers were fighting a war in in that country. Nigeria in Liberia was topical among thousands of Nigerian families whose members were directly involved either as peace keeping soldiers, journalists, etc., or as returnees from the war-torn country. Its effects on even some of the most remote settlements of Nigeria were tangible, as after Federal officials had received the returnees from Liberia, in relay form, individual state governors and officials received their indigenes and passed them on to the local council authorities. Individual communities, kith and kin as well as families, had feasted at the safe return of one of their own from Liberia. In the conflict Charles Taylor's rebel forces had particularly targeted Nigerians (including those formally residing there), for elimination on account of the perceived support of their government for Taylor's opponents.

Statement of the Problem

It is probable that Nigerian involvement in Liberia was Nigeria's single largest undertaking (in terms of men and materials) outside its shores. The Liberian crisis has seen Nigeria losing over 1,000 soldiers in the years of intervention between 1991 and 2003, and expenditure had reached $12 billion (Eze 2003: 2). Two Nigerian journalists; Kress Imodibie and Tayo Owotusin, were killed working in Liberia. The number of civilian causalities will never be known. Needless to say, when on July 6, 2003 it became public knowledge that Nigeria's President Obasanjo had granted President Taylor asylum in Nigeria, the gesture generated a furore. Individual communities such as those of Iviukhua in Edo State, (Kress Imodebie's home town), religious organisations such as the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), labour and other interest groups opposed the asylum project. The government went ahead with the project and criticism of its decision continued.

This article seeks to analyse the reaction of Nigerians to the granting of asylum to Charles Taylor in Calabar, Nigeria. Specifically, it will attempt to answer the following research questions:

(i) Why was the Nigerian public opposed to the asylum offered to former President Charles Taylor of Liberia?

(ii) What were government's justifications for the policy?

(iii) Why was public opinion overridden by foreign policy determinant(s) with regard to the offer of asylum to Taylor?

Theoretical Framework

In International Relations, the concept of theory has been used interchangeably with ideas of doctrine, philosophy and ideology. This situation makes it easier to ascribe theoretical bases to the foreign policies of the advanced democracies. This is because of the 'perceived national and international reality which informs the character of policy choice as well as the ability to predict events and situations and thus act' (Aforka 1988: 40). Theoretical justification for the foreign policies of smaller nations can be attributed to such concepts as Pan Africanism, regionalism, human rights and equality, especially, with regards to the foreign policies of most African states.

For the purposes of this article, decision-making theory is the major framework utilised. As espoused by Asobie in Aforka (1988: 45), decision-making theory assumes that foreign policy involves the setting of short-term goals and the choice of means of attaining such goals. Foreign policy implementation therefore involves a set of ad-hoc and uncoordinated responses to external stimuli. Thus, 'the nature of foreign policy determines the characteristics of the foreign policy itself' (Aforka 1988: 46). This has to do with the 'in-depth analysis of the bureaucratic framework of foreign policy making' (Stupak 1977: 135).

> Hence, the consideration of the various elements of national decision making: the actors, such as top military and diplomatic advisers along with the executive leaders; the internal environment of the state, including the relative expertise and power of various individuals, agencies and organizations ... and the external environment which includes analysis of the power positions of the international actors and the possibility for increasing the state's influence (Stupak 1977: 135).

Specifically, decision making here places emphasis on the problem of choice among alternative course of actions confronting the decision maker. It is also called statistical decision theory. Here, 'The decision problem under study may be represented by a model in terms of the following elements [or some of them]' (Hamburg 1977: 545):

(i) The decision maker;
(ii) The alternative course of actions;
(iii) Events;
(iv) Payoffs; and
(v) Uncertainty.

A discussion of these elements as they relate to the asylum project is now attempted here.

(i) The decision maker is the agent charged with the responsibility for making the decision and may be an entity, a single individual, corporation, government agency, etc. In the context of Nigeria's offer of asylum to former President Charles Taylor, the decision maker is (or ought to be) a combination of the presidency, the national assembly and the bureaucracy of the external affairs ministry.

(ii) The alternative course of action is the pool of action choices jostling for adoption by the decision maker. It is actually the adoption of any or more of these lines of actions that is the decision itself. The issue is actually how to discern among these options which is the most appropriate in the light of the prevailing circumstances. With regard to Nigeria and the Charles Taylor asylum project, there were these options:

- Handing him over for trials for war and other crimes;
- Asylum in Nigeria or elsewhere;
- Allowing the prolongation of the crisis in Liberia due to his (Taylor's) intransigence;
- Deciding not to act at all, as 'Even choosing not to act is a decision' (Conn 1971: 18).

(iii) Events are occurrences that affect the achievement of the objectives of the decision maker and are outside his control. They are imposed on the decision maker by virtue of the fact that we live in a complex and interdependent society (Conn 1971: 196). 'The events constitute a mutually exclusive and complete set of outcomes; hence, one and only one of them can occur' (Hamburg 1977: 549). No one such single event immediately applies here. But given the atrocities of Charles Taylor, we should consider the reactions of Nigerians, and even

Liberians, to this foreign policy action by the Nigerian government. And what would be the reaction of the international community?

(iv) 'Payoff' refers to the net benefit the decision maker receives for his choice from alternative course of actions in making his decision. More often than not, the core goal of foreign policy is the promotion of the national interest. The extent to which this is safeguarded could be considered the rationale for the Nigeria's grant of asylum to Taylor. This can exhibit itself in an increased esteem for Nigeria among the community of nations if by this action Liberia and hence, the West African sub-region, attains relative peace — especially given the fact that Nigeria received little or no financial assistance for this gesture.

(v) Uncertainty refers to not being sure regarding the reactions or events that a decision will trigger off. It requires the making of predictions or assigning probabilities to events. On the asylum project, this could take the form of Nigeria not being certain of the consequences of its action. It might then position itself for being more or less obliged to hand Taylor over for trial.

The foregoing scenario can be summed up thus: Nigeria, the decision maker, as the natural power broker in the West African sub-region in particular and Africa in general, decided in 1991, among alternative course of actions, to intervene in the Liberian crisis. By the year 2003, when it granted Taylor asylum, it had committed $12 billion and lost about 1000 soldiers in peace keeping operations. Even though these efforts were not acknowledged by the world, 'not even in giving us debt relief for the contribution we made' (Eze 2003:1), the gesture was said to be in Nigeria's interest.

Public Opinion: A Conceptual Framework

One of the criticisms against 'realist' theorists in international relations is the neglect of domestic factors, since they 'typically treat individual nation-states as sovereign systems whose internal politics can be safely ignored' (Peterson 1994: 228). But 'in international relations a dissident minority long has argued for the importance of studying causal links between domestic structures and foreign policy decisions' (Jacobsen 1996: 93). Actually, in the nineteenth century, the extent to which national factors influenced international politics was a dominant research paradigm (Almond 1990: 264).

There are also recent studies which establish that internal factors condition international policies. This has led Kehr (1977: 23) to say

that, 'A foreign policy has — this may sound trivial but it is often overlooked — not only an antagonistic front of it but a homeland behind it ... it is guided by the will and needs of the homeland, whose concerns are primarily domestic'. No wonder Jacobsen (1996:94) opines that, 'internal factors require attention whenever we set out to explain policy responses to external stimuli'. It is in this light that this study of the role of public opinion in the grant of asylum to Charles Taylor is undertaken.

Public opinion, which is in the realm of domestic political pressures, is one of the many domestic elements that could exert an influence on foreign policy. Another domestic element is economic constraint, which for example minimised Nigeria's capacity to sustain its radical anti-apartheid policy. Failing fortunes had made Nigeria embark on a policy of economic diplomacy resulting in its fraternising with the apartheid enclave, contrary to an initial stance of being in 'no haste to lift ... sanctions against South Africa until there was complete dismantling of all structures of apartheid ... and [initiating] the principle of one man one vote' Ojieh (1994: 89). Other domestic factors include domestic interest groups, social ideas, the character of the constitution and social tendencies (Jacobsen 1996: 97).

In its most simplistic form, public opinion means the opinion of the generality of the citizenry. As a determinant of foreign policy, it is the influence of the reactions of the public on the foreign policy actions of governments. One of the earliest references to it as an influence on foreign policy was with regard to Lord Canning who upon succeeding Castlereagh as British Foreign Affairs Minister in 1822 was said to have marked an innovation in the conduct of foreign affairs by appealing for popular approval through brilliant speeches aimed at English public opinion (Richards 1967: 72).

The connotation of the term 'public' here is that 'public opinion' is actually an authentic representation of the opinions of the generality of the people or the public. This kind of generalisation can be hasty and misleading. This is because public opinion has been described as in reality the opinion of an articulate minority, since 'the vast majority of people — even in highly literate societies — are unknowledgeable, uninterested, and apathetic with regards to most issues of world affairs' (Holsti 1977: 392).

This article does not seek to dabble in the debate of how 'public' public opinion really is. What is of importance is that in every society there exists in the words of Deutsch and Merritt 'a small top layer of the attentive public that is reasonably well-informed, articulate and interested'

(Holsti 1977: 393) in issues of world affairs. More often than not, this 'attentive public' is literate and petit-bourgeois in nature. It is the opinion of this class (which at some instance may galvanise the lower class, essentially to provide a mob) that constitutes public opinion.

Public Opinion and Nigerian Foreign Policy — A History

Central to the argument of this paper is that public opinion had and still helps to give direction to the foreign policies of states. Instances abound when states yielded to public pressure despite other preferred options because public opinion had elevated such 'issues to the top of their foreign policy agendas' (Hocking 1990: 118).

Immediately after independence, Nigeria and Britain had concluded a military pact 'to afford each other such assistance as may be necessary for mutual defence and to consult together on measures to be taken jointly or separately to ensure the fullest co-operation between them for this purpose' (Obasanjo 1981: 4). By all standards, this 'was an unequal treaty' which the newly constituted Federal House of Representatives interpreted as 'an attempt [by Britain] to swindle Nigeria out of her sovereignty' (Obasanjo 1981: 3). Public reaction to this pact led by university students and supported by other vehement factions resulted in Nigeria's abrogation of the pact in December 1960.

When in the first week of August 1972 speculation became rife that Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) was going to participate in the Munich Olympic Games of August to September 1972, even though its racist policy had in no way improved, Nigerians were full of indignation. 'All the Nigerian newspapers ... came out against Nigerian participation in the Games if the Rhodesian team was not excluded' (Aluko 1981: 183). This placed the country in a dilemma given the fact that in September 1971, Nigeria had acceded to Rhodesian participation in the Games when the Supreme Council for Sports in African (headed by Nigeria's Abraham Ordia), reviewed Rhodesian eligibility for the 1972 Games. There was thus a contest between Nigeria's honour by making its word its bond, and reneging on its word by bowing to public opinion. To wriggle out of this predicament, Abraham Ordia and Sir Adetokunbo Ademola, Principal International Olympics Committee officials fronting for the Nigerian government, facilitated Rhodesian expulsion from the Games, citing non-total conformity with the terms for admission (Aluko 1981: 183).

In 1986, it hit the news-stands that Nigeria was contemplating abandoning its observer status to assume full membership of the

Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC). Nigerians of Southern extraction reacted vehemently to this move, which was viewed as tantamount to the renunciation of Nigeria's claim to be a secular state. The reactions were virulent enough to threaten the corporate entity of Nigeria; splitting the ruling class to the extent that it was speculated that the resignation of Vice-President Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe might not have been unconnected with his (Ukiwe's) lack of compromise with others in the hierarchy over the Nigeria/OIC issue (Uzor 1986: 17). At the end of the day, President Babangida, at least, in public, refuted the speculation even though doubts remained.

The same President Babangida had called for a public debate on the viability or otherwise of an IMF loan for Nigeria. An official committee had turned in a 'no-loan' verdict. Once more, President Babangida, claiming respect for public opinion, was to have abandoned the idea. These and other examples suffice to demonstrate that state officials can yield 'to public pressures despite their own preferred policies' (Holsti 1977: 392).

Opinion Polls on Nigerians' Reactions to the Asylum Project

In the light of the preceding examples, it could be averred that in the event of an unfavourable public opinion, it was possible that the Nigerian government would abandon the asylum project. But first of all, we need to establish what the opinions of Nigerians on this matter were. In gathering the public opinion polls of Nigerians' reactions to the asylum project, the methodological tool of content analysis was adopted. Its choice was principally born out of the enormous cost in money and time of engaging in a nation-wide survey research on a topic such as this, given Nigeria's size, population, and low literacy level. And for government reactions, the choice of content analysis is premised on the fact that since the major actors in foreign policy making that is, the presidency and its advisers, ambassadors and the higher echelon of the Ministry of External Affairs, are not easily accessible to be observed or surveyed by the researcher, the gap is filled by the content analysis tool. Hence, Holsti (1969: 15-16) observes that, 'when restrictions of time and space do not permit direct access to the subject of research, they must be studied at a distance'.

The population of documents for this study consists of the daily publications of *The Guardian* and *Vanguard* newspapers published from Lagos, Nigeria. The choice of these newspapers is not arbitrary; the extent

of their national coverage (in the author's opinion) is obvious and the degree of the independence of opinions expressed in them is appreciable at least when compared with their government-owned counterparts. The period of study covers the months of June to August 2003, with regard to issues related to (or references to) the subject of Nigeria's asylum offer to former President Charles Taylor of Liberia. This periodisation was informed by the fact that in the first week of June 2003, peace moves between President Charles Taylor and the rebel groups were underway and when on June 17, a cease-fire was agreed and a peace agreement was signed in Accra, Ghana, its high point was that President Charles Taylor stepped aside. By July 6, it was already public knowledge that Nigeria was going to be the asylum and there was evidence of Taylor's tacit acceptance of it when he declared that 'We believe that there can be an orderly exile from power' (Okpowo 2003: 12). On August 12, 2003, Charles Taylor arrived in Nigeria for asylum.

The sample of documents for this study consists of one hundred and forty-three articles or references to the subject of Nigeria's asylum to Taylor as published in the aforementioned newspapers during the period of study. These 143 references have been systematically classified into units of analysis or variables to determine the frequency of their occurrence so as to enable us to reach conclusions on their influence on how Nigerians either as individual citizens, groups, professionals, etc., or government, reacted to the asylum project.

Specifically, seven units of analysis are generated, four opposed to the asylum offer and three in support. The various arguments against the asylum offer have been grouped into the four following broad categories:

(i) An objection to the asylum project due to Taylor's antecedents including unfriendliness to Nigeria and Nigerians.

(ii) The involvement in Liberia had constituted a huge drain on Nigeria's economy, and similar gestures by Nigeria in the past were not appreciated by Taylor and his countrymen.

(iii) Taylor was sought for trial by the UN Crimes Court, and there were fears of reprisals from the international community or a possible threat to Nigeria's security.

(iv) The asylum offer flew in the face of public opinion and lacked consultation.

The supporting items are grouped into three main arguments:

(i) The offer of asylum was in consonance with Nigeria's big brother role in the ECOWAS sub-region and Africa as a whole; Nigeria has done it before; and should do it again.

(ii) The offer was in Nigeria's national interest and boosted its status as a regional and continental power.

(iii) Taylor's exit due to the offer of asylum was synonymous with peace in Liberia and in the entire ECOWAS sub-region.

Table I: A Breakdown of the Frequency Among the Variables or Units of Analysis

No.	Variables	0	%
(i)	Objection to the asylum project due to Taylor's antecedents including unfriendliness to Nigeria and Nigerians	30	21
(ii)	Asylum project is a huge drain on Nigeria's economy/similar gestures by Nigeria in the past were not appreciated	16	11
(iii)	Hand-over Taylor for trails by the UN Crimes Court fear of reprisals from the international community/threat to Nigeria's security	34	24
(iv)	It undermines public opinion/lacking in consultation/gives credence to dissidence and bad leadership	11	8
(v)	Support for the asylum project; it is in consonance with Nigeria's 'big brother' role in the ECOWAS and Africa/Nigeria has done it before and can/should do it again.	12	8
(vi)	It is in Nigeria's national interest and boost to its status as a regional/continental power	5	3.5
(vii)	Taylor's exit from Liberia is synonymous to peace in Liberia and the entire ECOWAS sub-region	35	25
	N	***143***	***100***

Key: N = 143 (Total number of referential issues on the subject or (Sample Frame).
+ = number of times reference was made to the variable/unit of analysis.

% = percentage of the total units of analysis as applicable to this variable.
Note: tables in this article were created by the author, from data generated from the aforementioned newspapers.

Interpretation of Data on Research Question (i) - Opposing the Grant of Asylum

Four of the positions opposed the asylum project as discussed below.

Table II: Analysis of Variable I

Newspaper	No. of Referential Issues	%
The Guardian	12	8.39
Vanguard	18	12.58
Total	***30***	***21***

Variable I concerns objections to the asylum project due to President Charles Taylor's antecedents, including being unfriendly to Nigeria and Nigerians. There were 30 referential issues on this variable constituting 21 percent of the entire units of analysis. Specifically, these issues include Taylor's dubious antecedents such as his flight to the US on account of embezzlement of $800,000 Liberian while minister of procurement under President Samuel Doe; escaping jail in Massachusetts in 1985 while awaiting extradition to Liberia; his alignment with some African leaders notably those of Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Libya to launch attacks on his motherland, resulting in a seven-year war during which former President Samuel Doe was murdered. He is credited with aiding rebels in neighbouring Sierra Leone. Taylor therefore, 'is trouble personified and did not merit such [asylum] gesture'. The crisis he brought to Liberia is 'the worst example of man's inhumanity to man' so that the asylum offer is 'the most absurd gesture' (Obinor 2003: 15).

Taylor never considered Nigeria as a neutral arbiter in his contest for the leadership of Liberia. He was suspicious of the cordial relations of Nigeria's Ibrahim Babangida and Samuel Doe, alleging that the former gave military assistance to the latter's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). This reinforced the widely held view that the two leaders were close friends - a state of affairs attested to by the establishment of the Babangida School of International Relations at the University of Liberia and the buying over of Liberia's African Development Bank loan of $4m during Doe's time by Babangida's Nigeria. Thus, Taylor's perception that Nigeria's intervention was to feather the nest of former President

Samuel Doe to his (Taylor's) disadvantage resulted in his hatred for Nigeria and its citizens. His rebel forces thereafter gruesomely attacked Nigerians either visiting Liberia as peace keepers, monitors or journalists or even those previously resident there.

The most notorious of these attacks was the killing of two Nigerian journalists; Krees Imodibie of *The Guardian* and Tayo Awotusin of *The Champion*. These incidents are still fresh in the minds of Nigerians, and Nigeria's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief Tom Ikimi (Adesina 2003: 2), , 'cautioned the Nigerian government not to disregard the feelings and sensitivities of the friends and relations of the men and women who lost their lives at he instance of Taylor and his men'. 'Charles Taylor', he concluded, 'is not a friend of Nigeria' (Adesina 2003: 2). In the same vein, Nigeria's former Military Vice-President Agustus Aikhomu insisted that given Taylor's offensive against Nigeria, the asylum offer was not just a terrible mistake on the part of President Obasanjo but a slap in the face of Nigerians and concluded that Taylor was not a friend of Nigeria (Okhomina 2003: 6).

Table III: Analysis of Variable II

Newspaper	No. of Referential Issues	%
The Guardian	3	2
Vanguard	13	9
Total	***16***	***11***

Sixteen referential issues, or eleven percent of the entire units of analysis, were generated around Variable II that gathers together objections to the asylum project because it would further drain Nigeria's already lean resources. Worse still is that similar gestures by Nigeria in the past were not appreciated. Nigeria's intervention in the Liberian crisis from 1991-2003 led it to spend $12 billion and lose 1000 soldiers. By 1999, it had already spent $8 billion and lost 500 soldiers (Olawale 2003: 21). On the average Nigeria was spending $1 million daily for the up-keep of the troops and other logistics in Liberia. Testifying before a commission of enquiry on communal clashes in the Middle-Belt, former ECOMOG boss and former Chief of Staff Nigerian Army, Lt. General Victor Malu (Rtd.) noted how he brought home from Liberia an unprecedented number of corpses of Nigerian soldiers killed while on the peace mission in Liberia and he had directed that they 'be buried secretly in the night to avoid national uproar and panic' (Olawale 2003: 21). On its own, the

Nigerian Army claimed to have expended ₦135 million on medical bills for about 150 ECOMOG soldiers with bullet and other war related injuries from the operations in Liberia. It is speculated that some 400 Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers were infected with HIV/AIDS (Olawale 2003: 21).

The sore point of the forgoing is that internally, there are serious issues begging for government attention, hence the gesture in the view of one time Federal Minister Paul Unongo smacks of charity beginning abroad instead of the other way round (Anyagafu 2003: 15). More vexatious is that these gestures were not appreciated, neither have they, in the words Sagay Isaac (2003: 11) 'received any gestures of gratitude commensurate with the exertions on behalf of brotherly African states' including Liberia, who has exhibited ingratitude and hostility to Nigeria. Even Charles Taylor whose ascendancy Nigeria had ensured via ECOMOG had in return hounded Nigeria and Nigerians at every opportunity.

This development is not surprising, as Nigeria has often been paid back with ingratitude by African countries to which it had been a benefactor. Nigerians are today hounded all over South Africa -- the same Nigerians from whose salaries deductions were made towards the South African Relief Fund in addition to other Nigeria's efforts at dismantling apartheid in South Africa (Animasaun 2003: 35-38). The same is true of Cameroon; a recipient of Nigeria's assistance, especially when the former experienced volcanic eruptions. Yet Cameroon has used its gendarmerie to harass Nigerian communities along its borders. What of Equatorial Guinea that allowed South Africa use it as a military base against Nigeria despite the fact that Nigeria regards Equatorial Guinea as a friend and had rallied to its assistance in moments of need (Ojieh 1994:6)? When Nigeria gave Yormie Johnson asylum in 1992, the US had undertaken to offset the bill but a former Nigerian Foreign Affairs Minister Ignatius Olisemeka observes that this was never done (Okhomina 2003: 1).

Table III: Analysis of Variable III

Newspaper	No. of Referential Issues	%
The Guardian	15	10.5
Vanguard	19	13.3
Total	***34***	***24***

Variable III has the highest number of referential issues objecting to the asylum project. It generated 34 references and constitutes 24 percent of the total units of analysis. It refers to objections to the asylum project on the grounds that: (i) the indicted President Charles Taylor was better handed over for trials by the UN Crimes Court; (ii) non-compliance to (i) could incur reprisals for Nigeria from the international community, and (iii) the concomitant effect of these threats to Nigeria's security.

Pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution 1315 of August 14, 2000, to prosecute those allegedly responsible for atrocities in the Sierra Leone civil war, the UN's International Court for War Crimes on June 4, 2003 issued a warrant of arrest on Charles Taylor for arming rebels during Sierra Leone's long civil war (1991-2002). Specifically, Taylor was accused of 'bearing the greatest responsibility for violations of international humanitarian laws within the territory Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996' (Okoror 2003: 1).

The indictment was approved on March 7, 2003 but was served on June 4, 2003 to coincide with Taylor's trip for the peace talks in Ghana so that the Ghanaian authorities could facilitate his arrest. Ghana did not. Nigeria was then urged not to follow Ghana's example of ignoring international covenants. In the view of Bukhari Bello, Executive Secretary of Nigeria's National Human Rights Commission, Nigeria was one of the earliest signatories of the International Crimes Court treaty and the 1998 Statute of Rome, and it is morally wrong for Nigeria to prevent Taylor's trial by the same court (Akhaine 2003: 8).

The asylum gesture, it is feared, could make Nigeria at loggerheads with the UN (Uzuakpundu 2003:44) since Amnesty International had faulted the asylum project, accusing President Obasanjo of flouting international law even as a party to the Geneva Convention (Igbintade 2003: 1). International reprisals could have included turning down Nigeria's request for a seat at the UN's Security Council. The end result of such sanctions would be total insecurity for the Nigerian state.

Table V: Analysis of Variable IV

Newspaper	No. of Referential Issues	%
The Guardian	3	2
Vanguard	8	6
Total	***11***	***8***

Variable IV is the last of those that refer to objections to the asylum offer. In it, eleven referential issues or eight percent of the total units of analysis oppose the asylum offer on the ground that it amounts to undermining public opinion, since angry sentiments have been expressed about it since it was first announced.

Worse still was the unilateral nature of the policy since neither the National Assembly nor the Federal Executive Council was consulted. Hence, granting Taylor asylum in a manner 'lacking in proper consultation' (Okhomina 2003: 1) smacks of 'military dictatorship and insults the sensibilities of democratic norms ...' (Animasaun 2003: 37). So, Dr Usman Bugaje, Chairman, House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, has asked Nigerians to hold President Obasanjo responsible for any action of former President Charles Taylor while in exile in Nigeria (Ajanaku 2003: 3). The asylum gesture is also perceived as capable of giving credence to dissidents and bad leaders who are guaranteed a safe haven in Nigeria and thus, create more despots (Taire 2003: 11).

A combination of the arguments in variables (i) - (iv) above, answer research question (i). They tell us why Nigerians were opposed to the asylum project. They were opposed to the asylum project on the grounds of Taylor's atrocities. It was also argued that the asylum project would cause a further drain on Nigeria's economy considering the cost of providing accommodation, catering and logistics for Taylor and his large retinue, which at the first count stood at 500 with him in Calabar when he arrived August 11, 2003. When by August 21, no fewer than 200 more were said to have flown in; they were diverted to Uyo (Onah 2003: 3) apparently due to a shortage of accommodation in Calabar. Since then, the number of additional official and unofficial migrants could only be imagined.

Given Taylor's tastes and cravings, the cost of the asylum project was an 'injudicious use of public money' (Adesina 2003: 22). Making no attempt to disguise his extravagance, Taylor had hardly arrived Calabar than he began to import state-of-the art cars, furniture, cooking utensils, beddings and toiletries. This further incensed those Nigerians living in the area where he is quartered, and who did not hide their displeasure at his life style - requiring that security had to be beefed up in Calabar (Akinola 2003: 11).

Other arguments from this group of variables insist that Taylor is a UN-indicted war criminal, and Nigeria's offer of asylum amounted to

flouting international law, which could earn Nigeria international disrepute and portend grave consequences for Nigeria's security. So, rather than the asylum offer, Nigeria should facilitate Taylor's arrest and subsequent trial at the UN Crimes Court sitting in Sierra Leone. Finally, in this line of arguments, were referential issues, which opposed the asylum offer on account of its unilateral nature and could create the impression that Nigeria was abetting impunity by protecting dictators.

But even though the asylum project may seem generally faulty in the face of Taylor's well documented misdeeds, Justice Anthony Aniagolu; a foremost Nigerian jurist points out that when Taylor committed most of those atrocities, including the killing of Nigerians, he was still a rebel leader fighting to take control of Liberia (Mamah 2003: 8). The fear of possible reprisal from the international community is mellowed by the fact that the asylum project had the tacit support of the major powers. It was a French initiative, supported by the United States, Britain and the United Nations, and Nigeria insisted that afterwards, it must not be harassed and 'intimidated' to surrender Taylor for trial (Fatunde 2003: 6).

Taylor may be a war criminal and could be held responsible for the prolonged crisis in the Mano River area, but the fact is that the International Crimes Court's warrant of his arrest was ill-timed; coming when 'it looked like there was peaceful resolution of the Liberian crisis in sight' says Professor Bolaji Akinyemi (Benson 2003: 17). He insists that it aimed at criminalising and disgracing African leaders and using Africans as scapegoats as the conduct of ICC seemed politically motivated. Otherwise, how do you explain the preference of the court beginning its hearing with the killings in the Congo which were preceded by 'so many killings we read in so many parts of the world'? Akinyemi queries.

In all, variables (i) - (iv) with a total of 91 referential issues out of 143 or 64 percent of the entire units of analysis opposed the asylum project and give sufficient grounds for us to reach the conclusion that public opinion was against the project. But why did government go ahead with the project? Perhaps an analysis of research question (ii) may provide us with a clue.

Interpretation of Data on Research Question (ii) — Supporting the Asylum

Three of the seven variables for this work concern public support for the asylum project.

Table VI: Analysis of Variable V

Newspaper	No. of Referential Issues	%
The Guardian	7	4.9
Vanguard	5	3.5
Total	***12***	***8***

Variable V refers to arguments in support of the asylum project such as the idea that it is in consonance with Nigeria's 'big brother' role in the ECOWAS in particular and Africa as a whole. Nigeria has been responsible more than any other country for the maintenance of regional peace in Africa. Given its status in the West African sub-region, it becomes incumbent upon Nigeria to act the big brother.

Nigeria has been deeply involved in the peace efforts in Africa, West Africa and particularly in Liberia, whose two ex-war lords Prince Yormie Johnson and Roosevelt Johnson have been in exile in Ikoyi and Jos since 1992 and 1998 respectively. This is in addition to Nigeria having hosted such unpopular leaders as Mohammed Siad Barre of Somalia and Felix Malloum of Niger in the 1990s. 'Hosting Charles Taylor therefore, is only in keeping with a tradition of sheltering rejected [or put mildly, troubled] African leaders' (Omonijo 2003: 17), and a gesture for which President Bush and 'the world is grateful to Nigeria for spearheading' because removing Taylor from office in his words had been a 'tough issue' (Onurah 2003: 1 & 2). Nigeria's role was required in providing a safe landing for US peace keepers in Liberia (Akande 2003: 1). Twelve (12) referential issues or eight percent of the units of analysis were generated from this variable.

Table VII: Analysis of Variable VI

Newspaper	No. of Referential Issues	%
The Guardian	2	1.39
Vanguard	3	2.09
Total	***5***	***3.5***

Variable VI with five referential issues or 3.5 percent of the whole units of analysis endorsed the asylum project on the grounds that it was in Nigeria's national interest, as it boosted its status as a regional and continental power. This variable is of great significance since national interest is often the core determinant of nations' foreign policies. But it is lacking in proper representation here despite Fatunde's (2003: 6) argument that since Nigerians constitute the largest number of aliens in most West African States, if Liberia goes up in further flames and destabilises, several thousands of Nigerians living in those countries as successful big time traders, spare parts traders and artisans would lose their multi-billion naira investments, return home as refugees and increase the unbearable rate of unemployment.

Thus the asylum gesture was seen as pursuant to 'Nigeria's national interest which includes the protection of her citizens'. The asylum project has shored up Nigeria's image and 'Everybody is thanking us' remarked Presidential aide Femi Fami-Kayode (Akinola 2003: 1).

Table VIII: Analysis of Variable VII

Newspaper	No. of Referential Issues	%
The Guardian	16	11.2
Vanguard	19	13.3
Total	***35***	***24.5***

With 35 referential issues or 24.5 percent of the units of analysis, Variable VII concerns support for Taylor's asylum on the grounds that the crisis in Liberia was in large part due to the oresence of Taylor, the major agent of destabilisation in the West African sub-region. The stepping down of Taylor was the surest way to peace (Sando 2003: 10) in Liberia and would 'allow West Africa as a whole to concentrate on economic development, rather than solving conflicts' (Oloja 2003: 4). Ruud Lubbers, head of the UN refugee agency, while on a tour of West Africa identified Taylor as 'the source and very embodiment of the region's problem' (Adesina 2003: 1-2).

The stepping down of Taylor was inclusive of quitting Liberia as 'Bush tells Taylor — Quit Liberia now' (Akande 2003: 1). In the view of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of the Unity Party of Liberia, the ceasefire signed between Taylor and the rebels in Accra on June 17, 2003 could only be of effect 'on the departure of the Liberian President' (Adesina 2003: 10). President

Obasanjo also insisted that 'unless Charles Taylor leaves Liberia, there will be no peace' (Obinor 2003: 1-2).

To have tried to eject Taylor by force could have plunged the sub-region into a war of attrition that would follow a permanent guerrilla war waged by Taylor's supporters. Hence the need for an orderly exit for Taylor in the form of asylum, and this responsibility Nigeria was to assume.

Research question (ii), which this paper sought to address was answered in the analyses contained in the arguments or variables (v) - (vii). Basically, they argue in support of the asylum offer; firstly, that the asylum offer was in keeping with Nigeria's role as a major player in the sub-region's affairs making it incumbent upon it to act the big brother; including heading the peace mission into Liberia, ECOMIL, having previously headed ECOMOG in the 1990s. The argument that the asylum project was in Nigeria's national interest, however, was not frequently advanced in the sources consulted for this paper. The contention that the exit of Taylor from Liberia could bring in peace not only to Liberia but to the entire sub-region of West Africa was apparent given that it was frequently advanced.

But a distinction must be established between Taylor leaving Liberia and where he should go eventually. Nigerians were not only averse to his coming to Nigeria, but there is the possibility of Taylor still being a problem in Liberia even from Nigeria. The late Foday Sankoh had, via satellite phone calls from Abuja, directed his RUF to join forces with coup maker Johnny Paul Koroma to wreak havoc on Sierra Leone (Jason 2003: 16). Again, when in the face of the perceptions in some quarters that former President Samuel Doe was the problem with Liberia, when he died, how much peace did Liberia get?

On the whole, variables (v) - (vii) tell us the justifications for the grant of asylum. But we are still at a loss as to why this set of variables, which constituted 54 referential issues out of 143 or just 36 percent of the entire units of analysis should prevail over the arguments opposing the asylum (with higher responses) as shown above. Maybe the answers to research question (iii) could resolve this riddle.

Public Opinion and Foreign Policy — Critique

On research question (iii), the overriding of public opinion by other foreign policy determinants became known on August 11, 2003 when Taylor, his wife Jewel, two daughters and aides (Nwosu 2003: 1) arrived Abuja to be personally received by President Obasanjo. Obasanjo was

earlier cautioned not to ignore public opinion on the matter of Taylor's asylum since angry sentiments had been expressed over the project. There is also the need for the leader to carry the led along especially in very crucial circumstances as the asylum project (Animasaun 2003: 37).

In liberal democracies as well as emerging ones as exemplified by Nigeria, public opinion has exerted considerable influence on foreign policy. In nineteenth century Britain, the public was proved correct when it disagreed with government policy on the American Civil War, the Russo-Turkish War, and the Boer War ((Jacobsen 1996: 105). The campaign against the Vietnam War 'actually imposed constraints and unwelcome goals on resistant policymakers and forced a reshaping of policy networks because threats like promises need to be ratified'. Thus, 'the totality of the opposition activities put pressure on officials' (Jacobsen 1996: 104) to end the war. Even now, however, President Bush remains obdurate despite the fact that the mass of Americans have become weary of America's military project in Iraq. And so, if President Obasanjo had sought the opinion of Nigerians on the asylum issue he would have received an outright 'no'.

It can be argued that 'a time comes when a professional opinion holder is called upon by duty to swim above the tide of popular view and look at the greater stakes involved in an issue' (Nnana 2003: 37). According to Dougherty (1990: 102), the primary responsibility of statesmen is the survival of the nation-state, and thus 'governmental behaviour at the international level cannot be subjected to the same moral standards that are applied to human behaviour'. 'Moreover, it is by no means certain that governments in their foreign policies express the aspirations of their peoples'. Public opinion cannot play the same role in both national and international policies because the latter is 'a matter of relations between governments and not people'. 'The conduct of an effective diplomacy is said to be difficult if not impossible, if it must be subject, both in its conception and execution, to continuous scrutiny of public opinion' (Dougherty 1990: 111). This view sees public opinion as a detrimental foreign policy determinant. It is only resorted to when not in contest with other variables particularly national interest. After other determinants may have prevailed, public opinion is used to give the people a sense of belonging. Experts' judgment of what constitutes priorities overrides the public view. Public opinion is premised on numbers while experts base their own on dynamics. Hence, even though variable (vi) (which endorsed the asylum on the grounds that it was in

Nigeria's national interest and capable of boosting its status as a continental power) generated the least number of referential issues, the Nigerian government went ahead with the project. This is because expert judgment based on dynamics has taken precedence over public opinion - supposedly a game of numbers.

When in 1960, Nigeria abrogated the Anglo/Nigeria military pact due to public outcry, Nigeria was not in immediate need of any military assistance. The truth is that it would have quickly embraced such help during the civil war if offered. Former Nigerian Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon, confessed 'I wanted to finish the war quickly ... We were short of arms and ammunition and we could not get any from Britain or anywhere.. (Gowon 2005: 35). When Nigeria led other countries to boycott international sports meetings in the 1970s and 1980s on account of public outcry against the apartheid regime's participation in the games, they gave further impetus to Nigeria's status as an emerging regional power and hence, its actions were in the national interest.

When President Babangida led Nigeria to reject the IMF loan in deference to public opinion, it was only a predetermined course of action to prepare the ground for the same IMF/World Bank, Structural Adjustment Programmes, which he had already determined to accept. This is because, according to Simmons (1993: 4 & 281), when leaders find themselves with domestic problems, they attempt 'to maintain some semblance of control' and accept or reject international 'imperatives' depending on the extent to which they meet the leaders' needs.

On the Taylor asylum issue, President Obasanjo sacrificed public opinion on the altar of national interest. This is because 'no statesman, no publicist, no scholar would seriously argue that foreign policy ought to be conducted in opposition to, or disregard of, the national interest' (Dougherty 1990: 124). Nigeria's national interest here was directly involved as the implications in the event of a total conflagration in the West African sub-region were obvious. It had thus shouldered the burden of the refugees and Nigerian returnees, the high cost of restoring peace (which Nigeria had single-handedly borne before), etc. These were all higher stake issues than admitting Taylor and his retinue into Nigeria. And the last resort would be to hand Taylor over for trial. If the stake holders in the asylum project, that is, France, Britain, the US, UN, A.U, and the ECOWAS leaders (who tacitly or otherwise) endorsed the asylum offer, make a detour and decide that Taylor be turned in for trial, Nigeria will not be shamed.

We may have argued in this article that internal factors should be considered when nations' policies respond to international stimuli, and even though variable (iv) in this article specifically argues that the asylum project undermined public opinion and was lacking in consultation, we also noted that it was a joint decision of stake holders which included the major powers, the UN, the AU, and ECOWAS with Nigeria as a leading player. Although the asylum terms may not have been made public, Elizabeth Blunt of the BBC claimed they included a comfortable accommodation for Taylor in Nigeria and a pledge that he would not be handed over for prosecution (Oyatomi 2006: 7). This seemed to have mitigated the fear of reprisal by the international community.

There is no doubt that Nigerians agreed that former President Charles Taylor should be held responsible for the crisis in Liberia and to a large extent in the ECOWAS sub-region. Hence, they appreciated that his removal from office and exile from Liberia would largely ensure peace in Liberia, the Mano River, ECOWAS and even Africa as a whole. Nigerians' aversion to the asylum for Taylor was less a rejection of the foreign policy decision of President Olusegun Obasanjo than an innate disdain for the person of Charles Taylor.

Conclusion

This article submits that public opinion does not play the first fiddle in nations' foreign policies. It is resorted to when not in conflict with other determinants — particularly the national interest as perceived by the leadership. After other determinants may have prevailed, public opinion is used to give the people a sense of belonging. When Germany's naval build-up between 1892 and 1907 aggravated tensions with Britain, the latter was restrained from aggression because 'domestic conditions minimized the chance of funding a genuine military challenge' (Jacobsen 1996: 96). When public opinion led the US to abandon Vietnam, it was because of economic considerations rather than mere mass opposition. This was because 'once the nation's resource base came under pressure, domestic calculations influenced every aspect of war' (Jacobsen 1996: 105). When Babangida claimed to have deferred to it by rejecting the IMF loan, he wanted to give the people a sense of belonging in the eventual adoption of the SAPs.

If in the West, public opinion is adumbrated as the opinion of an articulate minority since 'the vast majority of people even in highly literate societies are unknowledgeable, uninterested, and apathetic with re-

gards to most issues of world affairs', the situation would be worse for African states including Nigeria given their low literacy levels, and other inhibitions and taboos. A closer scrutiny of the 143 referential items for this study showed that only two could be termed 'grass-roots' reactions. They even reduce to one given that they are actually the same issue but commented on by two newspapers – *The Guardian* 20/7/03 and *Vanguard* 22/7/03, reporting on the reaction of the Ivikhua community; the home town of one of the journalist killed by rebels in Liberia. And even the grass-roots nature of this reaction could be queried as the letter of protest letter was drawn up by the Ivikhua Progressive Union, an elitist representative of the community, based in Lagos, to President Obasanjo dissenting on the asylum offer. The other 141 referential issues were elitist opinions from the Nigerian Labour Congress, Christian Association of Nigeria, Nigerian Union of Journalists, Nigerian Bar Association, Parliamentarians, government ministers, students, academics, rights' groups, etc.

If as a determinant of foreign policy, public opinion means the influence of the reactions of the public on foreign policy actions of governments, and if in Vietnam, in the German arms build-up and in the Babangida IMF loan, the public reacted among other factors to the economic effects of these government policies, it still follows that the actual influences on the changes in policies were economic and not public opinion, which is here only ancillary. Public opinion remains relevant as a foreign policy determinant if only to the extent of serving as an outlet for venting public dissent over the adverse implications of government policies.

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