The State and Development in Africa

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Abstract

Colonisation obstructed the internal process of state formation and development in Africa and left legacies of authoritarianism, corruption and political instability. Embodied in the post-colonial state and sustained by foreign aid, these colonial legacies constitute the main obstacles to development in post-colonial Africa. The only way to liberate Africa and ensure its progress is a three-stage process involving the repudiation of foreign aid, the restructuring of territorial boundaries in accordance with African realities, and the formation of an African continental government. The African academia should be in the vanguard of African liberation by educating and mobilising the populace.

Resumé

La colonisation a constitué un frein au processus interne de formation et de développement étatique en Afrique, et nous a légué une tradition d'autoritarisme, de corruption et d'instabilité politique. Cet héritage qui est symbolisé par l'état post colonial et entretenu par l'aide extérieure, constitue un des principaux obstacles au développement de l'Afrique post coloniale. L'unique stratégie de libération de l'Afrique et de garantie de son progrès se décline en un processus en trois étapes : le rejet de l'aide extérieure, la restructuration des limites territoriales selon les réalités africaines et la formation d'un gouvernement continental africain. Le monde académique africain devrait être à l'avant-garde de la libération africaine en éduquant et mobilisant les populations.

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Introduction

The African continent is both the birth place of humankind and the cradle of civilisation. It is also endowed with enormous human and natural resources, with the latter 'estimated to be greater than that of almost any other continent in the world' (Nkrumah 1963: 216). Yet Africa is the least developed region in the world! And although the problem has been the subject of innumerable studies each purporting to prescribe a solution by discerning the way forward for the continent, the crisis is persisting and exacerbating, making Africa a beggarly neighbour and Africans the scum of the earth, a despicable people, so to say. Nor is there any hope for the future, as Ninsin (2000: 9) forecasts 'the prospects for Africa in the next century do not seem any better'.

But how has mother Africa, the cradle of mankind and civilisation, got into such an appalling state? In other words, what has hindered development in Africa? Modernisation literature attributes the failure of development in Africa largely to domestic or internal factors such as the domestic policy environment (The World Bank 1994; Ake 1996: 125); policy failures (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999: 23); the inability of the national bourgeoisie (Amin 1990a,1990b: 152); authoritarianism (Joseph 2003: 10); inappropriate state structures (Edigheji 2004; Lumumba-Kasongo 2002); and only marginally to external factors such as the role of the World Bank, foreign technical advisers, and foreign economic interests (Ninsin 2000).

Adopting an institutional approach in analysing the African predicament, Edigheji (2004) argues that 'the institutional nature and institutional perspective of the African state since independence primarily account for the continent's poor social and economic performance'. Consequently overcoming underdevelopment in Africa largely 'depends on the ability of the continent to establish state and society institutions that can successfully engineer social and economic transformation' (84). Although rightly pointing out that the 'policy informed by the Washington Consensus has entailed an usurpation of the powers and roles of African political elite over policy-making' (95), Edigheji nevertheless believes that the solution to Africa's problem is to be found in adjusting domestic power relations between the political elite who 'must rule' and the bureaucratic elite who 'must reign' and for which he proposes the 'recruitment of bureaucrats purely based on merit, predictable career paths and complemented by the need for top

bureaucrats to share the same development agenda with the political elite' (99-100). He ignores the vital role of external factors.

Another scholar who examines the problem from an institutional perspective is Lumumba-Kasongo (2004). He also maintains that 'African people need to reinvent new state forms that can effectively address issues related to poverty and gender inequalities' (80). The reinvention of new state forms requires the reconceptualisation of the African state for which Lumumba-Kasongo proposes four options, namely: recapturing and appropriating the state by gaining access to the state's resources, managing the state's affairs according to people's objective condition; owning the state apparatuses and participating in its decision making; renaming the state by adopting a social or popular revolution of radical change of the structures of the African economies within a pan-African perspective; and through what he calls the dynamics of African traditions (103-104). In this paper, I adopt Lumumba-Kasongo's concept of recapturing and appropriating the state. My argument is that colonial legacies embodied in the post-colonial state and sustained by foreign aid constitute the main obstacles to development in Africa. The only way forward is to recapture and appropriate the state in a three stage process: the repudiation of foreign aid; the restructuring of territorial boundaries; and the establishment of a continental government.

The kaleidoscopic connotation of development renders it a more or less catchall concept. At times, it is used to describe the processes of social, economic and political changes at both the individual and group levels. At other times it is utilised to describe social and economic indicators such as GNP, GDP, income levels, life expectancy, etc. The same is true of 'development paradigm' which has at one time or the other been import substitution industrialisation, basic needs, structural adjustment and now, good governance. Nevertheless, as Goulet (1983: 620) rightly points out, 'the best model of development is one that any society forges for itself on the anvil of its specific conditions'. Whatever development entails (and it entails many things both abstract and concrete), I agree with Ake (1996: 125) that it is 'the process by which people create and recreate themselves and their life circumstances to realise higher levels of civilisation in accordance with their own choices and values. Development is something that people must do for themselves. If people are the end of development, they are also necessarily

its agents and its means'. Therefore Africa can be developed only by Africans and not by outsiders.

This paper is divided into three parts. In the first part I seek to show that authoritarian rule or lack of democracy, corruption and political instability that are often presented as domestic constraints to development in Africa, are colonial legacies. The second part concentrates on the role of foreign aid in sustaining and reinforcing these legacies. In the third and last part I propose a three-stage way forward for Africa.

Colonial Legacies

Although colonialism used the denial of African history to establish the necessity of the 'white man's burden' and the 'mission civilatrice', much is known about political systems and governance in pre-colonial Africa. The political systems varied from highly centralised (kingdoms and empires) to highly decentralised political structures. A renowned anthropologist has written of these pre-colonial African states that 'in the thoroughness of their political institutions and in the skill with which social institutions were utilised to lend stability to the political structure, they exceeded anything in Europe prior to the 16th century' (Linton 1959: 120).

Pre-colonial states were not only stable, they were also governed democratically. Power within the state was decentralised which made it easier for citizens to participate fully in the political process. As a result each person was involved in political life (Busia 1962). In addition the power of centralised authority was counterbalanced by the devolution of power to regional, zonal and district chiefs. This ensured 'checks and balances and accountability' (Osabu-Kle 2000: 79). Decision-making was based on popular consultation within the framework of a bottom-up approach as opposed to the top-down authoritarian model.

The economic base of the states was autonomous and depended on the control of long-distance trade routes, and in which there were also autonomous international actors free to run their own affairs. An additional source of the state's wealth was the payment of tributes (Ibn Khaldun quoted in Muiu 2002: 25). Concerning the people and society in pre-colonial Africa the great Islam scholar Ibn Battuta asserted that they:

> Are seldom unjust, and have a greater abhorrence of injustice than any other people... There is complete security in their country, neither traveller nor inhabitants in it has anything to fear from robbers or men of violence. They do not confiscate the property of any white man who

> dies in their country, even if it be uncounted wealth. On the contrary, they give it into the charge of some trustworthy person among the whites until the rightful heir takes possession of it (quoted in Nkrumah 1963: 3).

Pre-colonial Africa was thus characterised by autonomous, stable and democratically governed political systems devoid of dishonesty or corruption. But these institutions and values were destroyed by colonialism, which replaced them with authoritarianism, corruption, and political instability.

The Colonial State and Authoritarianism

State formation in pre-colonial Africa, as elsewhere, was an internal evolutionary and revolutionary process involving conquest and assimilation of groups by stronger groups. The attributes of a state, namely, an autonomous government, a national foundation based on a population of citizens and a definite territory, were the end result of this process. Unlike the pre-colonial state the colonial state in Africa did not emerge from an internal evolutionary and revolutionary process. It was externally and forcefully imposed as an instrument of suppression, not of governance, and as such, it lacked the attributes of a state. It had no autonomous government, the territorial boundaries were arbitrary and therefore uncertain while the people within the territory were regarded as subjects, not citizens, and so it also lacked a national foundation. In other words, altough the colonial state lacked legitimacy yet it had to perform its functions of suppressing a restive population of subjects and destroying their institutions and values and replacing them with those reflecting the colonisers' needs and interests.

To perform these functions the colonial state used all the political, economic, cultural, military and psychological instruments of oppression 'to weaken, kill his sense of self-worth, and zombianize the African into the living dead' (Fanon 1968: 10), thereby vindicating Alexis de Tocquevilles's 1835 observation that 'if we reason from what passes in the world we should almost say that the European is to the other races of mankind what man is to the lower animals, he makes them subservient to his use, and when he cannot subdue, he destroys them' (quoted in Muiu 2002: 32-33). Given the situation, the colonial state could not but be authoritarian. As Ake rightly points out:

> Since the colonial state was called upon by the peculiar circumstances of the colonial situation to carry out so many functions – indeed to do

everything – it was all powerful. It needed to be all power not only to carry out its mission but also to survive along with the colonial order in the face of the resentment and the hostility of the colonised... The power of the colonial state was not only absolute but also arbitrary (1996: 2).

And so the structures of the colonial state – security forces, public administration, churches, etc. – were designed to be authoritarian since they were apparatuses of oppression and control rather than democratic governance and development. These are the structures that were inherited by the post-colonial state in most cases close to half a century ago, and have remained essentially unchanged. Is it any wonder then, that authoritarianism is pervasive in Africa? That the African state is a predatory rather than a developmental state? (Edigheji 2004).

Colonialism and Corruption

Although corruption is now a universal phenomenon that has reached cancerous proportions, it does not seem to have existed in pre-colonial Africa. It needs no further evidence besides Ibn Battuta's observation quoted above to show that corruption is a colonial legacy that did not exist in pre-colonial Africa. It should also be noted that corruption is not an object but a societal phenomenon that necessarily entails human action. Since there is no African language word for it, it did not exist in pre-colonial Africa. As shown below, corruption is indisputably a colonial legacy.

Despite the universality of corruption there is no single commonly accepted definition of it. Moreover societies differ in their views about what constitutes corruption and scholars too disagree about its causes and effects. Normatively defined, corruption refers to the abuse or misuse of public power/position/office/role of trust or resources for private benefit (Girling 1997; Alatas 1990; Thompson 1993; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Mulinge and Lesetedi 2002). However, corruption is viewed here from the perspective of Osoba as:

> a form of antisocial behaviour by an individual or social group which confers unjust or fraudulent benefits on its perpetrators, is inconsistent with the established legal norms and prevailing moral ethos of the land and is likely to subvert or diminish the capacity of the legitimate authorities to provide fully for the material and spiritual well-being of all members of a society in a just and equitable manner (1996: 372).

The origin of corruption is traced to the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century (Robb 1992). It was part of the white collar crime

produced by the financial growth that accompanied the industrial revolution. According to Robb (1992), the industrial revolution gave rise to a complex economy characterised by an increasing dependence on finance and investment and, consequently, enormous banking networks, stocks and credit, and a complicated legal system. These factors, coupled with the increase in lawyers, financiers and other professionals, greatly aided the expansion and the potential for white collar crime. Viewed as a by-product of traits of antisocial behaviour, corruption was later introduced into Africa by the British, French and other colonial rulers (Osoba 1996). Such behaviour infiltrated indigenous African peoples during the colonial period and was nurtured in the post-colonial era. The credibility of this position is further heightened by the fact that the colonisation of Africa was an extension of the new economic order that resulted from the industrial revolution and its concomitant problems (Mulinge and Lesetedi 2002), the quest for economic gain, or 'free trade imperialism' (Nabudere 1981: 7) that accompanied the industrial revolution fuelled the scramble for, and the eventual partition and colonisation of, Africa by Europeans.

Colonialism introduced corruption to Africa in essentially three ways, namely the introduction of a monetary economy, cash taxation and the use of the divide and rule method. First, corruption requires a well-developed monetary economy characterised by a clear differentiation of interest to survive. Such an economic system did not exist in pre-colonial Africa (Mulinge and Lesetedi 2002). Thus the introduction of a monetary economy by the colonial government 'laid down the structural groundwork for the origins and sustenance of corrupt practices' (Mulinge and Lesetedi 2002: 54). The introduction of compulsory cash taxation in the forms of hut tax and, later, poll tax constituted a second avenue of corruption only because of the manner in which the tax was collected. The colonial rulers relied on local African leaders to collect the taxes. And as a motivation the latter were allowed to pocket a part of the money collected, 'a practice that amounted to the taking of kickbacks by African chiefs' (Mulinge and Lesetedi 2002: 55) and became a principal method for the accumulation of private property (Leonard 1991), a way of life that became difficult to give up just as corruption has become. Thus Tlou and Campbell rightly conclude that the financial gains accruing from the amount pocketed from 'taxes blinded the chiefs to the plight suffered by their people as a consequence of taxation' (1984).

The technique of divide and rule adopted by colonial authorities to subdue and control Africans constituted a third link between corruption and colonialism. The technique of divide and rule involved the practice of favouring one tribe over others with a dual objective of securing the loyalty of that group to the administration and encouraging rivalry among the others to prevent a sense of unity from growing and threatening colonial rule. The favoured groups were rewarded with access to Western education (Kalinga 1985) and government-sponsored economic opportunities (Mulinge and Lesetedi 2002). This resulted in high regional variations in levels of educational attainment and economic opportunities such that at independence those favoured had an edge over those not favoured and constituted the beginnings of an African elite class that was to dominate the political and economic life of the post-colonial African countries. Unfortunately, the socialisation of this elite class into a culture that excluded the majority in favour of only a select few had sown the seeds of corrupt practices such as tribalism and nepotism that have become deeply rooted in Africa. Evidently then, corruption is, like authoritarian rule, a colonial legacy.

Colonialism and Political Instability

The link between political instability and colonialism is derived partly from the nature of the territorial boundaries of the colonial state and partly from the role of the colonisers in fostering ethnicity. In partitioning Africa among themselves, the European colonisers did not take local realities into consideration and as such, the colonial territorial boundaries were arbitrarily drawn. Thus, erstwhile autonomous groups were forcefully brought under one political administration thereby obstructing the pre-colonial process of integration and assimilation but doing nothing to assimilate the various groups into a culture of unity. As such the groups maintained and eventually carried their group identities into the post-colonial era. This is why the 'majority of Africans still define themselves as citizens of their own social groups or nations' (Lumumba-Kasongo 2002: 91). Moreover the territorial boundaries were not accepted by the colonialists as fixed, hence most of them were redrawn several times in accordance with the changing configurations of European politics. Thus as late as the 1950s issues related to colonial boundaries were still being raised by European authorities (Lumumba-Kasongo 2002: 89). This led to some African groupings within two or more countries experiencing two or more colonial administrations. After

independence, these boundary issues have resulted in more than ninety disputes with more than seventy-five of them leading to either short-term or long-term wars or war-like situations. Examples include Liberia and Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Mali, Cameroon and Nigeria, Togo and Ghana, Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Secondly, the colonial state fostered ethnicity by encouraging ethnic sentiments among the Africans. In order to discourage a feeling of unity among the Africans the colonialists seized every opportunity to spread the myth that Africans were different from one another and used several techniques to keep them apart. They adopted a strategy of exclusion by (i) classifying ethnic groups and insisting that official forms carry information about the ethnic origin of individuals, (ii) disaggregating ethnic groups into the various subgroups, (iii) favouring some groups over others, and, (iv) in some cases separating already assimilated groups (Nnoli 1998: 16-17).This strategy of fragmentation and exclusion induced ethnic consciousness which laid the foundation of the inter-ethnic conflicts that characterise post-colonial Africa. The urge to serve ethnic interests is manifest in the tendency towards the perpetuation of power, the nepotistic allocation of national resources, the repression of ethnic groups and even the resort to genocidal massacres as have been witnessed in Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, and Nigeria. Hence ethnic-based military-led political instability is 'a major cause of the current African crisis' (McGowan 2003: 339). The colonial state's arbitrary boundaries which included erstwhile autonomous groups that remained unassimilated facilitated the colonialists' strategy of fragmentation that gave rise to ethnic consciousness. By inheriting the colonial structures intact, the post-colonial state also inherited the inherent instability. Thus, instability like authoritarian rule and corruption has a colonial origin. These legacies though pervasive in Africa and often presented as the obstacles to development are not indigenous to the continent. In the section that follows I will argue that these colonial legacies are sustained and reinforced by foreign aid to ensure the continuity of colonial policy.

Foreign Aid and Colonial Legacies

The conventional aid theory asserts that the insertion of external resources into the recipient economy can help to accelerate the development process by relieving specific bottlenecks caused by limited domestic resources and limited access to external resources through non-aid

mechanisms (Chenery and Strout 1966). In other words, the purpose of foreign aid is to promote development in the recipient country. But in the development literature, aid is under attack by both rightist and leftist writers for not only failing to promote development in the recipient countries but also for actually impeding it. Those on the right argue that aid is preventing development because it inhibits the penetration and expansion of market forces in the recipient countries (Bauer 1979, 1984; Krauss 1983; Friedman 1970), while the leftists contend that aid acts as a catalyst for capitalist forces which exploit and retard rather than develop the recipient countries (Seers and Myrdal 1982; Mende 1973: Hayter and Watson 1985, Jalée 1968).

Thus, albeit for different reasons, scholars of different ideological persuasions reach the inescapable conclusion that aid impedes rather than promotes development in the recipient countries. The theoretical basis of aid is thus at variance with the empirical evidence of the effects of aid. Why then is aid still being given?. The reason is that although presented as the explanation for aid, the theory is not the basis on which aid is given. Aid is not meant for the development of the recipient countries. For one thing the theory followed rather than preceded the practice of giving aid. 'The truth', says Higgins, 'is that aid programs developed on an ad hoc basis and the effort to provide a logically consistent rationale came afterwards' (1968: 575). Moreover, the origin of aid has been traced back to the colonial links between Western imperial powers and their overseas territories (Zeylstra 1975). These links were formalised at the dawn of 'independence' by so-called co-operation agreements that validated Western pre-eminence in economic, political, cultural and military affairs and reinforced the Western mind-set of the African establishments.

These colonial links that aid was meant to sustain were not, and could not be, in the interest of the colonies. Thus to those who sought to blur the truth with notions of the 'white man's burden' and 'mission civilatrice', the French Colonial Secretary Albert Sarraut quipped 'what is the use painting the truth?', and then, went on to assert that:

> At the start colonisation was not an act of civilisation nor was it a desire to civilise. It was an act of force motivated by interest – the people who set out to seize colonies in distant lands were thinking primarily of themselves, and were working for their own profits and conquering for their own power ... the origin of colonisation is nothing else than enterprise of individual interest, a one-sided and egoistical imposition of the strong upon the weak (quoted in Nkrumah 1963: 21).

The real, though often unstated, purpose of foreign aid is therefore like that of colonialism to serve the interests of the colonisers subsumed under capitalism. Foreign aid does this essentially by sustaining the colonial structures embodied in and symbolised by the post-colonial state.

Although here as in the case of colonialism the tendency is often to cloak this real purpose of aid in a smokescreen of moral obligation or 'human good', it is nevertheless quite evident. President J.F. Kennedy, for instance, was unambiguous that aid was 'a method by which the United States maintains a position of influence and control around the world and sustains a good many countries which would definitely collapse or pass into the communist bloc' (quoted in Hayter 1981: 83). This was then elucidated by L.D. Black thus:

> The basic long-range goal of foreign aid is political. It is not economic development per se. The primary purpose of foreign aid is to supplement and complement the efforts of the developing nations to enhance their strength and stability and to defend their freedom. Success in these efforts is necessary to counter the spread of communism (1968: 18).

Similarly president Richard Nixon told his compatriots: 'let us remember that the main purpose of American aid is not to help other nations but to help ourselves' (Quoted in Riddell 1987: 63). Hence, the Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs had to stress that 'aid is not allocated on the basis of the needs of the recipients' (quoted in Riddell 1987: 63). This understanding of the purpose of aid is not limited to the United States. For example, Baroness Young, a Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, also stressed that 'in its broadest sense, aid must be seen in the context of our overall foreign policy objectives' (quoted in Riddell 1987: 64).

From the preceding it is obvious that the purpose of aid is to serve the capitalist interests of the so-called donors by sustaining colonial legacies, especially the authoritative and arbitrary structures of the post-colonial state in the name of 'defending freedom'. In this respect military aid is indispensable in protecting the capitalist-oriented state. Thus under the pretext of ensuring the security of the state, incumbents in Africa use the armed forces to intimidate, suppress and even eliminate actual and potential rivals.

Those African leaders like Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah and Samora Machel, among others, who express, or are suspected of harbouring, anti-capitalist ideas, are ruthlessly eliminated. The so-called economic aid including loans plays the role of bribes to African leaders

to help make it worth their while to continue to co-operate by accept-ing the status quo, with the drain of capital from their countries. This reasoning is adduced from the actions of donor governments and inter-national organisations in continuing to give loans to countries where it is obvious that aid money is diverted to private bank accounts abroad, as well as to those which by asking for debt cancellation, declare them-selves not to be credit-worthy. As a result foreign aid is a 'racket which benefits Third World politicians, the staffs of aid agencies and Western exporters at the expense of Western tax payers and ordinary people in the Third World' (quoted in Bauer 1981: 149).

The process of aid negotiation even within multilateral institutions is on an individual country basis. This requirement of negotiating on a country by country basis is like the colonial policy of divide and rule intended to emphasise the differences rather than similarities among African countries, thereby keeping them perpetually divided, weak and dependent. In this way, aid is sustaining the colonial policy of divide and rule. Furthermore, tied aid approximates corruption especially where the goods or services offered are inferior to those obtainable from else-where at the same price. Technical assistance constitutes a hindrance to the human resource development of the recipient country as it deprives its people of the learning experience by which required capacities could be developed and appropriate options chosen for development. This explains why 'the erosion of the African national capacity for develop-ment coincided with increase of outside assistance' (Yansané 1996).

But the greatest effect of aid is the re-colonisation of Africa that it has necessitated. Because of aid conditionalities African states have lost their marginal autonomy and are now being governed by aid offi-cials, especially from the World Bank and the IMF. It is now common to see these aid officials 'having to approve national budgets, being posted to Central Banks and Ministries of Finance, and also, not only have to approve macro-economic policies but in some instances have to draw up such policies for African countries without input from African governments' (Edigheji 2004: 95). The global project with its require-ment of good governance that entails the promotion of the various freedoms, the independence of the judiciary and the press, the conduct of democratic elections, etc., amount to the making of major political decisions for Africa by outsiders. Foreign aid is thus an avenue for the reinforcement of the political servitude and the economic subjection of Africa that was established during the colonial days.

The Way Forward

Africa's development predicament was born of colonial rule, a rule which killed the Africans' sense of self-worth. With the establishment of colonial rule, as Frantz Fanon notes, 'history for the African comes to an end. No longer do significant events occur. Development stops' (quoted in Markovitz 1997: 10). The symbolic withdrawal of overt colonial rule did not and could not restore the Africans' sense of self-worth and reverse the situation because measures were put in place to ensure continuity. These measures - authoritarian rule, corruption and ethnicity - (colonial legacies) are embodied in and symbolised by the post-colonial state which is sustained and reinforced by foreign aid to keep Africa divided and weak for exploitation. The consequence is that Africa has become a beggarly neighbour and Africans the scum of the earth. The one thing which is certain is that Africa will continue to be at the bottom of the world economic heap unless something is done, unless action is taken to change the status quo, by recapturing and appropriating the African state.

In order to change the status quo and get Africa out of its predicament I propose a three-stage way forward involving the repudiation of foreign aid and the restructuring of the post-colonial state's territorial boundaries as preparatory steps for the establishment of an African continental government. Besides its role in sustaining and reinforcing the colonial legacies mentioned above, foreign aid also obstructs development in Africa. First, it does so through capital flight mainly in the form of debt servicing, and secondly, by facilitating acceptance by African leaders of (a) Western economic decisions on pricing and restrictions in international trade which adversely affect African products and the balance of trade; and (b) political decisions on the nature of governance that facilitate capitalist penetration and exploitation of their economies. Foreign aid is thus part of the problem and cannot therefore be expected to provide a solution. Aid should be rejected not only because it cannot help but more importantly because it actually hurts. It is neither the type nor even the amount of routine official foreign aid that is the issue because in all forms and quantities it is inimical to African development.

Therefore, the appropriate starting point for the way forward for Africa is the rejection of foreign aid. This entails the utter repudiation of all forms of foreign aid, except perhaps, disaster relief assistance, along with the unilateral abrogation of all foreign debts. The unilateral

nature of these acts is intended to differentiate them from the so-called Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, which is merely a device for the consolidation of the status quo and the perpetuation of Africa's political servitude and economic subjection. This is a precondition for charting a way forward for Africa. Because aid is the main avenue for foreign intervention in and control of Africa, the repudiation of it is tantamount to, other things being equal, the prevention of that intervention. Africans will then be able with a free hand to restructure their societies in accordance with their realities.

The repudiation of aid and the abrogation of foreign debts is by no means an end in itself. It is only the necessary first step in a three-prong way forward for Africa. One of Africa's thorniest problems is political instability which is caused by ethnicity and manifest in inter-ethnic and interstate conflicts, civil wars, military coups and the tendency towards ethnic domination and the perpetuation of power. Ethnicity is, as shown in section one above, a colonial legacy arising from the artificial and arbitrary boundaries of the colonial state which were drawn to reflect foreign rather than African interests and which were inherited intact by the post-colonial state. Thus, ethnicity which is the main, if not the sole cause of political instability in post-colonial Africa is largely a function of the nature of the post-colonial state's boundaries.

Therefore, the second necessary step in the way forward for Africa after the elimination of foreign aid is the restructuring of territorial boundaries with a view to eliminating or, at least, greatly reducing political instability. As much as possible the restructuring should respect ethnic divisions so as to avoid what the Rudolphs call the 'pathology of national integration' that is, the pursuit of unity without regard for ascriptive local identities, as well as the emergence of the 'pathology of diversity', that is, a nation state with too limited a sense of citizenship (quoted in Markovitz 1977: 109). This proposal for the restructuring of boundaries in Africa to reflect ethnic divisions is justified on several grounds. Firstly, in spite of, or even because of, the pathology of national integration, Africans, as mentioned above, still define themselves as citizens of their own ethnic groups or nations. This is evidenced by the ethnicisation of politics in Africa, as Nyamnjoh and Rowlands (1998: 334) show in the case of Cameroon, and this applies to other African countries as well, ethnic considerations or what they call the 'politics of belonging' act to 'subvert urban civil society into familiar forms of ethnically defined patrimonialism', or what Geschiere and Gugler term

'villagisation of national politics' (1998: 319). As such, party cleavages in Africa are 'overwhelmingly ethno-linguistic in nature' (Van de Walle 2002: 321).

Secondly, as Lumumba-Kasongo points out, many ethnic nationalities in Africa favour the 'reconsideration of frontiers/ boundaries as a means of redefining their cultural identities and politics', as shown by the pan-Ewe movement in Togo and Ghana, the Bakongo movement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo Brazzaville and Angola, and the desire of the Akan groups in southern Côte d'Ivoire to join other Akans in Ghana (2002: 92). Thirdly, in many countries in Africa ethnicity has reached a point of no return or what Nnoli (1994: 31-32) terms a 'threshold of irreversibility' by erupting into bloody conflicts in the form of civil wars as has happened in Nigeria, Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, etc. Ethnic animosities are exacerbated and internalised by such conflicts to remain permanent obstacles to the development of a sense of national unity as well as democratic governance. Such animosities 'are passed on to successive generations through the family, the press, public and private conversations, such that even when the original basis of ethnic hostility has been eliminated ... there remains the problem posed by this internalised dimension which may continue to impact on other variables such as multiparty democracy' (Nnoli Ibid).

The fourth and final factor is closely related to the third. It is the fact that ethnically homogenous groups are found to be more conducive than heterogeneous ones to the development of democratic values and practices (MacLean 2004). This is essentially as a result of the mutual trust that exists among the members of the former group. Consequently, it is arguable that ethnically homogenous African states could be more conducive than heterogeneous ones for the formation of a continental government. In the present set up ethnic interest necessitates the acquisition of power by all means, its perpetuation and arbitrary exercise, that is, there is no agreement on how power is acquired, its duration and manner of exercise, and as such, there can be no agreement about relinquishing part of that power to a continental government. On the other hand, it seems easier for the leadership of an ethnically homogenous state to agree to relinquish some of its powers to a continental government because of the certainty of its interest being represented at that level by some of its kin than it is for the leadership of an ethnically heterogeneous state because of the fear of one's group

losing out arising from the uncertainty of representation. The fact, as mentioned above, that power is acquired at the national level either by force or fraud rather than by impersonal procedures reinforces this fear. Moreover the role of ethnic homogeneity in providing a conducive atmosphere for development is demonstrated by the fact that each of the often quoted success stories – Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong – is culturally homogenous.

The post-colonial state which was designed to serve foreign interests must be recaptured and restructured to serve African interests. It is certain that those who benefit from the status quo, that is, the metropolitan elite and their African compradores, will guilefully argue that restructuring territorial boundaries will further balkanise and weaken Africa. The status quo has rendered Africa the poorest region in the world; it is not just prostrate, but is actually lying flat on its back. And so the question is, whose interest is the status quo serving? And, can Africa be any weaker than it currently is? To assume that Africa can be weaker is implying that one can die beyond death. Moreover, and besides the fact that the restructuring is only a stepping stone, there is no reason to suppose that the restructuring will necessarily produce states that are smaller than the present ones. For instance, a state composed of the Fangs in Cameroon, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea would be much larger than either of the last two named states. The same could be true of other groups in Africa.

As we have seen, ethnicity arising from arbitrary territorial boundaries is the source of political instability in Africa. Therefore, restructuring the state in accordance with ethnic realities is a must if Africa has to be liberated. Nnoli (1998: 25) similarly agrees that since the state is 'central to the dynamics of ethnicity in Africa, ethnic conflict prevention and termination must address the issue of its reconstitution and transformation'. There is thus everything to gain and nothing to lose save the status quo with its implied misery for Africa, by restructuring territorial boundaries.

The final stage in the way forward for Africa is the establishment of a continental government which can only be feasible if preceded by the elimination of foreign aid and the restructuring of territorial boundaries.

The need of a continental government for Africa was recognised and emphasised by Kwane Nkrumah several decades ago:

> ... the continental union of Africa is an inescapable desideratum if we
> are determined to move forward to a realisation of our hopes and plans
> for creating a modern society which will give our peoples the opportu-
> nity to enjoy a full and satisfying life (1963: 224).

But Nkrumah was also aware of the fact that the efforts of Africans
towards the formation of a continental government were being frus-
trated by neo-colonialists by 'encouraging the formation of communi-
ties based on the languages of their former colonisers' (217). The for-
mation of regional communities is essentially a continuation of the
colonial policy of divide and rule intended to serve foreign interest.
This is evidenced by the absence of interregional trade among the re-
gions and by the fact that both intra- and inter-regional communica-
tions are much more difficult than communication between any of the
regions and the West. As Ninsin (2000: 15) also pointedly argues, 'co-
lonial political, economic and ideological ties compounded by calcu-
lated manipulation of such ties by the former colonial powers account
partly for the failure of the numerous integration projects on the conti-
nent'.

These colonial ties have been sustained by foreign aid to ensure the
continuity of colonial policy in the form of neo-colonialism which has
now metamorphosed into re-colonialism. Therefore, the need for a con-
tinental government is more compelling than ever before. The political,
military, economic and socio-cultural advantages of a continental gov-
ernment are inestimable and cannot be over-emphasised.

The continental government envisaged here is necessarily a bicam-
eral federation or union in which the member states have to be suffi-
ciently autonomous to control their citizens and manage their internal
affairs without foreign interference. At the central level, the interests of
the states would be represented in the upper house of the bicameral
legislature whose composition and functioning would be based on the
principle of sovereign equality of states, while the citizens of the vari-
ous states would be represented in the lower house. Moreover, in terms
of power sharing, the central government and the member states would
exercise concurrent powers in all but the areas of defence, currency and
foreign affairs, which though reserved to the central government, would
still be under the control and scrutiny of the member states through
their representatives in both houses of the central legislature. This is
the only way by which the African state can regain its sovereignty, and
the African, his sense of self-worth.

The continental market that would result from the union would be facilitated by a common currency to provide enormous economic opportunities. Similarly, while being better placed to ensure continental security, a unified military command would release, for developmental purposes, the enormous financial resources now being used to sustain the armed forces of the various states. The serenity resulting from the elimination of ethnic conflicts through the restructuring of territorial boundaries would offer a conducive atmosphere for concerted efforts in planning and implementing development projects. The current African Union is an international organisation, not a government, and should not therefore be confused with the continental government being proposed here. Moreover, its desire for foreign aid as evidenced by its NEPAD strategy and its insistence (Article 4(c) of its Constitutive Act) on 'the respect of borders existing on achievement of independence' are indicative of its purpose. It is antithetical to the way forward for Africa and would at the appropriate moment be dismantled along with other colonial legacies to be replaced with the type of continental government envisaged here.

Decisions on foreign policy, defence and currency are the hallmarks of sovereignty, yet since colonial days these have been made for Africans by foreigners. This has been because the balkanisation and colonisation of Africa resulted in dependent, inappropriately composed and conflict-ridden states that have been unable individually to ward off foreign domination. The only way of recapturing and appropriating Africa and ensuring that African interest is served is within a continental framework whose design, objectives and functioning are informed by African circumstances and needs. This is a new struggle which though similar to the nationalist struggle against overt colonial rule, will nevertheless be different in being protracted for two reasons. First, the current domination has internal collaborators in the African political and economic elites whose overall objective is to ensure their survival by maintaining the status quo, and secondly, the political, economic and cultural forces of the current domination are too subtle to be perceived by the man on the street. This implies that the status quo will remain for the foreseeable future. Yet we must begin to chart a way forward as outlined above, if Africa is to be recaptured and made to serve African interests.

For this purpose, the rule of the African academia would be indispensable. Because of their knowledge about the disastrous effects of foreign domination, the African academia must be in the vanguard of

African liberation. They must take the responsibility to educate the masses: about the disastrous effects of foreign domination through foreign aid; the necessity for restructuring the post-colonial state; and the political, economic, military, social, cultural and psychological benefits to be derived from a continental government. These should constitute a straightforward and easy to understand package for the intensive and extensive education of the masses, and in fact, of everybody across the continent. As Murungi (2003: 20) rightly points out, 'what Africa needs is a revolutionary education, an education whose mission is to liberate Africa humanity'. African intellectuals should not shirk the responsibility which because of their status, nature has assigned them. And remember that a job once started is half done, and that, the journey of a thousand miles starts with the first step.

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Reinventing the African State: Issues and Challenges for Building a Developmental State

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Abstract

Academic discourse and development policy debates have grappled with the contentious issue of the state–market interactions in Africa's development agenda and processes, particularly since the 1960s independence era. At the heart of this debate has been the contestation over the agency for development. The global wave of democratisation that swept through most parts of the developing world in the late 1980s and early 1990s revived this debate on the linkage between democracy, sustainable development, and state capacity in Africa (Leftwich 1996). The twenty-first century is witnessing a resurgence of confidence in a new type of activist state: democratic and developmental in character and content. The fundamental concern of this study is whether the exigencies of globalisation can be reconciled with democratisation and sustainable development. This provokes further questions such as: how can fragile democratic regimes improve their prospects for consolidation at a moment when the distributive impact of concurrent programmes of economic liberalisation and adjustment are highly contestable? Are the economic reforms prescribed by Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) and bilateral donors compatible with democratisation and developmental processes? How can the state's systematic loss of capacity to manage the economy be reconciled with demands for a more democratic polity? Finally, this paper examines the strategies for building the capacity of the African state as agent of development and partnership in the democratisation process.

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Résumé

Le discours académique ainsi que les débats relatifs aux politiques de développement se sont attaqués à la délicate question des interactions entre l'état et le marché au niveau de l'agenda et des processus de développement africains, particulièrement depuis les années 60. La vague mondiale de démocratisation qui a soufflé sur une grande partie des pays en développement à la fin des années 80, début des années 90 a ravivé le débat sur les liens entre la démocratie, le développement durable et les capacités de l'état en Afrique. Le vingt-et-unième siècle a vu la résurgence d'une certaine confiance en un nouveau type d'état activiste, démocratique et promouvant le développement de par son caractère même. La question fondamentale que pose cette étude consiste à savoir si les exigences de la mondialisation sont compatibles avec la démocratisation et le développement. Cela soulève d'autres questions : comment est-ce que les régimes démocratiques fragiles peuvent améliorer leurs perspectives de consolidation à un moment où l'impact des programmes concurrents de libéralisation et d'ajustement économiques sont hautement contestables ? Les réformes économiques recommandées par les Institutions de Bretton Woods (IBW) et les bailleurs bilatéraux sont-elles compatibles avec les processus de démocratisation et de développement ? Comment est-ce que la diminution systématique des capacités de l'état peut-elle être compatible avec l'exigence d'un état plus démocratique ? Enfin, cet article examine les stratégies de renforcement des capacités de l'état africain en tant qu'agent de développement et de partenariat dans le cadre du processus de démocratisation.

Introduction

Academic discourse and development policy debates have grappled with the contentious issue of the state-market interactions in Africa's development agenda and process, particularly since the 1960s independence era. At the heart of this debate has been the contestation over the agency of development: what is the key locomotive or engine of development? Two contrasting positions have emerged in this debate. One propounded mainly by the nationalist political elite, and couched in terms of economic nationalism, maintained that the state should play a central role in directing the development agenda. The far-reaching consequences of the triumph of the Russian revolution, the social degradation caused by the great depression of the 1930s and the political impact and outcomes of the two world wars led to the first serious pendulum shift towards a more activist and interventionist role for the state.

From the mid-1940s up to the mid-1970s, most states assumed greater functions and responsibilities in the provision of public services,

policy coordination and macro-economic management and involvement in sectors of the economy through state-owned enterprises. In the name of state-led development or state intervention, different models of state intervention emerged, such as the social-democratic state, the socialist state, the national democratic state and the benevolent authoritarian state. What is common among these states is that they privilege state-led over market-driven development. This strand of development thinking, thus, opted for a centralised development path, which has not really succeeded in Africa.

The other position, which has been driven mainly by foreign capital and industrialised nations, propounded a neo-liberal orthodoxy, giving as it were, pride of place to a market-based economic system in tune with economic liberalisation. By the end of the 1970s right up to the early 1990s, conservative parties in the UK and the USA led a systematic and sustained ideological and policy agenda to dismantle the capacity, scope and role of the state that developed in the post-Second World War period and urged a return to the 'free market' dogmatism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. From the 1980s onwards, large-scale neo-liberal public sector reforms were introduced with the aim of systematically dismantling state capacity in favour of the market. Under slogans such as 'lean and mean state', 'less government', 'rolling back the frontiers of the state', a neo-liberal alliance of conservative governments, neo-liberal policy think tanks and the Bretton Woods institutions recommended structural adjustment reforms for African states (Olukoshi 1998).

The structural adjustment policy framework for economic reform in Africa was underpinned by the assumption that the state and state interventionism were the sources of economic distortions to which African economies were exposed after independence was won (Olukoshi 1996). During the first stage of market reform implementations, the wholesale abandonment of the state-led mode of development and the rolling back of the state, therefore, became the flip side of getting prices right (Lensink 1996). During this phase of the adjustment agenda, the African state became, as noted by Mkandawire (1998), one of the most vilified and demonised institutions on the continent. Conceptually and ideologically, the state was presented as the millstone that hampered the quest for development in Africa, obstructing the free functioning of markets, consuming a disproportionate share of investible resources, extending its reach beyond what was desirable or necessary, over-

centralising the development process, and stifling private initiative (Olukoshi 1996). Thus, liberalisation of the market and the promotion of private enterprise that were central to structural adjustment, came to be seen as being fundamentally incompatible with state interventionism. The African state became the objective of punitive actions, and various negative adjectives were used to describe it by different scholars such as 'failed', 'over-bloated', 'neo-patrimonial', 'prebendal', 'over-extended', and 'predatory' (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Rothchild and Chazan 1988; Barkan 1998; Fatton 1991; Bayart 1993; Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Taming this state by cutting it down to size and preventing it from further intervening in the smooth functioning of the market was defined as the key intellectual and policy challenge facing Africa (Bates 1981; World Bank 1981, 1995).

The collapse of both the central planning model of the bureaucratic Soviet type as well as the retreat of the discredited neo-liberal perspective at the end of the twentieth century has marked a decisive return of confidence in state-led development. The twenty-first century is witnessing a resurgence of confidence in a new type of activist state: democratic and developmental in character and content. The new developmental state draws important lessons from the undesirable dependency fostered by the European welfare states, the undemocratic practices of the East Asian developmental states, and the failures of bureaucratic Soviet-style centralised planning. The centrality of the state in nation-building and socio-economic development is being reaffirmed, while at the same time asserting participatory democracy and a culture of human rights as key features of the new state. In a highly publicised Report in 1997 titled 'The State in a Changing World', the World Bank claimed that, contrary to all suggestions, it had never in fact (completely) discounted the role of the state in the economic process. That publication appeared on the face of things to signal an attempt at seriously revisiting the persistent question of the role of the state in the policy-making and developmental processes. While in earlier publications, the Bank had variously called for a minimalist state which was later gradually tasked with the sole responsibility of creating the requisite 'enabling environment' for the free functioning of the market, the flowering of the private sector, and the attraction of (foreign) investments, the 1997 report carried suggestions that the state might play a more pro-active role in their logical conclusion by proclaiming the need for an 'effective state'.

However, considering the reckless manner in which state capacity was eroded during the structural adjustment years, and the challenges posed for the modern state system by the processes and structures of globalisation, it is clear that the demands for democratisation and sustainable development cannot side-track the question of the re-legitimisation of the state as an actor in the developmental process and the restoration and enhancement of its capacity.

The concept of a 'developmental state' raises serious issues about the relevance, capacity, and potential of the African state as an agent of development and partnership in the democratisation process. This in turn provokes some questions such as: how can the state's systematic loss of capacity to manage the economy be reconciled with demands for a more democratic polity? Can the exigencies of globalisation be reconciled with democratisation and sustainable development? How could the African state be reconstituted to serve as a bridge between democracy and development? What kind of partnership can exist between the state and civil society in the developmental project? These are some of the specific issues discussed in this paper.

The African State in Historical and Theoretical Perspective

With rare exceptions, the African states, like states in most parts of the world, are conglomerations of groups, thrown together by the vagaries of colonial boundaries. There is certainly some truth to the claim that the European nation-state model has been imposed upon Africa during the past century, first through colonial rule and then through a process of decolonisation governed by a global order in which nation-state status is mandatory for becoming a recognised member of the international system (Basil 1992). As an 'entity' brought into being by the instrumentality of foreign military force, and administered for close to a century by a combination of coercion and co-option, the colonial state did not represent the sovereignty of the people but rather the abrogation of it. In essence, colonialism put the African state in place for the realisation of its imperial objectives. The colonial state in Africa was therefore a state lacking in natural legitimacy since it was an external imposition. Given its primary objectives of subjugation and exploitation of the people, the 'state' relied on force and violence, especially due to its monopoly of the instruments of coercion for the realisation of its imperialist objectives. The colonial state was governed by the principle of amorality since the people did not accept the state in terms

of the society's morality (Ekeh 1975). This created a duality in citizenship commitment and consciousness formation. The primordial identification became primary over 'national allegiance'.

The colonial authorities' attempts to bureaucratise and rationalise authority were uneven in both their implementation and their effects. For example, indirect rule facilitated the practice by indigenous agents of 'straddling' between administration and business, between 'official duties and lucrative activities'. The fusion of public and private spheres upon which these straddling practices were predicated has led to the privatisation of many state functions in post-colonial Africa. Indeed, an outright 'criminalisation' of the state has occurred: 'police preying on the civilian population they are supposed to protect, financial institutions falsifying the extent of their insolvency and the likes' (Bayart et al. 1999).

The attainment of independence, however did not fundamentally transform the structure of the African states. The political class that supplanted the colonial officers were committed to the protection of the 'colonial legacy'. The emerging nationalists whose political tutelage was under colonialism continued to operate with a 'bureaucracy trained and tested in the authoritarian habits and practises of the departed colonialists'. The African state thus retained its forceful and authoritarian character. The basic point about the post-colonial state in Africa is that it originated under colonial rule and that the perceptions and the attitudes which attended the latter subsist in various ways in the post-colonial period despite the structural transformations that have taken place since independence.

Instead of transforming the state and making it relevant to the satisfaction of the needs and interest of the people, the emergent post-colonial leaders in Africa were content with using the enormous authoritarian structures of the state to appropriate economic gains for themselves. The desperation that characterised the competition for the control of state offices resulted in violent struggles, recrimination, bitterness and the polarisation of civil society along ethnic lines. In this environment, politics was conceived as a zero-sum contest in which victors lacked magnanimity and losers were bereft of gallantry, whilst rulers relied on force and manipulation of the legislative instrument of the state to enfeeble and destroy opposition. To facilitate its regulatory and extractive roles, the post-colonial state centralised the production and distribution of national resources, and in the context of state capi-

talism, this encouraged the perception of the state as an instrument of accumulation and patron-client ties as the dominant mode of political relations. Thus, politics as a 'struggle' to gain access to 'the national cake' became a fierce battle.

Over time, as African economies deteriorated and state institutions lost legitimacy and a sense of purpose, the routines of state–society relations were disrupted. Economic deterioration increased state weakness (i.e., the inability of the state to regulate society and to implement public policies in an effective manner) and societal demands on the state. Though perceived as the key distributor of resources, the state lacked the capacity to satisfy public demands. Overstaffed, over-bureaucratised, and itself a major consumer of scarce revenues, the state found itself unable to implement its own developmental programmes, particularly in the hinterland (Olowu 1990). A gap between expectations and performance weakened connections between the state and society, causing the state to assume authoritarian powers, while in fact exerting less and less control over society. As the state failed to meet public expectations, its legitimacy was eroded and the public began to perceive it as an alien institution, 'suspended, as it were, in mid-air above society' (Rothchild and Chazan 1988: 34).

Political theorists have argued that neo-patrimonialism is a common feature of politics in the developing world. Robin Theobold, for example, argues that 'some of the new states are, properly speaking, not states at all; rather, they are virtually the private instruments of those powerful enough to rule' (Theobold 1982: 559). Christopher Clapham also maintains that 'neo-patrimonialism is the most salient type of authority in the Third World because it corresponds to the normal forms of social organisation in pre-colonial societies' (Clapham 1985).

In traditional African societies, chiefs or village heads were expected to guarantee the livelihood of the community, typically by entreating the spiritual powers to provide adequate rainfall and bountiful harvests. Leaders who persistently failed to satisfy community needs could be removed from office. Patrimonialism provides an accurate description of the political systems of small, isolated communities with rudimentary economies, including African chiefdoms in the pre-colonial era. In patrimonial political systems, an individual rules by dint of personal prestige and power; ordinary people are treated as an extension of the 'big man's household', with no rights or privileges other than those bestowed by the ruler. The personal interaction between the 'big man'

and his extended retinue defined African politics, from the highest reaches of the presidential palace to the humblest village assembly. Authority is entirely personalised, shaped by the ruler's preferences rather than any codified system of law. In return for the loyalty of his clients, the ruler provides security and distributes favours according to his will.

A similar sort of performance-based political compact was struck at the time of independence. African nationalist leaders staked a claim to political authority not only through a pledge to break the political shackles of foreign domination, but also with the promise to deliver the material advantages that ordinary people had observed but never enjoyed under colonial rule.

Max Weber distinguished patrimonial authority from rational-legal authority, in which the public sphere is carefully distinguished from the private sphere; written laws and bureaucratic institutions control the exercise of authority and protect individuals and their property from the whims of capricious leaders. Yet, it is clear that some nations in the developing world, particularly in Africa, still retain in modified form some of the characteristics of patrimonial rule. Thus, political scientists have found it useful to characterise as neo-patrimonialism those hybrid political systems in which the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions (Theobold 1982: 548-549). Under neo-patrimonial regimes, the right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than to an office, despite the official existence of a written constitution. An individual dominates the state apparatus and stands above its laws. A relationship of loyalty and dependence pervades a formal political and administrative system. Officials occupy bureaucratic positions less to perform public service, their ostensible purpose, than to acquire wealth and status. Although state functionaries receive official salaries, they also enjoy access to various forms of illicit rents, bribes and petty corruption, which constitute an important entitlement of office.

The fact that the post-colonial states in Africa have been formally constituted on the model of the western state is not itself evidence of the degree of their institutionalisation. Above and beyond the public display of the attributes of the modern state – such as ministries or civil service – the reality of the exercise of power on the continent points to caution when it comes to assessing the degree to which such formal bodies do amount to a modern state based on the western model, that

is, one that relies on a significant distinction between the public and private spheres.

In the context of modern bureaucracy, appointments and advancement are supposed to be based on merit, where salaries are commensurate with responsibility and the existence of a bureaucratic career structure. However, the state in Africa has not been properly institutionalised, because it was not significantly emancipated from society. This has to do partly with historical factors linked to the specific development of the colonial state – a state both arbitrary and poorly bureaucratised - and partly with important cultural considerations, that is, the personalised nature of prestige and status in traditional African societies. The logic of state service in Africa is resolutely particularistic and personalised - far removed from the bureaucratic norms as they operate willy-nilly in most western societies. Thus, holders of state office, however lowly, are rarely 'impartial'. Either they pursue their own 'business interests' – that is, the negotiation of their service for a fee, or else they provide the favour, which is expected, for clearly understood patrimonial reasons.

As a result of neo-patrimonialism, the majority of African political regimes were distinctly non-bureaucratic, despite the fact that they possessed a large state apparatus with all the outward trappings of a formal-legal order. African leaders rarely used bureaucratic formulas to construct authoritative institutions and seldom granted subsidiary spheres of influence to occupational interest groups within civil society. Rulers dominate their political systems to a much larger extent than is the case in bureaucratic polities. Legal niceties or systems of checks and balances did not restrain power. Rulers and their closest cronies were not bound by the dictates of the law, and in most cases, tried to emasculate or eliminate formal institutional checks on the executives. The independence of the legislative and the judiciary branches was severely limited because neo-patrimonial rulers are deeply suspicious of any form of institutional pluralism. In most cases, state revenues are stashed into personal accounts at home and abroad, to be spent as the ruler deems fit.

Moreover, like a traditional monarch, the neo-patrimonial leader often cultivated a 'paternal' image, directly responsible for people's welfare and willing to entertain and redress individual grievances personally, without the intermediation of the state apparatus. As Schatzberg has argued, 'the imagery and language of father and family are wide-

spread in Africa because they strike a resonant and deeply embedded cultural chord' (Schatzberg 1993: 451).

In political analysis, the state in Africa is no more than an artificially 'modern' political edifice. In the post-colonial context, political legitimacy derives from a creatively imprecise interaction between the 'ancestral' norms and the logic of the 'modern' state. Hence, it is a neo-patrimonial system. The edifice conforms to the western template, while the working derives from patrimonial dynamics. Within this system, public service remains personalised by way of clientelism and nepotism; on the other hand, access to the public institutions of the state is perceived as a means of personal enrichment.

In neo-patrimonial systems, appointments to position of 'public' responsibility, even at fairly junior levels, are made largely according to the wishes of the political leaders. The overriding criteria for selection are kinship, communal or blood-ties, and loyalty to the ruling elites rather than qualification or competence. Under the neo-patrimonial rule observed in Africa, the operation of the 'state apparatus' is largely informal, the rule of law is feebly enforced and the ability to implement public policy remains very limited. Also, the maintenance of 'state control' is substantial as the chief instrument of patrimonialism. In effect, the state is 'strong and powerless', 'overdeveloped in size and underdeveloped in functional terms' (Migdal 1998).

And if post-colonial states sought initially to consolidate and enlarge a distinct institutional domain of state operation, similar to the European model, they have not succeeded. The centralisation of authority has been systematically misconstrued as a deepening of state power, and efforts to extend state control and manufacture clearer boundaries between state and society have been consistently subverted by the 'capture' of the state by local social forces, and by the non-cooperation of local populations, notably through engagement in 'second economy' beyond state control (Olowu 1990). This prevents any hard cleavage opening up between state and society, replacing it with a porous, graduated continuum that stretches out and away from the political centre. In short, the state becomes less a bounded institution, and rather an 'absent presence' that disperses itself in varying directions into the component publics that make up its national constituency.

By the 1980s, with massive social dislocation brought by famine, civil war, systematic exclusion of groups from access to power, and ac-

celerating economic decline, a pessimistic tone increasingly marked analyses by Africans and African specialists. Withdrawal from the state became a central theme. Only by turning to the protection of kinship groups or similar institutions could persons cope with decline. The African state, in short, lost legitimacy.

The political and economic implications of this loss of legitimacy were readily apparent. The public reaction ran all the way from a 'culture of silence' in national affairs to open resistance and disengagement from activities in the formal economy (Adu 1989). A variety of informal economic activities (hoarding, currency exchanging, smuggling, etc.) spread and took place outside of state control, indicating a decline in the state's capacity to regulate social groups.

Globalisation and State Capacity in Africa

The crisis of legitimacy of African states was further exacerbated by the collapse of supposedly monolithic Eastern European regimes, the demonstration effect of which underscored the fragility of African governments. The end of the Cold War entailed the rapid collapse of external supports for many authoritarian regimes, thereby greatly weakening them, and making them vulnerable to attacks from 'popular forces'. The end of the Cold War significantly reduced the relevance of the tyrants and decadent political rulers of the Southern hemisphere to their erstwhile patrons. Since alliances with developing nations could no longer be based on Cold War ideologies and interests, 'democracy' became the basis for forging new relationships in the post-Cold War order. As the struggle for democracy got underway in a particular region, nearby authoritarian states found the costs of 'isolation' too great a price to pay since the Great Powers no longer considered it necessary to invest in the political 'stability' of bankrupt autocratic regimes in Africa. Thus, the end of the Cold War resulted in the withdrawal of support for African autocratic regimes, exposing their weaknesses to dissident groups. This led to the fall of dictators like Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, Said Barre of Somalia, Mobutu Sese-Seko of Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) and Samuel Doe of Liberia (Akinrinade 1998).

Autocratic regimes, thenceforth, could no longer explain away internal struggles for reforms as Soviet or Western-sponsored 'subversion' (Akinrinade 1998: 75). Increasingly, progress towards democratisation was set as a condition for economic assistance, giving birth to the curi-

ous marriage of the economic conditionality of structural adjustment with political conditionality of good governance (ibid).

The simultaneous occurrence of globalisation and political liberalisation has raised a number of questions among policy makers and researchers. Fundamental among these concerns is whether the exigencies of globalisation can be reconciled with the process of economic liberalisation and democratisation. How can fragile democratic regimes improve their prospects for consolidation at a moment when the distributive impact of the concurrent programme of economic liberalisation and adjustment may be highly contested? More relevant to this study is how economic reforms prescribed by the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) and bilateral donors are compatible with the democratisation process. Globalisation, by eroding national sovereignty, undermines a central tenet of liberal democracy, for liberal democracy was premised on the sovereignty of nation-states and assumed that the state has control over its own fate, subject only to compromises it must willingly make (Held 1995:141).

In the current wave of massive movements of capital to the emerging markets, Africa remains marginalised. Growing empirical evidences suggest that the segmentation in the global market is such that certain regions may not benefit from capital movements, regardless of the improvement in the 'fundamentals'. In this case, sub-Saharan Africa is invariably cited. For example, in 1995, of the total US $112 billion lent to the developing countries, only $5 billion went to Africa (Joseph 1999: 141). The policies that are touted as preparing Africa for a much more rewarding integration into the world system come in the form of stabilisation and Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). A major question raised in most debates is whether SAPs can be sustained under conditions of democratic transition and consolidation.

African analysts see the relationship between structural adjustment programmes and democratisation as inherently contradictory, or at least, problematic.[1] The assumption of this school is that economic policy must address a much larger range of fundamental issues than merely the allocation of resources. However, by side-stepping other important issues involved in democratisation like better economic management, greater equity, respects of human rights, and national sovereignty, SAP may undermine democracy, which has perforce to address these issues. It is also argued that SAPs as currently constructed threaten nation building and democratisation by exacerbating social conflict, weaken-

ing the capacity of the state to respond in a political way to the many demands on it, and riding roughshod over public opinion without due respect for democratic process (Joseph 1999: 141). As Bjorn Beckman argued, 'the political crisis of the African state is also the crisis of SAP' (Beckman 1992: 23). In some cases, it was the intense austerity demanded of populations by the structural adjustment programmes that made regime de-legitimisation and crises inevitable.

The political consequences of globalisation, as far as nation-states are concerned, can be considered from two perspectives. First, are those who argue that globalisation has led to the erosion of the sovereignty of the state (see Kenichi 1992). According to this school of thought, the power, authority and influence of the state are all on the decline as the process of globalisation advances. This suggests that the state is effectively in 'retreat' as a result of the increasing internationalisation of activities formerly performed by the state within their domestic national jurisdiction The growing autonomy of global capital market means states are no longer able to control the parameters within which they could chart or map their economic fortunes. Second, there are those who insist that globalisation, rather than resulting in the weakening or diminishing of the sovereignty of the state, has only brought about changes in the way states function (see Grugel 2002). To this school of thought, the fundamental role of the state has not changed but rather the environment in which states function, collaborate and interact. Even with globalisation, the sovereignty of the state, according to this viewpoint, remains intact. The fundamental power and authority of the state have not changed; instead, globalisation has only altered the way nation-states function just as the changing role of the state itself has influenced the process of globalisation.

However, as global actors invest and expand their activities, especially related to industrial, agricultural, mining, forest exploitation and fishing, the regulatory capacity of public administration in African countries, which is already limited in many respects, is becoming over-stretched. The state is getting caught in the middle of its need to speed development through industrialisation, agricultural modernisation, exploitation of natural resources, etc., and the pressure of local and global environmentalist groups. Global forces in this respect, rather than putting too much pressure on governments to do what is beyond their capacity, should first and foremost concentrate on strengthening the capacity of these governments in relevant aspects. Most African governments are

finding themselves in a situation of 'fait accompli' when it comes to making certain policies and decisions. International agencies such as the World Bank, IMF, and the United Nations World Trade Organisation take decisions that are binding on countries. The impact of globalisation's aggression on the state in Africa was enormous. First, governments, by the 1980s had lost their ability even to protect national interests against further encroachments on their sovereignty. Second, the state bore the hallmarks of a predatory one. That is, the pillars of the state were expropriation, extortion, the inflation of taxes, and corruption. And, of course, the predatory state was obviously inconsistent with economic development because it discouraged productivity and led inexorably to the misallocation of resources, culminating generally in its collapse as a rogue state. The collapsed state was not one that failed to do the right things, but one that failed to do much of anything effectively - even maintaining repressive order. Three broad and overlapping pathologies of state collapse could easily be identified: (a) States that lost (or failed to establish) legitimacy in the eyes of most of the population, and were unable to exercise that authority like Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia; (b) States that were run into the ground by leaders and officials who were corrupt, negligent, and incompetent, like Cameroon, Nigeria, Sudan, and Congo; (c) States that were fragmented by civil war and in which no party was capable of re-establishing central authority, like Liberia, Somalia, and Sierra-Leone.

Building a Developmental State: Issues and Challenges

In the 1980s, the orthodoxy admonished 'the rolling back' of the state giving free rein to supposedly 'free market forces and civil society'. The state was to be cut off almost completely from the economy and all its facets were to be 'streamlined and disciplined' to make it functional. However, although there was a substantial restructuring of state institutions, this did not necessarily translate into appreciable growth. Indeed, some of the adverse consequences of that 'restructuring' included diminished access to key social services such as education, and health (which are central to human development). The orthodoxy on 'rolling back the state' came under challenge as the 1990s progressed, leading to a major revision of the state's role by none other than the World Bank itself, which candidly acknowledged:

> As so often happens with such radical shifts in perspectives, countries sometimes tended to overshoot the mark. Efforts to re-balance government spending and borrowing were un-coordinated, and good was often cut as the bad. To meet their interest rate obligations, countries in debt squeezed critically important programmes in education, health and infrastructure as - or more than - they cut low-priority programmes, bloated civil service and money-losing enterprises. Reductions came primarily in capital budgets and, in Africa, in operating and maintenance outlay, further reducing the efficiency of investment. The result, seen most starkly in Africa, was neglect of the state's vital functions, threatening social welfare and eroding the function of market development (World Bank 1997b).

This view is largely influenced by the success of the state's role in the 'miracle' economies of East Asia where the rules and institutions allow markets to flourish, while people's lives substantially improve. There has therefore been a paradigm shift regarding the state's role in sustainable development; it is now being recognised that development without an effective state is almost impossible.

A major problem facing the consolidation of democracy in Africa is the translation of the state apparatus from one that served an 'oppressive state' to that of developmental project. This is not a question of 'dismantling the neo-colonial state' as suggested by some analyses, but involves the construction of efficient state institutions that will have the capacity to implement developmental goals and forge a cordial relationship with the private sector in the process of economic growth.[2] In essence, what Africa needs has been aptly described as a 'developmental state'.[3] A developmental state is that which is essentially democratic in orientation and sets as its primary goal the task of development. Such a state will facilitate rapid process of capital accumulation and industrialisation, while not compromising the goal of social welfare for the people (Adejumobi 2000).

As the issues facing the world community become more complex, the African state by its nature, its place and the condition of the global environment within which it exists, is characteristically enmeshed in a far more serious, challenging and sometimes impossible process of charting an interest-defining and interest-promoting course on the global stage. Although the African state, like its counterparts in the rest of the world, is preoccupied with contemporary issues such as security, health care delivery and HIV/AIDS, it is at the same time focussed on a more demanding task of economic development, state building, nation build-

ing and democratisation. The burden imposed by these problems as well as the prevailing internal socio-economic and political decay as recently demonstrated in Darfur in Sudan, the Niger Delta, Sierra Leone and Liberia, to mention just a few, pre-empts any afro-optimism regarding the state of affairs and the prospect for immediate socio-economic and political development on the continent. However, there has also been a shift in scholarly debates on the study of problems facing the continent. The focus is more and more on internal deficiencies within the African state such as the failure of leadership and the question of good governance; this is contrary to earlier studies attributing the undeniable African problems to both colonial and neo-colonial legacies.

The question of state building revolves around the effectiveness of the state and its ability to discharge its responsibility to its citizenry. And democratisation concerns the process of institutional governance which facilitates the effective allocation of resources within a particular geo-political entity and socio-economic development. All these take place within an environment characterised by globalisation which focuses on the ability of the African states to engage in and the extent to which it influences or is influenced within the global infrastructure. In its totality, the impact of the global system and the direct participation of Africa in global transformation remain important factors in determining the capability of the African state in a world in which its underdevelopment is a by-product of its incorporation into the metropolitan economy in the first place.

The current wave of democratisation faces a tremendous challenge because of the direct connection between the process and the degree of legitimate authority within the state. In order for the state to successfully develop the right conditions within which to sustain democracy, it must be perceived by the population as the protector of their interests and in order for the state to sustain the process it must also establish a level of trust between itself and the people. This dilemma is compounded by global transformation which imposes additional stress on the legitimate authority of the state. The effective participation in the global environment promotes sustainable growth, which is impossible to attain because of the nature of the African states.

The African state is limited in its ability to compete. The African state is not soft or weak nor has it collapsed, but it is a state in the process of being. It is in the process of re-inventing itself but is compromised by the changing nature of the global system and the speed of the

change. Many Africanists contend that the current spate of global trans-
formation is nothing but a re-colonisation process that has not only
disempowered the state, but facilitates the sustenance of the status quo
(Ake 1996). The question of nationhood has not been about how to
define 'nation' per se but how to effectively utilise the state to recreate
or redefine itself as a representative of all.

For the African state, the pre-colonial state was terminated by the
colonial state, which represented a disconnection between the people
that it dominated and had no interest in ever protecting them, except
when its lucrative economic infrastructure was in danger. The succeed-
ing post-colonial state lacks a history and has no connection to the pre-
colonial state, except some values dynamic enough to resist the years of
colonial domination. The post-colonial state is therefore in flux, in a
process of integrating a non-native value system and infrastructure, in
an un-comprehensive domestic environment. Those institutions that
have survived colonial domination exist in contradiction to newly
adopted European values. The level of confusion is enormous and un-
dermines the successful assertion of the state structure because of the
lack of trust and the disconnection inherited from the colonial experi-
ence. For example, the extended family system remains a critical sup-
port for the individual within an African societal setting but in the
context of modern Africa, it is inherently injurious to the survival of
the individual, and the need to eliminate this support system creates
problems in the attempt to build a vibrant and united community. An-
other example can be found in the redundant role of the traditional
institutions and values in modern Africa. For hundreds of years, these
institutions and values provided legitimacy for the state and the spir-
itual identity for the relation between the governed and the governor;
but today, they may be irrelevant and in time of crisis are unable to
sustain the people in their search for answers to the challenges of the
modern state within which they exist.

Therefore, building democratic institutions helps to ensure that the
priorities of diverse social groups and institutions are considered in the
formulation of development strategies. Democratisation in this case
also means building a democratic state, and doing so means institu-
tional change (the form of the state), representative change (who has
influence over policies and to whom is the state responsible) and func-
tional transformation (what the state does or the range of state respon-
sibilities) (Grugel 2002: 70). It is obvious that no state is fully demo-

cratic but the process of democratisation requires a transformation of the visible structures of the state, and this same process can be hindered by the difficulties of institutional reforms, the prevalence of non-democratic cultures, and elite opposition. The abuse of power by transition elites and corruption within the society can limit democratisation. Democratic deficits can also be caused by ethnic differences or nationality problems, diminished sovereignty, poor state capacity, and authoritarian legacies. Many African states which have also made the transition from military dictatorship to democracy suffer from the residues of the military culture in terms of policy initiatives, practices and decision making process (Ojo 1999). In Nigeria for example, not only has the military chaperoned the new democratic experiment but many of the military leaders also made the transition as the new democratic elite (Ojo 2001). As Grugel rightly put it, democratisation involves a transformation in the way the state takes and implement decisions but it is not a complete break with the past and the drive to reform the state is frequently blocked by interests embedded within it. And the way the state behaves after transition is dependent at least as much on the weight of the past as it is on the imperative for change (Grugel 2002: 85).

Furthermore, the regulatory capacity of a developmental state, including the capacity to discipline the market to the requirements of long-term development, will need to be sharpened. Of particular relevance here is the capacity not only to generate and manage growth but also to distribute its benefits in a manner that is consistent with the goals of nation-building, a stable foundation for continued accumulation and the aspirations of the populace for improved social livelihood standards. Such capacity will similarly need to be extended to the management of periods of economic crisis and decline. Attention will also need to be paid more closely to the revitalisation of education both at the primary and tertiary levels in order to raise the levels of literacy and renew the corps of technically competent personnel required for managing the state and the economy. Finally, a new dynamism will have to be infused into the interventions of the state in the economy, with officials taking more seriously the questions of if, when, where, how, for how long and at what level they should intervene in the markets and the reciprocal rules that should govern relations between government and business. This latter point is an extremely important one which is broadly relevant for all states but given the differences in the levels of development and needs of African countries, it would be foolhardy to

attempt to devise and impose a one-size-fits-all model of state intervention in the economy.

Conclusion

In the light of the analysis in this paper, my argument is that much as globalisation may be inevitable, its consequences for the African states are devastating. It is therefore, my contention that there is the need for an appropriate response to emerge from Africa with a view to understanding the dynamics that will hopefully help to evolve measures that will reduce the devastating effects of globalisation.

One can assume that since the African state is in a process of finding a common denominator through which it can reinvent itself, it has in no way reached a catastrophic level of failure but rather is actively trying to contend with the changing socio-political and economic changes of the global system. Under this scenario, there is definitely hope for Africa. Thus, we pose the question: what is to be done? Do Africans require a response informed by their own historical development? My belief is that for Africa to get out of this entrapment, it needs to de-link its dependency on the western powers and its system of independent states needs to be reconstituted. Given the foregoing, what are the alternatives left for the states in Africa in view of the rampaging menace of globalisation and the seeming helplessness (due to debt burden) of the states and the citizenry? In other words, what are the ways out? Even though these questions on the surface may appear unanswerable, it is essential for Africa's very survival to be emancipated from the current state of helplessness. Clues have been given as to what Africa and her people must do to 'counter the centrifugal forces of globalisation' and emancipate themselves from its manacling claws.

One possible way out according to Tandon (1998) is the subordination of external relations to the logic of internal development. Through this, African revolutionary and activist classes (could be) actively engaged in building alternative (new) structures of power for organising production based on new values of humanity and care for the environment. According to this logic, 'developing countries should retain the idea of an activist state in reacting to the effects of globalization' (Ohiorhenuan 1998: 14). That is, African citizens must cease to be mere 'onlookers' – who, according to Frantz Fanon (1961), are either cowards or traitors – on issues affecting their economic, political and socio-cultural well-being. Instead, they must sever the apron-strings of

domination by the developed world by categorically and practically resisting the inequality inherent in a globalised world. Thus, according to Ake (1996: 122-123) 'the people of Africa will have to empower themselves to repossess their own development'. This, could, in addition to other mechanisms, be done by rebuilding their national images, by fighting corruption and, by insisting on their own cultural preferences, and the terms of membership in the global village. This will only be possible through a sincere, committed sociological, cultural, economic and political realignment that is truly African in nature, and intent.

Finally, the developmental state in Africa can strengthen the local community-based system of production and marketing. This will enable the state to control local resources away from the hands of globalising international corporations. Economic policy, with regard to distribution in particular , should not be dictated by economic globalisation but subject to political decisions at home. That is, the state should maintain its ability to protect national interests against further encroachments on its sovereignty implied in globalisation's aggression. Without these, it will be difficult, if not totally impossible, for Africa and Africans to talk about political and economic integration, improvement and, above all, emancipative development in the twenty-first century.

Notes

1. See Olayode, K. O., 2004, 'Civil Society and Democratisation in Africa: The Nigerian Experience', Unpublished Ph.D Thesis: University of Cambridge, United Kingdom); Agbaje, A., 1992, 'Adjustment, State and Market in Nigeria: The paradoxes of Orthodoxy', *African Specimen*, 27 (2).
5. Held, D. A., McGrew, D., Goldblatt and J. Perraton, 1999, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*.
2. For example, Sola Akinrinade, 'The Re-democratisation Process in Africa: plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose?', argued for the 'dismantling of the neo-colonial state'. See Akinrinade and Sesay (1998); also, Julius Ihonvbere, 'The Crisis of Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa', Public lecture delivered under the auspices of the Triangle Association of African Students, North Carolina, USA, 7 April, 1995, argued for the 'dissolution of the repressive state in Africa'.
3. For further exposition of this concept, see Mkandawire, T., 'Thinking about Developmental States in Africa', Paper presented to the United Nations University and African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) Conference on Institutions and Development in Africa, Tokyo, Japan, 1998.

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Designing Viable Republican Constitutions for Modern African States: Why the Institution of Traditional Kingship Must Be Abolished

Jare Oladosu*

Abstract

In this paper I argue for the adoption of an unmitigated republican constitutional system by modern African nation states as a necessary condition for the realisation of their democratic aspirations. I identify the continued retention of the traditional kingship institution, even in a much whittled down form, as a major impediment to the establishment of full-fledged republics in contemporary Africa. I then argue for the total abolition of the kingship system on the following grounds: (i) that it was founded on historical injustice to begin with, (ii) that it has no relevance or utility to modern African states, and (iii) most importantly, that its continued existence is antithetical to the requirements of a modern democracy. This last point, I take largely for granted. I provide a short elucidation of 'republicanism' as a constitutional philosophy. Finally, I suggest some constitutional measures that African nation states may adopt to eradicate the traditional kingship institution and thereby ensure the survival and flourishing of their republics.

Résumé

Dans cet article, je soutiens l'adoption d'un système constitutionnel républicain absolu par les états nations africains modernes, comme condition nécessaire à la réalisation de leurs aspirations démocratiques. Je considère le maintien de l'institution traditionnelle de la royauté comme un frein majeur à l'établissement de véritables républiques en Afrique contemporaine. Ensuite, je soutiens

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l'abolition totale du système de la royauté pour les raisons suivantes : (i) je me suis avant tout basé sur l'injustice historique; (ii) ce système n'est d'aucune utilité ou pertinence pour les états africains modernes, et (iii) son maintien est antithétique aux exigences d'une démocratie moderne. Je considère que ce dernier point va de soi. Je propose une brève explication du terme « républicanisme » en tant que philosophie constitutionnelle. Enfin, je propose des mesures constitutionnelles que les états nations africains doivent adopter, afin de supprimer l'institution de la royauté et ainsi assurer la survie et l'épanouissement de leurs républiques.

Introduction

The fact that Africa[1] is bedevilled by a multitude of problems has become, in a perverse sort of way, an axiom of social and political discourse on the continent. Africa is the continent that cannot feed or clothe itself; it is the continent where development theories and programmes tested and successful everywhere else have failed; it is the continent where diseases and afflictions like HIV/AIDS ravage entire demographic segments; it is the only continent where life expectancy is decreasing, even as it is rising everywhere else, mid-way into the first decade of the twenty-first century. More pertinent for the purposes of this paper, Africa, it seems, is a politically confused continent.

The focus of this paper is on this more fundamental failing, namely, Africa's seeming inability to govern itself well. It is my contention that the political frustration, instability and chaos characteristic of the African world is, to a significant extent, at the root, a failure of philosophy, specifically, a failure of constitutional philosophy. Until modern African nation states get their political and constitutional philosophies right, not much progress will be recorded at the level of practical governance. In the post-colonial African societies, no task could be more urgent than the imperative of designing viable constitutions to serve as the legal framework for the political and social organisation of the emerging nation states. African philosophers, jurists and political scientists have an important role to play in the indispensable initial process of theoretical review and self-evaluation. My objective in this essay is to make some modest contribution in this regard, by arguing for the adoption of a full-fledged republican constitutional order by contemporary African states.

At independence, the newly 'formed' African nation states had three main constitutional options. The first was to revert to the pre-colonial

political order, which in many of the large African societies would be some form of hereditary monarchy. The second was to adopt a fully (unmitigated) republican constitution – with the 1787 post-revolutionary Constitution of the United States as a tantalising model. The third option was to fashion out some constitutional hybrid, which would incorporate elements of the republican model with aspects of the traditional kingship systems. On paper, nearly all African nation states today proclaim themselves to be modern republics. But whereas republicanism was an auspicious component of the rhetoric of anti-colonial liberation struggles in Africa, the reality in most cases was the subsequent adoption (after the attainment of political independence) of a mixed constitution. What we have in many African states today, as Ajume Wingo has correctly remarked, is 'a myriad of indigenous systems of government with superimposed foreign structures' (Wingo 2004: 450).

Among contemporary theorists and commentators on African social and political systems, the position of choice seems also to be the defence of some form of a mixed constitution.[2] Constitutional fundamentalism, as Wingo would describe it, either in the form of advocacy for '... a total return to the African past', or the polar opposite, ... a total unmitigated acceptance of Western political arrangements', is less appealing. In general, writers on African constitutional and political theory tend to agree with Wingo that '... a well-ordered liberal democracy should be built on deeply rooted African traditions' (Wingo 2004: 450).

 This has usually been understood to mean the continued retention of the institution of traditional kingship, no matter how incompatible it is with the imperatives of a modern democracy.

Against this popular current, I will, in this paper, defend an 'extremist' position; I will argue for the adoption of an unmitigated form of republicanism. I assume that modern Africans, like people everywhere, desire – or at least ought to desire – democratic governance. If that is so, then the motivation for the thesis of this paper can be easily stated: my defence of republicanism is informed by a fundamental conviction, namely, that only a full-fledged republican order can provide the constitutional anchor for true democracy.

By its nature, republicanism is opposed to all forms of despotism or social and political domination, whether the despotism is in the form of an absolute monarchy, a military dictatorship, or a theocracy. The first crucial step in the establishment of a republican order in African states is to subdue, or better still, eliminate, the sources of despotism,

represented, for example, by the institution of traditional kingship, state sponsorship of religious creeds, an overbearing, insubordinate military, and the neo-colonial global forces of economic and social domination. Each of these popular sovereignty-impairing conditions deserves serious scholarly attention; and none has, to my mind, received adequate analysis. However, my focus in this paper is on the institution of traditional rulers and chiefs in African societies. My contention is that this institution and the principles of republicanism are mutually incompatible.

The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows. Part two will be a discussion of the very resilient institution of traditional kingship in Africa. My objective here is to argue for its total eradication, or at least its relegation to the nominal status of historical relic, attracting no more than the role of a cultural reminder and occasional source of entertainment. Properly harnessed, the institution could be a contributor to the tourist economy. But it should attract no political value or significance whatsoever. In part three, I provide a short analysis of the concept of republicanism. Other than the conceptual elucidation, I also suggest a number of deliberate legal and constitutional measures that African republics could take to promote the growth of republicanism.

The Case against the Traditional Kingship Institution

Now that Africa is politically de-colonised and the process of democratisation is well under way in many African countries, what should we do with our traditional rulers and the traditional kingship institution? For African scholars, the significance of this question is clearly beyond the mere satisfaction of intellectual curiosity; matters of immediate practical import are at stake in the disposition of the question. I may repeat my own preferred answer to the question. African societies are desirous of democracy. Democracy can only thrive in a republic, in other words, republicanism is a necessary condition for the survival of democracy. In turn, the eradication of the traditional kingship institution is a necessary prerequisite for the establishment of a republican order. Therefore, the institution of traditional kingship or monarchy has to be abolished for democracy to succeed in African nation states.

It is advisable to start by acknowledging that to raise questions about the origin, historical role, and contemporary relevance of the traditional kingship institution in African societies is, in the eyes of thoroughbred traditionalists and cultural romantics, to commit an abomination. It is

to reveal oneself as a cultural heretic or traitor. Are our traditional rulers not the *Kabiesi* – the ones who may not be called upon to account for their deeds? Who then but a sacrilegious modernist dares to probe into such sacred matters – matters ordinarily beyond the full understanding of mere mortals? But this impulsive disdain for any attempt at critical scrutiny of the kingship institution in Africa is instructive. If the institution is indeed justly constituted, if truly it has a track record of achievements, if it has conferred benefits on generations of Africans, then the appropriate response of its defenders should be to showcase the justice at its foundation, as well as its record of achievements and contemporary relevance or utility. Could it be then that the impulsive flight into fury is borne out of fear? The fear may be that the inquisitive questioner might succeed in exposing the rotten underbelly of an inherently unjust social institution – 'a government of wolves over sheep' as Thomas Jefferson[3] once described a system of hereditary monarchy; a cultural albatross which we would have had to throw off anyway as other civilisations have done, with or without the colonial experience, and which we cannot now jettison soon enough. The fear, as an English gentleman once remarked (appropriately in connection with the British monarchy) that the questioner might be letting daylight in on magic.

It is my contention that the institution of traditional kingship in Africa was founded either on the coercive imperatives of might and naked force, being the prize of war and conquest, or on what we may describe as spiritual deception, the practical manifestation of a dubious theology.

Examples of monarchies founded on war and conquest abound all over Africa. I cite two well-known cases from Nigeria. Probably the most documented case is that of the Fulani warriors (Jihadists) of the Sokoto Caliphate, who overran virtually the whole of Northern Nigeria, establishing emirates in the conquered territories. The other example is the monarchy in Ibadan land (see Akinyele 1971) in south-western Nigeria. The Ibadan kingship institution offers a compelling case study in the metamorphosis of a monarchical system. Though at present the largest city in West Africa, Ibadan is a relatively new settlement. It was a nineteenth century creation, essentially a military camp at its inception. Indeed, it was the Ibadan warriors who checkmated the southwards advances of the warriors of the Sokoto Caliphate, after the Caliphate's army had successfully sacked the capital city of the old Oyo Empire. How the prevailing pattern of ascension to the throne of

Ibadan emerged is not too clear, but the first monarchs of Ibadan were, no doubt, the more resourceful war lords. Today, however, the Olubadan, a royal throne built on military conquest and pillage, is a first class Oba (king) in Oyo State, with a long line of people waiting eagerly for their turn to ascend the sacred throne vacated by their ancestors.[4]

The other foundation of the African kingship institution is much grander in conception and intellectual pretence. The origin of the traditional rulership institution on this account is supposedly so noble that the monarchs are to be credited with the divine right to reign as the legally-illimitable, supreme sovereigns over their subjects. This account of the origin of the hereditary kingship system is usually derived from the cosmologies and ancient mythologies of various African peoples. Again, I relate one such story with which I am most familiar.[5]

According to Yoruba cosmology and accounts of creation, a number of Yoruba monarchs derive their legitimacy as sovereign rulers by virtue of their divine pedigree. The primogenitor of these eminent monarchs, so the story goes, was actually a god who was sent down here to accomplish a sacred mission of propagating earthily existence.

In the beginning all that was, existed on the heavenly plain; what later became earth was a barren firmament of water and void. Then *Olodumare*, the Supreme Being, or Godhead decided to create earth and all the things in it, living and non-living. Olodumare commissioned some of His lieutenants – the lesser gods – to come down to perform the sacred task. The leader of the task force that came down from heaven was Oduduwa. Oduduwa came climbing down on a chain[6] and landed at present day Ile-Ife, with the paraphernalia of creation in his rucksack. The materials included some quantity of earth, to be poured on the barren water to form solid ground, a hen to help spread it around,[7] and a chameleon to perform the all-important but delicate task of test-walking the newly formed ground. This is why Ile-Ife is widely regarded as the cradle of the Yoruba race and civilisation, the source from where all Yoruba people migrated to other parts of the world where they are to be found today.

Oduduwa was the first Oba (monarch) at Ile-Ife. The Ooni of Ife is still addressed as the *Arole-Oduduwa*, the chief custodian of the household of Oduduwa. It was from Ile-Ife that the children and grandchildren of Oduduwa departed to found their own empires and kingdoms. Since those Ife princes and their descendants were, and are still supposed to be, the direct descendants of a being who was essentially a

god, not only would these royal offspring have the royal blue blood flowing in their veins, presumably they are also the proud carriers of godly genes. That is why their authority as supreme rulers and lawgivers may not be challenged; that is why their sovereignty is thought to be absolute.

As mythologies go, the Yoruba account of creation would rival any account from any other civilisation in poetic resonance and imaginative force. The legendary African capacity for story-telling is here on full deployment. And if ever characters in a story line are awarded medals for their author's display of raw creative genius, then Oduduwa and his fellow travellers – our own illustrious ancestors and gods – would deserve a place on the front row in a stuntman's hall of fame, standing shoulder to shoulder with the gods of Homer. The only problem with the story is that it is not believable.

The entire story simply evaporates once subjected to the most cursory test of critical scrutiny, much as an early morning African mist dissipates under the assault of a shaft of sunlight. The first thing to note is the sheer incredulity of Oduduwa's gravity-defying mode of transportation down to earth from the heavenly realm. The chain on which Oduduwa purportedly climbed down from heaven must have been one heck of a long chain; and going by the evidence of modern science, it is not clear to what the other end of the chain was fastened. But apart from the matter of whether Oduduwa's chain was anchored on something or nothing – stuff that science fiction is made of – we must also wonder where Oduduwa's first population of subjects came from. If Oduduwa became the first monarch at Ile-Ife there would have to have been other human beings to be his subjects. (Has anyone heard of a monarch without subjects?)

According to one version of the story, all Yoruba people are supposed to be the descendants of Oduduwa. This line enjoys a very popular mass appeal, for reasons not too far to seek: it serves obvious sociological purposes of rallying the members of the Yoruba race (the 'in group') against external forces of national political rivalry and contestation. But then again, this version of the story just cannot be true. For if it is true, then all Yoruba men and women should be princes and princesses, legitimate aspirants to the royal thrones in Yorubaland. What then happened somewhere along the historical line, so that in every town and city in Yorubaland only a few lineages qualify as ruling houses whose members may ascend a royal throne, while the majority of the

people in the town or city can only be mere subjects, or worse, descendants of freed slaves? That version of the story would also raise the issue of how Oduduwa alone was able, within his life span, to father enough offspring to fill a kingdom. How many wives accompanied Great Grand Pa Oduduwa on his journey of creation?

Surely, it makes more sense to suppose that there were already people around at Ile-Ife when Oduduwa got there. However, once we admit the existence of pre-Oduduwa people at Ile-Ife, the entire story explodes, much as Isaac La Perere's pre-Adamite theory (see Popkin 1968) exploded the Biblical account of creation and the entire corpus of Judeo-Christian cosmology. Moreover, the admission of pre-Oduduwa people at Ile-Ife would tend to reduce this second purported foundation of the legitimacy of the hereditary kingship system in Yoruba land to the first. Oduduwa might just be conceived as another rampaging warlord, who came and established dominion over an indigenous population.

I have examined two possible bases of the legitimacy of the institution of hereditary kingship or monarchy in Yorubaland – I know of no other – and neither would indicate that the institution was founded on justice. Whether it is conceived as an aspect of the spoils of war and subjugation, or as an elaborate cosmo-theological ruse, there can be nothing morally legitimate at the foundation of the institution of hereditary monarchy among the Yoruba people of south-western Nigeria. I believe that this conclusion could be extrapolated to other parts of Africa. In any case, it is one who wishes to insist that the institution is morally just in origin or in conception that must bear the burden of proof.

Let us now turn our attention away from the moral foundations of the institution to its social utility (in the course of African history) and its contemporary relevance. 'Consider the contents of the Red Book in England, or the Almanac Royal in France', Thomas Jefferson once admonished his countrymen, 'and say what a people gain by monarchy' (cited in Popkin and Stroll 1984: 395). In respect of the vast majority of the populations of African kingdoms and empires, we must ask then, what have these people gained from their subjection to the traditional rulers? We may detest the moral rot at the foundation of the institution, but if it can be shown to be the harbinger of real benefits and the good life to those subjected to it, there may yet be a case to be made for it on strictly utilitarian grounds.

At this point, a sharp contrast emerges between African emperors and kings and their European counterparts. While it is true that Europe's monarchs were (some still are) as opportunistic and predatory as African kings and princes, it is also the case that Europe's kings may justly be credited with the development of great civilisations. They were known to have commissioned the building of magnificent structures, many of which still stand. Peter the Great, Russia's most famous Emperor, personally supervised the design and construction of the city of St. Petersburg, located in an otherwise uninhabitable, reptile-invested swamp. St. Petersburg (christened Leningrad by the communists) is still today Russia's second most important city and cultural nerve-centre. European royals were generous sponsors of scientific research and great supporters of the adaptation of science for technology. If European technology was superior to what obtained in Africa when the two civilisations came into contact, Europe's kings and emperors deserve some of the credit. Up to the present-day, some funding organisations still retain their old names as royal academies, long after the monarchies under whose aegis they were founded are no more. Europe's emperors were great patrons of the arts and humanities. Many of the most memorable symphonies were composed at royal behest. The King James Version of the Bible, perhaps more than any other text, has contributed greatly to the propagation of the Christian theology.

By contrast, not much has been recorded as the contribution of African kings and princes to the building of the material structures of civilisation, or the development of its intellectual components. For the most part, it seems that the royals in African history have been content to just feed off the backs of their subjects. Many members of African royal houses merely savoured the best that the world had to offer, without adding a scintilla of value to it.

The situation is in fact worse than that. If we focus critical attention on selected periods in our past and contemporary history, we discover that the conduct of African emperors and kings has not always been noble.

A poignant case in point was the contribution of many African traditional rulers to the entrenchment of European colonialism, and the subsequent successful prosecution of the colonial subjugation of African peoples, and the plunder of the resources of our land. There is ample historical evidence to support what I would call the collaborationist thesis; the idea that many African traditional rulers

were active collaborators with the foreign exploiters of colonial Africa.[8] According to Akin Alao, 'As a strategy for efficient and effective administration the colonial government sought to involve indigenous chiefs in the administration of their towns under the direct supervision and authority of British administrators' (Alao undated: p. 7).To provide the necessary legal backing for the British policy of 'Indirect Rule' in Southwestern Nigeria, to cite one example, the Native Council Ordinance was enacted in 1901. Just as the British had intended it, 'the activities of the Native Council contributed to a successful establishment of colonial rule in South Western Nigeria' (ibid p.8).

In time, there developed a symbiotic relationship between the British Administrators of the colonial government and the African traditional rulers. As Alao puts it, on one hand, 'the opinion of the chiefs were heavily relied upon by the British Administrators in preference to the wish of the educated elite in the Yoruba society'. On the other hand, 'on their ... part, the Yoruba chiefs now sought the support and understanding of British officials to remain in office even when they were unpopular with their own people' (ibid p.9).

To appreciate how enormously successful the policy of Indirect Rule was in the Western and Northern parts of Nigeria where the British first tried it, we need only recall that the system was subsequently extended to Eastern Nigeria. Since the people of Eastern Nigeria had no tradition of centralised kingdoms and monarchies, the British created these institutions *de novo*, with the introduction of the so-called Warrant Chiefs. Now the fact that the British considered African traditional practices as primitive, indeed fetish, was too well-known. British contempt for anything African then was scarcely disguised. So, why else would they want to replicate an indigenous African institution unless, as Alao has suggested, 'many of the Native Councils [had indeed become] useful instruments of colonial control and domination' (ibid p.13)? Incidentally, in Eastern Nigeria too, institutional metamorphosis has run its full course. The landscape of Eastern Nigeria is today dotted with royal palaces and castles, with well-groomed princes waiting in line for their turn to ascend the (British-created) sacred thrones of their ancestors.

One particularly sad aspect of the dark history of European colonialism in Africa was the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Beginning from the mid 1980s till now, prominent Africans at home and in the diaspora have been agitating for the need for Europeans in Europe and America

to pay massive reparations to the descendants of Africa, for the systematic, large-scale colonial exploitation of Africa, and the unprecedented savagery of the ensuing slavery. However, one dimension of the issue that is yet to be properly confronted by the Africans themselves is the part some of their own people and socio-political institutions might have played in facilitating the pernicious objectives of colonialism and slavery. In this regard, it would be very instructive to know what roles Africa's traditional rulers played in the process. Did they do anything to protect their subjects against the scourge of slavery? Were they just unconcerned bystanders? Or, worse, did they actively deploy the resources of their offices as paramount rulers in the service of the international commerce in live human beings?

Another period I propose to look at is the era of military dictatorships. Consequent upon the attainment of political independence by many African states, there was a rash of military coups d'état, resulting in the overthrow of civilian governments and the establishment of military dictatorships in many African states. The last three decades of the twentieth century were the decades of military regimes all over Africa. During that period too, the collaborationist thesis was fully exemplified. Many African traditional rulers proved to be useful instruments for the consolidation of military rule, just as their forebears had proved to be the handy tools of colonial exploitation. It seems that our traditional rulers are equal opportunity collaborators. They are ever ready to collaborate with the oppressors of their subjects, whether the oppressor is a local or foreign actor, without regard to race, or creed. As Alao puts it, 'Because it lacked popular democratic support and legitimacy, the military depended almost exclusively on the traditional chieftaincy institution in the same way the British did. Military leaders therefore manipulated the traditional rulers to widen the base of their support in the inordinate search for legitimacy' (ibid p. 27).

The atrocities that military dictators perpetrated all over Africa are too well documented to bear any elaborate recitation here. Whether in Idi Amin's Uganda, Mobutu's Zaire, or Sani Abacha's Nigeria, the damage in terms of human suffering and the looting of national wealth was extensive. And we must also reckon with the more fundamental ideological harm in the form of the abortion of the germs of our democratic cultures. In many of these African states the wounds are still fresh. It goes without saying that any group of individuals or institutions (traditional or whatever) that provided the military power-usurpers the po-

litical platform and the moral succour to establish their reign of terror would be equally culpable for the sins of the military.

A summary of the discussion thus far is in order. The objective of this section of the paper is to articulate a case against the traditional kingship institution. I have argued that the institution is founded on some form of historical injustice or another, or that it derived from a piece of intellectual fraud. I have also argued that not only has the institution not conferred any significant benefits on African societies, when compared to the corresponding institutions in Europe, for example, but that at various points in the history of African societies, the institution has actually been of absolutely negative value, i.e., when it became a ready instrument in the hands of the destroyers of our societies.

Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of the case I have been trying to build against it, I should acknowledge the fact that voices – and these are by no means mean voices – have been raised in the defence of the traditional kingship institution. I propose next to examine the argument in defence of the institution by one of Africa's foremost philosophers, professor Kwame Appiah.

The question for Appiah is the same for us: what to do with our traditional rulers? Appiah (2001) starts with a review of some models that have been suggested. There was President Museveni's proposal of 'a cultural model'. Under this proposal, Africa's traditional rulers would be allowed to operate only within the cultural sphere; the mobilisation of the resources of the institution of traditional rulers for any other purpose and especially for political purposes would be strictly forbidden. Next is Ajume Wingo's suggestion that the traditional institutions be made to serve as 'theatres of civic pedagogy' (Appiah 2001: 46). In this role, traditional rulers can mobilise resources for public purposes, such as education, health, sport, etc (Appiah 2001: 46). Appiah considers neither of these models suitable. For one thing, it must be noted, Appiah says, that allegiance to the traditional kingship institution, unlike membership and participation in a civic organisation, 'is not strictly voluntary'(ibid p.47). Second, and more pertinent, is the fact that the institution itself is now firmly embedded within the framework of modern constitutional and legal provisions. To that extent, it is already inherently political (ibid p.48).

So, what model to adopt? What is to be our attitude toward the traditional kingship system? Appiah starts his defence of the institu-

tion with the acknowledgement that the '[African] practice of monarchy both offends liberal principles and reinforces illiberal views' (ibid p.50) because 'the practice of monarchy lends symbolic support to and reinforces certain forms of social hierarchy that do not comport well with liberal insistence on the equal dignity of all persons' (ibid). Nonetheless, Appiah says, with specific reference to the kingship institution in his native Ghana, that he could feel no 'urgency of republican sentiments in Asante' (ibid p.53). In fact, he contends that 'it seems wrong to go immediately from the way in which the Asante kingship offends liberal principles to the conclusion that we should abolish it ...' (ibid). Outright abolition of the kingship institution, Appiah argues, would deny society of a number of important benefits. In the first category are the material benefits whose provision may be coordinated through the offices of the Asantehene, for example. The second is the significance of the kingship institution 'for the central liberal value of self-respect' (ibid). Appiah's point is that the institution of monarchy plays a major role 'in the constitution of the self-respect of Asante men and women' (ibid p50). And self-respect is acknowledged by liberal theorists as an important good.

Appiah does not state in any helpful detail the features of the Asante kingship – in the past or at present – which would make it the epitome of cultural pride and the determinant of the self-respect and personal identity of the Asante man or woman of today. He claims that the Asante monarchy possesses 'symbolic legitimacy', and that Asante men and women identify themselves as the heirs to 'a rich tradition'. But, 'symbolic legitimacy', 'rich tradition', and such sundry notions sound like codes. Appiah will have to flesh out in more specific detail the precise import of these rather abstract categories.

For example, what enduring structures of a great civilisation were erected under the inspiration and sponsorship of the Asante kinship institution? How many invading forces of European colonialists were successfully beaten back by the Asante army, under the command of the Asantehene? On whose side was the Asante kingship during the colonial era – the Asante people or the British Administrators? On whose side was the kingship institution during the decades of military dictatorship in Ghana – the people or the generals? If by an act of the Ghanaian legislature, the Asante kingship system were to be abolished today, what specific negative consequences would befall the ordinary Asante men and women on the streets of Kumasi and elsewhere?

I suspect that the answers to these questions would be similar to the answers to them in other parts of Africa. I agree with Thomas Jefferson that a monarchy cannot confer any benefit on a people, it can only be a burden on their backs. Thus, if it is indeed the case as Appiah claims, that today's Asante men and women still regard the Asante monarchy as the symbol of their identity and the source of their self-respect, that would be most unfortunate. I should see nothing in that institution for an ordinary Asante person, who is not a member of the royal lineage, to identify with or conceive as the basis of her self-respect.

It is interesting to note that Appiah himself is not entirely comfortable with the continued existence of the Asante kingship institution. While asserting 'a substantial commitment to the present of the Asante monarchy', Appiah also nurses 'the hope that as time goes on, [the Asante monarchy] will wither away because the needs that it meets today will be met by the institutions of the increasingly democratic society that Ghana will become' (ibid p.53). Appiah can only hope that his present commitment to Asante kingship and his hope that it will some day wither away, supplanted by the liberal institutions of a democratic Ghana, are not inconsistent (ibid).

But if the central thesis I defend in this paper, namely, that republicanism is a pre-condition for democracy, is correct, then Appiah's 'commitment' and his 'hope' must be mutually inconsistent. As long as the Asantehene is able to run some kind of parallel government over his subjects, the Ghanaian democracy will remain an uncompleted and uncompletable project. Every inch ceded to the monarchy is an inch lost to the republic; a loss to the republic is a loss to democracy. It is not enough to hope that the traditional kingship institution will wither away, overwhelmed perhaps by the forces of democratic modernism. The monarchists would want to preserve their institution and the privileges they derive from it for as long as they could. That is the least we could expect. It would therefore be in their interest to frustrate the process Appiah envisages, whereby the expansion of democracy will result in the diminution of the monarchy.

The capacity of the traditional kingship institution to undermine democratic progress would be significantly enhanced in large, ethnically diverse federal states, such as Nigeria. In a federal system, the centres of authority and power are already constitutionally fragmented. A federal state, as Justice Anthony Kennedy of the United States Supreme Court once remarked, is a system where the atom of sovereignty

is split.[9] My contention is that traditional rulers constitute an additional layer of governance, one which by its nature can only complicate the task of national integration. The reason is that the interests and aspirations of the various traditional rulers would run contrary to the republican ideals on which a modern democracy should be anchored. It should come as no surprise, therefore, if, as is presently the case in Nigeria, the various monarchies and other indigenous chieftaincy institutions have served as rallying points for the promotion of parochial ethnic agendas.

Using the considerable resources still entrusted to their care, the traditional rulers can create a lot of static and tension in the system, the culmination of which would ultimately delay national integration. It is unrealistic to expect that the various traditional kings and chiefs in Nigeria, for example, would consider it in their respective interests if Nigerians begin to develop primary allegiance as citizens of Nigeria instead of as the subjects of their kings and chiefs.

Surely there is a need for legal and constitutional intervention to jump-start the necessary revolution in social and political beliefs and habits. Africans should no longer feel comfortable with defining their identity and self-respect by the fortunes of the traditional kingship institution; they must become proud republicans and democrats. It is to some details of the legal and constitutional measures needed to facilitate that process of political re-orientation that I turn in the third and final part of the paper.

Perfecting Our Republics

A 'republic', according to *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary*, is 'a state in which the sovereign power resides in a certain body of the people (the electorate), and is exercised by representatives elected by, and responsible to them' (1959: 719). Republicanism is, therefore, the political philosophy whose basic tenet is the belief that sovereignty derives ultimately from the people, not from God or other supernatural forces, nor from some hereditary institution or principle. As I observed earlier in this paper, nearly all African nation states today proclaim themselves republics. For example, Nigeria formally adopted a republican constitution in 1963, three years after securing political independence from Great Britain. Many other African states followed a similar pattern of political progression.

The actual situation on the ground, however, belies a serious commitment to that republican proclamation. In most cases what obtains is the adoption – partly deliberate, partly by default – of a mixed constitution. The trend has been to try and synthesise elements of the traditional kingship system with republican principles. The institution of traditional rulers has proved to be resilient indeed. And like the weed in the vineyard, the traditional kingship system will continue to grow and stifle the life of our republican democracies, unless a determined effort is made to uproot it. The founding fathers of the American Republic understood that all too well. The framers of the American Constitution took necessary measures to ensure that the monarchy would never again have a foothold in their land. As the Americans did more than two centuries ago, modern African nation states must adopt appropriate constitutional devices to immunise their republics against the pernicious effects of monarchies.

The first constitutional measure required is to vest the locus of sovereignty in the people by denying it to any other institution. The abolition of the monarchy should be made justiceable. Second, constitutional provisions should be made making religion strictly a private affair, through the express prohibition of state sponsorship of religion, or the establishment of state religions. Third, since traditional rulers depend on the permanent pool of indigenes of their respective domains for their supply of subjects, concerted efforts should be made through appropriate legislation to abolish the indigene/settler dichotomy. Modern African constitutions should provide for the 'continuous' residence in any part of a country (over a prescribed number of years) to confer nativity, not mere citizenship of the place. Better still, nativity and citizenship should confer identical legal and political status. Fourth, among other requirements, inclusion in a federation should be conditioned on a region or community's willingness to endorse, strictly, these principles of secularism in matters public.

Other measures such as programmes of rapid industrialisation, appropriate civic education as part of the school curriculum, and in general, rapid expansion of literacy, would also help to propagate the republican creed.

In concluding I again acknowledge how the thesis of this paper might cause cultural purists some distress. The suggestion that we go all out to abolish the traditional kingship institution may scandalise some, especially coming from an African. In their view, what I advocate would

amount to putting our traditional values down in order to promote foreign or western ideas and values. In his discussion of these issues with particular reference to the situation in South Africa, Joe Teffo, to cite one example of a cultural purist, considers it 'more disheartening that it was the blacks themselves who tended to undermine their own traditional institutions on which African societies are anchored' (Teffo 2002: 4). But there is really no basis for this 'us' versus 'them' mentality and the accompanying sentiments. As a constitutional philosophy, republicanism is by no means a stranger to Africa. There were clear instances of pre-colonial African states organised along strict republican lines of popular sovereignty, and where political leaders were regarded as no more than trustees of the people's power and authority; certainly not as the legally-illimitable owners of the earth. A good example, as I noted above, was traditional Igbo society in south-eastern Nigeria, i.e., before the colonialists's clumsy intervention at social engineering which gave the Igbos kings and crown princes.

I see nothing inherently African in the tenacious advocacy on behalf of the anachronistic traditional kingship institution. The monarchy was not an original invention of Africa. Surely there can be nothing un-African or foreign in the republican creed which identifies the people as the bearers of sovereignty, and which provides that all public offices and positions must be aspired to and occupied, at least in principle, strictly on the basis of merit and fair competition.

Notes

1. By 'Africa' in this paper, I will be referring primarily to sub-Saharan Africa.
2. To be sure, there are some 'fundamentalists', to use Wingo's label, of the first type, who call for a return to the 'glorious past' of the traditional chieftaincy institution. According to Ajume Wingo, Mwangi S. Kimenyi is one scholar who advocates 'the complete return to pre-colonial boundaries'.
3. This description is contained in Jefferson's letter to James Madison, January 30, 1787. Parts of the letter are reproduced in Richard H. Popkin and Avrum Stroll, eds., *Philosophy and Contemporary Problems – A Reader*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1984, p. 394.
4. The Governor of Oyo State, Senator Rashidi Ladoja, has declared, not too long ago, that he is number nine in the queue while his political godfather, Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu is number six.
5. This section of the paper draws heavily on the writings of Professor J. A. Atanda, formerly of the Department of History, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. The works include, Atanda, J. A., *An Introduction to Yoruba History*, Ibadan: University Press, Ibadan, 1980; Atanda, J. A., 'The Historian and the Problem of

Origins of Peoples in Nigerian Society', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, vol. X, No. 3, Dec. 1980; Atanda, J. A., 'The Origin of the Yoruba Reconsidered', *Odu: A Journal of West African Studies*, New Series No. 25 (January 1984), pp. 3-19. Other works of similar interest include, Biobaku, S. O., *Lugard Lectures: The Origin of the Yoruba*, G. P., Lagos, 1955. Among pioneering works of more general interest is Samuel Johnson's *History of the Yoruba*, Lagos, 1921.

6. Oduduwa is fondly called *Atewonro* – one who came climbing down on an iron chain.

7. Ile-Ife literally translates as the place from where the earth began to spread.

8. I am grateful to my colleague, Dr Akin Alao, of the Department of History, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, for making available to me an unpublished manuscript of his. This portion of the paper draws from his work.

9. Justice Kennedy made this observation in his concurring opinion in US Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton. (514 U.S.779, 115 S. Ct. 1842). The full statement is worth quoting:

> 'Federalism was our nation's own discovery. The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other. The resulting Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it'.

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Le Maroc entre la transition démocratique et une nouvelle renaissance socioculturelle

Bouazza Benachir*

Résumé

Outre l'intégration du Maroc dans une vision mondialisée et respectueuse de la diversité culturelle qui caractérise ce pays, le paradigme de «Renaissance arabe» se doit d'être nuancé une fois rapporté aux socio-cultures marocaines. Ce double mouvement (mondialité et spécificité) corrèle avec la mise en perspective critique et théorique de l'entremêlement dialectique de trois horizons socio-politique majeurs : la transition démocratique comme moyen et non une fin en soi ; la Région comme révélateur de l'efficace démocratique ; la diversité culturelle et humaine du Maroc. Le thème fédérateur de ce triptyque est la relation foncièrement politique existant entre la culture, la société et la démocratie et donc la charge sémantique et pratique de cette relation : les ethno ou socio-cultures sont indépassables quant à la question centrale du développement alternatif.

Abstract

Beside its role of integrating Morocco in a globalized vision that also takes into account the cultural diversity of the country, there is need for a nuance of the 'Arab Renaissance' paradigm in relation to the socio-cultural context of Morocco. This double movement (globality and specificity) correlates with the critical and theoretical perspective of the dialectic intermingling of three different major socio-political horizons: democratic transition as a means and not an end in itself; the region as an indicator of democratic efficiency; and Morocco's cultural and human diversity. The umbrella theme of these three elements is the unmitigated political relationship between culture, society and democracy

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and therefore the semantic and practical content of this relationship: ethnic or socio-cultural realities are indispensable to the central issue of alternative development.

Introduction

Trois perspectives retiendront notre attention à l'occasion de notre contribution aux travaux du thème de recherches sur « *Repenser le développement africain : au-delà de l'impasse, les alternatives* ».

1. Universaliser (mondialiser), dés-ethniciser, séculariser, etc., les approches de l'invention laïque d'une Renaissance marocaine diversaliste et autrement ouverte sur les exigences (politiques, juridiques, économiques, éthiques et culturelles) présentes et, à la fois, stratégiques du pays (hommes, cultures, démocratie territoriale ou interrégionale, recherche, éducation, développement alternatif…).

2.. Débloquer l'imagination créatrice tant individuelle que collective par la désaliénation tous azimuts et notamment par une réflexion critique sur le rapport de la politique à la question religieuse dont une ***des*** dimensions est le fascisme et ***le*** « terrorisme ».

3. Initier, développer et promouvoir la diversité culturelle[1] au Maroc, car ce pays est (au plan humain, linguistique et culturel) multiple. Autrement dit, il ne s'agit pas exclusivement de glorifier les dimensions euro-occidentale et moyen-orientale de ce pays, mais également ses dimensions amazighe (i.e. berbère) et négro-africaine et, donc, les régions (*länder* ?) qui composent ce pays.

Nous insisterons sur la dimension négro-africaine, car elle est peu connue des chercheurs marocains et africanistes : les Marocains noirs faisant partie intégrante des « fils aînés de la Terre » (Aimé Césaire à propos des Africains) et de la culture marocaine, il est indispensable de réhabiliter et de reconnaître leurs arts comme acteurs indépassables de la diversité humaine et culturelle du Maroc et, partant, comme porteurs de logiques métisses dont l'humanité aura de plus en plus vitalement besoin dans les temps présents et à venir. Le but visé par ce troisième axe de notre contribution, est de penser la diversité anthropo-culturelle en dehors de l'approche « réactive » (Nietzsche) et solipsiste du paradigme de l'ethnie dont les spécialistes savent qu'il peut être porteur d'une logique racialiste, voire génocidaire (Amselle 1990 ; Amselle et M'Bokolo 1999). Bref, de conflits et d'obstacles majeurs à la démocratisation des sociétés en voie de développement (en témoigne le cas catastrophique de la politique « négro-africaine » du Soudan à cet égard).

Le champ interdisciplinaire ouvert et couvert par l'idée de « transition démocratique au Maroc » nous semble mériter d'être traité et approché à partir du triptyque dialogique et critique que nous proposerons, ici, à la méditation et au débat.

Une transition démocratique et culturelle ?

Une transition politique ?

La transition démocratique ou l'« alternance consensuelle » (voir Herzenni 2002 : 25-32 ; Vairel 2001 : 301-15 ; « La laïcité et la question de la transition démocratique au Maroc, Espaces consensuels » 2001, « L'agonie de la transition démocratique au Maroc » 2004) est une expression, certes inadéquate, mais sa généalogie est certainement très ancienne. La démocratie est toujours inachevée ; elle constitue un processus labile, adaptatif, souvent conflictuel et dialogique, et sans fin. *Ab initio*, il s'agit de la penser en en définissant la situation et la configuration dans un espace-temps donné pour en projeter et programmer les scansions qui ponctuent son déploiement. De fait, l'histoire sociale et politique du Maroc atteste que ce pays a vécu et connu, à l'instar d'autres nations, plusieurs types de transitions réussies ou avortées (Terrasse 1950 ; Laroui 1993 ; Allam 2005). L'essentiel est, donc, d'en saisir l'actualité en focalisant notre attention, serait-ce laconiquement, non sur les différentes périodes prises successivement[2], mais, plus pragmatiquement, sur la période post-1999, car le référent philosophique et constitutionnaliste de cette dernière est les Droits de l'Homme et leurs corollaires : l'État de droit (sur cette notion voir Kahn 1989 : 49 et suiv.), la prise en charge des affaires de la Cité par le peuple.

Sans enter dans les détails, la cinquième période, l'actuelle, qui va de 1998-1999 à nos jours, est la période de restructuration et de refonte. Consensus et divergences en sont les marqueurs et les caractères manifestes. Le consensus est incarné par la nomination du gouvernement d'alternance, en 1998. La mission de celui-ci étant la mise en œuvre des principes universels de la démocratie dont le respect juridique des droits de la personne et des individus (corps, culture, désir, etc.). Les actions entreprises dans le sillage de cette mission continuent de faire l'objet d'évaluations et de lectures diverses, variées et contradictoires. Cette configuration n'est pas surprenante. Pour s'en rendre compte, il n'est que de pointer dans l'histoire passée et récente du Maroc, des faits qui

font tantôt l'unité, tantôt la dissimilitude des forces politiques et socio-culturelles qui co-existent dans le champ politique de ce pays. Il est des constats d'importance et à même de rationaliser le débat politico-social, culturel et économique au Maroc. C'est avant tout de la déconstruction-dépassement de ces données qu'il s'agit.

Premier constat : la *Région*. L'histoire du Maroc révèle une réalité plus que millénaire, à savoir que, – quoique dévoyée et sabordée par le caractère militariste de l'État marocain depuis au moins le Xe siècle –, la démocratie régionale (Montagne 1989) est la première donnée du système politique de ce pays. Le deuxième constat coïncide avec l'attachement du pays à son unité nationale[3].

Le troisième constat est à la base d'une conscience historique et collective tragique : le Maroc (hommes et socio-cultures) continue de payer, depuis plus de sept longs siècles infernaux, le prix exorbitant de tous les types possibles et imaginables (accommodés, troqués, organisés ou « réformistes »[4]) de la sujétion politique (qui n'est pas qu'une « servitude volontaire »). Corollaire 1 : la formation schisée et schizante d'une culture de privilèges, de droit des hors-la-loi, et, donc, d'impunité outre-cuidante – versus la plèbe et ses non-droits aux droits. Corollaire 2 : la confusion et l'indistinction de la ligne de partage séparant la sujétion et l'insoumission[5]

Quant au dernier constat, il porte sur les résultats auxquels aboutit un diagnostic clinique des données actuelles du Maroc politique. La configuration institutionnelle, culturelle et socio-économique, écologique, etc., du Maroc implique le rejet de toutes les formes de dogmatisme et de fanatisme. Corollaire 3 : une obligation d'innovation et d'immersion démocratique du peuple dans l'action politique, et ce, à la lumière de programmes inventifs, évaluables et mesurables. – La démocratie étant, à la fois, une utopie « actuelle » et un ressort, mieux : une ressource.

Compte tenu de la philosophie politique et de la globalisation des valeurs essentielles de la démocratie (Etchegoyen 1993, note 7), et à défaut de l'affirmation institutionnelle d'une culture de droits, parler de la démocratie au Maroc serait une billevesée tragique. L'affirmation et l'intériorisation d'une culture de droits est un problème institutionnel et, *en même temps*, socioculturel. Sans entrer dans les détails, la littérature relative à la démocratie et à la philosophie du droit consacre ceci, que le passage d'une culture de privilèges à une culture de droits est conditionné par la combinaison dynamique de plusieurs paramètres

dont, entre autres, la redéfinition des rôles de l'État et des acteurs de la « gouvernementalité », l'indépendance de la justice et l'application canonique de la loi, sans aucune discrimination, l'accès *citoyen* et performatif au savoir, à l'éducation et à la culture, la prééminence de la dignité humaine dans l'approche de la double question cruciale du développement humain et de la participation plénière des Marocains à l'humanisation de la communauté du monde. La question culturelle, quant à elle, trouvera des issues bénéfiques si les acteurs (État, créateurs et écrivains, système éducatif et universitaire, partis politiques, société civile, etc.) prennent en compte, aux plans de la formation, de la sensibilisation et de la communication, une vérité socio-historique marocaine éminemment évidente, à savoir : la dimension diversaliste, plurielle et métisse du Maroc (hommes et cultures). Instituée **par** la plus haute instance de l'État marocain, l'INDH (Initiative Nationale du Développement Humain) vient à point nommé rappeler le caractère pertinent, *et* de cette donnée, *et* de l'un de ses pivots fondamentaux : soit la Région[5] comme entité administrativo-économique, mais aussi comme support culturel et politique à même d'instaurer, d'un côté, l'aggiornamento des relations avec les « altérités » amazighe (« berbère), négro-marocaine et sahraouie, et, *d'un autre côté*, de révolutionner les « *recompositions des modes d'accès à la sphère politique des différents acteurs et intérêts en présence* » (Roussillon 2001 : 14), y compris les « élites locales » depuis longtemps considérées comme forces supplétives « autochtones » et désormais cataloguées comme « autochtones progressistes ». Avec la mise en perspective pratique et institutionnelle de l'imbrication de cet aggiornamento (qui doit également englober les relations État-religion) et de ses recompositions, le Maroc ferait précisément de la transition démocratique une transition politique effective (Allam 2005).

Le développement socioculturel au Maroc et l'obstacle des autochtones « orientalocentristes »

Insérés dans des champs de savoirs différents et animés par des soucis épistémologiques et éthiques qui en font l'expression d'une histoire authentique du présent ou d'une critique archéologique du passé, au Maroc et depuis un siècle, tous les discours relatifs à la « transition démocratique » s'articulent au problème central auquel est confronté le champ politique marocain et, au premier plan, ses acteurs (État, gouvernement, parlement, partis, syndicats, société civile, mass-média, intellectuels, mouvements de défense des droits de l'homme, etc.). La

préoccupation constante de ces acteurs consiste dans leur tendance commune à considérer *prospectivement* la (re)problématisation du paradigme d'État de droit : celui-ci, aussi bien que l'acte critique qui le ***pense*** (Laroui 1981), le « déconstruit », le donne à voir, etc., ressortissent de la décision consciente et vigilante de le *situer* et, en même temps, de *l'instituer* comme volonté de produire immédiatement une société, une socialité, une culture, une spiritualité, une grille de connaissance et un référentiel multipolaires : polyarchique (Ben Abdellah El Alaoui 2005 : 46-49). – En clair, le paradigme d'État de droit est condamné à être strictement fondé sur un socle constitutionnel dont le préambule et la finalité sont la démocratie (Rosanvallon 2002:16)[6] et, donc, la *renaissance*[7] socioculturelle et juridique d'une intellectualité et d'une praxis politiques qui dépassent, en le détruisant, l'assujettissement du citoyen (Laroui 1993 : 222-223, Leveau et al. 2004). Un tel chassé-croisé entre l'institution imaginaire du futur ou de la sauvegarde du possible, d'une part, et la prise en compte du réel (politique, droit, société, économie, égalité, citoyenneté…), d'autre part, révèle la présence active et inquiétante, tout à la fois, d'une ambivalence et d'une différence historico-existentielles inhérentes aux discours de Renaissance (discours du Même ou discours de l'Autre reproduisant – est-ce l'éternel retour ? – le Passé dans son impossibilité même ; discours de l'Autre, celui de la rupture critique, « *Lumièriste* », ou *Aufkärer*, avec *l'archée* et avec une recherche de soi narcissique mais immobilisante…) (Laroui 1987 : 127-151).

Dans ce sens, la « Renaissance » politique, comme objet théorique et comme préoccupation anthropo-historique, fonctionne comme *analyseur* et *révélateur* de la part d'insu contenu dans la Renaissance arabe (ou d'expression arabe) et ses discours. En effet, elle révèle comment la pensée et la conscience arabes modernes et contemporaines s'intensifient et progressent de manière significative dans l'ambition de « *renaître* » à mesure ou à chaque fois que se précise et s'approfondit la prise de conscience par les Arabes, par leurs *cultures* et leurs « horizons d'attente » (Jauss), de leur « *déclin* ». Cette situation « logique » fait fond sur une *différence* : une différence entre un « *déclin* » palpable (palpable, le « *déclin* » en question l'est, puisqu'il fait partie du vécu arabe, de la *quiddité* arabe) et une « Renaissance arabe » glorifiée comme donnée réelle ou comme réel proposé aux Arabes et à leurs discours par deux références ou deux « méthodologies » ou encore deux « modèles » : *d'un côté*, le modèle arabo-islamique et ses diverses variantes (dont la

version « islamiste ») ; *de l'autre côté*, le modèle européen inventeur et instaurateur de la modernité et de la « globalisation-mondialisation ».

Conséquence de cette idée de différence ou de cette situation ambivalente : penser la « Renaissance arabe » ne signifie pas la penser en tant qu'alternative à ce qui est ; penser cette Renaissance doit pouvoir objectivement exiger ce que voici : poser les conditions de possibilité d'une alternative produite à partir de *ce qui existe* effectivement. La « Renaissance » étant une praxis, et non plus une catharsis, serait-elle d'emprunt…

Assurément, l'ambivalence comportementale, discursive et cognitive de l'*homo arabicus* face à la Renaissance comme projet (et, à la fois, comme dépassement de cette ambivalence même) est le corollaire de ceci, que cet homme théorise la « Renaissance » en la décontextualisant, en la déréalisant (Tuéni 1991). Autrement dit, l'*homo arabicus* pense la Renaissance dans le cadre d'outils théoriques d'autant plus obsolètes (en dépit de leur apparence opérationnelle) qu'ils se *traditionnalisent* e t que cet homme n'en est guère conscient quant à leur mode d'emploi dans l'accès, intelligent et positivement productif, au réel :

– l'*homo arabicus* pense la « Renaissance arabe » dans et à partir du modèle arabo-islamique qui, lui, s'enracine sans cesse dans le passé, dans l'Origine. Et en s'éloignant de plus en plus considérablement du passé, ce modèle ne permet pas que s'exerce à son propos une pensée objective ; pire : les faits objectifs sur lesquels s'établit ce modèle faisant défaut, toute volonté de le penser devient sans objet, voire l'objet d'une inquisition feutrée ou franchement catastrophique (Bekri 1994 : 206)[8].

– l'*homo arabicus* pense la « Renaissance arabe » dans et à partir du modèle européen. Mais à l'inverse du premier modèle (re)traditionaliste, le modèle européen s'enracine dans le temps présent ; il se confond avec le futur ; il *produit* le futur. Et toute volonté « nationalitaire » arabe d'être en synergie avec ce processus producteur d'avenir s'amenuise sous l'effet du gigantisme des progrès politiques, économiques, sociaux, scientifiques, télé-technologiques, culturels, etc., générés par ce modèle « dromologique » (du terme grec *dromos* qui signifie vitesse)

En fait, l'alternative consiste moins dans l'emprunt de l'un ou l'autre modèle, que dans l'analyse de la réalité du « déclin » (versus « renaissance »). C'est le fait de faire l'impasse sur la nécessité incontournable de cette analyse – analyse qui fait se conjoindre la volonté de Renaissance avec la conscience de l'urgence de la production-maintien de cette

même volonté –, qui éclaire le pourquoi et le comment de l'« exigence » d'une « Renaissance arabe » autre. Mais cette « exigence » pourrait, d'une part, occulter le réel socio-historique et politique, et, d'autre part, *déterminer idéologiquement* le rapport du réel arabe en question avec l'un des deux modèles susmentionnés. En d'autres termes, le discours ou l'exigence de Renaissance, en optant pour ou en « intériorisant » l'un des modèles que voilà, est susceptible de l'utiliser comme théorie de couverture/légitimation ou comme écran qui occulte, précisément, le vécu multidimensionnel et la réalité économique et socio-politique des peuples arabes ou *d'expression arabe* comme le sont, on le sait, les peuples d'Afrique du Nord.

Les approches et les analyses contenues dans les « *langages arabes du présent* » (Berque 1974) convergent, chacune selon ses démarches propres, vers un point essentiel : à savoir que la représentation arabe de la Renaissance découle de la relation structurelle qui unit quatre composantes : le modèle européen, le modèle arabo-islamique, la question radicale du « déclin » et l'exigence philosophico-politique d'en sortir. En outre, la relation qui existe entre ses quatre facteurs se complexifie quand les sous-composantes (culturelle, « ethnique », sociale, scientifique, éthique, esthétique, économique, sociale, politique, juridique, stratégique, etc.) de chacun d'eux se mettent en rapport avec celles des trois autres ou inversement. De là, plus qu'à un « conflit des interprétations » (Paul Ricœur) de la nature du rapport en questions ; – au Maroc, par exemple, on est en présence d'une mise à nu salutaire des structures anthropologiques et logiques de la conscience socio-culturelle et politique contemporaine dans son désir besogneux de réaliser la Renaissance, *hic et nunc.*

De fait, la pensée arabe moderne et contemporaine s'articule, selon les promesses des thèses multiples qui la traversent, à la Renaissance du point de vue d'une double perspective : celle du *recommencement* et celle de la *problématisation*. Plus précisément, la Renaissance, pour la pensée arabe et ses différentes composantes, demeure un *projet*. Elle renvoie à une pensée du *commencement* et des *limites* (Nassar 1997: 57-80). Ces thèses rappellent, en substance, comment la problématisation de l'idée de Renaissance détermine, et ne cesse de le faire, le renouveau même de la pensée arabe et son arborescence en interprétations (souvent différentes, contradictoires, conflictuelles…) du passé, du présent et de l'avenir du Monde arabe et de ses *cultures*.

Étant donné la configuration et la constellation politiques, idéologiques et culturelles qui déterminent de part en part le Monde arabe, il est canoniquement évident que si une Renaissance arabe nouvelle il y a, elle pourra un jour se faire avec les prophètes de Dieu (voir le cas de l'Algérie, de la Palestine, du Liban)[9], certes, mais aussi avec les prophètes des hommes et des nations. Cette dyarchie est d'autant plus compréhensible qu'elle fait fond sur la composition multiconfessionnelle et multiculturelle-multilinguistique des univers arabe ou d'expression arabe. C'est ce qu'occultent les propos intéressés et irrationnels de certains chercheurs maghrébins soucieux d'apparaître plus Arabes que les Arabes…[10]

La région entre invention, création et résistances [11]

L'importance théorique et pratique du paradigme institutionnel de la Région (Réforme Constitutionnelle de septembre 1996 et l'Initiative Nationale pour le Développement Humain – INDH – été 2005) tel qu'il est à l'œuvre au sein des discours officiels marocains, est d'autant plus claire qu'elle souligne le lien qui fait nationaliser ou trans-nationaliser ou encore métisser le rhizome culturel qu'est la diversité humaine à l'œuvre au Maroc.

Ce paradigme permet d'aborder la question du Maroc comme horizon culturel métissé. Le métissage étant une transformation, une métamorphose ou un basculement de l'identité dans la diversalité, la région est un des ressorts et un des supports essentiels de la pratique démocratique qui se base, elle, sur la transversalité-horizontalité et non plus exclusivement sur le centralisme-verticalité. Il n'est pas question d'opposer, ici, la diversité de la société à l'unitéisme de l'Etat. Le centralisme dit « démocratique » ayant fait l'expérience historique avortée qui fut la sienne, au siècle dernier, les acteurs de l'analyse et de la mise en œuvre du concept de la région se doivent d'être constamment attentifs à l'idée de délégation ou de décentration-déconcentration.

La région : une ressource et un horizon diversaliste

La décentration est au principe de la philosophie politique qui formule la définition de la région par les discours royaux précités. De même que la notion de transfert de souveraineté obéit rigoureusement à la représentation marocaine de l'État, de même la mise en perspective prospective de celui-ci ne déroge pas à cette règle. En d'autres termes, pas plus

qu'il ne s'agit de « réinventer » notre État, il n'est question de « créer » la région. Comme l'histoire, les géographies (humaine et physique) fondent, en amont (État) et en aval (élus communaux, municipaux, provinciaux et régionaux, société civile), un Maroc où, à côté de la diversité bénéfique des régions, la diversalité des cultures est d'emblée une donnée structurelle et, à la fois, le produit d'une métamorphose socio-culturelle ou d'une acculturation historiquement et présentement attestées. Celles-ci sont intériorisées par la société et, en même temps, par l'État. L'histoire des mentalités l'atteste, à l'instar de l'anthropologie et de la sociologie politique, du reste.

Le paradigme régional est moins « régionaliste » ou administratif que juridique. Pratiquement et en principe, il devrait avoir comme support essentiel la souveraineté organique aux actions d'équité qu'elle (la souveraineté) met en œuvre au plan de tous les domaines nationaux et internationaux dans lesquels elle s'inscrit et s'incarne. Ces domaines, on comprendra qu'ils fassent l'objet d'une délibération institutionnelle et sociétale transversale mais orchestrée et modérée par l'État central. Ils n'auraient à être donc le fait ni des voix des « marges » (pourtant très actives) de la société, ni de ses « centres » autoproclamés comme tels et bénis par leurs connivences avec les pouvoirs des médias (et des appareils éducatifs) qui s'arrogent le droit (ou le non-droit) de dispatcher le peuple en deux catégories: l'« autochtone » et la « civilisée ». Cette ventilation délirante étant une des conséquences d'une philosophie du langage significativement naïve, parce que porteuse d'une illusion intéressée par la perpétuation des privilèges égocentriques qu'elle légitime : ce en quoi une telle « philosophie» est une idéologie... exogène, étrange, inquiétante, dangereuse pour le pluralisme politique et « ethno »-culturel du Maroc.

La construction de la région a une histoire. Celle-ci est pan-humaine. Seulement, avant que la région ne devienne un fait historique, elle aura d'abord été le produit d'un débat contextuel, c'est-à-dire situé dans un espace-temps institutionnel déterminé et précis. C'est pourquoi il y a autant de conceptions de la région qu'il y a de souverainetés nationales (USA, Royaume-Uni, Espagne, Allemagne, Suisse, Brésil, Mexique, Nigeria, etc.).

La théorie de la région dépasse donc le seul cadre économique, par exemple. Elle symbolise la mutation de la totalité de la société qui la produit et l'applique. Or, *ici et maintenant*, cette mutation aura à considérer, dialectiquement et pragmatiquement, certains aspects des com-

plexités concrètes de nos sociétés contemporaines, c'est-à-dire : entre autres, la revendication et la recherche convulsive – par les individus « genrés » (différence des sexes), les groupes, les institutions, les organisations, les associations (dont les ONG), l'éducation, les cultures (langues, arts, mass-médias…), les « régions », les jeunes, etc. –, *d'une multiplicité fondamentale*. En d'autres termes, chacun de ces acteurs revendiquent et recherchent, chacun à sa manière et selon sa définition de la situation (région, société, État…), sa vérité, mais une vérité qui ne soit plus confisquée par les institutions-tampons qui sont chargées (par qui ?) d'être des médiateurs entre le symbole légitime de la souveraineté nationale et la multitude des acteurs que voilà.

Région, être-en-commun et logiques de créativité

Même fantomatique, tout comme tout homme (quel*s* qu'en soient le sexe*,* les visions, les ambitions et les utopies) n'est pas sans moi, je ne puis exister sans lui. C'est cette dialectique qui est en jeu dans les coexistences métisses que la théorie institutionnelle de la Région postule comme horizon que les pratiques sociétiques sont capables d'atteindre. La Région représente en effet un enjeu stratégique: celui de la construction d'un *être-ensemble* basé sur le partage et la solidarité et, en même temps, sur la différence comme logique de créativité. Ce qui implique la construction d'une méthodologie et de*s* mots nouveaux qui rompent avec la « langue de bois » qui aura longtemps oblitéré l'accès à la connaissance du Divers tel qu'il anime et travaille la société marocaine concrète.

Il s'agit d'aller au-delà des ombres des composantes molaires de la société marocaine. Ce qui spécifie la dimension diversaliste du Maroc, ce n'est pas le fait du métissage biologique et culturel (puisqu'il y en a partout chez les Marocains), mais la place que *les* « logiques métisses » occupent dans ce pays. Autrement dit, cette dimension est un témoignage vivant de l'Autre qui est organique aux tréfonds psycho-culturels du Maroc métis. Cependant, encore faut-il que ce témoignage fasse *événement théorique*. C'est à conditionner le paradigme régional par l'avènement de cet événement que la Région, de l'un des critères de notre société plurielle qu'il est, pourrait faire partie intégrante des éléments de la grille d'évaluation de la mise en œuvre de nos valeurs ancestrales d'équité et de justice. Nous disons de *nos valeurs ancestrales d'équité et de justice*, car *et* notre société *et* son Etat son approchables (au sens de connaître) à partir de ces *valeurs* même. C'est la négation de

celles-ci et, donc, la tentation de néantiser le socle archéologique, an-
cien, de notre société et de notre État, qui exigent une nouvelle lecture
historiographique, socio-politique et juridique, de notre legs historique
qui, lui, s'inscrit dans le temps présent et les temps immédiats et pros-
pectifs, et corrèle, par conséquent, avec la nécessité de l'avènement d'une
approche plus sereine des différents problèmes qui sont liés à l'idée de
Région. Une évaluation plus réfléchie, plus anthropologique, voire psy-
chanalytique, est envisageable qui étudie et analyse les effets
« acculturels » des « résistances » à/contre l'idée démocratique-révolu-
tionnaire de Région. Sans entrer dans les détails ni cultiver l'idée d'en-
cerclement, ces résistances obéissent à des motivations diverses. De toute
manière, elles sont extérieures et intérieures. En bref, elles impliquent
leur dépassement et, partant, une révolution culturelle à l'espagnole ou
la tchécoslovaque.

La région alternative au centralisme

Nul oubli n'est concevable, possible, dans ce vaste mais déterminant
défi, à savoir celui de la postulation et de la construction de la Région
(Sedrati 1995 : 111-117). À l'instar du quasi-dévoiement de la règle
démocratique par certains *traitements courants* et « habitudes »
jupitériennes, la question (de cette nature) de la Région demeure omni-
présente. Ce qui signifie que cette question (pas seulement elle) n'est
toujours pas réglée ou, – puisque son règlement est enclenché par la
dynamique socio-politique et culturelle nationale en cours –, qu'elle
achopperait sur les « résistances » d'idéologies qui ne disent pas leurs
noms et qui entravent la marche du Maroc vers la construction d'un
rhizome plénièrement marocain mais néanmoins ouvert sur la commu-
nauté démocratique du Monde: soit un État qui n'est pas contre la
société, ni contre les diverses composantes de celle-ci. En clair, l'exis-
tence de « résistances » à la Régionalisation renvoie au fait, majeur et
stratégique, que, *d'une part*, la dynamique nationale actuelle en matière
de « länderisation » est justifiée, et que, *d'autre part*, les traitements
douteux de cette question sont devenus caducs. La question du Sahara
occidental et la revendication amazighe sont des révélateurs majeurs de
cette caducité incohérente.

Au Maroc, toutes les régions ont contribué à la constitution des logi-
ques transculturelles nationales, et ce, sans que personne ne s'en rende
compte. Cette donne s'explique par la fusion culturelle, cultuelle et spi-
rituelle des Marocain(e)s ; cette fusion favorisant (et continuant de

favoriser) l'avènement d'une culture diversaliste et unitéiste, à la fois. Il est d'aucuns qui objecteront que la culture ne nourrit pas son homme, et que même en le nourrissant, elle est nécessaire à maintenir et à défendre, mais pas suffisante. Qu'est-ce qui est *et* nécessaire *et* suffisant, donc? L'équité et la justice?

Équité et diversité humaine au service du développement humain et de la région

Mais n'est-ce pas que la présente réflexion a d'entrée de jeu posée cette question ? Récapitulons. La région comme paradigme moléculaire et polyarchique est de nature à mettre en œuvre la sauvegarde et le développement de la diversité humaine au Maroc.

Il est important de souligner ceci : la culture cosmopolite est une des fondations prioritaires du développement humain au sein des stratégies à venir de transferts d'hégémonie de créativité dans le cadre de la « Province » télé-techno-scientifique actuellement de plus en plus hégémonique à l'échelle mondiale.

Manifestement très actuel au Maroc (au niveau de l'État, des missions du système éducatif, et de la société civile), ce débat gagnerait en profondeur et en clarté, s'il s'articulait sur l'avènement, – constitutionnel et d'ores et déjà décennal –, dans ce pays, de la Région et, en même temps, sur la demande de reconnaissance des cultures « populaires » et « régionales » par les pouvoirs locaux et régionaux. L'existence du Sénat (la deuxième chambre du parlement) serait in-opérationnelle et dispendieuse si elle n'accompagnait pas de manière rigoureuse et efficiente la demande de régionalisation et les multiples défis que sa réalisation se doit de relever. Bien entendu, le gouvernement central n'est pas sauf de ses responsabilités et missions, autrement dit : pour que la « *lä*nderisation » ne soit pas un vain mot qui s'ajoute au slogan creux, il faut que l'Etat et ses organes concernés par cette problématique et à côté de la société civile, s'impliquent et s'investissent davantage et de manière stratégique et clairvoyante.

Inventer la Région n'est pas la recréer

C'est l'invention de *la* Région par les cultures et les individus concrets qui lui sont organiques, qui créera *les* Régions.

La présente contribution à un débat majeur devrait être relayée ou critiquée par d'autres approches car le pari est de déboucher sur la for-

mulation de politiques sociales et culturelles de proximité recadrées par une lecture, *in fine*, des attendus d'une théorie rigoureuse, démocratique et sans exclusivisme de la Région. Il ne s'agit pas de débattre de ce que la Région peut nous donner, mais de ce que nous pouvons faire pour elle. Certes, elle est aussi un concept lié à la théorie de l'aménagement du territoire. Mais encore faut-il faire de nécessité vertu, autrement dit : aménager des espaces destinés aux sciences et aux techniques et aux savoir-faire capables de répondre aux demandes de nos régions.

Exemples : une ophtalmologie spécifique au désert ou au pré-désert; des sciences agronomiques adaptées à ces mêmes zones ainsi qu'aux zones arides ou semi-arides ou montagneuses ou encore aux littoraux. Trois autres exemples (de taille) : celui de l'eau, des transports (Qu'attend-on pour creuser un tunnel sous le Haut-Atlas Central ou réaliser l'extension des réseaux ferroviaires et auto routiers ?), celui de l'exploitation des richesses halieutiques, celui de l'éco-tourisme. Ce sont là des chantiers d'importance qui doivent être mis en œuvre car ils font partie intégrante de la démocratie territoriale et des politiques de désenclavement égalitaristes et d'intégration régionale et interrégionale. Va-t-on encore objecter que ces domaines et celui de l'« aménagement linguistique » du territoire, sont d'ordre « culturel »…? En bref, l'événement réaliste et efficace d'un aménagement du territoire en termes politiques, culturels et télé-techno-scientifiques, passe par l'instauration de régions autonomes et, en même temps, par celle d'un État décentré-décentralisé.

La démocratie n'est pas uniquement une fin, mais elle est aussi un moyen. Des pans entiers de l'humanité vivent à l'âge post-démocratique. La Région n'est l'apanage de personne, car il n'est pas encore prouvé qu'elle ne représente qu'une simple panacée.

Comme dirait le barbu de Trèves (il s'agit de Karl Marx), il s'agit moins de penser la région que de la créer. En reconnaissant officiellement l'état de précarité avancée accablant ses régions et ses « ethno-cultures » les plus enclavées et les *plus* démunies, le Maroc officiel ne peut que faire de nécessité vertu, c'est-à-dire : créer les conditions de possibilité d'une productivité conceptuelle et pratique capable de mettre à nu un des aspects des marges de son humanité socioculturelle et économique. Le vécu des communautés Noires du Maroc que nous présentons ci-après n'est qu'un exemple parmi d'autres illustrant la précarité

structurelle de plusieurs communautés marocaines rurales, urbaines, sub-urbaines, etc.

Un cas de développement culturel alternatif :
la communauté noire d'Essaouira-Mogador (Maroc)

Cité cosmopolite et Port de Tombouctou ou l'influence culturelle subsaharienne à Essaouira

C'est de l'influence et du métissage culturel de ces Noirs sur, ou avec, les « autochtones blancs » que nous traitons dans ce qui suit, en termes d'ethnographie urbaine et d'ethnométhodologie (Schutz 1932, tr. fr. 1987 ; Garfinkel 1967 ; Quéré 1984 ; Coulon 1987).

Essaouira est la seule ville du Maroc où les Afro-Marocains ont construit, à la fin du XIXe siècle, un sanctuaire, une *zaouïa*, celle de *Sidi Bilâl*. Ce sanctuaire se situe à côté de la *Sqala* (batterie de canons), le long de l'Océan atlantique. Ce sanctuaire est doté d'une école coranique; au fond du patio, on trouve quatre pièces de cérémonies rituelles.

À Essaouira, l'influence de la civilisation du *Bilad es-Soudan* (i.e. « Le Pays des Noirs ») est un *tropicalisme* urbain et esthétique transversal qui touche l'ensemble des composantes de la totalité des cultures qui y sont en interaction. Ce *tropicalisme* nourrit l'imaginaire des jeunes générations, et devient le creuset d'une culture capable de passer du localisme à l'universalité. Toutefois, si ce *tropicalisme* n'est supporté en surface que par une existence fantomatique, l'espace d'expression identitaire africain-marocain possède une consistance d'autant plus symboliquement forte que celle-ci est immanente à l'épaisseur de la mémoire collective marocaine et à ses strates souterraines oubliées, ou secrètement célébrées, comme l'attestent de nombreux travaux ethnologiques. Et cet espace en révèle un autre, occulté, qui devient une autre *Afrique fantôme*, pour parler avec Michel Leiris. Cette *Afrique fantôme*, c'est l'homme austral et en particulier les Gnawa-Ganga ; elle constitue la face cachée et, sans doute, l'envers de l'identité inter-ethnique originaire syncrétique d'Essaouira et, sans doute, du Maroc dans sa totalité.

Plusieurs thèmes peuvent ponctuer la progression de notre présente réflexion. L'un de ces thèmes consisterait, précisément, dans la contextualisation de cette réflexion, et dans sa restitution au contexte cultuel et culturel d'Essaouira. De telle manière seulement, notre approche pourrait donner à voir la part invisible ou le négatif de cette

ville. Cette part est Autre et, en même temps, Même : *voir* la vicariance culturelle à Essaouira et, à la fois, *analyser* les mécanismes à travers lesquels l'ordre culturel noir occupe la place laissée vacante par les cultures « majoritaires» « autochtones». Il y a là comme un « retour du refoulé » interculturel et métissé : en ressortissant d'un espace urbain (Essaouira) auquel il participe, et que, en y participant, il révèle et en rend visible l'impensé (son origine négro-africaine), l'ordre culturel négro-marocain local se maintient et s'affirme.

En effet, telle qu'elle s'est constituée à Essaouira, la culture urbaine est à lire à partir de la prévalence culturelle de l'élément Noir sur la *pop'culture* locale, puisqu'il n'y avait que lui, à côté des trois ordres constitués de la ville, au moment de sa construction et tout le long de la première moitié du XIXe siècle: à savoir les représentants de l'État central marocain, le personnel consulaire européen et les commerçants judéo-marocains.

Or, la présence et la fonction des expressions culturelles à Essaouira participent du paradigme africain de cette ville. Par paradigme africain, nous entendons désigner la production, consciente ou inconsciente, à travers les expressions picturales, musicales, rituelles, etc., de la *quiddité* (l'essence de la chose, selon les thomistes) ou de la spécificité d'Essaouira et, en même temps, de ses ethno-cultures transversales à son espace urbain.

Un des mouvements génésiques de l'importance de plus en plus affirmée de l'ordre culturel africain-marocain, c'est la rencontre de l'identité culturelle négro-marocaine avec les mouvements culturels planétaires désignés par les expressions de *world music* et de *world culture* (*jazz, rythm and Blues, Living Theater, hip hop, ragamuffin*, etc.), qui sont, comme on le sait, d'origine africaine-américaine. Loin de constituer uniquement un processus de « déterritorialisation » (Deleuze et Guattari 1980), cette rencontre culturelle pan-diasporique africaine avec « la mondialisation globalisée » des musiques du monde, a également déclenché le processus d'« altermondialisation » des expressions artistiques des Noirs d'Essaouira.

La fonction « symbolique » de ces Noirs se libère ainsi de son localisme et de sa dimension strictement rituelle pour acquérir progressivement et sûrement un statut esthétique qui s'agence avec le dehors, avec l'harmonie universelle en noir et blanc, pour parler avec Fourier. De même que leur musique, leur peinture, ici à Essaouira, produit le basculement de cette culture « mineure» dans l'universel ou, si l'on veut,

dans les Ailleurs, dans les identités qui, pour cesser de fonctionner comme recherche mimétique de soi, s'agence comme singularité, ou ritournelle, avec la nécessité d'exister, certes, mais d'exister en tant qu'œuvre d'art...

La saisie de la signification du *tournant esthétique* en question **est nécessaire**. Car, à être analysé du point de vue de l'ethnographie urbaine, ce tournant constitue, aussi, un *tournant socio-urbain*. Non seulement ce tournant dé-ritualise les expressions culturelles noires d'Essaouira en les donnant à voir et à se produire comme *spectacle*, mais, plus encore, il instaure un *Cogito* de l'artiste d'obédience négro-africaine. Ce Cogito permettant à cet artiste d'affirmer son *existence sociale plénière*. C'est *l'effet-Aufhebung* (non obligatoirement hégélien !) : certes, le souvenir de l'esclavage persiste, mais il est transmué en corybantes dionysiaques qui permettent à la honte d'être soi (Noir, donc « esclave») de devenir une ressource, voire une puissance, tout à la fois ontologique, existentielle et sociale. L'énoncé du Cogito que voilà pourrait être formulé de la manière suivante: *Ce que je joue, comme musicien africain-marocain, ce n'est pas uniquement ce que je suis ; je suis également ce que je produis, et je suis, en même temps, ce que je deviens en **le** produisant*[12].

Dès lors, quelle est la spécificité de la place occupée par la culture afro-marocaine à Essaouira ? Quelle signification donner à ceci, que, – à la différence des autres villes marocaines « noires» comme Marrakech –, la population noire d'Essaouira jouit, auprès des autres populations de cette ville, d'une primauté culturelle évidente ? Ce qui fait la spécificité des membres de la communauté noire d'Essaouira, c'est la position particulière qu'ils y occupent comme « guitare du pauvre »[13] et *blues* des marges sociales. A Essaouira, les musiciens Noirs sont la guitare du pauvre ou du marginal. Le *Gumbri* (guitare basse à trois cordes avec caisse rectangulaire d'origine subsaharienne) et le chant représentent le support essentiel de la culture des personnes noires d'Essaouira. En clair, *Gumbri* et chant sont l'emblème de cette ville. En dépit du statut urbain et social marginal des animateurs de cette musique et de ce répertoire (qui rappelle le *pearching* des Africains-Américains des ghettos), ce sont des références culturelles acceptées et de plus en plus glorifiées par les jeunes mogadoriens et de plus en plus par des pans entiers de la jeunesse marocaine, voire mondiale. C'est l'effet-diaspora ou l'effet-réseau (Glowczewski 2003).

À Essaouira, la réception « festive» des expressions artistiques et « rituelles » africaines s'est déplacée. Prenons l'exemple du rite : chez les jeunes d'Essaouira, le rite devient une *catharsis*. Les rites de possession

africains instituent la ville et, à la fois, celle-ci institue ceux-là. Qu'est-ce qui explique cette forge métisse qui institue la transversalité existentielle des identités culturelles tant individuelles que collectives ? C'est le détournement des arts « nègres » par les « blancs ». Étant indissociables des vicissitudes « post-modernes » du paysage ethnique et social marocain dans son ensemble, les « institutions imaginaires » négro-marocaines d'Essaouira sont devenues l'objet d'une captation dont les auteurs sont les clients « blancs » de ces institutions.

En tant que transe des confins de la société, la nuit rituelle de transe (*derdeba*) des Noirs d'Essaouira incite le marginal ou le « ghettoïsé » à expérimenter les limites de leur transe, à aller au bout de leur transe. Mais, en même temps, cette transe n'est pas mystique; c'est un panaché de fatalité sociale et historique, de sous-développement, de marginalité, de problèmes de jeunesse désœuvrée, de citoyenneté en cours de décomposition-recomposition.

À la marginalité, à la précarité socio-économique et à la fragilité psychologique d'une majorité des jeunes d'Essaouira, il faut ajouter la précarité sociale et infra-structurelle de cette ville : la médina (l'ancienne ville) y est devenue un ghetto, un « bidonville », comme l'atteste l'état de délabrement avancé de l'ancien quartier juif *(le mellah)*.

En bref, les rituels afro-marocains participent d'un contexte social et humain devenu « composite» (le mot est du sociologue marocain Paul Pascon) et non exclusivement de « l'inquiétante étrangeté » de l'imaginaire « africain » d'Essaouira, qui, lui, est d'autant plus fantomatique (dans le sens grec du terme *phantasma*: fantasmatique et fantomatique) qu'il se nourrit de la mémoire, éteinte, des fastes de jadis, à savoir: l'âge d'or d'Essaouira du temps des négociants juifs, des consuls européens et des soldats de la Garde Noire… Essaouira a cessé d'être le « Port de Tombouctou » et de Marrakech que, jadis, elle fut. Le déclin et la fin, consécutivement à la découverte du Continent américain, du rôle d'intermédiaire commercial transsaharien qui fut, des siècles durant, celui du Maroc entre l'Afrique Noire, le Moyen-Orient et l'Europe, ayant sonné le glas d'un Mogador naguère perçu comme « Eldorado marocain » (Jackson 1820).

Entre Dionysos, transversalité réflexive, contre-culture et multitude

Le regard d'une ville croise celui de ses artistes et, au-delà, celui de l'ensemble de ses acteurs. Il faut souligner l'importance de cette synergie existentielle car elle exprime l'impensé (à Essaouira, cet impensé, c'est la précarité) de la ville et, corollairement, *ce qu'elle est, ici et maintenant*.

L'importance sociale de la culture négro-marocaine à Essaouira est une des conséquences du vide culturel consécutif à la déliquescence de l'ancienne vie culturelle traditionnelle désertée par les jeunes qui, eux, privilégient les groupes folk, qui existent sur les plans national et international et qui sont relayés localement par les musiciens Noirs. De plus, ce phénomène de « *blackisation* » culturelle renvoie à un statut que, désormais, ces musiciens ont acquis: ils se sont universalisés et, en l'étant devenus effectivement, ils *réfléchissent* la ville et en sont devenus les interprètes. Ce basculement dans le monde et l'Ailleurs, nous comprenons qu'il symbolise le passage du virtuel au concret: c'est *l'effet-réseaux*.

En effet, ce rapport réflexif explique ceci, qu'une ville est ce que ses expressions culturelles en disent ; et, en en étant « chantée », décrite, la ville les fait dire et exister, à son tour. D'autre part, et simultanément, les facteurs privilégiés (les musiciens) de ces expressions culturelles sont les aèdes ou les griots de cette situation ethno-urbaine puisqu'ils traduisent –esthétiquement et selon les attendus anthropologiques de l'acte réflexif – cette situation. *Inversement*, en donnant à voir ou à écouter cette situation, ces expressions culturelles l'approfondissent et l'affirment étant donné que la *monstration*, ou la manifestation, de *ce qu'il y a*, est indissociable de *ce qu'il y a*, c'est-à-dire, en l'occurrence : la ville, mais également le fait qu'elle est pauvre, délaissée et déshéritée.

La synergie existentielle ville/arts africains renforce la culture noire (musique, chant…) du fait que ces arts sont organiques à la ville et constituent un phénomène irréversiblement urbain. C'est là une situation d'autant plus singulière que l'arrière-pays ou l'espace géographique de référence historiquement attesté des Noirs d'Essaouira et de leurs expressions culturelles et artistiques, c'est l'Afrique au sud du Sahara, et non plus la compagne qui environne cette ville.

Un étrange, mais intense, pacte communicationnel unit les artistes noirs d'Essaouira, – dont l'imaginaire est subsaharien –, à leur public. En étant les révélateurs de l'impensé (la précarité socio-économique) de leur public et de ses conditions matérielles d'existence, ils expriment

non seulement leurs Ailleurs noirs, mais encore le statut d'oubliés de l'histoire tant de ce public que de la situation altérée, devenue proto-urbaine, d'Essaouira.

Dans cette situation, les artistes noirs (les Gnawa) constituent l'*organon* de la *quiddité* d'une identité culturelle en fusion, en perpétuelle procession vers *ce qu'elle est*, ici et maintenant. Ces artistes sont les griots de l'étrangeté et de l'absence de fond : ils donnent existence et consistance à la ville et à leur public auxquels ils sont indissociablement liés.

Ce triptyque rhizomatique est la traduction culturelle de la marginalité d'une ville. Extraordinaire communion que ce phénomène de *solidarité « esthétique »* qui unit les auteurs du *Blues négro-marocain*, ces troubadours des marges, à un public qui, lui, personnifie une mémoire orale et existentielle des marges de l'histoire. Cette « unitéisme » (Félix Guattari) se fait selon les procédures réglées d'un potlatch inouï : celui où, n'ayant rien à donner, le public offre ses rêves et les musiciens leurs arts et, à travers eux, la catharsis collective et la transe du pauvre.

À Essaouira, les arts noirs constituent, à leur manière, la métaphore vivante du vide culturel et du rêve sans lesquels le public jeune ne peut *s'éclater vers ce qu'il est*. D'où la transmutation de ce qui n'est jusque-là qu'imaginaire en « fait social total » (Marcel Mauss). Ce fait social total (*nous les jeunes, décidons d'exister, ici et maintenant, comme phénomène social surdéterminant*) assure le triomphe de l'existence et du rêve sur la fatalité d'une dissociation sociale dont il reste à davantage situer l'origine (Benachir 2005).

Le phénomène artistique afro-marocain est au centre des processus de révélation de l'impensé culturel d'Essaouira. L'influence et l'impact de ce phénomène – et de son universalisation (grâce à la *world culture*) –, sur les jeunes générations à Essaouira, exprime un phénomène d'acculturation dont la perpétuation est attestée par la reconnaissance dont sont l'objet les emblèmes locaux et internationaux des *Ijakane*[14] de l'étrangeté légitime, de la minorité, des marges de l'humanité, que sont les musiciens noirs ou ceux qui détournent leur art, c'est-à-dire : les « blancs » culturellement *blackisés*. En clair, les effets « acculturels » qu'inscrivent le cosmopolitisme « phéniste » (qui renaît continûment de ses cendres) et la « délocalisation » planétaire de la culture à possession rituelle et en transes de la communauté noire d'Essaouira, un auteur les résume comme suit : « *Étant marginaux, les Gnawa, et plus particulièrement ceux d'Essaouira, ville marginale, ont tendance à attirer dans leur culture toutes les marginalités.* » (Lapassade 1998).

Les musiques noires « chauffeuses » des transes collectives des jeunes générations participent de la manifestation généralisée de l'Autre (l'universalité) et du basculement esthétique du Même (le local) dans l'Autre. Elles contribuent à ce travail du négatif qui fait que la dépossession de soi n'est pas vécue sous le mode de la *honte*, mais sur celui de l'*intentionnalité* ou de l'entrée dans le réel concret, dans la vie. Ce phénomène peut s'expliquer par la communauté de situation dont font montre les jeunes à Essaouira consécutivement à l'isolement géographique et à la précarité économique de cette ville. Il peut également l'être par la conservation, même sous une forme quelque peu fragile, de traditions plus fortes finalement dans cette cité que dans une ville comme Marrakech.

Que peut-on préconiser ?

L'événement de la contribution « citoyenne » à l'élaboration d'un champ politique démocratique est incontournable quant aux noces des peuples et de leur destinée. Et à supposer qu'elle ne soit qu'une ébauche, pareille contribution est un des prolégomènes à une Nouvelle Renaissance du Maroc et de ses socio-cultures. Quoiqu'elle butte sur des contradictions socio-économiques, politiques, théologiques, géostratégiques, etc., internes au Maroc et à ses relations avec le reste du monde (déterminisme de la conjoncture internationale, l'intégrité territoriale), la pensée qui pense cette Nouvelle Renaissance marocaine définit et délimite le redéploiement et l'essor éthique de celle-ci : la démocratie, la liberté, l'unité, la tolérance, la dignité, l'égalité, la communication humaine...

En outre, nous préconisons la prise en compte de quelques perspectives majeures. Pour que se réalise un Maroc politiquement et culturellement multiple, il est nécessaire et urgent pour ce pays de prendre en compte quelques perspectives majeures parmi lesquelles le courage salubre de devenir : – un horizon de rationalité, – un horizon de dignité, – un horizon de liberté, – un horizon diversaliste. En effet, ces horizons fondent l'égalitarisme et, partant, la démocratie. Ceci d'une part. D'autre part, ils ne sont pas créateurs de *Limes* à l'intérieur et autour du Maroc dont le paradigme de *région* est porteur de la portée fédérale ou confédérale de l'État marocain d'autant plus que la dimension culturelle de chaque région montre comment chacune d'elles, cons-

titue, effectivement et depuis des millénaires, une *région à histoire et à écriture*.

Notes

1 À ce propos, voir la Déclaration de l'UNESCO sur la diversité humaine et culturelle : www.unesco.org /déclaration.

2 Cinq périodes marquent la transition politique au Maroc : VIIIe-XIVe siècle, XIVe début du XXe siècle, 1912-1956 (période des protectorats français et espagnol), et 1956-1992-94.

3 Il va de soi que nous ne nous intéressons pas, ici, aux conséquences catastrophiques que ne manqua pas d'avoir, des siècles durant, le rapport militariste de l'État à la société concrète. D'autre part, l'étude ici proposée ne prend en considération, ni les causes du non avènement du « citoyen », ni les « appareils idéologiques » qui ont servi l'État que voilà, tels la casuistique fikhique (théo-jurisconsulte), les confréries religieuses *(zaouia)*, le mysticisme « savant » et ses « transcendances », l'inconscience des acteurs sociaux dans l'usage qu'ils font du langage (terminologie, sémantique, concepts) comme outil cognitif rationnel dans son rapport à la réalité, l'absence tragique d'une culture esthétique et éducative qui initie l'enfant, mais également la femme-mère, aux *ars vitæ* (dans le sens que Michel Foucault a décisivement imprimé à ce terme). En clair, notre propos n'est pas de « déconstruire » les effets ravageurs induits par la destruction post-averroèssiennes de la raison par le « théologien » Hamid al-Ghazali.

4 Sur la « réforme » au Maroc, *cf. Hespéris Tamuda*, Vol. XXXIX, Fasc. 2, Rabat : Université Mohammed V, Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences humaines, 2001 : 7-108.

5 Voir, *infra*, la section *La région entre invention, création et résistances.*

6 Voir Rosanvallon, Pierre, 2002 « Pour une histoire du politique », in *Le Monde*, Paris, 30 mars : 16. L'auteur y dit, en substance, ceci, que le fait que la démocratie soit une institution faite pour l'expérimentation de la liberté, elle ne suffit pas pour autant pour qu'elle soit une solution problématique au service de l'instauration de la « Cité » qu est, elle-même, au service d'hommes libres.

7 Quand elle intègre à sa logosphère les sociétés maghrébines, la littérature pana-rabe relative à la Renaissance est plus soucieuse de l'« unité » de la « nation » arabe et de son accès à la « modernité » que de la démocratie comme horizon indépassable de l'existence humaine. *Cf.*, à titre d'exemple, Moussa 1987, Ghalioun 1987, Al-Jabri 1988, 1995.

8 Bekri, Tahar, 1994 : 206 : « Et c'est en empêchant la plume lumineuse que le sabre a transformé la majorité de nos pays en ruines où les traces du sang aveuglent nos utopies généreuses et nos idéaux animés de justice et de fraternité. Qui emprisonné, qui banni, qui contraint à l'exil, qui exilé dans son propre pays, la liste serait longue de tous les écrivains blessés ou morts sous le sabre, la volonté de l'État, monopole du dictateur aidant. »

9 Le retour en force du religieux dans les ambitions, les visions et les utopies de tout un peuple ne sont pas propres aux seuls peuples des pays susmentionnés. L'exemple nord-américain est une illustration « post-moderne » très significative.

10 À titre illustratif, voir, Daoui, Ali, 2003, « L'identité culturelle maghrébine et la question de la légitimité », La question de la culture dans le Maghreb arabe, in *At-Takafa al-Maghribia*, n° 22/23, Rabat, Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de la culture : 78-96, notamment note 31, p. 96 (en arabe).

11 Du 12 décembre 1962 au 5 novembre 1997, tous les discours de feu le roi Hassan II accordent une place privilégiée au concept de Région. Ainsi en est-il des discours du 12-12-1962, du 8-10-1963, du 3-3-1967, du 9-10-1967, du 12-9-1968, du 22-3-1969, du 24-10-1984, du 8-4-1988, du 24-7-1989, du 8-9-1992, du 16-9-1992, du 3-3-1993, du 29-3-1993, du 25-5-1993, du 16-7-1993, du 9-4-1994, du 6-2-1994, du 3-3-1996, du 20-8-1996, du 5-11-1996, et du 5-11-1997. De même le discours de S.M. Le Roi Mohammed VI, prononcé le 6 novembre 2003 ainsi que les discours récents présentant l'INDH (Initiative Nationale de Développement Humain, été 2005), accordent une place d'importance multidimensionnelle à la Région.

12 C'est tout le contraire de l'identité individuelle de l'artiste marocain d'origine bédouine, ou rurale, déplacé, *sub-urbanisé*, du fait de l'exode rural. Nous l'avons déjà noté, Essaouira est, dès sa fondation, une ville, au sens plein du terme. De là, chez les Noirs de cette cité, la constitution, entre autres éclatements vers le réel, d'un rapport esthético-urbain à la réalité et l'existence.

13 Pour détourner l'expression du sociologue américain Irving Goffman: « Culture du pauvre».

14 Terme amazigh-berbère signifiant nomades, passeurs.

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De la sujétion à la citoyenneté itinéraire du concept de *ra'iya*

Azzeddine Allam

Résumé

Dans la pensée politique marocaine traditionnelle, le terme *ra'iya* revient de façon récurrente pour désigner les gouvernés et établir leurs devoirs vis-à-vis du sultan. Objet du pouvoir sultanien, ra'iya doit en premier lieu s'abstenir, comme l'explicite toute la littérature politique sultanienne de toute action politique. L'utilisation d'un tel concept recèle, bien entendu, une conception de l'espace politique, une vision du rapport État/société. Dans toute la littérature politique sultanienne, il n'est jamais question de « peuple », « nation », « citoyen » … concepts relevant d'un autre contexte socio-politique. Cette approche traditionnelle a dominé la pensée politique marocaine jusqu'au moins la fin du 19e siècle. Elle se situe aux antipodes de la pensée grecque qui conçoit «le citoyen» comme élément de base de la cité-État. En effet, l'esprit de cette approche exclut catégoriquement les concepts politiques grecs, lesquels concepts seront revifiés, revitalisés, avec l'Europe de la Renaissance, et diffusés après avoir été revigorisés, et somment par conséquent les penseurs marocains de se position-ner vis-à-vis de cette nouvelle conception du politique. Dans ce sens on est amené à se poser la question lorsqu'un éminent penseur comme Abdallah Laroui constate avec étonnement qu'au cours du 19e siècle, les penseurs marocains, n'ont rien ajouté aux classiques, et que face à des problèmes cruciaux, ils ne trouvent rien de mieux que de rappeler la célèbre « loi circulaire » attribuée à Aristote et abondamment citée par leurs prédécesseurs. En effet l'esquisse d'une effervescence conceptuelle est perceptible dés la fin du 19e siècle. Cette effer-vescence s'accentuera avec les premières élaborations, constitutionnelles (1906/1908), et prendra une autre dimension avec les écrits de quelques auteurs ma-rocains réformistes et salafites. Cette contribution consiste à s'interroger sur la

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manière adoptée par la pensée politique marocaine afin de composer avec un nouvel appareil conceptuel. L'a-t-on rejeté partiellement ou totalement ? A-t-on essayé de l'endogéneiser ? S'agit-il en dernière analyse de cohabitation conceptuelle ou d'un phagocyte entraînant l'élimination des concepts «indigènes»•? Bref, il est question dans cette étude de suivre et de vérifier l'itinéraire d'un concept : ra'iya (sujets).

Abstract

In traditional Moroccan political thought, the word *ra'iya* is commonly used to describe those who are governed and also to define their obligations towards the sultan. Ra'iya, as object of the sultan's power, must first and foremost refrain from any political action, as written in the political literature. of the sultanate. The use of such a concept is in consonance with a given conception of political space; it is a specific vision of the relationship between the state and society. In the whole sultanian political literature, there is no mention of the words 'people' 'nation', citizen', which are concepts belonging to another social and political context. This traditional approach dominated Moroccan political thought up to at least the end of the nineteenth century. It is in contrast to the Greek thought which sees the citizen as the foundation of the city state. Indeed, the spirit of this approach excludes the Greek political concepts, which were then revived and disseminated by Renaissance Europe; Moroccan thinkers seek to position themselves vis a vis this new conception of politics. Abdallah Laroui, a great thinker, is surprised that in the nineteenth century, Moroccan thinkers did not contribute any thing new to the classics, contenting themselves with quoting Aristotle's famous 'circular law' to address critical problems. These changes were reinforced by the first constitutional acts (1906/1908), and also with the writings of a few Moroccan reformist and Salafist authors. This paper analyses the strategy followed by Moroccan political thinkers, in reconciling themselves with a new conceptual system. Was it partially or totally rejected? Was there an attempt at endogenisation? Is it about accommodating these concepts or of swallowing up 'indigenous' concepts? In a nutshell, the paper follows the evolution of the concept of *ra'iya* (subjects).

La présente étude s'organise autour de deux concepts: « sujet » et « citoyen ». Deux difficultés majeures tracent les limites de notre approche :

–   Il s'agit de concepts désignant, dans l'un et l'autre cas, une réalité marginalisée, dont le référent fait, le plus souvent, l'objet d'une mise à l'écart indissolublement politique et intellectuelle. D'une part, *ar-ra 'iya* – troupeau, et, par extension, l'ensemble des assujettis à l'autorité absolue du berger-sultan –, concept clé pour l'analyse du champ politique arabo-musulman (et marocain), n'a que faiblement retenu l'attention des

chercheurs. Il suffit, pour s'en convaincre, de se reporter à la masse considérable d'ouvrages consacrés à l'histoire politique marocaine, et plus largement maghrébine, qui se focalisent sur l'État et les institutions, la personne du sultan et ses actes, les guerres ou la diplomatie, et ignorent totalement ce que l'on désignerait aujourd'hui comme histoire sociale. Il n'est pas du ressort de la présente étude d'interroger les causes de ce désintérêt, dont on peut néanmoins souligner qu'il traduit la difficulté persistante de la société en même temps que des individus et des groupes qui la composent à exister politiquement et « théoriquement », pourrait-on dire, face à l'éminence du pouvoir sultanien – même quand celui-ci est le plus vivement contesté[1]. D'autre part, le terme « citoyen » *(muwatin)* ou « citoyenneté » *(muwatana)*, très récent dans notre vocabulaire politique, reste vague, ambigu et polysémique, renvoyant à des valeurs à la fois politiques, sociales et culturelles. La surcharge de ce terme et l'effervescence qu'il suscite aujourd'hui dans les esprits traduisent le fait que la citoyenneté, au sens large du terme, n'est pas totalement acquise et reste par conséquent un idéal à poursuivre et à concrétiser.

– La deuxième difficulté relève de l'objet même de la présente étude: « De la sujétion à la citoyenneté ». Il serait outrecuidant et pour le moins prématuré, en l'absence d'analyses fines de prétendre être en mesure de détecter les ruptures très lentes et les transformations parfois invisibles qui se sont opérées et sont toujours à l'œuvre entre deux concepts anta-gonistes que leur charge sémantique et politique situe aux antipodes l'un de l'autre. En tout état de cause, nous ne prétendons pas livrer ici une étude minutieuse relatant le passage, manifestement toujours inachevé, de la sujétion traditionnelle à la citoyenneté moderne – tâche que seul un ensemble d'études multidisciplinaires pourraient rendre possible. Plu-tôt, nous nous limiterons, dans un premier temps, à envisager le concept de *ra 'iya* tel qu'il a été élaboré par les penseurs marocains classiques, pour tenter de suivre, dans une deuxième partie, son éclipse progressive au profit d'autres termes qui débouchent, plus ou moins, sur l'émergence d'une « citoyenneté », au sens moderne de ce terme.

Ar-ra'iya dans la pensée politique marocaine traditionnelle

Dans toute la littérature politique sultanienne marocaine[2], depuis le *Kitàb as-siyàsa* (le livre de la politique) composé par Abû Bakr AI-Murâdi al-Hadrami au XIe siècle de l'ère chrétienne (IVe siècle de l'Hégire), jusqu'à *At-tàj wal-iklil* (le Livre de la couronne) d'Abü al-Qâsim Az-Zayyâni (mort en 1830), le terme *ar-ra 'iya* revient de façon récurrente pour désigner les gouvernés et établir leurs devoirs vis-à-vis des sultans.

Objet du pouvoir sultanien, *ar-ra 'iya* doit, en premier lieu, manifester son allégeance et notamment, comme l'explicite Ibn Abi ar-Rabi', « *s'abstenir de toute action politique* »[3]. L'utilisation presque exclusive de ce terme pour désigner les gouvernés traduit une conception de l'espace politique et une vision du rapport État/société basées sur l'appropriation par le pasteur de son troupeau et le devoir qui lui incombe d'orienter celui-ci[4].

Cette littérature est unanime à considérer *ar-ra'iya* comme l'assise de tout pouvoir: Abü Bakr At-Tartushi (XIe siècle) estime ainsi que l'entretien de celle-ci est de nature à assurer la stabilité politique plus efficacement que la mise sur pied d'une armée puissante[5]. AI-Murâdi (XIe siècle), Ibn Rad wan (XIVe siècle) et Ibn Al-Azraq (XV siècle) s'accordent à considérer qu' ar-ra'iya demeure la seule provenance des ressources indispensables pour l'entretien de l'armée qui est elle-même nécessaire pour assurer la continuité du pourvoir sultanien[6]. Sans multiplier les références, on peut souligner d'emblée un aspect paradoxal de ces écrits. À côté d'affirmations qui confèrent aux « sujets » un intérêt particulier, les auteurs sultaniens développent à leur égard une vision à la fois « passive » et « négative ». Un certain nombre de métaphores véhiculées par cette littérature en témoignent: AI-Mawardi conçoit *ar-ra 'iya* comme un « orphelin » ayant besoin d'un tuteur pour le protéger[7]; At-Tartushi y voit un « corps » pâle et affaibli à défaut. d'être habité par l'âme sultanienne, une obscurité nécessitant « le flambeau des rois », une terre sèche implorant l'eau sultanienne[8]. Ibn Radwan, Abou Hamou Az-Ziyyini, sultan de Tlemcen, et Ibn Al-Azraq y voient, pour leur part, un « malade » ayant besoin d'un médecin, en l'occurrence le sultan[9]. Toutes ces images renvoient à la conviction unanime de ces auteurs qui considèrent que « les sujets » livrés à eux-mêmes sont voués à la perdition et au désordre meurtrier. Ils ne peuvent exister, ni coexister, sans l'assistance du "*wazi'*" (puissance coercitive et incitative) sultanien. Plus encore, ces auteurs ne se contentent pas de faire l'apologie du pouvoir et de sa nécessité, mais ils recommandent aux sultans, étant donnée la nature malveillante et maléfique des « sujets », de se montrer fermes et vigilants à leur endroit. Il suffit, à cet égard, de rappeler les différentes qualifications qui fleurissent sous la plume de ces auteurs: *al-'amma* (le commun), *ad-dahma* (la foule), *al-ghawgha'* (la masse, *mob* en anglais), *as-süqa* (la multitude), *al-awbash* (la lie), *ar-ru'at* (le troupeau), *al-jarad* (les sauterelles) ; ces désignations veulent bien dire ce qu'elles veulent dire.

Trois éléments au moins corroborent cet aspect passif et négatif imputé aux "sujets".

Les techniques de l'emprise sultanienne

Le terme *ra'iya* n'est, on l'a souligné, jamais traité en lui-même, de manière indépendante, mais toujours en rapport avec le pouvoir du sultan, comme cela apparaît, en particulier à travers les conseils politiques prodigués aux sultans par les auteurs de cette littérature et dans les règles de conduite auxquelles ils lui recommandent de se tenir. De l'ensemble de cette éthique politique, on peut déduire deux techniques principales[10] qui servent de base à tout comportement sultanien : la technique de la séduction, *at-targhib*, la technique de l'intimidation, *at-tarhib*.

La première technique vise à conquérir « les cœurs » des sujets, en créant une atmosphère d'amour et de confiance, comme condition préalable d'un règne stable et prolongé. Elle assure au sultan l'image d'un être identifiable à un père, bienveillant, beau, généreux, compréhensif et miséricordieux. Le sultan mobilise, grâce à cette technique, ce que Elias Canetti désigne comme « l'économie de l'Éthique », une logique où derrière chaque « vertu » sultanienne se cache une contrepartie politique: il donne d'une main pour reprendre de l'autre, échange sa générosité ou exerce « la puissance de son pardon » pour recevoir soumission et allégeance.[11]

Toutefois, cette technique a ses limites. Elle ne peut à elle seule, assurer la pérennité de l'ordre établi, Pour ces auteurs, la grandeur, ou la vénération mêlée de crainte (al-hayba, ar-rahba), demeurent le moyen le plus sûr de se maintenir au pouvoir et de protéger celui-ci contre tous les prétendants. Cette technique correspond à la nature et à la logique même du pouvoir sultanien. Grâce à ses effets les sujets sont intimidés et nourrissent des sentiments de faiblesse et d'infériorité devant la machine sultanienne prête à écraser tout ce qui se mettrait en travers de son chemin. Les manifestations de cette technique épousent toutes les formes à travers lesquelles se matérialise la visibilité du pouvoir: étiquette de la cour sultanienne, manifestation des hiérarchies[12], et jusqu' aux sorties publiques des sultans.[13]

Les espèces d'ar-ra'iya

D'un point de vue méthodologique, faut-il pour autant écarter toute interprétation sociologique « positiviste » ? En effet, on est en présence de classifications fondamentalement « normatives » – les nota-

bles généreux (*an-nubala'*, *al-akram*), les gens moyens *(al-awsat),* les vilains (as-safal[14] – ou encore de classifications vagues sans consistance objective: al-amma (le peuple), al-khassa (l'élite), *khassat al-khassa* (l'élite de l'élite)... .[15] Et même lorsque les auteurs s'essayent à des classifications « socio-professionnelles » – *shurafa'*, saints, *fuqaha'*, commerçants, notables...[16], c'est strictement dans un souci « subjectif », à savoir, celui d'évaluer les positions de chaque catégorie par rapport au sultan. Ce qui préoccupe les auteurs sultaniens, dans toutes ces classifications n'est autre que la « valeur d'usage » que seul, le sultan est en mesure de consommer.

Droits et devoirs d'ar-ra'iya

At-Tartushi, dans l'intitulé. du chapitre 40 de son traité, se pose la question de savoir ce que les sujets doivent faire au cas où le roi serait injuste. La réponse est argumentée, tout au long de son texte, par une série de citations -versets coraniques, Hadith-s, récits, adages, dictons..., qui s'organisent autour de deux points: la proscription (au sens religieux du terme) de toute révolte *(khuruj)* au nom de la sauvegarde de l'unité de la communauté, et l'exaltation de la vertu de patience devant les actes injustes pour les gouvernés. Mieux encore, le bien des sujets consiste « à s'abstenir de toute action, parole ou comportement, se rapportant aux affaires de l'État ». Affirmant l'aspect à la fois politique et religieux du devoir de soumission, les auteurs sultaniens implorent les sultans de faire prévaloir les « droits de la sujétion » : justice, sécurité, application du *shar'*. etc. Cette série de « droits »[17] nous suggère deux remarques. D'une part, il serait proprement ahistorique de nous livrer à quelque forme d'analogie que ce soit entre les droits de la « citoyenneté » et ceux de la « sujétion » : la dimension à la fois positive et institutionnalisée des premiers est fondamentalement incompatible avec la dimension « subjective » des seconds; la citoyenneté ne procède de rien d'autre que d'elle-même, ou du moins de l'institution qui l'énonce comme abstraction, tandis que la sujétion concrète est intimement liée au caractère personnel, individuel des sultans. D'autre part, comme l' a montré Ibn Khaldun, il est toujours de l' intérêt du sultan de se comporter conformément à la justice *('adl)* ; cela favorise la longévité du pouvoir, alors que l'injustice conduit nécessairement à sa destruction. Cette

approche sultanienne, qui ne perçoit les sujets qu'à travers le prisme du pouvoir du sultan, a dominé la pensée politique marocaine au moins jusqu'à la fin du XIXe siècle. Les fondements de cette approche excluent catégoriquement les concepts politiques grecs, lesquels seront empruntés à l'Europe des *Lumières* et très lentement diffusés après avoir été revivifiés et mettent en demeure les penseurs marocains de se positionner vis-à-vis de cette nouvelle conception politique.

Une transition politique ?

Entre le dernier tiers du XIXe et le début du XXe siècle, on peut identifier trois types de documents susceptibles de nous éclairer sur l'itinéraire du concept de *ra 'iya* : la littérature politique makhzénienne, les chroniques de voyages et les premiers projets constitutionnels.

S'il est vrai que la situation globale du Maroc au XIXe siècle et les événements qui s'ensuivirent – occupation de l'Algérie, défaite d'Isly, guerre de Tétouan, menaces d'occupation, troubles sociaux, déliquescence de l'appareil étatique... – ont poussé les réformateurs marocains à centrer leurs discours sur l'État, il serait néanmoins déplacé d'attendre des réponses à des questions qu'ils n'ont pas posées. Néanmoins leurs écrits nous permettent de formuler quelques remarques :

– La littérature makhzénienne du XIXe siècle témoigne, comme l'a montré A. Laroui à propos d'Akansüs, d'un « irréalisme » surprenant, comme si rien ne s'était passé. Elle ne fait que reproduire exactement ce qu'al-adab as-sultani avait déjà mâché et remâché. Ces textes sont pleins de « réminiscences » et n'ajoutent rien aux « classiques » du genre. Les chapitres en sont sans grande originalité: face à un problème, on ne trouve pas d'analyses « théoriques », mais seulement un exposé de cas de "figure" ou d'"espèce". Comme par le passé, cette littérature ne constitue pas un « moyen d'action » mais plutôt un simple « signe de distinction »[18]. Cependant, pourquoi faudrait-il s'étonner de trouver au cœur du XIXe siècle marocain la même conception de la sujétion déjà établie par un Tartushi ou un Ibn Radwan ? En fait, le seul aspect qui distingue cette littérature makhzéniene du XIXe siècle finissant de ce qui l'a précédée, c'est, très fortement, cette « anxiété pathologique » qui travaille ces textes et ne cesse d'affleurer face à une Europe montante et menaçante qui bouscule l'ordre social culturel et politique du sultanat.

– À l'inverse de la réticence très explicite de ceux qui ont vu l'Europe venir jusque chez eux, les chroniques des quelques voyageurs marocains qui ont pu voir l'« Europe » de l'intérieur témoignent, globalement, d'une

certaine fascination à son endroit eu égard à sa puissance, à son organi-
sation et à ce que l'on s'accordera à désigner comme sa « civilisation » -
tamaddun, hadara... – forte, non sans que ne s'expriment de fortes réser-
ves, notamment en matière de religion ou d'éthique. Outre l'admiration
qu'il exprime à propos des moyens de communication, et notamment du
chemin de fer, de l'architecture des villes et de la propreté des gens, Mu-
hammad Ibn' Abd Allah As-saffar découvre l'inconcevable liberté dont
jouit ce que l'on désignerait aujourd'hui comme la « société civile » :
« *Parmi les lois que leur sultan a promulguées figure l'interdiction d'empêcher
toute personne de s'exprimer librement et d'écrire ce que lui dicte sa conscience* ».
Mieux encore, il rend compte de la révolution qui renverse Charles X en
expliquant que celui-ci voulait censurer la presse. D'autre part, il évoque
l'institution parlementaire, le mode électif de sa désignation et ses attri-
butions, identifiant les députés comme les "délégués des sujets" dont la
mission est de contrôler le gouvernement[19]. Soulignons, chez As-Saffar
et quelques autres[20], cette persistance de la terminologie politique
sultanienne sultan, *ra'iya, bayt al-mal*, pour rendre compte d'un monde
perçu comme tout autre. Comment passe-t-on de « citoyen-électeur » à
ra'iya - ou l'inverse -? Problème de langage ou problème politique ?

Les premiers projets « constitutionnels » qu'a connus le Maroc, au dé-
but de ce siècle, témoignent d'une certaine effervescence conceptuelle[21].
I1s constatent la déliquescence de la bureaucratie sultanienne et plai-
dent pour une réforme politique et l'instauration d'un État « juste »,
ce que l'on désignerait aujourd'hui comme un « État de droit ». On
continue de parler d'*ar-ra'iya* dans ces textes constitutionnels, mais force
est de constater l'émergence d'autres concepts qui reflètent cette vo-
lonté de réformer le champ politique. Le projet de 'Ali Zniber, tout en
utilisant le terme *ra'iya* dans un sens « passif », en tant qu'objet du
pouvoir[22] (art. II), témoigne de l'émergence d'une nouvelle terminolo-
gie[23]. Il n'est pas moins significatif de constater que dans le projet de
constitution publié par *Lisan al-Maghrib* en 1908[24] il n'est pas fait men-
tion d'*ar-ra'iya*. Il est vrai qu'il n'y est pas non plus question de « ci-
toyen », même si on peut soutenir l'idée qu'une telle notion était impli-
citement présente dans l'esprit de cette constitution qui reste l'une des
premières tentatives de modernisation du champ politique marocain.
En tout état de cause, l'éclipse d'*ar-ra'iya* ouvre la voie à une série de
notions: « individu » (*fard*), « marocain » *(maghribi),* « électeur »
(nakhib), « peuple » (sha'b), « habitants » (sukkan)... De tous ces ter-
mes, c'est celui d'"Umma"- « communauté », plutôt que « nation » –
qui revient le plus souvent tout au long des articles de ce projet. Pris

dans son ensemble, il constitue bel et bien un premier pas vers la citoyenneté: *al-umma* est au fondement de la représentativité *(at-tamthlliya)* (art. 46) ; elle incarne l'intérêt public "*as-salih al 'amm*" (art. 19) ; toute trahison à son égard est sévèrement punie (art. 40); elle a des droits (art 54) ; elle est assujettie à l'impôt (art 19) ; elle a le droit de poursuivre n'importe quel fonctionnaire de l'État (art 34).

S'agit-il pour autant vraiment d'une rupture avec la pensée politique traditionnelle ? La réponse est forcément négative dans la mesure où les deux terminologies, traditionnelle et moderne – voisinent et cohabitent tant bien que mal dans l'esprit de ces réformateurs. Cette cohabitation, souvent artificielle et sélective, est clairement perçue chez d'autres réformateurs marocains comme 'Abd ar-Rahman Ibn Zidan (m. en 1946) ou Muhammad Ibn al-Hasan Al-Hajwi (m. en 1956). Ainsi la soumission des « sujets » est-elle conditionnée par la sauvegarde des intérêts de la nation. *Al-'adl*, la justice, avec son fondement religieux, est identifiée aux lois « positivistes » ; quant à ceux qui délient et lient *(Ahl al-hall wa al-'aqd)*, ils sont identifiés aux institutions parlementaires,..[25]

En effet, il est frappant de retrouver la même confusion conceptuelle chez un penseur comme 'Allal al-Fassi (m en 1975) qui, lui non plus n'a pas pu se détacher ou du moins se distancier de l'arsenal conceptuel traditionnel qui a pesé lourd dans la pensée politique marocaine[26].

'Allal al-Fassi, grand personnage, homme politique, *faqih* réformateur salafite, poète… s'est servi de matériaux disparates pour élaborer son projet. Il est vrai qu'aux yeux de' Allal, qui a développé sa pensée politique contre la pensée sultanienne[27], les gouvernés constituent dorénavant un « peuple », une « nation », un « ensemble de citoyens ». Pour lui, il ne s'agit plus d'un sultan et d'une *ra'iya* mais d'un « roi » et d'un « peuple »[28], Toutefois faut-il signaler que sa pensée n'est pas aussi simple qu'elle le paraît, et que, loin de constituer une théorie cohérente et systématique, les idées politiques et sociales éparpillées dans son œuvre répondent en fait aux exigences du moment historique.

La terminologie moderne dont se sert 'Allal témoigne-t-elle d'une rupture avec la terminologie traditionnelle? Est-ce un hasard qu'il défende la liberté et notamment la liberté politique dans un ouvrage intitulé *Maqasid ash-sharia* ? En effet 'Allal al-Fassi projette sur le passé un avenir probable, Il s'efforce de trouver dans son héritage historique les bases de la modernité, en particulier le principe de « la participation politique », Ainsi la « constitution », de Médine, la *Bay'a* des premiers califes, le « conseil » créé par le calife 'Abd Al- 'Aziz, ou encore

l'institution traditionnelle de la *jmaa*' constituent des bases possibles de la participation politique.

La *shura* devient elle aussi synonyme de « démocratie » et signifie *la capacité du citoyen à légiférer selon son ijtihad*. Cette confusion conceptuelle, où islam, démocratie et socialisme se fondent, est l'horizon de la pensée politique de 'Allal al-Fassi et l'a empêché de concevoir l'État comme valeur « autonome » et indépendante en dehors des valeurs religieuses et morales[29]

En effet, la prédominance de l'instant politique (indépendance du pays, construction de l'État …) qui a empêché toute préoccupation théorique d'une citoyenneté « virtuelle » ou du moins en cours de construction, nous incite à ne pas attendre des réponses à des questions que Allal Al Fassi n'a pas posées ou du moins des questions qui n'étaient pas à l'ordre du jour de ses réflexions.

Enfin, qu'en est-il aujourd'hui, sommes-nous des sujets ou des citoyens? Il est significatif à cet égard que le thème de la citoyenneté avec toutes les questions qui en découlent se trouve d'une manière explicite ou implicite au centre des préoccupations des Marocains. Il est quasiment présent dans les discours de l'État, des partis politiques, des syndicats, des organisations et associations civiles.

Le milieu intellectuel marocain, pour sa part, a connu au cours de ces dernières années, des débats et de réflexions autour du concept de la « société civile ». Face à l'esprit manichéen marquant la plupart de ces débats (affirmer ou nier l'existence de cette société civile), on a le droit de s'interroger sur la pertinence d'utiliser un autre terme émanant de notre fond culturel, à savoir celui de *Arra'iya*, mot arabe qui, curieusement, n'a pas de singulier.

Notes

1   Mohamed Arkoun remarque, en ce sens, que l'étude sociologique de la société arabo-musulmane apparaît comme très difficile, sinon impossible, dans la mesure où la quasi-totalité des « ressources » qui nous sont parvenues écartent, sous-estiment et dénigrent ce que cette littérature désigne comme al-'amma - litt. le commun des mortels et, par extension, la « plèbe » ou le « peuple » - par opposition à al-khassa, l'élite. Voir Arkoun 1990 : 116. Pour ce qui concerne le Maroc, des historiens comme Abdallah Laroui, Mohamed Zniber et d'autres ont insisté sur la pertinence de faire valoir la dimension sociale de notre histoire. Voir aussi Sebti, s. d.; Mezzine 1989; Tahiri 1991.

2   Je me permets de renvoyer le lecteur à Allam 1990.

3   *Ibn Abi ar-Rabi', Sulük al-malikfi tadbir al-mamilik (Des comportements du roi dans l'administration de ses États)* 1978 : 138.

4   Étymologiquement, *ra'iya* signifie le troupeau de moutons ou de brebis. Voir *Lissan al-'Arab*.

5   At-Tartüshi, *Sirij al Mulük (Le flambeau des rois)* 1990 : 340.

6   *Ibn Radwan, Ash-shuhüb al-limi'afiy-siyisa an-niji'a (Les étoiles brillantes dans les politiques utiles)* 1984 : 100 ; Ibn Al-Azraq, *Bada'i' as-sulkfi tabi'i' al-mulk (Les conduites les plus éclatantes du point de vue de la nature des royaumes)* 1977.

7   AI-Mawardi, *Ta~bl7 an-nazarfi akhliq al-malik wa siyisat al-mulk (De l'éthique du roi et la politique du royaume)* : 214.

8   At-Tartushi, *op. cit.* Voir, en particulier, le chapitre 9.

9   Abü Hamü Az-Ziyyini, *Wisitat as-sulükfi siyisit al mulük (Des conduites médianes dans les politiques des rois)*, manuscrit n° 1298, Bibliothèque générale de Rabat, p. 34; Ibn AI-Azraq, *op. cit.*

10 L'utilisation du terme « technique » trouve ici sa justification dans le fait que les écrits politiques dits « sultaniens », al-adab as-sultini, étaient destinés exclusivement au sultan lui-même, pour qui il s'agissait d'exposer les règles à suivre tant en matière de comportement personnel « privé » (façon de se vêtir, de manger, comportement avec les femmes, palais...) que « public » (choix des ministres, secrétaires et gouverneurs... entretien de l'armée, rapports avec les sujets.etc.). Voir à ce sujet Allam 1990.

11 Canetti 1966 : 317-318.

12 Voir par exemple: Ibn Radwan, *op. cit.*, chapitre 5 ; At-Tartushi, *op. cit.* Chapitre 25 ; Ibo Al-Azraq, chapitre 15.

13 Al-Muradi, *op. cit.*, chapitre 8 et 9.

14 Cette classification tripartite est récurrente dans toute la littérature politique sultanienne. Voir à titre d'exemple AI-Muaidi, *op. cit.* : 13 ; Ibn AI-Khatib, *Maqama as-siyisa (la séance de la politique)*. Rabat, s.d. : 123 ; Ibn Tabataba, *Al-fakhrifl al-adab as-sullani (Morceaux choisis de la littérature sultanienne)*, textes publiés par Kamil Sha'bina, Beyrouth, Dar Beyrouth, 1980 : 41.

15 Voir à ce propos: *Encyclopédie de l'Islam (nouvelle édition)*, t. IV : 1128.

16 Par exemple, Ibn Abi al-Rabi', *op. cit.*, p. 147; Abü Hamü, *op. cit.*, p. 79; Ibn Al-Azraq,. *op. cit.*, t. I, chap. 18.

17 Voir, à titre d'exemple, *Al-Mawardi, op. cit.*, p. 214.

18 Laroui 1993 (réédition) : 222-23.

19 Voir à ce propos, ' Abd Il-llah Belqaziz, *Al-khitab al-islahi fil-Maghrib (Le discours réformateur au Maroc)* 1997 : 95-100.

20 Par exemple, *Idris Ibn Idris Al-' Amrawi, Tuhfat al-malik al-'aziz bi-mamlakat Bariz.*

21 Voir Muhammad al-Manuni, *Mazahir yaqazat al-Maghrib al-hadith (Les manifestations de l'éveil du Maroc moderne)* 1985, t. 2 : 399 et suiv.; A. Belqaziz, *op. cit* : 187-94.

22 La *bay'a* de Fès comporte les termes *ra 'iya* et *umma* dans deux sens opposés. Le premier représente *ar-ra 'iya* en tant qu'être passif et objet du pouvoir sultanien, le deuxième confère à la umma un rôle « positif » : le sultan ne peut conclure

un accord avec un État étranger qu'après en avoir informé *al-umma*. Celle-ci est devenue un acteur qui rejette les clauses d'Algésiras.

23 Notons, entre autres, la présence *de notions telles qu' « élection » (art. I), « contrôle du pouvoir exécutif » (art.8), « égalité » (art. 9).*

24 Voir par exemple *Abd al-Karim Ghallab, At-Tatawwur ad-dusturi wal-niyabi fil-Maghrib (L'évolution constitutionnelle et parlementaire du Maroc), n. d., s. n. é.*

25 Voir, à titre d'exemple Benyoussef 1994.

26 Voir à ce propos Laroui 1981.

27 Voir Meski 1996-1997.

28 *Ibid.,* p. 114-130.

29 Voir à ce propos Laroui 1981.

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Development and Peace in Africa

Knowledge Raji Matshedisho*

Abstract

Development is not often regarded as a function of peace in both development theory and development discourse. In the context of post-colonial Africa, both internal security and external security should be crucial considerations in the pursuit of development alternatives. The reason for considering development and security is that part of Africa's development impasse can be attributed to internal political terror since the Cold War. While development theory and discourse from modernisation theory to global neo-liberalism have dominated 'development' strategies in Africa and produced an Africa bereft of development, political terror has systematically undermined both development and security. Political terror, as sponsored by foreign forces and signified by collateral damage, not only produced extensive fear and destabilisation, it hit at the very core of development – human resources, political establishments and economic order. The end of the Cold War has not seen an end to political terror in Africa, but it has features that need to be considered for Africa's development alternatives. Some of the features are the reduction in Africa's foreign aid, disarmament, and the re-invention of the philosophical foundations of the state in Africa. This calls for a transition from a military state towards a developmental state with citizens participating to curb internal conflict and face the external challenges of the new post-Cold War global system.

Résumé

Le développement n'est pas souvent considéré comme ayant une fonction de paix, aussi bien dans la théorie du développement que dans le discours sur le développement. Dans le contexte de l'Afrique post coloniale, la sécurité interne et externe doit constituer des éléments cruciaux à la poursuite d'alternatives

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de développement. La raison pour laquelle le développement et la sécurité doivent être pris en compte est que l'impasse dans laquelle se trouve actuellement l'Afrique peut être attribuée à la terreur politique interne qui a eu lieu depuis la Guerre Froide. Tandis que les théories et le discours sur le développement, de la théorie de la modernisation au néolibéralisme mondial, ont dominé les stratégies de « développement » en Afrique et produit une Afrique dépourvue de développement, la terreur politique, elle, a systématiquement sapé à la fois le développement et la sécurité. La terreur politique, sponsorisée par les forces étrangères et symbolisée par divers dégâts collatéraux, n'a pas uniquement conduit à la peur et la déstabilisation, mais a également frappé au cœur même du développement (ressources humaines, institutions politiques et ordre économique). La fin de la Guerre Froide n'a pas mis fin à la terreur politique en Afrique, mais présente des caractéristiques qui doivent être considérées pour les alternatives de développement africain, parmi lesquelles : la réduction de l'aide extérieure du continent, le désarmement et la réinvention des fondements philosophiques de l'état en Afrique. Ceci exige une transition de l'état militaire à un état propice au développement où les citoyens contribueraient à diminuer les conflits internes, et relèveraient les défis externes du nouveau système mondial post Guerre Froide.

Introduction

Development theory and practice as characterised by the underpinnings of modernisation theory since the 1950s have been criticised as being at an impasse (Coetzee and Graaff 1996). Theories, concepts and processes such as imperialism, colonisation, dependency, globalisation and deconstruction have been used to demonstrate the limits of development theory and practice as underpinned by modernisation theory as conceptualised by Rostow's (1960) linear stages of economic development. Haydé (1994: 315) outlines and periodises the shifts in development theory in terms of structural functionalism (1955–1965), neo-Marxist political economy, neo-liberal political economy (1975–1985) and New Institutionalism (1985-). He concludes that it is still too early to assess the impact of New Institutionalism on development theory and practice. However as I will show later in the paper, the period after New Institutionalism is characterised by global neo-liberal 'development' which, like all other development theories, still retains the residual underpinnings of modernisation theory which equates development with economic growth and thus neglects human development and fosters inequalities.

The shifts in development thinking have, however, added some insights into the process of development. Holton (1992) reminds us that development is not a linear and neutral process, but it is rather characterised by spatial relations of power during the growth, development and expansion of capitalism. These spatial relations of power are partly demonstrated in the global capital relocation in which production is shifted from developed countries to both underdeveloped and developing countries. Some of the consequences of this process have been that 'Multinationals can exert power through control over the terms of trade under which raw material are sold on the international markets. This form of control is especially burdensome where less developed economies are dependent on the export of only one or two commodities' (Holton 1992: 141).

Moreover, the spatial relations of power are also indicated by a skewed global distribution and accumulation of wealth in which developed countries enjoy a relative net gain in global trade at the disadvantage of underdeveloped and developing countries. Khor notes:

> Developing countries are simply no match for the gigantic planning and negotiating machinery of the North. There is thus a gross inequity in the WTO, because negotiations and the formulation of rules (and the defence of a country's compliance or non-compliance with its obligations) is at the centre of the WTO's activities. Given the gross imbalance in bargaining and negotiating capacities between North and South (as well as the manipulative devices that the major industrial countries have mastered), the rich nations normally had their way in GATT and now have it in the WTO (Khor 2000: 16).

The relations of power in development practice have also been noted in Africa since independence with the experience of economic and leadership crisis:

The real weakness of their [African bourgeoisie and its leadership] situation is that they are themselves victims of circumstances over which they have little control. They have inherited an economic system managed by imperialism and a political structure fashioned out for them by the departing colonial powers. Even radical leader such as Nkrumah, Sekou Touré, Nyerere, Samora Machel and Mugabe have discovered that the economic and political structures left behind by the existing colonial powers have heavily circumscribed their freedom to create their own policies (Tandon 1987: 48).

In the present context of neo-liberal globalisation and the collapse of communism, development remains an issue. It is an issue particularly within the perspective of the global capitalism model as outlined by Sklair (1999). A proponent of the global capitalism model observes:

> As part of national economies became embedded more deeply in global enterprise through commodity chains, they weakened as national units and strengthened the reach of the global economy. This situation was not unique to the 1980s, but the mechanisms of the debt regime institution-alised the power and authority of global management within states' very organization and procedures. This was the turning point in the story of development (McMichel 1996: 135, cited in Sklair 1999: 15).

Whereas much has been written about the aspects and character of development, there is little research on the aspect of development as related to peace and violence. I say peace and violence because Hansen (1987) observes that while peace partly implies the absence of violence, violence is seldom used and justified to maintain peace. Thus one needs to understand what people mean by peace. From the perspective of this paper, peace means the absence of violence and non-violent measures to justly secure and maintain peace. This implies that 'Peace presupposes the suppression of both direct and structural violence; but on the basis of a clear distinction between wars of aggression and wars of resistance and liberation' (Nnoli 1987: 217).

This paper tries to argue that there is a relationship between development and peace, and that one of the negative factors with regard to economic growth and socioeconomic development is conflict in the form of political terror, violence or war. The relationship between development and peace is explored by using Mamdani's (2004) analysis of the Cold War's shift into southern Africa in which political terror was a direct and deliberate consequence. The first section summarises some points in Mamdani's book *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror*. The second section outlines political terror in southern Africa during the Cold War. The third section outlines the impact of the Cold War's collateral damage on development with reference to human capital, political establishments and the economy. The fourth section outlines the impact of military states on development. The final section gives reasons why disarmament, peace and security should be preconditions for development.

Mamdani's *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim*

Mamdani's book tries to analyse how the small Islamic ideological movements led by intellectuals turned into extremist political Islam often characterised by terrorism. He observes that part of the answer lies in understanding America's use of terror to win the Cold War against the Soviet Union. He argues that US state terror bred non-state terror and that political Islam is a non-state terror reacting to US state terror.

Mamdani (2004) also tries to demonstrate how US foreign policy has been responsible for political terror and burgeoning political Islam. He demonstrates these aspects through an interplay of ideological struggle between the imperatives of capitalism and the expansion of socialism, and the US conception of good and evil through the cultural talk of bad (primitive and fundamentalist) Muslims and good (modernised and secularised) Muslims.

Although the book deals with the roots of political Islam through US Cold War political terror, the interest of this paper is in the Cold War in southern Africa. The interest is of importance for three reasons. Firstly, one of the themes that runs through Mamdani's book is violence against civilians during political terror. Secondly, if one has to rethink development in Africa, then violence should be included among the factors that need to be considered to attain peace, security and socioeconomic development. Finally, as I will argue later, collateral damage in the context of the Cold War's focus on southern Africa, has been partly a negative factor regarding economic growth and socioeconomic development in Africa.

The Cold War and Political Terror in Southern Africa

Mamdani notes that '1975 was the year of the American defeat in Indochina, and of the collapse of Portuguese rule in the colonies of Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bssau, the last European Empire in Africa. In retrospect, it was the year that the focal point of the Cold War shifted from South East Asia to southern Africa. The strategic question was this: Who would pick up the pieces of the Portuguese empire in Africa, the United States or the Soviet Union?' (Mamdani 2004: 63). The shift of the Cold War's focus to southern Africa meant that the region was caught in the hostile ideological struggle between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Communism) and the United States of America (Capitalism).

During the Cold War, one country in southern Africa that was terrified of communism was the white minority-dominated South Africa. When the Cold War turned to Africa after the Second World War, South Africa had its Portuguese empire allies in Angola and Mozambique and also in former Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). With the fall of the Portuguese empire, South Africa lost its neighbouring anti-Communist allies. However, with the support of the USA, South Africa practised covert proxy wars against Angola, Mozambique and other governments deemed threatening to the interests of the United States and South Africa.

Of particular detrimental economic impact was the activities of the two terrorist movements, RENAMO in Mozambique and UNITA in Angola. These two groupings, with military assistance from South Africa and covert financial assistance from the USA, destabilised Angola and Mozambique causing losses of about $30 billion and $15 billion respectively by 1988 (Mamdani 2004: 91).

Caught in this process of destabilisation were human casualties. The intention of the American proxy wars was to intimidate and murder civilians so that terrorists could gain political power, to pursue the capitalist interest of the USA and to ensure that southern Africa did not turn into a socialist region. As Mamdani asserts:

> Political terror had brought a kind of war never before seen in Africa. The hallmark of the terror was that it targeted civilian life: blowing up infrastructure such as bridges and power stations, destroying health and educational centres, mining paths and fields, and kidnapping civilians – particularly children – to press gang them into recruits (Mamdani 2004: 91).

The shift of focus by the US from Asia – after its defeat in Indochina – to southern Africa was thus characterised by political terror in the form of US proxy wars in countries such as Angola and Mozambique. One of the interesting points about the proxy wars was that what is normally classified as collateral damage was now the very target of violence. These targets – human capital and the economy – are the basis for economic growth and development. Hence they justify special attention as part of factors that need to be considered in rethinking development in Africa.

Collateral Damage and Development

Political terror in Africa, as described by Mamdani (2004), brings to the fore the problem of collateral damage – the unintended negative

impact of war on society. It distinguishes between the targets and victims of an attack. The target is an intended object of attack and the victim is the unintended and regrettable consequence, hence collateral damage. Whereas collateral damage is understood as being unintentional, in the case of the proxy wars in Africa Mamdani (2004) observes that collateral damage was never a by-product of the war but the very point of terrorism.

When political terror attacked the post-colonial political establishment, infrastructure and civilians, then it undermined the entire process of development. The consequences of turning victims into targets were three-fold. The first consequence was the erosion of political establishments. Basing my argument on Martinussen (2004), I think political terror in Africa has indeed undermined the entire process of development. Martinussen (2004) agrees that the role of the state in socioeconomic processes should be to promote development, regulate participation of the citizens in decision making, and ensure national security (Martinussen 2004: 276). Proxy wars in southern Africa during and after the Cold War destabilised political systems, denied the establishment and growth of participatory civil society, and undermined national security by making it vulnerable to both internal and external threats. These consequences are observed by Cawthra when he states:

> Many conflicts in Africa, the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere are characterised as 'new wars'... These wars are often fought for private gain (sometimes of an individual or a small group of people), usually involve ethnic mobilisation, are often supported by diasporas and are intrastate but not 'civil' ... They are often characterised by extreme brutality towards civilians, and usually involve disparate groups of state and non-state actors such as warlords and criminal gangs, making them extremely difficult to end (Cawthra 2004: 31- 32).

The second consequence of turning collateral damage into victims is the assault on human capital which is part of the factors of production in any economy in the world. Depressingly, Smith (1994: 3) notes:

> Most estimates suggest that, in all, rather more than twenty million people have died in war since 1945. Wars active during 1993 may have killed a cumulative total of four to six million people. In all, counting internal displaced person as well as international refugees, as many as thirty million people may have been forced to flee from their homes through the impact or the fear of war.

Linked to the assault on human capital is the third consequence, namely, the creation of a conflict economy. According to Kamphuis (2005) conflict economies arise as a consequence of the interruption of production and trade, the erosion of the capital base, and the migration of human capital due to war. In a post-conflict war the following four intertwined economies are identifiable: the international aid economy; the criminal economy; the informal economy; and the formal economy.

The international aid economy comprises of individuals from aid organisations who demand office space, housing and luxury consumer commodities. The criminal economy comprises of organised crime syndicates. The informal economy is based on subsistence farming. The formal economy accounts for a small fraction of economic life.

Within the conflict economy, the power of the central government is limited to economic activity in the capital. The rest of the economy is controlled by criminal opposition forces and survivalist entrepreneurs. During this period the new government is too weak to intervene and is vulnerable to groups that benefit from the status quo. The situation is thus characterised by a lack of security, a lack of law enforcement and the presence of aid agencies, giving rise to profitable opportunities in the conflict economy (Kamphuis 2005: 187). For example, the lack of security is beneficial to warlords and foreign security firms who loot and provide privatised security respectively.

Similarly, in observing the impact of the war in Mozambique, Chingono states:

> The most direct impact of the war on the state [has] been to undermine its capacity to manage the economy. As the state survival was at stake, security, and not development, became the overriding policy concern. The maxim that 'production is the best defence' was ignored, as resources were diverted to the war effort (Chingono 1996: 10).

Such a situation can by no standard be considered a healthy economy that can sustain growth and socioeconomic development. Thus in Mozambique, the conflict economy (as Kamphuis calls it) or the grassroots war economy (as Chingono calls it):

> Generated social revolt and protest in ideas, values and behaviours which took many forms; innovative economic enterprising; increased political activism and militancy; religious revivalism; unorthodox feminine politics and youth subculture(s). In doing so the dispossessed have indeed been active agents in shaping the institutional structure of their society and

strengthening the embryonic civil society and weakening the state (Chingono 1996: 11).

Hence it is imperative that rethinking development in Africa should take into account the impact of war on economic growth and socioeconomic development and also recognise that negotiating peace settlements is one of the preconditions for a development alternative in Africa. The present situation in the western Sudanese region of Dafur is a typical situation of violent conflict against civilians and the hindering of humanitarian efforts to alleviate the already chaotic situation which will of course have dire socioeconomic consequences.

On the subject of collateral damage and development, there is also the paradox of victim and villain when one considers the position of children. Children as a group are among the most affected victims of war, both as victims of collateral damage and the villains thereof. On one hand child combatants are forced to kill during war, on the other hand civilian children are killed too. Moreover, in a post-conflict situation child combatants are not rehabilitated. For example, Ismail (2002) observes:

> Despite these grim statistics, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the plight of child combatants in the post-war period. As such, their rehabilitation has not been 'securitised' (that is linked to post-war stability) and the threat posed by partially rehabilitated child soldiers to post-war security and development has not been properly discerned. This issue is even more pertinent following the resumption of military activity in July 2000 by the rebel Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy Movement (Ismail 2002: 125).

Military States in Africa

There are multifaceted reasons for conflict in any part of the world. Junne and Verkoren (2005) list the following clusters of reasons for conflict:

- External/Internal: colonialism, the Cold War, globalisation;
- Characteristics of the State: strong (resistance) or weak (self-protection by civilians);
- Characteristics of society: ethnic cleavages, competition for resources, nationalism;
- Individual orientations: Cold War ideologies, different cultures.

Since the Second World War, the nature of conflict in some parts of Africa has been characterised by at least one of these clusters. For example, the civil war in Rwanda was primarily characterised by ethnic cleavages and competition for resources; the attacks in Mombasa in 2002 were part of global terrorism; and the political terror in Mozambique was a result of Cold War ideologies.

Part of the legacy of the Cold War is that it has left most African states with militarised states and dictatorships whose justification was partly to secure internal political stability and peace. In the 1980s, South Africa itself was a highly militarised state in its quest to maintain racial domination and to destabilise neighbouring countries in southern Africa (National Union of South African Students 1980). Whereas South Africa was perpetrating terrorism partly with the help of America, some African countries were fighting to counter terrorism partly with the help of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Beri (1996) notes,

> Between 1981 and 1988, the Soviet Union dominated arms supplies to sub-Saharan Africa. It provided a total of $18.9 billion worth of arms, as compared to just less than $1 billion for the US. Soviet involvement in Africa, with its substantial arms transfers to Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia, was aimed mainly at regaining some of the influence it had lost in the Middle East and its failures in the global competition during the 1980s (Beri 1996: 4).

In Table 1, Beri (1996) presents the cost of the arms that were delivered to sub-Saharan Africa between 1987 and 1994. 'Considering the growth of the armed forces in sub-Saharan countries, the US Arms Control and Disarmament agency found that they grew marginally at a rate of 0.3 percent annually during the decade 1983 and 1993, and declined by 3.2 percent annually between 1989 and 1993. While the relative size of forces is one of the indications of military balance, soldier-to-citizen ratio indicates the investment of human resources in the military power of a state. In Africa, the figure for soldiers per 1,000 people declined from 2.7 in 1983 to 2 in 1993. This is one of the lowest force ratios in the world, second only to South Asia with a figure of 1.7' (Beri 1996: 1).

With so much conflict going on in Africa (Algeria, Angola, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea Bissau, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Angola), it comes as no surprise that Africa is also the major recipient of illicit small arms from Eastern

Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States and China
(Graduate Institute of International Studies 2001: 170).

Table 1: Cost of Arms to sub-Saharan African countries, by supplier
country, 1987–1994 (US $millions)

	1987–1990	1991–1994
United States	330	123
Russia	10,000	600
France	100	200
United Kingdom	300	300
China	400	200
Germany	0	0
Italy	300	100
All other European countries	700	300
All others	1,300	500
Total	13,430	2,323

Source: Beri (1996:1).

Towards Security and Development

I think three processes are necessary to achieve peace in African states
that are ravaged by continuous acts of violence and also to lay the
foundation for rethinking development in Africa. They are: disarma-
ment, economic reconstruction, and peace talks. Himmelstrand (1994)
reminds us that development theory should take into account the spe-
cific context and history of African societies. Thus the suggestions that
I list below are no panacea for every African country but rather consti-
tute a framework for dealing with development and security.

These three processes are some of the preconditions for economic
growth and development for the following five reasons.

Firstly, Martinussen (2004) states that economic activity can be a
source of conflict. This is exemplified by Chingono (1996) with regard
to the conflict economy in Mozambique. So, development programmes
need to be prudent on the point of economic reconstruction.

Secondly, Sen (1999) observes that substantive freedom means that
civil society, states and markets should co-operate to support citizens of

developing countries to participate in economic activity. That means in the post-conflict context governments should channel resources to productive and developmental capital to boost the reconstruction of a war-torn economy. This process could borrow such mechanisms from the Marshall Plan after the destruction of Western Europe economies in the Second World War. A particularly important lesson that could be learnt is the role of the state in rebuilding industries that were the driving engines of the economy before the war. This calls for African governments to overlook the Cold War ideological underpinnings of the Marshall Plan and rather learn the economic validity of the plan in the context of redressing poverty and promoting human development.

Thirdly, as neo-liberal globalisation continues to produce economic crisis and the widening global and local inequalities, there is mass dissatisfaction among the poor and sporadic unrest and dissent (Seddon and Walton 1994: 8). The recent violent clash between the defunct Normandy Gold retrenched workers and the police in the Tano North District of the Brong Ahafo Region in Ghana is one of many examples of the dissatisfaction of poor people (particularly workers) with neo-liberal economic policies. In South Africa there have been sporadic incidences of vandalism by angry residents complaining about inaccessible and poor service delivery at local government as a result of privatisation of such services and the ANC's ideological shift from the social democratic Redistribution and Development Programme to a neo-liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution. It is thus imperative that as Africa tries to rethink development, it takes into account the impact of global neo-liberalism on internal conflict.

Fourthly, rethinking development as a function of peace requires both intrastate and interstate dialogue. Maloka (2002) acknowledges the contributions of the Organisation of African Unity, the African Union, the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development and other structures that have been trying to foster peace and development in Africa since independence. Even the G8 Gleneagles Communiqué (2005) on Africa does recognise:

> Peace is the first condition of successful development. We support Africa's efforts to build a peaceful and stable Africa. We will help Africa's fragile states to emerge successfully from crisis and conflict. We support African initiatives to prevent, mediate and resolve conflicts and consolidate peace, in the spirit of the UN Charter.

However, Maloka (2002) expresses concern that much of the efforts by Africa to foster peace and development have been rather declaratory instead of being pragmatic. He argues that it is time that declarations are turned into practical interventions. It is therefore imperative that efforts such as those of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in fostering peace in Côte d'Ivoire be strengthened in the light of different views, factors and solutions towards conflict in that country.

Finally, the end of the Cold War has left Africa in deeper economic crisis and with weak political institutions, and most importantly in competition with post-Communist countries for foreign aid as they try to move away from the 'necro-economy' ('dead' economy) towards a 'vita-economy' – a globally competitive market economy (Papava: 2005). The implication for this observation is that as Africa rethinks development, it should also think of ways of competing for global resources, not exclusively foreign aid, but rather also in the form of strengthening regional economic co-operation like the Southern African Development Community and the Southern African Customs Union.

Way Forward

A crucial step towards rethinking development and security is to recognise four considerations. The first one is that the existence and experience of peace is one of the preconditions for development. This experience requires efforts such as calls and action towards military youth disarmament in the Niger Delta, and disarming civilians in countries such as Kenya and Angola. The second consideration is the paradoxical nature of security. Cock (1998) observes:

> Rethinking security involves confronting a powerful paradox: that the military – the institution meant to 'protect' and 'defend' – in reality represents a threat to security ... This paradox is clearest in the growing body of evidence on the disastrous environmental impact of military activity, including research, development, weapon production, testing manoeuvres, the presence of military bases and the disposal of toxic waste, in addition to the direct impact of armed conflict (Cock 1998: 5).

What these considerations add towards rethinking development is that peace is one of the preconditions for economic growth and economic development. Moreover, because peace does not imply the termination

of the military, the operations of defence need to take into account their impact on sustainable development. Thus development becomes a function of peace and security, and peace and security need to operate within the framework of development itself.

The third consideration is global terrorism. In the light of the September 11, 2001 attacks on America, global terrorism and the war against terrorism have become another development threat to Africa. Kikaya (2005) argues that the 9/11 attacks had a negative economic impact on some African countries and that the US has used the attacks as an excuse to push the African agenda to the bottom of global priorities. The implications for these developments is that while Africa is struggling with civil wars and terrorist attacks such as those in Mombasa in 2002, it should also understand that the responsibility of peace and development is entirely upon its governments and citizens. This consideration is linked to the fourth one.

Table 2: Focus of Organisation

	Peace-building	Emergency Help	Long-term Development
Example	Search for Common Ground	Médecins Sans Frontières	Oxfam
Priorities	End and prevent violence; stimulate better undestanding between different groups of the population	Satisfy basic human needs (water, food, shelter, health)	Create structures that promote long-term sustainable growth and social stability
Experience	Mediation, dialogue, mass communication, and education	Technical, medical, logistical and organisational	Agricultural, economic and technical institution building
Blind spots	Economic under-pinnings of reconci-liation processes: immediate needs of victims	Long-term effects of humanitarian aid of future government activity and legitimacy	Security Risks to development projects: possible contribution of aid to conflict dynamics
Risks	Locks parties into conflicting identities and can perpetuate cleavages	Undermines build-up of government ctivities and institution building	Can create contended assets in future conflicts

Source: Junne and Verkoren 2005: 4.

The final consideration towards rethinking development is recognising both the advantages and challenges of involving international aid agencies and foreign government interventions. While it is commendable and necessary for foreign agencies and individuals to assist in war-torn countries, there may be problems in this regard. Junne and Verkoren, (2005) point out some of the post-conflict development challenges. The following grid summarises these challenges.

This grid indicates the types and examples of aid organisations that usually assist during conflict in parts of the world. It also characterises them according to their focus, priorities, experience, blind spots and risks in the process of their developmental aid to war-struck countries. Junne and Verkoren (2005) explain, for example, that Oxfam's focus is on creating structures to sustain long-term development and that it is experienced in agricultural, economic and technical institutional building. However, they add that organisations such as Oxfam run the risk of creating new forms of conflict as people contend for resources that are generated by the organisation's structures. On the other hand, organisations such as Médecins Sans Frontières are temporary and only help in emergency services and basic needs. Such organisations run the risk of creating a culture of dependency and thereby hinder the institutional capacity of the state.

The implications of these observations are that international aid agencies and individuals should take into account their roles in enhancing and hindering post-conflict development. Moreover, the government of post-conflict countries should also take into account the challenges that are posed by the unintended consequences of international aid in trying to foster development. In short, rethinking development also means thinking of development as both a value and a goal. It is a value because we all agree it is a good thing. It is a goal because we need to work towards it through trial and error.

Conclusion

In this paper I have tried to argue that there is a relationship between peace and development. Insecurity in the form of political terror is a stumbling block to economic growth and development. The Cold War in southern Africa is an example of how human capital, political establishment and economic order were destroyed by US proxy wars, civil war and terrorism. Thus, rethinking development in Africa needs the

incorporation of disarmament and other peace-promoting initiatives as preconditions of development too. Moreover, the demands of the Cold War on Africa and potential consequences of the 9/11 events should also be taken into account.

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(Mis)-understanding Nation and Identity: Re-imagining Sport in the Future of African Development

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Abstract

Athletics, its obsession and allure for economic empowerment (marathons, World Championships, Golden League track events) through skill and will, unlike any other sport in Kenya, has generated contestations in the emergence of national identity. Thus the crisis in the body Athletics Kenya (AK), the Ministry for Gender, Sports and Culture and among individual athletes in Kenya today is symbolic of the crisis of individuality, nationhood and identity in African development. Since the 'defection' of Wilson Kipketer in 1998, Kenyan athletes have negotiated and have 'run' for citizenship in the Middle East, Europe and the United States. At stake is whether athletes, athletics, sports policy and the governing bodies are witnessing an evolution or devolution in autonomy especially when citizenship changes necessitate identity changes as is the case of the Qatar/Bahrain 'defecting' athletes. The paper presents the case for this issue, while situating the practise of athletes 'defecting' within the global flows of movement and questions of identity.

Résumé

L'athlétisme, et son obsession et son attrait envers l'ascendance économique (marathons, championnats du monde, épreuves sur piste de la Golden League) grâce au talent et à la volonté a généré des contestations dans l'émergence d'une identité nationale, plus qu'aucun autre sport au Kenya. Ainsi, la crise au niveau de Athletics Kenya (AK), l'organisme kenyan responsable de la gestion de l'athlétisme, du Ministère du Genre, des Sports et de la Culture et des athlètes individuels au Kenya, aujourd'hui, est symbolique de la crise d'individua-

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lité, de statut national et d'identité en matière de développement africain. Depuis 1998 et la « défection » de Wiilson Kipketer, les athlètes Kenyans ont négocié et « courue » à la recherche de citoyenneté au Moyen-Orient, en Europe et aux Etats-Unis. La question en jeu consiste à voir si les athlètes, l'athlétisme, la politique sportive et les autorités gouvernantes sont en proie à une évolution ou un transfert d'autorité, particulièrement dans un contexte où le changement de citoyenneté s'accompagne de changement d'identité, comme ce fut le cas des athlètes qui ont migré au Qatar/Bahrain. Cet article présente ce cas de figure, tout en situant cette pratique des athlètes « migrants » dans le contexte des flux mondiaux et des questions identitaires.

Introduction

The African continent today has reached a definitive moment in the nurturing and provision of talent in sports globally. Since 1968 in Kenya, every time the Olympics games are held, the track athletics events become national moments for symbolic dissemination of power and in particular portray the socio-economic dimensions of emerging symbols in the globalised arena of sport. Subject to external interventions and influences, track athletics has enmeshed itself firmly within the global capitalist system. Part of this spread of capitalist consumerism in athletics is found in international meetings such as the Olympics and the Commonwealth Games. Athletics agents are all located in Western capitals. The crisis in Athletics Kenya (AK), the Ministry for Gender, Sports and Culture and among individual athletes in Kenya today is symbolic of the crisis of individuality, nationhood and identity in African development. The athletics track has been transformed from a space defined as equal, offering sovereign rights to the competing athletes, to one where individually athletes echo and shoulder the contested symbol of nationalism in the 'running for money or petrol dollar' debate. Publicly an individual athlete's ability is subsumed into a political collectivity for the purposes of nation building where the successful body performs and promises the triumph of the body politic. The track, however, collapses the separation between the athletes and the Kenyan spectators in a moment where athletic events have historically embodied the Kenyan nation and its narrative of triumph.

In essence, the growth of athletics in Kenya is variously situated in the discourse of the development of the nation. For instance, track athletics, starting from the 800 metre race, describes the history of the nation by constituting athletics as a potential subject for the national epic. However, the contemporary market-oriented glamour of global

sports influences athletes' patterns of training and allegiance to the ideals of nationalism and identity. The example of Kenyan-born, Danish citizen, Wilson Kipketer, was a starting point to critically evaluate the discourses of nationalism, identity and culture in the development of sports as an economic alternative in Kenya. Were these issues envisaged in the developmental agenda for Kenya or Africa? Since Kipketer's 'defection', Kenyan athletes have negotiated and have 'run' for citizenship in the Middle East, Europe and the United States. At stake is whether athletes, athletics, sports policy and the governing bodies are witnessing an evolution or devolution in autonomy especially when citizenship changes necessitate identity changes as is the case of the Qatar/Bahrain 'defecting' athletes. The image and perception of the athlete in Kenya today publicly pronounces the hidden relations of consumerism, and power and generally illuminates global trends of modernity and the contradictory economic predicaments Africans face today. Athletics, its obsession and allure for economic empowerment (marathons, World Championships, Golden League track events) through skill and will, unlike any other sport in Kenya, has generated contestations in the emergence of national identity. Other issues that inform this trend but are beyond the confines of this presentation include political developments and athletics, athletics and its administration over time, athletics once as a preserve of the Rift Valley and now open to all Kenyan competitors, the gendered dynamics of athletics, history and athletics, and the rise of athletic personalities. At the present time, there is a disjunction between ideals of nationhood, identity, culture and individual pursuits in athletics. As such, (re)writing nationhood and identity through athletics invites analysis of the contemporary phenomenon of socio-economic development in Kenya. Athletics as a sport offers a platform from which to further develop an investigation of the contingent relation of the many discontents associated with the current phase of globalisation and the necessity for Africa and individuals to regain the policy initiative. Using recent media reports of the transformed Middle East 'Qatar/Bahrain defectors', the paper examines the ways in which global forces have impacted on the nation, on the culture of athletics as it relates to the debate and the crisis of nationhood and identity in seeking to create a space for Africa-centred development.

Reflections on Individuals, Nationhood and Identity

Last Saturday, 21-year-old Kimutai Kigen walked into the Nation Centre with a peculiar request: 'How can I go to Qatar? I am desperate', he said. 'The Military is not recruiting. No club is willing to take me in and I have to survive. The government should assist us go to Qatar, Bahrain or any other country'.[1]

Globalisation and the need for economic migration constitute an unstoppable force in today's world. However, the key role of actors like Kigen in creating and further shaping the globalisation process is important. As an individual, Kigen's quest (un)consciously can be seen to influence the dynamics and varying contexts of the direction which globalisation takes. The relevance of Kigen's request emphasises the multiple level of dominance and the centrality of athletics in Kenya's developmental agenda and history of sports. Furthermore, it augments the impression that the globalisation of economic and communication systems has enabled and motivated Kenyans to seek economic transnational migration. Central to this claim is a younger generation born into the global experience and who seem to have a less salient attachment to patriotism. By seeking and adopting cosmopolitan life-styles and global political identities, individuals see the government as being less supportive in addressing their personal, social and economic needs (Castells 1996).[2] In this perspective the grounds are laid by individuals like Kigen for an identity shift, detached from the activities of traditional citizenship. These athletes instead are ready to embrace fluid global identities and defiant stances in their quest for economic emancipation. Consequently, the political power of the individual becomes organised around the social networks of the self. Kigen's quest for migration is not a new phenomenon, given that many Kenyans dot the globe.

However, the phenomenon today poses a challenge to national identities and the 'preserve' of social and economic spaces with new patterns of solidarities emerging. Athletics as a sport has been re-ordered and developed, with the opening up of high altitude training camps, and multinational sponsorship events in Kenya like the annual Nairobi Marathon and the pastoral communities' marathon. In these endeavours capitalism provides a basis for profits as well as identities that sustain hegemony and the ideological control of sports culture to produce individuals willing to consent to the new economic reality. The view of Kosgei below depicts the re-organisation of sport in accordance

with dominant world-cultural models and market forces engendering increasing individualism. It also becomes clear that experiences in the local and global processes through which they are acquired and imbued with value play a big part in altering the perspective about the world beyond them and their place in it. Therefore, athletics as an experience with its images and ideas impacts on identities and will continue to play a major role in the ideology and practice of athletics. The contested identities and the local contexts under which they are constructed or modified are often heavily influenced by global forces. Therefore athletics in Kenya has become a critical arena for contestation.

> 'Athletics is threatened in this country. With athletes like Kemboi and Langat going, I can't imagine what the situation will be like in the next 10 years. It is very alarming,' said former national head coach, Mike Kosgei.[3]

The transnational movement of athletes like Langat, decried by Kosgei, potentially influences the diasporic and world view towards the defection of athletes and the view of sport as an economic enterprise in general. For example, Langat's decision to change his citizenship and become a US citizen was influenced by his training and family commitments. Similar sentiments have been expressed by Wilson Kipketer and Lorna Kiplagat. Therefore changes in citizenship depend on individual contexts selectively appropriated and modified. There is also a group of athletes like Paul Tergat, Tecla Lorupe and Catherine Ndereba who have expressed their intention of retaining their Kenyan citizenship. As such, the impacts of globalisation on the individual are viewed subjectively and in turn influence the construction of identity and political dynamics of sports. In this debate athletics takes on a pivotal position not only because of its intrinsic significance, but because it has become bound up in the fundamental question of identity and its many dimensions: personal, ethnic, religious, social and national.

Two former world champions, Ismael Kirui and Moses Tanui, argued that Kenyan runners lacked enthusiasm in the races in which they participated. Kirui, the 5000 metres world champion in 1993 and 1995, said: 'Either our runners lacked pre-race plans or there exists rivalry among them driven by selfishness'.[4]

This controversy brings to light a deeper form of alienation. Historically, the narrative of athletics in Kenya and the accompanying glamour has been shrouded by issues such as issues of disadvantages in education, the marginalisation of communities providing athletes, and the

exclusion of athletics from the national debate until the Olympics. The trend started by Cherono and his fellow defectors challenges this narrative of marginalisation by swapping identity for recognition. At the award podium they also swap a familiar anthem symbolic of their national allegiance for one that signifies change and their rupture with normality in the global competitive arena. As individual runners they may have less power for negotiation but the lucrative deals provide them with more choices and a better lifestyle. The impact of this struggle for recognition by individuals produces varying reactions from the governments and other interested stakeholders.

> The Ethiopian's great run reminded Ondieki[5] of a similar breed of Kenyans which is now history ...Ondieki thinks the last of the great Kenyans are those who ran up to 1994, notably William Sigei, twice world cross-country champion ... Ondieki said the lack of education and focus are the major drawbacks facing athletes ... 'The federation was bad in our days but that did not stop us from winning championships and breaking records' ... He said Bekele would not be heard of until next year while Kenyans make newspaper headlines only to succumb in Bekele's presence ... 'We have become Grand Prix winners, non-record breakers and championship losers ... Kenyans are part of the circus that is the Grand Prix series and are like orphans at championships when they are on their own ... today's athlete is everywhere as if the world is coming to an end'.[6]

The process of identity creation and the emergent images as defined by ethnicity, race, religion, regional or national affiliations are historically contingent and socially contested. Rivalry between the Ethiopians, Moroccans and Kenyans for dominance in the track events provides an avenue to interrogate the myriad ways in which sports affects our identities.

Power and Cartels of Seduction

The Qatari defections began when William Tanui, the local contact person for KIM International Management group, was approached by a club in Doha to recruit two athletes. He then identified Stephen Cherono (world junior steeplechase champion in 2001) and Albert Chepkurui (fourth in the senior men's World Cross-Country 4000 metres in 2001). What Tanui had not foreseen in these early negotiations were issues like a change of citizenship and of names which the two athletes later discussed as part of their individual defection packages in 2003. Thus, until he got his Qatari passport in 2003, Cherono kept his 'defec-

tion' plans secret. When Cherono running as 'Shaheen' beat the Kenyan champion Ezekiel Kemboi at the 2003 World Championships in Paris, the Kenyan government reacted with great anger and a probe committee was constituted to investigate the 'defection'. The role of Athletics Kenya in the defection saga was not without suspicion, since government policy and Athletics Kenya (AK) and IAAF rules were not evidently followed prior to the defections. Underhand deals must have been involved in these cases of defection, the concerned Minister said. 'AK should have a mechanism of producing more athletes to replace those that go to represent other countries'.[7] Quoted in the foregoing article was the fact that over forty Kenyan athletes had at the time 'trafficked' to Qatar and Bahrain under unclear circumstances. So, as the consciousness begins to grow in Kenya that athletes' numbers exceed the demands of the sport and can be 'exported to buy citizenship', identity is subsumed and becomes part of an emerging narrative in sports.

> In Kenya he was known as Moses Chirchir, a resident of Marakwet, which has produced the largest number of world-class steeplechasers. In the Athens Olympics, he was Al Badri Salem Amer ... The exodus of Kenyan athletes to the Gulf States, which started with the controversial defection of Stephen Cherono and Albert Chepkurui, aka Seif Saeed Shaheen and Hassan Abdallah is alarming ... more worrying is the constant flow of athletes from Eldoret, Iten and Central Kenya to Qatar and Bahrain ... two have gone to Saudi Arabia ... Kosgei ... is Saudi Arabian renamed Al Salhi Mohammed ... Qatar's Ali Thamer Kamel ... was Thomas Kosgei ... Rasheed Essa Ismael ... was Daniel Kipkosgei ... Salem Jamal was Thomas Katui. Others who have quietly defected recently to Bahrain are Isaac Waweru, now Abadeen Eshaaq, John Yego, now Ali Belal Mansour, Bekhait Saleh formerly Simon Mbuthia, Hosea Kipkemboi, Khamees Adam. Denis Sang, Taher Tariq, James Yatich, Faraj Shaheen, Peter Ndegwa ... Khalid Kamal Khalid ... David Nyaga ... Bashir Daham Najim.[8]

Though unsubstantiated it seems plausible that these two Middle East countries are engaged in complex underhand deals with some officials of AK, especially since the matter of citizenship seems riddled with uncertainty. One earlier case was that of the footballer Dennis Oliech (Al Arabi football club in Doha) who turned down a monetary offer to change his citizenship to Qatari. In Oliech's case his mother was quite categorical about the price of citizenship given a name change. Consumerism in the sense of more personalised, less collective public policy

choices seems to be driving the core of the relationships between citizens and the government in the politics of sports.

> Kenyans should forget the multi-million stadium that was supposed to be built at Kiplombe in Eldoret by the Qatari government ... the deal had everything to do with Kenya's Qatar-base footballer Dennis Oliech and not Saif Saeed Shaheen ... only if Oliech defected to Qatar prior to the last African Cup of Nations.[9]

The story of AK when viewed against the tide of defectors sounds like a tired soliloquy, since many of the officials have dominated the organisation for decades. The defectors act as both cultural citizens while at the same time claiming the right to remain in the new society (Turner 1993; Stevenson 1997).[10] Training in Qatar due to its flatness is out of the question for all the athletes. Consequently, apart from Kenya, the Qatar government has established training camps in Morocco, South Africa, Brazil and the United States. The emergence of corporate sponsorship of events that honour athletes is part of the dissatisfaction of the Kenyan public towards the administration of AK. Some of the AK officials have gone to great lengths to defend the question of 'defection' in athletics unlike a similar instance when the footballer Oliech was asked to defect. This had drawn attention to the fact that relevant policies and frameworks for 'defection' need to be put in place. And one athlete who is being touted to take over the mantle of administrative leadership within AK is Paul Tergat, perhaps to make a success of his tenure like athletes such as Sebastian Coe of Britain who have managed sports.

> 'He was paid about $250,000(Kshs 19m). But the incentives are alluring. A World or Olympics gold is worth $100,000(Kshs 7.6m). The figures depend on which medals are won', ... 'Cherono is paid $5,000(Kshs 380,000) per month, Kemboi about $2,000(Kshs 152,000). Recent recruits are being paid $1,000(Kshs 76,000) per month', ... Being paid for life is debatable. I doubt whether the Qataris or Bahrainis will give a damn about them after their active running days', he said, adding: 'This is why I opposed this venture from the start'.[11]

The above sentiments deal with athletic ability that is reduced by a capitalistic system to a commodity, which is only understood in terms of its monetary value and not intrinsic worth and meaning. And herein contained is the question of citizenship and name change. However, in an interview Cherono (Shaheen), gave some of his reasons for defection: the competitive environment for any athlete to make it onto the national

squad; few opportunities available for a career; training costs left to the athlete.

> [Shaheen's mother] was not happy with her son's change of allegiance. But there was little she could do. On the contrary, Shaheen's father Augustine Cherono, an athlete in his youth who chose to marry and start a family early, unlike his training mate Kipchoge Keino, embraced the idea wholeheartedly. In his youth athletics prices came in the form of lanterns, blankets and hoes. 'Not like today when one can live on running', 'I don't care what they call him', he told us. 'He went to secure his future and that is what we all want all young men to do. To me he is still Stephen and when he visits me he will always bring me something'.[12]

Cherono's (Shaheen) defection to Qatar generated controversy principally due to the change in citizenship, the manner in which AK continued to handle the affairs of other younger athletes and the value of the steeplechase. In his 'defection' Shaheen provides for the individual voice, and the political signal he conveyed was one of defiance. Athletics seen as a symbol for unity and nationalism of Kenyans is weakened and portrayed as a sign of resistance. The cultural significance and value of the 3,000 metres steeplechase event in the history of Kenyan athletics is challenged whenever Shaheen wins the event and aligns himself with Qatar symbolically, living out the economic benefits. The steeplechase – a dominant preserve of Kenya – is now threatened with a contested identity shift; whereas the winner is Kenyan the anthem played is Qatari. The symbolic value and meanings the athletes and the nation have attributed to specific races is important in understanding the process of identity (Nyamnjoh 2001).[13] The subjectivity given to the image of athletics enhances a wider understanding of the issue as an important mechanism for local and global interaction.

> Currently thirty percent of the top marathoners in the IAAF rankings are Kenyans. Almost every week a Kenyan runner wins a marathon somewhere in the world ... the marathon is by far Kenya's strongest event, yet quality performances have been elusive in championship events ... as much as the world championships were well paying, there was no appearance fee.[14]

The hidden terrain of the sport in Kenya reveals underlying ethnic tensions and the game of football overtly depicts the ethnic image. But the fact that athletics will continue to contribute to the Kenya economy cannot be disputed. From its early beginnings in the 1960s, these ethnic dimensions were in evidence until the 1990s with the dominance of

athletes from the Rift Valley-Kalenjin community. This scene was punctuated by athletes from the Kisii Highland region, and increasingly in the 1990s the emergence of athletes from Central Kenya. Predominantly, the athletics stable was created by the Armed Forces and it took effort from individuals like Brother Colm O'Connell to develop St Patrick's Secondary School in Keiyo-Marakwet District as a competitive 'search engine' for aspiring athletes. It was here that Cherono (Shaheen – The falcon of Qatar that will soar), began his running career. With the setting up of Qatari 'defectors' training camp in Iten town, an ethnic twist has been added to the debate. The Immigration Minister belongs to the Kalenjin ethnic group and is the Member of Parliament for Marakwet. Why is it that all defecting athletes are from one region? How do these young athletes get their documents processed without authorisation from AK? Who is involved in the negotiations and what are the long-term benefits to the athlete? Responding to some of these questions, below:

> The International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), President Lamine Diack, yesterday asked countries affected by defections to provide incentives for their athletes ... a new rule says no runner can compete under new citizenship until after three years of acquiring it ... Kenya is the hardest hit by defections ... 'It's hard for a starving family to stop their son or daughter from going for US$100,000 (Sh 7.6m) if they defect'.[15]

Yet, the fact remains that athletics in Kenya is controlled by a group of foreign coaches and investors who decide the training programme for the athletes. The role of AK in harmonising all the various facets of athletics has been wanting. Also it becomes imperative that upcoming disadvantaged athletes use successful athletes like Paul Tergat and Tecla Lorupe to inform their knowledge gap especially as far as training programmes and investments are concerned. Two Kenyans during the World Youth Championships in Marrakesh, Morocco in July 2005 falsified their ages to participate in the events. The two, Dennis Kipkurui Keter (Taker Tareq Mubarak) and John Yego (Ali Belal Mansoor) were over-age for the events. The falsifying of ages was attributed to avarice from their Moroccan coach. 'He knows that by using these runners, they can win medals, and this will no doubt build his profile as a coach'.[16]

To avoid the controversy that surrounded Cherono's and Chepkurui's defections, the Italian coach has turned to young runners or those who have not represented Kenya internationally.

> 'He is the one recruiting athletes for the Gulf States in Kenya. They
> have their base in Iten where they stay at Kerio View Hotel' ... 'He has
> made contacts with young villagers through established runners in his
> stable. They have rented houses in Iten and his movements in the vil-
> lages is easy.[17]

The Kerio hotel charges Kshs 4,500 per night (approximately $71),
thus at the regional level providing much-needed business. The activi-
ties of these coaches need to be understood and examined, given the
fact that some training camps are managed under deplorable condi-
tions. Furthermore, in this era of all forms of illicit activities, it is im-
perative for the local authorities to undertake the mandate of oversee-
ing the activities of these coaches. Sentiments expressed by observers
like those below need to be given more scrutiny:

> He enters Kenya on a tourist visa, which does not allow him to engage in
> gainful employment. Yet, he coaches and recruits athletes. He has now
> set up a training camp in Iten being funded by Qatari's, ... He requires a
> work permit endorsed by Athletics Kenya and Kenya National Sports
> Council to engage in what he has been doing in Iten ... he does not only
> contravene Kenya's immigration rules with impunity, but is also deplet-
> ing Kenya's athletics talent ... The Italian coach has disdain for Kenyan
> athletes whom he variously refers to in unflattering terms.[18]

Conclusion

Movement in sport for African governments presents an opportunity
to start a new phase of development and surveillance using approaches
that are suited to the sport and the country's circumstances. Possibili-
ties exist for the Kenyan government to provide guidance and a frame-
work of operation for its athletes who wish to 'defect' for more lucrative
deals. The debate will be lost if the governments concerned agree to be
manipulated by promises that do not materialise, while the moral value
of defection is ignored. If more Kenyans take up the 'defection' offer,
should the government deter them? Or should it aid in this process?
We should enable AK to be more responsive to the needs of athletes in
Kenya, and also build on the success of Shaheen to uplift the standard
of training in Kenya. With the high altitude training camp in Iten many
Kenyans can make use of the facility and it presents an important in-
vestment incentive for those athletes who remain home to train. At the
individual level 'athletics defectors' exist as transnational citizens, who
continue to maintain strong links with home. They are able to develop

adaptive complex, efficient systems to help them meet their training, communication and technological needs and in turn develop the infrastructure of rural areas like Iten and towns like Eldoret. The implications of the actions of 'defectors' by way of remittances channelled via banks or Western Union to the development of Africa is yet to be fully comprehended. Despite the question of name change and identity, the Kenyan government should mobilise this group of runners by using some form of coercive measures to ensure that they invest in Kenya and therefore are an important resource.

> The number of Kenyans heading abroad is worrying the athletics world. 'From a moral point of view, we should avoid this transfer market in athletics. What we don't like is athletes being lured by large incentives by other countries and giving them passports when they arrive at the airport', commented Jacques Rogge, International Olympic Committee President.[19]

Notes

1. Special report in the *Daily Nation*, 1 June 2005, pp. 38-39, Njenga Peter and Macharia David, titled 'Powerful Gulf Cartel behind the Defection of Kenyan Track Stars'.
2. See Castells, Manuel, 1996, *The Rise of the Network Society*. Oxford: Blackwell.
3. Article from *The Standard*, 9 May 2005, p. 39, by Okoth Omulo, titled, 'Kemboi Defects to Qatar, to Run for Gulf State in Helsinki Global Tourney'.
4. Interview in the *Daily Nation*, 17 August 2005, p. 50, by Macharia David and Ouma Stephen.
5. Ondieki Yobes is one of the international athletes that Kenya has developed, running the 10,000 metres under 27 minutes in 1993. Other notable athletes over time, Ondieki notes, are Chelimo Richard, Rono Henry, Ereng Paul, Konchellah Billy, Ngugi John and Sigei William.
6. Interview with Ondieki Yobes in the *Sunday Nation*, 28 August 2005, p. 38, by Peter Njenga in Eldoret.
7. *The Standard*, 9 May 2005, p. 39, by Okoth Omulo, 'Two Officials Manipulated Rules to Push for Qatar Deal'.
8. Article by Okoth Omulo, in *The Standard*, 30 May 2005, p. 34, titled 'Many Young Kenyans are Heading to Gulf States'.
9. Sports article on the Qatari defections in *The Standard*, August 13, 2005, p. 25, titled 'Planned Stadium no More', by Mbaisi Chris.
10. Turner, B., 1993, 'Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship', in Turner, ed., *Citizenship and Social Theory*, London: Sage; Stevenson, N., 1997, 'Globalization, National Cultures and Cultural Citizenship', *The Sociological Quarterly*, 38: 41-66.

11. Article by Okoth Omulo in *The Standard*, 30 May 2005, p, 35, titled 'Exodus to Qatar Intensifies'.

12. Special report in the *Daily Nation*, 1 June 2005, pp. 38-39, by Njenga Peter and Macharia David, titled 'Powerful Gulf Cartel behind the Defection of Kenyan Track Stars'.

13. See, Nyamnjoh, F. B., 2001, 'Concluding Reflections on Beyond Identities: Rethinking Power in Africa', in *Identity and Beyond Thinking Africanicity*, Discussion Paper 12, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, pp. 25-33.

14. *The Standard*, 15 August 2005, p. 35, 'Kenyans Blame Course for Poor Show'.

15. Article by Mbaisi Chris in *The Standard*, 13 August 2005, p. 25, titled 'Good Incentives for Athletes will Cut Down on Defections, States Diack'.

16. Article by Mbaisi Chris in *The Standard*, 26 July 2005, p. 30, titled 'Ex-Kenyan Stars Face IAAF Probe'.

17. Ibid.

18. Article by Okoth Omulo in *The Standard*, 30 May 2005, p. 35, titled 'Exodus to Qatar Intensifies'.

19. Ibid.