

Neo-liberalism, Human Security, and Pan-Africanist Ideals: Synergies and Contradictions

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Introduction

Neo-liberalism and human security have gained prominence in discourses on Africa's political economy in contemporary times. As an ideology or creed neo-liberalism has become synonymous with post-Cold War economic management in several countries. It has come to be seen as the best mode for assuring efficient management of state resources and ipso facto national productive capacities. By further implication, the neo-liberal ideology has not only become the centrepiece of modern economic management practices but is also conceptualised as the best mode for the delivery of an elusive human security, especially in the developing world.

On the other hand, as a concept, human security in Africa has lately assumed critical importance on the basis of the unmitigated slide of Africa into a state of anomie, hopelessness, and helplessness in developmental terms. Human security, conceptualised as the security people should have in their daily lives, not only from the threat of war but also from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards, conforms to the Pan-Africanist ideal in its current usage. This is because the Pan-Africanist ideal is encapsulated in the fulfillment of the developmental aspirations of Africans, both on the continent and in the diaspora. However, the state of African economies is a far cry from the ideal envisaged by Pan-Africanists.

This paper intends to interrogate the tenuous relations between the neo-liberal creed and human security in Africa and Pan-Africanist

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ideals on development, democracy, social enhancement, etc. It is argued that uncontrolled neo-liberalism has supplanted human security in both its classical and modern connotations as well as Pan-Africanist ideals. There is, therefore, the need to infuse neo-liberalism with humanism to suit prevailing African conditions in order to attain the Pan-African ideal construed in terms of rapid economic growth, dignified standard of living, sovereign equity in the comity of nations, etc. The paper delineates the key features of Pan-Africanism, human security, and neo-liberalism with a view to interrogate and tease out both positive and contradictory linkages. The conclusion is that the practice or implementation of neo-liberalism in its classical form is inimical to the ideals embedded in Pan-Africanism and the neo-conceptualisation of human security. Neo-liberalism can be a positive tool for the attainment of Pan-African ideals, which in reality encapsulate human security in the classical and modern senses, only if it is infused with African Humanism to conform to the socio-political conditions in individual African countries.

Pan-Africanist Ideals: Past and Present

Pan-Africanism owes its intellectual origins to Africans in the diaspora who were bent on ending subservience to African colonial overlords who were instrumental in the slave trade and had subjugated Africa for years. The impetus for these diasporan African ideas flowed from the experiences of dispersed Africans who felt emptied of their being ‘through dispossession or slavery, or socially, economically, politically, and mentally through colonialism’. ‘With this loss came enslavement, persecution, inferiority, discrimination, and dependency’. It equally involved a ‘loss of independence, freedom and dignity’.¹ Since the expression of these sentiments, regaining lost dignity has become the mainspring of most actions by Pan-Africanists.

The crystallisation of Pan-Africanist ideals came through the writings and songs of leading Pan-Africanists. The first to be clearly expressed were the concepts of *freedom* and *common identity*. The yearning for the former was because of the bondage in which those

in the diaspora found themselves, and the common identity from the need to ascribe to racial oneness. They perceived their strength in the collective recognition of their common racial stock. The development of the concept *negritude* by Aimé Césaire and its later amplification by Leopold Senghor and of African Personality by Leon Damas flowed from the desire for identity and racial unity in addition to the longings for freedom. Africans studying in the United States and the United Kingdom were deeply attracted to the monumental works of W.E.B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Sylvester Williams, George Padmore and others because their works explicated African conditions and suggested means for dealing with such depressing issues as ignorance, illiteracy, enslavement, colonialism, and many others.

Notable African leaders such as Nkrumah, Azikiwe, Kenyatta etc., were greatly influenced by these early Pan-Africanists. The Pan-African Congresses started by Marcus Garvey in 1900 were the spark that ignited educated Africans to sharpen their wits for the struggles for colonial emancipation. Indeed, these congresses, especially the Manchester Congress of 1945, apart from bringing leading Africans studying across Europe and America together, served as springboards for launching the political careers of many of the immediate post-independence African leaders.

Apart from the yearnings for racial identity and freedom, another ideal to come out without ambiguity was the *equality of all men*. The manifesto of the Fourth Pan-African Congress stated in part: 'we ask in all the world, *that black folk be treated as men*. We can see no other road to peace and progress'.² Part of the resolutions of the pivotal Pan-African Congress of 1945 in Manchester demonstrated what the ideals of the Pan-Africanists were. In the declaration to the colonial powers subsumed under the 1945 resolutions, the desire for *freedom, education, democracy and social betterment* were re-emphasised. What may stand in sharp contrast to current ideological posturing by neo-Pan-Africanists was the critique of monopoly capital and 'the rule of private wealth and industry for private profit alone'.³ This part of the resolution at the Pan-African Congress of 1945 implied that even from its early beginnings Pan-Africanists had cause to assail the monetarist pretensions of economic management embedded in current neo-liberal practices of the Bretton Woods institutions. The belief was that hankering for private profit by

private entrepreneurs was not in the best interest of Africa. This stands in sharp contrast to the current prevailing notion that sees private capital and entrepreneurship as the engine of economic growth and development.

African unity was another favourite theme of the early Pan-Africanists. A united continent with interlinking federations was preferred. There was equally a call for African renaissance and African personality that were to take into account the valuable and desirable heritage of the past and 'marrying it into modern ideas'. African nationalism or loyalty was more preferable than parochial tribal affiliations.

The desire for the regeneration of economic activities in place of the existing colonially structured economy was another ideal that was relentlessly stressed by the early Pan-Africanists. Even though early Pan-Africanists rejected international communism, they expressed a belief in a 'non-exploiting or *communalistic* type of socialism'.⁴ There was also a strong belief in democracy, which was seen as the most desirable mode of government that hinged on the principle of one-man-one vote. However, the type of democracy expressed by some Pan-Africanists leaders after independence ran counter to the liberal democratic principles we know of today. According to George Padmore who also had a great deal of influence on Dr. Nkrumah, 'Panaficanism subscribes to the fundamental objectives of Democratic Socialism, with state control of the basic means of production and distribution'.⁵ With reference to the same democratic mode, Dr. Nkrumah noted:

Democracy, for instance, has always been for us not a matter of technique, but more important than technique - a matter of socialist goals and aims. It was, however, not only our socialist aims that were democratically inspired, but also the methods of pursuit were socialists.⁶

It appears that Dr. Nkrumah's preference for Democratic Centralism, which was the true expression of the socialist technique of democratic engineering, was influenced by George Padmore's Democratic Socialism. The preference for a one party state that came into vogue across the continent in the 1960s was the natural translation of the theoretical ideals of Democratic Socialism or Democratic Centralism into reality.

The foregoing ideals with several potential applications could be summed from the works of the early Pan-Africanists. The struggle for independence and the activities of the immediate post-independence African leaders brought some of these ideals to the centre of politics and sharpened others in consonance with the developmental problems of our time. As poignantly pointed out by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, 'the constitutional implications of Pan-Africanism present to its builders a challenge to create a heaven on earth for African humanity'.⁷ Dr. Azikiwe was emphatic on the need to guarantee human rights for citizens, social security among the workers, and collective security among the populations, and noted that African unity would be strengthened if leaders succeed in resolving the problems created by the processes of social interactions in Africa.⁸ People of African descent laid the foundations of Pan-Africanism in the pre-independence era but the implementation and nurturing of Pan-Africanist thoughts fell into the laps of the immediate post-independence African leaders.

Post-Independence African Ideals

The ideals and philosophies were derivatives of the pre-independence views. Freedom, *economic development*, *racial identity*, *education*, *democracy* etc., were the key components of the ideals. The euphoria that surrounded the attainment of independence ran very deep, and this could be understood from the perspectives of the views of pre- and post-independence African leaders. Independence led to the transfer of the management of African economies that were deficient in capital and human resources into the hands of elected African leaders. There was a strong belief that African leaders could facilitate development faster than could be attained under colonialism. Independence was, therefore, necessary 'for the welfare and well-being of societies characterized by poverty, ignorance and disease, and for the direction of political entities lacking natural cohesion'.⁹

The problems faced by Africa at independence engendered various responses in different countries. These problems included low levels of economic development, lack of social cohesion, high illiteracy levels, the lack of manpower resources, poverty, hunger, diseases, etc. However, the responses from countries in East Africa were

more concrete than in West Africa because they revolved around specific ideological viewpoints. In East Africa, leaders adopted far-reaching strategies that aimed at tackling the developmental problems holistically. In the minds of the leaders concerned, these strategies were the means through which Pan-Africanist ideals could be realised. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania came up with the Arusha Declaration that embodied several concepts such as 'Education for Self-Reliance' and 'Socialism and Rural Development'. The *Ujamaa* or villagisation policies embarked upon later by Julius Nyerere were all aimed at accelerating the development of Tanzania. Priority was given to rural development with socialism rooted in African communal experiences as the guiding principle. Kenneth Kaunda shared similar sentiments with Nyerere but with a humanistic approach, while Kenya favoured a pragmatic African socialism, which in effect was capitalism with an African face. Their colleagues in West Africa expressed similar sentiments that favoured socialist modes of economic management but not in such compact, academic, and holistic vein.

The sum total of their ideals reflected the classical Pan-Africanist notions in the Cold-War context. For instance, in Nyerere's *Freedom and Development*, freedom was contextualised as freedom from external interference in the affairs of Tanzania, freedom from hunger, disease, and poverty, and personal freedom including right to live in dignity and equality, freedom of speech, and freedom from arbitrary arrest. The enjoyment of these freedoms was predicated on economic and social development; in absence of this, national freedoms might be endangered by foreign elements.¹⁰

Human security in its present conceptualisation tallies with the well-thought out ideas expressed by Julius Nyerere in *Freedom and Development* as well as by Kenneth Kaunda in *Humanism: A Guide to the Nation*. Dr. Kaunda enjoined Zambians in particular and Africans in general to remember that in building a man-centred society we should not forget that people are above ideology and man above institutions. He notes: 'Society is there because of Man' and 'whatever we undertake to do we have got to remember that it is Man that is the centre of all human activity'.¹¹ The import is that every action taken should lead to the optimum satisfaction of man. This would imply his security, social welfare, economic well-

being, etc. Kaunda was not dogmatically socialist like Nyerere because 'humanism recognizes the importance of private initiative in the economic development of the Nation. But at the same time, it abhors the exploitation of human beings by other human beings'.¹² Clearly, Kaunda did not see private initiatives in nation building as an exploitation of man by man.

The Kenyan approach which was also termed African Socialism had the following features: political democracy; mutual social responsibility; various forms of ownership; a range of controls to ensure that property is used in the mutual interests of society and its members; diffusion of ownership to avoid concentration of economic power; and progressive taxes to ensure an equitable distribution of wealth and income.¹³

In the West African sub-region, Kwame Nkrumah was much more concerned with the continental political struggles that would lead to a united Africa than to pay heed to a systematised, concrete, and coherent economic blueprint as was the case for instance in Tanzania and Zambia. Most of his writings were basically political treatises with the underlying objective of goading African leaders to realise the essence of a United States of Africa. Where he dealt with economic issues, the pronouncements were political statements couched in the context of a United States of Africa. For instance, in *I Speak of Freedom*, Nkrumah stated with regard to a continental market:

An African Common Market, devoted uniquely to African interests, would more efficaciously promote the true requirements of the African states. Such an African Market presupposes a common policy for overseas trade as well as for inter-African trade, and must preserve our right to trade freely anywhere... Indeed, the total integration of the African economy on a continental scale is the only way in which the African states can achieve anything like the levels of the industrialized countries.¹⁴

It took African leaders 30 years to hammer into place the African Economic Community (AEC) in Abuja in 1991. The political vehicle on which this was to ride had been constituted amid contestations between the Monrovia and the Casablanca groups earlier in 1963.

The post-independence ideals were in consonance with those in the pre-independence days. The only difference was that post-

independence African leaders, as opposed to their pre-independence counterparts, had the vehicle - state machinery - at their disposal to bring to reality what existed in theory and in the minds of the early Pan-Africanists. It could be stated that whereas the ideals expressed conformed to human security in its current and prevailing usage, they did not completely ignore human security in the classical form. Human security appears to be the core of the ideas of Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda. The welfare of man was at the core of Kaunda's political ideals termed humanism. A man-centred ideology would imply an ideology that implicitly has human security as its fulcrum. To what extent were the pre- and immediate post-independence notions of Pan-Africanism reflective of human security in Africa? The dimensions of human security discussed below demonstrate the extent of its conformity or otherwise to the ideals of Pan-Africanism of both the pre and post- independence eras.

Pan-Africanism and Human Security

The quest for freedom, racial identity, the regeneration of economic development, a belief in a non-exploitative mode of economic production, rejuvenation of African moral virtues and cultures, belief in democracy as the most desirable mode of government based on the principle of 'one man one vote' etc., by Pan-Africanists could be seen from the human security perspective in its current usage. Such quests conform to the primary roles of the state, which is 'to provide peace and security for its citizens both within the nation-state and to ensure their protection against threats from outside'.¹⁵ The primary or traditional security threats were assumed to emanate from other states in the international system that had aggressive or adversarial plans. Consequently, traditional security issues were examined in the context of state power where 'the protection of the state... its boundaries, people, institutions and values... was the responsibility and objective of the state. People were presumably assured of their security by the shield of the state'.¹⁶ The OAU Charter talks about maintaining territorial integrity, which implied the protection of the nation state from internal and external attacks. Thus the classical notion of human security whereby the security of the people was

deemed to be assured if the physical territory is well defended or protected was not alien to the immediate post-independence Pan-African leaders. However, Naidoo points out that states and by implication governments must no longer be the primary referents of security because in the post-Cold War era, 'governments which are supposed to be the guardians of their peoples' security have instead become the primary source of insecurity for many people who live under their sovereignty, rather than the armed forces of a neighbouring country'.¹⁷

With the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has been effectively shorn of its militaristic connotation. The classical usage that implied state security and territorial integrity (at times at the expense of the human beings who inhabit the state) has given way to a broader conceptualisation. In the view of Chowdhury, 'For most people of the world, a sense of insecurity comes not so much from the traditional security concerns, but from the concerns about their survival, self-preservation and wellbeing in a day-to-day context'.¹⁸ For these people, 'security meant protection from the threat of diseases, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression, and environmental degradation'.¹⁹ This new conceptualisation brings under the fold of human security the variegated interests of the people. Economic, social, health, and political well-being have all been incorporated in the broader modern day concept of human security. This does not mean that nations are lax on national security construed in terms of military alertness and defense of the motherland. That still remains a noble pursuit but it should not, under any circumstance, be at the expense of broader human security.

The importance of human security is incontrovertible. Human security implies development and development should in reality assure human security. Arguably, the struggles of Pan-Africanists were geared toward socio-economic development that would enhance the living standards of the people. Freedom, which formed the original basis of the thinking of the early Pan-Africanists in the diaspora, is an aspect of development. I have yet to see a developed polity in which people's freedoms are restricted. So if it was an ideal in pre-independent times and still is an ideal, then it is because human security is coterminous with development and an enhanced mode of human existence.

The relevance of human security in the current global situation underlines its central role in the policy orientation of some international organisations and developed countries. 'Ensuring human security is, in the broadest sense, the United Nations' cardinal mission'.²⁰ For instance, human security has steadily and perceptibly become the cornerstone of the foreign policy orientations of Canada, where foreign policy has been geared 'more toward protecting human beings than defending the power of the state'.²¹ It appears then that the current underpinning of Canadian policy is more towards human centredness as enjoined by Kenneth Kaunda's man-centred approach to development. Human security is a package which according to Metta Spencer and others concerns itself with human rights, the establishment of an international rule of law, and the advancement of literacy, food security, health care, political representation and the well-being of the weaker members of the human family.²² In this light, any acceptable conceptualisation of human security for African countries should 'link human security with human development'.²³ because human development is one important means to create human security. Development was perceived as the only means through which the security of the people could be assured. As noted, both concepts are 'complementary and mutually reinforcing. Without one, the other becomes difficult, if not impossible'²⁴ to achieve. Human development, just like human security, is also people-centred, multidimensional and is defined in the space of human choices and freedom. As such, both share a conceptual space. Even though both approaches address those who are already destitute, human security 'has a systematic preventative aspect'. In a more explicit sense, 'while human development aims at *growth with equity*, human security focuses on *downturn with security*'.²⁵ In other words, human security should not be sought only in times of abundance and enhanced economic growth. It is where poverty is biting hard that the search for human security must be intensified.

Pan-Africanism could not have been motivated solely by nationalistic fervour for freedom. Freedom in itself is meaningless if it does not lead to the protection of human dignity. Human dignity is assured where the people are guaranteed food security, health care, education, and effective representation. In the absence of the general

well-being of the people, one cannot meaningfully talk about human security. I believe the early Pan-Africanists and those who followed thereafter were not so naïve as to think solely in terms of African freedom from colonial rule for its own sake. The belief was that political freedom would facilitate rapid economic development that would enhance the living standards of the people. The cries for freedom and racial identity were equally cries for emancipation from economic servitude, degradation, and despicable living standards.

From the onset of the Pan-Africanists movement the question of democracy was never marginalised. Democracy formed an important aspect of the whole struggle. It was obvious that Africans lacked representation in their own countries. They were subjugated politically and economically. Since democracy assures effective representation of the people through the principle of one man, one vote, Pan-Africanists embraced democracy. We have to admit rather sadly that most of the emergent Pan-African leaders veered from this conception of representation that could have assured the people the needed confidence in the government of their countries. Many tinkered with the familiar notion and planted one party states - an affront to democratic governance. Countervailing voices that are known to be crucial to development and governance were stifled, some forever. This clearly was a contradiction of Pan-Africanism.

In all, however, the synergies between Pan-African ideals and human security are very obvious. The mere acceptance of the concept of democracy was in tune with the concept of human security in current usage. Human security could be assured where the people have well defined democratic rights. Modern concepts of human rights, human security and development could all be distilled from the variegated ideals propagated by the early and later-day Pan-Africanists. What has incontrovertibly eluded Africans and has never been manifested to the satisfaction of Pan-Africanists is economic growth and development. Pan-Africanists upon assuming the mantle of leadership in individual African countries had no illusions about the need for rapid economic development, equity, and rule of law, human rights and many others. To a large extent, parts of the ideals have been attained save economic development that can guarantee enhanced living standards of the people.

Several Pan-Africanist-influenced economic development

strategies have been applied by individual countries in addition to several continent-wide development paradigms. These development strategies have run the gamut of African socialism to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Earlier development paradigms had clearly socialist pretensions. Strains of socialism in various forms adopted by several independent states made inroads into continental development strategies such as the Lagos Plan of Action (1980-2000) and the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) (1989). The failure of these programmes was due basically to a lack of financial resources to pursue the desired policies, and since the underpinning ideology contradicted the development philosophy of donors, most of the programmes became stillborn.

Direct external intervention in Africa's development process after independence was reflected in the sponsorship of several structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) by the Bretton Woods Institutions. Structural adjustment programmes had to be adopted against the backdrop of change in the ideological underpinnings of global development processes. Management practices that extolled an inherent socialist approach to management had to be jettisoned for a new paradigm and a way of thinking - neo-liberalism - that was not kind to state management of economic productive activities. The adoption of neo-liberal economic management strategies has been a great challenge to Pan-Africanists and the ideals they have been championing before decolonisation. Given the nature of Pan-Africanist thought, how do these neo-liberal ideals subsumed in economic globalisation conform to or deviate from Pan-Africanist ideals on human security in its current usage? Is neo-liberalism the antithesis of Pan-Africanism?

Neo-Liberalism and Pan-Africanism: Strange Bedfellows?

If neo-liberalism aims at rapid national economic development and growth, then it cannot under any circumstance be said that its ideas conflict with those of Pan-Africanism. However, if the components

of the neo-liberal creed undermine the broader conception of human security in current usage, then arguably it contradicts the aspirations of Pan-Africanists. What then is neo-liberalism? Neo-liberals welcome the triumph of individual autonomy and the market principle over state power.²⁶ While neo-liberals had served a useful historic function of questioning the viability of existing forms of state intervention, they have failed to provide an intellectually successful and workable programme for comprehensively rolling back the state, and achieving their vision of a 'brave new world.'

Neo-liberal political economy rests on the assumption that African development depends, to a large extent, on the downsizing of the state in economic activities. Thus neo-liberalism abhors state intervention in the development process. The neo-partimomial and rent-seeking pretensions of the state in Africa run counter to development, and the statist approach to development distorts markets through misguided policies such as protectionism, non-tariff barriers, overvalued exchange rates, price controls, subsidies, and state monopolies. Indeed, the statist approach of the past has been termed 'wasteful authoritarian intervention' but this is in line with current conceptions that approve a minimalist state and frown upon anything that amounts to statism. the hegemonic political discourse in the post-Cold War era has been strongly neoliberal in both its economics and its politics'.²⁷ If the state is retrenched from participating in economic activities, The market will find its level to the advantage of national development. An efficiently retrenched state will end in the strengthening of civil society and associational life, which will be to the betterment of African development. The phases of structural adjustment programmes were meant, among others,²⁸ 'to "thicken" civil society and thereby generate interest at the level of society in how the state is governed'.²⁹

Democratic centralism, which also meant state control of national economic activities, propelled policy choices in most post-independent African states. The Pan-Africanist leaders were convinced that state participation was sufficient to assure equitable distribution of national resources apart from facilitating full employment and the enjoyment of other economic goods in developing economies. The race towards one party states was equally propelled by the felt need to incorporate all in the development process irrespective of

political creed or thinking. However, this interventionist role of the state came under strenuous attacks in the 1970s when neo-liberalism found its feet. 'From being the cornerstone of development, the state now came to be seen as the millstone holding back a system of market-led development'.³⁰ The failure of state interventionist policies appears to have been amplified by neo-liberal advocates in order to strengthen the basis for advocating the pursuit of minimalist state policies.

Neo-liberals demand a high degree of economic freedom even though 'some evidence suggests that statist intervention in direct support of more equitable growth, including restraints on pure market forces, restrictions on certain property rights, and state-guided rather than radical, trade liberalization' have been more beneficial than the neo-liberal model. By implication, state interventionism, which conforms to the development paradigm favoured by the immediate post-independence Pan-Africanist leaders, proved to be more development orientated than the neo-liberal model, which is clearly anti-state. One writer puts it bluntly that the much-extolled rapid development of the Asian tigers ignores the fact that those East Asian countries were long on aggressive development policy through state intervention and short on democracy.³¹

Neo-liberalism is an attack on big government and bureaucratic welfare state 'with a policy mix based on free trade and the establishment of an open economy'.³² The components of the neoliberal model include the following: economic liberalisation or rationalisation characterised by the abolition of subsidies and tariffs, floating the exchange rate, the freeing up of controls on foreign investment; the restructuring of the state sector, including corporatisation and privatisation of state trading departments and other assets, 'downsizing', 'contracting out', attack on unions and abolition of wage bargaining in favour of employment contracts; and finally, the dismantling of the welfare state through commercialisation and individual 'responsibilisation' for health, welfare and education.³³ Education and health become mere services and products to be traded in the marketplace.

Given the ramifications of neo-liberal economic policies one could argue that their strict implementation has been a great disservice to Africa and has undermined Pan-African ideals. Such

neo-liberal policies call for reductions in public expenditure on services, including education (a sector where massive support is required to assure effective national participation in the global information technology). The concept of privatisation, which is one of the pillars of the neo-liberal ideology, has provided the rationale to reduce the size of the state. As Le Grand and Robinson point out, '... any privatization proposal involves the rolling back of the activities of the state'.³⁴ Basically it involves three main activities that also constitute the modes of state intervention: a reduction in state subsidy; a reduction in state provision; and a reduction in state regulation.³⁵

Pan-Africanists expected a lot from the state in assuring the economic development and growth of the state itself and the well-being of the citizenry. One rationale for the statist policies adopted by the Pan-African leaders was the equalisation of opportunities. The state is deemed apolitical and not likely to discriminate unduly in the disbursement of state largess to the people. Even though this assertion would seem to ignore the fact that human beings with peculiarities operate state institutions, it was believed that inequities emerging from state management of economic resources would comparatively be minimal.

To all intent and purposes, Pan Africanist ideals found a better expression in the statist policies adopted by the immediate post-independent African leaders than in the prevailing neo-liberal model. The dogged pursuit of structural adjustment policies represents the implementation of neo-liberalism in its classic form. The failure of adjustment that engendered recourse to mechanisms that would ameliorate the extreme negative outcomes of the programme such as the Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Consequences of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) in Ghana is just one example of the failure of neo-liberalism and thereby the need to temper such policies with the views and insights of Pan-Africanist thinkers.

The 1980s was the halcyon decade of neo-liberalism as a political philosophy and structural adjustment programmes became the empirical barometer. It was a decade that witnessed unbridled governmental support for the modernising influences of neo-liberalism geared towards state exposure to global economic competition. However, the neo-liberal zeal ended in damaging

several sectors such as education and health, thereby compelling Pan-African leaders to reconsider their unmitigated adherence to the doctrine. As pointed out by Peters, the apparent failure of neo-liberalism in the 1980s led to a turn around in the 1990s but 'this time towards a realization that the dogmatism of the neo-liberal right had become a serious threat to social justice, national cohesion, and to democracy itself'.³⁶ In effect, neo-liberal policies could not guarantee social justice, national cohesion, national development, democracy, and enhanced standard of living. That being the case, the neo-liberal model must be infused with Pan-Africanist ideals that extol some level of state intervention, if not absolute statism, especially state ownership of key industries, and state support for education and health, in addition to the provision of the necessary conditions that will assure human security. That is to say that a blend of neo-liberalism with sound Pan-Africanist ideals that perceive man as the centre of all political and economic initiatives will augur well for African development and human security than is the case through the instrumentality or the zealous implementation of classical neo-liberal orthodoxy.

Conclusion

It is clear that there is some level of coherency and consistency in Pan-Africanist thought and ideals over the years. Pan-Africanist viewpoints on issues such as economic growth and development, human security, human rights, general national aspirations, and so forth are unambiguous. Embedded in several statements or pronouncements by past and present African leaders or Pan-Africanists was the need for concerted continental, and indeed, global actions to deal with diseases, poverty, ignorance or illiteracy, environmental degradation, governmental transparency, accountability, full employment etc. etc. That most African countries, after over a decade of neo-liberal economic management practices, are still basket cases makes this call for global action more compelling than ever. The political future of Africa is tied more or less to the economic well-being of the generality of the people. As it stands now, the synergies between Pan-Africanism and

neo-liberalism are few while the contradictions are legion. There is, however, a perfect agreement between Pan-Africanism and human security in its current usage. All that remains is to ensure concerted global and continental actions that will strengthen and, indeed, enhance human security whilst minimising the negativities of neo-liberalism. It does not appear, as the experiences of the last two decades show, that neo-liberal economic practices will fulfill the aspirations of Pan-Africanists of the past, the present and the future. In other words, what matters most in the face of the apparent failure of neo-liberalism is adjusting neo-liberalism to suit Pan-Africanist legacies of the past and the requirements of the present as well as expectations in the future.

Notes

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12. Ibid. 116.
13. Ibid. 136.

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Julius Nyerere: The Intellectual Pan-Africanist and the Question of African Unity

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Abstract

The question of African unity has dominated political and intellectual discourse for quite a while, yet the approach, mechanism and substance seem to be ever elusive. The rhetoric has raised so much dust it has blinded political leaders as to the concrete measures that need to be undertaken. To Julius Nyerere, the quest for unity, both nationally and continentally, was a lifetime undertaking and commitment, the lifeline for the emancipation and development of African people. Nyerere will forever be remembered for pushing and spearheading the growth of Kiswahili in East and Central Africa, which epitomized his belief that Kiswahili could promote African unity, just as it had done in Tanzania. He gave content and meaning to Tanzania's independence by recognising the role of an indigenous language in the development of cultural authenticity and national unity. To him, pan-Africanism meant self-determination in political, economic, ideological, social and cultural spheres. As globalisation witnesses growing nationalism in other continents of the world (such as pan-Europeanism in Europe), and as Africa faces the prospect of increased marginalisation, African thinkers, intellectuals and literary icons such as Ali Mazrui, Chinua Achebe, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Okot P'Bitek and Wole Soyinka have made passionate pleas for a cultural re-awakening, which they see as a first step towards social, political and economic growth. It is the thesis of this paper that by drawing from Nyerere's example, African renaissance and the dream of pan-Africanism shall be realised and that Africans shall not only discover themselves and uphold their identity but also appreciate the inherent power enshrined in their cultural heritage. It is argued that over-reliance on imperialist colonial languages—which by and large are emblazoned with Western world views, cultural values and ideals—

is in fact neo-colonial and therefore detrimental to African unity and the spirit of pan-Africanism. A common indigenous language will not only foster unity but accommodate and manage diversity, express identity and articulate concerns for collective action and shared solutions to achieve growth and development.

When you recognise that so many of the surrounding nation states are riven by horrendous ethnic and tribal divisions, what Nyerere accomplished seems almost miraculous.¹

Tanzania illustrates the potential for ethnic harmony in a racially diverse setting. With an estimated 120 ethnic groups, it has avoided all ethnic conflict or political appeal to linguistic units. National unity cuts across ethnic boundaries, leading to a widespread rejection of tribalism. This outcome can be attributed to former president Julius Nyerere's integrative political efforts and his government's promotion of Swahili as a common language.

Introduction

The patriarchs of pan-Africanism may be gone but the fire they ignited is still burning. Pan-Africanism has generated more rhetoric and literature and dominated political discourse perhaps more than any other issue. Though the achievements of the movement can be considered modest, this has not killed the spirit, desire and belief in getting strength out of unity. It is generally recognised, and therefore need not be overemphasized, that unity remains 'an objective worth pursuing if Africa is to benefit from economies of scale in her industrialisation process'.²

Julius Kambarage Nyerere, or simply Mwalimu, stands out as a relentless pan-Africanist who sought the unity of the African people with a passion. In his tribute to Mwalimu, Jacob Zuma, Deputy President of South Africa, aptly summarized Nyerere's career thus:

Mwalimu, the teacher who taught the African continent about peace, democracy and unity - Mwalimu, the freedom fighter who became one of the founding fathers of the Organisation of African Unity, he laid the foundation for the African continent to start its long and arduous road towards peace and unity.³

The bold cultural choice that Mwalimu made by adopting an indigenous language was not only a rejection of Euro-centricity but an instrument that could facilitate social integration and unity of the people, both nationally and continentally. Mwalimu did not tolerate the balkanisation of Africa, and in one of his speeches he expressed his displeasure that:

Politically we have inherited boundaries which are either unclear or such ethnologically and geographical nonsense that they are a fruitful source of disagreements... the present boundaries must lose their significance and become merely a demarcation of administrative areas within a large unit (Nyerere 1966:212).

Julius Kambarage Nyerere is therefore remembered as a pan-Africanist who lived his entire life pursuing unity both at the national and at the continental level. He cherished a strong belief that only in unity can strength be found to tackle other challenges of life. He understood that the question of development is inextricably linked to whether or not a majority of the people are included in decision making by virtue of being conversant with the language of governance. And this he did by example. Neither did he believe in continued dependence on foreign languages to articulate African concerns, as this tended to retard pan-Africanism. Mwalimu's linguistic nationalism traversed national boundaries, and its ultimate objective was to secure unity and solidarity for all Africans for greater growth, development and security. It is further demonstrated that Kiswahili has been successfully used in social integration and national unity in Tanzania, and therefore can do the same for Africa.

Nyerere: Background and Political Career

Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere was born in 1921 in Butiama, in the north of Tanzania, to the eastern shore of Lake Victoria, to a colonial chief of the Zanake ethnic group. Describing Mwalimu's early life, Iliffe (1979:508) talks of him as 'a first generation convert of sparkling intelligence who had been the archetypal mission boy and whose academic success had carried from local primary school to Tabora, Makerere and finally Edinburgh university in October 1949'.

During his stay abroad, he associated very closely with George Padmore, the West Indian pan-Africanist who had been Kwame

Nkruma's mentor. Imbued with the spirit of pan-Africanism, Mwalimu returned to Tanganyika in 1952. He arrived back at a time of rising political agitation against British rule. No sooner had he taken up his old job as a school teacher in St. Francis school Pugu near Dar es Salaam than he plunged into politics. He got involved in political agitation against the British colonial authority. On being elected president he turned an otherwise moribund Tanganyika African Association into a formidable political party, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), in 1954. Once described by an American official at the United Nations as a 'symbol of African hopes, African dignity and African successes,'⁴ Mwalimu carved himself a reputation as a most respected and staunch pan-African statesman whose qualities of warmth, humility and oratory skills captivated the public and helped to win widespread support for TANU.

On ascending to the helm of TANU, Mwalimu guided Tanganyika through the various steps towards independence. Tanganyika attained internal self government in May 1961 and Nyerere became Prime Minister. Complete Independence was granted on December 9, 1961 and a year later, in 1962, the Republic of Tanganyika was proclaimed with Nyerere as president. Nyerere was to be president until 1985 when he voluntarily stepped down.

During his tenure as president, Nyerere ensured peace and unity for Tanzanians, who were made to actively take part in the governance of the country. His political contribution traversed Tanzania's borders. More than any other leader in Africa, he played an important role in the independence struggle of countries still under colonial rule and in dismantling apartheid in South Africa. He was an innovator who crafted his own form of ideology in African socialism: Ujamaa, which was meant to dismantle endemic dependence on Euro-American economic and political ideologies.

As a relentless pan-Africanist he provided sanctuary to resistance movements from Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and South Africa. Despite his country's weak economic base, he gave his all materially and morally. When Idi Amin subjected Ugandans to injustices, Nyerere was there to provide sanctuary, material and moral support to the liberation struggle. Nowhere did his efforts fail to accomplish their mission. Nyerere died of leukaemia trying to make and restore peace in war-torn Burundi. The cruel hand of

death did not give him time to accomplish his mission. Even unto death, he has remained a most honoured 'Father of the Nation,' as the national radio service allocates him 30 minutes daily to speak to the people he left behind.

Nyerere's Vision and Linguistic Nationalism

When Mwalimu Nyerere became president of TANU in 1954, a new constitution was adopted which was to lead the country into independence. It stressed peace and equality and abhorred tribalism and discrimination. A staunch socialist, Mwalimu envisaged an independent, free and self-reliant people. Speaking about the role of education in achieving this goal, Nyerere (1968:74) avers that education '...must encourage the growth of the socialist values we aspire to. It must encourage the development of a proud independent and free citizenry which relies upon itself for its development'.

Pride, independence, freedom and self-reliance related not only to political liberation for Tanzania but also to economic, social and cultural spheres. In fact Mwalimu was cognizant of the Euro-centric cultural tyranny that was imposed on Africa during the colonial era and the need to provide a framework in which indigenous cultural practices could be safeguarded. It's no wonder that he personally spear-headed pursuits aimed at authentic African cultural expression and liberation. This he did by adopting a language policy which recognised African culture.

Right from the time of TANU's inauguration in 1954, deliberate steps and measures were taken to develop, promote and popularise Kiswahili, an indigenous African language. Thus Kiswahili was the ideal tool to galvanise the people in the struggle for independence. Soon after independence in 1961, the TANU government made Kiswahili the national language and a year later it was declared the official language. To demonstrate his resolve, Mwalimu Nyerere delivered his speech in Kiswahili. The years that followed saw policies formulated to develop and promote Kiswahili as the language of the masses, the common man. This had the immediate effect of arousing feelings of cultural nationalism and cultivated equality of all citizens.

The decision to make Kiswahili the language of policy,

government, politics, education and commerce ensured popular involvement in government and decision-making processes. Thus the language policy adopted by Mwalimu Nyerere fostered social cohesion and unity. People did not feel alienated. It widened the range of political leadership as all citizens had equal opportunity to vie for any position, the pre-requisite being only the knowledge of Kiswahili. Opportunities were flung open for people with no knowledge whatsoever of foreign tongues. These gave the citizens a sense of involvement in the running of their country. A sense of identity was created in them.

In the schools, Kiswahili was the language of instruction in primary schools and adult education programmes. Commenting on this policy Mazrui & Tidy (1984:30) write that '...the children are nationalized with a common language which is also an African language and which gives them a sense of common cultural identity'. Similar sentiments are echoed by Khamisi (1991:104), 'Swahili which will increasingly provide the medium through which peasants and workers exchange ideas has been made the medium of instruction throughout the primary school system and adult education'.

On the part of the government, several steps were taken to enhance Kiswahili's status. Among these initiatives, the government created the position of Promoter of Kiswahili who was charged with promoting and expanding Kiswahili usage in government business as well as the dissemination of research findings. This was followed by the establishment of a National Swahili Council, which took over all the functions of the Promoter of Kiswahili. On the other hand the Institute of Education was charged with among other things publication of books, while the University of Dar es Salaam offered courses in Kiswahili language, literature and linguistics.

The government also sponsored literary competitions which in turn increased literature in Kiswahili. Mwalimu himself not only used Kiswahili in his discourses but he also wrote widely. For example he authorised several political and religious poems and translated some of Shakespeare's plays. This had the effect of putting Africa on the map of global literate civilisations and demonstrated Kiswahili's inherent capacity to absorb and express complex and philosophical ideas from other civilizations in the world.

Some authors have ascribed the promotion of Kiswahili to

other factors, for example Wright (1965:48) argues that, 'the early radicalism of German policy made Swahili the language of power, the interwar conservatism ensured it a broad popular base. Together they have given Tanganyika a priceless asset, a national language'. Others like Legere (1991:120) enumerate several factors including trade, wage-labour in plantations, road constructors, and urbanization, which made the adoption of Kiswahili by the independent government a matter of course. He agrees with the Marxist-Leninist approach 'that the emergence of a national language is a complicated and protracted process which cannot be accomplished at one stroke by a legislative act' (1991:120).

These factors notwithstanding, it's the position of this paper that what Mwalimu did was a deliberate and bold cultural experiment which has no corollary elsewhere in Africa. He did not exhibit the kind of cultural self-contempt which makes other people treat the acquisition of foreign tongues as a status symbol. He was at liberty to opt for a foreign language instead of Kiswahili, but did not do so, even though prevailing linguistic circumstances were hostile to Mwalimu's efforts. This is adequately captured by Khamisi (1991:96):

Linguistically the nation was tri-focally stratified. There was the class of those who could operate only in Swahili or the tribal language or English....yet in terms of status perhaps a bifocal division....English held high status and Swahili and the rest of the tribal languages a low status in society. Those who spoke and wrote reasonably in English belonging to the privileged group, socio-economically and those who did not were the good for nothing.... If all the linguistic climate was unfavourable or negative for Kiswahili, people's attitudes, including those of Swahili speakers themselves, were no better either.

But Mwalimu's intervention marked a turning point in all this. With Kiswahili's status elevated, the peoples, outlook changed as they discovered their own selves, their lost dignity, their own institutions, culture and all that they had lost either through their own or through foreign influences (Khamisi 1991:96). Thus Kiswahili became embedded in the political and ideological work, social organisations, administrative bodies, the security organs, parliament and other representative bodies, education, industry, agriculture, trade, transport, telecommunication, media, etc. Kiswahili became the

language to create a national culture and preserve major parts of Tanzania's rich cultural heritage and develop its cultural life (Legere 1991:124).

Why Kiswahili?

All African languages are capable of development and promotion as languages of wider communication and media of education, both at formal and informal levels. Indeed all living languages are equal and no one language is superior to another in thought and action. The misconception that African languages are lexically poor or incapable of expressing abstract ideas (Alexandre 1972:33) is a banal fallacy. Every language is equally endowed with an infinite capacity to meet the demands of its users.

But the prevailing linguistic situation does not make matters any easier in terms of finding the most suitable unifying language. Africa boasts of a linguistic heterogeneity of more than one thousand languages. There are 50 languages of wider communication, which enjoy a speakership of more than a million people. Of these 50, 47 are spoken in more than one state. Creole, Fulfulde and Yoruba are some of the most widespread, with Fulfulde spoken in 13 countries. Then there are sub-continental languages used by more than 30 million persons, namely Hausa, Kiswahili and Arabic.⁵

Arabic may not endear itself well in sub-Saharan Africa due to historical and political reasons, as well as the fact that this will entail a completely new orientation in terms of learning Arabic characters. On the other hand Hausa has on occasions faced ethnic rivalry from southern Nigeria (Indakwa 1978:76). Of all the languages of wider communication, Kiswahili is ethnically neutral; only a small minority of those who speak Kiswahili speak it as a first language, and they do not constitute an ethnic group in the usual sociological sense. As Mazrui and Tidy (1984:327) put it, 'the group is an ethnically or culturally mixed and diffuse community at the east African coast, not politically strong enough to arouse the linguistic jealousy of other groups'.

Similar sentiments are echoed by Chimera (1998:2), 'the original speakers of the language, the Waswahili of Kenya, Tanzania, and

Mozambican coasts are, on the whole an extremely detribalised polity....' While agreeing with what Chimera (1998) and others say about the relative advantages of Kiswahili, Roscoe (1977:4) adds that what sets the language apart is 'its classlessness, its status of people's language, its lack of identification with Mandarin groups and elitist castes'.

Kiswahili enjoys a rich literary tradition, and those who speak it were estimated by the BBC in 1995 to be more than one hundred and ten million (Chimera 1998:149). Some of the countries where a sizeable population speaks Kiswahili include Malawi, Zambia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Somalia, Madagascar, the Comoros, Mozambique, Oman, Ethiopia, Sudan, and of course Kenya and Tanzania where almost the entire population are fluent speakers.

Kiswahili is offered as a foreign language subject in more than 100 universities across the United States of America, Britain, Germany, South Korea, and Ghana. Radio programme broadcasts are found in South Africa, Britain, Germany, Russia, USA, China, India, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. In Kenya and Tanzania Kiswahili enjoys full-time Kiswahili services.

It is no wonder therefore that Kiswahili has been mentioned time and again as the ideal language of social integration in Africa. No lesser a person than the first African Nobel Laureate (Literature), Wole Soyinka, has added his voice to this call. While addressing the Union of Writers of the African Peoples on the 27th February 1976, he said

The union finds it regrettable that twenty years have been wasted since the Second Congress of African Writers in Rome recommended the adoption of one language for the African peoples. Resolved to end this state of inertia, hesitancy, and defeatism, we have, after much serious consideration and in the conviction that all technical problems can and will be overcome, unanimously adopted Swahili as the logical language for this purpose. We exhort all writers to apply every strategy, individually and collectively on both national and continental levels to promote the use and enrichment of Swahili for the present and the future needs of the continent⁶

With Africa looking into itself to seek solutions to the myriad of problems beleaguering it, Kiswahili is the language of the re-awakening and renewal.

Challenges for African Renaissance

Pan-Africanism was born out of a realization that African people were a downtrodden group and that they are not only culturally related but also share similar problems and aspirations. It therefore made sense to pull together for mutual support to liberate themselves and even to have a more effective voice in the affairs of the world (Akintoye 1976, July 1992, Ward 1967). It is this realisation that ignited the desire and the quest for eventual unity for all the Africans, and even the coming together of the black people in Diaspora. The quest began in earnest in the early part of the twentieth century.

The initial players in the pan-African movement were intellectuals and thinkers from this continent and blacks in the Diaspora. The attainment of Ghana's independence in 1957 marked a second phase in pan-Africanism with the players taking political leadership and a more pro-active role in the liberation of the whole continent from colonialism, by not only strengthening the spirit of challenge to colonialism but also giving practical support to the movement to liberate Africa.

With more countries attaining their independence from colonialism, it was realized early by the political leaders that the fragile nation-states, born out of the accidents of history that colonialism had bequeathed to Africa, would be too weak, too poor, too politically vulnerable to serve the needs of her peoples after the heroic struggle for independence (Nyong'o 2000:3). For example Kwame Nkrumah believed that Africa could never be truly independent of the former colonial powers unless it was strong, and it could only be strong if it was politically and economically united (Mazrui and Tidy 1984:343). Nkrumah's belief was shared by many other progressive pan-Africanists, among them, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Madibo Keita of Mali and Nyerere of Tanzania. Writing about the essence of unity for the Africans, Nyerere (1966: 336) asserts that :

Africa wishes to have the political strength to prevent other powers using her for their own ends, and it wishes to have the economic strength to justify and support a modern economy, which is the only basis on which prosperity can come to its people....For each one of us is so weak in isolation....

It is for this concern for unity and solidarity that the pan-Africanist movement established institutions and organs to deal with specific needs, with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) established in 1963, being the most prominent. It was envisaged that continental or regional cooperation could be expressed via the OAU. The OAU was to not only coordinate and intensify cooperation but it was thought to be a precursor of ultimate unity and solidarity of the African states.

A few successes in Africa are attributable to the OAU. In the Nigerian civil war, 1967–1970, the OAU intervention contributed to the ultimate settlement, and was partly responsible for restraining the world powers from interfering and turning the conflict into an international one (Akintoye, 1976). The OAU has also prevented some disputes from developing into full-scale wars. The liberation movement received moral and material support from the OAU. Internationally the OAU enabled African countries to speak with a united voice on world issues, increasing the influence of Africa at the United Nations and the world generally.

But after about four decades, the achievements of the OAU have been so modest that the original goal of facilitating and speeding up the goals of the pan-African movement have not been realised. Rather the movement has undergone a number of hurdles, owing to the unwillingness of some political leaders to surrender part of their countries, sovereignty for the sake of African unity. The tragic consequence of this procrastination has been the proclamation of unity as the ultimate goal of pan-Africanism by the political leaders while at the same time failing to agree on the approach and substance let alone the meaning of the term “unity”. Lamenting about this curious scenario, Nyerere (1966:334) says,

For many years African politicians from all parts of the continent have called for African unity. They have presented the political and economic arguments for it, and left details alone. But this cannot continue much longer. Hard thought and detailed negotiations have now to replace slogans if the objective is to be attained.

It is due to the OAU poor showing as a pan-African institution with clear goals of achieving unity and solidarity for the African people that a need was felt to rename it the African Union (AU). It is envisaged that the new outfit will deliver what the former failed to deliver. In fact for the pan-Africanist that Mwalimu Nyerere was, the

issue of unity, whether at the national or continental levels was not just a mere slogan. It was a lifetime undertaking and commitment. It was part and parcel of the development of the African people.

It is no wonder that as early as in 1958, Mwalimu invited nationalist colleagues from East and Central Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Zanzibar and Malawi to meet in Mwanza to form the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMEYA), whose immediate objective was to co-ordinate the struggle for freedom and independence for all the territories. In 1962, this organisation was expanded to include other countries, namely those of southern Africa, thus becoming the Pan-Africa Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA).

The creation of the OAU was therefore a watered down version of what the real pan-Africanists had in mind. Referring to this turn of events Nyong'o (1990:4) writes:

Instead of establishing a vibrant and active continental organisation which would destroy colonialism and build on its ruins, Africa created a club that was more content with the past achievements of its members than on the creative energies of their highest aspirations.

While the quest for unity and solidarity of the African people seems to elude the political leaders and as the intellectuals and thinkers seem to be sidelined from responding to the challenges of sustaining independence and making it meaningful for the broader populace, Africa seems to slide into deeper crises. Inter-state and intra-state conflicts are a common occurrence, while social, political and economic woes seem to multiply by the day. The African continent remains the most underdeveloped of the third world continents. Mazrui and Tidy (1984) observe that by the close of the seventies, Africa had 7.5% of the world's population yet it only enjoyed 1.2% of global Gross National Product, with illiteracy standing at 74% compared to Asia's 47% and Latin America's 24%. Africa also trails in statistics of life expectancy, infant mortality, and public health expenditure and energy consumption. They regret that attempts at political and economic co-operation between African states in an effort to overcome balkanisation and related poverty have been limited in scope and lacking in positive results (Mazrui and Tidy 1984:326–7).

It is the submission of this paper that to accomplish the pan-

African goals and objectives, realise a renewal and a reawakening for the African people, Africa must embrace a new approach. The new approach rests on recognition of the role of language, an indigenous African language, which will not only facilitate social integration but also spur technological and economic prosperity. It must be realised that continued reliance on imperfectly mastered foreign languages retards ingenuity and performance in scientific and technical pursuits. This hampers economic growth, political stability and social cohesion.

It clearly appears that lack of meaningful unity and solidarity of the African peoples is a result of failure by the players to recognise and appreciate the inherent power enshrined in our cultural heritage which can be harnessed to foster social integration. The leaders have completely overlooked an enviable tool to galvanize the populace. There is total absence of linguistic nationalism in Africa than say India or Malaysia or Bangladesh. Echoing Sedar Senghor's sentiments, Mazrui and Tidy (1984: 298) observe that one of the obstacles to cultural liberation has been an excessive emphasis on political and economic liberation as processes in themselves, divorced from the struggle for cultural independence:

.... Cultural decolonisation is more fundamental than many have assumed. Yet cultural imperialism 'obscures awareness', making it the most dangerous form of colonialism.⁷

Accordingly 'the lack of political will for an economic transformation may in part be due to a state of mental and cultural dependency.' (Mazrui and Tidy 1984:298). It is a painful legacy of Western civilization that whatever comes from there is the best. This myth is reinforced by tailoring its educational, cultural and social values to Europeanize and de-Africanize the African via European languages and culture. The acquisition and imitation of these languages and culture was rewarded thoroughly and made a status symbol. Those who learned these languages tended to despise those who did not. They identified more with the colonisers, as they out-did each other in speaking the foreign tongue with eloquence. This had to do with maintaining intercourse with the masters and by securing the opportunities availed by such knowledge. Describing the situation then Emerson (1962:136) writes:

The imperial languages were of course tied to the prestige system of the white since the Whiteman, with the partial exception of the missionary and the scholar, generally learned the local languages as an act of grace or better to rule or trade with the subordinate peoples where it was assumed that the native who wanted to advance must rise to the level of the foreign language.

The result was that indigenous languages were despised by the elites. But as Ngugi wa Thiongo remarks, “when you hate your own language, therefore you hate who you are, and you hate your neighbour.”⁸

It must be recognised and emphasized that it is only through language that we can understand ourselves more fully as well as be able to understand others, that we can enhance our cultural identity and development of our personality.

Thus foreign languages have tended to divide society along the lines of social status. Those who can speak these languages are a minority, yet they are the well-to-do in society owing to the opportunities availed by the foreign languages. On the other hand these languages deny opportunities for the majority of the people who have no access to them. The majority of the people are segregated from the communicative process that is fundamental to the economic, social, political and cultural structures of the modern state. How then can development take place when the majority are not involved?

Pan-Africanism has also been a victim of foreign languages. In the early sixties, different regions of Africa were divided linguistically due to loyalty to different former colonial masters, thus there existed the Anglo-phone and the Franco-phone African countries. For example, the latter formed the Brazzaville Group in 1960, which was later changed to the Afro-Malagasy Organisation for Economic Cooperation (OAMEC) in 1961 in Yaoundé. When it changed its name to Afro-Malagasy Union (UAM), it immediately signed a defense pact with France. In 1965 the name was changed to Organisation Commune Africaine et Malagasy (OCAM) Common Organisation of Afro-Malagasy States. This Organisation even set up a joint company: Air-Afrique. Though these differences seem to be downplayed currently, the then linguistic schisms in commonwealth (Anglo-phone) and French community (Franco-phone) tended to

arouse political differences. Continued dependence on foreign languages to articulate African concerns will not realise the dream of pan-Africanism. Mazrui and Tidy (1984:300) have articulately argued that:

English and French are invaluable in various ways for modern African development: they help integrate Africa in world culture, and they are politically neutral in the context of Africa, multi-ethnic societies. But they do not necessarily help to overcome the crisis of national integration which is one of the most fundamental political problems facing African countries.

There is therefore the need to rediscover our own languages not only for social integration but also to enhance our cultural identity and guarantee an effective development of the African personality in terms of self-reliance, self-confidence, resourcefulness and innovativeness. Neo-colonialism and imperialism will be things of the past, and Africa will develop a continental identity. Stressing the need for promotion and use of African languages Roscoe (1977:4) writes:

African aspirations, ideally, should be expressed in African language. How can national hopes, with their special nuances rising from traditional societies and their values inherited from a non-European ethic, resonate in people's hearts via a language which is firstly alien, the product of a foreign way of life and world view and secondly spoken by only a small minority?

Mwalimu Nyerere's rejection of Euro-centricity forged a national unity and identity by promoting Kiswahili as the national and official language. In fact he will be remembered forever for one of his greatest contributions, that of pushing the growth of Kiswahili in east and central Africa. Mwalimu believed, with good reason, that Kiswahili could promote African unity, just as it had done in Tanzania. This should serve as a wake-up call for Africans to emulate Mwalimu.

Conclusion

Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere is undeniably one of the greatest and most respected statesman Africa will ever have. He was a relentless pan-Africanist, whose quest for peace, freedom and solidarity both nationally and continentally will be missed by all.

His bold language experiment has been examined in the light of restoration of cultural dignity and identity of the African people. In so doing he was able to detribalise and cement his country with social cohesion and integration. Language has an overwhelming capacity of bonding people together. People who speak one language are united by the ease with which they can communicate.

Africa needs to keep alive the dream and vision of Mwalimu Nyerere for a shared destiny of the African people. The full realization of our being lies in our collective as Africans. Our freedom, strength, dignity, survival and prosperity as a people depend on our unity as Africans, for only in unity can strength be found.

Having already proven itself as a resilient tool of integration, Kiswahili is the ideal instrument to bridge the linguistic barriers which retard pan-Africanism. This has been demonstrated by Nyerere in Tanzania. Kiswahili has a rich literary tradition, it is widespread with more than one hundred million speakers, it is non-tribal with no political overtones, and it has an overwhelming capacity for modernity, science, technical and complex philosophical concepts. It has a capacity as a tool, to re-ignite the pan-African fire which seems to be in a state of limbo. Kiswahili is therefore the social force that can build the Africa of the future. There can be no better way to remember Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere.

Endnotes

- 1 See UNICEF tribute to Nyerere in *Chicken Bones: A Journal for Literacy & African-American Themes*. (Available On-Line: <http://www.nathanielturner.com/index.html>).
- 2 See the World Bank study 'Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth,' cited by Nyongo (1990:12).
- 3 Available On-Line at <http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/speeches/1999>.
- 4 See *Chicken Bones: A Journal for Literacy & African-American Themes*. (Available On-Line: <http://www.nathanielturner.com/index.html>).
- 5 See UNESCO (1985).
- 6 See Killam(ed) (1984), cited by Chimera (1998:149).
- 7 See Sedar Senghor (1968), In *Presence Africaine*, cited by Mazrui

and Tidy (1984:298).

8 See Ngugi wa Thion'go in the Sunday Standard, 28th September 2003.

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The African Union and the Destiny of Africahood: The Southern Africa Development Community and Neo-colonial Challenges to Pan-Africanism

Godfrey Chikowore

Introductory keynotes

“Only a united Africa can redeem its past glory, renew and reinforce its strength for the realization of its destiny. We are today the richest and yet the poorest of continents, but in unity our continent could smile in a new era of prosperity and power”, Kwame Nkrumah, President of the first independent Sub-Saharan African State of Ghana 1957. Abraham Knife, Challenges and prospects of Pan-African Economic Integration. (http://:eiipd.org/publications/occasional%20papers/pan_african_eco_integration.htm). 23 October 2003.

“To dominate a people is, above all, to take up arms to destroy, or at least to neutralize, to paralyze, its cultural life. For, with a strong indigenous cultural life, foreign domination cannot be sure of its perpetuation. The value of culture as an element of resistance to foreign domination lies in the fact that culture is the vigorous manifestation on the ideological or idealist plane of the physical and historical reality of the society that is dominated or to be dominated. Culture is simultaneously the fruit of a people`s history and a determinant of history, by the positive and negative influence which it exerts on the evolution of relationships between man and his environment, among men or groups of men within a society, as well as among different societies”, Amilcar Cabral, the late President of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. Centre of Pan African Culture. (<http://:hierographics.org/cpacdefined.htm>). 14 October 2003.

“The reality today is that we cannot treat the UN system as given. The institutional arrangements in place were relevant only for a specified period and must inevitably be adapted, transformed or even radically modified as material circumstances have changed and prevailing meanings, practices and purposes have been challenged by new inter-subjective voices,..., what is good for a goose must surely be good for a gander. The present autocracy in global governance must be challenged stoutly so all nations, big or small, have equal say and equal power in the way we govern world affairs”, President Robert Gabriel Mugabe of Zimbabwe at the 58th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. (Herald Sept 27, 2003)

Introduction

With the model of the State in Africa remaining typically an imported one, former colonial powers perceive it their right to extend economic, political and cultural civilization to Africa. Consequently, most former colonies were established in the image of the colonizing master with the constitutional apparatus essentially drawn from the same source. Over time this controversial development has had other consequences which effectively postponed Africahood, meaning the African foundations to all development processes in resonance with the Greater World.

Concentrating much on the political dimension of Africa, the predecessor institution, that is the Organization of the African Unity (OAU) beyond conviction, ensured the political independence of African States but the foundations of the same newly independent states, with regard to African development, were hardly consolidated in social, economic, political, cultural, historical, scientific and technological terms. This essentially means that neo-colonialism is still deeply entrenched in the newly independent African States.

With the evolution of the OAU into the African Union (AU), addressing the economic challenges of Africa—especially after the devastating experiences of economic Structural Adjustment Programs and globalization—the problem of consolidating the pan African foundations of state and nation building on the continent remains equally urgent. Considering the SADC as one of the pivotal

building blocks of the African Union, and the position it currently occupies against the neo-colonial tendencies, especially ‘the land question’ in Zimbabwe, it would therefore be morally sound to give a more Afro-centric strategic impetus to the regional cooperation and integration in Southern Africa. Such an approach would mean institutionalization of the problem on consolidating the Pan-African foundations of development on the continent and giving specifically Afro-centric content to the regional development projects and programs, which would finally contributed to the overall Africa development program.

In the light of the above ideological perceptions, therefore, this contribution seeks to:

- explore the opportunities and constraints experienced by African States in the SADC in their efforts to give the pan-African content and meaning to development projects and programs in Southern Africa since the early 1980s to date;
- critically assess the Pan-African foundations of the economic, political, social, ideological, cultural, historical, scientific and technological choices African governments in the SADC made then and the consequences;
- suggest recommendations on the inevitability of consolidating integrated Pan-African foundations and approaches in development processes in the SADC as a strategy on securing the position and destiny of Africa as a greater competitor both within its limits and in the global setting.

Definition of the topic

For purposes of guiding this engaging debate in a constructive manner, which would facilitate the broader pursuit of identity, unity and equality in development for Africa and Africans in a global setting, one might usefully proceed from the following considerations:

What is the ‘African Union’?: It is the functional physical embodiment of the profound history of African people as a unique race (among other racial groups) and as an integral component of the global community. On a developmental note, the African Union can

be perceived as an evolutionary institution of the African continent destined to accelerate the process of integration on the continent to enable Africa to play its requisite role in the global economy while addressing multifaceted social, economic and political problems compounded as they are by certain negative aspects of globalization (URL/http://www.Africa-union.org/aboutAU/Abou_in_a_nutshell.htm 21 October 2003).

Equally compelling is the term 'Africahood', which is understood to mean a definitive state of the conscience imbued by African morality, values and integrity typified among other essentials by the air that we breath, our mode of self expression, the words we utter and the blood that flows in our African veins and arteries. It should be noted that Frantz Fanon (1966) and Daniel Tetteh Osabu-Kle (2000) percieve Africahood, as an accention of the cultural heritage of Africa signified by the efforts to uphold an ideology that seeks to emancipate the African from mental slavery resulting from centuries of slavery, colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialist (now, superpower unilateralist) subjugation. Another very central concept to this debate is 'Pan-African' which refers to a recognition of the need for countries ¹in Africa to cooperate and help one another. It is the practice of that recognition that we call Pan-Africanism. Another concept that is likely to be confused is 'Pan-African Nationalism',—which is not synonymous with Pan-Africanism. Pan-African Nationalism is a powerful ideology without which the African or Pan-African cannot be emancipated from mental slavery to rediscover himself or herself. Consequently, Pan-Africanism holds fundamentally that all Africans or Pan-Africans ²being all descendants of Mother Africa are equal members of the Jaku family. The anti-thesis of Pan-Africanism, is 'neo-colonialism' ³ conceived of as the manifestation of an indirect form of control of the former colonies through economic and cultural dependence, and the ruling native elites, compliance with the neo-colonial powers, populations that are exploited for their labour and resources in order to feed an insatiable appetite for finished physical or cultural commodities made by the metropole.

Much more important is the systematic and accurate articulation of these terms within the globalization discourse in as much as Pan-Africanism indexes not only a recognition of the need to be supportive

but also to practice cooperation on which the survival and identity of Africans, and African descendants, has to find expression, as in the SADC development programs. This regional initiative constitutes one of the critical building blocks of the African Union (AU) in the new millennium riddled by complexities of varying magnitude.

Conceptualization of the SADC as an essential Pan-African institution and Africahood

In a contribution entitled 'Road to Pan-Africanism: another development perspective', dedicated to the occasion of ratification of the SADC protocol on trade, the author accentuated that:

As South Africa prepared for the ratification of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) protocol on trade, there was a need to look beyond trade integration and analyze regional integration...arguing,...the artificial borders that separate the national territories in the SADC region are divisive of people united by history and divisive of regions united by geography to the extent that they are subjects of disputes and conflicts between African states. SADC, he continued...must strive for a community that transcends the economic level and strive for the territorial and political unification of Africa. This is the only way for the continent to become a great modern power. This is the only protection against neo-liberalism and globalization (Pheko 1999:2).

With the signatories of the SADC Treaty (1980) having agreed and adopted the common position that underdevelopment, exploitation, deprivation and backwardness in Southern Africa would only be overcome through economic cooperation and integration, that outcome in itself amounted, as a matter of principle, to the advancement of the cause of Pan-Africanism. Having been the last region in Africa to be under the colonial yoke, but now reaffirming its mission to effect its own route to the Pan-African foundations of development, the SADC adopted economic cooperation as one of the major principal objectives governing the existence of the African Union. Emerging in Southern Africa, this regional bloc further made a positive qualification of Pan-Africanism in the manner that the moral and material support by the African Union (then OAU)

to the liberation struggles in the SADC signified the continued survival of the African Union. To date, it maintains a functional relevance that accentuates the validity of the political, economic and strategic considerations behind Pan-Africanism. These strategic circumstances are continually reinforced by the prevailing social, economic, political, scientific and technological realities in Africa and internationally, which make co-operation among the sub-Saharan countries even more crucial. Definitely a closer look at the problems, challenges and opportunities of the future by and large strengthens the historically founded gamut of strategic considerations behind Pan-Africanism. In the contemporary period such considerations include the menace of HIV/AIDs pandemic, poverty, threat of Great Power unilateralism, general socio-economic stagnation which extensively plague the continent. Certainly, it is in the light of these challenges that the Pan African⁴ essence and Africahood of the SADC as an institution have to find practical expression if the struggle on the restoration of Africa and its mightiness is to become a reality.

Millennium challenges, pan-Africanism and neo-colonial tendencies in the SADC region

In this age of globalization, one of the main challenges the SADC confronts emanates from the circles of the controversial European Renaissance⁵ which was the foundation of slavery, colonialism, apartheid and racism. These developments have thrown not only Africa but, more precisely, the SADC into a quagmire of underdevelopment, poverty, endless conflicts, economic domination and dictatorship by the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF, WTO, World Bank) as the proponents (of this Pan-European lagery) work hard to perpetuate the holocaust of African people by way of advancing the notion of Pan-Europeanism through the European Union, making themselves a powerful economic bloc, and effectively integrating socially, politically, and working for a borderless Europe across the globe. Actually the advancement of the notion of globalization as a brainchild of ideology of Pan-Europeanism purports to turn the world into a simple global village on European terms, that way dealing another fatal blow to Pan-Africanism. As if Pan-Africanist

have not yet established that the triumph of Pan-Africanism, the only way Africans could survive the foreign onslaught and live as a truly liberated people, will come out of the sweat and blood of the African people themselves. In the SADC at the moment, the need for a critical Pan-Africanism is quite urgent considering the three schools of thought which have emerged in this Southern African region under the influence of globalization. The first school has seen leaders subscribing to the notion of Pan-Europeanism, that way confirming their full support for the concept of globalization and the neo-liberal as well as neo-colonial circles⁶. With respect to the second school of thought, this could incorporate upholding the Pan-African paradigm comprised of the leadership that is prepared to see the triumph of Pan-Africanism as the only way Africans could survive the foreign onslaught and live as a truly liberated people. Last but not least the third school of thought that has emerged in the SADC in recent times is the one which seeks to accommodate the contemporary progressive elements of both Pan-Africanism and Pan-Europeanism but on the basis of the African Union and the United Nations Conventions or instruments which promote principles of cooperation and integration, sovereignty and equality of states in development. Basically these schools of thought so conspicuously visible in Southern Africa, are indicative of how versatile Pan-Africanism as an ideology vis-à-vis Pan-Europeanism has to be as a means of completely eliminating and minimizing in short, medium and long term the setbacks that have existed in recent times and those that are likely to emerge in the future, having been generated in the Pan-Europeanism legacy (in fact currently globalization is its pivotal weapon) through slavery, colonialism, apartheid and racism. This in reality poses a critical question: other than the traditional ideological sermon adopted as the weapon for advancing the Pan-Africanist cause, what other matching strategy to the Pan-European globalization has been adopted to counterbalance? Could this be seen in the evolutionary process that the economically founded African Union has gone through, from the former politically founded Organization of the African Unity (1963)? If that is so, what then is the qualitative and at most quantitative nature of the evaluation that we give to this process relative to the impact of globalization on the Pan-African mission and cause, not only in Africa but across the globe?

SADC as a development arm of the African Union

In the critical research contributions pursued by Njoroge J. Raphael (2002/3) entitled 'AU Integration of African Regional communities into the African Economic Community (AEC) and the African Union'—and by Abraham Kinfe entitled 'The challenges and prospects of Pan-African economic integration'—the conception of the SADC as a development arm of the African Union and, consequently, as a subscriber to the cause of Pan-Africanism was clearly articulated. Within the context of the United Nations sponsored Economic Commission for Africa based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and possibly the European Union, the visionary African leaders translated their vision into the creation of regional entities capable of promoting regional cooperation and integration⁷. However, a consolidation of this vision in the form of a principle of development on the basis of Pan-Africanist foundations was expressed in the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa (1980–2000) in which the vision of the African Union (then OAU) was outlined proposing the establishment of an African Economic Community (AEC) which logically would be preceded by an African Common Market (ACM). With the commitments of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos having been translated into concrete terms in Abuja in 1991, the Heads of Government and State concluded the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) and it was operationalized from May 1994 onward, with the AEC establishing formal working relations with the regional entities⁸ on the African continent, including the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) in Southern Africa. Having found definition within the African Union Regional Economic Communities (RECs), specifically in the domain of the African Economic Community (AEC) the SADC, which automatically became an organically indispensable player to the 1991 Abuja Treaty, set modalities for establishing the African Economic Community (EAC). These modalities, which in their advancement of the Pan-Africanist cause the Southern African Development Community (SADC) had to be part of as a strategy for achieving the goal of forming an African Economic Community, constituted five successive stages, namely:

- Preferential Trade Area (PTA);
- Free Trade Area (FTA);
- Customs Union (CU);
- Common Market (CM) and;
- Economic Community (EC), etc.

With regards to the above mentioned stages viewed as the cornerstone to the consolidation of an African Economic Community, and thereby addressing the Pan-African cause, the SADC is now at the Free Trade Area negotiating stage with a few other remaining member states, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Seychelles having to accede to the SADC Protocol on Trade⁹. Under this envisaged Protocol which is catalytic and core to regional cooperation not only in Southern Africa but on the African continent within its system of Regional Economic Communities, substantially all trade will be duty-free by 2008 while the liberalization of country-specific sensitive products will be accomplished by 2012. However the selective tariff phase down and categorization of SADC member states into the three respective groups of the developed, averagely developed and least developed creates a critical position regarding the combination of the contesting ideological fronts of Pan-Africanism and Pan-Europeanism; each of these fronts in the final analysis will exert influence that promotes the values of its mission but actually at least partially demeans the values of the other contesting ideological front. In the final analysis, what is vital is that the virtues of the overlapping zone of the two have to be promoted *on the assumption that they are mutually enhancing* on one hand. On the other hand, the vices of the contesting ideologies have to be reduced to the minimum and be effectively eliminated since *the assumption at this juncture is that they are mutually retrogressive* and time is not on either side, consequently the mutually enhancing dimensions have to be promoted within the set of existing African Union and United Nations (the supra-national institutions) Conventions, in whose framework the SADC as a development arm of the AU is privileged to operate. In Pan-African terms, these provisional categories founded on the principle of asymmetry, should sooner be perceived as a critical unity-reinforcing exposition that should not again be availed to the common historical enemy, the colonialists and the neo-

colonialists to yet undertake political speculation destined to further divide, rule and plant mutual antagonism¹⁰ amongst the Africans and most of all the SADC as a united member of the Jaku struggling to consolidate its destiny on Pan-African foundations.

Culturo-ideological challenges of the SADC and Pan-Africanism

In a contribution entitled, 'Africa, Pan-Africa, Pan-Africanism and Pan-African Nationalism', commenting on the significance of culture and ideology as the basics to Pan-Africanism, the author noted that,

Solutions to African problems can only be found in African culture¹¹... for this reason any technology or knowledge should be adapted to African culture in the same manner that the Japanese adapted capitalism to Japanese culture... it emphasizes that the African taken out of culture becomes a commodity or a chattel reminiscent of the era of captive slavery (Osabu-Kle 2000: 3).

In another equally enlightening contribution entitled 'Africa's Peace Fiasco: From 1960 to 1995', accentuating the criticality of culture and ideology for state formation especially in Africa in the Post-Independence Era, the author noted that,

We in Africa should inevitably realize that we misconceived the significance of attainment of independence. Furthermore we must be guilty of having underestimated the tasks and efforts which would be required for building a new post-independence state, society and economy..independence was ignorantly assumed to a setting of a golden era and conferring upon Africa a new status at home and abroad.. this assumption was accompanied by the notion that the drafting and execution of four or five year national development plans was the correct vehicle to deliver economic growth, social development and prosperity to the post-independence society (Kambudzi 1998: ix-xii).

In the case of the SADC and the challenges of consolidating the pan-African foundations to the historical mission of reclaiming the African identity, much has to be done to establish the cultural and ideological foundations of that noble undertaking. Notably in the

SADC and across the African continent the Post-Independence Era saw instead the neo-colonial state emerge and this was symbolized by a continued accumulation by foreign companies and non-indigenous people. Thus, the American and United Kingdom commercial business moguls have continued, still continue and will continue if not tamed sooner, to dominate the main stream of economic development in Southern Africa with the majority of the population remaining marginalized. Thus in real experience the colonial and post-colonial state are quite discernable on one hand while truly on the other hand, the post-colonial state is hardly anywhere nearer to be discerned, thus emphasizing the magnitude of the SADC problem in conveying the development processes in Southern Africa on the Pan-African foundations. As such in a situation like the contemporary SADC where the neo-colonial state is discernable, politics has been noticed to remain a shared enterprise between the indigenous elite, the ruling party or the opposition parties that assumed or sought to assume political power at independence and foreign business or government. As observed in the above cited critique, the presence of neo-colonial states¹² on the African continent and in the SADC is characterized by political instability, external economic influence, economic marginalization of the majority and insecure ruling elite alliances.

However notwithstanding the setbacks and the pronounced traces of the neo-colonial state in the SADC and the prospects of developing within the framework of the Pan-African cultural and ideological doctrine, it would be vital to mention the adoption of a draft SADC Protocol on Culture, Information and Sport (coordinated by Mozambique) which in the context of the institutional restructuring of the SADC (since March 09.2001) falls under the Directorate of Social and Human Development and Special Programs. At any rate, while adoption of this Protocol is commendable, the issue is how well will the protocol practically translate into the lives of the SADC population and to what extent will this protocol enhance the cultural¹³ and ideological priorities of the African Union as a Pan-African institution? But at most, for this protocol to translate more meaningfully into the lives of the SADC population as an indispensable part of the African Union advancing the cause of Pan-Africanism, it would be quite strategic to incorporate it in the

curriculum of primary, higher and tertiary education, emphasizing the priorities and values that give the rationale of Pan-Africanism as opposed to other contesting Pan-Europeanism trends of thought.

Economic Structural Adjustment Programs and Africahood in Southern Africa

Certainly, considering the socio-economic impact of these US initiated structural adjustment programs since the 90s across Africa and in particular in the SADC, it becomes clear that while these could have facilitated the Pan-African cause on consolidating the position of Mother Africa as an equal player in the global economy, they instead sooner impoverished Africa. With the emergence of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)+ Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) in the '90s numbering 41, almost 34 of these were African states and 6 of them SADC member states. The Dependency Syndrome was to stay in Africa and in the SADC as well, that way having to compromise one of the basic principles of Pan-Africanism – *economic emancipation of Africa on African terms*.

Notwithstanding the fact that the SADC had made remarkable progress in implementing its economic cooperation and integration agenda since the SADC Treaty came into force in 1992 by way of adopting twenty Protocols to provide the legal framework for sectoral activities and programs, it maintained fairly low average economic growth rates. For instance, in 2000 the average economic growth rate in the SADC was 3.2 percent compared to the 1999 rate which stood at a minimal 1.8 percent. In fact throughout the mid-1990s the region recorded growth rates above 2.7 percent. But however as was pointed by Kambudzi (1998) in his examination of the neo-colonial states in the Post-Independence Era, this growth rate was mainly predicated on the output of foreign multinational international corporations with the majority of the SADC nationals being literally marginalized from the main stream of economic development. In fact it was because of the inherent deviation from the Pan-Africanist foundations of economic development which saw the swelling of poverty levels to the tune of forty percent of the population (190 million) in Southern Africa even when the average

annual population growth rate throughout the '90s was lower than the average economic growth rate experienced in the region through the '90s. This sooner expressed the highly prejudicial inequalities in the distribution of wealth across the region.

As indicated by available data, trade development reflects great disparities on all levels: regional, intraregional, global. On a regional level South Africa throughout the 1990s contributed about 94 percent of the SACU's exports, while accounting for 98 percent of SACU's imports because then South Africa the biggest export market for Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. But again South Africa is the biggest source of their imports. For the same period SACU accounted for 41 percent of the SADC's world exports trade and 48 percent of the overall SADC imports in 1997. In all intraregional trade in terms of imports throughout the 90s in the SADC comprised 7.1 percent of the total SADC world imports. In other words, the SADC member states, imports of goods and services amongst themselves amount to the tune of 7.1 percent while they import from the world to the tune of 86.1 percent, that way showing the higher level of dependency of the SADC on the world market. Such an unfavorable trade trend in which the SADC remains heavily dependent threatens the Pan-African foundations of development in this age of globalization on the African continent a whole. On another note again throughout the '90s, intra SADC trade exports were to the tune of 14.1 percent while the SADC exports to the world market were to the tune of 87.7 percent again denoting the greater dependence of the SADC on the world market than on its own regional market. In Pan-African terms what this precarious economic position in which trade ¹⁴ is highly to the disadvantage of the SADC means is:

- Efforts on economic emancipation not only by SADC but across the African continent have to be revisited as the economies cannot add value to their commodities, manufacturing has remained underdeveloped;
- The SADC and Africa will remain heavily indebted and may find it difficult to shrug off the neocolonial-bug, unless new alternatives are fashioned out as a matter of urgency, etc.

Notwithstanding the negativity of the impact of Structural Adjustment Programs, the United States of America and the European Union, as well as Japan and the Far East have remained the largest world markets for most of the SADC member states. Also on a regional level Europe has remained the SADC's largest trading partner receiving the greatest share of the SADC exports over the '90s. Much as Africa should have made a significant contribution in trade terms, she only accounts for 0.5 percent of the total SADC imports, of course excluding SACU imports. Equally, Germany, United States of America, United Kingdom, Japan, Italy and France continue to emerge as top countries of origin of most imports into the SADC. In spite of this development over the 1990–1997 period, the orientation of the SADC exports to Asia had fairly high nominal growth. With new developments emerging such as the US-Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the SADC export volumes to the USA are bound to increase, notwithstanding the divisive nature of this instrument in both short, medium and long term.

However in Pan-African terms, these developments constitute a simultaneous occasion of both opportunities and setbacks depending on the strategies the SADC and Africa adopt on a short, medium and long term. Otherwise instead of engaging its counterparts in trade, the SADC could start contemplating FTAs with any of the host trade partners on the basis of well negotiated commonly agreed national and regional social, economic, cultural as well as scientific and technological priorities. If these trade arrangements which the SADC has with Europe and the rest of the world continue to have the disparity-benefits asymmetry to the disadvantage of the SADC and Africa without their manufacturing industries being developed, with no value added to commodities originating in the SADC destined for the world market, then the Pan-African mission will be considerably compromised, which actually should hardly be the case in the contemporary.

Other than the opportunities or setbacks at the disposition of the Pan-African lagery generated by trade operations in the SADC, the high levels of external debt coupled with declining ratios of development aid pose the same unpleasant situation. In this respect, six SADC countries namely Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia

have been classified as severely indebted low income countries; on another note Zimbabwe has been classified as a moderately indebted low income country; Lesotho has been classified as a less indebted low income country.

In a higher category is the moderately indebted middle-income country, Mauritius, while Botswana, the Seychelles, South Africa and Swaziland are classified as the less indebted middle-income countries with Namibia not as yet considered under this system in as much as it does not subscribe to the Debtor Reporting System of the World Bank. At the end of 1999 the total external debt of the SADC member States was US 80.3 billion reflecting a fairly marginal decrease of US 4 billion from the 1998 debt level of US 4 billion. In absolute terms what this means is that each of the fourteen member SADC bloc owes the debtor countries nearly US 6 billion with almost each of the 190 million SADC citizens owing the debtors 31.57 US\$. The unprecedented higher levels of SADC debt to the donor community is disturbing in pan African terms, not even withstanding the fact that the debt burden alleviating HIPC Initiative has accommodated three SADC countries, Mozambique, Malawi and Tanzania. However the registered decrease (US 4 billion) in debt owed by the SADC to the donor community is attributable to the strict debt management policies, avoidance of borrowing by Member states and possibly debt forgiveness under the HIPC Initiative, although debt servicing requirements in hard currency have militated efforts by many SADC countries to make adequate investments in the social/infrastructure and productive sectors and to respond effectively to natural disasters which hit the region 2001. Consequently in Pan-African terms the socio-economic circumstances obtaining in the SADC at the moment still require that regional cooperation and economic integration as the basic concept for transformation, be adapted to the changing regional and global political, social, economic, cultural, scientific and technological circumstances, before the intellectually unchallengeable Pan-African doctrine loses its meaning in the SADC region and on the wider African continent.

Political development trends in the SADC within the greater world and pan-Africanism

The signing of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation opened up a new and a more strategic platform to deal competently in a predictable manner with the political challenges of the SADC. Such an outcome in the debate raised by Nyamnjoh Francis (2003) in his contribution ‘ Globalisation, Boundaries, and Livelihoods: Perspectives on Africa’, vividly reflects the extent to which Africans in their own right are attempting to Africanize globalization instead of letting Africa be completely globalized. Within the framework of the United Nations Charter reaffirming the UN Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, and the role of the Central Organ of the African Union Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, the SADC Protocol on Peace, Defence and Security Cooperation put up (among others) its primary objective namely:

- To protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict, interstate conflict and aggression;
- To develop the peacekeeping capacity of the national defence forces and coordinate the participation of state parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations;
- Consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed.

Notwithstanding the enforcement of this Protocol, the SADC has experienced unfavorable political developments and episodes since the 1980s, that way throwing into considerable disarray the Pan-African efforts on bringing stability and prosperity to Africa through economic integration and cooperation. The nearly thirty year devastating armed conflict in Angola brought a lot of socio-economic hardships which saw Angola being categorized in the '90s as one of the SADC severely indebted countries, together with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. Huge armies of refugees moved to the neighboring countries as Zambia and Namibia during this period which assumed a more predictable Pan-African character, after the death of Jonas

Savimbi who had been then declared a rebel by the SADC. The merging of UNITA and the MPLA after Savimbi's death has led to the participation of Angola in the regional integration process on a new horizon that way rationally investing resources for overall development of the country and the region in the final analysis.

Equally compromising the Pan-African mission was the Great Lakes Crisis which saw nearly 3 million people dying and also huge armies of refugees migrating within and beyond the Great Lakes region. While the SADC Allied Forces (Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola and also Chad) made great positive contributions towards the restoration of peace in the region, neocolonial forces made frantic efforts to decampaign that operation, in spite of the AU, UN and SADC Charter(s) having provisions accommodating the performance of that role by the SADC Forces. Again in this enterprise financial and material resources that could have been rationally invested in the advancement of the Pan-African cause were misused, repelling African invading forces working at the hands of the neo-colonial lagery through its clandestine malicious maneuvers. In the research and academic circles the Great Lakes Crisis has also spoken to the larger political questions that have confronted Africa with a greater intensity than ever before and these center around citizenship and citizenship rights; the state and the governance of the public arena; and the organization of socio-economic development, placing the inevitable demand to design workable frames for addressing these problems as a means of establishing stable democratic systems for the development of the SADC and Africa in the final analysis (Olukoshi 2003).

The other dimension which appears to have compromised the Pan-African cause was what we could more accurately term "Political Capitalization on Pan-Africanist by Neocolonials/Mechanisation of Pan-Africanist". Instead of turning these Pan-African-Nationalists into potential candidates as ex-offio national ambassadors, or candidates of the Good Offices, the newly emerging African governments would start "for purposes of securing funds with the Bretton Woods Institutions", criminal lawsuits against these highly esteemed personalities even when there was no acceptable rationale to do so. The case in point is lately that of Chiluba's Era as the former Zambian President in which the Zambian National Constitution was

even altered to outlaw the veteran nationalist leader Dr Kenneth Kaunda who led Zambia to its independence. At that very time the Zambian Government was selling away all the national wealth to the Multi-National Corporations further impoverishing the nationals. But certainly in the Pan – Africanist lagery, it still remains unclear what virtues the incarceration of Dr Kenneth Kaunda were for the nation but developments sooner indicated that Chiluba's move was gross and disrespectful of the commonly shared African vision. Interventions by the late veteran nationalist the President Mwalimu Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, with appeals for the release of Dr Kenneth Kaunda were again not heeded, but otherwise the veteran nationalist found his jail terms relaxed to be under the ethically embarrassing house arrest. Essentially these practices on the part of the young generation of Heads of States and Governments in the SADC and in Africa would sooner generate unnecessary tension amongst citizens that would potentially divert not only resources, but again time and energy of the nationals and worse still give more leverage to the neocolonial forces to frustrate efforts on the fulfillment of the Pan-African mission. Such grossly undesirable experiences in Africa especially when being purposely committed by a head of state and government can have a very devastating effect for national development not only within its context but within the regional and international context as well, especially how it facilitates brain drain to other destinations. In a classical analysis of Pan-Africanism and intellectuals, an accurate observation capping the above undesirable developments that have and still continue to haunt Africa and the SADC region too, stated that,

It was among other such undesirable experiences that while African independence witnessed a flowering of both intellectual activity and Pan African euphoria on the continent, there were also casualties of the post colonial decay which sadly were the intellectual vibrancy and Pan African fervor; the decline was compounded by brain drain from Africa and by the falling standards at major institutions of higher learning and research on the continent; eloquent voices of dissent either went silent or found their way to more receptive lands (Mazrui 2003: 20).

Consequently, while there is need to operate within a global setting the political dimension of the Pan-African mission has to be adapted

to the changing circumstances essentially within the framework of the respective SADC, AU and finally UN Conventions.

Social development trends in the SADC and Pan-Africanism

Developments of a social nature occurring in the SADC at the moment are best defined within the framework of the Social and Human Development and Special Programs Directorate. However the most serious challenges have always been related to poverty with over 60 million people or 30 percent of the population of the region living below the internationally recognized poverty datum line of US\$1 per day. This unbecoming development is corroborated by highly depressed social indicators as high levels of malnutrition, illiteracy, unemployment, underemployment, declining levels of life expectancy and very limited access to basic services and infrastructure needed to sustain basic human capacities.

Other very pronounced social problems which have raised obstacles to the fulfilment of the Pan-African cause are refugee flows and the HIV/AIDs pandemic. The conflicts in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have led to massive displacement of the population internally with that of Angola working to the tune of 2 mln. In 1998 out of a total of 702,000 refugees in the SADC, Tanzania was home to about 300,000 refugees, the Democratic Republic of the Congo was home to 200,000 while Zambia was home to 160,000 refugees. Such massive flows have had and continue to have negative effects on the economy with a greater part of the uprooted population having no access to the means of production and literally putting pressure on the environment, natural resources and government services. The World Bank emerged with a rough estimate of the costs of refugees to the host country in Africa to the tune of US\$530 mln per year. With the same figure invested for production or improvement of the infrastructure, this would have a positive impact on the welfare not only of SADC but the African continent as a whole.

Last but not least is the problem of HIV/AIDs pandemic which threatens also the Pan-African cause for peace and development in

the region. Currently, there is an estimated total of 4 million AIDS cases and about 10 million cases living with positive HIV/AIDS that way accounting for nearly 5 percent of the total population in the region. This is a very devastating situation if one considers in labor market terms the magnitude of per capita labor loss in both production and skills. The SADC has adopted a Strategic Framework and Program of Action on HIV/AIDS for 2000-2004 with a goal to reduce the number of HIV/AIDS infected and affected individuals and families in the region. This will ensure that HIV/AIDS will no longer be a threat to the public. At the same time the SADC has always advocated for access to affordable drugs and has forthwith established the Bulk Purchasing Technical Committee with also the demand for compulsory licensing, parallel importation and local manufacturing of pharmaceuticals being considered as mechanisms for facilitating access to more affordable drugs. Again within the Pan-African paradigm this is a challenge that has to be resolved together with other key players to ensure a gradual elimination of the health threat caused by HIV/AIDS to the public in the SADC and on the African continent as a whole.

SADC and its scientific and technological disposition

One of the major setbacks to the efforts on making robust national economies in the SADC is the absence of consistent science and technology programs although Africa Technology and Policy Studies (ATPS) and its respective National Chapters across the SADC is making considerable inroads in advancing the cause for coming up with a policy that would be promotive of the requisite technologies for the varied specific countries and their priorities within the SADC and in Africa as a whole. Again notwithstanding the fact that manufactured value added is so low in the SADC economies, the most appropriate directorate, that is trade, industry, finance and investment where actually science and technology should have been identified as a special sector on its own is nowhere to be seen, that way scuttling the hopes scientific and technological development founded in an understanding of African priorities and interests. This actually raises critical questions as to how urgent and whether this science and technology ¹⁵ is really conceived as a priority in

the development of the SADC economies as they contribute to the fulfillment of the Pan-African cause. This is one of the other major reasons which explains why most of the exports from the SADC have no value added to them (see 3.3). Centers of specialization in science and technology have to be established, with funds mobilized, and develop the entrepreneurial as well as the innovative capacities of the nationals in an effort to improve the productive base of the manufacturing sector of all SADC economies.

Operative solutions and recommendations to the challenge of consolidating Pan-African foundations to approaches on eradicating neo-colonial tendencies in the SADC region

In the contemporary world, the Pan-African mission has equally weighing opportunities and constraints emanating from the nature of underlying principles in the political economy of development initially between the developed and developing world as well as between particular African countries and particular developed countries (in the contemporary the USA and Britain versus Zimbabwe). In their combination the Pan-African has to exploit the existing opportunities and work out commensurate strategies which will give a milage to the effort on fulfilling the Pan-African cause.

The Great Powers cooperation

As of now the World Powers especially the USA and Britain together with Members of the European Union have to respect the spirit and conscience guiding the SADC Treaty in deeds and words. This fundamental principle was highly emphasized by President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe at the 58th UN General Assembly in New York when he criticized the unfortunate emergence of the powerful nations such as Britain and the USA which sought to dominate the world and dictate to other countries how they should govern themselves (*Herald* Sept 27.2003). Take the example of Africa Growth and Opportunities Act 2000 (AGOA) which while it purports to revive

economic growth through trade promotion on the African continent still selectively limits that provision to only thirty five countries notwithstanding the fact that Africa has fifty three states which are all in great need of funding and revival of industrialization processes in the contemporary. At best AGOA should have been adopted as an all Africa embracing corrective instrument to redress the devastating setbacks which the US initiated: ESAPs inflicted on the African and the SADC economies over the 1990s period. Moreover again its main area of focus, that is apparel which may in most cases not be the priority area for development in the SADC or the African Union seeking equally economic transformation, sooner indicates the existence of other motives behind AGOA than what the initiative is exactly purported to serve. Far from it, the African Union and the SADC guided by the Pan-African philosophy cannot fully realize the goal of Pan-Africanism through trade in apparel which in the long run will mean again the domestic markets of these countries having sooner to be flooded by apparel goods from the USA (read footnote 14). Otherwise left as it is the World Powers, especially the USA and Britain, will just be imposing themselves on the weaker SADC, African Union that way eroding the values and priorities of the latter while promoting the western neo-colonial values and priorities unfortunately, in the Pan-African lagery.

Alternative operational solutions

Global perspective

On a global perspective the position of the SADC as arm of the African Union advancing the Pan- African cause has to be recognized in the Bretton Woods institutions in the manner of the latter being receptive to the social, economic, political, cultural, scientific and technological priorities and interests of the SADC. This would facilitate the implementation of programs and enhance the sense of ownership amongst the African population in the SADC. The inequalities in trade and generally socio-economic development would be even much narrower getting finally eradicated if the global institutions were receptive in principle and in practice towards the development efforts by the SADC. Failure of the Pan-African cause

on this perspective has to be brought up as question to the IMF, World Bank and the World Trade Organization, that in spite of humanitarian essence of the philosophy that drive them, why is it that the world and especially Africa and the SADC have been riddled with poverty and diseases with no end in sight even then?

Continental perspective

On the level of the continent the African Union Charter has been more definitive in the Peace and Security issues with now a super continental army having to ensure peace on the continent, without having to wait for the UN peacekeeping forces which of late have been visibly selective and in most cases not receptive to the demand for peace on the African continent. The most recent example was the limited number of forces sent to the DRC and even then only to Bunia (only an urban settlement) under the leadership of the European Union. In real combative terms this contingent has not scored any success that could add much to the Pan-African cause. At any rate the SADC Allied Forces (Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and Chad) did much in combative terms than what the present EU led UN military mission to the DRC has done in the small tribal rivalry stricken northern city of Bunia where it is taking pains to bring sanity. So again with all due fairness and respect for the sovereignty and the right to freedom and equality of African states and the SADC members, the outer world has to be receptive to the mission of the AU and its sub-regional bodies, otherwise conflicts will remain endless on the continent, that way spending resources which would have otherwise been appropriately invested more productively.

Regional perspective

On the regional perspective in the upholding of the Pan-African cause there has to be a united SADC front and the emergence of a Peace and Security Council in Southern Africa is strategic. This would then mean that any threats to peace so essential for faster development will be dealt with immediately without again having to wait for the United Nations Forces whose receptiveness has become

very controversial in the contemporary mostly due to the expansion of unilateral tendencies in the camp of the Great Powers led by the errant USA and the United Kingdom. A supportive stand of the SADC members as a community has a more positive implication for the Pan-African cause than if these countries were to otherwise adopt a unilateralistic approach. Here the case in point is the support which the SADC community continues to give Zimbabwe over its implementation of the land resettlement program (greatly opposed by the self imposing United Kingdom and the USA) on the principle of equity and equality across racial groups against the racially biased former colonially instituted land tenure system whereby each (of the 4500 farmers of British descent) white farmer had 2-3-5 and even 15 farms on one hand while the majority of the blacks were mostly crowded in rural areas with agriculturally non-viable soils on the other hand.

National perspective

On a national level African values have to be upheld and the African child taught and reminded through media, education and arts about the dangers of adopting alien cultures and the magnificence, greatness of upholding your own culture, sticking to the doctrine of Africahood. The SADC has to be promotive at national levels of the practices that add value to the Pan-African cause and equally intolerant of practices be they economic, political, social, cultural, psychological, scientific and technological which tend to militate accomplishment of the Pan-African cause in essence.

Conclusion

Certainly in this new millennium when the world is rapidly changing, the Pan-African cause remains the only guiding philosophy to the salvation of Africans and at the disposal of the African Union, the SADC and other sub-regional formations charged with the mission to contribute to the reconstruction of Africa not on neo-colonial but essentially Pan-African foundations. As should always be the case unity of purpose among African States and adherence

to the principles of the founding Charters of the SADC, African Union, United Nations in the battle for consolidating Pan-African foundations for development and transformation in the SADC and the African continent as a whole should remain as the unshakable guiding beacon.

Explanatory endnotes

1. Means the extended boundaries of Africa that is, the whole of Africa and not just the continent of Africa with Madagascar because the historical forces of slavery, neo-colonialism and immigration extended the boundaries of Africa into Europe, the Americas and Asia (all people of African descent are Africans including the Macaronis of the Indian sub continent, and the Nigritos of Papua New Guinea and the Philippines whose very African features suggest that they migrated from Africa at some point in their history). As such those interested in studies concerning the whole of Africa- pan Africa are called Pan Africanists and may or may not be necessarily Africans. On another note academics interested in studies limited to the continent of Africa with Madagascar are contented with calling themselves Africanists and may not be Africans again as such, Dr. Daniel Tetteh Osabu-Kle, 2000, Africa, Pan-Africa, Pan Africanism and Pan African Nationalism.(<http://www.expotimes.net/issue000816/osabu.htm>, independent, Sierra Leone, 16–29 August,2000). 14 October 2003.
2. Irrespective of their particular locations on this planet, they belong to one and one only true nation- the African Nation- to which the great civilizations of Egypt, Nubia, Axum, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Songhai and Zimbabwe also belong. What matters is Mother Africa or the Jaku- their common African family, *ibid* p2 of 4.
3. According to Kwame Nkrumah (1965) neo-colonialism is ... the worst form of imperialism. For those who practice neocolonialism, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress... among other things neocolonialism continues to actively control the affairs of the newly independent states, Leong Yew, Research

- Fellow, University Scholars Programme, National University of Singapore: Neocolonialism- Political Discourse – Theories of Colonialism and Post Colonialism: (<http://www.scholars.nus.edu.sg/landow/post/poldiscourse/neocolonialism.html>), 21 October 2003.
4. Pan-Africanism demands that the riches of Africa be used for the benefit, upliftment, development and enjoyment of the African people. Pan-Africanism is a system of equitably sharing food, clothing, homes, education, healthcare, wealth, land, work, security of life and happiness. Pan-Africanism is the privilege of African people to love themselves and to give themselves and their way of life respect and preference, Pfeko, 1999, Road to Pan-Africanism- another development perspective. (<http://library.wustl.edu/~listmgr/devel-1/Nov 1999/0000.html>). 23 October 2003. and Abraham, Kinfe., The challenge and prospects of Pan-African economic integration. (<http://www.eiipd.org/publications/occasional>). 23 October 2003.
 5. In August a prominent Nigerian political scientist had to remind the participants of the fifth Pan-African Colloquium in Ghana of the historical context of the European Renaissance from which the so-called African Renaissance was purportedly being made to borrow that way placing it on a high risk of transposing its rationale. Arguing that European Renaissance was the origin and foundation of slavery, colonialism, apartheid and racism, the exponents of this European Renaissance are still advancing their forces in the fashion of Pan-Europeanism while other African leaders were visibly dragging their feet on the implementation of Pan-Africanism and have made Africa a perpetual beggar of foreign aid, *ibid*, p3 of 4.
 6. This situation in fact helps to explain why when there is the urgency of settling issues which pertain to the Pan-Africanist circles some of the African leaders visibly drag their feet having already in ideological terms confirmed that they are agents of neo-liberalism and neo-colonialism whose instrument is globalization. In contesting real ideological terms both the

Pan-Africanists and Pan-Europeanists do realize that globalization is a new form of the re-colonization of not only the African continent but the whole former colonial world including the former socialist countries which then had not as yet succumbed to the notion of Pan-Europeanism.

7. Peter, J. Schraeder, 2000, *African politics and society*, (Boston: Loyola University Press), p.307.
8. These are the regional and sub-regional economic blocs meant to promote regional cooperation and economic integration on the African continent chiefly as a strategy on advancing the cause of the Pan-Africanist paradigm which purports to reverse the setbacks to the African conscience and mentality that were generated by slavery, colonialism, apartheid and racism at the hands of the exponents of European renaissance reliving as Pan-Europeanism and now having the form of expression as neo-colonialism and lately through the instrument called globalization. Specifically the referred to AU-AEC regional entities (Regional Economic Communities) are the: Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) established Feb.04.1998; Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) founded in 1993 but succeeded in 1994 the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) established in 1981; Economic Community of the Central African States(ECCAS) established in October.18.1983 by way of uniting the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes States (CEPGL); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established May.28.1975; Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) established in March 21.1996 as a successor to the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) established 1986; the SADC established in 1992 as a successor to the SADCC established in 1980; Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA) established February 17.1989 in Marrakech. About OAU (http://www.africa-union.org/About_AU/Abrecs.htm) . 21 October 2003.

9. Launched in September 2000, the SADC Trade Protocol will catalyze the process of regional economic cooperation and integration in Southern Africa. The Trade Negotiating Forum (TNF) as defined in the Protocol negotiates and recommends trade agreements for the Committee of Ministers of Trade and as far as tariffs are concerned, the TNF designed a tariff phase down (on the basis of the principle of asymmetry) so as to accommodate the different levels of economic development in the region. Consequently in the first category there are Southern African Customs Union (SACU) member states comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland; in the second category there is Zimbabwe and Mauritius; while in the third and least category there is Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. In the light of this tariff phase down schedule, the relatively developed SACU countries would front load its tariff phase down, while Zimbabwe and Mauritius would mid-load, and the remaining from the least developed category would tariff phase down having to be back loaded. The front, mid and back loading applies to goods in category B and C while goods in category A are for immediate liberalization, Source: The Official SADC Trade, Industry and Investment Review., 2002, Southern African Marketing Co (Pty)Ltd, Gaborone, p22–23.
10. The cases in point are the intra-regional conflicts generated through the mechanizations of the neo-colonial forces originating in Pan-European circles which have seen the Great Lakes crisis exacerbating poverty in already poverty stricken regions that are actually notable as humanitarian crisis regions in the United Nations record. Since 1998 a death toll of nearly 2.5 million has been registered coupled by a huge army of refugees within the conflict zone and migrating to neighboring African countries in spite of all the efforts the SADC, the AU and UN (with marked reservation indeed) are making to reconcile these conflicting belligerents. The devastating sixteen year war experienced in Mozambique, and the highly impoverishing twenty-seven year war experienced in Angola are regrettably living testimonies or experiences of the critical challenges that the Pan-African struggle has to face up to and chart its way forward.

11. Because of their emphasis on African culture, the Pan-African Nationalists of today are often described as Afro-Centric. In equally the same manner that the Japanese use their Emperor as their ideological axis and call upon all Japanese to revere the Emperor and rid themselves of the Barbarians, Pan-African nationalists use Mother Africa as the ideological axis and call upon all Africans to revere Mother Africa and rid themselves of the barbarian excrescence of mental slavery. This reverence of Mother Africa has been an inseparable part of the African psyche from time immemorial and it explains why Africans pray to God by pouring libation to Mother Africa (the Jaku) symbolized as the ground, *ibid* Daniel Tetteh Osabu-Kle 2000.
12. Making an insight into the neo-colonial phenomenon, Kambudzi AM, accentuates the fact that, “the truth is unavoidable-that is independence came, but with the formal inheritance of a state as well as a false nation which obscured real nations.. what were nations to become were fatally dubbed “tribes,” both before and after independence. Kambudzi, A.M., 1998, Africa`s peace fiasco: from 1960 to 1995, UZ publications, Harare, p xii.
13. As a matter of factually acknowledging the significance of culture and ideology for regional integration in Southern Africa the SADC Treaty of 1980 defines one of its objectives as “the strengthening and consolidation of the long standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region”. And in order to achieve this objective, the SADC would among the series of strategies to its disposal “mobilize the peoples of the region and their institutions to take initiatives to develop economic, social and cultural ties across the region, and to participate fully in the implementation of the programs and operations of SADC and its institutions, The SADC Official Trade, Industry and Investment Review.,2002, Southern African Marketing Co (Pty) Ltd + SADC, Gaborone, pp 14–15.
14. By the Pan-African yardstick trade trends in the SADC throughout the 1990s to date reflect more of risks than opportunities because the trade ratio of intra-SADC, and that of the SADC and the

World was [1 : 6.2] for imports; and [1 : 7.1] for exports, thus reflecting highly distorted trade imbalance against the SADC: Source- Official SADC trade, industry and investment review, 2002, Southern African Marketing Co (Pty) Ltd, Gaborone, p42. Again while the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act could have development advantages for Africa, its selective application makes it more of a political weapon to rule and divide Africa and even its sub-regions of which the SADC is an integral part. This USA trade initiative for sub-Saharan Africa became effective in October 2000. Under this instrument, all SADC countries are legible with the exception of Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe. Across Africa thirty five countries have been eligible of which 29 are regarded as Lesser Developed Beneficiary Countries which qualify for an additional preference of duty free and quota free market access for apparel originating anywhere in the world until 30 Sept 2004 after which date they would require to meet a different set of rules of origin that will require cloth to be imported from either the USA or from AGOA eligible countries. Under AGOA except for Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa all the rest are categorized as Lesser Developed. In order to qualify for exporting garments under AGOA eligible countries have to establish an effective Visa System with strong enforcement mechanisms and verification procedures in place to ensure compliance with the rules of origin. By June 2001 three SADC countries Mauritius, Lesotho and South Africa had qualified for the Visa system while Malawi, Swaziland, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia were under consideration. It is quite a controversial arrangement in terms of its essence and what the Pan-African mission is meant to achieve. Moreover it is not negotiated within the African Union development platform for it to get well synchronized, therefore it comes in as an alien effort which is not driven by the African conscience and spirit.

15. An existing program identified as “Program on Industrial Research and Development” has been initiated with the aim to strengthen the region’s capability in industrial development, and to enable its effective contribution to the socio-economic

development of the region, through establishing a process of sustainable industrialization in the SADC. Ibid, p 48. However this program is not getting the exact momentum as indicated by continually depressed levels of manufacturing and fairly high levels of raw materials constituting the exports of the SADC to the outer world.

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SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation.

Exiting the Whirlpool? Pan-Africanism Caught in the Crossfire of Identity and Globalization

Tatah Mentan

Abstract

Africa's peoples and cultures have been subject to dramatic external interventions and influences enmeshing them firmly within the world capitalist system. The successive population decapitalizations, conquests, colonizations, and associated cultural imperialisms of Arab and European, Islam and Christianity, the slave trade, and more recently the rapid 'modernization' and spread of capitalist consumerism have all transformed and internationalized cultures, conceptualizations, and commodities. This increasingly powerful process of convergence has captured the African popular imagination to the extent that 'globalization' is as much a subject of media interest as of academic enquiry.

Yet convergence and globalization are not all-embracing, unidirectional, and homogenizing processes. Rather, their impact varies greatly in extent and intensity over time, across space, and within and between cultures and social classes. Moreover, counter-movements, both conscious and unpremeditated, are occurring simultaneously. Pan-Africanism has been one such counter-movement. How can a renascent Pan-Africanism assert its identity within these global networks of interconnections?

The overall aim of this study is therefore to examine the ways global forces impact upon African societies; the ways in which African societies have an impact upon the globalization process; and the comparative, cross national and cross cultural comparison of global processes as they relate to Africa. Will the Pan-African ideal help the continent to exit the whirlpool of decapitalization and deterritorialization by the ravaging forces of globalization? If so, how? These are the challenging questions facing Pan-African intellectuals and which this paper attempts to grapple with.

Introduction

On the verge of the twenty-first century, Africa is in upheaval. The limits of imported paradigms to explain such phenomena have been exposed. Worse yet, they have brought conflicts and devastation, accentuated regression, and distorted the African concept of identity and development. These imported structures disintegrated at the end of the twentieth century and leaders in many regions of the continent are being swept away by events instead of imposing their will on them. This existential situation is attributed to the loss of the power and glory of the Pan-African ideal.

The result of this upheaval is that the history of Africa is a history of domination by the Western political economy, which created and now dominates and operates the modern world system. This assertion raises some pertinent questions. First, does this statement stand up to historical facts? Two, does it still hold true today in the era of globalization? Three, has there been any resistance to this situation by African nationalists or has there been any attempt to assert Africa's identity in the face of these western incursions? And, finally, what have intellectuals said about the existential situation and the re-assertion of African identity?

The process of Western incursions, capture, exploitation, and domination of Africa can be divided into the following phases:

- Population Decapitalization and Anarchic Plunder
- Colonial Imperialism
- Birthing Pan-Africanism
- Killing Pan-Africanism
- Africa 'in' the Global Village?
- Exiting the Whirlpool

Each phase was manifested both in the Western nations and in Africa and every capitalist transformation in the West was reflected in the political economy of Africa. These reflections of Africa's asymmetrical integration into the world capitalist system have been deemed 'development', 'civilizing missions' or 'modernization'.

Theorizing globalization and development

The globalization and world-systems theories, and to some extent the dependency approach, take into account the most recent economic changes in world structure and relations that have occurred in the last two decades; for example: (a) the adoption of more flexible mechanisms in terms of exchange rate control; (b) futures trade speculation, reinforced by the more flexible use of modern technology in information, computers, and communication systems; (c) the computer revolution of the eighties; (d) the Internet system which allows for more rapid and expansive communication. The fundamental premise of globalization is that an increasing degree of integration among societies is necessary. However, there is less consensus on its fundamental organizing principles and laws of motion. Neoclassical economic theories based on comparative advantage (Klein, Pauly and Voisin 1985), international relations approaches that stress geopolitics (Keohane 1993, Thompson 1991), and world-systems perspectives that emphasize 'unequal exchange' (Amin 1989, Frank 1979, Wallerstein 1991) offer contrasting models of the international system.

Through the process of globalization more nations are depending on worldwide conditions in terms of communication, the international financial system, and trade. Therefore the world scenario is more integrated in international economic transactions (Sunkel 1995, Carlsson 1995, Scholte 1995). Effects and influences from these integrational aspects can be studied from two major perspectives: (a) countries' external level (the systemic approach); and (b) domestic or internal conditions within nations (sub-systemic approach). In this last mentioned case, the units of analysis correspond to national variables of economic growth or social indicators.

In terms of the globalization process that is taking place under current worldwide economic conditions, two main topics in international political economy are: (a) the structure of the international economic system; and (b) how this structure has changed.¹ The basic claim is that international connections, roles, and relationships are important variables in any analysis which tries to explain various dimensions of development.²

The main areas under dispute concerning globalization theory

relate to four main aspects: (a) The fact that countries can have more than three levels of placement: core, semiperiphery, and periphery countries (Schott 1986); (b) The positional characteristics of several countries in terms of sharing the same patterns of relationships can be related to the 'clique' characteristics with other nations at a regional level (Snyder 1989); (c) Even inside the same position within international relations, the features of countries vary in terms of the size of their economies, internal effective demand, export structure, and level of historical and/or current economic growth (Smith 1992); and (d) There is strong evidence that the patterns of economic concentration among nations especially in the fields of international trade and financial systems, are related to the dependent development patterns claimed by the neostructuralist authors (Cardoso 1992).³

The theory of globalization emerges from the global mechanisms of greater integration with particular emphasis on the sphere of communications and economic transactions. However, one of the most important characteristics is the emphasis on cultural aspects and their communication worldwide. One of the most important factors is the increasing flexibility of technology to connect people around the world.⁴ The main aspects can be delineated as follows:

- a) Global communications systems are gaining in importance, and through this process all nations are interacting much more frequently and easily, not only at the governmental level, but also within the citizenry;
- b) Even though the main communications systems are operating among the more developed nations, these mechanisms are also spreading among the less developed nations. This fact will increase the possibility that marginal groups in poor nations can communicate and interact within a global context using the new technology, and therefore can integrate themselves with the 'global village';⁵
- c) The advances in communication are also more accessible to local and small businesses. This situation is creating a completely new environment for carrying out economic transactions, utilizing productive resources, equipment, trading products, and taking advantage of 'virtual monetary mechanisms'. From a cultural

- perspective, the new communication products are unifying patterns of communications around the world, at least in terms of economic transactions under current conditions;
- d) The concept of minorities within particular nations is being affected by these new patterns of communication. Even though these minorities are not completely integrated into the new world system of communications, the powerful business and political elites in each country are a part of this interaction around the world. Ultimately, the business and political elite continue to be the decision makers in developing nations;
 - e) Social and economic elements under the influence of the current phenomenon of globalization are determinant circumstances which affect the standards of living of every particular nation.⁶

The assumptions of the theory of globalization can be summarized in three principal points. First, cultural and economic factors are the determining aspect in every society. Second, under current global conditions, it is not as important as previously thought to use the nation-state category as a unit of analysis, since global communications and international ties are making this category less useful. Third, with more standardization in technological advances, more and more social sectors will be able to connect themselves with other groups around the world, which implies faster and easier communications and economic transactions. This situation will affect the dominant and non-dominant groups from each nation.⁷

In more specific terms, it is important to mention that globalization theory implies a key element concerning integration – integration regarding international trade, the international financial system, technology and communications, and cultural values from the more developed countries (DeMar 1992, Carlsson 1995). Economic integration at the systemic level – among countries – means stronger worldwide relationships. At the sub-systemic level – within countries – it implies social and economic integration from the different social sectors (Sunkel 1995). At the systemic level there are some nations which are able to achieve more integration into the new world economic conditions than other countries. At the sub-systemic level there are some social sectors which integrate themselves into the new economic dynamic derived especially from

the economic growth, and sectors which become more marginalized in social terms (Sunkel 1995, Paul 1996, Scholte 1996).

While the term globalization is now currently utilized, especially following the technological revolution in communications⁸ and the creation of cyberspace, one of the first major arguments on 'Globalization of the Markets' can be found in a 1983 article by Theodore Levitt in the *Harvard Business Review*.⁹ The functionalist aspect of globalization is what distinguishes it from the mere notion of internationalization, which refers to a quantitative process but not necessarily to an epochal shift of a more qualitative kind. According to Peter Kickens, globalization processes are qualitatively different from internationalization processes. They involve not merely the geographical extension of economic activity across national boundaries, that is internationalization, but also the functional integration of such internationally dispersed activities.¹⁰

In addition to globalization, the other main theories of development are: (i) modernization; (ii) world systems; and (iii) dependency. From a more comparative point of view, the theory of globalization coincides with some elements of the theory of modernization. These schools hold that the main patterns of communication and the tools to achieve better standards of living originated in those more developed areas.

The modernization perspective differs from the globalization approach in that the former follows a more normative position – stating how the development issue should be solved. The latter reinforces its character as a 'positive' perspective rather than a normative claim.¹¹ Globalization theories emphasize cultural and economic factors as the main determinants which affect the social and political conditions of nations, which is similar to the 'comprehensive social school' of Max Weber's theories.¹² From this perspective, the systems of values, beliefs, and the pattern of identity of dominant and the subordinate groups within a society are important elements to explain national characteristics in economic and social terms.¹³ For the globalization position, this statement from the Weberian theory from the 1920s must apply to current world conditions especially in terms of the diffusion and transference of cultural values through communication systems that are increasingly affecting many social groups in all nations.

It is clear that the globalization and world-systems theories take a global perspective as the unit of analysis, rather than focusing strictly on the nation-state as was the case in the modernization and dependency schools. The contrasting point between world-systems theory and globalization is that the first contains certain neo-Marxist elements, while the second bases its theoretical foundations on the structural and functionalist sociological movement. Therefore, the globalization approach tends more toward a gradual transition rather than a violent or revolutionary transformation. For globalist authors, the gradual changes in societies become a reality when different social groups adapt themselves to current innovations, particularly in the areas of cultural communication and the economic sphere.¹⁴

Today, the main aspects under study from the globalization perspective are: a) new concepts, definitions and empirical evidence for hypotheses concerning cultural variables and their change at the national, regional and global level; b) specific ways to adapt the principles of ‘comprehensive sociology’ to the current ‘global village’ atmosphere; c) interaction among the different levels of power from nation to nation and from particular social systems which are operating around the world; d) how new patterns of communication are affecting minorities within each society; e) the concept of autonomy of state in the face of increasingly flexible communication tools and international economic ties, which render obsolete the previous unilateral effectiveness of national economic decisions; and f) how regionalism and multilateral agreements are affecting global economic and social integration.

Population decapitalization and anarchic plunder

Since time immemorable there has been interplay between Southern Europe and North Africa. Portugal was the first to venture outside her own shores towards Africa. Contact between Portugal and West Africa was first made in 1446. For Europe this first contact later proved to be a watershed event. For Africa it was a prelude to a descent to hell. The Africans traded with the newcomers with reckless abandon. For their gold they received silly trinkets. But the Portuguese adventurers had in mind another form of trade that was

potentially more lucrative. They wanted to capture slaves for markets in Portugal and Spain.

However, it was the aftermath of the voyages of Columbus to the so-called New World that brought anathema to the African continent. One of the outcomes of these voyages was the creation of the 'triangular trade' system in which manufactured articles flowed from Europe to Africa; slaves from West Africa to America; and sugar, gold, silver, indigo, tobacco, and other products flowed from America to Europe.

Atlantic Slave Trade

Slavery remains a crucial area of study in the history of North America. But this history of slavery is a part of a larger operation that exported people from the African continent to regions throughout North and South America for more than 400 years. Some historians estimate that more than 15 million Africans were forced to leave Africa to cross the Atlantic to be sold into slavery. In addition, millions of other Africans lost their lives during slave raids or during their forced removal to coastal forts where they would be transported to the Americas. This trade had devastating economic and social effects on Africa: it crippled economic potential, destroyed political systems, broke down moral and civic practices, integrated Africans into the international division of labour and exhausted human resources.

Europeans had been involved in trade with Africa before the Atlantic Slave Trade began. In the 1400s, Prince Henry of Portugal began an initiative to seek out direct sea routes to gain access to the gold trade in West Africa, as well as trade in Asia. In the fifteenth century, European countries were seeking trade routes with Asia, particularly the spice islands of south-east Asia. What began as a quest for trade in gold and spices, ended up becoming a trade network exporting African slaves, which would continue for more than 400 years.

The first slaves brought to Portugal came in 1444 from Northern Mauritania. From Mauritania, the Portuguese moved their way down the western coast of Africa, establishing contact all the way down to the Cape of Good Hope and around to the other side of Africa.

Through these contacts, the Portuguese initiated trade relations that grew into the Atlantic Slave Trade. The Dutch, French, Spanish, and British soon followed in their footsteps.

The interaction of European powers and Africans varied from region to region. What may have seemed like a *diplomatic* exchange of citizens in the beginning grew into a system of slave trade that devastated the Kongo Kingdom. In 1483, the Portuguese began a long-term relationship with the Kongo Kingdom (see map below to locate the Kongo Kingdom.) Portuguese explorer Diogo Cão sailed via the Atlantic Ocean down into the mouth of the Congo River. Upon reaching the Kongo Kingdom, he took Kongo *emissaries* back with him to Portugal, who later returned to Africa with European soldiers, priests, and goods. This was the beginning of a strong trade relationship with the Kongo that exported slaves and ivory in exchange for European luxury goods and guns.

Although historians know that slavery existed in some places on the African continent prior to the Atlantic Slave Trade, the ways in which African slavery compared to and interacted with the exportation of African slaves across the Atlantic remains a topic of much discussion and debate. Many historians suggest that slavery as practiced in different areas in Africa was not the same as ‘chattel slavery’ which was practiced in the Americas. For example, slaves in some West African societies filled different positions in society, including positions of important responsibility; they were not restricted to hard labour. It is also not easily determined to what extent the Atlantic Slave Trade fueled and transformed the practice of slavery within Africa. However, there is no doubt that the Atlantic Slave Trade brought dramatic changes on a global scale throughout the African continent as well as the Americas.

The Atlantic Slave Trade essentially worked like a triangle between Africa, Europe, and the Americas. Trade goods, such as guns and textiles were sent out of Europe and traded in Africa for slaves. The slaves were crammed into ships that crossed the Atlantic in order to provide labour for large plantations in North and South America, which were growing cotton, sugar cane, and tobacco. These regions of North and South America were European colonies for much of the Atlantic Slave trade and served to provide raw materials to Europe for manufacturing. Slaves were sent from Africa not only to North

America, but also to the islands of the Caribbean and the east coast of South America.

To speak about the degree of human suffering that took place during the Atlantic Slave Trade is not an easy task. Slaves were kept living in abominable conditions in dungeon fortresses along the coast of western Africa until the time that they were sent out to sea on large boats headed for the Americas. They were kept in chains and left to lie on their backs on slave ships while crossing the Atlantic Ocean. This long and treacherous journey has become known as the 'Middle Passage'. Historians estimate that as many as 20 percent died while crossing the ocean.

Estimates of the total human loss to Africa over the four centuries of the transatlantic slave trade range from 30 million to 200 million. At the initial stage of the trade parties of Europeans captured Africans in raids on communities in the coastal areas. But this soon gave way to buying slaves from African rulers and traders. The vast majority of slaves taken out of Africa were sold by African rulers, traders and a military aristocracy who grew wealthy from the business. Most slaves were acquired through wars or by kidnapping. The Portuguese Duarte Pacheco Pereira wrote in the early sixteenth century after a visit to Benin that the kingdom 'is usually at war with its neighbours and takes many captives, whom we buy at twelve or fifteen brass bracelets each, or for copper bracelets, which they prize more'.

European slave buyers made the greater profit from the despicable trade, but their African partners also prospered. Africa's rulers, traders and military aristocracy thus protected their interest in the slave trade. They discouraged Europeans from leaving the coastal areas to venture into the interior of the continent. European trading companies realised the benefit of dealing with African suppliers and not unnecessarily antagonising them. The companies could not have mustered the resources it would have taken to directly capture the tens of millions of people shipped out of Africa. It was far more sensible and safer to give Africans guns to fight the many wars that yielded captives for the trade. The slave trading network stretched deep into Africa's interior.

Contact with Europe opened new images of the world for the African elite and presented them with products of a civilisation which as the centuries passed became more technologically

differentiated from their own. The slave trade whetted their appetite for the products of a changing world.

A number of factors contributed to ending the Atlantic Slave Trade officially in the early 19th century after it had continued for over 400 years. Among these was a growing public revulsion against the slave trade. One important person in bringing about this change was Olaudah Equiano, born in present-day Nigeria and later taken to the Americas as a slave. During his life, he was able to buy his freedom (a rare occurrence) and wrote about his experience of being captured and sold into slavery. His writing had a profound effect on public opinion on the slave trade.

In addition, between 1801 and 1803, there was a successful slave revolt in the Caribbean island nation of Haiti, which shook people throughout the Americas as they realized that the system of slavery could be challenged and overthrown.

Finally, the Industrial Revolution in Europe and North America, which occurred simultaneously with the Atlantic Slave Trade, was fueling a growing demand for free rather than servile labour. In the early years of the Industrial Revolution, cheap raw materials, such as cotton, produced by slave labour in the Americas were essential, but by the 19th century continued industrial expansion was dependent on a flexible and mobile labour force. Consequently, many European and American industrialists who supported the slave trade in the 18th century changed their minds when slavery was no longer an economic benefit.

In 1807, Britain became the first European nation to ban the slave trade. France, Holland, and the United States (the latter only in 1864) thereafter passed legislation banning the slave trade. However, since Spain and Portugal did not follow this example, African slaves continued to be sent to countries in South America until near the end of the 19th century.

In an attempt to stop the slave trade, Britain dispatched war ships to intercept slave ships off the west coast of Africa. When intercepted, the freed slaves were often sent to Liberia ('Liberty') and Sierra Leone (capital city of Freetown) in West Africa, which were established by US and British anti-slavers as havens for freed slaves.

When Britain abolished the slave trade in 1807, however, it not only had to contend with opposition from white slavers but also from

African rulers who had become accustomed to wealth gained from selling slaves or from taxes collected on slaves passed through their domain. African slave-trading classes were greatly distressed by the news that legislators sitting in parliament in London had decided to end their source of livelihood. But for as long as there was demand from the Americas for slaves, the lucrative business continued. A consequence of the ending of the slave trade was the expansion of domestic slavery as African businessmen replaced trade in human chattel with increased export of primary commodities. Labour was needed to cultivate the new source of wealth for the African elites.

Had Europe not decided to end the slave trade and the New World agriculture ceased demanding chattel labour, the transatlantic trade might still be rolling today. The ending of the obnoxious business had nothing to do with events in Africa. Rulers and traders there would have happily continued to sell humans for as long as there was demand for them. One can only imagine how much more determinedly African merchants would have clung on to the business as goods offered by European buyers became more attractive with changes in Western technology. How many souls would African chiefs have been prepared to trade for a television or a car? It is a disturbing thought.

To highlight the role of the African elites in the slave trade is not to argue the obvious that they were morally depraved like the Europeans who bought slaves from them. It is to show that the corrupt leadership that undermines democracy and economic development in African countries today has a long history. The selfishness and disregard for the welfare of fellow humans manifest in the sacking of national resources by modern African leaders also motivated the pillaging of the human resources of the continent in times past.

Emergence of corrupt African ruling classes

Some African writers, seeking to maximise the culpability of Europe in the slave trade, minimise the part played by African rulers and traders or explain it as the result of white trickery. Such distortion of history may make the moral case against European imperialism seem sharper, but it does nothing to aid the understanding by Africans of a critical period of their history. African slavers acted

out of their own volition and for their self-interest. They took advantage of the opportunity provided by Europe to consume the products of its civilisation. The triangular slave trade was a major part in the early stages of the emergence of the international market. The role of slave-trading African ruling classes in this market is not radically different from the position of the African elite in today's global economy. They both traded the resources of their people for their own gratification and prosperity. In the process they helped to weaken their nations and dim their prospects for economic and social development.

The slave trade had a profound economic, social, cultural and psychological impact on African societies and peoples. It did more to undermine African development than the colonialism that followed it. Through the trade the continent lost a large proportion of its young and able bodied population. Guyanese historian Walter Rodney cites one estimate showing that while Europe's population more than quadrupled between 1650 and 1900, Africa's population rose only by 20 percent during the same period. The loss of workforce was not more serious than the damage to the social and economic fabric of the society and the undermining of the confidence of Africans in their historical evolution.

The Transatlantic Slave Trade and slavery were major elements in the emergence of capitalism in the West. As Karl Marx noted, they were as pivotal to western industrialisation as the new machinery and financial systems. Slavery gave value to the colonies in the New World which were crucial in the development of international trade. Trinidadian historian Eric Williams showed that the slave trade and slavery helped to make England the workshop of the world. Profit from slave-worked colonies and the slave trade were major sources of capital accumulation which helped finance the industrial revolution. The transportation of slaves transformed British seaport areas into booming centres.

While Europe invested profits from the trade in laying the foundation of a powerful economic empire, African kings and traders were content with wearing used caps and admiring themselves in worthless mirrors while swigging adulterated brandy bought with the freedom of their kinsmen. Virtually all the items imported during the nefarious business were for consumption or weapons

for waging wars. Africa's contemporary history may have been different had its rulers and traders demanded capital goods for use in building the economy rather than trinkets, gin and booze. As it was, the slave trade arrested economic development in Africa. The loss in human resources had dire consequences for labour dependent agricultural economies. Any possibility that the internal dynamics of African society could have led to the development of capitalism and industrialisation was blocked by the slave trade. The few existing manufacturing activities were either destroyed or denied conditions for growth. Cheap European textiles, for instance, undermined local cloth production. The predominance of the slave trade also prevented the emergence of business classes that could have spearheaded the internal exploitation of the resources of their societies. The slave trade drew African societies into the international economy but as fodder for western economic development.

The Atlantic Slave Trade had enormous negative effects on the continent of Africa. Many parts of Africa suffered from an increase in violence, drain of people, and an economy increasingly reliant on slavery. Over four hundred years of slave trade had transformed the African Continent from coastal regions (where most of the trading with Europeans took place) all the way to the interior of Africa (where many slaves were captured to be sold.)

This was the earliest phase of European capitalist incursions into Africa. It occurred simultaneously with the epoch in western capitalist development called 'primitive accumulation'.¹⁵ At this time the West was breaking free from feudalism but had not yet entered the era of capitalism. According to Hopkins,

In three centuries before the industrial revolution the focus of the trade moved from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, from Venice and Genoa to Liverpool and Nantes. This momentous shift of economic power was the product of fundamental changes in the economic and technological basis of European society at the close of the Middle Ages.¹⁶

The boost in trade increased the wealth of merchants and enhanced their power. Population decapitalization and anarchic plunder of Africa by western powers therefore corresponds to this era of mercantilism in Europe – a period which set the stage for the eventual collapse of feudalism.

The West used unprecedented barbarism in their penetration, domination and pillage of African society. The purpose then was not to rule or govern; the purpose was unrestrained loot and plunder without parallel in Africa's history. The most horrendous form of it lasted from the fifteenth century to early eighteenth century.¹⁷ According to Marx, the history of this period is written in the annals of mankind in 'letters of wood and fire'.¹⁸ It was characterized by 'the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black skins'.¹⁹

The effects of this period in Africa can be briefly summarized as follows:

- a. massive depletion of the African population, especially among the most relevant and productive groups;
- b. massive destruction of the entire fabric of African society - disruptions in socio-cultural relationships and, above all, the diversion of interest from productive activities to plunder and loot as a way of life;
- c. the pillage of the resources of Africa under the guise of international trade.²⁰

According to Hopkins, 'The chief effect of the overseas slave trade in the New World was to depopulate (Africa) and develop the abundant land resources of the Americas and the West Indies'. He further observes:

It remains true that the slave and sugar trades brought great wealth to the principal entrepots, such as Liverpool and Nantes, and to many other leading cities. It is impossible to account for the economic vitality of these parts in the eighteenth century, their physical and demographic expansion, and the remarkable overflow of money into cultural activities, without stressing the causative, though not exclusive, role of the Atlantic commerce.²¹

Colonial imperialism

European colonialism in Africa proved to be: (a) a system of administration; (b) a process of exploitation; and (c) a production system often geared towards the creation of capitalist relations of domination-subordination and the economic and socio-cultural

enhancement of the colonizer. This may be done by covert or overt, psychological, legal and military mechanisms. Colonialism inhibited the development of indigenous technology in Africa to a large extent. Colonial domination brought with it a shift into a cash crop economy and de-stabilized some of the existing processes of technical growth.

The dumping of European goods took place in Africa. African markets were flooded with cheap mass-produced textile, glass and iron products in the context of policies such as ‘the scrap iron policy’ of Britain. Indigenous manufacturing capability was deliberately undermined to facilitate European exports. Captive markets were created. There were deliberate laws aimed at African indigenous technological development. Among the first groups to feel the impact of the invaders’ new laws and activities were the metallurgists. These included the blacksmiths who forged iron and the whitemiths who worked with lighter metal such as tin. Blacksmiths were depended on as much by farmers, for implements, as by the aristocracy and the political elite. This system of internal self-reliance changed.

Conquests

The colonial conquest of Africa by Europe was a three-step process fueled by the highest degree of avarice. First, came the exploration. In 1799, following Mungo Park’s visit to the Niger, Sir Joseph Banks, head of England’s Association for Promoting the Discovery of the Interior Parts of Africa declared:

We have already, by Mr. Park’s means opened a Gate into the Interior of Africa into which it is easy for every nation to enter and to extend its Commerce and Discovery from the West to the Eastern side of that immense continent.

The exploration of the Continent was no easy undertaking. Scores of explorers lost their lives because of diseases or unforgiving Africans. But the appeal of African riches was too strong and the potential dividends too enormous to keep other explorers at bay. Mungo Park, Rene Caille, Livingstone, Stanley, to name just a few, brought back to Europe information on African geography, and thus facilitated the exploitation and the conquest of Africa. The pattern was simple: first the region was explored, then missionaries were sent in, and

finally an occupation force followed. By 1884, roughly a century after Mungo Park's first trip, various European powers had claims on various parts of Africa. In December 1884 a conference took place in Berlin to resolve European disputes over colonial expansion. The Berlin Conference averted European wars over colonial possessions. In Africa, however, it did not stop colonial expansion. In the last five years of the nineteenth century only the Sudan and Ethiopia stood unconquered. By 1900 with the exception of Ethiopia, the partitioning of Africa was complete.

Belgium's creation of the Congo Free State goes to the essence of the economic and political systems established in colonial Africa. Between 1885 and 1908, there were about five million victims of Leopold's personal rule, under a barbarous system of forced labour and systematic terror. Hochschild examines how, in the nineteenth century European drive for possessions in Africa, the moral rationalisation of the 'civilising' mission was used to justify colonialism. An example was the founding of Leopold's International African Association (IAA) in 1876, at a conference of famous explorers in Brussels. As its first secretary, King Leopold opened the conference thus: 'To open to civilisation the only part of our globe which it has not yet penetrated, to pierce the darkness which hangs over entire peoples, is, I dare say, a crusade worthy of this century of progress' (Hochschild 1998:44). The aim of the conference was proclaimed to be 'abolishing the [Arab] slave trade, establishing peace among the chiefs, and procuring them just and impartial arbitration'.

Contrast this with remarks Leopold made to his London minister on the explorer Henry Morton Stanley, hired by the IAA to explore the interior of the Congo: 'I'm sure if I quite openly charged Stanley with the task of taking possession in my name of some part of Africa, the English will stop me... So I think I'll just give Stanley some job of exploration which would offend no one, and will give us the bases and headquarters which we can take over later on' (ibid.:58).

Leopold felt squeezed out by the British and French Empires, and the rising power of Germany. He studied forms of colonialism from the Dutch East Indies, to the British possessions in India and Africa. Leopold argued that forced labour was 'the only way to civilise and uplift these indolent and corrupt peoples of the Far East' (ibid.:37).

Opposing the prevailing desire of Belgian parliamentarians to avoid the expense of colonies, he argued, 'Belgium doesn't exploit the world... It's a taste we have got to make her learn' (ibid.:38).

The King sent instructions to Stanley to 'purchase as much land as you will be able to obtain, and that you should place successively under... suzerainty... as soon as possible and without losing one minute, all the chiefs from the mouth of the Congo to the Stanley falls...' (ibid. :70). He was to purchase all the available ivory and establish barriers and tolls on the roads he opened up. Land rights treaties should be as 'brief as possible and in a couple of articles must grant us everything' (ibid.:71). Stanley secured 450 such agreements. Leopold developed a military dictatorship over a country 76 times the size of Belgium, with only a small number of white officials. Initially, he paid mercenaries, but in 1888 these were transformed into the *Force Publique*. At its peak, there were 19,000 conscripted African soldiers and 420 white officers.

By means of bribes and lobbying, Leopold gained recognition for the Congo in 1884 by the United States, followed by a similar deal with France. By making a web of bilateral agreements at the Berlin conference in February 1885, he carved out the boundaries for this huge state. Once his ownership of the Congo was secure, the rubber boom erupted. Joint ventures ensued between Belgian, British and Dutch firms. The profits saved Leopold's colonial empire. Apart from financing Leopold's private army and the *Force Publique* (which took up half the Congo's budget) to control the slave labourers who gathered the rubber, capital outlay was non-existent.

The *Force Publique* had a combined counter-insurgency role: as a force to suppress the natives and as a 'corporate labour force'. Their murderous assaults against the native population were described as 'pacification'. The demand was for labour, and they destroyed all obstacles in their way. Hochschild quotes the Governor of the Equatorial District of the Congo Free State when the demand for rubber became ferocious: "As soon as it was a question of rubber, I wrote to the government, 'To gather rubber in the district... one must cut off hands, noses and ears'" (ibid.:165).

Towards the end of his rule, Leopold, desperate to stop the flow of information about the Congo getting back to the West, filed a libel suit against the black American missionary William Sheppard.

Emile Vandervelde, a socialist lawyer and president of the Second International, went to the Congo to defend Sheppard; he made a brilliant defence speech and the publicity forced Leopold to retreat. Leopold attempted to destroy the evidence: for eight days in 1908 furnaces in Leopold's Brussels headquarters were at full blast, as Congo state archives were tuned to ash. He sent word to his agent in the Congo to do likewise. This, the 'politics of forgetting', was followed by the entire Belgian state.

More important were the limitations of the Congo Reform Association (CRA). The campaign effectively folded after the Belgian government took over the colony in 1908, as though the issues were resolved. Yet most of the brutal state officials deployed under King Leopold were retained by the Belgian state. With the profits extracted from the Congo, huge sums in compensation were paid to the king by parliament. Whilst the policy of holding women and children hostage or burning villages ended, the Belgians continued to use forced labour. Joint imperialist ventures in the Congo all utilised the *Force Publique*, while the French, German and Portuguese used the example of King Leopold's Congo as a template for their own systems of rubber extraction. It was safe for campaigners to single out the Congo because such outrage 'did not involve British or American misdeeds, nor did it entail the diplomatic, trade or military consequences of taking on a major power like France or Germany' (ibid.:282).

The second phase of Western domination of Africa corresponds to a definite historical epoch in European political economy. Marx observes that, driven by its internal dynamics, capitalism must 'nestle everywhere'. Having fought their national rivals, and having thus established their predominant position in the national economy, capitalists now shifted the theatre for profit and power to the international level known as imperialism. Lenin characterized imperialism as the last, monopoly, stage of capitalism, and identified five characteristic features of this phase of capitalism:

the concentration of production and capital developing to such a high stage as to create monopolies with a decisive role in the political economy; the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, forming finance capital and a financial oligarchy; the export of capital becoming more important than the export of commodities;

the formation of international capitalist monopolies, which shared the world among themselves; and the completion of the territorial division of the world between the monopolies.²²

Lenin, however, saw imperialism as an open-ended phenomenon with a discernible beginning but not necessarily an end. Historically, this phase corresponds roughly with the abolition of slave trade by Britain, in 1807, till the end of the century, when colonial governments were being established. This was the period of the industrial revolution in Europe. In the frantic search for cheap materials for its industrial production and captive markets for its products, European capitalist countries began occupying lands and setting up governments. Therefore, while imperialism was the monopoly stage of capitalism in Europe, for Africa it represented the beginning of an epoch when capitalism's first serious attempt was made to create conditions favorable for a more permanent implantation.

The principal actors were Britain, France and Germany, essentially acting through their chartered companies. In the scramble for a place in the 'colonial sun', large chunks of African hinterland were seized and claimed and counter-claimed by contending European firms. They could well have driven Europe to war for the sake of their ill-begotten possessions.

A European Conference at Berlin was held to avert a military clash over colonial territories. Called at the initiative of the German government under Bismarck, it was attended by all the major European powers, including the United States which for the first time was participating in a major international conference with European powers. The European governments met to discuss ways and means of controlling the activities of their merchants before the latter plunged all of them into a bloody shooting war.²³

The Berlin Conference resolved the conflicting territorial claims of these firms by making it obligatory for them to respect the territorial ownership if a trade or protectorate treaty had been signed with the African chiefs. More importantly, it worked out a general alliance between the imperialist powers for the balkanization and control of Africa. However, like all such alliances, the Berlin Conference agreement later turned out to be nothing more than a temporary truce which was destined to crack.²⁴

Relations between the powers continued to deteriorate and,

according to Allan Burns, the continued French incursion into the British 'territory' heightened the tension between them to the point where 'even war between France and Britain was not far from the minds of the cabinets'.²⁵ The Conference thus heralded the continuation of the territorial struggle for control of raw materials and markets, even though the struggle was being conducted with the open and overt political support of their home governments.

Colonialism

This was the era of European monopoly capitalism in Africa. It was a stage in the development of industrial capitalism in Europe dominated by giant corporations, each of which sought to control a relatively high proportion of the local or African markets for its products. This means that instead of simple price competition between small independent producers, there was greater importance for finance and investment. Competition between large corporations each with monopoly control in different areas of Africa took the form of competition for finance, for sources of raw materials and for profitable investment opportunities.

European presence implied a fundamental change in the concept of power, a profound alteration in the culture, and welfare of whole populations. Cash crops were emphasized to the detriment of existing African economy. The view of Africans became even more deprecatory than during the height of the slave trade. Colonialism made a point to accentuate perceived African inferiority and the adoption of imported paradigms anesthetized African Power. Colonialism prevented African leadership from exercising even the feeblest control over the accelerating changes.

This phase of capitalist domination in Africa, in the form of colonialism, corresponds to the period between the beginning and middle of the nineteenth century, when colonialism was institutionalized in most seized lands. Colonialism was a unique form of capitalist domination and control which had not existed earlier. The uniqueness consisted in its totality. It was the most complete and the most direct form of Western domination. It was the most comprehensive strategy of capitalist penetration, domination and control because it left no facet of society untouched.²⁶

Above all, it involved direct political and military administration of people to effect sustained maximum economic exploitation, through an organized, disciplined and, above all, administered capitalism in Africa. Colonialism became the politico-military weapon for effective and institutionalized administration of the territories their companies had earlier 'acquired'. Colonialism aimed at creating both international and internal order and discipline from an otherwise anarchic imperialist system by means of direct imposition of superior military-political power.

The imperialist system collapsed for a number of reasons:

1. an increasing inter-European counter-penetration of the areas;
2. an increasing African recalcitrance, resistance and hostility to further European penetration and control;
3. the rising cost and complexities of administering Africans far beyond what the companies could 'profitably' continue to undertake.

Colonialism attempted to remedy this by:

- lending some sort of international credence and/or legitimacy to the ownership of the areas concerned;
- gaining better internal control of the African through their acquiescence or passivity;
- providing political clout to facilitate the creation of a more efficient system of exploitation to foot the cost of policing the people.

Therefore colonial imperialism truly was beginning of the monopoly stage of capitalism in Africa. The institutionalization of the metropolitan power over African territories gave it the rationale of keeping other rival powers from its territory and preventing the intrusion of other competing monopoly firms.

In the process, the laissez faire and free trade of the political economy of Adam Smith, which had ruled Europe from the early phases of industrial capitalism, were thrown overboard.²⁷ The Berlin Conference had reiterated the principle of free trade and put the signatory powers,

under obligation to adhere to the principles of free trade by allowing other nationals free access to the area and to protect foreign merchants and all trading nationalities as if they were her own subjects.²⁸

The repudiation of the principle signified the death of free trade in the international market and legitimized monopolies at both ends – in Europe as well as in Africa. This distinction between colonialism and the earlier phase of imperialism should not be overlooked. During imperialism, the monopolies' right to territorial exclusivity was recognized neither by their home governments nor by the international community, making it very difficult for companies of one nation to exclude those of others, since they could not count on the official support of their home governments.²⁹

The decline of colonial imperialism was fast – indeed, faster than anything the West had imagined.³⁰ Colonialism was a very unstable system, marked by uncertainty and fear and maintained by violence and brute force. It was a situation in which both the settlers and the natives had lived, according to Fanon,

In keeping with the rules of pure Aristotelian logic, they both follow the principles of reciprocal exclusivity. The settlers' town is a strongly built town, all made of stone and steel. It is a brightly lit town, the streets are covered with asphalt and the garbage cans swallow all the leavings. The settlers' feet are never visible except perhaps in the sea, but there you are never close enough to see them. The settlers' town is a well-fed town... its belly is always full of good things. The settlers' town is a town of white people, of foreigners.³¹

On the other hand, the town belonging to the natives was:

a place of ill fame, peopled by men of ill repute. They are born there, it matters little where or how; they die there, it matters little where or how. It is a world without spaciousness. The native town is a hungry town starved of bread, meat, of shoes, of light. It is a town of niggers and dirty Arabs.³²

Birthing Pan-Africanism

Pan-Africanism was a gift of the new world of America to the old world of Africa. 'Pan-Africanism was born', in the words of Diallo

Telli, 'in the emotional atmosphere of complete alienation, physical exploitations, and spiritual torment. When Henry Sylvester-Williams of Trinidad convened a Pan-African conference in 1900, he did this largely to mobilize solidarity for Africans threatened in various ways by depredations of colonizers in various parts of the continent' (see Wallerstein 1967:7).

The conference was held in the wake of the Boer War and of Rhodes's expansion in Central Africa. The conference also resulted from the enactment of the Jim Crow laws in the southern United States. At that time, racism was a respectable doctrine, popular even in the universities. To the new sentiment of racial self-assertion and solidarity, the term 'Pan-African' was applied; W.E.B. DuBois proclaimed at this conference that 'The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line' (Wallerstein 1967:7). This sense of racial solidarity began soon after to take organizational forms. In the United States, there was the Niagara movement of 1905, followed by the creation of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in 1910. In South Africa the African National Congress was founded in 1910. In West Africa, the first contacts were made which led to the convening in 1920 of the National Congress of British West Africa. In Senegal, Africans assumed a leading role in the politics of the commune of Dakar, and the first deputy was elected in 1914.

In all of these cases the social composition of the new organizations was the same. They were made up of relatively well-educated, relatively well-off African (or Afro-American) professional and business men. All of their programmes were dedicated to achieving equal rights and increased educational opportunities, and to the assertion of the validity of the African cultural heritage. Their programme was the programme of western liberalism. As DuBois said in *The World and Africa*, 'their plans had in them nothing spectacular nor revolutionary' (Wallerstein 1967: 8).

In 1917, the Russian Revolution occurred. Thus in a major European country, a group of men came to power, whose doctrine was far from the liberal egalitarian ideals of the Pan-Africanist. The Pan-Africanists were African and Afro-American intellectuals who had to some degree dedicated themselves to a class analysis of many of the problems of race.

Protest based on race had come to terms with protest based on class, especially since the latter seemed relatively more successful, certainly intellectually more sure of itself, and commanded more mass support. The intellectual impact was slow rather than sudden. In time Marxists' hypotheses came to permeate the thinking of African intellectuals, who began to see colonial and racial oppression as based on economic considerations. Ironically, this slow assimilation of class analysis served to integrate these intellectuals in the White world. Richard Wright reveals the following point:

The fear inspired by White domination breeds a tendency... to make Asians and Africans act, pretend. This same almost unconscious tendency to pretension will spur them to pretend to accept an ideology in which they do not believe. They accept it in order to climb out of their prisons. Many a Black boy in America has seized upon the rungs of the red ladder to climb out of his Black Belt. And well he may, if there are no other ways out of it. Hence ideology becomes a means toward a social intimacy.

There were two quite separate lessons symbolized by the Russian Revolution. One was a way of analyzing the world. The other was a way of changing it by organized, militant, mass action. It was possible to absorb one lesson without absorbing the other. Most of the intellectual leaders of African and Pan-African movements of this time really learned only the first lesson. They were in this sense armchair revolutionaries. The leader of the black world who learned the second lesson best was, paradoxically, one of the few who rejected the theories of communism outright. He was Marcus Garvey.

Marcus Garvey was a Pan-African Nationalist: For him Africa was the ancestral home and the spiritual cradle of all African-descended people. His paramount political goal was to wrest the continent from the tyrannous European imperialist grasp and build a free, united, black Africa. This was to be achieved by the planned repatriation of a revolutionary vanguard of new world blacks in cooperation with like-minded Africans. The Marcus Garvey movement of the 1920s became one of the most phenomenal social movements in modern history, and his name one of the best known both within and outside the Black world. Garvey did not succeed in his specific goals, but the memory of the man and his movement remained a powerful

source of inspiration to black Nationalists, both in the new world and Africa (Jacques-Garvey, 1970:2).

There were two main circuits of discourse for African and Black-American intellectuals in the period between the two world wars. The first centred around the leadership of W.E.B. DuBois. DuBois had been active in the Pan-African Conference of 1900. After the First World War, he convened in 1919 in Paris a Pan-African Congress with the aim of influencing those who were drafting the peace treaties. The first congress was followed by a second in 1921 in London, Paris and Brussels, a third in 1923, in London and Lisbon, and a fourth in New York in 1927. All these congresses were dominated by Western Hemisphere blacks and the organizers had a difficult time establishing rapport with major African groups.

These congresses petered out, partly because the impact of the depression cut off financial support. In 1935, a number of former participants in the congresses plus a Gold Coast group that had been created in 1934 came together. These groups organized to protest certain colonial legislation and formed the International African Service Bureau, which emerged in 1944, with a number of African groups, largely in England, into the Pan-African Federation. It was this group which convened the Fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945, and called on DuBois to preside over it.

Among this group, a flame was preserved. This flame saw an intellectual tradition that was influenced by Marxism, but never subordinate to it. This group was concerned primarily with the rights of black people. Increasingly, however, it concentrated on purely African problems, first land rights, later political emancipation in general. It always saw the relevance of the wider struggle of the colonial people and the need for alliances with progressive white forces, but remained nonetheless primarily a black Pan-African movement.

The demand for independence was thus being prepared on the intellectual plane at least as early as the 1920s; the African revolutions of the 1960s erupted only after a slow evolution (Kesteloot 1927:13-14). Political action followed logically from the idea of the cultural commitment of the intellectuals.

The second major circuit of discourse was located in the French literary world. Here in the mind-set of European civilization was a group of harsh critics who sought to answer the discretions of a

rationalized, industrial society by an appeal to the senses, to a renewal of so-called primitive visions. Denouncing bourgeois capitalist society, racism, and the ethnocentrism of Europe, they could not fail to find a sympathetic audience. Indeed there were disciples, among the African and Caribbean intellectuals in Paris and in the French world, men such as Leon Damas, Etienne Leto, and later, Aimé Césaire. The group of Caribbean students in 1932 founded the journal *Legitime Defense* and accepted surrealism unreservedly as its basis.

The two circuits were not entirely separate. They were linked by a perhaps unexpected group, the American authors of the Negro Renaissance, such as Claude MacKay, Langston Hughes and Countee Culeen. Produced by the new American black intellectual world so deeply influenced by DuBois, they followed the path of American white authors attracted to Paris in the 1920s. They sought human freedom in artistic freedom and in throwing off constraints of traditional forms. In this period, American Negro, Caribbean and French African writers rediscovered Africa together.

The imposition of colonial rule on the continent put Africans from every walk in life in a position of powerlessness. Colonial rule was alternately direct or indirect. In the regions where direct rule was applied traditional rulers were simply pushed aside and became irrelevant. In the other regions where indirect rule took effect, these traditional rulers turned into puppets: they were protected when they carried out colonial policy and removed from power when they became obstructionists. In addition to this powerlessness, Africans had to perform in a new culture and new institutions which accentuated their feelings and perceptions of inferiority. But before long, an African elite emerged. Some of this elite resented the colonial presence and started agitating for change. The most renowned proponent of African liberation in the nineteenth century was Edward Wilmot Blyden. Blyden was born in 1832 in the Virgin Islands. After studying in the United States, he settled in Liberia in 1850. He took upon himself the task of developing a philosophy that would unite Africans and compel them to challenge their second-class status in the world.

Blyden had a profound impact on the African intellectual elite of the nineteenth century. He was the first to speak of an 'African personality'. He essentially stirred Africans towards independence

and self-sufficiency, urging them 'not to suppose that the Anglo-Saxon methods are final'. Notwithstanding Blyden's influence, European political rule imposed itself by force and succeeded to stifle voices of dissent on the continent so well that the main activity for African liberation took place outside the African continent. Two organizations deserve special mention: the Black Zionist Movement and the Pan-African Movement.

The Black Zionist Movement was the creation of Marcus Garvey, a Jamaican. Based in New York, it urged the Diaspora to return to Africa to build a new state and civilization. The movement galvanized millions of Diasporan Africans. The Black Zionist Movement collapsed in 1925 with the deportation of Marcus Garvey. The Pan-African Movement was the creation of another West Indian, Henry Sylvester-Williams. He organized a mini-Pan-African Conference in London in 1900. But it took the creative genius of W.E.B. DuBois to build Pan-Africanism into a force to reckon with.

Under the leadership of DuBois the ideals of Pan-Africanism inspired many Africans and Diasporan Africans. The fifth Pan-African Congress proved decisive. Among the organizers were Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta. Nkrumah was rapporteur of two sessions when West African colonies were discussed. Nkrumah would later put into practice the resolutions of the Pan-African Congress when he returned to his native Gold Coast. These ideas ultimately led to the independence of Ghana in March 1957. Nkrumah saw Ghana's independence as the first step in a revolutionary process.

Slowly an intellectual attitude was evolving, which was the major achievement of the intellectuals in the years between the wars. Meanwhile, some of the Pan-African intellectuals tried to find an organizational base in the world communist movement. George Padmore was active in the Black Bureau of the Profintern, the trade-union adjunct of the Comintern. Padmore encountered what he called the eroding influence of doctrinaire Marxism, including the curious Soviet pressure to support Black states within the United States and the union of South Africa, and thus they took their distance from the communist movement. (Wallerstein 1967:11). For all these reasons, as the Second World War approached, the results of their efforts were meager. A French colonial administrator, Henri Labouret, writing

in 1937; 'At the present times the Pan-Negro movement born in the new world scarcely seems to menace the White hegemonies in Africa' (quoted in *ibid.*:12–13).

In the period following the Second World War, from 1945 to 1957, the Pan-African movement became far more visible to the rest of the world, and indeed to Africa itself. In 1945, the Fifth Pan-African Congress was convened in Manchester and presided over by DuBois. The delegates still came overwhelmingly from the English-speaking world, but for the first time Africans like Kwame Nkrumah, Wallace Johnson, and Jomo Kenyatta were at least prominent. Anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism became the major themes of the congress, and also for the first time, national independence was openly asserted to be the only valid solution to Africa's political aspirations (Wallerstein 1967: 13).

Meanwhile, the Paris circuit continued on its largely separate way. There was some contact between Nkrumah and various French West African leaders such as Houphouët-Boigny, Senghor, and Apity in 1946. For the time being, Pan-Africanism for the French Africans remained a cultural ideal, as French colonial policy ruled out political devolution of power as unthinkable. French cultural policy created far greater pressure on African intellectuals than did British, and consequently evoked a greater reaction. Thus, the French-speaking Black intellectuals in Paris evolved the doctrine of Negritude. The journal *Presence Africaine*, founded by Alioune Diop, became the focal point of this movement. The tradition of contact with the French intellectual world was maintained by the participation in a Comité de Patronage of the journal with such figures as Sartre, Gide, Camus, and Mounier. The tradition of contact with the black American literary world was maintained by the close collaboration with such later exiles as Richard Wright. The tradition of contact with the communist world was also maintained, notably by the membership in the French communist party of Césaire, who was for many years elected a member of the French National Assembly from Martinique on the communist party's ticket.

In 1955, however, *Presence Africaine* discreetly dropped its European Comité de Patronage. The following year Césaire sent a letter to Maurice Thorez, in which he resigned from the French communist party. He explained:

One fact of primary importance to me is this: That we men of color, in this precise moment of historical evolution, have, in our consciousness, taken possession of the whole domain of our particularity and then we are ready at all levels and in all matters to assume the responsibilities which devolve from this new consciousness. What I want is that Marxism and communism be placed at the service of Black people and not Black people at the service of Marxism and communism (Wallerstein 1967:14).

In September 1956, *Presence Africaine* convened the first World Congress of Black Writers and Artists, which was able to get significant participation from the English-speaking Black world even though it was an outgrowth of the Paris Pan-African circuit. The gap was beginning to close between the two linguistic-social worlds into which Black men had been divided. Alioune Diop summed up most aptly in his opening address the key proposition which was to pervade and justify this most important cultural event in the history of the Pan-African movement:

It is important to point out here that all of us, whether we believe in God or are atheists, whether Christians, Moslems, or communists, have in common the feeling of being frustrated by western culture. To which Cesaire added: There are two ways to lose oneself: Segregation within the walls of the particular or by dilution in the universal. My conception of the universal is that of a universal rich with the particular, rich with all the particulars, a deepening and a coexistence of the particulars (Wallerstein 1967:15).

Killing Pan-Africanism

Pan-Africanism promoted the nationalisms that gave Africa independence in the 1960s. However, the establishment of the Pan-Africanist ideal remains essentially unfinished. An organization whose acclaimed objective was to unify Africans was created in the 1960s but forces that benefit from African divisions rose up and made their best attempt to weaken this organization. In its first incarnation on the continent, the Pan-African ideal fared very poorly in its execution. Two groups were formed: a progressive group, led by Ghana that was named the Casablanca movement, and a more conservative group known as the Monrovia group. The ensuing

charter of the OAU reflects the conservative group and its lack of vision and imagination.

A weak Organization of African Unity made the task of the enemies of Africa easy. Moreover, in the euphoria that followed the independences, Africans never sat down to evaluate the institutions they were inheriting from colonialism. Were these institutions designed with the interest and the well-being of Africans in mind? There were plenty of legitimate questions that deserved to be answered. Was the colonial justice suitable for an independent African nation? Did it best serve the interests of the African people? Nobody asked these questions. What type of education would best realize the economic objectives of an independent African nation? What type of mode of production would accelerate African development?

Since Africans were not operating in a vacuum, but with a background of thousands of years of civilization, the right thing to do was to place these imported paradigms alongside genuine African institutions, compare them, extract values in each of them and if possible adopt some of these values and reject others. And above all, the African people were to be consulted. Unfortunately the people had no say in the adoption of these colonial institutions.

The African army, inherited from colonial rule, was one of the institutions that needed to be scrutinized after the independences. The colonial army was essentially an anti-African institution used essentially to vigorously suppress dissent. It was responsible for the death of millions of Africans. It was not an army designed to protect territorial integrity and defend the populations. It was an army designed to protect the status quo. With pernicious effect, this army essentially started to exact its toll. Coups d'état soon gained currency. By 1989 more than 60 coups d'état had been committed by African armies. The dictatorships that ensued brought havoc to many African regions. In many instances, it was the age of the indirect rule again. This time around the traditional rulers were replaced by military dictators, while former colonial powers went on their business of spoliation.

Neo-colonialism

Neo-colonialism appeared on the African scene in the decade following World War II. Its predecessor, colonialism, was destroyed by two convergent pressures: one internal and the other external. Internally, the Pan-Africanist/nationalist sentiments, whipped up in the course of the West's mobilization of African manpower and resources to fight Nazism, turned against their European masters. Africans were determined to wrest power from them.³²

Externally, besides world opinion being against colonial domination, the West feared communism becoming an attractive alternative to the colonized. The colonial powers accepted the inevitability of retreat, but cleverly turned it into a tactical withdrawal, giving up the form of domination but retaining its substance. Foreign faces were withdrawn from positions of power, but only after their places had been taken by hand-picked native faces ('interlocuteurs valables' -negotiators worth talking to³³). Exploitation continued unabated, the grip remained as tight, the control of the 'new independent nation' was total, but the system was so sophisticated that it functioned by 'remote control' without the irritating physical presence of the colonialist.

The defining features of this neo-colonialism, which lasted for about a decade after the attainment of formal independence, were:

- that the former colonial master still served as the exclusive reference group for the new nation;
- that the former ruler still exercised domination over every aspect of life: political, economic, and cultural. We shall consider them briefly below.

Political domination

The new nations emerged out of colonialism usually with constitutions that were drafted at the metropolitan headquarters. The essential government and its political institutions – e.g. the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and political parties – were modeled on those obtaining in the former ruling nations. In the international arena, it was the former colonial power which chaperoned the representatives of the new nation through the diplomatic corridors and put them through the paces in diplomatic etiquette – the first

principle of which, not unsurprisingly, was that they must endorse the foreign policy of the metropolitan power. The army and other security forces of the new nation were still trained and manned by the former masters who guaranteed the protege's national and international security. This was economically and politically very beneficial to withdrawing colonialists.

African states today are not, in any real sense, capitalist states. Elsewhere, the state has played a crucial role in facilitating capitalist expansion, but in postcolonial Africa one finds a form of neopatrimonialism – personal rule – that introduces a variety of economic irrationalities. Productive economic activities are impeded by the political instability, systemic corruption and maladministration associated with personal rule. In extreme cases, a downward spiral of political-economic decline is set in motion that is difficult to halt and reverse. Thus, personal rule has become simply a euphemism for ineptitude and mismanagement that operates according to a particular political rationality that shapes a ruler's actions when, in the absence of legitimate authority, he is confronted with the challenge of governing an unintegrated ethnically-diversified peasant society. Neopatrimonialism is essentially an adaptation of colonial-inspired political institutions to peculiar historical and social conditions of poverty and inequality.

African rulers and their actions serve specific interests. The failure of democracy and economic development in Africa are due largely to the scramble for wealth by predator elites who have dominated African politics since independence. They see the state as an arena for personal wealth accumulation. There is high premium on the control of the state, which is the biggest and most easily accessible source of wealth accumulation. The people in power and those who seek power use all means to attain their goal of capturing the state. The strategies for capturing include fostering ethnic sectarianism and political repression. Competition for control of the state, whether between the military and civilian classes or between civilian political parties, is invariably ferocious and generates instability. Many of the apparently senseless civil conflicts in Africa are due to the battle for the spoils of power.

Franz Fanon (1961) eloquently described the character of the class that inherited power from the colonialists. It is 'a sort of little

greedy caste, avid and voracious, with the mind of a huckster, only too glad to accept the dividends that the former colonial power hands out. This get-rich-quick middle class shows itself incapable of great ideas or of inventiveness. It remembers what it has read in European textbooks and imperceptibly it becomes not even the replica of Europe, but its caricature'. This class is not capable of building industries: 'it is completely canalised into activities of the intermediary type. Its innermost vocation seems to be to keep in the running and to be part of the racket. The psychology of the national bourgeoisie is that of a businessman, not that of a captain of industry'. The description remains valid today for Africa's predatory elite who have grown through civilian politics, military governments, business and the civil service.

As long as African political rulers and administrators are drawn from this class of parasites, no amount of preaching the virtues of good governance or tuition on public administration will fundamentally alter the quality of governance. This is not to say that constitutional reforms and increasing civil society infrastructure are not important. But they are not the key to solving the problem of bad governance.

Good governance is the effective exercise of power and authority by government in a manner that serves to improve the quality of life of the populous. This includes using state power to create a society in which the full development of individuals and of their capacity to control their lives is possible. A ruling class that sees the state solely as a means of expropriating the nation's limited resources is simply incapable of good governance. More specifically, such a class will, by its character and mission, abuse power due to its lawlessness.

An underlying cause of many of the manifestations of bad governance, including political repression, corruption and ethnic sectarianism, is the endeavour by the unruly ruling classes to be and remain part of the global elite despite their nation's poverty. The competition for national resources leads to conflict and repression. It is difficult to see how there can be good governance when the orientation of the elite is to stay in the running and be part of the fifth of the world's population that forms the international consumer class.

Bad governance is not mainly a problem of ignorance or lack of infrastructural capacity or even of individual dictators. States in Africa are incapacitated as instruments of development because ruling

classes, including people in and outside government, are motivated by objectives that have little to do with the common good.

Africa's tragedy is not that its nations are poor. The tragedy is that it lacks ruling classes that are committed to overcoming the state of poverty. Real politics here has little to do with social and economic reconstruction. The observation of the South African writer Ruth First (1970) remains valid today: 'There has been eloquent, inexhaustible talk in Africa about politics, side by side with the gaping poverty of political thought. Down there on the ground in Africa, you can smother in the small talk of politics. Mostly it is about politicking, rarely about policies. Politicians are men who compete with each other for power, not men who use power to confront their country's problems.'

As long as politics is dominated by predator elites it is difficult to see how meaningful democracy or economic development can be sustained. The challenge facing those who want better governance is how to *make* those in power accountable and ultimately rescue the state from them to transform it into an agency for positive change.

Economic domination

Over the past few decades, much of the world focused on the debt crisis of Latin America. But the economic crisis in Africa was one that was more complex and rested on issues deeper than the short-term financial obligations of Latin American countries. The woes of the African economy were plentiful. Agricultural production, governmental institutions, and political origins were only a few of the contributors to the economic crisis of this vast continent. Besides, the pattern or monopoly domination of the colonial era still operated exactly in tact. The foreign exchange reserves of the new nations were still kept in the metropolitan headquarters. A large part of the foreign trade of the new nation was still with the metropolitan country.

Agricultural production has long been the primary export of African countries. However, Africa's population rapidly increased with the increase in agricultural production. Although Africa is largely agricultural, the continent had to import increasing amounts of food to keep pace with the population growth. During the 1960s, agricultural production increased at a rate of 2.3 percent greater than the population increase. By the 1970s, increase in

agricultural products slowed, while population accelerated and in some years Africa was just barely breaking even. In two countries, food production was actually less than the population increase and accounted for the need of imports.

Another agricultural problem persisted in the farmlands. Farming in much of Africa was based on a system where land was cleared, cultivated for several years, and left fallow to gain its fertility. However, the pressure exerted by a rapidly rising population forced farmers to shorten necessary fallow periods, thus decreasing the fertility of the land. In the long run, farmers paid the price of declining soil productivity and mounting weed and pest problems. To overcome such difficulties caused by continuous cultivation, Africa's farmers would need better seeds and fertilizers, pesticides, and technical aids, but all of these things are very expensive for low-level subsistence farmers.

The agricultural problems of Africa did not stop at the population increase or the farmlands, but continued to incorporate an irrigation crisis. African farms depended heavily on rainfall in an area frequented by droughts. Africa has a number of major river systems that could potentially serve as sources of irrigation, but constructing and maintaining irrigation facilities is expensive. Finally, two pests accidentally imported from the Western hemisphere threatened the production of Africa's staple crop. Africa's major export, agricultural goods, was definitely in trouble from every viewpoint imaginable.

The foundations for the economic ailments had already been laid in the 1970s and 1980s. State enterprises inherited from colonial powers ran the national airlines, public utilities, large-scale agricultural products, and financial institutions. These enterprises also regulated the sale and price of many commodities. The presence of the government in the economy was substantial and in socialist-oriented countries, these enterprises were hostile to private investment. These governments were subject to political influence and pressures and when they failed to operate efficiently, they became a financial drain on the government and were replaced with a new group of leaders.

African leaders soon replaced the political institutions and the new leaders attempted to monopolize their power. National economic resources and policies became a political battleground.

Political leaders sought to enhance national pride, but more so, their own positions, by spending money on prestigious projects. These new buildings were visible, but expensive and unproductive from an economic viewpoint. Government agencies became sources of employment of supporters of the party in power and selected and located investment projects on political rather than economic grounds. In many countries, politicians created lavish lifestyles financed by public resources. This allowed and possibly persuaded lower level public officials into corruption in order to supplement their inadequate incomes.

Another increasingly prominent factor in African politics was the military and its demands. The military was often motivated by a desire to improve its own circumstances. Enlarging arsenals, modernizing equipment, and raising salaries were top priorities. In 1970, African countries spent \$175 million on importing arms; by 1979, these estimates had skyrocketed to \$2.3 billion.

One suggestion of improving the situation in Africa was that of self-sufficiency. This requires the cooperation of all the countries to purchase goods and services from other countries of the continent. Although it is a good idea, it is difficult to maintain because it can hurt poorer countries. These countries are obliged to purchase goods from their wealthier partners over cheaper products from established industries in industrialized countries. This causes the poorer countries to feel that they do not share equally in the benefits of such economic unions.

Cultural domination

To ensure its exclusive domination in the cultural life of the colonized people, the colonial government hammered into them its own values, social norms and social organization. It assiduously inculcated in them the feeling that its own culture and education were superior to those of other Western nations. The indigenous culture the colonialist destroyed was supplanted, not by European culture as such, but by its own particular brand of European culture. Strong bonds of affection and shared values between the 'two' nations were emphasized. The function of media was to disseminate news about the former colonial ruler.

The form and content of education were the same as in the erstwhile ruling nation. Students who got a chance to go overseas for further studies normally went to the metropolitan country. Until recently in Nigeria, for instance, if one studied outside Britain, one would be hard pressed to find a job back home. The neo-colonialism era was supposed to be a period of apprenticeship for the fledgling nation under the tutelage of the former ruler for graduation to full nationhood.

The process of colonization involves one nation or territory taking control of another nation or territory either through the use of force or by acquisition. As a by-product of colonization, the colonizing nation implements its own form of schooling within its colonies. The idea of assimilation is therefore important when dealing with colonial education. Assimilation involves those who are colonized being forced to conform to the cultures and traditions of the colonizers. Gauri Viswanathan points out that ‘cultural assimilation (is)...the most effective form of political action’ (Viswanathan 85). She continues: ‘cultural domination works by consent and often precedes conquest by force’.

Colonizing governments realize that they gain strength not necessarily through physical control, but through mental control. This mental control is implemented through a central intellectual location, the school system. Kelly and Altbach (1984:2) state that ‘colonial schools, sought to extend foreign domination and economic exploitation of the colony’. They find that ‘education in...colonies seems directed at absorption into the metropole and not separate and dependent development of the colonized in their own society and culture’ (ibid.:4). The process is an attempt to strip the colonized people away from their indigenous learning structures and draw them toward the structures of the colonizers.

Much of the reasoning that favors such a learning system comes from supremacist ideas of leader colonizers. Thomas B. Macaulay asserts his viewpoints about a British colony, India, in an early nineteenth century speech. Macaulay insists that he has ‘never found one among them [Orientalists, an opposing political group] who could deny that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia’. He continues stating, ‘It is, no exaggeration to say, that all the historical information which has been collected from all the books written in

Sanskrit language is less valuable than what may be found in the most paltry abridgments used at preparatory schools in England'. The ultimate goal of colonial education might be deduced from the following statement by Macaulay: 'We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, (African) in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect'. While all colonizers may not have shared Macaulay's lack of respect for the existing systems of the colonized, they do share the idea that education is important in facilitating the assimilation process.

Often, the implementation of a new education system leaves those who are colonized with a lack of identity and a limited sense of their past. The indigenous history and customs once practiced and observed slowly slip away. The colonized become hybrids of two vastly different cultural systems. Colonial education creates a blurring that makes it difficult to differentiate between the new, enforced ideas of the colonizers and the formerly accepted native practices. Ngugi Wa Thiong'o displays his anger toward the isolationist feelings colonial education causes. He asserts that the process 'annihilate(s) a people's belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves. It makes them see their past as one wasteland of non-achievement and it makes them want to distance themselves from that wasteland. It makes them want to identify with that which is furthest removed from themselves' (Ngugi 1981: 3).

Not only does colonial education eventually create a sense of wanting to disassociate with native heritage, but it affects the individual and the sense of self-confidence. Ngugi believes that 'education, far from giving people the confidence in their ability and capacities to overcome obstacles or to become masters of the laws governing external nature as human beings tends to make them feel their inadequacies and their ability to do anything about the condition of their lives'.

In order to eliminate the harmful, lasting effects of colonial education, post-colonial nations or territories must remove the sense of nothingness that is often present. Ngugi insists that 'To decolonize our minds we must not see our own experiences as little islands that are not connected with other processes' (ibid.).

Post-colonial education must reverse the former reality of 'education as a means of mystifying knowledge and hence reality'. A new education structure boosts the identity of a liberated people and unites previously isolated individuals.

Kelly and Altbach (1984) define 'classical colonialism' as the process when one separate nation controls another separate nation. However, another form of colonization has been present in America for many years. The treatment of the Native Americans falls into the category of 'internal colonization', which can be described as the control of an independent group by another independent group of the same nation-state. Although the context of the situation is different, the intent of the 'colonizers' is identical. This includes the way in which the educational system is structured. Katherine Jensen indicates that 'the organization, curriculum, and language medium of these schools has aimed consistently at Americanizing the American Indian' (1984:155). She proceeds and asks, 'If education was intended to permit native people mobility into the mainstream, we must ask why in over three centuries it has been so remarkably unsuccessful' (ibid.:155).

Deepening dependency

This is critical and the latest phase of capitalist domination in Africa. While in the neo-colonialism period the former colonial master still held and exercised the dominating and unchallenged influence in the affairs of the new nation, dependency betokens a shift in the focus of attention till domination becomes truly 'international', the uni-national monopoly control having been broken. It makes possible the expansion of the cultural area of the former colonies.³⁴

The emotional debate over the impact of structural adjustment on the poor in Africa has been confused by the complexity of economic reforms and their inconsistent implementation, the diversity of prior conditions, and confounding effects of external shocks. The main instruments of implementing the policy of deepening Africa's dependence are assured by the Bretton Woods institutions, to ensure that debt repayment is done in such a way that social spending and development must be cut back and debt repayment must be made the priority. In effect, the International Monetary Fund and World

Bank demand that these poor nations lower the standard of living of their people.

The IMF and World Bank prescribe cut backs, ‘liberalization’ of the economy and resource extraction/export-oriented open markets. Following an ideology labeled “neoliberalism” the role of the state is minimized. Structural adjustment programmes also encourage privatization and reduced protection of domestic industry. Other adjustment policies also include currency devaluation, increased interest rates, and the elimination of subsidies such as food subsidies. To be attractive to foreign investors various regulations and standards are reduced or removed. For poorer countries these impacts can be devastating. Factors such as the following lead to further misery for the developing nations and keep them dependent on developed nations:

- *Poor countries must export more* in order to raise enough money to pay off their debts in a timely manner.
- Because there are so many nations being asked or forced into the global market place – before they are economically and socially stable and ready – and told to concentrate on similar cash crops and commodities as others, it is like *a huge price war*.
- The *resources then become even cheaper* from the poorer regions (which favours consumers in the West).
- Governments then need to *increase exports* (by further reducing costs, making the resources even cheaper etc) just to keep their currencies stable (which may not be sustainable, either) and earn foreign exchange with which to help pay off debts.
- Governments therefore must spend less, reduce consumption, remove or decrease financial regulations, and so on.
- Over time then, the value of labour *decreases*, capital flows become more *volatile*, and we get into *a spiralling race to the bottom*. *Social unrest* is often one result.
- These nations are then told to peg their currencies to the dollar. But keeping the exchange rate stable is costly due to measures such as increased interest rates etc.
- Investors obviously concerned about their assets and interests can then pull out very easily if things get tough. In worst cases *capital flight can lead to economic collapses* like we have seen in

the Asian/global financial crisis of 1997–99, Mexico, Brazil and many other places – of course, the blame by mainstream media and free trade economists is laid on emerging markets and their government’s restrictive or inefficient policies, crony capitalism etc, which is a cruel irony.

- Keeping the exchange rates in their favor, *by IMF donors, means that the poor nations remain poor, or get even poorer.* Even the 1997–99 global economic financial crisis around the world can be partly blamed on structural adjustment and overly aggressive and early deregulation for emerging economies.

Most African nations entered this phase of dependency domination in the 1970s – that is, a decade after their political independence. In this phase, the new nations are subjected to a diffused and complex system of control and exploitation in a situation created by the cumulative effects of the various phases of domination. The end product of this process is a retarded African political economy. Retarded in the sense that the political economy (not the economy) does not and cannot sustain an independent existence. The negative forces have acquired a dynamic of their own and serve to ensure the continued development of underdevelopment in Africa.

Dependency domination is the capitalist strategy of control and exploitation in the modern system where international financial organizations and multinational companies have become vital actors; together they have perfected an intricate and complex control network on which the African nations, as all Third World nations, are hooked. The control mechanisms have been institutionalized, and they have acquired legitimacy within the international system. It is therefore much more difficult to try to break away from the syndrome because it is bound to invite the wrath of the entire capitalist international system.

In the dependency era, the former colony has been subjected to a barrage of competing forces, the economies of the former colonies have been fully integrated with the international capitalist market economy, making it almost impossible for the new nations to break loose from it even though the odds in the market are all against them. They have been incorporated into the world economic order as mere appendages. Two factors have made this possible:

- (i) proletarianization of African societies,
- (ii) the peonage system imposed on them.

Proletarianization

This is a state in which all that Africans can offer is cheap labour. Proletarianization of Africans during the colonial epoch went side by side with semi-proletarianization. In other words, it was the process (and result) of generalized employment of wage labour in commodity production. Proletarian labour is one of the fundamental characteristics of capitalism in which workers are separated from their means of production, and sell their labour in the market to capitalists (owners of capital). The notion of ‘generalized commodity production’ (often used to describe capitalism) therefore suggests not only the generalized production of goods for sale but the employment of commoditized labour (i.e. wage labour) to do so. Proletarianization is based on economic compulsion; the forcible introduction of cash-crop farming and taxation were the force-motrice of this process. Since one needed foreign currency with which to pay tax, one had to farm cash crops and sell to colonialists or offer one’s labour to those colonialists who needed it for cash.

Semi-proletarianization was a process where people who had inadequate access to means of production, or had been dispossessed of such means, had to provide labour for others. One mechanism of semi-proletization was *debt bondage* in which producers provided labour because they had fallen in debt with their creditors over land rents, cash loans or other resources. Another type of semi-proletization occurred through *periodic labour migration*. Historically, semi-proletization has involved a dimension of extra-economic coercion as well as economic compulsion. Current forms of semi-proletization may mirror characteristics of colonial forms but are generally regarded as being based on economic compulsion. Additionally, contemporary semi-proletization often combines production using one’s own means of production with wage labour for local farms and industrial enterprises. The dispossession of the African of his land for colonial plantations rendered him semi-proletarianized.

The process of savage proletarianization runs as aptly stated by John Maleley, ‘Competition between companies involved in manufacturing in developing countries is often ruthless. We are

seeing what Korten described as “a race to the bottom. With each passing day it becomes more difficult to obtain contracts from one of the mega-retailers without hiring child labour, cheating workers on overtime pay, imposing merciless quotas, and operating unsafe practices” (Madeley 1999:103).

Having been made dependent on external sources for the satisfaction of even basic needs, the new nations have lost the capacity of feeding themselves, which they were well able to do with their indigenous farming methods. Take for example Nigeria which for ages was a food- surplus country.³⁵ As of now, Nigeria, like other African nations, has to import grains and other agricultural products. The metropolitan countries supply to African nations not only manufactured goods but also foodstuff.

The peonage system

This debt system ensures continuing servitude of the former slaves after their proclaimed emancipation. In the system, the peons are paid below-subsistence wages; they can meet their very basic needs only by loans given them by their master. So the debts go on mounting and the servitude of the peons is perpetuated.³⁶ According to Payer, the worker cannot run away, for other employers and the state recognize the legality of his debt: nor has he any hope of earning his freedom with his low wages, which do not keep pace with what he consumes, let alone the true value of what he produces for his master.³⁷

According to *Campaign Resource* of April 2003, ‘Every child in Africa is born with a financial burden which a lifetime’s work cannot repay. This debt is a new form of slavery, as vicious as the slave trade’. Indeed, the All-Africa Conference of Churches estimates that Africa is the world’s poorest region, and most of its people live on less than \$1 a day. But African countries owe \$300 billion in foreign debt.

It is the extension of this system of debt slavery to the emergent African states from the period of their political independence to the present day that has continued to ensure, and to worsen, their dependency status. For instance, Africa’s debt rose sharply in the past decade and is now equivalent to over 100 percent of its gross national product. Debt servicing payments have soared and account for 30–40 percent of the continent’s export earnings which themselves are

subject to commodity price decreases. It is estimated that by the year 2004, Sub-Saharan Africa will have to spend a staggering 70 percent of its export earnings on external debt servicing. This summary of debt data for sub-Saharan Africa is instructive:

- (1) For every \$1 received in aid grants in 1999, sub-Saharan Africa paid back \$1.51 in debt service.
- (2) Sub-Saharan Africa owes \$231 billion to creditors, that is \$406 for every man, woman and child in Africa.
- (3) Sub-Saharan Africa bears 9 percent of the developing world's debts, but has only 5 percent of the developing world's income.
- (4) Since 1996, sub-Saharan Africa has paid the IMF \$1.2 billion more than it has received.
- (5) In 1999, sub-Saharan Africa paid \$15.2 billion in debt service. This works out at \$42 million a day.
- (6) Sub-Saharan Africa spends over twice as much on debt service as on basic health care.
- (7) Sub-Saharan Africa spends 6.1 percent of GNP on education and 5 percent on debt service. If Africa's debt were cancelled it could almost double its spending on education.
- (8) Since 1990 debt service has risen from \$10.9 billion to \$15.2 billion, a rise of 39 percent.
- (9) Sub-Saharan Africa's terms of trade has worsened steadily since 1980, as commodity prices have fallen. The effect is to make the region 40 percent worse off in terms of its trade relations with the rest of the world.
- (10) If Africa's export prices had kept pace with import prices since 1980, Africa could have repaid its debt twice over.

Given the fragile structure of Africa's economy, the debt burden is one of the continent's most crippling constraining factors. Any Action Research must aim at addressing the adverse consequences of the debt problem, in particular: (i) the reduction in the utilization rate of available productive capacity and the concomitant fall in output levels and fiscal revenues; (ii) the deterioration in the quantity and quality of public services in such crucial areas as education, health, transport and infrastructure as a result of reductions in government expenditure

levels; and (iii) the fear of the tax implications of a heavy debt burden, which will induce domestic as well as foreign capital holders to invest outside the country, further exacerbating the shortage of investment funds. Many of these loans are illegitimate because:

- Many loans being repaid by African countries were made to Cold War era dictators whom Africa's people did not choose and who used the money to repress them. Example: In South Africa, the apartheid regime took out more than \$18 billion in foreign debt in its final 15 years in power. The victims of the apartheid regime should not now be forced to pay for their previous repression.
- Many loans being repaid by African countries were made to corrupt leaders who kept this money for themselves and added it to their own personal wealth. Example: In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire, dictator Mobutu Sese-Seko received more US aid than the rest of sub-Saharan Africa combined during much of the Cold War, even though it was known that this money was being diverted into his Swiss bank accounts. The people of the DRC should not now have to pick up the tab for loans from which they saw no benefit.
- African countries' debts have swelled massively over time as a result of skyrocketing interest rates and harmful economic policies forced on these countries by creditors. Example: Nigeria originally borrowed \$5 billion from foreign governments and institutions. It has paid back \$16 billion, but its debt still stands at \$32 billion.
- African countries do not owe the US and European countries; these countries owe Africa for the wealth and resources they have stolen from the continent over centuries. Who really owes whom?

In sum, 'Debt is an efficient tool. It ensures access to other peoples' raw materials and infrastructure on the cheapest possible terms. Dozens of countries must compete for shrinking export markets and can export only a limited range of products because of Northern protectionism and their lack of cash to invest in diversification. Market saturation ensues, reducing exporters' income to a bare minimum while the North enjoys huge savings. The IMF cannot seem to understand that investing in ... [a] healthy, well-fed, literate

population ... is the most intelligent economic choice a country can make' (*George 1990: 143,187,235*).

Between Pan-African identity and globalization

Kwame Nkrumah touched on the naughty question of Pan-African identity when he said: 'All Peoples of African descent, whether they live in North or South America, the Caribbean, or in any other part of the world are Africans and belong to the African nation'.

Pan-African identity is a truly complex as well as somewhat controversial issue. There is little agreement on precisely what constitutes an indigenous identity, how even to measure it, and who truly has that identity. Indeed, there is not even a consensus on appropriate terms to be used. Are we talking about Black people, African Americans, American Africans? Are we talking about race, ethnicity, cultural identity, acculturation, enculturation, bicultural identity, multi-cultural identity, or some other form of identity?

The issue of Pan-African identity opens a Pandora's box of possibilities, and to try to address them all may mean doing justice to none. This paper therefore concerns itself with three facets of identity: self identification, community identification, and external identification. But, our reflections shall be based on the shared sense of enslavement, exploitation and humiliation of people of African descent.

The current phenomenon called globalization has compounded the problem of Pan-African identity today. Globalization can be conceived as a process which embodies a transformation in the *spatial* organization of social relations and transactions, expressed in transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power. It is characterized by four types of change. First, it involves a *stretching* of social, political and economic activities across frontiers, regions and continents. Second, it is marked by the *intensification*, or the growing magnitude, of interconnectedness and flows of trade, investment, finance, migration, culture, etc. Third, it can be linked to a *speeding up* of global interactions and processes, as the development of world-wide systems of transport and communication increases the *velocity* of the diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital and people. And, fourth, the

growing *extensity*, *intensity* and *velocity* of global interactions can be associated with their deepening *impact* such that the effects of distant events can be highly significant elsewhere and specific local developments can come to have considerable global consequences. In this sense, the boundaries between domestic matters and global affairs become increasingly fluid. Globalization, in short, can be thought of as the widening, intensifying, speeding up, and growing impact of world-wide interconnectedness.

The present world is more tightly integrated than at any earlier point in history. In the age of the jet plane and satellite dish, the age of global capitalism, the age of ubiquitous markets and global mass media, the world is rapidly becoming a 'global village'. But, a perhaps even more striking aspect of the post-cold war world is the emergence – seemingly everywhere – of identity politics whose explicit aim is the restoration of rooted tradition, religious fervour and/or commitment to ethnic or national identities. African Renaissance, African Union, Afro-Pessimism, etc. are offshoots of this explosion of identities.

Globalization is a pervasive tendency influencing the lives of people everywhere since it entails essentially *all the sociocultural processes that contribute to making distance irrelevant*. It has important economic, political and cultural dimensions, as well as equally important ethical implications. Its processes affect the conditions of people living in particular localities, creating new opportunities and new forms of vulnerability. Risks are globally shared in the age of the nuclear bomb and potential ecological disasters. On the same note, the economic conditions in particular localities depend on events taking place elsewhere in the global system.

Patterns of consumption also seem to merge; people nearly everywhere desire similar goods. Naturally a precondition for this to happen is the implementation of certain institutional dimensions of modernity, notably that of a monetary economy – if not necessarily waged work and literacy. The ever-increasing transnational flow of commodities, be they material or immaterial, seems to create a set of common cultural denominators which threaten to eradicate local distinctions. Investment capital, military power and world literature are similarly being disembedded from the constraints of space; they no longer belong to a particular locality. In fact, with the

development of the jet plane, the satellite dish and more recently, the Internet, distance no longer seems a limiting factor for the flow of influence, investments and cultural meaning.

At the same time, we have in recent years witnessed the growth, in very many societies in all continents, of political movements seeking to strengthen the collective sense of uniqueness, often targeting globalization processes, which are seen as a threat to local distinctiveness and self-determination. Many African countries have also seen a strong ethnification of their politics during the last decade, as well as the rise of political Islam in the north.

This new political scene, difficult to fit into the old left–right divide, is interpreted in very different ways by the many academics who have studied them. This is partly because identity politics comes in many flavours: Some are separatist nationalist movements; some represent historically oppressed minorities which demand equal rights; some are dominant groups trying to prevent minorities from gaining access to national resources; some are religious, some are ethnic, and some are regional. Many writers see identity politics in general as an anti-modern counterreaction to the individualism and freedom embodied by globalization, while others see it as the defence of the weak against foreign dominance, or even as a concealed strategy of modernization. Some emphasise the psychological dimension of identity politics, seeing it as nostalgic attempts to retain dignity and a sense of rootedness in an era of rapid change; others focus on competition for scarce resources between groups; some see identity politics as a strategy of exclusion and an ideology of hatred, while others see it as the child of socialism, as an expression of the collective strivings of the underdog.

Neither of these interpretations and judgements tells the whole story, both because the concrete movements in question differ and because the phenomenon of identity politics is too complex for a simple explanation to suffice. What is clear, however, is that the centripetal or unifying forces of globalization and the centrifugal or fragmenting forces of identity politics are two sides of the same coin, two complementary tendencies which must be understood well for anyone wishing to make sense of the global scene in the twenty-first century.

For a variety of reasons, globalization creates the conditions for

localization, that is various kinds of attempts at creating bounded entities – countries (nationalism or separatism), faith systems (religious revitalization), cultures (linguistic or cultural movements) or interest groups (ethnicity). For this reason, a more apt term, coined by sociologist Roland Robertson, might be *glocalization*. Some features that the ‘glocal’ identity movements of the turn of the millennium seem to have in common are:

First, identity politics always entails *competition over scarce resources*. Successful mobilisation on the basis of collective identities presupposes a widespread belief that resources are unequally distributed along group lines. ‘Resources’ should be interpreted in the widest sense possible, and could in principle be taken to mean economic wealth or political power, recognition or symbolic power – although what is usually primarily at stake are either economic or political resources.

Secondly, *modernisation and globalization actualize differences and trigger conflict*. When formerly discrete groups are integrated into shared economic and political systems, inequalities are made visible, since direct comparison between the groups becomes possible. In a certain sense, ethnicity can be described as the process of making cultural differences comparable, and to that extent, it is a modern phenomenon boosted by the intensified contact entailed by globalization. Nobody envies his neighbour if he is unaware of his existence.

Thirdly, *similarity overrules equality ideologically*. Ethnic nationalism, politicized religion and indigenous movements all depict the in-group as homogeneous, as people “of the same kind”. Internal differences are glossed over, and for this reason, it can often be argued that identity politics serves the interests of the privileged segments of the group, even if the group as a whole is underprivileged, since it conceals internal class differences.

Fourthly, *images of past suffering and injustice are invoked*. To mention a few examples: Serbs bemoan the defeat at the hands of the Turks in Kosovo in 1389; leaders of the Hindu BJP have taken great pains to depict Mughal (Muslim) rule in India from the 1500s as bloody and authoritarian; and the African American movement draws extensively on the history of slavery. Pan-Africanism invokes images of enslavement, colonization and crass exploitation.

Fifthly, *the political symbolism and rhetoric evokes personal experiences*. This is perhaps the most important ideological feature of identity politics in general. Using myths, cultural symbols and kinship terminology in addressing their supporters, promoters of identity politics try to downplay the difference between personal experiences and group history. In this way, it becomes perfectly sensible for a Serb to talk about the legendary battle of Kosovo in the first person ('*We* lost in 1389'), and the logic of revenge is extended to include metaphorical kin, in many cases millions of people. The intimate experiences associated with locality and family are thereby projected onto a national screen.

Sixthly, *first-comers are contrasted with invaders*. Although this ideological feature is by no means universal in identity politics, it tends to be invoked whenever possible, and in the process, historical facts are frequently stretched.

Finally, *the actual social complexity in society is reduced to a set of simple contrasts*. As Adolf Hitler already wrote in *Mein Kampf*, the truly national leader concentrates the attention of his people on one enemy at a time. Since cross-cutting ties reduce the chances of violent conflict, the collective identity must be based on relatively unambiguous criteria (such as place, religion, mother-tongue, kinship). Again, internal differences are undercommunicated in the act of delineating boundaries towards the frequently demonised person. Pan-Africanism thus must tackle global intrusions if it must survive as a relevant contribution to Africa's freedom in the third millennium.

Africa: Exiting the global whirlpool?

The starting point for understanding the world today is not the size of its GDP or the destructive power of its weapons systems, but the fact that it is so much more joined together than before. It may look like it is made up of separate and sovereign individuals, firms, nations or cities, but the deeper reality is one of multiple connections (Mulgan 1998:3).

Mulgan's assertion impels one to agree with Wallerstein that 'African development could only be the consequence of African strength, and that strength would come both from unity of action

and from a recognition of the total worthiness of African culture, the total possibility of African achievement' (Wallerstein 1967: 27). The important question for Pan-Africanism is: how can Africa extricate itself from the modern highly digitized and militarized international system with its sophisticated and complex control network?

There is no simple answer to this question. History provides no parallel to the modern dependency-dominance syndrome. Today, the international system is much more integrated than even before, and, moreover, there is a commonality of interest among the major powers in the continued subjugation and exploitation of African societies, whatever the degree of rivalry between them for scarce and dwindling resources. If, therefore, African political economy desires to disengage itself from the international political economy, it faces a stupendous task.

However, the new Pan-Africanism must start by cleaning its house in Africa. First, the African army has to be solved. The African army is becoming less of a player on the political scene and that is the way it ought to be. At the threshold of the twenty-first century we must contemplate revamping the African army. The Information Age compels us to make the African military an informed and educated organic entity. Failure to do so may hamper African development. Soldiers of the new African army should have at least a high-school education and officers should have at the minimum American Junior college level education. The power of the army of the twenty-first century will be centered on education and technology. In the twenty-first century concepts of defense will encompass more than the usual concept of the preservation of territorial integrity. The preservation and the enhancement of the environment will play an important role. For many countries of the Sahel, a security priority should be stopping the encroachment of the Sahara. At the global level, pollution, water scarcity, and environment degradation will be at the forefront of security issues. It then behooves Africans to have a military that can contribute to reduce these security risks. And this is possible only when the military becomes attractive to some of the best and the brightest youths in our societies.

The political class is another organic entity that is bound to have its power curtailed in the twenty-first century. Far from being a phenomenon confined to Africa, this will happen globally. The

reason is very simple. The deeply cynical nature of the political class puts it at odds with the Information Age which at its core promotes transparency. Furthermore, the Information Age promotes education of the masses and as a result impacts the criteria of representation and the delegation of power.

In the twenty-first century the real, high quality power will be in the hands of a new African priesthood made of individuals capable of harnessing information and making a positive impact on the symbolic economy and the culture at large. These wizards of the Information Age will undoubtedly find themselves at odds with the current power structure that is fighting constantly for its survival and that of the status quo. Ultimately this new priesthood will prevail because they represent the future. In addition they will be in harmony with the new-networked economy referred to euphemistically as 'globalization'.

The challenge posed by globalization to the Pan-Africanist intellectual derives from the fact that it has powerful economic, political, cultural and social dimensions. In other words, globalization involves the diffusion of ideas, practices and technologies. It is more than internationalization and universalization. It certainly isn't just the liberalization of markets. Giddens (1990:64) has described globalization as 'the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa'. This involves a change in the way we understand geography and experience localness. As well as offering opportunity it brings with considerable risks linked, for example, to technological change.

This technological change has restructured the world in terms of:

- de-localization and supraterritoriality;
- the speed and power of technological innovation and the associated growth of risk;
- the rise of multinational corporations;
- the extent to which the moves towards the creation of (global) free markets leads to instability and division, especially deprived of the instruments of Knowledge Capitalism.

That is, in about the last twenty years of the twentieth century, a new economy emerged around the world based on Knowledge Capitalism that has three fundamental features:

Productivity and competitiveness are, by and large, a function of knowledge generation and information processing; firms and territories are organized in networks of production, management and distribution; the core economic activities are global – that is, they have the capacity to work as a unit in real time, or chosen time, on a planetary scale. (Castells 2001:52)

In this era of globalization and knowledge economy productivity and competitiveness are, by and large, a function of knowledge generation and information processing. This has involved a major shift – and entails a different way of thinking about economies. That is to say,

For countries in the vanguard of the world economy, the balance between knowledge and resources has shifted so far towards the former that knowledge has become perhaps the most important factor determining the standard of living - more than land, than tools, than labour. Today's most technologically advanced economies are truly knowledge-based (World Bank 1998).

The rise of the so-called 'knowledge economy' has meant that Pan-African intellectuals have been challenged to look beyond labour and capital as the central factors of production. Paul Romer and others have argued that technology (and the knowledge on which it is based) has to be viewed as a third factor in leading economies (Romer 1986; 1990). Global finance thus becomes just one force driving economies. Knowledge capitalism: 'the drive to generate new ideas and turn them into commercial products and services which consumers want' is now just as pervasive and powerful (Leadbeater 2000:8). Inevitably this leads onto questions around the generation and exploitation of knowledge. There is already a gaping divide between rich and poor nations - and this appears to be accelerating under 'knowledge capitalism'. There is also a growing gap within societies (and this is one of the driving forces behind the English government's 'Connexions strategy'). Scholars have argued for the need to 'innovate and include' and for a recognition that successful knowledge economies have to take a democratic approach to the spread of knowledge: 'We must breed an open, inquisitive, challenging and ambitious society' (Leadbeater 2000:235,237). This is the role of the Pan-African intellectual so that powerful counter-forces to this democratic knowledge ideal should not permit significant attempts by large corporations to claim intellectual rights over new discoveries, for example in relation to genetic research,

and to reap large profits from licensing use of this 'knowledge'. This is the only way of exiting the whirlpool since the

central issue of contention is not globalization itself, nor is it the use of the market as an institution, but the inequity in the overall balance of institutional arrangements--which produces very unequal sharing of the benefits of globalization. The question is not just whether the poor, too, gain something from globalization, but whether they get a fair share and a fair opportunity (Sen 2002).

Strong markets require significant Pan-African state and transnational intervention. To be sustained across time strong capitalist markets also require stable social relationships and an environment of trust. Moreover, they can be organized and framed so that people throughout different societies can benefit. The assurance here lies in the nature of the capitalist world system itself.

Historically, free markets have been dependent upon state power. For markets to function over time they require a reasonable degree of political stability, a solid legal framework and a significant amount of social capital. The push to engineer free markets has contained within it the seeds of its own destruction.

The central paradox of our time can be stated thus: economic globalization does not strengthen the current regime of global *laissez-faire*. It works to undermine it. There is nothing in today's global market that buffers it against the social strains arising from high uneven economic development within and between the world's diverse societies. The swift waxing and waning of industries and livelihoods, the sudden shifts of production and capital, the casino of currency speculation – these conditions trigger political counter-movements that challenge the very ground rules of the global free market (Gray 1999:7).

Capitalism is essentially disruptive and ever-changing - and takes very different forms across the world. While it produces wealth for significant numbers of people, many others have suffered. The gap between rich and poor has widened as global capitalism has expanded. Since Africa has been the permanent victim of these processes, its intellectuals have to develop tools for interpreting and changing the forces of this world system. Liberation theories of Pan-Africanism must benefit from this current situation created by global networks or perish.

Task for Pan-African Intellectuals

Economic processes are no longer tied to distinct nation-states. Less so the African nation-state. This explains why 'globalization' is used with great frequency to describe complex processes and yet these uses are often uncritical of their ideological and methodological assumptions. Globalization should be viewed by the Pan-African intellectual in terms of communications' models, such as 'networks' to distinguish these signifying practices from those governed by more narrowly conceived linguistic and semiotic models, which were developed before the advent of the technologies partially responsible for the new globalization. These networks of transnational practice are: (a) corporate, (b) cultural, (c) technological, and (d) environmental.

These networks of globalization intersect in many crucial ways. In order to foreground possible overlaps between different global networks and thus articulate better what is meant at this stage by 'global forces', Pan-African intellectuals should apply three different methodological criteria to each of these four transnational networks. They should ask to what extent each of these global networks contributes to: *decentering or recentering* of the customary modes of scientific knowledge; *new hierarchies and process of hierarchization*, such as class, gender, race, and such formulations as 'first', 'second', and 'third world', *diasporan, nationalism, local, and regionalism* as metaphors for new social organizations.

Transnational corporate networks should be investigated in terms of their control over new forms of world-wide cultural dissemination, language circulation, consumerism, labour organization and finance. The way in which global economic and financial institutions have made African governments obsolete and exercise unchecked powers over peoples' lives of a magnitude unequalled in the past will provide a focus. They should also examine the paradoxes involved in the practices of these economic giants. How have they created hyperorganization on some levels of social and ecological life while producing unprecedented chaos on other levels? How has their supra-national power rendered obsolete traditional notions of social contract while leading to intensified claims of citizenship? How have they destabilized traditional boundaries of class, ethnicity,

gender, generation, and authority while creating new hierarchies and intensifying the polarizations between haves and have-nots on a world-wide scale? They will explore the contribution that critical theories can make on the one hand to understanding the role of institutions like the World Bank and the IMF and on the other hand to the experiences of migrant African workers. They will therefore ask what kinds of theories can help us envision the as-yet-undiscovered political and social forms that would redistribute social power away from corporate control into more democratic relations in the continent.

The unstable, contested concept of culture looms large in many of the key debates that seek to define the present globalization moment, both within the academy and outside it. As an analytical concept, 'culture' has undergone major transformations in recent years, transformations that may most readily be identified as hybridization, creolization, multiculturalism, transnationalism, globalization. Further, such transformations at the level of the disciplines and media open up new, hitherto unmarked, links with political and social discourses throughout the world.

In dealing with this problematic they need to differentiate, first of all, two conceptions of culture, one allied to cultural studies and the other to anthropology: on the one hand, a cultural studies (or 'aesthetic') approach is oriented primarily to cultural products and expressive forms; on the other, the anthropological understanding of 'culture' is directed to the lifeworlds of people, to symbolic and cosmological systems. They would here be interested in exploring the increasingly important intersections between these two conceptions, and notably the ways in which such intersections are being determined through processes of globalization.

In the twenty-first century, many of the struggles over culture and globalization, purity and creolization, will take on new urgency. Practices of taxonomy and dissemination become determining in altogether new ways in areas like pedagogy, work and leisure, art and media, belief and ritual. They should be attentive both to the symbolic and political dimension of this process and thus to foreground ethical stakes that are implicit in the kinds of transformations we have outlined in the conceptualization of culture.

Both of the previous areas of investigation depend upon the study of how various technologies have contributed to the globalization of

economies and cultures. Of technologies, they must be especially interested in communications' technologies, such as e-mail, video, fax, hypertext, internet, satellite, and film. They should be especially interested in the ways new technologies have resulted in new modes of *commodification*, both in terms of 'objects of consumption' and the more general 'object-relations' through which human subjects in part socially construct themselves. If the 'commodity' is, for example, no longer defined primarily through its materiality but rather through its discursive (or semiotic) functionality, then its mobility across national and other territorial borders is likely to be greater. In a related area, the 'the image' (lacking a better term at this stage of our project) takes the place of both the humanly constructed 'object' and the linguistic 'sign'. What is the phenomenology of the 'image' in a global framework, and to what extent does the 'image' function *within* or *beyond* the parameters of specific *languages*? In this latter regard, does 'image production' depend upon criteria of valuation, such as performative and communicative efficiency, that differ from the criteria governing a 'useful' object or 'meaningful' statement in language? More complex structures incorporating 'images' into narratives, such as 'virtual realities', will have to be examined similarly according to their implicit criteria for valuation.

New forces of globalization suggest variously coordinated transnational efforts in *ecological awareness* and *environmental protection*. These efforts are more needed in Africa today than ever before. These same forces suggest, however, technological transformations of 'Nature', such as in genetic engineering and the *human genome project*, that constitute yet another force of globalization: the thorough incorporation or subordination of Nature to social and economic domains. In this context, the Pan-African intellectual would be particularly interested in studying assumptions of political responses to the globalization of environmental issues, ranging from specific political movements like the Green Party and its international offshoots, various eco-feminisms to the recent valorization of the *local* over the *international*, as well as just how such *neo-regionalisms* are configured in terms of a postmodern *cosmopolitanism*. Certain *health* issues are also relevant in this network, as they are in the *cultural* network, especially as epidemics and pandemics (such as *AIDS*) and environmental crises and disasters

(such as damage to the ozone layer) shape transnational policies and thus contribute to what is understood in the phrase, *forces of globalization*.

There is not the least sign that globalization in its networks is leading to the historical obsolescence of the state. But neither does the present stage of history undermine the claim that the law of value necessarily operates in the world market over and above individual states. A Marxian theory of the state must thus explore the role of the state in furthering capital accumulation. This role includes a) enforcement of property rights, b) regulation of money, c) crisis management, d) provision of infrastructure, R&D, training, and other ‘public goods’, and e) maintenance of access to necessary raw materials, markets, and so on. Globalization hardly erodes these essential state functions.

All the main forms of economic globalization – foreign direct investment (FDI), international trade, and flows of financial capital – require the enforcement of property rights. This remains the responsibility of states. FDI will occur only if states extend the same sorts of protections guaranteed under their system of jurisprudence to the holders of foreign investments. Regarding trade, in a world of rapid technological innovation the scope of intellectual property rights acknowledged and enforced by states becomes a matter of increasing importance. In the realm of finance capital, the state retains the capacity of decreeing which contracts are enforceable and which are not, a power that can affect which financial transactions occur in the global economy and which are not. The globalization of economic activity, and the specific paths taken in the course of globalization, are thus to a considerable extent a function of the power of states to define and enforce rights to property and exchange.

Money has always been the Achilles heel of the neoliberal dream of a self-sufficient free market. The reproduction of capitalist markets requires state activity regarding money. On the level of the global economy the same point holds. Even neoliberals hold that the satisfactory reproduction of the global economy over time requires appropriate monetary decisions by states, especially their central banks.

Of course defining what counts as an ‘appropriate’ monetary decision in a given context is a matter of great dispute. What is hardly in dispute, however, is that when crises break out in the

global economy, governments must assume special responsibility to 'restore investor confidence'. In the continued absence of an international monetary agency with the power to create credit money, the responsibility for increasing liquidity in the global economy ultimately rests with national governments. Some states, at least, also retain a capacity to intervene to prevent losses to particular players from threatening global markets as a whole, as Alan Greenspan's organization of the bailout of Long Term Capital Management suggests. Further, investors continue to call on the state to 'socialize' the costs of global downswings by displacing them onto working men and women, the unemployed, the elderly, and so on. One mechanism for socializing these costs is through the state taking over private debts.

The extent to which particular regions enjoy success in the global economy today is to a considerable extent a function of their governments. Governments help create the conditions for regional success through support for education and training, funding for infrastructure and research, the formation of formal and informal networks of elites, government/business partnerships for specific projects of importance to regional growth, etc.

In the global economy access to foreign supplies of needed raw materials, foreign labour power and technologies, foreign markets for exported goods and services, foreign sources of capital, and so on, regularly requires state negotiation. Continued access may also regularly require military intervention by the state, or at least an effective threat of military action.

Conclusion

World capitalism has been undergoing a period of profound restructuring since the 1970s bound up with the world historic process that has come to be known as globalization. One process central to capitalist globalization is transnational class formation, which has proceeded in step with the internationalization of capital and the global integration of national productive structures. Given the transnational integration of national economies, the mobility of capital and the global fragmentation and decentralization of accumulation circuits, class formation is progressively less tied

to territoriality. The traditional assumption by Marxists that the capitalist class is by theoretical fiat organized in nation-states and driven by the dynamics of national capitalist competition and state rivalries needs to be modified since nowadays the capitalist class has organized itself at global level.

The transnational capitalist class (TCC) has emerged, and that this TCC is a global ruling class. It is a ruling class because it controls the levers of an emergent transnational state apparatus and of global decision making. This TCC is in the process of constructing a new global capitalist historic bloc; a new hegemonic bloc consisting of various economic and political forces that have become the dominant sector of the ruling class throughout the world, among the developed countries of the North as well as the countries of the South. The politics and policies of this ruling bloc are conditioned by the new global structure of accumulation and production. This historic bloc is composed of the transnational corporations and financial institutions, the elite that manage the supranational economic planning agencies, major forces in the dominant political parties, media conglomerates, and technocratic elites and state managers in both North and South.

In the process of globalization, all over the world Capital is chosen as the supreme ruler allowed to transmute the life of landscapes and forests, of animals and humans – the intactness of the entire biosphere – into vast amounts of money. These are then used solely to safeguard the continued self-gratification of a minority group in control of the means of power, the media and the financial centres, rather than in the service of the requirements of a healthy social existence of humanity together with all other life forms on earth. The result of this ‘progress’ is an increasingly desperate situation of a large part of the world’s population and the decimation of the diversity of species. Corporations, markets, investors, and elites are going global. The globalization that is so often celebrated by economists, pundits, corporate executives, and the leaders of the world’s richest nations is actually their ‘globalization from above’. The danger of a new meta-narrative rooted in the language of globalization is that it denies the purposeful, creative, and, at times, powerful role Africans have played in the world capitalist system.

This globalization from above can and should be contested by a

‘globalization from below’ through which people at the grassroots like those in Africa link up to impose their own needs and interests on the process of globalization. A movement embodying globalization from below is already emerging. Its global grassroots solidarity has the power to transform the world. Globalization gets mixed reviews. Greater interconnectedness among the world’s people seems to promise a ‘global village’ in which the destructive antagonisms of the past can be left behind, replaced by global cooperation and enriching diversity. The advocates of a world without national economic barriers maintain that it will make everyone, including the people and countries at the bottom, better off.

But the actual experience of fin-de-millennium globalization has not fulfilled this promise. Instead, it has given us more poor people than the world has ever known and an increased threat to the environmental conditions on which human life itself depends. It has led many to fear the loss of hard-won social and environmental protections and even of meaningful self-government. Globalization from above is provoking a worldwide movement of resistance. While this movement has been gathering for years, many people first became aware of it in late 1999, when tens of thousands of protesters brought the Seattle meeting of the World Trade Organization to a halt. As *The New York Times* reported, ‘The surprisingly large protests in Seattle by critics of the World Trade Organization point to the emergence of a new and vocal coalition’ that included ‘not just steelworkers and auto workers, but anti-sweatshop protesters from colleges across the nation and members of church groups, consumer groups, the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth and the Humane Society’.³⁸

This movement is neither a one-shot nor a local phenomenon. As Elaine Bernard, executive director of the Harvard Trade Union Program, put it in the *Washington Post*, ‘The WTO meeting was merely the place where these people burst onto the American public’s radar. Social movements around the world had already linked into grass-roots networks, made possible by the astonishing speed at which they can communicate in the Internet era’.³⁹ Is such a movement futile, or can it actually affect the course of globalization? People can indeed exercise power over globalization, but only by means of a solidarity that crosses the boundaries of nations, identities, and narrow interests. A corporate-driven, top-down

globalization can only be effectively countered by globalization from below. Fortunately, much of the movement that is emerging in response to globalization is showing just such a character. As Naomi Klein wrote in a *New York Times* op ed, ‘The protesters in Seattle have been bitten by the globalization bug as surely as the trade lawyers inside the Seattle hotels... and they know it. This is the most internationally minded, globally linked movement the world has ever seen’.⁴⁰

Nonetheless, this movement is ambivalent about globalization. All of its participants share a commitment to resist globalization in its present form, but they differ on what should replace it. Some aim to roll back globalization and restore the – real or imagined – national economies of the past. Some present an agenda of modest reforms to correct globalization’s worst excesses. Some are prepared to embrace a more interconnected, less nationally bounded world – but only one radically different from the ‘actually-existing globalization’ being created from above.

This movement can only succeed if it evolves from resistance, reform, and restoration to transformation – albeit a transformation that is rooted in today’s resistance, that reforms institutions at every level, and that restores the elements of democracy, diversity, and ecological balance that globalization from above has destroyed. Such a transformation requires a multi-level strategy and program to impose new rules on the global economy while transferring wealth and power to ordinary people: a worldwide economic and political democratization.

Pan-Africanist-activist scholars must demonstrate their critical commitment in the central issues of globalization and their role in the production and dissemination of knowledge. They have a unique opportunity to challenge the inherited orthodoxies in both the academy and in the world in which we live. Their political commitment must fuel innovation in that they must explore some of the theoretical, conceptual, and empirical issues at stake, although we state as caveat that space constraints preclude a full discussion of these issues.

The propositions advanced here are intended to provoke discussion, and as a matter of course are tentative in nature, requiring further substantiation in ongoing research. In other words, they must

continue to shape scholarly inquiry on such foundational issues as the origin and nature of slavery, the roots of underdevelopment, the meaning of sustainability, and the challenges of developing effective African democracy in the world capitalist system. On a theoretical level, they should insist on the explanatory power of class, gender, and a Pan-African perspective and emphasize identity politics. On the practical level, the Pan-African intellectual must demonstrate political commitment. This political commitment implies the promotion of human rights, involvement in anti-colonial and anti-imperialist campaigns, grassroots organizing, working in transnational NGOs, or speaking out as radical public intellectuals.

Notes and references

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4. See B. Kaplan, *Social change in the capitalist world*, Beverly Hills, California, SAGE, 1993.
5. Under the present stage of the information-communications revolution, 10 multinational corporations control 65 percent of the world semiconductors market, 9 accounted for 89 percent of the world telecommunications market, and 10 others took care of the vast majority of the world computer market. See Maddison, A., *Dynamic*

- forces in capitalist development*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 118–119.
6. These concepts are developed at greater length in M. Moore, *Globalization and social change*, New York, Elsevier, 1993.
 7. Related to this issue is the significant power of multinational or transnational corporations. Data from 1997 shows that Mitsubishi Trading Co., Mitsui Co. and General Motors had sales equivalent to the economic size, in gross national product, of Indonesia, which is the 24th economy of the world. These conditions lead to the evidence that certain parts of the world are undergoing processes of economic integration and desintegration. For more on these aspects see, Mundell, R., *International Economics*, New York, McMillan, 1998, especially the chapter concerning the theory of optimum currency areas, pp. 177–186; and Kenneth Galbraith, J. Challenges of the New Millennium talks with Asimina Caminis, in *Finance and Development*, 1999, Vol. 36, No. 4; and US Network for Global Economic Justice. (<http://www.50years.org/>).
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 9. See T. Levitt, *The marketing imagination*, New York, Free Press, 1986.
 10. See P. Dickens, *The global shift*, New York, Guilford, 1998; and J. Foster, ‘Contradictions in the universalization of capitalism’ *Monthly Review*, 1999, Vol. 50, No. 11, p. 39.
 11. See especially A. Portes, *Labour, class, and the international system*, New York, Aberdeen, 1992.
 12. See M. Weber, *Economía y sociedad*, México, D.F., México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1987, especially pp. 8–16 and 23–54.
 13. See a classic text on these issues in M. Weber, *The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism*, New York: Scribner, 1988.
 14. See concepts and examples of relationships between cultural aspects and communication in Etzioni.
 15. See I. Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, New York: Vintage Books, 1967; See also K. Marx, *Capital*, New York, New York International Publishers, 1967.
 16. A.G. Hopkins, *Economic History of West Africa*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1973, p. 87.
 17. For details, see E. Williams, *Capital and Slavery*, Capricorn Books,

- 1966; Hopkins (note 3), pp. 78–117.
18. K. Marx (note 2), *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 714.
 19. *Ibid.*, p. 751 (emphasis added).
 20. See A. Okolo, 'The role of International trade in the African political economy', in Shaw and Ojo, eds., *Africa and the International Political System*, University Press of America, 1982, pp. 68–103.
 21. 21. See W. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Tanzania Publishers House, 1973, pp. 103–162.
 22. Hopkins (note 3), p. 117.
 23. *Ibid.*, pp. 117–118.
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Religion and the Pan-African ideal: The Experience of Salafi Islam in the West African Sub-Region

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Introduction

Salafi Islam is one of the fast growing brands of Islam in Africa in general and in West Africa in particular. Salafi Islam is an Islamic movement established with a view to making the value-pattern-embodied in the Qur'an and the Sunnah again operative in the hearts and lives of Muslims. The main aim of this paper is to examine the question of the relationship between religion and the Pan-African ideal. It seeks to address this question by exploring the experience of Salafi Islam in the West African sub-region.

The real problem in assessing and analyzing the operation of Salafi movement as it relates to Pan-African ideal is to determine which activities of the former are Salafi relevant to the latter Pan-African idea and in what specific manner they are relevant. The relationship between religion and Pan-African ideal is rather ambivalent, because the former both promotes and hinders the growth and development of the latter Pan-African ideal. To understand how, a few questions are crucial to consider: Does the emergence of Salafi Islam suggest new directions in the relationship between religion and the Pan-African ideal? Does the emergence of Salafi movement present a paradigm shift in terms of relationship between religion and Pan African ideal? If so, in what specific manner, why and how? These and many other questions are in the present state of knowledge on these matters, unanswerable.

The rest of this paper is organized into four main sections. The first section deals with research procedure. The second section focuses on the emergence and development of Salafi movement in the sub-region, paying attention to the questions such as its goals, membership, leadership, ethos and activities. The third section

examines the question of relationship between Salafi Islam and Pan-African ideal. And the fourth section summarizes and concludes the discussion and analysis.

Research procedure

This survey of opinion and attitudes of membership and leadership of Salafi Islam on the Pan African ideal was based on multi-sited ethnographic methods. The choice of area from which the sample was drawn was more or less limited by three factors of finance, time and convenience. Consequently, it became necessary for the survey to be carried out locally, and North Western Nigeria was chosen as the most convenient area. Four major cities in the zone: Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto and Birnin-Kebbi were purposefully chosen.

The sampling procedure adopted consists of snowball, judgement and opportunistic sampling. The snowball approach involves using a small group of informants who were asked to put the researchers in touch with their friends who were subsequently interviewed, then asking them about their friends and interviewing them until a chain of informants had been selected. Regarding the judgement sampling approach, we selected informants for the study on the basis of their status and previous experience that endow them with special knowledge. As for the opportunistic sampling we selected individuals with whom it is possible to cooperate (Burgess 1997:55).

Three categories of respondents selected for the study are: (i) leaders of Salafi movement (ii) members of Salafi movement and (iii) comparable members of non-Salafi groups. These categories of respondents were selected because they seemed to be the most representative example of the people likely to have participated or observed the activities of Salafi groups. The total number of respondents is 400 out of which 20% would be leaders, 40% members, and 40% comparable non-members.

The strategy for data collection entailed a standard questionnaire and interview schedule, while the strategy for data analysis was a systematic combination of quantitative and qualitative evaluations. The procedures used were purely descriptive, including frequency counts, percentages as well as chi-square and correlation analysis.

The emergence and development of Salafi Islam in the West African Sub-Region

It is a matter of the gravest consequences that despite the advances in technology and mass communication the dialectics and rhetoric of the scientific debate have failed to effectively expel religious discourse from the world intellectual forum in general and the African intellectual forum in particular. Perhaps the best indication of this is the major ‘transformation of Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism and Islam which has been occurring in different parts of the world over the past two decades, where new religious movements have been displacing the more established ones’ (Ibrahim 2000: 16). The West African sub-region is not an exception to this general rule. The most reliable barometer of this trend is the phenomenal rise of the Salafi movements in the Muslim world in general and in the West African sub-region in particular.

Every part of the Muslim world, Jega (1997:102) argues, is experiencing an Islamic revival. Muslims are rediscovering their spiritual roots and reasserting the political power that corresponds to their way of life. There is a rising trend among the youth of both sexes to observe the dictates of the Qur’an and Sunnah. A wave of conversion to the Islamic way of life is taking place in university campuses, which were hitherto citadels of anti Islamic forces. Consequently observance of Islamic dress code in conformity with Islamic injunctions concerning modesty came into vogue.

In the political and public arena voice was raised in support of subordinating the workings of modern states to the Shariah. More and more *Ulama* (Islamic scholars) are calling for the establishment of the Islamic order and return to the Salafi’s vision. From the standpoint of faith, Al-Faruqi (1986:47–8) contends:

The Muslims perceived the aberration of history as departure from the norms of faith. It was hence natural for Muslims to think that the restoration of history and of the Muslim place in it must be preceded by restoration of the faith, of its values and practices in the hearts and lives of Muslims. For this, the example of the Prophet (SAAS) and his companions, which Islam has always regarded as normative alongside the Qur’an, was ready to assume the role of ideal to which all Muslims should return. As a result, a will to reform the status

quo arose in almost every quarter. Everywhere the movements called themselves Salafi or Salafiyya in assertion of their will to remould the present in the likeness of the glorious past. To relive, to make real and present again the concretization of the Islamic vision of the Prophet (SAAS), his companions and successors, was the first determinant of their consciousness and reforming endeavour; hence, their name and nature of their reformative moves.

By now we can take Salafi movement to be an Islamic movement that identifies itself with the Islamic movement of the Prophet (SAAS) by seeking to make the values, imperatives and recommendations of the Prophet (SAAS) again operative in the hearts and lives of Muslims. Salafi movements as Moten (1996:130) noted are neither modern nor new; they represent not a response to the challenges of the West but a quest to mould Muslims' life after the Prophetic pattern in an imperfect world. The general thrust of Moten's argument is that Islamic society is capable of reasserting its Islamicity even where pressures of the West are totally absent. The impetus for Islamic resurgence in the contemporary Muslim world is the need for the Muslims to preserve their identity by maintaining continuity with the culture that has nurtured them and the urgent requirement to adapt to contemporary reality as a condition of survival. Even in the most isolated corners of the world, therefore, Muslims are bound to strive to make their society the living embodiment of Islam by interpreting the eternity of its symbols in terms of contingency of history. The jihad movements of the nineteenth century in West Africa are a good case in point.

There is a current fervour among Muslim communities for the shariah and the return to the Salaf's vision ranks high in popularity with many Muslim masses in different parts of West Africa. But the question shall be raised: what are the factors responsible for the growth and development of Salafi movement in the West African sub-region?

A number of complex factors were responsible for the resurgence of Islam in West African sub-region. The first important factor is the nature and character of Islam. The totality of Islam is an ideal which comprises a sense of meaning of Islamic values, the over-arching worldview and set of aspirations by which Muslims locate and evaluate their efforts. It is only because Muslims maintain a notion of

an enduring if not always consistently defined ideal that movements and initiatives take place (Davies 1985:45). This implies that Islam in and of itself is the *raison d'être* for the growth and development of the Salafi Islam as well as for the support it enjoyed. In line with this pattern of thought, Al Faruqi (1979: xvii) argues that:

(the) inner vitality of Islam alone, its own inner force for self-renewal *sui generis* was the sole responsible agent for reform. This inner force derives from the essence of Islam itself. It is constitutive of the Islamic religious experience. It alone is the sufficient reason for every movement in Islam, the complete explanation of every Islamic idea.

More to the point the totality of the ideology of Salafi movement and the nature of its message enable it to draw support from all social classes rather than from a particular class. Closely related to this is the new form of religious education. In essence, the new form of religious education was meant to rouse the Muslim populace from their apathetic slumber. Thanks to the effort of some *Ulama* and their followers, a considerable progress had been made in this direction. As a result of this, many Muslims have rededicated themselves to the Salaf's vision and have been appalled at the gap between their ideals of how society should operate and the ways in which it actually does operate, and have made efforts to bring reality in conformity with the ideal.

Anti-imperialist attitudes and activities were a factor of high potency in the rise of resurgent Islam in general and Salafi Islam in particular. In different parts of West Africa Islam played and continues to play a significant role in the growth and development of movements of resistance against colonization and recolonization. The Muslims feel that for the past one hundred years the West had totally overpowered them politically, economically and culturally, and in the process their own institutions and way of life have become second rate. They also feel that imperialist conspiracy was responsible for their failure to make headway in socio-economic spheres of life. Now they have seen through this 'conspiracy' and risen up to challenge it. Thus, Islam is being used as a 'vehicle for striking back at the West, in the sense of people trying to reclaim a very greatly damaged sense of self-esteem' (*Times*, 16 April 1979:10).

The interface of religion and anti-imperialist struggle does not receive adequate attention from the radical intellectuals. Religion is considered suspect by such a category of intellectuals because they believe that it numbs the masses and invites them to obscurantism. Hence the inability of the masses who are under the influence of religion to become aware of their exploitation let alone rise in rebellion to improve their lot. The hostility to the idea that religion has a revolutionary significance was so strong that attempts to raise such an issue were felt to be inappropriate. Anyone who made enough protest was given the academic cold shoulder, condemned and ridiculed. The antagonism was sufficient to ensure that scholars, who wished to advance in academic circles, dropped these unorthodox ideas. However, the Iranian revolution has shown that revolutions can be based on religious idioms and ushered in by a collective action of all classes. It 'presents itself in terms of Islam, that is to say as a religious movement with a religious leadership, a religiously formulated critique of the old order and a religiously expressed plans for the new' (Lewis 1988:1).

Prior to the Iranian revolution, it was considered unworthy of a modern scholar to treat a topic that could be understood to suggest the revolutionary significance of Islam. The Iranian revolution, Krichen (2000: 26) said:

Showed that political Islam could lead a people in revolt and overthrow one of the bloodiest and most dictatorial regimes. All this happened at a time when the revolutionary dream seemed fanciful and freedom of opinion was denied in the Third World. The Iranian revolution bowed to the will of the streets and that the weapon of faith was more powerful than faith in weapons. It is scarcely surprising that the Third World peoples admired an Iranian revolution that seemed to offer a feasible answer to the endemic crisis in their countries.

The West African sub-region was no exception to this general rule. The Iranian revolution was therefore of great importance to the resurgence of Islam in the sub-region. The victory of Islamic forces in Iran marked a turning point in the history of Islamic activism. With the establishment of an Islamic republic in Iran, the idea that Islamic activism is a regressive return to the past seemed to have been replaced with the recognition that it is a sign of cultural authenticity and quest for comprehensive prosperity (*falah*). The

Iranian revolution had greatly increased the popularity of Islamic ideas and antagonism towards the old order. The usability of Islam as an instrument of protest and change had drawn many people who were antagonistic towards the old order into the fold of Salafi Islam. To many an Islamic activist Islam represents a bulwark against the transformation of his society in the image of the West. Islam, after all, discourages the acceptance of the world as it now stands with its point of reference in the West. Perhaps, this helps to explain why some intellectuals turn to Islam in their search for a suitable framework that would point the way out of current subservience to the West.

The ability of Salafi *Ulama* to articulate experienced deprivations and generate from their own base symbols and ideas alternative to dominant ones, enhances the popularity of the movement among all segments of society. Salafi mosques sprung up in almost every nook and corner of the sub-region. The movement enjoys high levels of membership and support from every section of the society. Its call for a return to Salaf's vision finds a resonance among both the western educated and masses. The mosque has once again become a centre of learning, a meeting-point for Islamic activists and medium for political education and communication. Apart from the mosque, the movement used open air preaching (*da'awah*), child and women education, adult education, as well as audio and video cassettes as a vehicle for the communication of its ideals and activities. The overall effect of all this is creating a climate of questioning on such issues as boundaries between Islam as a religion and its received cultural packaging.

The missionary work of the Salafi movement was organized into seven components: wards, township, local government, and state, zonal, national and international levels. The central theme in the discourse of Salafi Islam is *Tawhid* (unity of God) and return to true Islam devoid of deviations, distortions and perversions. The central question therefore becomes that of what is really Islamic and what is an additive mixture of sufism and local customs. Something that all the Salafi groups in the West African sub-region share is that many of their activities appear to be unrelated to and perhaps even radically divorced from the sufi Islam. As their missionary work is essentially concerned with the propagation of the unity of God and

condemnation of idolatry in every shape and form they often come into confrontation with the sufi fraternities and adherents of African ancestral beliefs. Members of sufi brotherhoods such as *Qadiriyya* and *Tijjaniyya* like those who adhere to the African ancestral beliefs are regarded by Salafi groups as ‘mushrikun’, meaning those who ascribe the attributes, power or authority of God to others beside Him and/or worship others beside Him.

Salafi groups regard Sufism to be a dangerous innovation (*bidi'a*) created by enemy of Islam (Gumi 1994:167). Hence Sufism as far as they are concerned is weed in the field of Islam that must be uprooted once and for all. It is ineluctably dragging the Muslim *Ummah* (society) into a danger of becoming a stable chrysalis. The Sufi groups on the other hand, viewed Salafi groups as *Wahhabites* and arch-enemies of Islamic saints (*awliya*). The ancestral beliefs have no place in the Salafi scheme of things. As for the local customs, the Salafi groups argued, must meet the test of Islam and become fully subsumed in an Islamic worldview. In essence, the totality of Salafi missionary work is reduced to a critique of Sufism and traditional beliefs and customs.

Another important area of Salafi activities is social provisioning. The Aid Groups of the movement engage in humanitarian activities such as first aid to accident victims, disaster relief efforts, traffic control and helping the sick on the occasion of outbreak of epidemic disease. The Salafi groups also engage in marriage match making by arranging marriages between members. During the Ramadan fast and *eid* festivities they provide food items and clothes to widows and divorcees in the community. The movement's activities in the here and now are oriented around the fulfillment of the future, and its strategies for this fulfillment rest upon a long-term vision. Moreover, as Du Preeze (1980) has rightly argued, religion must be socially and politically relevant, it must speak to the present needs of and problems facing the people before it can, if ever address them on their relation to the next world.

To be sure, the Salafi groups do not try to wrest power from the secular authorities but they recognize the centrality of political power in the concretization of the Salaf's vision. Their political discourse centers on the means and mechanics of subordinating the workings of the modern states to the Shariah. This they feel will

lead to the return to a kind of political system where leaders are chosen by members of community rather than imposed by force, and where the behaviour of the leaders is clearly dedicated to serving the community instead of satisfying their personal ambitions. The Salafi groups wanted to create a condition under which Islam supplies the norms and rules that govern the social and political order across the West African sub-region at least. Their concern for promotion and consolidation of transnational common religious ties made them feel that the vital interests of Islam require a stable and integrated African community. Hence, their concern for large-scale community building. This brings us to the question of relationship between Islam and Pan-African ideal.

As Kwame Nkrumah (1970) once argued the future of Africa will be a synthesis resulting from the dialectic of African, Islamic and European civilizations (Paden 1986:7). The growth and development of Salafi Islam on the West African sub-region seemed to have offered a space in which creative thinking about the place of Islam in the Pan-African ideal can take place. But questions should be asked: Is Salafi Islam saying anything radically new to and different from what already exists in the Islamic religious market? Does it have the capacity to make a qualitative difference as far as promotion of the Pan-African ideal is concerned? In short, do Salafi *Ulama* have the capacity to present the Pan-African ideal in terms the understandable and acceptable to Muslim publics, why and how? These are some of the questions the next section of the paper will attempt to answer.

The Salafi Movement and the Pan-African ideal

In this part of the paper, our interest lies in the identification and analysis of responses to the questionnaire with a view to establishing whether there is a strong relationship between Salafi Islam and the Pan-African ideal. The first question raised is whether there is no such thing as Yoruba or Hausa Muslims, but there are only Muslims. The response to this question is shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1: On whether there is no Yoruba or Hausa Muslim but only Muslims

Variable	Leaders	Followers	Non - followers	Total	
Strongly agree	80	120	70	270	68.5
Agree	0	30	30	60	15
Disagree	0	0	20	20	10
Strongly disagree	0	0	0	0	0
Undecided	0	10	40	50	13.5
Total	80	160	160	400	100

Source: Questionnaire administered

From the table it is clear that the majority of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement. All the leaders (i.e. 80) strongly agreed with it. On the part of the followers, 120 out of 160 strongly agreed with the statement. This means 100% of the leaders and 75% of the followers strongly agreed with the statement. This is in sharp contrast with non-members who only 70 out of 160 strongly agreed with the statement.

When the data was subjected to further analysis by means of chi-square and partial correlation the calculated $\chi^2 = 2.4$ is far less than $\chi^2_{0.99} = 29.141$ obtained from the chi-square table; we thus conclude that the statement is widely accepted. The partial correlation is 0.5521 respectively while controlling for leaders, i.e. holding leaders constant. Also the partial correlation between leaders and followers holding non-followers constant is 0.9110. This implies that there is a high relationship between leaders and their followers.

The second question concerned whether Islamic identity must not be determined by ethnicity, nationality or geography.

Table 2: On whether Islamic identity must not be determined by ethnicity, national or geography

Variable	Leaders	Followers	Non - followers	Total	Percentage
Strongly agree	80	160	160	400	100
Agree	0	0	0	0	0
Disagree	0	0	0	0	0
Strongly disagree	0	0	0	0	0
Undecided	0	0	0	0	0
Total	80	160	160	400	100

Source: Questionnaire administered

With regard to this question, the statement is unanimously accepted. Perhaps this is due to the fact that Islam is against social discrimination. This is in line with the Qur'anic verse: 'O Mankind, we have created you all from a male and a female and made you into tribes and nations so that you would know one another. Verily the most honourable among you, in the sight of God, is he who is the most righteous among you'. It is interesting to note that Pan-Africanism is diametrically opposed to all forms of racial discrimination. Moreover, since the calculated $\chi^2 = 5.4$ is less than the $\chi^2_{0.99} = 29.41$ obtained from the χ^2 table, the unanimous acceptance of the statement is beyond any reasonable doubt.

Closely related to the second question is the third question which centers on the fact that Islam does not discriminate on racial, ethnic, linguistic, economic or educational grounds for it believes in unity of humanity. All the three categories of respondents unanimously agreed with the above statement. Similarly on the question of whether any Muslim of decent character can lead congregational prayers, all the categories of respondents strongly agreed with the statement. All these suggest the idea of racial equality, which is an important cornerstone of the Pan-African ideal.

When the three categories of respondents were asked to respond to the statement 'if you are born into the Nigerian view of Islam you are not a true Muslim', the statement is rejected out rightly. This is because all of them strongly disagreed with the statement. However, on the question of whether every African state must insist on ethnic identity and language as the criteria for determining citizenship, the respondents are somewhat divided as indicated by table 3.

Table 3: On whether every African state should insist on ethnic identity and language

Variable	Leaders	Followers	N o n - followers	Total	Percenta-ge
Strongly agree	0	0	0	0	0
Agree	0	0	0	0	0
Disagree	0	0	20	20	5
Strongly disagree	70	150	110	330	83.75
Undecided	10	10	30	50	12.5
Total	80	160	160	400	100

Source: Questionnaire administered

The partial correlation between leaders and followers controlling for non-followers is 0.9568. The partial correlation between followers and non-followers controlling for leaders is 0.4229. This implies that the degree of correlation is less between followers and non-followers concerning the above view.

As regards the question of whether marriage proposal can be rejected on purely national or racial grounds, the respondents unanimously disagreed. But on the question of whether free movement of people and goods throughout the African continent must be encouraged, the opinions of the respondents slightly differed. While all the leaders (80) strongly agreed, 155 out of 160 followers strongly agreed. As for the non-followers, 140 out of 160 strongly agreed.

Table 4: On whether African governments should encourage free movement of people and goods throughout the African continent

Variable	Leaders	Followers	Non - followers	Total	Percentage
Strongly agree	80	155	140	375	93.75
Agree	0	05	20	25	6.25
Disagree	0	0	0	0	0
Strongly disagree	0	0	0	0	0
Undecided	0	0	0	0	0
Total	80	160	160	400	100

Source: Questionnaire administered

The χ^2 calculated for the variables are 1.600, 1.600 and 1.800 which are far less than the χ^2 in the table; while the partial correlation between leaders and followers is 1.0000. This suggests closer relationship between leaders and followers. Also controlling for leaders, partial correlation between followers and non-follower is the same as that between leaders and followers (i.e. 1.0000) suggesting that there is a high degree of relation between all the three categories of respondents concerning the above view.

On the question of whether every African has the right to claim the citizenship of any African state if he/she so desires, both the leaders and followers strongly agreed. While 63% non-followers strongly agreed, 10 agreed, 5 disagreed, 10 strongly disagreed and 35 remained undecided. This means 100% of both leaders and followers strongly agreed with the statement. As for the non-followers, 69% strongly agreed, 22% remained undecided, while the remaining percentage disagreed.

The respondents were asked whether obstacles should not be placed against transnational flow of ideas and information throughout the African continent and their responses are shown in Table 5.

Table 5: On whether obstacles should not be placed against transnational flow of ideas and information throughout the African continent

Variable	Leaders	Followers	N o n - followers	Total	Percentage
Strongly agree	30	70	30	130	32.5
Agree	10	35	30	75	18.75
Disagree	20	20	40	80	20
Strongly disagree	13	05	10	28	7
Undecided	7	30	50	87	21.75
Total	80	160	160	400	100

Source: Questionnaire administered

Since the calculated $\chi^2 = 53.01$ exceeds $\chi^2_{0.99} = 20.09$ obtained from the table, we conclude that majority of the respondents were of the view that obstacles should not be placed against transnational flow of ideas and information.

On the question of whether religious contact must be encouraged between different parts of Africa, all the leaders and followers strongly agreed. Only 20 out of 160 non-followers agreed, 40 disagreed, and 100 remained undecided. This means 100% of both leaders and followers strongly agreed with the statement. About 19% and 6% of non-followers strongly disagreed and disagreed respectively while 20% remained undecided.

The respondents were asked whether socio-economic interactions between citizens of different African states must be discouraged. They responded as par table 6 below.

Table 6: On whether socio-economic interaction should be discouraged between citizens of African states

Variable	Leaders	Followers	N o n - followers	Total	Percentage
Strongly agree	0	0	0	0	0
Agree	0	0	20	20	5
Disagree	0	05	40	45	11.25
Strongly disagree	80	155	0	235	58.75
Undecided	0	0	100	100	25
Total	80	160	160	400	100

Source: Questionnaire administered

The table shows that the partial correlation between leaders and followers is 0.9994 controlling for non-followers: This implies that there is high degree of relation between leaders and followers concerning their response to the above statement than between followers and non-followers controlling for leaders (0.0000).

On the question of whether there is need for every religious group in Africa to find satisfactory bases of cooperation and partnership between people of different states in the continent, both the leaders and followers unanimously strongly agreed. This is in sharp contrast with the response of non-Salafi members, who about 31% remain undecided while 13% strongly disagree. The respondents were asked whether people of every state in Africa must show their willingness to share their wealth with people of the less fortunate sister African states, both leaders and followers were unanimous in strongly agreeing with the statement as shown in the table below.

Table 7: On whether citizens of every state in Africa should be willing to share their wealth with other citizens of less fortunate African states

Variable	Leaders	Followers	N o n - followers	Total	Percentage
Strongly agree	80	160	80	320	80
Agree	0	0	30	30	7.5
Disagree	0	0	0	0	0
Strongly disagree	0	0	0	0	0
Undecided	0	0	50	50	12.5
Total	80	160	160	400	100

Source: Questionnaire administered

Table 7 indicates that majority of the total categories of respondents (80%) strongly agreed with the statement that people of every state in Africa must show their willingness to share their wealth with the citizens of the less fortunate African States. Only about 31% of the non-followers remain undecided.

Table 8 shows the responses to the question of whether as Muslims, they will use everything at their disposal to promote African unity and solidarity.

Table 8: On whether respondents will use everything at their disposal to promote African unity and solidarity

Variable	Leaders	Followers	N o n - followers	Total	Percentage
Strongly agree	70	150	0	220	55
Agree	10	0	80	90	22.5
Disagree	0	0	05	5	1.25
Strongly disagree	0	0	0	0	0
Undecided	0	10	75	85	21.25
Total	80	160	160	400	100

Source: Questionnaire administered

On the above question, 6% of the followers and 47% of non-followers remain undecided. The partial correlation between these categories of respondents is 0.3403 which is very low compared to partial correlation between leaders and followers which is 0.9839 controlling for non-followers. This suggests a high degree of relation between leaders and followers. For instance 88% and 94% of leaders and followers respectively strongly agreed that they would use everything at their disposal to promote African unity and solidarity. This is in sharp contrast with 50% of the non-followers who only agreed while 47% remained undecided.

The respondents were asked to respond to the question on whether every Muslim must support the idea of a United Africa subject to a single government and they responded as shown in the table 9.

Table 9: On whether each Muslim should support the idea of a united Africa subject to a single government

Variable	Leaders	Followers	N o n - followers	Total	Percentage
Strongly agree	80	150	0	230	57.5
Agree	0	10	50	60	15
Disagree	0	0	05	5	1.25
Strongly disagree	0	0	0	0	0
Undecided	0	0	105	105	26.25
Total	80	160	160	400	100

Source: Questionnaire administered

The partial correlation between followers and non-followers is low (0.1366) compared to that of leaders and followers (0.9975) which implies that leaders and their followers tend to be closer in accepting this view than followers and non-followers.

When asked to respond to the question of whether Muslims should go against the idea of free movements of goods and people throughout West Africa, all the three categories of respondents were unanimous in strongly disagreeing. Perhaps, this is because Islam is in favour of free movement of goods and people.

Regarding the question of whether Muslims must arrest the process of detribalization that is taking place throughout the West African sub-region, the respondents were unanimous in strongly disagreeing. However when the respondents were asked to respond to the question of whether there is every need for modification of the present global states system to meet the needs and test of Pan-African ideal, they slightly differed. For instance both the leaders and members of Salafi movement strongly agreed (60%) while only 30% of the non-members strongly agreed. For those that remained undecided formed 25% of the total respondents from non-members category.

Concerning political unification of Africa all the respondents in the category of leaders and members respectively strongly agreed

while only 25% of non-members strongly agreed. Six percent of non-members remained undecided.

Conclusion

In this paper we tried to make intelligible the religious roots of the Pan-African ideal from the standpoint of Islam. Islam as a religion advocates social equality, unity of humanity and antagonism to all forms of oppression be it racial or colonial. The Pan-African Idea of unity between Arab Africa and Black Africa is perfectly in harmony with the Islamic value of unity of human race. This suggests the religious roots of Pan-Africanism.

Religion as Mbiti (1970:261) noted, is 'the backbone of African life', hence the affinity of Islam to some ideological underpinnings of Pan-Africanism. Three general conclusions flow from our discussion and analysis. First is that the strength of Salafi movement in the West African sub-region must in some sense be a reflection of its diverse interests which allows members of different character, ability and enthusiasm to find some activity that matches their aptitude. The fact that Salafi movement in the sub-region has encouraged and made space for the participation and involvement of people of different nationalities such as Nigeria, Niger, Ghana, Benin, Cameroon, Mali, and others in its activities is enough proof of its concern for large-scale community building. Many a member of Salafi group feels that the vital interests of Islam require a stable and integrated West African community. After all, they wanted to promote and consolidate the trans-ethnic and transnational religious ties that hundreds of years of existence of Islam in the sub-region had fostered, hence the support for idea of international cooperation and partnership throughout the sub-region.

The second conclusion is the fact that Islam has shown itself throughout its history to be an effective bulwark against colonialism and imperialism had indicated that some significant aspects of Pan-Africanism have close affinity with Islam. The anti-colonial and anti-imperialistic character of Islam is so strong that in many a Muslim community Western culture formed no more than a thin and brittle veneer. By virtue of this fact, it could be argued that Islam has a role to play in the search for a suitable framework that would point

the way out of current subservience to the West. Islam then seems to have the capacity to provide intellectual fermentation for the African mind during the period of transition from the Organization of African Unity to African Union. Many Muslims have viewed Islam as an appropriate response to the perceived inadequacy of Western oriented models of development.

And third is that, the empirical section of the paper, though limited in scope, has clearly established that some aspects of the Pan-African ideal have roots in the religious life of the people. The data presented and interpreted indicated a strong relationship between Islam in general, and Salafi movement in particular and Pan-African ideal. Our analysis though simple, is therefore a useful spadework and may provide both the stimulus and the indications for further research in this field.

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