

NEPAD and the Challenge of Africa's Development: Towards the political economy of a discourse

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Abstract:

The critical necessity of development for Africa in the 21st century is an issue around which there is considerable consensus. There is, however, little agreement on the nature of the crisis, the required development framework, and the 'desired state'. In the context of the debate, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has been promoted by its authors and sponsors as Africa's development blueprint for meeting its development challenges. Much of the criticism of NEPAD has focused, procedurally, on the lack of consultation in its drafting, and, paradigmatically, on its neo-liberal content, the same set of policy instruments that have damaged Africa over the last 20 years. The latter underscores the sense of betrayal that comes through civil society resistance to NEPAD. The question though is this: Why would a group of African leaders, who seem genuine in their concerns, take responsibility for such policy framework? The paper seeks an explanation in the complex interaction between a set of developments since 1980: the neo-liberal hegemony at the level of state policymaking, internal policy atrophy, coercive power of compliance, but equally the new constituencies (class forces) that have been thrown up in the last two decades – within the state, economy, and importantly the civil society in sub-Saharan Africa. Much of the latter is premised on the 'death of the emancipatory project' and the dominant politics of the petty bourgeois class in Africa. It is in this sense that we understand NEPAD as a class project, hence, its import.

Introduction

The development challenges that face Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, are enormous and varied. The crisis of poverty, genocidal conflict and civil wars, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and the

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crisis of economic and social policy outcomes are often presented as emblematic of the region. Understanding the nature of the crisis and dynamics that feed it has been the object of considerable contention. The analyses are to a considerable extent driven by ideological locations and paradigms. As I have argued elsewhere (Adesina 2002b), the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is best understood as having specific ideological location and driven by specific development paradigm. This paper is a follow-up to the earlier one. While the earlier paper was concerned with specifying the epistemic basis of NEPAD as a policy framework, the present paper is concerned with the nature of the social forces that undergird the document as a development paradigm.

Often, reactions to NEPAD and the mode of its deployment have been driven by a sense of betrayal. A similar feeling of astonishment and betrayal is documented in the reaction of community-based organisation (CBOs) activists to the contents and policy thrusts of country Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (Nyamugasira and Rowden 2002:15). While we can argue about the specific manner in which NEPAD involves the extension of the policy orthodoxy that has governed South Africa's macroeconomic policy making and economic relations, it does not explain why the African leaders at the 2001 Lusaka conference of the OAU Heads of State signed on to the document. The explanation, I will argue, lies elsewhere. The organising framework for this paper therefore is to understand NEPAD as a class project, and to tease out the emergence of this class configuration, which while bourgeois is distinctly different from its primogenitors of the pre-1980s. The defining shift in the African terrain of class relations is around the dominant project of the petty bourgeois class. While in the 1970s, the dominant pattern was of the African petty-bourgeoisie taking up Amilcar Cabral's (1979: 136) injunction of the necessity to commit class suicide (in order to be one with the people), the dominant shift in Africa's class topography since the late 1980s is that of a petty bourgeois class least intent on committing class suicide. In other words, the shift is from the 1970s of a petty bourgeois class with proletarian/peasant aspirations to one that since the 1980s is set on realising its bourgeois aspirations. This is the importance of what I call Africa's silent revolution of the late 20th century. The objective

of the neo-liberal project since the 1980s, has not only been to restructure Africa's economy (to meet the expansionary needs of global capitalism) but create an enabling environment – the class basis of making such project sustainable. In other words, create a class whose interest is inexorably linked to preserving the neo-liberal project. That, I argue in Section 4 of this paper, is the full import of NEPAD as a project. It is within this framework – rather than a sense of betrayal – that constructing an alternative project and *rethinking Africa's development* must begin. It is within this framework that I very briefly explore some antinomies and blind spots of NEPAD. I conclude with a prolegomenon to what must be the focus of the agenda for an alternative development framework.

To set the stage for the core discussions in this paper, I outline in Section 2, the analytical framework that I employ. Much of the debate around NEPAD – both from its sponsors and several of the opponents – has been driven by a binary logic. I suggest a different logic. Much of the criticism and defence of NEPAD has been driven by this posing of binary opposites: 'if it is neo-liberal, it cannot be concerned with poverty'. In a specifically South African context: 'if it is bourgeois/neo-liberal, it cannot be concerned with poor black issues'. This posing of binary opposites, I argue, obscures the fundamental nature of identity as it is played out in the content and deployment of NEPAD. It is possible to be bourgeois and be concerned with poverty; to genuinely raise the issue of the need to end global apartheid but deploy policy frameworks that actually reinforce it; to deeply affirm one's Africanness and yet have a prosaic understanding of its history; to be black and bourgeois! That, obviously, is axiomatic, but it is often lost when we get into the arena of political contestation. It is in understanding the mutual self embeddedness of opposites, which we can fully come to grips with the *discourse* of NEPAD. In essence, this is the key to a political economy of the discourse. Crucial to this is re-visiting the essence of *neo-liberalism*. In the earlier paper, I have sought to demonstrate the extent to which NEPAD is driven by the neo-liberal logic of the *post-Washington consensus*. Untangling the 'rational kernel' of neo-liberalism is essential to overcoming the binary logic of the political debate around the idea. In the current atmosphere (especially in South Africa), there is a sense in which most activists deploy the

label and those implementing the neo-liberal project vehemently reject the label.¹ Again, we confront the crisis of binary discourse. It is in understanding the policy terrain not as a pristine and ideal-type proposition of Normative Economics, but as the contested terrain of actors that are multi-layered and multi-dimensional, in the identities they bear. It is in understanding how biographies (individual and collective) impact on the policy arena that we can grapple with multidimensional nature and outcomes of policymaking. It is in this context that we understand the concrete forms that neo-liberalism assumes in the broad daylight of active human agencies' contestations.

A bridge between the analytical framework and the discussion of the understanding of NEPAD as a class project is the understanding of the development and evolution of NEPAD. This allows for a better understanding of the technocratic mode of its formulation, and the distinctly South African reading of Africa's development past and future at the heart of NEPAD. This is outlined in Section 3.

Analytical Framework: beyond binary logic

The debate around policymaking and content, especially when interlaced with social location (gender, class, religious, ethnic, and so on), is always fraught with considerable danger. Much of this finds its expression in the clashes between activists and those designing policies. Very often the debate descends into ascribing immutable, essentialist, properties to human agencies on both sides of the divide. On the other hand more subtle analytical attempts to grapple with complex reality easily give way in the heat of political conflict. As indicated in the introductory section, the result is that the multiple interpolation of social positions, and the ways in which these shift and change in the light of contested terrains of social existence, are lost. Often the retreat into Aristotelian binary logic (in which something is either/or, but hardly ever both) hinders both political practice and the understanding of social processes. As discussed in greater detail elsewhere (Adesina 2001/2002d), I will suggest that "the displacement of Aristotelian binary logic and the affirmation of contingent co-existence of opposites... provides the basis for a distinctly sociological" insight.

This is one in which the coexistence of opposites and the open-ended

outcome of social interaction or contending social forces provide an analytical framework devoid of teleological discourse. Outcomes are not fixed beforehand. When we confront class, ethnic, religious, and gender manifestations of mutually exclusive identities; it will not be that we take them as alternative identities. Rather it is in their interpenetration and mutual embeddedness that we understand real, lived existence as multilayered, contradictory and context-situated (rather than the post-modern imagined identities). We are not 'either/or'; we are often many things embedded in one. (Adesina 2002d:106)

The analysis of the NEPAD is within this analytical framework, especially the core thesis that the policy framework is better understood as a class project, within a particular interpellation of a network of identities: even when they seem contradictory at first. Identities here, to reiterate the point, are not some disembodied or imagined social practice; they are rooted in real material contexts, aspirations and interests. It is within this context that we will examine what I refer to as the silent revolution of the past two decades.

Neo-liberalism: specification and analytical framework

Central to the project of this paper is the concept of *neo-liberalism*. Earlier I have argued that NEPAD is profound neo-liberal in mindset, especially its understanding of Africa and the prognosis on the way out of Africa's development dilemma (Adesina 2002b). Within the wider policy debate in South Africa for instance, and the global social justice movement, neo-liberalism has assumed the status of a catchall labelling of policy opponents and a shorthand for privatisation. The most cited definition, as Paul Treanor (n.d.) reminds us, involves 'usual definitions' that are so vague as to be of no heuristic value. It points to the consequences of neo-liberalism as increased gap between the rich and the poor, and the fact that it has been imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. Often, it is in the dramatic analogy that its essence is conveyed. Bond (2001:4) used the metaphor of "knots in the economic rope tied around the necks of ordinary people getting ever tighter and digging ever deeper".² On the other side of the table are policymakers who increasingly resent the labelling of their ideas as neo-liberal. An interesting case was when President Thabo Mbeki, (in response to a comment by a

participant at the 'Continental Experts' Meeting on NEPAD' held in Pretoria in June 2002, about the neo-liberal content of NEPAD), said he would like to be further informed on what "this thing called neo-liberalism is", because he has heard it used frequently but could not seem to understand what it means. The debate within the Congress Alliance in South Africa demonstrates the extent to which the word is considered a byword for 'right-wing' and wielded as a political weapon (cf. Endnote 1.)

At the heart of the apparent confusion is a deficit of understanding concerning the relationship between conceptual discussions about neo-liberalism and actual policy implementation. For the opponents, 'privatisation' has become mobilisational rather than analytical. For proponents, the charge of neo-liberalism unfairly groups them with advocates of traditional economic liberalism, fails to recognise that privatisation (i.e. divestment of state assets or equity holding) is only a limited aspect of their programme of 'the restructuring of state assets', and that their social policy is concerned with poverty reduction, equity of access (opportunity) for historically disadvantaged segments of the population. In a sense, both sides are correct, but only because of a limited and circumscribed understanding of neo-liberalism and what it actually entails.

Neo-liberalism, as Treanor (n.d.) notes is best understood by focusing on "the historical development of [economic] liberalism". Central to this is the "belief in the moral necessity of market forces in the economy" and "entrepreneurs... as a good and necessary social group". Economic liberalism revolves around these two fundamentals and the propagation of the culture, norms and social framework of power and relations that sustain both ideas. In this regard, market forces are not only morally necessary but inherently good and are the most appropriate ways to allocate resources and create incentives in society. The entrepreneurs are the primary social force for deploying and implementing this virtuous mode of managing society. The extent of penetration of society – what Marx would call the "commodification of social life" – is itself a result of contestation of the social terrain.

What is significant about neo-liberalism, deriving from this basis in orthodox market liberalism, is "the desire to intensify and expand the market, by increasing the number, frequency, repeatability,

and formalisation of transactions” (Treanor, n.d.: 5). It is in this propagation of the principle of market transaction to as many areas of social and economic existence and interaction as possible that defines the core value and principle of neo-liberalism. This could be spatial or temporal, or terrains of social relationship that would be considered unsuitable to the logic of market transactions. Bond (2001:4-10) appropriately identifies the basis of contemporary neo-liberal globalisation as an attempt to address the crisis of over-accumulation by displacing the crisis. It is in pushing the frontiers of the market, as a normative position, that we understand the attempt to resolve that crisis. In its specific manifestation, however, neo-liberalism is under-girded by two other core ideas: monetarism (as the normative framework for regulating macroeconomic affairs), and supply-side economics (as the framework for addressing firm level production activities).

The specific configuration of the expansion and intensification of market logic and norms, monetarism and supply-side management, and manifestation in actual policy practice and implementation, will, however, depend on the configuration of social forces and agencies that contest the policy terrain. Capacity to move from theory to policy practice is therefore a critical function of balance of social forces contesting the policy terrain. The outcome, to go back to the analytical framework, is not fixed before hand. Furthermore, the nature of the policy contestation is itself not binary, as in State versus Civil Society (even if one could assume that there is one civil society). The State itself is a terrain of active human agencies contesting the policymaking process and at various levels the human agencies are subject to multi-dimensional constellation of interest and aspirations. The same applies to the civil society, which one would see as even more multi-dimensional in this constellation of interest and aspirations.

What is crucial for our understanding of neo-liberalism, therefore, is not privatisation, *per se*. That is only one of several options available in the extension of the market logic and the deification of the entrepreneurial spirit. In the specific case of ‘restructuring’ of State assets, it is not so much privatisation that underlines the neo-liberal project, *but the falling away of the welfare functions of public enterprises and utilities*. The aspiration to extend the market

logic to every arena of social and economic relations (realised or not) would manifest itself in attempts at inserting the ‘commercial principle’ into the heart of the traditional terrains of social policy: health, sanitation, education, social security, and so on. Added to this is the increased definition of every terrain of service delivery as a business concern, driven by business logic: from municipal services to the running of health and educational institutions. The entrepreneur becomes the high-priest of this new brave world driven by market logic. *I will argue that it is in this reading of NEPAD, as a development framework, that we understand its true import.*

To the extent that these are principles that have for the last twenty years been associated with the Bretton Woods institutions’ (BWIs) social vivisection (Adesina 1994) in Africa, NEPAD’s significance is in accepting the call by the BWIs and the ‘donor community’ for African countries to take ownership of these policies. The intensification and expansion of the market principle and practice and the deification of the entrepreneurial ‘class’ are themselves not a disembodied social process. They represent a distinct class project at the global level. The failure of the sponsors of NEPAD to pay attention to the debilitating consequences of twenty years of carnage of the neo-liberal project is more than coincidental. I will argue that it is illustrative of the fundamental shift in the nature of the class forces on the continent itself.

It is in understanding the core values of neo-liberalism that we appreciate its enduring logic in the policy of ‘weaving and diving’ by the BWIs and the handlers in Washington and Europe over the last two decades. While there has been significant shift in the *language* of deploying neo-liberal policy instruments, from the early days of orthodox stabilisation and the liberalisation agenda (or Washington Consensus) and the current so-called post-Washington Consensus, the core values remain the same (cf. Adesina 1994: vi-viii). It is in following the distinction that Imre Lakatos made between the *core* and the *protective belt* of a research programme or paradigm that we understand the shift in the language of the neo-liberal discourse. I have argued (Adesina 2002b) that NEPAD is rooted in the post-Washington Consensus of the Wolfensohn Comprehensive Development Framework type, not Joseph Stiglitz’s. The rediscovery of poverty, the concessions to basic education and

'good governance' etc., are not simply driven by deception. Protests from street-level activism, the global social justice movement, multilateral organisations, and those having to assume responsibility of the policy instruments in the recipient countries have taken their toll on the proponents of the Washington Consensus. Beyond the usual suspects one must add protests against orthodox neo-liberalism have come from countries like Japan and conventional economists like Joseph Stiglitz (1998a, 1998b) and Paul Krugman (1998) over the IMF's bungling of the Asian Crisis of the mid-1990s. The limit of the concessions was, however, set by the core values of neo-liberalism. So while there has been a lot of an effort to massage the protective belt of neo-liberalism, the core values have remained largely the same. While not everyone has remained as dogmatic as Deepak Lal (1994), Bhagwati's (1988) excellent documentation of the basis of this concession – something in which he is himself a high priest – shows the extent to which the neo-Walrasian trade-off (between growth and equity) is rooted in sustained adherence to the core values of market liberalism.

Many of us have been surprised, though pleasantly this time, by the realisation that we had exaggerated our early fears about the trade-off between 'consumption' expenditure (such as financing education and health) and investment expenditure aimed at growth. More is known now, therefore, to wean us away from the fear that such educational and health expenditures are necessarily *at the expense of growth* (Bhagwati 1988:549-550).

Mkandawire (2001a) provides an excellent overview of these issues. The concession to social policy spending is, however, without prejudice to sustained adherence to the core values of neo-liberalism. Indeed, the core proposition of neo-liberalism is that addressing equity issues – to a lesser or greater extent – follows fundamental transactional principles. The implementation of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) often involves the application of market principles to traditional areas of social policy. User-fees involve the application of quasi-market logic to areas traditionally considered as requiring universal entitlements. That this might be wholly inappropriate in most contexts, and that the fundamental assumptions of neoclassical economics (and specifically market liberalism) have little validity in broad-day light of social existence,

remain fundamental sources of the damage and instability that neo-liberalism continues to wreak, and its link with heightening inequality and worsening poverty. The issue is not whether neo-liberal adherents and fellow-travellers cannot (or are incapable of) empathy with the poor: that would be to essentialise the more vociferous expressions of market liberalism and assume that all neo-liberal think the same way. It is that sustaining the core principles of neo-liberalism sets the limit on empathy with the poor. Particular manifestations of neo-liberalism will reflect the highly contextual nature and diversity of social experiences, biographies, aspirations, and interests of particular adherents, as well as the capacity of other social forces to contest the terrain of policymaking with the neo-liberal adherents.

It is in this highly contextual understanding of particular deployment and engagement with the core values of neo-liberalism that we can better understand NEPAD as a policy document: in all its antinomies, misconceptions, and high-minded aspirations. It is in this context that we move from the anger and despair concerning NEPAD as a betrayal to a social reading of the project. To facilitate this, I believe it is important to understand the origin and evolution of the document itself.

NEPAD: origin and evolution

The emergence of NEPAD has become the subject of considerable 'urban legend'. Much of this has been in the context of response to the blistering attacks on it by civil society organisations (cf. Bond 2002 for a compilation). At other times, it is driven by the considerable acrimony going on within the African diplomatic circles that prompts its sponsors to find legitimacy for it. For instance, the statement by Aziz Pahad (2002), South Africa's Deputy Foreign Minister, that the troika, of Presidents Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Thabo Mbeki, and Olusegun Obasanjo, was authorised by the OAU Heads of State in 1999 to develop the plan is such an urban legend.³ The outcome of the OAU Heads of State's 35th Ordinary Session and 3rd Ordinary Session on the African Economic Community in Algiers made no reference to such a mandate. While President Thabo Mbeki, attending his first OAU meeting as Head of State of South Africa, delivered a statement on the challenge of globalisation, his concerns about the

need to “put in place the mechanisms and procedures which would enable us to determine whether what we are doing at the national, bilateral and regional levels is consistent with the objectives in the Abuja Treaty”⁴, did not translate into the idea of such mechanism being taken up in or outside normal OAU structures. If anything, the speech which took a very magisterial tone, rubbed the other Heads of State on the wrong side.⁵

The outcome of the OAU session focused more on (a) a commitment to exclude those who come to power by *coup d'état* from attending OAU sessions, (b) the adoption of a proposal submitted by President Olusegun Obasanjo on peace and security issues. This led to the *Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa* (CSSDCA) initiative, which was formally adopted at the 37th Session in Lomé. Indeed, President Mbeki strongly objected to a proposal by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) to put in place a mechanism on the challenge of globalisation and information age for Africa, because it was outside the framework of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Further, there was nothing in the two major international speeches that President Mbeki gave three months later to suggest such mandate or plan.⁶

Finally, no authorisation or mandate to develop a new development framework is found in the Lomé Declarations of the OAU 36th Ordinary Session/4th Ordinary Session of the AEC, in July 2000 (OAU 2000) or that from the March 2001 Extra-ordinary session of OAU Heads of State at Sirte, Libya. Further, it is curious that such major project as the Millennium Plan was never mentioned in the Declaration and Programme of Action adopted at the April 2000 G-77 Summit in Havana, Cuba. President Obasanjo was chair of the G-77, while President Mbeki was the chair of the NAM, and President Bouteflika was still chair of the OAU. Both Presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki played pivotal roles at the Havana Summit.

I have gone to this extent because understanding the origin of NEPAD lies elsewhere, outside of the OAU mechanism and it involves the troika taking matters into their own hands.⁷ The need for a distinct document, outside existing structures of the OAU or the AEC, followed the 2000 meeting of the G8 in Okinawa, Japan in July 2000. Presidents Bouteflika, Obasanjo and Mbeki had met with the G8 leaders on the issue of debt relief for developing countries,

generally, but African countries in particular.⁸ The continent had in twenty years of structural adjustment faced the massive escalation in external debt: from US\$60.6 billion in 1980 to US\$206.1 billion in 2000 (Adesina 2002b). The demand for debt cancellation or relief had featured in the Algi s that underscore the document, both as an Africanist agenda and as a distinctly *neo-liberal Africanist project*. It is neo-liberalism of the structuralist variant, a lá Wolfensohn's CDF. For the drafting team in South Africa, the organising framework was defined by two separate but interlinked projects.

First is the *African Renaissance* project of President Mbeki, as an intellectual and cultural project. While confusing for many people in the rest of the continent, the project is best understood as part of an effort in an Africanist agenda of self-awareness within South Africa and 'defeating' the negative psychological, moral, and intellectual impact of 200 years of institutionalised racism of settler colonialism and Apartheid. In Spring of 2000, Rev Frank Chikane, the Director General in the Presidency (Pretoria), had been to the United Nations to promote the idea of *African Renaissance*.¹¹ On 21 November 2000, President Mbeki signed into law the *African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund Act No.51* (Adesina 2002b).

The second is the economic worldview that defined the work of the drafting team. For Pretoria, the *Growth and Employment and Redistribution* (GEAR) macroeconomic framework, adopted in 1996, has remained the premise of any discussion or operation. It is fundamental to the notion of redistribution and how Pretoria engages with global capitalism and its governance institutions, such as the WTO. In spite of protestations to the contrary, GEAR is a profoundly neo-liberal document – not in a pejorative sense, but in the sense that I discussed earlier.¹² It is this conception of contemporary global economy and how to survive in it, that undergirds NEPAD. While there were some contestations of the turf among the team members, it is the more neo-liberal group that won the day.¹³ Perhaps, the only major concession that the team took on board was the CSSDA framework that was President Obasanjo's pet project.¹⁴

The first public mentioning of the 'plan' was six months later, on 28 January 2001, at the World Economic Forum gathering in Davos. As Mbeki (2001) noted:

It is significant that in a sense the first formal briefing on the progress

in developing this programme is taking place at the World Economic Forum meeting. The success of its implementation would require the buy-in from members of this exciting and vibrant forum (p.1).

The programme was appropriately named the *Millennium African Renaissance Program*. Mbeki's briefing clearly indicated that the programme was meant to be a club of "participating African leaders [who] would form a compact committing them to the programme and a Forum of Leaders who would make decisions about sub-programmes and initiatives and review progress on its implementation". While "participation [was] open to all African countries", there was an opt-in clause: those intent on participating must be "prepared and ready to commit to the underlying principles guiding the initiatives. *We intend to brief all African Heads of State over the next few months*" (Mbeki 2001a:2). Those who are not "ready will be welcome to join later". Clearly, this was not an initiative of the OAU or its Assembly of Heads of State and Government. This is an idea completely alien to the way the OAU operated. Earlier in 1999, at Algiers, President Mbeki had objected strongly to the UNECA project, precisely because it arose outside of such an institutional framework. President Mbeki's own account of the project, two days after he arrived in South Africa from Davos (Mbeki 2001b), suggests an active agenda in 2000 during which he interacted widely with the "political leadership of the developed world – the North" (Mbeki 2001b) discussing and seeking commitments to "the idea of a new and concerted effort to address, among others, the challenge of African poverty and underdevelopment" (Mbeki 2001b). But this was essentially a personal initiative, without and before 'coming to any agreement with other African leaders and African civil society' (Nabudere 2002: 52).

However, in purporting to speak for African leaders, and by claiming that "the MAP programme is a declaration of a firm commitment by African leaders" (Mbeki 2001:1), Mbeki caused quite some angst among other African leaders, like Abdoulaye Wade, also present at the WEF gathering. Nothing in the comments of President Wade indicated that he had or was developing an alternative plan. The *Omega Plan* was developed *afterwards* as a counter-measure to MAP (cf. Adesina 2002b). Like MAP, the *Omega Plan* bears extensive evidence of the proponent President being a key

author (cf. Wade 2001a, 2001b).¹⁵ The May 2001 version of *Omega Plan* envisaged it being presented to the OAU Summit scheduled for Lusaka in July 2001. The international conference of experts was convened in Dakar in June 2001. This might explain the fast tracking of MAP document for the same OAU Summit.

The initial preference for MAP as a principle by ‘club of participating countries’ approach may reflect the suspicion within the OAU Assembly of Heads of State itself. Nigeria and South Africa virtually walked out of the Lomé Summit over complaints about Libya’s domination of the issue of the African Union, and fast-tracking its establishment. The African Union project had been put on the front burner at the September 1999 extra ordinary session in Sirte, Libya. Muammar Ghaddafi’s capacity to rally the smaller African countries ahead of the 2000 Lomé Summit and in securing sufficient signatories to the Constitutive Act to bring the Act into force, created considerable angst in Pretoria and Abuja. The *Omega Plan* was going to be the second time that the two major African countries (Nigeria and South Africa), which see themselves as natural leaders of the continent and its spokespersons, would find themselves to be generals without troops.

While different in origin, both MAP and the Omega Plan share a common approach to overcoming Africa’s development challenge. As “Africa’s strategy for globalisation” (Wade 2001b:6), the Omega Plan shares the same understanding of sources for financing and a private-sector led approach. While the Plan is considerably woollier than MAP in the coherence of its arguments, MAP and subsequently NEPAD suffer from related problems.¹⁶

The diplomatic efforts at the Lusaka summit led to the integration of the two plans, which was named the *New African Initiative* (NAI). In the new structure for implementation, Wade was brought onboard as a vice-chair of the Heads of State Implementation Committee (HSIC). The OAU Summit endorsed the new document. The first meeting of the HSIC meeting was held in Abuja, Nigeria in October 2001. A reworked version of the document was released. The document that emerged from the Abuja meeting involved extensive reworking of the NAI document. The substantial difference is editorial – making the document more coherent and focused than earlier versions. The team that did this redrafting drew on people

from the Abuja and Pretoria presidencies and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).

Africa's Silent Revolution: towards a political economy of NEPAD

In spite of continuing tension within the OAU and among the Heads of State on the framework itself and mode of its implementation, NEPAD was endorsed by the Lusaka Summit. A cynic might wonder if the Heads of State read the document, but that would miss the point. Adedeji (2002) expressed anguish at the lack of political will and nerve by African leaders to implement their own agenda, especially the LPA. For a document that detracts in important areas from earlier OAU declarations on globalisation, the debt crisis, democratising the global governance system, trade regimes, and the superintending powers of BWIs on economic management on the continent, what needs explaining is the extent of the consent that it has received from so many State functionaries on the continent, and from the 'business community'. It is to this, that I now turn.

I will argue that the remarkable shift in Africa in the post-1980s was not only in the imposition of orthodox stabilisation and liberalisation programmes, but the manner in which this and the change from bipolarity to a unipolar world impacted on the ideological landscape on the continent. This was both at the material level of the constitution of class relations and of the mind-set. I will contrast this with the post-colonial nationalist project. The shift in the constitution, mind-set, and aspiration of the African petty bourgeois class is the critical component.

The immediate post-independence political economy of Africa was dominated by an enthusiastic commitment to the nationalist project. At the heart of this commitment to the nation-building project was a development focus. This is regardless of whether we are dealing with Julius Nyerere's Tanzania or Kamuzu Banda's Malawi, Leopold Senghor's Senegal or Jomo Kenyatta's Kenya. While there were the Left and the Right ends of the political spectrum, there was broad concern for what Olukoshi (2002:6) referred to as the 'post-colonial social contract':

The promise of independence nationalism lay not only in discarding colonial rule and the broad-ranging exclusion on the basis of which it thrived but also opening up access to economic, social and political opportunities... the anti-colonial nationalist coalition was held together by the promise of freedom, unity and development.

It was underscored by different economic visions – from the ‘African socialism’ of Nyerere and Kaunda to the commitment to capitalism in Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire. Even the ‘capitalist roaders’ were driven by a Keynesian commitment to social policy outcomes and growth. Commitment to nation-building was an overriding and common vision. As Mahmood Mamdani recently noted¹⁷, while it is commonplace to stigmatise Julius Nyerere for the failure of the Ujamaa project, history will remember him more as Africa’s foremost nation-builder. Tanzania is the only multi-ethnic country in which no ethnic group has been made a victim. Contrary to the narratives of the period that seems to underwrite much of the current reluctance to increase spending on social policy, the significant improvements in social policy outcomes (cf. Adesina 2002b, Ghai 1987) was not financed by borrowing or the ‘printing of money.’ As Mkandawire (2001b) shows, inflation was generally low, and current account deficits quite limited. There are the obvious outliers (cf. Hutchful 2002). The development of an indigenous bourgeois class was equally driven by the nationalist project and the dimensions of the post-colonial social contract. Micro case studies of Western Nigeria (or Ghana), for instance, point to the development of a strong local consensus regarding the value of investment in universal entitlement to education, health care, and a strong orientation to full employment. This social compact survived into the late 1980s. In spite of the widespread perception, in the late 1970s, of development failure (because as the LPA argued, the average growth rate did not exceed 4.8 percent annually) there is increased consensus today that compared with the post-1980s, those first two decades have turned out to be the ‘golden age’ (Adedeji 2002) of Africa’s economic and social development (cf. Mkandawire 2001b, Adesina 2002, Olukoshi 2002).

The disaffection with the elite closure of the political space and an increasingly authoritarian developmental state stimulated a *dominant* mode of alternative politics. This was defined by Amilcar Cabral’s injunction that for the African petty bourgeois class to

become one with the people, it must *commit class suicide*. And the context of Cabral's statement is quite poignant. In a speech delivered in January 1966, at the First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America in Havana, Cuba, Cabral highlighted the critical role of the indigenous petty bourgeois class after the end of formal colonial rule. The petty bourgeois class has two possible options. One is "to give free rein to its natural tendencies to become 'bourgeois'... and necessarily to subject itself to the imperialist capital" (1979:136). This situation, Cabral argues, "corresponds to the neo-colonial situation... [a] betrayal of the objectives of national liberation" (1979:136). The other road is one that commits the petty bourgeois class to "committing *suicide* as a class, to be restored to life in the condition of a revolutionary worker completely identified with the deepest aspirations of the people to which he/[she] belongs" (1979:136). It involves "repudiating the temptations to become 'bourgeois' and the natural pretensions of its class mentality" (*ibid*). This is the dilemma of the Africa petty bourgeoisie.¹⁸

The dominant alternative politics of the 1970s, I will argue, was dominated by Cabral's injunction and inspired a generation of Africans: it inspired a *petty bourgeois class with proletarian/peasant aspirations*. The nationalist project took an increasingly more radical orientation. The liberation movements that dominated the landscape in the 1970s were decidedly driven by Cabral's injunction: from the Guinea-Bissau to Mozambique, the *emancipatory project* was not only conceivable, *it was feasible*. Unlike the old nationalist project, the national liberation agenda of these movements was enthused with proletarian and peasant aspirations. From the PAIGC to FRELIMO, the gender question was central to the liberation project itself – a deeper sense of social democracy was feasible and was being built in the liberated territories. These in turn animated politics on the continent – from the student uprising in South Africa to contending with military autocracy in Ghana. It was an *optimism of the will* that made building socialism feasible (even if profoundly dubious of the Soviet project) within the social movements across the continent. In South Africa, it made the South African Communist Party (SACP) a natural home for many who might have little awareness of what Marx, Mandel, Mao, or Machel actually said or wrote.

The significant shift, in the post-1980s, particularly in the 1990s,

was in the dominant aspiration of the African petty bourgeois class. Unlike the 1970s, the dominant aspiration is increasingly one of a *petty bourgeoisie with bourgeois aspirations*. This shift has been both at the level of the state and the civil society (or societies); voluntary and compelled. The origin is equally diverse: the ascendancy of right-wing monetarism and conservative politics in Europe and North America, and the debt crisis in Africa and Latin America. The intellectual cohesion for the right-wing project was provided initially by the Chicago brand of monetarism, but assumed widespread force through the counter-revolution in/against Development Economics, specifically. Attempts to resolve the crisis of over-accumulation in the West took the form of the displacement of the crisis and aggressive prising open of markets across the world – what Bond (2001) called the geographical displacement of the crisis.

The decline and the collapse of the Soviet bloc and China's turn from Maoism, as well as the intense hostility of the West to all instances of emancipatory politics, would impact directly on the dominant alternative politics in Africa. The containment and subjection of liberation projects in Mozambique and Angola, for instance to intense carnage by proxy forces trained and financed by an alliance of the US, Britain, and Apartheid South Africa, was not only important for moderating the end game of Apartheid but the continent generally. It triggered the perception that the emancipatory project was dead! As with everything, politics is driven by success stories and the demonstration effect of epochal events. Pessimism of the intellect was matched by pessimism of the will.

The escalation of the debt crisis and the balance of payment problems provided the entry-points for the World Bank and the IMF in the illegal micro-management of the economies of many African countries. The effect was, initially, most crucially within the state. State functionaries were confronted with ultimatums from the IMF and World Bank to implement aggressive stabilisation and liberalisation agendas or risk bankruptcy. In cases like Ghana, under Jerry Rawlings, the finance officials complained that empty treasuries left them with no alternative to accepting the bitter pill of adjustment. The turn from left-wing politics to the neo-liberal project, which saw many formal left-wing allies of Rawlings imprisoned, was taken reluctantly but taken nonetheless. However,

the impact of adjustment policies deployed with an army of western market liberal economists, took the issue beyond compulsion. The sociological effect was to shift the balance of forces within the state itself in favour of neo-liberal fellow-travellers by establishing neo-liberalism as the undercurrent of policy discussions. In many cases this involved personnel changes (Hutchful 2002, Bond, 2001). In other cases, it was a matter of a dominant ideology becoming hegemonic. Government units with economic mandates – Ministries of Finance, central banks, bureaux with oversight mandate for privatisation and commercialisation – often became the first line infantry for the emergent neo-liberal orthodoxy. ‘Capacity building’ projects by BWIs and similarly oriented western agencies focussed on reinforcing this ideological commitment. These processes were not uncontested. Tensions within the state, especially in the face of the failure of adjustment to produce the sustained growth or prosperity for the population (by ‘trickle down’) were rampant. Public revolts against the consequences of SAP fed into the scepticism and resistance of those within the state structures that were more averse to the neo-liberal project. In certain cases, and at the early stages, the more aggressive neo-liberals lost elections. Nevertheless, the continued exposure of the economies to external shocks and the debt peonage set the boundaries of resistance.

Intellectually, the crisis was posed by the new guardians of global capitalism as not merely short-term, or as symptomatic of the crisis of neo-colonial capitalism. The crisis, they argued, was evidence of the failure and bankruptcy of the nationalist project, and the developmental state agenda. This was signalled early by the Berg Report. Neo-liberalism – first in aggressive pricist terms, but later with more structuralist content – was presented as the only solution. Every instance of the failure of adjustment was presented as policy slippage and failure of political nerve, requiring exposure to more aggressive neo-liberal policy instruments. Incremental additions of political and later ‘social’ conditionalities were imposed, again driven by the market logic. The aggressive production of reports (often with dubious methodological content) by the BWIs and their intellectual associates tightened the perception of the inevitability of the neo-liberal policy package.

At the level of civil society, there was a concerted effort to

develop a new generation committed to the neo-liberal vision. The *African Economic Research Consortium* is such an initiative. The neo-liberal counter-revolution took to heart the Maoist principle on revolutionary insurgency – burrow deep within the population. The collapse in public sector wages and the secular decline in formal sector employment stimulated the growth of the NGO sector and the drift into the ‘non-formal’ sector. The emergence of the governance argument initiated the campaign to extend and deepen the ‘civil society’ of a neo-liberal hue. Elsewhere, (Adesina 2001b:i) I have argued that:

The rise in the hegemonic profile of neo-liberalism, with its focus on market-led growth... created an immanent bias towards the ‘private sector society’. NGOs were the private sector, at least not the public sector. The interesting switching of the argument about democratisation also created a perception of the need to reinforce the ‘civil society’ [often] as the antithesis of the State.

Funding from official and non-official western sources provided the basis for sustaining core actors and the diverse projects, which in many cases became increasingly hostile to the state. The political implications have been profound. Alternative politics in the 1990s lurched decidedly to the right, driven by liberal political theory and the extension of the market logic to the political space. In places like Zambia and Zimbabwe for instance, alternative politics (led by the trade union movement) commenced from the point of view of the inevitability of the neo-liberal agenda. Indeed, in both the cases of Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Zambia and Zimbabwe, respectively, the labour movement became the spring board for a conservative agenda, in the name of opening up the political space to competition. Even as the change to liberal democracy is celebrated, perhaps rightly so, the dominant form of politics took the neo-liberal agenda as inevitable *and disconnected political rights from economic rights*, or at least circumscribed the latter.

The NGO sector and the pro-democracy terrain were increasingly dominated by a petty bourgeois class least intent on committing class suicide. The normative shift was underscored by the assumption that the emancipatory project was dead, at least in class terms, and there was no viable alternative to neo-liberal growth trajectory. What was described as the 2nd Independence movement of political reform

(democratisation) is perhaps better understood as a bourgeois revolution of a kind – driven by a petty bourgeoisie with rampant bourgeois aspirations. The resentment against the one party-state and dictatorship was, in great part, driven by a petty bourgeois class straining at the leash of class aspiration, much more than the social consequences of autocracy. The tendency to acquiesce in the face of growing poverty and still insist on the deployment of market forces for rationing access to social services – health, education, sanitation, etc.- defines this orientation. True, many tears have been shed about poverty, but this is within the neo-liberal concession to the demands of equity. The neo-Walrasian equity/efficiency trade-off still drives even the concession to social policy (cf. Bhagwati 1988, Mkandawire 2001, Adesina 2002).

With limited historical memory, the new petty bourgeoisie often took the neo-liberal discourse of Africa as given. Its discourse demonised the state, as the arena of all that was wrong, and the civil society and private entrepreneurship as the domain of all that is virtuous. The idea that imperialism and transnational capital are too strong to be argued with pervades much of the discourse within civil society and state in most African countries, including South Africa. John Kufor's article on the "limits of self-sufficiency" (*Project Syndicate*, April 2002) is emblematic: "Ghana", he says, "needs foreign donors to plug the gap in its finances and assist us in standing on our own two feet."¹⁹ It is a mind-set that is seeing an increasing number of African countries dependent on donor finance for a substantial part of their *annual budgets*; especially the countries labelled as 'successful adjusters'. At the height of its being proclaimed a success story of the Structural Adjustment Programme, Ghana was dependent on external aid for between 72.15 percent and 98.61 percent of its central government expenditure. In 1999 and 2000, 54.41 percent and 76.83 percent, respectively of Uganda's (the new star pupil) central government expenditure derived from aid (World Bank 2002c).

Those who would not give up their proletarian/peasant aspirations ploughed their energy into the social justice movement, often with a considerable post-modern mind-set. For many others the emancipatory project involves energetic engagement with 'local narratives' and the politics of grassroots campaigns. Many civil society organs like the NGOs that are operationally 'radical' have

become so dependent on donor resources that the imperial and national agendas of European and North American aid agencies are not questioned. Indeed, the assumption that such institutions as USAID are ‘development partners’ is not uncommon in the NGO sector. So far, I have spoken of the *dominant* tendencies.

The class implications have been profound. The new aspirant bourgeois class (in politics and society) is defined by its rejection and hostility of the nationalist project and the post-colonial social compact. Its discourse on the nationalist project and the policy trajectory for Africa is driven by the BWIs narratives and is predominantly hostile to the state as a domain of public good. It differs from the nationalist (petty/) bourgeois class in this significant respect. This, I will argue, is important for making sense of the *content* of NEPAD, rather than its public persona. There is, however, nothing uniform about this trend.

Black, Bourgeois, and Proud of It

The pattern in South Africa shares similar but also specific characteristics and this is quite significant for the NEPAD initiative. The coalition that developed in the struggle against Apartheid was a loose one. The common platform was race-based oppression. The dominant segment, while subscribing to the principle of non-racialism, was both Africanist and non-socialist. While the language of left parties might have dominated the discourse, the tension between the complex amalgams of forces persisted. The same process discussed above – especially the notion that class emancipatory project was dead, the demise of the Soviet bloc, and the ascendancy of neo-liberal globalisation – would have profound effect on the post-Apartheid agenda of reconstruction and change. While the more radical segments of the liberation movement were in ascendancy in the late 1980s to early 1990s, a radical social reconstruction agenda was limited by the murderous violence that was unleashed by the right wing in the lead up to the 1994 elections. The curtailment of the radical agenda, to accommodate disaffection in the formerly racially privileged groups, also strengthened the traditional Africanist segment that had little inhibition about its bourgeois aspirations. While the terrain has been vigorously

contested, for the soul and direction of the dramatic changes that have happened in post-Apartheid South Africa, it is in the class agenda that we understand the import of NEPAD, as a development project.

The class force that drives the project combines a passionate Africanist agenda (exemplified in the idea of *African Renaissance*) with a class agenda to create and nurture a black bourgeoisie. In its experience of racism and social exclusion of the Apartheid era, this segment shares a common history and concerns with ordinary black people. Its quest for race-based (and gender-based) justice creates common purpose with ordinary South Africans. But it is also trenchantly committed to the bourgeois agenda. In this context, it shares common ground with the international, and predominantly white, capital-owning and directing forces. The shift from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), a neo-Keynesian agenda, to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macroeconomic framework signalled a major shift in the class balance of forces within the ruling coalition (Congress Alliance) and deepened the commitment to active engagement with global capitalism. It is in the twinning of a race-based (and gender-based) social justice concern, and the class aspirations that we fully understand NEPAD as a class project. It is this twinning of race and class aspirations that the South African promoters and drafters of NEPAD share with their counterparts in other parts of Africa. As Africans they strain at the leash of global geopolitical and economic subordination (or subsumption). In their class aspirations, they share similar concerns with the bourgeois project, worldwide. It is this that makes Benjamin Mkapa, Frederick Chiluba, Abdoulaye Wade, Olusegun Obasanjo, and Thabo Mbeki fellow-travellers.

In its Africanist orientation, and concerns for race-based justice, the South African sponsors of NEPAD do have a track record of serious concerns and commitment to what happens on the continent. South Africa's involvements in the Comoros, Burundi and the DRC have been at considerable emotional, financial, material, and military expense. It is difficult not to take in the deep emotional feeling and pride with which President Thabo Mbeki approached the signing of the peace deal in Pretoria between the Presidents of the DRC and Rwanda or the final DRC accord in Sun City. His statement that it was a bright day for Africa is in the sense of

Africans taking responsibility for resolving their own crisis. It is this Africanist dimension that is a motivating factor in trying to write a development agenda for Africa.

It is, however, the wider class and specifically neo-liberal project that sets the Pretoria group apart and defined the instruments of development that was considered feasible. The size of the South African market, the extent of the commitment of its economic policy team (Treasury, Presidency, Reserve Bank, and Trade and Industry) to active engagement with global capitalism and being a major player, defines the more aggressive commitment to a neo-liberal policy direction. Part of this may be defined as national interest, but it will fail to fully appreciate the extent to which being 'black and bourgeois' is not necessarily manipulative or a case of the deployment of alternate identities in different terrains. It is that of class aspirations and orientation which is distinctly 'black' and Africanist. Often in this context, it is not a question of the conflict between class and race – it is that of class aspiration within a racial locus.

The experiential basis of the self-embeddedness of race and class, however, also explains the extensive misreading of Africa's development crisis and growth and social development achievement that is so inherent in NEPAD. In reproducing the reading of Africa that was so typical of the *Berg Report*, NEPAD failed to recognise the complexity of the paradoxes and puzzles of Africa's development experience (Adesina 2002d). There is the lack of fit between macroeconomic indicators of performance and social development outcomes: the richest countries sometimes have social policy outcomes that are far worse than the poorer countries. Foreign investment flow has been highest in countries with pervasive social instability and/or rampant dictatorship. Further, the specific location of South Africa within the continent, and the extent to which its trade policies are driven by actors with strong commitment to the existing mechanisms for governance of global capitalism, explains the enthusiasm of the NEPAD document for the World Trade Organization, even as other African countries are sceptical, and often hostile to the power-based nature of the organisation (cf. Keet 2002). Class and neo-liberal commitments would explain the extensive antinomies in the document, as well. Much of this has been dealt with elsewhere (Adedeji 2002, Adesina 2002a, Olukoshi

2002, Bond 2002, Tandom 2002), and therefore need not delay us here. The extensive subordination to the BWIs' perspectives raises its class project above its Africanist aspirations – but it predates the NEPAD project (Bond 2000, 2001).

The effect is that NEPAD proposes the same set of policy instruments that have extensively damaged the continent in the last two decades. Its proposition that Africa should strive to develop “into a net exporter of agricultural products” (par. 154), for instance, reveals a considerable lack of understanding of the logic of the failure of a policy that African countries have pursued since the 1960s. Indeed, in making ‘market access’ such an integral aspect of its mode of ‘partnership’ with global capital, NEPAD reinforces a false debate. Increased market access for agricultural products may assuage some conscience in the North, but nothing we know in theory or practice suggests that this is in fact the way to go (Adesina 2002c). The persistent argument in the NEPAD document about Africa’s economic marginalisation also misreads the basis of Africa’s ‘marginalisation’. It is not the extent of ‘integration’ of Africa into the global economy that is the problem but *the mode*. A good measure of ‘integration’ is the percentage of trade (export and import of goods and services) in a country or region’s gross domestic product. The SSA region shows a consistently higher degree of ‘openness’ than the rest. It is in changing the *mode* of Africa’s integration into the global economy that we address its marginal voice in the global economy. In this regard, NEPAD offers little that is of promise.

Simply trying to encourage quantitative growth in macroeconomic indicators, as NEPAD seems so concerned with, is also only one side of the equation. Reduced inequity in wealth distribution is fundamental to sustainable economic growth (Mkandawire 2001b), and macro-economically poor countries do hide highly inequitable distribution of wealth. In countries such as Central African Republic, Nigeria, Zambia, Mali and Niger, more than 60 percent of the population are classified as living in absolute poverty. Yet in many of these countries income distribution remains highly skewed. The richest 10 percent in Nigeria, Zambia, Mali, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso, to name a few, control more than 40 percent of income or consumption. In the specific case of Nigeria, we are not dealing with a poor country. Indeed,

stupendous wealth has been accumulated by a tiny fraction of the population during the same decade of mounting poverty, destitution, and structural adjustment. The return to a 'democratic polity' in Nigeria, as in Zambia or Malawi has done little to tame rampant corruption in the economies – if anything Zambia, for instance, demonstrates the extent to which the opening of the political space also widens the space for corrupt enrichment of public officers *with* detrimental effect on social policy outcomes. Kuznet's thesis that income inequality must first get worse before it gets better has been shown to be absolute nonsense. This pattern of inequity has been fostered by the same set of policy instruments that NEPAD proposes.

It is in recycling the neo-liberal agenda of the BWIs and purporting to give it an African ownership that we understand the enthusiasm for the project by the same global forces that have dominated Africa for centuries.

Prolegomenon to an alternative development framework

In this paper, I have been concerned with a distinct aspect of what I consider the basis for rethinking Africa's development; beyond NEPAD. A critique of NEPAD, I argue, must go beyond expressions of despair or a sense of betrayal. It is in understanding NEPAD as a distinct class project and how this is tied to the significant shift in the African political landscape that we can begin to overcome it and develop an alternative framework that genuinely empowers our people and gets beyond the neo-liberal project. The drafting of an alternative framework should itself become the project among progressive forces on the continent – where Cabral's injunction serves as the basis for development programming. It requires the return of the Developmental State, but in a context where state/society relations are inclusive, equity-focussed, democratic, and growing economically (UNRISD 2001). This is not to underestimate the extremely hostile environment in which such a project must operate. It is important that in attempting to take ownership for policies that are in the interest of global capital, the sponsors of NEPAD are not allowed to deflect the enormous pressure that has been put on the G8 and the Bretton Woods Institutions in the last two

decades. Critical areas of the work of OAU/AU remain at variance with key propositions of NEPAD – and prefigure a different world, in which African countries are not held hostage by global capital and international financial institutions.

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Notes

1. In the South African context, this took a hugely acrimonious form that came to a head in late September and early October 2002, in the conflict over policy direction between the African National Congress and its partners in the ruling Congress Alliance, especially the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). On 1st and 2nd October, COSATU staged a series of ‘anti-privatisation’ strikes to press home its demands for a fundamental policy review. The ANC, led by its President, Thabo Mbeki, lashed out at COSATU with claims of ‘ultra-Left’ tendencies (cf. Mbeki’s statement to the ANC Policy Conference: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/speeches/2002/sp0927.html> and SACP, <http://www.sacp.org.za/umsebenzi/online/2002/uo1001.htm>).
2. This is not to take anything away from the collection of essays, which continue to show Patrick Bond’s detailed, brilliant and poignant documentation and insightful analysis of South Africa’s policy context.
3. Speech given by Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad at the conference on NEPAD sponsored jointly by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) and the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Cape Town, on 1 November 2001. This followed the Parliamentary debate on NEPAD in the South African parliament.
4. Thabo Mbeki, ‘The Challenge of Globalisation: the establishment of the African Economic Community’, *Statement by Thabo Mbeki at the 35th Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government*. Office of the President, Pretoria (13 July 1999), <http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/speeches/1999/sp0713.html>.

5. President Mbeki pointedly objected, in his speech, (*vide supra*) to a section of the Draft Declaration that he said was ‘fundamentally flawed and should be changed’. This section, quoted in full in his speech concerns the fear, expressed in the draft declaration, that globalisation ‘poses serious threats to our sovereignty, cultural and historical identities as well as gravely undermining our development prospects. We believe that globalisation should be placed within the framework of a democratically conceived dynamics, and implemented collectively to make it... capable of fulfilling the hope for a concerted development of mankind and prosperity shared by all people’ (cf. OAU 1999). President Mbeki went on to say: ‘I am certain that in our discussions today we will help one another, among other things, to understand better the objective process of globalisation and its positive and negative features. Having gained this understanding I believe we would be better placed to respond to the urgent and important challenges it poses’. If that was not off-putting, I am not sure what is! The Assembly went on to reject his objection and retained this segment of the draft Declaration, *in toto*. The recent argument about the nature of the Peer Review Mechanism, and South Africa’s approach to Zimbabwe would suggest that some lessons are being learnt.
6. Cf. Thabo Mbeki, *Speech of the President of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, at the 54th Session of the United Nations General Assembly*. New York, 20 September 1999. <http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/speeches/1999/sp0920.html>. Thabo Mbeki, *Address by the Chairperson of the Non-Aligned Movement, President Thabo Mbeki, to the NAM Ministerial Meeting at the United Nations*. New York, 23 September 1999. <http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/speeches/1999/sp0923.html>.
7. The Lomé Declaration (12 July 2000) contained a statement of agreement to ‘reinvigorate the OAU Contact Group on Africa’s External Debt’. But nothing on any mandate to produce a development document for partnership with the ‘world’.
8. Cf. SABC News *Mbeki and other African leaders ask G8 countries for debt relief*.
9. Interview, April 2002.
10. Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, SABC News (13 July 2000, 07:45), <http://www.sabcnews.com/world/other/0,1009,1756,00.html>.
11. My appreciation to John Ohiorhenuan for this insight – telephonic interview, 28 October 2002.
12. For a very insightful, frog-eye, view of the process, see Bond (2000, 2001).
13. It is safe to speculate that President Mbeki himself contributed to

the drafting of the document. Draft 3A of the Millennium African Recovery Programme, bears the stylistic hallmarks of the President's speeches, including the (signature) quote at the head of the document. The president has a well-earned reputation for working long hours and hard. He writes most of his speeches himself. Obasanjo shares similar virtues, and only the self-deluded will deny that both are smart.

14. *Vide* Endnote above.
15. The folksy tone of the *Omega Plan* reflects Abdoulaye Wade's personal style. The 'Catch-up Theory' (which President Wade claims as his personal theory) is the 'conceptual' basis of the Plan. He was correct, though, in arguing that the idea of a Marshall Plan for Africa, which underlies MAP, is wholly inappropriate to the African situation: 'it made me smile because this vision resulted from a total lack of understanding of the Marshall Plan and the context of its implementation. Reconstruction in a developed country like France...does not have anything to do with the construction of a factory or the development of an industrial sector in an African country' (Wade 2001a:4).
16. See Bond (2002) for a detailed textual critique, Adesina (2002b) for a critique of its epistemic basis, and misreading of Africa; Olukoshi (2002) for its understanding of political issues, and Adedeji (2002) for its historical weaknesses.
17. Mahmood Mamdani, Keynote Address to the 2002 South African Sociological Association Congress, East London. 30 June 2002.
18. My continuous appreciation to Omafume Onoge who introduced me to Cabral as an undergraduate at University of Ibadan.
19. John Kufor, 'The Limits of Self-reliance', *Project Syndicate*. April 2002. http://www.project-syndicate.org/series/series_text.php4?id=851 (Accessed 26 September, 2002).

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Post-Cold War International Relations and Foreign Policies in Africa: New Issues and New Challenges

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Abstract

This paper argues that international relations in Africa have changed especially in content since the abatement of the Cold War. These changes have been accelerated by the pressures unleashed by the international environment, including the reality of Africa's marginalisation and the forces of globalisation. These, along with domestic factors, including debt, internal conflicts, the impact of the ubiquitous structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), HIV/AIDS and human insecurity in general have combined to underscore foreign aid and economic assistance as key driving forces of the continent's foreign policies and diplomacy towards the North. Yet, the new thrust of foreign policies, informed by the need for foreign aid, has not occurred without a price. Among other things it has elevated technocrats in central or reserve banks and finance ministries to positions of prominence vis-à-vis officials from foreign ministries and in the process introduced extra-African actors into the foreign policy making process of the continent. This in turn has undermined Africa's increasingly tenuous economic sovereignty. But above all, it has led to the strengthening of ties with the North and international creditors in particular at the cost of intra-African relations. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU) recently inaugurated, promise to open a new chapter in Africa's international relations. It is argued, however, that against a background of a confluence of factors, these new continental projects will make only a minimal impact in terms of mitigating the consequences of the aid-driven foreign policies and thus altering the donor-oriented postures of African states.

Introduction

Africa's international relations in general and foreign policies in particular have taken a new dimension since the abatement of the

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Cold War. In contrast to the situation under bipolar politics, which provided African states with the leverage to play one superpower against the other in a bid to extract concessions, the continent's post-cold war foreign policies have become circumscribed and relatively predictable. Besides, the abatement of the Cold War has generated new anxieties and challenges for the foreign policies of African states. The combined forces of globalisation and marginalisation, along with internal factors, including debt, conflicts, the scourge of HIV/AIDS, and general human insecurity have not only become new sources of challenges, but also forces that inform the international relations and foreign policies of African states. This paper attempts to place these interrelated issues in context and argues that the combined effect of these forces has helped to elevate economic issues and the need for aid as key foreign policy objectives. It argues, moreover, that the extent to which the New partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the new continental union, the African Union (AU), make an impact in re-ordering the foreign relations of the continent depends to a large extent on the degree to which these new initiatives can assure economic security. In placing these issues in perspective, the first section of the paper elucidates on some of the key theoretical concepts in international relations, particularly the interrelated notions of foreign policy and diplomacy. The second section analyses some of the contemporary factors underscoring the importance of aid in the continent's foreign policies; the third highlights the consequences of aid-driven foreign policies; the fourth evaluates the efficacy of NEPAD and the African Union (AU) in spawning new directions in the continent's international relations; while the conclusion recapitulates the main arguments in the paper.

Foreign policy and diplomacy as elements in international relations

Foreign policy and diplomacy are as old as the state. Since the emergence of the modern state, generally traceable to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, governments and statesmen have orchestrated relations between their states and others. The list of foreign entities affecting the foreign policy calculations of states increased with

the growing importance of non-state actors, including international financial Institutions (IFIs), multi-national corporations (MNCs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and other inter-governmental bodies within the international system. The features of such non-state and sometimes supranational actors have challenged some of the central assumptions of classical realism, which projects states not only as unitary actors and the dominant players in international relations, but also among whom diplomacy is conducted, and whose conduct of foreign policy is geared towards the maximisation of power (Morgenthau 1967). Today, a myriad of non-state actors has come to affect the foreign policies of states. In Africa, the list of such non-state actors has become even longer given the emergence of new and hitherto unrecognised agents on the domestic scene, including rebel movements, warlords, mercenaries, local and international NGOs, to mention just a few. Although they operate mainly at the national level, the presence and pressures of these entities have often influenced both the content and direction of the foreign policies and diplomacy of national governments.

How, then, do we explain foreign policy and diplomacy? It is tempting to conflate foreign policy and diplomacy since both involve elements of interaction between entities in international relations (Sharp 1999: 37). The two processes are often confused with each other, moreover, because there cannot be diplomacy without foreign policy. Yet although intertwined, the two concepts are theoretically distinct; the former being a logical consequence of the latter. The connection between foreign policy and diplomacy has led one observer to contend that “foreign policy is what you do; diplomacy is how you do it” (Gore-Brooth 1994: 15). However, what is done and how it is done are discrete. Accordingly, it is useful to explain the concepts separately. Foreign policy has elicited almost as many definitions, as there are authors. Cohen and Harris have warned that no two people define foreign policy in the same way mainly because of the varying approaches and methodologies used (Cohen and Harris 1975: 318). Thus David Vital (1991: 34), for example, conceives of foreign policy as “the course of action adopted by a state consequent upon decisions taken by those who have the authority to commit a significant proportion of the nation’s resources to that end”. Others see it as the interplay of domestic and external

forces, (Rose 1998: 15) or simply the projection abroad of domestic politics (Pym 1982: 1-2). More generally, and for the purpose of this discussion, we adopt Holsti's (1995: 83) definition, which takes foreign policy as "ideas or actions designed by policy makers to solve a problem or promote some change in the policies, attitudes or actions of other states or states, in non-state actors (e.g. terrorist groups), in the international economy or in the physical environment of the world". The place of a state in the international system and its material power capabilities tends to inform its foreign policies (Rose 1998: 146). Conventionally foreign policy aims at achieving a specific objective or a set of objectives consistent with the interest of the state undertaking the foreign policy mission. However, foreign policies are not always successful in achieving original goals and governments are often compelled by expediency or exigency to either modify or totally reverse them (Hermann 1990: 3-20).

A further conceptual dimension in the foreign policy discourse relates to its formulation. Various approaches to foreign policy making are discernible. The pluralist conception, which gained currency with the publication of Allison's *Essence of Decision* in 1971, subsumes a wide range of versions (Carlsnaes 2002: 331-349). Generally, these approaches focus on the role of decision-making units, particularly small groups, in foreign policy making. For this perspective, foreign policy is the culmination of inputs from various units in society (Beasley 1998; Hart *et al* 1997; Ripley 1995) and is neither the preserve of the executive wing of government nor the brainchild of any particular constituency in the state. Elite theorists, however, see foreign policy not as a compromise among competing views but rather reflecting the preferences of the dominant elite in society. These elites, who are either the top echelons of the party hierarchy or the political leaders, constitute the ruling aristocracy. These, along with their financiers are, according to this perspective, the key originators and directors of foreign policy (Pareto 1935; Mosca 1939; Michels 1935). For the elite perspective, political parties, the media and other civil society organisations (CSOs), which are critical in the articulation of interests in the pluralist cosmology, are simply peripheral to the foreign policy making process. Another perspective worthy of note is the Marxist approach, which sees foreign policy as the preferences of the economically dominant class

in society. Following from the assumptions of classical Marxism, the radical perspective interprets the foreign policy of a country as necessarily reflecting the orientation of the powerful economic class. This postulation is reflected in the popular Marxist aphorism, which depicts the state and the economically dominant class as one and the same thing, the former being “a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx and Engels 1974: 82). For the radical perspective, the critical issue in the making or pursuit of foreign policy is not the interest of the masses, but rather what the economically dominant class sees as promoting its interests, which is often the protection of capital and the maximisation of profits. Although none of the above perspectives accurately captures Africa’s foreign policy dynamic, we will surmise that the elite approach seems closely apt, although it will be noted that key foreign policies relating to economic and aid issues are increasingly drifting out of the control of the political elite.

Diplomacy on the other hand involves the methods and mechanisms employed in the pursuit of foreign policy goals. Diplomacy, therefore, has no ontological status; its existence is contingent on, or is a consequence of foreign policy. The varying, often conflicting, interests of actors in the international arena underscore the importance of diplomacy. The conflicting interests of these actors necessitate the pursuit of foreign policy in a way that lessens the harm it does to other actors while simultaneously maximising its benefits. Thus, in another sense, diplomacy involves the conduct of foreign relations in a manner that is acceptable to both the initiator and the target of foreign policy. Against this background, diplomacy has been defined as ‘an instrument of foreign policy for the establishment and development of peaceful contacts between the governments of different states, through the use of intermediaries mutually recognised by the respective parties’ (Magalhaes, 1988: 59). However, this perception has been viewed with considerable scepticism because of its realist connotations and its failure to recognise non-state actors in diplomacy. Although by no means sacrosanct, the conceptualisation of Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 1) is a better working definition for the present analysis because of the lesser emphasis on the state. They note that diplomacy is “the peaceful conduct of relations among entities, their principals and accredited agents”.

The key ingredients of diplomacy include negotiations, bargaining, persuasion (the use of ‘carrots’) and deterrence (the use of ‘sticks’). Essentially diplomacy requires methods short of aggression to achieve foreign policy goals, although some see war as a continuation of diplomacy (Clausewitz 1976: 87). The objectives of diplomacy are diverse, however. One observer has identified five of its ‘substantive’ functions namely:

- Conflict management;
- Solving problems facing two or more governments;
- Increasing and facilitating cross-cultural communication on a wide range of issues involving the countries;
- Negotiation and bargaining on specific issues, treaties and agreements; and
- General programme management of the foreign policy decisions of one towards another (Poullada 1974: 202).

However, for much of the developing world, diplomacy has focussed largely on managing foreign policies in a manner that ingratiates them to the more economically powerful and influential actors within the international system. We surmise that Africa’s foreign policies and diplomacy particularly towards the north have been consistent with this objective.

Contemporary issues shaping Africa’s foreign policies

Although the objectives of foreign policy change over time, there are certain goals that remain fairly constant for states. Holsti (1995: 84) notes that these relatively constant objectives include security, autonomy, welfare, status and prestige, although the premium placed on these concerns varies from state to state. However, for Africa, a typically peripheral continent and grappling with the challenges of development, its foreign policies and diplomacy especially towards northern governments have been geared towards securing economic assistance and foreign aid in general. As Agyeman-Duah and Daddieh (1994:44) have correctly argued,

a prime purpose of foreign policy for most developing nations has been to secure economic assistance for development efforts. The continued stagnation, even decline, in African economies therefore suggests that economic considerations will remain a driving force in the making of foreign policies.

A plethora of factors explains the salience of aid in Africa's post cold war foreign policies. The first and perhaps the most glaring is the continent's increasing marginalisation in the global economy. In perspective, the literature on Africa's marginalisation is profuse (Callaghy 1991; Awoonor 1994; Kraus 1994). Marginalisation describes the continent's increasing peripheral role in the global economy, a fact dramatised in two main areas – the continent's declining official development assistance (ODA), and its shrinking share of foreign direct investment (FDI). That ODA to Africa is in steady decline is no longer polemical. For example, although new loan commitments by international banks to developing countries increased from \$20 billion in 1990 to \$28 billion in 1991, the proportion destined for Africa declined from \$0.6 billion to \$0.4 billion (IMF 1992: 77). Also, between 1983 and 1990 development aid to Africa shrank from more than \$8 billion to just \$1 billion. In 1991 aid (bilateral and multilateral) to Africa totalled \$25.2 billion, this declined to \$17.6 billion in 1998 and further down to \$15.7 billion in 2000 (Africa Recovery 16(2-3), 2002: 31). Just as ODA is declining, so is FDI to Africa dwindling. For example, in 1997 total FDI to sub-Saharan Africa valued at \$8.6 billion but this declined to \$6.5 billion in 2000 (Africa Recovery 15(3) 2001: 28).

The underlying factors accounting for Africa's marginalisation are varied. However, the most popular reasons relate to the discovery of new investment opportunities in Eastern Europe following the liberation of the region's economies from communism (Callaghy 1994), along with the intractable conflicts, bad governance, which together undercut Africa's attractiveness as a region for investments (Strange 1991). The only country enjoying some exception to the general trend of declining ODA and FDI is South Africa which, by reason of its huge industrial development, is able to attract FDI. For example, in 1997, South Africa received a net FDI of \$1705 million, representing 54 percent of total FDI to Eastern and Southern Africa (UNDP 1999: 45). This is no accident of history; South Africa alone generates over 71 percent of the GNP of the entire Southern African Development Community (SADC) region (Lee 2000). Besides, South Africa is among the few African countries investing abroad. Of the \$1.3 billion invested outside their own countries by African corporations in 2000, for example, South Africa accounted for

43 percent (*Africa Recovery* 15(3) 2001: 28). The assertion about Africa's marginalisation in the global economy is thus increasingly becoming contentious. It is clear that by its heavy dependence on external aid and the dominant international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, the continent is being tightly incorporated into the global economy. In the same way, by adopting the preponderant structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), which epitomise the economic dogma of neoliberalism, Africa is being grafted into the global political economy. This phenomenon of simultaneous marginalisation and incorporation underscores Africa's ambivalent, if not uncertain, posture in the global economy. The contradictory posture of Africa in the global economy is being aggravated by globalisation. Characterised by liberalisation, competition and free market policies, globalisation undermines Africa's fragile economies and creates phenomenal developmental challenges for the continent (Akokpari 2001a). The combined effects of globalisation and liberalisation have thus intensified Africa's need for external aid and development assistance, making them dominant driving forces of the continent's international relations with the north.

Complementing the external forces are compelling internal pressures, which redirect the attention of foreign policy makers on external aid. Notable among these is the continent's escalating debt, which by 1998 stood at a staggering \$345.2 billion up from \$294.3 billion in 1990 (*Africa Recovery* 14(1), 2000: 7). Although the causes of the debt remain a source of debate (Akokpari 2001b), it is clear that the debt debacle vitiates the continent's ability to deliver social services. This fact is partly responsible for the institution of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC) in 1996 by the major international creditors through which to write-off the debts of poor countries. Africa's inability to deliver services under the weight of debt results from the large percentages of national budgets devoted to servicing existing debts. During the 1990s, debt service ranged from 5 to 112 percent of export earnings in Africa (*West Africa*, 16-22 August 1993: 1459). Devoting such percentages of national budgets to service debt leaves little to meet the competing demands on the state. For example, Tanzania's debt payments were four times what it spent on primary education and nine times what it spent on basic health during the 1996/97 fiscal year. Similarly,

during the same fiscal year Cameroon spent 36 percent of its national budget on debt service compared to only four percent on basic social services (*Africa Recovery*, 13(4), 1999: 3). Zimbabwe's case is equally telling. At its independence in 1980, it spent 1.2 percent of its GNP on debt service compared to 1.9 percent on education. By 1995, debt servicing was taking 10.3 percent of GNP compared to 8.5 percent and 3.5 percent on education and health respectively (*Africa Recovery*, 15(3), 2001: 28). Aggravating the debt is the process of rescheduling which, although it provides some temporary relief, leaves the interest on the original capital growing. Between 1986 and 1990, for example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) extracted over \$3 billion more than it gave to low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa as a result of rescheduling (*New African*, October 1991: 32). Rescheduling has thus been partly responsible for the escalation of sub-Saharan Africa's debt and in turn augmenting the need for foreign aid.

Related to debt are the ubiquitous SAPs being implemented by nearly all sub-Saharan African countries. Established as conditions for western credit and investments, SAPs call for the de-subsidisation of services, floating of national currencies in the market (often resulting to devaluation), and the deregulation and decontrolling of economic activities. In essence SAPs involve the liberalisation of the national economy. The overall impact of SAPs have been mixed and remain controversial. However, the dominant perception that has emerged over the last two decades depicts the programmes as counterproductive (ECA 1989; World Bank 1994:1). Among other effects, they have compounded rather than ameliorated the deleterious conditions they were originally meant to alleviate. Consequent on their emphasis on the liberalisation of economies, for example, local industries have collapsed causing an escalation in unemployment. With their devastating impact on women and the vulnerable sections in society, SAPs have been blamed for the deepening of poverty in much of Africa (Stewart 1991), and partly for the growing indebtedness of the region (Akopari 2001b). But more relevant for this discussion, adjustment programmes have deepened the dependence of implementing countries not only on imports but also on international creditors. The latter scenario has led to the strengthening of the international economic relations between

adjusting African states and the supplier countries of their imports.

But if SAPs have been responsible for the strengthening of economic ties with the north, creditors and donors in general, the HIV/AIDS scourge, which is assuming crisis proportions on the continent and especially in sub-Saharan Africa, is helping to forge new partnership with countries in the north to help fight it. Although the distribution of the incidence of AIDS on the continent varies considerably – with a high prevalence rate in Southern and Eastern Africa – Africa is generally known to be the current global epicentre of the epidemic. Of the 36 million affected across the world, 16 million, roughly 70 percent, are in sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, of the nearly 22 million AIDS deaths worldwide, 16 million were Africans (*Africa Recovery*, 14(4), 2001: 1) while the continent accounts for 12 million of the 13 million aids orphans in the world (*Africa Recovery*, 15(3), 2001: 1&18). Disturbing as these statistics are, they have raised the profile of HIV/AIDS on the foreign policy agenda of African states. The thrust of foreign policy in this regard is soliciting international support in the form of aid to combat the epidemic.

The partnership between Africa and the international community to fight the epidemic was underscored by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), Kofi Annan, in an address to African leaders and policy makers in Abuja, Nigeria, in May 2001. Annan warned: “AIDS is not an African problem alone, AIDS is a global problem. But if we do not win [the fight against AIDS] in Africa, we are not going to win elsewhere” (*Africa Recovery*, 15(2), 2001:1). Annan’s warning might have had some impact. In one of his weekly radio addresses in early 2003, the US president, George W. Bush, announced a \$15 billion aid package to developing countries to fight HIV/AIDS. Encouraged by this gesture, albeit small, the South African president, Thabo Mbeki, attending the G-8 summit at the French resort town of Evian, urged European leaders not only to emulate America’s example, but also to fulfil earlier aid pledges to Africa (BBC, 2003). The gravity of the AIDS problem and the reality that Africa cannot single-handedly score any measure of success in fighting it, is increasingly making the phenomenon an important driving force in the continent’s foreign policies. African leaders who visit western capitals in search of economic assistance now have the task of not only soliciting for economic aid, but also aid to fight AIDS.

The need for foreign aid has been exacerbated by the incessant political conflicts, which remain a nightmare for the continent. Although conflicts are not new in African politics, they have become so widespread in the last two decades that only few countries can guarantee political stability for a considerable length of time, notwithstanding the adoption of democratic governance. The list of countries currently at war is endless – Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the DRC, to name just a few. Previously serene countries such as Zimbabwe and the Ivory Coast are now among the warring states on the continent. For these warring countries, foreign policies have focussed on increasing defence budgets and the concomitant procurement of sophisticated military hardware. During the Cold War these countries would quickly have requested military assistance from their ideological patrons as did Angola, Somalia and Ethiopia in the 1980s (Copson 1994). Nevertheless, conflicts seem to strengthen the international relations of especially Francophone African countries with Paris even in the aftermath of formal colonialism. The ongoing conflict between rebels and the government of Ivory Coast in which France has successfully negotiated a cease-fire between the protagonists, shows that Paris still wields considerable influence over its former colonies, decades after the latter's political independence. At the continental level, conflicts also help forge stronger alliances between beleaguered regimes on the one hand and allies on the other. This became apparent in the DRC conflict when the government of Laurent Kabila solicited military assistance from friendly regimes such as Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. By spawning the need for external assistance, internal conflicts shape the foreign policies and international diplomacy of states.

Linked to HIV/AIDS and conflict is the growing elusiveness of human security on the continent. In retrospect the meaning of security has remained in flux since the end of the Cold War. At the height of bipolar politics, security was generally conceived in terms of external military threats. Concepts such as power and deterrence influenced the calculations of statesmen and foreign policy makers. The instrumentality for acquiring power and deterring external aggression was the acquisition of sophisticated military hardware (Akokpari 1999). In the post-Cold War era, however, this purely realist thinking, premised on power and state survival, increasingly

became obsolete with the emergence of new security threats, both internal and external, posed by such conjectural factors as sectarian violence, economic adversities and terrorism. The new security paradigm argues for the linkage of security to life experiences and the survival of people who live within the territorial boundaries of the state (Buzan 1983). Thus, rather than proceeding from the state, the new paradigm focuses on the peace and security of people. The key point of departure of the new in contrast to the old concept of security is the emphasis on the people rather than the state precisely because threats to human security are largely non-military and therefore require non-military responses. Thus, according to the UNDP (1994), human security prevails when people are safe from acute instability in their social and political environment, which in turn disrupts their well-being. Human security is people-centred and as such transcends the conventional state-centric conception of security. For Africa, human security means addressing the chronic and crippling problems of hunger, disease, poverty, unemployment and all forms of oppression and repression. In other words, human security refers to the “protection from sudden and hurtful disruption in the patterns of daily life” (Moyo and Tevera, 2000: 5). The fragile economies across the continent have demonstrated that human security is nearly unachievable without foreign assistance. The drought and the attendant famine that hit Southern Africa in 1992 and the prompt response of the international community with food aid and other humanitarian assistance to the affected populations, especially in Zambia, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique, confirm further that, not just food, but human security in general, is unattainable without international assistance. The need for human security thus highlights the prominence of aid in the foreign policies of the continent. However, the practice of foreign policies being informed largely by the need for aid is not without a price.

Consequences of the new orientation of Africa’s foreign policies

The new aid-driven foreign policy thrust produces severe consequences for the foreign policy making and international diplomacy of African states. The emergence of aid and economic issues has eclipsed non-

economic concerns in foreign policy and relegated the latter to the margins. This in turn has spawned new, and relatively predictable, changes in the dynamics of foreign policy making and the general conduct of traditional international affairs. Foreign ministries, which have traditionally been in charge of the foreign policies and the link between external environments and their respective countries, are increasingly losing this function to central Banks and finance ministries, which are better placed to interact with external creditors. Indeed, not even trade ministries, which by the logic of the prevailing global free trade paradigm are expected to play a central role in shaping foreign economic relations, can be said to be in the mainstream of foreign policy. The new concern for foreign aid has put the spotlight on bureaucrats and technocrats in the central banks and finance ministries. Thus, if in the immediate post-independence era foreign ministries were perceived as emissaries of presidents (Aluko 1977, Clapham 1977), today these ministries have lost even this emissary role, remaining largely peripheral in the making and implementation of foreign policies targeting external assistance.

The diminishing importance of foreign ministries in foreign policy making and control is occurring in tandem with the growing prominence of technocrats in the central Bank and the Finance Ministry, but also of new extra-African actors. The World Bank, the IMF and the accredited representatives of the London and Paris Clubs to whom the continent seeks to ingratiate itself in order to receive economic assistance, have become key players in, if not the ultimate masters of, foreign policy making. Although the involvement of these extra-African actors has been covert and indirect as their policy preferences are transmitted to the continent in the form of aid conditionalities, it has on some few occasions been very overt where representatives of these institutions actually dictate policy (Ankomah 1992: 14). Nothing could be more overtly intrusive than international creditors dictating what proportion of the assistance they offer should go into education, health or agriculture or which goods and public services are to be de-subsidised. The involvement of these agencies, moreover, has actively crushed any hopes of a democratic process of foreign policy making, especially in a continent notorious for disregarding public opinion despite the institution of democratic politics.

A corollary to the growing loss of control over policies relating to key economic issues is the menacing threat posed to Africa's already tenuous sovereignty. Although it is a known fact that absolute sovereignty is inconceivable in the current global economic arrangement characterised by complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977: 3-35), countries nonetheless try to maintain a degree of autonomy in terms of their ability to determine policy choices. However, with aid as a key driving force in foreign policy, the ceding of the continent's sovereignty to international creditors is becoming palpable. The adoption of SAPs and their vast panoply of conditionalities – most of them unpalatable – is not only evidence of the creditor community's control over adjusting countries, but also the extent to which the latter have ceded their sovereignty. The aphorism that the feeder controls the thoughts of the fed could not be more true, particularly within the context of Africa's relations with its creditors. As part of the aid conditionalities, moreover, international creditors have successfully implanted a largely top-down democracy with which countries are grappling in various parts of the continent. The illusions about Africa's economic sovereignty are thus becoming more manifest in the post-Cold War period than ever before.

The sequel to the loss of sovereignty is the related problem of consolidating the new and nascent regionalism in Africa. One of the daunting challenges unleashed by globalisation for developing countries is how to remain competitive in the hostile global economy. The need to maintain competitiveness is partly responsible for the creation of regional economic blocs by which member countries attempt to insulate their economies from the devastating consequences of global competition. The attempts across Africa to strengthen existing common markets such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the revived East African Common Market (EAC) or create new ones such as the African Union (AU) are policies designed to mitigate the effects of competition on African states. For Africa, regionalism has an additional advantage of providing alternative paths out of the continent's economic doldrums by creating a larger domestic market thereby attenuating its precarious reliance on the global market. However, the critical question is how the continent can simultaneously remain committed

to the seemingly contradictory terrains of creditor conditionalities on the one hand and the ideals of continental regionalism on the other. There is growing concern that the donor-oriented posture of African states may be incompatible with effective regionalism, particularly where the demands of creditors conflict with the dictates of continental union (Shaw 1989). This quandary will pose daunting questions for Africa's international relations. For a country like South Africa, which can find niches in the international market, this situation presents a perplexing dilemma. On the one hand South Africa can go it alone on account of its economic development and yet is obliged on the other hand by the paradigm of regionalism to work in concert with other African states. For South Africa, the likely scenario will be to sacrifice regionalism on the altar of its interest, a fact already evident in its single-handed dealings with the European Union (EU) without the involvement of SADC although its trade policies with the former will most likely impact on the southern Africa region as a whole (Lee 2000).

New directions for foreign policies?

The general economic dependency into which Africa has fallen and which has necessitated the heavy reliance on external aid and on the dominant international financial institutions (IFIs) has generally been seen as worrying. This, along with the ineffectiveness of externally formulated paradigms in addressing the continent's multiple problems, has led to new initiatives on the continent. Two of these and, indeed, the most notable and ambitious, are the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU), both of which were officially launched in July 2002. In many ways these new projects are certain to affect Africa's intra-regional and international foreign policies and diplomacy.

NEPAD, a new development programme, developed by African leaders, aims at tackling the continent's multi-faceted crisis, reflected in poor economic performance, bad governance, corruption and mismanagement, conflict and insecurity. More specifically NEPAD seeks to arrest and eradicate the deepening poverty on the continent; promote growth and sustainable development; halt and reverse the

trend of the continent's marginalisation; and restore peace, security and stability. These are to be achieved in partnership with the international community especially foreign donors. In addressing these issues, NEPAD identifies certain key areas whose tackling enhances the achievement of its overall aims. These include peace and security, economic and corporate governance, infrastructure, agriculture, and access to international markets (http://www.nepadn.org/nepad_presentation.html). The achievement of these objectives necessarily affects the continent's relations with the international community. In contrast to previous developmental paradigms, which required the bulk of the efforts from African states, NEPAD projects itself as a partnership between the continent and the international community to promote the development of the former. But, in seeking the partnership of the international community, NEPAD attempts to accelerate the integration of the increasingly marginalised African continent into the global economy (Ubomba-Jaswa 2002). And although the NEPAD project emphasises mutual partnership, Africa is heavily dependent on financial aid from the North.

Moreover, by relying on external funding, NEPAD is unlikely to change either the current configuration in Africa's international relations with the North or the contents of the former's foreign policies. On the contrary, the new development paradigm is not only certain to maintain Africa's weakness vis-à-vis the IFIs, but also deepen its dependence on international aid and thereby reinforce the centrality of aid in the continent's foreign policies. Globalisation has generally been seen as posing major challenges to the African continent and NEPAD's quest to conform with it (through the latter's call for increased foreign investments and the adoption of neoclassical economic policies), rather than offering theoretical challenges to it, is seen as a potential source of failure of the new project to offer real alternatives for Africa. Furthermore, strengthening the donor-oriented posture of African states, NEPAD is poised to weaken intra-African relations. Since no African state demonstrates a capacity to provide economic assistance to a fellow African state, NEPAD may become a blueprint document legitimising the outward-looking tendencies of African states.

If NEPAD shows weakened capacity to alter the content of Africa's foreign policies with the North, the AU may be equally

unlikely to strengthen intra-African relations and thus seriously alter the current direction and content of foreign policies. The AU was born out of the conviction among African leaders that its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), was considerably frail and demonstrated an inability to truly unite the continent. This fundamental weakness was reflected among other things in the inability of the OAU to effectively contain, manage or terminate conflicts on the continent or fashion a workable developmental paradigm. That the OAU was incapable of meeting the new challenges facing the continent is less surprising. The OAU was formed in 1963 at a time when the Cold War was gearing up. Nearly four decades now, new issues have emerged which challenge the efficacy of the OAU's institutions. The forces of globalisation; the dominance of neo-liberal doctrines; the phenomenon of rebel movements; national and international terrorism; and the threat of general human insecurity are among the many novel issues that challenge the largely anachronistic institutions of the OAU. The Cold War institutions of the OAU are seen as largely incompatible with post-cold war realities. It is against this backdrop that the AU was formed – to perform the tasks that are simply too modern for the OAU.

Modelled after the European Union (EU), the AU seeks, among other things, to promote unity on the continent; contain, terminate and prevent the occurrence of conflicts; create a larger African market to make the continent more competitive in the international economy; and to find innovative ways of addressing the continent's galaxy of problems, including the crisis of governance, debt, corruption and HIV/AIDS (Salim 2001). The achievement of these noble objectives requires the strengthening of intra-African ties and in a sense increase the self-sufficiency of the continent. However, although perceptive, the AU agenda is riddled with fundamental flaws, which may vitiate the organisation's effectiveness in altering the current nature of Africa's international relations. Among other things, the AU is appears too ambitious a project to achieve real continental unity within a short span of time. The EU after which it is modelled took over three decades to materialise and therefore attempting to achieve economic and political unity in months in a continent characterised by conflicts, mutual suspicion and economic decadence may be idealistic (Makgotho 2002: 1). Even granting the

exhibition of commitments by member states to unite, there still remain critical issues to be addressed. There are, for example, the vast disparities in economic performance and income levels among African states. Such differences are certain to trigger other auxiliary and indeed undesirable developments, including migration from weaker economies to the more affluent countries. Moreover, in the midst of troubling economies marked by escalating external debts, it is unclear how member states will meet their financial obligations to the AU. Similar questions also include the extent to which the AU will be able to prevent conflicts and promote good governance on the continent. These are compelling questions that may be sources of pessimism about the ability of the AU to chart a completely new direction from the OAU as far as the international relations of the African states are concerned. Against this background it may be surmised that the AU may make only minimal impact, if any, on the continent's foreign policies. Since the receipt of foreign aid remains a critical driving force of foreign policies, and since the AU may not be an alternative source of economic assistance for the continent, the former will be unlikely to reverse the current donor-oriented foreign policies of African states.

Conclusion

Clearly, the abatement of the Cold War has brought new anxieties for developing regions, including Africa. Developments in the wake of unipolarism, including economic crisis and the general developmental challenges, have elevated the search for foreign aid as a critical driving force in foreign policies. The paper notes that the dominant factors injecting high aid contents into the foreign policies of the continent are both external and internal. The external factors include marginalisation and globalisation, which are augmented by a myriad of internal factors such as debt, SAPs, HIV/AIDS, conflicts and the general human insecurity on the continent.

Nevertheless, the aid-driven foreign policies and donor-oriented posture of African states have spawned serious implications for the continent's foreign policies and international diplomacy in general. Among the many consequences, the high aid content in foreign policies has somewhat accelerated the marginalisation of foreign

ministries in foreign policy making and concomitantly brought into centre-stage finance ministries and central or reserve banks. In addition, the aid-driven thrust of foreign policy has introduced new extra-African actors, namely the international financial institutions (IFIs) into the foreign policy dynamic of the continent, in the process not only undermining the economic sovereignty of the continent, but also truncating Africa's efforts towards regionalism. So severe are these consequences that neither NEPAD nor the AU, which are expected to lead Africa out of its current quagmires, will be able to immediately mitigate them. It has been argued that in the light of a confluence of factors, these new continental projects will be less able to catalyse fundamental changes in the content of Africa's foreign policies with the North. Rather, NEPAD in particular will predictably accentuate the continent's dependence on the North for aid. Although theoretically a partnership project, NEPAD may emphasise more partnerships with the North rather than intra-African partnerships thereby undercutting the objectives of the AU. But above all, such vertical rather than horizontal partnerships are likely to be accelerated by NEPAD, and along with the slow recovery of the continent will most likely ensure that the quest for aid as a driving force in foreign policy remains unchanged.

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Reflections on Liberal Democracy and International Debt in Post-Cold War Africa¹

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Introduction: Main Issues, Objectives, and Approaches

International debt problems, involving the arcane operations of the world's financial system, may appear abstract and far removed from peoples' daily lives, but those problems have had severe, pernicious, and very concrete impacts. In the third world, debt problems have increased hunger, illness, and degradation; debt has become a barrier to progress, dashing hopes and solidifying misery for millions of people. – MacEwan, 1990, p. 14.

The central observation, which is used in this paper as a reflective hypothesis, stipulates that although liberal democracy as a form of governance has been applauded and welcomed with a high level of enthusiasm and optimism the world over as a necessary global dogma or remedy for 'good governance', the moral foundation embodied in this dogma has proven less convincing. And its ideology can also be teleologically questionable. As is well recognised, the economic basis of liberalism has created serious degrading social conditions in most African societies and among the majority of the African people. These conditions have started to engender among some social groups a certain level of scepticism concerning the abilities of liberal democracy to perform after the first phase of 'democratic euphoria' has passed. Despite this illusion, however, most people

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still firmly believe that democracy is the way out of poverty, social instability, and war. I think that the appropriate question should be: What kind of democracy will produce what kind of society?

In general, this article tries to tackle the above question. It is divided into five sections. The first part deals with my objectives in writing this article, the elements of theoretical approaches used to guide the analysis, and the identification of relevant social and political issues affected by the pursuit of liberal democracy and the mechanisms and policies of foreign loans. The second section analyses liberal democratic theory as a global electoral issue. I also discuss other developing regions of the world to reflect the global dimension of representative democracy. Given the technical and philosophical nature of the relationship between foreign loans and the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilisation programmes since 1981 in Africa, and how these programmes have influenced international and national politics and policies, the third section discusses the ways in which the concept of liberal democracy, from a realist perspective, has been projected on, or incorporated in, structural adjustment programmes. The fourth part examines the question of the nature of international debt in Africa. Here, I also compare some figures and percentages among the African countries and other countries in the Global South to contextualise the question of African debt. The conclusion considers the question of what should be proposed as remedies to solve the puzzle of international debt and democracy effectively and comprehensively and how they can be changed with other socially productive systems.

The main objective of this article is not to economically articulate the correlations between the consequences of international debt and liberal democracy. I am basically interested in making a critical and theoretical analysis about the implications of foreign debt on the development process. How would African social conditions effectively support or be conducive to liberal democracies that are being technically reduced to electoral procedures? I will elaborate on the assumption that foreign debt is a key factor that has helped to impede any consistent local and regional efforts toward mobilising human and material resources needed to actualise a development agenda. I also further discuss how liberal democracy, in its current

form, despite its massive support and high level of 'revolutionary' expectations among various segments of African societies, is likely to produce meagre positive social results in light of the current marginalisation of Africa. It should be emphasised that this article is generally theoretical. However, it has also supportive empirical illustrations to clarify my views.

What is most likely to happen in African politics and societies, especially in the area of liberal democracy, if African states collectively default or deliberately fail to honour their financial obligations because they are simply unable to pay their loans and their debt service as agreed upon with the so-called donors? Whose debts are they? Who contracted them and in whose names were they contracted? Would they be collectively punished as a result of defaulting? Would international law and trade relations as articulated by the World Trade Organization (WTO) alienate them all? The option of defaulting is still explorable and possible, as with Argentina in 2002, in international relations. As of 2003, among 42 countries which are classified as heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC), 34 are located in Africa. Four are in Latin America, three in Asia, and one in the Middle East. Also as of 2003, it should be noted that among these 34 African countries, 20 have serious manifestations of inter-and intrapolitical conflicts, which have led to wars, a high level of social explosion, and political instability. In the same period, wars in various parts of Africa cost about US \$15 billion per year. Among 46 African countries which are members of the World Health Organisation (WHO), 23 countries have been experiencing some kind of serious emergency situations, which had created, at least, nine million refugees and over 35 million internally displaced persons across the continent. The human loss in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, has reached an unprecedented magnitude with an estimated 4 million casualties between 1998 and 2003 as a result of military invasions by Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi.

Since the 1990s, several factors, which have variously affected the African states' policies of development, people's efforts at attempting to articulate social programs, and the quality of the governing structures, have coexisted in a complex, interrelated form. These factors include the increase of foreign debt; the activism of the so-

called donors in making sure that the foreign loans are systematically paid, or at least the debt service is paid; the publicity of the ideas and policy of debt-relief programs; and the intensification of popular demand for democracy and multipartyism. While the number of democratic elections has significantly increased in Africa, the quality of the life of the average African has been at the same time systematically degrading for the past 20 years or so. The debt-relief programmes essentially revolve around how the so-called donors should deal with Africa's economic and social problems. Despite the publicity, it is argued that debt-relief or forgiveness often simply amounts to clearing the way for the acquisition of new loans. It should be noted that some countries, Japan in particular, view debt forgiveness almost as default and withdraw confidence in those countries, creating a loss of trust by private corporations as well.

In post-Cold War Africa, is international or foreign debt still an important factor in the Africans' search for development paradigms and strategies that should be relevant and appropriate to current African objective conditions? Within the context of the euphoria associated with the promotion of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), an initiative which is claimed to be African and which was officially adopted on October 23, 2001 by African heads of state, is liberal democracy adopted in Africa equipped with the moral support needed to eradicate poverty, as demanded by the African people? Furthermore, within the framework of the newly established African Union (AU), seemingly an imitation of the European Union at least in its current form, will the issues concerning African debt continue to be central as a way of dealing with the total integration of African economies, markets, and politics?

Another important issue to be mentioned, which constitutes a serious ongoing debate related to foreign debt, is the question of reparations. Many African scholars, political activists, and politicians both in Africa and the Africa Diaspora, especially in the United States, have argued that Western powers and their multinational corporations which subjected the African people to slavery for hundreds of years must pay, in the form of cash, damages related to this enslavement. Indeed, this enslavement contributed to the development of capitalism in the West. Although this dimension is not the object of this paper, it must be mentioned because from an

Afro-centric perspective, African states and people should not pay debts which were accumulated under the conditions of collective servitude of the African people.

Additional philosophical questions must be posed in this context. What kinds of people and societies can be promoted by liberal political theories and practices, as they are applied in African conditions? How are the values and principles of liberal democracy supported by the advocates of international debt? I critically discuss whether the rise of liberal democracy and multipartyism and the newly promoted debt forgiveness agenda by the G-7 countries (the major highly industrialised and democratic countries) are likely to create the conditions conducive to genuine political debate on development at the national and continental levels. (It should be noted that with Russia on board, the group is now referred to as the G-8.)

Can the national and international technicalities and conditionalities set up for applying for foreign loans, the domestic/internal financial constraints such as deficits, the payment of arrears, social conditions, and the ideological determinism related to the international debt in Africa support the claims of 'genuine' liberal democracies? Are there really any international debt problems in relationship to people's efforts to actualise democracy or any other type of progressive society? With the current internationalisation of the principles and the actions and policies of global financial donors, are we witnessing the end of the progressive movements in Africa? If so, what will the alternatives be and can they lead to development?

The total African external debt at the end of the 1998 was \$324.6 billion. The issues concerning this international debt and its social, economic, and political implications have been intensively debated in international, regional, and national forums between the 1980s and the 1990s. Practical actions have been organised by various local and international groups; for instance, the Jubilee 2000 held one of its protest meetings in Dakar, Senegal, in December 2000 and the author was invited to attend it. He wrote a critical paper on the debt issue for the meeting. Furthermore, interesting and provocative books related to issues of debt, which have received positive reviews such as *A Fate Worse than Debt: The World Financial Crisis and the*

Poor by Susan George, *Debt and Disorder: International Economic Instability and U.S. Imperial Decline* by Arthur MacEwan, and *World Debt, Who is to Pay* by Jacobo Schatan, and Opoku Agyeman's *Africa's Persistent Vulnerable Link to Global Politics*, have also been published. However, philosophical and developmental issues associated with the debt question have not been fully explored in Africa. Yet the results of the international forums and intellectual discourses in terms of the impact of the debt have been pragmatically either negligible or totally negative. Thus, they are still debatable. What is clear is that the amount of debt has been consistently increasing since the end of the 1980s as Table 1 shows.

As alluded to earlier, it is difficult to set out with precision the nature of the implications of the relationship between the forms of democracy movements that are taking place in Africa, the magnitude of Africa's international debt in general terms, and the deep cuts in national budgets as part of the SAPs. My concern is not necessarily about the narrow issue of analysing the amount of the debt accumulated in Africa. Rather, I am interested in examining the nature of power relations between the so-called donors of the loans and the receivers, and the abilities or possibilities of payment of the debts by national governments at this time of global political uncertainty. Thus, I argue that the analysis of the nature of the relationship between the availability of the existing national resources in each country and the implications of policy decisions on the institutionalisation of liberal democracy is essentially a matter of distributive capabilities and the political will of a given political regime and in a given society. In addition, it should be noted that there are different types of international debt, for example, bilateral, multilateral, concessional, official non-concessional, and loans originating from private creditors and commercial banks. This analysis reflects on foreign debt at large.

Elements of my approaches can be summarised as a combination of historical-structuralism with a dose of systems analysis. Social systems do not simply change by their own volition. They must be changed by either internal factors or by pressure from their ecological circumstances. As is argued here, genuine or quasi-permanent changes are first of all structurally internal, although they may have important external support. The way states and societies function in

Table 1: External Debt of Net-Debtor Developing Countries, 1989-1999 in Million \$

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Africa											
Total External Debt	275.5	288.8	291.1	287.5	290.1	315.6	335.2	330.1	315.4	324.6	---
Long-term Debt	241.5	254.5	257.6	251.6	250.2	275.6	290.3	282.8	269.5	276.5	---
Concessional	77.1	84.9	91.8	95.8	100.8	110.6	119.2	125.2	122.8	130.4	---
Bilateral	51.8	56.6	60.1	62.2	64.2	68.8	72.0	76.1	73.0	76.4	---
Multilateral	25.2	28.3	31.7	33.6	36.6	41.9	47.2	49.1	49.8	54.0	---
Official, non-concessional	79.8	81.4	84.1	82.5	81.1	91.5	97.2	90.1	82.7	84.5	---
Bilateral	51.8	50.6	51.7	50.5	47.8	55.3	60.7	55.4	52.0	53.3	---
Multilateral ¹	21.4	24.6	26.6	27.0	28.2	30.4	31.3	29.2	26.1	26.9	---
IMF	6.6	6.1	5.7	5.0	5.0	5.8	5.2	5.4	4.5	4.3	---
Private creditors	84.7	88.3	81.8	73.2	68.4	73.4	73.9	67.6	64.0	61.7	---
Of which:											
Bonds ²	2.0	3.6	3.1	5.1	2.9	4.5	5.3	5.9	9.7	9.8	---
Commercial banks	31.9	31.1	29.4	22.9	21.3	21.9	22.9	25.1	22.3	21.3	---
Short-Term Debt	34.0	34.2	33.5	35.9	39.9	40.0	44.9	47.3	45.9	48.1	---
Sub-Saharan Africa											
Total External Debt	123.8	140.0	145.9	149.5	153.7	162.5	172.1	170.6	165.8	171.1	175.7
Long-term Debt	108.4	121.3	125.7	127.1	129.2	140.0	147.4	145.1	141.8	147.4	149.9
Concessional	50.0	58.4	63.1	66.3	69.8	77.9	82.2	84.6	84.6	90.5	94.2
Bilateral	29.0	33.0	34.5	35.8	36.7	38.4	39.8	40.3	39.9	42.3	42.7
Multilateral ¹	21.0	25.3	28.6	30.5	33.1	39.5	42.4	44.3	44.6	48.3	51.5
Official, non-concessional	33.7	37.4	37.3	36.7	35.3	37.2	39.5	36.6	33.0	33.6	33.0
Bilateral	20.0	22.8	22.9	22.8	21.7	24.7	25.8	24.8	22.6	21.1	22.9
Multilateral	9.3	10.5	10.9	10.8	10.9	11.2	11.1	10.0	8.8	8.7	8.1
IMF	4.4	4.1	3.5	3.0	2.7	1.3	2.5	1.9	1.6	1.8	2.0
Private creditors	24.7	25.6	25.3	24.1	24.1	24.9	25.7	23.8	24.3	23.3	22.8
Of which:											
Bonds ²	4	.3	.3	.2	.2	.2	.3	.2	.2	.2	3.2
Commercial banks	8.1	8.7	8.5	8.2	8.2	8.5	9.3	12.2	10.1	9.9	10.2
Short-Term Debt	15.4	18.7	20.2	22.4	24.5	22.5	24.8	25.5	23.8	23.7	25.8

1. 'Including concessional facilities of IMF' (p. 278).

2. 'Government or government-guaranteed debt only' (Ibid).

Source: from Table A.25 (Pg. 276-278), United Nations, *World Economic and Social Survey, 2000*, New York, based on IMF, OECD, and World Bank's data.

the world system is the result of the internal and external dynamics of their location. But this location is far from being historically fixed or static.

The world is a system and an organic whole, which is conditioned by the actors' location and history. Despite the fact that European-imposed political and economic transformation created a peripheral Africa since the nineteenth century, Africa is perceived as a complex political system that has its own history and its own internal social dynamics. This history is cumulative, and not necessarily deterministic, in relationship to the ability of the system to change or to engage in the process of change. I am more interested in the history of social production and reproduction than in a descriptive history. It is argued in this article that the way in which a system produces and reproduces itself in a given environment is likely to inform the nature of the system itself, its weaknesses, and its strengths. This information is vital in engaging change. That is to say, I am interested in contradictions, not necessarily as pathological tools of destruction, but as signs or reflections of objective conditions needed for any kind of constructive endeavour to take place. Within the logic of the historical structuralism as used in this study, it should be stated that one cannot fully study and understand any aspects of any region of the world, in this case the African region, without relating them in a critical manner to those of other regions either through imperialism, colonialism, or humanism (Windschuttle, 1999: 71-75).

The conceptual elements that support the above approach can be summarized in the following three constructive premises, which I borrowed from another work, 'Reconceptualizing the State as the Leading Agent of Development in the Context of Globalization in Africa', (*African Journal of Political Science* Vol. 7 No.1 June 2002).

The first premise is that 'regardless of the good intention of many African leaders, activists, and people in trying to continuously copying or imitating the European experiences and their unilinear models of development, and regardless of the quality of their imitations at a given time, Africa will never organically and ontologically develop out of the European history and the European languages and metaphysics. However, no society can develop out of autarky. People also can learn or borrow from others but whatever can be borrowed from other people's experiences has to be selectively injected into the

African projects, appropriated, and owned by Africans before it can positively be part of the African metaphysics, ethos, and the African experiences' (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2002: 84).

The second premise, which is also similar to the scientific and historical premise, stipulates that: "no people, a nation or a continent can socially progress without building the foundation of its actions first, on its own history and culture" (*Ibid.*). European kings, the nobility (commercial classes/petty bourgeoisie), and the churches from the medieval era up to the renaissance and even in the eighteenth century, fought each other to acquire or share power in Europe. But it should be emphasised that the emergence of modern state structures in Europe since the Westphalia peace accord in Prussia in 1648, was essentially an internal/ regional process and a collective decision. In this case, the notion of collective sovereignty implies survival, respect, and autonomy. European monarchs and nobility forcibly appropriated the Mediterranean city-states' histories and cultures, as well as technologies and resources from China, India, and Africa. Martin Bernal (1987) traced Greece's roots to Africa, whose semiotic and spiritual innovations had been channelled to the Aegean Sea by Egyptian boats. This second premise promotes a perspective that African history and culture and their internal contradictions must be critically reexamined to avoid either their romanticisation or a lack of awareness. As compared to a historical and sociological analysis, which is reflected in Bernal's thesis, romanticisation of any culture and history is as dangerous phenomenon as fascism, racism, or any kind of biological argument in a nation-building project. Fascist, racist, and biological arguments are generally deterministic and often stereotypical. It should be emphasised that the contradictions should not always be perceived and defined as infinitely pathological. Out of the contradictions or science of dialectics, humans have historically made synthetic judgments on what directions to follow in defining and redefining themselves.

The third premise is that even with the advancement of genetic engineering or newly developed cloning experiments, people have not consciously chosen for themselves the place of their birth, their gender, and the colour of their hair and eyes. People are who and what they are as a result of historical accident, biological structures, revolutionary and evolutionary processes. An individual's infant

conscious contribution to this historical determinism at the beginning of life has a probability of zero. What is more important in the definition of humans, however, is what we can or should do after we have been projected out into 'the jungle' by the forces of historical and natural accidents. That is to say, human beings' choices and decisions are transcendently more important than what gods or divinities did or do in their single objective on our behalf. Further, social consciousness is a valuable determining factor in the ways people define and redefine themselves in a given physical and social environment. Without such a social consciousness, humans may not be very much qualitatively different from other animals. Social consciousness is a determining factor of what we can become.

It should be noted that at the end of the Cold War, judicial activism, the rise of demands for democratic rights, grassroots movements, the popularisation of human rights, the globalisation of a liberal economy, and widespread state reforms, have significantly contributed to the struggle for some type of democracy the world over. These factors, in one way or the other, have also challenged the mechanisms related to the payment or acquisition of more foreign debt in Africa. Debt as an analytical tool, or a unit of analysis in the international political economy, is not new in the social science lexicon. Historically, it has taken different forms depending on its nature and origins, its beneficiaries and social and political implications in a given society, and its social classes and gender. However, when nation-states start to spend between 30 percent and 40 percent of their gross national product (GNP) to either pay for the principal or to service foreign loans, then international debt becomes part of the world crisis. A country like Mozambique until recently had to save only \$10 million a year out of its GNP to pay a debt service bill of \$120 million. Before the adoption of the newly defined HIPC guidelines from the G7 since 1996, Zambia, for instance, spent around 45 percent of government revenues on debt service alone. What are the social and political consequences of this crisis in HIPC?

In general terms, Cold War politics can be characterised by the influence of two interrelated factors, namely the building of international debt and the escalation of the politics of militarism. Most African countries gained their nominal political independence during the Cold War era (1945–1991). The dominant ideology during

that period was militarism. The military victory of the allied forces over Nazi Germany and Japan projected international militarism as a tool for producing political peace and capitalist development. In Africa, peripheral capitalism was fully supported by the militarism of both civilian and military regimes. The world, especially the Global South, was essentially ruled by the institutionalisation of the military in state apparatuses. The debt that African states accumulated took place when liberal democracy was either functionally very weak or totally absent in Africa. However, it is not the lack of liberal democracy that led to the accumulation of foreign debt in Africa; rather, the contradictions of liberal economics supported the states' loan projects, thus reflecting the logic of push-pull theory. The global financial institutions that organised and provided loan programmes such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund themselves are functionally undemocratic.

Global capitalism as promoted by the above institutions has created a *global apartheid* system that consists of the established centres (European Union and NAFTA), the emerging peripheries (East Asia, South Africa), struggling peripheries (much of Latin America and the Middle East), and stagnating or regressing peripheries (much of Sub-Saharan Africa). For instance, about 14 percent of the world population use more than 80 percent of the world's resources. The bulk of global resource flows is confined to the dominant capitalist centres. While the African continent accounts for 10 percent of the world's population, its economies account for only 1.1 percent of world GDP. According to Keet (1997, p. 23):

Fully 84% of all Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) originates within such countries, with a large proportion (of almost 40%) originating in just two countries, the USA and the UK, in 1996. [...] (Almost 60% of global FDI in that year was still moving between the most developed industrialized countries of North America and Europe. [...] 98 out of the 100 largest TNCs, globally, originate in the OECD. [...] Fully 87% of all TNCs are headquartered in the EU, the US, and Japan; and in 1996, 88% of their 'foreign assets' were actually located in each other's economies.

In the 1970s and 1980s at the time of accelerated militarism in most developing countries, especially in Africa, issues concerning social and human rights, development, and individual and collective security were timidly articulated, often in grassroots movements or in underground circles of civil societies. In this context, militarism took shape as an ideology that highly valued war and warlike social situations and in so doing, legitimised state violence. It implied the subordination of the cultural values of civil society, even in truncated form, to military values and the subordination of civilian control of the military to military control of civilians. In most cases, militarism was associated with political instability, rigid bureaucracy, arbitrary decision-making, totalitarianism, and autocracy. Between the 1990s and 2003, popular demands for social and political rights and gender equality have intensified. These quests have been incorporated into the behaviour and actions of opposition political parties and opposition discourse. Thus they have become part of action platforms and the means through which people and their local leaders are requesting social changes.

The debates on what kind of democracy or multipartyism and what kind of development for Africa are not new. These debates should continue to help redefine and refine the old question of what kind of social and political systems may fit the African socio-historical and cultural imperatives. These questions have been examined within the framework of debt issues as global issues and the recent movement of ideas on debt forgiveness or debt relief programmes.

The question of international debt and its implications in relationship to the practices and values of liberal/representative democracy must be critically examined within the context of the failures of the states in Africa to produce, to promote, and to sustain systematically any consistent agenda or policies that articulate development or social progress.

Electoral Democracy as a Global Issue

There are some people, including scholars, who are still sceptical about the possible success of electoral democracies around the world (especially among countries in the South) in terms of their contributions towards the improvement of people's social conditions.

This scepticism is based on the nature of the global economy and new orbits of power. Some have perceived the theatre of global democracy and its dominant dogmas as an operational scene or procedure that resembles a Japanese Kabuki drama in which on a *karaoke* stage, the visible singers come and go, but the songs remain the same, selected from a limited, rarely changed menu (Jain and Inoguchi (1997, p. 2). Japanese democracy has been called ‘*karaoke* democracy’. It is my position in this article that the notion of “plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” is intellectually inadequate in examining a dynamic social concept such as democracy. Internal and local alliances of forces based on the formation of local interests are as important as the external factors in the definition and allocation of foreign debts in Africa. This is an area where social science scholars have emphasised the interactive intellectual perspectives as the most relevant to the study of African politics.

Since the fifteenth century of the existence of the world system, which expanded unevenly through a complex system of mercantilism, transnationality, Western culture, and market forces. The twentieth century was essentially the century of large-scale wars, massive migration of refugees, colonisation, and decolonisation. But, at the same time, we should not repudiate the view that it is at the end of the twentieth century we started talking about global democratisation in terms of its defined claims and demands, the number of the actors involved in the democratisation process, the internationalisation of the values of democratic policies, and the social implications of such policies. Obviously, slavery, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and global corporatism are all structurally anti-democratic. Their contradictions, the levels of exploitation of labour, and the pillage of the material resources, have historically led to the rise of the struggles for democracy in various forms.

There are some pragmatic and historical difficulties that can be pointed out in studying democracy, as a “government of the people, by the people, and for the people” at the global level. For instance, despite the fact that democracy is globally acknowledged as a desirable end, no single model of democracy can claim to be universally acceptable. Different regions, subregions, and countries have produced their own democratic forms based on the imperatives of their histories and geographies. Each democracy among the

existing liberal democratic societies, for instance, has its own technical mechanisms and procedures that define its uniqueness and particularities. The systems of social control also differ from country to country. People's attitudes, expectations, and responses to democratic institutions, and the nature of the democratic institutions and their values in those countries, also all vary from country to country. In a broad sense, however, Robert Dahl (1971) provides a generally agreed upon definition of democracy, with the following characteristics: (a) an extensive competition among individuals and organised groups; (b) a highly inclusive level of participation in the selection of leaders and policies; (c) and a high level of civil and political liberty. It is "a political system, separate and apart from the economic and social systems to which it is joined" (Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 1999: 6) and a system that supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials and that permits the population to influence major decisions by choosing the holders of political office.

What factors associated with electoral democracies have been globalised? Have the demands of democracy and the processes of producing democracies become global? Through a new wave of democratisation, democracy has been claimed by most people. Theoretically, the demands have become global. In 2000, the movements that started in the 1970s from the demands for democracy the world over could be characterised by what Victor Hugo once said: "On peut résister à une armée mais jamais à une idée dont le temps est venu". ("One can resist an army but never an idea whose time has come.")

After the end of World War II, many countries in the South were still under the domination of the colonial powers. The new processes of globalisation were set up with the creation of three major United Nations agencies, namely the World Bank, the IMF, and the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) now the World Trade Organization (WTO). In fact for more than 40 years, these global forces not only produced undemocratic effects and behaviour, but more important, they have themselves functioned undemocratically. Thus, while there was high economic growth between 1945 and 1960 in colonial Europe and the United States, democracy was not a consistent part of the economic equation as a global force. Even

in Western Europe, the priority of the reconstruction movement was essentially based on a free market economic determinism, and military and security policies.

Although some countries in the colonial world gained their independence by building or borrowing from the dogmas of liberal democracy, establishing fragile institutions such as chambers of representatives or national assemblies, in general the struggle for democracy, as a specific issue about political rights, was not a unique movement that was philosophically different from the overall strategic struggles for independence. The principle of self-determination at the international level, which was articulated and promoted by the United States since the end of the nineteenth century, was essentially adopted in many countries as a national liberation objective or nation-state building dogma. This principle became popular and was considered legitimate, especially by newly emerging states, between the end of World War II and the 1960s, as a result of the military intervention of the United States to save Western Europe from Nazism and Fascism, the American reconstruction of Western Europe through the Marshall Plan, and the establishment of its Peace Corps and Fulbright programmes. But soon the militarisation and privatisation tendencies of United States foreign policy prevailed as they started to challenge the considerations related to the principle of self-determination in other countries.

The priorities of most movements, focussed more on building nation-states and promoting the ideas of constitutional rights and political sovereignty than on the pursuit of individual political rights. The rights of the nation-state were perceived as superior and eventually more important and comprehensive than the rights of individual citizens. It was assumed that the dynamics of the states would subsequently create the conditions for the institutionalisation of democracy. Furthermore, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, composed of a preamble and 30 articles adopted by the Third General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948, is one of the most important international positions that contributed to the rise of the struggles for liberal democracy.

The advent of the Cold War was not conducive to the consolidation of democracy in Africa. Undemocratic states were promoted in the name of capitalism and militarism. In most cases, during the Cold

War era, states' apparatuses, especially ruling political parties and executive branches of governments essentially served as national intelligence agencies for the super-powers to collect information, and to intimidate progressive forces.

Many aspects of this culture are still functionally alive today. In the 1970s, one-party regimes and military dictatorships of various sorts, supported by multinationals, the World Bank and the IMF, the United States, and the Soviet Union, held power in Africa, South America, Asia, and Eastern Europe. In contrast, in 1999, there were electoral democracies in about 180 countries. The number has been systematically increasing. This movement has swept over every region of the globe. And three-quarters of the countries in Africa have organised national elections mostly on a multiparty basis (Adejumobi, 2000: 6).

Not only have the claims of liberal democracy become global, but also democracy itself is perceived as a global value. The propaganda about the values of liberal democracy from the global financial institutions, the European Union, and the United States, has also intensified. In March 2003, the United States waged war against Saddam Hussein of Iraq basically in the name of liberal democracy.

There are high expectations about what these electoral democracies should do and how fast they should deliver services to the people. For many people in developing countries, for instance, this democracy has become a saviour in their minds. It is perceived either as another dimension of development or as a complementary force to it. It should also be recognised that its expansion between 1970 and the 1990s has been unprecedented in contemporary world politics. For instance, in just 25 years since the mid-1970s, the number of electoral democracies has more than doubled. During this period, approximately 74 countries changed from non-democratic to democratic regimes based on electoral democracy criteria. According to the survey conducted by James Holston of the University of California in San Diego, in 1972 there were 52 electoral democracies, constituting 33 percent of the world's 160 sovereign nation-states. By 1996, the number rose to 118 democracies out of 191 nation-states, or 62 percent of the total, for a net gain of 66 democratic states. Among the larger countries, those with a population of one million or more people, the number

of democracies nearly tripled during the same period. Significantly, the number of non-democratic states has declined by a third since the early 1970s, after rising steadily from the beginning of the century. In the Asia-Pacific region, only a handful of countries, including Australia, Fiji, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Sri Lanka had some democratic practices. Others such as India, although it has been often presented as the largest or most populous democracy, Pakistan, the Philippines, and South Korea had suffered from democratic reversals in the 1960s and the 1970s. Furthermore, the recent military coups d'état in several countries in the South have reflected a new trend of democratic reversal, for instance, Côte d'Ivoire since the military coup of December 1999, Fiji since May 19, 2000, the Democratic Republic of Congo since the assassination of Laurent Kabila on January 17, 2001, and the military coup d'état in the Central Africa Republic on March 16, 2003.

However, it should be noted that by the end of the 1990s, among 35 states that compose the Americas, 31 had electoral democracies (89 percent). In South and Central America, of 20 nation-states, only Peru and Mexico could not be clearly considered democratic despite some partial elections. Of 53 countries in contemporary Africa, the number of electoral democracies increased to 18 (34 percent). (It should be noted that Western Sahara is not counted among these countries.) But there have been several democratic reversals in countries, which previously have practised some liberal democracy, such as Côte d'Ivoire, the Central African Republic (CAR), Liberia, Niger, and Sierra Leone. The recent movement of Islamisation in northern Nigeria, for example, can seriously threaten the foundation of Nigerian electoral democracy. Despite this dimension, however, electoral power and its multiparty basis seem to be larger than the religious configuration in the north of Nigeria. Thus, despite protests by the so-called opposition parties, Nigeria had its elections in April 2003, and Chief Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria's ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) was re-elected president. In countries involved in war in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, practices of electoral democracy have been illusory. Nevertheless, some countries such as Benin, Mali, and Cape Verde, have made significant progress in the opening of the political space. In the Asia-Pacific region, 24 of its 38 nation-states are now politically democratic (63 percent).

Within the new nation-states of the former Eastern Europe, out of its 27 nation-states, 19 have become formally democratic (70 percent) (Holston, op. cit).

Although democratic debates and local democratic projects are not absent in the Middle East, it is the only region of the world that has been comparatively stagnant in terms of engagement in the pursuit of liberal democracy. But even the Palestinian Authority (PA), which has been described by the Western dominated media and politicians as being essentially undemocratic, with the selection of a newly established Prime Minister by the name of Mahmood Abbas in April 2003 is showing some signs of public debates. He seems to accept the language of liberal democracy in his discourse on peace and nation-state building. However, only Israel and Turkey, (14 percent) have had solid political debates on democratic and systematic elections and functioning liberal democratic institutions. In short, there is no doubt that the electoral processes have been globalised and multipartyism has been perceived as an instrument of liberal democracy.

Liberal Democracy within the Framework of the Realist School of Thought, and the Claims of the Structural Adjustment Programmes

(a) Arguments and Assumptions Related to the Realist School of Thought

The realist school of thought as the dominant paradigm for analysing state formation and international relations at large in the North has been influenced by the Hobbesian state of nature perspective, theories of anarchism, and libertarianism, and also by the Hegelian idea of the divine foundation of statehood. My objective here is not to expand the discussion on the historiography of liberal democracy within the realist school of thought. Rather, I would like to identify some general characteristics of liberal democracy and examine whether they have been projected or incorporated into the logic of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in Africa.

In comparison to idealists, realists in the political science literature tend to perceive and define the world mainly in the state-centric

paradigm. Idealists argue that in addition to the state as an important actor, there are other actors that should equally participate in the management of world politics with legitimacy. As it is also called power politics theory, and as it developed within many dimensions of the European-American scholarship, the realist school of thought as reflected in the works of Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes, Niccolò Machiavelli, Hegel, E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger, for instance, is essentially a state- and Euro-centric phenomenon (Lumumba-Kasongo 2003). States are fundamentally self-interested and competitive phenomena (Newman 1996: 17). As an irreducible element in international politics, the underlying condition for the state's development is conflict.

In international relations, the state's expansionism is the motive for the interactions among states and nations. It is in the name of the national interests that states interact with one another. It is in the name of those interests that they also take arms against one another. So-called national interests are defined as natural and organic. Humanity is considered secondary to the interests and actions of actualisation of the state power. In this tradition, the state is perceived as a rational political animal, despite contradictions that may emerge from its actions and means. As Ann Kelleher and Laura Klein state:

While the state primacy perspective of the world does not define the superiority of types of systems, it does privilege a specific type of political organization: The state is viewed as the most important unit for both national and international interaction. According to those who hold this perspective, the primary political identity for all groups and individuals should be as citizens of the state of their birth or adoption. The state primacy perspective does not argue for universal similarity in cultures or centralized power between states. In fact, it gives states a tremendous amount of autonomy in deciding the nature of their realms (p. 41).

Within the state primacy school, realists emphasise the sovereignty of the state. No matter how this state was created and whether it is located in the North or the South, as a reflection of human nature, the state has to be a self-centred entity. David Held has written that "Modern liberal and liberal democratic theories have constantly sought to justify the sovereignty power of the state while at the same time justifying limits on that power. The history of this attempt

since Thomas Hobbes produced the arguments of balancing might and rights, power and law, duties and rights. On the one hand, states must have a monopoly of coercive power in order to provide a secure basis on which trade, commerce, religion and family life can prosper". (1993: 18)

What does that mean in a competitive world economy? To be able to discuss how realists define and characterise some elements of liberal democracy, it is necessary to briefly describe the classifications of the functions of government as reflected in the structures of the industrial societies. Realist scholars (known also as functionalists and neo-functionalists) have defined the role of government in a "perfect competitive society" in the following manner:

- to protect our freedom from the enemies outside our gates,
- to preserve law and order,
- to enforce private contracts,
- to foster competitive markets (Dodd, 1955: 219), and
- to undertake those public projects like road construction, that are clearly of general value to the whole society and cannot be readily undertaken under private auspices (Franklin, 1977: 47).

First, however, it should be emphasised that the concept of a 'perfect competitive society' is ahistorical even in the United States after the Great Depression. Second, it should also be mentioned that the idea of a government that should function as a balanced wheel through appropriate monetary and fiscal policies is important for the functioning of any government in the capitalist world. Another notion that the realists, especially the mainstream economists, have put forward is of government as a so-called neutral, impartial institution. Government can represent the general interest of society as a whole and hence steer capitalism in the social interest (Franklin, 1977: 48). In short, the best government should be the government that does not govern or that governs the least. In the United States, for instance, the idea of 'small government' has been part of the political lexicon during recent election campaigns. As Dick Howard stated: "The government is best that governs least" (2002: 177). However, despite controversies, the United States qualifies the notion of the strong government paradigm. Contrary to the common illusions regarding the total laissez-faire principles of realists, the United

States government, for instance, has significantly and consistently intervened in the mobilisation of resources and the sponsorship of development projects since the 1930s. It is still more visible in the public arena than many people would imagine, especially after the tragedy of September 11, 2001. As Ned Boudreau stated:

According to the neo-liberal bible, countries must 'liberalize' their economies by eliminating barriers to free trade; specifically, tariffs, quotas and subsidies. Yet Japan, the United States, and the European Union heavily subsidize their farmers, allowing agribusinesses from the developed North and West to sell surplus grains and produce in less developed countries at artificially low prices. This practice wrecks entire sectors of indigenous farming economies by making local rice, maize and wheat more expensive than their imported counterparts, thus driving farming families from their land. Furthermore, tariffs and quotas imposed by the industrialized nations block imports of textiles, leather goods and agricultural products from less developed countries. If free trade were truly free, these commodities are the very items that would form less industrialized nations' most competitive comparative advantages. This situation will not change in the near future. The United States, for example, this year passed what *The Economist* (June 29-July 5, 2002 issue) called 'an appalling new farm bill', which raised subsidies to American farmers to \$170 billion over ten years – a staggering rise of 80%. In Europe, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) shows little signs of changing any time soon. The CAP eats up 48% of the European Union's annual budget on farm subsidies. In 2002, CAP subsidies totaled \$39 billion. The issue of agricultural subsidies in the industrialized North and West is so fraught that even mainstream conservative business media are predicting subsidies could and most likely will de-rail the Doha Round of negotiations for further expansion of free trade based on neo-liberal principles (2002, pp. 1-2).

What are the characteristics of liberal democracy based on a realist's perspectives and assumptions? For instance, how does a citizen interact with the state in a liberal democracy? How should a citizen pursue his or her personal interests? How should his or her interests be protected within the framework of state sovereignty? A brief comment on the above questions helps construct a theoretical framework of the nature of the relationship between citizen and liberal democracy.

Citizenship is a territorial and ideological concept. In the territorial boundary context, citizens are people who are legally born in a given country or naturalised individuals. They have civil rights, duties, and obligations to the society and the state in terms of respecting laws, paying taxes, and maintaining the 'equilibrium' of the society. From a realist perspective, these individuals are also buyers and sellers, and producers and consumers. Within the logic of the self-regulated market or the invisible hand of Adam Smith, buyers and sellers are free to buy and sell whatever they have and wherever they choose to. In principle, what is important is the quality of their goods that should allow them to compete effectively with each other. The buyers and sellers (citizens) should be able to participate freely in order to sell and buy their services and labour according to their abilities.

Liberal democracy is the system of governance that, in principle, claims to protect citizens' rights and the instruments of production (land, machinery, factory buildings, natural resources, and the like) that are privately owned by many individuals. The institutions of state should produce social equilibrium. This democracy is called procedural democracy. As Robert D. Grey, citing Joseph Schumpeter, states:

The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote (1942). Scholars who adopt this procedural, or elitist, version of democracy tend to be concerned primarily with stability of the system. Once the rules are in place, is the system able to maintain itself without experiencing outbursts of violence or becoming oligarchies? Rule of law and constitutionalism help regulate both government and citizens activity to limit abuses of power and keep the system running (Grey, 1997: 83).

Do people, as citizens, really matter in this type of democracy? The question is relevant but will not be expanded on in this article. Still, in general terms, it should be confirmed that people as consumers or voters matter. The routine ritual of elections brings political elite and electors closer for a short period of time in many social contexts. The vote is partially a commodity and partially a civil and political right. It is an exchangeable phenomenon. A fresh start can bring new inspirations and also can offer new possibilities for the ordinary people. But mass values are articulated through elitist filters through which important issues are selected and elevated from

their individualistic origins to the local or national agenda. With its concern for reason, law, and freedom of choice that can only be properly upheld by recognising the political equality of all mature individuals, this democracy limits to a large extent the power of the state (Held, 1993: 18).

While realist politics puts the emphasis on the state, its economics has been articulated in terms of individualism and the free market. But in its pragmatic dimension in the West, state-centric power has prevailed over individual choice and the claims of self-emancipation. The question of whether liberal democracy effectively functions in the way liberal theorists tend to project is a complex matter that is not the object of this article. In short, in a liberal democracy, individuals' rights, free choice, freedoms (or civil liberties), and democratic accountability are among the most important characteristics. How have these elements of liberal democracy and the notion of a strong state been projected in the SAPs?

(b) Liberal Democracy within Frameworks of Structural Adjustment Programs and State-Centric Logic

In the 1970s and 1980s, SAPs were implemented through very centralised political structures with a high level of technical secrecy in Africa. But even before the implementation of these programmes in Africa, an anti-democratic formula was preferred in the name of efficiency and growth. As it was stated in *World Development Report* of 1991: "Authoritarianism often has been seen as a useful, if regrettable, expedient for effective policy-making in the face of political instability. A strongly held view through the 1970s was that development policies took time to bear fruit, and that this was inconsistent with the politics of short-term electoral cycles. Democracies were seen as having a built-in inclination toward populist policies" (1991: 132).

In most cases at the initial stages of SAP adoption, there were no serious debates on how to implement them and what the long-term the consequences of their implementation would likely be. Even when they were wrapped in the African policy symbolism of

‘nationalism’, their content tended to be ‘universal’, or they were articulated in the Americo-European development orientation. Their implementation was basically a technical operation by selected members of the political elite in the ministries of finance, economy, planning, and in other cases, the office of Prime Minister. As Ali Mazrui has written:

When I served on the World Bank’s Council of African Advisors, I repeatedly asked the Bank to devise a calculus of democratic indicators by which an African country would be judged democratically before a loan was granted. Vice- President Edward Jaycox of the World Bank repeatedly protested that it could not be done. Partly because market ideologies have been pushed with greater vigour and consistency than has liberal democracy, the market is almost triumphant by the end of the 20th Century. There are more countries that have been forced to privatise and adopt structural adjustment programmes than there are countries that have been penalised for not democratising (1998: 2).

Although the political situation in the world has changed since the 1990s and there is a space for political debates in most countries, the SAPs are still very much elitist technical programmes in Africa. That is to say that the majority of Africans, especially those who live in the countryside, have not been able, directly or indirectly, to participate even in a reactionary manner in their local formulation and implementation.

Furthermore, since the early 1990s, as a result of popular movements, intellectual critiques by both liberals and organic intellectuals, and the brutal end the Soviet Union and its socialist bloc, the World Bank has been obliged to revise some of its requirements for gaining access to its financial resources and to those of its affiliate institutions. In the process of producing new reform guidelines, the technocrats and policymakers at the Bank started with what they called “rethinking the state”. Thus, the World Bank started to insist on ‘good’ governance as one of the prerequisites for admitting states to its credit lines and loans. As it states in its Report: “The agenda for reform that emerged in the course of this Report calls for government to intervene less in certain areas and more in others – for the state to let markets work where they can, and to step in promptly and effectively where they cannot” (*World Report Development*, 1991: 128).

The notion of a strong state that was defined by a militaristic and personalistic power structure and that prevailed throughout the 1970s and 1980s, is no longer a rigidly defined central dogma of the World Bank. The state that can maintain 'law and order' is the one that the Bank can do business with. 'Law and order' is a legalistic expression that has been well articulated in the literature of functionalist sociologists and in the modernisation of school of thought as the state's coercive power. Even Leopold II of Belgium used 'law and order' to govern the Congo as his personal property.

It should be noted that despite the fact that the World Bank has started to engage the non-governmental institutions, it still believes in the power and organisation of the state in the process of implementing its programmes. It should also be emphasised that the notion of 'law and order' does not necessarily imply liberal democracy – or any type of democracy for that matter. It implies, rather, institutional stability and political coercion more than liberty and equality. Another notion that has been central in the discourses and the lexicon of the Bank is 'good' governance. Projected in normative terms, it includes building state institutions and accountability. In the past, the World Bank supported notorious dictators in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.

It is clear that liberal democracy within the SAPs means periodic elections at most levels of societal organisations within multiparty politics as well as political stability of some kind. Concerning elections and multipartyism, the rules have not been generalised over Africa. Some countries with limited electoral democracy, such as Uganda until recently, are still considered despite questioning their performance and calling for possible restraint on the flow of money into their coffers. These are *les enfants chéris* of the so-called Western donors, including the Paris Club and the World Bank. The 'World Bank revolutionaries', as some scholars have characterised leaders like Museveni, have very little, if any, social revolution in their SAPs. As recently reported and confirmed by the Office of the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian regarding Museveni's government's level of corruption:

Donors and civil society organisations have joined together to deplore corruption in Uganda's government, which they say is endemic from the top right down to local administrative levels. A statement issued

by Uganda's Development Partners at the annual donor conference in Kampala, read by Netherlands ambassador Matthew Peters, spoke of the widely held perception in Ugandan society that corruption is pervasive, institutionalised and on the increased. Uganda continues to rank amongst the most corrupt countries in international indices, the statement added. Large scale corruption and embezzlement at the top, which is carried out with impunity, has worked to encourage the proliferation of administrative corruption at the grassroots, it said. 'This has led to a disturbing trend of increasing tolerance of corrupt practices within Ugandan society. Citing the findings of a Uganda Debt Network investigation into government accounts, Peters noted that some 200 billion Ugandan Shillings (US\$ 40m) is lost or misused each year, leaving 7.5 percent of the budget unaccounted for. It is becoming increasingly difficult for us, as donors, to explain this to our taxpayers at home who currently provide just under half of the government of Uganda budget', he warned (IRIN, 2003: 1).

The point to be made is that multipartyism and liberal elections are still used as ad hoc principles within the World Bank and other global financial institutions and their sponsors. In a situation where multipartyism has become almost routine in some African countries, the World Bank does not seem to care much about whether this multipartyism is autocratic or a democratic. I defined multiparty autocracy as a system of governance with more than one political party in which the ruling party has monopoly over political and financial resources; it controls them to advance its causes, and it also determines the direction of discourse of other political parties and those of national politics at large (Lumumba-Kasongo, 1998: 22-23). This kind of multipartyism was developed in countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Togo. Multiparty autocracy has been deliberately confused with liberal democracy.

International Debt

The African debt crisis is part of a larger world debt crisis. Nevertheless, given the local and regional particularities associated with the dynamics of the world economy, the implications of African debt should be analysed through geopolitical regional paradigms and the role of Africa in world capitalism. International debt issues

should inform our understanding of capitalism. Another aspect of African debt, which has been extensively popularised and which is an integral part of African debt, concerns the debt relief programmes. What are the socioeconomic and political dividends at the state and people levels directly associated with these programmes? Who actually gains from these new programmes?

The issue of foreign debt forgiveness, known also as debt relief, has been internationalised since the 1999 G-8 conference in Germany, although debt relief itself was introduced earlier. At the April 2000 conference in Cairo, Egypt, President Jacques Chirac announced that France would forgive the totality of bilateral debts to the poorest and most heavily indebted countries and that other countries should follow suit. In the following 15 years, France would make an effort to forgive about \$23 billion to heavily indebted countries. The process of selecting the first group of countries was completed. Eleven poor countries already qualified for debt relief from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and other creditors. These countries include Benin, \$460; Bolivia, \$2.1 million; Burkina Faso, \$700 million; Cameroon \$2 billion; Honduras \$900 million; Mali, \$870 million; Mauritania, \$1.1 billion; Mozambique, \$4.3 billion; Senegal, \$850 million; Tanzania, \$3 billion; and Uganda, \$2 billion. In the case of the United States, the debt-relief package was pending in Congress, which must approve the US share. It should be noted that it is not clear how the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank calculated the above figures. However, many speculate that the debt-relief scheme is basically part of bilateral debt.

Other countries that were also in the pipeline and expected to obtain debt relief before the end of 2000 included Chad, \$250 million; Gambia, \$130 million; Guinea, \$1.2 billion; Guinea Bissau, \$700 million; Guyana, \$1.1 billion; Malawi, \$1.1 billion; Nicaragua, \$5 billion; Rwanda, \$800 million; and Zambia, \$4 billion. Countries under consideration for debt were Ethiopia, \$1.5 billion; Madagascar, \$1.5 billion; Niger, \$700 million; Sao Tome and Principe, \$170 million. It should be noted that conditionalities for debt relief are similar to those of the SAPs discussed earlier, with an emphasis on electoral democracy, poverty alleviation, and women's issues. But these conditions have been used in ad hoc fashion depending on the unwritten geopolitical factors that shape the major powers'

interests in the discourse of the global economy and their security paradigms. What do all the above figures represent out of the total African debt?

In order to form an idea of what debt relief may represent in the African debt saga – and without data for 2003 – I decided to use 1998 data to calculate the relief as a percentage of total debt. It should be noted that the selected nations in my sample are likely to have continued to increase their loans between 1998 and 2003, making the percentage not representative of reality. However, the exercise gives a general idea about the statistical constitution of debt relief (see Table 2). Unless in the past three to four years countries selected here doubled or tripled their loans, it is clear that the debt relief scheme may have had a significant reduction of between 20 percent and almost 100 percent of the total debt in some cases in some countries. The effort seems to be on the positive side. However, the impact of debt relief has to be assessed within the framework of the performance and structure of the total African political economy. As indicated below, Mozambique has become an exceptional case.

It should be noted that among those African countries that qualified for the relief programmes in 1998, Benin, Mali, Senegal (long before the other countries), and Tanzania implemented multipartyism in the 1990s. This has produced acceptable processes of presidential and legislative elections without any major social clashes. Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Mauritania have produced what I have characterised earlier as ‘autocratic multipartyism’. Uganda rejected multipartyism, and its leadership has maintained a one-party state (even when consistently supported by the West as previously indicated), a common characteristic of most African states in the 1970s. However, upon continuous pressure by his international mentors and the actors associated with major wars, Museveni announced in February 2003 that he would amend the constitution towards the implementation of multipartyism, the absence of which did not deprive his regime of loan and even massive grants.

Why do nation-states, companies, and people take foreign loans? Who is to pay back these loans in Africa? One simplistic answer is that some nations, companies, and people are at a given time in need of cash in order to run the business of public administration and to correct their budgetary problems for investment. It is also obvious

Table 2: Debt and Debt Relief in Million \$ and Relief as Percent of Debt in 1998

Country	Debt Relief (\$ millions)	Debt in 1998 (\$ millions)	Debt minus relief	Relief as % of Debt
Benin	460	1,044	584	44.1%
Bolivia	2,100	4,933	2,833	42.6%
Burkina Faso	700	826	126	84.7%
Cameroon	2,000	8,198	6,198	24.4%
Honduras	900	3,220	2,320	28.0%
Mali	870	2,183	1,313	39.9%
Mauritania	1,100	1,423	323	77.3%
Mozambique	4,300	2,731	-1,569	157.5%
Senegal	850	2,710	1,860	31.4%
Tanzania	3,000	5,682	2,682	52.8%
Uganda	2,000	2,371	371	84.4%
Expected 2000				
Chad	250	630	380	39.7%
Gambia	130	269	139	48.3%
Guinea	1,200	2,512	1,312	47.8%
Guinea Bissau	700	695	-5	100.7%
Guyana	1,100	1,078	-22	102.0%
Malawi	1,100	1,371	271	80.2%
Nicaragua	5,000	5,238	238	95.5%
Rwanda	800	682	-118	117.3%
Zambia	4,000	5,317	1,317	75.2%
Under Consideration				
Ethiopia	1,500	8,733	7,233	17.2%
Madagascar	1,500	3,273	1,773	45.8%
Niger	700	1,114	414	62.8%
Sao Tome and Principe	170	144	-26	118.1%

Source: World Bank, *Global Development Finance*, 2000.

that people are paying back their loans with their labour. But in Africa it should be emphasised that many governments have been paying their financial obligations with people's 'blood and lives'. Many people are being socially and physically tortured as they are deprived of basic human needs and dignity so that governments can pay back loans. And many people are dying as the result of policies related to loan scheme payments.

Since the 1970s, along with the oil crises, international debt has become an issue not only of international relations, trade arrangements, and diplomacy, but also of fiscal policy management, and resources allocation, internationally and domestically. In principle, executive branches of the states, from the views of both realist and idealist schools of thought, have an obligation to secure resources for the social progress of their citizens. This complex issue has to be examined within a structuralist perspective.

The amount of African international debt, or public debt, has gradually increased every year since the 1970s. But as compared to other countries in the developing world, especially those in South America, the total African public debt represents only a relatively small percentage of the total public debt of the world. Still, it has had a crippling impact on African lives and economies. For instance in 1998, the total public debt of Nigeria represented 3.485 percent (\$ 23.455 billion) of the total public debt of the world while the total public debt of Côte d'Ivoire was 1.608 percent (\$10.822 billion). South Africa's public debt was 1.579 percent (\$10.626 billion); Ghana's was 0.828 percent (\$5.57 billion); DRC's was 1.330 percent (\$8.949 billion); Kenya's was 0.836 percent (\$5.629 billion); Senegal's was 0.487 percent (\$3.74 billion); and Ethiopia's was 1.429 percent (9.618 billion). In countries in South America, the percentage of the total public debt was higher than in Africa and Asia. For example, in Brazil it represented 14.707 percent (\$98.959 billion); in Mexico, 13.076 percent (\$87.996 billion); and in Argentina, 11.413 percent (\$87.799 billion). In Asia for instance, South Korea represented 8.612 percent (\$57.956 billion), and Indonesia was 9.948 percent (\$66.944 billion). These trends are not qualitatively very different from those of the 1980s. The calculated values in millions of debt countries as a percentage of GDP in 1998 in Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, South Africa, DRC, Kenya, Senegal, and Ethiopia are as follows:

71.1, 116.3, 291.1, 57.9, 44.7, 174.7, and 133.5. As previously stated, the issue is about the availability of resources to pay back this debt and the origins of loans. In a simple formula, money with which one is paying debt has to come from some other source. What are those sources and how are they related to human conditions in the indebted countries?

Why is debt forgiveness or debt relief an issue at this time? The question is complex as it reflects both cost-benefit analyses and power relation issues. Generally, it is difficult to relate these in a nonlinear reasoning process. How will Africa benefit from this relief in the short and long run? And should the 'forgivers' gain as a result of their actions? It should be emphasised that in capitalist, pragmatic logic, there is no such thing as a free lunch. But Africa may take advantage of the principle of mutuality, which should be examined carefully.

I have tried to show in this article that in the world of the states there is no such thing as 'compassionate capitalism'. To save capitalism some decisions must be made in the various orbits of powers. The specific scheme of debt relief is not a humanitarian action from the industrial countries. It is a corrective process aimed at integrating Africa further into the world of international capitalism. Jacques Chirac clearly articulated this position in the Cairo conference in April 2000, stating that what Africa needs is European investment and further integration into the world economy. And also she needs to compete with other actors. So in order to accomplish these interrelated goals, there is a need for political and juridical stability. This is where the role of electoral democracies becomes vital. The question is: How would this integration, which is based on relief debt programmes, produce and sustain social policies such as food security, self-sufficiency in food production and processing, manufacturing in small and mid-size enterprises, employment, economic diversification, and the protection of human rights and living conditions with basic dignity?

Conclusion

Is post-Cold War liberalism equal to pre-Cold War liberalism in terms of the power associated with international debt? Given the

focus of this paper, no attempt was made to expand on this question. However, a short answer is that militarily, post-Cold War liberalism is directed and guided by the geo-strategic and national interests of the United States. Economically, within this kind of liberalism, capitalism is organised and managed more by the dynamics of regionalism than by the state-centric paradigm alone.

It should be emphasised that Cold War liberalism was essentially an ideology of a military alliance and its bureaucracies and of private corporate complexes that ruled the world with iron, stick, and the ‘controlled “freemarket” tools’. Its major institutions were essentially interested in power, control, and surplus generation – not in genuine democracy. This militarism continues to play an important role in the organisation of the world capitalist economy. The space and options for dealing with economic democracy, which has been demanded by popular, grassroots movements and progressive forces, were limited and in most cases nonexistent in developing countries, especially in Africa.

Many countries in Africa accumulated the larger portions of their external debts at a time when there were no functioning liberal democracies. The state apparatuses were reorganised to support the major objective of debt payment. In the post-Cold War era, these countries have been expected to fully commit to pay back their debts or to renegotiate payments when electoral democracy has become in part the rules of the game or international practice, for better or for worse. It is my view that electoral democracies have been supported by the Western powers and global financial institutions partially to avoid what they may consider as possible occurrences of worst-case scenarios: default, extreme nationalism, or social revolution. Within the existing social and economic conditions, the chance to have an ‘acceptable’ level of people’s political participation in those democracies, with perhaps few exceptions, is at a minimum because of factors such as intrigues within ruling parties for control of electoral processes, the internal weakness of opposition parties, poor technological and social infrastructures; and more important, the involvement of support of the agencies associated with corporate globalisation in the local electoral processes.

It was argued in this article that as long as the structures of the world economy have not been seriously challenged collectively or

regionally in Africa by the African political, social, and economic organisations and alliances, the results of the electoral democracies in terms of substantively changing people's living standards will matter very little. In fact, the involvement of private corporate globalisation in electoral democracies, either by directly supporting the elections of some candidates or through propaganda in the international media, has been worrisome to many people because corporate globalisation is not philosophically and socially interested in any real democracy, development, and people. Its main interests are in labour, power, control, and the accumulation of surplus. In short, if electoral democracies framed within the technical dogma of the World Bank and the IMF are not transformed, by the actions of coalitions among popular and social movements, into social democracies, they will not be able to satisfy the demands for social change that are being articulated in most societies in Africa. Corporate globalisation is interested in the existing electoral democracies because these democracies are, in most cases, a mere façade.

We must search for some forms of working multipartyism and democracy. In the absence of guided revolutions, a combination of the politics of 'consensualism' and 'consociational' democracy (Lijphart, 1984) can contribute to the process of producing humane, productive, and transformative multipartyism and democracy. This working multipartyism has to be constructed on a genuine premise of the 'politics of compromise'. Within the existing levels of social and economic cleavages, this compromise will not be actualised until African systems of governance provide and secure basic rights and needs for all. The *sine qua non* condition for better-functioning multipartyism and democracy is that the state has to provide social security, improve the standards of living, and provide advancement for all. I have argued that African states should be recaptured and transformed so that they are able to support liberties and rights. This can be achieved if social protection is codified. There is a need to create a leadership that is committed and nationalistic and that understands the dynamics of the world economy and its contours. As for proposed solutions to debt issues in Africa, I agree with the logic articulated by McEwan, who stated:

There is no way to determine in advance when a debt burden will

become unsustainable. The debt process is a bit like building a tower with a set of children's blocks. We cannot tell ahead of time how high we can go, how many blocks we can pile on top of each other, but we do know that there is a limit. If we keep going higher and higher, at some point the whole structure will come tumbling down. There are, of course, ways to extend the limit. We can widen the base of tower, for example, or construct some support structures. There comes a point, however, where we are devoting all our efforts and resources to shoring up the tower (1991: 31).

In short, some of the elements of my thinking are reflected in Henry Hart's statement: "Equality among nations and the democratization of international relations, economic, and political. It wants global co-operation for development on the basis of mutual benefit. It is a strategy for the recognition and preservation of the world's diversity" (1977: 360). Africans need developmental democracy (Olukoshi, 2002) and a developmental state (Amuwo, 2002) in order to deal effectively with the implications of international debt in its domestic affairs. It is only when people are able to determine what they can do about the international debt in their specific countries that this issue is likely to be permanently resolved. It is only in a social democracy promoted by an African welfare state, a strong and visionary interventionist state, on behalf of the hitherto majority weak and poor, that people can be in charge of their destiny.

For liberal democracy to be effective, it has to be substantive, it has to correct and permanently eradicate social injustices and gender inequalities, and it has to promote and protect the right to life principle. Therefore, the main question is, given its essence and goal, and in its current form as practised in Africa, is liberal democracy philosophically and instrumentally capable of fulfilling these above criteria? In the absence of compelling philosophical or historical grounds to assert that liberal democracy can positively reach the majority of the African people (the poor people including women, youth, peasants, and working classes), and structurally transform their living conditions, there is a need to consciously and systematically explore and project social democracy as an alternative to the United States model of 'classical' liberal democracy. There will not be any democracy in Africa without an inbuilt national development agenda, a commitment to human dignity, and collective decolonisation.

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International Foundations, Agenda Setting and the Non-Profit Sector in South Africa

*Bhekinkosi Moyo**

Introduction

That there is a vibrant civil society in South Africa encompassing political, labour, religious, cultural, welfare and developmental organisations, many of which developed as resistance structures to apartheid is not debatable. However what is debatable is the extent to which part of this vibrancy is a result of the society's own commitment or that of its donors¹ in response to the country's development challenges. The question that we are concerned with is the extent to which the development agenda is owned by development organisations in South Africa and the extent to which it is promoted by international foundations. This is an attempt to interrogate the assumptive argument that the development agenda has not emerged from the country itself but from interaction with foreign agencies (Budlender 1999:357). We locate the whole discussion in the relationship that develops between international donors and local recipient non-governmental organisations. We also make the observation that the extent and manner to which international aid impacts on the development agenda is uneven. We then draw the conclusion that the evidence seems to suggest that the development agenda is promoted by a variety of role players, chief of whom are the third sector, donors and government. However, we also note that the relationship that develops between donors and recipients is complex. There is evidence which suggests that many local NGOs² are dependent on donor funding.³ This opens up a whole set of questions around long-term impact and the feasibility of donor assistance. Partly, this is so because the survival of these

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organisations depends not so much on their ability to engage their constituencies, but more upon their ability to persuade the donors. In the long run this could contribute to unhealthy donor-recipient relations.⁴ This could confirm the view that the importance of donor funding in the short term is offset by the dependence that it creates in the long term.

This paper is a result of widely held interviews with international donor foundations and their grantees.⁵ The role that these international agencies have played in supporting the non-profit sector in South Africa cannot be ignored. A huge impact, which manifests itself in a number of ways, has been made in areas such as gender and women's development; strengthening the non-profit sector; institution building; democracy building and good governance; promotion of citizen rights and responsibilities; lobbying for a more enabling environment for the sector; capacity building; economic justice; human rights and democratisation; and community development among others. However this achievement does not preclude the fact that these foundations can call the shots. They certainly have the leverage to do so through their broad priorities. There is evidence which suggests that donors such as these foundations indirectly promote their own agenda and NGOs often model their programmes to suit donor guidelines. At the same time, local NGOs have more power in the relationship than they realise and should exploit it to get donors to support the kinds of programmes that they believe are most important and relevant to their constituencies. Our final point is that the development agenda appears to be the result of a multiple response to South Africa's contextual needs.⁶

Structure of the paper

We start by framing the conceptual paradigms that we use in the paper. In the first section, we look briefly at the aid and development literature in Africa. We then move to give a snapshot of the state of civil society in South Africa. Lastly we discuss the question, who is promoting the non-profit sector's development agenda in South Africa?

Framing the Paradigms

Aid and Development in Africa: Conceptual Paradigms

There is a considerable amount of literature on aid and (under) development in Africa that has shaped popular discourse. This discourse has tended to assume both theoretical and practical approaches. Carol Lancaster (1999) is perhaps the leading scholar who has identified the two main analytical approaches to investigate the impact aid has had on development. These approaches are contextual and instrumental.

- (a) The contextual theory is more theoretical and considers the impact of aid on development primarily as a function of the broader political and economic context in which it is provided (Lancaster 1999: 5). A number of theories are relevant here:
- Dependency theory, which focusses on the relations of power between rich and poor countries or between donors and recipients. According to this theory, strong capitalist countries in the developed world that exploit developing countries are the cause of the lack of development in the Third World. Aid is used as a capitalist tool that reinforces and continues exploitative behaviour, deepening underdevelopment and poverty.⁷ By the same token this could suggest that aid creates much of the misery which it seeks to relieve. And whether or not it relieves all the misery that it creates is yet another area of concern that needs to be further researched. What is important for us is the examination of the validity of this theory with regard to the NPO sector in South Africa. We depart from the point that this theory has not had adequate empirical evidence to support its claims. We hope to test it with some evidence in the context of civil society assistance.
 - Deconstructionist theory: which is inspired partly by the great disparity of power between the rich, developed world and the poorer developing regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America. As an anthropological approach, it sought to highlight that the idea of development is an invention of Western capitalism, aimed at creating an extremely efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World (Escobar,

A 1995:9), but with little basis in the realities of that world. Aid is therefore a tool by the donor to exercise power but with little relevance to (and possibly with negative consequences for) the lives of the recipients (Lancaster 1999:6). We acknowledge that this approach also lacks empirical evidence to support its claims. However, taken in its moderate form, it has been productive in its analysis. A famous example is the study by James Ferguson (1990), which examined the impact of aid in Lesotho's rural development project. This approach observed that the project failed to achieve its goals because it used a developmental tool that did not understand the social and political environment in which it was working. For example, poverty was treated as a technical problem rather than a political one. Our chief concern is the extent to which development actors have understood the culture in which they are working and the extent to which they have not. This ties in very well with what we said earlier, that there are arguments that suggest that the development agenda is not locally developed.

- State-Market Failure theory: which in the early 1950s and 60s viewed underdevelopment as a result of the lack of savings and investment in poor countries. Aid was introduced to stimulate growth and reduce poverty ⁸ Aid also acts as an incentive to encourage policy and regulatory reforms, which would free markets and stimulate investment and growth. Aid agencies therefore become central in influencing policy in economic and political landscapes. These have emphasised the importance of democratic institutions such as improved governance, transparency, rule of law, elections and so on in improving the environment for investment and development. Seen from this perspective, aid is not necessarily a bad tool. We use this approach to determine the extent to which donor organisations have contributed to the democratisation of South Africa and the extent to which they continue to contribute towards the consolidation of democracy.
- (b) The deconstructionist approach is more empirically oriented and evaluates the impact of aid in terms of the success or failure of the projects and programs it finances (Lancaster 1999:5). Within this analysis, literature falls under two categories, one polemical

and the other more sober. The polemical literature exposes the sins of the aid industry. A typical example of such literature is Graham Hancock's *Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the International Aid Business* (1989), which asserts that aid should be terminated because as a tool of development it is fundamentally flawed by misguided policies, bureaucratic inefficiency, self-interest, and corruption of official aid agencies.⁹ The sober literature tends to be based on evaluations, studies and other empirical material. The World Bank's many studies on the statistical relationship between aid flows and economic growth constitute one such category. The general finding has been that when monetary, fiscal and trade policies in recipient countries are taken into account, aid has a positive impact on growth in supporting policy environments (Burnside and Dollar 1996).¹⁰ The other category is that which states that aid is effective in achieving its goals most of the time.

We build on these approaches to understand the effectiveness of aid on civil society organisations. But we first, let us turn to a discussion of civil society in South Africa.

Civil society in South Africa

Explaining the sector

We are not going to delve into the discussions that have surrounded the concept of civil society in this paper. Instead we give a working definition of civil society and give a brief discussion of its state, size, nature and scope in South Africa. We follow the general trend of using some terms interchangeably. Thus, the terms, third sector, non-governmental sector, voluntary sector, non-profit sector, non-profit organisations and community based organisations are used interchangeably as if they meant the same thing to refer to the constituents of civil society. The term civil society, in political philosophy, has been contested. Discussions around it have stretched from Hegel, through Marx, Gramsci and Habermas on the one hand and through Durkheim, Simmel and Parsons on the other to its rebirth in the 1990s. These debates have given birth to a wide range of alternative definitions of civil society. In short these range

from broad based popular participation (Locke, Hobbes) to elite bargaining of one kind or another (Montesquieu) to elite-citizen-government interchanges (de Tocqueville).

The term today still has as many definitions as there are people defining it. Its ugly face however is that donors are not unanimously agreed on its definition. More often they regard it as the organised arena in society located between the state and the private citizen. For the Mott Foundation, for example, civil society consists of three sectors: namely, public or government, private or for profit business, and voluntary, charitable or nonprofit (Stacey and Aksartova, 2001: 380). And for the Ford Foundation, civil society is broadly constituted but also specific, hence it is not the society as whole. For Ford, civil society's role is to instill a democratic temperament and to monitor and restrain government (Stacey and Aksartova, 2001: 378). As a result of this debate about the meaning of civil society, Bebbington and Riddell note that:

Civil society is a notoriously slippery concept. It has entered donor terminology without careful attention...In many respects the term is used as a code for a set of ideas related to participation, good government, human rights, privatization and public sector reform (Riddell and Bebbington 1995:23).

This debate on civil society is also found in South Africa. The term is contested. A recent research project forming part of the broader 'CIVICUS/South African Non Governmental Organizations Coalition (SANGOCO)' process in developing a common vision of a healthy civil society by the Co-operative for Research and Education (CORE) and the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) defined civil society as:

The sphere of organizations and/or associations of organizations located between the family, the state, the government of the day, and the prevailing economic system, in which people with common interests associate voluntarily. Amongst these organizations, they may have common, competing, or conflicting values and interests. (Core/Idasa, 2001: 4)¹¹

We use this as our working definition. However we go a step further to distinguish what a non-profit organisation or a non-governmental organisation is.

Defining a non-profit organisation

According to a new study on the size and scope of the non-profit sector in South Africa which was modelled according to the Johns Hopkins Nonprofit Comparative Project, a non-profit organisation must be organised, private, self-governing, non-profit distributing and voluntary. This agrees with the characteristics of civil society organisations in South Africa that are identified by the CIVICUS-SANGOCO study. These range from NGOs, CBOs, associations-networks of NGOs-CBOs, trade unions and federations, professional associations, employer-business associations and their federations, sports-arts-cultural organisations, religious organisations and independent research institutes.

The size of the non-profit sector in South Africa

Evidence from the two studies referred to suggests that the non-profit sector in South Africa is heterogeneous. It ranges from the less sophisticated burial societies to the most professional research institutes. This makes it very difficult to accurately and reliably define its size in numbers. However, the study *The Size and Scope of the Non-profit sector in South Africa*, estimates that there are 98 920 NPOs across all sectors. According to the study, the sectors with the largest number of NPOs are culture and recreation (20 587), social services (22 755), and development and housing (20 382). Other findings about the size of the sector are that the majority of NPOs are less formalised community based organisations concentrated in the poorer communities. No less than 53 percent of all NPOs can be classified as less formalised community-based organisations (i.e. not formally structured as Section 21 companies, trusts, churches, trade unions or co-operatives). Women and black people play a leading role in the NPO sector. According to this study 59 percent of the managerial level of all NPOs surveyed is made up by women. And 60 percent of all full-time employees are women. The study also suggests that the sector is a major economic force. It employs just over half a million people and generating income in excess of R10 billion per year. According to the study, there are 645 316 full time equivalent staff employed by the sector, which is equivalent to 9 percent of the formal non-agricultural workforce of 7.6 percent of the

total non-agricultural workforce. This shows not only the vibrancy of the sector but its contribution to economic development as well. It is here that the part played by donors is also to be appreciated.

Funding to the sector

Soon after the negotiated transition to democracy in South Africa, there were fears that the sector was experiencing financial problems. The general assumption was that donors had decided to reroute funding to the democratic government especially after 1994. However new findings, for example, those from the International Organization Development (IOD), reveal that international development aid to South Africa has not declined. It averages between R2.3bn and R3bn, with a quarter going to the non-profit sector (*Development Update*, 2001, Vol.3. No.4: 135). Another study is that of the U.S. Foundations in South Africa, which argue that even though most official donors to civil society in South Africa rerouted their support to the democratic government, U.S. Foundations did not follow this trend. According to this study, U.S. Foundations showed no tendency to scale back their grantmaking to South Africa during the transition to, or consolidation of, democracy (Stacey and Aksartova, 2001: 390). In fact funding from these agencies increased steadily as from 1988 till today. The findings of these studies concur with the findings of *The Size and Scope of the Non profit Sector in South Africa* (2002), which shows that the non-profit sector had an estimated income of R14bn in 1998, with contributions from government (42 percent, R5.8bn), the South African private sector (21 percent, R3bn, private philanthropy and international non-governmental organisations (25 percent, R3.5bn), and service fees and other self generated income (34 percent, R4.6bn).

This section shows that the third sector in South Africa is very huge. It is a force to reckon with. What we want to point out is that this sector has existed for a long time with the support of international donor agencies. The foundations that we investigated in this paper have been active in South Africa as early as the 1980s well before they even set up offices. For all these years in South Africa, the question that we want to ask, how have they been interacting with their grantees? To what extent have they promoted their own

interests? And to what extent have they been influenced by their grantees in shaping their guidelines? These are complex questions that we do not claim we will be able to answer in full.

Who Calls the Shots?

*'He who pays the Piper, Calls the Tune?'*¹²

Generally, there is no direct answer to the question of the impact of the aid on agenda setting. First, the impact is uneven and relations are complex. According to Christa. L. Kuljian, director of Mott Foundation in South Africa,

There are cases where support by the donor for an organization can be broad, covering the general operations, general activities and the overall budget. Here there is some flexibility for the organization. In other cases support could be in the form of project funding, thus making it more targeted and thus less flexible on the part of the organization. There are also cases where the donor provides support for the organization's capacity building thus covering strategic planning, organizational development and staff development. This is usually a response to the realization that one cannot have an effective project if one does not have an effective organization.¹³

Secondly, this question pulls together priorities and programme areas. How grantees negotiate the agenda without either alienating their constituencies or losing their donors? There is overwhelming evidence which suggests NGOs are increasingly challenged by donor dependence¹⁴ and shifts in donor policies.¹⁵ However, looking at the programmes and projects that agencies such as Mott, Open Society, the Humanistic Institute for International Development (Hivos), Atlantic Philanthropies and Ford have supported in South Africa, it appears that international funding has had a significant impact on local NGOs. Yet the question that cuts across this discussion is whether these NGOs are carrying out their own agendas or the agenda of donors. How do donors decide on their priorities? Are donors influenced by their domestic concerns or they are reacting to what seem to be overriding problems in the recipient country? Does paying the piper necessarily translate into calling the tune? In other words do donors set the development agenda for NGOs because they support them?

There are mixed opinions regarding the above questions. At this stage we can only say that answers depend on the type of the NGO that is receiving support and the agency supporting it. Intermediary NGOs, like the International Fundraising Consortium, for example, would answer the questions differently from research oriented NGOs like the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), the Co-Operative for Research and Education (CORE), the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) etc. Likewise organisations with a diverse funding base would also respond differently.

Organisations with a diverse funding base in most cases find it easy to create healthy donor relations. However, according to Alicia Pieterse, director of INTERFUND, diversifying funding may cause more problems than it seeks to solve. Her words capture the argument clearly:

The most important thing that you must understand about us is where we are placed. We are very much in the middle, we have all these donors in the top and we are funding about 130 organizations some of which are NGOs and others CBOs. In all honesty you cannot begin to know how much time it takes to negotiate upwards. We are all saying we are talking about partnerships and partnerships imply equality, but then why are we not negotiating the other way; downwards and both ways because we always find ourselves in a position to satisfy donor requirements. We serve so many donors and they all have different requirements ...the following is not politically correct but it is a fact that resources are still located at the top and the cultures are different. There is still a culture of superiority plus the resources...¹⁶

However, this is not to say INTERFUND has not made any achievements, it has. And yet these achievements say nothing about agenda setting. According to Renald Morris of the Open Society Foundation in South Africa, donors assist in setting the agenda for NGOs but they do not go as far as telling them what kind of work that they should be doing. He noted:

Unfortunately, I do not have first hand information of having spoken to donors but based on a wide range of NGOs that we interact with on a daily basis, there seems to be a very strong movement by donors to set the agenda for NGOs. I think so, partly as you would know that if you talk collectively all donor funding that comes to the country amounts to less than 3 percent of the annual budget of the country. Even though it translates to hundreds of millions of Rands¹⁷, there is

not much that goes around to actually sustain these NGOs to work. So NGOs are really desperate for survival. The other thing that I think has acted negatively or forced NGOs to accept this agenda by donors is that the National Development Agency has been slow in releasing funds to NGOs. Just speaking to beneficiaries and the way we interact, and I am not saying we do not have an agenda, we have an agenda in terms of programmes, we need to support the broader mission of the organization but we will not in any way force an organization and say this is what you have to do. What we ask for is that programs need to have an evaluation component. Now if some NGOs see that as an agenda by the Foundation, then that probably could be seen as pushing our own agenda. But we are saying funding is scarce and because our funding is limited to our experience, we need to be very sure that the work we are funding has a particular impact because part of our agenda is to disseminate learning in the sector and push NGOs to be innovative in the work that they are doing.¹⁸

Mokgapi Maleka, a senior Project Officer also at Open Society Foundation concurred with Morris. He said:

I know that the organization I work for has a clear agenda, to promote democracy, – that’s the agenda. And in cases where NGOs are contracted, I would imagine they are forced to conform to that philosophy that the organization stands for. We treat NGOs as independent entities but make sure that they do not go out to do their own things, whatever we agree on they have to do it.¹⁹

And Piroshaw Camay, director of CORE, echoed the same sentiments. He argued:

Often donors come along and say we have a Civil Society Strengthening Programme or a governance program and yet those agendas have been set in Washington, London, Paris or wherever. So often-local NGOs bid for work and agree to do that work which is really the donor’s agenda, it’s definitely not the local agenda. The trick is how to implement changes so as to create a local agenda. That is really the skill.²⁰

Donors and funding guidelines: Bad tools or sources of creativity?

The above remarks indicate that donors can directly influence the

agenda priorities of the recipient organizations through their funding guidelines, mission statements and objectives. Guidelines serve to ensure responsibility and accountability for funds.²¹ However, the questions that need to be asked are whether this is a bad practice when these guidelines define and determine the agenda for recipient organisations? How do they do this? Gary Hawes of the Ford Foundation suggested an answer when he said:

I am sure that our partners are intelligent human beings and they know what some of our priorities are and they would shape proposals to meet those priorities. I do not want to sound over cynical, but it is a fact of life that NGOs and CBOs have to scramble to find funding to implement the projects and programs. So it is in their best interest to get to know what the priorities of the donor are and see how their goals might overlap with the goals of the Foundation.²²

Hawes's comments seem to agree with what Tvedt (1998) argues: that in order to access money, NGOs tend to describe the local needs in the aid language prevailing at any one point in time, as a means of maintaining organisational activities as well as for the sake of the oppressed. In the same line, Alicia Pieterse of INTERFUND commented:

I was a director of an NGO before and you learn to play the game. What I used to do was to match the needs of the community. I never used to just draft a standard proposal. I used to adjust the needs of the community to suit whichever donor's criteria. I would want to know that we have leaders who are passionate enough about local agendas but are also equipped enough to go back to the office and write a proposal in such a way that it can generate funds, because you can not do without funds. So what I am saying is that we have to report to these people in a very sophisticated way. You must understand that even here we have to be schizophrenic. We live in a third world environment but report to the first world people. So the reporting has to be in the first world standard, highly sophisticated. But when you go to the field, you surely do not want to be sophisticated but reality is, when you come back to the office and you have to present problems of that community, you have to do it in a sophisticated first world standard²³.

However the problem with funding guidelines it seems, according to Ben Fani, co-coordinator of the National Network of Community Based Organisations, that proposals are expected to be formulated in

terms of what donors are known to be prepared to fund rather than in terms of what communities themselves have determined to be their priorities (*Development Update* 2001, vol.3. no. 4, 37). However Christopher Landsberg, a lecturer in International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, had a different argument. He argued that some NGOs do not have an agenda for what they want to do.

They go to the donors to raise funds for their agenda. They do this by asking what the donor is funding that particular year. They then go back to their offices to write proposals in line with the funding guidelines of the donor.²⁴

In the context of isomorphic change formulated by Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, one can argue that the more uncertain and ambiguous the goals of these organisations, the greater the extent to which they will model themselves upon organisations that they depend on.²⁵ Whether this is a bad practice or not is the question. What is clear though is the fact that at times donors do not have to directly put pressure on the NGO or set its agenda. Landsberg has a more simple explanation. He says that “The NGO is just gullible and conforms to the donor’s agenda without any conditionality.”²⁶

This view, however, misses the opportunistic element in the search of NGOs for funding to survive, even though it is true that such organisations jump from one particular plan of action to another in order to access funding, as Abie Dithlake, director of SANGOCO, maintained. He argued:

If one moves from the point of understanding that philanthropy is generally not an innocent thing, it is based on particular interests and particular needs of the philanthropists, there is no doubt of the impact of the donor community on NGOs especially as they are very dependent on that philanthropy. This impact happens in a number of ways. First, they determine what needs to happen because donors say these are our priorities and this is what we fund. We see that many people then go to develop proposals in line with what the donors perceive to be the priorities. Second, we see NGOs jumping from one particular issue to the next, for example from gender to HIV-AIDS because that is where money happens to be at that particular time. That in itself does not reflect what the particular nation needs and what the priorities are at that point in time. This reflects largely donor driven programmes.²⁷

Dithlake's views could be matched with those of Steven Friedman of the Centre for Policy Studies, who questioned cynically the motives of some NGOs. He asked,

Why do people want to be part of civil society? What's so special about being part of civil society? Why is somebody who is part of civil society better than somebody who is not? Everybody wants to be part of civil society because donors give money to civil society.²⁸

These views show that jumping from one issue to the other could really be problematic especially if organisations end up taking projects that they have no expertise in or have very broad objectives that look fancy but unachievable. According to a 1999 CPS study, many CBOs had difficulty providing a clearly defined set of objectives and priorities. Many of their mission statements conveyed a strong commitment to values and principles such as social justice, equity, non-racialism, gender equality, human rights, democracy and freedom. These (laudable and unrealistic) aims, according to this study, were formulated to appeal and attract funders (Core/Idasa 2001: 49). This is a situation where organisations knowingly, unknowingly and-or willingly are influenced by what donors are funding in a way that is detrimental. This is a problem.

The problem

The problem with guidelines as the evidence suggests is that they might facilitate lip service by NGOs to the issues. NGOs end up doing something completely new, different from their initial vision. For Xolela Mangcu, director of the Steve Biko Foundation:

There are a lot of things that NGOs are doing that they would not do were it not for funders. If funding were not a major concern, these NGOs would be honest with themselves. There are things that have to do with issues of identity, issues of consciousness and issues of values that NGOs are not attending to. A lot of NGOs develop this isomorphic syndrome; they begin to transform themselves to chase the money.²⁹

And according Morris, NGOs end up chewing more than they can swallow.³⁰ The problem here is that if the only reason for being an organisation is to chase money and survive then there is something very wrong which needs attending to. There is obviously no

commitment and passion to the vision of the organisation and donors should be very wary about this. However, according to some donors, this appears to be something that they identify with ease. There are solutions to this problem. According to Jan Nijzink, director of the Regional Office of Hivos for Southern Africa:

It is not difficult to see through applications. We never ask NGOs to write proposals based on our priorities. It is a big mistake if NGOs think they will get money because they have read our document. That would be very opportunistic of NGOs. We look at the experience of the NGO and if it is a new NGO, we look for the experience of the donors who are funding the NGO. It is very easy to find out if an NGO is just paying lip service for example on gender.³¹

The solution

It seems therefore to us that funding guidelines can influence NGO priorities but this can be overcome through mechanisms to test the commitment of the NGO. The Ford Foundation, for example, spends quality time with its grantees. Ford Foundation staffs make site visits, evaluate what they have accomplished and at the end of the process reach a consensus on goals to be pursued.³² The Mott Foundation also has a regular process of feedback and reflection and thinking through what is needed. According to Christa Kuljian:

We have an on-going relationship with our grantees. We do not want to say we negotiated this grant, here is the money, we will see you in three years, good luck. We want to have an on-going communication and be able to learn from the experiences of our grantees.³³

Eugene Saldanha of the NPP also commented on the relationship between his organisation and its donors (Mott, Ford and Atlantic Philanthropies). He said:

It is excellent. The advantage with Mott is that we have found them not only to be a grantmaker; we have found them to be a partner. In the Income Tax lobby, Mott has attended our meetings, made suggestions at the substantive levels...Mott has contributed in a way that goes just beyond just giving us a cheque. Those are the kinds of relationships that we look forward to our funders, where they understand the work we do, support it and are simply not an organization that gives a cheque.³⁴

It seems therefore that NGOs develop their own mission, and on the basis of that mission, they develop a set of work plans. They then take these plans to international donors who then fund them on the merits of their proposals and their capacity. They do this in response to particular needs in the NGO sector and in South Africa. The NPP, for example, responds to problems related to the financial sustainability of the sector. Mott, Ford and other donors support the NPP's work on the basis of how it has delivered. This has been the primary drive for funding NPP.³⁵ The same applies to organisations like CPS, INTERFUND, CSVN and many others. It seems very true that both donors and NGOs respond to problems and issues on the ground. There is a coming together of minds. Alice Brown (Director, Ford Foundation) captured this when she said:

An example would be HIV-AIDS. Everyone realizes that it is a problem facing South Africa. Donors, NGOs, CBOs and individuals realize this. There will be some groups, be they CBO or NGO who would respond to the problem by developing different programmes on HIV-AIDS and in turn because I am a donor who wants to be responsive to real issues and problems on the ground, I am going to be receptive to requests that are targeted at dealing with the pandemic. So it's not a matter of me as a donor setting the agenda, I do not think the donor should set the agenda. And for that matter I do not think the NGO can set an agenda in a vacuum. The issues set the agenda and the problems facing the communities in which we work (donors, NGOs and CBOs) and that is what we all need to be responding to.³⁶

What we can say at this moment is that it seems that the development agenda in South Africa's non-profit sector is set by the context. Donors and grantees have been responding to needs of the communities that they serve. However in doing this, NGOs should be evolutionary. For instance, during the apartheid period, it was important and it made sense for public interest law centres to fight apartheid laws and focus their attention on promoting and protecting civil and political rights. In 2003, this is no longer pertinent; most people have civil and political rights. What people lack are social and economic rights. It thus makes sense for public interest law centres which previously fought pass laws, lobbied for freedom of expression, association etc, to shift their work and deal with issues of housing, access to clean water and towards realising that social

and economic rights are guaranteed under the new constitution. This is an example where groups are not corrupting their mandate but are responding and adapting to contextual needs. We observe that there is overwhelming evidence which suggests that it is not always true that paying the piper means calling the tune. From our study, this happens in very rare and extreme cases. One of these cases, according to Abie Dithlake is when

Ruthless donors, who in the event that that they failed to achieve what they wanted through their activities begin to have a direct and political role in coercing and determining who should be the people and leaders of the particular organization before they could fund it.³⁷

Another case is where the grantee does not have a diversified funding base. Alice Brown (a donor) alluded to this when she said

We do not want a grantee to be solely dependent on us; it is not a healthy relationship. It is not healthy for any recipient to be solely dependent on one source of funding...Some organizations have done well in diversifying their funding bases and therefore will not be so completely or totally be subject to the whims or will of one or two donors. That is the best position to be in.³⁸

While we have maintained that donors are not setting the agenda for the their grantees, we have also observed that it is very easy for smaller organisations to succumb to the demands of a donor if their funding base is not diversified. This can be said to be a creation of donors. Donors tend to have a weakness for funding bigger and more professional organisations that have a good track record at the expense of smaller grassroots based organisations. As a result of this, smaller grassroots organisations have no leverage to resist the demands of the donor. Resisting the demands may translate into losing the grant. This is a serious weakness and it is very common among donor foundations.

A common weakness

Most of the donor organisations that we looked at share a common weakness. They tended to fund larger, professional, and urban organisations with a proven track record. One donor said:

I think that one area of weakness with quite a few international donor agencies is that we tend to fund larger, more established NGOs that happen to be in big cities in Gauteng, Natal, Western Cape and Braamfontein.³⁹

This has also been echoed at the grassroots level. Ben Fani, commenting on the state of community based organisations, argued in 1998 that changes in donor practice favoured larger, sophisticated and urban non-governmental bodies at the expense of smaller, grass-roots organisations, which are no longer able to meet the more rigorous criteria and reporting requirements of Northern donors.⁴⁰ The book *Funding Virtue: Civil Society and Democracy Promotion* also discusses this issue. Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers observe that donors end up concentrating on a very narrow set of organisations. These are the professionalised urban NGOs that focus mainly on issues directly related to democratisation. Marina Ottaway argues that the organisations that this aid targets are creations of donor funding rather than of social demands for representation. This has resulted in many of these organisations tending to resemble each other in the leadership, programmes and ideological outlook. They tend to be much closer to the donors' preferences than to the needs of the supposed constituencies. Bluntly put by Christopher Landsberg:

At times donors tend to have a buddy-buddy relationship with particular NGOs. They know the individual who can write the best proposal that suits their demands but not the needs and the critical nature of the work and simply give support on that basis.⁴¹

This view obviously misses the contractual nature of relationships and the fact that outcomes are measurable. But supposing such relationships exist, the question would be; why is this? Who should carry the blame? Xolela Mangcu has one answer. He argues:

You cannot blame donors when NGO leaders have no guts to stand up for their own ideas. Do donors seem to influence local organizations? Of course they do, but the extent to which they influence depends on the quality of leadership of the organization.⁴²

Mangcu's views seem to discard the notion that NGOs are vulnerable to a donor-driven agenda. While we agree that this is

true of organisations with quality leadership, we are nevertheless not very convinced about the extent to which this can be advanced by smaller CBOs and other NGOs that do work that does not fall into the priorities of many donors. Research organisations, for example, seem to us to be very vulnerable to a donor driven agenda. Steven Friedman, director of CPS, a research organisation, for instance, explained that while CPS stood and fell by its independence, it faced difficulties in accessing funding to carry through its own research agenda. He said:

We try to develop our own research agenda. However we must be honest, most of the time a lot of what we are doing is not our research agenda, it is the donor's research agenda. But that does not mean we are total slaves. We try within that to do as much our own research agenda as we can. Sometimes we succeed in persuading the donor that our research agenda is worth funding... There is no way that I can look you in the eye and say that we have entirely our own agenda and we do not do what the donors want us to do. No research organization would look you in the eye and tell you that. It won't be telling you the truth. It is not possible to survive even for one day if you take that attitude. If you are asking me, are we simply slaves of the donors? Then I would get angry because we do get lucky and manage to persuade our donors that what we want to do is what they want to fund. Secondly we do not just take it at face value. We discuss and negotiate. We would not do the work, which we think is totally out of our experience and research interest.⁴³

While it is clear that there are challenges that the sector is facing, it is also true that there are mechanisms to meet these challenges.

Meeting challenges

It is very clear from Friedman's comments that research organisations, for example, can develop their agenda but it is more difficult for them to follow through their entire agenda even if good leadership is present. Donors will have something that they want researched. This is not true of CPS only. It is also true of CSV, CORE and other research organisations as well. Mott's support, for example, for CSV's *Transition and Reconciliation Unit* was to ensure the continuation of the process of transition and reconciliation in South

Africa. Ford's support to the same organisations also has its own objectives. To CSVR, the Ford Foundation's objective was to evaluate the *Truth and Reconciliation Program* and the *Gender Project*. And to also examine the patterns, causes and prevention of violence. To meet these challenges, however, these organisations have put in place systematic plans to attain sustainability over a period of time. For instance, they have developed marketing strategies for their publications to generate income, and perhaps more successfully, have developed consultancy units that charge for services.

Conclusion

In this paper, we looked at the extent to which donors impact on the development agenda of civil society organisations in South Africa. While this study is not a universal sample, its findings, nevertheless, may apply to other donors and NGOs as well that are not covered here. Based on the organisations that we looked at, there is evidence that suggests that the relationship between donors and NGOs is complex. It is true that most NGOs are dependent on donors. However the extent to which this dependence helps donors exert their leverage on NGOs in the prioritisation of programs is problematically debatable. What is clear though, is that dependence on external donor funding can shape the NGO's agenda in ways determined by broad donor priorities. However, NGOs are able to negotiate their agenda within the broad parameters of the guidelines. And this is not to say there are no challenges that NGOs and donors encounter in their relationship. The position that International Fundraising Consortium (INTERFUND) occupies, as discussed earlier, presents an example of challenges that other intermediary organisations could face in South Africa. INTERFUND finds itself having to satisfy many donor demands and yet still be accountable to the community-based organisations that it supports. A balance has to be struck between donors and grantees. Problems on the ground must inform policy as well as set donor and NGO priorities. As Alice Brown put it, the agenda must be set not by the donor or the NGO, but by the context. We conclude therefore by stating that while there are many challenges that NGOs face in South Africa, they have not sacrificed themselves to donors. They have achieved

this by diversifying their funding bases. However what this paper did not explore, which might be worth doing, is the impact that internal funding may have on the same NGOs if suddenly they were to get support from domestic sources like the National Development Agency. We recommend further research on this because we believe that there is more internal funding to the sector as shown by *The Size and Scope of the Non Profit Sector in South Africa*. And this makes us rethink the arguments that have been developed about the sector's vulnerability to international donors and their agendas. We also want to make a note that our study did not look at the impact funding has on grassroots organisations in its analysis. We recommend a further study on these. We believe relations with their grantors may be different from the ones that we looked at, that tended to be bigger and located in urban areas.

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Notes

1. We use the word donor to refer to foundations that are supporting civil society organizations in South Africa. This support can be financial or technical. The word donor is not used in this paper to refer to an individual or individuals.

2. For the emergence and role of NGOs in general, see Brown and Korten (1991), Tvedt (1998), Jorgensen (1996), Farrington & Bebbington (1993), Hadenius (1996), Naidoo (1997), Hulme & Edwards (1996). Korten (1991), Blair (1997), Van Rooy (1998) among others.
3. A lot of literature on NGOs in South Africa testifies to this fact and most of my respondents concurred with this observation.
4. Steven Burkeman argues that donor-recipient relations are inherently unhealthy because they reflect unequal power relations (Burkeman 2001:152).
5. Private foundations that we referred to in this study are mainly American. These are The Open Society for South Africa, The Ford Foundation and The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation. In addition, we use European foundations such as The Humanistic Institute for International Development (HIVOS) and The Atlantic Philanthropies. Among the development organisations most of whom are grantees of the above foundations, we use: The Steve Biko Foundation, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Centre for Policy Studies, The International Fundraising Consortium, The Group for Environmental Monitoring, The South Africa NGO Coalition, The Cooperative for Research and Education, The Non Profit Partnership, The Southern Grant Makers Association and Mvula Trust.
6. See for example the list of demands that women made to be incorporated into the Freedom Charter in 'What Women Want', www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/women/demand.html.
7. Andre Gunder Frank (1967) discusses this in *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*, and also in *Neo-Colonialism in West Africa* (1973), probably influenced by the works of Walter Rodney (1972), *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*.
8. See for example the discussion by Hollis Chenery and Allan Strout (1966), *Foreign Assistance and Economic Development*.
9. This seems to agree well with the new book by Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalisation and Its Discontents*, which looks critically at the misguided policies of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank towards developing countries.
10. See also a study by Howard White (1992), *The Macroeconomic Impact of Development Aid: A Critical Survey*, Paul Mosley (1995) *Aid Effectiveness*, and Peter Boone (1994) *The Impact of Foreign Aid on Savings and Growth*.
11. This definition was agreed upon after conflicting ideas by South African researchers, academics and practitioners on the definition offered by The CIVICUS Index Project, which had defined civil society as: the

- sphere of institutions, organizations, networks and individuals (and their values) located between the confines of the family, the state and the market, which is bound by a set of shared civic rules, and in which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests (Core/Idasa 2001: 3).
12. Hulme and Edwards also used this to refer to pressures for co-optation of recipient organisations by donors.
 13. Interview with Christa. L. Kuljian (Braamfontein), 5 March 2002.
 14. David Hulme and Michael Edwards (1996) discuss the effects of dependency in detail in *NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort...* They say that although the evidence is inconclusive, there are signs that greater dependence on funding may compromise NGO/GRO performance in key areas and distort accountability and weaken legitimacy.
 15. This discussion about the impact of international funding should also be understood in the context of South Africa's transition to democracy and the route donors took. First, we must remember that after 1994, most donors rerouted support to fund the democratic government directly. Thus NGOs were hard hit by diminishing budgets. Second, there was an exodus of people from the NGO sector to government departments. The sector therefore was affected by both human resource as well as the financial constraints. Hence according to Chetty (2000) this diminution in the pool of donor funding and rechanneling to government has forced many CSOs to bow to the pressures of funder demands. Thus the agenda and plans of institutions becomes funder driven. For a detailed history of international funding to South Africa, Christopher Landsberg and Michael Bratton are worth reading in *Good Intentions...*, pp259-314.
 16. Interview with Alicia Pieterse (Braamfontein), 8 March 2002. Beni Fani also alludes to this issue. He says 'donors own and control these resources... Sometimes, a donor's agreement to make funds available has strings attached, some obvious, some hidden'. *Development Update*, Vol. 2. No. 1. 1998.
 17. The Rand is the South African currency.
 18. Interview with Renald Morris (Braamfontein), 4 March 2002.
 19. Interview with Mogkapi Maleka (Braamfontein), 22 February 2002.
 20. Interview with Phiroshaw Camay (Johannesburg), 7 March 2002.
 21. Interview with Zakes Hlathswayo (Braamfontein), President of SANGOCO, 8 April 2002.
 22. Interview with Gary Hawes (Braamfontein), 13 March 2002.
 23. Interview with Alicia Pieterse op cit.

24. Interview with Christopher Landsberg (Witwatersrand University), 6 March 2002.
25. Terje Tvedt argues that donor money and donor policies shape organisational landscapes in other countries and this creates the dilemma between organisations' external dependency and their roots in society (p.5).
26. Interview with Chris Landsberg, op cit.
27. Interview with Abie Dithlake (Braamfontein), 23 April 2002.
28. Interview with Steven Friedman (Doornfontein), 12 February 2002.
29. Interview with Dr. Xolela Mangcu (Braamfontein), 4 March 2002.
30. Interview with R.Morris, op cit.
31. Interview with Jan Nijzink (Harare, Zimbabwe) 27 May 2002.
32. Interview with Gary Hawes and Alice Brown (Braamfontein), 13 March 2002.
33. Interview with Kuljian, op cit.
34. Interview with Saldanha, op cit.
35. Interview with Saldanha, op cit.
36. Interview with Alice Brown (Braamfontein), 13 March 2002.
37. Interview with Dithlake, op cit.
38. Interview with Brown, op cit.
39. Interview with Kuljian, op cit.
40. See the article 'Sacrificed to the donor gods: community-based organizations' struggle for survival', *Development Update* Vol. 2. No. 1. 1998 pp37-40.
41. Interview with Landsberg, op cit.
42. Interview with Mangcu, op cit.
43. Interview with Friedman, op cit.

From OAU to AU: New Wine in Old Bottles?

*Armstrong M. Adejo**

If we are to remain free, if we are to enjoy the full benefits of Africa's rich resources, we must unite to plan our total defence and the full expectation of our national and human means, in the full interest of all our people. To go it alone will limit our horizons, curtail our expectations and thereafter our liberty. – Kwame Nkrumah.

Introduction

The coming to fruition of the African Union at the seminal assembly of African states, held in July 2002 in South Africa, 'closed the shop' on the Organization of African Unity which had been in existence since May 1963. Incidentally, this momentous development came a little over a century since the first ever Pan-African Conference was held in London. This development has generated much excitement among African analysts, albeit with some cautious predispositions regarding the future of the new Union. These reservations derive from the problem of who controls the development agenda of African states, which has been a matter for concern over the decades. At independence, nearly all the states of Africa and their leaders were in no position to undertake meaningful progress because they were too engrossed in the struggle for survival and the need to cope with the many problems threatening their countries and their power.

However, against the realities of the international division of labour many leaders of African states were quite aware that on their own individual countries would not make any reasonable economic headway in a world that discriminates overtly against them. Consequently, since 1960 many attempts have been made to channel African aspirations towards a greater political unity based on a programme of freedom, equity, and justice. Against many

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odds, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) emerged with high hopes of tackling Africa's problems. The search for progress in a competitive, progressive world indicated clearly to some African leaders that the course of the OAU would be tortuous and the search for development strategies would multiply. Thereafter, the continent was subjected to waves of regional integration initiatives. Bearing in mind the challenges of globalisation, the conviction on the part of several analysts was that the only choice for Africa's salvation lay in continental union. The emergence of the African Union thus came out of a litany of initiatives dating over decades. It is this struggle that is the subject of this paper. The paper discusses four major areas as related to the roots of the African Union: a brief theoretical framework which looks at the lure of regionalism; the emergence of OAU itself, the road to the African Union; and the challenges ahead.

The Lure of Regionalism: A Theoretical Perspective

At independence, the economies of African states were structurally disarticulated because they had been developed as aggregations of enclaves, each linked to the metropolitan economy but not necessarily to one another. As Claude Ake noted, even though individual states of Africa seemed content to surrender their development agenda to external development agencies, they still groped collectively towards a vision of how to proceed.¹ It was contended that such collaborative efforts would serve as building blocks of a future African Economic Community or African Union. Consequently, the lure of regionalism has had a profound effect on the foreign policies of African states.

However, much confusion often arises as to the application of the terms 'regionalism' or 'sub-regionalism' in describing integration efforts in Africa. Many of the attempts are informed by the experiences of North America and Europe. But the argument could be put that many regional cooperation efforts were 'home grown', an organic development within specific historic, political, economic, regional and global contexts.² The arguments advanced by the political elites in favour of regional cooperation, as Anthoni van Nieuwkerk writes, were simple and elegant. First, regional efforts would strengthen the capacity of countries to manage

relations with powerful external actors and could facilitate the expansion of markets that would aid industrialisation. Second, faith in regional cooperation was strengthened by the post-Cold War academic 'discovery' of a new form of regionalism comprising a multidimensional form of integration that included economic, political, social, and cultural aspects.³ The first argument favoured the emergence of the OAU since the states of Africa were not committed to any formal regionalism which would be the outcome of state policies involving the transfer of national state powers to a supra-natural body or a hegemonic state. This cautious disposition resulted in half measures even with regard to the regional and sub-regional groupings which emerged. Consequently, the impact of inter-state relations remained important but instead of integration, the experience in inter-governmental cooperation seemed more successful, arising from the desire to coordinate sectoral policies.

Thus, the first generation of African integration arrangements focused principally on trade promotion through trade liberalisation schemes based on the creation of free trade areas. This strategy, as the Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo has revealed, was to overcome three fundamental development constraints characteristic of African economies: namely the relative small-sized economies, the lack of structural complementarity as manifested in the narrow set of similar low-value goods, and the dependence on import of intermediate and capital goods.⁴ A plethora of regional integration institution which came into existence included:

- The Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC 1964), later the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC).
- The East African Community (EAC 1967-1977), now the East African Cooperation.
- The West African Economic Community (CEACO, 1972).
- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS, 1975).
- The West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA, 1990).
- The Preferential Trade Area (PTA 1980) now the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA, 1999).

- The Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC, 1980) now Southern African Development Community (SADC 1992).
- The Union of Maghreb Arab States (UMA, 1988).⁵

It is significant to indicate that in spite of the proliferation of regional integration institution on the African continent over the decades, a dispassionate assessment of the impact of Africa's efforts at regional economic cooperation and integration between the 1960s and 1990s suggests that the expected benefits have eluded the continent. It is not difficult to establish the reasons for these unprofitable results. At independence, it was assumed that the international order would significantly help to alter the African condition. African leaders put great efforts into development through internationalism, thinking perhaps that this would be a useful way of getting resources from the West while diversifying their dependence enough to find some space for manoeuvre. This approach was tested in the demand for a new world order, which accomplished nothing – if anything it increased the frustration of the impoverished nation-states of Africa.

As has already been pointed out, African states were structurally disarticulated, each linked to the metropolitan economy but not necessarily to one another. At such a critical conjuncture, the dependence development approach was a politically driven decision and with the dearth of native economists and planners, there was a reliance on expatriates which in turn caused and reproduced neo-colonial notions of development. However, complacency of the political leaders in relying on a foreign developmental paradigm came under pressure. The need to develop endogenous plans led to what Claude Ake usually refers to as the emerging of a 'confusing agenda'.⁷ But as Ake himself was quick to observe, although individual African states seemed content to surrender their development agenda to external development agencies, they did grope collectively towards a vision of how to proceed, especially with the establishment of the OAU.

One such vision was the Lagos Plan of Action which was the implementation of the Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa (adopted in July 1979). The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) was the most comprehensive and systematic statement

of the vision of Africa's leaders on the development of the continent. It stemmed from the effect of unfulfilled promises of global development strategies which had been felt more sharply in Africa than elsewhere. To the irritation of Africa's foreign patrons, the LPA agreed that Africa's economic problems were partly caused by Africa's dependence and opening to exploitation, hence the necessity for self reliance. The Bretton Woods institutions and the West would not accept the approach of the Lagos Plan, although they refrained from opposing it openly. Unfortunately, African leaders began to retreat, discovering that they were too weak and too dependent, and so they began to reform their economy along the lines suggested by the Bretton Woods institutions. Most significant was the adoption of the devastating SAP. For progressive action, one could posit this devastation, on a scale that African states historically faced, had its usefulness. This is because marginalisation, often decried, is what Africa radically needs for it to evolve an endogenous development agenda. It is on these grounds that the development of relatively cohesive and integrated regional groupings has concerned some writers whose focus has been upon the maintenance of world order and stability.

During the 1960s and in the wake of what appeared to be widespread enthusiasm for developing regional groups and schemes to promote economic integration, regions in international politics began to be comprehensively defined. Some viewed regionalism as 'a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual independence'.⁹ This must not be taken exclusively as the dominant paradigm for regionalism, because it required not only geographical proximity and increased economic interdependence for its promotion but other factors that are significant in underpinning potential development of regional problem-solving processes. These include historical experience, power and wealth distribution within and outside the grouping, social and ethnic tradition and ideological or political preferences.¹⁰

Regionalism, according to Hurrell, can be broken up into specific or concrete types to identify important variations in the concept, and such variations could be explained according to the level of growth in socio-economic interdependence; according to the extent to which shared values and cultural traditions persist; according to

the extent to which formal institutional arrangements are sought; and the extent to which a regional grouping displays a cohesive identity and external presence.¹¹ Some may be solely concerned with maximising economic welfare and gains from international trade and investment, while others are concerned with defence and security or the protection of social and cultural traditions. Regionalism is thus conceived as a body of goals laid down for the regional project. It is the body of visions, values, and concrete objectives that supervise the processes of the interaction between state and market aimed at providing and maintaining national and regional security in a broad sense. In this conception geography is not by necessarily an objective criterion. It is, according to Morten Boas, a social construct.¹²

It is also important to point out that the intellectual construct with which the conception of regionalism has been theoretically associated is classical functionalism, which is in contrast to the idea of world federation. Functionalism, of which regional cooperation agreements bear the trade mark, is directed at building 'peace by pieces' through transnational organisations which emphasise the 'sharing of sovereignty' instead of its surrender, and an evolutionary strategy for building cooperative ties among states.¹³ Kegley and Wittkopt state that the functionalist plan recommends that less difficult tasks be tackled first, assuming in the main that the successful mastering of one problem will encourage the tackling of other problems collaboratively.¹⁴ Consequently, if the process continues unabated, the bonds among countries will multiply since no government would oppose the web of functional organisations that provides such clear-cut benefits to its citizens.

By the middle of the 20th century, the functionalists' theory began to be attacked as analysts contended that functionalism was an idea whose time had passed. In its place emerged neo-functionalism which sought to address directly the political factors that obtrusively dominate the process of merging formerly independent states.¹⁵ Arising from this, the concept of integration is rather more difficult to define. It can be understood as a condition or as a process; as a description of a system with its elements already in existence, or as an explanation of how a political system is sustained and developed in a particular direction. A useful view, as posited by Baylis and Smith, sees integration:

As the creation and maintenance of intense and diversified patterns of interaction among previously autonomous limits. These patterns may be partly economic, social, and political in character.¹⁶

Integration could be a kind of formal process which involves conscious political decision, a process designed to deepen interrelatedness and exchanges between a group of countries by way of economic integration or political integration, which can involve not merely the formation of institutional mechanism and decision-making procedures but also the development of shared values and expectations, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and socio-political cohesiveness. Integration could also be in the form of informal processes involving economic, social, and cultural flows.

The study of regionalism and integration lies in the problem of how conflict can be avoided, and how cooperation and stability can be maintained. The development of regional cooperation and structures is often explained as a utilitarian and state-driven process enabling states to reconcile competing demands in the face of global political and economic challenges. However, neo-realist-neo-liberal debate in international relations, as Baylis and Smith posit, is divided on whether regional cooperation and grouping are effective and reliable instruments to maintain order and peace.¹⁷ This debate, as the authors note, encourages analysts to think about important characteristics of cooperation such as reciprocity, i.e. the expectation of mutually regarding behaviour and the distribution of gains from cooperation. For instance, countries in Latin America have consistently pursued forms of regional economic integration since 1950. South America is also characterised by a number of regional integration schemes and cooperation between the richer developing countries. In any case, this enthusiastic process has had patchy success as political difficulties associated with different government philosophies, territorial disputes and infrastructural weakness have combined to dilute the progress made.

In South East Asia, political and economic cooperation within the Association of South East Asian nations (ASEAN) since 1967 has made for invaluable cooperation. Since 1992, there have been progressive efforts toward regional economic integration with an agreement to develop an ASEAN Free Trade Area and the

establishment of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation as a wider forum. Significant economic differences do characterise the region's economy but it is also an important factor in the future development of intra-regional cooperation.

The European regional integration approach has been more fundamental and has influenced almost all regional experiences. During the post-1945 period Western Europe gradually constituted itself as a highly integrated and cohesive grouping of economies and peoples. It should be stated, however, that the historical and political changes that shaped and continue to shape European experience may not exist in other regional groupings. Consequently, it will be inappropriate to readily transpose the European expectations to the study of other regional groupings. The African experience readily comes to mind in this regard. Most African states have continued to confront colonial legacies of arbitrary territorial boundaries, weak and inefficient state structures, profound social and cultural cleavages and protracted conflicts.

In all the regional integration efforts, the central influence of the state has remained decisive. Some analysts contend that global changes call into question the usefulness of the nation-state itself because it does not seem to be losing control and integrity. Its overbearing force and the emotion that surrounds national matters of security, economic and political development, hinder effective cooperation. As the argument holds, the nation state appears to be the wrong sort of unit to handle the new circumstances of global change. In this respect, neo-realist theory helps to explain why the proposals for international cooperation and change often seem dim. Inter-governmental organisations are products of the interest of the nation-state and in their operation, fear is endemic to the system as long as states wish to survive, being wary of the threat posed by others. The states are sensitive to their relative position in the distribution of power, and to the uncertainty about each others' future intentions.

Consequently, the argument is that when the states dominate international organisations, like the OAU, the prospects for international cooperation decline because states typically resist any actions that could compromise their own interests. However, neo-liberal theorising holds to the perspective which maintains that

cooperation among states, even powerful ones, is possible and that international organisations can help produce it. One example is the European Union, which combines two important features: a 'supra-national entity' and a 'pooled sovereignty'. The EU has the power to make some decisions binding on its members without being subject to their individual approval, which in a sense qualifies it as a supra-national entity because it goes beyond the state, mirroring the vision of its founding fathers. Secondly, the EU, although it incorporates some supra-national elements, constitutes a pooled sovereignty because states remain paramount in its institutional structures and decision-making procedures. Sovereignty is shared in this process.

In the African situation, it would not be inappropriate to argue that the study of regional organisations should put behind it the blueprints based on the European experience and commence probing into new unknown ground. Accordingly, Morten Boas states that

we will have to set aside the universalistic approach to regionalization and accept that regional organization is not developed within the framework of just one rationality, but in several localized rationalities.¹⁸

The OAU and Africa's Development

Pan-Africanism has a rich history dating back to the 18th century, coming from the new world rather than Africa itself. Prince Hall, a black cleric in Boston, campaigned unsuccessfully in 1787 for help from the state Assembly in returning poor blacks to Africa. He was followed by Bishop McNeil Turner who established the American colonialism society.

However, it was the naked scramble for Africa, after the 1884 Congress in Berlin, that gave new urgency to the Pan-African response. In 1886, George Charles, President of the African Emigration Association, declared to the United States Congress that his organisation planned to establish a United States of Africa. Consequently, Pan-Africanists convened their own Congress in Chicago in 1893. In 1900, the first Pan-African Conference was convened in London by Henry Sylvester Williams, a lawyer from Trinidad. In the first half of the 20th century, the twin giants of Pan-

African Movement were Marcus Garvey and W.E.D. Dubois. Dubois organised another Pan-African Congress in Paris in 1919 to coincide with the Versailles Peace Conference, hoping to persuade the world leaders that the principle of self-determination should be applied to Africa as well.¹⁹

In the 1920s Dubois organised three more Pan-African Congresses, but the main impetus of Pan-Africanism by the 1930s in America was cultural. In 1945, the fifth Pan-African Congress was held under Dubois. The most fundamental change at that time was that the torch of Pan-Africanism had in reality passed on to new generation of Pan-Africanists from the continent of Africa itself – to men like Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta. Nkrumah became the voice and organising force of Pan-Africanism. In the 1940s and 1950s he promoted the idea of an independent West African federation, as first step towards a United States of Africa.

When Kwame Nkrumah led Ghana to independence in 1957, he inspired Africans resisting colonialism and seeking freedom all over the continent. His firm conviction was that national independence was not enough and he spent much of his energy pursuing the possibility of a united Africa. In April 1958, he organised the first Conference of Independent African States – attended by Ethiopia, Egypt, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Sudan. The Conference declared a policy of non-alignment in world affairs and decided to coordinate African policies on international political questions.

The second conference of independent African States was attended by 13 countries and they included the Provisional Government of Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan Tunisia, UAR, and Cameroon. Participants expressed deep-seated ideological differences regarding the form African Unity was to take.²⁰ However, despite the basic disagreements and numerous inter-state squabbles, independent African states maintained a façade of unity until the last half of 1960 when a number of unrelated events led to the formation of competing political alliances. Some of the most important developments included Nigeria's attainment of independence, which challenged Ghana's claim to leadership; Morocco's quarrel with Tunisia over Mauritania's right to exist as a separate sovereignty state; the accession of thirteen francophone

African states to independence and their being accused of failing to oppose France's policy on Algeria and sending African troops to combat FLN in Algeria, support for western policies, the signing of defence pacts with France and their opposition to Patrice Lumumba in the Congo.²¹ The most fundamental development which widened the emerging rift among African states was the Congo problem and the rise of competing alliances.

In October 1960 in Abidjan, Ivory Coast a number of Francophone African states held a conference (although Guinea, Togo, and Mali were absent). The conference tried to formulate direct negotiation between Algeria and France and recognised the right of Mauritania to full independence. In 1961 they established the Africa and Malagasy Union (UAM).

The formation of the UAM led to the establishment of a radical alliance at Casablanca in January 1961 where Ghana, Guinea and Mali sought to escape isolation in the face of the moderate alliance of Francophone states. It held a conference, supported Patrice Lumumba, and enunciated its radical proposals for African unity in a 'Casablanca Charter'.²² As a countervailing force the moderate alliance was enlarged at a meeting held in Monrovia in May 1961. It now included Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, and 12 UAM members. By the time of the summit Conference in Addis Ababa in 1963, where the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was created, the Casablanca Group had become relatively weak, while the moderates were clearly in the majority to push their agenda. A preparatory Conference of African Foreign states held on May 15-23 was charged with the formulation of plans for the establishment of the OAU. A Committee constituted for this purpose studied a variety of proposals including the Casablanca Charter, the Lagos Charter, Nkrumah's plan and a draft charter prepared by the Ethiopian government, the host country. The Committee encountered great difficulty in effecting a compromise because the Casablanca charter reflected the ideal of political union while the Monrovia group advocated a more conservative policy.

While Nkrumah could obtain support for his radical position from the Casablanca Group, there was strong opposition to the idea of an African Union from the Monrovia group, which included the Francophone bloc. This group, led by imperialist propaganda,

insinuated that the radical Casablanca group was communist-inspired. Unfortunately, the fear of opposition in various African countries had helped the capitalists to play up the crises of subversion as the instruments of the radical group. The division placed serious obstacles on the path of African cooperation. However, the heads of African states were determined to approve a charter, which became a compromise charter signed on May 25, 1963. At this time hard-core radical states were Algeria, Ghana, Mali, and UAR. Thereafter, it was clear that the composition of the ideological bloc was not stable and some of them managed to maintain two foreign policy positions simultaneously.

Interestingly, the purposes and objectives of the OAU, as stated in Article 11 of the Charter, included the following:

- To promote the unity and solidarity of the African states;
- To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve better life for the people of Africa;
- To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;
- To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa and to promote international cooperation, having due regards to the Charter of the UNO and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

To this end, the member states agreed to coordinate and harmonise their general policies especially in the following fields: political and diplomatic cooperation, economic cooperation including transport and communication, health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation; scientific and technological cooperation, and defence and security cooperation. Among the cardinal principles of the OAU, an aspect which has allowed for uncomplimentary remarks on the OAU in the last four decades, were the issues of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states (which is most un-African) and the inherited colonial borders remaining sacrosanct.

In the OAU, as analysts observe, several groups of states sharing similar values on a wide range of issues interacted with one another along the lines of a classical multipolar balance-of-power type of international system. Equally, the organisation could be likened to the post-Napoleonic concert of Europe in some respects as it worked for the preservation of existing political systems and borders in Africa

either by direct action or inaction. At independence the leaders were in no position to undertake serious development initiatives because they were too engrossed in the struggle for survival and the need to cope with the many problems threatening their countries and their power.

The OAU became a painfully ineffectual regional body, too often presided over by dictators who made a mockery of its Charter's concern for human rights and social justice. National leaders stoutly defended the colonial borders they had inherited and, as Chris Brazier puts it, 'there was a fear if these borders were dissolved, all hell might let loose'.²³ As individual nation-states within artificial borders they could too easily be played off against each other by the imperialists in a post-colonial version of divide and rule.²⁴ That was exactly what unfolded and the idea of a united Africa then became progressively consigned to the past with the notion of Pan-Africanism anathema to some leaders. Sustaining the OAU, even on the basis of the regular budget, became very difficult. Problems plaguing the OAU included:

- The secessionist wars like the Biafran episode;
- The fascist rule of dictators like Idi Amin;
- The Rwanda problem where millions of people died;
- The Burundi periodic killings since 1988;
- The internecine civil wars in Angola, Chad, Sudan;
- The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea;
- The disintegration in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia;
- Morocco's unending hold on western Sahara;
- The scourge of HIV/Aids;
- The poverty and debt burden;
- The Nigeria-Cameroon palaver over Bakassi.

The political, economic and social environment in which African states found themselves since 1960 has not altered much in a favourable way and Africa's current problems seem to resist every attempt at resolution.

The frustration of African leaders in the OAU was clearly recognised in the need for progress in Cairo Declaration at the 29th Summit of Heads of State and Government of OAU in Cairo which states, among other things, that:

Despite the fundamental changes that have taken place in the post independence era and more particularly since the end of the Cold War, there is still the need for establishing a close link between development, democracy, security and stability in the years ahead as the most ideal formula for fulfilling the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Africa to a decent life, progress and social justice. This formula will enable us to solve gradually the acute socio-economic and political problems facing the African continent. It will also serve as a proper framework for the preservation of the diverse nature of our nations and societies and further enhancement of the fraternal ties that exist between our states.²⁵

These words sounded no different from innumerable similar declarations of intent emitting from the OAU in the past.

The Emergence of the African Union and the Challenges facing it

Novelty, they say, has its attractions and, as Cameroon Duodu sarcastically observes, in *News-Africa* of July 29, 2002, ‘who would blame an organization with a record of poor performance if it wishes to take a leaf out of the book of a corporate boardroom and “rebrand” itself?’ Kwame Nkrumah had set the stage a long time ago but the other African actors were acting out other scripts which they could not discard. Nkrumah had been clear in his own mind:

We can’t afford to place our needs, our development, our security, to the gait of camels and donkeys. We cannot afford not to cut down the overgrown bush of outmoded attitudes that obstructs our path to the modern open road of the widest and earlier achievement of economic independence and the raising up of the lives of our people to the highest level.²⁶

The flame of unity and freedom lit in the sixties has continued to glow, though dimly, to illuminate the path of the transition from the OAU to the African Union (AU). The AU is not a child of an impetuous inspiration but the offspring of a gradual but dedicated progression towards ideals and commitments. The continent has remained in dire need of solutions to its critical problems and it is this very condition that propels the need for change and progress. When, in the 1990s, the

notion of a Pan-African Union was born again, it was the liberation of South Africa from apartheid that helped it back to life. Equally, there is the argument that the main influence propelling Africans towards greater economic and political unity is globalisation. Faced with a trading system which insists on transnational capital having *carte blanche*, Africans became increasingly aware that they would have to stand together if they were to defend or advance their own cause. But even as they favoured unity in principle, they could not necessarily agree on how closely united they should be and what forms their unity should take.

Several years ago the OAU Summit had set up a 14-member committee to review its charter. By 1996 when the Yaounde Declaration was issued, the Charter Review Committee had held six sessions and had submitted, on an annual basis, reports to the OAU summit. As Jackie Cilliers notes, not dissimilar to the impasse within which the UN finds itself, the review of the OAU Charter remained the captive of the competing national interests of a number of member states.²⁷ However, for a number of important countries, such as South Africa, the initiative towards the establishment of the AU provided a way out of this impasse.

A major problem, indicative of the ideological divide of the 1960s, was the vision of a single federal African states that inspired leaders like Moammar Gaddafi, a vision which many of the states did not share but which they were hesitant of criticizing. The Libyan initiative, it was interpreted, was intended to enable the North African leader to break out of the prolonged diplomatic isolation brought about by its poor relations with the US, the UK and some of the Arab States. Notwithstanding the misgivings, the declaration adopted by the 4th Extra-ordinary Summit of the OAU held in Sirte, Libya, in September 1999 set the fast track to the Constitutive Act of the AU that emerged. In July 2000, African Heads of state met in Lomé, Togo for the 36th Ordinary Summit of the OAU. At the end of that Summit they came out with a Draft Treaty for an African Union which would replace the OAU. Incidentally, that came a hundred years after the first-ever Pan-African Conference was held in London.

The OAU Lusaka Summit meeting of July 2001 mandated the Secretary-General to proceed, in consultation with member states,

with a process to work out the rules of procedure to launch the key structures within the AU; such as the Assembly of heads of states and government; the Executive Council of Foreign Ministers, the Commission (including its structures, functions and powers), and the Permanent Representatives Committee of Ambassadors. The Lusaka Summit also agreed to incorporate the mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution as an organ of the AU. After a review of its structure, procedures and working method in a typically uncertain manner, the first draft text provided for the AU to co-exist with the OAU and AEC rather than serving the purpose of rationalisation and consolidation.

The seminal assembly of the African Union held in July 2002 in South Africa ‘closed the shop’ on the OAU which had been in existence since 1963. Much hope was raised by this development as manifested in the statement of the Nigerian Foreign Minister, Sule Lamido:

Arising from the realization in today’s world order, we Africans are essentially on our own, the leaders had to re-think. We have to look inwards to try to create a stronger, more effective process of continental interaction, something more integrative, merging our economies, markets, and capacity. We have to bring our potentials so that our partners will be forced to engage us. ²⁸

Such moving statements have not been lacking in Africa but the AU, like OAU, is an inter-governmental organisation and the pace of change is therefore still likely to be determined by what cynics refer to as ‘lowest common denominator politics’. ²⁹ The Constitutive Act of the AU envisages the establishment of a supranational type of executive body that can promote integration and sustainable human development more effectively than the OAU. The Act has the following bodies as principal organs:

- The Assembly of the Union;
- The Executive Council;
- The Pan-African Parliament;
- The Court of Justice;
- The Commission;
- The Permanent Representatives Committee;
- The Special Technical Committees;

- The Economic, Social and Cultural Council;
- The Financial Institutions.

Among the AU's major objectives, as stated in Article 3 of the Act, are:

- Active greater unity and solidarity between African countries and the peoples of Africa;
- Acceleration of the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
- A common market and economic community;
- International cooperation, taking dual account of the charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- A common defence policy for collective security.

Keeping in mind the challenges of globalisation and marginalisation there was a consensus, even if only for public consumption, that the aim of the Union would be to consolidate the gains made by the OAU in 37 years and to advance from there to chart a new dynamic vision of collective continental action and cohesion for Africa. The big question, however, is, will the re-launch or rebranding of the OAU achieve the desired objectives? Can the AU stop the “yawning and the tightening of the stomach muscles that used to accompany the mention of the name of the OAU”?³⁰ Would a United Africa benefit the ordinary people and can African leaders sustain the organisation through a corporate agenda?

Critics have been quick to dismiss the Constitutive Act as utopian, while some believe that the treaty does not present a new agenda for Africa, as the whole thing appears to be only a declaration of intention which does not respond to the realities and aspirations of Africans. Although reinforcing stereotypes of ‘backwardness’ and ‘hopelessness’ is not conducive to finding solutions to any of Africa's problems, old habits die hard. Though the post-Cold War ideological schisms are eroded, the contentious matters stemming from the colonial background, which hamstrung the OAU in several instances, persist. A union that must last cannot be driven by the distrust which prevails in some circles of collective effort in Africa. The state-centric approach to international affairs leads states to think of sovereignty from an exclusive angle. Many leaders do not

share the vision of a single Federal African state.

Under the terms of the Constitutive Act of the AU, Article 4 lists 16 principles which contain an ambitious wish list, including, for example, the establishment of a common defence policy and the “right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly of the Union in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. As Michael Mulikita rightly observes, the Act makes no reference to the UNSC, which is the primary instrument for dealing with the type of emergencies referred to in Article 4(h) of the Act.³¹ More worrisome and in the classic manner of state-centric organisations, Article 4(g) effectively nullifies Article 4(h) by affirming “non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of another”. Hence, as Mulikita concludes, under the non-interference clause, a regime guilty of the type of gross human rights violations outlined in Article 3 (on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the promotion and protection of human and people’s rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and People Rights) and Article 4(h) can legally obstruct Union intervention. This confirms the old habits, the old fears and the old traits since the 1960s. The Act does not provide for the tools or mechanism with which to implement, monitor or advance these lofty ideals. It is recalled that in the OAU Charter, Article 3(2) on non-interference in the internal affairs of member states led to serious drawbacks and had negative implications for the activities of the organisation for several decades. In this the period, ruthless, corrupt and unaccountable leaders emerged across the continent, without African states or leaders confronting them. Along with other factors, it led OAU to degenerate into what the Kenyan statesman, Oginga Odinga, called “a Trade Union of African Heads of State”.³²

In the same vein, Article 30 states that governments that come to power in future through unconstitutional means will not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union. Jackie Cilliers believes that the Act does not incorporate extensive principles for democratic governance, the definition of unconstitutional changes, or the measures that the AU would take in response to such developments.³³

These apparent contradictions, admittedly, provide an example of the ambivalent attitude of African states towards the sensitive issue

of national sovereignty. It strengthens the impression that the AU amounts to merely giving the OAU a 'fresh coat of paint' without the inner structures undergoing any renovations.³⁴ This paper, without lapsing into unprofitable pessimism, notes that the AU project is going to be a much more expensive undertaking than the regular amount of \$31 million annual budget of the OAU. Quite clearly, much thought needs to be devoted to how the union will be funded, especially the Pan-African Parliament. The doubts emerge against the background of the fact that by mid 2000, only 17 of the 53 member states of the OAU were up to date in the settlement of their financial obligations to the regular budget.³⁵ The question is how will the additional obligations be met, against the background of the near permanent poor showing of African economies.

The establishment of a union as contained in the Constitutive Act presupposes a high degree of social and political integration of member states. It remains unclear whether a union modelled along the example of European integration can be successfully established in Africa. This is all the more problematic in the sense that intra-African trade, notwithstanding the existence of sub-regional economic arrangements as ECOWAS, SADC, and COMESA, has persistently remained below the 5 percent mark calculated as a fraction of the continent's total external trade.³⁶ The overlapping membership of several regional grouping with duplicating mandates and structures leading to inadequate financing of the integration process, poses a serious threat to continental union. Ironically, African leaders refer to their sub-regional efforts regarding security arrangements, but they are not ready openly to chastise their colleagues for undemocratic tendencies in their sub-regions.

Some of the noticeable habits of the African leaders which have not altered dramatically over the decades are obstacles to any genuine union on the continent. These include a penchant for luxury items like expensive official vehicles, presidential jets and the expending of inordinate amounts on running public offices, foreign travel and diplomatic representation which cannot be sustained, instead of engaging in pooling or coordinating representation; military spending in excess of two percent of the GNP (any success achieved in reducing military spending translates into an expansion of public domestic savings); corruption which is widely recognised as a

serious obstacle to development; and ethnic and communal conflicts fuelled by elite struggle and the asphyxiating debt gap.

Finally, the AU is an ambitious undertaking but despite the change in name, many of the institutions that have been created as part of the OAU and the African Economic Community will continue unchanged for the foreseeable future. However, in spite of these identifiable features, it is necessary to provide clarity on whether the Union is a replacement or a continuation of the OAU and whether the Union aims at both economic and political integration. The overwhelming competition instituted by globalisation must be openly noted because globalisation in its current form is the biggest threat to African independence, sovereignty and therefore to its development. Globalisation is said to be a magnified integration which threatens all.

One could be driven by the optimistic variety of patriotism to believe that the Union can be made to work for the African people at large. However, at a more critical level, it is difficult to believe that adequate space will be made for what is widely referred to as African civil society, especially if that civil society seeks to make use of the aspirations of the AU to offer criticisms of rulers which are illegal to voice at the national level. Many are sceptical that a union designed by the beneficiaries of state power will be allowed to work to any other advantage than that of the dominant political class.

Conclusion

It has been stated that there has been a consensus that the aim of the AU would be to consolidate the gains made by the OAU in its 37 years of existence and to advance the cause of collective action in African affairs. This paper however acknowledges that against the backdrop of the OAU's history and the general African condition, the new Union project fits into a prevailing condition which does not portend radical transformation due to internal and external constraints. New institutions and frameworks, themselves, will do little to rectify the situation described in the Yaounde Declaration of 1996 on Africa:

At the close of the 20th century ... of all the regions of the world,

Africa is indeed the most backward in terms of development from whatever angle it is viewed, and the most vulnerable as far as security and stability are concerned.

Although this paper in conclusion would rather err on the side of hope than of despair, unity may not make Africa suddenly rich but it can make it difficult for Africa to be disregarded and humiliated. Perhaps marginalisation, so often decried, is what Africa needs right now. For one thing, it will help the evolution of an endogenous development agenda, an agenda that expresses the aspirations of the people and can therefore elicit their support. The AU may clearly be more than old wine in new bottles in the sense that it offers at least a new approach to Africa's collective efforts, but, given the continued existence of old political structures which will shape political will, the Union might well be new wine in an old bottle.

However, the fundamental issue is really not that of recounting the benefits but that of developing the political will among African statesmen and their readiness to bear the costs that is required to produce and sustain an effective union. This demands equitable burden-sharing in matters affecting the continent and the administration of the Union. It also requires an appropriate institutional framework with sufficient authority and capacity for implementing decisions. The creation of the necessary democratic environment rather than mere summit diplomatic rhetoric and the involvement of civil society in order to ensure the building of integrated production capacities are indispensable requirements for a solid union.

The success of the AU would require mature African statesmanship that strikes a balance between the desires of member states to pursue their individual interests, and the political will to forgo certain aspects of national sovereignty and independence for the common good of the continent. African states, marginalised by economic globalisation and under severe strains from poverty, war and other forms of degradation, cannot afford to be half-hearted in their pursuit of regional cooperation. Otherwise, it is difficult to see how they can survive on their own in a highly competitive global economy in the present world order.

Notes

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3. Ibid. p. 8.
4. President Olusegun Obasanjo, 'African Union: The Challenges of Cooperation and Integration', *National Interest*, June 11, 2001. p 6.
5. Ibid.
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27. Jackie Cilliers, 'Towards the African Union', *African Security Review*, vol. 10, No., 2, 2001, pp. 115-119.
28. 'Sule Lamido on Nigeria has no Reservation on African Union', *ThisDay*, (Lagos) April 8, 2001, p. 21.
29. Jackie Cilliers, 'From Acronym to Action: The Seminal Assembly of the African Union' in *African Security Review*, vol. II, No. 1, 2002, p. 97-102.
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34. Ibid.
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Reconstructing Africa's Development in the New Millennium Through NEPAD: Can African Leaders Deliver the Goods?

*Cyril I. Obi**

Introduction

This study critically explores the linkages between the post-Cold War 'new' African ruling class its global allies, and the challenge of the continent's development in the new millennium. It takes the form of a critique of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as the expression of the collective developmental vision of a 'new' generation of African leaders. Beyond this, it teases out the global connection to NEPAD and captures its implication for the development project in Africa in the 21st Century.

This involves a radical understanding of NEPAD as the new strategy of an African ruling elite intent on jump-starting the engine of Africa's development by accepting wholesale the hegemonic global discourses on the neo-liberal market-model of development, and forging a new (but unequal) partnership with the advanced capitalist countries or the G-8 group of industrial powers. By the same logic, it involves an analysis of the problems and prospects of Africa's 'new' leaders successfully re-charting Africa's development through NEPAD, particularly in the face of the further marginalisation of the continent by the forces and process of globalisation, as well as the growing demands within the continent for the dividends of democracy and development. In this regard, it is important to address the fundamental issue of whether the 'new' African leaders can meaningfully engage (rather than bow before) hegemonic trans-global forces in a 'unipolar' moment, to re-negotiate, and transform Africa's subordination in a rapidly globalising and unequal world.

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NEPAD and the African Leadership

NEPAD symbolises the new thinking of Africa's leadership on development. This is brought out in sharp relief in the opening paragraph of the NEPAD document (2001:1):

This New Partnership for Africa's Development is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The Programme is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of development and exclusion in a globalizing world.

It is clear that African leaders see in NEPAD the vehicle to transit from underdevelopment to development, and from exclusion to inclusion into the mainstream of a rapidly globalising world. The implication of this is that NEPAD is seen as a 'historic' opportunity to take advantage of the 'unipolar' moment to integrate Africa on more generous terms into the charmed circle of capitalist economic globalisation. Determined to swim out of the global backwaters where poverty, conflict, environmental degradation, crisis and disease hold sway, African leaders in the 21st century declare to the world that (NEPAD, 2001:2):

We will determine our own destiny and call on the rest of the world to complement our efforts. There are already signs of progress and hope. Democratic regimes that are committed to the protection of human rights, people centred development and market-oriented economies are on the increase. African peoples have begun to demonstrate their refusal to accept poor economic and political leadership.

This is not just telling the world, but inviting it to support the new initiative of African leaders: "It is a call for a new relationship of partnership between Africa and the international community, especially the highly industrialized countries to overcome the development chasm that has widened over centuries of unequal relations" (NEPAD, 2002:2).

NEPAD is thus located at the conjuncture of an African leadership vision, driven largely by the intention of delivering the goods of

development to its people, and a particular understanding of the reality of the structure of global power, and how it can ultimately shape the outcome of Africa's quest to develop, based on a redefinition of its relationship with the rest of the world. This much can be gleaned from the NEPAD document and the signposts along its road map.

According to Ohiorhenuan (2002:10), NEPAD's strategic framework is made up of five main elements:

- First is the insistence on African ownership, responsibility and leadership and the building of capacity to play the role.
- Second is the focus on developing a new partnership with the industrialised countries and multilateral organisations on the basis of mutual commitments and obligations.
- Third is the commitment to nurturing an enabling socio-political environment by minimising conflict and promoting democracy and human rights.
- Fourth is the commitment to an enabling economic environment by ensuring macro-economic stability and maintaining transparency and accountability in institutional support mechanisms for the market.
- Fifth is promoting sub-regional and continental economic integration.

In relation to its programme of action, NEPAD hinges upon four broad initiatives: Peace and Security Initiative, Democracy and Political Governance Initiative, Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative, and Sub-regional Approaches to Development. NEPAD activities are coordinated by its Secretariat in South Africa, while its management is led by the Head of States Implementation Committee, the Steering Committee and the 5 task teams (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:11; NEPAD, 2001; <http://www.gov.za/docs/nepad>). These NEPAD structures, controlled by the 'original' five or core-NEPAD initiating Heads of state (Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Egypt and Senegal), give depth and breath to the vision of African leaders, fashioning programmes and policies for the propagation of the new African developmental initiative, regionally and globally. In this regard, African leaders through NEPAD have promised to deliver on the following developmental goals (NEPAD 2001:11-12):

- Strengthening mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution at the sub-regional and continental levels, and to ensure that these mechanisms are used to restore and maintain peace;
- Promoting and protecting democracy and human rights in their respective countries and regions, by developing clear standards of accountability, transparency and participatory governance at the national and sub-national levels;
- Restoring and maintaining macro-economic stability, especially by developing appropriate standards and targets for fiscal and monetary policies, and introducing appropriate institutional frameworks to achieve these standards;
- Instituting transparent legal and regulatory frameworks for financial markets and auditing of private companies and the public sector;
- Revitalising and extending the provision of education, technical training and health services, with high priority given to tackling HIV/AIDS, malaria and other communicable diseases;
- Promoting the role of women in social and economic development by reinforcing their capacity in the domains of education and training; by the development of revenue-generating activities through facilitating access to credit, and by assuring their participation in the political and economic life of African countries;
- Building the capacity of states in Africa to set and enforce the legal framework, as well as maintaining law and order;
- Promoting the development of infrastructure, agriculture and its diversification into agro-industries and manufacturing to serve both the domestic and export markets.

Having described in some detail the new vision of African leaders for re-constructing Africa's development in the new millennium, it is necessary to critically examine the strengths and weaknesses of the NEPAD project, and its prospects to deliver development to the masses of the African people.

Since NEPAD was formally launched in Abuja on October 23, 2001, it has drawn a lot of attention from policy makers, politicians, the donor community, scholars, civil society groups and activists. While it has received support and the seal of approval of the leaders of the G-8 Group of Countries, and the Bretton Woods Institutions,

it has been sharply criticised by civil society groups, scholars and activists in Africa who point out that:

While many of its stated goals may be well intentioned, the development vision and economic measures that it canvasses for the realization of these goals are flawed. As a result, NEPAD will not contribute to addressing the developmental problems mentioned. On the contrary, it will reinforce the hostile external environment and the internal weaknesses that constitute the major obstacles to Africa's development (TWN-Africa, 2002:2).

The following questions are thus pertinent. Is NEPAD really the vision of African leaders? Why did it emerge on the scene at the beginning of the 21st Century, and which forces propel it? What is the global agenda of the 'new' African (democratic) leaders? Does NEPAD advance or subvert the interests and welfare of majority of African? What is to be done to free up the social forces, dynamics and processes so necessary for genuine self-reliant African development beyond the home-grown rhetoric of NEPAD?

In order to provide answers to the foregoing questions and address the concerns of this study, it is divided into four broad sections. The introduction sets out in detail the idea of development as envisioned by NEPAD and the commitment of the African leadership to this new project. It is followed by an analysis of Africa's developmental efforts prior to NEPAD, particularly those from the 1970s onwards. This section which also places NEPAD in historical and global perspective, lays bare its external moorings in spite of the rhetoric of its being a home-grown, African-owned initiative. The third section, which constitutes the analytical fulcrum of the paper, is a critique of NEPAD as a trans-global hegemonic project reflecting Africa's subordination, and the wholesale acceptance by African leaders of the paradigm of their subordination as that of development based on a 'new' partnership with the G-8 countries. The fourth and concluding section seeks answers to the question as to whether African leaders can deliver development through NEPAD in spite of the flawed assumptions and unequal partnership upon which it is erected. In the final analysis, an alternative developmental path based on a popular vision of development rooted in the African people and a participatory framework of democracy is proffered.

Africa Development and NEPAD in Historical Perspective

Although NEPAD is very young, it springs from certain historical imperatives which underscore a concern to overcome the crisis of development in which African countries had been immersed in for over three decades. The immediate background however was the failure of IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes to arrest Africa's economic and external debt crises. In fact, the adoption of structural adjustment in the 1980s worsened social life and had adverse consequences on the African economies it sought to stabilise in the first instance. This led to widespread protests in 'adjusting' African countries against structural adjustment and its pernicious conditionalities. There is no doubt, that in part, the 'democratic momentum' that swept across the continent in the 1990s was strengthened by anti-structural adjustment protests.

Yet adjustment itself was at the core of the neo-liberal development paradigm of the so-called Washington consensus for which the Bretton Woods Institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), had been well-known. Thus, the failure of structural adjustment in Africa posed very serious problems for the neoliberal discourse of development hinged upon the market model of private sector/export-led growth, free trade, unhindered movement of finance capital, and the expulsion of the state from the economy. Therefore, a frantic search began for an alternative to structural adjustment which had been attacked by the African people for its anti-people, anti-democratic ethos, its external origins, and the fact that it had the impact of further impoverishing the people as a result of its obsession with 'getting the prices right', and the erosion of the welfare gains of the post-colonial state. The 'new' approach to the neo-liberal paradigm of development was based on two planks, first, a shift that included 'getting the politics right' – good governance, accountability, transparency and the rule of law, which fell under the rubric of the new market-based political economy (Abrahamsen, 2000), and secondly, the concern with preventing Africa from going under and collapsing from the sheer weight of its own contradictions – statism, corruption, conflict, failed states and poverty. These also underscored the need for the G-8 to ensure that Africa did not to

export security threats to the western world (Obi, 2000a). Both planks emphasised the need for Africa to surrender all to the new hegemonic development paradigm of market-led growth.

Thus, there was an effort in post-structural adjustment Africa by the West to throw away the 'adjustment' bathwater, but keep the 'neo-liberal' baby. The essence of structural adjustment was retained in the 'neoliberal baby' which was then re-named, and 'sold' to another generation of African leaders that had risen to power on the crest of the 'democratic' wave, and were equally keen to boost their global and local legitimacy by attempting to lead their people out of the crises of development in which they had been immersed for decades. In the face of the de-legitimisation of the socialist model in global developmental discourse, and the hegemonic profile of the market-led growth paradigm as the homogenising ideology of capitalist globalisation and the Bretton Woods Institutions, African leaders have somehow found themselves caught between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, they seek development through further integration (on more generous terms) into the globalised capitalist system, while on the other hand they seek to appear as the true representatives of the collective developmental interests and aspirations of Africa in a new century. Yet the popular critique of capitalism and the socially harsh impact of its globalised variant on African countries and peoples poses serious difficulties for the new agenda of the African leaders whose new vision of NEPAD as an African-authored initiative, was largely at the promoting of Western leaders (Adesina, 2002).

It is in the light of the foregoing, the delegitimisation and failings of structural adjustment, and the aspirations of African leaders to discover a new path to development based on past experiences and the promptings of the G-8 countries, that we can explain the background to NEPAD. From an ideological perspective, its claims to being home-grown and African-owned are no more than a reflection of the antics of the Bretton Woods institutions and their local allies in Africa to destroy the nationalist and popular platforms on which anti-structural adjustment protests were organised in the 1980s and 1990s in Africa. The embrace of the macro-economic and macro-political frameworks of the Bretton Woods institutions by African leaders and the domestication of market-led growth policies

in NEPAD, thus provide ideological justification and legitimacy for a 'new' capitalist 'revolution' as the only path to the reconstruction of Africa's development in the 21st century. It remains to be seen, however, how African leaders are going to pull off this revolution by reinforcing a subordinate partnership with advanced capitalist countries in a rapidly globalising world. Before going further, it would be apposite to examine in closer detail the evolution of NEPAD.

The Evolution of NEPAD: The Historical Background

At independence in 1960 African countries looked forward to the future with a vision of development based upon state-led growth. As observed elsewhere (Obi, 2000a:39):

These 'developmental states' were guided by the thesis on the modernisation of society through state-led capitalism, welfarism, and an industrialization strategy of import substitution. The principle was that through a trickling down process, the wealth generated by state-led capitalism would transfer wealth to the masses and resolve the problem of poverty.

After two decades of independence, where in most cases, the independence democratic movement had been undermined, or even supplanted, by single party or military rule, the promise of development and 'abundance for all' turned out to be illusory for the majority. Rather than reap the bounty of the harvest of development, these states stagnated in underdevelopment, or even regressed as a result of oppressive leadership, or the uncritical acceptance of Western modernisation/economic models that failed miserably.

It is against this background that the search began in the 1970s for an alternative African model of development. Adedeji (2002b:18), traces this to the 'Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International Economic Order in Africa (1975-1977), to the Monrovia Strategy (1979) and culminating in the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action for the economic development of Africa'. In another paper, Adedeji (2002a:35) notes that there were five landmark strategies since the 1980s adopted by African leaders to advance the continent's development. These were:

1. The Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development for Africa, 1980-2000 and the Final Act of Lagos (1980).
2. Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 (APPER), which was later converted into the United Nations Programme of Action for Africa's Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD) (1986).
3. The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for socio-economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) (1989).
4. The African Charter for Popular Participation for Development (1990).
5. United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF) (1991).

Most of these efforts by African leaders were premised on African self-reliance and integration, popular participation in development, the centrality of the state to the developmental processes, the removal of inequities in the international economic and trading system, and an African alternative to market-led growth. In its essential form, the African alternative critiqued the very basis on which the Western model of market-led growth was erected. In this same spirit, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in 2000 produced yet another plan for the continent's development called the Compact for African Recovery. Yet, in spite of its indigenous and pan-Africanist slant, the 'five strategies' of the 1980s and 1990s, were eventually sidetracked and abandoned by African leaders by the turn of the century. As Adedeji (2002a:35) argues; these home-grown strategies of African development "... were opposed, undermined and jettisoned by the Bretton Woods institutions and Africans were thus impeded from exercising the basic and fundamental right to make decisions about their future". He notes further, that:

... given their excessive external dependence, their narrow political base and their perennial failure to put their money where their mouth is, the implementation of these plans has suffered from benign neglect. Lacking the resources and the will to soldier on self-reliantly, they abandoned their own strategies, including the two – UN-PAAERD and UN-NADAF – which were crafted jointly with the international community.

Thus, the abandonment of indigenous models led to the adoption and implementation of exogenous models, particularly those prescribed by the Western Development Merchant System (DMS). According to Adedeji (2002a:36), the DMS provides for economic policies and paradigms which they foisted upon Africa 'regardless of the negative impact of such policies on African economies and politics'. Adedeji citing Kakwenda, also points out, that 'the overarching objective of DMS is for the African canoe to be firmly tied to the North's neo-liberal ship on the waters of globalisation'. In this regard, African leadership as a part of a global ruling elite, fully embraces the neo-liberal political economy paradigm and its policies which routinely marginalise and impoverish the masses of the African people.

It is however important to note that the African leadership is not so much under the influence of the Bretton Woods Institutions, as it is under the influence of the power behind these institutions – the highly industrialised states of the West – the G-8, the Multinational Corporations and the Donor Community whose power and dominance of the globalised world is of hegemonic proportions.

The issue that then comes to mind, now that it is clear that there were earlier home-grown and African-owned development initiative that engaged the international community, is that of the timing of the drawing up of the NEPAD document. Why did NEPAD emerge on the African scene in the post-Cold war phase of globalisation? Olukoshi (2002c) offers an explanation:

The process leading to the formulation and adoption of NEPAD could, in its remote origins, be traced to the arrival of the post-Apartheid era in African politics and the widespread feeling that with the task of continental liberation from foreign and minority rule having been completed, the next challenge which Africans now needed to face frontally was that of promoting economic development.

Other factors that fuelled the circumstances within which NEPAD emerged, include the growing Afro-pessimism in Western policy, donor and scholarly circles, the low levels of aid to Africa in spite of the end of the Cold War and the increased aid flows to Eastern Europe, and alarm in Africa that the world was fast abandoning the continent to its own fate (Olukoshi, 2002a:88-89; 2002b; 2002c). Other factors include the emergence of a crop of new democratic leaders intent on reversing African fortunes in the 21st century.

Of specific note, were Thabo Mbeki, an apostle of the African Renaissance, who succeeded Mandela as President of a post-Apartheid South Africa, and President Obasanjo (retired Army General and former military head of state) who returned to power in Nigeria – this time via democratic elections in 1999, after a decade and a half of military authoritarianism and political crisis.

The notion of an African rebirth first found early expression in Thabo Mbeki's famous speech in South Africa, in which he called for an African Renaissance in the 21st century. At that time, as Vice President of the Post-Apartheid South African state Mbeki had declared that, 'those who have eyes to see, let them see the African Renaissance is upon us' (Mbeki, 1998, 2002a). The notion of the African Renaissance was to some extent rooted in earlier philosophical discourses on Pan Africanism, Negritude, Ubuntu or Black consciousness (Melba, Cornwall, Gatheka and Wanjala, 2002:5). It was these discourses that influenced the notion of African Rebirth based upon a 'new' model of Pan African development and a pro-active African engagement with the world's powers (Mbeki, 2002b). It is important to note that by 1999 when NEPAD was literally in the womb, Presidents Mbeki, Bouteflika and Obasanjo chaired the Organisation of African Unity, the Group of 77 countries, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Akinrinade, 2002) – all African and Regional bodies that occupied important positions in the evolving post-Cold War order in which globalisation was a major force.

This placed them in a unique position to tap into global and multilateral spaces in pursuit of an agenda for a new Africa in a more sympathetic (pro-Africa) world. It was in this capacity that they "met with G-8 leaders in Okinawa, Japan to discuss the issue of debt relief for developing countries, generally, but African countries in particular" (Adesina, 2002a). This was also in the context where as far back as 1993, Japan (which was the host-country of the G-8 summit 7 years later in 2000), had during the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) sought to revive the interest of the international community in Africa (Kawaguchi, 2002:1-2). At this meeting under the rubric of TICAD I, the participants – African countries and development partners – adopted the Tokyo Declaration. According to official Japanese sources under TICAD I (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 2002):

- Agreement was reached among African countries and development partners concerning the direction of cooperation for Africa. This agreement provided the guideline for cooperation with Africa.
- The Tokyo Declaration responded to the sense of crisis among African countries that they would be left behind by the international community, due to their economic difficulties and the decline in the international society's interest toward Africa.

TICAD I, was followed by TICAD II in 1998, during which the concepts of 'Ownership' and 'Partnership' were established as the underlying principles of cooperation between the international community and Africa. TICAD III is planned for October 2003 within a period designated in Japan as the 'Year of Soaring Cooperation with Africa' (Kawaguchi, 2002:2). In the same regard Adesina (2002c:2) notes that NEPAD was framed within a global development discourse that emphasised partnership between Africa and the international community:

The NEPAD document locates itself within a broad international development debate, while emphasizing local ownership as an African-driven and African focused initiative. NEPAD proceeds on a claim of global consensus in the wake of several multilateral initiatives, such as the UN's New Agenda for the Development of Africa, The Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, the World Bank-led Strategic Partnership for Africa, the IMF-led Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and bilateral efforts such as the Tokyo Agenda for Action, and the United States' African Growth Initiative.

Thus, by the time that Presidents Obasanjo, Bouteflika and Mbeki, met with the G-8 leaders in Japan in July 2000, the notions of 'ownership' and 'partnership' has been well integrated into the developmental dialogue between Africa and the developed countries. It is therefore not surprising that the "outcome of the meeting was a demand by the G-8 for a workable plan as the basis of the compact" (Adesina, 2002b:ix). According to Adesina, "after Okinawa, Mbeki was given the responsibility by the troika to develop a workable plan as the G-8 had demanded". This explains why the early drafts of the NEPAD document were "driven by a distinct South African reading of the development problems facing Africa and the prognosis for

Africa ‘extricating itself’ out of its development quagmire” (Adesina, 2002b:x). At the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, it was clear that Mbeki had bought into the notion of a partnership, during his presentation on the Millennium African Renaissance Programme (MAP), which also harped on African ownership of its new developmental direction. This was how the Millennium Partnership for Africa’s Recovery Programme (MAP) was drawn up, and subsequently received legitimation through the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). As noted earlier, several scholars have pointed out that the MAP was heavily influenced by Mbeki’s project of an African Renaissance (De Waal, 2002; Taylor 2002a; Taylor 2002b; Olukoshi, 2002a; 2002b; 2002c). But it also important that it was also framed within the ‘ownership’ and ‘partnership’ paradigm of global cooperation discourse as dictated by the G-8 whose leaders were consulted during the writing of MAP (Nabudere, 2002:51).

The OMEGA plan of President Wade, earlier presented to the Franco-African Summit in Cameroon as a project for “regional infrastructural and educational development”, was integrated into the MAP, on the basis of the decision of the May 2001 Conference of Africa’s Ministers for Finance, Planning and Economic Development (Akinrinade, 2002). The task of the merger was undertaken by South Africa and Nigeria, and they were later joined by Egypt and Senegal. The third component of NEPAD (the least influential), was the Compact for African Recovery, an Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) development programme which was also merged with MAP in May 2001. At this point, the merged programmes became the New African Initiative (NAI), which was adopted at the July 2001 OAU summit in Lusaka, Zambia, where the Implementation Committee of 15 African Heads of State for the NAI was established (De Waal, 2002:466-467). In October 2001 at a meeting of the NAI Implementation Committee in Abuja, Nigeria, the New African Initiative was renamed the New Partnership of African Development (NEPAD).

Since the adoption of NEPAD, the five initiating presidents – Mbeki, Obasanjo, Bouteflika, Wade and Mubarak – have spared no moment in promoting the programme at global and multilateral fora. It has also been promoted in all the Western capitals, the July 2001 Summit of the G-8 in Genoa, at the June 2002 Summit of the G-8 in

Kananaskis where a G-8 African Action Plan was adopted, and the May/June 2003 Summit of the G-8 in Evian.

From the historical background to NEPAD, it is not difficult to agree with Adedeji (2002b: 3) that "... The NEPAD initiative is set within the context of dismal economic performance by African states both in relative and absolute terms when compared to other regions of the world". Yet it is also easy to observe that NEPAD "did not result from participatory local, national and regional strategies, appropriate to the particular concerns of poor and marginalized African countries" (African Canada Forum, Canadian Council for International Cooperation, 2002). This strongly implies that NEPAD is not a true reflection of the will or interests of African people as they were not consulted in the design or implementation stages. The neglect of the African constituency is on the other hand over-compensated for by the gesturing of African leaders to the G8 countries, global business groups and the donor community, to whom NEPAD in its earliest forms was first presented for their approval and support, before it was presented to the OAU Heads of State Summit in Sirte Libya, in March 2001 (Nabudere, 2002:50).

There is no doubt therefore that NEPAD though 'home-grown' in the sense that it was written by Africans, in Africa it was "not home-based". Rather, it was directed at eliciting more generous terms for Africa's integration into the globalised capitalist system which has over time marginalised Africa, divided the continent, and widened divisions either within each country, or between countries. Such expected advantageous terms of integration are expected to yield greater market access for African goods into global markets, debt forgiveness, mobilisation of resources and support for African development programmes and policies, and attract foreign investments and capital into Africa. NEPAD was thus 'homegrown' only to the extent that it satisfied G-8 demands that African leaders 'voluntarily' take responsibility, framed as 'ownership' for a new 'partnership' for development based on western conditionalities but wrapped in African colours by African leaders.

The courting of the highly industrialised countries has fed into a type of ahistorical treatment of the crises of Africa's development which tends to turn a blind eye to the external moorings of the continent's multiple crises. This results in the imposition by African

leaders upon themselves of the western conditionalities adapted from the Bretton Woods institutions, without any overt pressures from the G-8 countries. Of particular note is the acceptance of “the governance programme which the international financial institutions developed within the framework of orthodox structural adjustment”, repackaged under purported African ‘ownership’ (Olukoshi, 2002a: 89).

At this point, it is useful to peep beneath the veil of the African ownership of NEPAD and argue like Olukoshi (2002a: 90), that “ownership rests less in its geographical origin and more in its local anchorage”. What this implies is that ownership could be more apparent than real, being a claim of a hegemonic African ruling elite to mask a transnational capitalist project hinged upon the reproduction of capitalist accumulation globally. As such, NEPAD, though owned by a globally aligned faction of the African ruling elite, cannot be said to be owned by the African people. At another level, the adoption of the neoliberal or Washington Consensus paradigm by African leaders divorces NEPAD from its local context, acceptable to Africa’s external ‘development partners’, but alien and exploitative to African people.

The extraversion of NEPAD is brought out in bold relief when one compares its language with that of the World Bank and the IMF. Thus, the appearance of ‘good governance’, ‘transparency’, ‘accountability’, ‘anti-corruption’, ‘trade liberalisation’, and ‘poverty reduction’, all go to underscore the linguistic dimension of NEPAD’s extraversion. While this may offer a badge of acceptability for the programme within donor and Western circles whose technical and ‘politically-correct’ language it speaks, it is doubtful if it would attract the same attention among the majority of Africans on whose backs African leaders would ride the NEPAD horse to the neo-liberal developmental El Dorado.

What the foregoing historical and global perspective shows is that NEPAD is the boldest neo-imperialist African-grown project of development. It quite rightly claims that this is done on the basis of a new partnership based on the support of the international community for an African-owned initiative. Yet it has been shown that although NEPAD may have emanated from Africa, it is not of Africa.

The new terms of partnership are thus defined by the new parameters and conditionalities of capitalist globalisation, the need

for the Western economies to fully tap Africa as the last frontier of the global economy, and prevent threats emanating from Africa, environmental, health, criminal and terrorist, from coming into the prosperous parts of the world. It is also directed at expanding and reinforcing the hold over African leaders, as their plans appear to be the plea for acceptance for integration into the global mainstream, based on their adoption of 'universal rules of neo-liberal economic reform and democracy' and their willingness to impose and implement these rules on themselves, by themselves and for themselves. Yet the imperatives of African development lie less with what is approved externally, and more with what is done locally, especially in the ways people participate in, shape, and define their own agenda of self-reliant development.

NEPAD, Africa's Leadership and the Trans-Territorialisation of Global Power

As noted in the earlier section, the African leadership is the key to NEPAD, its conception, vision, construction and implementation. Thus, it is important to understand the African leadership itself, its evolution and how this has played out in the local and international politics of the NEPAD process. Beyond this, it also facilitates the location of the African leadership within a framework of trans-territorialised global power, which in turn explains the leverage and constraints on the power of the African ruling elite globally.

Before going further, it is necessary to briefly examine the notion of leadership. Leadership is a social phenomenon based on giving direction, purpose or headship to a group, institution or process. It also refers to a relationship between those leading and those who are led in a particular direction, or to achieve set goals. Cartwright (1983:1) defines leadership as "the ability to obtain non-coerced, voluntary compliance which enables followers to attain goals which they share with the leaders". Yet Olugbade (1987:239), notes that:

A leader establishes the goals, purposes, or objectives of the collectivity, creates the structures through which the purposes of the collectivity are fulfilled, and maintains or enhances those structures. Leaders are supposed to co-ordinate, control, direct, guide or mobilize the efforts of others.

What comes out clearly, is that leadership does not exist in isolation, or rely ideally on force or deceit. Leadership is often based on trust or a pact between the leader and the led. For while the leader is important for social progress, the followers provide legitimacy for the goals to be attained, as well as the energy and resources for the attainment of such goals. In other words, leadership should reflect the collective aspirations of the people or societies that they lead, and defend their most cherished values and ideals.

In this regard, leadership becomes a social contract between leader and followers. The followers give up some of their 'sovereignities', choose their leaders, and expect such leaders to work for the progress of the society. Thus, leaders bound by the social contract based on the consent of the led, are ultimately accountable to the people, and must consult them and truly represent their collective aspirations and goals.

A look at the history of pre-colonial Africa clearly shows that in the cases of both centralised and decentralised societies, even the most powerful ruler was subject to some extent to some form of control, and did reflect the communal spirit of the people and their collective aspirations (Obi, 2002). One of the implications of the colonial intrusion and the integration of Africa into the global capitalist system was the severance of the link between the people and their leaders. For the colonial state appointed its own African puppets – warrant chiefs and 'traditional' rulers who merely obeyed the master's voice, even though they were often dressed up in the robes and beads of African royalty. By the time the nationalist movement gathered momentum in Africa, those who led the peasants, students and workers to reject colonialism through mass resistance and struggle, were often sidelined or eliminated in favour of those who sought accommodation with the colonial power for the peaceful transfer of authority to indigenes.

Many of these compromises were forged on the backs of an elite-people coalition. The people, driven by anger at the injustice of colonial exploitation and discrimination, saw in the independence from foreign rule, freedom and hope for a better future that would bring democracy, jobs, development and life more abundant for all. Unfortunately, many of these nationalist coalitions collapsed after independence, when the political elite having captured state power, turned on its erstwhile allies, some on whom were in the opposition,

arguing that such divisiveness was diversionary, and antithetical to national unity and national development.

Thus, in the name of the nation-building project, the African leadership increasingly alienated itself from its own people, undermined the social contract between the leadership and the led which had under-pinned the nationalist coalition, and divorced itself from the collective aspirations of the people within the first decade of independence. This leadership in the context of the Cold War global politics of the time, as well as its privatisation of the state, which had a monopoly of public resources, became prisoners of power, unable to govern effectively, worse, unable to lead their own people towards a defined goal of social progress. Thus, the apparatus of the single party or the military dictatorship provided these leaders with the means to silence all opposition and repress any dissenting voices to their authoritarianism. Even when these leaders displayed a semblance of gestures towards Pan-Africanism and African unity, they were as divided as ever and could provide no united African front against the forces of neocolonialism and imperialism, which were underdeveloping Africa.

Thus, by the late 1970s many African countries were already immersed in crises, resulting from many years of authoritarian rule, corruption, the collapse of their monocultural economies, wild fluctuations in the global oil markets as well as declining prices for their primary products exports. By the next decade, many of them had been forced to adopt IMF/World Bank economic reform packages or structural adjustment programmes (SAP) to enable them to manage their economic crisis and external debt problems. With the end of the Cold War and the build up of popular protest against the harsh conditionalities and consequences of adjustment, many of Africa's dictatorships came to an inglorious end, and were replaced by multiparty democracies which in many cases threw up new leaders, or forced old leaders to adopt new methods of survival in new multiparty contexts.

While most African countries by the 1990s had become multiparty democracies, complete with constitutions and democratically elected leaders, the process essentially remained one of democracy from above. As Mkandawire (1995; Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999) notes, these democracies merely gave the people the right to vote, but not a

choice, hence the description, ‘choiceless democracies’. These were democracies in which the people were faced by candidates from the same class, operating political frameworks that did not guarantee the participation of the people in governance, nor the protection of their economic, social and political rights. It was thus a democratic leadership as defined by the vote, but in reality by the ‘imperfect’ democratic transitions that ushered them to power.

The foregoing captures the type of the new ‘democratic’ leadership that emerged in Africa in the era of neo-liberal globalisation. It was a leadership that not so much reflected the collective aspirations of their poor masses, as it did the broad interests of the hegemonic elite that sought to re-legitimise its rule using the form (and not the content) of democracy that had in the post-Cold War world become the internationally acceptable organising principle for politics. This acceptance of (liberal) democracy, Ake (1997:282), argues is “because it has been trivialized to the point that it is no longer threatening to power elites around the world, who may now enjoy democratic legitimacy without the notorious inconveniences of practising democracy”. The African power elite, fully aware of this trivialisation of democracy and no longer feeling threatened by Western demands for democratisation, decided to reinforce its hold onto power, by partnering with the West in de-politicising development and democracy in Africa.

At present, Africa’s leadership at the dawn of the 21st century is at the crossroads of a globalising world. As it looks Westwards for succour and acceptance based on a new partnership with the G-8 countries, it may do well to reflect on the words of Mwalimu, Julius Nyerere (2000:19-20), who in 1997 observed that:

Africa South of the Sahara is totally isolated in terms of configuration of developing power in the world of the 21st Century – on its own. There is no centre of power in whose self-interest it’s important to develop Africa, no centre. Not North America, not Japan, not Western Europe. There’s no self-interest to bother about Africa south of the Sahara. Africa south of the Sahara is on its own.

He goes further to adjure (Nyerere, 2000:22)

The leadership of the future will have to devise, try to carry out policies of maximum national self-reliance and maximum collective

self-reliance. They have no choice. *Hamna!*

It would appear that the dialectics of African leadership have been largely shaped by the mode of integration of the continent into the international capitalist system at the turn of the 19th century, and the continued reproduction of this subordinated integration in the 20th century. The same logic of subordinated integration comes out in sharp relief in the era of post-Cold War neo-liberal globalisation, with African leaders 'indigenising' the conditionalities of integration. Thus, the new generation of African leaders who rode to power on the wave of a huge democratic ferment across the continent, but remain committed to the class interests of the ruling elite and the reproduction of global capitalism, have sought to achieve two things. First, to renew the basis of Africa's integration into a highly globalised world on the basis of a 'new partnership' with the capitalist powers of the Industrial North, based on promises of 'internationally-acceptable conduct' in exchange for more global support for a 'new' Africa. In conformity with the spirit of a hegemonic homogenising project of capitalist globalisation, African leaders enthusiastically signal their surrender to the ineluctable logic of capital, in the expectation that this time they will convince the global powers of their sincerity to comply with the rules laid down by the global powers, and in return, win attention and support for African development.

At another level, African leaders seek to globalise the African cause. Reacting as much to globalisation which has further impoverished the continent, as well as to Afro-pessimism which has also led the West to scale down Africa's rating in its strategic and economic considerations, African leaders, particularly Presidents Mbeki, Obasanjo, Wade, Mubarak and Bouteflika, have sought to forge relations with the West on a new basis that is more advantageous to Africa. In this manner, they too by being integrated into a trans-global elite, seek to make a case for the integration of Africa on better terms into a highly globalised world. As Ian Taylor (2002a: 5) argues in relation to the thesis of the global transnational elite:

Originating in the capitalist core, this transnational elite is increasingly developing linkages with like-minded parties in the South to form a truly global elite. The elites of New Africa may be seen as key representatives of this new phenomenon.

When it is considered that globalisation apart from being another phase in the global expansion of capital hinged upon trans-territorialisation and the strategic role of the unhindered movement of capital across a borderless world, it would be easy to understand why African leaders are keen to be a part of the 'latest game in town'. In spite of Africa's small contribution to global trade, it still has a potential market that can be tapped and has a fast-growing population that the West is keen on keeping within African borders. Thus, at certain levels, the West has a stake in a partnership with Africa, but one that privileges Western interests over African interests, and spins a web of control at the bilateral and multilateral levels to ensure African compliance to Western standards, values, conditionalities, and ultimately, demands, in exchange for 'support'.

From the foregoing, it is not difficult to fathom the connection between Africa's 'new' leadership, the trans-territorialisation of global power and NEPAD as the new blueprint of African integration into the global market economy system. What is ironic about this linkage is that African leaders seek through the reform of their relationship with the West to which they have been historically subordinated, to negotiate Africa's freedom and development. There is no doubt that this calculation though seriously flawed is more about affirming the legitimacy of the 'new' African leadership globally, rather than delivering the power over the development process to their own people. But this only comes out clearly after a critical examination of NEPAD.

NEPAD in Critical Perspective

As noted earlier, NEPAD, the latest blueprint of African development has elicited both support and sharp criticism in different quarters. It is however important to note that those at whom NEPAD is targeted – the G-8 countries – have given it qualified support. As the first paragraph of the G-8 Africa Action Plan notes:

We, the Heads of State and Government of eight major industrialized democracies and Representatives of the European Union, meeting with African Leaders at Kananaskis, welcome the initiative taken by African states in adopting the *New Partnership for Africa's Development* (NEPAD), a bold and clear-sighted vision of Africa's

development. We accept the invitation from African Leaders, extended first at Genoa last July and reaffirmed in the NEPAD, to build a new partnership between the countries of Africa and our own, based on mutual responsibility and respect. The NEPAD provides an historic opportunity to overcome obstacles to development in Africa.

It is very important to draw attention to the basis of G-8 support for NEPAD (G-8, 2002:1):

It is, first and foremost, a pledge by African Leaders to the people of Africa to consolidate democracy and sound economic management, and to promote peace, security and people-centred development. African Leaders have personally directed its creation and implementation. They have formally undertaken to hold each other accountable for its achievement. They have emphasized good governance and human rights as necessary preconditions for Africa's recovery. They focus on investment-driven economic growth and economic governance as the engine of poverty reduction, and on the importance of regional and sub-regional partnerships within Africa.

Yet, in spite of the request for \$64 billion per year to support African development by African Leaders, the G-8 pledged an increase of only \$12 billion per year by 2006, but insisting that:

Each of us will decide, in accordance with our respective priorities and procedures, how we will allocate the additional money we have pledged. Assuming strong African policy commitments, and given recent assistance trends, we believe that in aggregate half or more of our new development assistance could be directed to African nations that govern justly, invest in their own people and promote economic freedom.

The foregoing quote from the G-8 Africa Action Plan already reinforces the argument as to the clearly asymmetrical relations that underpin the African-G-8 NEPAD partnership. It also shows the subordination of the partnership to the notorious conditionalities of structural adjustment, and indeed is an effort to institutionalise this at the bilateral and multilateral levels. It also gives individual G-8 countries, and the G-8 as a whole, the leverage to define their priorities and procedures and how much they would give on this basis to a continent whose resources have been plundered over the centuries. Thus, there is no doubt where the real power lies in this partnership, just as it is clear whose values and standards the African

NEPAD initiative seeks to uphold. As Taylor notes (2002a: 1):

... the new hearing being granted to the New Africa representatives is precisely because the message communicated fits the neoliberal discourse and avoids blaming particular policies or global trade structures for Africa's marginalization but rather, if pushed simply passes off the blame on the mystical notion that is known as globalisation. In addition, the leading elements within the New Africa have gained the North's seal of approval regarding their outward commitment to liberal democracy and market economies, and are held up as models by which the rest of the continent can/should learn from.

Thus, as well-intentioned as NEPAD may appear as a strategy for reconstructing Africa's development in the 21st century, there is a dimension of neo-imperialism to it, which undermines the autonomy and resolve of the 'New Africa leadership' to change the basis of its partnership with the West, and by the same token, develop Africa. In other words, the African leadership seems to be stuck with the mindset that if it 'complies'; the West will 'help' Africa to develop.

Looking at the NEPAD document itself, there are contradictions and some flawed assumptions. These have come out in the critiques made by Olukoshi (2002a, 2002b); Taylor (2002a, 2002b); Mafeje, (2002); Mkandawire, (2002); Moyo, (2002); Africa Canada Forum, (2002); Deng, (2002); Campbell, (2002); Tadasse, (2002); and Adesina, (2002a, 2002b). In order to critique NEPAD in the context of the leadership, attention needs to be focussed on the Democracy and Governance Initiative as articulated by the document. In this regard the works of Olukoshi (2002a, 2002b; 2002c) are quite instructive. The Democracy and Political Governance Initiative of NEPAD (NEPAD, 2001:17-18), notes "that development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance. With the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), Africa undertakes to respect the global standards of democracy, which core components include political pluralism, allowing for the existence of several political parties and workers' unions fair, open free and democratic elections periodically organized to enable the populace choose their leaders freely". This clearly show the commitment of African leaders to liberal democracy in the electoral, 'choiceless' sense. Yet, as Mafeje

(2002:81) argues, “It is obvious that in the modern world liberal democracy cannot satisfy the emerging political and economic demands that are a result of new forms of social awareness”.

Olukoshi (2002a: 5) points out in his critique of the initiative, that it is couched in a framework that is “lacking in the kind of basic social anchor that can ensure that the democracy and governance proposals that are made are moved from the realm of the pro forma and technocratic to the arena of the political as a living experience marked by contestations and negotiations among the bearers of competing interests”. Beyond the lack of popular participation in ensuring that the initiative reflects human-developmental, rather than technocratic and managerial priorities, there is no clear role for the people in the politics of NEPAD. Taking on the democracy and governance initiative of NEPAD headlong, Olukoshi (2002a: 90) doubts if it represents or seeks to advance the cause of popular political forces in Africa:

... the democracy and governance initiative of the NEPAD raises more questions than it answers and, on a more critical examination, seems designed more to pander to a donor audience than responding to, or representing the concerns of the domestic forces in the vanguard of the struggle for the reform of the political space and developmental agenda.

Since it ‘panders’ to the donors, and by implication the G8 countries, NEPAD is clearly not about the transformation of the unequal partnership with the West, nor is it about the radical restructuring of the unjust state-society relations in Africa. As such, it appears merely to fuel what Ake (1992; 2000; 2001) described as the “democratization of the disempowerment of the African people” (Olukoshi, 2002a: 93; 2002c). This is given credence by the lack of a framework of civic engagement in the NEPAD document, as well as the non-consultation of civil society in Africa by African leaders in drawing up, and implementing, the NEPAD document. Thus, irrespective of the commitment to the virtues of good governance, accountability, transparency and poverty reduction, it is clear that the kind of democracy being promoted by NEPAD is choiceless and elitist, and does not take on board the concerns, interests and participation of the people on whose behalf the NEPAD document was drawn up.

In the same regard, while the NEPAD document makes African leaders clearly accountable to their international partners, on the basis of global standards and values, it is difficult to see how these same African leaders are going to be accountable to their own citizens for the implementation of NEPAD. It would appear that NEPAD's focus on accountability is one-sided, in favour of African leaders and their global partners.

Another aspect of NEPAD that links the African leadership to the issue of accountability and governance is the African Peer Review (APR) mechanism or code of conduct. The African Peer Review mechanism provides for African leaders to voluntarily submit themselves periodically to the test, and be accountable to each other for their commitment to good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law as well as economic and corporate governance. The APR mechanism provides for best practices as regards specified codes and standards for political and corporate governance, complete with an in-built reward and sanction system for all those who sign up. It is perhaps a novel dimension to Africa's development strategy. According to De Waal (2002:471):

The APR mechanism broadly echoes the OECD peer review mechanism, which is regarded as a successful means of identifying and promoting appropriate practices. The rationale for the APR is that Africa should move away from donor-imposed conditionalities, which have been found ineffective, inefficient and burdensome, towards mutual accountability among development partners towards desired outcomes (specifically poverty reduction).

The criticisms that could be levelled against the APR are similar to those mentioned earlier. While one agrees with De Waal on the rather difficult task of the APR, it is more pertinent that Olukoshi (2002c) argues that its mere existence is not enough to guarantee the integrity of the review process.

It is also instructive that he draws attention to the danger of the NEPAD APR mechanism evolving into "the route by which some of the conditionalities of the adjustment years are locked into the fabric of African economy and politics". In this regard, the contradictions of the APR in its application, and the risks inherent in it are illustrated in the case of the recent Zimbabwe crisis (Taylor 2002b: 404-408).

Thus, the APR's being an incentive to external donors to support African leaders who practice good governance is a much more complicated issue than it appears to be on the surface and may yet become a noose around the necks of some African leaders that can be tightened at will by the donor community.

The point has been made also about NEPAD's external dependence. Nowhere is this more pronounced as in the area of its Resource Mobilisation Strategy (Moyo, 2002:183-208). Africa, although rated as the poorest continent in the world, is still a net exporter of capital and can mobilise its own resources. But the framers of NEPAD still look up to the Industrial North for aid, Direct Foreign Investments and trade access. As Moyo (2002:207), notes:

NEPAD appears to ignore the ideological dimensions of external funding and a market- based model of development in a harsh globalised environment. Despite the failures of aid and transnational capital in promoting pro-poor development in Africa, the overriding concern in NEPAD appears to be the access to capital rather than any moral, social and political considerations.

In a global context where the rate of FDI to Africa is declining and largely limited to a few countries on the continent (based on mineral exports and market size), NEPAD's extraversion in seeking resources merely amplifies the obsession with the neoliberal macro-economic framework and the lack of popular roots.

Another aspect that has been sharply criticised about the NEPAD document is its very scant regard for women and gender issues. In this regard (Tadesse, 2002:275), notes that:

A good governance discourse that is based on a procedural conception of democracy conceived as separate and apart from socio-economic rights and structures – as does NEPAD – has extremely limited transformatory potential for a new and gender-just Africa.

This is against the background of the marginalisation of women in Africa from the structures and the processes of governance and development in the continent. This tends to frame the African leadership in the context of a continental-global patriarchy, but more fundamentally, fails to represent the interests of the one half of the African populace that bears the brunt of the crisis of development in which the continent has been immersed in for over three decades.

Conclusion: Can African Leaders Deliver the Goods?

From the foregoing, it is clear that based on NEPAD as currently constituted, African leaders will not only fail to deliver the goods of development to the African people, but will reinforce the structures of external dependence and deepen the underdevelopment of Africa in a globalised world.

In the first instance, African leaders are demanding reform and incorporation based on the same terms and values with which global power has subordinated Africa, while side-stepping the real issues. The Africa-Canada Forum (2002), identifies two such issues as “the reform of global trade and investment regimes, and ensuring effective participation, transparency and fairness in the governance of multilateral institutions”.

The most critical issue that is side-stepped by NEPAD is the building of a participatory relationship between African leaders and the citizens of their countries, in ways that transfer real power to the people, and grand policies and programmes upon consultation with, and the consent, of their citizens. It is a ‘blind spot’ that undermines the legitimacy and workability of NEPAD as the African leaders’ blueprint for the reconstruction of the continent’s development in the 21st century.

If African leaders adopted an elaborate agenda such as NEPAD, why did they do so in the face of its contradictions and flaws, and without consulting their own people? There are several positions on this question, but only two will be reflected upon here. The first is from Adedeji, and the second from Taylor. According to Adedeji (2002a: 43):

There is always a childlike naivety among African leaders and policy makers that rhetoric and reality are the same and that claiming ownership is tantamount to having ownership. It is the Africans who are claiming they are forging a partnership. The other side will no doubt continue to see it as a donor-recipient relationship.

What then explains the ‘naivete’ of Africa’s new leaders? Adedeji himself provides a hint when he describes NEPAD as a “feudo-imperial partnership” (Adedeji, 2002a: 44), between the strong (G-8) and the weak (Africa). What cannot be denied is that African leaders as a faction of a trans-global elite are responding to globalisation

and the new terms of incorporation and integration. This suggests that the leaders are not that naive but are consciously (or is it subconsciously?) promoting an agenda that will benefit them as a fraction of global capital as well as their global partners.

For his part, Taylor (2002a: 22) reiterates the call for a radical interrogation of NEPAD which as presently constituted will only benefit the few:

African-based initiatives are vitally needed, but it seems clear that what is emerging is a nascent reformism, emanating from key elites in the developing world, that far from ushering in a Twenty-first Century NIEO, remains rooted in an orthodox discourse that benefits but a small elite.

The foregoing issues clearly show that NEPAD in its current form cannot deliver the goods. This immediately raises the challenge of what is to be done. It is clear that as far as the issues of the African Initiative for development and engagement with the international community are concerned, African leaders would need to seek the mandate of the African people. Ownership of the African development project must not begin and end with African Heads of State. NEPAD itself would have to be subjected to a transformational critique directed at placing it under the power of the people. For just as Adedeji (2002b: 21), argues:

Until NEPAD becomes owned by the people of Africa, its civil society and grassroots, the initiative will not take off at the national level. And without taking off at the national level, the plan is as dead as a dodo.

Yet the people of Africa cannot own NEPAD if they remain constrained by the 'choiceless democracies' that hold them captive. There is therefore a need to deepen the content of the democratic process in Africa by placing the people and their participation in the political process at the centre of democratic practices.

At another level, there is also the need to transform the character of the state in Africa as well as the post-colonial mode of accumulation. The new democratic African State in the 21st century must be central to the processes of development in the popular sense of the word. The African developmental state would hopefully represent a solid social basis for Africa's engagement with the world, and

strengthen its demands for a new and equitable international order. As Mkandawire and Soludo (1999:133) correctly suggest:

What African does need is a system of democratic governance in which political actors have the space to freely and openly debate, negotiate, and design an economic reform package that is integral to the construction of a new social contract for ushering Africa into the 21st century.

It is important that the interrogation of NEPAD by African scholars, civil society activists and people remains an ongoing counter-hegemonic project. For without the imperial moorings and internal contradictions being laid bare, the possibilities for the transformation of the African developmental project would become even more complicated, protracted, and unproductive. Beyond this, the popular critique of NEPAD would enrich the process of providing more viable alternatives for African development.

In the final analysis, Africa's development in the 21st century can only be on the basis of self-reliant development, popular democracy, unity and regional integration. The forces that have historically subordinated and exploited Africa for their own benefit are not likely to change their ways in the era of globalisation where the competition for markets and profits is intensely ruthless. The starting point perhaps is for Africa's leaders to interrogate, rather than embrace, globalisation's neoliberal discourses, and become dialectically a counter-elite, siding with the African people against the hegemonic trans-global elite that seeks, through new rules to keep Africa in its subordinated position for yet another century.

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African Development and the Globalization Imperative: New Directions, Familiar Crises

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Abstract

Globalisation has emerged as the defining conceptual and contextual socioeconomic framework of analysis for the early 21st century. Throughout Africa particularly, globalisation has become a political-economic buzzword for profound structural change, as well as the focus of vociferous and rigorous criticism by those sectors of society disadvantaged, damaged, or bypassed by the forces of global restructuring. Moreover, globalisation often is discussed from an absolutist perspective and framed almost exclusively within the context of the political state. As a result, regions, places, and people frequently are reduced to insignificant actors or are omitted from the analysis altogether. This paper examines the theoretical and practical implications of globalisation for development in Africa and argues for an analytical approach that encompasses key regional and local conditions. With Africa as the framework of reference, six critical elements of development under globalisation are examined: social polarisation, migration, democratisation, cultural identity, transportation, and environmental change. The paper concludes by discussing the concept of 'globalisation' and arguing for a policy approach that rethinks the extant framework and restructures the analytical construct in a more proactive manner.

Introduction

Throughout Africa, globalisation has emerged as the defining conceptual and empirical phenomenon of the early 21st century. From an evolving trendy perspective on socio-economic change two decades ago, globalisation has become the dominant contemporary

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political-economic framework for national development policy, as well as the focus of vociferous and rigorous criticism by those sectors of society disadvantaged, damaged, or bypassed by the forces of global change. African governments, almost exclusively, have adopted wholeheartedly globalisation policies such as privatisation, deregulation, neoliberalism, and free trade in an attempt to reverse decades of economic mismanagement and squandered development opportunities. The shift from an ideology of *dirigismo* (state-directed development) to one of *neoliberalismo* (state disengagement) has opened up the region to the global capitalist regime of finance, production, marketing, and consumption, which has altered irrevocably the way in which goods and services are provided, spatial relationships are structured, and cultural identities are defined and understood.

As globalisation evolves into a fully defined theoretical framework, its impacts and implications in Africa often are discussed from an absolutist perspective and framed almost exclusively within the context of the political state. This is occurring despite a conceptualisation of globalisation that implies a frictionless world without state-imposed barriers to economic interaction. Economic development policies throughout Africa, for example, continue to be framed by a conception of national territory as culturally and structurally homogenous, rather than by the reality of socioeconomic spatial heterogeneity that goes beyond artificial internal or international political boundaries. As a result, regions, peoples, and places frequently are reduced to insignificant actors or are omitted from the analysis altogether. Indeed, a central criticism of globalisation throughout Africa has been its role in accelerating social polarisation or the 'development gap'. This occurs when an increasing percentage of national income or wealth is concentrated in the hands of fewer people. Increasingly, globalisation analysis seems to be driven primarily by macroeconomic statistics that serve as positive indicators of long-term national development trends, while micro-economic data that measure quality of life for individuals and communities are downplayed or dismissed outright as insignificant short-term trends.

This paper examines the implications of globalisation for development in Africa by focussing first on six key long-term

forces of change, the ‘subsurface’ processes that are reshaping the national and regional environments within which globalisation operates. Next, it examines six key themes that encapsulate the short-term disruptions experienced by African societies today as a consequence of globalisation. Finally, the question is raised about how to mitigate the damage caused by short-term disruptions, while developing meaningful policies that recognise the long-term shifts in the restructuring of African countries and societies, shifts that are being driven by the forces of globalisation and neoliberalism. The paper argues ultimately for a policy approach based on the concept of ‘globalization’ that rethinks the analytical approach to globalisation’s impacts in a more sensitive, proactive, and spatially relevant manner.

Setting the Stage: The Globalisation Thesis

Globalisation is fast becoming the shibboleth for the profound reordering of the world political economic system that has taken place over the past two decades. The term has emerged as the ultimate expression both of an increasingly interconnected global society and as a socio-economic Trojan Horse that will wreak deprivation and degradation on local communities. Some explanations and definitions of globalisation argue that it is a process of spatial integration, inclusion, and engagement, while others posit that it is a process of spatial segregation, separation, and exclusion (Bauman 1998; Sadowski 1998).

Such a seemingly unresolvable theoretical paradox points to the challenges presented by the globalisation thesis: to understand its theoretical and ideological context and to analyse empirically its impacts on people and places. From the vast and rapidly growing literature on globalisation, Lechner and Boli (2000) have identified six key questions: Is globalisation new? What does globalisation involve? Is globalisation driven by an expanding market? Does globalisation make the world more homogenous? Does globalisation determine local events? Is globalisation harmful? In order to set the stage for an analysis of globalisation’s implications for development in Africa, these questions need to be explored briefly.

First, is globalisation new? To answer this question, a distinction

should be made between what is known generally as historical globalisation and what Lloyd (2000:260) calls “ultra-modernist” globalisation. Historical globalisation processes can be traced back to at least the 15th century, with the genesis of the capitalist world economy and the geographic expansion of division of labour, access to raw materials, industrial production, and the circulation of capital. Wallerstein (1974, 1979) conceptualised these developments as a single world system divided into three main economic zones: core, semiperiphery, and periphery.

In contrast, ultra-modernist globalisation refers to the intensification since the 1980s of the spatial reorganisation of production and distribution, the spread of financial markets, the interpenetration of advanced producer services, and the rise of key cities as command and control centres of global capital (Mittelman 1994; Lechner and Boli 2000; Lloyd 2000). Although the roots of ultra-modernist globalisation are planted firmly in the garden of historical globalisation, the contemporary system has matured by the adoption and spread of transport and communication technologies.

For the first time in human history, multinational corporations can produce anything anywhere on the planet and can sell anything anywhere on the planet. As Held et al. (1999:15) argue, time-space compression has ‘stretched’ capital and information activities across the traditional boundaries constructed by political and geographical structures. This theoretically borderless world now presents few impediments to the rapid and efficient movement of people, capital, goods, services, and information, thus facilitating the emergence of a truly global marketplace. Second, what does globalisation involve? Giddens (1990:64) has defined globalisation as “an intensification of world-wide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa”. In other words, globalisation involves changes in the spatial reach of capital, financial activities, advanced producer services, and information that transcend the political state system and where, arguably, multinational corporations replace states and communities as the dominant actors in the global system.

In theory, a globalised socio-economic system would be freer, more efficient, economically rational, and unfettered by state-

directed diversions of wealth into unproductive areas. As production is reorganised across time and space, industries interpenetrate across political borders, financial capital spreads across the globe, homogenised consumer goods diffuse to distant markets, and people flow to new areas of economic opportunity, the local and the global will become inextricably intertwined in a system of universal order (Loker 1999; Bauman 1998).

However, globalisation also involves reshaping the social structure of the world system in a way that reinforces social polarisation. At the top of the globalisation hierarchy are those individuals and communities integrated into the global economy who have command and control functions over global production, finance, and information. In the middle are those who serve the global economy in more precarious employment circumstances, and at the bottom sits the superfluous labour force that represents a potential destabilising threat to globalisation (Cox 1996).

Third, is globalisation driven by an expanding market? The global operation of multi-national corporations has played a major role in the expansion of international trade and the emergence of regional trading blocs since the 1980s. A significant number of treaties, institutions, and organizations aimed at facilitating global trade have come into being in order to 'open up' national markets and local communities to free trade. Thus there is a reciprocal relationship between an expanding market and the forces of globalisation. As capitalism continues to overcome spatial limitations to market expansion through time compression, an expanding market provides a more conducive environment within which globalisation processes can spread.

One of the arguments supporting the spread of democracy across the planet, for example, is that, theoretically, stable, participatory democracies encourage the expansion of a consuming middle class. In turn, an expanding middle class creates a growing demand for goods and services, thus facilitating an expanding national market. This allows the forces of globalisation to maximise capital returns, economies of scale, production systems, and distribution costs by engaging with specific expanding national and regional markets and integrating them into the global economy. The fourth question asks if globalisation makes the world more

homogenous and, if so, what are the consequences. Embedded in the ideology of global change is the homogenisation or Americanisation thesis, which argues that capitalist consumerism has orchestrated the spread of Americanised commercial and media products across the planet, with particular success in developing countries (Friedman 1999; Tomlinson 1999). Commodified culture in myriad forms, ranging from Cokes to Big Macs, from Nike to the NBA, and from CNN to Hollywood, has disseminated from the U.S. to the rest of the world, overwhelming local cultural traits and leaving local communities with few choices in the marketplace. Critics of the homogenisation thesis argue that globalisation is taking multiple paths in local places, giving rise to terms such as 'hybridization', and 'globalization'.

In many parts of the world, local entrepreneurs and consumers are using imported cultural products to shape and assert their own unique identities, so much so that globalisation's success in promoting capitalist consumerism has spawned multiple local variations of so-called globalised culture (Robertson 1995; Howes 1996; Watson 1997; Kim 2000).

Fifth, does globalisation determine local events? There is little doubt that in Latin America and other regions of the world, governments have responded to the rhetoric of globalisation by adopting neoliberal strategies to restructure economies and societies. As a consequence of these policies, local businesses and communities are exposed to competition from global corporations who often have better financing, technology, advertising, and market reach.

Finally, is globalisation harmful? This is perhaps the most complex question of all to address because there are multiple contradictions embedded in the globalisation thesis. For example, the socioeconomic elite of most developing countries, who comprise a tiny fraction of a country's population, have integrated into the world system and have become completely globalised. In contrast, many highly developed countries are creating developing world conditions among the bottom tier of their labour hierarchy (Cox 1996; Sassen 1998). Throughout the emerging regions of the world, vast segments of society are becoming further impoverished, isolated, and excluded from the socioeconomic opportunities offered by globalisation.

Other contradictions are the loss of regulatory power by states

and the widespread resurgence of attempts to reinforce local religious, ethnic, linguistic, political, and gender identities in the face of wider global forces. Brecher and Costello (1994) have synthesised effectively in a single statement the issue of whether or not globalisation is harmful: global village or global pillage? The challenge for researchers is to examine both macro-socioeconomic and micro-socioeconomic indicators of development under conditions of globalisation to understand the impacts for all segments of society across all possible scales of analysis. This requires a holistic, multidisciplinary approach to development analysis.

Without a doubt, globalisation, both as ideology and as process, has transformed the world system in profound and fundamental ways over the past two decades. This is especially true in Africa, where neoliberal policies have dismantled state regulation of the economy, opened up the region to globalising processes, and created a new framework for development, growth, and change. As Korzeniewicz (1997:20) observed, the region's institutional structures are being disassembled at a 'precipitous pace, to be replaced by a deepening differentiation in the arenas of operation of enterprises, states, and households'. How these changes unfold in different places at different times will determine the long-term contribution of globalization to improving the quality of life for all Africans in the 21st century.

African Development under Globalisation

A fundamental difference exists between the economic ideologies or policies of globalisation, which are essentially structural and conceptual in nature, and the processes of globalisation, which are outcome driven and can be empirically measured. However, there is much confusion throughout the region about the distinction between the two definitions.

Over the past two decades, African governments and socioeconomic elites have embraced the ideologies of globalisation uncritically and enthusiastically, but have done very little to convert these ideologies into measurable development improvements for the majority of the population. This is indicative of Africa's general economic failures throughout the 20th century in that the region frequently has embraced changing economic philosophies and ideologies and incorporated

them into national policy. Yet these policies ultimately always have failed because of insufficient attention paid to the processes that translate policy into measurable development. For example, let us accept the premise that transport and communication technologies are the engine driving contemporary globalisation.

African governments, with few exceptions, have recognised explicitly in publications, conferences, policy statements, and electoral rhetoric that transport and communication are crucial to development success. They have promoted a variety of high-profile projects to address national and regional integration. Yet by conservative estimates, Africa suffers from an infra-structural deficit in excess of US\$1 trillion in the transport and communication arena just to bring the region up to a minimum level of support for globalisation policies to have any reasonable chance of long-term development success.

This deficit suggests that a significant problem exists between policy formation and policy implementation in the region. How, then, has Africa development fared under globalisation, what are the fundamental forces of change shaping the region today, and why do so many of the familiar development crises that afflict the region remain un-addressed?

Contemporary or ultra-modernist globalisation has emerged from the long-term historical processes that have shaped Africa's people and places. A useful metaphor for explaining African development in a broader context is provided by plate tectonic theory. Drawn from the physical world, plate tectonic theory is the idea that subsurface convection currents cause continental and oceanic tectonic plates to move, thus causing changes both in the position and surface relief of the oceans and continents.

Applying this theory to the cultural world, contemporary globalisation can be viewed as part of the long-term or tectonic shifts in the socioeconomic forces shaping the world around us. The short-term surface manifestations of these long-term shifts are earthquakes and volcanoes, which can reshape local and regional conditions profoundly and rapidly. Cultural 'earthquakes and volcanoes' generally are short-term events such as rapid inflation or deflation, war, revolution, coups d'état, increased social polarization, paradigm shifts, boom and bust cycles, and currency devaluations

that have a dramatic and often negative impact on economies and societies (Thurow 1996).

First, the system of state-directed economies that dominated the region for nearly 50 years has ended and neo-liberalism is emerging as the dominant economic model. Second, the basic structure of African economies is undergoing a transition from a system based on natural resources to one based on human capital and brainpower. Third, African societies have become predominantly urban in composition, and demographic aging, coupled with economic welfare, is looming as a significant social issue. Fourth, the effects of social polarisation in the region are becoming more evident as societies undergo cultural and economic restructuring based on the ability to engage with globalisation activities. Fifth, as neo-liberal policies and noninterventionist strategies are applied to primary sector export activities, to industrialisation, and to urbanisation throughout Africa, increased stress is placed on the physical environment. Finally, as globalisation spreads geographically, it exerts change in accessibility and mobility demands through its dependence on the technologies of time-space compression.

The Fundamental Forces of Long-Term Change

Neo-liberal policies adopted throughout Africa since the 1980s have moved the region's countries and societies in a new economic direction, away from the influences of import-substitution and socialist ideologies and towards the integrative embrace of globalisation. This policy paradigm shift involves the replacement of state control over resources, production, and services with privatization strategies, the regulation of financial markets with deregulation and fiscal reform, inflexible labour markets with flexible ones, closed domestic markets with open and free trade, and restrictive institutions with more innovative management approaches. Moreover, the transition to a more globalised structure for African economies has coincided with a transformation of the political environment from primarily authoritarian to mostly democratic (Haggard and Kaufman 1995).

Reductions in the power of the state through privatisation and deregulation are seen as critical to reducing government inefficiencies and management ineptitude in the economic arena

and to providing a more technical, disciplined, and flexible approach to running the national economy (Edwards 1995; Gwynne and Kay 1999). Neo-liberal reforms have not been uniform throughout the region, however. Considerable and important variations exist both in the pace of neo-liberal restructuring.

In addition, the spatial and structural impacts of globalisation are displaying significant local, regional, national, and supranational variations, which suggest that this fundamental force of change is facilitating development divergence rather than convergence.

Countries in the developed world such as the United States, Germany, Britain, and Japan have seen the structure of their economies shift over the past fifty years from a natural resource base to a human brainpower base. Information processing, financial management, marketing, research, biotechnology, and other 'brainpower' activities have replaced smoke-stack industrialisation, manufacturing, and similar traditional 'blue-collar' production as the dominant employment sectors of the economy.

Social polarisation is being experienced across the globe, including Sub-Saharan Africa where over one-quarter of a billion people live in poverty. The complex mosaic of globalisation's development impact is characterised by the emergence of marginalised enclaves where people and communities are unable to gain access to the global economy's productive processes (Mittelman 1996). How can these local communities and regions demarginalise when state policy options are extremely constrained by the forces of globalisation?

Although social polarisation as a development condition has long been evident in African societies, the current trend is being exacerbated because those social groups with specific skills or capital benefit from links to the global economy, while those lacking the necessary skills or capital become increasingly detached. Neo-liberal reforms do not address such social concerns directly because the policy priorities are macroeconomic in nature and are not geared toward addressing poverty, inequality, or the redistribution of access to skills, capital, and global opportunities. As Sheahan (1997:9) puts it, neo-liberal policies "do not in principle rule out redistributing assets for the sake of equalization, but their spirit certainly goes against it". The theory behind neo-liberalism is that macroeconomic stability and greater efficiency will favour economic growth, which

in the long term should reduce poverty and inequality and improve access to capital, skills, and opportunities.

Africa's fifth fundamental force of change is intimately related to the first four. Neo-liberal reforms and the drive towards free-market economies within the context of globalisation have placed renewed pressure on the physical environment and on natural resource inventories. The globalisation of the region's economies is expanding trade and investment relationships, but primarily in non-manufacturing exports such as agriculture, mining, fishing, forestry, and ranching. In the mid-1990s, primary products continued to dominate the mix of total merchandise exports in the majority of African countries.

An emphasis on the export of natural resources has encouraged the incorporation of ever-increasing hectares of land into the resource-extraction economy, with significant impacts on the environment. Moreover, growing social polarisation, rural-urban migration, industrialised and mechanised farming, rapid urban expansion, and the ideologies of capitalist consumption have stretched the limits of environmental sustainability to crisis point, particularly in large urban areas. Globalisation has accelerated the pace of environmental degradation, raised new challenges for sustainable development policymakers, and questioned the traditional relationships between economic growth, social justice, and environmental quality.

The final fundamental force of change involves a profound restructuring of time-space relationships in the global system. Innovative technological advances in transport and communication since the 1970s have altered radically the cost, speed, security, and flexibility of interaction across the planet. Long-range jumbo jets, giant container ships, supertankers, satellites, high-speed trains, and computers, among other advances, enable complex global organisations of production, distribution, and consumption to function in an efficient and integrated manner. People, goods, information, capital, and ideas flow relatively unimpeded across time and space and have the potential to reshape local conditions in profound and often unintended ways. No corner of Africa is immune to the influences of restructured transport and communication systems and networks, especially in terms of the impact of radio, television, and video on the attitudes, aspirations, and cultural values

of millions of rural and urban people (Sagasti 1995; Loker 1999).

Within the context of globalisation, Sagasti (1995:600) argues that computerisation particularly has created a great divide between those with the capacity to “generate, acquire, disseminate, and utilize knowledge, both traditional and scientific”, and those without. Thus, full participation in globalisation can be defined in terms of knowledge producers versus knowledge consumers and in terms of those who have accessibility and mobility within the global system and those who do not. As transport, communication, and information technologies link African intellectuals and the elite more closely to the global community, arguably they draw “farther away from the concerns of their own society, reproducing the global divide” at both the national and local levels (Loker 1999:26).

In the broader context of this paradigmatic shift towards globalisation and all that it entails, as suggested by the preceding six fundamental forces of change, Africa is undergoing a political, social, economic, and cultural metamorphosis. Yet change does not occur without disruption or conflict. There is little debate that globalisation is transforming Africa in myriad ways, both positively and negatively. As the region embarks on a development path that will take people and communities in a completely new direction over the next several decades, many familiar development crises remain unresolved. As the region moves toward the future, it faces not only the long-term challenges presented by neo-liberal and globalisation strategies but also the short-term ‘earthquakes and volcanoes’ that are occurring as a consequence of adopting these strategies.

Although the impacts of globalisation are myriad and diverse, six specific issues are identified as the most critical ‘earthquakes and volcanoes’ reshaping the African socioeconomic landscape in the first years of the 21st century: social polarisation; migration and labour flow; cultural identity; democratisation, accessibility and mobility; and environmental stress. An exploration of these six short-term impacts of globalisation serves to crystallise the meeting of the global and the local (GLOCAL) and to help place in context the contradictions embedded in globalism.

Growing Polarisation of Society: Globalisation’s fundamental ideology is that a rising tide lifts all boats. Neo-liberal reforms are viewed throughout the region as imperative for long-term

development, and the negative social impacts being experienced by millions are explained away as simply short-term adjustments to the new economic conditions that soon will be overcome. There can be no doubt, however, that serious fraying of the social fabric is occurring throughout Africa today. Over 40 percent of the region's population is considered poor, and the absolute numbers in poverty have grown from 120 million in 1970 to over 220 million at the beginning of the new millennium.

Analysts of social polarisation in the region argue that globalisation has vested the board-rooms of multinational corporations with immense power over the daily lives of rural and urban dwellers alike. Globalisation is seen as "econocentric, technocentric [and] commodocentric", abstracted from the social cultural context in which economies, technologies, and commodities operate (Cernea 1996:15).

Indeed, African governments are turning increasingly towards market-driven forms of social support in an attempt to reduce the state's long-term financial commitment to the welfare of society. The upper middle and elite sectors of society who are able to engage with globalisation can afford the high cost of private healthcare, retirement programmes, education, and skill development, whereas the poorer majority must fend for itself within an increasingly inadequately funded and declining public welfare system (Bulmer-Thomas 1996; Lloyd-Sherlock 1997; Gwynne and Kay 1999). Throughout the past 20 years of neo-liberal reforms in Africa, the upper 20 percent of society has benefited substantially in terms of income distribution, the middle 40 percent has remained static or declined slightly, while the lower 40 percent has seen its share of national income decline consistently (World Bank 2000).

Trade liberalisation, labour-market adjustments, and fiscal reform, the backbone of globalisation strategies in Africa, are exacerbating social polarisation in several major areas (Bulmer-Thomas 1996). First, unemployment rates have grown dramatically as public sector employment is cut and domestic companies are forced to 'downsize' their workforce in the face of increased international competition in local economies. Those with the skills, capital, and training needed to take advantage of the opportunities presented by globalisation find employment, while those without the necessary attributes drift into the informal economy (underemployment) or become unemployed.

Second, downward pressure on wage-labour rates as a consequence of globalisation has reduced the real minimum wage and thus the level of household income for the majority.

This, in turn, widens the gap between average household income and the cost of a basic 'basket of food' needed to support that household. Third, the urban formal economy has shrunk and the informal economy has expanded as structural adjustment programmes bring greater production flexibility to the marketplace. Small-scale enterprises lack access to the capital, skills, and distribution systems necessary to compete in a globalised local and national economy. Fourth, agricultural policies that are export-oriented and geared toward production rationalisation are exacerbating the marginalisation of the rural poor. Many rural communities have been dispossessed from subsistence land, the average farm size has declined, and many rural workers are being forced to seek wage-labour employment, primarily in urban areas (Loker 1999).

Finally, the time-space compression technologies that drive globalisation are accessible generally to the elite segment of society and not to the poorer majority. Lack of accessibility and mobility for the majority widens the development gap between the haves and the have nots and leads to declining opportunities in the social, economic, and political spheres.

Oppressive Democratisation: Although globalisation has exacerbated social polarisation and fostered greater levels of social inequality in Africa, neo-liberal restructuring seems to be linked to an emerging political equality that has come from the expansion of democratisation. Herein lies the paradox of what can be termed 'oppressive democratisation'.

Improvements in the social and material welfare of society are deemed central to the development of greater political equality and thus democracy. Yet throughout Africa, welfare systems have been undermined and social justice appears to have fallen by the wayside as a policy objective. At the same time, globalisation appears to have weakened the power of the state to influence the direction of neo-liberal policies.

Neo-liberalism has created a 'hollowed out' state, where most economic decisions now are made by the market, by corporations, and by newly emerging global or regional institutions (WTO, GATT,

etc.). This leaves little policy room for governments to develop social programmes aimed at reducing unemployment, poverty, and the erosion of basic public services. Indeed, the current neo-liberal economic conception of globalisation allows for much greater tolerance of social inequality than in recent history, which in turn leads to the erosion of political responsibility and political equality. Global capitalism is not held accountable to elected state or local officials, which is a further contradiction with the emerging preference for electoral democracy.

Globalisation in Africa has become the most efficient way for governments and consumers to express their economic preferences, and it has relegated citizenship and political participation mostly to elections and voting. Tax breaks and relentless competition are used as tools to attract new investment, with most important political and socioeconomic decisions now made by the global elite, beyond the influence and reach of the vast majority of Africa's citizens.

As O'Donnell (1996:45) observed, "...for large sections of the population, basic *liberal* freedoms are denied or recurrently trampled [and]... individuals are citizens in relation to the only institution that functions close to what its formal rules prescribe, elections. In the rest, only the members of a privileged minority are full citizens". Privatisation and other neo-liberal policies also have accelerated political-economic corruption, which has weakened the 'prestige' of democracy, strengthened the general level of political apathy, and encouraged the depoliticisation of society. As a result, the most serious immediate threats to democratic development in Africa are poor management of national affairs, conspicuous political corruption, the abandonment of social justice as a legitimate development objective, and the political disenfranchisement of vast segments of the region's citizenry.

Conflicting Socio-Cultural Identities: Sociocultural identities have always been influenced to some degree by external forces, either directly through colonisation and imperialism or indirectly by trade and other interactions (Gwynne and Kay 1999). The difference today is that ultra-modernist globalisation is facilitating the rapid diffusion of cultural images, products, artifacts, and ideas around the world, which in many ways seems to be overwhelming indigenous technical and social knowledge.

Globalisation is defining new standards for what is considered a desirable lifestyle. It is creating new contexts for choices about 'wants' versus 'needs', and it is establishing new definitions of success. Thus, argues Véliz (1994), in order to participate fully and successfully in globalisation, Africa must abandon its historical identity and embrace neo-liberalism.

Africa's development failures can be traced to an embedded aversion to risk and change, to distrust of new ideas and technologies, to political and economic preferences for stability and central control, and to an unquestioned respect for social status, hierarchies, and old loyalties. Socio-cultural characteristics such as clientelism, ideological traditionalism, authoritarianism, and racism are seen as anti-modern and barriers to the full incorporation of Africans into the globalised world.

Globalisation is creating a new kind of African socio-cultural identity, one that is constructed by individual success, innovative entrepreneurialism, the conspicuous consumption of global products, secularisation, privatised social welfare, and international accessibility and mobility. Political-economic values such as state-sponsored welfare, justice, industrial development, full employment, national planning, and centralism no longer are deemed viable in the race to become a 'winner' in the globalisation competition (Larrain 1999). The changing identities encouraged by neo-liberalism are particularly evident in Africa's cities, in part because at the beginning of the twenty-first century the majority (80 percent) of Africans are urbanites.

Twentieth century industrial and urban biases to socio-cultural development in the region have been exacerbated by globalisation, as the dynamism of economic change rests on cities as the command and control centres of the global system. As urban wage labour becomes increasingly important, and as globalisation draws people into more varied spheres of socio-cultural interaction, either vicariously through mass communication or experientially through migration, urban social, political, and economic identities become further fragmented.

Across the region, socio-cultural urban space is being partitioned ever more rigidly, both perceptually and physically, between protected areas for the globalised elite and insecure areas for the non-globalised majority. Such fragmentation may well foster increased

urban delinquency, intra-class violence, a weakening of grassroots social movements, political apathy, and the general disarticulation and demobilisation of civil society.

Adverse Accessibility and Mobility: Transport and communication form the foundation of ultra-modernist globalisation because they not only facilitate the rapid transfer of capital, goods, people, ideas, and information across the planet but they also shape the accessibility and mobility patterns of individuals and communities. New technologies in the transport and communication arena have revolutionised socioeconomic interaction across space and time and they are driving the dissemination of the knowledge that fosters further technological innovation.

Yet despite the significant advances in transport and communication technologies in recent decades, Africa faces two serious crises in accessibility and mobility. The first is the region's tremendous infrastructural deficit, which is severely limiting the ability of countries, communities, and individuals to participate more successfully in the processes of globalisation. Inadequate telecommunications, roads, railroads, port facilities, and public transportsystems across the region are stifling the ability of communities to engage with the opportunities presented by globalisation.

Lower Environmental Quality: Of all the 'earthquakes and volcanoes' that currently are reshaping the socio-cultural landscape in Africa, the ongoing and worsening degradation of the physical environment perhaps is the most serious immediate threat to development in the region. Moreover, deteriorating environmental conditions do not discriminate by social strata, location, or economic system – poor-quality air is breathed by both rich and poor, while air pollution recognises no political boundary. Although international attention has focussed primarily on broad issues such as the destruction of the rainforest, local concerns are directed primarily towards the daily hazards to human health and well-being such as non-potable water, air pollution, soil degradation, inadequate sewage treatment, and solid waste removal.

Governments, business leaders, and the globalisation strategists assure critics that the solution to environmental problems "lies in pursuing even more single-mindedly the liberalization policies that produced these problems" (Power 1997:77). Free-trade

advocates, for example, argue that neo-liberal policies will replace aging, inefficient, and polluting factories with more efficient and environmentally friendly production systems, leading to cleaner air and rising incomes. Critics argue that globalisation is not conducive to protection of the environment because competition forces countries to neglect long-term environmental safeguards for short-term economic benefits (Roberts 1996).

Africa's continued focus on resource exploitation, a condition reinforced by the comparative-advantage logic of globalisation, is placing ever-greater stress on ecosystems and local environments. Many new 'nontraditional' agricultural products are financed, developed, and exported before any accurate ecological evidence has been generated that assesses the sustainability or negative consequences of new production systems.

Exploiting water aquifers with new technologies for expanded vegetable production or increasing the use of fertilizer and pesticides often is unsustainable over the long term. Export-oriented development policies also encourage households to colonise environmentally sensitive 'frontier' zones, leading to social conflict and ecological degradation (Durham 1995). Other immediate threats to the rural population include the unsustainable intensification of agricultural practices from increased population, land and capital shortage, and excessive chemical inputs.

Threats to Africa's urban population are no less immediate and serious than those experienced in the rural areas, and are perhaps even more localised. Unsafe water, poor-quality shelter, unsafe housing locations, inadequate waste and sanitation services, and a lack of access to health services are just a few of the daily environmental challenges faced by Africa's poorer urbanites.

In summary, the long-term fundamental forces of change emerging under conditions of globalisation are giving rise to a regionalised and localised restructuring of socioeconomic landscapes.

Rethinking the Framework, Restructuring the Analysis

Since the late-1970s, African governments and the business elite have adopted the ideologies and policies of globalisation in an attempt to

alter the long-term direction of socio-economic development in the region. Macroeconomic statistics and indices that measure inflation, employment restructuring, trade flows, capital investment rates, currency stability, and export linkages point to some level of success in changing the course of development in Africa for the better. Globalisation advocates rely on these statistics as evidence that the policies of neo-liberal restructuring are working and that the short-term development pain experienced by millions across the region will give way ultimately to long-term development gain. Globalisation critics argue that the macroeconomic or global indices of success mask the serious local upheaval suffered by the region's majority and that the short-term socioeconomic pain afflicting the majority of Africans will give way to long-term entrenched development pain.

Globalisation policies have accentuated the socioeconomic importance of the primary city or city-region in each African country, with the consequence that most gains in labour productivity, economic growth, technology improvements, and employment restructuring have occurred in the core area. Beyond the core region, development prosperity under the conditions of globalisation has been linked to the ability of a region or community to attract capital, to produce goods for the export market, and to offer a comparative advantage in the cost of labour. Those regions without this ability have suffered economic stagnation, labour losses, capital shrinkage, and further national and regional isolation.

Yet as Gwynne and Kay (1999:21) point out, it is most often "at the regional and local scales of analysis that the impacts of globalization can best be seen in terms of changing social relations" and in terms of sustainable development. Regional economies and societies are an aggregation of the competitive advantages and economic destinies of individual localities and, as such, are critical collectives of interdependent socio-economic activities (Scott 1998).

Therefore, the immediate policy task for African countries ought to be a clearer democratic articulation of the social, political, and economic development goals that need to be achieved at the regional and local level within the broader context of globalisation policies. This requires a set of institutional structures that can co-ordinate, integrate and cooperate on the type of strategic planning needed to articulate the global with the local and to allow all of Africa's disparate

regions and countries to benefit fully from globalisation. Failure to establish this type of framework for regional and local development likely will result in further damage to the socio-economic landscape as a consequence of globalisation's 'earthquakes and volcanoes'. Moreover, it will further deepen the problem of underdevelopment that today restricts millions of Africans from achieving their full life potential.

A key theme that emerges from this discussion of Africa's engagement with globalisation is that the 'global' has overwhelmed the 'local' completely as a framework or context for socioeconomic policymaking. As the ideologies and technologies of globalisation link governments, planners, and the elite more closely to the global community, they tend to disarticulate these same groups from the local concerns of people and communities.

Thus, in order to rethink the broader development implications of globalisation and to restructure the ways in which globalisation forces affect the socioeconomic landscape, governments, planners, and the elite must move towards a conceptualisation of sustainable development that merges the global and the local in the policy-making process. Merging the two frames of reference into one can be termed a global-local approach to policymaking, and the broader analytical context for this approach should be regional in nature.

In other words, policymakers must move away from a conceptualisation of national development that sees the socioeconomic landscape as homogenous within the global system to a conceptualisation of national development that treats the socioeconomic landscape as regionally based, heterogeneous, and imbued with local conditions and contradictions.

Finally, we need to rethink the metal theoretical framework of globalisation in policy formation because the use of the term has become problematic and value-laden, and it carries powerful ideologies that tend to refocus societies and economies outward toward a broader context. Globalisation, in contrast, recognises the wider spatial forces of development and change, but also focuses on the local implications and adaptations.

This concept of linking the global and the local conceptually and empirically – thinking globally and acting locally – has been in the lexicon of academics and others for many years, yet it seems

to have diverted attention away from actually acting locally because the global has become so overwhelming. The issues presented in this paper suggest that the concept be rephrased to 'thinking and acting locally within a global framework, while acting and thinking globally within a local framework'. Such an approach may well help Africans to structure the forces of globalisation in a more positive and proactive manner for people, communities, and places.

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