

# **Can a ‘Realist Pan-Africanism’ Be a Relevant Tool Toward the Transformation of African and African Diaspora Politics? Imagining a Pan-African State**

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## **Introduction: Objectives and Issues**

This paper is written as a reflective essay. But its arguments are guided by historical perspectives. My main objectives are to examine the components of what I refer to as ‘realist Pan-Africanism’, to identify the basic arguments behind it, and to analyse the implications of this kind of Pan-Africanism and the dynamics it might engender in Africa’s international relations and in the African Diaspora. Although some generalised illustrations are discussed as related to the African Diaspora at large, the paper focuses on the Diaspora in the United States. Obviously, Pan-African ideas were born-here.

In this study, I do not intend to expand on the origins and history of Pan-Africanism, for the literature on its history is immense. The discussion about its significance, both in Africa and in the African Diaspora, continues to attract scholars and students of African politics and history. As an ideology and intellectual discourse among African scholars and political activists, Pan-Africanism is not new in terms of its intellectual positions as to what directions Africa should take and the kind of projects that should be developed to allow Africans to set up institutions of societal transformation. But at the policy and political level, Pan-Africanist advocates have not seized or created any real opportunity for its actualisation. Pan-Africanists have not succeeded in capturing state power and actualising Pan-Africanism in public policies and development projects. In other words, they

have not been creative, imaginative, and daring enough to translate this ideology into political actions.

Let me make some general assumptions that may help locate my arguments and my analysis in this paper. One of the problems that African states and people have been facing in the past 500 years or so is the fact that they have tended to accept the European un-historical interpretations of the African world. This implies that African states and people tend to project themselves in the world as institutions and people with a short memory. Economically and politically, Africa would not have been where it is today without its 'consent'. We have accepted, to a large extent, consciously or unconsciously, what the European and the American power systems have defined for us as 'normal'. As manifested in the current dynamics of Africa's international relations, political economy, and domestic policy frameworks, African states and political elites have internalised the concept of the 'dark continent' as invented by European powers long before Columbus came to the Americas. In this process, many essential aspects of the African identities have been lost.

In the way used in this paper, imagination is one of the most important human activities, which is linked to the intellect, history, and society. It is the most powerful tool of human and social reproduction. Imagining is not a finite process. It is a synthetic, conscious, and teleological activity. It is not random and does not happen in a vacuum.

Within the context of the arguments based on a historical imagination process, a Pan-African state is firstly, a philosophical and socio-historical concept. This imagination implies a critical rethinking of the African state, a process through which a new political invention called Pan-African politics can be created. It is about the abilities and social consciousness of the African people to understand the direction of the past and the present dimensions of their history and rethink the nature of the African state that can unite African people. If we are to seriously and constructively challenge the contradictions of the current history and the massive forces both visible and invisible that work against the African people and cultures, imagining a Pan-African state is a must and legitimate political exercise to be taken seriously. Every people or nation, which socially and economically progressed, had an opportunity to

stop and rethink what it is and what its future ought to be regardless of what was happening around it. One cannot rethink about where to go from a current location without making a critical analysis of the history of the existing African states.

Secondly, it should be noted and recognised that existing structures of the African state, contemporary African political culture, and liberal globalisation dogmas are the most visible enemies of Pan-Africanism as a political ideology. With neo-liberal globalisation and its processes of structural de-stating Africa, its disengagement policies, and its liberal democracy, Pan-Africanism as an ideology has become more of an illusion and intellectual fictitious thought than a political tool of structural change. It is argued in this paper that despite the existing fragile regional economic and political organisations, which have been responding more to the imperatives of globalisation than any African national economies, and the creation, by imitation, of an European union, the Pan-African agenda has become weaker than ever before. One cannot talk about Pan-Africanism when our land, water, and air have been almost totally sold to the foreign investors and multinational companies within the context of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) or neo-global liberalisation. In my view, an African Union that is founded on the flawed historical principle of 'one size fits-all', the so-called Adam Smith invisible hand, and the massive selling of African resources as the only roads to industrialisation and development, cannot structurally and philosophically advance the cause of Pan-Africanism.

In contemporary world politics, Pan-Africanism has been one of the expressions most used by African scholars and the black scholars in the Diaspora but at the same time less understood and less tolerated by the African states and the capitalists in the North. Its practical usage across a multitude of cultures and political ideologies has been less attractive and at a same time confusing and misleading than its intellectual foundation. In its historical usage, one cannot fully discuss Pan-Africanism without referring to 'racial' and geographically coded foundations. That is to say that the foundation of this ideology has been in most cases defined in 'racial' (the skin colour) versus biological disposition, ethnic, and geo-political terms. One of the questions behind this work is: What is its meaning after the end of Cold War Era?

Cultural and intellectualistic Pan-Africanism in its multiplicity of imagined, imaginary, or real colorful entity has failed African people the world over. Why has it failed? And what should be done to improve the quality of the discourse of Pan-Africanism and make it more realistic and pragmatic in this century?

Obviously, no real African nationalist can rely only on the size, resources, the history of his/her country and its relations with the international political economy in order to implement relevant policies. Linkages with other countries are essential. Unfortunately, since the 1960s, those linkages have continuously been weakening, even though regional economic organisations such as ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, the Maghreb union, the Preferential Tariff Agreements (PTA), to cite only a few, were intended to have a positive impact on state policies and people's development projects. For instance, from 1976 until 1990, the total volume of trade among the ECOWAS countries increased only 4 percent. Moreover, the African states trade heavily with their former colonial masters, and these powers are the sources of their foreign exchange needed for international transactions. For example, since the North African countries gained their independence, over 60 percent of their total exports have gone to the former European Economic Community (EEC), and 50 percent of their imports come from the state members of that community, making them the EC's third largest customer and fourth largest supplier.

As African people and their social institutions are struggling to look for development options, the study of Pan-Africanism is very justified. The faulty universal historical premises as articulated in the American and European foreign policies at the end of the Cold War politics and their social and political implications provide us an opportunity to revisit Pan-Africanism.

Despite the fact that we have been told over and over at the end of the Cold War era that we are at the end of the Fukuyamaist history and that finally the world is going toward the same universal finite direction and that probably in some days the world will be unified, historical facts in the world and their ramifications, the dynamics of social movements, and the objective conditions are defining matters differently. The world is moving through a complex transition with multiple layers and dimensions. This transition is being defined

differently depending on the nature of the actors involved in the global system, their location in this system, and the dynamics of the regional politics and their realities.

## **Intellectual guidelines and major arguments**

The arguments in this paper are built on three interrelated premises, which I have used from my article published in the *African Journal of Political Science*, Volume 7, Number 1 (2002). The first premise is that ‘regardless of the claimed “good” intention of many African leaders and people in continuously copying or imitating European experiences and their unilinear models of development, and regardless of the quality of their imitations, Africa will never organically and ontologically develop out of European history and European languages and metaphysics’. However, no society can develop out of autarky. People also can learn or borrow from others but whatever can be borrowed from other people’s experiences has to be selectively injected into the African projects, appropriated and owned by Africans so that it can positively be part of the African metaphysics, ethos, and the African experience.

The second premise, which is also similar to the scientific and historical premise, stipulates that ‘no people, nation or continent can socially progress without building the foundation of its actions on its own history and culture’. European kings, the nobility (commercial classes/petty bourgeoisie), and churches from the Medieval Era up to Renaissance and even in the eighteenth century, fought each other to acquire or share power in Europe. But it should be emphasised that the emergence of the modern state structures in Europe since the Westphalia Peace Accord in 1648, was essentially an internal process and a collective decision. European monarchs and nobility forcibly appropriated the Mediterranean city-states histories, cultures, technologies, and resources from China, India, and Africa. This second premise promotes a perspective that African history and culture and their internal contradictions must be critically reexamined to avoid their romanticisation as a tool of making social synthesis. Romanticisation of any culture and history is as dangerous phenomenon as ‘intellectual fascism’ or any kind of biological

argument can be in a nation-building project. Contradictions should not always be perceived and defined as infinitely pathological. Out of the contradictions, humans have always made synthetic judgments on what directions to follow in defining and redefining them. Africa must be re-invented.

The third premise is 'that at the time of their conception, people do not consciously choose by themselves their ethnic and physical characteristics'. They are who and what they are clearly as a result of some immanent historical accident and biological structures. An individual's infant conscious contribution to this historical determinism at the beginning of his/her life is zero. However, what is more important in defining human beings is what they can or should do after they have been projected out there in the context of the jungle or divined forces of historical and natural accidents. That is to say that, human beings' choices and decisions to shape their destinies and create social meanings and define things including themselves, is transcendently more important than what gods or divinities did or do on their single objective on behalf of humanity. Social consciousness is a valuable determining factor in the ways people define and redefine themselves in a given physical and social environment. Without such a social consciousness, humans may not be very much different from other animals. Thus, the African Renaissance is discussed from this teleological history and political struggles for redefinition of beings and their socio-historical environment.

It is argued in this paper that one of the most important weaknesses of Pan-Africanism is that it has failed to penetrate and transform the state. As a cultural ideology, it has shaped behaviours, arguments, and perspectives of many individuals. However, Pan-Africanism has not done much for the majority of the African people because it has not become yet the ideology of the state. It is only when, and if, it becomes an ideological framework of the African state that this movement may be transformed from cultural and individual ideology into a political Pan-Africanism. Then it can become an ideological vehicle for collective struggle and change. A well-conceived state will de-romanticise Pan-Africanism and make it a tool for policy formulation and implementation.

For me Pan-Africanism can be a political philosophy of change only if it is able to promote the following elements: a strong sense

of self-determination, a sense of belonging to a larger political unit, knowledge of one's objective conditions and constraints, a progressive agenda, which should be permanently a critical assessment of one's role in the international political economy and the division of labour, and a strong cultural basis.

### **General characteristics of a realist Pan-Africanism**

From W. E. B. Dubois, the father of Pan-Africanism, to Kwame Nkrumah, Pan-Africanism has generally embodied the following aims: the search for common cultural specificities and affinities among African people, and for intellectual connections among them based on 'race', ethnicity, and history. All these objectives were supposed to lead towards fostering an understanding and appreciation of African culture. Thus, in general terms, Pan-Africanism embodies an ethnic/racial, cultural, or continental unity of some kind.

Pan-Africanism is essentially an international phenomenon described in multicultural linguistic expressions. As used here, a realist Pan-Africanism is the political dimension of international relations as defined by Pan-Africanists. It is a defined tool of political and policy formation. We all are citizens with or without rights in some states. These states name us, give us cultural identities, and define where we can operate. The states define geo-political boundaries and the social environment in which citizens operate. We speak the languages that have been recognised by the states. Despite the marginalisation and segmentation of African states the world over, they are still major actors in international relations and the international political economy.

As compared to idealism, which puts more emphasis on democracy, utopianism, interdependency, and cooperation, realism especially as used by the Western dominated states in the past 500 years or so, is a controversial theory in international relations, as it tends to promote the extreme dimensions of the Hobbesian human nature doctrine, imperialism, and euro-ethnocentrism. In the classical political science discipline, it refers to the 'Hegelian role' of the state-centric political philosophy in the world and the objective in social, economic, and political conditions related to the nation-state.

It refers to a rigidly organised space. This state has the power to embody the collective identity and the will of people. In international relations, nation-states pursue mainly their own 'national' interests. This perspective also refers to questions regarding the capabilities of African states, their potentials in their social environments, the availability of resources, and their constraints, both nationally and internationally, to formulate policies for change.

It should be noted that the behaviours and the structures of the contemporary nation-states, including those in Africa, are centered more on realist roots than on any other political doctrine in the management of the world affairs. Despite the controversies that realists and neo-realists have engendered in their interpretations of the role and characteristics of the state, I have borrowed the logic and the principle of centrality of the state, its strength, and its nationalistic assumptions as forces that can dynamise Pan-Africanism, if they are properly adopted as the foundation of the ideology of Pan-Africanism. This process can transform both the doctrine of realism and the nature of the African state. How can African political institutions and people connect themselves with the African Diaspora within the framework of a realist Pan-Africanism and not in a romantic and symbolic manner?

A realist Pan-Africanism is also an intellectual effort to stimulate and encourage debates and dialogues between the legalist and functionalist approaches to the question of Africa's independence and social and economic progress. This may be one of the contributions of Pan-Africanists in the re-definition and re-conceptualisation of states in international relations.

Pan-Africanism has been instrumental in the achievement of nominal political independence, but so far economic independence has eluded African peoples. This is because the alliance between black labour and black capital has not materialised due to the fact that the black world controls very little of the world monopoly capital. Hence Pan-Africanism needs an economic component in its ideology. Africans, who are the most exploited groups in the capitalist system, need to construct a theory of economic emancipation rooted both in economics and in the ethnic experiences of the black world.

The openness among African states, countries, and people is the prerequisite for this new reshaping of African conditions and policies.



This cannot be done randomly. The late Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire was not Pan-Africanist. But he argued for the need for more dialogue due to the conditions of war and exploitation. He supported an openness that could promote linkages among African peoples through coordination of national policies and social and political organisations. But an economic argument alone, whether it is a free market, trade, capital, or bank arrangement, is not sufficient to deal with the African crisis or the crisis of the African state and African nationalism. The African crisis cannot be dealt with only technically or by sector analysis. Indeed, I deal with it as a structural political problem.

The existing political and economic structures are not conducive to the creation of structures in which a real participation, both political and economic, can occur and through which relevant public policies can be formulated and implemented. This crisis is, first of all, a structural political problem. The way Africa will be able to progress will depend much on the abilities of its people and their political organisations to restructure their existing political systems, and establish their policy priorities in the international political economy. This has to be based on the local needs, the energy of the local culture, and the participation of the African community in the global economy.

This task requires a new re-mapping of Africa. No democratic principles will successfully operate as long as Africa as a whole is still an extremely dependent economic and cultural unit of the dominant world economy which is primarily managed by the former colonial powers, their local extensions, and multinational corporations. The questions of democracy and of economic independence must be dealt with simultaneously. Without that, even the progressive nationalists will not be able to be democratic and free in a world dominated by power and national interests. Democracy and freedom are prerequisites for social progress.

Pan-Africanism, as a political realist ideology, requires that one becomes aware of who one is, where one stands in international politics, what one possesses, what one is capable of producing, the way to consume cultural or material production, and where one plans to go from here. International relations and politics are strongly influenced by these factors, but to participate productively

in these relationships, the major decisions must be made at the local or regional level. Though I am underlining the need for focusing on the implications of Pan-Africanism on regional conditions and its potential solutions to social problems, an important point is that all solutions also must be part of a larger political unit. Pan Africanism is, above all, an international phenomenon and, as such, it should deal with power and interest and their dynamics in the international arena: international political forums and international political economy.

A realist Pan-Africanism is not a separatist ideology. Rather, it is a development ideology that may lead to alternative development and policy options. From the viewpoint of Africa, the economic linkages between Africa and the industrial powers, as reflected in the conditions of underdevelopment, have failed to improve the living conditions of African people. These linkages have been consistent with slavery on a massive scale and with the colonial design of Africa. To move away from this design, Pan-Africanist ideology articulates the need for a selective approach to development organisations. Another element in the debate deals with the potential contribution of the African Diaspora, which includes African people who live and are citizens of continents other than Africa.

### **What should be Africans' contribution to the Diaspora?**

The focus in this section is on African Americans. What would the contributions of the African Diaspora in the United States, for instance, be to the African development effort and its policies through this ideology? What would the nature of such a contribution be? And how would it be operationalised? Further, how can we fuse the 'Pan-Negro' sentiments in the United States with the Pan-African ones in Africa?

Political stability, social cohesion, economic progress of Africa, and positive images about the continent will boost cultural identity in the Diaspora. It will bring pride that cannot be quantified in economic and political terms.

The perception of Africa in the United States, for instance, as projected by the media, United States' foreign policy, conservative organisations, and popular culture, is consistently one of the 'dark

continent/Tarzan movies'. Unfortunately, very little has changed, even more than four centuries after slavery began and was followed by colonialism and neo-colonialism. After the independence of many African countries, the images of hunger, starvation, and wars—for instance, in Nigeria, the Congo, the Horn of Africa, and Southern Africa—have consolidated the stereotypical perceptions of Africa. In the 1990s, the images of extensive starvation and massive displacement of people and refugee problems have been reinforced in the United States' perceptions of Africa. The collapse of states such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the DRC, and Haïti has added another dimension to the way in which Africans have been evaluated in the US. There are many people in the United States who believe that Africans are incapable of governing themselves.

A critical approach of looking at Africa objectively and historically has not been part of scholarship in the United States, nor in its foreign policy. The majority of the African Americans, especially those who do not have a strong political consciousness or an advanced formal education, have also rejected Africa or are reluctant to accept or associate themselves with it because Africa is widely considered the initial cause of their problem. It is difficult for anyone to identify him or herself with a world or culture that is constantly perceived and projected in his or her milieu as static, chaotic, or even anarchic, though in reality this may not be the case.

Another element that should be mentioned is that, since the 1980s, American society at large has become more conservative after many years of right-wing administrations. The effects of the civil rights movements have receded as the US claims a status of the only 'superpower' (hyperpower). After the collapse of the communist institutions in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Africa, the American people have been told that the US is the only world leader. Undoubtedly, the bombings and invasions of other countries, such as Libya, Grenada, Nicaragua, Panama, and Iraq, have created the psychology of 'superiority' and of temporary reconciliation, even among poor Americans. Indeed, those invasions were fully supported by the American people, including many African Americans who are unable to connect the crushing of other countries or people by the US government and their own conditions. They have been firmly supportive of the United States' flag, despite the fact that it is the

poor people who are paying most of the price for these political adventures. During the Republican administrations, more money has been allocated to defense programmes and to making war than for social alleviation, which would be beneficial to the poor, especially to African Americans.

These conservative tendencies also are prevalent among African Americans. An ordinary African-American perceives Africa as the land of problems or conflicts, and he/she does not seem to have anything to offer to Africa or, for that matter, to gain in being associated with Africa. Many African-American yuppies of the Judge Clarence Thomas or the Stephen Carter kind have made personal and conscious decisions to become Republicans. They have thus dissociated themselves from their own history and culture in order to pursue personal careers. Moreover, they believe in the natural law theory and individual effort. Politically, they can be considered by some progressive forces as opportunistic, but they represent a real political and intellectual tendency among those African Americans who have succeeded in integrating the American system's dominant values—the so-called 'American Dream'.

Although the concept of the 'melting pot' has not worked because of the United States' obsession with racial classification, conservative forces claim that individual effort can make a difference in terms of his/her personal social mobility. Many of those conservative African Americans do not seem to have any specific agenda for Africa, apart from that of the United States government. Indeed, they did support conservative or reactionary African leaders. The late Mobutu of Zaïre, for instance, despite his atrocities and kleptocratic practices, was supported by some African American congressmen, such as Marvyn Dymally, for many years. Nevertheless, African Americans have a lot to offer to a realistic Pan-Africanist agenda, and they have a role and place within this ideology. They also have a lot to gain from it; the game is one of mutual benefit and reciprocity.

The starting point has to be developed as an umbrella of economic and cultural cooperation between Africa and the African Diaspora within a framework of a clearly articulated political agenda. The same groups could also serve as lobbies for Africa in the United States. However, this project cannot work without a firm understanding of, and cultural and historical appreciation between, Africans and

the African Americans. It is in the educational field and in social and political organisations that this issue can be best introduced. This process also has to be reciprocal. African institutions, as well as African American institutions and programmes, must exchange students, scholars, and data on a systematic basis. This would help contribute to the necessary changes in the conception of Africa among many African Americans, from an imaginary cultural symbolism to a political and social reality with all its contradictions. Simultaneously, African people and leaders may start to understand the social experience and the value of the contribution of African Americans in the US. This can be a process of global consciousness-making in both Africa and the US.

The cause of South Africa was much more popularised in the US than in many other industrial countries. In many respects, it was taken seriously in the US Congress, despite the strong support for apartheid by the Reagan-Bush administrations. This is largely thanks to the special efforts of African American organisations such as TransAfrica, PUSH, and progressive forces, including other African American special interest groups. In the 1960s, the civil rights movement and other more radical movements such as Black Power succeeded in challenging the United States legal system. They were also psychologically influenced by the dynamics of the African independence movements. African Americans fighting for their political, social, and legal rights, or for the right to citizenship in the US, also had a powerful impact on the nationalist movements in Africa. The Kwame Nkrumahs, the George Padmores, and the Jomo Kenyattas were among those intellectual and political actors who incorporated some of the African American thoughts and strategies in Africa. Most members of the then emerging African ruling class attended the 5th Pan-African Congress, organised by George Padmore (who became the dominant leftist figure in the Pan-Africanist movement in Manchester), held in October 1945.

In the late 1950s and the early 1960s, nationalist movements in Africa created a strong sense of psychological support for the political challenges and struggles in the United States. Many African Americans carefully followed the events in Africa. In fact, at one time, African leaders like Patrice Lumumba, Julius Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah, Albert Luthuli, and Jomo Kenyatta were even more

popular among African American activists and fighters than among many groups of Africans on the continent. Without any doubt, there are dynamic correlations between what happens in the US among African Americans and what goes on in Africa at the political level.

When Andrew Young became the US representative to the United Nations, he used his civil rights approach to foreign policy and his respect for African culture and history, and thus the perception of Africa became relatively different among many Americans during the Carter administration. At that time, Africa was not continuously viewed as an exotic, anarchic, and poor geographical and social area, as it is currently generally perceived in the US among its populace, policy makers, and scholars. President Carter himself visited some African countries and some African dictators and political villains, like the late Mobutu of Zaïre, barely survived as the US cut their allowances and military assistance. During this time, many African Americans began to be proud of their historical and cultural roots in Africa.

But in the 1980s and 1990s, with the coming to power of the Republicans, the rise of racism in the US, and the deterioration of economic and social conditions in Africa due to internal and external factors, especially the effects of the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the World Bank and the IMF, the perception of Africa in the US went back to square one.

After the release of Nelson Mandela after 27 years in prison, and upon his international saviour-like trip to the US, his symbolism succeeded in again mobilising African Americans behind what he represents: the struggle for freedom, justice, and equality for Africans. The participation of African American business, political, and religious groups was unprecedented in working together with the federal and state governments in order to organise Mandela's trip and arrange his public meetings, interviews, and security. This solidarity shows that Africa is still a symbol of identification among the majority of the American Africans, and this symbol can play a transformative role if it is taken politically.

However, we have to distinguish between the level of cultural and historical symbolism and the political and economic realities. How would African Americans participate in the political model that I am articulating in this paper, namely realist Pan-Africanism,

without transforming themselves to be de facto representatives of the US foreign policy, or the dominant ideology? How would they dissociate themselves from the interests of US power in interacting with Africa? A certain scepticism, based on the history of US-African relations, is relevant here.

Although the historical context has changed and history may not repeat itself, the experience of what happened in the political history of Liberia is still vivid in the memories of many people in Africa, especially after the collapse of the Liberian state following the assassination of president Samuel K. Doe in September 1990 and the subsequent tragic power struggle that led to a civil war. Recall that Liberia was formed by the American Colonization Society (ACS) in 1822 for blacks in the US. Some blacks from the West Indies also settled in Liberia. It was supported by abolitionists, both blacks and whites, and Liberia was conceived as the land of freedom for free blacks in the Diaspora. In 1847, it proclaimed its independence from the ACS and became the first free black state in Africa. It has never been formally colonised by the Western powers, though it became a neo-colonial state par excellence. But through the power/state formation and power consolidation, free blacks from the US produced one of the worst segregationist, racist, and sexist societies in contemporary Africa.

In short, instead of advancing the cause of freedom, as reflected in the preamble of their constitution, 'the love of liberty brought here', they reproduced the social contradictions of US society in Africa, especially its obsession with racial distinctiveness. They kept power for themselves through the True WHIG (With Hope in God) party, which was the ruling party for more than one hundred years until the violent and bloody military coup d'état which brought the late Doe to power in April 1980. In short, the state and ruling class of Liberia are responsible for most of the contradictions and social atrocities that have been produced in that country. Though the ruling class was black (or people of the black race), its behaviour was consistent with that of a colonial power. The African Liberians were subjected to the same oppressive laws as those of other parts of Africa and, in some instances, it was even worse. The game was that of power and interests.

The concept of racial unity and its policy implications did not work in Liberia. Collectively, the Americo-Liberians saw themselves

as Americans first, for the natural law and the previous historical experiences prevailed in this case. Though the political context has changed both in Africa and in the US, the question of how African Americans would participate in the new Pan-Africanist movement and ideology in Africa without reproducing the social and philosophical contradictions of their own social and political milieu is still valid. In the case of Liberia, many people believe that only real democratisation of Liberia will change the roots and structures of social tensions. Blyden, two centuries back, promoted some similar ideas of hybrid Pan-Africanism.

The large-scale development that I am talking about will not be possible without financial investments, human power resources, technology, sound management policies, and conscious leadership. African Americans have developed important communities in the business class, among scholars and among political activists. These groups, including the black proletariat, may be able to offer an alternative sort of assistance that is not comparable to that of Europe and other industrial countries in Africa, especially if this assistance is based on some clear political objectives and political consciousness. These interactions will not be possible if African states do not change their investment codes and their economic and cultural relations (or their political economies) with the former colonial powers in order to allow more investments from African Americans. Within the logic and political philosophy of a selective approach, these groups can bring their input in specific areas without damaging the theory I am developing here. But how they would dissociate from the ideology, attitude, and interests of power is questionable. This must seriously be debated.

To improve the level of communication and understanding that I am articulating here, the political reality and context have to be taken seriously. With the exception of the constitution of Liberia, in which it is stated that only people of black origins can become citizens, most African constitutions are open or flexible on the question of citizenship. Citizenship and its rights can only be looked at and appreciated in terms of responsibility and loyalty to a collective idea or ideal. Generally, countries of immigrants are more flexible on this question than those which are not. In many countries, only citizens can have certain rights, own certain properties, or invest in certain



corporations. Of course, this limits the capacity of such a country to benefit from non-citizens' capabilities and resources. Within a realist Pan-Africanism, the issue of the double citizenship of the African and African Americans must be addressed.

I am of the view that if African Americans and Afro-Brazilians, among others, are consciously engaged in African development or in the emancipatory causes of Africa, why not give them opportunities to do so fully by offering them either citizenship or permanent *carte de séjour* (green card, *à l'Américaine*), if one wishes to do so? The African Americans presumably would also use their constitutional rights in the US to help Africans advance the same rights. They could also bring their know-how, investments, and managerial skills to help Africans establish their firms and corporations. The experience of African Americans in selected areas—for instance, the well-known efficient management of Ethiopian Airlines—is a good indicator of the rich contribution the expertise of the African Diaspora could make to Africa. However, this effort may elicit strong opposition from the states if they are not transformed into a larger political community. The promotion of common areas of interests between Africans and African Americans can facilitate the needed dialogical relations and economic cooperation approaches to which I am alluding here. The opening of African countries' borders to the African Diaspora (from the United States, South and Central America and the Caribbean) may bring about new dynamics in the relations among African people the world over. Those relations can be even more dynamic within the framework of resource management of the regional community. But if those relations are dominated mainly by the capitalist economic ethos, the chance that they may lead to social conflicts cannot be ignored.

### **The Organisation of African Unity and the Pan-African idea**

The OAU is now part of history as it has been replaced by the African Union (AU). However, learning from such a history and its contradictions allows us to be critical of the existing African Union and its philosophy. What were the OAU's contributions to Pan-African objectives? Was the OAU a real Pan-African organisation?

On May 25, 1963, with the participation of all independent African countries, the OAU was finally formed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It was created as an ideological and institutional compromise among various political tendencies that developed among African nationalists in the 1950s and early 1960s.

What kind of compromise was it? What were the intended objectives of the political actors and leaders involved at the time? And how is Africa perceived in the OAU? Because much has been said about the OAU, only a brief comment is needed here to clarify my position and support my perspective.

I should restate the point that, with the creation of the OAU, Kwame Nkrumah's ambition to realise the formation of a continental union government as a political reality and a monumental dream were defeated by the African heads of state. The OAU became, rather, a symbol for unity and a basis for articulating functional economic cooperation. Prior to the creation of the OAU, several political blocs were formed on the continent. In December 1959, for example, Kwame Nkrumah convened the first All African People's Conference in Accra, Ghana. This conference called for a commonwealth of all African states, a commonwealth that was going to transcend ethnic, linguistic, ideological, and colonial or nation-state boundaries. The most important resolution adopted in the conference was the drafting of the constitution, which included a provision for a United States of Africa or union government. All the independent African states were present, and most African nationalist political organisations sent their delegates as well, including those from the Belgian Congo.

The African évolués in the Belgian Congo, as it is commonly known, were not politically very active and visible in the struggle for independence before 1958, as was the case in other countries because of the nature of colonial policies. But after this conference, Patrice Lumumba and Gaston Diumi, among those who attended the conference, brought back with them the spirit of Pan-Africanism, and this quickly had an impact on the nationalist movements in the Congo, especially on *the Mouvement National Congolais* /Lumumba (MNC/L).

Between the 1959 conference and the second All African People's Conference, held in Tunis in 1960, many political events in the continent and in the metropolitan countries contributed to determine

the positions of many African nationalists vis-à-vis Pan-Africanism. Following many discussions, meetings, and consultations, three political blocs emerged as African élites were trying to deal with the mechanisms of decolonisation. These blocs reflected their reactions and positions toward the idea and proposition of the formation of the United States of Africa and their relations to the former colonial powers.

The leaders of Nigeria, a demographically and economically powerful country in Africa, opposed the idea of the union. It artificially allied itself with Côte d'Ivoire, other former French colonies, and Liberia to form what was known as the Monrovia bloc. The influence of Charles De Gaulle in the former French colonies forced Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, Léopold Sedar Senghor of Sénégal, Hamani Diori of Niger, among others, to dissociate themselves from the Nigerian-dominated bloc and form the Brazzaville bloc. Indeed, France and De Gaulle were particularly influential in the former French colonies. With the exception of Sékou Touré of Guinea-Conakry, all the leaders of those former colonies voted yes in the 1958 referendum, forcing them to remain part of the broader French community under the domination of Paris. The Brazzaville bloc's position was for a functionalist approach, namely cooperation in economic and military relations. This position was also very much ideological: they feared a radical Nkrumahist union government because this idea was ideologically socialist and Pan-Africanist at once. But in 1962, despite the tendencies of the power struggle and a suspicion that had developed between Houphouët-Boigny and the Nigerian political élites, the Monrovia and the Brazzaville blocs merged into the Lagos group which strongly rejected the idea of the union government or the political integration of sovereign states that they considered to be immature at that time. Further, they did not define when this idea might become mature in the political development of the African politics.

The Casablanca bloc was mainly formed by the North African countries under the strong influence of Nasser of Egypt. It included Ghana and Guinea-Conakry. In East Africa, Tom Mboya (Kenya) and Milton Obote (Uganda) were strong supporters of the union government approach. It also should be said that the solidarity of the Casablanca group was not based on a common ideology, but rather

on strategic preference. Morocco was not a progressive state, for instance, but it joined the group to seek its support for its territorial dispute with the Western/Spanish Sahara. In general, four elements characterised the political situation in the above blocs:

- (a) Tendencies toward power struggles and personality conflicts among the leaders;
- (b) Ideological determinism of each bloc;
- (c) The impact of the metropolitan powers on the political choice of the new states;
- (d) A differing time perspective on the evolution of African politics.

It is with this political situation, as is reflected in the above characteristics, that the question of unity was debated until finally the political leaders of the independent states voted against it in 1963. The African states were polarised on ideological, personality politics, nation-state and historical differences, and the Cold War struggle. These states were 'trivialized' in international affairs and domestic and national power struggles, and they were not looking at what an independent Africa should be in the 21st century and beyond or what its public policy basis should be.

From the time of its formation, up to the early 1990s, the OAU functioned as a symbolic institution of unity, and its function was shaped mainly by this political symbolism. It should be emphasised that all the ideological conflicts which reflected international power alliances during the Cold War were also influential in the OAU summits and political discourse. Indeed, the Western powers did influence the OAU debates and policies through the channels of the client regimes of their former colonies or neo-colonial power puppet regimes. In this sense, it functioned as a microcosm of the international power struggle. The United States, which did not have former colonies in Africa, also succeeded in penetrating the Organisation through its client regimes, including those of Mobutu of Zaïre, King Hassan of Morocco, Nemeiri of Sudan, Tubman and Doe of Liberia. It also used French connections to advance its cause. Thus, the agenda of the Western powers to stop Africa from formulating its own developmental and political projects was always present in the deliberation processes of the OAU meetings.

Bloc politics weakened the organisation and its policies, and this did not allow state members to see clearly the degree of seriousness of the economic, political, and social problems with which Africa has been faced. I must also add another factor in the discussion: it is a fact that two-thirds of the Arab people live on the African continent (or are Africans), and they are also members of the OAU. Therefore, the question of the Palestinians has been an important agenda item in the organisation. And pro-Israeli states also have had a strong constituency in the organisation.

However, concerning its behaviour in international fora, it attempted, sometimes successfully and other times not so, to formulate common positions. On the positive side, the position of the OAU against apartheid was firm and consistent. It supported the freedom fighters in Southern Africa militarily, financially, politically, and morally through a special committee of frontline states. Though some individual countries were secretly or openly doing business with the apartheid state, especially in the areas of transportation, trade, and military equipment, the apartheid system did not have, in terms of open diplomacy and politics, supporters in the OAU. Given the intensity of the debates on apartheid, some scholars even asked what the OAU role would be in African politics after a free Namibia and South Africa. For instance, the decision of the African states to halt their relations with the state of Israel in the 1970s, after the 1977 six-day Israel-Egyptian war, was commonly implemented, even if many states continued to enjoy special relations with the state of Israel in several sectors such as agriculture, military and national intelligence arrangements. But generally, they partially transcended their ideological particularities and former colonial borders.

In the 1981, the Lagos Plan of Action was created as a genuine progressive programme for regional development. It was never implemented. It was replaced by the SAPs of the World Bank and stability programmes of the International Monetary Fund.

In the 1990s, especially with Salim Ahmed Salim, a nationalist Tanzanian and General Secretary of the OAU, most debates in the organisation took on a strongly Pan-Africanist tone rather than a sub-regional one. On the debates concerning the African economic crisis and how to deal with it, the position taken by the OAU in Addis Ababa, with a strong initiative and directive from the United

Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UN ECA) under the leadership of Professor Adedeji Adebayo, comprised a collective and determined effort.

One of the most important decisions was taken on June 3-5, 1991, at the OAU summit in Abuja, Nigeria by thirty-four African political leaders, which was the signature of the treaty for the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC). This initiative was the most important ideal ever to have been initiated by the OAU and the UN ECA. It came as a result of the individual failures of most national economic policies to deal with the conditions of underdevelopment. This option was an effort to approach African social and economic problems collectively from an African perspective. Between May 1993, when a Pan-African Conference on Reparations was organised by the OAU together with the Nigerian Government in Abuja, Nigeria, and the July 2001 summit in Lusaka, Zambia, where the African leaders agreed to form an African Union (AU), the Pan-African project took on a different perspective and form.

### **The political significance of regional economic organisations in the deconstruction and the reconstruction of African states**

In general terms, economic organisations were not constructed to advance Pan-African causes. They were essentially a part of the dynamics of global capitalism. How would these functioning economic arrangements fit into the momentum of a transnational ideology? As indicated earlier, the existing sub-regional economic organisations are antithetical to the ideal of African unity. Their structures slow down the vision and the processes of the continental identification, for they were designed in such a way that they provided much more power to the states as state-centric institutions. Heads of state have more authority than the rotated chairpersons or the executive secretariat, in the cases of the ECOWAS or the ECCAS. That is to say, they are politically rigid because they have been built within the structures and logic of state sovereignty. Despite this structural problem, the sub-regional organisations can offer their contributions to the ideas and argument of unity, though

my position is that they must first be transformed if they have to attain the objectives of realist Pan-Africanism.

In addition to this design problem, these organisations are project-based. Thus, in most cases, they lack the broader vision articulated through realist Pan-Africanism. As project-based regional developments, most of these organisations, like SADC, tend to enhance the existing vertical integration into the northern hemisphere rather than promoting horizontal cooperation among the member states. This is mainly because the projects themselves are either northern-initiated or almost entirely funded by northern donors. There are, therefore, obvious attractions in project-based organisations for many people in the northern hemisphere.

However, the sub-regional organisations can contribute to a realist Pan-Africanism in many dimensions. First, they can popularise the concept of trans-national relations among African states, countries, and people, and they can enhance the needs for cross-boundaries politics. Thus, African nations' specific political history, their geographical location, and their political implications in world politics can be appreciated more if they are firmly founded on a broader ideological basis. Second, despite the rigidity of the organisations vis-à-vis the African states and their less rigid relations with the industrial powers, these organisations have the potential to promote some forms, loose or firm, of federation.

Another reason sub-regional organisations can contribute to a realist Pan-Africanism, is that they promote some forms of *rapprochement* among the African states. Despite the ideological and policy differences, and even wars among them, the *rapprochement* that has taken place may also foster more dialogue, especially within the context of the current spirit of 'democratic movements'. Like any *rapprochement*, this one also functions on the assumption that states can work together effectively on some specific and general forms of collective consensus basis. The general form of consensus has to be based on the notion that states and people have a common enemy—underdevelopment—and its social implications, factors, and forces that promote the miseries of Africa. The specific form of consensus refers to multilateral agreements and/or pacts among African states and nations to deal with the conditions in which some countries find themselves.

Though the realist pan-African claim is based on the need to search for a broad continental ideology for development, rather than on a segmented cultural argument per se, cultural realities within sub-regional organisations must be seriously considered. Many people, ethnic groups, and social classes in the sub-regions do have many more social and cultural characteristics in common than they have differences. The appreciation of a common culture and the injection of culture into local projects can promote development. In fact, development cannot occur without such cultural support, for culture is the bridge to development. For example, logically it may be easier to choose and promote cultural elements for the purpose of more cooperation and consolidation of the relations in each sub-region than to impose an 'alien' cultural pattern on all the sub-regions. It may be more difficult to recommend, for example, Kiswahili as a regional language in West Africa than to do so in East Africa, including Zaïre, because of the historical affinities with such a language in those areas.

My observation is that many common cultural elements in each sub-region, because of their fluidity and common functions and usefulness, can become means for promoting the causes and spirit of a realist Pan-Africanism. For instance, not so long ago, we were forced to learn French, English, Portuguese, and Spanish, and now they functionally have become part of our national cultures. We can learn African languages but not in the brutal way we were forced to learn the European languages. Much depends on the political will of the African people and their leaders. The non-cultural elements—for example, small common informal or petty trades or works of arts among the people—can also be encouraged and even promoted by the states in neighbouring countries.

Africans need to build real federalism based on the sub-regional organisations. If they are structurally transformed, they can become very relevant in the promotion of a trans-national ideology of development.

Kwame Nkrumah advocated this kind of federalism, in which independent states could form a larger and more comprehensive political union. Under his leadership, Ghana's foreign policy was largely shaped by the concept of African unity. However, he was not supported by many of his fellow African heads of state, despite



the fact that many leaders talked about encouraging economic cooperation as a means toward Pan-Africanism. Julius Nyerere, for instance, opposed the idea of federation, even at the Eastern Africa level, because he believed that the white settlers in Kenya could dominate the political and economic situation. Later on, however, he supported the idea of the East African Economic Community.

This rehabilitation was due to the fact that African leaders and many intellectuals, especially those who were engaged in the critical assessment of Western scholarship and its policy implications in Africa, realised that national policies based on the state-centric structures and approaches have failed to improve most African social conditions. In many ways, Africans are hostages to the states' arrogance and corruption. Thus, to be liberated, that is to say, in order to set up mechanisms for development, they need to initiate policies and create new means of implementing those policies. Processes of establishing this federalism must be fully democratic, and democracy is the only bargaining and negotiating mechanism that can be used among our diverse cultures, ideologies, boundaries and political objectives to reach consensus. Without any doubt, this democracy cannot be reduced merely to the rituals of rights and voting: it is a right to life itself. In this sense, democracy is normatively good in itself.

As discussed earlier, with few exceptions, the African state in its current form is essentially militaristic and elitist. It behaves as a mechanism through which the interests of a few are articulated and secured while the interests of the majority of people are disarticulated. Thus, they are themselves alienated from their own history and labour.

### **State security and Pan-Africanism**

The existing concept of security articulated by the African state is inadequate and irrelevant because it is narrowly militaristic. The Pan-African concept of security must be comprehensive. It must include social and economic security, respect of human dignity and life, and physical safety. However, African states, just as states elsewhere, justify their militaristic and police behaviour and actions on the

basis of the claim to the security of the state. And they have been spending more millions of dollars annually in the area of security than for education and health services.

Since the 1960s, there have been more than 150 incidences of violent disputes among African states. More than 70 of them have been about the claims to protect colonial boundaries. More than 50 of the conflicts have led to wars. In 1998 alone, 18 African states were at war and 11 other countries faced internal civil unrest (Geiss, 1974, p. 30). Most of those states have developed a paranoia syndrome vis-à-vis their opposition: most of them tend to see their enemies on every corner of cities or towns of both their own countries and of neighbouring countries. Members of the opposition party are considered real enemies to the state and the people.

All this has contributed to the creation of state insecurity in Africa for at least four reasons:

- (a) They do not have a strong and genuine local base.
- (b) Their policies are intrinsically antagonistic; that is to say, in terms of the distribution of revenues, they widen the gap between the rich and poor social classes.
- (c) They have been essentially undemocratic until recently.
- (d) They are also heavily dependent on the industrial powers for military, financial, and economic survival.

In short, the conditions of underdevelopment, or those of peripheral capitalism, make the African states essentially insecure. If these conditions are transformed or improved, will they still be insecure?

The view that I advance here is that it is less likely that the current forms of the states will continue to behave in a militaristic manner if the conditions and structures conducive to such behaviour are removed or cease to exist. In other words, security is another existential expression of the state. Changes in the structure of the state would also affect security objectives in a given context. NATO and the Warsaw Pact were good examples of this: with the end of the Soviet Union, the structures of the security system have profoundly changed in the former USSR, in Europe, and in the United States.

In addition, it should be noted that security arrangements in many African countries have been directed against the people (and not against the real enemies of the people), who are generally poor and

against those segments of society which cannot defend themselves. In recent years, women, students, lumpen-proletarians, and peasants, have been the particular targets of the security arm of states. Many have been attacked and tortured and even killed in the name of the security of the state. In short, the police and military systems in many African countries have been anti-people and anti-development. The security of the state is an instrument of the ruling classes, used to kill and destroy anything that can threaten their interests.

The argument based on realist Pan-Africanism is that security as politics should not be separated from economics, for it is also an economic issue. A state that can provide basic needs, develop infrastructures, and create mechanisms for the people's participation is the one that cares about the security of its citizens. African heads of state did not develop any real security system for the people or citizens. They have created only personal security agencies.

What would African people and federalist systems need in terms of the military dimensions of the security system? Changes in the conception of who are considered the real enemies of the state and the state's political agenda lead me to think that another security arrangement, in terms of military force, would be needed in Africa. It is argued that, as more economic and political systems are structurally integrated, less of the basis of conflicts will remain intact in the interactions among the African states. Realist Pan-Africanist government means that African states should have a strong basis for common development interests and projects as well as broader areas of consensus. This also means that they would cease to compete antagonistically for the same interests.

The collective security approach may decrease the chances of potential tensions among the federated states, as there will be common rules governing the behaviour of all the states. This approach should not follow the model of the hierarchy and structures of the United Nations, for these are too costly, and their bureaucracy is too slow and inefficient. The collective security approach should be built into the structures of a united government, to be promoted for the interests of all. Its operations must be decentralised, but its command system should be centralised. This may also decrease the chances of military coups d'état, as all the armies may be commanded by one higher military institution which would divide its responsibilities

into three structures: continental, regional, and national/state.

At the continental level, Africa cannot afford to adopt the Costa Rica model of choosing not to build a strong army. The history of nation-states and international capitalism show that building a defensive military system is a necessity as a deterrent force against internal and external aggression. What kind of military system, then, ought to be appropriate to the African conditions? Clearly, modern military systems are always costly to maintain, and their proper functioning depends heavily on the military technologies developed by the industrial powers. In 1960, Sylvanus Olympio of Togo attempted to develop a state without an army. He was overthrown by a military coup d'état in which he was violently assassinated by ex-French soldiers, led by Sergeant Eyadema, who became a general and the President of Togo. The coup leaders tried to argue for their incorporation into the Togolese security system. Though this position has not yet been documented, some scholars have argued that France was behind this coup because it disagreed with Olympio's political stance and the structure of the new state.

The question of the nature of the military systems to be adopted in Africa cannot fully be discussed in this paper because it is an enormously complex issue, one that necessitates continent-wide political debate. Generally, we should project stronger continental and regional military apparatuses and weaker national military structures.

Despite the fact that, with the exception of the North, Africa is not geographically located near the industrial powers, the political actions of Africa which may displace the interests and the role of the industrial powers will not be accepted by those powers because political elites in those countries, and most of their people, treat Africa as a collection of subordinate states and people. It is certain that strong African projects would be met with the politics of intimidation and with indifference, and they would also be the objects of political and perhaps even military attack. This is why it is realistically imperative to have a federal kind of defensive army to protect African value systems and people. Its ideology and mission would be to defend people and to contribute to the development projects. In the light of such a mission, what can we do with the existing military academies and training centres?

The existing military apparatuses should be the centres for reeducating soldiers. Their objectives can be converted to fit the purposes of the new approach to the new nature of African politics and international relations. Some of those centres could even be converted into institutions for social education and local factories of ideas or commodities. They can also be transformed into national police academies. Furthermore, the process for actualising this structural military transformation has to be democratic, and in a democratic process, those academies would better serve people. Systems of education, socialisation, curriculum, and a great many other systems will change to meet the needs and objectives set for the promotion and maintenance of Pan-Africanism.

## Conclusion

In the absence of a well-elaborated Pan-African social movement, and within the spirit of the existing multipartyism, imagining the creation of a Pan-African state as a concrete and realistic possibility, several processes must be articulated. Firstly, there is a need for creating a ministry of Pan-African affairs to replace the so-called ministries of integration or those of regional affairs. Given the fact that African political regimes are essentially presidential, this ministry should resort directly under the presidency. Secondly, each ministry should have a unit to deal with Pan-African affairs. Thirdly, we should introduce Pan-African curricula in all disciplines from the elementary schools to universities. Fourthly, realistic Pan-Africanism must promote gender equality. The role of African women must be considered as a human rights and development issue. Fifthly, rural and urban economic disparity must be combated. And lastly, the existing constitutions and the basis of the Africa's international relations must be debated and changed.

It should also be noted that realist Pan-Africanism defines Pan-Africanism as being essentially an international phenomenon. Its actualisation depends on how African people will be able to change the structures of their states. Critical approaches and perspectives were suggested in this paper to challenge the existing model of African state-centrism, precisely because of the way in which

it renders invisible the globalised African social and economic condition, while also trivialising cultural diversity issues.

It was argued that, if transformed by a Pan-African ideology and agenda, the African state can service better the African community. Realist Pan-Africanism also recognises particular economic needs and cultural and sociological identities as articulated in a given state. Pan-African political forces, namely political parties, research organisations, people's organisations, and political elites are under the obligation to capture the state apparatuses in order to transform them. Within the framework of a realist Pan-Africanism, Africans on the continent as well as Africans in the Diaspora will not be able to enforce and actualise Pan-Africanism until they capture the states. It is only after this phase that they would be able to re-define trade, economic, cultural and political relations between Africa and other states. For instance, until the African Americans in the United States take real state powers, they will not be able to project any kind of consistent functional Pan-Africanism in dealing with Africa even at the simple level of lobbying. We hope that the dynamics of American society and politics will produce, among the African Americans, more leaders like Cynthia McKinney, who have a sense of history, a solid understanding of the African conditions, and a commitment to promoting social progress.

Pan-Africanists should take advantage of the existing political pluralism to capture the existing state and transform it so that it can serve the African people.

In contrast to the neo-colonial ideology of the existing state, a realist Pan-Africanism is an ideology of development, which is articulated within a strong nationalistic perspective. It is neither militaristic in the classical European-American sense nor anti-people. Nor can it sustain itself in a situation of the strong, absolute state *à la* Hobbes, for it is only in a genuinely democratic and decentralised political and social environment that a realist Pan-Africanism can become a functioning political structure. I am here suggesting the possibility of building a strong federation and relatively 'weak', but highly decentralised states, and strong and democratic apparatuses as ways toward creating institutions in which people could fully participate in their political affairs. This democracy means also 'participatory budgeting' in all aspects of

the political structures. This kind of continental unity, which goes beyond any economic factor or argument, is possible only when the structures and objectives of such a unity are strongly reflected in the dynamics of the local market, politics, culture, and the state apparatuses. This kind of realism I have projected in this study is qualitatively different from the one developed in Europe and the United States, which supported euro-ethnocentrism, absolutism, and the extreme arrogance of the state. However, Pan-Africanism will not go far enough in its mission of actualising a Pan-African agenda until it transforms the state and becomes a guideline for Africa's progress and international affairs. It is my view that the realist Pan-Africanism can make African visible in positive and constructive ways in world affairs, against the extreme vulnerability the existing state system has created.

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