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Jomo Kenyatta: An Epitome of Indigenous Pan-Africanism, Nationalism and Intellectual Production in Kenya

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Abstract

This paper discusses the late Jomo Kenyatta, founding President and Head of State of the Republic of Kenya. The paper focuses on Kenyatta as a pioneer and giant African Pan-Africanist, nationalist and intellectual. As a pan-Africanist, the late Kenyatta together with other founding presidents Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Patrice Lumumba of the Republic of Congo, Leopold Senghor of Senegal among others joined hands in spreading the message and values of pan-Africanism which emphasized a form of intellectualism, and political and economic co-operation that would lead to the political unity of Africa. The pan-Africanist spirit, advocated that riches of Africa be used for the benefit, upliftment, development and enjoyment of African people. It is the outstanding African scholars, political scientists, historians and philosophers living in Africa and the Diaspora who developed pan-Africanism that was conceived in the womb of Africa and a product made in Africa by Africans. The paper will focus on Kenyatta`s role in fostering pan-African ideologies for the continent of Africa. Having been influenced by nationalism, Kenyatta sought to address the inter-related issues of power, identity politics, self-assertion and autonomy for Kenya, himself and the African continent. His activities in his struggle for independence and democratic governance in Kenya evidence this. His role in initiating the spirit of Harambee (development through collective pooling of resources) among the diverse ethnic groups of Kenya is particularly well recognized, appreciated and approved by Kenyans. This paper will also seek to give a critical examination of the challenges faced

and caused by Kenyatta as a statesman in his leadership styles especially the way he dealt with emerging opposition in his cabinet. Finally, the paper seeks to discuss Kenyatta the intellectual. As a trained anthropologist and author, Kenyatta contributed immensely to knowledge production in Kenya and Africa as a continent. This is evidenced in his book, Facing Mount Kenya*, which talks about his ethnic group, the Gikuyu, and their traditional way of life.*

Introduction

There are many who celebrate Africa on the move, while remaining paralysed with pessimism – they prefer simply pontificating on the future. The year 2003 has been momentous in many ways and NEPAD debate and African renaissance offer genuine political opportunities for African unity and cooperation. Appropriately, Kenya has been at the forefront of supporting the idea of African unity and the search for new forms of economic relations. Jomo Kenyatta, as one of the leaders of Kenya, distinguished himself in his vision and resolute action for the liberation of the continent.

First, this paper seeks to examine Kenyatta's background within the African context. It is not my intention to detail here, a biography of this great African statesman, for this will be a labour of sanctimonious indulgence, indeed an exercise of futility since many African and Africanist scholars have done so more extensively. However, allow me to briefly state that Kenyatta was born at Ng'enda in the Gatundu Division of Kiambu in the year 1889 to Muigai and Wambui. He was later baptized and given a Christian name John Peter, which he changed to Johnstone and later to Jomo in 1938. He lived among Maasai relatives in Narok during World War I. While staying in Narok, Kenyatta worked as a clerk to an Asian trader and after the war, he served as a storekeeper to a European firm. During this time, he began wearing his beaded belt (Ochieng and Ogot 1996).

Kenyatta married his first wife Grace Wahu in 1920. Between 1921–26, he worked in the Nairobi City Council water department. Though he owned land and a house at Dagoretti, he preferred to live closer to town at Kilimani in a hut and cycled home during weekends. By 1925, he was one of the leaders of the Kikuyu

Central Association (KCA), a party, which chose him to represent the Kikuyu land problems before the Hilton Young Commission in Nairobi, thus starting his career in politics. In 1928, he published his newspaper, *Muigwithania*, which dealt with Kikuyu culture and new farming methods. The Kikuyu Central association (KCA) sent him to England in 1929 to influence British opinion on tribal land.

In 1931, Kenyatta again went to England to present a written petition to Parliament where he met Mahatma Gandhi of India in November 1932. After giving evidence before the Morris Carter Commission, he proceeded to Moscow to learn Economics but was forced to return to Britain by 1933. During the gold rush, land in Kakamega reserve was being distributed to settlers. This made Kenyatta very angry and he spoke about Britain's unjust activities. For this reason he was dubbed a communist by the British. Kenyatta taught Gikuyu at the University College, London and also wrote a book on the Kikuyu language in 1937. Under Professor Malinowski, he studied Anthropology at the London School of Economics. In 1938, his book, *Facing Mount Kenya* that talked about Kikuyu customs saw the light of day.

During World War II, Kenyatta served on a farm in the United Kingdom, while owning his own farm there; he married Edna Clarke, his second wife 1942. Along with other African leaders, including Nkrumah of Ghana, he took part in the Fifth Pan-African Congress of 1945 in Manchester. When he returned to Kenya in 1946, he married his third wife Wanjiku. But Kenyatta was perhaps not as whimsical as it he might appear with respect to marriage. It is believed that he used polygamy to win political support especially among the Kikuyu tribe. During his travels in the countryside at Kiambu, Murang'a and Nyeri, he took the opportunity to contact the local people and to speak to them. His fourth and last wife was Mama Ngina. In 1947, he took over the leadership of Kenya African Union (KAU) from James Gichuru (Ochieng and Ogot 1996).

In 1952, October 20, Sir Evelyn Baring, newly appointed Governor of Kenya of two weeks, declared a state of emergency in the country. Jomo Kenyatta and other prominent leaders were arrested. His trial at Kapenguria on April 8, 1953, for managing Mau Mau was a mockery of justice (Muoria 1994). He was sentenced to 7 years in prison with hard labor and to indefinite restrictions thereafter. On

April 14, 1959, Jomo Kenyatta completed his sentence at Lokitaung but remained in restriction at Lodwar. He was later moved to Maralal, where he remained until August 1961. On August 14, 1961, he was allowed to return to his Gatundu home and on 21 August, 1961, nine years after his arrest, Kenyatta was freed from all restrictions (Muoria 1994).

On October 28, 1961, Kenyatta became the President of the Kenya African National Union and a month later, he headed a KANU delegation to London for talks to prepare the way for the Lancaster House Conference. On June 1, 1963, Mzee Kenyatta became the first Prime Minister of self-governing Kenya. At midnight on December 12, 1963, at Uhuru Stadium, amid world leaders and multitudes of people, the Kenya flag was unfurled and a new nation was born. A year later on December 12, 1964, Kenya became a Republic within the Commonwealth, with Kenyatta as the President.

Kenyatta died on 22 August 1978 in Mombasa at the age of 89 years. President Kenyatta is acknowledged as one of the greatest men of the twentieth century (Ochieng and Ogot 1996). His reign will go down in history as a golden era in Kenya's positive development. Indeed, he was a beacon, a rallying point for suffering Kenyans to fight for their rights, justice and freedom. His brilliance gave strength and aspiration to people beyond the boundaries of Kenya, indeed beyond the shores of Africa. Just as one light shines in total darkness and provides a rallying point, so did Kenyatta become the focus of the freedom fight for Kenya over half a century to dispel the darkness and injustice of colonialism. Before matter can become light, it has to suffer the rigors of heat, so did Kenyatta suffer the rigorous of imprisonment to bring independence to Kenya? As the founding father of Kenya, and its undisputed leader, he came to be known as *Mzee*, Swahili word for a respected elder.

Kenyatta is seen as the leader who united all races and tribes for the freedom struggle, the orator who held his listeners entranced, the journalist who launched the first indigenous paper to voice his people's demands, the scholar who wrote the first serious study about his people, the teacher who initiated love for Kenya culture and heritage, the farmer who loved his land and urged his people to return to it, the biographer who documented his 'suffering without bitterness, the conservationist who protected Kenya's priceless fauna

and flora, the father figure who showered love and affection on all, the democrat who upheld the democratic principle of one-man one-vote, the elder statesman who counseled other Heads of State, and finally Kenyatta the visionary who had a glorious image of Kenya's future and toiled to realize it.

Since ideas are more enduring than human bodies and sacrifices last longer than sermons, the light that is Kenyatta burns on to illuminate the path of Kenya. According to Lonsdale, this is one quality that makes him difficult to understand,

> Kenyatta is conventionally seen as a consummate political fixer, a 'prince' rather than an ideological 'prophet' like his neighbour Nyerere of Tanzania. I wish to propose a more ideological Kenyatta. I do so by paying more attention to intellectual biography, and indeed to African theology and political thought, than is normal in African historiography (Lonsdale 2000).

Pan Africanism, Kenya and Kenyatta

According to Motsoko Pheko, Pan-Africanism advocates that the riches of Africa be used for the benefit, upliftment, development and enjoyment of African people. Pan-Africanism is a system of equitably sharing food, clothing, homes, education, health care, wealth, land, work, security of life and happiness. Pan-Africanism is the privilege of African people to love themselves and to give themselves and their way of life respect and preference. Pan-Africanism was developed by outstanding African scholars, political scientists, historians and philosophers living in Africa and the diaspora. It was conceived in the womb of Africa and a product made in Africa by Africans

The first pan-Kenyan nationalist movement in Kenya was led by Harry Thuku to protest against white-settler dominance. His party, the East African Association, traced its roots to the early Kikuyu political groups. Thuku was arrested by the colonial authorities in 1922 and exiled for seven years. He was released only after agreeing to cooperate with the colonial government, a decision that would undermine his leadership of the Kikuyus. This incident united Kenya's diverse African communities firmly together in their demands for freedom from British colonial rule (Wepman 1985).

In 1929, Kenyatta sailed to England to present the Association's case for freedom directly to the Colonial office, the British parliament and the British people. The Carter Land Commission was convened in 1931 to adjudicate land interests and Kenyatta once again presented evidence supporting the Association's cause. The findings of the Commission proved detrimental for the Africans however, it marked out permanent barriers between the white-owned farms and the African Land Units or "reserves." These boundaries were made into law five years later. As a result, the number of groups demanding greater African political power increased dramatically. The colonial government quickly reacted by banning all African political associations in 1940.

World War II only increased African discontent as many Africans fought side by side with their colonial overlords. Much like their American counterparts, during the five-year conflict, Africans were exposed to many new influences and developed an awareness that Europeans were far from invincible. Empowered by this new outlook, African veterans returned home to their respective countries only to face discrimination. Many rebelled against such unfair treatment. As discontent grew, the anti-colonial fervor swept across Africa (Throup and Hornsby 1998).

Jomo Kenyatta returned to Kenya in 1946 after 15 years of study and political activity in England in order to assume the leadership of the Kenya African Union (KAU). He became the next great Kenyan leader after Thuku. He quickly became the first propaganda secretary of the East African Association, and later the secretary-general of the Kikuyu Central Association.

As the fight for freedom grew, the Kikuyu formed secret societies united in desire to break British rule. These societies encouraged oath-taking ceremonies, which bound the participants to wage war against Europeans and any Africans who were thought to be collaborators. From this movement, the Kikuyu dominated the Mau Mau organization that had been formed. On October 20, 1952 the Mau Mau protested the midnight arrest of Jomo Kenyatta and five colleagues. Ninety-seven Africans considered to be collaborators were killed in what is today known as the Lari Massacre. Some Mau Mau however denied involvement in the affair, calling it a government plot. The British accused Kenyatta of organizing the Mau Mau rebellion and subjected

him to a rigged trial. It is during these events that Kenyatta and the others were found guilty and sentenced to seven years of hard labor at a remote camp near Lake Turkana.

The Mau Mau rebellion continued until 1956. During the three years of civil war, over 30,000 African men, women, and children were imprisoned in British concentration camps, many losing their homes and land as a result. Though only 100 Europeans were killed, the British massacred over 13,000 Africans during the course of the war. But the war was costly to the British, a scenario that made the colonial government finally concede some political power to the Africans with limited representation in the Legislative Council. Angry white settlers, not satisfied with anything short of a complete partition of the country, began to leave. Kenyatta was sentenced to two more years of prison, but was elected president 'in absentia' of the Kenya African National Union, or KANU (Muoria 1994).

While the Kenya African National Union (KANU) under the leadership of Kenyatta advocated for a strong central government, the newly formed Kenya African Democratic Union, or (KADU), favored a decentralized federal form of government. Leaders of both parties (KANU and KADU) attended talks at Lancaster House in England due to Kenyatta's continuing imprisonment. General elections were held for the first time in February 1961. KANU received more votes, but refused to participate in government until Kenyatta was released. The Asian Kenya Freedom Party and numerous independent candidates joined in the protest and, as political pressure built up, Kenyatta was finally released in August 1961.

KANU and KADU continued to debate on the eventual form of government most suited to a free Kenya. In the meantime, Kenyatta agreed to a coalition government until independence. The first universal elections in the country took place in May 1963, with an overwhelming victory for Kenyatta and the KANU party. On June 1, 1963, Jomo Kenyatta became the first Prime Minister of Kenya. In his inaugural address, he promoted a concept that would eventually become an official motto now incorporated in the county's coat of arms: *Harambee,* or *let us work together*, in building a free nation. Independence became a reality for Kenya on December 12, 1963. Nationalism in Africa has displayed a remarkable enduring resonance. In the more recent years, it has taken the enormous

integrity and courage of a Nelson Mandela to remind us what African nationalism was all about. However, during the two decades after independence, so many dictators had worn the mantle of nationalism that it is difficult to imagine it ever had popular support.

Kenyatta and his vision for African leadership

Forty years after Kenyan independence, the difference between liberation and social emancipation is becoming more apparent. Collective leadership and responsibility have by and large been missing from the top decision making processes in Africa in the past forty years. Instead, patriarchal forms of governance along with vanguardism were the political forms through which programmes of action were dictated to the producers. At an early moment in the independence of Kenya, there was a recognition of the centrality of these elements in the political process and the term *wananchi (citizens)* became part of the popular vocabulary (Wepman 1985). Now, ideas of individualism and private accumulation have replaced the commitment to emancipating Africa and her peoples from the destruction caused by four hundred years of contact with Europe.

According to Lonsdale (2000), Kenyatta saw the Modern World as a threat to moral and social order. At its worst, it caused the 'detribalisation' that deprived people of the will, and sense of purpose, that were needed to struggle for self-determination. Kenyatta worked out this view in the course of his own intellectual and moral journey. In the early years of his public life, in the 1920s, he had enthusiastically linked Christianity to the cultural reform of his people. By the 1930s, he had arrived at a more conservative God, partly because of what his fellow Christians seemed to be abandoning in Kikuyu culture, partly because of his Malinowskian anthropology, learned in London. This conservative political ideology came to dominate his political judgment.

There were three profound implications for Kenyatta's (and Kenya's) political practice, both in his leadership of anti-colonial nationalism, and as his country's first President:

> *Kenya's critical nationalities*, the moral crucibles for self-mastery, were the ethnicities that (in general) had acquired their own vernacular

> Bibles, Kenya's only common political primer.
>
> *Each nationality* owed it to its own sense of self-mastery to fight its own political battles. A pan-ethnic nationalism carried the risk of denying others the responsibility that they owed to themselves. And there were clear limits to a cultural project to destroy ethnicity as a moral community.
>
> If authority lay in virtuous labour that sustained one's own prosperity, rather than that of another (an employer), then a class politics in which the poor had the right of struggle was scarcely thinkable. (Lonsdale 1999).

The two points, on African unity and confidence in the youth will distinguish the African continent in the 21st century and the question for this conference and for serious thinkers in Africa will be how to develop the intellectual and political leadership to chart an economic and social course which breaks the forms of economic relations which have characterized the continent since the period of colonialism (Lonsdale 1999). Forty years of formal sovereignty have made it more possible to grasp the strength and weaknesses of an independence, which meant the Africanization of the structures of the colonial state. At the end of the twentieth century, one can also critique the cultural and gender bias which was built into concepts of African unity.

The transcendence of colonialism and racial degradation as goals of the African nationalist leadership inspired deals of continental unity but African feminists have exposed how the same nationalists have sanctioned the institutionalisation of gender differences. Nationalists have always been ambivalent on issues of African languages, cultures, and religion and have been as culpable as colonial overlords in ensuring that men and women, especially women who are producers, did not have the same rights and access to resources. In this sense, the goals of unity and liberation in this century have been a much masculinised concept. One sees this reproduced in the present period with the amount of ink flowing on the new leadership in Africa (Wepman 1985).

The issue of the content of African leadership has been the subject of numerous books, commentaries and meetings. Once the mass resistance to oppression exploded in the face of the colonisers,

there was an outpouring of projects to develop the correct 'Political Leadership in Africa' (Mazrui 1972). The obscene military dictatorships once experienced in Nigeria and other parts of Africa forced a retreat by those who celebrated the military as bearers of modernity in an earlier period. The democratic discussions, which take place at conferences and meetings, require some historical context to grasp who and what are the forces capable of maintaining democratic relations in Africa. Eusi Kwayana reminds us that once the popular rebellions began in the period of the second global war, the colonial offices of France and Britain wanted to find good leaders. The stress on individual leaders meant that the colonial office was always looking for the kind of leader with whom they could negotiate. Kwayana remarked that, 'The Colonial office in London also fostered the conception of leaderism by maintaining that without the leaders to stir up the people, they could contain the colonial uprisings' (Berman 1990).

Let me now briefly examine the questions of leadership and the intellectual traditions which have shaped African leaders in this century. One cannot speak of leadership without critiquing leaderism and those forms of party organization, which inhibit creativity. The organizational culture of centralised party structures has stifled the participation of the producers. Frantz Fanon was far ahead of his time when he spoke at length on the pitfalls of national consciousness. Kenyatta recognized the pitfalls of crude nationalism and at all times supported a Pan African agenda, which rose above petty nationalism. This presentation celebrates those aspects of this Pan African vision, which can enrich this vision for the liberation of Africa and the emancipation of humanity.

Kenyatta: Leadership and Intellectual tradition

Like Kenyatta, many political leaders of Africa's nations have displayed various patterns and styles of leadership. These styles according to Mazrui and Michael Tidy, often appear to be revolutionary or at least radical, because they are different from those bequeathed by the politicians of their former colonial powers. Westminster-style democratic leadership, based on open debate and

an open electoral process, which was inherited from the colonial masters at the time of decolonization, has disappeared almost everywhere in Africa and given way to different and often less democratic patterns of leadership. Yet these different patterns are not necessarily new in Africa. In some ways they follow the patterns established by Africa's great leaders of the past. Three styles of leadership which form elements of continuity between Africa's pre-colonial past and post-colonial present are: the Elder Tradition, the Sage Tradition, and the Warrior Tradition.

Intellectuals have defined intellectualism differently. Mazrui defines intellectualism as an engagement in the realm of ideas, rational discourse and independent inquiry. For its Head of state, Kenya had the nation's first black social anthropologist, Jomo Kenyatta- author of *Facing Mt. Kenya*. The period after most African countries attained their independencies has been called the golden age of high Pan-African ambitions and towering intellectuals in Africa. Both Pan-African and African intellectuals were flying high. Pan-Africanism was indeed still alive, but the progress of slippage had begun as Africans became less idealistic and more pragmatic as cautious post-coloniality replaced the vigour of anti-colonialism.

Within the African countries, forces were unfolding which were lethal to both the spirit of Pan-African and the ideals of intellectualism. Mazrui argues that over the last 40 years, East Africa in particular has experienced the rise and decline of African intellectuals. This has been attributed among other reasons, the inability of some heads of states to accommodate divergent views from intellectuals. The thrust of this paper will be to accentuate and celebrate the Kenyatta leadership and his intellectual production for Africa. While Kenyatta is seen by many as one among few first founding presidents who promoted intellectualism, his rising authoritarianism led to the declining academic freedom on campuses. In the mid-1970s when Kenyatta was still in power, Ali Mazrui who had resigned from Makerere University as a measure of impact of political authoritarianism on the university's freedom of choice, the University of Nairobi in Kenya refused to hire him. The fate of intellectualism became worse in Kenya during the years of President Daniel Arap Moi as intellectual opposition to capitalism in Kenya became increasingly a punishable offence.

This is why there is more perception among the committed intellectuals who have sought to understand why concepts such as imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism have taken a back seat to globalization as a way to organize thoughts and political possibilities. There is the proposition that the conception globalization is being used as a powerful deterrent to anti-imperialist action, and consequently, the use of concepts such as globalization contains no vision for the African people since it is being used to signal powerlessness on the part of the producers in Africa and the Third World (Harvey 1995).

The Elder Tradition

To Mazrui, elder tradition is heavily paternalistic, almost by definition. It is particularly strong where you still have the original first president of an African State. The notion of a *Founding Father*, with prerogatives not just in politics but also in opinion formation, is a major component of the total political picture. The elder leader or patriarchal leader is the one who commands neo-filial reverence, a real father figure. He may prefer to withdraw from involvement in the affairs of the nation and dominate the scene from a godlike position in the background rather than as a participating politician, and in general delegate duties to his lesser colleagues who carry out the day-to-day business of running the nation.

Patriarchal leadership can be profoundly African when it becomes intertwined with patriarchal leader – the massive presence of national authority, non-interventionist except when really needed, projecting an air of solidity and stability in spite of the cracks and cleavages of Kenya politics. The affectionate use of the title 'Mzee' for Kenyatta was a manifestation of his patriarchal status and the filial reverence he commanded. The Elder Tradition also carries heavy preference for consensus in the family. The father figure expects that consensus is not questionable and therefore has a profound distrust of dissent and dispute, even of the kind, which is indispensable for a vigorous political and intellectual atmosphere. The Elder Tradition also has a preference for reverence and reaffirmation of loyalty towards political leaders, and that reverence and reaffirmation of loyalty is

in turn sometimes hostile to the atmosphere of adequate intellectual independence and political criticism (Throup and Hornsby 1998). More often than not Presidents with patriarchal status rarely accommodate dissenting political views. During Kenyatta's time, political assassinations of the late politicians Tom Mboya 1969 and J.M. Kariuki in 1975 have always been linked to political dissent to Mzee's leadership.

The Warrior Tradition

Increased attention has recently been paid to the phase of 'primary resistance' when Africa first had to confront Western intrusion. The arguments of scholars like Terence Ranger for Eastern Africa and Michael Crowder for Western Africa identify those early-armed challenges by Africans against colonial rule as the very origins of modern nationalism in the continent. By this argument, Tanzania's ruling party and its functions as a liberating force has for its ancestry both the Maji Maji and earlier rebellions against German rule. African struggles against colonial rule did not begin with modern political parties and western-trained intellectuals, but originated in those early 'primary resisters' with their spears poised against Western military technology.

Yet, while some scholars regard the Nkurumahs and Nyereres of modern Africa as the true heirs of these primary resisters, it is certain military regimes in independent Africa, and the liberation fighters in Southern Africa, who really carry the mantle of the original primary resisters. The warrior tradition was not a technique invented to counter colonialism. Present-day military rulers and freedom fighters are a symbol of the beginning of a new warrior tradition, or perhaps a resurrection of the old one. The struggle against dependency as exemplified by certain military regimes is a reactivation of the ancestral assertiveness of warrior culture (Mazrui 1972).

Yet warrior tradition revived before the colonial period was over. The Mau Mau movement helped many Kikuyu Christians transcend the conditioning of 'turning the other cheek, as well as overcome the terror of eternal Christian damnation. The oaths, which ensured militant commitment, helped to counter the emasculating

consequences of the colonial experience. The forest fighters were militarily defeated by the British, but this was clearly a victory that vanquished. The political triumph went to Africans, even if the military success was retained by the colonists. The stronghold of the white settlers was at last broken, and before long Kenya was preparing for independence.

Mau Mau was the first great liberation movement of the modern period. All the efforts which are now being made in Southern Africa to consolidate resistance, organize sabotage, and seek to dispel which power and privilege, have for the their heroic ancestry the band of fighters in the Nyandarua forests of Kenya. The warrior tradition was at least temporarily revived at a critical moment in Kenya's history (Mazrui 1972).

In addition to these types and styles of leadership, there have been a number of pre-colonial cultural traditions, which affected those types and styles. The most obvious was the elder tradition in pre-colonial African culture, which has probably conditioned the patriarchal style after independence. The reverence of Jomo Kenyatta as Mzee (the Elder) in Kenya was substantially the outcome of the precolonial elder tradition still alive and well. Nelson Mandela by the time of his release was also a heroic Mzee (Elder). Did the American people hold Ronald Reagan in affection partly because he was perceived as an elder?

Conclusion

There will continue to be an ideological and intellectual crisis in the African world until Africans understand Pan-Africanism, its value and luminaries' visions like those of Kenyatta, and apply them to their many problems. These include 'foreign debts', reparations, repatriation of African intellectual property from the museums of Europe, lack of continental railroads and air routes, intra-trade, communication and technological development among the African people and states. The triumph of Pan-Africanism, the only way Africans can survive the foreign onslaught and live as a truly liberated people, will come out of the sweat and blood of the African people themselves. As Nkrumah put it:

> Only a united Africa can redeem its past glory, renew and reinforce its strength for the realisation of its destiny. 'We are today the richest and yet the poorest of continents, but in unity our continent could smile in a new era of prosperity and power.

Ali Mazrui promotes the view that Africa needs a process of `social engineering' to instigate nation-building, with the four imperatives: '*emphasising* what is African, *nationalising* what is tribal, *idealising* what is indigenous, and *indigenising* what is foreign.' In other words, he is calling for an approach that allows room for being specifically African and not merely dependent on western models. It illustrates the danger of ideological and political imitation that has no roots in African soil and is therefore too alien to achieve authenticity (Berman 1990).

Modernisation in Africa need not be synonymous with the import of westernisation or the attempt to erase ethnic consciousness. The incorporation of ethnicity into political legislation seems to be crucial if the threat of ethnic warfare, as has been recently witnessed in Rwanda, is going to be removed. The option of federalism seems to have been left relatively untouched, despite the fact that it has the mechanisms and potential within it to incorporate ethnic diversities in such a way that does not threaten the national profile. With resources becoming scarcer every day, the intensity of ethnic feeling is only going to increase, and ignoring ethnic profiles within African states could become increasingly dangerous.

Politics in Africa continue to be characterized by two opposing trends. In some places, democracy is gaining ground, strengthening the argument that there is an African Renaissance "creeping slowly across the continent." For example, in countries such as Botswana, Mali, and South Africa, citizens enjoy more political competition, freer media, and greater civil liberties than at any time in their independent history. However, in many other parts of Africa, the process of democratization has been reversed, particularly in places like Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire. Throughout the continent, the African Renaissance "continues to be threatened by poverty, power struggles, ethnic conflict, poor governance, and corruption. With the call of the African patriarchy and living their examples, I have argued that the African renaissance can be achieved with ease.

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Pan-Africanism and the Language Question: Re-reading African Cultural and Intellectual History

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Introduction

This paper examines the role of intellectuals in the development of Pan-Africanist linguistic nationalism. The specific aim of the paper is to analyse elite ideas about African linguistic nationalism and their role in African society from the perspective of the sociology of knowledge, a stance which understands ideas in terms of the social, cultural and civilisational milieu that produces and consumes them.

The focus of the paper is dictated by the fact that little, if anything, has been written on linguistic nationalism as a factor of Pan-Africanist ideology. This is in contrast with the abundance of literature on the political and economic aspects of the movement. Political theorists on Africa have had a lot to say about the 'language of Pan-Africanism' but very little to say about 'Linguistic Pan-Africanism'. It is therefore argued in this paper that the structure of nationalism consists of two equally powerful components: traditional data (such as race, language, literature, tradition, and territoriality), and egalitarian ideology (such as freedom, equality and fraternity). Pan-Africanism was a type of nationalism that fused traditional culture and modern ideology to generate the great social power that it was. Thus, Pan-Africanist linguistic nationalism deserves special attention because not much has been written on this aspect of cultural nationalism, and yet cultural nationalism was part of the social struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Further, among the intellectual leaders of Africa, none have attracted less attention than the language reformers.

Intellectualising Pan-Africanism

There is no agreement on the meaning, character and periodization of Pan-Africanism. Opinions on its meaning, aspirations, and nature will continue depending on whether we assume the phenomenon came into being in the eighteenth, nineteenth, or twentieth centuries. And, it is perhaps important to note that definitions Africans advanced during the 1960s often differed from those put forth by members of the African Diaspora.

Rayford W. Logan, an African-American historian, defined Pan-Africanism as 'self-government' or independence by African nations south of the Sahara. Chief Anthony Emahoro, a Nigerian politician, argued that it included the economic, social, and cultural generation or development of Africa; the promotion of African unity and of African influence in world affairs. Alioun Diop felt that Pan-Africanism was more or less synonymous with the concepts of the 'African Personality' or 'Negritude'. Vincent Bakpetu Thomson and John Hatch viewed Pan-Africanism as the same thing as African unity (1967:7). Robert G. Weisbord, an African West Indian historian, believed that the phenomenon was a 'racial movement'. George Shepperson used Pan-Africanism when referring to the twentieth century movement and pan-Africanism to describe 'a moral sentiment of international kinship and numerous short-lived movements with a predominant cultural element'.

Whoever first expressed Pan-African sentiments may never be known. Consequently, it is futile to try to attribute the phenomenon to any one individual or trace its inception to a particular year. Pan-Africanism became popular after the first Pan-African Congress that was held in 1900 in London and initiated by the African-West Indian barrister Henry Sylivester Williams. Before that, Pan-Africanist feeling first became articulated in the New World during the century starting from the declaration of American independence in 1776. It represented a reaction against the anti-African racism that marked the campaign for the abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade. It also found expression as well in resistance to European intrusion in Africa (Esedebe, 170). According to Wodajo (1964:166), the seeds of Pan-Africanism were implanted in Africa the moment the first alien coloniser set foot on her soil. In Africa, Pan-Africanism amounted to a rejection of foreign domination.

Pan-Africanism is therefore a political and cultural phenomenon that in the early stage regarded Africa and persons of African descent as a unit. It aimed at the regeneration of Africa and the promotion of a feeling of solidarity among the people of the African world. Pan-Africanism was equated to Black African nationalism, which was itself viewed as a spiritualistic and community-oriented (socialist) ideology (Mudimbe, 1983:144). Thus, Pan-Africanism emerged as a body of ideas clearly structured and influential in the thinking and the behaviour of Africans wherever they were. As the passion for the African nation, Pan-Africanism glorified the African past and inculcated pride in African values.

The preoccupation of Pan-Africanism with Africanness, that is, African consciousness, or the rediscovery of African values, and the recognition of Africa as the black matrix, was applied with great boldness to a whole continent. It was the intellectual bond that united Africa, and best interpreted its deepest soul. Pan-Africanists had a deep bond to their own culture, and they had a legitimate interest in maintaining this bond. They argued that access to a societal culture was essential for individual freedom. According to Mudimbe (1983:145). Pan-Africanist ideology was akin to trends of restoring traditional African philosophies. Like them, it was motivated by negation. Pan-Africanists opposed the negation of African societies imposed, first in the slave trade and then in colonization and balkanization. They delved more into social realism with a greater concern with African identity and national politics. As a matter of fact, no more fantastic idea has ever played a part in serious politics than that of Pan-Africanism.

The search for and assertion of Black and African identity cannot be fully appreciated unless in relation to European encounter with Africa. In fact, concepts like Negritude (cultural), Pan-Africanism (political) and Ethiopianism (religious), are all historically justifiable and have been employed as continental movements with the hope of making Africans more conscious of their community of interest and experience in the face of European colonialism in Africa (Okita 1992:180). They represented an ongoing intellectual search for black identity in the world and African responses to the European concept of "the Universal" as part of their broader rhetorical resistance to the complex colonial marginalization of the non-European Other. The

most important contribution that intellectuals made was to create an original discourse out of their sense of the African-European encounter, an encounter marked by domination and resistance, by conflicts and attempts at harmonization, and by a white cultural monolith clashing with a dynamic of Africanity.

The involvement with the cultural factor in the whole matrix was to be expected. Culture is seen as infrastructural, and social, economic and political phenomena are often seen as symptoms of immanent culture (Yoshino 1992:10). Writing on intellectuals and cultural nationalism, Smith (1983:94) says:

> Cultural nationalism has always constituted the creation and special zone of intellectuals. For they, above all, feel the need for a resolution of those crises of identity, which menace modern man, and which require of him a moral regeneration, a rediscovery and realisation of self, through a return to that which is unique to oneself, to one's special character and history, which cannot be severed from the individuality and unique history of one's own community.

African cultural nationalism was thus premised on two related, yet distinct, aspects: the aspects of 'identity' and 'solidarity'. The former was concerned with the exploration, formulation and emphasis of a nation's (racial) identity; the latter with the creation, maintenance and enhancement of solidarity among members of a nation (race). African intellectuals therefore occupied an important place in cultural nationalism. It was felt that African nationality and spirituality, the two most important elements that contributed so much to the glory of ancient Africa, had departed through western encounter and influence. Therefore, it was felt that under the impact of utilitarian Western civilization, Africa must reassert its vitality through the development of African culture. Intellectuals expressed and formulated ideas of cultural distinctiveness in one main approach: 'holistic' . They regarded Africa as a whole and assumed members of the 'African nation' shared a common 'soul'.

According to M'Bow (1992:12), cultural identity is the privileged medium through which the individual asserts himself/herself against another; it is the decisive lever for collective and individual liberation, for creation, progress and development. Culture gives us the justification for existence; it gives us the perspective necessary to rethink the meaning of the future: the relation between our

means and our ends, man and technology, society and nature, the individual and the state; it also gives us the impetus to leap over today's obstacles and clear new paths to tomorrow. It is only if we go back to the very sources of culture, the living hearth of inspiration, continuity and renewal of each people, that we become starkly aware of the limitations of any development effort based solely on the principle of material growth, and more so when modeled after a unique economic example.

For scholars like Hans Kohn (1955:9), nationalism is basically a subjective 'state of mind'; for others such as A.D. Smith (1971; 1973) it is primarily an ideological movement. Also, nationalism can be a latent phenomenon expressed mainly as pride in the nation's history and way of life, or it may develop as a dynamic force demanding strenuous efforts and immense sacrifice on the part of the members of the nation. Whatever aspect of nationalism one refers to and whatever form nationalism may take, the common denominators of nationalism are the belief among a people that it comprises a distinct community with distinctive characteristics and the will to maintain and enhance that distinctiveness (Yoshino 1992:6).

African cultural nationalism began to develop in the late nineteenth century with many educated Africans falling back upon their indigenous culture in the wake of Western cultural penetration. That was the time when the glory, genius and vitality of Africa ended and its spiritual and cultural degeneration started with the influx of Europeans. Modern Africans then accelerated their cultural decay under colonialism.

Perhaps aware of the fact that it is only Africans who are capable of preserving and creating their culture – of making history, there was enhanced affirmation of the indigenous culture of Africa. The African thinkers' exploration and emphasis of African distinctiveness were explicit, autocritical and vigorous in expanding the philosophical dimensions of understanding the needs of the development of Black Africa. A series of Pan-Africanist meetings held was a clear testimony of the national awakening in Africa on the intellectual and political levels. The meetings were made possible by a multiplicity of reasons among which were the information media and means of communication introduced by modern civilization and the new ideas which infiltrated and stirred up the hitherto placid intellectual life

of the conquered countries through that cultural contact with their conqueror; world awareness of the problems of economics and politics, the newly learned tactics of resistance and the rights of peoples.

The distinctiveness of African culture became a major focus among Pan-Africanists when Africannness/Africanity emerged emphasizing the civilizational past of Africans rather than the territorial and political nature of the continent. This was the message of the first Pan-African Congress held in 1900 in London. Eight years later, the important theme of 'indigenization' featured prominently during the Pan-African Congress of 1908. Four Pan-African Congresses of 1919, 1921, 1923 and 1927 summoned by Du Bois, underscored the centrality of Africanity. The year 1929 marks the emergence of notable African intellectuals and scholars. From this time, racially and socially important critical writings appear. Nearly all publications by Africans show their engagement with colour and culture. The purpose of that commitment was to create a new discourse that would stand separately from and, sometimes, in opposition to the discursive systems inherited from metropolitan Europe. The late 1930s through the 1950s marked a period of international insecurity. For Pan-Africanists, the racial and social justice themes and the perennial problem of identity dominated. African intellectuals were also ideologically committed; hence a majority joined political parties. In the 1950s, Kwame Nkrumah's political credo was 'seek ye first the political kingdom and all else will be added unto you'. Later, the serious limitations to this seductive credo of the primacy of the political process as a panacea for achieving the total liberation, unity and development of the African continent became clear.

In 1962, the Congress of Africanists, the precursor to the Congress of African studies, was inaugurated at the University of Ghana, at Legon in Accra by President Kwame Nkrumah during the heady days of Ghana's newly won independence. The Congress was founded as a visible beacon of Africa's intellectual and cultural birth. During the International Congress of Africanists held in Senegal in 1968, it was generally agreed that the days of European patronage were over and had been replaced by individual African governments. Participants were then more concerned with changes necessary within Africa itself in order to enhance its contribution

to world civilization. The battle about whether Africa had anything to contribute had been won and it was now the nature of its quality with which they were concerned (Nicol, 1979:6). In all the Pan-Africanist meetings, almost all the discourses had as their essential point of reference the historical existence, organisation, and culture of African peoples.

Among the intellectuals who systematised the identity of the African community were historians and artists (like Nyerere, Neto, Senghor). All these were prominent in discovering and presenting the foundations in time of communal regeneration. They argued that it is by discovering the history of the continent that its members rediscover its authentic purpose. As Banerjea (1971:235) argues, the study of the history of one's own country furnishes the strongest incentive to the loftiest patriotism.

Breuilly (1982:338) summarises the historicist argument and concern with national distinctiveness, which centre on the discovery of the uniqueness of the ancestral culture and the emphasis of a shared history, as the only way to apprehend the spirit of a community. In Africa, politics was the engine that helped achieve other ends. Far from distracting attention from cultural affairs, politics served to distill thoughts and concentrate concern for the creation of a new African society. African leaders saw this new society as one retaining much of traditional African civilization, blended with imported ideas of a better society. Leaders sought for Africa an intellectual decolonization, to take its place alongside political independence. African universities had to train individuals who could help construct the new African society. Nkrumah saw Ghana and Africa moving into an age where socialism shaped societies and Africans joined in a union of states that embraced the entire continent. To achieve this objective, African universities would have to produce citizens whose thinking was consonant with these ideas, who were aware of Africa's destiny, as Pan-Africanist leaders then understood it. The universities that were inherited from the colonial administration, however, were ill adapted to their needs. They had been created in faithful replica of European models with rigid structures of degrees that emphasized Western institutions and values to the virtual exclusion of Africa, its history and way of life. African leaders sought an Africanised curriculum and a radically altered educational philosophy that

stressed the history, culture and institutions, languages and arts of Africa in new African centred ways, in entire freedom from the propositions and presuppositions of the colonial epoch (Nkrumah, 1964). Nkrumah's 'African personality' concept argued an African presence of unique culture in the world determined to pursue African interests in the arena of international affairs. The idea signified a theoretical construct made of pan-African symbols.

From the foregoing, Pan-Africanism then is the general sophistication of the African cultural and intellectual tradition. Pan-Africanism is for some a concept or an idea, or historical and existential fact. It is a representation of Africanness: it refers to being African and to the acceptance of that Africanness in a world whose imaginative and scientific efforts are strongly cultural and racial. Indeed, on a broader scope, Pan-Africanism was linked to the fervent vitality that characterised the period of Reconstruction in North America, roughly from 1863 to 1930. The movement benefited from the movement toward Africa led by Marcus Garvey, the intellectual revolution spearheaded by Du Bois, the black cultural 'Golden Age' expressed in the Harlem Renaissance, as well as other black cultural movements. Thus, as a syncretic Africanity, an African consciousness, Pan-Africanist discourse principally is a black interest in and cultivation of African ancestrality. It uses reasoning, arguments, inferences, and analyses that have everything to do with Africa and African thought. Because the idea of Africa is its main focus, it is Afrocentric.

The Afrocentric idea became a rhetorical reaction against the tendency to treat the whole world civilization, history and development only from a western perspective. It suggests the need to reevaluate reality as well as the discursivity that engenders reality as it affects Africans. It rejects the 'us-versus-them' mentality embedded in the colonial and imperialistic ordering of Africa and things African. Pan-Africanism has emerged therefore, as a discursive challenge to the marginalization of Africannness, and to work toward African reconstruction. It is a challenge encompassing politics, economics, and culture, broadly conceived. African intellectuals strive to portray Africa and Africans as contributors to the history and culture of the world. This historical reconstruction then is impelled by a sense of African self-renewal and self-affirmation.

The chief centres from which the intellectual life of Africa radiates and a vibrant Pan-Africanist critical frame of reference still exists, are African universities and learned societies. Among learned Pan-Africanist societies, first rank is taken by the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), in the work of which African scholars take a large and increasing part. This organisation, founded through the initiative of African intellectuals, has given much encouragement to the development of African research, and its members included leaders in the intellectual life of Africa.

On the evidence of Olukoshi (2002:1); the Executive Secretary of CODESRIA:

> When CODESRIA was founded in 1973, it was established on a host of ideals which could be summarized as entailing the search for a credible forum located in Africa to serve as a home – if not *the* home for the entire African social research community. As a home, it was consciously conceived and constructed to accommodate the disciplinary, methodological, linguistic, geographical, gender, or generational diversities that characterise the African social research community. But these diversities were equally anchored on a broadly shared commitment to Pan-Africanism, the promotion of multi-disciplinary interaction, academic vigour and integrity, the independence of African scholarship and the promotion of research deriving from and relevant to the African context. Also integral to this commitment was a concern to ensure that the African academy played a full role in the quest for improved human livelihood on the African continent.

African intellectuals and knowledge production

During the colonial era and before, Europeans had unceasingly assured Africans that their own culture was barbaric and dated, and that it was best to emulate the European as quickly as possible, to get on with the business of joining the modern world. Thus, Europeans introduced into Africa a system of education based entirely upon their own ideas and experience, a system which in the event served to impede the spontaneous development of indigenous African culture and to substitute in its place an artificial exotic growth. The

systems of education were purely a product of *a priori* reasoning, without regard to the historic background of African culture, nor to the economic and social needs of Africans.

The systems of education were evidently apt to make African countries poor by stunting intellectual growth. Prior to the coming of colonialists, Africa enjoyed an era of intellectual languour; African intellectuals, aware that great things lie in the past, turned their eyes to the past for guidance. Then suddenly, this connection with the past was severed, and the African intellect was invaded by the conflicting notions and ideas of European literary culture, imparted in a superficial manner. Quite demonstrably, Europe began to treat Africa as the distant other from about the fifteenth century when Portugal and Spain sought new territories overseas. The Euro-African unequal encounters in the Americas intensified the process of 'othering' Africa. In particular, from the mid years of the nineteenth century onwards, certain factors led to a deepening and widespread belief that the 'primitive' was interchangeable with the Dark continent and with things African. It was held that the primitive was located outside the industrialized world and that there was a scientifically measurable human difference between non-technological and more advanced consumer societies. Those factors, all of which were to impact upon the creative imagination about Africa, included the effects of Social Darwinism, anthropological findings and geographical explorations in Africa, the founding of European museums with special interest in primitive treasures, and the political expansions of Europe that culminated in the partition of Africa in 1884 (Kubayanda 1990:18).

In history lessons, pupils learned the names of the great European explorers who sailed in their magnificent ships all over the world. They learned the dates when different physical features in Africa were 'discovered' and who was the 'first man to see' them. This education taught them that civilization did not exist in Africa until the Africans were enlightened by the Europeans. They also learned the names of European geniuses who made great contributions to the advancement of their countries through the machines that they invented. This education taught them that Africa was underdeveloped because her people lacked intelligence and creativity. Pupils learned the names of all the great rulers of Europe and the dates when they

reigned. They learned the dates when all the great wars were won. In English literature, for example, Shakespeare, Dickens and Hardy were studied. Africans were eager to learn European languages.

Prof. Hugh Trevor Roper's declaration in 1963 that 'at present there is no African history but only the history of the Europeans in Africa, and that all the rest is darkness and darkness is not a subject of history' is well known. Earlier on in 1928, the Chair of Colonial History at Oxford University, Reginald Copeland, said:

> The main body of the Africans, the Negro peoples who remained in their tropical homeland between the Sahara and the Limpopo, had no history. They had stayed, for untold centuries, sunk in barbarism. Such, it might almost seem, had been nature's decree. So they remained stagnant, neither going forward nor going back. Nowhere in the world was human life so stagnant. The heart of Africa was scarcely beating (Boahen 1985: 804).

That the Black peoples of Africa have no history and have no meaningful place in the history of humanity was the fog of racial prejudice and ignorance which characterized European thinking since the nineteenth century about the continent's ahistoricity, typified by philosopher Hegel's opinion that the Black peoples of Africa formed no part of human history, and Richard Burton's view that it was 'egregious nonsense' to question the natural and inherent superiority of Europeans over Africans (Davidson 1984:13). The nineteenth century was indeed a crucial moment not only because it was the highest point of European colonial expansionism in Africa, but also because it saw the perpetration of several negative images of Africa. It fostered a variety of psychological, anthropological and sociological ideas misrepresenting Darwin's theory of evolution and delineating the black other as mentally and culturally inferior. Racist ideology and scientific or pseudo-scientific thought met and interconnected, providing an adequate set of concepts and discursive forms to represent people of colour as occupying the lowest rung of the cultural hierarchy. By the dawn of the twentieth century the idea of primitive Africa had become full-blown in Western discourse and institutions.

Africans had long been made to perceive themselves to be on the "periphery" in relation to the 'central' civilizations where the 'universal' norm was supposed to exist. The West constituted the

reference point from which Africans borrowed models and against when they affirmed and reaffirmed their identity. For most Africans, Western educational experience was akin to acquiring the 'universal civilization'. Schools in Africa were neither a place where African identity was nurtured nor a source of knowledge about the history of Africa. Education was to convince Africans that their motherland had no history and had no meaningful and dignified place in the history of humanity. The African was represented as "the lowest anthropoid" and therefore uncivilized, since civilization was often equated with the ability to read and write, profession of the Christian faith, proficiency in a European language, and cultivation of European ways of life. Unfamiliar African cultures and societies were treated with condescension and contempt.

The denial of the history and the identity of Africa was an important strategy used by Europeans to enslave and colonize Africans for, by portraying people as less than human, it was easier to treat them as work animals. No system could have been more successfully devised for the intellectual emasculation of a race than education. Instead of training the power of observation, developing reason and judgement through social and historical investigation, and using literary studies for the nourishment of the critical and constructive faculties, African education was made up mainly of learning by rote parts of an alien literature and half-understood summaries and abstracts. The passing of language examinations, which were the portal to official employment, was the end-all and be-all of this education. The energy of students and teachers was bent on language tests and their successful accomplishment was the sole criterion of educational methods.

The net result achieved was to exaggerate certain 'native' defects of the African intellect. But it was not only the mental constitution of the African people that suffered through this superficial method of education. The development of character itself has been affected, as the youth have not received, together with their intellectual discipline, the needful training of their moral nature; the education they received was disconnected from the ethical impulses native and natural to the African mind, and had not provided the youth of Africa with definite moral aims. It is paradoxical that the European system of education, introduced to liberate the African mind from the

superstitions of a backward learning, has had the result of enslaving rather than setting free, of weakening rather than building up, the intellectual forces of Africa.

The present situation of African intellectual life clearly shows an unusual dissociation of the educated from the masses of the people. The educated world is of course everywhere in danger of losing its contact with the broader currents of human life and experience; but in Africa, where the learned class has been reared upon an alien culture, this detachment is especially noticeable. The intellectual leaders are not fully understood by their own people; in other words, those whose intellectual powers entitle them to leadership have received from their education little assistance toward making such leadership effective. It is perhaps correct to say that the actual influence of the educated Africans has often been overestimated. Their command of European languages like English, French, German and Portuguese enables them to make themselves heard in the world. But, on the other hand, their alien training prevents them from being always the effective interpreters of what the silent millions of the African masses feel.

That the Europeans harboured a sinister motive to destroy indigenous culture, and impede the development of national life in Africa is in no doubt. In the leading European countries, there has been an uninterrupted development of national culture, disturbed at times, retarded, warped by external factors, yet in the main a continuous growth. There has at least been no violent break in traditions. Nor has there even been a long period of decadence and stagnation. Their literature, science, philosophy and ethics are intimately connected with their past traditions, out of which they have been gradually developed. As concerns Africa, the European episteme, expressed through its scientific formulations and languages of conquest, has 'inscribed [racial] differences as fixed and finite categories' between 'superior' and 'inferior' beings (Gates, Jr. 1986:6).

The 'othering' of the 'primitive' African was challenged by African intellectuals through various activities. In them, there was a consciously stated resolve to reconsider the African past in order to impose a new meaning on the present and the future. In the whole of Africa, there was an orientation toward a new destiny: movement, change, progress, even in the names. There was a widespread

inspiration to deconstruct the acquiescent, the static, the time-honoured notions of grandeur, and the colonial rhetorical traditions. It should be noted that during the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, Africa represented a complex idea. At times, it was no more than emptiness or darkness, a negative consciousness fed by the colonial and imperial phenomena in African culture. European cultural hegemony held the European traditions in place and almost systematically undercut the African dynamic in societal life. It was during the same period that a definite group of intellectuals was emerging, and whose goal was to bear witness to the aspirations of their generation and to unify through artistic and intellectual contacts, a historically scattered and brutalized people. Theirs was supposed to be a vindication of the indigenous African culture that had been held in disrepute. During the 1920s and 1930s when African intellectuals were beginning to write in the context of their national realities, the European civilization was still generally defined in terms that excluded the contributions of Africans. A continuing marginalization of Africa was no longer altogether feasible because of the emergence of Africans of power and vision. The subject of 'civilization versus barbarism' was a major cultural and intellectual concern.

During the Second World War in Paris, a group of black students from French-speaking Africa and the West Indies led by Aimé Cesaire of Martinique and Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal formed a movement, which, among other tenets held a central one that there was a common cultural identity among all peoples of African descent which they called Negritude. This identity needed strong assertion for it to be properly recognised and for its contribution to world culture to be acknowledged. Negritude was necessary because colonial empires had assimilationist policies which encouraged the adoption of their cultures and the shedding of indigenous African cultures as a sign of the civilized person who could then take their place socially, intellectually and indeed legally in the society of the metropolitan countries and their overseas territories. Africans in the French and Portuguese spheres of culture had mastered European civilization and had in some cases substituted their African culture completely by them. They had become black French and Portuguese and were accepted in Paris and Lisbon as such. Nonetheless, these people had to rediscover their African culture and assert it against

the pervasively assimilationist European culture. At the same time, they had the ability of being able to place their African culture in the context of Western and indeed world civilization with which they were also familiar.

These processes then for the educated African of rebellion against western culture, rediscovering African culture and re-aligning it with other cultures, were particularly significant for the birth of the concept of Negritude. Alioune Diop was an active member of this group of intellectuals and in 1947 the literary journal *Presence Africaine* was founded under his editorship. Explain the relationship of African culture to world culture, Diop, a prominent Egyptologist, consistently argued that black Africa constitutes one cultural unit, and that historically, black Africa became an active participant in the early Egyptian civilization. He even suggested that black civilization transcends boundaries, from the Atlantic to the Sahara (Nicol, 1979: 3–4). Diop had political power because he had access in a quiet but effective way to most of the African heads of Government. He and his colleagues at the multilingual *Presence Africaine*, felt the need to bring together men of intellect of African descent to form a cultural movement. As a result, the first Congress of Negro Writers and Artists was convened in Paris in 1956.

It was that whilst in the 1940s the Anglo-Saxon African was holding, with a strong political flavour, the Pan-African Congress in Manchester, England, attended by figures such as Du Bois, Jomo Kenyatta and Kwame Nkurumah, the French Africans were launching Negritude in Paris under Senghor, Jacques Rabemananjara (later Vice President, Madagascar) and Aimé Cesaire. Van Niekerk (1970) interprets Senghor's enterprise as a preoccupation with the sources of African civilization as well as a quest for a way of bringing Africa and its human sciences to the attention of an ignorant Europe.

The years directly after World War II were especially conducive to the revival of indigenous culture. Post-war nationalist movements preached political independence and economic modernization, but there was also the urge for a concurrent reaffirmation of Africa's own values as expressed in its arts, its literature, its philosophy, and its history. Political freedom would thrive best, it was said, when accompanied by a parallel autonomy of cultural expression. It would be expected that independence movements in Africa would

be accompanied by an intensified interest in Africa's past. New nations sought legitimacy in a long-lived history. Shivji (2003:109) describes the period after the Second World War to the defeat of US imperialism in Vietnam in 1975 as the age of national liberation and revolution when 'Countries want Independence, Nations want Liberation and People want Revolution'. This was also the age of great intellectual and ideological ferment. Every revolution and liberation struggle had its theoreticians, its thinkers, its arsenal of articulated ideas, not just arsenal of weapons. In other words, masses had to be moved by ideas before they could move mountains.

In most African countries, socio-political developments were by all means favourable to the evolution of an intellectual leadership in direct touch and harmony with other social forces. There was a rising tide of a fervent nationalism that found expression in an aggressive scholarship. Such a development required more than political speeches, for it entailed a re-establishment of the Africans' humanity and their pride in Africa's past achievements and future goals. The process began in the critiques of European models of development and social change. African intellectuals argued that any effective economic and social development must be based upon a firm foundation of African cultural authenticity, distinctiveness and individuality. The modernization of Africa needs not be synonymous with its westernization. Africa's modernization, thus, is a cultural challenge encompassing the arts, music, dance, poetry, beliefs, values, traditional religious systems, law, custom and knowledge, plus any other capabilities and habits acquired by members of society.

African intellectuals devoted themselves to the renaissance and promotion of classical African culture. The work of a number of individuals broke new ground: the research of historians like B.A. Ogot (Kenya), Ki-Zerbo Joseph (Burkina Faso); Adu Boahen (Ghana); Ajayi (Nigeria); innovative and provocative writings of Cheikh Anta Diop (Senegal); musicians and musicologists like J.H. Nketia and Ephraim Amu (Ghana); dance scholars like A.M. Opoku (Ghana); literary artists like Chinua Achebe and Wole Soyinka (Nigeria), Ayi Kwei Armah, Isidore Okpewho, Amadou Hampate Ba, Boubou Hama, H. Mokhtar, Theophile Obengo, H. Djait, Efua Sutherland; Ngugi wa Thiong'o (Kenya); Taban Lo Liyongo (Sudan), among others, helped to give shape, direction, and purpose

to a new way of looking at Africa. These were among African intellectuals who believed that African civilization still survived, and it still offered its people much that was satisfying and much that worked. They recognized this fact, and were concerned that too rapid and unreflective an adoption of foreign ways might lead to complications, unforeseen and dangerous. They did not wish to turn their backs on the West but they did warn that African needs and conditions should always be given first priority (July, 1983: 119).

The above scholars exemplify in their intellectual life the best results of the contact between Africa and the West. With their intelligence quickened and their mind enriched by Western learning, they remained true to their indigenous culture, which they studied from a new point of view. Research and teaching in African studies – history, languages, literature, culture, anthropology and sociology – were started at African universities. Particularly, in the new universities of the former British colonies, departments of history were quick to introduce courses on the African past while interdisciplinary institutes of African studies also appeared on a number of African campuses. Their activities were particularly noteworthy because they were closely related to ideas on education then being argued by African Heads of State. The most important contribution that African intellectuals made in these universities was to create an original academic discourse out of their sense of the African-European encounter. This distinct and legitimate way of looking at Africa and the world, was an instrument that would serve to prevent a complete neutralization of the African cultural voice. Theirs was an intellectual rescue and recognition of Africa, as well as a conscious agent working against the mismeasuring of Africanity by Eurocentric critical constructs.

Colonialists had invented numerous 'theories' about the inferiority of black races and their inability to create cultural values or appreciate the treasures of world civilization. African culture, according to them was 'low' and 'primitive', and educated Africans were taught to despise it. However, African intellectuals wrote to prove that Africa was the continent that was the cradle of civilization of art and religion. They argued that the history of human civilization was the history of African and African civilization. They saw their task as an effort at regaining that lost glory, an initiative that

would enrich the culture and civilization of humanity. This would be realized through the solidarity and unity among Africans who had suffered bitter experiences imposed on them by the barbarism of imperialism and colonialism. As far as aims and objectives were concerned, colonialism in Africa was explained as aiming at economic exploitation of raw materials, manpower and markets; and cultural domination embracing religion, language, customs, behaviour and social patterns.

Cultural identity had to be accepted as a determining factor of worldwide importance. Apart from being accepted, this basic reality had to be fully and immediately accepted in its many forms and in all its complexity. The import of this reasoning was vividly captured by M'Bow (1992:12):

> Cultural identity is one of those vaguely demarcated realities whose multiple incidences on the life of societies had remained long unknown but which at present forced itself on everyone's attention in no uncertain manner… In the last fifty years, during which many peoples were faced with the crucial problem of acceding to sovereignty, it was only natural that national identity be used as a stepping stone towards an essentially political objective.

The emergent wave of heroic struggle and noble rebirth which was sweeping across the continent demonstrated how imperialism had imposed its inhuman system so as to try to undermine the very foundations of Africa's ancient civilizations and to destroy African culture and national character. Great harm was done to Africa's peaceful development and culture by colonialism. African intellectuals were conscious of the indignities and humiliations suffered by their race. Racism during the pre-colonial period was no more than a social stigma. The radical and systematic use of racism for blatantly exploitative motives did not therefore exist in the pre-sixteenth century period. Adverse racial propaganda of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had by extension legitimised the low cultural standing of the black person. That was part of the colonial ideology that justified the economic exploitation of blacks by advancing racial and cultural theories.

The beginning of the twentieth century was a culmination point of years of historical gestation and development in black consciousness. African intellectuals adopted an affirmative strategy to rehabilitate

the black past and reinstate the black person to a status of worth and dignity by elevating the strength and virtue of the race. The protest literature focused on the cultural aspect of the African life, and was aimed to counterbalance and neutralize the negative impact of the old ideology on the cultural status of the Africans. A massive movement of blacks from rural Africa to the cities and to Europe had taken place. The period also witnessed the participation in and heroic contribution to World War I (1914–1919) by Africans. The rallying cry before the end of the war was that of making the world safe for democracy and extending justice to all. From the 1960s, Africanization is no longer an identity quest shaped by the colour of the African cultural world in opposition to the Eurocentric 'othering' of Africa and things African; rather, from then on, it begins to take a more critical look at the structures and practices of power that had come to replace the European hegemonic codes in Africa.

African intellectuals exercised a great influence upon public opinion in favour of cultural reforms, which they made appear not only desirable but also necessary. The romantic view of African history and culture expounded by African intellectuals had a powerful influence in arousing the national spirit of Africa. Among the areas that were inspired by the Pan-African activities, which had Africa and the Afrocentric heritage as its common take-off ground, were African languages.

Pan-Africanist Linguistic Nationalism

One of the most difficult problems in national and cultural advancement of Africa is language. The language question has elicited a great deal of debate and attracted the attention of political leaders and national intellectuals in all African countries. The language question can be projected into the African historical context and be seen as part of African history.

Thus, the language question can best be understood as a development in response to European contact with, and colonization of, Africa. In that contact, linguistic domination and control, conflict, resistance, adaptation, assimilation, and other developments took place, thereby threatening the wholeness of African languages. The salient factor in the historical background out of which the language

question arose can be identified as the experiences of subordination to what were perceived as culturally superior foreign languages – English, French, German, and Portuguese. Broadly speaking, invasion, settlement, enslavement, education, and evangelization characterized domination and control. Acculturative conflicts occurred naturally, when less powerful groups, the marginalized Africans, moved against the establishment of control models.

The phenomenon of cultural nationalism, of which language revivalism was a part, must be seen as a reaction to the psychology of colonialism as analysed by Franz Fanon, who describes two sets of images promulgated by the colonizer and often uncontested by the colonized: one involves the settler, who brings reason, enlightenment, order and progress; the other is of the native who lives in a bestial or childlike world of superstition, darkness, anarchy and backwardness. The rebellious reaction, albeit subtle, of individual Africans to colonial authorities who forbade African tongues was the genesis of African linguistic nationalism. The political position and fiat used to force Africans into adopting European languages add up to the circumstances that placed severe obstacles in the worth of healthy identity formation. Thus, African language politics during colonialism was characterized by widespread disaffection and alienation which found expression in a rising tide of cultural and linguistic nationalism (Simala, 2001:317–318).

Besides colonialism, there is also one other development which has been determinant in the rise of African linguistic nationalism. The coming of age of a new generation of Africans educated in Western systems of education, and who were radicalized by the gap between reality and practice. These were the driving force behind Pan-Africanism, an increasingly important origin of African nationalist and liberation movements. These intellectuals became a large, moderated well-defined and partly self-conscious group. Thus, according to one of them, Ki-Zerbo (1986:46):

> The historical and contemporary dilemma in which African peoples find themselves reflects a crisis of consciousness, or rather a crisis of lack of consciousness – consciousness about what actually happened to us and the factors responsible for it, consciousness of the ultimate intentions of our 'partners' in various abortive programmes of development. To deal with the crisis of consciousness, we must first

> of all turn our full attention to "that most manifest and coherent of all cultural systems – language… Language is a creative force, a fundamental tool of civilization and development. The very concept of what it means to be "human" is invariably defined with reference to language. The essence of our humanity and of our uniqueness as a species is a function of our language.

If language is such a fundamental requirement of our capacity as humans, any disruption in language will inevitably subvert our capacity for human development. In other words, language does (help) create civilization, but it can also (help) destroy or undermine its development. Indeed, the human element of every civilization appears to be the language factor (Balde 1986).

Chinua Achebe argues that culture is not only a force of creativity, but also the utilization of human intelligence for social development. But culture cannot achieve its creative and utilitarian potential without the vehicle of language. Given that language is crucial to the creation of society, there is no way in which human society could exist without speech (Language 87:46). The most influential advocate of the use of African languages in African development programmes was Cheikh Anta Diop, who urged us:

> …. to create our linguistic unity through the choice of an appropriate African tongue promoted to the influence of a modern cultural language. Linguistic unity dominates all national life. Without it, national cultural unity is but fragile and illusory…. European languages must not be considered diamonds displayed under a glass ball, dazzling us with their brilliance. Our attention must be fixed on their historical development. Creatively, we discover that similar paths are open to us (1978).

A similar view was held and expressed by Kofi Anyidoho (1992) who argued that a people denied the ability to name themselves, their own experiences, and in a language native to their very souls, their secret selves, is a people degraded to the state of shadows, shadows of other selves. It is a people in danger of annihilation. Language is not only the key to a people's identity; it is the strongroom in which the inherent soul of a people can be protected from 'the too rough fingers' of a predatory world.

Samir Amin (1989) views Eurocentrism as a culturalist phenomenon of irreducibly distinct cultural invariants that shape the

historical paths of different peoples. Eurocentrism is therefore anti-universalist, since it is not interested in seeking possible general laws of human evolution. But it does present itself as universalist, for it claims that imitation of the Western model by all people is the only solution to the challenges of our time. Although present in all areas, the Eurocentric basis of looking at the world is particularly manifest in the fields of language and literature. According to Mazrui and Mazrui (1998:1), this state of affairs has evolved as a result of two interrelated factors: originally, the failure of African societies to be expansionist enough in territorial terms and later, the failure of African people to be nationalistic enough in linguistic terms.

Ali Mazrui (1998:43– 46) distinguishes at least five strands of linguistic Eurocentrism. The first is classificational Eurocentrism, whereby European linguists divided world languages along racial lines. This resulted into the unscientific assumption that the languages of the 'lower' races were somehow more primitive than the languages of the 'higher' races. African indigenous languages belonged to the former category while European ones were in the latter.

Secondly, Mazrui identified terminological Eurocentrism where all language families have been named by Europeans on the bases of criteria determined by Europeans. Consequently, the terminology of language classification has continued to be overwhelmingly Eurocentric. At the start of the twenty-first century, no clear and consensual picture exists with respect to either the number of languages on the African continent, or how these languages can be usefully classified. This has led to one of the most persistent myths in the study of African society: Linguistic Tower of Babel. It argues that linguistic diversity is of such proportions that Africans cannot share or work in their own languages (Prah 2002:12).

The third sense of linguistic Eurocentrism is semantic. This refers, in particular, to the tendency of European languages to use terms like 'animism', 'tribe', and 'primitive' in describing the African world, and to associate negative images with the terms. Mazrui has argued that because of the origins of English, as a language of white-skinned people, it has accumulated a heritage of imagery that had invested black people with negative connotations.

Linguistic Eurocentrism has also been identified to be orthographic. European missionaries and scholars undertook a

monumental task when they started transcribing African languages. It was the Latin script that came to serve as the foundation of this exercise. Latinization of African languages by missionaries was done with gusto even to languages like Hausa and Kiswahili which were closely related to Arabic script. Orthographic Arabicization of African languages was never entertained by European missionaries who equated the process to Islamization, and thus subjugation to Islamic faith.

Finally, Mazrui identifies the demographic sense of linguistic Eurocentrism. This refers to European linguistic expansionism and linguistic domination of peoples of other nations and nationalities, increasingly resulting in the capitulation of the world to European languages as first or additional media. Within the global arena, European languages are suffocating and marginalizing other languages with the probable result of linguicide.

The idea of language imposition as a strategy of power and political control in Africa must be kept in mind as a crucial political and social question. Language is merely a symbolic embodiment of the values, institutions, ideologies, and attitudes of a people. Pan-Africanist linguistic discourse, therefore, emerged largely against this backdrop of African self-review and self-recognition. It served as an intellectual and cultural attempt to affirm an Africa affinity with Africa as well as to express faith in African languages.

African linguistic revivalism was therefore a combative weapon that had to be used against occupation by foreigners. Language was also meant to operate as an instrument for the re-assertion of African values, African history, and a whole ideology justifying the existence of the African world against 'their world'. Language revivalists wanted to re-establish the validity of their own languages and cultures. Theirs was a primarily political movement with a powerful cultural adjunct. Africans' self-emancipation was both physical and psychological. It was a realization that one cannot entirely, or even significantly, free the body from its chains unless one first frees the mind of its enslavement. According to Levy (1979:32–33), there is no politics that is not first of all linguistics. We know that the regulation of language is the best preparation for the regulation of souls.

European languages have been projected and privileged as the idioms of power, politics, religion, virtue, beauty, truth, and law and

order. All African indigenous languages were dismissed as being incapable of carrying the burden of civilization. This was meant to make Africans feel insecure in their language, thus abandon their linguistic identity and take on the dominant European languages. And it is this reasoning that African linguistic nationalists wrestled with. They argued that language is the product of its unique history and culture and as a collective solidarity endowed with unique attributes. In short, African linguistic nationalism was concerned with the distinctiveness of African linguistic communities as the essence of African culture and African nation.

Language occupies an important place in the idea of a nation. Those who share a common understanding of lingusitic meanings may be said to constitute a nation. Bernard (1969) believes that:

> By means of language, man is able to enter into communion with the way of thinking and feeling of his progenitors, to take part as it were, in the workings of the ancestral mind. He, in turn, again by means of language, perpetuates and enriches the thoughts, feelings and prejudices of past generations for the benefit of posterity. In this way, language embodies the living manifestation of historical continuity and the psychological matrix which man's awareness of his distinctive social heritage is aroused and deepened.

Pan-Africanist intellectuals can justifiably be regarded as heroes of African languages. Their role has been part of a process that addresses itself not only to the language issue as an instrument of cultural revolt and national reassertion, but also a way of re-establishing African values and traditions. Indeed, one of the elements unifying language intellectuals and other Pan-Africanist intellectuals is the focus on Africa as a central problematic in Eurocentric epistemology.

Pan-African intellectual nationalists stressed the achievements of their ancestral languages, and declared the importance of Africans studying them. They discussed the greatness and the uniqueness of African linguistic civilisation. They emphasized the unique creativity of African languages: the languages were the mother of philosophy, science, art and literature, and were responsible for the high standards of spiritual, moral and ethical life of Africans. Language as the epicentre of culture is the unique and original foundation upon which African civilization was built and upon which it survived through the centuries. Pan-Africanist intellectuals

argued that Africans had their own distinct languages long before European languages became dominant. The revival of indigenous languages was encouraged because it was thought that the study of the languages, the most enduring monuments of the past greatness of the continent, would assist Africans in preserving their Africanity.

That language has been marginal to the self-identity of Africans, and indeed to the very need for a Pan-African language to write and symbolize the "African nation", is often denied or downplayed by African politicians and theorists. To say that Africa is a multinational continent is not to deny that the citizens view themselves for some purposes as a single people. According to Mudimbe (1988:47), during the history of African slavery and colonialism, the imposed languages of the enslaver and colonizer did a great deal to misrepresent human experience and contributed to the situation that lies behind our present crisis of consciousness. Until we forthrightly address the issues involved, until we formulate and execute bold, intelligent strategies for the creation of an effective language plan-of-action, our otherwise excellent blueprints for material development will largely remain at the talking stage.

Africans can have a strong sense of common loyalty, despite their culturo-linguistic divisions. Africa's survival and emergence as a strong global player will largely depend on their allegiance to a larger political unit. This common loyalty may take, among other forms, that of a linguistic identity. Africans ought to be as patriotic as they wish to pay their allegiance to individual states, but they can simultaneously cultivate a sense of continental membership through linguistic identity. There is no likelihood that any of the European languages will become the languages of the masses in Africa, or of any very considerable portion of the population. Nevertheless, their statuses as literary languages of the educated are not without their import. For one thing, they keep these classes in touch with European public opinion.

The Pan-African opinion and efforts to address the language issue are best exemplified by the Inter-Governmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Africa (1975), and the Conference of Ministers of Education of African Member States (1976), both of which recommended the increased use of African languages. Despite the OAU Language Plan of Action for Africa (1986) setting the agenda

and putting forth justification for the same, the issue of language rights in Africa still suffers from, among other problems, avoidance, vagueness, arbitrariness, fluctuation and declaration without implementation. Even if states and international organizations devote substantial human and financial resources to the sector, without doubt African leaders have not yet become sufficiently conscious of what is fundamentally at issue in the promotion of African languages and the importance of these in general development of the country (Phillipson, 1996:102).

This general apathy towards African languages has, perhaps, its genesis in a problem that Ki-Zerbo (1986:105) explains thus:

> Even today our Ministers of Culture, with very few exceptions, are finding it hard to demonstrate the fact that African culture is not the artificial flower which adorns our hat, but the very blood which flows through our veins…Our Ministers of Economy go on harping on the imperative need for growth and 'modernisation'…Our Heads of State often consider culture as that additional element that is added to the budget when the latter is more or less well balanced.

Thus far, the ideas of a Pan-African language have been vague and conflicting. Africa does not yet possess that definite common language which captures and constitutes the psychological unity of her people. As the perception of a certain unity of African renaissance and development becomes clearer, and as the historic sense is strengthened through the rise of a strong political entity, we may look for powerful conscious efforts to realise an African unity of language and identity.

With regional integration becoming the norm on the continent, and informed by the globalization discourse, the rights, duties and powers of states are being re-articulated in a much more complex way, involving the development of a world of multiplayer power, multilayered authority and complex forms of governance. Forms of governance are being diffused below the level of the nation-state to sub-national regions, and above the level of the nation-state to supranational regions and global institutions. A shift is taking place from states as simple 'containers of political power' to states as just one layer, albeit an important layer, in a complex political process in which state sovereignty is a 'bargaining chip' for use in negotiations over extensive transnational phenomena.

At independence, most African countries rigorously sought to define what their national cultures were. They did not leave it to chance. They promulgated it through schools, the media, national celebration and so on. And if you read through Pan-Africanist literature over the years, it is clear that national culture is not something that is taken for granted in the development project in Africa. There are constant reminders of 'our languages'; reminders that seem to suggest that national cultures and national languages are much more than appendages in the struggle for total liberation of Africa.

The African Union has pledged respect for the cultural and linguistic diversity of its Member States and has recognized minority languages as an inherent constituent in this regard. Thus, minority language groups should turn to the Union in response to grapple with minority language issues when perhaps domestic response to their concerns is either not forthcoming or simply not enough. This paper submits, however, that while there is a justifiable role for AU involvement in minority language issues, this competence is necessarily limited by the function and capacity of the AU more generally.

The recognition and realization of minority language rights are rooted in considerations of equality and non-discrimination, effective participation and cultural democracy. This holds true at both the national and international levels and applies equally to the AU as a governing entity that should create both rights and duties for those subject to its jurisdiction. Although without its official language policy more generally, it is fair to say that there exists something of an 'unofficial' AU language policy.

The work of the AU on language matters should be both consolidated and developed. However, the extent to which the AU can influence language rights protection within its Member States is a more problematic concept. Ambitions towards this end must be tempered by an appreciation and understanding of the capacity of the Union to act, and of the purpose and functions of the AU more generally–at least for now. How the AU might yet evolve may call for a reassessment of this type of competence. However, in the interim, we can only speculate in the realm of linguistic aspiration.

History seems to point to Kiswahili as the coming language of Africa; if indeed, a common African indigenous language is finally

to be adopted. This language is among the most lavishly endowed in existence. Kiswahili is an idiom based upon Bantu speech, the populous tongues of Africa, an African language that originated from disparate dialects at the Coast of East Africa many centuries ago, to which has been added the wealth of Persian, Hindi, English, and Arabic diction. Throughout its existence, Kiswahili has witnessed momentous historical events that have transformed the language and its speakers into a global tongue that it is now. The language extends northward into southern Somalia, southward to northern Mozambique, eastward to major Indian Ocean Islands of Pemba, Zanzibar, the Comoros, and the northern tip of Madagascar, and westward into Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is believed that Kiswahili, also spoken in some urban parts of Malawi, Zambia, Southern Sudan and Ethiopia, and with a growing number of speakers in the African Diaspora, is the most widespread indigenous language on the continent. Kiswahili is also taught in a large number of universities across the world. It is estimated that Kiswahili speakers number about one hundred- plus million people (Simala 2003).

The theories and activities of African revolutionaries like Julius Nyerere, Amilcar Cabral, Agostino Neto, Nelson Mandela and Eduardo Mondlane heavily influenced African American activists (Walters 1993). The 1970 Congress of African Peoples was an expression of this Pan African sensibility in the Diaspora and aimed at redefining Black Identity. The theme of the congress was 'Unity Without Uniformity' bringing together activists and legislators of disparate ideological orientations. An "ideological statement" adopted by the delegates on 6 September asserted that 'All black people are Africans, and that as Africans, we are bound together Racially, Historically, Culturally, Politically and Emotionally'. The statement focused on the need to develop a programme to ensure unified action in the Pan-African world. Julius Nyerere's ideas about *Ujamaa* (African socialism) and Pan-Africanism had radical influence on African American activists. Scores of African American activists traveled to Tanzania where they found a highly politicized nation that hosted several Pan-African liberation movements, opponents of neo-colonial African regimes and African Americans. They also saw for the first time, the power of an African language,

Kiswahili, to unite disparate linguistic communities to fight for a just cause.

Consequently, in the Diaspora, Kiswahili has been adopted as the language of ritual and Pan African solidarity. Since the 1970s, Kiswahili has been used in *Kwanzaa* (a derivative from 'matunda ya kwanza', meaning first fruits), an African American harvest celebration designed to reconnect Diaspora blacks with their African roots. *Kwanzaa* is observed by over 28 million people of African descent in the United States (Karenga, 2000). According to Karenga, Kiswahili was chosen as the language of *Kwanzaa* in 1965 because it was 'non-ethnic' and 'non-tribal' language and 'Pan-African in character' (Karenga 1997:123). Karenga argues that Kiswahili is the most appropriate African language for African Americans because it reflects the syncretic nature of African Americans who claim all of Africa rather than one people or place. This borderless claim of Africanity is, as Karenga puts it, a 'matter of self-determination'. It is this agency that links the adoption of Kiswahili in the Diaspora to the diffusion of Kiswahili on the continent. The activists chose Kiswahili in an attempt to 'create, recreate and circulate African culture as an aid to building community, enriching black consciousness, and reaffirming the value of cultural grounding for life and struggle' (Karenga 1997:1).

For a long time, the OAU, did not interfere with the linguistic market place; it neither promoted nor inhibited the growth of any particular language. Rather, it responded with 'benign neglect' to linguistic differences. By deciding to accord Kiswahili official status, the AU provides what is probably the most important form of support needed to Pan-Africanize the language, since it guarantees the elevation of status of the language across the continent and beyond. However, giving recognition or support to Kiswahili is seen by some as unnecessary and unfair. It is unnecessary because a valuable language like Kiswahili will have no difficulty attracting users across the African continent. And it is unfair because it subsidizes a regional language at the expense of others.

It is worthy realising that not all language interests can be satisfied in a continent of conflicting linguistic interests and scarce resources. But we should not lose sight of the fact that promoting one regional language has costs for other regional languages and

their speakers, and we need to determine when these trade-offs are justified. However, a system of universal individual rights already accommodates cultural differences, by allowing each person the freedom of speech. This enables people from different Ethno-linguistic backgrounds to pursue their distinctive languages without interference. Culture will remain a purely private affair in Africa. For while Kiswahili has official AU backing as the 'utilitarian' language of the Pan-African spirit, all indigenous African languages will compete on equal terms for cultural allegiance. It is the task of individual members of language communities to show the excellence of their languages on the linguistic market place.

As I have argued elsewhere (Simala 2001), African governments have not come to terms with the need for substantial indigenous languages development programme. Glorious declarations and resounding resolutions have had little effect. There is uncertainty and hesitation by governments regarding how much effort indigenous language rights deserve and require. But considering the fact that language is an essential precondition for economic and social development, for political participation and democracy, then the people and governments of Africa have not only a legitimate right to be concerned about indigenous languages, but also a duty to advance their cause, not merely with rhetoric, but more importantly with resources. As aptly observed by the OAU and Economic Commission for Africa representatives at the African Leadership Forum in Kampala in May 1991, almost everything that could be suggested by way of solution had been suggested and incorporated in some declarations or resolutions somewhere; a point had been reached where the multiplicity of purported solutions was adding to the problem.

Conclusion

This paper has been engaged in a discussion about language in the Pan-Africanist ideology. It has been argued that the discourse on Africa and Africanness was one of the first truly serious attempts to use the idea of Africa to develop a new discursive system in the so-called New World. What is clearly evident is the fact that Pan-

Africanism led to the dialectical relationship between ideology, culture and race. Central to the discourse on Pan-Africanism are several crucial ideas, which include colonial oppression, racial differentiation, social imbalance, and a recurring European 'othering' of Africa. These factors working together were enough to generate a black discourse, not perfect, not unique, but distinct, so distinct that it can be intelligently analyzed.

The intellectual debate in Africa has been guided by grand social theories and inspired by epochal visions of social emancipation of all Africans. All African experiences, different as they may be as a result of the diversity of social and economic conditions, traditions and political, social and ideological beliefs, share a broad and common ground, namely that of the struggle against imperialism in all its forms and manifestations, for liberty, justice, peace, progress and prosperity. Pan-Africanism has helped deepen knowledge of these issues. And at the same time, it has given them a deeper and broader significance. It has dictated to African intellectuals the necessity of being committed to their continent and society. Indeed, as enlightened members of society, African intellectuals have gone further beyond commitment and taken leadership positions among their people, by actively participating in the process of individual and societal transformation.

It is quite noteworthy that the awakening of African nationalism was accompanied by a development of African Linguistic Nationalism. The desire for a Pan-African language, for a positive linguistic identity, while still incomplete and halting in implementation, is yet alive with new ideals. Linguistic Pan-Africanism does not mean hate for European languages. On the contrary. However, the appreciation of other languages cannot be fruitful or worthy except in so far as it can help enrich African languages, culture and civilization, by increasing awareness and broadening the African character.

African intellectuals should raise the banner of the great Pan-Africanism spirit. They should undertake the task with the fortitude of fighters, the alertness of thinkers, the sensitivity of writers, and the firm resistance for which vanguards of intellectuals everywhere have been known. It is a responsibility necessitated in this crucial stage of history by the serious challenges facing the continent of Africa. The true African intellectuals, with their talent, ability and sensitivity,

ought to respond to and to react to events around them, to the views, sentiments, emotions, pains and joys of the African people.

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Self-Determination, Nationalism, Development and Pan-Africanism Stuck on the Runway: Are Intellectuals to be Blamed?

John W. Forje

Abstract

Almost fifty years after independence that aspiration of regaining lost human dignity seems stuck on the runway – warranting 'the people's distress call' for a genuine take-off. The questions that come to mind given the plethora of problems plaguing the continent are many and varied. First, does Africa want to develop? Second, what kind of independence did Africa get? Third, through which means must Africa address its problems? What has been the role of its intellectuals? What are the responses of the international community, particularly the former colonial masters in structuring and influencing the destiny of the continent for good or bad? In short, what is the trouble with Africa?

This paper looks at the litany of national deficiencies that give the continent a bad image, leaving it unable to address the plethora of problems confronting the region. Why Africans have resigned themselves to their existing peril and why African governments must give content and meaning to the aspirations of the people under the canopy of the rising tide of globalization and the information communication technology age. This essay considers the dialectic of micro-nationalism, nationalism, development and globalization—which define the place of Africa within the world system—besides forcing a serious reflection on ways in which citizenship and development can be reconceptualised beyond the mere confines of the existing nation-state order.

This discussion addresses issues underpinning the struggles for self-determination, African renaissance and the unity of

the continent. It does so by looking into the role of intellectuals, leadership and habits which cripple the aspirations and inhibit the chances of Africa becoming a modern, democratic and attractive continent capable of transforming the lives of the poor and needy, instead of waiting for 'band aid[s] and other handouts' to improve the quality of living standards of the population.

Adopting a multidisciplinary analytical and discussional approach by tackling issues of the interface of self-determination, (under) development, marginalization, xenophobia, and exclusion, the wanton and colossal destruction of natural and human resources in the process of knowledge production, this essay probes efforts aimed at constructing a sense of belonging as the take-off to sustainable development. The descent into mere anarchy must be halted and reversed if Africa is to be part of the twenty-first century and beyond.

> 'What has become embarrassingly clear after three decades and more after the attainment of independence by the majority of African countries, is that the generality of our people have been excluded from any significant contributions to the determination of national directions'. Adebayo Adedeji (1991)

> A turning point has now been reached in Africa's history. After years of patient effort to achieve the total political and economic emancipation of the continent by peaceful means, only limited results have been achieved, and it has become essential to adopt a more militant and positive strategy. Kwame Nkrumah (14 June 1966)

Foreword to Oginga Odinga *'Not Yet Uhuru'*

> No idea is so generally recognized as indefinite ambiguous and open to the greatest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls victim) as the idea of liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning. Hegel's Philosophy of Mind Oxford (1894:238)

Unearthing the Salient Issues

These words of Adebayo Adedeji (1991), Kwame Nkrumah (1966)—and those of Hegel (1894) written more than 100 years ago—still retain their relevance. The vast literature on the problems of freedom and quality living standards of people, in all languages of the world, gives rise to endless questions and objections. Philosophers and jurists and the ideologists and politicians who draw on their works (especially those belonging to different cultural systems) repeatedly fail to agree on the essence of the key concepts. What is more, the extreme lack of clarity in the initial positions and principal definitions renders discussions of freedom inefficient, if not impossible; the diverse opinions express diverse views, with few possibilities for intersection.

To be sufficiently comprehensive, every new discussion should take account of past failures and strive to avoid repeating them at all costs. CODESRIA's 30th Anniversary celebrations in my opinion fall with the realm of inter-related and interdisciplinary scholarship in that it aims to:

(i) to describe in rigorous terms the system of coordination – scholarship, objectivity, and freedom used to present a set of ideas;
(ii) to detail in the finest degree, the problem under analysis and discussion; and
(iii) to provide maximally rigorous definitions so as to move forward African social research and knowledge production in the age of the growing changes, challenges and opportunities offered by the information and communication technologies and globalization.

The theme of the anniversary celebrations 'Intellectuals, Nationalism and the Pan-African Ideal' is an embodiment of the continent's struggle for freedom, liberty, knowledge acquisition, social justice and equitable sharing of the national wealth among the people. The call by CODESRIA's leadership for the African academic community for full 'engagement with such question(s) also suggest the existence of a broad consensus that the basic principles and goals that underpinned African nationalism and the Pan-African ideal were impeccable, although the mechanisms and instruments for their

operationalization into a strategy for democratic development were open to negotiation and contestation' (CODESRIA Handout 2003). Negotiation and contestation thus provided a fountain of knowledge on which to fashion the development path of the continent.

Having leafed through almost half-a-century of independence, 'the struggle for a 'just war' – 'self-determination', or the quest for a valid political kingdom and power for nationalism and sustainable development—remains a struggle yet to be won. In other words, the just war—self-determination and inclusion—was derailed by an 'unjust war' (exclusion)—seeking first the belly kingdom, power, wealth and property accumulation for self and not for the common good. Why have things gone the way they have in Africa? Why has the just war for self-determination, nationalism and the Pan-African Ideal remained stuck on the runway? Could we see CODESRIA's 30th Anniversary as a distress call 'to move the continent forward through the collective efforts of the people'? Which role should the academic community play in this? Was the derailment of the just war—self-determination and unity—caused by the failure of the intellectual class and why? What has and continues to be the role of the individual to knowledge production?

Many questions abound. The problems are many and varied. Many answers are required to give a clear picture of what went wrong, how to address them, and how to move forward in the spirit of our founding fathers and earliest generations of African scholars who 'cut their teeth in the context of the nationalist struggles for self-determination and independence struggles underpinned by a broad-based quest for an African renaissance and the unity of African peoples'. More than fifty years after the granting of independence to the dependencies, the salient issue in African politics, socioeconomic transformation and development is that of: who gets what, when, where and how, and who gets left out? The two key words being the politics and policies of 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' What roles did the intellectual class play particularly during the colonial era in promoting the struggle for self-determination and social justice? How genuine were the intentions of the educated class for the self-determination of the people? What has been the significant role of the educated class after independence? Has the Pan-African Ideal been upheld or destroyed? Where is the continent headed?

It is time for stocktaking; to situate the causes and generate a new vibrant spirit and will to move forward in partnership with the broader populace for restructuring a new Africa capable and willing to withstand the challenges and changes. To use the opportunities offered by the twenty-first century and beyond for the socioeconomic, scientific and technological transformation of the region. While analyzing the notion of intellectuals, nationalism and the Pan-African Ideal, we should not strive for any single or final definition but rather for a series of 'shifting' issues that have influenced or retarded the direction of academic freedom, liberty and knowledge production in the continent. We depart from the premises of a full realization that our analysis will repeatedly lead us back to the point where we started, thus enriching the original, poor abstractions with more specific and varied content to better address the present and look into the future with hope and confidence that the social sciences have an indispensable role to play in knowledge production and the sustainable socioeconomic transformation of the country.

One outstanding input factor is that of the role of the individual, and how the individual collectively forged a vibrant front for the course of a just war. What we should be discussing is not the individual's ability to act but his/her possibility of acting. Action could be seen in respect of at least four inter-related areas:

- Individual's interest
- Individual's actions in accordance with his/her interests
- The cognised objective necessity
- Individual's actions in accordance with the objective necessity.

It is generally agreed (and the definition reflects this consensus) that freedom of the individual should be described through the positive, conjunctive ties between all these elements. Unfortunately, one's abilities are not enough to attain freedom; people require adequate conditions for its realization. Thus those social scientists who stood their grounds on (what the state perceived as) the wrong side of the divide because of their ardent adherence to moral ethics, professionalism and of the role of the university as the fountain of scholarship, knowledge creation and objectivity in building a strong

united and sustainable nation were forced to flee the country or seen as 'enemies in the house'.

Indeed issues were not helped or made lighter by the crystallization in the post-independence era of myriad political, economic, and social problems that manifested in direct challenges to post-colonial nation-statism by social movements of the disenchanted and to their claims or by those intellectuals who now were reaping the largest share of the nation's wealth at the expense of the suffering silent but large population. The intellectuals who stood their grounds became victims of the making of their colleagues who had acquired administrative, political and economic power in the new political constellation of the nation. The fleeing scholars were denied means and possibilities of advancing the liberalism of knowledge for socioeconomic transformation on grounds of *inclusion and not exclusion* of the people in the newly African independent countries. Thus a complex and contradictory situation and relationship emerged between university intellectuals and state functionaries (Farah 1990:7–10).

This state of divide between the two could be seen arising from a difficult relationship encountered during the immediate post-independence era from two perspectives–*collaboration* and *contestation*. Collaboration in the sense that the euphoria of independence generated a spirit of partnership between the state, civil society and the academic community; making the state enjoy immense popular legitimacy and credibility–the result of the nationalist struggles for nationhood. The ideology of the new state and that of the emerging educated class converged on the issue of nation building. As such, the state was able with the acquiescence of the educated class to fashion and push forward an instrumentalist agenda for knowledge creation and production.

That relationship did not last long. Bones of contestation soon emerged. Contestation and disagreement centered on problems of nation building – the pattern of socioeconomic transformation and development. It centered on the politics of inclusion and exclusion – the inequality in the distribution of wealth of the nation that was taking place. A few well placed had suddenly hijacked state property as personal or ethnic properties. Living standards were declining rapidly for the greater part of the population. Life more abundant

for the few was now the order of the day. In short, the state had failed. This greatly jeopardized the goals of self-determination and the Pan-African Ideal and the dream of African unity particularly in the process of knowledge production and identity formation. Governments had failed at the very early stages of nation building to give content and meaning to the nationalist and pan-Africanist goals and to improve the quality of living standards of the people. Society was on the verge of decay and collapse.

Critical scholarship soon emerged challenging the trend of development which now had fallen short of the expectations of the people in respect of 'partnership, participation, and responsibility sharing' between the state, civil society, individuals and the productive private sector. These scholars depicted and seriously questioned the ideological orientation and the emerging agenda of the state on nation building, development, and equitable sharing of the nations wealth. They saw the politics of 'exclusion' overtaking that of 'inclusion.' Here Zeleza (1997) notes 'it was hard for the latter to ignore the ethnic and regional imbalances in the distribution of the fruits of uhuru, or the appearance of corruption, incompetence, and intolerance among members of the political class. The social scientists could not ignore these realities for, besides being state functionaries, they were also the representatives and interpreters of the various constituencies of civil society which were jostling for place and privilege in the emerging post-colonial order'.

These developments could be seen in two ways: (i) a healthy sign of maturity for an emerging academic community through the product of growing radicalism in African studies. This gave birth to opposition to imperialism and neo-colonialism and preferences for socialist economics and political strategies (Waterman 1977:1). Commitment to withholding the inalienable rights of the custodians of power – the people: and (ii) the move by the state to clamp down any form of challenge on its development agenda and authority. The quest for academic democracy and independence had its repercussions for the wider national democracy, just as academic freedom had consequences for political freedom at large. The student revolution in the 1960s and the emerging critical writings of scholars at the period injected new momentum on fundamental issues of national priority, which sought to unravel the fundamental realities

of the *continent.*Publications like Chinua Achebe (1958) *Things Fall Apart*; Basil Davidson (1964) *Which Way Africa*; Demount (1965) *False Start in Africa*; Oginga Odinga (1967) *Not Yet Uhuru*, and many others elaborated on how things were moving in the wrong direction for the new African nations. The competing theories of dependency, Marxist and modernization approaches also generated greater debate and division within the social sciences and the academic community at large. This entrenched on an already fluid values and fragile institutions unable to hold itself. Ali Mazrui (1978) notes: 'the rhetoric of socialism is heard on one day, becomes silent and terrified the next day. A Parliament exists this year in effective action; it becomes a rubber stamp the next year; and perhaps dies out completely the third year'. Hence the need to seriously critique the different variants of the nationalist and pan-Africanist historgraphy that produced the different schools of thought offered by Marxism, the dependency school, the neo-patrimonialist / rent seeking approach, neo-liberalism and so on.

This fluid and fragile situation of the state placed the university community in a form of direct confrontation on issues of development: the location of universities; and other related issues that fuelled confrontation between the state and the academic world exposing upcoming intellectuals to the economic and political realities of nation-building that could not just be dismissed lightly.

No doubt we cannot deny the significant events and major contributions by so many scholars in piloting the independence struggle in the immediate post-colonial years. The out pouring of African intellectuals–virtually crying out for synthesis in mapping a scholarly approach to the many and varied problems the continent was to encounter. The momentum building for an African scholarship to address the problems of the continent was immense, intense and focused on giving Africa a new look for the future. The continent was to find its place within the world not as a passive bystander but as an active participant.

Self-determination, nationalism and development was a just war for the people: a cardinal part in the realization of fundamental human rights. At least three major fashionable political positions that masquerade under an academic facade that deserve particular attention and consideration which constitutes Africa's distress call

and why the continent is stuck on the run way unable to take-off to sustainable development and quality livelihood for the vast majority of the population.

The first is that African states have fallen or are falling apart; the basic problem facing African states is the need for stability or that 'Africa's current crises should not only be ascribed to the effects of colonialism and neo-colonialism, but also to the failure of leadership among African elites' (Houngnikpo 2000). The second is that African politics are essentially conflict less and classless, a view that originates from two very different sources: romanticism about the unity, the one-for-all and all. For one nature of the African people; and Western liberal and conservative social sciences that reject class interpretations in any context. The third, which stems from a bitter overreaction to wildly optimistic expectations at the end of the second World War that independence would bring some new panacea for mankind, is a devastating pessimism as to the possibilities for future African state building and economic development (Markovitz 1977).

These three scenarios intercept in one: that of the elite abandoning the just war by creating a passive civil society through what could be seen as 'the black-elite burden', who had taken over the 'Whiteman's burden' not for 'mission civilatrice' but through neocolonialism succeeded in inducing schizophrenia, ethnicity, witch-hunting, tribalism dictatorship, authoritarianism, disunity, xenophobia and institutionalized racism in the body politic of the society. It was a policy agenda that isolated individuals and ethnic groups in their own world of mundane concerns. Collective action for the common good became more difficult: and resistance harder to organize. The authoritarian state was now in full control. It did not condone any form of challenge.

Yet resistance to the colonial regimes appeared everywhere on the continent before independence. And independence for African students studying abroad implied 'life itself', the 'end of alienation', the raising of the standard of living, gained control of both personal and natural destinies of oneself and one's country (N'Diaye 1962).

To understand the perils of the African intellectual class one should look at the pushes and pulls of the academics within the body politic of the society. At independence the university, most of which were

created by the newly independent states as factories to churn out the new human capacity for the Africanisation of state apparatuses and as emblems of cultural modernity, enjoyed rosy relations with the new nationalist rulers. Two sets of intellectuals soon emerged the morning after independence; (i) those intellectuals who sought to reap the greatest benefits of their newly acquired positions as the new custodians of authority and power vacated by the departed colonial masters; and (ii) the educated class that remained within the university circles who struggled to maintain the liberal and critical structure of the university as a fountain of knowledge, objectivity and scholarship, as well as to maintain the liberal and independence of the university.

The latter saw the university as a liberal and independent institution void of political party rhetoric; in inspiration and aspiration, these scholars resisted turning the center of academic excellence and knowledge creation into a glorified school for political party ideology. Rather, they subjected the emerging new political rhetoric and dreams of nation building into critical and scientific analysis. This did not enamour them to the new impatient and insecure ruling elites who had obtained administrative positions or were in government as ministers, and who by now were unduly concerned by the trappings and realities of power. The goals of self-determination had escaped their minds. Seek yea the belly kingdom was the order of the day. Thus a new power struggle emerged between the two intellectual camps plunging the country and civil society into greater confusion.

The drive for centralization and control that this led to pitted the universities as vibrant mediators of civil society against the state which was increasingly flexing its authoritarian reflexes as the triumphs of nationalism were eclipsed by the challenges of independence. The universities came to be seen as potential saboteurs of the national mission, defined narrowly according to the shifting ideological, religious, ethnic, regional and class predilections of the incumbent regime (Zeleza 1997:11). The conflict relationship between the academic communities, a vibrant civil society and the new custodians of power could be visualized as Africa's distress call with the serious risk of the continent being forever grounded on the runway hoping to receive clearance for a take-off instead of finding its own way of becoming airborne (Houngnikpo 2000). To be air

born requires both a critical and objective mind-set including the commitment toward sustainable socioeconomic transformation.

Building up within this state of intellectual conditions, confusion, contradictions and constraints were also issues of poor leadership that had suddenly embraced the ideological orientation of centralized and accumulated power and authority not for the common good and genuine transformation of the nation, but for selfish interests.

A number of significant outcomes could be registered, namely

(i) critical academics were increasingly accused of being purveyors of 'foreign ideology';
(ii) such critical scholars were forced to migrate due to the hostile and unfavourable working climate they encountered;
(iii) the university could no longer play its critical and destined role of knowledge creation, and being a center of excellence; objective scholarship deteriorated, resulting in the acceleration of the brain drain phenomenon which raped the continent of its few human power capacity in the early stages of its transformation process;
(iv) mediocratic scholarship took control. This helped to derail civil society and the development process. A derailment, which worked to the advantage of the failed regime to further consolidate greater powers in order to exert its legitimacy and authority.

Above all, the conflict situation only reflected the contradictory mandate of African universities as a vehicle of modernization and the transmission of western culture and value belief systems the wrong way, and on the other, as crucibles through which national cultures could be forged out. The few scholars who survived the hot pursuit or holocaust against critical and objective scholarship were soon to be caught up with Bayart's 'politics of the belly'. Sadly this turned the university into a haven of petit bourgeois ambitions aspirations and fantasies, engended a culture of careerism and fierce competition, fertile breeding grounds for the transmission of political repression and intellectual persecution (Zeleza 1997:12).

In Cameroon for example, the decline of objective academic scholarship started the day a presidential decree appointed a university don as a Minister. This move accelerated the conflict

and divide within the academic community. It created a climate of witch-hunting, backsliding and other unhealthy activities within the university environment. On the other hand, the move could be interpreted as (i) to bring the elite into the fulcrum of the development process, to help shape and strengthen the course of decision-making; and (ii) as a calculated move to silence criticism of the state by the educated class; and subsequently mould a passive and acquiescent civil society. The second objective was achieved. The academic community becomes an enemy of itself, failing to offer the kind of leadership that was expected of the academic community.

Conflicts within the intellectual class had the consequences of the intelligentsia losing sight of its noble, committed and obligatory mission to society. It impacted in creating a solid opening and sustained string of 'failed leadership'. With failed leadership the ruling elites and shroud politicians utilized their privileged position to amass wealth and authority. In turn, it contributed to them indefinitely clinging to power forever. Consequently and most unfortunately, " one of the dire consequences of holding to power by all means necessary turns out out to be the debasement of the office of the President and other leadership positions in Africa. Clientelism and corruption became the main techniques of political mobilization and control throughout the continent, creating harsh political and economic consequences. Given the economic and social advantages and benefits of being in power in Africa, it is not hard to comprehend why being involved in politics on the continent is so tempting" (Houngnikpo op cit.).

While the body politic of African states exhibits quantum leadership failure, the surviving minority of the intelligentsia continue to hold their grounds in social science research and knowledge production in the world. For example, The CODESRIA Symposium on Academic Freedom. Research and Social responsibility of the Intellectual in Africa, Uganda, November 1990 that objectively and critically revealed many painful problems entangled with academic liberty, scholarship and lack of effective leadership in post-colonial Africa. Or as noted in ACDESS Research Programme (Adedeji 1993) involved two interrelating core areas identified as (i) focusing on Africa's internal dynamics and aiming at developing strategies for overcoming the key obstacles to the continent's development and transformation; and (ii)

concentrating on scenarios for Africa's future within foreseeable global constellations, exploring in particular the continent's maneuvering space in the international economic and political system.

These and other related developments show the commitments African social scientists have for their societies or that their levels of social responsibility is low. Far from that. Mafeje (1990:55) stipulates, 'The writings of African intellectuals are preoccupied with problems of development to the point of sounding hysterical in the case of the left'.

Comparative legitimacy and credence

From the analysis of the kinds of elites, it is clear that intellectual freedom in Africa has been up against a dual tyranny, namely (i) domestic tyranny–the temptations of power facing those in authority since the early formation stage of the nation-state in Africa. Mazrui (1978:260) sees this as the political tyranny of governments as yet insensitive to needs and roles of education institutions and educated citizens in nation building.

For most of these governments, educational institutions and the academic community constitute a serious threat and challenge to the existence of the state. It should be pointed out that the established universities in Africa (Ibadan, Legon, Makerere, Senegal, Fourah Bay etc.) enjoyed greater credibility, autonomy and legitimacy than the new independent governments. These educational establishments were created long before the nation-state came into existence. In some cases, Fourah Bay in Sierra Leone for example, being older than the state by over one hundred years. The reality of indigenous African governments dates back to 1956 (Sudan), Ghana (1957) and Nigeria (1960). Most African states gained their independence in the 1960s.

Such a situation had its consequences in respect of comparative legitimacy and credence of the university as against the state. As centers of academic excellence, knowledge creation and human capacity building under colonial rule, these educational establishments had succeeded in penetrating civil society and accepted as credible and reliable body than the political parties and rulers. A conflict of interest over credibility and legitimacy could not be avoided between the state and the academic community.

To a large extent the state found itself vulnerable, weak and

failing in meeting its obligations and aspirations of the people. Promises were not fulfilled. The state had become the oppressor and not the liberator of the people. State sovereignty and authority were under surveillance, and facing serious challenges from civil society. Politicians showed signs of insecurity in the wake of a growing intellectual force. The situation compelled a fundamental interaction or rapprochement between the university environment and the political environment. The possible way forward for the state toward the intolerant of academic freedom was to coerce the academic community with the instruments of the carrot and stick. It paid off. The academic community split into factions paving the way for centralized and authoritarian governance system.

The second tyranny is largely external – the Euro centrism of academic culture. Should the African university be structured in the same pattern with Western values and as a medium of a transmission of European culture and value belief systems in non-European societies? The challenge is how to sustain universal academic excellence without westernizing the African cultural heritage, identity and values. But how to promote these values and give scientific meanings to the usefulness of the non-western cultures and belief systems? How could modernity be attained without succumbing to heavy dependency orientation? In the words of Mazrui (1978) external tyranny of Euro centrism may well be at least as obstinate as the domestic tyranny of African dictators. Both are likely to remain part of the general picture of academic life in Africa for much of the rest of this century.

Therefore creating an appropriate domestic political and economic climate and a sustainable international environment as well must be the main objective of the continent's strategy to ensure a place in the new world order. Towards this end, it is essential to have a vibrant civil society and an articulate intellectual community to give the necessary guidance, leadership and vision for the present and future. In short, partnership, participation and responsibility sharing among the different stakeholders is imperative and necessary to address the dialectic of micro-nationalism, nationalism, regionalism and Pan-Africanism which are forcing a serious reflection on the ways in which citizenship could be reconceptualized beyond the confines of the existing ethnic and national-territorial order.

The major thrust of these adjustments has to be a greater outward orientation for the common good–with increased scope for total inclusion. The most negative elements of exclusion must be rectified and destroyed and to prevent it to have a place in the body politic of the society. The different factions of the academic divide must converge instead of internalizing division and dependence in various forms, and to react in recognition of reality and the common good. The intellectual community should constitute itself into a force and focal reference point where many ideas flow together, fertilize each other and challenge each other, where the policy of relevance of research remains preminent and the common good a top most priority.

Fighting for the common good means fighting tyranny, injustice and bigotry so that when the history of the struggle for intellectual and academic freedom is written it should in the words of Nelson Mandela (1994) pivot on;

> A glorious tale of Africa solidarity, of Africa's adherence to principle. It will tell a moving story of the sacrifices that the peoples of our continent made. It will speak of the contributions which all Africa made, from the shores of the Mediterranean Sea in the North, to the confluence of the Indian and Atlantic Oceans in the South'.

The African intellectual community must find peace with itself so as to discover existing weaknesses and shortcomings, and sustain a shared sense of responsibility in advancing the course of social science research and knowledge production in Africa far beyond the twenty-first century. To achieve this goal, no single intellectual should claim him/herself a lone player in knowledge production. It has been grounded within the contour of joint and collaborative venture and of the collective efforts of the entire community of the intellectual body in forging a new socioeconomic transformation order for Africa.

CODESRIA's 30th anniversary should constitute a forum and a framework for the determination of the people to make a success of the new transition to a new African academic order in partnership with the state. An order that ensures majority-ruled, pluralistic democratic systems, a vision of the political leadership that ensures the interface of nationalism and Pan-Africanism in the process of knowledge production and identity formation. An order that ensures

and sustains relative peace and political stability and quality living standards for the greatest population possible. There is need for a holistic structural change, not only of the academic community, of the polity but also of the economy and the society through a constructive and consolidative process of partnership, participation and responsibility sharing among the stakeholder.

The push for development in the twenty-first century requires an urgent revisiting of the aspirations and expectations of the nationalist struggles for self-determination and independence, struggles underpinned by a broad-based quest for an African renaissance and unity of the African peoples. A revisit which should reawaken, inspire and stimulate a new fire of nationalism and Pan-Africanism in the minds of intellectuals to respond positively to the challenges of sustaining academic independence and forging broader interdisciplinary scholarship for the Common Home Africa. A Common Home Africa where the basic tenets of democracy, accountability, social justice, rule of law, adequate and equal opportunities for all and development for transformation become internalized and deep-rooted in every hamlet of the continent. A continent with an enabling environment for all. One that provides the empowerment of the people and the democratization of the development process are the moral, ethical and political obligation and commitment of the people. A continent that calls for visionary leadership evolving mutually beneficiary relationships between the people and improving the quality of livelihood of the currently marginalized poverty stricken population.

An agenda for intellectuals in the name of restitution and distribution

Thirty years may be a short period in the history of CODESRIA to transcend all barriers to knowledge production and place the social sciences firmly within the body polity for them to play a critical role in the democratic development of the continent. Indeed a society which neglects the instructive value of its past for its present and future cannot be self-confident and self-reliant and will therefore lack internally generated dynamism and stability.

> Dispossession and dependence which when combined, amount to more than five hundred years have left a heavy imprint on Africa. Thirty years, or generation is a very short time in which to reduce their impact, let alone transcend this legacy. What brought us to Dakar was the fear that Africa is not moving further away from this legacy to more autonomy, but finds itself caught in the worst manifestations. (Adedeji 1993).

These wise words written a decade ago and coincidentally in Dakar, (within the framework of ACDESS seminar on Africa Within the World: Beyond Dispossession and Dependence) remain very factual today as CODESRIA celebrates its thirtieth year of social science research and knowledge production. No doubt CODESRIA has made tremendous efforts to respond to the challenges and goals it set to achieve some thirty years ago. Whilst these challenges provided scholars with a clear historical context for the definition of their identities and role, the record of the post-independence nationalist period, including especially that of the politicians who inherited state power, and the organization framework they adopted for the realization of the dream of Pan-Africanism left a great deal to be desired. From Kampala (1990) on the topic of Academic Freedom, Research and the Social responsibility of the Intellectuals, to Dakar 2003, CODESRIA's goal has been to bridge that gap, to fill the vacuum through scholarship and academic excellence for the rehabilitation of Africa's culture, traditions and value systems and the use of indigenous knowledge systems for the common benefit of the people in particular and in the general interest of humanity.

The African intellectual community must take this challenge by pursuing restitution policies if it is to transcend its protracted dispossession and loss of autonomy. A loss that plunged the continent into total disarray and decay. The lopsided equation of state authority and dictates stretching its muscles over the independence of the university and freedom of speech, and academic freedom, university independence and liberals in search of knowledge creation and human capacity building must be addressed to ensure the sustainable development of the continent. To achieve this end, both the political leadership and academic community must rediscover, acknowledge and act upon the continent's wealth of collective wisdom and resources – be it in the form of social, economic, cultural, and

political, or organization of knowledge, or ways of thinking – largely accounts for the endemic crisis that has confronted the continent since independence.

The emergence of the intellectual division among African scholars and the state was of course, not simply an imperialist scheme hatched by the latter. It arose out of the ideological imperatives of nation building in Africa itself, particularly following the failure of the nation-state to respond positively to the needs, aspirations and expectations of the people. The state transformed itself into a tyranny rather than a liberator and protector of the people.

Furthermore, the post-colonial nation-state established the boundaries of research and intellectual discourse. The scholars were expected to show commitment to the problems of their nation; to study its institutions and values: to provide solutions to the national problems of economic development and political integration. Following the positive responses of the intellectual community in advancing the ideology of nation building, the state equally feared the outspoken and articulate approach and exposure of its failures to address pertinent problems clammed down on intellectual freedom, liberty and excellence.

> Basil Davidson (1992) notes: The actual and present condition of Africa is one of deep trouble, sometimes a deeper trouble than the worst imposed during the colonial years. For some time now, harsh governments or dictatorships rule over peoples who distrust them to the point of hatred, and usually for good and sufficient reason: and too often one dismal tyranny gives way to a worse one. Despair rots civil society, the state becomes an enemy, and bandits flourish.

This attitude accentuated the descent of the African state into crisis and stagnation destroying the structural basis of the Pan-African Ideal and subjecting the people into abject poverty and misery in the midst of plenty. With the complacency of African leaders the industrialized world has continued to take its cut of Africa's dwindling wealth. Transfers of this wealth to the

> developed countries of Europe and America have annually expanded in value; in 1988, for example, to what was then a record figure, an immense figure paid out to "developed" creditors. And multitudes starved (Davidson op cit).

Today, resources rich nations are classified as highly indebted poor countries (HIPC). What explains this degradation from the hopes and freedoms of newly regained independence? How has this come about? Where did the liberators go astray?

No doubt failed institutions and bad leadership in partnership with human blunders blending with corruption can supply some easy answers. We live with human failures. And the continent's crisis of society derives from many upsets and conflicts with the root of the problem closely engraved within the social and political institutions within which decolorized Africans have lived and tried to survive. Primarily, as noted by Basil Davidson, this is a crisis of institutions. Which institutions? We are concerned here with the nationalism, which produced the nation-states of newly independent Africa after the colonial period, with the nationalism that became nation-statism. This nation-statism looked like liberation, and really began as one. But it did not continue as liberation. In practice, it was not a restoration of Africa to Africa's own history, but the onset of a new period of indirect subjection to the history of Europe. The 54 or so states of the colonial partition, each formed and governed as though their peoples possessed no history of their own, became 54 or so nation-states formed and governed on European models, chiefly the models of Britain and France. Liberation thus produced its own denial.

These developments reflect the problems the intellectual community is up to address, challenge and correct through scientific social science research and knowledge production. We find ourselves embedded in the wave of hatred, tribalism, xenophobia, and racism to name just but a few distracting attributes in the development process. This concepts flourishes on disorder. And remains utterly destructive of civil society, making hay of morality, flouts the rule of law which civil society undermined and finally brought down by decades of alien rule after Africa's imperialist partition in the 1880s.

Today the African continent is left with shells of a fragile and fallible civil society, and the intellectual community cannot deny being part of that creation. It is the intellectual community in partnership with failed governments or shroud politicians believing in the politics of the belly that continues to fan the ideological

orientation of 'tribalism, clientelism, patronage, ethnicity, and other family linkages and similar networks of local interest (see Rothchild and Chazan 1988, Young 1988, Davidson 1987).

The state of the art – Intellectuals, Self-determination, Nationalism and the Pan-African Ideal – is an analysis of Africa's troubles and an inquiry into the process of nationalism that has crystallized the division of Africa's many hundreds of peoples and cultures into a few dozen nation-states, each claiming sovereignty against the others, and all of them sorely in trouble with one another. In Cameroon like many other countries on the continent, a few persons or ethnic groups have confiscated state machinery and state property.

The invisible and neglected silent majority

Another shortcoming of social science research and knowledge production especially before and in the immediate post-independence period has been the inadequate representation or neglect of the African women and their contributions to the self-determination and independence struggles. The challenge therefore for the new intellectual order of the continent is to recover empirically the lives and roles of women in the independence struggle, their contribution to the transformation and development process and to restore their role and story to history.

There is an urgent need to redefine and enlarge the scope of female gender into reconstruction and reform of the African society in the twenty-first century, to make their roles more inclusive, more comprehensive and more coherent to the ultimate goals of a developed Africa of the present and future. Finally to articulate ways of gendering African history.

It is imperative for female scholars to take up the challenge and ensure the mainstreaming and gendering of their roles in the socioeconomic and political transformation and development of the continent. It is their obligation, for if they do not do it no one will do an honest job in this direction. It should be seen within the same context as only Africans can genuinely spearhead their development path. Though significant literature on African women has grown considerably in the past two decades, much remains to be achieved if restoring the input roles of African women in the nation-building

process of the continent. Today a good number of African universities now offer degree programmes in women studies. These developments are attributed to numerous factors, including the political impetus of the women's movement and the crisis of conventional development theory and practice, and the consequent rise of the women-in-development project. The biases against women must be addressed if the social sciences are to contribute significantly to knowledge production and the transformation of the African polity.

So far, there has been shewed coverage of women in the development process. This is evident in the total neglect of a group that constitutes more than 52 percent of the population of African states. A brief analysis does show this neglect. For example women are not mentioned in Ingham (1965), Ogot (1973) volumes 1 and 2 of the three volumes of the Oxford History of East Africa: Harlow and Chilver (1965). In volume 3 of the 691-page book, women are mentioned only in 10 pages. The same is true of Ajayi and Crowder (1976) in which women are mentioned only in four pages out of 649 pages of the book. There is considerable improvement with the 1978 edition with two additional pages. Birmingham and Martin (1983) Vol.1 allocates 59 out of 315 pages to women and vol.2, 53 out of 432 pages on women. Rotberg and Mazrui (1970) collection does not even index women. Gifford and Louis (1982) 654 pages make mention of women only once, not in the text but in the bibliographic essay. In Rodney (1982) women are mentioned only in six out of 312 pages. The same is the case of Feierman and Janzen (1992), where women are considered in 58 out of 487 pages, while Illife (1987) allocates 100 out of 387 pages on women.

The poverty or neglect of African women in social science not only shows the distortions in the study and recognition of women but poses serious challenges to the intellectual community to embark on effective components of research in situating the role of the African women in the mainstream development of the continent. It is a task that requires the collaboration of both men and women and requires an inter-disciplinary approach to critically advance social science research and knowledge production in the years ahead.

One must also admit that the prevailing socioeconomic conditions in African universities are not conducive to the production of knowledge; scholars situated in impoverished or beleaguered

institutions lack the time and resources to produce scholarly work; the few women scholars in African universities often lack a supportive environment to do critical feminist work (Signs 1991:645). Thus the situation and language of exclusion, of privilege and power, of intellectual imperialism should be adequately addressed.

A new landscape and visions of redistribution is the inspiration needed by all as items on the African agenda for social sciences and knowledge production. It is a challenge to all from educated establishments, the intellectual community, the political leaders, heads of state and government to all stakeholders to subscribe to at least two imperatives. The first being the determination by the African community to survive with integrity and to deploy all available opportunities to halt the ongoing crisis; and decay of the African polity must be nurtured with pride, and in the spirit of partnership, participation and responsibility sharing by all actors. The time has come when the people of this continent must articulate, develop and aggregate a culture of not just speaking but acting actively and positively for its own best interest, not in the interest which others perceive.

The people of the region must grapple with the existing realities of developing itself through its own efforts and on the basis of indispensable reliance on its own resources even though this may be difficult, and even though it cannot be based exclusively on domestic resources. Bearing in mind that we lack the means and guts to colonize or enslave other parts of the world as Europe and North America did, and which to a large extent, constitute the root of Africa's predicament, we must adopt the best possible alternative to attract foreign resources. That best possible alternative is to ensure the structures and functioning of a democratic governance system: a system that encapsulates the rule of law, social justice, transparency, accountability, freedom of speech among others.

The second imperative earlier mentioned is that of the continent in general, and the intellectual community in particular, pursuing restitution policies in order to transcend its protracted dispossession and loss of autonomy. The second strategic imperative must be an embodiment of both material and non-material restitution encompassing a moral and psychological dimension. Ethically and morally this entails the reinstitution of legitimacy, moral and political accountability and of

sources construed on trust and respect, which existed on the continent before the advent of the transatlantic slave trade and colonialism. On the psychological front, Africa must rediscover its self-confidence and self-respect and emancipate itself from mental dependence (Adedeji op cit.). There is the call, therefore, for the intellectual community to the rehabilitation of the continent's culture, traditions, value systems and indigenous knowledge systems as vital inputs to the transformation and construction of the nation-state.

Awareness of the complexities of the African political past and prevailing present should spur students of African political history and contemporary politics in researching, analyzing, integrating and advancing solutions for the continent's present problems with implications for the future. Social science research should be construed from the perspectives of looking back to understand the present and to address the future by avoiding existing known mistakes.

The bon-voyage accorded the Cold War by the world community is also required to bid fare voyage to authoritarian and dictatorial regime forms on the continent, to embrace academic freedom, liberalism and independence of the university as the fountain for thinking and knowledge creation, and as the pillars on which to reconstruct a new African nation on the golden principles of the basic tenets of democracy, rule of law, inclusion and quality livelihood for all. There is need for articulate scholarship to address the totalitarianism of megalomaniac leadership, self-styled Life President that has made it possible for the state to marginalize and suspend civil society like malevolent clouds. The grip of African leaders over their states widened the state-society gap, and with civil society forced into coma, the little pressure that existed vanished, and the result turned out to be catastrophic. Thus clientelism and corruption became the main techniques of political mobilization and control throughout the continent, creating harsh political and economic consequences. Politics becomes the quickest means of making money and uplifting ones social status in society.

There is need to revisit Achebe's *No Longer at Ease*, Dipoko's *Because of Women*, Nkrumah's *Dark Days in Ghana*, Dumont's *False Start in Africa*; and other similar publications by African scholars that did not escape the self-righteous wrath of the censors that had been put in place to silence critical thinking as instruments

and mechanisms for moving the country forward from a solid base. The solution to the problems facing the continent must emanate from within Africa spearheaded by the educated class. This is not the time to be hoping and waiting to be rescued from outside. Unless the people of Africa through the political leaders; intellectual class, and civil society realize that no help from outside will ever show up, Africa's problems will only get worse.

Three brands of elites

From the analysis, three brands of intellectuals emerged at the immediate post-colonial era; (i) the leftist; (ii) bridge builders and (iii) belly intellectuals (for lack of a better description). The belly intellectuals are those who failed victims of the one-party governance system the wrong way; opted to sacrifice ethics and professionalism for self-interest. In doing so, they succumbed to the whims and caprices of the shroud politicians. An act, which gave credence to these politicians to further the scourge of centralism, authoritarian and dictatorial governance system. The outcome has been legitimized corruption, abuse of fundamental human rights, underdevelopment and misuse of both human and natural resources. In short, failed, collapsed, shadow, quasi and military governments that littered the continent for the past four decades or more. They helped sustain the decline of the African state making it incapable of fulfilling its basic duties and obligations to the people.

The intellectuals of the left belong to the group that stood its grounds on academic liberty, the independence of the university as the bastion for knowledge creation, objective and advocating a vision for building a sustainable society of equal opportunities and quality living standards for the population. The propensity of this group has been to hold at the highest esteem self-confidence and self-criticism of African scholarship. These scholars stood firm in spite of all adversaries in discussing their countries, problems (See CODESRIA Bulletin 1990, and Mkandawire 1989:16; and 1995) who states; 'increasingly aware of their preeminent position in African studies, thanks in part to the paradigmatic crises of the social sciences in the metropolitan countries have contributed both to the de-fetishization

of African social reality and the de-mystification of metropolitan social science and opened new vistas to approaches that are more deeply rooted in African social reality'. The state machinery for voicing openly the shortcomings of the system detested the group.

The bridge builders are those who (i) attempt to maintain their academic militancy but are attracted by the trappings of the inherent force and privileges of power, sometimes not of their own choice. For example, forced into the situation by ethnic, social and other factors; or operated on the principles, if you cannot beat them join them; (ii) those who see the use of state machinery to fill certain missing lapses and to revenge though not de-linking themselves totally from the university environment; sometimes operating on the principles of you 'scratch my back I do the same in return'.

To bring sanity to a chaotic situation, the efforts of a certain category, the efforts of the positive bridge builders may be solicited without sacrificing ethics, moral rectitude, and professionalism that underscore the tenets of academic excellence and scholarship. In short, the academic community must rediscover its self-confidence and self-respect, and emancipate itself from mental dependency and belly politics for self. The ultimate goal is to look back in order to look forward with greater experience, zeal and vision, adopting measures that can best be applied to African systems of governance and accountability, traditional checks and balances of power as well as sanctions on flawed leadership.

It is the moral and ethical obligation of the intellectuals to bring down the apartheid wall of dictatorship, flawed leadership, impoverishment, poverty, ethnicity, xenophobia by building a constructive forum for the institutionalization of the basic tenets of democracy and good governance. Intellectuals are important for the success of the current struggles for democracy in Africa. They need to re-link with civil society through responsible education and scholarship. They are also responsible to design and develop the scientific content of the cultural heritage, indigenous knowledge and value belief systems of the people. It is their duty to continue to advance the role of social science research and knowledge production for the continent well beyond the twenty-first century.

However, to attain this vital and noble goal requires unity of the sciences and scholarship void of party politics, witch-hunting;

and cooperation across the different disciplines. Seen within this framework, "their contribution should begin with the democratization of their own priorities and the construction of academic structures and traditions that promote, support and respect African intellectual production. African intellectuals have to challenge vigorously the Eurocentricism that dominates Africanist discourses (Zeleza 1997). A relinking between home based intellectuals and African intellectuals in the Diaspora remain imperative to uplifting the knowledge production base of social science research in Africa.

Conclusion: Not at Ease – Our Burden

Is Africa ludicrously doomed forever? Are the miseries of malice and incompetence or greed to be blamed for 'the prime failure of the government', (Davidson 1992)? Where were the intellectuals as things fell apart? The absence of the intellectuals and failure of government are not the cause, they are the effects. The cause has to be located elsewhere. To a large extent, it lay in the 'failure of the rulers to reestablish vital inner links with the poor and dispossessed, civil society and the alienated intellectual class (see Achebe 1988:130–31). It was the failure of post-colonial communities to find and insist upon means and living together by strategies less primitive and destructive than rival kinship networks, whether of 'ethnic' clientelism' or its camouflage in no less clientelist 'multiparty systems' (Davidson 1974).

The intellectual has been caught between the trappings of state machinery and civil society drugged in coma and passiveness. If the founding fathers negotiated a bad independence hand over on grounds of 'seek yea first the political kingdom' the second-generation leaders have worse of badly brokered deal. And this constitutes the deepest wound inflicted upon the continent. What the continent requires now is a new breed of leaders and an articulate scholarship direction to give a comprehensive and concerted sense of direction to the new leaders. In the words of Lewis (1998:154) 'the assertion of civil society in Africa is a multifaceted process, entailing basic changes in the associational arena, the role of an emergent political society and the reconstruction of the state." The

issue at stake is for the intellectual community, in liaison with the state and civil society, to inject new blood and save the continent from further descent to decay.

Reform and reconstruction from the premises of partnership, participation and responsibility sharing among the different stakeholders remains the best way out of the current danger plaguing the continent. 'Any ground democracy has gained on the continent will be lost without the vigilance of both civil society and ordinary citizens. An African political and academic renaissance will have to go beyond quick fixes and slogans, and rather tackle, as soon as possible, the seemingly intractable problems of economic underdevelopment, the dilemmas of state weakness or the challenges of communal division the continent has been experiencing (Houngnikpo 2000). It should be noted that 'institutions that were established to promote participation, such as parliaments, political parties, local governments and independent print media, have either been legislated out of existence, or transformed into institutions which are clearly dominated by their executives' (Olowu 1989: 13).

It goes without saying that any grounds covered by social science research and knowledge production during the past thirty years of CODESRIA's inception has to be further intensified through scholarship, and above all, to restrain the leaders from crafting pervasive clientelistic networks, ethnic hegemony and patronage that further ensures the flow and retention of power by a clique totally alienated from society. What will get the continent out of its present crises and development stalemate is not clamping down of intellectuals and more government controls, but the release of the people's organizational genius at solving their problems. African governments must have the nerves and vision truly to accept the four levels of activities—*participation*, *partnership*, *responsibility and wealth sharing*—between the state, civil society, productive sectors and other actors.

The features of self-determination were necessary to the success of the Pan African Ideal. The intellectuals were needed to give a scientific objective orientation to the struggle and to map out the road map for sustaining and meeting the expectation and aspirations of the people. That intellectual input needed the practice of democracy, of criticism and self-criticism, the increasing responsibility of civil

society for the governance of the nation. In order to drive the benefits of development in terms of schools, health services, security to life and properties, social facilities and amenities designed to improve the quality of livelihood of the population. What Africa needs most urgently is a government that ensures and guarantees a culture of tolerant consensus, a culture able to promote a politics of self-development and self-criticism, and to put in place an enabling environment of inclusion not exclusion. The intellectual community is not asking too much for such a conducive environment from the state. It is asking for an enabling atmosphere to contribute its quota in moving the continent forward in the right direction.

To a large extent, one can also apportion blames on the continent's administrative intelligentsia who had sacrificed professional ethics and objective for Bayart's 'the politics of the belly'. 'Africa's descent into decay being attributed to the tragic failure of African leadership in the social, political and economic arenas, the personalization of rulership, the expropriation of social resources by the kleptocracy of the ruling classes in a patron-clientelist autocratic, coercive and dangerous intrusive state' (Anice op cit). People have to be educated to come out of the current stage of social dislocations centralized and authoritarian governance system has engendered and the mechanisms and attitudes that lie in the background of massive affliction caused by exclusion, alienation and bad governance. The challenge for the intellectual community and social sciences research is to address the absence of a clear political analyst that could break into the stagnation so as to set new ideas moving and new hopes stirring There is need for an ideological and scientific breakthrough under the canopy of participation and partnership between the different actors.

A new era in the mass participation in the political process and in social science research in Africa is about to begin. The feasibility of this social science research and a new politics of mind and capacity, a politics and research era that might at least be able to confront the real problems of the continent and to begin to solve them needs the support of all. What this paper advocates is the invention of a state appropriate to a post-imperialist or post dictatorial future for the continent and where social sciences would play an imminent role. As of now, the continent is plagued with among others the following:

- Rising frustration with the pace of development, intensified by industrialization, urbanization, and population growth, abject poverty and misery.
- Political and social instability, corruption and bad management,
- An increased tendency to turn to authoritarian or radical solutions.
- Continuation of the trend of the military to take power.
- Growing nationalism, racism, xenophobia, discrimination, hatred and exclusion, injustice, failed governments and descent to total collapse.
- Declining academic excellence due to poor input factors, dilapidated infrastructure, poor financial resources, poor functional environment and increasing demands for new entrants–students.

Proactive measures

Though the academic community has been faced with disappointment and disillusionment, it must forge ahead with a new lease of life for total reform and reconstruction with social sciences research playing the lead role. There has to be a fundamental commitment by the academic community to social science research and knowledge production in order to accelerate the genuine independence of the continent.

The immediate pursuit for scientific excellence and academic freedom in the pursuit of a collective self-reliance, national integration and the transformation of the continent for the common good of all.

Restructuring of the educational curriculum and the establishment of more centers of excellence to meet the growing demands of the population and to adequately address existing pertinent issues plaguing the society.

For the intellectual community to inculcate a work of ethical, moral and professionalism that does not compromise professionalism for belly politics.

Forging the imperative of scientific objectivity and consensus and collaboration among the major disciplines and actors in government,

civil society, and academic community including networking across national frontiers.

The articulation of a new educational order to take into account the modalities of promoting greater integration among the different disciplines, through sound and effective education curriculum and policies of economic and political cooperation, networking among the different educational establishments within and beyond the frontiers of the continent.

This proactive agenda is in no way comprehensive or exhaustive. It does not even pretend to capture the wealth of ideas and problems that confront the continent. The problems are immense. The proactive policy measures are only intended to stimulate further debate and discussion on the way forward for social science research and knowledge production in Africa. There is need to develop beneficial political and socio-economic research so as to establish a framework for popular participation in the democratization process and academic excellence for the future of the continent.

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Can a 'Realist Pan-Africanism' Be a Relevant Tool Toward the Transformation of African and African Diaspora Politics? Imagining a Pan-African State

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Introduction: Objectives and Issues

This paper is written as a reflective essay. But its arguments are guided by historical perspectives. My main objectives are to examine the components of what I refer to as 'realist Pan-Africanism', to identify the basic arguments behind it, and to analyse the implications of this kind of Pan-Africanism and the dynamics it might engender in Africa's international relations and in the African Diaspora. Although some generalised illustrations are discussed as related to the African Diaspora at large, the paper focuses on the Diaspora in the United States. Obviously, Pan-African ideas were born-here.

In this study, I do not intend to expand on the origins and history of Pan-Africanism, for the literature on its history is immense. The discussion about its significance, both in Africa and in the African Diaspora, continues to attract scholars and students of African politics and history. As an ideology and intellectual discourse among African scholars and political activists, Pan-Africanism is not new in terms of its intellectual positions as to what directions Africa should take and the kind of projects that should be developed to allow Africans to set up institutions of societal transformation. But at the policy and political level, Pan-Africanist advocates have not seized or created any real opportunity for its actualisation. Pan-Africanists have not succeeded in capturing state power and actualising Pan-Africanism in public policies and development projects. In other words, they

have not been creative, imaginative, and daring enough to translate this ideology into political actions.

Let me make some general assumptions that may help locate my arguments and my analysis in this paper. One of the problems that African states and people have been facing in the past 500 years or so is the fact that they have tended to accept the European un-historical interpretations of the African world. This implies that African states and people tend to project themselves in the world as institutions and people with a short memory. Economically and politically, Africa would not have been where it is today without its 'consent'. We have accepted, to a large extent, consciously or unconsciously, what the European and the American power systems have defined for us as 'normal'. As manifested in the current dynamics of Africa's international relations, political economy, and domestic policy frameworks, African states and political elites have internalised the concept of the 'dark continent' as invented by European powers long before Columbus came to the Americas. In this process, many essential aspects of the African identities have been lost.

In the way used in this paper, imagination is one of the most important human activities, which is linked to the intellect, history, and society. It is the most powerful tool of human and social reproduction. Imagining is not a finite process. It is a synthetic, conscious, and teleological activity. It is not random and does not happen in a vacuum.

Within the context of the arguments based on a historical imagination process, a Pan-African state is firstly, a philosophical and socio-historical concept. This imagination implies a critical rethinking of the African state, a process through which a new political invention called Pan-African politics can be created. It is about the abilities and social consciousness of the African people to understand the direction of the past and the present dimensions of their history and rethink the nature of the African state that can unite African people. If we are to seriously and constructively challenge the contradictions of the current history and the massive forces both visible and invisible that work against the African people and cultures, imagining a Pan-African state is a must and legitimate political exercise to be taken seriously. Every people or nation, which socially and economically progressed, had an opportunity to

stop and rethink what it is and what its future ought to be regardless of what was happening around it. One cannot rethink about where to go from a current location without making a critical analysis of the history of the existing African states.

Secondly, it should be noted and recognised that existing structures of the African state, contemporary African political culture, and liberal globalisation dogmas are the most visible enemies of Pan-Africanism as a political ideology. With neo-liberal globalisation and its processes of structural de-stating Africa, its disengagement policies, and its liberal democracy, Pan-Africanism as an ideology has become more of an illusion and intellectual fictitious thought than a political tool of structural change. It is argued in this paper that despite the existing fragile regional economic and political organisations, which have been responding more to the imperatives of globalisation than any African national economies, and the creation, by imitation, of an European union, the Pan-African agenda has become weaker than ever before. One cannot talk about Pan-Africanism when our land, water, and air have been almost totally sold to the foreign investors and multinational companies within the context of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) or neo-global liberalisation. In my view, an African Union that is founded on the flawed historical principle of 'one size fits-all', the so-called Adam Smith invisible hand, and the massive selling of African resources as the only roads to industrialisation and development, cannot structurally and philosophically advance the cause of Pan-Africanism.

In contemporary world politics, Pan-Africanism has been one of the expressions most used by African scholars and the black scholars in the Diaspora but at the same time less understood and less tolerated by the African states and the capitalists in the North. Its practical usage across a multitude of cultures and political ideologies has been less attractive and at a same time confusing and misleading than its intellectual foundation. In its historical usage, one cannot fully discuss Pan-Africanism without referring to 'racial' and geographically coded foundations. That is to say that the foundation of this ideology has been in most cases defined in 'racial' (the skin colour) versus biological disposition, ethnic, and geo-political terms. One of the questions behind this work is: What is its meaning after the end of Cold War Era?

Cultural and intellectualistic Pan-Africanism in its multiplicity of imagined, imaginary, or real colorful entity has failed African people the world over. Why has it failed? And what should be done to improve the quality of the discourse of Pan-Africanism and make it more realistic and pragmatic in this century?

Obviously, no real African nationalist can rely only on the size, resources, the history of his/her country and its relations with the international political economy in order to implement relevant policies. Linkages with other countries are essential. Unfortunately, since the 1960s, those linkages have continuously been weakening, even though regional economic organisations such as ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, the Maghreb union, the Preferential Tariff Agreements (PTA), to cite only a few, were intended to have a positive impact on state policies and people's development projects. For instance, from 1976 until 1990, the total volume of trade among the ECOWAS countries increased only 4 percent. Moreover, the African states trade heavily with their former colonial masters, and these powers are the sources of their foreign exchange needed for international transactions. For example, since the North African countries gained their independence, over 60 percent of their total exports have gone to the former European Economic Community (EEC), and 50 percent of their imports come from the state members of that community, making them the EC's third largest customer and fourth largest supplier.

As African people and their social institutions are struggling to look for development options, the study of Pan-Africanism is very justified. The faulty universal historical premises as articulated in the American and European foreign policies at the end of the Cold War politics and their social and political implications provide us an opportunity to revisit Pan-Africanism.

Despite the fact that we have been told over and over at the end of the Cold War era that we are at the end of the Fukuyamaist history and that finally the world is going toward the same universal finite direction and that probably in some days the world will be unified, historical facts in the world and their ramifications, the dynamics of social movements, and the objective conditions are defining matters differently. The world is moving though a complex transition with multiple layers and dimensions. This transition is being defined

differently depending on the nature of the actors involved in the global system, their location in this system, and the dynamics of the regional politics and their realities.

Intellectual guidelines and major arguments

The arguments in this paper are built on three interrelated premises, which I have used from my article published in the *African Journal of Political Science*, Volume 7, Number 1 (2002). The first premise is that 'regardless of the claimed "good" intention of many African leaders and people in continuously copying or imitating European experiences and their unilinear models of development, and regardless of the quality of their imitations, Africa will never organically and ontologically develop out of European history and European languages and metaphysics'. However, no society can develop out of autarky. People also can learn or borrow from others but whatever can be borrowed from other people's experiences has to be selectively injected into the African projects, appropriated and owned by Africans so that it can positively be part of the African metaphysics, ethos, and the African experience.

The second premise, which is also similar to the scientific and historical premise, stipulates that 'no people, nation or continent can socially progress without building the foundation of its actions on its own history and culture'. European kings, the nobility (commercial classes/petty bourgeoisie), and churches from the Medieval Era up to Renaissance and even in the eighteenth century, fought each other to acquire or share power in Europe. But it should be emphasised that the emergence of the modern state structures in Europe since the Westphalia Peace Accord in 1648, was essentially an internal process and a collective decision. European monarchs and nobility forcibly appropriated the Mediterranean city-states histories, cultures, technologies, and resources from China, India, and Africa. This second premise promotes a perspective that African history and culture and their internal contradictions must be critically reexamined to avoid their romantisation as a tool of making social synthesis. Romantisation of any culture and history is as dangerous phenomenon as 'intellectual fascism' or any kind of biological

argument can be in a nation-building project. Contradictions should not always be perceived and defined as infinitely pathological. Out of the contradictions, humans have always made synthetic judgments on what directions to follow in defining and redefining them. Africa must be re-invented.

The third premise is 'that at the time of their conception, people do not consciously choose by themselves their ethnic and physical characteristics'. They are who and what they are clearly as a result of some immanent historical accident and biological structures. An individual's infant conscious contribution to this historical determinism at the beginning of his/her life is zero. However, what is more important in defining human beings is what they can or should do after they have been projected out there in the context of the jungle or divined forces of historical and natural accidents. That is to say that, human beings' choices and decisions to shape their destinies and create social meanings and define things including themselves, is transcendentally more important than what gods or divinities did or do on their single objective on behalf of humanity. Social consciousness is a valuable determining factor in the ways people define and redefine themselves in a given physical and social environment. Without such a social consciousness, humans may not be very much different from other animals. Thus, the African Renaissance is discussed from this teleological history and political struggles for redefinition of beings and their socio-historical environment.

It is argued in this paper that one of the most important weaknesses of Pan-Africanism is that it has failed to penetrate and transform the state. As a cultural ideology, it has shaped behaviours, arguments, and perspectives of many individuals. However, Pan-Africanism has not done much for the majority of the African people because it has not become yet the ideology of the state. It is only when, and if, it becomes an ideological framework of the African state that this movement may be transformed from cultural and individual ideology into a political Pan-Africanism. Then it can become an ideological vehicle for collective struggle and change. A well-conceived state will de-romanticise Pan-Africanism and make it a tool for policy formulation and implementation.

For me Pan-Africanism can be a political philosophy of change only if it is able to promote the following elements: a strong sense

of self-determination, a sense of belonging to a larger political unit, knowledge of one's objective conditions and constraints, a progressive agenda, which should be permanently a critical assessment of one's role in the international political economy and the division of labour, and a strong cultural basis.

General characteristics of a realist Pan-Africanism

From W. E. B. Dubois, the father of Pan-Africanism, to Kwame Nkrumah, Pan-Africanism has generally embodied the following aims: the search for common cultural specificities and affinities among African people, and for intellectual connections among them based on 'race', ethnicity, and history. All these objectives were supposed to lead towards fostering an understanding and appreciation of African culture. Thus, in general terms, Pan-Africanism embodies an ethnic/racial, cultural, or continental unity of some kind.

Pan-Africanism is essentially an international phenomenon described in multicultural linguistic expressions. As used here, a realist Pan-Africanism is the political dimension of international relations as defined by Pan-Africanists. It is a defined tool of political and policy formation. We all are citizens with or without rights in some states. These states name us, give us cultural identities, and define where we can operate. The states define geo-political boundaries and the social environment in which citizens operate. We speak the languages that have been recognised by the states. Despite the marginalisation and segmentation of African states the world over, they are still major actors in international relations and the international political economy.

As compared to idealism, which puts more emphasis on democracy, utopianism, interdependency, and cooperation, realism especially as used by the Western dominated states in the past 500 years or so, is a controversial theory in international relations, as it tends to promote the extreme dimensions of the Hobbesian human nature doctrine, imperialism, and euro-ethnocentrism. In the classical political science discipline, it refers to the 'Hegelian role' of the state-centric political philosophy in the world and the objective in social, economic, and political conditions related to the nation-state.

It refers to a rigidly organised space. This state has the power to embody the collective identity and the will of people. In international relations, nation-states pursue mainly their own 'national' interests. This perspective also refers to questions regarding the capabilities of African states, their potentials in their social environments, the availability of resources, and their constraints, both nationally and internationally, to formulate policies for change.

It should be noted that the behaviours and the structures of the contemporary nation-states, including those in Africa, are centered more on realist roots than on any other political doctrine in the management of the world affairs. Despite the controversies that realists and neo-realists have engendered in their interpretations of the role and characteristics of the state, I have borrowed the logic and the principle of centrality of the state, its strength, and its nationalistic assumptions as forces that can dynamise Pan-Africanism, if they are properly adopted as the foundation of the ideology of Pan-Africanism. This process can transform both the doctrine of realism and the nature of the African state. How can African political institutions and people connect themselves with the African Diaspora within the framework of a realist Pan-Africanism and not in a romantic and symbolic manner?

A realist Pan-Africanism is also an intellectual effort to stimulate and encourage debates and dialogues between the legalist and functionalist approaches to the question of Africa's independence and social and economic progress. This may be one of the contributions of Pan-Africanists in the re-definition and re-conceptualisation of states in international relations.

Pan-Africanism has been instrumental in the achievement of nominal political independence, but so far economic independence has eluded African peoples. This is because the alliance between black labour and black capital has not materialised due to the fact that the black world controls very little of the world monopoly capital. Hence Pan-Africanism needs an economic component in its ideology. Africans, who are the most exploited groups in the capitalist system, need to construct a theory of economic emancipation rooted both in economics and in the ethnic experiences of the black world.

The openness among African states, countries, and people is the prerequisite for this new reshaping of African conditions and policies.

This cannot be done randomly. The late Félix Houphoüet-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire was not Pan-Africanist. But he argued for the need for more dialogue due to the conditions of war and exploitation. He supported an openness that could promote linkages among African peoples through coordination of national policies and social and political organisations. But an economic argument alone, whether it is a free market, trade, capital, or bank arrangement, is not sufficient to deal with the African crisis or the crisis of the African state and African nationalism. The African crisis cannot be dealt with only technically or by sector analysis. Indeed, I deal with it as a structural political problem.

The existing political and economic structures are not conducive to the creation of structures in which a real participation, both political and economic, can occur and through which relevant public policies can be formulated and implemented. This crisis is, first of all, a structural political problem. The way Africa will be able to progress will depend much on the abilities of its people and their political organisations to restructure their existing political systems, and establish their policy priorities in the international political economy. This has to be based on the local needs, the energy of the local culture, and the participation of the African community in the global economy.

This task requires a new re-mapping of Africa. No democratic principles will successfully operate as long as Africa as a whole is still an extremely dependent economic and cultural unit of the dominant world economy which is primarily managed by the former colonial powers, their local extensions, and multinational corporations. The questions of democracy and of economic independence must be dealt with simultaneously. Without that, even the progressive nationalists will not be able to be democratic and free in a world dominated by power and national interests. Democracy and freedom are prerequisites for social progress.

Pan-Africanism, as a political realist ideology, requires that one becomes aware of who one is, where one stands in international politics, what one possesses, what one is capable of producing, the way to consume cultural or material production, and where one plans to go from here. International relations and politics are strongly influenced by these factors, but to participate productively

in these relationships, the major decisions must be made at the local or regional level. Though I am underlining the need for focusing on the implications of Pan-Africanism on regional conditions and its potential solutions to social problems, an important point is that all solutions also must be part of a larger political unit. Pan Africanism is, above all, an international phenomenon and, as such, it should deal with power and interest and their dynamics in the international arena: international political forums and international political economy.

A realist Pan-Africanism is not a separatist ideology. Rather, it is a development ideology that may lead to alternative development and policy options. From the viewpoint of Africa, the economic linkages between Africa and the industrial powers, as reflected in the conditions of underdevelopment, have failed to improve the living conditions of African people. These linkages have been consistent with slavery on a massive scale and with the colonial design of Africa. To move away from this design, Pan-Africanist ideology articulates the need for a selective approach to development organisations. Another element in the debate deals with the potential contribution of the African Diaspora, which includes African people who live and are citizens of continents other than Africa.

What should be Africans' contribution to the Diaspora?

The focus in this section is on African Americans. What would the contributions of the African Diaspora in the United States, for instance, be to the African development effort and its policies through this ideology? What would the nature of such a contribution be? And how would it be operationalised? Further, how can we fuse the 'Pan-Negro' sentiments in the United States with the Pan-African ones in Africa?

Political stability, social cohesion, economic progress of Africa, and positive images about the continent will boost cultural identity in the Diaspora. It will bring pride that cannot be quantified in economic and political terms.

The perception of Africa in the United States, for instance, as projected by the media, United States' foreign policy, conservative organisations, and popular culture, is consistently one of the 'dark

continent/Tarzan movies'. Unfortunately, very little has changed, even more than four centuries after slavery began and was followed by colonialism and neo-colonialism. After the independence of many African countries, the images of hunger, starvation, and wars–for instance, in Nigeria, the Congo, the Horn of Africa, and Southern Africa–have consolidated the stereotypical perceptions of Africa. In the 1990s, the images of extensive starvation and massive displacement of people and refugee problems have been reinforced in the United States' perceptions of Africa. The collapse of states such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the DRC, and Haïti has added another dimension to the way in which Africans have been evaluated in the US. There are many people in the United States who believe that Africans are incapable of governing themselves.

A critical approach of looking at Africa objectively and historically has not been part of scholarship in the United States, nor in its foreign policy. The majority of the African Americans, especially those who do not have a strong political consciousness or an advanced formal education, have also rejected Africa or are reluctant to accept or associate themselves with it because Africa is widely considered the initial cause of their problem. It is difficult for anyone to identify him or herself with a world or culture that is constantly perceived and projected in his or her milieu as static, chaotic, or even anarchic, though in reality this may not be the case.

Another element that should be mentioned is that, since the 1980s, American society at large has become more conservative after many years of right-wing administrations. The effects of the civil rights movements have receded as the US claims a status of the only 'superpower' (hyperpower). After the collapse of the communist institutions in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Africa, the American people have been told that the US is the only world leader. Undoubtedly, the bombings and invasions of other countries, such as Libya, Grenada, Nicaragua, Panama, and Iraq, have created the psychology of 'superiority' and of temporary reconciliation, even among poor Americans. Indeed, those invasions were fully supported by the American people, including many African Americans who are unable to connect the crushing of other countries or people by the US government and their own conditions. They have been firmly supportive of the United States' flag, despite the fact that it is the

poor people who are paying most of the price for these political adventures. During the Republican administrations, more money has been allocated to defense programmes and to making war than for social alleviation, which would be beneficial to the poor, especially to African Americans.

These conservative tendencies also are prevalent among African Americans. An ordinary African-American perceives Africa as the land of problems or conflicts, and he/she does not seem to have anything to offer to Africa or, for that matter, to gain in being associated with Africa. Many African-American yuppies of the Judge Clarence Thomas or the Stephen Carter kind have made personal and conscious decisions to become Republicans. They have thus dissociated themselves from their own history and culture in order to pursue personal careers. Moreover, they believe in the natural law theory and individual effort. Politically, they can be considered by some progressive forces as opportunistic, but they represent a real political and intellectual tendency among those African Americans who have succeeded in integrating the American system's dominant values–the so-called 'American Dream'.

Although the concept of the 'melting pot' has not worked because of the United States' obsession with racial classification, conservative forces claim that individual effort can make a difference in terms of his/her personal social mobility. Many of those conservative African Americans do not seem to have any specific agenda for Africa, apart from that of the United States government. Indeed, they did support conservative or reactionary African leaders. The late Mobutu of Zaïre, for instance, despite his atrocities and kleptocratic practices, was supported by some African American congressmen, such as Marvyn Dymally, for many years. Nevertheless, African Americans have a lot to offer to a realistic Pan-Africanist agenda, and they have a role and place within this ideology. They also have a lot to gain from it; the game is one of mutual benefit and reciprocity.

The starting point has to be developed as an umbrella of economic and cultural cooperation between Africa and the African Diaspora within a framework of a clearly articulated political agenda. The same groups could also serve as lobbies for Africa in the United States. However, this project cannot work without a firm understanding of, and cultural and historical appreciation between, Africans and

the African Americans. It is in the educational field and in social and political organisations that this issue can be best introduced. This process also has to be reciprocal. African institutions, as well as African American institutions and programmes, must exchange students, scholars, and data on a systematic basis. This would help contribute to the necessary changes in the conception of Africa among many African Americans, from an imaginary cultural symbolism to a political and social reality with all its contradictions. Simultaneously, African people and leaders may start to understand the social experience and the value of the contribution of African Americans in the US. This can be a process of global consciousness-making in both Africa and the US.

The cause of South Africa was much more popularised in the US than in many other industrial countries. In many respects, it was taken seriously in the US Congress, despite the strong support for apartheid by the Reagan-Bush administrations. This is largely thanks to the special efforts of African American organisations such as TransAfrica, PUSH, and progressive forces, including other African American special interest groups. In the 1960s, the civil rights movement and other more radical movements such as Black Power succeeded in challenging the United States legal system. They were also psychologically influenced by the dynamics of the African independence movements. African Americans fighting for their political, social, and legal rights, or for the right to citizenship in the US, also had a powerful impact on the nationalist movements in Africa. The Kwame Nkrumahs, the George Padmores, and the Jomo Kenyattas were among those intellectual and political actors who incorporated some of the African American thoughts and strategies in Africa. Most members of the then emerging African ruling class attended the 5th Pan-African Congress, organised by George Padmore (who became the dominant leftist figure in the Pan-Africanist movement in Manchester), held in October 1945.

In the late 1950s and the early 1960s, nationalist movements in Africa created a strong sense of psychological support for the political challenges and struggles in the United States. Many African Americans carefully followed the events in Africa. In fact, at one time, African leaders like Patrice Lumumba, Julius Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah, Albert Luthuli, and Jomo Kenyatta were even more

popular among African American activists and fighters than among many groups of Africans on the continent. Without any doubt, there are dynamic correlations between what happens in the US among African Americans and what goes on in Africa at the political level.

When Andrew Young became the US representative to the United Nations, he used his civil rights approach to foreign policy and his respect for African culture and history, and thus the perception of Africa became relatively different among many Americans during the Carter administration. At that time, Africa was not continuously viewed as an exotic, anarchic, and poor geographical and social area, as it is currently generally perceived in the US among its populace, policy makers, and scholars. President Carter himself visited some African countries and some African dictators and political villains, like the late Mobutu of Zaïre, barely survived as the US cut their allowances and military assistance. During this time, many African Americans began to be proud of their historical and cultural roots in Africa.

But in the 1980s and 1990s, with the coming to power of the Republicans, the rise of racism in the US, and the deterioration of economic and social conditions in Africa due to internal and external factors, especially the effects of the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the World Bank and the IMF, the perception of Africa in the US went back to square one.

After the release of Nelson Mandela after 27 years in prison, and upon his international saviour-like trip to the US, his symbolism succeeded in again mobilising African Americans behind what he represents: the struggle for freedom, justice, and equality for Africans. The participation of African American business, political, and religious groups was unprecedented in working together with the federal and state governments in order to organise Mandela's trip and arrange his public meetings, interviews, and security. This solidarity shows that Africa is still a symbol of identification among the majority of the American Africans, and this symbol can play a transformative role if it is taken politically.

However, we have to distinguish between the level of cultural and historical symbolism and the political and economic realities. How would African Americans participate in the political model that I am articulating in this paper, namely realist Pan-Africanism,

without transforming themselves to be de facto representatives of the US foreign policy, or the dominant ideology? How would they dissociate themselves from the interests of US power in interacting with Africa? A certain scepticism, based on the history of US-African relations, is relevant here.

Although the historical context has changed and history may not repeat itself, the experience of what happened in the political history of Liberia is still vivid in the memories of many people in Africa, especially after the collapse of the Liberian state following the assassination of president Samuel K. Doe in September 1990 and the subsequent tragic power struggle that led to a civil war. Recall that Liberia was formed by the American Colonization Society (ACS) in 1822 for blacks in the US. Some blacks from the West Indies also settled in Liberia. It was supported by abolitionists, both blacks and whites, and Liberia was conceived as the land of freedom for free blacks in the Diaspora. In 1847, it proclaimed its independence from the ACS and became the first free black state in Africa. It has never been formally colonised by the Western powers, though it became a neo-colonial state par excellence. But through the power/state formation and power consolidation, free blacks from the US produced one of the worst segregationist, racist, and sexist societies in contemporary Africa.

In short, instead of advancing the cause of freedom, as reflected in the preamble of their constitution, 'the love of liberty brought here', they reproduced the social contradictions of US society in Africa, especially its obsession with racial distinctiveness. They kept power for themselves through the True WHIG (With Hope in God) party, which was the ruling party for more than one hundred years until the violent and bloody military coup d'état which brought the late Doe to power in April 1980. In short, the state and ruling class of Liberia are responsible for most of the contradictions and social atrocities that have been produced in that country. Though the ruling class was black (or people of the black race), its behaviour was consistent with that of a colonial power. The African Liberians were subjected to the same oppressive laws as those of other parts of Africa and, in some instances, it was even worse. The game was that of power and interests.

The concept of racial unity and its policy implications did not work in Liberia. Collectively, the Americo-Liberians saw themselves

as Americans first, for the natural law and the previous historical experiences prevailed in this case. Though the political context has changed both in Africa and in the US, the question of how African Americans would participate in the new Pan-Africanist movement and ideology in Africa without reproducing the social and philosophical contradictions of their own social and political milieu is still valid. In the case of Liberia, many people believe that only real democratisation of Liberia will change the roots and structures of social tensions. Blyden, two centuries back, promoted some similar ideas of hybrid Pan-Africanism.

The large-scale development that I am talking about will not be possible without financial investments, human power resources, technology, sound management policies, and conscious leadership. African Americans have developed important communities in the business class, among scholars and among political activists. These groups, including the black proletariat, may be able to offer an alternative sort of assistance that is not comparable to that of Europe and other industrial countries in Africa, especially if this assistance is based on some clear political objectives and political consciousness. These interactions will not be possible if African states do not change their investment codes and their economic and cultural relations (or their political economies) with the former colonial powers in order to allow more investments from African Americans. Within the logic and political philosophy of a selective approach, these groups can bring their input in specific areas without damaging the theory I am developing here. But how they would dissociate from the ideology, attitude, and interests of power is questionable. This must seriously be debated.

To improve the level of communication and understanding that I am articulating here, the political reality and context have to be taken seriously. With the exception of the constitution of Liberia, in which it is stated that only people of black origins can become citizens, most African constitutions are open or flexible on the question of citizenship. Citizenship and its rights can only be looked at and appreciated in terms of responsibility and loyalty to a collective idea or ideal. Generally, countries of immigrants are more flexible on this question than those which are not. In many countries, only citizens can have certain rights, own certain properties, or invest in certain

corporations. Of course, this limits the capacity of such a country to benefit from non-citizens' capabilities and resources. Within a realist Pan-Africanism, the issue of the double citizenship of the African and African Americans must be addressed.

I am of the view that if African Americans and Afro-Brazilians, among others, are consciously engaged in African development or in the emancipatory causes of Africa, why not give them opportunities to do so fully by offering them either citizenship or permanent *carte de séjour* (green card, *à l'Américaine*), if one wishes to do so? The African Americans presumably would also use their constitutional rights in the US to help Africans advance the same rights. They could also bring their know-how, investments, and managerial skills to help Africans establish their firms and corporations. The experience of African Americans in selected areas–for instance, the well-known efficient management of Ethiopian Airlines–is a good indicator of the rich contribution the expertise of the African Diaspora could make to Africa. However, this effort may elicit strong opposition from the states if they are not transformed into a larger political community. The promotion of common areas of interests between Africans and African Americans can facilitate the needed dialogical relations and economic cooperation approaches to which I am alluding here. The opening of African countries' borders to the African Diaspora (from the United States, South and Central America and the Caribbean) may bring about new dynamics in the relations among African people the world over. Those relations can be even more dynamic within the framework of resource management of the regional community. But if those relations are dominated mainly by the capitalist economic ethos, the chance that they may lead to social conflicts cannot be ignored.

The Organisation of African Unity and the Pan-African idea

The OAU is now part of history as it has been replaced by the African Union (AU). However, learning from such a history and its contradictions allows us to be critical of the existing African Union and its philosophy. What were the OAU's contributions to Pan-African objectives? Was the OAU a real Pan-African organisation?

On May 25, 1963, with the participation of all independent African countries, the OAU was finally formed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It was created as an ideological and institutional compromise among various political tendencies that developed among African nationalists in the 1950s and early 1960s.

What kind of compromise was it? What were the intended objectives of the political actors and leaders involved at the time? And how is Africa perceived in the OAU? Because much has been said about the OAU, only a brief comment is needed here to clarify my position and support my perspective.

I should restate the point that, with the creation of the OAU, Kwame Nkrumah's ambition to realise the formation of a continental union government as a political reality and a monumental dream were defeated by the African heads of state. The OAU became, rather, a symbol for unity and a basis for articulating functional economic cooperation. Prior to the creation of the OAU, several political blocs were formed on the continent. In December 1959, for example, Kwame Nkrumah convened the first All African People's Conference in Accra, Ghana. This conference called for a commonwealth of all African states, a commonwealth that was going to transcend ethnic, linguistic, ideological, and colonial or nation-state boundaries. The most important resolution adopted in the conference was the drafting of the constitution, which included a provision for a United States of Africa or union government. All the independent African states were present, and most African nationalist political organisations sent their delegates as well, including those from the Belgian Congo.

The African évolués in the Belgian Congo, as it is commonly known, were not politically very active and visible in the struggle for independence before 1958, as was the case in other countries because of the nature of colonial policies. But after this conference, Patrice Lumumba and Gaston Diumi, among those who attended the conference, brought back with them the spirit of Pan-Africanism, and this quickly had an impact on the nationalist movements in the Congo, especially on *the Mouvement National Congolais* /Lumumba (MNC/L).

Between the 1959 conference and the second All African People's Conference, held in Tunis in 1960, many political events in the continent and in the metropolitan countries contributed to determine

the positions of many African nationalists vis-à-vis Pan-Africanism. Following many discussions, meetings, and consultations, three political blocs emerged as African élites were trying to deal with the mechanisms of decolonisation. These blocs reflected their reactions and positions toward the idea and proposition of the formation of the United States of Africa and their relations to the former colonial powers.

The leaders of Nigeria, a demographically and economically powerful country in Africa, opposed the idea of the union. It artificially allied itself with Côte d'Ivoire, other former French colonies, and Liberia to form what was known as the Monrovia bloc. The influence of Charles De Gaulle in the former French colonies forced Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, Léopold Sedar Senghor of Sénégal, Hamani Diori of Niger, among others, to dissociate themselves from the Nigerian-dominated bloc and form the Brazzaville bloc. Indeed, France and De Gaulle were particularly influential in the former French colonies. With the exception of Sékou Touré of Guinea-Conakry, all the leaders of those former colonies voted yes in the 1958 referendum, forcing them to remain part of the broader French community under the domination of Paris. The Brazzaville bloc's position was for a functionalist approach, namely cooperation in economic and military relations. This position was also very much ideological: they feared a radical Nkrumahist union government because this idea was ideologically socialist and Pan-Africanist at once. But in 1962, despite the tendencies of the power struggle and a suspicion that had developed between Houphouët-Boigny and the Nigerian political élites, the Monrovia and the Brazzaville blocs merged into the Lagos group which strongly rejected the idea of the union government or the political integration of sovereign states that they considered to be immature at that time. Further, they did not define when this idea might become mature in the political development of the African politics.

The Casablanca bloc was mainly formed by the North African countries under the strong influence of Nasser of Egypt. It included Ghana and Guinea-Conakry. In East Africa, Tom Mboya (Kenya) and Milton Obote (Uganda) were strong supporters of the union government approach. It also should be said that the solidarity of the Casablanca group was not based on a common ideology, but rather

on strategic preference. Morocco was not a progressive state, for instance, but it joined the group to seek its support for its territorial dispute with the Western/Spanish Sahara. In general, four elements characterised the political situation in the above blocs:

(a) Tendencies toward power struggles and personality conflicts among the leaders;
(b) Ideological determinism of each bloc;
(c) The impact of the metropolitan powers on the political choice of the new states;
(d) A differing time perspective on the evolution of African politics.

It is with this political situation, as is reflected in the above characteristics, that the question of unity was debated until finally the political leaders of the independent states voted against it in 1963. The African states were polarised on ideological, personality politics, nation-state and historical differences, and the Cold War struggle. These states were 'trivialized' in international affairs and domestic and national power struggles, and they were not looking at what an independent Africa should be in the 21st century and beyond or what its public policy basis should be.

From the time of its formation, up to the early 1990s, the OAU functioned as a symbolic institution of unity, and its function was shaped mainly by this political symbolism. It should be emphasised that all the ideological conflicts which reflected international power alliances during the Cold War were also influential in the OAU summits and political discourse. Indeed, the Western powers did influence the OAU debates and policies through the channels of the client regimes of their former colonies or neo-colonial power puppet regimes. In this sense, it functioned as a microcosm of the international power struggle. The United States, which did not have former colonies in Africa, also succeeded in penetrating the Organisation through its client regimes, including those of Mobutu of Zaïre, King Hassan of Morocco, Nemeiri of Sudan, Tubman and Doe of Liberia. It also used French connections to advance its cause. Thus, the agenda of the Western powers to stop Africa from formulating its own developmental and political projects was always present in the deliberation processes of the OAU meetings.

Bloc politics weakened the organisation and its policies, and this did not allow state members to see clearly the degree of seriousness of the economic, political, and social problems with which Africa has been faced. I must also add another factor in the discussion: it is a fact that two-thirds of the Arab people live on the African continent (or are Africans), and they are also members of the OAU. Therefore, the question of the Palestinians has been an important agenda item in the organisation. And pro-Israeli states also have had a strong constituency in the organisation.

However, concerning its behaviour in international fora, it attempted, sometimes successfully and other times not so, to formulate common positions. On the positive side, the position of the OAU against apartheid was firm and consistent. It supported the freedom fighters in Southern Africa militarily, financially, politically, and morally through a special committee of frontline states. Though some individual countries were secretly or openly doing business with the apartheid state, especially in the areas of transportation, trade, and military equipment, the apartheid system did not have, in terms of open diplomacy and politics, supporters in the OAU. Given the intensity of the debates on apartheid, some scholars even asked what the OAU role would be in African politics after a free Namibia and South Africa. For instance, the decision of the African states to halt their relations with the state of Israel in the 1970s, after the 1977 six-day Israel-Egyptian war, was commonly implemented, even if many states continued to enjoy special relations with the state of Israel in several sectors such as agriculture, military and national intelligence arrangements. But generally, they partially transcended their ideological particularities and former colonial borders.

In the 1981, the Lagos Plan of Action was created as a genuine progressive programme for regional development. It was never implemented. It was replaced by the SAPs of the World Bank and stability programmes of the International Monetary Fund.

In the 1990s, especially with Salim Ahmed Salim, a nationalist Tanzanian and General Secretary of the OAU, most debates in the organisation took on a strongly Pan-Africanist tone rather than a sub-regional one. On the debates concerning the African economic crisis and how to deal with it, the position taken by the OAU in Addis Ababa, with a strong initiative and directive from the United

Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UN ECA) under the leadership of Professor Adedeji Adebayo, comprised a collective and determined effort.

One of the most important decisions was taken on June 3-5, 1991, at the OAU summit in Abuja, Nigeria by thirty-four African political leaders, which was the signature of the treaty for the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC). This initiative was the most important ideal ever to have been initiated by the OAU and the UN ECA. It came as a result of the individual failures of most national economic policies to deal with the conditions of underdevelopment. This option was an effort to approach African social and economic problems collectively from an African perspective. Between May 1993, when a Pan-African Conference on Reparations was organised by the OAU together with the Nigerian Government in Abuja, Nigeria, and the July 2001 summit in Lusaka, Zambia, where the African leaders agreed to form an African Union (AU), the Pan-African project took on a different perspective and form.

The political significance of regional economic organisations in the deconstruction and the reconstruction of African states

In general terms, economic organisations were not constructed to advance Pan-African causes. They were essentially a part of the dynamics of global capitalism. How would these functioning economic arrangements fit into the momentum of a transnational ideology? As indicated earlier, the existing sub-regional economic organisations are antithetical to the ideal of African unity. Their structures slow down the vision and the processes of the continental identification, for they were designed in such a way that they provided much more power to the states as state-centric institutions. Heads of state have more authority than the rotated chairpersons or the executive secretariat, in the cases of the ECOWAS or the ECCAS. That is to say, they are politically rigid because they have been built within the structures and logic of state sovereignty. Despite this structural problem, the sub-regional organisations can offer their contributions to the ideas and argument of unity, though

my position is that they must first be transformed if they have to attain the objectives of realist Pan-Africanism.

In addition to this design problem, these organisations are project-based. Thus, in most cases, they lack the broader vision articulated through realist Pan-Africanism. As project-based regional developments, most of these organisations, like SADC, tend to enhance the existing vertical integration into the northern hemisphere rather than promoting horizontal cooperation among the member states. This is mainly because the projects themselves are either northern-initiated or almost entirely funded by northern donors. There are, therefore, obvious attractions in project-based organisations for many people in the northern hemisphere.

However, the sub-regional organisations can contribute to a realist Pan-Africanism in many dimensions. First, they can popularise the concept of trans-national relations among African states, countries, and people, and they can enhance the needs for cross-boundaries politics. Thus, African nations' specific political history, their geographical location, and their political implications in world politics can be appreciated more if they are firmly founded on a broader ideological basis. Second, despite the rigidity of the organisations vis-à-vis the African states and their less rigid relations with the industrial powers, these organisations have the potential to promote some forms, loose or firm, of federation.

Another reason sub-regional organisations can contribute to a realist Pan-Africanism, is that the they promote some forms of *rapprochement* among the African states. Despite the ideological and policy differences, and even wars among them, the *rapprochement* that has taken place may also foster more dialogue, especially within the context of the current spirit of 'democratic movements'. Like any *rapprochement,* this one also functions on the assumption that states can work together effectively on some specific and general forms of collective consensus basis. The general form of consensus has to be based on the notion that states and people have a common enemy–underdevelopment–and its social implications, factors, and forces that promote the miseries of Africa. The specific form of consensus refers to multilateral agreements and/or pacts among African states and nations to deal with the conditions in which some countries find themselves.

Though the realist pan-African claim is based on the need to search for a broad continental ideology for development, rather than on a segmented cultural argument per se, cultural realities within sub-regional organisations must be seriously considered. Many people, ethnic groups, and social classes in the sub-regions do have many more social and cultural characteristics in common than they have differences. The appreciation of a common culture and the injection of culture into local projects can promote development. In fact, development cannot occur without such cultural support, for culture is the bridge to development. For example, logically it may be easier to choose and promote cultural elements for the purpose of more cooperation and consolidation of the relations in each sub-region than to impose an 'alien' cultural pattern on all the sub-regions. It may be more difficult to recommend, for example, Kiswahili as a regional language in West Africa than to do so in East Africa, including Zaïre, because of the historical affinities with such a language in those areas.

My observation is that many common cultural elements in each sub-region, because of their fluidity and common functions and usefulness, can become means for promoting the causes and spirit of a realist Pan-Africanism. For instance, not so long ago, we were forced to learn French, English, Portuguese, and Spanish, and now they functionally have become part of our national cultures. We can learn African languages but not in the brutal way we were forced to learn the European languages. Much depends on the political will of the African people and their leaders. The non-cultural elements–for example, small common informal or petty trades or works of arts among the people–can also be encouraged and even promoted by the states in neighbouring countries.

Africans need to build real federalism based on the sub-regional organisations. If they are structurally transformed, they can become very relevant in the promotion of a trans-national ideology of development.

Kwame Nkrumah advocated this kind of federalism, in which independent states could form a larger and more comprehensive political union. Under his leadership, Ghana's foreign policy was largely shaped by the concept of African unity. However, he was not supported by many of his fellow African heads of state, despite

the fact that many leaders talked about encouraging economic cooperation as a means toward Pan-Africanism. Julius Nyerere, for instance, opposed the idea of federation, even at the Eastern Africa level, because he believed that the white settlers in Kenya could dominate the political and economic situation. Later on, however, he supported the idea of the East African Economic Community.

This rehabilitation was due to the fact that African leaders and many intellectuals, especially those who were engaged in the critical assessment of Western scholarship and its policy implications in Africa, realised that national policies based on the state-centric structures and approaches have failed to improve most African social conditions. In many ways, Africans are hostages to the states' arrogance and corruption. Thus, to be liberated, that is to say, in order to set up mechanisms for development, they need to initiate policies and create new means of implementing those policies. Processes of establishing this federalism must be fully democratic, and democracy is the only bargaining and negotiating mechanism that can be used among our diverse cultures, ideologies, boundaries and political objectives to reach consensus. Without any doubt, this democracy cannot be reduced merely to the rituals of rights and voting: it is a right to life itself. In this sense, democracy is normatively good in itself.

As discussed earlier, with few exceptions, the African state in its current form is essentially militaristic and elitist. It behaves as a mechanism through which the interests of a few are articulated and secured while the interests of the majority of people are disarticulated. Thus, they are themselves alienated from their own history and labour.

State security and Pan-Africanism

The existing concept of security articulated by the African state is inadequate and irrelevant because it is narrowly militaristic. The Pan-African concept of security must be comprehensive. It must include social and economic security, respect of human dignity and life, and physical safety. However, African states, just as states elsewhere, justify their militaristic and police behaviour and actions on the

basis of the claim to the security of the state. And they have been spending more millions of dollars annually in the area of security than for education and health services.

Since the 1960s, there have been more than 150 incidences of violent disputes among African states. More than 70 of them have been about the claims to protect colonial boundaries. More than 50 of the conflicts have led to wars. In 1998 alone, 18 African states were at war and 11 other countries faced internal civil unrest (Geiss, 1974, p. 30). Most of those states have developed a paranoia syndrome vis-à-vis their opposition: most of them tend to see their enemies on every corner of cities or towns of both their own countries and of neighbouring countries. Members of the opposition party are considered real enemies to the state and the people.

All this has contributed to the creation of state insecurity in Africa for at least four reasons:

(a) They do not have a strong and genuine local base.
(b) Their policies are intrinsically antagonistic; that is to say, in terms of the distribution of revenues, they widen the gap between the rich and poor social classes.
(c) They have been essentially undemocratic until recently.
(d) They are also heavily dependent on the industrial powers for military, financial, and economic survival.

In short, the conditions of underdevelopment, or those of peripheral capitalism, make the African states essentially insecure. If these conditions are transformed or improved, will they still be insecure?

The view that I advance here is that it is less likely that the current forms of the states will continue to behave in a militaristic manner if the conditions and structures conducive to such behaviour are removed or cease to exist. In other words, security is another existential expression of the state. Changes in the structure of the state would also affect security objectives in a given context. NATO and the Warsaw Pact were good examples of this: with the end of the Soviet Union, the structures of the security system have profoundly changed in the former USSR, in Europe, and in the United States.

In addition, it should be noted that security arrangements in many African countries have been directed against the people (and not against the real enemies of the people), who are generally poor and

against those segments of society which cannot defend themselves. In recent years, women, students, lumpen-proletarians, and peasants, have been the particular targets of the security arm of states. Many have been attacked and tortured and even killed in the name of the security of the state. In short, the police and military systems in many African countries have been anti-people and anti-development. The security of the state is an instrument of the ruling classes, used to kill and destroy anything that can threaten their interests.

The argument based on realist Pan-Africanism is that security as politics should not be separated from economics, for it is also an economic issue. A state that can provide basic needs, develop infrastructures, and create mechanisms for the people's participation is the one that cares about the security of its citizens. African heads of state did not develop any real security system for the people or citizens. They have created only personal security agencies.

What would African people and federalist systems need in terms of the military dimensions of the security system? Changes in the conception of who are considered the real enemies of the state and the state's political agenda lead me to think that another security arrangement, in terms of military force, would be needed in Africa. It is argued that, as more economic and political systems are structurally integrated, less of the basis of conflicts will remain intact in the interactions among the African states. Realist Pan-Africanist government means that African states should have a strong basis for common development interests and projects as well as broader areas of consensus. This also means that they would cease to compete antagonistically for the same interests.

The collective security approach may decrease the chances of potential tensions among the federated states, as there will be common rules governing the behaviour of all the states. This approach should not follow the model of the hierarchy and structures of the United Nations, for these are too costly, and their bureaucracy is too slow and inefficient. The collective security approach should be built into the structures of a united government, to be promoted for the interests of all. Its operations must be decentralised, but its command system should be centralised. This may also decrease the chances of military coups d'état, as all the armies may be commanded by one higher military institution which would divide its responsibilities

into three structures: continental, regional, and national/state.

At the continental level, Africa cannot afford to adopt the Costa Rica model of choosing not to build a strong army. The history of nation-states and international capitalism show that building a defensive military system is a necessity as a deterrent force against internal and external aggression. What kind of military system, then, ought to be appropriate to the African conditions? Clearly, modern military systems are always costly to maintain, and their proper functioning depends heavily on the military technologies developed by the industrial powers. In 1960, Sylvanus Olympio of Togo attempted to develop a state without an army. He was overthrown by a military coup d'état in which he was violently assassinated by ex-French soldiers, led by Sergeant Eyadema, who became a general and the President of Togo. The coup leaders tried to argue for their incorporation into the Togolese security system. Though this position has not yet been documented, some scholars have argued that France was behind this coup because it disagreed with Olympio's political stance and the structure of the new state.

The question of the nature of the military systems to be adopted in Africa cannot fully be discussed in this paper because it is an enormously complex issue, one that necessitates continent-wide political debate. Generally, we should project stronger continental and regional military apparatuses and weaker national military structures.

Despite the fact that, with the exception of the North, Africa is not geographically located near the industrial powers, the political actions of Africa which may displace the interests and the role of the industrial powers will not be accepted by those powers because political elites in those countries, and most of their people, treat Africa as a collection of subordinate states and people. It is certain that strong African projects would be met with the politics of intimidation and with indifference, and they would also be the objects of political and perhaps even military attack. This is why it is realistically imperative to have a federal kind of defensive army to protect African value systems and people. Its ideology and mission would be to defend people and to contribute to the development projects. In the light of such a mission, what can we do with the existing military academies and training centres?

The existing military apparatuses should be the centres for reeducating soldiers. Their objectives can be converted to fit the purposes of the new approach to the new nature of African politics and international relations. Some of those centres could even be converted into institutions for social education and local factories of ideas or commodities. They can also be transformed into national police academies. Furthermore, the process for actualising this structural military transformation has to be democratic, and in a democratic process, those academies would better serve people. Systems of education, socialisation, curriculum, and a great many other systems will change to meet the needs and objectives set for the promotion and maintenance of Pan-Africanism.

Conclusion

In the absence of a well-elaborated Pan-African social movement, and within the spirit of the existing multipartyism, imagining the creation of a Pan-African state as a concrete and realistic possibility, several processes must be articulated. Firstly, there is a need for creating a ministry of Pan-African affairs to replace the so-called ministries of integration or those of regional affairs. Given the fact that African political regimes are essentially presidential, this ministry should resort directly under the presidency. Secondly, each ministry should have a unit to deal with Pan-African affairs. Thirdly, we should introduce Pan-African curricula in all disciplines from the elementary schools to universities. Fourthly, realistic Pan-Africanism must promote gender equality. The role of African women must be considered as a human rights and development issue. Fifthly, rural and urban economic disparity must be combated. And lastly, the existing constitutions and the basis of the Africa's international relations must be debated and changed.

It should also be noted that realist Pan-Africanism defines Pan-Africanism as being essentially an international phenomenon. Its actualisation depends on how African people will be able to change the structures of their states. Critical approaches and perspectives were suggested in this paper to challenge the existing model of African state-centrism, precisely because of the way in which

it renders invisible the globalised African social and economic condition, while also trivialising cultural diversity issues.

It was argued that, if transformed by a Pan-African ideology and agenda, the African state can service better the African community. Realist Pan-Africanism also recognises particular economic needs and cultural and sociological identities as articulated in a given state. Pan-African political forces, namely political parties, research organisations, people's organisations, and political elites are under the obligation to capture the state apparatuses in order to transform them. Within the framework of a realist Pan-Africanism, Africans on the continent as well as Africans in the Diaspora will not be able to enforce and actualise Pan-Africanism until they capture the states. It is only after this phase that they would be able to re-define trade, economic, cultural and political relations between Africa and other states. For instance, until the African Americans in the United States take real state powers, they will not be able to project any kind of consistent functional Pan-Africanism in dealing with Africa even at the simple level of lobbying. We hope that the dynamics of American society and politics will produce, among the African Americans, more leaders like Cynthia Mckinney, who have a sense of history, a solid understanding of the African conditions, and a commitment to promoting social progress.

Pan-Africanists should take advantage of the existing political pluralism to capture the existing state and transform it so that it can serve the African people.

In contrast to the neo-colonial ideology of the existing state, a realist Pan-Africanism is an ideology of development, which is articulated within a strong nationalistic perspective. It is neither militaristic in the classical European-American sense nor anti-people. Nor can it sustain itself in a situation of the strong, absolute state *à la* Hobbes, for it is only in a genuinely democratic and decentralised political and social environment that a realist Pan-Africanism can become a functioning political structure. I am here suggesting the possibility of building a strong federation and relatively 'weak', but highly decentralised states, and strong and democratic apparatuses as ways toward creating institutions in which people could fully participate in their political affairs. This democracy means also 'participatory budgeting' in all aspects of

the political structures. This kind of continental unity, which goes beyond any economic factor or argument, is possible only when the structures and objectives of such a unity are strongly reflected in the dynamics of the local market, politics, culture, and the state apparatuses. This kind of realism I have projected in this study is qualitatively different from the one developed in Europe and the United States, which supported euro-ethnocentrism, absolutism, and the extreme arrogance of the state. However, Pan-Africanism will not go far enough in its mission of actualising a Pan-African agenda until it transforms the state and becomes a guideline for Africa's progress and international affairs. It is my view that the realist Pan-Africanism can make African visible in positive and constructive ways in world affairs, against the extreme vulnerability the existing state system has created.

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