Globalisation and the Paradox of Participatory Governance in Southern Africa: The Case of the New South Africa

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it will explore the tensions and contradictions of participatory governance in the context of globalisation in the new South Africa. Second, the paper will interrogate the links between neo-liberal economic reforms and participatory governance in South Africa. In particular, it will explore the question of whether or not participatory governance is inherently democratic and development enhancing. On the basis of the analysis, the paper will explore an alternative scenario that will be relevant for policy and academic purposes for South Africa and other developing countries.

Résumé

Cet article comporte un double objectif. Tout d'abord, il analyse les tensions et les contradictions de la gouvernance participative dans le contexte de la globalisation, dans la nouvelle Afrique du Sud. Deuxièmement, cette contribution interroge les liens entre les réformes économiques néo-libérales et la gouvernance participative sud-africaine. Ce travail s'intéresse particulièrement à la question de savoir si la gouvernance participative est démocratique par essence et susceptible de promouvoir le développement. Sur la base de cette analyse, l'auteur se propose d'étudier un scénario alternatif qui pourra servir aux politiques publique ainsi qu'au monde académique, en Afrique du Sud et dans les autres pays en développement.

Introduction

The last two decades of the 20th century were marked by increased pressure on developing countries to embrace and promote consultative decision-making. In fact, international development agencies and academics from across the political spectrum pressured these countries

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to take the path of participatory governance, while at the same time liberalising their economies as the solutions to their political and economic crisis of authoritarianism, poverty, low growth, and marginalisation in the global political economy. Participatory governance is seen as a means to overcome governmental deficits, reduce information gaps and to build consensus around policy, lead to smoother implementation of state policies, ensure accountability and transparency in governance, as well as to enhance the credibility and sustainability of programmes, and to enhance developing countries' global competitiveness.

The debate on economic liberalisation and participatory governance is thus far being cast in positive terms and by so doing, its contradictory dynamics are being overlooked. This resonates in the new South Africa, where the democratic government is being urged to liberalise the economy and promote participatory governance in order to make the economy globally competitive and to improve the standard of living of South Africans, especially the previously disadvantaged communities. This is at a time when the role of the state as a provider of social insurance is being reduced and it is becoming more responsive to the private sector. At the same time, given South Africa's history of political and economic marginalisation of blacks, there is a need to ensure greater participation of citizens in governance (Edigheji 2003). There is also an expectation that the government would intervene in the economy to reduce social exclusion, meeting its democratic commitments to the electorate (especially blacks) and to reduce income and wealth inequalities along racial lines. The African National Congress (ANC), the ruling party in the post-1994 South Africa, believed that participation of citizens is a key factor in transforming the South African polity, society and economy in the democratic dispensation. Accordingly, it argued that:

> No democracy can survive and flourish if the majority of our people remain in poverty, without land, without tangible prospects for a better life. Attacking poverty and deprivation must therefore be the first priority of a democratic government. ...Above all, the people affected must participate in decision-making. Democratisation must begin to transform both the state and civil society. Democracy is not confined to periodic elections. It is, rather, an active process enabling everyone to contribute to the reconstruction and development.

The ANC and South Africans cannot be faulted for anchoring the developmental path of the post-apartheid period on participatory and consultative processes. But the crucial questions that remain unanswered are what should be the economic plank for participatory governance to be developmental and to be inclusive and growth enhancing? Or can it be taken for granted that every economic model will lead to equitable growth? Given that the democratic government's economic policy is based on economic liberalism, along the dominant paradigm and logic of global orthodoxy, we need to ask ourselves whether participatory governance and economic liberalism are compatible. Will they lead to democratic governance and inclusive development in order to overcome the legacies of inequities and pervasive poverty of the apartheid dispensation? To put the question differently, what are the inherent conflicts between neo-liberal economic reforms and participatory governance that the government is simultaneously pursuing?

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it will explore the tensions and contradictions of participatory governance in the context of globalisation in the new South Africa. Second, the paper will interrogate the links between neo-liberal economic reforms and participatory governance in South Africa. In particular, it will explore the question of whether or not participatory governance is inherently democratic and development enhancing. On the basis of the analysis, the paper will explore an alternative scenario that will be relevant for policy and academic purposes for South Africa and other developing countries.

The Dominant Discourse and Policy Thrust in the Era of Globalisation

Globalisation, according to former World Bank economist and winner of the Nobel Prize of Economics in 2001, Joseph Stiglitz 'is the closer integration of countries and peoples of the world which has brought about enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge and (to a lesser extent) people across borders' (2002:9). This is coupled with the emergence or re-orientation of international institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 'that have written rules, which mandate or push things like the liberalisation of capital market' (2002:10). As Stiglitz correctly points out, 'The Institutions are dominated not just by the wealthiest countries

but by commercial and financial interests in those countries, and the policies of the institutions naturally reflect this' (2002:19). Hence, although markets for capital goods produced in the developed world are being liberalised, the same cannot be said of primary goods such as agricultural products by developing countries. As a result, globalisation has unequal benefits. It mainly benefits global capital and the developed world while excluding and marginalising the majority of people in the world, mostly from the developing world from its associated benefits. Indeed, in the latter, poverty, hunger and diseases seem to have been the cost of globalisation. Needless to stress that even in the developed world, a fourth world has emerged with the same characteristics of their counterparts in the developing world. These are mostly underclass and immigrant communities.

In this era of globalisation, governments, across the globe, have become preoccupied with the need to attract foreign investment, to liberalise and deregulate national economies, so as to integrate into the global economy. Consequently, governments are becoming more responsive to the needs of the private sector and becoming a guarantor of capital accumulation. This has been coupled with the privatisation of public goods.

We have been reminded by Cerny (1996) that the key public and constitutional functions of the state are being subordinated to the imperatives of global marketplace – or even being rendered vestigial, as it is increasingly drawn into commodification and marketisation of its activities and structures. This is true of the state in both the developed and the developing world with devastating effects on development, especially on citizens' welfare.

This policy thrust is inspired by the discourse of the New Managerialism that is justified on the grounds of providing more choices for users of public services and exposing service providers to competition through user choices in order to stimulate efficiency in service provision. In simple language, the New Managerialism that underpins public sector reforms across the globe is changing the way citizens and the state as well as its democratic role is conceived. As can be seen from the quotation above, citizens are now conceived as users and consumers. And by that conception, the democratic responsibility of the nation-state is also being changed from improving the welfare of its electorate to that of 'consumers' and 'users', whose ability to gain access to basic services is dependent on ability to pay. Associated with this new discourse and

policy thrust is the situation that the role of the state as a provider of public goods is being redefined, as is the concept of public goods. Public goods are no longer the provision of goods, namely health, education and welfare services, that improves citizens' welfare, but goods which will meet the needs of the private sector by giving greater attention to its regulatory role – of being night watchman – and the provision of economic infrastructure to enhance the competitiveness of local and national economies.

Hence, 'user fees' has entered the lexicon of states' relationship with citizens. In effect there are conflicting imperatives for democratic practices versus managerial efficiency, and the desire for an effective social welfare safety net versus the need for budgetary responsibility (Kronnenfield and Vike 2002). This new policy shift is increasing poverty as people, especially the lower class, who are unable to pay market-based prices, have their access to basic social services cut off. As noted above, the activities of the state have become *marketized* and *commodified* as part of the new policy thrust. The marketisation of government functions and the consequent commodification of basic services is having adverse effects on citizens, especially the poor.

Concomitantly, national political elites are losing power and control over policy processes and policy outcomes to both domestic and international bureaucratic elites. The latter are gaining much more influence over the policy direction, from agenda setting to implementation. Paradoxically, this shift in power balance runs against the grain of democratic governance, democratic accountability and transparency as more and more policies are undertaken by civil servants without democratic control and in secrecy, a point which is often overlooked by proponents of participatory governance and economic liberalism. Indeed the autonomy of the state in Africa, like most of the developing world, is under attack by the policy of economic liberalisation with the emphasis on a minimalist state and the introduction of new managerialism. In the context of new managerialism, the bureaucratic elites not only rule but they also reign with important implications for democratic governance and accountability. Important policies are now driven and formulated by unaccountable bureaucratic elites, and at times with minimum inputs from, and against, the electoral mandate of governments, with important adverse implications for democratic governance and accountability.

National parliaments are at the receiving end of this unfolding drama. They are either bypassed or made to rubber-stamp economic policies on which they have little or no input. Thus policy informed by the Washington consensus, which is dominant in the current global conjuncture, has resulted in the usurpation of powers and roles of domestic political elites over national policy-making by both unaccountable domestic and international bureaucratic elites. The latter, in most cases, have exercised considerable power over socio-economic policies. For example, it is not surprising to see World Bank and IMF officials being located at National Finance Ministries and Central Banks. These officials not only vet and veto national macro-economic policies, at times they are involved in the drafting of economic documents that are in accord with the Washington Consensus. These international institutions also use other mechanisms to influence domestic bureaucratic elites, and in the process, national economic policies. These include, among other means, sponsorship of domestic elites to international conferences where they are inundated with the policy pills of the Washington consensus. And because of these supports, the domestic bureaucratic elite tends to become unaccountable to the national political elites. In other words, bureaucratic accountability, a central tenet of democratic governance, is being undermined by the Washington Consensus-informed policy. Also, through development aid, bureaucrats in these international agencies, including the UNDP, exercise considerable leverage over national development agendas that undermine democratic governance.

As pointed out earlier, development agencies, however, continue to romanticise the virtue of citizens' involvement or participation in governance and development. Against this background, democratic governance is seen as a panacea to developing countries' development problems. The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, a leading advocate of democratic development in Africa, argues that '... equitable, sustainable development is predicated on transparent, accountable governance. Good governance and sustainable development are indivisible; the former provides the foundation for the latter'. Developing countries such as South Africa are therefore urged to embrace democratic governance as a necessary condition for sustainable development. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in particular has been playing a leading role in promoting democratic governance on the continent, placing emphasis on accountability and transparency in areas such

as the legislative and the judicial branches of government, civil society organisations in their advocacy and monitoring roles; public and private management,the electoral process, decentralisation and other mechanisms of enhanced participation.

The main argument is that there is a need to give citizens, especially at the local level, greater influence over decisions that affect them. Such influence will help to bring people's knowledge of distinctive local conditions to bear on the implementation of projects. Their participation, it is believed, will make development more sustainable because people will feel more inclined to maintain and possibly contribute funds, time and labour to projects over which they have had some say (Manor 2002). Also, the argument is that citizens' participation will give greater credibility to development policies and policy outcomes. Indeed, citizens' ownership of development is used as a justification for this emphasis on participation. This zeal for people's participation has seen the rise of 'users' committees as policy-networks for interaction between the local state and 'users'. Recall that the concept is that of users and not citizens. The main distinction being that the latter confers some inalienable rights accompanied by civic obligations. In contrast, being a user does not confer such rights. It is constructed around economic transactions with monetary values attached to the relationship.

Governance in South Africa in the Context of Globalisation

Most countries in the Southern African region embarked on both political and economic liberalisation in the last two decades of the 20th century. South Africa was the last to achieve procedural democracy following the demise of apartheid. Against the theoretical paradigm and dominant policy path set out above, this paper examines their implication for South Africa since the multi-party, non-racial, democratic elections in 1994. Although unique in some ways, developments in South Africa somewhat mirror the dominant trends of political and economic liberalisation in the region – hence this focus in the paper.

This focus is important given that the democratic dispensation in South Africa, as noted above, is confronted with the challenges of promoting democratic governance, equitable development and undoing the legacies of racial and gender inequalities, overcoming past conflicts and reintegrating the economy into the global order. With respect to

promoting participatory governance, the post-1994 government has set up an array of participatory structures at all levels of governance – from the local to the national levels. These include statutory structures such as the National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac); the five Presidential Working Groups, sectoral bargaining councils, and the Integrated Development Plans (IDP) at the local government level. These structures involve a range of stakeholders including trade unions, business organisations, women's organisations, youth associations, the organisations of people with disabilities, co-operatives, etc. With respect to economic policy, the government has predicated its economic reform on market fundamentalism that is dominated by economic citizenship – multinational corporations which move capital, technology and goods across borders. Although the post-1994 period has witnessed some gains, in general terms, this has not been done in a manner that fundamentally alters the nature of poverty. Hence former President Nelson Mandela lamented that poverty remains the main scourge in present day South Africa (cited in *Umsebenzi*, May 2003).

Mhone and Edigheji (2003) point out that the post-1994 South Africa has witnessed the consolidation, in practice, of the supremacy of the interests of the dominant class in South Africa, who, given the history of the country, happen to be predominantly the white business class. Although the new South Africa has been marked by the mushrooming of consultative and consensus-seeking structures, such structures have further entrenched the interests of this class while those of the previously disadvantaged communities continue to be marginalised. This is evident by the fact that wealth and income inequalities are increasing, especially among the black community, with few blacks having disproportionately reaped the economic benefits that arose from political liberation. This is like development in other parts of the African continent. This is what Abrahamsen calls exclusionary democracies:

> Although democracy may, at least initially, have expanded the room for political expression, particularly in terms of a more critical press and opportunities for social and industrial protest, the political influence of Africa's newly enfranchised citizens has been highly limited. In particular, demands for socio-economic improvements by the poorer sections of the population have been effectively ruled out a priori. In this sense, these are exclusionary democracies: they allow for political parties and elections but cannot respond to the demands of the majority or incorporate the masses in any meaningful way (Abrahamsen 2000:133-134).

The observation by Abrahamsen is pertinent in the South African case. For example, the Department of Water and Forestry (DWAF) recognised that the participation and inclusion of previously disadvantaged communities in water resource management processes was crucial in redressing the inequities of the past and in alleviating poverty. Accordingly, the Department established the Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs), also referred to as the Water Management Agencies (WMAs). The evaluation report of three of the CMAs – the WMA 3 Crocodile West-Marico; WMA 11 Umvoti to Umzimkulu; and WMA 17 Olifants-Doorn (Ministry of the Environment and Energy 2002) highlights important problems that are often ignored by proponents of participatory governance.

The report notes the inadequacy of the process in addressing the needs or problems of people from previously disadvantaged communities. Consequently, the WMAs could not effectively deal with the issues of equitable development. Second, it notes that 'Mechanisms for identifying the correct beneficiaries (PDIs) and the mechanisms of consultation that will lead to the incorporation of the needs of the rural poor in the project design are in general not practised'. As the report notes, 'issues of importance to PDIs, especially the rural poor that would contribute to poverty alleviation are frequently excluded as they are regarded as not relevant to the CMA establishment process'. Third, the report points out that there was 'limited effort in the design phase to ensure the establishment and/or development of linkages with existing local (rural) initiatives such as local water committees. The latter, as the report acknowledged, are well represented and active in addressing local issues. Lastly, it was noted that in establishing the WMAs, the issue of assessing the capacities at the local level in order to participate meaningfully in the decision-making processes was not adequately addressed. Like other consultative processes and structures in South Africa, it was also noted that:

> Information dissemination between those involved in the forum and the CMA establishment process and those who are not remain weak. Communication between forum or team members is also not taking place effectively. The roles and responsibilities of forum members in general have not been clearly set out. Overall, there was low participation by people from previously disadvantaged communities, especially black women and the rural poor. This was partly due to the fact that they could not afford the transport cost for them to attend meetings of the

WMAs, which the designer of the project did not recognise as a signifi-
cant factor that could enhance their participation and the eventual suc-
cess of the programme.

Due to all of the above, the report noted that 'There is no common
understanding of the clarity and consistency of the overall objectives,
purpose and result of the participation process'.

Some of the above problems are also manifest in other participatory
processes and structures such as NEDLAC. This is because '... those
that participate in the policy process have little time to consult with
their constituencies on all issues, in spite of the fact that agreements
reached at negotiations are expected to be binding on organisations. Of
critical importance is that accountability and transparency, central ele-
ments of the strength of civil society organisations, are being under-
mined as a result. Again, on occasion, there is little co-ordination and
reporting back by delegations to the various Nedlac processes' (Edigheji
2003:105). Like the WMAs, the participation of women at Nedlac is
very low. As a result, gender is not mainstreamed in its activities.

The policy of fiscal restraint adopted by the national government is
having dire consequences not only in addressing past racial inequalities
but also in promoting democratic governance and citizens' participa-
tion in the development process. As McLennan notes, 'the tendency to
pass on responsibility for the growing costs of education to local com-
munities was disguised as an attempt to improve management efficiency
and democratic participation by extending responsibility and account-
ability (ownership) to local communities'. But this has the contrary
effects of widening 'gaps in education provision to the detriment of
poorer communities'. McLennan further notes:

> The emphasis on consultation and collaboration enabled privileged
> stakeholders to re-articulate the discourse of democratic participation to
> further group interests and channel resources. As a consequence, con-
> sultative relationships were characterised by high levels of distrust within
> the state, between provinces and within civil society. Finally, civil society
> was unevenly organised and privileged interests groups were able to domi-
> nate the voices of the excluded. In these contexts, participatory proc-
> esses tended to favour those groups within the state most able to ma-
> nipulate the system to achieve their interests. Formal consultative and
> participative processes based on representation did not guarantee that
> all interests were considered... As a consequence, policy developed tended
> to favour the privileged middle class and millions of poor rural children

were excluded from the processes of education transformation (McLennan 2003:205).

By so doing, the apartheid inequalities in the education system, as in the society in general, are being reproduced and reinforced. Consequently, there has been no significant reduction in income and wealth inequality along racial lines in the new South Africa. In fact the poor in black communities are further being disempowered by the policies emanating from consultative and participatory structures and the resort to the 'new managerialism' and technocratic policy making as the overriding paradigm of governance. This point is highlighted in the WMAs' report earlier referred to, where it is observed that 'In broad terms PDIs and rural communities feel alienated from the process through lack of participating (sic) or being able to participate, and through feeling that their issues are not being addressed' (p.10).

The same is true of the recent agreement of the Growth and Development Summit (GDS) as part of the Nedlac process. In spite of pressure from civil society organisations and the trade unions, HIV/AIDS was not addressed by the summit. This was one factor that could have aborted the GDS. Cosatu's president, Willie Madisha, in his address to the summit, lamented the inability to reach agreement on issues around HIV, which was instead deferred to a separate task team (Madisha 2003). The summit was an effort by the national stakeholders 'to commit themselves to a common vision for promoting rising levels of growth, investment, job creation and people-centred development'. But overall, business interests predominated while making very minimum concessions. In the case of retirement funds for example, 'the life insurance industry, government, labour and community organisations committed to work towards investing five percent of their investable income' in unspecified 'appropriate financial instruments'. The trade unions in particular were demanding more than ten percent of pension funds be invested in job creating initiatives. But, as we can see from the above, business did not yield to this demand and remains a source of dissatisfaction for the unions. Although the rhetoric in the GDS agreement tended to be progressive, the actual challenge is whether or not the parties to the agreements will fulfil their comments. As I have noted elsewhere, the South African social partners, especially business, are known for not meeting their commitments. In some instances business has worked against agreements that it perceived not to advance its interest. Its continued opposition to labour laws and affirmative action laws and policies are illus-

trative of this point (Edigheji 2003). Perhaps this is what the Cosatu president, Willie Madisha, had in mind at the GDS when he observed that 'As always at Nedlac, it is easy to talk, hard that action follows the talk'. The unfortunate thing is that there are no effective mechanisms to monitor the implementation of Nedlac agreements, like most participatory structures in South Africa. It is therefore not surprising that the GDS agreement contained similar contents to the 2000 and 2001 Nedlac annual summit agreements (Nedlac 2000 and 2001). Since the almost three years these annual summit agreements were signed, no significant movement has been made toward their implementation. Indeed, the Council has been unable to come up with a work programme towards the implementation of the aforementioned annual summit agreements. Whether the same fate will befall the GDS agreement is yet to be seen.

In general, participatory structures and technocracy have therefore become a means to legitimatise the interests of the dominant groups in society while marginalising the poor and at the same time fostering a sense of disempowerment among them. Similarly, technocracy undermines democratic control over public policy thereby also reducing its legitimacy as public participation, parliamentary debates or other consultative mechanisms are sidestepped. This method of policy formulation and implementation, according to Mkandawire (1999:123) 'is carried out completely oblivious of the demands of good governance and long-term economic development. Indeed, policies are often introduced in isolation from the considerations of political stability or the legitimacy of the authority of elected bodies'.

Mkandawire's observation provides a more profound understanding of the development crisis in South Africa, like the rest of the continent. In the past, scholars such as Herbst (1999) tended to explain the inability of African states to deliver basic services to their citizens as a result of resource constraints. But this seems only part of the answer. A more profound understanding of the issue in the continent is *poverty of a developmental vision* by African political elites and a complete surrender of their developmental role to the market – hence their citizens are conceived as users rather than citizens with rights and obligations. In this conception, they accept the liberal discourse of participatory governance, and by so doing shift participation from something that is built around citizenship to users with an emphasis on consumption and markets as the effective agents of service provision. In this way,

they turn citizens into passive economic entities whose access to basic social and physical services and infrastructure is based on ability to pay. Hassen (2003) has highlighted other negative consequences of the shift from citizenship to clients or users to democratic governance:

> Managerialism transforms citizens in demobilising ways... Managerialism, furthermore, transforms a collective (citizens) into a singular entity (client). In so doing, the ability of communities to intervene on specific issues is made more difficult, for their treatment by the public service is not as collective but as individual clients... The interaction between the government and its clients is largely seen as transactional. A wider conceptualisation of citizens as active participants in delivery is absent (Hassen 2003:135).

This conceptualisation also tends to redefine politics, as politics is conceived in terms of struggle over distribution of wealth rather than the creation of common wealth. Furthermore, it replaces citizen democracy by consumer democracy as citizens are reduced to consumers, clients and users with government services being commodified. The consequence of these policies is the fostering of competition among citizens, leading to conflict rather than cooperation, and more political apathy and disengagement from public affairs than participation, a fact that is ignored by proponents of economic liberalism and participatory governance.

These developments are leading to the displacement of ordinary citizens' participation by the dominance of career politicians and public sector managers. If one uses procedural democracy to judge participation of South Africans, they would have scored highly as evident from the 1999 election with over 80 percent of registered voters turning up for the general election. But this would be an inappropriate measurement. This because there is nowhere in the world where major socio-economic decisions are formulated or implemented through regular elections – such policy decisions are made in the period between elections in institutional structures within the state or those composed of representatives of the state-capital-civil society. These are the arenas where the contestation over the policy direction largely takes place, although on occasion, especially in the developed world, referenda are conducted to decide on major policy-decisions. Therefore elections do not ultimately decide the outcome of competition for policies and power. As has been poignantly argued by Peter Evans :

> it has become increasingly clear that holding regular elections and main-
> taining at least nominal protection for civil rights is not sufficient to
> generate public discussion that has real bearing on the weighting of the
> developmental goals or the allocation of collective resources (Evans
> 2002:15).

Therefore, judging the degree of South Africans' participation should
be based on their involvement in participatory and consultative deci-
sion-making bodies including parliament. In this respect, the findings
of Houston et al (1999) are illustrative of the level of citizens' disen-
gagement from public affairs. They report that '91.3 percent of respond-
ents never asked a member of the national legislature for assistance, 90
percent never attended public hearings of the national legislature, and
89.4 percent never made enquiries at parliamentary constituency of-
fices' (Houston et al 1999:157). If we are to use these figures as an
indicator, they show that there is a low citizen participation in public
affairs. And as I have noted elsewhere in the case of Nedlac, besides
government, the other social partners in the Council represent only a
small fraction of their constituencies, with the membership of the three
union federations constituting only 35 percent of the formally employed
and business representation accounting for about 30 percent of the
total businesses in the country (Edigheji 2003). Taken together, we can
conclude that there is low citizen participation in shaping public policy,
leaving the political elite and the predominately white business elite to
dominate in the process and their interests to prevail. Even in parlia-
mentary budgetary process that has been marked by an increase in civil
society participation, Warren Krafchik concluded that 'Formal inputs
within the budget process do not sufficiently reflect the growing inter-
ests of civil society in budget-related issues' (Krafchik 1999:93) mak-
ing range of CSOs to conclude that parliament is not an effective vehi-
cle to influence the budget.

    The shift from citizenships to users, consumers or clients also has
major implications for South Africans and the socio-economic develop-
ment of the country. Citizenship confers some inalienable rights on the
individuals and communities, which were denied to black people by the
apartheid government. These rights were restored by the new constitu-
tion. However, the adoption of an economic model that emphasises
users, consumers and clients, and so-called alternative models of serv-
ice delivery such as public-private partnerships – which is another word
for commercialisation of basic services – that emphasise financial

sustainability through cost recovery for all services is stripping mostly poor South Africans of these rights, with adverse consequence for sustainable human development and economic growth. The shift from citizenship to users and consumers has the potential to disrupt individual plans and diminish the value of years of work. The result is that it is creating uncertainty and diminishing the capacity of South Africans, especially blacks, to save and make long-term investments that could have become the engine of economic growth in the new dispensation. This is coupled with the fact that poor South Africans are being denied productive economic assets and basic infrastructure. Hence South Africa has experienced a low level of investment and a sluggish economic growth rate. Most South African poor people, owing to the legacy of apartheid, have no access to the means of sustainable livelihoods and are unable to afford basic necessities.

A trend that is consequently emerging in the new South Africa is that 'in the face of gross inequalities and relative under-development, economic liberalism has tended to compromise substantive democracy'. The manner in which the government formulated its major economic policy to date, the Growth Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR), is illustrative. The government unilaterally formulated the GEAR policy without consultation with domestic stakeholders, including the Congress of the South African Trade Union (COSATU), an alliance partner of the ruling party, the ANC. By so doing, it circumvented democratic processes and structures including the Nedlac, a national statutory body set up to facilitate dialogue and consensus seeking between government, organised business and trade unions, and civil society organisations. Although the Nedlac Act did not make it compulsory for government to take its macro-economic policy through a consensus process, by unilaterally imposing it and proclaiming its 'fundamentals as non-negotiable', the basis was laid for similar unilateralism by other social and economic interests, and the consequent conflicts that emanate from such actions. The overall effects of these is that in the post-1994 South Africa, according to Mhone and Edigheji:

> ... consultation, cooperation, consensus seeking and compromises which are essential elements of governance are being replaced by nominal consultation, unilateralism and conflicts. And even when consultations takes place, they serve primarily as information sharing mechanisms rather than for social partners to make meaningful input and influence the policy agenda and outcome. These important policies to integrate the

domestic economy into the global economy are thus being ruled out of
the purview and ambit of consultative and consensus seeking structures.
Where consultation takes place around micro-economic issues, the macro
environment of economic stabilisation is thus taken as given, and not
subject to discussion or consultation. By foreclosing debates on such
important political economy issues government is undermining a key
tenet of governance (2003:353).

Indeed, GEAR undermines the foundation of participatory governance
both by its contents and the manner in which it was formulated and
announced. As I have noted elsewhere, GEAR marked a fundamental
shift from *people-driven* to *technocratic-driven,* with the marginalisation of
civil society organisations in the policy process and the predominance
of interests of market agents, both local and global, in policy objectives
(Edigheji 2003:93). It is therefore not surprising that the predominately
white private sector has embraced the government economic policy. In
contrast, the black community, especially the trade unions and other
civil society organisations that represent the poor and the marginalised,
continue to oppose it. What is clear from this is that economic liberal-
ism symbolised by GEAR is leading to a realignment of class forces in
South Africa. While the ANC continues to proclaim itself an organisa-
tion of the poor and remains in formal alliance with COSATU and the
South African Communist Party (SACP), the government seems to be
advancing the interests of capital with which it is has an informal alli-
ance. This situation explains the dominance of the interest of business
in the national agenda. This once again highlights the disjuncture be-
tween the ANC in government and the ANC outside government, with
the former not only exercising greater leverage over the development
agenda but also driving and defining it. This includes the restructuring
of the public service. By so doing, the bureaucrat elites are reconfiguring
the state in the new South Africa into a minimalist state along the line
of the dominant ideology of the Washington Consensus.

Also, consultative processes are now confined to discussing sectoral
and micro-policies whose scope and parameters are conditioned by the
objectives of GEAR, a product of a non-consultative process. The im-
plication of this is that consultative processes have limited parameters
and influence in the democratic South Africa. They cannot discuss is-
sues that will result in inclusive development as that would require re-
visiting of the GEAR policy, which the government is not prepared to
do at this juncture for fear of scaring off investors, both domestic and

foreign. By such a narrow preoccupation, the government tends to ig-
nore the generally known fact that investment follows growth and not
the other way round. Thus, rather than focus on trying to expand do-
mestic savings as a basis to increase domestic investment which will
spur the growth of the economy, the government seems preoccupied
with trying to attract the elusive foreign investment as a basis for growth.
There cannot be participatory governance where certain policies are
ruled to be outside the purview of open discussion and other consulta-
tive processes. Even in the East Asian developmental states, which pro-
ponents of procedural democracy might classify undemocratic, the gov-
ernments in those countries subjected their main economic policies to
consultative processes, although such consultations were mainly between
the state and business, which in turn enhanced such policies and their
outcomes. The shared growth outcome of these states is a testimony to
the importance of participatory governance.

Furthermore, gains in micro-economic and sectoral policies such as
the Labour Relations Act, the Employment Equity Act, etc. with the
potential to advance broad based development, affirmative action, equal-
ity, justice and workers rights are being revised by the negative impacts
of GEAR, which emphasises cost recovery, social policy and privatisa-
tion and commercialisation of basic services. The result of which is that
these policies are leading to job losses. According to Statistics South
Africa (2002) unemployment rose from 16 percent in 1995 to over 30
percent in September 2002. In the process inequality is not only deep-
ening but also denying households access to sources of livelihood – and
increasing numbers of people and households, mostly poor and black,
are being cut off from access to basic necessities of life such as water
and electricity. This is despite the fact that the post-1994 period has
been marked by extension of electricity for lighting from 64 percent
households in October 1995 to 72 percent in October 2000. In the
same period households with access to clean water increased from 79
percent to 83 percent, telephones from 25 percent to 35 percent (Sta-
tistics South Africa 2000). Because the commercialisation of these serv-
ices requires that the market determines prices, the same households
are being cut off from such services.

Some scholars have projected that in 1998 over 500,000 households
had their electricity cut off (Ruiters 2002) and by early 2001 more
than 20,000 households per month had their electricity cut off due to
their inability to pay (Fiil-Flynn 2001). The increased tariff of basic

services has placed a major debt burden on households. In certain towns, as reported by Ruiters, 45 percent of inhabitants were in debt regarding municipal services. In the case of housing, while the government has built about two million houses with households living in formal housing rising from 66 percent to 73 percent in the period referred to above, the housing programme is driven by market imperatives and limits the number of poor households that could afford them. Critics of this model such as Pape and McDonald (2002) note that:

> The neoliberal model and its cost-recovery component gradually came to dominate both national legislation and local government practice. On one level this undermined many of the gains in infrastructure. For example, while two millions households may have been given access to water between 1994 and 1999, cost recovery measures and bureaucratic inefficiency made many projects inoperable. Peter Wellman estimated in 1999 that at least 50 percent of the water projects were not functioning (Pape and McDonald 2002: 4).

This is in addition to the fact that the government housing scheme seems to have institutionalised the ghettoising of shacks and informal settlements – one of the inhumane legacies of apartheid – in South Africa, given the poor quality of the new public houses. That these houses are also market-driven has resulted in a situation where their developmental potentials are not realised. This is aptly captured by the former National Chairperson of the South African National Civics Association (SANCO), Moses Mayekiso (SANCO 1994) when he observed that 'Urban and rural development have been presided over by state bureaucrats and have been designed to entrench apartheid. It has been developer-driven and often carefully organised to disempower communities. The result is that development has failed'.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have highlighted the paradoxes of participatory governance and economic liberalism in the new South Africa. While the government genuinely believed that citizens' participation would lead to democratic development, and consequently established a range of participatory structures and processes, the adoption of conventional economic policy that emphasised cost recovery, fiscal restraints and market efficiency is undermining participatory governance and limiting its impact. Participatory structures are reinforcing the interests of the elite. And, given the apartheid legacy of race and class, it is the rich,

who are mostly white, and the new black bourgeoisie, who are reaping the benefits of political liberalisation and participatory mechanisms. The latter have created spaces of inclusion and exclusion but with the general effect of disempowerment for the majority of the South African populace who are included to the extent that they do on occasion participate in consultative structures. Therefore an inclusive-exclusive nexus has emerged, and is pervasive in the current dispensation in South Africa.

Against the preceding background, South Africa's developmental future requires a different economic policy premise. Participatory governance should be predicated on an economic model that will unleash the vast resources of South African society. In this respect, providing access to economic assets for the majority of the people is a *sine qua non* to sustainable development and the consolidation of democratic governance. This requires shared growth, that is growth whose fruits are shared by all. Central components of this approach include the decommodification of basic services, and the provision of social safety nets in terms of access to income opportunities and productive economic assets and activities.

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Regional Integration: A Political Federation of the East African Countries?

*Phillip Apuuli Kasaija**

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to explore the possibility and viability of an East African political federation project. Since the late 1800s under the then British East Africa, the countries of East Africa have been searching for ways to integrate. The search led to the establishment of the East African Community (EAC) in December 1967, which later collapsed in 1977. The argument of the paper is that it appears that among the current crop of leaders of the region there is the political will to establish the East African federation. However, it will take more than political will to bring the federation to fruition, as conditions in the region currently do not augur well for the project. Also, the leaders have not carried the people along with them on the integration journey. One main problem of attempts at integration in East Africa in particular and Africa in general, has been that they have been leader-led. Whether it was the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) or now the African Union (AU), the people at the grassroots have played no role in their establishment and consolidation. The question therefore is: Do existing conditions in the region advance the project of an East African federation?

Résumé

L'objectif de cet article est d'étudier la possibilité et la viabilité du projet d'une fédération politique est-africaine. Depuis la fin des années dix-huit cent, dans l'Afrique de l'Est britannique de l'époque, les pays de la zone cherchent des moyens d'intégration. Cette quête a conduit à la mise en place de la Communauté Est-Africaine (CEA) en décembre 1967, qui a été dissoute en 1977. L'argument avancé par cette contribution est qu'il paraît clair que les actuels dirigeants de la région

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expriment une volonté manifeste de mettre sur pied la fédération est-africaine. Cependant, il faudra bien plus qu'une simple volonté politique pour mûrir un tel projet de fédération. Les conditions actuelles de cette région n'augurent rien de bon pour la création de ce projet. En outre, les dirigeants n'ont pas consulté les populations dans le cadre de cette intégration. Le problème des processus d'intégration en Afrique de l'Est particulièrement et en Afrique de manière générale, est que ceux-ci sont monopolisés par les dirigeants. Par exemple, le citoyen lambda n'a joué aucun rôle dans l'établissement et la consolidation de l'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine (OAU), aujourd'hui Union Africaine (UA). Il convient donc de se poser la question suivante : les conditions actuelles de la région permettent-elles de faire avancer le projet d'une Fédération Est-Africaine ?

I. Introduction

In July 1998, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda presented a paper entitled 'Towards a closer cooperation in Africa' at the ruling National Resistance Movement's (NRM) National Conference. Clearly the paper was aimed at domestic as well as regional audiences. In the paper Museveni argued, among other things, that if the countries of East and Central Africa are to play a meaningful role in this era of globalisation, they had to think of moving towards a political union. He suggested that the countries of the East Africa Community (EAC) together with Rwanda and Burundi must federate politically in order to command respect from the other countries of the world. The federation would also enhance their bargaining strength in multi-lateral institutions, as well as bilaterally.

At the time of Museveni's speech, the East African Community revival draft treaty was being debated by the public in the three East African countries. The draft treaty contained a provision which called for the three partner states to move towards a political federation. After the signing of the East African Community Treaty, the call to establish a political federation of the three states has been taken up by the East African Legislative Assembly. The debate was launched in Nairobi in June 2002, when the Assembly held its session in Kenya. The coming to power of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government in Kenya in December 2002, further galvanised the voices that are in favour of moving towards the political integration of the EAC. President Mwai Kibaki, like Museveni, is in favour of the project.

The aim of this paper will be to explore the possibility and viability of the project of an East African political federation. Since the late

1800s under the then British East Africa, the countries of East Africa have been searching for ways to integrate. The search led to the establishment of the East African Community (EAC) in December 1967, which later collapsed in 1977. The argument of the paper is that it appears that there is the political will to establish the East African federation among the current crop of leaders of the region. However, it will take more than political will to bring the federation to fruition. The conditions existing in the region currently do not augur well for the project.

Also, the leaders have not carried the people along with them on the integration journey. The problem of the integration process in East Africa in particular and Africa in general, has been that it has been leader-led. Whether it was the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) or now the African Union (AU), the common man has played no role in their establishment and consolidation. The question therefore is: Do conditions that exist in the region advance the project of an East African federation?

II. Conceptualising the Terms

According to the East African Community Treaty, the EAC intends to achieve a political federation starting with a common market and a monetary union. Therefore at the moment, the cooperation between the three East African countries can be categorised as being in a state of becoming, which in the long run is aimed at achieving a political federation (Mukandala 2000:89). In other words, the integration process in East Africa is to be achieved incrementally. The argument has always been whether the logical conclusion of any integration process is political or economic unity. The jury is still out.

Ben Belassa identified five ideal types of integration (Ojo et al. 1985:145). He stated that at the lowest level there is the free trade area in which tariffs and quotas are eliminated among the members of the integrating region. A customs union involves the elimination of tariffs and quotas, and also eliminates discriminatory tariffs by non-member countries, by setting up common external tariffs. The third level of integration involves the establishment of a common market. This entails the elimination of obstacles for the free flow of the factors of production, namely labour and capital. The fourth level is the establishment of an economic community or union, entailing the harmonisation of economic policies which may involve the introduction of a common

currency. The highest form of integration is a political union, where the structures and political institutions which harmonise policies also themselves become harmonised and unified. The integration of East Africa aims at not following Belassa's typology as a straight jacket. Rather, it aims at achieving political federation by first establishing a customs union, and then following with a monetary one.

But what is political federation? Federalism refers to a political organisation in which two or more states agree to form a union government with central authority, while retaining local autonomy (Ojo et al. 1985:75). At the regional level however, federalism is the call for the coming together of independent nation states to form a federal government (ibid). In regional integration, political federation is a mean between political cooperation and political union. Political cooperation involves mutual policy arrangements among member states aimed at attaining common interests and objectives (Mukandala 2000:89). Political cooperation does not necessarily require the surrendering of one's jurisdiction to a central unit. A political union is the ultimate goal of cooperating parties, and entails a shared political jurisdiction in which the parties to the union agree to surrender either all or part of their sovereignty to a central political unit (ibid). In between political cooperation and political union is political federation. Political federation is a union of groups, united by one or more common objectives, but retaining their distinctive group character for other purposes (ibid). Each member state retains its distinctiveness in its own sphere. As a step towards achieving a political federation, the treaty of the EAC calls upon the partner states to establish a common foreign and security policy.[1] But is political federation or union possible? Suffice to note that the European countries that have been building the European Union are still grappling with the whole question of political cooperation.

III. East African Integration: The History

Attempts at integrating the region started in the latter years of the 19th century. Moves to integrate East Africa were initiated by the British in 1894 with the decision to start the construction of the Uganda Railway. Ostensibly at the time, the British were not aiming at the integration of the region. Rather, the railway was to be used to transport raw materials for use in British industries. They did not know however that this venture would prove to be the first step that would help in fostering a process of integration of the region in the years to come.

The process of integration of East Africa can clearly be divided into four periods. The present attempt that began in 1984 can be said to be the fourth. The other three periods covered the years 1894-1947, 1948-1966, and 1967–1977. As we have already said, the British inadvertently set in motion the integration process of the region when they decided to construct the Uganda railway from Mombasa, Kenya in 1894. The construction work actually began in 1895. Later on, they began promoting efforts to advance a more unified administrative control over their East African territories by establishing the Court of Appeal for East Africa in 1902, a Postal Union in 1911, a Customs Union in 1917, and the East African Currency Board in 1920 (Ojo et al. 1985:157). Tanganyika which became a British Mandate after the First World War, and which later merged with Zanzibar to become Tanzania, was gradually absorbed into these institutions by 1963. This was the first period of integration of East Africa. Commenting on the moves to integrate the region during this period, Ibrahim Gambari asserted that:

> [s]kewed as it may have been in favour of the settler community in Kenya, economic cooperation was an early fact of life in the sub-region. In 1917, the Kenya and Uganda protectorates merged their custom authorities, common tariff rates between Kenya and Uganda were also extended to Tanganyika in 1922. By the following year, the three countries engaged in free trade for local produce. This was followed by an agreement which removed almost all custom duties between the three territories.(Ademola 1999:90-1)

The second period began in 1948, when a quasi-federation was established with a common market and a number of common services (ibid). The common services included the establishment of an East African Railway and Harbours Administration, the East African Posts and Telecommunications Administration, and the Agricultural and Medical Research Services (ibid). A High Commission, comprising of the three territorial governors,[2] with a Secretariat manned by technocrats with a region-wide outlook and expertise, coordinated the common services. There also existed a central legislature called the East Africa Central Legislative Assembly, although only with limited powers. Commenting on the integration of the region at this time, Mukandala-Rwekaza has noted that:

> [t]his was a political cooperation whose scope was limited only to providing the critical support and context for economic cooperation. It was not expected to develop and evolve into something qualitatively differ-

> ent like a political federation or union. There was never the possibility
> that the three governments could go to war against each other, or could
> undermine each other... the three governments were unified in philoso-
> phy, purpose and strategy. Thus their value was mutually compatible
> (Mukandala2000:95).

No doubt that this period was the golden era of East African integra-
tion. In 1961, the quasi-federation was revamped with the attainment
of independence by Tanganyika. The other reason for the revamping
came from the resentment that Uganda and Tanganyika expressed at
the disproportionate benefits accruing to Kenya in terms of growth in
GNP, foreign investment, international trade, and the location of the
common services headquarters in Nairobi (Ojo et al. 1985:157). The
location of the common service headquarters in Nairobi was to remain
a sore point of contention. Suffice to note that an East African Com-
mon Services Organisation (EACSO) had been established, as a prel-
ude to the establishment of a fully fledged political federation of the
region.

This period of integration was tempered by the attainment of inde-
pendence by the three countries of East Africa. A political federation of
the three independent countries was to be ushered in by the Nairobi
Declaration of 1963, but this was not to be. Uganda was opposed to
the high degree of centralisation, which its partners wanted to build
into the federation (ibid: 158). Also, as it has been noted, the ruling
regimes in the three countries were engaged in intensive battles for po-
litical domination and hegemony at the time... [thus] challenges of
nation building and regime consolidation demanded a national focus
[and not a regional one] (Mukandala 2000:95). The situation pertain-
ing then impelled Mwalimu Nyerere to write in the following terms:

> a federation of at least Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania should be com-
> paratively easy to achieve. We already have a common market, and run
> many services through the common services organisation which has its
> own central legislative assembly and an executive composed of the Prime
> Ministers of the three states. This is the nucleus from which a federation
> is the natural growth.(Ademola1999:91)

The quasi-federation that began in 1948 culminated in the establish-
ment of the East African Community in December 1967. However,
this was preceded by four landmark events in the history of East Afri-
can integration. First, in 1963, the East African Federation Treaty was
nearly signed in Arusha by the three presidents, but the agreement was

aborted. This was for reasons we have just stated above. Second, in 1964, an agreement was signed in Kampala on the distribution of industries in the three partner states. This agreement called the Kampala-Mbale agreement provided that certain industries such as tyres, bicycle parts and fertilizers, be exclusively located in Uganda and Tanzania. Kenya failed to ratify this agreement. Third, in 1965-6, the East African Currency Union came to an end. As a result, three separate central banks were set up and started issuing national currencies. Fourthly, in 1966, a Commission made up of three Ministers and headed by a UN expert Kjeld Phillip, was appointed and tasked with negotiating a permanent solution to the problems that were afflicting East Africa's integration (Ojo et al. 1985:158). It recommended the establishment of the East African Community.

The third attempt at regional integration of East Africa began on 1 December 1967, with the coming into force of the Treaty for East African Cooperation. This experiment ended in failure in 1977. However, the treaty was significant in many ways. First, it placed the common market and the common services within one framework, and also gave the former a solid legal foundation (ibid). Secondly, it made provisions aimed at achieving equitable distribution of cost and benefits. Thirdly, a new innovation was made. The treaty created a number of community organs to coordinate activities and also give executive direction. In this regard, it provided for a Community Minister who was appointed by each state to promote the Community's interests and project its viewpoints in his or her own cabinet (ibid). This experiment at integration failed in 1977 for various reasons.[3]

However, it should be noted that the time the EAC was in existence, it was one of the most advanced integration schemes in Africa. In fact it has been said that the EAC effort was the most advanced regional idea at integration in the whole of the developing world (Ademola op cit:90).

The latest attempt to reconstruct the sub-region into a viable integration group began in 1984 when the three countries signed the East African Community Mediation Agreement for the Division of Assets and Liabilities[4] of the defunct EAC (Mukandala 2000:97). In this agreement, the partner states committed themselves to exploring areas of future cooperation. However, concrete moves towards the revival of the Community did not begin until November 1991, when the three heads of state held a summit in Nairobi, after which they issued a formal communiqué committing themselves to revive the East African Coop-

eration (Tulya-Muhika 2000:37). A committee of Foreign Ministers was set up to work out the details. Two years later, in November 1993, the heads of state set up the Permanent Tripartite Commission after a meeting in Arusha, Tanzania. A year later, in November 1994, the first protocol to establish an EAC Secretariat in Arusha, was signed in Kampala. The Secretariat was finally established in March 1996, and Ambassador Francis Muthaura was appointed its first Executive Secretary.

The draft Treaty for the establishment of the EAC was published in 1998, after which it was circulated in the three countries for debate. After the debates in the partner states, the heads of state finally signed the treaty into force on 30 November 1999. As we write, most of the institutions that were provided for under the treaty are up and running. These include the Secretariat, the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), and the East African Court of Justice.

IV. Museveni's Arguments

Amid the debate on the draft treaty of the EAC, President Museveni came out with his own views. We will restrict ourselves to only those that pertain to the integration of East Africa. In his paper, that we mentioned in the introduction, he advanced a number of arguments. First, he averred that economic integration is not enough because of political fragmentation. There is a lack of a political superstructure necessary for the integration process. Given the present economically weak states, there is no single African state that can impose discipline on the others by economic or other forms of pressure. He compared Africa to the Western hemisphere, where the United States plays a head prefect role due to its economic and military might. Museveni concluded that Africa lacked a head prefect because of political fragmentation. Therefore, he was making a case for African political integration.

Secondly, he argued that a Union of Central and Eastern Africa states would command more respect from the world. 'An investor would be more attracted to invest in a united East Africa than in just Uganda because of the bigger market the former offers', he argued.

Thirdly, a union would command more defence potential to guard African interests against encroachment by foreigners. He argued that 'the present small African states individually, do not possess much defence capacity'.

Fourthly, he averred that there were already basic unity or linkages in Africa. He gave the example of East Africa where there are linkages of

languages and culture. He cited the example of the Luo language which is spoken by the Nilotics, who are found in Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Tanzania and parts of Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In terms of culture, he argued that the Bantu culture straddles East, Central and Southern Africa.

President Museveni further argued that Africa must create a centre of gravity, just like the USA is a centre of gravity for Anglo-Saxon-Latin civilisation. He said that the countries that would establish the initial vanguard of the Union would be Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. The advantage of these countries is that they are geographically contiguous and share to a certain degree a common language (Swahili) and culture. Other countries would be encouraged to join, as long as they were geographically contiguous to the Union.

According to Museveni the union would be that of East and Central African states. Power would be shared between the Union government and the national governments. The Union government would be responsible for external defence, foreign affairs, common market affairs, common services – such as railways, harbours and posts and telecommunications, and scientific research. The national governments would share responsibility with districts in the areas of justice, education, health, internal security, roads, wildlife and tourism, agriculture, etc.

When circulated in the regional capitals, Museveni's paper was greeted with consternation. Commenting on it, Akiiki Mujaju noted that:

> Museveni... has been acting like a leader on the campaign trail... the latest evidence of this was a document which he circulated recently advocating a political union of East African states including Rwanda and Burundi... his role in the Tutsi dominated Rwanda and Burundi and now his intervention in the DR Congo cast him in the image of a new Nkwame Nkrumah.[5]

It has to be remembered that when the African countries were debating ways on how they would integrate in the late 1950s, the then leader of Ghana, Nkwame Nkrumah, argued that African countries should right away integrate politically. In his own words, 'seek ye the political kingdom and the rest will follow'. However, the majority of the African countries rejected this view. Some leaders saw Nkurumah as wanting to become the president of Africa. In calling for political federation of East and Central African states, some quarters thought that now Museveni wanted to become the leader of the region! But, however

much Museveni's views are disdained, he is the first leader in the region to come out with a clear view of what shape and form the federation of the region should take.

The issue of political federation has now been firmly put on the agenda of the EAC. The EALA has been debating the matter.[6] The problem however is that the treaty does not define what a political federation of the region would eventually be.[7]

V. Problems Militating Against the Ideas of Museveni and the Federation

As we write, the partner states of the EAC are moving ahead to establish a customs union by the end of this year. This is the first step towards establishing the political federation. On the surface, it looks like achieving a political federation for the region would be easy, as all three governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are democratic. The economies of the countries of the region to some degree are already integrated. The total market that the region would command in a political/economic union would be close to 90 million people. If Rwanda and Burundi were added, then the market would grow to more than 100 million. In principle, the latter two countries have applied to join the EAC as partners. In fact, Rwanda's application has been pending since 1999. Suffice to note that it has had an observer status in the EAC since 1994. The final admission of Rwanda into the EAC as a full partner has been delayed until the Community has established a custom union later this year. However, we would like to argue that the politics of the region and other inherent problems would severely hinder the advancement of Museveni's suggestions and also of the political federation idea.

First, internally the majority of the countries of the region generally are not stable. In Museveni's Uganda, an internal rebellion of the dissident Joseph Kony and his ilk of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has been waging a war in Northern Uganda since 1986. This war has gone on for such a long time that it is very difficult to say when it will end. Increasingly, the conflict has taken on ethnic undertones. Some see the conflict as pitting the Nilotic northerners against Bantu southerners. Museveni and Kagame's military adventures in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have also been singled out as destabilising the region.

Despite the recently held elections, which saw the overwhelming election of Paul Kagame as president, ethnic tensions remain in Rwanda. Matters have not been helped by the continued marginalisation of the majority Hutus by the minority Tutsi dominated government of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). Burundi has been in turmoil since 1993, when the first popularly elected Hutu president was brutally assassinated by the Tutsi dominated Burundi army. The current transitional government led by Ndayizeye is too occupied fighting for survival to even think about regional integration. Therefore, the only two islands of peace in the region are Kenya and Tanzania. It is, therefore, very difficult to see how a region that is largely in turmoil can move towards a federation, let alone a political union.

Secondly, the fundamental principles of the community seem paradoxically to be working against the establishment of the political federation/union. For example, there is the emphasis on sovereign equality[8] of the partner states. This seems to work towards consolidating the status quo rather than easing the introduction of a completely new dispensation.

Thirdly, as it has been pointed out, while political federation is identified as the ultimate goal, the process that will bring it about is not specified (Mukandala 2000:100). There is no timetable with clear benchmarks to guide the process. The treaty is silent on the time frame to achieve the federation. While we know the starting point and the end point, it is assumed that the process of getting from one end to the other is obvious. But this is not the case. Whereas the treaty spells out the process of economic integration, that of political integration is not. There is, therefore, a need to develop a clear vision for political federation, regardless of the existence of political will.

Fourthly, structural and institutional obstacles to the free movement of capital, goods and people remain. Specifically talking about the movement of goods, some partner states still practise market protectionism. Recently, Uganda's sugar caused an uproar in Kenya. Members of Kenya's parliament who hail from sugar producing areas were not amused by their government's decision to allow Ugandan sugar on the Kenyan market. These MPs argued that Ugandan sugar was killing the Kenyan sugar market. At one time Ugandan milk was prohibited from entering Rwanda.

V. Silver Linings

Much as the idea of political federation of the region faces great challenges, small strides have been taken towards achieving a politically federated East Africa. The very fact that the treaty of EAC mentions political cooperation is a plus in itself. A look at the treaty that established the defunct EAC reveals that political cooperation was not one of its objectives. Therefore, the prominence that is given to it in the current integration process is a silver lining. This has been amplified and concretised by the political will that the current crop of East African leaders have given towards achieving political integration.

By the end of this year, the leaders of East Africa have committed themselves to signing a protocol establishing a customs union. In fact the Secretariat of EAC is working around the clock to bring this occasion to fruition.[9] This will be another milestone on the path towards achieving political integration. President Kibaki of Kenya has asserted that 'once the customs union is complete it will be closely followed by the finalization of the instruments for the common market, which include freedom [of movement] of labour and residence across the region'.[10] Truly, real integration of East Africa is on the way.

In addition, other small steps that have been taken to enhance the integration of the region include the launching of the East African Passport and the East African flag. Others include the establishment of the East African Business Council, and the East African Defence Affairs Unit, among others. It has to be remembered that the framers of the EAC treaty put the private sector and the civil society at the centre of advancing the region's integration.[11] Small steps they may seem, but these activities have helped to further East African integration. Studies are being undertaken by experts to further harmonise the three countries' foreign and security policies in accordance with the provisions of the treaty.

VI. Conclusion

The revived integration process of East Africa is trudging along slowly. The legal framework is in place. Institutions have been created and are up and running. By the end of this year it is hoped a fully functioning customs union will be established. The debate on establishing a political federation is going on in the EAC institutions and the respective partner states. However, we would like to warn that political coopera-

tion should not be hurried. This would help to avoid the problems of integration that the region faced in the past. The suggestion of President Museveni that a union of East and Central African states should be established, much as it sounds a great idea, is not realistic at the moment. The conditions for the establishment of a political federation or union just do not exist, regardless of the existence of the political will on the part of the leaders. Some of the countries involved face monumental problems to even think about regional integration.

Notes

1. Article 123 (1).
2. The governor of Kenya was the permanent Chairman of the Commission, and he had certain powers to act on behalf of the Commission when it was not in session.
3. For a comprehensive study of the reasons accounting for the failure of the cooperation, see Ojo et al. (1985), *African International Relations*, London, Longman, pp. 158-71. See also Rwekaza Mukandala (2000), 'Political Cooperation', in *Perspectives on Regional Integration and Cooperation in East Africa: Proceedings of the 1st Ministerial Seminar on East African Cooperation*, Arusha, Tanzania, 25-26 March, pp. 87-106.
4. In 1978, one year after the break-up of the EAC, the three countries appointed Victor Umbricht to start mediating between themselves on the division of the assets and liabilities of the defunct EAC. He produced two reports in March 1980 and October 1981. The 1984 agreement was based on these two reports.
5. Akiiki Mujaju (1998), 'How to make sense of the events taking place in the Great Lakes Region', Public Lecture, Department of Political Science, Makerere University.
6. EAC News, August 2002, p. 6.
7. Articles 5 and 123.
8. Article 6 (a).
9. The occasion for the signing of the agreement has been put back to the second half of January 2004.
10. *The East African*, 22-28 September, 2003, p. 6. See story, 'We must finalize EAC Agreement, says Kibaki'.
11. East African Community, 2nd EAC Development Strategy 2001-5, paras. 4.10.2 and 4.10.3.

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The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community.

The Politics of International Terrorism in the Security Complexes in the Greater Horn of Africa: An Overview from Uganda under the Movementocracy

Aaron K.K. Mukwaya*

Abstract

The article attempts to analyse the phenomenon of international terrorism in the Greater Horn Security Complexes, with the emphasis on the role of Uganda's Movementocratic government. The article is premised on the thesis that 'International Terrorism', apart from its local, national, regional and global causes, has become one of the key determinants of foreign policy and regional relations in the Greater Horn of Africa, and even more so for Uganda. It asserts that given the uniqueness of the Movementocracy and the global appraisal of this governance, Uganda is at the moment standing up to be counted by western countries as one of the vanguards in the fight against international terrorism in the Greater Horn of Africa. It also considers the causes and consequences of international terrorism and the methodologies and strategies for addressing this political scourge at the local, national, regional, continental and global levels. Here we shall examine unilateral, bilateral and multilateral approaches in dealing with international terrorism through states and non-states arrangements and methodologies.

Résumé

Cet article tente d'analyser le phénomène du terrorisme international dans les *Greater Horn Security Complexes* (complexes de sécurité dans la région de la Grande Corne de l'Afrique), en insistant sur le rôle du gouvernement mouvementocratique de l'Ouganda. Cet article part de l'hypothèse que mis à part ses causes locales, nationales, régionales et mondiales, le « Terrorisme International » est devenu un des principaux déterminants de la politique étrangère et des relations régionales dans la région de la Grande Corne de l'Afrique, et en Ouganda. L'auteur affirme

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qu'étant donné le caractère unique de la Mouvementocratie et l'évaluation mondiale faite de ce mouvement, l'Ouganda est en passe d'être considéré par les pays occidentaux comme une des nations à l'avant-garde de la lutte contre le terrorisme international, dans la région de la Grande Corne de l'Afrique. L'article analyse également les causes et conséquences du terrorisme international ainsi que les méthodologies et stratégies de lutte contre ce fléau politique à l'échelle locale, nationale, régionale, continentale et mondiale. Dans le cadre de ce travail, nous examinerons les différentes approches unilatérales, bilatérales et multilatérales de lutte contre le terrorisme international, à travers des dispositions et méthodologies étatiques et non étatiques particulières.

Introduction

The article is concerned with the current global issue of terrorism. It should be noted that terrorism has manifested itself in various forms in Uganda, Africa and globally. At the local level, expressions of lawlessness, taking the laws into people's hands, and people operating in politically chaotic situations have all been common in Uganda. At the national level, terrorism has been practised in two forms. First, Uganda has experienced state terrorism in many ways. In some instances, governments failed to run the country on the basis of the rule of law and human rights. Uganda has been bedevilled with a history of torture, torment and traumatisation of its people by governments.

Uganda has also experienced internal terrorism through rebel activities, tribal killings in Kibaale, and bombardments through urban terrorism in Kampala. The other dimensions of state/international terrorism are found in Uganda. And lastly, state/international terrorism is expressed in human rights violations and mayhem during Uganda's invasion of other countries in the region. The most striking examples of Uganda's encounter with international terrorism were in June 1976 and the politics of the war on terror (Al Qaeda). In 1976, Palestinian terrorists hijacked an Air France airbus with 258 passengers outside Athens. The airbus was piloted to Entebbe airport in Uganda. During the debacle, the internal terror machine of President Idi Amin embraced the actions of the Palestinian hijackers. The debacle ended with an episode known as the Israeli Entebbe raid, code named 'Operation Thunderbolt'.

The present state of international terrorism is what I have termed as 'Global terrorism made in the USA'. It is Al Qaeda terrorism against Western, especially US, interests globally as well as the reactions of Western countries and chain reactions of developing countries to the new non-state international terrorism. Global terrorism Made in the

USA is defined by the rich and politically powerful countries. For instance, the American government defines its enemies and puts them on or off the list of terrorists as it so wishes. The US then uses its money to force the developing and other developed countries to swallow their definitions, actions and reactions. The Patriot Act is the road map of the anti-terrorism crusade. Both sides use religious rhetoric in their pursuit of the policy of 'With US or with the Enemy'. Even liberation movements were labelled terrorist organisations by the West. For example, the British government for a long time considered the ANC of South Africa a terrorist organisation.

International terrorism is, therefore, both an action and reaction to a depressing, desperate, hopeless and excluding situation. The actions and reactions take on political, economic, social, ideological, psychological, emotional and religious fervour. Terrorist activities against civilians and military personnel aim at visibility, recognition and the creation of fear and panic. As a result of certain terrorist activities, the concept of 'non-state actors' has acquired a negative connotation in international relations.

At the moment there are more than nineteen UN and international conventions which deal with international terrorism in one way or the other. It was not until the Al Qaeda 9/11 episode that an attempt to reach an overriding definition was put into question. The most acceptable definition continues to pre-occupy politicians, lawyers, administrators and academia. National Anti-Terrorism Acts (balancing between national security and civil liberties) have continued to grapple with a proper definition as well. This article aims at examining and analysing the politics of international terrorism from the Movementocracy point of view.

The governance of Movementocracy is a direct result of the armed struggle of the National Resistance Army (NRA) and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in Uganda, which were fused to bring about the political concoction which ravaged the country for more than five years. The Luwero Triangle Bush War, as it came to be known, drew the country into yet another outbreak of political rebellion. The 1980s and 1990s experienced a region-wide wave of politically motivated rebel movements and activities, which culminated in some unique political regimes in the Greater Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region. Countries which experienced such upsurges included Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda, the DRC, Burundi, and Sudan.

The region-wide wave of rebel activities was ignited by domestic, regional and global factors which were dynamically changing as a result of the rapid transition from the Cold War to the Post-Cold War era. The Greater Horn of Africa, and Africa as a whole, were afflicted by a generation of violent regime changes, not through state organs, but non-state actors. The military coups d'Ètat were replaced with protracted guerrilla movements, which ended with the 'New Breed' of African leaders controlling state power.

Given the similarities of guerrilla warfare and the culminating new rebel regimes, one is tempted to argue that there are more commonalities than divergences in the region. The new developments in the region and Africa have inclined scholars to claim that Africa is experiencing a Renaissance (New Rebirth), a Second Liberation, a New Revolution and a Success Story engineered by the New Breed of African leadership. However, the changing dynamics at the domestic, regional and global levels have produced very unpredictable and unprecedented non-state actors, who pose violent and radical challenges to the real foundations and existence of the nation-state system itself.

Increased domestic and regional unpredictability, instability and insecurity have become characteristic of the politics of the Greater Horn of Africa. The region is embroiled in increased rebel activities, warlordism, interstate and intrastate conflicts, cattle rustling, cross-border make-shift incursions, fundamentalism, resurfacing sub-chauvinistic nationalisms, boundary disputes, wars and international terrorism. These, and much more, drain efforts and resources for nation-building and regional cooperation, security and development. Several countries are the arena of state and regime survival. Many attempts to address these new challenges have taken on multiple dimensions at the national, regional and global levels; but solutions are not easily found.

The article attempts to analyse the phenomenon of international terrorism in the Greater Horn Security Complexes, with the emphasis on the role of Uganda's Movementocratic government. The article is premised on the thesis that 'International Terrorism', apart from its local, national, regional and global causes, has become one of the key determinants of foreign policy and regional relations in the Greater Horn of Africa, and even more so for Uganda.

It asserts that given the uniqueness of the Movementocracy and the global appraisal of this governance, Uganda is at the moment standing up to be counted by western countries as one of the vanguards in the

fight against international terrorism in the Greater Horn of Africa. It also considers the causes and consequences of international terrorism and the methodologies and strategies of addressing this political scourge at the local, national, regional, continental and global levels. Here we shall examine unilateral, bilateral and multilateral approaches in dealing with international terrorism through states and non-states arrangements and methodologies.

The nation-states in the Greater Horn of Africa are battling with the problems and politics of nation building, national and region integration and unity, security, stability, markets and development. To achieve their goals, the phenomenon of international terrorism need to be addressed head on by Uganda and the region itself without succumbing to external pressures and without sacrificing national and regional interests.

The data used in the article is drawn from ongoing research on 'Uganda's foreign policy under the Movementocracy' by the author. The article considers the Realist Theory in international relations and applies it in a wider development thinking perspective. Since the two place great emphasis on power, power relations, security and actors, the article attempts to unveil a new outlook for studying foreign policy in Africa.

Re-defining the Greater Horn of Africa

It is essential that we attempt an analytical understanding of the concept and region referred to as the Greater Horn of Africa. In this way, we shall be able to map out the main actors (states and non-states-actors) and elements that condition the new dynamics in the region. The Greater Horn of Africa is a region with certain commonalities. The countries identified in the region include Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Egypt. We need to trace the origins and development of the concept in order to analyse contemporary international relations in the Greater Horn of Africa.

Historically, the Greater Horn must be examined within the context of the water systems of the River Nile, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and Lake Victoria. These countries lie in the Horn-shaped North-Eastern tip of the African continent. In this geographical context:

> Uganda sits on the top of the waters of the largest Lake in Africa - Lake Victoria, and the source of the River Nile. This location made Uganda unique and strategically important to the colonial adventurisms. The

struggle between the British, Belgians, Germans, Portuguese, Spaniards and the French were centred around the River Nile water sytems.[1]

The source of the White Nile is in Uganda. The White Nile is joined by the Blue Nile from Ethiopia through Sudan to Egypt where it flows into the Mediterranean Sea. The River Nile systems connects and brings Uganda even closer to Sudan, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Lake Victoria, the source of the Nile, is Africa's largest inland water body, connecting the traditional three East African states of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. The influence of all these bodies of water on Uganda's relationships in the Greater Horn of Africa dates back to the precolonial era.

Uganda is not only a land-locked country but also its immediate hinterland states – Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – use it as a transit state to the Kenyan and Tanzanian Indian Ocean ports. The port of Mombasa is the lifeline of Uganda's economy. Anglophone interests and influences have predominated in the Greater Horn. Almost all the countries in the region were under British colonial rule. The only exception was French Somaliland and the temporary Italian influence in Ethiopia. Historically, the height of the scramble for Africa was centred in this region. For example, the Fashoda Incident (1899) between the British and the French; the struggle between the Germans and the British; as well as that between the British and the Belgians, were concentrated in this region.

Politically, it has been argued that the Greater Horn of Africa contains one country of immense historical significance. Ethiopia was the only country which was not colonised, although briefly occupied. It is a country with traditional links with the Jews – the 'Black Jews' or Falashas in Israel. It is also a country which had an Emperor with connections to the Middle East and Africans in the Diaspora; and a country, which houses the headquarters of the African Union (AU), formerly the Organisation of African Unity. Even after the Second World War, Uganda was suggested as a resettlement area for the Jews in diaspora in Europe.The Movementocracy, which was equipped with a new Pan-Africanist agenda, found it easy to demystify and demythologise the colonial dichotomies in the Greater Horn. Here Anglophone influences were dominant, in contrast to the Great Lakes region where the clashes between Anglophones and Francophones are visible and real. The Movementocracy was of the view that such dichotomies were a danger to national and regional security and development.[2]

The geographical overlap of the Greater Great Lakes region, the Great Lakes region, and the Greater Horn of Africa is indicative of the fact that these regions are mere geopolitical expressions. The Greater Great Lakes region consists of Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, the Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and the Horn of Africa.[3] The Greater Horn of Africa takes in parts of countries from the Great Lakes region and adds them to the traditional Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan). Most of the traditional Horn of Africa possesses poor soils and vegetation, mountain ranges with several intermittent water bodies, except for the perennial Blue Nile. The region experiences hunger and famine, cattle rustling, seasonal migrations in search of grazing lands and water, and cross-border clashes. Here clan systems are very strong, developing into what we might term as 'clanocracies'. Clanocracies are based on chauvinistic sub-nationalisms, and have led to warlordism in the region. This type of social organisation has undermined the foundations of national sovereignty and nationalism, in turn frustrating nation building and regional cooperation.

In the area of security, the Greater Horn is knit together into a kind of common destiny of alternating insecurity and cooperation. There have been many crises in the region, with local and global dimensions. Two types of conflict have been common: intra-and inter-state conflicts. These are state-based conflicts. However, non-state conflicts are also very common. Conflicts over grazing lands, water, and cattle rustling also run through Uganda, Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia. The Southern Sudanese conflict encompasses Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Eritrea, Ethiopia, while the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) involves Uganda and Sudan. In 2001 Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war over the Badme border area. The end of the rulership of Siad Barre led to the dismemberment of the Somali Republic in 1991 giving rise to warlordism and clanocracies in Somali.

The Greater Horn of Africa has also become the African centre of international terrorism and violent fundamentalism. This state of affairs has led to new Great Power interest in the region and in the long run it refuels an already insecure situation.The Greater Horn has also been a theatre for violent scenes in the political history of Africa: civil wars, rebel activities, military coups, guerrilla movements, ethnic and racial insurgencies, human rights violations, and drugs and arms trafficking. This makes the region one of the most unstable and insecure

on the continent at the moment. The questions of nation building, security, cooperation, image building and development remain central for the region. The current inter-state, intra-state and non-states conflicts have not only riveted the world's attention on the region, but also helped to broaden the nature and scope of events in the Greater Horn of Africa.

The region is also characterised by marauding rebel movements. Nearly all rebel activities operate across the borders of two or more countries. Intense suspicion, mistrust and misunderstanding are rampant in the region. Accusations and counter accusations about states aiding rebels to destabilise other states abound. The agendas of the rebel groups, which include propaganda, training, arming and even financial assistance, run across the borders of several countries. The rebel movements, terrorism, fundamentalism as new non-state-actors have all heightened tensions and insecurity in the region.Most of the governments in the region are products of military coups and guerrilla wars. These rebelocracies and clanocracies have attempted to dupe the international community into believing that they intended to democratise. In return, the international community has glorified some leaders of the region as the New Breed of African leaders.

Given that there is an overlap between the so-called Great Lakes region and the Greater Horn of Africa, conflicts and insecurity tend to spill over from one part to another. The Greater Horn also enjoys a geographical proximity to the Middle East. The Middle East has remained the major hot spot in international relations. Being close to the Middle East has made the Greater Horn a backyard to the crisis in that region. The Arab/Non Arab factor is characteristic of the dynamics of the Greater Horn. Islamic fundamentalism in the Arab world finds its way to the region, especially the Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia, Uganda and Djibouti. The Muslim-Christian divide is highlighted by the conflict in the Southern Sudan. The struggle in the Southern Sudan between the rebel groups and the Sudanese government finds expression in racial, religious and political clashes.

The West, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, have extensive interests in the Middle East and the Greater Horn of Africa. The United States has military and intelligence bases in the Middle East as well as Djibouti and Kenya. The Middle Eastern oil resources and the existence of Israel make the region central to the United States and Western interests. Undemocratic regimes, rebel ac-

tivities, collapsing states, and wars in the Greater Horn as well as the upsurge of fundamentalism and international terrorism centred in the Middle East bring renewed interest by Great Powers in the African region.

International terrorism has created new dynamics in the region. The West, led by the United States, has emerged with new policies, which are packaged for the region. At the same time, states in the region have responded by re-designing their domestic and foreign polices in the region and globally to accommodate new developments resulting from international terrorism. On one hand, the West views the collapsing states and fundamentalism as some of the causes of terrorism in the region. On the other hand, states in the region are thrown into a scramble by the United States anti-terrorism programme. The Greater Horn has become an extension of the Middle East political hot spot.

Uganda in the Greater Horn

In examining the position of Uganda in conflict and security dilemmas in the Greater Horn of Africa, a look at some theoretical perspectives is essential in understanding the overall debate in its full context. It is true that Uganda is more a part of the Great Lakes region, and on the fringe of the Greater Horn of Africa. However, Uganda has also had pronounced political, diplomatic and military interests in the latter region. Under the Movementocracy Uganda has been able to manipulate resources in its pursuit of an assertive foreign policy in the Great Lakes region and the Greater Horn of Africa.

Let us now examine the factors that condition Uganda's position in the Greater Horn of Africa. First, when the region sank into political, economic, military and social crises and chaos, Uganda was no exception. Uganda has also had the lion's share of domestic and regional problems. Historically, Uganda only became a legal actor in the regional and international scenes in 1962 after more than six decades under British colonialism (Nnoli, 1992)[4]. The problems of colonialism and neo-colonialism are not only experienced in Uganda but also in the Greater Horn of Africa.

Uganda's geographical area is 241,138 sq. km of both land and water masses lying on the equator with a population of 24 million people. Uganda is a land-locked country bordering the Sudan to the North,

Kenya to the East, and Tanzania to the South. The three bordering countries connect Uganda to the Greater Horn of Africa with its world system. To the Southwest, Uganda borders Rwanda, to the West the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). These two border states bring Uganda within the Great Lakes region. Like Rwanda, geographically Uganda is also a small country surrounded by very large countries. However, Uganda is endowed with fertile loam soils, and rainfall between 510mm to 2160mm well distributed throughout the year, giving it an edge on the other countries in the Great Horn of Africa. Apart from the favourable climate and weather, Uganda is also endowed with water and natural resources vital for development. Lake Victoria connects Uganda with Kenya and Tanzania. Through the River Nile water system, Uganda is connected to Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Rwanda. Uganda is the immediate hinterland of countries like Rwanda, Burundi, and DRC who use it as a transit country to the Kenyan and Tanzanian Indian Ocean seaports. Mombasa port remains a lifeline of Uganda's economy. Uganda is also one of the poorest countries of the world with GDP of $5.44 billion and real per capita income of $1,370.

The influence of the water bodies on Uganda's foreign policy in the security complexes in the Greater Horn has been crucial since pre-colonial times. The strategic nature of the River Nile has led to the formation of a number of cross-national organisations concerned with the management of the system: the Kagera Basin Organisation, the Nile River Initiative, Lake Victoria Initiative, the East African Community, and to some extent the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Since independence Uganda has in theory followed a foreign policy of non-alignment. During the Movementocracy, domestic and external factors and forces have dictated a discretional (even total) alignment in her regional and global foreign policy pursuits.[5] The non-alignment foreign policy line emphasized existence and survival of newly independent states, by collectively or individually avoiding alignment with any of the two blocs:

> new states, by refusing to identify themselves with any side, maintain their freedom of action. Indeed, they gain self-recognition by asserting themselves – at the very minimum on a verbal plane – against the great power.[6]

However, under the Movementocracy, Uganda strives to 'Always maintain an independent line in economics, politics, culture and foreign relations... Judge friend or foe according to how they relate to our own interests irrespective of the social systems prevailing in the various countries'.[7]

However, given the domestic, regional and global dynamics, Uganda's foreign policy is guided by an open alignment to the West, especially during the Cold War under the Movementocracy.[8]

While Uganda is a land-locked country, its geographical location has been used as an important, political weapon in its regional relations. Given its geopolitical and strategic location, Uganda has been able to use its transit position and the River Nile system to manipulate and amplify its role in the Great Horn security complexes.

Uganda's foreign policy in the Greater Horn of Africa has been influenced by several elements in its domestic sphere. The best conceived and most expertly executed foreign policy, drawing upon an abundance of material and human resources, must come to naught if it cannot also draw upon good government. When the NRA/M took over state power in 1986 from the elected government of Obote, there was a need to rebuild the country. Within one year of the Movementocracy, the Museveni regime abandoned Marxism-Leninist and idealistic rhetoric and fully embraced liberal-realist thinking and practice. Foreign policy is domestic policy pursued by other means; it is domestic policy carried beyond the boundaries of the state. Leaders use foreign policy to cushion domestic policy.

After putting Uganda in historical and contemporary perspective, let us now examine the application of the Realist Theory in a wider development agenda perspective with regard to the country's relations in the Greater Horn of Africa. Classical realism puts much emphasis on power as the determining factor in foreign policy. The state is considered the most important actor in foreign policy. Given that the African states were young, poor and vulnerable, if power is equated with might, then these state were unable to engage fully in 'realist' foreign policy. From the Eurocentric view, African states were mere absorbers and recipients of the shocks of global foreign policy.

The weakness of African states has led them to be consumers of the foreign policies of developed countries. According to Burton and Morgenthau,[9] nations have elements of power that determine their interactive capacity in the community of nations. These elements must

be weighty enough to influence the role of a state vis-à-vis other states. Since Africa lacks the capacity to exploit its resources to the full, it is unable to make its presence felt on the international scene as it might wish. It has also been argued that African states have real national interests, but the environment for pursuing them is controlled by developed countries. When one examines western conditionalities, the problems of debt, and the global interests of developed countries vis-à-vis developing ones, it may seem that the classical realists have a point.

However, in analysing African foreign policies, the neo-realist trends are more appropriate. Sanders argues that there cannot be 'a global harmony of interests'[10] and therefore, in a situation where the international system lacks a world government, the nation-state can never be sure that it is safe from external attack.[11] Africa and the Greater Horn have suffered from weak governments, rebel movements, fundamentalism, international terrorism, and western interference to the extent that the countries have not been able to build viable institutions and values for aggregating national interests.

The emergence of new actors and new regional and global situations demand new theoretical approaches to the study of regional relations. Applications of the Realist Theory within a wider development agenda perspective could be appropriate in explaining the new interactive relationships of Uganda in the Greater Horn of Africa.Given the country's violent political history as well as changing dynamics in the region and globally, the NRM embarked upon reformulating Ugandan foreign policy. The NRM administration has re-emphasised security as the core of its foreign policy. First and foremost, the NRM was of the view that its unique Movementocracy was under threat from the regimes in the Great Lakes region and the Greater Horn of Africa. The NRM was of the view that these regimes were potential aggressors which:

> dominate and exploit any other state weaker than itself... The overriding objective of a given state's foreign policy must be the achievement and maintenance of its security. This need to ensure security in turn requires both a strong defensive posture and the construction of alliances with other states, which share similar security fears.

Ensuring security also requires that the state does all it can both to weaken the strategic position of its opponents, and to ensure that friendly governments are installed (or maintained in power); in essence, cyni-

cal, self-regarding calculation based on the paramount need to preserve national security.[12]

Second, Uganda under the Movementocracy governance relied heavily on the military. The belief that state activity should be based on the strength of the army has made the country's foreign policy extremely militarised. At the domestic level, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been marginalised and excluded from mainstream foreign policy making. Instead, the State House Complex (Palacism), and the Ministries of Defence and Finance have taken over from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Apart from spending more on defence, the NRM have built on and off alliances with states with similar fears. Alliances have been built with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (Rwanda), Meles Zanawi (Ethiopia), Afwereki (Eritrea) and Kabila I (DRC) in order to re-design the region. These leaders were former rebels who had fought themselves into state power to build rebelocracies in the region. The NRM administration has worked tooth and nail to ensure that regimes of its liking are installed in power in the region. However, disagreements and domestic and external pressures, have not helped the maintenance of such alliances. The ultimate objective of preserving national security has not been realised, but the new leaders have managed to concentrate state power around themselves.

Here we need to apply the Realist Theory in a wider development agenda perspective. The Agenda aims at 'bridging the gap between theory and practice'.[13] Development thinking relates Power to (In)Security and Ex/Inclusion in analysing foreign policy. The perspective re-integrates foreign policy research on a global, regional, national and local level.[14] For instance, globalisation and its ramifications play a major role. At the same time there exists a strong cultural impact that imposes a western style of thinking.[15]

By applying the Realist Theory within the wider development thinking perspective, new light is shed on theory searching and methodological re-assessment in the discipline of international relations. The development thinking perspective, like Realist Theory, pays attention to actor-oriented approaches where the capabilities and potentialities of the traditional and new actors influence and are influenced by structural changes at local and global levels. There is a need for new directions by the traditional and new actors in their policies and practices in coping

with the new dynamics of foreign policy relations.In this kind of analysis, it is important to take into account the security implications by relating power positions and exclusions. The relationships between the two variables are major causes of insecurity locally, nationally, regionally and globally. At the same time, insecurity breeds further exclusion and marginalisation from the development process in the economic, social and political spheres.[16]

The Greater Horn of Africa, comprising weak states, is confronted with the problems and policies of democratisation, foreign influences, economic liberalisation, social flux and increasing instability. In Uganda, like in the region, elements that make up state power, the quality of the governmental structure that enables the state to stand up successfully, are weak or totally absent. A nation-state that lacks appropriate arrangements for governance is bound to suffer the prevalence of internal insecurity and conflict.[17]

Uganda's role in the region is seen within the region's communalities of conflict, turbulence and insecurity. This common destiny poses a challenge to national and regional security, coexistence, cooperation, conflict resolution and development, which are in short supply in the region. The communalities in the region compound into security complexes, which are comprised of 'Groups of states whose primary concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national security cannot realistically be considered apart from one another... Security complexes emphasize the inter-dependencies of rivalry as well as that of shared interests.'[18] The Realist Theory guides us in examining the role and position of Uganda in the security complexes in the Greater Horn of Africa.

The Movementocracy within the Security Complexes in the Greater Horn

The NRA/M bush war was a unique experiment in the region. It was the first successful rebel movement stationed in the middle of the country of origin to take over state political power. The conduct of the NRA/M rebels made the movementocracy acceptable at home but a bad example for the region. This state of affairs has made the development of rebelocracies regionally and internationally almost acceptable. This is a very different development in security at the national and regional levels. The NRA/M was also programmed to remove the old regimes in

the region, in the process leading to mutual suspicion and mistrust. The personality of Museveni came under heavy scrutiny, and evoked considerable suspicion amongst regional and global leaders. In the case of Kenya, continued insecurity and instability in Uganda was seen as a threat to the stability of the East African region. The Kenyan government, led under President Moi, was fearful that increased bloodletting and rebel activities would spill over into the entire region. Instability in Uganda was a threat to Western interests in Kenya and the region.[19]

Uganda has all along been a major regional market for Kenya's products, which include western industries. The role of Uganda as a major market for Kenya is a consideration that needs to be kept in mind when looking at the stability and security of Uganda and the Greater Horn.[20] As early as 1986, the government of Kenya drove Ugandan exiles out of the country on the ground that they were fomenting rebel activities in the region. There were also Kenyan exiles in Uganda who were receiving military and other assistance from the NRA/M in order to fight the Kenyan government. The famous Mwakenya and Onyango groups were stationed in Uganda. In 1987 Uganda and Kenya nearly went to war, with their soldiers deployed at the Busia border. The Moi government was determined to hit hard at Uganda's new administration. The situation only cooled after the diplomatic intervention of Britain and the EU.

Uganda's role in the Horn of Africa has been influenced by the NRM ideal of a New Pan-Africanist Movement, which emphasises assistance to regional neighbours to free themselves from old regimes and to stop the dismemberment of states in the region. The bottom line to such an ideal is stability and security of the region centred around the movementocratic governance. It is in this light that President Museveni travelled into the thick of the war in Somalia. This personal initiative to assist Somalia from collapsing into clanocracies was a clear manifestation of the Movementocracy's aim to build a stable and strong regional bloc.

However, the Somalia situation, has not improved since the end of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. The country continues to be divided among warlords in Puntland, Jubaland, Somaliland and Mogadishu. At the moment Uganda is one of the four main mediators concerned with Somalia through IGAD. This is a regional body in the Greater Horn to deal with economic, political and conflict issues. At the moment IGAD negotiations on Somalia are still taking place in Kenya. Uganda is also

involved hand in hand with Djibouti, Kenya and other members in finding lasting solutions to the Somalia problem.

In the 1990s Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and to some extent Rwanda and the DRC were hailed by the west as stars of the African renaissance and the new African revolution. They were defined as the new breed of African leaders who were bent on transforming Africa and bringing about democracy and economic development. This bigger picture has been marred by the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the DRC wars, the Kony war, wars in the Southern Sudan, rebel activities, and failures in the economy and democratic transformation.

The post-Cold War period has unleashed new political forces, which need new solutions regionally and internationally. The Greater Horn of Africa has become the core of fundamentalism and international terrorism on the continent. Islamic fundamentalism has characterised the politics and the realpolitik of Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Tanzania, leading to the demand for new strategies in combating it. In Uganda, Islamic fundamentalism has been associated with the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). This is the rebel organisation which terrorised Western Uganda in the 1990s forcing the government to send the army into the DRC in order to eliminate its bases. The ADF operated between Uganda, DRC and the Sudan. At the same time, Christian fundamentalism found expression in the Lord's Resistance Army of Joseph Kony.

The Ugandan government has condemned the Islamist Khartoum government for propping up fundamentalists. Uganda has pointed to Islamic fundamentalism in the Sudan as a way of demanding more assistance from the West. Uganda's foreign policy has therefore taken advantage of Islamic fundamentalism for its military, financial and economic benefit. Uganda's increased support of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) has in part been guided by anti-fundamentalism and extremism in the Khartoum administration. Uganda's relations with Sudan in this aspect have also been guided by the new Pan-Africanist principles and agenda of the Movementocracy governance - support for the Southern brothers and sisters under the yoke of the Northerners in the Sudan. In 1995 Uganda even broke off diplomatic relations with Sudan, which were only resumed in 1999. Uganda continues to support the SPLA on the basis that the Khartoum government represents the old regimes which harnessed Islam to oppress the south. Uganda has

also continued to accuse the Sudan Government of supporting the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) of Joseph Kony.

Uganda has jumped on the US bandwagon of labelling the LRA as a terrorist organisation, and all its sponsors and supporters as terrorist collaborators. At a legal level, this situation makes it hard for the LRA to agree to negotiations outside Uganda and Sudan. However, the 1999 Protocol and 2002 Operation Iron Fist allowed the hot pursuit of the LRA inside the Sudan by the Ugandan Army. However, Iron Fist has only led to more havoc by the LRA in the North, to the extent that at the moment the LRA have driven deeper into the Lower North of Uganda (Lango) and the Far East (Teso). Accusations and counter accusations continue between Uganda and Sudan for equipping and giving safe haven to SPLA and LRA. The military approach of the Ugandan army has not provided a viable solution to the 18 year-old insurgency. There is a need for regional and international dialogue to resolve this problem. While the Ugandan government on its own initiative and through IGAD has advocated dialogue in the conflicts in Southern Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia-Eritrea, DRC, and Burundi, it has not been keen on negotiating with the LRA.

Uganda, the Greater Horn and International Terrorism

Terrorism has been around in varying forms for centuries. However, the savagery of the new form of terrorism came into global prominence in what came to be known as September 11th, 2001. The end of the Cold War has unleashed forces which demand new outlooks and solutions. Even before 9/11, the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam had been attacked by terrorists in 1998 leading to a new era of terrorism in the Great Horn. Since these twin incidents, there have been increased tensions and security alerts in the region. The national and regional domestic and foreign policies and configuration of political forces have been dramatically changed and challenged.

In Uganda, the Parliament quickly passed the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 which defined terrorism as:

> the use of violence or threat of violence with intent to promote or achieve political, religious, economic, and cultural or social ends in an unlawful manner, and includes the use of violence or threat of violence to put the public in fear or alarm.[21]

The Act in itself led to important developments with regard to domestic and foreign policy in Uganda. At the domestic level, the need to strive for stability and security prompted the passage of the Act. However, the over-arching definitions of terrorism in the Act tend to expose every act of violence to the label of terrorist, to the extent that public demonstrations or opposition group activities could be seen in terrorist terms.

At the foreign policy level, the Act emphasised the development of extradition arrangements with countries in the region and globally. The Act also seeks assistance and cooperation with other states in preventing and combating terrorism. Since the Bwindi Forest attack on tourists in Uganda, and the Nairobi-Dar-es-Salaam attacks, Uganda's security has been tightened. The British and American Diplomatic Missions were barricaded and enclosed like barracks. The US and British visa acquisition process became a real tug of war in Uganda and the Greater Horn.

It must be remembered that the US and Britain have military interests and establishments in Kenya and at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, as well as economic and business interests in Kenya. US and British troops, as well as German, are stationed on the islands of Lamu, Kilindini and Mombasa. The military presence was increased after 9/11.The US and British government warned its citizens of the dangers of staying in Kenya after 9/11 and the Mombasa Hotel bombing. British Airways even suspended its flights to Kenya and re-routed them to Uganda. In order to ensure that the Kenyan government was doing something in the fight against terrorism, all air travel to and from Somalia was suspended.

The relationship between Somalia and Kenya has not improved as the Kenyan government is witch hunting non-Kenyans, especially Moslems from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti as terrorist suspects. In the district of Mombasa, there are constant operations to route out criminals, drug and arms traffickers who may be involved in terrorism. This state of affairs has affected the Moslem community in Kenya, which feels persecuted in the name of fighting terrorism. The United States, Britain and the West have declared the Greater Horn of Africa as a terrorist-infested region.

Fighting international terrorism has opened a new chapter in the US/West relations with the Greater Horn, with great consequences. On his tour of Africa in July 2003, President Bush drummed up the anti-

terrorism theme in Kampala. Bush visited only Uganda in the Greater Horn. He promised financial, military and economic assistance in fighting terrorism in the region. However, US assistance needs to be focused on preventing terrorism at the economic and political levels rather than by the military. More assistance should go into building nation-states, regional development, security and cooperation than military and intelligence hardware.

Terrorism, terror alerts and insecurity in the region hamper and affect investment, tourism and development. At the same time, regional relationships between nations are affected due to the fear of the spread of terrorism. For example, Kenya has been declared a key terrorist target by the West. This state of affairs was worsened by the US war against Iraq and the Mombasa Hotel bombing (2003) in the region and globally. Uganda has also been involved in anti-terrorist operations in Kampala by targeting non-nationals from Somali and Ethiopia.

In September 2003, Djibouti, due to pressure from the United States, gave a deadline for all non-nationals (illegal migrants) to leave the country. Most of these migrants originate from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Sudan. The expelled persons have created returnee problems for countries which are already affected by famine and hunger.[22]The struggle over the US anti-terror monies and military assistance in the region has affected the configuration of political forces locally and regionally. Terrorist alerts and anti-terrorist laws are quickly passed, at the pleasure of the US. However, such approaches generate a lot of tensions in the political economies of countries in the region, as already noted.

At the continental level, the new AU has attempted to handle the issues and politics of terrorism through declarations and meetings. For example, the Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and other relevant international instruments (August 2002) and the Fifth Extra-Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the OAU mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management Resolution at a ministerial level (November 2001) are some of the direct legal and diplomatic steps taken at the continental level.

Concluding Note

The Greater Horn of Africa has many of the negative elements which characterise much of the continent. This region is infested by natural, man-made, political and security quagmires, which demand serious aca-

demic investigation and common practical solutions. The commonality of problems demands some form of regional economic, trade, political, security cooperation and revisitation with the assistance of the international community. The interplay between Power, (In) Security and Ex/InClusion and Marginalization in the nation-states of the region needs to be addressed in order to reduce the tendencies towards extremism, fundamentalism and terrorism in the Greater Horn.

It is true that the region has shared history, culture, natural resources, and governance. However, increased intrastate and interstate conflicts and wars fed by fundamentalism, international terrorism and Great Power involvements pose a challenge to national and regional stability and development. Attempts have been made to resolve the outstanding problems through dialogue, negotiations, discourses at state initiatives, regional and continental institutional arrangements and even involving the international community, but these solutions do not seem to be working. The New AU, EAC, IGAD, COMESA, and the NEPAD are all attempts to address the economic and political imbroglios which characterise the region and the continent. The way forward towards regional integration should address some of the issues of democracy and security. Academia should engage in serious research, debate and dissemination of ideas on the issue of security in the region and the continent. Security and democracy should be at the core of debate regarding regional integration and the unity of the continent. It might seem crude to debate regional integration while the integrating units are collapsing, at war and in economic, social and political dire straits. African leadership, which should be the vanguard of the new Africa, has fallen prey to personal and selfish interests. It is the humble contribution of academia to stand up to be counted in the areas of restoration of democracy, security and the economy of Africa. No political struggle is not a protracted one; however, the struggle must vigorously and rigorously continue on the academic plane.

The struggle against international terrorism in the region needs the concerted efforts of all nations at national, regional, continental and global levels. Regional and national initiatives are crucial in tackling this new political scourge in the Greater Horn of Africa. Uganda, which is sandwiched between the Great Lakes region and the Greater Horn, has a crucial role to play in fighting the politics of terrorism. The anti-terrorism fight should not compromise good neighbourliness, regional

cooperation, security, human rights, democracy and development in Uganda and the Great Horn of Africa.

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From Local Conflicts to Global Terrorism: Can Refugees and Regional Security Problems Jeopardise the Renewal of Kenya?

Babere Kerata Chacha*

Abstract

Over the last decade or so the African continent has continued to experience political changes of monumental proportions. Monumental not only because of the drastic restructuring of social and economic and political spaces, but also because of the introduction of new forms of politics and political actors. These changes were driven a great deal by the developments in the global system, in particular, the demise of the Soviet Union as a nation and super power, the triumph of the market, and more importantly, the end of the Cold War. In relation to these changes, the African continent has equally been characterised by a succession of large-scale refugee movements, internal population displacements and mass repatriation movements. In a number of countries – Angola, Burundi, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia, for example, large proportions of the population have been uprooted, forced to abandon their homes by communal and ethnic conflict, persecution and violence. Most of these refugees have ended up in Kenya with a number of arms or religious fundamental ideologies. The process has witnessed an influx of arms in Kenya, helping fuel intra-ethnic and inter-border conflicts. Kenya has witnessed massive devastating terrorist attacks beginning with the bombings of the US Embassy and now Kenya has become an easy prey and target for terrorist activities. The reasons for this trend have been a concern for academics around the globe. A close look at intra-state conflicts in East Africa reveals a common pattern, for example: rebellion against central authority; inter-communal ethnic or religious conflicts; sporadic short lived conflicts related to resource around livestock; and generalised violence which is banditry-related. This study is a historical investigation of the development of

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local conflicts, informal militia and security measures during the transition to political pluralism in Kenya between 1992-2002, and tries to establish some links that may have connected or caused the country to be a target of international terrorism.

Résumé

Au cours de la décennie passée, le continent africain a vécu d'autres changements politiques aux proportions monumentales, non seulement du fait de la restructuration radicale des espaces sociaux et politiques, mais également du fait de l'introduction de nouvelles formes de politiques et d'acteurs politiques. Ces changements ont pour la plupart été provoqués par les développements intervenus au niveau du système mondial, en particulier la chute de l'Union Soviétique en tant que nation et superpuissance, le triomphe de l'idéologie de marché, et surtout, la fin de la Guerre Froide. Avec l'intervention de tous ces changements, le continent africain a également connu une succession de mouvements de réfugiés à grande échelle, ainsi que des déplacements internes de population et des mouvements de rapatriement de masse. Dans un certain nombre de pays - Angola, Burundi, Liberia, République Démocratique du Congo (RDC), Rwanda, Sierra Leone et Somalie – par exemple, une grande partie de la population a été déracinée, forcée d'abandonner foyers et maisons du fait de conflits communautaires et ethniques, et de la persécution ou de la violence dont elle fait l'objet. La plupart de ces réfugiés s'est retrouvée au Kenya en détention d'un certain nombre d'armes ou entretenant des idéologies religieuses fondamentalistes. Ce processus a engendré un influx d'armes au Kenya, attisant ainsi les conflits intra ethniques et inter frontaliers. Le Kenya a connu des attaques terroristes de masse à l'impact dévastateur, qui ont débuté avec les attentats contre l'Ambassade Américaine, et ce pays est à présent devenu une proie et une cible faciles pour les activités terroristes. Les origines d'une telle situation constituent une réelle préoccupation pour la communauté académique mondiale. En examinant de plus près les conflits intra-étatiques en Afrique de l'Est, on note une constante: le phénomène de rébellion contre une autorité centrale; les conflits intercommunautaires ethniques ou religieux ; les conflits sporadiques de courte durée, liés au contrôle du cheptel ; et enfin, la violence généralisée liée au banditisme. Cette étude constitue une enquête historique sur le développement des conflits locaux, des milices informelles et des mesures de sécurité adoptées durant la période de transition vers le pluralisme politique au Kenya, de 1992 à 2002. Cette analyse tente d'établir des liens qui auraient amené ce pays à devenir une cible du terrorisme international.

Introduction

In contrast to many of its neighbours, Kenya is often seen as a bastion of stability. The country has several strengths that militate against the outbreak of mass violence, but it also exhibits many of the factors that have been markers of civil strife elsewhere in Africa: strong ethnic divisions, polarised political issues, political manipulation, rampant vio-

lence, socio-economic disparities, a lack of economic opportunity, and endemic corruption. When combined with the increased availability of firearms, this dangerous mix becomes all the more volatile. The easy availability of such weapons within the country contributes to the growing culture of violence that is taking root inside Kenya. In addition to rising crime and generalised insecurity in recent years, the country has experienced repeated flashes of politically inspired ethnic violence, especially during election periods. Those instigating this deadly violence have not been held to account. This continuing pattern of violence and impunity, together with the spread of small arms, threatens Kenyan society and greatly endangers human rights.

The region has suffered from all these types of conflicts for a long period. While at the local level, Kenya is today leading in sporadic violent banditry, which includes car jacking, bank and house robberies, and murders. The focus of this research is to explore whether there is any inter-linkages between and within these conflicts. To start with, it is very clear that as far as cattle rustling is concerned, this is a phenomenon that cuts across ethnic lines and national borders. The illegal circulation of small arms has created a strong inter-linkage of conflicts in the region. Arms once used for cattle rustling have become available for car-jacking, highway and bank robberies.

Coming to rebellion against the state, there is a strong thread linking up the countries of the region. The conflict in the Sudan is perhaps the classic example, and there have been inter-linkages since the flare up of the present conflicts. Most of the local authorities and the region as a whole are under the control of Islamic fundamentalists. In all these conflicts there is an Islamic factor, which links the Oromos, the Somalis and the Kenya Somalis and the Sudan.

Arms, people and fundamentalist ideologies are moving freely within a conflict system. Whenever a major conflict is resolved, a large surplus of arms often becomes available to others involved in conflict. With such a picture it is important to approach the problem globally as a conflict system. This research seeks to address a major question that arises from this: What steps can be taken to begin to address the problem from a conflict system scenario? Furthermore, the regionalisation of domestic conflict that has come to characterise Africa in the past decade has affected Kenya as well. Armed conflict in neighbouring countries has destabilised Kenya through cross-border incursions and trade in small arms, often on the basis of kinship ties that traverse interna-

tional frontiers. In addition, the situation in Kenya has had an impact, albeit less dramatic, on its neighbours.

The Setting

During the 1990s African states experienced failed economic programmes, the unequal distribution of the pains and costs of orthodox stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes, the delegitimisation of the violent neo-colonial state, frustration with existing institutions, and a new desire to end the decades of oppression, violence, intimidation, waste and corruption. These trends led people to demand national sovereignty, open elections, sharing of power, the overthrow of the old order, an end to military rule and patrimonial regimes, and constitutional reform. In addition and more particularly, in sub-Saharan Africa more than anywhere else, direct intervention from foreign aid donors has played an important role in several recent transitions to democracy. For example, in Malawi and Kenya, multilateral and bilateral donors specifically suspended new foreign aid in the early 1990s until political reform was enacted – a practice known as political conditionality. As a direct result, in both cases, authoritarian rulers held multiparty elections. In Kenya a severely flawed electoral process returned the same regime to power.

Equally, the demand for the (re)introduction of democratic institutions into the African political space during the 1990s resulted in several processes. In some countries multiparty elections witnessed changes in government. These included countries like Benin, South Africa, Zambia, Mali, Niger, Congo, Madagascar, Central African Republic, Lesotho, and Malawi. In other cases, multiparty elections resulted in no change in government. These included Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, the Seychelles, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Guinea-Conakry, Comoros, Mauritania, Cameroon, Gabon and Togo (Olukoshi 1998).

However, one common feature in all these cases was unprecedented and widespread violence, meted out to either the ruling party sympathisers or to those sympathetic to the opposition. In countries like Kenya and Malawi where the ruling regimes had anticipated violence with the introduction of multiparty politics, opposition leaders were often targeted together with their supporters (Murunga 1999).

In his speech, delivered at the annual general meeting of the Freedom of Expression Institute, Johannesburg (1996), Chifu Ayakub explained

that 'the process of democratisation which we have witnessed in many African countries over the past six or seven years has, on occasions, brought with it an unwelcome concomitant. Many of the "new democracies" have found themselves almost immediately plunged into political violence, formation of informal militia and sometimes but not always with an ethnic tinge: Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Cameroon and others'.

Ironically, some African leaders, such as Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, used this descent into violence as evidence of the inherent tribalism of Africans and thus of their unsuitability for multiparty democracy. This is, almost word for word, an echo of the old idea of the 'white man's burden'. The role of European colonialism – or these days the post-colonial state – was to keep 'natives', with their primordial tribal divisions, from hacking each other to pieces.

Therefore, the transitions to pluralist politics in many parts of Africa were marked by violence, intimidation and harassment by either those holding political power and those seeking it. The political space became an arena where informal militia groups developed either to cushion the older regimes or those seeking change. Yet, despite the similarities, we lack a detailed comparative historical study of this phenomenon, particularly, how these developments interlinked with ethnic conflicts in neighbouring communities. In addition, further compounding these disturbing trends have been the stream of refugees fleeing upheavals, and the incursion of international terrorism.

Kenya-US Relations: A Cause for the Terrorist Target?

Although the United States and Kenya have enjoyed cordial relations since Kenyan independence, these relations have in one way or another contributed to the terrorist aggression in Kenya. The Kenya-US relation needs consideration, since for one, more than 7,000 US citizens live in Kenya, and as many as 25,000 Americans visit Kenya annually. About two-thirds of the resident Americans are missionaries and their families. US business investment is estimated to be more than $285 million, primarily in commerce, light manufacturing, and the tourism industry. President Moi was a close ally of the West in general and it is clear that American and Israeli intelligence agencies always enjoyed a strong presence in Kenya.

Moi's support was important for the United States during the Cold War when it set about destabilising the progressive regimes in the region. The strong-arm methods Moi used against his opponents after a failed coup in 1982 did not bother the West. Today Kenya plays a crucial role in the US game plan for West Asia. American troops were given base facilities and logistical support as the US prepared for war against Iraq.

The United States has spent $3.1 million (Sh210 million) on anti-terrorist training in Kenya since 1998. However, its recent travel advisories to their nationals not to visit Kenya because of the threat of terrorist attacks are, in the opinion of many economists, undermining the new government's project of economic and political renewal. The US presence, therefore, may shape the nature and source of terrorism in Kenya. The US believed that supporters of al-Ittihad al-Islami, which it identifies as 'a Somali terrorist organisation with links to al-Qaeda', *(East African Standard* 16/09/03, p.6.) have infiltrated some of the refugee camps in North-Eastern province, and made their way to Mombasa and Eastleigh, the Nairobi quarters of Somalis. Furthermore, it is alleged that 'they may well have gained support among the thousands of un-employed youths, hit by the decline of the tourism industry'*(Kenya Times*, 27/1/03, p.18). While in both the 1998 bombing and the attack on the Israeli hotel some Kenyans were implicated, a point which out-going ambassador Johnnie Carson has not tired of repeating, the feeling seems to be that Islam is not a major factor.

When the US prepared to go to war in the Persian Gulf, the then President Daniel Arap Moi confirmed its right to use the Mombasa port as a supply and recreational base, and to airlift men and materiel to the Gulf through the Nanyuki military airbase. If the country did not maintain these facilities and old strategic links with the US, Washington would certainly be less concerned about the terrorist threats it was facing. In that sense Kenya's blessing is also its curse.

This role, according to the survey, goes beyond the single issue of counter-terrorism. For more than a decade, Operation Lifeline Sudan has been a vital conduit of humanitarian relief to southern Sudan from its base in Turkana District. Kenya also provides a haven to thousands of Somali refugees. In his last year in office, President Moi played an important role in efforts to end the civil war in Sudan, building on the peace initiatives of former US Senator John Danforth. This initiative led to the Machakos protocol on the issue of self-determination for southern Sudan.

Since the US continues to regard Kenya as one of the four 'anchor states' in sub-Saharan Africa, and has heightened concerns over the penetration by Al-Qaeda, how does one make sense of Kenya's present position? One possible conclusion is that the 'weakening of the country's counter-terrorism' institutions happened because of the decay and politicisation of the security apparatus during the rule of KANU. Action needs to be taken now while the reform momentum is high. This would explain the timing of the pressure on the Government to deal with terrorism. Raising the scare level and raising the price of inactivity on terrorism is likely to create a lot more local acceptance for the actions necessary to deal with the threat.

The alarm bells from the US that ring in Kenya over terrorism would be equally important in winning domestic support for anti-terrorism security assistance to be funnelled to Kenya. According to Strategic Survey, US actions in Kenya 'mean Washington will have a standing, if secondary, interest in strengthening Kenyan institutions and in "inoculating" its Muslim population against radicalisation through longer-term development programmes'.

Regional Insecurity and Terrorism: The Role of Neighbouring Countries

The absence of a responsible government, administrative apparatus, organised politics and government or private business in Somalia, became a haven for the fundamentalists to fill the vacuum and gave them a comparative advantage over the other forces who lacked any kind of ideology. Although traditionally clan loyalty is more important than any religious affiliation in Somalia, war weariness, desperation, eagerness for peace and order as well as widespread poverty seem to have attracted the youth to join the fundamentalist camp. That is why Islamists in Somalia target the youth more than any other group for terrorist activities. Undoubtedly Islam preaches peace and harmony, but Islamic extremists in Somalia tend to use political Islam as a weapon for the elimination of enemies and peace forces in the area. In fact, my fear is that Islamic extremists are trying to destroy the long-standing tolerance and harmony among Muslims and Christians in the horn of Africa (Tadesse 2001)

Fighting in Ethiopia in many cases spilled over into Kenya. Ethiopian security forces have crossed the border and attacked the Borana

people, who are believed to support the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which is fighting for greater autonomy from the Ethiopian government. Members of the OLF are reported to have placed landmines in Kenyan territory and attacked local ethnic Somalis. Over 25,000 people were reported displaced in December 2000, after militiamen from Ethiopia crossed into Kenya's Wajir District.[1] The Turkana are targeted as well. For instance, in September 2002, Ethiopian raiders killed 16 Kenyans in Turkana District (*Daily Nation*, 18 September 2002).

Militias from Somalia have also entered Kenya, attacking Somali refugees and Kenyan ethnic Somalis, effectively rendering the border area unsafe. General Mohamed Farah Aidid's forces, for example, carried out a number of raids in retaliation for the Kenyan government's support of his rival Mohamed Hirsi 'Morgan', who has important links to ethnic Somali clans in Kenya (*Africa Confidential*, 9 November 2001). The Sudanese government has used allied local warriors in Southern Sudan to attack the Turkana in Kenya on the pretext of cattle-rustling.[2] Far worse and more widespread geographically has been the influx of small arms into northern Kenya.

Religious Backlash and the Arab Silence

Curiously, some scholars blame Arab aggression and are wondering why Africa must bear the brunt of a Middle East conflict. The continent is not an enabler, nor is it a global power to force mediation on the combatants. So why this carnage on her soil? That question has been answered by individual Africans who interpret the attacks as the result of sheer arrogance and contempt for African lives. On being told about the latest bomb blast, Vice-President Musalia Mudavadi of Kenya said to the BBC that 'his country has become a battleground for other people's wars and is being dragged into issues over which it has very little influence'. This perspicacious remark is however limited because it does not mean that the whole African continent is under attack. However, among Africans in North America, there are rumblings about Arab insensitivity to Africans.

They are struggling to understand why Arabs enjoy abundant hospitality in Africa, even to the point of being allowed to expropriate key sectors of the continent's economies; yet pay Africa back with ingratitude. There was a time when it was easy for Africans to sympathise with Middle Eastern problems. Many saw the problems through the

prism of religion and not from the point of self-interest. But with these attacks, religion in politics, especially the Islamic brand in certain parts of Africa today, is coming under scrutiny. A reader, observing the increasing Islamic hold on governance in some states of Nigeria, wrote with concern to state that 'There is a new dictatorship abroad in Africa and it is called Islamic Fundamentalism'.[3] And connected to Islam in many eyes in Africa is the Arab brand of nationalism.

According to George Ayittey, professor of economics and a leading Africanist, who spoke recently on the Jim Lehrer Report, there have been 'invaders, colonizers and slavers, who used their religions – Christianity and Islam, neither of which is indigenous to Africa – to convert, oppress, exploit and enslave blacks'. He said that 'While the Europeans organized the West African slave trade, the Arabs managed the East African and trans-Saharan counterparts... Over 20 million black slaves were shipped from East Africa to Arabia'. Should the history of the slave trade, and current events in Sudan and Mauritania be enough to turn Arabs into enemies in Africa? Not yet. One reader, upon learning of the atrocity in Kenya, also wrote to complain: 'Would the African Union condemn this? NO! Because it has not been perpetrated by the West'.[4]

The implication of this statement was that had terrorist attacks been the work of the West, African leaders would be lining up to condemn them vociferously. No Arab country has condemned the Nairobi and Tanzania bombings since 1998. Dr. Ayittey finds in this silence a message that is 'particularly arrogant and maddening'(Ablorh-Odjidja 2002). Is this reticence on the part of African leadership caused by fear of a religious backlash? If so then the future will be very horrifying for Africa.

Refugees and Terrorism

It is not the intention of this article to enter into a lengthy discussion on the concept of security. This concept, over the last decade, has been the focus of intense academic debate. Much of the debate has revolved around the central issue of just what is supposed to be protected. The ensuing debate has challenged one of the central assumptions of realist thought that holds that the protection of the state, its borders, resources, population and so on, is the essence of security. Security was provided primarily through military force, backed by a robust economy and stable political leadership. During the Cold War, the linkage between military

activity and security became so strong that an issue that did not involve military force was simply not a security issue (Baldwin 1997).

In the wake of the Cold War, the state-centric notion of security has been heavily challenged.[5] Among the alternatives to military dominated, state-centric concepts of security are: societal security (Buzan & Wilde 1998), individual, or human, security (Booth 1991), and international security.[6] As they apply to the situation of refugees in the Great Lakes region, each of these concepts, as well as the more traditional notion of state-centric security, will be examined. The very concept of societal security is also problematic, and contains some troubling nuances. Societal security is a state-centric notion. Not only must the state ensure the security of territory, resources and population, but also of 'identity'. Identity includes such components as language, culture, religious customs and so on. Refugee flows thus could be a threat to societal security (Katzenstein 1998).

Examining threats to state security involves looking at threats to territorial integrity, political autonomy, internal stability, and economic well-being. Throughout all phases of the conflict, the presence of large numbers of refugees, to varying degrees, constituted threats to the state security of all of the countries in the region. Opponents of the concept of societal security find much to criticise. Some claim that the identification of refugees as a societal threat may imperil their human security (Goodwin-Gill 1999). Finally, claims of societal security may simply be an easy way to mask xenophobia and racism (Schuster & Solomos 1999).

As a result of such notions and although Kenya is a signatory to the international agreements on refugee protection, the country has no established national legal framework to handle refugee issues, including the management of their resettlement and integration in the country. Instead, the government has let the United Nations High Commission for Refugees be at the forefront of managing the bulk of refugee affairs in the country. With no programmes for their permanent resettlement and integration in Kenya, a majority of refugees in the country are confined to camps in geographically remote semi-arid areas such as Dadaab and Kakuma.

Refugees in urban areas such as Nairobi and Mombasa have more options than those in the camps, but their lack of a recognised legal status has left them subject to frequent harassment by Kenyan police.

They are also often the targets of native resentment and political scapegoating in connection with the rise in urban crime and the proliferation of firearms trafficked across the country's borders. Tensions between local communities and refugees living in camps have occasionally turned violent, with fatalities on both sides. The threat of international terrorism has also recently affected Kenyan attitudes and policies towards refugees with Muslim backgrounds whose population has been increasing in the country.

The bombing attacks by suspected Al Qaeda operatives on the US embassy in 1998 and on an Israeli hotel and plane in 2002 have spurred increased scrutiny by Kenyan police of refugees from Somalia and visitors from the Middle East. Since September 11, 2001, increased security checks have led to long delays in the departure of thousands of Somali Bantu refugees previously approved for permanent resettlement in the United States *(Kenya Times*, 8/7/03). Like these refugees, many ordinary Kenyans seeking visas for study, vacation, or business in the US, the UK, and other countries have also faced additional requirements and longer waiting times. The Kenyan government is active in regional peace initiatives, seeking political resolutions for the ongoing conflicts in Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Burundi.

The success of such initiatives will help to allow more of the refugees a chance to return to their home countries. On the domestic front, however, repeated promises by Kenyan government leaders to enact comprehensive legislation on refugee rights have not been fulfilled. The latest proposals from Kenya's minister of home affairs include a plan to allow skilled refugees the right to live and work anywhere in the country (Okoth Kenya 2003).

Regional Security and the Proliferation of Small Arms

Arms transfer and trafficking are having a devastating impact on sub-Saharan Africa. The proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) is no doubt a global phenomenon whose adverse effects are most visible in Africa. These weapons make conflict more deadly and crime easier, feeding cultures of retribution and downward spirals of violence around the world. Besides taking a heavy toll on human life, small arms undermine nations' development. The widespread abuse of

weapons deprives developing countries of the skills and talents of the victims of small arms. Small arms are the preferred tools of violence in most internal wars, coups, militia and gang rampages, government oppression and human rights abuses. The arms are also commonly used in domestic and transnational crime (Brown 2003b: 15). In cultures of violence and gun-ownership, these weapons become symbols of power and pride, even objects of affection.

The regional illicit arms trade began in earnest in 1979 with Idi Amin's overthrow in Uganda, after which members of Kenya's Pokot community purchased weapons from their ethnic cousins across the border in Uganda (Brown 2003b: 25). The subsequent civil war and its remaining vestiges have further increased the flow of weapons from Uganda, as has the civil war in Southern Sudan. Continuing political instability in two other neighbouring countries - the implosion of the Somali state in 1991, as well as the Ethiopian civil war, which overthrew a military regime in 1991 - also flooded northern Kenya with small arms and ammunition. As many as 5,000 automatic rifles, for instance, are said to cross the border with Somalia each month, while an estimated 90-95 per cent of households in northern Kenya are armed (Muggah and Berman 2001: 10-11).

The easily available, low-price smuggled weapons, many of which have found their way to Nairobi and the southern part of Kenya, have greatly contributed to insecurity. Between 500,000 and 1,000,000 small arms are believed to currently be in circulation (Muggah and Berman 2001: 10). The inability of the government to crack down on the arms trade, in my opinion, led in some cases to Kenya becoming a staging-ground in a wider international conflict. For instance according to Brown, explosives used in the bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi in 1998 and of an Israeli-owned hotel near Mombasa in 2002, as well as the surface-to-air rockets that shot down an Israeli passenger jet as it left Mombasa in 2002, are widely believe to have been smuggled into Kenya across its 'porous border' with Somalia by al-Qaida operatives or allied groups (Brown 2003b).

It is quite true that weapon smuggling should be blamed on the hundreds of thousands of foreign refugees on Kenyan soil. In 2000, Kenya provided leadership in hosting a regional conference on the proliferation of small arms in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa. A few scholars blamed the Kenyan president for government's responsibility for the use of Kenya as a transit point for arms being shipped

onward to conflict zones in Kenya's 'economic hinterland', many of which were diverted to the local market.[7] Thus, the domestic dimension cannot be detached from the regional context of cross-border linkages in conflict and the arms trade.

In Uganda, the Karamojong for many years relied on traditional weapons when engaging in cattle and clan warfare. By the late 1990s, there was an estimated 30,000-40,000 AK-47 rifles in the hands of the Karamojong. Ownership of such weapons conferred a political, social and economic status. Often, an AK-47 was part of the dowry. In Kenya for instance, small arms are prevalent in the North Rift Region with a significant percentage of the male population possessing illegal arms. A report by the Nairobi based Security Research and Information Centre entitled 'Profiling Small Arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya' estimates that there are about 127, 519 small arms in the region. It is the prevalence of insecurity in this region that has contributed to the gun culture. The communities, largely pastoralists, arm themselves in a bid to protect their livestock from aggressors (Brown 2003b: 20).

The proliferation of small arms across the globe leads to the more rapid spread of violence and magnifies the devastating effects of violence, contributing significantly in areas of armed conflict to human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. In countries emerging from war, the widespread availability of guns contributes to high levels of crime and makes the transition to a lasting peace more difficult. In Kenya and other countries not at war, the ready availability of these weapons undermines security (including increased crime), erodes prospects for development, contributes to social disintegration, and makes the resort to violence more likely – and more deadly.

Kenya has been vulnerable to weapons trafficking because of its geographic location in a conflict-ridden region. The weapons circulating in Kenya originate from places as far away as China and the United States, but most of them passed through war zones in neighbouring countries before making their way to Kenya's illegal gun markets. For years Kenya's territory has been a conduit for weapons shipments destined to nearby areas of violent conflict, but more recently the spread of weapons has spilled back into Kenya itself. For the time being, guns in Kenya circulate on a small scale when compared to its war-torn neighbours. They are smuggled into the country a few at a time in a steady flow and

sold by traders in secret markets, with some larger-scale illegal arms trafficking also reportedly taking place.

The impact of even relatively modest quantities of such weapons, however, is already being felt. The increasing availability of weapons in Kenya has helped fuel rising insecurity and, in some areas, the growing militarisation of society. Much media attention has focused on the prevalent use of sophisticated weapons in urban crime, particularly in Nairobi. Often, refugees living in Kenya are scapegoated as the source of these weapons. The proliferation of small arms is most serious along Kenya's northern and western borders, where pastoralist communities have ready access to AK-47s and other automatic rifles obtained from neighbouring countries.

The introduction and spread of such sophisticated weapons among these communities has intensified conflict and blurred the line between long-standing ethnic competition – traditionally manifested in cattle theft or rustling – and political violence. Guns are now widely used to carry out acts of banditry and cattle rustling in Kenya, and have been responsible for growing numbers of human casualties, including during armed confrontations that pit ethnic groups against each other. This grave insecurity, as rightly noted by a Kenyan civic leader, derives both from 'the influx of small arms' and 'careless utterances and incitement' by politicians.[8]

Equally, several of Africa's main foreign aid donors (the United States, the United Kingdom and France), along with the Soviet Union, also provided a vast supply of weaponry during the Cold War. This flow, though reduced, continues to this day, as private companies based in these countries and Russia, along with their licensees in developing countries, sell the arms that exacerbate insecurity in Kenya and its neighbors (Human Rights Watch 2002: 8). The political economy of the international – and not just regional – arms trade plays a role in the endurance and spread of violence in Kenya and the rest of Africa. Therefore, the international context and international actors shape in significant ways the events under consideration here. The next task is to weigh the importance of the various dimensions and consider their theoretical significance.

Weak Governance Structures – KANU and NARC

Both weak governance and corruption at the entry ports of the republic, including the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, have been blamed

for the illegal migrations into Kenya. Observers see it as part of a wider pattern of terrorist aggression in Kenya. The state's role in declining security goes far beyond a simple lack of capacity, more precisely a failure to secure national borders and prevent lawlessness. The Kenyan case underlines the need to critically examine state-society relations. When power is as concentrated as it is in the Kenyan presidency, as it is still in the NARC government, incumbents are loath to relinquish it voluntarily. In no region is this more the case than in Africa. Thus, continued attention to domestic factors, especially the state, is warranted, taking into account the logic of neo-patrimonialism and the complexity of state-society relations. In integrating non-traditional actors into theorising, it is important not to forget that states can in many cases remain key actors.

There is a regional dimension to Kenya's declining human security that is of fundamental significance to the influx of terrorists into the region, as well as black-market regional trade, cross-border fighting, ethnic links that predate and cross colonial-era borders, ethno-regional identities that compete with national ones, and private armies, as well as incomplete sovereignty over large swaths of territory. The violence of the borderlands and the influx of small arms are closely linked to conflicts in neighbouring countries. Still, the regional dimension is less central in this case than the domestic and international ones. Though the availability of weapons and the lack of border controls have exacerbated human insecurity, especially in northern Kenya and cases of petty crime across the country, they were not a necessary precondition for organised violence.

Kenya's leadership role in regional organisations, especially in the areas of arms control and conflict resolution, provides it with the potential for improving human security throughout the region. However, as we have seen, domestic financial and partisan considerations have so far outweighed the benefits of greater regional stability.

Socio-Economic Effects of Terrorism

International tourism is one of the world's largest industries and many small, open economies such as Kenya heavily rely on tourism as a major source of foreign exchange earnings. In addition to its direct benefits, such as foreign exchange earnings, tourism is also a source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in many developing countries. Terrorism can hurt the tourist sector by reducing tourist arrivals. Over time, continued

terrorist attacks may also reduce FDI significantly. Besides such direct short- and long-term costs, indirect costs of terrorism include the need for greater advertising expenses to attract new or more tourists, reconstruction costs for damaged tourist facilities, and security enforcement expenses to lessen terrorist threats.[9]

Major airports in Europe and Mediterranean have been forced to make costly improvements in security in response to growing terrorist attacks (Drakos & Kutan 2001). Most insurance companies now exclude coverage for losses suffered through terrorist-related injuries or losses, passing the cost of terrorism directly onto tourists and the owners of tourist facilities. Terrorism is more likely to have detrimental effects on tourist arrivals in countries with significant terrorist incidents.

To help in understanding the cost of terrorism in Kenya I also examine some selected countries in the Mediterranean region that have a high incidence of terrorism. For example, Turkey has been facing threats from several terrorist organisations, including the Islamic Great Eastern Raiders/Front, Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), and Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Liberation Army (TIKKO). Periodic bomb attacks and shootings by the PKK, especially in Turkey during the 1990s, have had a negative effect on tourist arrivals. According to Hall, the number of tourists from the UK alone was expected to decline by 20 percent, as a result of the threat of Kurdish terrorism in Turkey. This figure is quite significant, given that the tourism sector accounts for about 25 percent of Turkey's foreign currency earnings (cited in Westbury 2002).

In addition to regular attacks by PKK and others, Turkey has recently been subject to new terrorist incidents due to the political instability in the region. For example, looking forward, empirical findings presented in this paper justify the concerns that terrorism hurts tourism (Westbury 2002).

The findings developed here are of practical use for policymakers, helping them design effective domestic or region-wide strategies against terrorism. For example, in a speech delivered at the 56th Session of the United Nations General Assembly of the United Nations, New York on 12 November 2001, His Excellency the former president Moi made some remarks in which he equated poverty and the problem of terrorism with the political instability in the region:

> The biggest challenge facing the African continent today is the increasing level of poverty. Poverty has become an obstacle, a roadblock to every effort we are making at improving the overall welfare of our people.

> Poverty is a fertile breeding ground for conflict and instability and even terrorism. It is therefore regrettable that very little progress, if any has been made since the world summit on social development in Copenhagen in 1995. I remind you that the main outcome of that summit was the resolve to eradicate poverty as an obstacle to human development.[10]

And although US President George W. Bush suggested there is no link between poverty and terrorism - in other words, poverty does not, by itself, prompt individuals to commit or be affected by terrorist acts - research has suggested that it does so to a high magnitude. According to the head of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Michael Moore, 'Poverty in all its forms is the greatest single threat to peace, security, democracy, human rights and the environment'.[11]

It is a mistake to disassociate the realities of hunger, poverty, and terrorism; they are inter-related, and any one of these may be the cause of the other two. The world does not need to tolerate despots, or war against entire populations in order to get rid of the one. Hundreds of thousands of lives are lost this way. The United Nations should use its authority to seek indictment by way of international criminal tribunals.

Acts of terrorism can have an extremely negative impact on a country's tourism, with ripple effects in several sectors of the economy. Tourism from an economic perspective has made a significant contribution to Kenya's Gross National Product (GNP).[12] When terrorists strike or target the country, a lot of things will go wrong alongside tourism. Tourism employs many people in the hotels and entertainment sector and is also a source of earning from agricultural products as well as artifacts. When this happens it seriously disrupts tranquillity within the sector and economic decline follows immediately.

Tourism is an indicator for economic stability and when the country attracts more tourists, it helps in building confidence in the people, locally and internationally, that economically things are looking up. This will be very useful to local and international investors in various sectors of the economy. Acts of terrorism can lead to serious declines in the number of tourists coming into the country, thus denying the country much-needed foreign exchange. This will essentially deal a severe blow to wealth creation in the country. Tourism also has a major impact on the micro-economic environment.

The bombing of the twin towers in New York on September 11, 2001, caused a collapse in world tourism that also affected Kenya. Arrival

figures have gone down since September 11 and Kenya is now about 12 percent down as compared to 2001. Nairobi arrivals have dropped more than Mombasa and there is a need to concentrate on boosting tourist arrivals into Nairobi. The strike on the American embassy in Nairobi in 1998 and the one that occurred in November 2002 on a Mombasa hotel frequented by Israelis seriously undermined gains made before. The gains and confidence painstakingly made over years were practically shattered as tourists started shying away from Kenya. Terrorism scares tourists into preferring other destinations where they will feel safe.[13]

Conclusion

For Kenya, African renaissance is, to begin with, a solution to the problem of security. Africa, as it were, is not insulated from its history and the global dynamics that have shaped its destiny in the past and in contemporary times. In this regard, the dialectics of imperialism and struggles for national liberation need to be seen as providing the context within which this rebirth is to take place. Internal security problems such as poverty, corruption, and crime viewed in their historical perspectives, should be addressed.

Far from being bogged down with problems of economic backwardness, political repression and external dependence, the renaissance in Africa is to be a product of the conscious will of social forces determined to bring positive changes to the lives of the African people. Systems of government that are autocratic and unresponsive to the needs of the people are to be replaced by those that are democratic and sensitive to political rights as well as people's basic needs. Instead of using public resources to satisfy the personal and selfish interests of power elites, systems that ensure good economic governance where public resources are used for the public good are to be preferred. A participant citizenry in the affairs of a modern republican government is to be encouraged as opposed to docile and oppressed subjects.

Although Kenya is seen to have achieved these desirable goals with the 2002 General Elections, hopes are fast seeping away – with provision of so-called 'democracy in abundance', the country seems to be losing its fabric, and the government's inability to handle a weak coalition means that the country is opening itself to further external attacks and the perpetuation of corruption. The 'democracy in abundance' which seeks not to discriminate in the screening of Somali and other immigrants into Kenya is a case to this point.

Recommendations

In order to minimize the problem of security in the region so as to pave way for the renaissance in Kenya I suggest certain remedial actions:

- Nurture environments in which root causes of conflicts can be adequately addressed and durable stability established.

- Pursue negotiated solutions to conflicts so as to ensure their peaceful resolution, to promote a culture of peace, and to encourage education and awareness-raising programmes on the problem of illicit small arms, involving all sectors of society.

- Seek effective controls of arms transfers by suppliers outside the region, including measures against transfers of surplus arms to prevent the problem of illicit small arms.

- Call on states to strengthen sub-regional co-operation among police, intelligence, customs and border control officials in combating the illicit circulation and trafficking in small arms and light weapons and suppressing criminal activities relating to the use of these weapons.

- Invite the regional governments' cooperation with the AU and other regional and international organisations to assist countries of the region to carry out a detailed study on the problem of illicit arms within the region and to draw up appropriate programmes for the collection and destruction of illicit small arms and light weapons.

Notes

1. *People* [Nairobi], 5 December 2000, cited in Norwegian Refugee Council, 2002: 13.
2. Musambayi, pp. 260-30.
3. See for example in www.profileafrica.com.
4. Ibid.
5. See Buzan, Barry, O. Waever and J. de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework For Analysis*, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998; Booth, K. 'Strategy and Emancipation', *Review of International Studies*, 1991, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 313 - 326. and Graham, David T. and Nana Poku, *Migration, Globalization and Human Security*, New York Routledge, 2000.
6. Ullman, 1983, p. 133.
7. Mombasa, on the Kenyan coast, is an important port of entry for goods that are transported across Kenya by rail or truck to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), all of which have been sites of large-scale armed violence in recent years. These areas thus constitute an economic hinterland of sorts inside a transnational regional trade area.
8. www.itdg.org, ITDG East Africa PEACE bulletin – Issue two, August 2003 - peace-building.htm

9. The Costs of Terrorism and the Benefits of Cooperating to Combat Terrorism', Paper presented by Dr Geoff Raby, Deputy Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to APEC Senior Officials Meeting, Chiang Rai, 21 February 2003 and submitted by Australia to the Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) Conference, 24 Feb 2003. Economic Analytical Unit.

10. Daniel T. Arap Moi, speech delivered in the 56th Session of the United Nations General Assembly Of the United Nations, New York on 12 November, 2001.

11. Michael Moore, A Speech delivered at the International Development Summit in Mexico, 2002. Cited in BBC online magazine.

12. Professor Enos Njeru, Co-ordinator Social Sector of the Institute for Social Analysis Policy and Analysis Research (IPAR).in *The East African Standard*, 30/11/02.

13. Ibid, p. 19, see also, *The Kenya Times,* 2/3/03, p. 7.

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International Terrorism and East African sub-regionalism: Developing a Sub-regional Tourism Industry in the Face of War

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Abstract

This paper discusses both positive and negative implications of fighting international terrorism and how it impacts on trust between East African countries, peace building in the region and tourism development in East Africa.

Résumé

Cet article analyse les implications positives et négatives de la lutte contre le terrorisme international et l'impact de celle-ci sur la confiance entre les états est-africains, sur le processus de construction de la paix et le développement du tourisme en Afrique de l'Est.

Introduction

In Africa, integration within and between regions has been thought of as an alternative development strategy, especially following the failure of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). This can, however, be achieved in an environment of peaceful co-existence between and within countries in a given (sub)region. This, therefore, calls for solutions to the problems of political conflicts and international terrorism. Lack of peace in regions of Africa adversely affects industries such as tourism.

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In the case of Africa, tourism was developed, during the colonial period and shortly after independence, as a regional industry. The development of the tourism industry in East Africa has, in the recent past, been negatively impacted by international terrorism as well as the war on terror. It is in the same vein that Professor Ali Mazrui says 'war and peace exist in Africa for reasons that are not always internal to Africa. Conflicts in other parts of the world often have huge repercussions across Africa' (Mazrui 2003:8).

Africa, just like the United States, is affected by international terrorism both in terms of massive loss of lives and property as well as economic development. In terms of economic development in East Africa, there has been a slump in the tourism industry. The attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 epitomised the threats of international terrorism. The responses arising from this attack, collectively termed as the "War on Terror", have both positive and negative implications for efforts towards sub-regional integration in Africa in general and East Africa in particular.

Fighting international terrorism has taken many forms as well as involved many actors. The forms include militaristic and diplomatic means. Militaristic solutions to international terrorism have been applied in Afghanistan and Iraq, generating many reactions in support and opposition and all pointing towards its successes and failures. It was expected that two countries in the East African Region, Sudan and Somalia, would be militarily attacked through this method. This created a mood of fear in the region affecting tourism but also creating suspicion among countries in the region as some countries were expected to provide launch pads from which the attacks would be carried out on Sudan and Somalia. So fighting international terrorism in the Eastern African region provides two conflicting positions. On the one hand, it is a pre-requisite for economic (sub)regional development and on the other a ground for continued suspicion and therefore (sub)regional disintegration. Therefore, fighting international terrorism requires a diplomatic rather than a militaristic approach.

If the United States applied a militaristic approach then it was thought that the most appropriate ground for attacking these countries was Kenya. However, due to little success achieved in Afghanistan and Iraq through use of military, and subsequent eminent loss of international support, the United States adopted a diplomatic method towards resolving conflicts in Somalia and Sudan. Kenya, as it would have been

used if military attacks were to be used, is playing a useful role in these diplomatic efforts.

It is this diplomatic means that I refer to as a positive result of the 'War on Terror'. This diplomatic approach, now being applied under the supervision of the Kenyan government, to find peace for the countries and the region is an important aid in fighting terrorism. This is because war creates an obscure environment within which terrorists can operate unnoticed. A stable government is important in aiding the fight against terrorism although not sufficient. Diplomatic methods of fighting terrorism now underway will go a long way in fostering good neighbourliness in the region and therefore cooperation in the development circles.

There is, however, the dark side in the fight against terrorism arising from the way Kenya is handling international terrorism through issuance of security threats that negatively impact on tourism in East Africa. The treaty that established the East African Community (EAC) demands that the issue of security be handled collectively through consultation. When Kenya seeks funds from the United States to bolster its security situation as well as compensate its economic losses resulting from terrorism, it sidelines the other two partner states, Uganda and Tanzania.

The paper discusses both positive and negative implications of fighting international terrorism and how it impacts on trust between East African countries, peace building in the region and tourism development in East Africa.

Need for sub-regional integration

In this era when Africa's development has been negatively affected through pursuit of policies advanced by the Bretton Woods institutions, mainly the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), new ways for Africa's development need to be sought and attempted. According to Uche:

> International financial institutions have been extensively criticized for the inability of their programs and schemes to enhance economic development and reduce poverty in Africa. If anything, some have argued that their programs have further plunged the sub-continent into economic distress (Uche 2002:2).

There is an increasing concern in Africa for the development of home-grown solutions to Africa's development problems as stated in the NEPAD document. This is because programmes initiated and funded from abroad have been out of touch with the circumstances unique to the African continent (Uche 2002).

The need for sub-regional integration is not new in Africa. When African countries attained independence, two schools of thought emerged with regard to integration. One school of thought, led by Nkrumah, was hinged on promoting the formation of regional entities whereas the other was bent on the formation of continental unity. The other, led by Nyerere, wanted African unity to take place one step at a time. This was based on his understanding that the diversity of the African continent required first forming regional groupings on the basis of which continental unity would be achieved.

Nkrumah was a revolutionary pan-Africanist who wanted the whole continent to unite at once because taking a slow pace would leave plenty of room for imperialism to further frustrate African unity. This led Nkrumah to de-campaign the formation of the East African Federation but without success (Okoth 1986).

Based on the examples of Europe and North America, regional and sub-regional integration creates bigger markets and enhances both trade and industry. Sub-regional cooperation leads to advantages of economies of scale, which result from both bigger markets and mobilisation of resources. It is with this understanding that Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are working towards the formation of the East African Community. However, this process must be understood from what was/is happening in the world as a whole.

The Lomé IV (1990) trade agreement made it clear that Africa would make losses under a single European market as a result of:

1. Reduction or total elimination of the preferences given to Africa's export to the EC
2. Reductions in volumes of Africa's exports to EC due to removal of preferential treatment and competition from other regions
3. Stiffer competition for Africa's exports to the EC from other regions
4. Higher costs of imports being harmonized with EC tariffs, among others.

Consequent to the formation of the EC was the incentive to start thinking about promoting intra-regional trade and export diversification. In addition, other regional blocs in North America, such as NAFTA, were further diminishing Africa's access to export commodity markets by:

1. Raising the average level of protectionism in advanced countries
2. Hardening of export competitiveness.
3. Substitution for Africa's commodity exports and imposing losses in terms of trade.
4. Higher costs of imports and reduced export earnings from these markets.

Regional and sub-regional integration were among the proposals for the solution of Africa's problems discussed at the Kampala Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation (CSSDCA), held in May 1991.

The Kampala forum endorsed the approach of phased continental integration with sub-regional economic groupings as the building blocs and leading to the formation of the Africa Economic Community (AEC). The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community was signed at the OAU Summit at Abuja (Abuja Treaty) on 3 June 1991, and came into force in May 1994.

Okoth (2001) has elucidated the reasons why African countries should promote intra-regional cooperation for economic advancement as follows:

1. African countries can not hope to compete individually in the 'new' international economic system dominated by regional economic blocs.
2. The need for collective action in utilizing such resources as waterways, forests and coastal zones, and general management of environment.
3. African countries must seek to explore opportunities for beneficial co-operation with other developing and industrial countries.

In eastern Africa, prospects for sub-regional integration will be obtained from successful achievement of the East African Community (EAC). EAC forms the nucleus around which other countries in the sub-region can coalesce. Although currently comprising of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, other countries are already showing signs of joining the EAC. For the EAC community to thrive and attract more members, a peaceful environment is mandatory. Already, international terrorism is threatening the EAC and its growth.

International Terrorism

It is not easy to define international terrorism except from a descriptive point of view. To attempt a definition, one needs to give it a time and spatial frame. I attempt a description of International Terrorism from a post September 11 attack on the United States and the discourse this

attack generated thereafter as well as the global action taken against real or perceived perpetrators. The description provided here is therefore that advanced by the United States and adopted by its allies in the 'War on Terror'.

International terrorism has been referred to as the 21st century threat to civilization. It is a threat targeted at the United States or its foreign interests. When it is targeted at U.S. interests abroad, America says it is targeted at her friends. In the same vein, any efforts to fight terrorism must involve protection of U.S. friends. George Bush refers to terrorists as 'our enemies (who) want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends' (Bush 2002).

From President Bush's statement we can define terrorism as any act of aggression, real or threatened, aimed at blackmailing or harming the United States or her friends. This makes it international as it is not targeted at U.S. but also at its allies. International terrorism goes beyond terrorists themselves, defined as people who carry out the actual threats and acts of terrorism. The definition goes further to include any support that such terrorists obtain. The support could be in the form of providing residence to or arming terrorists. The term, therefore, includes those countries which host terrorists. This is based on the fact that terrorists are groups that do not constitute states in themselves but which hide within states and/or get support from them.

> As we survey the security environment, a strong link between terrorist-sponsoring states and the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction becomes readily apparent. We believe that with very few exceptions, terrorist groups have not acquired and cannot acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction without the support of nation-states. Thus we are moving to end state-sponsored terror, and to expose those states that are acquiring WMD, often in violation of global non-proliferation treaties (Bolton 2002:5).

The term goes further to include both state and non-state actors as components which make international terrorism complete. In addition, it includes those states which possess dangerous weapons and are unfriendly to the United States. This is based on the argument that such states can transfer weapons to terrorists for use against the U.S. These weapons have been branded Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

> As we combat the threat of terrorism, we must be prepared for ever-escalating means of attack from weapons designed to kill far greater numbers of people and wreak havoc on our infrastructure as the United

> States works to rid the world of the terrorist threat, we must not dis-
> count the real and added danger posed by chemical, biological, and nu-
> clear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. Dictators in hostile
> states such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea already possess some WMD
> and are developing others. Their terrorist allies are in search of such
> weapons, and would waste no opportunity to use them against us (Bol-
> ton 2002:5).

Terrorists, according to this discourse, are non-state actors who need
the protection and sponsorship of states. International terrorism, there-
fore, refers to both state and non-state actors. This broad definition of
international terrorism has also broadened the fight on terrorism. In
fighting international terrorism, it has become necessary to fight both
the state and non-state actors. The 'War on Terror' has therefore in-
cluded both attacks on state and non-state actors.

However, much of the first instances of fighting terrorism, which
were militaristic, did not yield much fruit as evident in the U.S. attack
on Afghanistan and Iraq. The target in Afghanistan was to capture Osama
Bin Laden either dead or alive. This attack was therefore targeted at
both the government, which harboured terrorists and terrorists them-
selves. On the other hand, the U.S. attack on Iraq was based more on
the fear that Iraq was in possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
which it would easily transfer into the hands of terrorists. The allega-
tion that Iraq possessed WMD is proving false with consequent reac-
tions from all over the world. The loss of the military fight on terrorism
has, however, proved to be beneficial to the East African region in terms
of peace-building. This benefit comes from the fact that earlier on, there
was the possibility of the U.S. attacking Sudan and Somalia in the East
African region. This was based on the understanding that Osama Bin
Laden had at one time been hosted in Sudan and also that most of the
terrorists who bombed Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in 1998 came through
Somalia. On the other hand lack of government in Somalia, it was
thought, would provide a conducive environment for thriving of terror-
ist cells.

The failure of the United States to find WMD in Iraq has become a
blessing to Sudan's peace-building. Instead of utilising military meth-
ods, the U.S. is now promoting diplomacy. Many analysts see this as a
U.S. face-saving mission. Whether face-saving or not, this gesture is
good for the peaceful co-existence of countries in the East African Re-
gion which can promote integration and trade. Sub-regional or regional

integration requires peace and trust. If the US had utilised military means, there were chances that it would have sought Kenya's aid, especially in providing military landing grounds. This would have created mistrust between Kenya and Sudan.

In fighting terrorism, the U.S. has adopted measures that will promote peace in Africa. Two such measures include diplomatic peace-building initiatives in Sudan as well as checking on proliferation of arms.

Peace-building in Sudan

The US is beginning to realize that stateless as well as states in conflict in Africa is not just an African problem but also a world problem because terrorist groups may find a home in such states and operate unnoticed. War torn areas are conducive environments for recruitment and training of terrorists and through which terrorists can acquire weapons. So, the US has adopted diplomatic methods towards conflict management with their support. In examining why the United States was giving Sudan a second chance, Charles Omondi makes the observation that 'the biggest obstacle to peace has been American policy which has been committed to overthrowing the government in Khartoum' (Omondi 2003:11). This is because Sudan at one time hosted Osama Bin Laden and there has also been the understanding that due to this sympathetic mood to Osama, Sudan could have a nuclear plant for manufacturing chemical weapons for use by terrorists. The fresh look that the US is giving Sudan climaxed when the United States Secretary of State, Collin Powell, attended the Sudan peace talks in Naivasha on 23 October, 2003.

Former US president Jimmy Carter once observed that the US policy was an obstacle to peace in Sudan by supporting the revolutionary movement rather than working for an overall peace settlement. The US was committed to overthrowing the government in Khartoum. During the Naivasha meeting in Kenya, the parties resolved the issue of security arrangement through an agreement to merge their armies and set an agenda of deliberating on the modalities of implementation such as the location of the central command.

This is in spite of outstanding issues such as wealth sharing, the status of Khartoum as the seat of government and the three disputed areas of Abyei, the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile. The reasons as to why the US is involved in finding peace in Sudan 'transcend

US's self-proclaimed roles of defending democracy and human rights' (Omondi 2003:11). It has something to do with fighting terrorism. Securing peace in Sudan fits in well in this grand design. The US, for years, had blacklisted Sudan as a supporter of international terrorism.

The US could be fearing that not extending an olive branch to Sudan could further radicalize them. When terrorists attacked Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, the US was quick to target Sudan as a possible accomplice in the acts that claimed more than 200 lives in Kenya alone (Omondi 2003:11). The pharmaceutical firm that the US attacked, however, turned out not to be the nuclear plant that it had been thought to be. President Bush is exploiting the important role that Kenya plays in regional politics to bring the Sudanese into the fold. This is a significant change in Bush's position bearing in mind that after the bombing of New York and Washington, Bush had promised to take the war to the enemy, both real and potential.

> We can not put our faith in the work of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systematically break them. If we wait for the threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long we must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act (Bush 2002:2).

This gesture is beneficial for peace in the region and for regional renewal. Peace will benefit trade and investment in the region as well as promote tourism.

The other decision by the US which is going to bring peace to the region is its pledge to manage, in collaboration with Russia and other allies, proliferation of arms. This will go a long way in minimising proliferation of arms into the East African Region and thereby reduce crime and conflicts.

Checking Arms Proliferation

Many of the political conflicts that have rocked African states have been fuelled by arms proliferation, sometimes obtained through illegal trade. Many of the arms used in Africa are not manufactured in Africa. Proliferation of arms in Africa has been a result of relaxing anti-arms proliferation treaty rules and regulations. This is partly because such arms were not detrimental to the developed world.

It was seen as an African problem without any association with the West. With international terrorism increasing at a catastrophic scale, the danger of arms falling into the hands of terrorists, who are alleged enemies of the United States, is bringing new attention to this problem.

War in certain parts of Africa is not only thriving on illegal arms proliferation but also provides an environment within which these arms can fall into the hands of terrorists.

> Denying proliferators WMD technology and expertise is a central element of U.S. Non-proliferation policy. Marshalling international efforts to deny proliferators the material equipment, equipment, expertise and technology necessary to pursue Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the means to deliver them has long been a priority of the US Government. But the terrorist attacks last September 11th and the subsequent anthrax deaths spurred a new sense of urgency in the fight against proliferation (Wolf 2002:7).

However, as a result of international terrorism and subsequently war against terrorism, the United States has renewed its commitment to enforce it. Presidents Bush and Putin agreed upon a comprehensive security strategy called New Strategic Framework during their meeting in May 2002 at the Summit in Moscow. The framework 'involves reducing offensive nuclear weapons, creating defensive systems that protect against missile attacks, strengthening non-proliferation and counter proliferation measures and cooperating with Russia to combat terrorism' (Bolton 2002:6).

Although America restricts the dangerous arms to include nuclear and biological there is a need to include small arms, which can be equally dangerous. The arms used in the attacks in Nairobi and Dar-Es-Salaam in 1998 were not as sophisticated as the United States wants us to believe. In Africa, small arms have been the cause of many wars and subsequently many deaths. In Somalia for example, small arms have made it impossible to secure peace and elect a government. Yet it is such insecurity brought about by small arms that creates an insecure environment within which both terrorist groups can survive and even smuggle WMD.

Small arms proliferation is a problem in Africa but may also pose a threat to the ongoing 'War on Terror'. This is because of the very inse-

curity that they help breed. As we have already discussed, insecurity breeds an environment within which terrorism can thrive and escape notice from those fighting it. Arms transfer and trafficking are having a devastating impact on Africa. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is no doubt a global phenomenon whose effects are most visible in Africa. These weapons make conflict more deadly and crime easier, feeding cultures of retribution and downward spirals of violence around the world. Besides taking a heavy toll on human life, small arms undermine nations' development. The widespread abuse of weapons deprives developing countries of the skills and talents of the victims of small arms. Small arms are the preferred tools of violence in most internal wars, coups, militia and gang rampages, government oppression and human rights abuses. The arms are also commonly used in domestic and transnational crime.

The US should not only worry about the potential grave dangers posed by WMD. African countries should be helped to crack down on the smuggling of small arms. Chacha contends that 'the inability of the government to crack down on the arms trade led in some cases, the country to be used as a stain-ground in a wider international conflict' (Chacha 2003:11-12).

Explosives used in the bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi in 1998 and an Israel-owned hotel near Mombasa in 2002, as well as the surface-to-air rockets that would have shot down an Israeli passenger plane as it left Mombasa in 2002, are widely believed to have been smuggled into Kenya across its 'porous border' with Somalia by Al-Qaeda operatives or allied groups (Chacha 2003).

Despite these positive effects resulting from fighting terrorism in the World, there is the dark side which results from Kenya's handling of international terrorism on tourism in East Africa.

Terrorist Bombings and Their Impact on Tourism in East Africa

Tourism by definition and description is massive peacetime travel and therefore a security sensitive industry. In East Africa, tourism was developed on a sub-regional level and therefore, lack of peace in one country leads to a slump in tourism in the region because the region has shared infrastructure like railway lines, road networks, harbours and airports. The colonial administration contributed much towards this

regional development of tourism. The inauguration of the East African High Commission in 1948 not only enhanced achievements over the decades of cooperation between Kenya and Uganda but also brought in Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

As a result, they shared many services essential to regional development of tourism such as East Africa Railways and Harbours, East Africa Airways Corporation, Postal and Telecommunications Services, a Customs Union, immigration issues and others. Even though Tanganyika was the first East African country to attain independence it opted to cooperate with the others under the East Africa Common Services Organization. Both the East African High Commission and East African Common Services Organization enabled East African Tours and Travel Association (EATTA) and private operators to promote tourism with official and co-operate blessings.

Even though tourism was not mentioned in the East African Treaty, the inauguration of the E.A. Community in December 1967 enhanced East Africa's development as a regional tourist destination. Consequently, there was a deliberate move towards developing tourism as a regional industry even though it was over-weighted in favour of Kenya. Even after 1965, tourists to East Africa considered this region as a tourist unit (Ouma 1970).

The EATTA did a lot of publicity of tourism whose fruitful results were evident in terms of its contribution to the GDP of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda during the colonial period. After independence, individual East African countries continued to promote tourism in their respective countries, but with a regional touch. In 1968, tourism was number one, two and six respectively in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania as earner of foreign exchange. In Kenya alone, tourism earned more foreign exchange than coffee, tea or any other crop (Ouma 1970).

However, terrorist bombings in Nairobi which started in 1998 began to undermine achievements made in the tourism industry. It is alleged that terrorists were targeting Americans and nationals of those countries allied to America. In the process of carrying out their schemes, Kenya and the East African region has suffered in terms of losses incurred in the tourism and horticultural sectors. In some cases, potential investors are scared away.

Referring to international terrorism and its impact on the lives of Africans, their property and general development matters, Professor Ali Mazrui once asserted that 'war and peace exist in Africa for reasons that are not always internal to Africa' (Mazrui 2003:8). The 1998 bombing in Nairobi saw 200 Kenyans perish. This was followed by another bombing in Mombasa in November 2001 with an Israeli hotel and chartered plane as targets. The plane was not hit but the hotel was bombed. The bombing killed three Israeli tourists and eleven Kenyans who were working at the hotel. The bombing generated a lot of debate but the most interesting was that of the American Embassy in Kenya. The Embassy complained that no arrests had been carried out by the Kenyan government yet US officials had 'intercepted communications among Al-Qaeda operatives in Eastern Africa and other unspecified intelligence indicating that terrorists were plotting an attack on embassies or the residences of foreign officials in Nairobi' (Mwangi 2003 a).

The American position was worsened by confirmation from the government of Kenya that security officers had identified a suspected Al-Qaeda member they believed was involved in both the 1998 and 2001 terrorist attacks. The Minister for Security issued an alert that an identified Al-Qaeda suspect, Fazal Abdalla Mohammed, had returned to Kenya. The unfolding story around terrorist threats and attacks led to the British and American embassies being closed down just after issuing travel advisories to their citizens against visiting the country and the region; and losses in the tourism and horticultural sectors.

The closing of the two foreign embassies was meant to force the Kenyan government to address the issue of international terrorism. On the other hand, the government demanded that America assist with funds to step up security. The American government responded positively and security was improved but the travel advisory was maintained. The British high commission lifted its travel advisory, including lifting the ban on British Airways. The lifting of the ban followed advice by UK intelligence that the threat to British interests in Kenya 'was not severe' (Mwangi 2003b:1). Other countries lifted travel advisories including Germany and France. The situation in the tourism industry became worse, to the extent that the Ministry began working on a plan to tap new markets in the Far East to make up for the losses.

The US pledged support for Kenya's economic recovery. This followed a request from Kenya's president, Mwai Kibaki, to the US for 30 billion Kenya Shillings for the fight against terrorism.

The amount was arrived at after calculating the losses accrued due to a slump in tourism and horticultural exports. Chris Murungaru estimated that Kenya was losing $14 million (about 1 billion Kenya shillings) a week in tourism earnings and tax revenues as a result of US and British warnings of a looming attack (Kelly 2003). According to statistics given by the Managing Director of the Kenya Airports Authority, during a seminar on security held at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, there was a loss of 40 million Kenya shillings. The plea was delivered to the US by Kenyan Ministers, Chris Murungaru, Raila Odinga, John Michuki and Mukhisa Kituyi. The US congress was pleased with Kenya's efforts to fight terrorism and said 'it was a good example to other countries in the region' (Mwangi 2003 b:1).

Many Kenyans did not take the travel advisory bans lightly. They said there was ill intention in the move because the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, had travelled to New York just after the terrorists had bombed the Twin Towers. America was more unsafe than Somalia then. Despite this, Blair encouraged Britons to visit New York. Others cited the Israeli case saying that Kenya was far safer than Israel yet many Britons and Americans travelled there.

The issue seemed at first to affect Kenya, and later became an East African Regional concern prompting the three heads of state of the East African sub-region to issue a joint communiqué in which they said that the region was safe for tourists and investors and called for the removal of all travel bans. The leaders were attending the second extraordinary summit of the East African Community in Nairobi. The three heads of state of the East African Community decried that 'all travel advisories seriously impacted on the economies of the partner states of East Africa, particularly the tourism industry' (Juma 2003:1).

Kenyan authorities issued a statement about an eminent terrorist threat that came to affect the whole region and, when they sought to be compensated, they did not include in the compensation the losses that Uganda and Tanzania had recorded. This was contrary to what the treaty stipulated. In the Treaty establishing the East African Community, tourism is properly identified as an important component of development in each of the three East African Community countries. In Chapter 20, Article 115, section 1 and 3, it is stated that:

> The partner states undertake to develop a collective and coordinated approach to the promotion and marketing of quality tourism into and within the community. To this end, the partner states shall coordinate

their policies in the tourism industry and undertake to establish a framework of cooperation in the sector that will endure equitable distribution of benefits. The partner states undertake to develop a regional strategy for tourism promotion whereby individual efforts are reinforced by regional action (East African Secretariat 1999).

There was, in addition, a clause in the treaty which required that the three partner states approach the issue of terrorism together. This is important because strengthening security in Kenya alone can make terrorists resort to Uganda or Tanzania and their activities will affect tourism in the region.

With regard to regional security. Chapter 23, Article 124, section 1 and 6 states that:

> The partner states agree that peace and security are pre-requisites to social and economic development within the community and vital to the achievement of the objectives of the community. In this regard, the partner states agree to foster and maintain an atmosphere that is conducive to peace and security through cooperation and consultations on issues pertaining to peace and security of the partner states with a view to prevention, better management and resolution of disputes and conflicts between them. The partner states undertake to cooperate in reviewing the region's security particularly on the threat of terrorism and formulate measures to combat terrorism (East African Secretariat 1999).

From the foregoing, we make observations to the effect that Kenya is not observing the East African Treaty to the letter. Kenya did not consult the other three East African States before issuing a security alert yet it was required to. This in turn led to a slump in tourism in the region. When it pursued compensation from America, it did not include losses incurred by its sister states in the region. In addition, it has failed to include the other states in its call to the US to help bolster internal security, especially at airports.

Conclusion

Africa can no longer rely on neo-liberal development policies advanced and funded by international lending agencies as they have failed to pull Africa out of its economic stagnation. These policies have been adequately criticized and new 'home grown' development measures have been called for. These new measures for Africa's development are already being put in place such as sub-regional cooperation.

However, it should be noted that pursuit of 'home-grown' development policies are subject to international happenings. African countries have been caught up in the international order and disorder not by their own choice but by conquest and manipulation. Africa's integration in the world economic order and disorder complicates both nation-state, and regional or sub-regional order. One such case has been evident in the way the War on Terror has affected East Africa's tourism industry.

Countries in the East African region should fight terrorism collectively for the region's good rather than for individual nation-state benefits. This will minimize competition for handouts from either America or terrorist sponsoring states as well as militate against possible suspicion and mistrust between and among them. My call to East African leaders is that they should take part in fighting international terrorism and at the same time participate in peace building by addressing the root causes of these wars, especially in the Middle East.

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Civil Society Organisations and Democratic Consolidation in Uganda[1]

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Abstract

This paper examines the role of civil society organisations as agents of democratic consolidation in Uganda. It argues that civil society organisations (CSOs) play an important role in building democratic governments but also questions whether the CSOs can live up to the theoretical expectations of building democratic governments. This paper, based on case study evidence from Uganda, attempts to bridge the gap between theory and reality by offering a realistic assessment of CSOs' capabilities as regards democratic consolidation. Because of Uganda's political history, political activism and political advocacy have not been widely embraced by CSOs. Negative political experiences have created some apathy and wariness resulting in many CSOs maintaining that they are apolitical. As a result, CSOs have failed to mark distance from the NRM government in a manner that affirms their autonomous and independent growth. Ultimately, such a posture has undermined the CSOs' cause and has confined them to issues that do not fundamentally challenge or affect the status quo.

Résumé

Cette contribution s'intéresse au rôle des organisations de la société civile, en tant qu'agents de la consolidation démocratique en Ouganda. L'on y affirme que les organisations de la société civile (OSC) jouent un rôle important dans le processus de construction de gouvernements démocratiques. La question posée ici consiste à savoir si les OSC sont à la hauteur des attentes théoriques en matière de construction de gouvernements démocratiques. Cet article est basé sur des faits tirés d'une étude cas ougandaise, et tente de combler le fosse entre théorie et réalité, en offrant une étude réaliste des capacités des OSC en matière de consolidation démocratique. Du fait de l'histoire politique de l'Ouganda, l'activisme politique n'est pas suffisamment pris en charge par les OSC. Les expériences politiques malheureuses ont provoqué une certaine apathie et une certaine méfiance, qui ont poussé un

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grand nombre d'OSC à se présenter comme apolitiques. La conséquence en est que les OSC n'ont pas réussi à se démarquer du gouvernement NRM, de sorte à affirmer clairement leur maturité autonome. Une telle situation a fini par endommager la cause des OSC et les a limitées à intervenir sur des questions qui ne remettent pas vraiment en question le statut quo établi.

Introduction

Even if there is scepticism about the applicability of western conceptions of civil society in the African context, increasingly a number of African scholars[2] are affirming the importance of CSOs for democratisation and governance. It is widely believed that a thriving civil society can widen democracy by promoting pluralism, and it can deepen democracy by embedding the values and institutions of liberal democracy within society at large, not simply at the same level. This paper argues that civil society organisations in Uganda have failed to mark distance from the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government in a manner that affirms their autonomous and independent growth. Ultimately, such a posture has undermined the CSOs cause and has confined them to issues that do not fundamentally challenge or affect the status quo.

In the first part of this paper we have the introduction, the second part looks at the key concepts of the paper, Civil Society Organisations and Democratic Consolidation, and the third part is an assessment of civil society organisations as agents of democratic consolidation in Uganda under the NRM government and lastly conclusions and recommendations.

Civil Society Organisations

The term 'civil society' has a long history in political philosophy, and its definition has altered with Roman, Hegelian, Marxist, and Gramscian interpretations long before it was resurrected in the 1990s (Kumar 1993). The Latin notion of *civilis societas* referred to communities, which conformed to norms that rose above and beyond the laws of the state. For many centuries, theorists did not clearly distinguish 'civil society' from the 'state' and often use the two terms interchangeably (Kean 1988: 35).

The concept civil society, therefore, is characterised by contradicting and inconsistent definitions. Many scholars, however, focus on the autonomous and voluntary nature of CSOs. For example, Larry Diamond[3] conceives civil society as the realm of organised social life

that is voluntary, self generating, self supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules.

Write argues that the use of civil society 'implies a certain power relationship between state and society such that there are limitations on the state's capacity to pervade and control society, and a certain power on the part of members of a society to insulate themselves from, and exert influence upon, the state.'[4]

Drah[5] argues that civil society is not entirely 'separate' from the state and identified two conceptions of the relationship that civil society can have with the state, namely corporatist and voluntary-pluralist.With regard to the 'corporatist' type, the institutions of CS, which usually have a proven constituency that they can deliver and hold to certain agreements, are 'incorporated' into decision-making processes and institutions by the state. These are strategically placed groups, such as business and labour, and as a result the state 'has gained greater social control in return for giving functional representation to such groups in economic management.'

According to N. Steytler and G. Hollands,[6] the voluntary pluralist type of CS is the classic liberal model where voluntary associations of individuals operate at a greater distance from the state, and 'implies a strong sentiment of "anti-statism" – disillusionment with parliamentary democracy, the welfare state, and the alienation engendered by vast government bureaucracies.' This means that citizens should be effectively empowered, especially through collective action and solidarity in pursuit of shared values.

To draw up a comprehensive list of the types of associations which make up civil society would be futile, as by their nature these organisations are interest-based and as such many are volatile and fluid, forming and disbanding around different issues which are important at the time. Atkinson[7] makes what she calls a broad distinction between 'profit making' and 'non-profit' organisations. The former refers to the private business sector. The latter are those organisations distinct from this sector. They are associations of professionals, workers, women, students, employers, journalists and consumers, religious organisations, recreational and cultural clubs, human rights groups and, some would add even political parties.

Therefore, the concept of civil society can be defined to include, free associations such as churches, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), political parties, trade unions etc. and other organisations not controlled

by the state, which are self-organising. A civil society organisation (CSO) is a political community, which can organise and co-ordinate its activities for the purpose of influencing state policies. All in all, a civil society may be defined as a society in which there are autonomous groups which aggregate the views and activities of individuals and which act to promote and defend the interests of those people, including against the state[8].

This implies that there is the public discussion of issues, with questions of public policy being debated widely within the community rather than being decided solely by regime elites. It is through this public discussion of issues in part that autonomous groups act to defend the interests of their respective constituencies. Crucial for the existence of a civil society is that both state and civil society recognize the legitimacy of the other, and acknowledge the right of the other to act unimpeded within certain defined spheres of competence.

Democratic Consolidation

Debates about democratic consolidation in low-income countries are often discourses about the meaning of consolidation itself[9]. Any talk about democratic consolidation presupposes that a democratic regime exists from the beginning to the end of the process. Democracy is the indispensable starting of democratic consolidation (in form of a 'consolidating democracy') and its hopeful outcome (in form of a 'consolidated democracy'). Therefore, it does not make any sense to speak of the 'democratic consolidation' of an authoritarian regime.

Scholars have increasingly adopted broader definitions of consolidation in which the criteria include the legitimation and institutionalisation of democratic practices over time, buttressed by the widespread adoption of democratic values and others even argue that the emergence of a democratic political culture is an essential component of consolidation.[10] A widely used definition of consolidated democracy refers to a political regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules and patterned incentives and disincentives has become, in a phrase 'the only game in town,' behaviourally, attitudinally and constitutionally.[11] 'Behaviourally' means that no significant actors attempt to use non-democratic means to obtain their goal, 'attitudinally' implies that democratic procedures and institutions are considered by the vast majority to be preferred way of organising politics, and 'constitutionally' signifies that actors—governmental as well as non-governmental, are subject to the laws and institutions of the democratic proc-

ess. In other words, consolidation is the more or less total institutionalisation of democratic practices, complete only when citizens and the political class alike come to accept democratic practices as the only way to resolve conflict.

Other definitions range from simple mechanistic tests such, as whether a country has experienced two successive and peaceful transfers of power.[12] Although a change in government is often used as criteria to evaluate to what extent democratisation has become consolidated[13], it would be unreasonable to claim that a system could not be democratic if there was not turnover in government.[14] All in all, democracy is consolidated when a reversal to authoritarianism is impossible and civil society can help consolidate democracy in a number of ways.

What is civil society supposed to do?
A strong civil society is considered one of the prerequisites for democracy. Diamond identifies at least six functions of civil society in shaping democracy:[15]

1. Civil society is a reservoir of political, economic, cultural and moral resources to check the power of the state. Civil society can play a role in checking, monitoring and restraining the exercise of power by the state and holding it accountable. This function can reduce political corruption, which is pervasive in Uganda. It can force the government to be more accountable, transparent and responsive to the public, which strengthens its legitimacy.
2. The diversity of civil society will ensure that a few groups do not hold the state captive.
3. The growth of associational life will supplement the work of political parties in stimulating political participation. Civil society organisations can encourage people to get involved in politics especially as voters in elections. Political participation strengthens the legitimacy and the institutionalisation of democratic government, which are essential for consolidation.
4. Civil society will eventually stabilise the state because citizens will have a deeper stake in social order. Further more, while civil society may multiply the demands of the state, it may also multiply the capacity of groups to improve their own welfare.
5. Civil society is a locus for recruiting new political leadership. Those who are involved in the activities of such groups learn how to organise and motivate people, publicise programmes, reconcile conflicts and build alliances. This teaches people to deal efficiently with political challenges and can mould competent political leaders.

6. Civil society resists authoritarianism.

The performance of civil society organisations in consolidating democracy in Uganda remains to be seen.

Civil Society, Political Transition and the NRM Government

Like other African countries, building democratic institutions and democratic politics remains a major challenge in Uganda. Indeed, in Uganda, one of the major challenges facing the country is how to consolidate democracy. Historically, modern state structures in Uganda were designed as the pivot for development processes, resulting in the construction of authoritarian state institutions. Civil society was never seen as playing any partnership role and instead was always viewed with hostility because the colonial and postcolonial states did not desire competitors. Under colonialism, civil society in Uganda was marginalised and conscripted into the state machinery to contain the African majority, which was completely excluded from any institutional role in governance.

As Uganda moved closer to independence, the institutions of civil society were weakened to the point where political parties battled each other rather than advancing the common cause of democratic participation. Independence saw the complete demise of these institutions of civil society. Most were either incorporated into the state machinery or severely restricted in their operations.

Even after the National Resistance Movement (NRM) under President Museveni came to power in 1986 on a ticket of democratisation and the strengthening of popular participation, many institutions of civil society did not wake up from the slumber of containment adopted by the British and perfected by the post-independence regimes. Against the backdrop of the several decades of misrule and economic destruction, the NRM ascendancy to power witnessed a mixed context for the operation of civil society.

There are very many CSOs in Uganda (e.g. NGOs, private sector associations, community-based groups, religious organisations, media etc.) which bring together activists around common issues such as health care, education, children, youth, disability, gender issues, human rights and democracy, income generation and other economic issues, religion and culture. Among these are professional and business associations

such as those of lawyers, journalists, accountants and economists, traders and industrialists. Umbrella networks to co-ordinate and encourage collective action by CSOs in the same field also exist. The NGO forum tries to bring all NGOs together under one umbrella to have a collective voice when speaking with government and for self-regulation.

Non-Governmental Organisations

It should be noted here that civil society is not synonymous with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) howsoever they may be defined and despite the frequent temptation to collapse the one into the other. NGOs comprise only a segment of what may be considered as civil society, albeit an important section of it.

The phenomenon of NGOism has had a considerable effect on the growth and character of civil society as well as the state. NGOs however, are seen to some extent as the 'flag bearers' of CS and its associated values. NGOs are viewed as a sub-component of other organisations within civil society, which are characterised by four attributes. They are voluntary, independent, not for profit and not self-serving[16]. In order to be regarded as 'legitimate', NGOs, in addition to their non-profit character, are required to demonstrate their accountability to a genuine constituency. These constituencies are identified by some degree of need of marginalisation, which the state cannot fully address. NGOs are, therefore, expected to prove that they act 'in the public interest'.

But the NGO explosion has been primarily in the area of social and economic welfarism, a sphere of operation in which the state feels little challenge and indeed often welcomes the filling-in of the breach that NGOs carry out through their multifarious activities. NGOs are consequently praised by agents of the state for their 'facilitative role' in the alleviation of poverty, improving conditions of health and education and proselytising on the environment.

Mamdani, as cited in Oloka Onyango and J.J Barya's article, is of the view that one must greet the growth of civil society in Uganda with some caution. Reflecting on the particular issue of NGOs, Mamdani puts his ambivalence eloquently:

> NGOs, in my opinion, are a mixed blessing whose main effect is to worsen our dilemma. On the positive side, the proliferation of NGOs has liberated middle class entrepreneurial talent; but on the negative side, it has

left NGOs wholly unaccountable to the people at home. An NGO is not like a co-operative. In a co-operative, members have the right to hold their leaders accountable. The intended beneficiaries of an NGO are not its members. They receive a charity, not a right. An NGO is accountable not to the people it intends to benefit, but to those who finance it, the overseas donors.

Indeed, the continued dependence of the majority of NGOs, particularly on foreign sources of funding puts a greater challenge on the question of ownership and legitimacy. In addition, internal governance of NGOs is dominated by personalities and lack of democratic culture. In other words, the influence and the role of founders and leaders is overwhelming. Without adequate internal democratic culture, dialogue, and participation, NGOs could not be expected to play a positive role.

As NGOs have attained prominence in the economic and political life in Uganda, the NRM government is determined to control them. The government of Uganda has proposed or enacted legislation designed to strengthen official authority over NGOs, usually under the guise of developing a national regulatory framework for associations. Relationships between NGOs and government are characterised by suspicion and confusion about roles and rights.[17] And the existence and activities of NGOs are subject to stringent legal restrictions.[18] All NGOs in Uganda must be approved and registered by a government appointed board composed mostly of government officials, including security officials before they are allowed to operate. The Board has used its powers to delay and deny the legal registration of some NGOs that it deems too controversial. Three very prominent cases—the de-registration of the Uganda Human Rights Education and Documentation Center (UHEDOC) and the delay and almost denial of registration of National Organization for Civic Education and Election Monitoring (NOCEM) and National NGO Forum (NNF) illustrate regime intolerance to any 'political' activities of NGOs and served as warnings to other NGOs that the regime would not tolerate anything 'political.'[19]

In numerous instances, some NGOs have withered or changed character as key leaders have taken posts in the government. The Movement regime (1986–present) has co-opted NGOs into its national development strategy, so that NGOs are vehicles of development inspired and led by the Movement. This detracts from the ability of NGOs, particularly indigenous NGOs, to provide an alternative source of influence or accountability to the regime.

Therefore, NGOs are tolerated and, for the most part, embraced as partners of development. Yet, many NGOs hesitate to become politically active. The NGOs get co-opted by the regime, which uses the NGOs for legitimacy building and social gap filling. These NGOs do not challenge the state; as a consequence, their ability to link the empowerment of the powerless with the development of a democratic society and polity is limited. That is why many NGOs in Movement-ruled Uganda prefer to remain apolitical and, presumably, on good terms with the Movement regime. The movement has been able to maintain a fairly non-confrontational policy with regards to monitoring and controlling NGOs, but this has been due mainly to the non-confrontational and apolitical approach of the NGOs.[20]

Perhaps the most dramatic growth of any sector in civil society in Uganda has been witnessed in the women's movement. However, there are significant problems in the fashion in which the women's movement has grown and developed. This is true of the fact that the movement has failed to mark distance from the NRM in a manner that affirms its autonomous and independent growth. In other words, the women's movement considers that it owes the advances made for women to the NRM.[21] Ultimately, such a posture undermines the women's cause and confines the development of the movement to issues that do not fundamentally challenge or affect the status quo. This was evident in the run up to the Presidential elections in 1996 and 2001 when women organisations conducting civic education were accused of campaigning for President Museveni.

The Media

The media can play a big role in consolidating democracy. The media has the ability to provide citizens with electoral and other kinds of social choices related to the provision of information about political candidates and events. The media can be vigilant against corruption practices and tendencies and can keep public figures accountable in the public realm. The media should scan information and set the agenda for politicians and citizens in the domestic and international arena. Lastly, the media can open communication channels and organise a dialogue among the various elements of society concerning everyday problems, chiefly with respect to the protection of ethnic and minority rights.

As regards the media in Uganda, more than twenty newspapers have sprouted since 1986. The broadcast media has been freed of state control and monopoly, and political commentary over virtually any issue is widely tolerated. Yet at the same time, at least 40 journalists have appeared before the courts of law charged with a variety of criminal offences since 1986; new laws governing the media have been enacted enshrining several questionable provisions, and punitive economic measures (increasing taxes on news print) have been deployed with the intent of curtailing the operation of the free press. Private newspapers also fear losing much-needed revenue from government advertisements and will engage in self-censorship rather than displease high officials. Private media in Uganda is emerging but most of it is in the hands of people close to the political regime or individuals who do not necessarily have the ambition of improving the performance of democracy, but are primarily profit driven, and hence have mainly commercial ideas in mind.

Religious Organisations

Churches appear to suffer the fewest organisational and financial handicaps. Their large memberships, strong, complex, and capable national organisations, politically sophisticated leaders, considerable financial security and independence, and international contacts allow them to maintain their autonomy from government. These strengths, combined with civic-mindedness, make Christian bodies important parts of Uganda's civil society, capable of breaking the 'culture of silence' imposed by years of authoritarian rule.

Yet in the context of democratic consolidation, religious bodies in Uganda have suffered underlying weaknesses. Nationalists view them with suspicion because of their colonial origins. They often compete fiercely among themselves (or with other religions such as Islam) for state support and recognition, thus compromising their non partisan credibility and moral authority and maybe for reasons of innate caution and self-preservation, these established religious bodies tend to prefer ad hoc rather than prolonged involvement in national politics.

Currently, the debate is raging in the country on the role of the church in politics. When the Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC)[22] declared their stand on the political transition[23] in Uganda, some elements of the system took it as a personal attack on the ruling movement government. Consequently, the President himself has attacked

the church and its supporters saying that Christians have nothing to do with politics. Except for the Catholic church, other churches appear to be silenced by President Museveni's stand.

Politicians in the present Museveni government seem to suggest that religion has no business in political issues. The problem is that when church leaders say what the government supports it is okay, but when they say what the government leaders do not like, it is a problem. These are double standards. In fact, political actors in the search for legitimacy have strategically used religion. More and more politicians attend religious ceremonies or finance religious activities by contributing to building or renovation of religious centres especially a few months before the elections.

In addition, the explosive growth in Uganda of 'independent' or millennial Christian churches[24] and new age religions appears to present a threat to the political influence of the 'orthodox' Christians and their organisations. Ultimately, the willingness of these newer churches and their leaders to align with governments for reasons best known to themselves could undermine the work that 'Orthodox' Christian groups do to counter governmental hegemony.

It is also important to mention that rivalries still persist among churches despite the apparent unity of the Christian community. In fact, churches still compete among themselves in the search for additional members. Most of the churches are also so fragile and affected by the conflict of their members over financial and leadership issues, resulting sometimes in the creation of new rival churches from the initial ones.

Political Parties

There is general agreement among political analysts that democratic consolidation would be impossible without the effective participation of political parties. However, on the NRM assumption of power in 1986, political party activity was proscribed ostensibly on the grounds that it was a significant contributory factor to the chaos of the past several years. As a consequence, political activity since 1986 has been dominated by the NRM, the traditional political parties being relegated to a state of political limbo.[25] Uganda has what is described as a 'no-party' democracy implying that full political contestation is restricted. Notwithstanding the restriction on political party activities, the Human

Rights Chapter of the Ugandan 1995 Constitution provides a solid framework within which civil society in Uganda can operate. Article 29 (1) (a), (d) and (e) guarantees rights of expression, assembly and association. However, it should be noted that, in cases where there are autonomous groups but a restriction on political activity exists, where autonomous groups can act in defence and furtherance of their members' interests but not politically and cannot place restrictions on the government, those groups constitute civil society forces rather than civil society as such.[26]

Concluding Remarks

It is therefore a truism, to say that the NRM has allowed the enhanced growth and evolution of civil society, and at others operated as a barrier to its free expression and development. In Uganda, the personalisation of political power and its use for private gain has made politics a high stake, in which President Museveni is desperately defended and challengers desperately attacked. Decades of authoritarianism have left behind a culture of incivility in politics.[27] In Uganda, politicians call their opponents 'murderers' or 'bastards' and have threatened to kill them. In such a highly charged atmosphere, civil society organisations fear to take on the state in fear of being branded enemies of the state.

One of the reasons for the slow development of Ugandan civil society has been the lack of a strong private economic sector. Vast swaths of the working and middle classes are still tied to government through employment, and the private sector is still acutely dependent on government for contracts, subsidised credit, foreign exchange, and protection from foreign competition. As a result, key social groups and their organisations are ultimately dependent on government and vulnerable to governmental arm-twisting.

Private businessmen, fearing the loss of profitable government contracts, may not place advertisements in private newspapers that the government sees as insubordinate. Therefore, business groups in Uganda are also not in the best position to support democratic consolidation. This is because some of the business groups tend to avoid confrontation with the state or involvement in politics, as they are state-funded or state-created. They find themselves confined to behind-the scenes lobbying on behalf of their own, narrowly defined interests.

It is also important to note that Ugandans are still emerging from the shadow of repressive rule. They still fear to take on the state. Because of Uganda's political history, political activism and political advocacy have not been widely embraced by CSOs. CSOs are timid and do not effectively call on government to account to their constituents. In fact, negative political experiences have created some apathy and wariness resulting in many CSOs maintaining that they are apolitical.

However, there are some rays of hope for civil society organisations as agents of democratic consolidation in Uganda. Firstly, multilateral and bilateral donors are increasingly refusing to regard national sovereignty and borders as sacrosanct, which means a greater willingness to give direct assistance to local NGOs and pro-democracy civil associations. In the past foreign assistance went through the state, with disastrous consequences for the autonomy of civil society organisations in Uganda. The increasing amounts of aid coming from pro-democratic international NGOs could help to redress this imbalance. Secondly, the increasing trends toward political liberalisation and pluralism in Uganda are getting civil society its best ever opportunity to flourish and thirdly, new information and communications technologies as fax machines and computers can help civil society organisations handle many organisational challenges and end state-imposed isolation by networking through electronic mail.

All of these developments are encouraging, but taken together they are not enough to change the most likely prospect. African civil society, given the deep-seated and multifaceted problems it faces, is probably not going to lift itself out of its doldrums in time to play a key role as an agent of democratic consolidation. The feasible goal, in every case, should be to reduce the severe organisational, financial, legal and political constraints that presently burden civil society. That is a responsibility for all supporters of African democracy both foreign and domestic.

For a long time Uganda has had a one-party propaganda instead of real education for citizens. With the possible demise of the movement system of government in 2006, civil society organisations need to urgently establish a nation-wide structure for civic education. Civic Education including voter education should be carried out periodically, covering the entire country. This will ensure that the population is constantly aware of the issues at hand and knows how to exercise their obligations as free people. There is a need for civic education providers to agree on a broad based National Civic Education Framework through which fund-

ing partners can channel funding for civic education delivery in Uganda. This programme needs to adopt a rights-based approach that will highlight human rights, domestic law (including the constitution), regulations and principles of participatory government as mechanism for enforcement and the realisation of the values and priorities of the community.

Civil society organisations need to improve their knowledge of one another and deepen their collective awareness of the pivotal role that they must play in fostering democratic governance. This greater knowledge and deeper insight promise to bear fruit in the form of greater cooperation, assertiveness, confidence and perhaps efficacy. Civil society organisations need to evolve an internal culture of adherence to democratic process and respect for human rights before they can hope to effectively and genuinely contribute to the wider course on the same issue. They must devise means of being substantive and more participatory, and to relate more directly to the target groups they are designed to support by directly involving them in all stages of the planning and execution of their projects. In sum, the exercise of democratic rights must be given full expression. At the same time there is a great need for establishing and fortifying sustainable links with other actors in the arena, both those operating within a similar sphere of action, and those outside.

If CSOs were able to organise themselves into a representative body that could interact with government this would substantially increase their legitimacy. Because of this dis-unity amongst CSOs in Uganda it is very difficult for them to take on a unified position on specific issues. Under these circumstances many CSOs prefer not to speak at all. One idea is to have a designated APEX (or lead) institution working around particular issues or sectors that could prepare background information and 'drive' the debate forward. Such an institution would address the following problems:

- Disunity within the CSO 'community' resulting in the absence of a clear and more effective 'voice'.

- Difficult working relations between CSOs, the Government of Uganda and other stakeholders.

- An ineffective and inefficient use of resources because of duplication of actions and activities between CSOs.

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African Instituted Churches in Southern Africa: Paragons of Regional Integration?[1]

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Abstract

While the role of Christian churches in the struggle for liberation in Southern Africa has been acknowledged, most writers have glossed over the importance of religion to regional integration. Most studies on the churches tend to be limited to specific countries and thus overlook the transnational connections. This study explores the activities of African Instituted Churches (AICs) in Southern Africa. It examines the emphasis of some Apostolic churches on black economic empowerment and outlines their dominance in the informal sector. It argues that AIC members are actively involved in cross-border trading and have formed transnational support systems. Fellow believers in Botswana, South Africa and Mozambique, for example, host AIC traders from Zimbabwe. This study maintains that whilst politicians and technocrats on the continent are still debating issues concerning indigenisation, the NEPAD initiative and other strategies for integration, AICs are already implementing these ideas. The study recognises the importance of religion to Southern Africa and analyses the role of spirituality in the quest for total liberation in the region.

Résumé

Bien que le rôle des églises chrétiennes dans la lutte pour la libération de l'Afrique australe ait été reconnu, la plupart des écrivains ont négligé l'importance de la religion dans le processus d'intégration régionale. La plupart des études ont tendance à se cantonner à des pays spécifiques, en survolant les connexions transnationales. Cet article s'intéresse aux activités des Eglises à Institution Africaine (AIC) d'Afrique Australe. Il étudie l'importance que certaines églises apostoliques accordent à la notion de *black economic empowerment* (émancipation économique des noirs) et souligne la prédominance de celles-ci dans le secteur informel. Cette analyse démontre que

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les membres des AIC sont activement impliqués dans le commerce transfrontalier et ont constitué des systèmes de soutien transnationaux. Par exemple, les disciples du Botswana, d'Afrique du Sud et du Mozambique hébergent des commerçants AIC du Zimbabwe. Cette étude affirme que pendant que les hommes politiques et les technocrates débattent de questions relatives au processus d'indigénéisation, de l'initiative du NEPAD et autres stratégies d'intégration, les AIC, elles, sont déjà en train d'appliquer ces principes. Cette étude reconnaît l'importance de la religion en Afrique Australe et analyse le rôle de la spiritualité dans le projet de libération totale de cette région.

Introduction

Regional and continental integration have become buzzwords within African political and economic discourses. Underpinning the initiative to have the African Union is the conviction that harnessing resources will bring economic and social benefits to member states. The spirit of cooperation is also indelibly imprinted on the collective consciousness of African peoples. As one African proverb puts it, "When spider webs unite, they can trap a lion." The ideal of Pan-Africanism has also galvanised nations to strive for unity and cooperation across the continent. It is envisaged that, with gritted determination and singleness of purpose, Africa shall finally shrug off the "Dark Continent" image and experience remarkable transformation in the postcolonial period.

Regional bodies such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have emerged from this drive to attain integration. A number of studies have been conducted on different aspects of this process. These include trade and investment in Southern Africa (Chipeta 1998), labour and migration (Sachikonye 1998), as well as migration and development (Matlosa 2001). Such studies have shown the potential of Southern African countries to bring better living standards to their citizens. However, the religious dimension within the quest for integration has been consistently overlooked. This has had the effect of reducing discussions on regional cooperation to purely economic and materialistic issues. This study seeks to correct such an approach by highlighting the importance of spirituality in African life.

This study acknowledges the role of religion in social transformation in Southern Africa (Walsh and Kaufmann 1999). Using the example of African Instituted Churches (AICs), the study argues that religion plays a significant role in bringing people of the region together. In the first section, the study outlines the emergence of AICs, paying particular attention to their emphasis on black independence in all sectors

of life. The second section highlights the importance of religious links for some cross-border traders from Zimbabwe. It illustrates how a shared faith has acted as the basis for mutual support for believers coming from different countries. The third section argues that AICs provide a useful model of grassroots cooperation within the region. In conclusion, the study urges planners to recognise the continued vibrancy of spirituality within Southern Africa. As technological sophistication increases, it will become tempting to dismiss the religious approach to reality as a relic from the past. This study maintains that the region can use religion as one of its greatest assets in striving for health and prosperity.

Domesticating Christianity:
The Rise of African Independent Churches

Before a description of the contemporary activities of the AICs can be undertaken, it is necessary to provide a brief background of their emergence in the region. This topic has attracted the attention of scholars from diverse disciplines. Numerous debates have emerged regarding the causative factors, typology and terminology (Anderson 2000: 8). A number of terms, including, 'African Independent Churches', 'African Initiated Churches', 'African Indigenous Churches' and 'African International Churches' have been used interchangeably to characterise this phenomenon. These labels strive to capture the African initiative in Christian mission. They also seek to distinguish AICs from the 'mainstream' or 'mission-derived' churches such as the Catholics, Anglicans, Methodists and others. A detailed analysis of the terminology goes beyond the purview of this study.

The remarkable success of Western Christian missionaries in Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has been well documented (Isichei 1995). Through the translation of scriptures into African languages, provision of social services and other strategies, Christianity succeeded in capturing the African imagination. Many Africans converted to Christianity, resulting in a significant shift in its centre of gravity to the two-thirds world. The notion of Christianity as the white person's religion was profoundly challenged as Africans embraced the faith in large numbers.

The mass movement of Africans to Christianity was, however, not without problems. In Southern Africa, Africans experienced racism in

the mission churches. Many white Christians discriminated against blacks, regarding them as junior brothers and sisters. This refusal by whites to accept blacks as equals is one of the main reasons for the rise of AICs. Africans also felt that the style of worship in the mission churches was too static and they endeavoured to implement a lively style. The demonisation of most African beliefs and practices by the missionaries also encouraged Africans to seek alternative havens of belonging. Lack of leadership opportunities, personal ambitions, theological controversies and other factors resulted in the rapid multiplication of AICs (Daneel 1987).

By the 1920s, AICs had become a significant feature of the religious landscape in Southern Africa. Africans had taken it upon themselves to couch the Christian message in African idiom. Rejecting the verdict of most foreign missionaries that African culture was heathen and in need of cleansing by the gospel, many founders of AICs actively sought to appropriate indigenous traditions in their movements. Within the Zionist churches, namely those that yearned for the holy city and were moved by the Holy Spirit, a creative adaptation of African Traditional Religions (ATRs) was consciously sought. Most of these founders had little formal education but they succeeded in unleashing a powerful movement that decisively changed the face of Christianity. In the hands of energetic spirit-filled prophets, the Christian message underwent radical interpretation and transformation.

Some founders of AICs retained the administrative structures of the Western denominations they had separated from. These churches are often termed 'Ethiopian' and they also had a strong Africanist thrust. Empowered by the passage, "Let Ethiopia hasten to stretch out her hand to God" (Psalm 68:31), Ethiopian churches preached the message of African emancipation in all sectors of life. Ethiopianism should be acknowledged as one of the key guiding ideologies in the struggle for liberation by blacks on the continent and in the Diaspora (Chirenje 1987).

Although AICs were diverse in their beliefs and practices, and continue to be so today, they were all characterised by the desire to allow Africans to express themselves freely in the new religion. Independence from white racism, paternalism and oppression is a salient feature of the AIC movement in Southern Africa. Rejecting the Hamitic myth of perpetual black subservience and inferiority to whites, AICs sought to equip their followers to affirm their dignity and value. Through the

composition of new songs, reading the scriptures from African stand-points and dramatic healing sessions, AIC prophets repackaged Christianity as an African religion that found resonance with African aspirations. Some scholars in the study of African Christianity have maintained that Christianity has taken an essentially African flavour, a central goal of the AICs (Chitando 2002).

In Zimbabwe, some founders of AICs, like Johane Masowe, had distinctive messages to deliver to the blacks. His Apostolic movement sought to empower blacks economically by challenging them to reject their low status in the racist and oppressive formal sector. This was a response to oppressive legislation that sought to protect white interests during the colonial period. Masowe encouraged his followers to be creative and to find alternative strategies for survival in a stifling environment. They became actively involved in the informal sector, excelling in basket making and metal work (Dillon-Malone 1978). By withdrawing from participating in the highly skewed colonial economy, AICs were undermining the oppressive system.

The emergence of AICs in the region was also tied to the nationalist awakening. Colonial regimes were wary of the brazen confidence of African prophets who asserted the right of blacks to worship openly and unhindered. Many colonial administrators were worried about the spontaneity characterising AICs, rightly fearing that the Holy Spirit could blow in the direction of armed resistance. Prophetic utterances on the integrity of blacks coincided with the nationalist cry that Africa belonged primarily to Africans. Significantly, both the AICs and African nationalism went beyond the narrow confines of colonial boundaries. Both movements were characterised by transnational networks, with nationalists like Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe getting their nationalist awakening while in South Africa. Similarly, some AIC founders in Zimbabwe were indebted to South African prophets. The following section seeks to briefly examine the transnational networks that are discernible in the activities of AICs.

Going Forth: AICs in Southern Africa

The emergence of AICs in Southern Africa is intimately related to the movement of people and ideas within the region. A good example is how AICs in South Africa provided the impetus for the rise of AICs in Zimbabwe, with returning migrant workers founding their own churches. This South African influence can also be detected in the spread of wom-

en's movements in the mainline churches. Migration within the region preceded colonialism, although the gold mines of South Africa heightened these cross-cultural exchanges. It is also important to note that mutual exchange characterised this interaction, with migrant labourers from within the region influencing the host culture in turn.

David Maxwell (2002: 296-297) has observed that, "The so-called African independent churches had a great propensity to movement, often to the point of its being a defining characteristic." This observation is accurate and stems from the fact that AIC preachers criss-crossed the region with the message of an African spiritual revival. Central to their message was the conviction that the hour of Africa's salvation had come. Unlike the missionaries who interpreted salvation in a trammelling manner, AIC preachers had a holistic understanding of salvation. Africa's salvation entailed total religious, political and economic emancipation. Armed with this message, AICs spread across the region at a pace that surprised missionaries and scholars alike.

Charismatic men and women like Isaiah Shembe in South Africa, Masowe in Zimbabwe, Alice Mulenga Lenshina in Zambia and others felt compelled to spread the gospel to Africans. Highly mobile and propelled by an acute sense of urgency, they called upon Africans to embrace Christianity, but with an African flavour. Masowe Apostles, for example, took a conscious decision to preach across sub-Saharan Africa. Their founder had a clear Africanist agenda where Africa would become the centre from which the message of salvation would go into the world. Similarly, Paul Mwazha formed his African Apostolic Church that sought to project Africa as the new source of salvation history. Where the white missionaries had written off Africa, AIC leaders were becoming the new missionaries to Africa. They disputed the claim of racial superiority by the whites and endeavoured to demonstrate that Africans were spiritually equipped to preach the good news of human liberation. Harvey Cox (1996: 251) rightly notes that, "no one can read their early history without noticing a certain element of rebelliousness against European expressions of the faith, for the founders of these churches were rebels as well as prophets."

Women have played a significant role in the rapid spread of AICs in Southern Africa. Apostolic women in their distinctive white garments and Zionist women in colourful outfits have become an integral part of urban life in the region. It is women who constitute the majority of members within AICs, and they have been central in the emergence of

transnational networks that have emerged. A number of reasons have been proffered in an effort to explain the dominance of women in AICs. One of the key attractions is the space that has been granted to women in these new religious movements. They are allowed to express themselves fully, and to occupy key offices as prophetesses. Thus:

> Africa's new religious movements provide a rich and varied spectrum of women's agency. Religious symbols and practices shape women's perceptions of themselves, their relations with others, their ability to act, and provide strategies for survival and empower and disempower them within the context of their religious and wider communities (Hackett 1995: 262).

AIC women constitute a massive evangelising army that has spread this particular brand of Christianity in Southern Africa. As they traverse the region in cross-border trading, these women have carried the message of African self-reliance. Other AIC women have become itinerant preachers, moving from one community to the other. It is through such constant changing of operational zones that AICs have posed a fundamental critique to the inherited colonial boundaries. AICs preach the message of salvation to Africa in her entirety, and pay little attention to imposed borders. In the following section, I seek to highlight how this feature has contributed to regional integration.

Cords That Cannot Be Broken: AICs and Regional Cooperation

When the former colonial masters met at the Berlin Conference in 1884/1885, they carved the continent with scant regard to the existing political and cultural boundaries. Close relatives often found themselves in different countries due to the arbitrary nature of the exercise. In some places, communities need to apply for visas to enable them to cross borders and hold traditional rituals at their sacred shrines. AICs have generally refused to endorse the colonial invention, preaching to Africans wherever they are found. As the previous section highlights, AICs have spread throughout the region, cutting across national and ethnic identities. These ties that were formed amongst AICs during the colonial period have been sustained in the postcolonial period.

On the basis of a shared faith, AICs have provided support systems for members from different economic backgrounds and nationalities. In South Africa, for example, AICs have multiple functions, including

acting as mutual aid societies and supporting small-scale businesses (Oosthuizen 1992). In urban contexts where the traditional family support systems are not always readily available, AICs have played important roles. As healing movements, AICs in Southern Africa have brought together people with diverse identities and have given them a sense of unity. This capacity to build new communities is an important resource that should be utilised in the quest to forge a common African identity. It emerges from the ecumenical nature of AICs.

Although African Christianity inherited the divisive aspect of denominationalism from the missionaries, it has sought to promote ecumenism. Mainline Protestant churches in most countries come together under their National Council of Churches. In Zimbabwe, AICs have an ecumenical organisation called Fambidzano, initiated by the missiologist Inus Daneel. At the continental level, the Organisation of African Instituted Churches (OAIC) seeks to present the collective voice of indigenous churches. It is this ecumenical thrust of AICs that has facilitated the cooperation of members in the informal sector.

Cross-border trading within the SADC region has a long history that precedes colonialism. In the postcolonial period goods and services have moved in various directions, depending on the state of particular national economies. When the economic situation in Zimbabwe deteriorated in the 1990s, there was a marked increase in the volume of cross-border trading. Individuals selling stone sculpture, electrical goods and other items constantly moved between the country and South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and other countries.

The decision to take up cross-border trading as an alternative survival strategy is in most cases painful and characterised by anxiety. Women in particular have found the patriarchal ideology dominant within the region suffocating (Gaidzanwa 1998). Negative labels and suspicions have accompanied women who have become economically empowered by selling their wares outside the country. As Victor Muzvidziwa (1998) notes, female cross-border traders from Zimbabwe face numerous challenges in their quest to fend for their families. These include xenophobia, sexual exploitation, difficult visa requirements and others. With the shortage of foreign currency in the late 1990s, the continued vibrancy of the sector has been threatened. AIC women traders have used the resources from within religion to strive to overcome these challenges.

AIC members in host countries have sought to mitigate some of the challenges that Zimbabwean traders face. Since accommodation is one of the major problems that the traders face, AIC members in host countries have often been willing to stay with fellow believers from Zimbabwe. A good example is the close cooperation between members of the Zion Christian Church (ZCC) in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Due to the influence of the South African church in the formation of the Zimbabwean one, strong ties exist between the two AICs. Furthermore, members in both countries often put on distinctive badges that give them a specific identity. Informal traders from the ZCC in Zimbabwe have been well received by fellow believers in South Africa and Botswana.

Access to markets is another daunting challenge that cross-border traders have to negotiate. Due to the experience of AICs in the informal sector, members in host countries induct those coming from outside. Although competition certainly exists, it is clear that contact with fellow believers in a specific trade has enabled Zimbabwean traders to thrive. This spirit of unity amongst believers is cultivated and enhanced at religious gatherings in the different countries. A lot of networking takes place at the various transnational conventions within the region. As with the newer Pentecostal churches, AICs utilise connections that transcend national boundaries. Thus:

> The 1980s and '90s have seen the development of an increasingly complex web of transnational Pentecostal networks, where flows of people, money, ideas and images circulate with speed and intensity, defying all attempts to pin them down to any particular source or destination (Corten and Marshall-Fratani 2001:1).

A good example of this form of networking is discernible in the operations of one of the largest AICs in the region, the African Apostolic Church of Paul Mwazha. It holds an annual convention at its sacred site, Guvambwa, in Zimbabwe. It was at Guvambwa that Mwazha had a vision where he was commissioned to be an apostle for the African continent. Over a million pilgrims from all over the region attend this significant event. Preachers from different countries emphasise the centrality of a shared faith and call upon adherents to have a common identity. It is such ideologies that help to foster the spirit of cooperation amongst members of AICs in Southern Africa.

Periodic retreats to mountains and secluded spaces also equip AIC traders from different countries to share a feeling of belonging. This practice of regular prayer and fasting gives AICs a deep spiritual out-look. Emerging from holy groves and putting on a common white gar-ment, AIC members momentarily obliterate national, ethnic and class distinctions. A fellow believer-a prayer warrior-from Zimbabwe becomes closer than an unbelieving compatriot. Through intense supplication and inspired singing, members of AICs plead for earthly success in the various fields of life. In this quest, nationality plays a secondary role to the common African and black identities. It is as African brothers and sisters that members of AICs approach and treat each other.

The regional integration championed by AICs is based on the need to utilise Christianity in the struggle for black economic empowerment (Chitando 1998). AICs interpret the Christian message as availing abun-dant life to all Africans, irrespective of their country of origin. Deliver-ance from spiritual and material poverty and foreign dominance in all spheres of life is a key feature of salvation as it is preached in AICs. In a context where cross-border traders and other Africans operating in the informal sector may be tempted to give up, AICs urge their follow-ers to continue fighting. As forces of globalisation and Economic Struc-tural Adjustment Programmes threaten to liquidate Africans economi-cally, politically and culturally, AICs motivate their members to perse-vere and subvert these stifling systems. Thus, "Pentecostals conscientize the individual to fight back, to refuse to accept defeat, want, failure and pessimism or negativity"(Kalu 2000:127).

The grassroots cooperation that exists amongst followers of AICs across the region has valuable lessons for proponents of regional and continental integration. Their transnational support systems are effec-tive and emerge from a shared religious ideology. In the ensuing section, I seek to highlight the significance of the AIC model to policy makers in the region. I argue that grassroots communities are marching ahead of planners and politicians in the area of integration.

AICs and Regional Integration: Some Emerging Themes

AICs in Southern Africa illustrate how ordinary citizens implement various developmental programmes ahead of official pronouncements and declarations of intent. Due to their long history of networking within the region, AICs are already living out the ideal of regional inte-

gration. While politicians and planners have held consultations on indigenisation, the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the African Renaissance and other initiatives, AICs have already begun to bring these into reality. To make this observation, however, is not to denigrate the value of academic reflections. It is to recognise the fact that the grassroots communities should be allowed to influence policy planning.

Ideological consciousness will be invaluable for the success of regional and continental integration. It is regrettable that in the euphoria of globalisation and the reality of a unipolar world, 'ideology' has become politically incorrect. Although struggles for black liberation from the yoke of slavery and colonialism were based on clearly enunciated ideological principles, economic integration in postcolonial Africa is still expected to occur in an ideological vacuum. AICs provide a helpful model in terms of providing sound ideological principles. President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa has rightly insisted that Africa is fully human. Thus:

> An essential and necessary element of the African Renaissance is that we all must take it as our task to encourage she who carries this leaden weight to rebel, to assert the principality of her humanity-the fact that she, in the first instance, is not a beast of burden but a human and African being (Hadland and Rantao 1999:173).

Following the setting up of the African Union, nagging questions remain concerning its operations. Stringent visa requirements and travel restrictions continue to frustrate the movement of people and goods on the continent. Although many nationals from Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe perished during South Africa's liberation struggle, most South Africans have repaid them with xenophobia and condescending labels. While they are willing to embrace white immigrants, many black South Africans loathe immigrants from within the continent. This absence of solidarity has meant that true regional integration has received its greatest support at the level of rhetoric. African political leaders have congratulated each other for initiating lofty philosophical projects that do not reflect the reality on the ground.

AICs may impart valuable insights to those who seek a democratic renaissance in Southern Africa in terms of their insistence on African ownership of resources. As the preceding sections illustrate, founders of AICs proclaimed the gospel of self-reliance and utilisation of African

resources for the development of her people. As long as Africa's re-
sources are in the hands of foreigners, she will continue to enjoy 'flag'
independence, devoid of control of wealth. Although President Robert
Mugabe of Zimbabwe has had his radical approach to the land issue
demonised due to a number of contradictions, the principles upon which
his project is built are commendable. In his pronouncements on the
land question, he has consistently evoked a theme emerging from the
AICs: Africans should be left to become masters of their own destiny
(Mugabe 2001).

The networking amongst AICs in the region shows that consider-
able steps have been undertaken to achieve integration. As AIC mem-
bers from Botswana and South Africa share the ritual meal of remem-
bering the sacrificial death of Jesus, they solidify a common African
Christian identity. When the Apostolic women in Bulawayo, Zimba-
bwe's second largest city, trade in large amounts of foreign currency
with their sisters from Mozambique, they weave strong bonds that can-
not be broken easily. In these little symbolic gestures, AIC members are
vividly demonstrating how people within the region can usher in a new
era of cooperation.

However, as the region seeks to propel itself into a vibrant zone
characterised by democracy, good governance and economic growth, it
finds itself facing the menace of HIV/AIDS. The region is at the epicen-
tre of this pandemic, which threatens to reverse all the gains that have
been achieved so far. South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe are amongst
some of the worst affected countries in the world, and the high death
rate has generated a lot of despair. The AIC message of healing, com-
passion and hope becomes particularly relevant in this context. Amidst
so much suffering and death, hope usually becomes the first casualty.
The AIC prophetic message of hope may resurrect and recharge com-
munities to meet the challenge (Okeyere-Manu 2003).

Despite the challenges posed by HIV/AIDS, the informal sector has
continued to be the arena where much creativity has gone on. Policy
planners in the region need to take this sector seriously. In many in-
stances, proponents of regional integration have operated with grandi-
ose projects in mind. However, small to medium scale projects across
the region may be more beneficial to ordinary citizens. Of special sig-
nificance should be projects that target the empowerment of women.
Although women in the region heave under the weight of oppressive
cultural practices, they have demonstrated remarkable resilience and

tenacity. AIC female cross-border traders in Zimbabwe have increased the disposable income of their families. It is therefore important to support such women if the ideal of liberating women is to be achieved.

Technocrats in the region often overlook the valuable insights that may be derived from the activities of AICs. A secularised approach to developmental issues is dominant, and the role of religious communities is often understated. While the continent is awash with religion, most deliberations on the future of the continent proceed without the faintest reference to spirituality. Perhaps this is due to the belief that religion stifles development or that it may be too divisive. In the following section, I argue for the continued relevance of spirituality to African development. I maintain that spirituality is an important resource that has been overlooked in discourses on Africa's reawakening. Spirituality could play an important role in the quest for regional integration.

Spirituality in Southern Africa: A Forgotten Resource?

While this study has highlighted the significance of AICs to the quest for regional integration, the NEPAD document (2001:42) devotes only a paragraph to the role of culture in the new dispensation. It is obvious that those who crafted this document have succumbed to the secularised view of reality. Perhaps they felt that it was embarrassing to include references to religion and culture in a document dealing with economic and technical issues. It could also be that they were convinced that Europe has attained high levels of economic development while adhering to a secular approach to life. However, I am convinced that such a perspective fails to appreciate the value of religion to African life.

Granted that Christianity, Islam and indigenous religions have not always been beneficial to Africans, it remains true that religion plays an important role on the continent. To ignore the religious dimension is to fail to approach *homo Africanus* in her entirety. As the discussion on the role of AICs in the informal sector shows, religion has a direct bearing on economic activities. By utilising the idea of African self-sufficiency, AICs have mobilised their members to undertake useful economic activities. It is therefore crucial for those who seek to achieve regional integration to pay attention to such initiatives by grassroots religious communities.

The spirituality that characterises communities in Southern Africa was a significant factor during liberation struggles. By emphasising the right of Africans to lead wholesome lives, activists from various spiritual traditions actively participated in the quest for freedom. Religious texts from these traditions were interpreted in the context of human rights, as blacks fought for their rightful place. In Zimbabwe, some AIC prophets condemned the colonial regime for its naked racism and oppression. They encouraged blacks to subvert the economy by moving into the informal sector. In line with the indigenous African understanding of salvation, AICs preached the message of holistic liberation.

As policy planners in the region seek to consolidate the democratic renaissance, they should creatively appropriate progressive religious ideologies. The spiritual traditions that are dominant in Southern Africa can be utilised to promote human liberation (Cohn-Sherbok 1992). This will facilitate a more promising approach to development. It is religion that influences identity and commitment to ideals. Without fanning the flames of fanaticism, religion can be used to mobilise individuals and communities to strive for what they uphold.

> As Africa positions herself to attain economic prosperity on the platform of unity and cooperation, the message of AIC prophets remains urgent and valuable. Long before the contemporary discourses on the African Renaissance, Paul Mwazha proclaimed the message of the "Recreation of Africa". In his 1940 vision, Mwazha was shown a united and economically independent Africa. He went on to preach about the need for Africans to achieve high academic standards for them to challenge Western dominance. Mwazha proclaimed that Africans should fight for religious and political emancipation. His prophetic pronouncements find resonance with the current calls for an African Renaissance (Chitando 2003: 248).

African spirituality can also be appropriated to equip the inhabitants of the region to persevere in the wake of the challenges that lie ahead. This study has already raised the threat of HIV/AIDS and how it has sapped the confidence of African communities. Faith-based organisations will be required to play an increasing role in HIV/AIDS prevention and care. AICs have been actively involved in this struggle, moving resources from one community to the other. Through their grassroots approach, AICs in the region have presented a formidable front in the fight against HIV/AIDS.

Spirituality is a valuable resource that should be harnessed for regional integration and development. It can become a uniting factor for the diverse communities of Southern Africa. As the example of AICs illustrates, sharing a common religious ideology has facilitated the coming together of people with different backgrounds. Spirituality can help individuals and communities in the region to overcome potentially divisive identities. It is therefore incumbent upon African intellectuals to appreciate the value of spirituality to African life and to integrate it within their programmes.

Conclusion

In this study I have argued that AICs provide a helpful model to those who seek to forge unity and cooperation within the SADC region and on the continent. Emerging as "sites of struggle" during the colonial period, AICs have pressed for black liberation in all spheres of life. Furthermore, AICs have sought to transcend colonial boundaries, encouraging all Africans to work together for mutual benefits. AICs have therefore moved from rhetoric to action, facilitating the participation of their members in programmes meant to promote black economic empowerment. Adherents of AICs have formed regional support networks in their struggle for progress. I have also maintained that the quest for an African Renaissance may be enhanced by appropriating the important resource of spirituality. It is my firm conviction that AICs in Southern Africa have proudly marched ahead of policy planners and politicians and serve to impart valuable lessons to all those who pause to reflect on the role of grassroots communities in the proposed new Africa. These movements are spiritually grounded, economically astute and ideologically sophisticated: ingredients necessary for the rebirth of Africa.

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The Utilisation of Africa's Environmental Resources and the Challenges of Globalisation: A Case Study from Eastern Tanzania

*William Rugumamu**

Abstract

This paper concerns the micro-environment and globalisation nexus. With the effective participation of the leadership in Morogoro region, Melela village on the leeward side of the Uluguru mountains was identified as an ecologically and economically problem area typified by, among others, periodic drought, crop failure, food shortage and famine, relief food supplies, urban-rural migration, land use conflicts and a community sensitive to agricultural market signals. It is indeed this state of affairs that makes Melela village an interesting diagnostic case that calls for in-depth analysis of agro-biodiversity conditions under economic globalisation and indeed for urgent resource planning and management.

Résumé

Cet article porte sur le réseau du micro-environnement et de la mondialisation. Avec la participation effective des dirigeants de la région de Morogoro, le village de Melela, situé dans les montagnes Uluguru, et placé sous le vent, a été identifié comme une zone posant des problèmes d'ordre écologique et économique, caractérisée entre autres par une sécheresse périodique, des récoltes déficitaires, des pénuries alimentaires, des périodes de famine, l'acheminement d'aide alimentaire, une migration urbaine-rurale, des conflits fonciers et une communauté sensible aux signes du marché agricole. C'est cette situation qui fait que le village de Melela est un cas particulièrement intéressant à étudier, qui appelle une analyse profonde de

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l'agro-biodiversité dans le cadre de la mondialisation économique, et exige également une planification ainsi qu'une gestion urgente des ressources.

Background to the Problem

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is endowed with a rich diversity of environmental resources. Some of these terrestrial and aquatic resources are country specific while others transcend national boundaries of two or more countries within the region. Since World War II, Africans have embarked on the massive utilisation of their environmental resources for improving their quality of life and that of their global business partners (Frobel et al. 1988; French 2000). In spite of the abundance of these resources, local communities, predominantly smallholder farmers and pastoralists, whose production systems are based on traditional environmental knowledge systems (TEKS) are now unable to meet their basic needs, sustain environmental productivity and even have an equitable share of the global wealth (ADALCO 1990). The predominance of international trade over local needs fostered, among other things, specialisation in spatial production and exchange of goods and services on a global scale. As a consequence, it is evident that in some geographical areas, natural resources are still sustainably utilised, while in others there is evidence of environmental degradation (Stebbing 1935; Timberlake 1985; Blaikie 1989; Juma and Ford 1992; Rugumamu 1993; Boyce 2002).

Modern-day advances in agricultural technology in industrialised countries, however, pose great challenges that lead to the failure in the agricultural industry in the subregion. Smallholder farmers cannot afford modern-day environmental knowledge systems (MEKS). With globalisation accelerated by advancement in media technology and communication, these technologies are gradually diffusing universally and are creating an environment for rapid changes in the economy in SSA (Ohiorhenuan 1998; French 2000; Boyce 2002). Being supported by new supranational policy regimes, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), trade and production are becoming more homogenous. Under the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) championed by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Brown and Tiffen 1993) globalisation is pursued in order to facilitate the use of modern-day agricultural production systems to revamp the ailing SSA economies.

Given that in Tanzania, like in other SSA countries, environmental resources form the corner-stone of socio-economic development, and that the nature and characteristics of the environment are ultimately limiting factors for the well-being of the local people and the state, there is the need to come up with strategies and tools for environmental policy and programme reform in planning land use. For the government of Tanzania, one way of combating ecological and socio-economic depression has been to opt for political and economic reforms under the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). These policies are tailored around perceptions of the international donors (the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, United Nations agencies) regarding the causes of and solutions for Africa's underdevelopment (Blaikie 1985; World Bank 1997; Juma and Ford 1991; Rugumamu 1993). Their goal is to create conditions conducive to the play of free market forces and free flow of goods and services between countries and the outside world. (Lal et al. 1988). As noted by Rugumamu (2001) among others, processes of globalisation and their impacts have been documented at the macro-level in a variety of ways. There are however, few corresponding studies at the micro-level.

This paper concerns the micro-environment and globalisation nexus. With the effective participation of the leadership in Morogoro region, Melela village on the leeward side of the Uluguru mountains was identified as an ecologically and economically problem area typified by, among others, periodic drought, crop failure, food shortage and famine, relief food supplies, urban-rural migration, land use conflicts and a community sensitive to agricultural market signals. It is indeed this state of affairs that makes Melela village an interesting diagnostic case that calls for in-depth analysis of agro-biodiversity conditions under economic globalisation and indeed for urgent resource planning and management.

Theoretical Framework

Globalisation is conceived as a set of worldwide processes which strive to selectively link the world economy into a single global market village. The increased shrinkage of economic distances between and among nations is facilitated by policy changes towards economic liberalisation. The integration processes are also strongly associated with rapid development in technology, production, trade, and finance. They are thus correctly seen as consisting of two separate but not necessarily mutually exclusive trends – the globalisation of production and trade,

and the globalisation of finance and capital flows. The rapid advancement in the field of information communication technology (ICT) set in motion by transnational corporations (TNCs) and other actors has facilitated linkages across national boundaries. The processes have since opened new gaps between information-rich industrialised nations and information-poor developing countries. Some actors in the game, mostly in the North, gain whilst the majority of those in the South lose (Kennes 1997; Hoffmaister et.al 1998).

The TNCs and other actors are a lead agency in the allocation and re-location of national economic processes within a global system. TNCs are more able to control and hence link national level companies and markets to international ones (Boyce 2002). Conventionally, these linkages have accelerated the integration of two spatio-economic systems, namely a globalised space in the developing countries, and a globalising space at the centre of the global economic system in developed countries into one whole (Milton Santos, pers. com; Amin 1976.). The polarisation of technology at the centre through massive investment in the telecommunication and computer systems for networking and on-line data distribution by satellites is a process that makes areas and distances shrink, making the centre the custodian of technology and power and hence the engine for global unilateral change.

On the policy side, one instrument for global trade integration is the creation of the WTO. The establishment of this institution has ushered in a new era of multilateral trading arrangements. Within this framework, however, SSA economic performance between the mid-1980s and the 1990s has been disappointing (UNCTAD 1993). It is reported that SSA economies experienced falling shares, mainly relative to other developing countries, during 1987-91 in spite of preferential market access accorded to them. This demonstrates how Africa has failed to economically compete on the global scene. These results may be attributed in part to the inability of Africa to assert herself in the fields of trade, technology, finance and production in a global village.

Centres in the globalised space, the periphery, serve as facilitators and consolidators of technology and power from the western centres, but not vice-versa. The impacts of the total processes on a globalised space might be reflected by the degree of environmental degradation and economic decline. Furthermore, the dynamic relationships in the global system will serve as an indicator of the behaviour of the key role players with respect to environmental resources. It is within this frame-

work that a better understanding can be gained at the micro-level of the mechanisms necessary for regulating sustainable resources productivity under economic globalisation for present and future generations in the subregion.

The environmental resource component considered in this study is land. Geographically, the concept land refers to a specific area of the earth's surface; its characteristics embrace all reasonably stable or pre-dictably cyclic attributes of the biosphere vertically above and below this area including those of the atmosphere, the soil and the underlying geology, the hydrology and the plant and animal populations, and the results of past and present human activity, to the extent that these at-tributes exert a significant influence on present and future uses of the land by humans (adapted from Smyth 1972; FAO 1976). Included also are the adverse results of human activity processes. The principle objec-tive in land resource utilisation that this paper seeks to promote is the attainment of sustainable economic development and social equity through the wise utilisation of the resource base for the present and future generations (WCED 1987).

Sustainability and development as concepts have had a variety of interpretations since they gained prominence in development literature in the 1980s. The World Commission on Environment and Develop-ment (WCED 1987), for instance, refers to 'development that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs' as sustainable. Un-fortunately, a focus on sustainable development has diverted attention from gross inequities that exist between and among the people of the South and North. Furthermore, it has glossed over the disproportion-ate use of power and resources within and between the North and the South. Sustainability in agriculture and natural resources should thus allow for progression towards an ever improving quality of life – for nations as well as individuals and the environment (The Independent Commission on Population and Quality of Life 1996). It is against this background that the article conceives sustainability as a strategy that consolidates environmental and developmental concerns in pursuance of economic prosperity and social equity while preserving the integrity of Mother Nature for future generations.

To this end, sustainable productivity of the land user and the environmental resource base in the SSA is conceptualised at a production unit level within a specific macro-ecological zone. When the agricultural

production goals are dictated by needs of the community, and the resilience of the resource base is maintained indefinitely, then the pattern is sustainable. As the production process is linked to the needs of the North and indeed at the expense of the survival economy, an over-utilisation of natural resources which exacerbates degradation is inevitable. For this very reason it is timely to explicate the impacts of the land users' economic activity processes and their technology on the productivity of environmental resources within global market forces.

Technology, as an engine of development, may be broadly conceptualised as systematic knowledge, skills, practices and machines, usually of industrial processes but applicable to any recurrent activity process. Being closely related to science and engineering, technology deals with the tools, skills and techniques for carrying out the plans (Muller 1980) through liquidation or consolidation in industrial technology. As reported by Chungu and Mandara (1994), technological development is important as a major determinant of the level and pattern of national economic development and also as a major determinant of international competitiveness. Economic development and technological advancement are positively correlated.

It is in this light that the sustainability of agricultural production and the physical environment should be seen (Cooke 1991). This is central in development, in that it is conceptualised at the outset that we are concerned at all levels – household, local, sub-national, national and international (Carpenter 1980; Blaikie 1989; Boyce 2002). As globalisation strives selectively to integrate the world into a single global market village, the prospects for sustainable development of ecologically and economically marginal areas have to be clearly understood. It is within this framework that this article contributes to a critical assessment of the impact of processes of economic globalisation on the utilisation of Africa's environmental resources.

Objectives and Methodology

The specific objectives of the article are two-fold. First, to assess the impacts of economic globalisation on the environment with specific reference to an ecologically and economically fragile ecosystem typified by Melela village in eastern Tanzania. Second, to propose a viable approach for achieving socioeconomic prosperity and equity and ecological stability through community-based resource use systems in Africa.

To achieve these objectives the paper adopts a methodology based on a political economy approach in understanding the application of ecological principles in agricultural production processes under economic globalisation. The issues examined are the contemporary socio-economic ecological relations of smallholder farmers to their land holdings as well as with their business partners. The approach thus seeks to integrate local human needs and ecosystem production capacity within an international economic setting as a basis for identifying adverse consequences and a search for sustainable development. The paper draws evidence from the study of an area on the leeward side of the Uluguru Mountains in Eastern Tanzania. This approach therefore, pays equal attention to the local communities' livelihood needs and those of the ecosystem, plus the generation of a surplus for the international market by providing a holistic framework for sustenance in the realm of environment, economy and policy development.

The remaining part of the paper falls into two main sections. The proceeding part outlines contemporary land use types and environmental management technologies, both traditional and modern ones, as a basis for a better understanding of relationships between economic globalisation and the utilisation of environmental resources. The section thereafter reviews the key impacts of economic globalisation processes on environmentally and socioeconomically marginal ecosystems in SSA as reflected in Melela village in eastern Tanzania.

Assessment of the Environment and Economy in Eastern Tanzania under Globalisation

Farmers' land holdings are a component of a specific macro-ecological zone, the semi-arid zone. The discussion considers the agrobiodiversity conditions for the functioning of a given farming system. It explores contemporary land use types and environmental management technologies, both traditional and modern, as a basis for a better understanding of relationships between economic globalisation and the utilisation of environmental resources.

Evolution of the Utilisation of Tanzania's Environmental Resources

Experience in the SSA countries reveals a long tradition of well-adapted TEKS for sustained environmental productivity before the coming of

colonialism (Ruthenberg 1971; Van de Welle 1972; Kjekshus 1977; Rodney 1980; Neriove 1988). Allan (1965) notes, for instance, that pastoralists were capable of assessing the feed value of different rangelands and their stock carrying capacity at different seasons of the year. The Barabaig in northern Tanzania have a strong stake in maintaining fodder trees and have customary rules regarding utilisation. Amongst the agropastoralists, there were some communities who developed a sustainable agricultural production system based on mixing crop production with animal husbandry, until the arrival of Rinderpest (Kjekshus 1977).

With respect to the skills and innovativeness of the land users, Boserup (1965) cites the case of Ukerewe Island, in Lake Victoria, where population pressure has triggered agricultural intensification through technological inventions, thus averting food shortages and maintaining soil productivity. Further more, the ability of the farmers to adopt new crops such as rice and maize in the nineteenth century and to incorporate them successfully in their farming systems (Illife 1972) is a positive indicator of the farmers' ingenuity in sound land husbandry. It is further reported that during the pre-colonial period, the Sukuma people, south of Lake Victoria, had already developed mechanical soil conservation technology (Rounce and Thornton 1939). The farmers construct tie-ridges to address the problem of soil-water loss, fertility depletion and decreased yields.

In spite of these technological and institutional advances in earlier times, land degradation processes are as severe as ever (UNSO 1986; Hudson 1987). In some areas, the problem has since been associated with drought hazards, when in actual fact, drought is one of the precursors (Rugumamu 1993). Recent studies have revealed that land degradation in Tanzania knows no ecological boundaries (Rapp et al. 1973; Amin 1986; GEO-SAREC 1990).

It has been noted that in the semi-arid areas of Tanzania only poorly vegetated areas are susceptible to surface run-off as downpours set in (Van Rensburg 1955); Christiansson 1988). Such a monolithic view of the problem has led some distinguished scholars to refer to soil erosion as a technical issue (Morgan 1986; Stallings 1987). They propagate terracing, gully stabilisation, tree planting and so on as control measures, when in essence the problem is socio-economic, political, ecological and technological in origin. This is a holistic view of environmental degradation propagated among others by Carpenter (1980); Blaikie

(1985); Feierman (1990); Shiva (1991); Juma and Ford (1992); Rugumamu (1996); Boyce 2002).

The failure of colonial policies and measures to combat ecological degradation in Tanzania is clear testimony of the lack of a holistic approach to mitigate the hazard. For instance, most efforts directed to export crop production improvement have had no bearing on either food crops, livestock keeping, forestry nor water sources management, reflecting a high level of sectoral fragmentation. According to Berry and Townshend (1973), the colonial administrators failed to take into account the land users' attitudes to conservation when prescribing conservation measures. It is argued here that the land users were not involved in planning land management. It is the local skills and practices employed by smallholder farmers that are the major foundation for sustaining agriculture and the environment (Biowman 1974; Hudson 1987; Feierman 1990; Choucri 1998). Hence the colonial command-type approach to environmental management created resentment among smallholder farmers and pastoralists which in turn endangered resource sustainability.

In response to declining land productivity, the Government of Tanzania has introduced a number of programmes and policies since independence, but has met with limited success (Berry and Townshend 1973; McAuslan 1980, DANIDA 1989; Rugumamu 1996). It is imperative, therefore, to assess the impact of globalisation on the environment and development.

The Case of Melela Village, Uluguru Mountains in Eastern Tanzania

This subsection outlines the environmental resource base with which economic globalisation articulates. The tract of land of the Uluguru Mountains referred to is the leeward side represented by Melela village settlement (Rugumamu 2000). The village is located about 35 km in the neighbourhood of Morogoro municipality and along the Tanzania-Zambia Highway (TANZAM). The size of the village is yet to be accurately determined but official estimates put it at 80 square kilometres (8000 hectares). Administratively, the village is a subset of Mlali ward, Morogoro Rural district in Morogoro region, Eastern Tanzania. The

region is one of the 20 administrative regions in Tanzania, and occupies about 8.2 percent of the total mainland area.

As for local level governance, Melela is governed by the village council and headed by a democratically elected chairman. There is also a village executive officer who is a local government employee. The secretary and the various village committees, finance and planning, social services, and defense and security issues, are the council's executive arms as provided for in the 1982 Decentralisation Act. Administratively, the village is subdivided into nine sub-villages (*vitongoji*) each led by a ten-cell entity (*balozi*).

Geologically the country rock in Tanzania is composed of the Pre-Cambrian basement complex that has been subjected to tectonic and metamorphic processes and cycles of erosion resulting in a mosaic of rock types and landforms (Berry 1971). Geomorphologically the Uluguru mountains, of which the Melela is but a part, have been subjected to block faulting in several orogenic periods during the late Tertiary, Pleistocene and as recently as the Holocene. The occurrence of small inselbergs in this unit spells a multiplicity of land facets namely the hillcrests, upperslopes, midslopes and footslopes. V-shaped valleys and tributary channels with steep sloped sides dissect this pediment, and ephemeral streams characterise the study village during the short and long rainy seasons as uncontrolled surface runoff. Permanent rivers include the Melera and Kikundi and some of their tributaries.

The mountains intercept the South East Trade Winds (SETW), thereby creating a rainshadow over the village. It is this environmental condition that is typified by a fragile semi-arid type of climate, given that climate is the most important single factor influencing agricultural production in SSA. The annual average amount of rainfall at the Melela site in the rain shadow is 719 mm (Jackson 1971). Further, the amount of rainfall tends to increase significantly with increasing altitude reflecting marked precipitation variation within short distances around the mountainous land surface (about 0.2 km). On the temporal scale, rainfall distribution on the leeward side starts in late February and continues into early May. It peaks in March and April, occasionally accompanied by violent thunderstorms. Generally, short rains are atypical yet in good years they are reported by farmers to start in late October and end in early December. The dry season lasts for up to nine months and starts in early June and ends in mid-February.

Using a 51 mm month as a criterion for assessing the length of a rainy season (Jackson 1971) the village experiences a soil-water deficit for almost the whole year round, punctuated by a short growing period of about 90 days. Furthermore, the village experiences periodic drought (occurring every four to ten years). The PRA team reconstructed 1974, 1978, 1984, 1988 and 1998 as a series of dry years with disastrous effect on the crops, livestock, and water sources. This condition renders the village vulnerable to the serious effects of drought, a precursor of desertification. A dependable rainfall occurs in one out of five years. Most dependable water sources for human development in the study area include traditional boreholes, popular shallow wells (*mdundiko*), and piped gravity water from the slopes of the Uluguru Mountains.

The mean annual temperature and evaporation are 23.40 C and 1760 mm respectively. It is noted that the annual temperature range (5.40 C) is generally less than half the monthly range. Seasonal temperature variations are small, and the diurnal range is more significant given pronounced temperature inversions in the deep mountain valleys at night. The leeward village location influences day length, wavelength and the intensity of light. All these aspects are important factors, especially with regard to plants, as they do not vary independently. It should be noted that as the mean angle of incidence becomes more oblique, it affects the intensity of different wavelengths to different degrees to the extent of the convex slopes being left in the shade. It should be noted that both temperature and sunlight have marked effects on growth and development of plants and indeed crops – the processes decreasing as the two variables decrease.

After rainfall, probably the single most determining influence on agricultural production is soil conditions. Soil is thus a major resource for human development, especially in developing countries. Melela soilscapes may be grouped into three types, namely the skeletal soils (Lithosols); the moderately deep and excessively drained soils, and the well to imperfectly drained deep soils. The latter two types may be tentatively classified as Ferralsols varying from Rhodic to Ochric. The skeletal soils are shallow (less than 25 cm deep),derived from acid gneisses. These soilscapes are dark reddish brown sandy loams typical of hillcrests and upperslopes. The moderately deep and excessively drained soils (25-100 cm deep) are derived from in-situ, weathered and colluvial materials occupy steepslopes. They are yellowish brown sandy clay loams to well drained yellowish red clay loams and stony silt loams.

These soilscapes cover most of the upper piedmont land unit, typified by upperslopes and midslopes. The well to imperfectly drained deep soils are derived from colluvial-alluvial materials found on the lower pediment on gently sloping to relatively flat footslopes. These soils are predominantly dark grayish brown silt loams to yellowish red sandy clays and clay loams. Mineralogical analysis reveals high kaolinitic clay content (30 percent) found in the lower pediment land unit soils which makes them suitable for brick making (both sun-baked and kiln burned bricks).

The selected community is typified as practising low-external-input systems – TEKS. A horticultural centre locally known as Melela Bustani, a private farm enterprise within the village ecosystem, was identified as a model for natural resources management for sustainable development based on MEKS. This foreign managed farm is a highly mechanised enterprise that could serve as the vision for Melela community and the entire lee-ward Uluguru mountain ecosystem on the biospheric part of production conditions, but of course, not on the economic front. The two production systems have been reported to have good relation in the context of exchange of some aspects of technology and markets.

This sample area is floristically poor and dominated by shorter degraded woodland, the eastern miombo type. The upper pediment is typified by much shorter Brachystegia boehmii, B. speciformis, B bussei and Julbernardia globiflora to degraded Combretum bushland in the dry areas. These trees are mixed with grasses like Hyparrhenia rufa and Panicum maximum as understorey. The lower pediment's native vegetation is dominated by the Acacia-Comiphora deciduous woodland/bushland and Hyperrhenia spp in the wetter areas. While some hillcrests are denuded others are covered by medium Heterogon-Combretum wooded grassland. Vegetation has been severely degraded by human processes, and the current threats include housing construction, cultivation, grazing, fuel wood, bush firing, accelerated soil erosion, urban-rural migration, and weak regulatory by-laws. The productivity of the land resources in this ecosystem is, therefore, facing the risk of over-exploitation.

In terms of land use, agriculture is the most important socioeconomic activity in this rural setting. In 1999 it was estimated that about 38 percent of the arable land was under cultivation with the rest of the village land lying fallow and/or serving as pasture. Based on ecological conditions and recently on dietary preferences coupled with develop-

ments in agritechnology, the staple food crops grown include maize, sorghum, and millet. Minor crops are legumes, vegetables, and fruits. National campaigns on food security have facilitated the substitution of drought tolerant crops like serena and lulu for sorghum, and staha, kilima, and katumani for maize. Agricultural production is predominantly subsistence farming and livestock raising. Farming practices employed by the majority of smallholder farmers are characterised by short fallow periods, rudimentary tools including fire for bush clearing, and the generation of a cheap soil ameliorant such as crop residues and ash. The village authorities consider both wildlife, vermin and livestock to be natural enemies of the agricultural industry.

As for the livestock keeping, indigenous breeds of cattle, goats and sheep define the industry in the study area and in Tanzania in general. Other domestic stock includes pigs, donkeys, and chicks. The livestock population, save for pigs and chicks, is raised by way of the transhumance system. It is normally the lactating and the sick stock that depend on the village pastureland. The Masai and Kwavi are the main livestock keeping community. They are either agropastoralist or pastoralists keeping large numbers of stock and tilling the land. The pastoralists advance that seasonal migration and burning of rangeland during the dry season are strategies for pasture resource management.

Afforestation activities are ongoing in the area as can be witnessed around some homesteads, dispensaries, primary schools, and village offices (formerly godown). The most renowned development partners in this field include HOCEDSO – a Finnish NGO, World Vision and Catholic Integrated Community – a German-supported NGO, and locally known as Melela Bustani. These institutions have set up tree nurseries, promoted tree-planting education through competitions and with the school. The current tree planting campaign championed by NGOs, among other initiatives, appears to be a positive move towards greening the environment.

Waluguru people mainly inhabit the village with a minority of Wakaguru, Wakwavi, Wamasai and Wachaga. The village leaders estimated the village population in November 1999 (just before the 2000 general elections) as 3364. The able-bodied men and women resident in the village were about 1960 of whom around 51 percent were women. The average household size was five persons. As regards the origin of households, about 53 percent of the interviewees (52 heads of households) were born in the village, 11 percent within Mlali ward,

14 percent within Morogoro rural district, and 21 percent migrated into the village from outside the district. The survey shows that the village population growth is greatly influenced by immigration among other determinants. The Melela community also confirmed that the factor contributing most to population change was in-migration, especially urban-rural movement.

According to the sample, the population quality was such that slightly less than half of the women interviewed had no formal education compared to only about one-fifth of the male population. It clearly demonstrates that men have greater educational opportunities than women, even in the rural areas. The study, however, showed a high illiteracy rate. Traditionally, many parents do not consider sending their daughters to school on the grounds that they should help mothers with domestic and farming activities (Headteacher, pers. com). Education, as one of the most important factors in development and the one on which advances in health, wealth-creation and political culture and technology depend, is central to ecological sustainability. There was a deliberate attempt at involving a young group since it possesses the potential for sociocultural change. About 41 percent of the sample (42 respondents) constituted the aged with 55 percent being men, while the rest were youths, with 65 percent women and 35 percent men. The following subsection explicates key contemporary environmental utilisation types in Melela village.

Characterisation and Assessment of Major Land Use Types

Based on the adaptation of the FAO (1983) approach, five land use types were identified as a basis for characterising and evaluating Melela village land and the uses to which it may be put. The analysis of the two variables was based on the site and socio-economic conditions within which the industry operates. It is worth emphasising here that more than one land use may be practised in one enterprise, though not in one spatial continuum. The major land use types are:

A1: Smallholder rain-fed arable farming and improved traditional technology based on crop mixture of millet/sorghum/maize/cassava combined with legumes (beans, pigeon peas) with or without livestock.
A2: Smallholder rain-fed arable farming and improved traditional technology based on rice and sugarcane.

A3: Smallholder rain-fed arable farming and intermediate technology based on maize, (cotton and sunflower – dropped), vegetables with or without livestock.

L1: Smallholder livestock keeping and improved traditional breeds, namely cattle, goats, sheep, donkeys, and poultry, all based on ranges (agropastoralism).

L2: Smallholder livestock production based on improved traditional pig farming.

Setting and Produce

The land users' ingenuity and diligence with which they have managed their natural resources through time may be seen across the current resource use patterns over time and space. Generally, the land users have been able to locate and reallocate specific land use types in particular sites on the landscape, a catenary sequence (Conacher and Darlymple, 1977) for particular time periods with very limited agricultural extension support. The stakeholders subdivide their village land into three main units. These are Kilimani (Upslope), Mteremko (Midslope) and Bondeni (Footslope). This feature is as evident in the distribution of crops in the study area as it is in the siting of particular land use types on specific land units or otherwise over time.

Land use A1 characterised by millet and/or sorghum and/or cassava and/or maize combined with legumes is the most common land use type on almost all land units in the study area except where physical land resource limitations such as severe erosion sites, steep slopes, very shallow soil depths, or waterlogging occur. Land use A2 typifies monoculture crops and although rice is grown as both a lowland and upland crop, sugarcane is mainly a lowland one. The PRA team was aware of the concept of limitations on land use type to command location as a social construct, and hence the decision whether or not to use a soil resource was subject to debate.

Land use A3 constituting maize, non-food commercial crops (formerly cotton and sunflowers), was typical of the well drained level to gently sloping land facets on the lower pediment's footslope. Small holders explained that, due to poor marketing systems (a combination of the Tanzania Cotton Authority [TCA], National Milling Corporation [NMC] and the private sector), the production of cotton and sunflower has been abandoned in favour of maize. This land utilisation type reflects the smallholder farmers' sensitivity to market forces and the Regional and District Authorities' concern to reintroduce the pro-

duction systems and regain foreign exchange earnings. This state of affairs reflects the effects of globalisation. Authorities are working hard for the reintroduction of non-food commercial crops, and the situation involves the reorganisation of space by forces external to the land tiller and also to itself.

In the recent past (1960s), land use L1, including A1, A2, A3 practising livestock keeping, were commonplace on almost all leeward side members of the catena on a seasonal basis. Basically cattle, goats and sheep rely on natural pasture under free range. Every respondent who owned livestock was of the opinion that there was not enough grazing land. The dry season is characterised by an acute shortage of pasture and water. The distance to grazing land varies between the wet and the dry seasons. During the latter season animals wander longer distances looking for grass. As a general pattern, dry season grazing is carried out in the surrounding swampy plain and beyond. During the short wet season, livestock grazing is conducted around village land, especially on the short fallow land, on the stubble, and on forest land. This free-range management type opens almost all of the landscape units to L1, albeit on a rotational basis with crops and other uses of the land over time. The issue of mobility of this land use type L1 has a critical bearing on resource stewardship and conservation and the quality of life of the land users on a national scale. These agropastoralists/pastoralists have been trekking the country in search of grazing. Sedentary peasants tend to act as barriers and by the same token intensify resource use under traditional management systems. Incidentally, some herdsmen tend to deliberately graze their stock on farmers' crops, a situation that triggers conflict. The issue of conflict disaster, currently a hot debate in Tanzania, needs to be taken up in a full study.

Land use L2, typified by pig production under improved management, is carried out in the compounds of progressive farmers with zero grazing. The produce from this land use type is both pork and live animals. All pig farmers interviewed (14 percent) construct pens made out timber, and mostly feed their stock with maize husks. Distance from the farmers' dwellings is greatly influenced by the level of the security of the stock (an average of between 8 and 10 metres from the residential house). This land use type is, therefore, site specific.

Farm Holdings

Farm holdings are composed of disaggregated small plots. These small plots without specific geometrical shape appear to be located haphazardly on the land surface. The survey revealed that an average household farm size is an aggregation of small plots of about 1.4 – 3.8 ha in size. The available family labour and financial resources are major constraints on the size of farms. The largest farm in the sample was 15 hectares. Given an average household size of 5 members, this is indeed higher than the estimated national cropland available per capital of 0.3ha in 1990, which was expected to drop to 0.005 ha by 2025 (UNDP 1999).

By way of summary, for Land use A1, A2 and A3 it was found that out of 98 sample interviewees, about 19 percent cultivated less than one hectare, nearly half (48 percent) hoed one to two hectares, about 20 percent ploughed between 2.1 and 5.0 hectares, while 10 percent cultivate between 5.1 and 8.0. The remaining 3 percent cultivate more than eight hectares per year. With respect to the tenurial issue, it has been noted that its general nature has been changing in Tanzania since independence in 1961, as reviewed in the National Land Policy (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development 1995). The most conspicuous feature was the conversion of freehold titles to leaseholds under the Freehold Titles (Conversion) and Government Lease Act (Cap. 523) of 1963. This system was later changed into Rights of Occupancy under the Government Leaseholds. These changes lead to a decline in customary rights and the abolition of landlord-tenant relationships (Shivji 1998). These and other developments, notes Shivji (1998), have culminated in state land ownership and control. In Melela village, the village government holds land. Individual farmers have usufruct rights.

Land use L1 was being practised by eight percent of the sample. Livestock ownership ranged from one to fifty for two respondents, fifty one to two hundred for two respondents, two hundred and fifty one to five hundred for three and more than five hundred head of livestock for only one farmer. As for grazing land at the village level (land use L1), pasturelands are communally owned. But further out from Melela village the land belongs to the state and there is no formal control of grazing. With a change in economic policy, land which apparently had no market value is now a scarce resource. This new economic environment calls for an attendant policy shift toward a marketisation system

that looks after the conventional livelihoods of the majority of the rural poor while simultaneously promoting private sector development. The current situation is perpetuated by the parallel nature of traditional and modern laws – hence casting a shadow on access to and control over resources, a prerequisite for tenure security and sustainable resource utilisation cum conservancy (Rugumamu 2000b).

Weather changes, both seasonal and aperiodic, affect the availability of and hence distance to both pasture and drinking water points. The main sources of drinking water for animals and people are springs, rivers, and ponds (*mabwawa*). It was found out that estimated distances to water points for land use L1 varied from less than ten kilometers within the village boundary during the rainy season, to more than ten kilometers away from the village, ward, district, region, and even across the international borders to the southern neighbouring states.

Land use L2 employs zero grazing techniques in the raising of pigs. The main fodder is maize husks. All farmers in this category store the fodder to last for six to nine months, the life cycle of the stock. It was noted that at village level this feed supply faces stiff competition, with local brewing demand creating shortages, especially during the crop planting season when the cereals are in short supply.

With respect to land use A1, A2 and A3, the sample respondents stated that the tenure systems included inheritance (70 percent), village government allocation (11 percent), self acquisition (5 percent), and renting (12 percent). In some circumstances land may also be bought (2 percent). Land use types A1, A2, A3 are characterised by individual (private) ownership of plots under the head of a household. Amongst the Waluguru, the women inherit land, and when they marry their husbands live on the inherited land. A decision on how each parcel is to be used is made by the husband, the head of the household. Usually women have access to household land if part of it has been left uncultivated. The women may put this land under minor crops such as legumes. For rich female farmers some plots may be loaned out to the needy and even sold to other farmers.

At village level, transport is predominantly non-motorised – that is, human muscle. A few farmers own bicycles (14 percent) and others (8 percent) use tractors to transport crops (maize) from the fields to the homestead. In all land use types crop and livestock processing, transport is by traditional technology, thus making demands for mechanisation very low.

In an effort to understand the relationship between farm size, access to land and basic needs, it was found that 98 percent of the respondents felt there was enough land, and 20 percent stated that they could not meet their aspirations from the existing land resource base. Given that each farmer normally cultivates more than one plot, and these plots are randomly distributed along the village soilscapes, it is not surprising that in view of the system of land control, more women's plots than male ones are to be found on poorly productive sites. Being less productive, women's plots are also susceptible to degradation over time as they are put to use.

Household gender division of labour

The present gender division of labour at the household level is predominantly a reflection of the colonial capitalist mode of production (Rodney 1980). Generally men, women and children work on the farm and take care of the livestock with some degree of specialisation (Little 1991; Rugumamu 1999). Over and above these activities, women, with the assistance of children, are responsible for all the domestic chores. At the end of the day, women are more involved in food preparation and cash crops as well as livestock production processes than men.

Market orientation

Agriculture in the semi-arid areas is characteristically subsistence oriented (Rugumamu 1996). Regarding land use type A1, food crops are sold and bought within the village markets. The favourite staple food, maize, is also a cash crop which may be sold soon after harvest and re-bought just before the next sowing season as household food reserves run down. Before economic liberalisation, that is pre-SAPs, maize was sold to the state organisation, the NMC. Thereafter, the crop has enjoyed an assured market in spite of institutional malfunctioning. The findings reveal that, first, state marketing institutions (e.g. NMC, TCA) failed to buy their crops in good time, and even worse have underpaid for them. Now, under market-driven globalisation, the farmers have completely lost the usual outlets for their traditional cash crops. The present free market system has introduced the village market to unreliable crop buyers including consumer co-operative societies, saving and credit societies, and private entrepreneurs. The field findings show that the government has almost always left the peasants in the hands of

businessmen under the umbrella of economic liberalisation. Following from this the farmers have dropped the production of traditional export crops, like cotton and sunflowers, and intensified the production of the ecologically delicate commodity of maize, which enjoys demand in local, national and international free markets.

Land use type L1 produces dairy products and meat for domestic use and live animals, as well as hides and skins for local and international markets. Livestock are also a source of farm manure for the few progressive farmers. As for land use L2, farmers sell live animals and on very rare occasion's they sell pork. The latter is due to lack of local market as pork is more expensive and indeed a wild variety can be freely obtained in the bush. There is a growing pig market in Morogoro Municipality as well as in Dar es Salaam.

In terms of socio-economics, livestock, given their mobility, serve as security against droughts that destroy crops, and also against famine (animals can be exchanged for cereals). To the Masai and Kwavi agropastoralists livestock keeping is a cultural practice tied to their livelihoods unlike in a modern market system. A formal market for livestock products was also not evident. This applies to the lack of the livestock industry's infrastructure such as cattle routes, market posts, and security. At community level livestock are also needed in order to perform traditional ceremonies. It is against this background that the agropastoralists prefer to keep 'large' herds and are reluctant to reduce their stocks when pasture demand exceeds supply in a particular area. This state of affairs exacerbates transhumance and its negative environmental consequences. Some cultural attitudes and values, therefore, tend to propagate negative effects on commercialisation processes and on the environment. It is hence unquestionable that realistic price mechanisms coupled with environmental education and communication will encourage the agropastoralists to invest part of the profits in their land in order to raise its productivity.

Following from the above observation, it may be stated that the need for stabilising market development in the local economy cannot be overemphasised. It is therefore in this light that the lack of pro-poor investment in the natural resource base should also be seen.

Key Impacts of Globalisation on Environmental and Socio-economic Sustainability

Here an attempt is made to review some key impacts of economic globalisation processes on ecologically and socioeconomically marginal ecosystems in SSA as reflected in Melela village in eastern Tanzania. Carson (1962) was one of the first writers who eloquently articulated the issue of ecological degradation due to human mismanagement of the environment. The current economic liberalisation programmes regarding investment in agriculture can be considered in this light (Amin 1976; Seidman and Anang 1992; Brown and Tiffen 1993). For analysis, the paper draws heavily from available evidence in the semi-arid areas of Tanzania and indeed elsewhere, where most smallholders use low level technology in their production, storage and environmental conservation activity as a survival strategy. Experience, however, reveals that the world over farmers carry out 'experiments' on their farms, and adapt, innovate and observe the results of their efforts in manipulating these artificial ecosystems. Creating knowledge in this way is hence an integral part of sustaining ecological and agricultural productivity in the SSA (Rugumamu 1993). It may be advanced on the outset that intensive human use of fragile ecosystems is a risky investment both economically and ecologically.

To this end, it is anticipated that economic globalisation processes and their ecological-economic impacts may be understood through examining (i) financial investment by transnationals (ii) the growth of manufacturing of high technology machineries, seeds, fertilizers and insecticides, and (iii) the marketing of technology and produce.

Financial investment by transnationals

Private companies and financial institutions at the centre of developed countries are the agents of financial investments in developing countries under the banner of liberalisation of the global economy. Some urban entrepreneurs supported by foreign investors such as TNCs form major corporations investing in the high-value commodities in the agricultural sector (Barraclough and Finger-Stich 1996). WTO, for instance, is championing such a course. Agricultural land use types being contemplated in this area include smallholder intermediate level technology based on cotton, sunflowers and tobacco.

Being very influential, TNCs obtain preferential access to public or private lands, water, credits, markets, tax holidays, subsidies, foreign exchange and technology. Further application of low environmental standards resulting, among other factors, from faulty environmental impact evaluations, would exacerbate environmental degradation problems. The high returns in convertible foreign currency from high-value crops such as tropical vegetables and fruits make it an industry which has been greatly favoured by governments in developing countries as well as by transnational banks. Given the above circumstances, the state is compelled to transform multiple use/multiple user resources, historically used by local communities, to single use private property owned by national and/or transnational business corporations. Such circumstances might result in inefficient and unplanned use of environmental resources. As the tracts of land are appropriated by transnationals, the local communities become environmental refugees. But who benefits and who pays the cost of those foreign exchange earnings?

The interplay of foreign capital with local natural resources may be rated as the initial process in the internationally organised vertical integration of the modern-day farming industry within the framework of globalisation and liberalisation processes. National bureaucracies exerting state power too often promote the investment process, thereby aggravating spatial inequality. This process goes hand in glove with industrialisation in developed countries, deepening and widening the economic gap between the North and the South.

This trend has been observed in the study area, where a large tract of land has been set aside for ranching and game farming for an investor. The result has been the concentration of livestock keepers in relatively smaller loci, which in turn has led to pastoralists competing with smallholder farmers and investors for the shrinking land. The outcome is intensification of land use and subsequent soil erosion, sedimentation, and soil mining. Further more, competition for land is resulting in sporadic conflicts and civil strife in the area.

The growth of manufacturing of high technology equipment, seeds and fertilizers and insecticides

As already noted for the early 1980s, high technology machinery, seed, fertilizer and insecticide manufacturing industries in the industrialised countries of Europe, North America and Asia are likely to become increasingly important due to the rapid demand for agricultural produce

from the subregion with the onset of massive investment. Furthermore, growth in development research at the centre is prominenbt. An influx of a variety of manufactured inputs including heavy and light farm machinery, genetic engineering (seed), fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, and veterinary drugs as well as of technical tools for farm management is imminent. The list may also consist of off-farm, post-harvest production links such as industries for further transforming the produce.

The input manufacturers, being price determinants of their goods and services, have over time increased their own profits from developing countries. This is facilitated by the liberalisation policy adopted by most developing countries today. However, it should be noted that a few TNCs increasingly have oligopolistic control over the technology production sector. It follows, therefore, that massive investment will witness an economic boom in the North through industrial growth triggered by the input demand in the South.

In the South, however, organic farming processes carried out by smallholder farmers that are environmentally friendly are being promoted by NGOs. The pressure of foreign demands coupled with the basic family survival needs is suffocating these initiatives. It is in this context that government policies on agriculture that are export-oriented and directed towards earning foreign exchange favour wealthy farmers at the expense of poor peasants who have no access to credit, new technologies and indeed markets. Ultimately, these policies are threatening agricultural sustainability and environmental stability.

In the study area, the high prices for inputs such as fertilisers and insecticides have forced the smallholder farmers to stop production. These economically sensitive land users under the SAP have failed to gain any benefit as the prices of inputs in the absence of subsidies coupled with currency devaluation raises the prices of imported goods. Because there is practically no land use type that cannot be sustainably carried out without the renewal of soil nutrients, the current uses of land are leading to ecological degradation and the intensification of poverty. On the other hand, agricultural development based on subsidy input may lead to overutilisation of non-renewable energy that might result in 'dust bowls' or desertification. In this regard environmental degradation is a function of agricultural land use, the level of technology notwithstanding.

The above operations link natural resources utilisation in developing countries with industries in developed countries, demonstrating yet another globalisation process referred to here as marketing.

Marketing of technology and produce

The operations involved in the marketing process include the export of farm products and the import of crop and livestock production technologies. Overseas marketing agents, who are also increasingly powerful actors in the production chain, conduct the process. In several developing countries, it is reported that these providers of inputs such as freezing facilities managed to push direct producers to expand and intensify their production.

It is worth noting at this juncture that these foreign marketing agents tend to have more stable incomes because they often enjoy significant market shares covering almost all countries. Based on the above exposition, it may be stated that there is a general tendency towards vertical integration of the production chain, with TNCs as providers of technology, inputs and credits increasingly controlling all stages from production to marketing in both North and South alike. In the study area the marketing system was liberalised in response to SAPs, with insufficient preparedness planning. This state of affairs has led to weak competition amongst state-owned and private marketing institutions such as NMC and TCA that have failed to buy the export crops in good time, and have underpaid the land users.

In general, the new millennium should signal a paradigm shift 'from always-renewable Nature to revolt against over-exploitation of its resources' (*Report of Independent Commission on Population and Quality of Life*, 1996). That Mother Nature is finite should not be questioned by modern day biotechnology. Agricultural investment projects, for instance, virtually appear economically viable and environmentally sustainable in the light of MEKs advancement. This view is more challenging now than ever before when the SSA is grappling with the debt crisis that has paralysed to a high degree the social sector (education, health, transport and communication infrastructure) (Adams 1991). The motive driving the investor, however, is the high profitability of the industry and not its sustainability. It should be emphasised that the SSA is duty bound to guard against bankrupting the environmental resources of the future generations who are privileged to benefit most from the work we do today.

Transnationals argue, for instance, that investment projects in developing countries create employment opportunities – a poverty alleviation strategy. Given that opportunities for unskilled labour exist, real jobs are not sustainable. It may be noted among other reasons that first, there are no training facility components identifiable for local people in such projects, hence the job security is very low. Second, the projects are short-lived, with a duration of between five to ten years. These problems should be compared with the indigenous environmental resource use systems which, when improved upon, have the potential for sustainability, productivity and equity. It is against this background of rapid changes in food needs and the loss of indigenous knowledge and social cohesion, that smallholder farmers and their communities have often lost their self-confidence to adapt, innovate and create. These factors have, among other things, currently contributed to changing food consumption habits locally and at national level, resulting in food shortages, malnutrition and famine. However, like in Melela village, TEKS is now often insufficient to guarantee sustained development on both socio-economic and environmental fronts. Local people's traditional way of life has been threatened.

As for sustainability, the agrotechnological transfers in the SSA should effectively involve the local people as improved smallholder farmers and not as farm labourers and headmen. It should be noted that for the viability of the sector to create employment opportunities under globalisation, programmes for empowering local communities should go hand-in-glove with agricultural investment. Throughout history fertilizers and insecticides have played an essential role in transforming agriculture. As Altieri (1993) notes, massive yield increases have been achieved in both developed and developing countries through chemical applications as the leading tool. The Green Revolution in the South has made at least some countries self-sufficient in food. As liberalisation gains ground, imported machinery, seed, pesticides, fertilizers become unregulated, resulting in dumping of the commodities in developing countries. Evidence from the developing South reveals that pesticide use has generally not been appropriate for subsistence farmers on marginal lands on an economic and ecologic basis (French 2000; German Advisory Council on Global Change 1994). In spite of prohibitively high prices for fertilizers and insecticides, the relatively few smallholders who can afford them are reported to have been tempted to use more and more chemicals, wasting precious capital while simultaneously

creating environmental pollution. Inability to cope with these technologies is resulting in food insecurity, as observed in Melela village.

Disastrous consequences of the use of these inputs in poor countries of the South include human death and suffering, ever rising costs, increasing farmer dependence on expensive imports, water pollution and damage to biodiversity. To add insult to injury, because too often smallholder farmers are unable to read instructions on chemical containers, chemicals (eg DDT) abandoned in the North for health reasons are still available in the South.

Genetic engineering of seeds is an agrotechnology in industrialised countries which is unfriendly to smallholder farmers and ecologists. For instance, the cultural practice of locally adapted seed varieties and storage systems contributing to reduction in input costs is nullified. Hence the importance of cultural control techniques including botanical pesticides and locally adapted seed varieties currently in use by smallholders cannot be overemphasised (Anderson, et. al. 1996; Rugumamu and Mtumbuka 1998). The potential instability of the artificial agricultural ecosystems in which species diversity has been reduced is thus a subject of concern to biodiversity experts.

Unlike in smallholder production, where most soil nutrients feed crops and livestock products are consumed within the farming community, globalisation propels export-oriented production. The marketing of the produce overseas contributes to soil nutrient exhaustion in the soil system as crops and livestock products are exported. High levels of nutrients involved in this loss include the macronutrients N, P, K (German Advisory Council on Global Change 1994). The situation worsens as production is intensified, yields and nutrient content of the products are increased, all characteristic of western resource exploitation systems. To genuine environmentalists such soil mining practices are unethical (Lal, Miller and Logan 1988). The need for proper environmental impact assessments (EIAs) cannot be overemphasised.

Furthermore, the monitoring activities in the EIA should give concise alternative solutions to issues like socio-economic shocks on the international market. It should be noted that many consumers in the North are increasingly concerned about how their food is produced and are prepared to pay more for products using methods that are environmentally sound.

Because the nature at the end of the investment regime is not spelled out in the investment codes, chances are that the productivity of the

land at the end of the production season may be lower than at the start. Such a situation is contrary to the principles of sustainable agricultural development and is thus disastrous to the ecology and economy. The above risks would also be coupled with the emergence of environmental refugees who are marginalised by the new industry together with consequent psychosocial, economic and ecological effects besetting them. The EIA statement should, therefore, reveal these disasters holistically as cumulative and interactive compounding over time and space.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In light of the above findings, it is concluded that economic globalisation processes destabilise smallholder farmers, benefit TNCs, and accelerate the degradation of the environment in SSA. The way out is to empower smallholder farmers so that they are able to take advantage of economic globalisation through planning and management of grassroots based and environment-friendly and profitable production systems of high quality produce. In the light of the above evidence it is clear that economic globalisation processes should be tuned to respond to the material conditions prevailing in the SSA as dictated by the needs of the local people and the carrying capacity of the land. It is axiomatic to conclude that environmental degradation is a function of agricultural land use, the level of technology notwithstanding, but one should quickly add that the problem is deeply rooted in the policy sphere. To this end, development scholars and policy makers are duty bound to take the lead in reforming this situation. It is proposed that democratic opportunities be promoted for enhancing smallholder farmers' and agropastoralists' food self-sufficiency and environmental sustainability using participatory planning. Empowered farmers are more able to take advantage of globalisation through practising environment-friendly agricultural production systems which meet the needs of the farm family, the environment and at the same time production of high value produce for the anonymous market (Agarwal and Narain 1990). In this regard, it may safely be stated that economic globalisation is raising the rewards for countries introducing sound economic governance, but is also raising the costs for economies with poor economic governance. This results in some actors being winners and others losers. We reiterate that a viable approach for achieving economic prosperity and social equity should be based on stakeholders' democratic participation in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of land use plans

and policies in the SSA (Peatti 1968; Carpenter 1980; PRA 1991; FAO 1993; Boyce 2002).

In principle, to alleviate poverty and conserve the ecosystem calls for the effective participation of local people in planning and management of their natural resources (Bandyopadhyay and Shiva 1989). Capital investment in resources may lead to over-exploitation, negating local progress and creating environmental refugees and land and water deterioration. Such a situation will only accelerate rural poverty tides making many more people poor and the already poor ones poorer than ever before. As initial capital and high yielding technologies are always missing ingredients at the local level, well-tailored joint venture type investments – locals and foreigners – may be a viable solution towards poverty alleviation and resource sustainability.

In order to achieve equity and benefit from globalisation processes there is also the need to reexamine gender divisions of labour and smallholder productivity enhancement requirements within the context of household, subnational, national and international ecological and socioeconomic conditions.

The proposed measures are as follows: (i) regulating liberalisation to meet ecological and smallholder farmers' needs on a sustainable basis. (ii) Access to appropriate productivity enhancing resources, namely farm machinery, fertilizers, seed, insecticides, and efficient cooking stoves. (iii) Access to education, especially regarding the gender division of labour and environmental resources management. Training in appropriate seed, fertilizer and pesticides usage is necessary. Veterinary services must be extended. Sound water and sanitation programmes are vital. Finally, an emphasis on Integrated Management, (IM) should be pivotal.

Through participatory learning approaches, researchers should support the local development process through setting up research with the farmers to investigate problems and opportunities identified by farmers (Rugumamu 1999). Researchers should take part in studies to assess, for example, local institutions and provide advice in setting up a land use planning and management (LUPM) programme. Together with farmers and other stakeholders, researchers should further monitor and evaluate LUPM projects' initiatives in terms of the set programmes and policies. In view of the high cost of research the private sector, the central government and the international organisations as well as the donor

community are called upon to support this reform initiative in the new millennium.

To this end great attention should be directed to improving TEKS in order to increase environmental resources productivity, improve food security and alleviate rural poverty. It is of paramount importance, however, that agricultural research in the changing socio-economic systems should be an on-going process because specific objectives change. As a technology is developed and used, the production system changes where a new constraint becomes limiting and hence a new technology is to be derived. Achievement of sustainable development and resources productivity should thence be based on methods that democratically integrate men and women as important players in participatory planning of available and potential natural resources management.

There is, therefore, an urgent need now for designing improved yet appropriate environmental resources utilisation technologies to enhance the productivity of the smallholder farmers and their ecosystems given that the major global thrust is to invest in developing countries (French 2000). This goal can only be achieved through a major policy reform at national and international levels to create the conditions for sustainable development at farm level. In this regard democratic global governance based on vibrant civil organisations should be a driving force to bring about new economic globalisation opportunities in SSA in the Third Millennium.

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Reforms and Industrial Development and Trade in East Africa: The Case of Tanzania

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Abstract

The objective of this discussion is to critically examine the performance of the industrial and trade sectors in the context of the East African Community (EAC). It has been shown that the industrial performance has some direct impact on trade and that Tanzania's trade shares to EAC are still low. Furthermore, despite the recent impressive performance of the industrial sector, there are traditional and competitive challenges to the sector. The paper therefore concludes by providing policy recommendations.

Résumé

L'objectif de cette discussion est d'examiner sous un oeil critique les performances des secteurs de l'industrie et du commerce, dans le contexte de la Communauté Est-Africaine (CEA). Il a été démontré que la performance industrielle a un impact direct sur le commerce et que la part commerciale de la Tanzanie au sein de la CEA reste faible. En outre, malgré la récente bonne performance du secteur industriel, il subsiste d'anciens défis concurrents au niveau de ce secteur. Cet article conclut en fournissant des recommandations de politique publique.

Introduction

The pre-reform period in Tanzania was in the main guided by policies based on African Socialism (*Ujamaa*) in terms of the 1967 Arusha Declaration. Such strong ideological emphases were absent in the other East African Community Countries. The differences in ideology was

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probably one of the factors which contributed to the disintegration of the East African Community in 1977.

The economic crisis of the early 1980s shook the region's economic performance, including industrial development and trade. In Tanzania, the impact was exacerbated by the aftermath of the war with Uganda – a short-term domestic phenomenon. This resulted in the decline in GDP, an acute shortage of goods and inputs, and an unsatisfactory performance of industrial and other productive sectors as discussed in the subsequent section. The first effort to manage the crises was the 1981 National Economic Survival Programme (NESP) followed by the 1982 Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Effective reforms, however, started in 1986 with a series of economic recovery measures guided by IMF/World Bank. These led to effective market reforms and privatisation.

The performance of the economy and the industrial sector in particular fluctuated with changing policies and crises. Industrial commodity trade also tended to follow the fluctuations.The objective of this article is to examine critically the industrial and trade sectors' performance in the context of EAC. The emphasis is on the period after the introduction of reform.

Market Reforms and Industrial Development in Tanzania

Background Information

The Tanzanian economy in the first 15 years of independence (1961-1976) was impressive in terms of economic growth. During the first six years the economy was largely guided by inherited policies. As noted in the introduction, between 1967 and 1985 the Tanzanian economy was essentially guided by the state. The first ten years of the period (1967-1976) saw a fairly satisfactory economy in terms of growth and provision of basic goods. During that period the economy grew by about 5.4 percent while the industrial sector grew by 6.5 percent. The policy emphasis on the provision of basic goods and services certainly paid off (Bagachwa 1992: 23). However, the period just prior to the effective reforms (1980-85) saw the economy grow by 1.2 percent while the industrial growth was almost negative throughout the years averaging -4.9

percent. This was essentially due to the early 1980s general crisis referred to in the Introduction.

Reforms and Industrial Performance

During the first Economic Recovery Programme (ERP I: 1986-1989) the real growth of the economy was 3.7 percent while that of narrowly defined industrial sector (manufacturing) was 2.7 percent. The average growth rate was about 3 percent during the 1986-1991 period while the industrial contribution to GDP averaged 9 percent. For details see Table 1.

Table 1: Industrial Sector's GDP and Employment Rates and Contribution to GDP (%).(1992 Prices)

Year	Overall GDP Growth	Industrial Sector to Growth	Contribution GDP	Employment Growth
1986	3.3	0.1	9.1	1.8
1987	3.9	4.1	9.2	-9.9
1988	4.2	3.1	9.1	0.4
1989	3.3	5.2	9.3	7.4
1990	3.6	4.1	9.2	2.5
1991	3.3	1.9	9.1	-1.3
1992	3.0	-4	8.6	3.5
1993	4.1	-0.6	8.6	0.1
1994	3.9	-0.2	8.4	3.3
1995	4.0	1.6	8.2	1
1996	4.2	4.8	8.3	-0.1
1997	3.3	5.7	8.1	2
1998	4.0	8.0	8.4	3.9
1999	4.5	3.6	8.3	5.5
2000	4.9	4.8	8.3	6.5
2001	5.7	5.0	8.3	6
2002	6.2*	8.0*	8.4*	10.3*

Source: United Republic of Tanzania (henceforth URT) *Economic Surveys* (various issues).
Note: * Provisional.

Capacity utilisation also increased in some industries from lower levels in 1985 to higher levels in 1991. Examples are textiles, cement, cigarettes, soft drinks, cooking oil, tyres and match boxes. (See Appendix, Table A). This was attributable mainly to the eased availability of raw materials and spare parts as a result of foreign exchange being more accessible during the recovery period. Another related factor was the rehabilitation of many industries, which became visible in 1989.

However, the growth rate became negative between 1992 and 1994. The contribution of the industrial sector to GDP declined from 9.1 percent (1991) to 8.6 percent (1992).

The official reasons for this trend include:

- unfair competition between domestically produced industrial products and imported products especially the case of textiles after introducing trade liberalisation. This was compounded by unfair competition resulting from cheap and untaxed (illegally) imported industrial products;
  government efforts to reduce government deficit and money supply (as reflected in recommendations based on structural adjustment);
- the migration of skilled/technical manpower from the public sector to newly established private enterprises where higher salaries and fringe benefits prevailed;
- declining effective demand for industrial goods due to the decrease in consumers' purchasing power;
- an increase in costs of production, especially the component relevant to public utilities (electricity, gas and water) and transport and communication; and
- frequent power interruptions, inadequate water supply, and unsatisfactory transport and communication services.

Some comments on these points are in order: The first three reasons can easily be related to the early impact of structural adjustment, or market reforms. The rest of the reasons were mainly internal. We may add the following reasons: misuse of funds and other properties; management problems; liquidity problems; delays in formalising proper foreign exchange applications due to bureaucratic procedures; inappropriate technology; and the low quality of industrial products (Kapunda 2000:6).

After 1994 industrial growth was positive. In fact, the average real growth was 5 percent despite the relatively low percentage contribution to GDP. In recent years both the economy's growth and industrial growth

seem to be very impressive. The increase in production has been mainly a result of the rehabilitation of divested/privatised enterprises, the establishment of new industries, and an improvement in the supply of electricity and water (URT 2002:143, URT 2003:179). Industrial employment has been higher than before, largely as a result of an increase in private and informal enterprises and also in small scale and medium industrial firms. (URT 2003:179).

But it should be noted that a few industrial products have improved their market competitiveness. Products with remarkable sales performances include beer, cigarettes, soft drinks, bottled water, tyres and textiles. The increase in sales is mainly due to an increase in quality, a more efficient distribution system, and vigorous promotion and advertisement. Joint ventures and privatisation have also contributed positively in some cases, as with beer.

With regard to production costs and prices it is observed that they are still relatively high. Most of the industrial commodities are sold at higher prices than imports. This tends to discourage domestic production. Some of the reasons for high domestic prices include an increase in production costs including expensive imported inputs, high transaction costs, and a partially reformed tax structure regarding commodities.

Most industries produce consumer goods. The contribution of consumer goods industries to total industrial earnings was 57 percent in 1990, and it rose to 63 percent in 1998. In the same years the contribution of intermediate goods fell from 29 percent to 24 percent and that of capital goods declined from 14 percent to 13 percent. It is often argued that to realise economic independence, capital goods and intermediate goods industries play an increasing role in the economy. In the long run the two types of industries should overtake the consumer goods sector in terms of contributions to the economy. However, the case of Tanzania seems not to follow the trend. Part of the reason is that most (foreign) investors concentrate on consumer goods industries where they can make quick profits and where they can compete in the domestic markets too (in which the majority of consumers have low purchasing power). However, the old debate on a basic industry strategy should be revised. The government should encourage foreign investors to invest jointly with the public sector in intermediate and capital good industries and inputs like the Mchuchuma coal and Liganga iron ore, especially in the long run by providing effective incentives. This line of

argument has recently been supported by the Ministry of Industry and Trade (URT 2002:16).

Reform Impact and Implications for Small Scale Industries and Informal Industrial Activities

Between the crisis of the early 1980s and the early 1990s, small scale industries and the informal sector have been growing at a commendable rate. This has also provided a growing share of jobs, output and income. Currently, nearly 60 percent of the urban labour force in mainland Tanzania is absorbed in the informal sector. A World Bank Survey revealed that output in most larger firms contracted, while output in smaller and medium sized firms expanded. More specifically, 60 percent of the smaller firms increased production while only 48 percent of the larger firms managed to do so (World Bank 1991).The impact of the reforms on the small industrial enterprises seems to have been mixed. Positive impact aspects include the following:

- import liberalisation has improved the supply of intermediate inputs and spare parts;
- domestic trade liberalisation has also made raw materials more freely available for small scale grain mills, oil, coffee and cashew nut processing and saw mills.

However, the following negative impact aspects need to be noted:

- the inflationary impact of devaluation increased prices of imported inputs;
- the volume of sales has decreased in some plants due to increases in prices of imported inputs and spare parts; and
- the closure of small plants, especially those which are very import-intensive or less competitive or both, as cheap imported products of high quality enter the domestic market.

It should be underlined that although most of the small-scale industries currently cannot face global market competition, they are still important in the domestic market since the internal demand is high. Furthermore, they generate employment even in rural and semi-rural areas. The record of a 10.3 percent rise in the employment rate in 2002 (see Table 1) is partly a result of increase in small and medium enterprises.

Industry and Trade

Impact of Industrial Performance on Trade

As noted in the Introduction, the trade in industrial goods tends to follow the fluctuation of the performance of the industrial sector and the economy in general. When the industrial and general economic performance was fairly satisfactory between 1961 and 1976 there was a reasonable provision of basic industrial goods for both the domestic and international markets. However, during the crisis in the 1980s there was a very acute shortage of locally produced industrial goods to trade with. Parallel markets dominated the economy (Kapunda *et al* 1988, 1990).

The negative industrial growth of 1992-1994, and the subsequent rise of the growth rates in later years influenced negatively the pattern of industrial contribution to total exports, as noted in Table 2. The industrial contribution to total exports rose from 16.0 percent in 1995 to 19.0 percent in 1998 despite the declining tendency of recent trends – with some improvement between 2001 and 2002.

Regional Trade

Tanzania is a member of both the East African community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It also participates in global trade organisations like the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and has qualified in terms of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).

Tanzania exports more goods and services to Kenya than previously, but it imports even more from that country resulting in a negative balance of trade. In fact the overall balance of trade is negative for the EAC, SADC and the rest of the world. However, Tanzania is mostly a net exporter to Uganda (Table 3). The volume of trade between Tanzania and the European Union (EU) is the greatest (Appendix Tables B and C).

The volume of trade between Tanzania and the EAC seems to be small given the great emphasis on EAC trade. In 2002, for example, Tanzania exported only 4.5 percent and imported about 5.9 percent of total volumes of trade from the EAC. Similar percentages for the SADC were respectively 5.6 and 12.8 in the same year. While Tanzania trades mostly with Kenya in the case of the EAC, its major trading partner in the SADC is South Africa.

Table 2: Industrial Growth and Contribution
to Total Exports (Percentage)

Year	Sectoral Growth	Contribution to total Export	Contribution to Non-traditional Exports	Change in Industrial exports
1986	0.1	10.7	45.5	19.2
1987	4.1	17.8	43.1	16.1
1988	3.1	18.9	48.8	14.4
1989	5.2	21.2	51.4	18.9
1990	4.1	23.8	48.9	13.3
1991	1.9	19.4	43.7	-27.7
1992	-4.0	16.0	36.4	-8.7
1993	-0.6	11.8	28.4	-19
1994	-0.2	14.8	42.2	48.1
1995	1.6	16.0	36.5	41.9
1996	4.8	14.5	37.5	1.6
1997	5.7	17.0	35.1	-9.3
1998	8.0	19.0	15.4	-67.9
1999	3.6	12.0	12.4	-15.7
2000	4.8	6.5	11.6	43.2
2001	5.0	7.2	10.3	30.3
2002	8.0*	7.3*	9.5*	17.3*

Source: URT, *Economic Survey* (Various years)
Note: * Provisional.

Qualification in terms of the provisions of AGOA provides not only
free access to US markets but also promotes opportunities for increased
USA investment in a participating country. Already some textile indus-
tries like A-Z and Sunflag have taken advantage of the Act. In the year
2000, products worth US $1,642 million were sold in the US (URT
2003:42).

Table 3: Trade Between Tanzania, EAC and the Rest of the World (million US$)

Region/Country		1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002*
Kenya	Exports	12.8	26.0	21.0	32.2	38.1	35.3
	Imports	95.7	105.8	95.1	93.4	96.1	95.2
	B/Trade	-82.9	-79.8	-74.1	-61.2	-58.0	-59.9
Uganda	Exports	11.6	6.5	4.7	8.5	5.5	5.5
	Imports	1.9	2.3	6.0	5.6	11.4	2.7
	B/Trade	9.7	4.2	-1.3	2.9	-5.9	2.8
EAC	Exports	24.4	32.5	25.7	40.7	43.6	40.8
	Imports	97.6	108	101.1	99.0	107.5	97.9
	B/Trade	-73.2	-75.5	-75.4	-58.3	-63.9	-57.1
SADC	Exports	22.3	15.1	13.8	18.4	21	51.3
	Imports	139.9	179.8	196.3	194.4	221.6	211.1
	B/Trade	-117.6	-164.7	-182.5	-176	-200.6	-159.8
Global	Exports	752.5	588.5	543.2	663.2	776.4	902.5
	Imports	1320.3	1588.7	1572.8	1533.9	1714.4	1658.4
	B/Trade	-567.8	-1000.2	-1029.6	-870.7	-938.0	-755.9

Source: Calculated from URT (2003) *Economic Survey* data.
Note: * Provisional. B/Trade - Balance of Trade.

Industrial Challenges and Prospects

The main challenges to the industrial sector include a set of traditional and competitive - oriented constraints. Examples of the former include limited capital, high electricity costs, high interest rates and high transport/transaction costs, especially in the regions (provinces) (URT 2002:7). Competitive-oriented constraints include stiff competition and unfair trade and dumping practices.

The expected trade reforms by the EAC, SADC, WTO and others require the industrial sector to produce products of high quality and at low cost in order to face the stiff competition from highly industrialised countries in SADC, WTO and other areas. Effort in improving the quality of industrial products and lowering production costs can be made. Some industries like beer, soft drinks, and cigarettes have already shown some progress in that direction. With regard to AGOA, Tanzania should con-

tinue to take advantage of opportunities provided by the Act in developing textiles and other industries.

At this stage a cautionary word is in order. While regional co-operation and integration and international organisations like WTO have some positive impact on trade, the special interests of individual countries need to be taken into consideration. These may include the need to assist weak competitor firms like small and medium enterprises in a country like Tanzania; the importance of inter-industrial linkages; the use of local inputs to ensure economic stability; and the need for some mechanism to control unfair competition and dumping practices (Kapunda 2003:13).

Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter has indicated that there has been a significant improvement in the industrial sector performance in Tanzania during the reform period, especially in recent years. However, the sector is faced with traditional and competitive challenges. To improve the situation the following recommendations are advanced:

> First, Tanzania should raise its trade share with the EAC because of its proximity and similar competitive indices. This can be done by increasing industrial and other exports and thereby improving the balance of trade. In general, the country should participate more in the EAC Development Strategy.
>
> Second, despite the current regional and global emphasis on market reforms and private investment, the particular interests of individual countries should be respected as far as possible. This may involve a mixture of the visible hand of the state and the invisible hand of the markets in guiding the industrialisation process and trade. Specifically the Tanzania Government should attempt to:

(i)   guide the industrial sector through an effective trade and competition policy centred on fair competition. The Policy should put special emphasis on industries of particular interest in the country like small and medium industries and strategic industries. Botswana, for instance, is taking such a programme seriously;

(ii) play a leading role in developing strategic intermediate and capital goods industries which have positive sectoral linkage benefits in the long run. This is essentially because private investors are normally interested in projects with a short pay back period. The recent position of the Ministry of Industry and Trade on joint

ventures with foreign investors in developing the Mchuchuma coal and Liganga iron ore projects is commendable;

(iii)   support projects which tend to lead to high quality products and low cost production. The support may involve transitory tax exemptions to encourage both citizens and foreigners;

(iv)   support the reduction of costs in the sectors which are crucial to the industrial and other sectors of the economy such as transport and public utilities. In this case, the government of Tanzania should work closely with the other governments of the EAC where joint projects like those involving infrastructure are involved; and

(v)   support industrial and skilled labour training and technological progress.

Third, domestic enterprises should exploit to the full the AGOA and other trade agreements; but should devise long-term competitive strategies that can enable them to weather the period after the expiration of such special opportunities.

Fourth, industrial investors should make a greater effort to compete directly, through raising product quality, efficiency, and productivity and maintaining minimum input costs.

Last, industrial investors should also compete indirectly. The small scale and medium enterprises, for instance, can compete successfully through niche marketing by identifying and occupying tightly defined segments of the market place, which they can service better than large firms. Traditional crafts and other labour intensive products can be exported to markets not tapped by global players. Although these recommendations are directed to Tanzania, they may be relevant to other EAC members and other African countries.

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Appendix
Table A: Capacity Utilisation of Selected Industries in the 1980s and Early 1990s

Industries	1980	1985	1989	1990	1991
1. Textiles	46.6	22.3	22.9	29.0	30
2. Fertilizer	38	30.9	24.7	13.0	15
3. Leather	40	17.7	8.6	12	14
4. Cement	22.9	28.5	44.0	49	48
5. Cigarettes	80.3	47.5	58.5	66.0	68
6. Soft drinks	na	16.0	29.0	30.0	17
7. Beer	75	59.0	42.0	35.0	41
8. Iron	63	30.0	51.0	33	26
9. Cooking oil	na	13.0	42.0	18.6	32
10. Tyres	na	37	61.0	63.0	53
11. Match boxes	61	66	51.0	90.0	100

Source: (1) URT, *The Economic Survey* (various years). (2) URT (1992), Budget Speech, Ministry of Industry and Trade 1992/93. Note: na = not available

Table B: Tanzania's Exports to SADC and Elsewhere (million US $)

Region/Country	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002*
SADC						
- South Africa	7.9	6.3	6.6	12.1	8.7	16.5
- Zambia	10.0	3.7	2.8	4.7	5.5	17.4
- Mozambique	2.6	0.1	0.7	1.5	1.4	1.6
- DRC	1.8	5.0	3.7	0.1	5.4	15.8
EAC	24.4	32.5	25.7	40.7	43.6	40.8
AFRICA	51.2	48.1	43.0	63.8	70.8	99.4
EUROPEAN UNION (EU)	226.5	241.2	214.7	362.1	432.2	473.7
USA	21.4	12.8	18.0	15.2	15.1	13.5
CANADA	1.7	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.5	1.4
ASIA	302.0	113.6	95.8	73.9	88.6	128.1

Source: URT 2003 *Economic Survey.*
Note: * Provisional

Table C: Tanzania's Imports to SADC and Elsewhere (million US $)

Region/country	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002*
SADC						
- South Africa	96.0	130.7	170.8	174.4	2.03.4	188.8
- Zimbabwe	4.7	14.6	5.6	4.5	3.0	2
- Zambia	25	17.0	7.3	2.4	1.8	4.3
- Mozambique	5.1	5.5	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.1
- DRC	0.2	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4
- Swaziland	9.0	11.5	12.5	12.9	12.7	15.6
EAC	97.6	108.1	101.1	99.0	107.5	97.9
AFRICA	237.7	287.9	297.5	293.4	329.2	309
EU	367.1	514.6	413.1	344.6	389.7	391.1
USA	52.6	813.0	99.3	58.9	65.3	91.4
CANADA	12.5	16.7	26.7	32.3	23.1	17.7
ASIA	328.3	320.2	316.7	424.1	481.5	419.6

Source: URT (2003) *Economic Survey.* Note: * Provisional.