Media Image and Social Integration of Liberian and Togolese Refugees in Ghana

Heidi G. Frontani,* Kristine Silvestri ** and Amanda Brown***

Abstract
In the 1990s, refugees throughout West Africa originated largely from Liberia and Togo. This article explores the reception of Liberian and Togolese refugees in one West African country – Ghana – from 1990-2007. It focuses attention on the role of Ghana’s print media, both state- and private-owned, in fostering or hindering the social integration of refugees. Ghanaian newspapers, radio broadcasts, United Nations reports and semi-structured interviews were used to build on studies of politics of belonging and relationship between ethnic identity and social integration among migrants to Ghana. It was found that Ghanaian media framed Liberia’s largely Krahn and Mandingo refugees as security threats, mercenaries and criminals, but not Togo’s Ewe refugees. Ghana’s ties to the Ewe people built hostility towards Togo’s anti-Ewe regimes, while Ghana supported Liberia’s anti-Krahn and Mandingo regimes. Liberians’ social integration was thwarted not only by Ghana’s good relations with the Liberian government, but also by media framing, lack of historical ties, internal dissent, cultural values opposed to Ghanaians and long term dependency on large United Nations organized settlements. Conversely, Togolese refugees self-settled with Ghanaian Ewe and quickly became self-sufficient in Ghana’s Volta region, once a part of Togo. The media can support social integration and more humane policies toward refugees by framing issues in human rights rather than security terms.

Key Terms: Ghana, Liberia, Togo, media framing, refugees, social integration.
Résumé

Mots clés : Ghana, Liberia, Togo, couverture médiatique, refugiés, intégration sociale.

Background
In 1994, there were approximately one million refugees in West Africa, mainly Liberians and Togolese (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 1994). More than a decade later, little had changed. In 2005, Togo had 39,000 citizens leave their homeland. At the time, this was the world’s largest movement of refugees within a single year time frame. Liberia fared just a bit better. Between 2000 and 2005, 70,000 Liberian refugees repatriated. Yet, Liberia remained one of the top ten source countries for refugees, with approximately 231,000 Liberians remaining in asylum outside of their homeland (UNHCR 2006).
Liberians’ main countries of refuge have been Sierra Leone, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and, for those with greater means and education, the USA (Kuhlman 1994). The main countries of refuge for Togolese have been Benin and Ghana (UNHCR 2006). In early 2006, Ghana had approximately 54,000 refugees, including around 38,000 from Liberia and 14,000 from Togo. Togolese refugees in Ghana, mostly self-settled into smaller communities, have been relatively successful in terms of social integration. Liberian refugees in Ghana have been placed in large United Nations-organized settlements and faced multiple obstacles to acculturation.

Theoretical Framework and Scope
This article explores the reception of Liberian and Togolese refugees in Ghana from 1990 to June 30, 2007, when the United Nations withdrew support for refugee settlements in Ghana. It pays special attention to the role of Ghana’s print media in fostering or hindering social integration. The article builds on studies of migration and politics of belonging (Castles and Davidson 2000), specifically the relationship between ethnic identity and social integration among migrants to Ghana (Schildkrout 1978; Schlottner 2000; Nugent 2002; Akyeampong 2006). It expands upon research on the print media’s framing of political issues, migration and refugees (Dardis 2007; Vliegenthart and Roggeband 2007) and adds to studies of refugee communities which all too often focus on their impact on, rather than interaction with, host communities (Kuhlman 1994).

Gitlin (1980:2) defines frames as ‘persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation and presentation, of selection, emphasis and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual’. Robert Entman (1993:52) describes framing as the selection of some aspects of a perceived reality and making ‘them more salient in communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem, definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described’. In order to fight negative media framing by Ghanaian media and improve social integration, Liberians created an alternative press which expressed their perspective on the contributions of refugees to the host society. This article examines the extent to which their alternative press effected their social integration and served as an effective media for change in post-conflict life.

The scope of the paper is limited to refugees, specifically Liberian and Togolese refugees, who are among the 8.4 million, globally, who have fled persecution in their own country and sought safety in another, thereby
securing the protection of international law (UNHCR 2006). Internationally-displaced persons, or individuals who leave their homes due to persecution but remain within the border of their own country, do not have the legal protection or official status of ‘refugee’ (UNHCR 2006). These 23.7 million internally-displaced persons across the globe (UNHCR 2006) are beyond the scope of this article.

**Methodology**

United Nations documents, government and independent Ghanaian newspapers, radio broadcast summaries, and semi-structured interviews with journalists with experience in Buduburam, Ghana’s largest Liberian refugee settlement, were the main sources used for this study. Many United Nations reports were available online; newspapers from 2006 to 2007 were accessed online and pre-2006 newspapers and all radio broadcast summaries accessed via Elon University’s electronic library databases. In addition, news on Liberian and Togolese refugees, reported by the British Broadcasting Corporation and China’s English-language Xinhua News Service, were obtained online and via Elon University’s electronic databases. Reports on refugees and human rights from the United States State Department also informed this study.

The authors were sensitive to Ghana’s lack of freedom of the press during the decade prior to 1992, when Ghana experienced restricted freedom of the press through a Newspaper Licensing Law (United States Department of State 1993; Hasty 2005). Therefore, non-governmental Ghanaian press coverage of the 1990 wave of Liberian refugees was reconstructed from archived international press releases, available via Elon University’s electronic databases, and reports from non-governmental organizations obtained online.

The key terms: Togo, Togolese, Liberia, Liberians and refugee were used to target relevant journal and newspaper articles as well as radio broadcast summaries in electronic library databases and non-governmental organization and United Nations reports on-line. The words describing Togolese refugees and Liberian refugees in the articles, summaries, and reports were evaluated with regard to their tone, whether positive/compassionate (refugees as innocent victims), negative/accusatory/blaming (refugees as criminals, causal in their own fate) or neutral.

The exact number of refugees on the move or who self-settle is difficult to estimate and reports from different agencies and news services on refugee numbers differ considerably. The numbers presented here are
those we believe to be most representative or the best information available after comparing reports from multiple sources for the same period.

**Background on Liberian Refugees**

In 1980, Samuel Doe seized control of the government of Liberia. Doe was the first non-Amero-Liberian President in the country’s history. Amero-Liberians are the descendants of freed African-Americans who founded and became the ruling class in Liberia. During his presidency, Doe gave virtually all positions of power to people from his own Krahn ethnic group and maltreated most other ethnic groups (Adebajo 2002).

In 1989, Charles Taylor, an Amero-Liberian, formerly in Doe’s government, overthrew Doe from a base in Côte d’Ivoire, using mostly ethnic Gio and Mano forces. Taylor’s regime targeted Krahn and Mandingo who were viewed as Doe-supporters. Liberia erupted in civil war, which lasted until 1996 when there was temporary peace which allowed for the 1997 elections (Adebajo 2002). The elections resulted in Taylor’s victory, but fighting continued until 2003.

More than 200,000 people were killed in Liberia’s on and off civil war from 1989 to 2003, and up to 750,000 are believed to have fled, most to nearby West African countries (Dick 2002). A peace agreement, Taylor’s resignation and exile to Nigeria in 2003 led to the United Nations declaring Liberia safe in 2004 and the onset of repatriation initiatives. By March 2007, approximately 94,000 Liberians had been repatriated, but many are still abroad because they believe their country remains unsafe (Saul 2007; UN News Service 2007).

There have been ethnic and geographic patterns to resettlement. Most refugees returning to Liberia from October 2004 to April 2007 went to Lofa county (52,685) and Nimba county (8,239), home areas for Mandingo, Mano and Gio; fewer returned to Grand Gedeh county (1,931) a sparsely-populated, predominantly Krahn area (Cephas 2007). The slow return of the Krahn suggests that Liberia remains unsafe for them and that their gains in social status during the Doe regime enhanced their ability to settle outside of West Africa. Corruption and violence remain problems in Liberia and many, not just the Krahn, have no families, homes or possessions to which to return (New Amsterdam News 2006).

**Liberian Refugees in Ghana**

Liberians began entering Ghana in greater numbers as refugees in mid-to late-1990, shortly after the outbreak of civil war at home. Refugees chose Ghana for its general stability, reasonable economy and the widespread
use of English (King 2007). Liberians were initially brought by air and sea to Ghana. Navy ships and merchant vessels cooperated with the military branch of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to bring refugees en masse (Dick 2002a). The majority of refugees represented the average Liberian, but a substantial number of the initial arrivals were younger, well-educated, urban-based professionals from Liberia’s capital of Monrovia or surrounding communities. They were brought to abandoned church premises at Gomoa Buduburam west of Ghana’s capital of Accra. By September 1990, there were 7,000 Liberians at Buduburam and more than 2,000 had left the facility and self-settled in Accra or communities nearby (Dolvo and Sondah 2001; Dick 2002a). The social composition of Ghana’s Liberian refugee population differed notably from the hundreds of thousands of poorer, rural, often illiterate Liberians who fled by roads and on foot to neighbouring Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire (Owusu 2000).

The initial response of Ghanaians to the plight of the relatively well-educated Liberians was quite warm and welcoming. Ghanaian churches, families, and concerned individuals offered food, clothing, transportation or rented rooms or leased properties for reduced fees to assist refugees (Dick 2002). Ghana’s government newspaper, the Daily Graphic, reported that the country would do whatever possible to ensure a peaceful resolution to the Liberian conflict (Xinhua General Overseas News Service 1990). The Liberians were the first large-scale arrival of refugees in Ghana since the 1983 forced repatriation of more than one million Ghanaians from Nigeria; their return had been associated with a rise in robberies and homicides by youths with poor employment prospects (Gocking 2005).

Refugees at the Buduburam, with the help of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), quickly created a more permanent and stable atmosphere within the settlement. They built a primary school and a junior high school by 1991 (Dick 2002). But the settlement was overcrowded, lacked proper sanitation and basic social services, especially in the first year when Ghana had no official laws regarding refugees and no United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) support (Owusu 2000; Dolvo and Sondah 2001; Agbale 2007). The ongoing unrest in Liberia was described by Ghana’s The Mirror as threatening the stability of the entire West African sub-region (Xinhua General Overseas News Service 1991).

**Ghanaian Media Coverage of Liberian Refugees**

By 1993, media coverage of Buduburam focused on official corruption within the settlement, and its rising death toll from cholera, diarrhea and
malaria (Dick 2002). Additional concerns were raised by the press about
refugees when a second major wave of 1,559 Liberian refugees arrived in
Ghana aboard the ship the ‘Bulk Challenge-Lagos’ in May 1996, following
renewed fighting in Monrovia (Dick 2002; Zinnah 2005). The new round
of refugees necessitated the creation of a second, smaller settlement at
Sanzule-Krisan near the border with Côte d’Ivoire in Ghana’s southwest.
The relatively small Krisan settlement supported 4,000 Liberian refugees
along with refugees from Rwanda, Sudan, Togo and Côte d’Ivoire (Owusu
2000; UNHCR 2006a). With the recent arrival of additional refugees and
donor participation waning, anxiety within the government and the general
public over the expense of supporting these new groups increased. Although,
the activities of Liberians were not singled out by the press, security
concerns and the financial strain of refugees on Ghana were highlighted
(King 2007).

By the mid- to late-1990s, sanitation and other social services within
the refugee camps and settlements drastically improved. Residential areas
for the refugees began to resemble thriving neighbourhoods with new
churches, shops, soccer clubs and markets. The press picked up on the
frustration of Ghanaians who were struggling financially, but not eligible
for the external aid received by refugees.

The Liberian’s relative success in Ghana began to attract Liberian
refugees from neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire, especially after the 1999 coup
there. Liberian refugees from Côte d’Ivoire included less-educated and
more vulnerable groups like women, children, young teens, the elderly and
the disabled. Ghana’s press, which at the time consisted of government
papers, including dailies with relatively wide distribution, and private papers
published weekly or bi-weekly, raised concerns that recent arrivals,
especially unemployed youths, would be vulnerable to recruitment by
mercenaries (Kwansah-Aidoo 2003). Mention of Liberians as rebels, armed
robbers and prostitutes filled the pages of Ghana’s government-owned
and largest circulating paper, the Daily Graphic and, to a lesser extent,
the ‘most important’ privately-owned paper, the Chronicle (Gocking
2005:208; King 2007). Interviews indicate the resonance of these
descriptions with Ghanaians, who described popular images of Liberians
being ‘problems ... people who don’t respect our laws’ (Agbale 2007) and
who engage in ‘robberies’ and ‘prostitution’ (Agbale 2007; Amedahe 2007).
Increasingly, conflicts erupted between Liberians and Ghanaians as
Liberians squatted on land outside the overcrowded Buduburam settlement.
Conflicts also erupted within Buduburam when religious leaders were
accused of impropriety with external aid and forming churches for personal benefit (Dolvo and Sondah 2001).

**Diminished External Support Fuels Ghanaian Media Criticism of Liberian Refugees**

Temporary peace was restored in Liberia in July 1997. Around this time, the UNHCR began phasing out support for Liberian refugees to encourage self-sufficiency. With elections in Liberia, Ghanaians increasingly began to question why Liberians needed to remain in Ghana, especially when some Liberians were doing better than the average Ghanaian (Dick 2002). Ghanaian radio stations voiced anti-refugee and anti-Liberian rhetoric, adding to an ever-widening range of concerns expressed about Liberians in the print media (King 2007).

By mid-2000, the UNHCR withdrew its assistance to Liberian refugees throughout West Africa in the hope that this would encourage refugees to repatriate. Yet, many at Buduburam, not yet self sufficient, relied heavily on remittances from relatives and friends in Ghana or the United States, and, in the absence of remittances, some resorted to prostitution and other socially unacceptable acts, which led to more negative press (Dick 2002; King 2007). Some Liberian refugees found themselves the targets of violence by Ghanaians, and seemingly ignored when they complained of such violence to police, or imprisoned for years without apparent cause (Carvin 2005; King 2006; King 2007). Reporters from Ghana’s *The Chronicle* called on Liberian refugees to ‘reject criminality’, noting that in the first four months of 2002, according to police statistics, more than 100 crimes had been committed at Buduburam, including 49 cases of assault, 32 cases of theft, 12 armed robberies and 11 cases of fraud (Garblah and White 2002).

When the UNHCR and many NGOs withdrew their support, the Government of Ghana re-examined who could claim refugee status. The Ghana Refugee Board, which had been established in 1993 as the local counterpart to the UNHCR, started to interview the approximately 22,000 Liberians at Buduburam. Only 4,000 were found eligible to register as refugees, while the remaining 18,000 stayed at Buduburam with uncertain legal status (Dick 2002; Garblah and White 2002). Subsequently, the *Daily Graphic* and the *Chronicle* portrayed those remaining 18,000 refugees as not being true refugees, but instead using the settlement as a base from which to run goods to Monrovia for profit.

Ghanaians accused Liberians of taking advantage of Ghanaian hospitality and of repeatedly entering Liberia, demonstrating that the Taylor
regime was not a real threat. An article in the *Chronicle* described the settlement as full of ‘dubious characters’, of whom 4,000 were suspected combatants, many with assault weapons, and that because ‘of the skills, weapons, the yearning for action and the spoils of war that a sizeable section of the Budumburam (sic.) community has, the camp has become fertile ground for the recruiting of mercenaries for the battles in the sub-region of West Africa’ (Ohene 2003). The same article raised concerns over Buduburam residents being a source of drugs, disease and potential coups.

Liberians who did not receive remittances, UNHCR support or living wages through informal sector work became more desperate as health services closed for lack of funds. In the absence of UNHCR-supported community health programmes, teen pregnancy and HIV/AIDS rates rose. Subsidized educational and health services were now full cost, leaving ‘restless youths’ to form gangs which added to Buduburam’s negative image (Dick 2002:21). In March 2001, riots broke out at Buduburam after Ghanaian police released the prime suspect in a series of knifings who had been captured by settlement residents (UNIRIN 2001). Subsequently, 22 Liberians were deemed national security threats and imprisoned (Dick 2002). Although Ghana’s print media continued to present an exaggerated image of Liberians as criminals and HIV carriers, the problems faced by refugees remained under-reported (Bernard 2007).

**Liberian Social Integration not helped by Negative Coverage in Ghanain Print Media**

Print media in Ghana, rather than aiding the social integration of Liberian refugees, tended to thwart it through its predominantly negative coverage of the group. Negative press coverage of Liberians helped reinforce unfavourable impressions Ghanaians might have formed of Liberians from personal interactions. The *Chronicle* noted the ‘swagger and arrogance of the typical Liberian refugee’, and Ghanaians interacting with Liberians noted that Ghanaians’ complaints about Liberians were dismissed as due to jealousy (Dick 2002).

Press coverage emphasized Liberians, social and cultural difference from Ghanaians, and that Liberians had a penchant for making fun of Ghanaian culture. Liberians negatively regarded Ghanaian food, social system, the way businesses are named after Bible verses, and the odd logos or slogans which typically appear on buses (Dick 2002; Cooper 2005).

Poor social integration had its price. Liberians reported not being allowed to sell produce in Ghanaian markets when others heard their accents (Dick
2002). Instead of being offered discounted housing rates like early arrivals, recently arrived Liberian refugees reported being charged more than average prices because Ghanaians believed Liberians had access to US dollars through remittances (Dick 2002; Jaman 2007).

Ghanian media coverage of Buduburam improved slightly after measures were taken to reduce crime in the settlement. Nonetheless, infrequent neutral or positive press was insufficient to create a more favourable impression of Liberians among the Ghanaian public. Overall, in most news articles, Liberian refugees continued to be framed as criminals, disease carriers and security risks. This held true even when journalists simultaneously noted improved security or self-help initiatives in the settlements (Dencik 2003).

The Ghanaian press not only portrayed Liberians as socially and culturally different, but also as people to be feared and avoided. The coverage of Buduburam in The Chronicle in 2004 included stories on the need for increased HIV/AIDS awareness training for settlement youth, security issues in the settlement, and a plea to Liberians to refrain from interfering with Ghana’s elections. The Ghana Review International (2004) offered thanks to donors who assisted Liberians to go to school because ‘without education some of the youth could become mercenaries, armed robbers and drug addicts, and even contract the deadly HIV/AIDS disease’. Articles with less inflammatory language appeared in the privately-owned, issues oriented, weekly Public Agenda and the Accra Mail (Gocking 2005); they highlighted the considerable aid to Liberians at Buduburam, for sanitary facilities, technical training and scholarships. Such stories emphasized the financial burden Liberians placed on Ghanaians and did not support the social integration of refugees.

**Liberian Response to the Ghanaian Press**

Given the overall failure of the Ghanaian press to promote positive public dialogue about Liberians in Ghana in 2004, Liberian journalists Semantics King Jr. and Jos Garneo Cephas founded the Vision, a newspaper specifically aimed at overcoming the negative press the Buduburam settlement still received in Ghanaian newspapers. The newspaper sought to demystify the negative Buduburam image as an ‘AIDS-infested and crime-ridden blot and a training ground for mercenaries’ (DeSaybel 2006:33).

Articles in the Vision highlighted that much of the refugee population of approximately 30,000 at Buduburam consisted of dependent single parent women, children, elderly or disabled who suffered depression and post-
traumatic stress (Kreitzer 2002; UNHCR 2006a; Cephas 2007a). These extremely vulnerable groups were also victims of mismanagement of funds by settlement staff, lack of staff encouragement to take more initiative, and poor English language skills (Kreitzer 2002; BRYCS 2004; Phelps 2007). The vulnerability of refugees did not become the focus of articles in the Ghanaian press. Instead, Ghanaians read about Liberians’ considerable remittances and improved conditions in Liberia. Few stories mentioned the true reality facing many refugees. Some Liberians had started a life in Ghana – a business or programme of study which led them to stay; some had no home or land to return to, while others lacked the funds rather than the desire to return home. For some, returning home was not an option at all – the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups faced political opposition by those who opposed Doe’s regime (Dick 2002; Romann 2006).

The Vision was an outlet for some Liberians to express their perspectives, but due to financial constraints the newspaper had intermittent and extremely limited circulation. It reached few Ghanaians beyond government officials and those who had contact with Buduburam for professional reasons. Liberians in Ghana and elsewhere expressed concern over how well they would be tolerated by their host countries after the June 30, 2007 deadline for voluntary repatriation by Liberian refugees throughout West African refugee camps and settlements (UN News Service 2007). One Liberian in Ghana reported that his parents’ killers were now serving in the Johnson-Sirleaf government (King 2005). His sentiments are echoed by others (Carvin 2005).

**Background on Togolese Refugees**

As with Liberians, the impetus for Togolese fleeing to foreign lands was often the result of presidential elections or persecution by government forces. Togolese experienced harsh German colonial rule from the 1880s to the First World War, followed by French colonization and independence in 1960. The country experienced two coups. One was in 1963, followed by another in 1967, which brought Gnassingbe Eyadéma to power. Eyadéma declared his party the country’s sole political party until 1991, and tightly controlled the media (Ellis 1993). Like Doe of Liberia, Eyadéma heightened ethnic tensions in his country by selecting three-quarters of the army from his own Kabye (Kabiye) ethnic group, including half from his northern Togolese home town of Pya (Piya) (Ellis 1993; Amnesty International 2005). The Kabye represent 10-15 per cent of Togo’s population and are the second largest ethnic group in Togo after the Ewe (20-25 per cent of the population) (Houngrnkpo 2001; United States Department of State 2007).
Eventually, Eyadéma was pressured internationally and domestically to abolish his one party state. Joseph Kokou Koffigoh was appointed as transitional Prime Minister of Togo until democratic elections could be held (Ellis 1993). As Koffigoh and Eyadéma vied for uncontested control of the country, more than twenty Lomé-based newspapers appeared virtually overnight, most openly hostile toward President Eyadéma. Television and radio programming were also openly anti-Eyadéma, but Eyadéma still controlled the military and used the press to instill public fear of the opposition’s ability to manipulate the spirit world by use of dark arts (Ellis 1993). Throughout the 1990s, hundreds of journalists and other critics of the government were detained, imprisoned, tortured, executed or ‘disappeared’ (Amnesty International 2001). Formal opposition was replaced by frequent informal anti-Eyadéma political discussions, rumours, puns and other verbal and symbolic assaults on Eyadéma by the urban public in Lomé (Ellis 1993).

In response to persistent informal opposition in the Ewe-dominated south, President Eyadéma’s forces attacked civilians in January 1993 in Lomé. Anti-Eyadéma Togolese newspapers had their editors attacked, arrested or fined, offices ransacked and facilities bombed; opposition radio stations were jammed (United States Department of State 1994). By April 1993, Ghana was host to approximately 106,000 Togolese refugees (Afele 1993). By June, approximately 40 per cent of Lomé’s population of 600,000, or nearly 240,000 people, were refugees in Ghana or Benin (BBC 1993; USCRI 1997).

Economic sanctions against Togo by the European Union encouraged Eyadéma to make a show of bringing greater democracy to Togo. Eyadéma named Edem Kodjo, head of a small opposition party, as Prime Minister in April 1994. Kodjo sought economic recovery and the return of refugees. Encouraged by the apparent change in political climate, approximately 200,000 refugees returned to Togo between 1994 and 1996 (USCRI 1997); however, Kodjo’s limited ability to bring about real change led to his resignation in August of 1996, solidifying Eyadéma’s position. At the end of 1996, there were approximately 20,000 Togolese refugees remaining in Ghana and around 10,000 in Benin (USCRI 1997). Nearly 4,000 Togolese repatriated from Ghana after the UNHCR’s repatriation programme ended in mid-1997. By late-1998, approximately 1,000 Togolese refugees remained in Ghana and 2,000 in Benin, many of whom were asylum seeking prominent opponents of the ruling party (USCRI 1999).

Eyadéma signed the July 1999 Lomé Framework Accord which suggested that there would be an improvement in media, political parties
rights, and open arms for returning refugees, but bodies shackled and with bullet holes were appearing in fishing nets and washed up on the beaches of Benin and most of Eyadéma’s severest critics remained in exile (Amnesty International 1999). Eyadéma ruled Togo until his death in February 2005; Eyadéma’s son, Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé, was appointed to the presidency. Gnassingbé’s unconstitutional appointment led to another wave of violence, death and more than 25,000 refugees arriving in Benin and nearly 15,000 in Ghana (United States Department of State 2007). Like his father, Gnassingbé made an attempt to reduce criticism of his regime, appointing Yawovi Agboyibo, a human rights activist and the leader of a somewhat larger opposition party, as Prime Minister. The appointment, along with no reports of summary executions, disappearances, or detentions of journalists in 2005, led many refugees to repatriate (United States Department of State 2007).

**Togolese Immigrants and Refugees in Ghana**

The Togolese have such longstanding ties with Ghana such that it can be difficult to distinguish between immigrants and refugees, something which rarely holds true for Ghana’s Liberian community (Agbale 2007; Amedahe 2007). The ties are largely limited to Ghana’s Volta region, which borders Togo and is home to the Ewe, Ghana’s third largest ethnic group, representing around 13 per cent of the total population (Gocking 2005). Nearly half of all Ewe sought reunification with Togo rather than integration with Ghana when the Ghana-Togo boundary was being determined (Nugent 2000).

Based on their common ancestry and customs, Ghana’s Ewe view Togo’s Ewe, the country’s largest ethnic group, as kin rather than foreigners (Akyea 1998). The Ewe share many cultural practices: chieftaincies and queen mothers, shared festivals, proverbs and places of worship, including Catholic or evangelical Protestant churches (Akyea 1998; Nugent 2000; Nugent 2002). Togolese generally live in villages separate from, but in close proximity to, Ghanaian Ewe villages (Gavua 2000). In the Volta region, a ‘traditional area’ generally consists of several villages and hamlets. Some of these settlements are considered Togolese, based on their first language (Nugent 2002; Amedahe 2007).

Togolese refugees who arrived in Ghana in late January to early February 1993 consisted largely of women and children. Men generally stayed behind to watch over the family’s property, as did the elderly who would find the journey difficult. By mid-February 1993, after the collapse of peace talks in France between Togo’s warring factions, additional waves
of Togolese refugees arrived in Ghana, including many able-bodied men and youths assisting disabled and elderly friends and relatives (BBC 1993d). The large numbers of Togolese refugees initially were welcomed to United Nations-sponsored refugee centres at Aflao (Aflaho) and Denu (Ghana-Togo border towns) as well as Klikor near Aflao (BBC News 1994), though their arrival briefly raised concerns about congestion and the potential for cholera outbreaks (BBC 1993a).

Unlike most Liberian refugee settlements, most Togolese centres were relatively small and somewhat integrated within existing villages (BBC News 1994). At Aflao, the UNHCR funded the conversion of an abandoned school compound into Togolese refugee housing. Only one month after the refugees’ arrival, officials from Ghana’s Ministry of Health reported not being able to effectively distinguish Togolese refugees from the local population and that Togolese refugees were often going to local health centres and paying for services rather than making use of free camp services (BBC 1993a). The UNHCR reported some concern over lack of shelter and proper sanitation for refugees at Klikor which housed up to 10,000 refugees but noted that most refugees were in good condition and ‘many were living with families of the same tribe’, being hosted by humble fishing and farming families and in the palaces of paramount chiefs (Associated Press 1993). By and large, approximately 100,000 refugees had effectively ‘disappeared’ into the Volta region (BBC 1993b; BBC News 1994).

Unlike Liberian refugees, Togolese refugees were entering a country whose President, Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, shared their Ewe ethnic background (Gocking 2005). The Ghana Broadcasting Corporation’s radio coverage of Togolese refugees focused on their shared history with Ghanaians, called for the government of Togo to cease terrorizing its citizenry, and asked that the United Nations establish more welcome centres to help Ghanaians effectively host refugees in border towns with rising food prices (BBC 1993c). Many international NGOs and UN agencies offered financial assistance and several Members of Parliament offered to use personal allowances to aid the refugees (IPS 1993). Overall, Togolese refugees appear to have been well integrated since their arrival in 1993 and only left Ghana in the mid-1990s when the situation at home improved.

The next larger wave of Togolese arrived in Ghana in 2005. The Ghanaian press compared these masses of rapidly arriving Togolese to Liberians, expressed security concerns, and requested that Togolese be law abiding and considerate of their hosts (Public Agenda 2005). Particularly, Togolese refugees in Ghana without Volta region ties who
sought refuge at the UNHCR-supported Krisan settlement received negative press. These settlement-based refugees, together with Liberians, led a November 9, 2005 protest at Krisan that led to Ghanians questioning their presence (Ghana Review International 2005; USCRI 2006; King 2007). But negative press of Togolese refugees was short-lived because the majority of Togolese refugees in Ghana were quickly absorbed into approximately 114 villages and towns scattered across Ghana’s Volta region (UNHCR 2006a).

**Analysis and Discussion**

Increased movement across international boundaries, even if only temporarily, raises questions of political and cultural belonging for those who are not full legal members of their country of refuge or short-term residence. Which groups and sub-groups find greater acceptance and social integration, or marginalization and a failure to integrate socially, has much to do with numerous factors. Some of the factors significant in promoting acceptance and integration include the following: (i) the degree of freedom of the press in the refugees’ country of resettlement; (ii) the groups’ self-definition and how they are defined by the dominant group or host culture, including its media; (iii) whether the refugees are placed in large externally-organized settlements or self settle; and (iv) the degree to which the refugees share a common ancestry or ethnicity with members of the host culture.

**Restrictions on Print Media Freedom Limit Social of Refugees**

Ghana’s newspaper content changed over time due to increased freedoms, but government restrictions on the media left little room for criticism. Evidence of the limits to press freedom in Ghana in 1990 included that ‘there were more sports and lotto papers being published in the country than those that covered political and economic issues’ (Gocking 2005:201). Although privately owned media were allowed in Ghana after 1993, journalists who wrote in opposition to the government frequently found themselves jailed or sued under its Criminal Libel laws which were not repealed until 2001 (Kwansah-Aidoo 2003). Independent radio stations and newspapers proliferated in the mid- to late-1990s, but budget crises often led to short life spans. For many surviving independent papers, trepidation over how long multi-party political systems and press freedoms would last, led to news reporting that was largely indistinguishable from that of the government (Alhassan 2005; Nyamnjoh 2005; Duodu 2006). Consequently, press coverage of Liberian and Togolese refugees did not
differ substantially in Ghana’s major government-sponsored (*Daily Graphic*) versus its independent (the *Chronicle*, *Public Agenda* and others) newspapers. Such ‘self editing’ is not restricted to the African context, but fits well with Herman and Chomsky’s (2002) analysis of press coverage of politically-sensitive matters in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Herman and Chomsky note that relations between a country’s government and the governments of other countries impacts what is deemed ‘worthy’ of coverage by the media. Ill treatment of groups friendly to a government generally receives empathetic coverage which conveys outrage at the group’s mistreatment and a call for justice. Ill treatment of groups opposed to a government generally fails to be documented or is presented in neutrally-worded press coverage. Ghana’s Rawlings government supported Liberia’s anti-Krahn Taylor regime. The pro-Doe regime Krahn were the largest ethnic group in the Buduburam settlement (BRYCS 2004; King 2007). As enemies of political allies of the government of Ghana, the Krahn were not ‘worthy’ of more balanced or empathetic press coverage. On the other hand, Togolese refugees were fleeing an enemy government and highlighting their plight supported Ghana’s hostile stance towards Togo.

Liberian refugees were targets of what Herman and Chomsky would classify as propaganda, which played a role in their relatively poor reception by the Ghanaian public. According to Dardis (2007), communication and social movement theory indicate that defining an issue as a problem, blaming a cause, suggesting solutions and invoking a moral appeal are the most important functions shaping individuals’ interpretations of sociopolitical issues. Casting blame is the most influential opinion shaping factor (Dardis 2007).

The Ghanaian press framed the Liberian refugee issue as a problem and blamed the Liberian presence for Ghana’s political and economic insecurity. Liberians were presented as dangerous criminals, mercenaries, disease-ridden, HIV-infected, drug users, who took advantage of Ghanaians generosity by sapping the tax base to support their multitude of social programmes. Such depictions helped generate negative images of Liberians among Ghanaians who had not had contact with the refugees; they also reinforced or heightened negative impressions of Liberian refugees which may have been reached during limited social interactions with them, thereby harming Liberians ability to effectively integrate into Ghanaian society.
Refugees’ Limited Ability to Counter Negative Press
Liberians have not had effective counters to negative media images. They created positive press about their communities in the *Vision*, but the paper was not published consistently, its distribution was severely limited, and aid agency workers and Ghanaian officials had better access to the publication than the Ghanaian public (Henry 2007; King 2007). Liberian refugee communities were physically separate from Ghanaian communities, which served to increase social distance and decrease the likelihood of meaningful cross-cultural contact, mutual understanding or social integration.

Even material well-being often did not lead to social integration, because Liberians, especially Americo-Liberians, like to live large, spending money as fast as they make or receive it through remittances, in stark contrast to the generally more fiscally conservative Ghanaians who save and plan for the future (Dick 2002a). This is not to say that Ghanaians do not make shows of wealth, such as for funerals and weddings (Salm and Falola 2002), but these are communal events related to important rites of passage, not individual displays of conspicuous consumption.

Greater Social Integration among Self-settled Refugees
Voicing security concerns, African governments have strongly favoured organized- versus self-settlement by refugees, because organized settlements are more visible and potentially more likely to receive external aid. But the supposed advantages of organized- over self-settlement often do not hold true, as seen in the Ghanaian case. Large United Nations organized settlements, even generally well functioning ones, as Buduburam was considered by the UNHCR, can fail to support refugee social and economic integration. Such large settlements can become the target of a negative press and lead to the discrimination of settlement inhabitants and those associated with them through the politics of exclusion.

Many Togolese refugees self-settled and lived in poverty with other peasant farmers, fishers, and small-scale traders, but they did not represent an economic burden on the state in the long term. In contrast, Liberians’ attempts to secure land outside of the settlements were met with resistance and many Liberian refugees in organized settlements required external assistance for extended periods, often years. With the removal of external aid, the financial burden of supporting Liberians in settlements increasingly shifted to Ghana’s governmental and non-governmental organizations which contributed to the media framing of Liberians as threats to Ghana’s economic security.
Self-settled Togolese refugees generally were well integrated into the Ghanaian Ewe society. Refugee communities took on activities and behaviour patterns similar to those of their hosts; their presence did not result in social conflict greater than what existed within their host communities before their arrival. Togolese with more education remained in the same communities as less educated Togolese and contributed to their acceptance (Nugent 2000). Schildkrout (1978) noted the importance of a broader ethnic identity and networks of solidarity among successful migrant groups to Ghana, such as the Mossi from Burkina Faso. Like the Mossi, Togolese migrants maintained identities separate from those of their Ghanaian neighbours through various festivals and associations, but made efforts to fit in terms of broader cultural norms with their hosts, often sharing political party affiliations, schools and places of worship (Gavua 2000; Nugent 2002). Even in the United States, the successful integration of West African migrants, like the Mossi and Togolese in Ghana, has been based on taking on aspects of local culture and having networks of solidarity (Salzbrunn 2004).

Negative media images of Liberians were not restricted to Ghana, but were concentrated in periods and locations in which Liberians lived in large organized settlements. Many refugees prefer to self-settle if given the choice and organized settlements make ‘forced’ repatriation easier, but are no better than self-settlement when refugees want to repatriate (Kuhlman 1994).

The authors do not wish to suggest that planned settlements for refugees should be abandoned. In fact, they are great tools to help those who are less self-sufficient – like the disabled, elderly, orphans and single-headed households – and should remain an important force for dealing with large scale refugee movements (Kuhlman 1994). However, large scale settlements and top-down planning have been over-relied upon. In cases where a common cultural background between refugees and their host communities exists, the authors suggest shifting away from large organized settlements towards providing more support for smaller and more socially integrated self-settlements. The need for this shift from planning for, to seeking solutions from, and listening to, holds true not only for the case of refugees, but for development aid more generally (Easterly 2006).

The Importance of Shared Ethnic Background to Social Integration of Refugees

The print media not only produces, but also reflects culture and power relations. Thus, even with balanced press coverage, Liberians’ opportunities
for meaningful social integration in Ghana would have been fewer than for the Togolese. Social inclusion in African communities is often dependent upon being descendents of the first settlers of an area as well as having ethnic and cultural ties (Geschiere and Gugler 1998). Centuries of Togolese arrivals in the Volta Region gave Togolese refugees the luxury of ancestral access to land and peoples, which led to greater levels of independence within only a few months of their arrival in Ghana (Nugent 2002).

Unlike the Togolese, Liberians lacked cultural and historical ties to Ghana. They lacked the ethnic and political unity of the Togolese communities in Ghana (King 2007a). The press framed Buduburam’s internal unrest as potentially of concern to national security. Ghanaians perceived Liberians not only as security threats, but also as aloof and keeping to themselves – characteristics Ghanaians use to label Accra’s longstanding Lebanese communities which have remained non-socially integrated (Akyeampong 2006).

A lack of tolerance for Liberians could also have come from Ghana’s media not making clear the causes for Liberians’ internal dissent and their difference by ethnic and political background. By the time the media made some distinctions among Liberian refugees in the early to mid-2000s with regard to gender, vulnerability and age, many Ghanaians simply wanted Liberians to repatriate, but numerous Doe-supporting Krahn Liberians could not safely go home.

**Conclusion**

Whereas all migrants are likely to face challenges related to cultural belonging, refugees are among the most legally and socially disadvantaged migrants, sharing many of the challenges facing the poorest of the poor, including inadequate access to food, land, income, education and essential services (de Jongh 2002). The media can help or thwart the introduction and implementation of more effective and humane policies with regard to refugees and other migrants by manipulating how they frame issues and the relative frequency of particular frames (Vliegenthart and Roggeband 2007). Framing refugee issues in security terms is a widespread phenomenon (Loescher 1993). The use of human rights, rather than security, to frame issues could improve the reception and social integration of refugees and would be of particular significance to those whose prospects of ever repatriating safely remain slim.

In countries with relative freedom of the press, as is now enjoyed in Ghana, there is a need for a more structural view of communication which recognizes the potential role of the media in peace building and good
governance. A good way to develop better communication for the future would be to train journalists to be more sensitive to diverse communities and help ensure that refugees, including ex-combatants, are aware of transitional assistance, training and skills development programmes via the UNHCR and other organizations supporting refugees in their post-conflict lives. Encouraging journalists to deepen public and citizen-state dialogue in ways which support humanitarian relief and refugees’ social integration may have improved Liberians’ reception in Ghana. A greater focus on the humanitarian issues facing refugees would likely have reduced discrimination against Liberians in jobs and housing and other key life areas; the public would have been less likely to view the refugees as security threats, and the refugees themselves would have been more aware of their rights and services available to them. Although print media stories about gun running and security threats can grab readers’ interest and help sell papers, journalists must be aware that their coverage of events can not only have real consequences for members of the groups reported on, but also impact the actions of politicians and law enforcement officials interacting with those groups.

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