Since the celebration a few decades ago of the life and work of Raymond Mauny, African historians have routinely withdrawn, almost every decade, from the busy schedule of their daily occupation to pay homage to one of the best among them. Robin Law’s is the latest in an already impressive string of celebrations dotting like memory signposts the tortuous path leading to the growth of an authentically African approach to history. But, even though, by the standards of earlier events of the kind, Robin Law may look like a rather young man, this does not affect in the least the meanings traditionally assigned to such congregations of university dons: first, to take stock of the progress so far made by African historians in a particular field of research, and secondly, to draw a road map for future scholarship. Nevertheless, the dilemma facing scholars on such occasions is whether to be forward-looking or backward-looking in the assessment of their illustrious colleague. Indeed, depending on the age of the hero of the day, it proves very difficult to strike the right balance between these two approaches. Admittedly, the presence of the frail figure of an elderly professor may easily sway his colleagues into indulging in glib eulogy as they vie with one another in praise for the past achievements of an obviously declining star. On the contrary, the celebration of a teacher in mid-career has none of this inhibition. Rather than closing a chapter, it is a prospective exercise circumscribing clearly the challenges still lying ahead. This is exactly the impression one gets through a perusal of this voluminous festchrift in honor of Robin Law, combining harmoniously at it does retrospection and prospection in a balanced picture.

But let no one be deceived by the relatively young age of Robin Law. He deserves as much as all his predecessors who underwent the same ritual to take his rightful place among the founding fathers of the mighty discipline that African history has become today. Indeed, he has greatly contributed to the growth of this branch of human inquiry of which he became a devotee at the tender age of twenty-seven. Robin Law’s long presence in the field has turned him both into an astute student of West Africa and a privileged eye-witness of its recent history; incidentally, he lived in Nigeria throughout the duration of the civil war in the late sixties. This fact explains the range of topics covered in this book as well as the diversity of background of its contributors.

Celebrating a Knight of Clio: Robin Law and the Merry-Go-Round of Atlantic Africa

Anselme Guezo


The changing worlds of Atlantic Africa” is indeed a very fat book both in terms of content and detail. With its 513 pages, it stands as a vivid testimony of the scope and depth of Robin Law’s
scholarship. Perhaps, more than one review article is needed for this book, which represents the latest statement on the controversial issue of the Atlantic slave trade. There can be no better tribute to Robert R. R. Law as they collect in a book a bouquet of writings on the question which has exercised his mind since his undergraduate years. It is no exaggeration to assert that all the aspects of this obnoxious trade except perhaps one have been dealt with in this well-bound book. As it is known, the number game has dominated the early debate on the Atlantic slave trade. However, for one reason or another, as time wore on, the matter has become redundant, giving the impression that the last word has already been said on this aspect of the trade. On the contrary, much as one can agree roughly on the number of Africans exported to the Americas, a great deal still remains shrouded in darkness as far as the statistics of the trade are concerned. The later Werner Peukert cogently argued that statistical studies of the flow of African commodities imported into the Slave Coast can shed much needed light on the workings of the African societies. Unfortunately, very few African historians are willing to follow in his footsteps as they are deterred by the statistics that European commodities were just trinkets to lure African chiefs into an unequal exchange.

This opinion is hardly borne out by the contributors to this book who have given a very good account of the manner in which trade had expanded inland in the wake of the Atlantic slave trade. As is evidenced by the study of Lagos, this process of trade expansion predates the inception of the Atlantic slave trade by many centuries and in many respects vindicates the Smithian theory of growth. Actually, the early Portuguese explorers inserted themselves into this well-established trade system as middlemen, carrying ijebu cloth from the Slave Coast to the Gold Coast and later to the Ashanti. Akan began to invest the profit they made from the gold trade into the clearing of the Gold Coast forest, the Portuguese middlemen were still at hand to import labor from the same area. Therefore, one can conclude that, but for the disruptive effect of the Atlantic slave trade, West Africa could have experienced a steady growth based on the exploitation of its own natural resources.

On the contrary, according to certain authors in this collection of essays, the Atlantic slave trade, by resorting to the very forceful displacement of people, had impeded the process of economic growth in the sense that it led to both the weakening of the market and the neglect of the endogenous industries. In the assessment of the contributors to the volume, the Atlantic slave trade was a traumatic experience which cannot even be redeemed by the emergence of the state in Africa as earlier historians had assumed. Indeed, the state in Africa played very little role in the development of trade, to the extent that the living conditions of the Africans under state-controlled institutions were no different from those of the Africans in stateless societies.

African states, on the other hand, had the tendency of avoiding negatively the settlement pattern in a given region by causing the emergence of a periphery on their marshland. It is thought that they were raiding their weaker neighbors with the firearms supplied by their European trading partners, the African societies eventually pushed the latter into the mountainous recesses and inhospitable resorts. If states played such a limited and negative role in the development of the market, how then can one account for the procurement of export slaves? Some of the contributors to this collection suggest that the imbalance between center and periphery which resulted from trade expansion was enough to destabilize less organized societies and to make populations vulnerable to food shortage. They lay great emphasis on the role of kinship in the expansion of trade network. It would appear that it was through the channel of family alliances and trade networks that commodities against which were exchanged the millions of Africans were conveyed. Trade also served as a conduit for the transfer of the technology and knowledge of the populations living in the centers to the communities in the peripheries. Hence the necessity to bring under closer scrutiny these two pillars of any African society: kinship and trade.

The Omari aristocracy of the Lomos showed how to meet this networking to sustain their hegemony over the centuries and accumulate wealth which they lavishly displayed in conspicuous consumption. The same trade strategy was used by the Congo and Angola. It is the success of the trade in the periphery in Igbomina by stressing descent from Ooduwa as a claim to leadership. Thus, the ideology of kinship, the second pillar of African social organization, justifies the control of manpower, one of the preconditions for the development of the Atlantic slave trade. Indeed, the status of domestic slaves was a direct outcome of the ideological restrictions on the assimilation of strangers to the extended families. Domestic slaves were said to be protected against sale into the Atlantic slave trade. But the extent to which captives were also separated from their families is not known. What is clear though from this collection of essays is that, due to the commitment to family members, it was not uncommon to see a kin entering into bondage or pawnship on behalf of his relation.

Here again, pawns were not immune to sale until and unless the debt was paid. One can, therefore, assert that a substantial number of slaves were the hapless victims of the kinship system. Others were, however, indirectly produced by the breakdown of this system, especially when faced by a subsistence crisis which eventually led to famine and war. Viewed from its very perspective, the supply side of the Atlantic slave trade appears to be fully integrated into a system of transfer of full manpower and knowledge subsequent to the expansion of the market into the interior of the continent. It was this well-oiled mechanism that Abolition brought to an abrupt end. It remains to be proven whether this momentous event was equally beneficial to the three sides of the famous triangular commerce.

Many of the contributors to this book have tried to assess the impact of Abolition in the economic development of the three continents involved in the Atlantic slave trade. Thus, in contradiction to all the predictions of economic slump likely to follow Abolition, this decision ushered in Europe an era of tremendous growth in all sectors of the economy. This prosperity was measured in the extent to which the Nigerian economy and macroeconomic terms. It may not be amiss to assert that Abolition paved the way to the industrial revolution, in which Britain took a very decisive lead. The other European powers, which at first did not feel bound by the British decision to abolish the Atlantic slave trade and thus did not follow suit, also reaped some profit from the withdrawal of their British competitors.

Spain, for instance, welcomed the British slave traders and sailors into the country, and these latter continued to operate under a different European flag. In this way, they proved instrumental in transferring their new Spanish employers all the technologies and know-how of the African slave trade for another half a century. As far as France was concerned, it took advantage of Britain’s official withdrawal from business to expand its own sugar industry, mostly by attracting British financial capital to a large degree to Indian sugar and other financial perks. The American side of the triangle, the conclusions that one can draw about Abolition are in the nature of things much more tempered. Here, the color bar was skillfully manipulated so as to keep blacks away from any benefits which may accrue to them from the new dispensation arising from Abolition. On the contrary, the white settler communities who were by then fully integrated in the world capitalist system were given free range to accumulate capital and invest in other industries. They were, therefore, poised to seize control of the colonial economies by becoming the new property-owning bourgeoisie of Cuba and Brazil. Meanwhile, the most enterprising among their black fellow citizens had to struggle against all odds to keep their heads above water.

The new world in which freed slaves found themselves proved to be very imminence to black business which had no leeway except in the gray area between legality and illegality. This is very well illustrated by the case study of a black liberated slave in post-Abolition Brazil. As this essay shows, the white settlers authorities tolerated the gainful activities of the blacks as long as there were not too many of them. This situation exposed the priests of this cult to legal harassment and prosecution at any time the authorities might decide to do so. On the whole, if there was any change in the life of liberated slaves in Brazil, it was in the fact that some of them have been able to use the profits accumulated from their business venture in acquiring property which was essential to ensuring the circle of their clients. The dominant attitude prevailed among so-called Abolition merchant princes on the African coast. Given this background, it is a misnomer to speak of an economic revolution, as far as Africa, the third side of the metaphoric triangle, was concerned. Even though Abolition in Africa is widely praised as the harbinger of change on the continent, this must be taken with a pinch of salt. A very stimulating study of a Lagosian entrepreneur convincingly proves that the Blacks, when given equal opportunities, evince the same foresight as their white counterparts in matters of determining promising fields of capital investment. However, the big stick of colonialism was always there to be out them out of sight. In the end, this typical Lagosian businessman had no space left for him by the colonial system except extending credit and developing himself. He also developed the money of the banks which would complete the circle of his exclusion from the economic arena of Lagos. One can draw a parallel here between the plight of this businessman and the fortunes of the blacks in post-Abolition Brazil. But even more interestingly, this description of the situation in the mid-nineteenth century sounds like a premonition when set against the predicament in which contemporary Nigerians find themselves.

Today, the same Lagosians had very little room for manoeuvre outside registering as mules or couriers in the bruising drug trade. The lesson of the story is that capitalism entertains no morality about the use of black labor. Likewise, this is the message conveyed by a study which evoked the antics played by BP Shell in the pursuit of their own interests. The management of this company did not shrink from sitting on a fence throughout their war rather than taking the costly decision of siding with one of the two belligerents. Given all these counter-examples it would be difficult to adhere to the
produce cash crop, but rather food for widespread opinion, in the hinterland of continent.18 However, it would seem to the colonial conquest of the African Hopkins about half a century ago, led were formulated into the theory of became so valuable as to be privately of the continent such as Hausaland, land market pursuant to the rule of the came mainly from international trade, entrepreneurs responded to the demand of the opportunities offered by was true of the following period shrank into insignificance internal manufactures. Therefore, the Atlantic institution became apparent when trade, cyclical development predicated upon African societies followed a pattern of addicted to any linear growth, the therefore, evident that rather than being periphery of the Oyo Alafinate.22 It is, indicated later by the cases of the slavery-raiding mode of production applied directly to the Atlantic slave trade, if not Dahomey. But it is baffling to realize that an historian of the talent of Robin Law should also find it necessary to coin his own exotic concept: revolution of destruction.29 For him the rise of Dahomey in the area of the Slave Coast wreaked havoc and desolation on the previously well organized Aja states which had to bear the brunt of the Dahomean invasion. The exotic literature which is aimed at a European audience purports to paint at a European audience purports to paint

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Admittedly, we tend to put too much weight behind the meaning of the word Abolition. On the ground, Abolition has the aura of being a fine thing, but it is bad and good. As is demonstrated by many, Abolition was a meandering process with a great deal of will and dealing behind the scenes. For instance, the prosecution of British-born clandestine traders caught red-handed in slave trading was not always straightforward on the contrary, it was likely to become entangled in lengthy and intractable court procedure. In the few court cases which have survived the colonial period and public time, it is often the case that the law was harder on the African accomplices of these British-born slave traders who were liable to jail, even when they were found to be women.20

Perhaps the so-called ‘adaptation crisis’ is only in the eyes of the historian. British and post-Abolition African societies on the continent, as indeed in Brazil, there was a great deal of continuity. It is symptomatic that the only change noticed in post-Abolition Dahomey in this book was towards the development of kinship ties with the adoption of the asen, this portable iron altar designed to celebrate the ancestors of the royal family in Danxome. According to Professor Bay, the cult innovation was a further attempt to later taken over by the families of commoners. Interestingly enough, asen predated by centuries the establishment of the family cult as it was found associated with the worship of the local deity in both Africa and in Dahomey. This important discovery raises the question of whether the Africans sold into slavery belonged to the same stock as their captors. Was not the Atlantic slave trade one of the tragic outgrowths of the spread of family based land tenure and farming? The essay on Igboninaland gives a tentative answer to this question. It described the process of expansion and decline of the family ideology in this peripheral of the Oyo Alafinate.21 It is my theory that the evidence of the binge or to any linear growth, the African societies followed a pattern of cyclical development precipitated upon the flow and ebb of trade. Indeed, much as family bonds helped integrate its members within a larger community with rights and obligations, they could also serve as discriminatory labels to classify and rank people on a social scale. The contradictions of the family institution became apparent when trade, which was the only cement keeping this

quality side, simply because, according to him, historians are firmly in the grip of their Zeitgeist, which keeps them enthralled to a particular vision of the world.27 Indeed, despite all their effort, European historians are not any more moved by a revisionist spirit in their assessment of the Atlantic slave trade. Dominination is an infectious disease which affects to the same degree masters and slaves. That is why no matter how hard European historians may try, they cannot free themselves from the ghost of colonialism which causes their writings to be constantly buffeted between the Charibdis of exoticism and the Scylla of ethnography. I will use two examples to illustrate this position.

The exotic literature which is aimed at a European audience purports to paint the world in sharp contrast so as to raise the consciousness of the European elite. Its objective has never been to study alien cultures in their own right but with the view of what Europe can learn from them. Caricature is, therefore, the most suitable literary device to make sense of the educational goal of castigare ridendo mores. That is why the process of ‘discovery’ and conquest of Africa during the Atlantic slave trade, was no radical change either in the educational goal of the African peoples, is marked by a string of exotic concepts. A few of them, such as the curious asen, simply extended control over the natural resources still lying idle and established a rent-based economy not unlike the previous exchange of human resources. As far as plantations were concerned, they were mainly supported by the Weme valley, the hinterland of Lagos being slightly marginal to the palm oil belt. If, macroeconomically, there is no gaining say that there was the rise of a few merchant princes – albeit their ability to accumulate wealth was curbed by the domestic economy, the domestic economy continued to loom larger than international trade in the GDP of these countries and labor never became free. Transfer and improvement of technologies remained limited except perhaps in Hausaland with its export-driven dying industry.

In the light of this argument, the vibrant economy before the sixteenth century fueled by an autonomous development of exchange between the areas of Guinea, Dahomey and the Gold coast was suddenly brought to a halt after the inception of the Atlantic slave trade. This outward-looking activity eventually stifled all the indigenous industries of the continent. The indigenous economic systems were highly acclaimed by the first European traders to the extent that they put themselves forward as middlemen in their exchange, gradually lost in quality and were replaced by European manufactures. Therefore, the Atlantic slave trade contributed very little to the growth of the market economy. It rather shrank into insignificance internal demand through its decimation of the continent’s population. The opposite was true of the following period, heralded by the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade. Indeed, taking advantage of the opportunities offered by ‘legitimate’ commerce, many African entrepreneurs responded to the demand of the market by expanding their business. Even though this demand came mainly from international trade, the profit percolated into the internal market pursuant to the rule of the surpluses theory. For instance, in certain regions of the continent such as Hausaland, land became so valuable as to be privately owned. These developments, which were formulated into the theory of ‘adaptation crisis’ by Professor Hopkins about half a century ago, led to a change of leadership in some of the major African polities and, ultimately, to the colonial conquest of the African continent.25 However, it would seem that one would be hard-pressed for evidence of adaptation in this case for reasons of transition. More often than not, there was no radical change either in the political leadership or in the economic field. The common pattern was that, after Abolition, the traditional aristocracy simply extended control over the natural resources still lying idle and established a rent-based economy not unlike the previous exchange of human resources.

In the oil Rivers as in the hinterland of Poro Abolition, the natural groves of cocoa was simply tapped to respond to the demand of the international market. In Dahomey, where plantations did exist, they were a direct outcome of clandestine slave trade, not of Abolition.24 Contrary to a widespread opinion, in the hinterland of Lagos, slave hands were not used to produce cash crop, but rather food for the large households of Yoruba chiefs and kings. The palm oil export of Lagos was supplied mainly from the Weme river pursuant to the rule of the surpluses theory. For instance, in certain regions of the continent such as Hausaland, land became so valuable as to be privately owned. These developments, which were formulated into the theory of ‘adaptation crisis’ by Professor Hopkins about half a century ago, led to a change of leadership in some of the major African polities and, ultimately, to the colonial conquest of the African continent.25 However, it would seem that one would be hard-pressed for evidence of adaptation in this case for reasons of transition. More often than not, there was no radical change either in the political leadership or in the economic field. The common pattern was that, after Abolition, the traditional aristocracy simply extended control over the natural resources still lying idle and established a rent-based economy not unlike the previous exchange of human resources. As far as plantations were concerned, they were really few and far between. In the Oil Rivers as in the hinterland of Poro Abolition, the natural groves of cocoa was simply tapped to respond to the demand of the international market. In Dahomey, where plantations did exist, they were a direct outcome of clandestine slave trade, not of Abolition.24 Contrary to a widespread opinion, in the hinterland of Lagos, slave hands were not used to produce cash crop, but rather food for the large households of Yoruba chiefs and kings. The palm oil export of Lagos was supplied mainly from the Weme river pursuant to the rule of the surpluses theory. For instance, in certain regions of the continent such as Hausaland, land became so valuable as to be privately owned. These developments, which were formulated into the theory of ‘adaptation crisis’ by Professor Hopkins about half a century ago, led to a change of leadership in some of the major African polities and, ultimately, to the colonial conquest of the African continent.25 However, it would seem that one would be hard-pressed for evidence of adaptation in this case for reasons of transition. More often than not, there was no radical change either in the political leadership or in the economic field. The common pattern was that, after Abolition, the traditional aristocracy simply extended control over the natural resources still lying idle and established a rent-based economy not unlike the previous exchange of human resources.

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understand that there was only a difference of degree and not of kind between Dahomean rule in Ouidah and French colonial rule there? If the answer to this last question is yes, then are we not facing a subtle attempt to justify colonialism posthumously?

Presumably, even in the expression of their empathy for Africa, the European historians cannot help being selective. They are unable to see the continent as a whole because they are trapped in the Manichean world view of colonialism. Here Robin Law openly takes sides with those he considers to be the victims of the Atlantic slave trade. In perhaps the most brilliant piece in this collection of essays, Professor Tom McCaskie, on the contrary, did not conceal his sympathy with the former perpetrators, whose descendants form the Kumasi-based Ghanaian elite and of which President Kufuor is a member. With tremendous dexterity of narrative and considerable mastery of twi, he mingles oral and written sources to come up with a comprehensive genealogy that fully justifies, historically, the president's claims to political leadership. While it is a very convincing account of the historical background to the rise of the two political traditions which compete today for the exercise of power in Ghana, his analysis appears a little bit reductionist and tends to exonerate colonialism in the establishment of this artificial bi-polarization of the country's political scene.

Yet it is known that it is the rent economy fostered by colonialism on the backs of the Ghanaian masses that entrenched the wealth, exhibited today by the so-called bourgeoisie, as passport to political power. Elsewhere in Africa, where there were no proven natural resources, colonialism did not lend its support to traditional rule. If it did at all, it was for reasons other than the promotion of any modern African elite. In any case, what extent is an elite whose members have to underrive their credentials by British universities still regarded as representative of the peoples whose political experience it pretends to summarize? But Professor McCaskie sees no prospects for Ghana's political future beyond the 'democratic' transfer of power between these two traditions.

For him, this is the sole condition to ensure the continuity of the Western-educated elite. This is exactly the mirage of development against which Kwaame Nkrumah, the founder of the second tradition, was warning the Africans about in his writings. But this limitation of the political debate to the Western-educated elite keeps out of the picture the overwhelming majority of Ghanaians still sharing their African cultural heritage. This presence of the African culture is conspicuous, though in the role kinship played in shaping the psyche of the elite on both sides of the divide. Family ties determine largely the rules of the political game as could be seen in the elegant description by McCaskie of the socialization of the members of the elite. Indirectly, he is pointing the way to bridging the gap between these two competing traditions, which must reconcile with their African heritage.

To go through these essays is a highly rewarding exercise. One comes out of it a little dizzy as one would from a merry-go-round. African historians deserve this timely distraction even if this means returning to reality with a deep sense of unfulfilled expectations. I would recommend this book as the latest compendium on the Atlantic slave trade after correction of the numerous grammatical mistakes which are an eyesore to its majestic tapestry.

Notes

1 On 22 February 2010, Professor Robin Law honored the entire staff of the Department of History and Archaeology of the University of Abomey-Calavi by paying a visit to the Department. On this occasion, I delivered an introductory speech in French on the contents of the recently published book. This review article is an English version of the gist of that presentation.

2 For a biography of Professor Robin Law, see the introductory chapter of the book, Toyin Falola and Matt D. Childs, eds., 2009, pp. 1-18.


4 See Werner Peukert, 1978, Der Atlantische Sklavenhandel von Dahomey 1740-1797, Wissenschaft Anthropologie und Sozialgeschichte, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, GMBH.


12 See José Guadalupe Ortega, 'From Obscurity to Notoriety: Cuban Slave Merchants and the Atlantic World', in Toyin Falola and Matt D. Childs, eds., 2009, pp. 287-304.


17 See J.E. Inikori, op. cit., p. 182.


19 The plantations were established by the ruling slave owning elite in order to feed the slaves awaiting shipment. This situation was not different from that in the Oil Rivers, according to Waddell: see Hope Masterton Waddell, 1970, Twenty-Nine Years in the West Indies and Central Africa, London: Frank Cass, pp. 315-320.


22 See Aribidesi Usman, op. cit.


27 See David Henige, 'The Lessons of the Rawlinson Correspondence', in Toyin Falola and Matt D. Childs, eds., 2009, pp. 89-96.

28 Ibid.

29 See Law, quoted by Toyin Falola in the introductory chapter of this book, p.7. Actually, no revolution can endure if it is not based on some degree of popular consent.


Pratiques d’accompagnement et performance

Très petites et petites entreprises camerounaises en phase de démarrage

Emmanuel Kamdem

Avec la gestion de proximité, les ressources ont été transférées aux communes. Ceci leur permet de prendre en charge leur fonctionnement et d’assurer l’irrégularité. Seulement, les ressources dont une commune peut disposer peuvent paraître insuffisantes si les besoins ne sont pas hiérarchisés dans l’optique de lui apporter une solution appropriée. C’est ainsi que les collectivités territoriales ont la possibilité d’établir des priorités dans la répartition des ressources. Les ressources sont destinées à alimenter le budget de chaque commune (emprunts, subventions de l’Etat, impôts et taxes) pour subvenir aux besoins de fonctionnement et au développement. Donc, la gestion de ces ressources doit naturellement se faire dans la logique des principes de la décentralisation et de ceux de la comptabilité publique à travers les différentes structures en charge de la question. La décentralisation postulant la responsabilisation des communes, celles-ci doivent mettre l’accent sur la mobilisation des ressources fiscales pour ne pas continuer à dépendre des ressources venant d’autres acteurs comme l’Etat et les partenaires techniques et financiers. C’est donc la question de la gouvernance de la décentralisation qui est interpellée et qui requiert l’implication de toutes les composantes de la commune pour une mobilisation effective des ressources et de leur utilisation judicieuse. Tout ceci se pose en termes de défis que doivent relever les collectivités territoriales, notamment les communes. La présente étude se propose d’analyser ce processus à travers l’exemple de la commune rurale de Kalabancoro.

Conçue comme un élargissement du pouvoir de l’Etat du centre vers le niveau local, la réforme sur la décentralisation est perçue comme un processus qui permet de faire participer les populations à l’élaboration et à la gestion des politiques qui concernent leurs territoires. Au niveau local, sa mise en œuvre permet aux acteurs en rapport direct et indirect de prendre en charge des aspects plus ou moins familiers des défis de leurs territoires. Ainsi, l’intervention des bailleurs de fonds et des ONG, activitée socio-économique analyser dans la présente étude, se réfère au cas de la commune de Madiama, cercle de Djenné. Ainsi, à travers l’intervention des bailleurs de fonds et des ONG, il s’agit d’évaluer le niveau d’appropriation des instruments de gestion environnementale par les acteurs locaux et de leur impact sur les plans social, politique et économique. Ceci amène à analyser les relations entre les institutions communales et la sphère de la gestion environnementale à travers l’implantation des projets de gestion des ressources naturelles. Ainsi, il s’agira d’évaluer l’effectivité des instruments de gestion des ressources naturelles transférés aux acteurs locaux dans la phase actuelle de post-projet, et de voir ainsi comment la création et le renforcement d’organismes parallèles de gestion, tels que le Comité communal de gestion de ressources naturelles, peuvent avoir un impact sur la gouvernance démocratique locale.