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The Great Lakes Region and Southern Africa in Historical and Contemporary Perspective
MOSES KHISA

Mémoires d’une combattante de l’ALN : un devoir de mémoire
KHEDIDJA MOKEDDEM

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Contents/ Sommaire

Seifudein Adem
Postcolonial Constructivism: Ali Mazrui’s Theory of Intercultural Relations? .................................................. 4

Adekeye Adebao
Nigeria’s Iron Lady .............................................................................................................................................. 7

Moses Khisa
The Great Lakes Region and Southern Africa in Historical and Contemporary Perspective ............................ 10

Geetha Ganga
Salvaging Mogadishu from Ruin and Rubble ...................................................................................................... 13

Mustapha Medjahdi
Le Soudan face aux dissidences ......................................................................................................................... 15

Cristina Robalo Cordeiro
Le Portugal et son impensé colonial ................................................................................................................... 17

Khedidja Mokeddem
Mémoires d’une combattante de l’ALN : un devoir de mémoire ....................................................................... 18

Kahina Bouanane Nouar
Lorsque l’exil et la mémoire transforment une parole énonciative : un clin d’œil d’Alain Mahancekou ........... 19

Tayeb Rehail
Quelle place pour le sport dans l’identité africaine? ......................................................................................... 20

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The Rise of Ali Mazrui

Ali Mazrui arrived in the world of scholarship in the 1960s. This was when postcolonial Africa was being called into being, when the Third World was attracting special attention from the Superpowers, and when the discipline of International Relations (IR) – and other disciplines – was seriously tackling issues of concern to the Third World, including Africa. Mazrui debated the issue of international justice versus international order with prominent scholars like Hedley Bull, who was one of the early IR scholars in the second-half of the twentieth century. In fact, Bull recognized Mazrui as a formidable intellectual adversary. Shortly after he published his influential book The Anarchical Society in 1977, Bull (1978:1390) wrote: Ali Mazrui is not only the most distinguished writer to have emerged from independent Black Africa, and the most penetrating and discriminating expositor of the nature of the Third World, but he is also a most illuminating interpreter of the drift of world politics…[T]he issues that interest [Mazrui], the audience to whom he addresses himself, even the values he embraces, are not simply black or African or Third World, but global.

Mazrui first made a name for himself by publishing, “On the Concept of ‘We are All Africans’” in the American Political Science Review in 1963. As it turned out, this was to be a landmark in the evolution and development of Ali Mazrui as a scholar. The article was one of the first major writings in that journal about postcolonial Africa written by a postcolonial African scholar. American political scientist Herbert J. Spiro (1967:91) noted: ‘Mazrui’s article identified him as a perceptive and original voice of African political thought’. By publishing in the journal, Mazrui declared that he was ready to engage intellectually one of the most vibrant communities of scholars in his field. It was also significant that the article should be published in an influential journal of political science based in an increasingly influential country in the world – the United States.

Additionally, later in the decade, Mazrui (1968:89-83) published another article in another major journal, World Politics. The article, ‘From Social Darwinism to Current Theories of Modernization’, was significant for two reasons. It further problematized the notion that it was impossible to separate a cultural element to it. But the publication of the article was also indicative of how relatively more receptive the discipline had been not only to Negro-Social Darwinism but also to a different perspective which informs it.

Mainstream IR, of which Hedley Bull was a part, was thus picked up Mazrui and engaged him because there was a concerted effort and genuine commitment to understanding international re- lations in all its complexities, including by explaining or evaluating what Donald Puchala (1998:135-157) described as: the significance of the emer- bited tone, the complex motivations, the mythological underpinnings, or the historical dynamics of North-South re- lations. The relationship between Bull and Mazrui was, however, not a one- way street. According to J. D. Miller (1990:65-78), Mazrui, too, was a posi- tive influence on Bull: ‘Hedley Bull’s contact with stimulating people like Ali Mazrui caused him to ask questions about the direction in which the Third World might be heading…’. Although Mazrui’s focus was, as Bull understood the Third World and global, his perspective was, and has continued to be, bot- tom-up. It was this postcolonial orien- tation in Mazrui which Bull had in mind when he described him as ‘boss of the ideol- ogy of the Third World’.

The Decline of Ali Mazrui

Ultimately, however, it was perhaps the same bottom-up perspective about the Third World, a perspective which, to adapt a phrase from Philip Dar- by (1997:11-32), not only articulates Third World dissatisfaction with its lot but also attempts to change it, that marginalized Mazrui in the IR world of the 1970s and 1980s. The external manifestations of how Mazrui’s rela- tionship with Bull eventually soured perhaps symbolized the then emerging ‘paradigm shift’ in the mainstream discipline and the nature of its consequences. As Mazrui reminisced: Hedley Bull thought that I car- ried my anti-imperialism too far at a conference in Britain, which addressed international issues in connection with American hos- tages in Iran. Bull was taken aback by my anti-imperialism. In the late 1970s. In my speech I argued that it was a change that Americans were hostages. Most of the time the United States held much of the world hostage to what Americans regarded as their national interest. I spoke with passion and at one stage I stopped speaking and began to hold back my tears and prevent the exercise of judgment and by the assumptions that if we confine ourselves to strict standards of verification and proof there is very little of sig- nificance that can be said about international relations, that gener- alanproposalsaboutthis sub- ject must therefore derive from a scientifically imperfect pro- cess of perception or intuition. Fact/value dichotomy became the or- der of the day, placing positivism on a solid ground as the dominant meth- od of research in IR. Also as a con- sequence of this, Mazrui became etc) in the eyes of the mainstream scholars, who were, in Mazrui’s (1974:67-71) own words, ‘…the different shades of behaviouralists in the western world…who believe that political science ought not to in- clude normative and value preoccupa- tions’. In any case, one of the endur- ing effects of the ultimate triumph of behaviouralism in IR was the reign of quantification and formal models and the steady marginalization of culture as an important variable in the study of international relations. But Mazrui re- fused to change his approach and kept relative distance from the theoretical exchanges which characterized this pe- riod, taking leave of absence from the so-called ‘inter-paradigm’ debates of the 1980s, as he apparently chose to forget the mainstream discourse, by which he was also seemingly forgotten.

It must be reiterated, in closing, that Mazrui’s relative obscurity in IR would seem to pertain also to the predomi- nance of Anglo-American IR in the academic discipline (Waever 1998:687-727). D. S. L. Jarvis (2000:2) was therefore right in pointing out: ‘…for a discipline whose purview is osten- sibly outward looking and international in scope, and at a time of ever encroach- ing globalization and transnationalism, International Relations has become in- creasingly provincial and inward look- ing’. But, even more specifically, it was Waever (1997:4) who brought to our attention a possible reason for the exclusion of prominent non-Western thinkers from a book he co-authored, The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making? ‘…if it had not been for the relative predominance of Anglo-American IR… it would have been nice to have had a chapter on [Ali] Mazrui or [Takashi] Inoguchi’.

On Postcolonial Theory and Social Constructivism

Postcolonial theory, or postcolonialism, emerged in the mid-1980s (Zeleta 2003: 12). It can be defined as a disciplined critique of power and modernity, an articulation of the dissatisfaction of the Third World with its condition of existence; the challenge and rejection of Eurocentric narratives and constructions of what they misrepresent or erase; and the formulation of alternative narratives about the postcolony (Chowdhry and Nair 2002:26; Beier, 2002:87;Matin, 2011:359; Rita-Kiki Edzie and Peyi Soyinka-Airewele, 2010:376).

Julian Go (2013:29) says postcolonial theory is ‘a loosely coherent body of writing and thought that critiques and aims to transcend the structures supportive of Western colonialism and its legacies’. Philip Darby (1997:14) outlines the major endeavors of postcolonial theory as: emphasis placed on subjectivity, the critique of modernity, the challenge to positivism and the rejection of European universals, the prizing open of the nation-state, and the commitment to the marginal’. Extracted deliberately from wide-ranging sources, the above definitions of postcolonial theory affirm to, me, one thing. It is next to impossible to root any definition of the postcolonial scholarship of Mazrui’s postcolonial scholarship spanning more than half a century in which he was not engaged in some aspect of these postcolonial undertakings. Ali Mazrui’s postcolonial theory but without, to borrow a phrase from Paul Zeleza (2005:13), ‘postcolonial theory’s obscurity language and inertational rhetoric’. Postcolonial Constructivism: Ali Mazrui’s Theory of Inter-Cultural Relations? Seifudden Aden
But Mazrui’s vast scholarship also exhibits some of the attributes of social constructivism. While social constructivism is ‘broadly’ accepted today in the discipline, its relevance was questioned until very recently (Hurd 2008:301). Social constructivism has a rich variety (see, for example, Ruggie 1998: 855-885; Zeifuss 2002; Adler 2002: 94-118; Hurd 2008:298-316). Yet, unlike virtually all paradigms of thought about society, social constructivism too is based on specific assumptions about social knowledge, the relationship between knowledge and reality, and what is to be known, and, of course, the best way of acquiring knowledge. I maintain that social constructivist assumptions inform much of Ali Mazrui’s scholarship (see, for instance, Mazrui, 2007, 1976a:399, 1967b, and 1975). Mazrui has also occasionally articulated (or anticipated) some of the major social constructivist postulates in a language strikingly similar to that of social constructivists. For example, sociological scholar Alexander Wendt (1999-25) wrote in relation to the role of ideas in world affairs: ‘US military power means one thing to Canada, another to Communist China’. About a decade earlier, Mazrui (1998p:162) put the same notion in this way: ‘Although Brazil is much larger than Iraq, Brazil’s nuclear capability would be less of a global shock than Iraqi nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s explosion of nuclear device would cause greater fears than a successful explosion by China’. Wendt (1999:31) also unveiled the useful concept of ontological security, defining it as ‘the human predisposition for a relatively stable expectation about the world around them’. Wendt (1999:48) clarified the concept thus: ‘…along with the need for physical security, this [predisposition] presupposes human beings in a general way to have a stake directly and to seek out recognition of their standing from their society’. In a very different context, Mazrui (1971-48) elaborated a roughly similar idea about ‘the ‘sense of security afforded by the familiar’.

Social constructivism emphasizes the role of inter-subjectively shared ideas, norms and values; highlights the relationship between knowledge and reality; and refuses to privilege structures over agents, and vice versa. Mazrui tended to explain things much more than indicating which explanations are suitable and why. And yet, a Mazrui reader could feel the presence of an organizing ‘theoretical’ principle in his scholarship, too, one which is rooted in social constructivism. In closing, there are three things we should keep in mind about Mazrui’s constructivism: to the mainstream discipline of IR is minimal. For instance, Mazrui 1995:25; 1980). In any case, Mazrui’s advocacy against nuclear weapons is based on moral calculus rather than on the logic of deterrence. Mazrui (1980) is for total nuclear disarmament, but he is also against ‘nuclear apartheid’; his advocacy about nuclear proliferation was premised on the assumption that ‘a dose of the disease becomes part of the necessary cure’. As he later elaborated: ‘Some degree of proliferation may shock the five principal nuclear powers out of their complacency. The proliferation would gradually convince them that this system of a few select nuclear powers cannot be long sustained. Therefore we should aim for global nuclear disarmament, universal renunciation of these evil weapons for everybody, not just for all but the five countries [‘the nuclear superpower’] (1999-5: In late, incidentally, Mazrui’s position seems to be winning some following among empirical political theorists, too, such as J. David Singer (2008:256). In any case, Mazrui’s advocacy against nuclear Apartheid speaks to the postcolonialist impulse in him.

Mazrui has also advanced arguments which are in tune with the liberal theory of IR. Indeed, it is arguable that much of Mazrui’s scholarship shows such impulse, particularly as it was articulated more fully in his most ambitious book, World Federation of Cultures (1976a). Like liberalism, Mazrui’s theory places greater emphasis on the utility of institutions.

Mazri parts company both with realism and liberalism in important respects. He views his theory as a disciplined challenge of dominant paradigms of a few select nuclear powers and as a systematic interrogation of power relations in world politics. It allows for total nuclear disarmament, but he is also against ‘nuclear apartheid’; his advocacy about nuclear proliferation was premised on the assumption that ‘a dose of the disease becomes part of the necessary cure’. As he later elaborated: ‘Some degree of proliferation may shock the five principal nuclear powers out of their complacency. The proliferation would gradually convince them that this system of a few select nuclear powers cannot be long sustained. Therefore we should aim for global nuclear disarmament, universal renunciation of these evil weapons for everybody, not just for all but the five countries (‘the nuclear superpower’).’ (1999:5).

Mazrui’s theoretical contribution to the mainstream discipline of IR is minimal. This has partly to do with his position on ‘theoretical impurity’. The very notion of an all-embracing theory is anathema to him. Mazrui is also generally unconcerned about the lack of ‘theoretical’ consis- tency in his propositions. He abhors, for instance, the amoral fabric of the realist theory. On one occasion, Mazrui (1976) described Machiavelli as ‘the first great rationalizer of hypocrisy and false pre- tenses as a cornerstone of high policy in diplomacy and politics’. In his approach to theorizing, Mazrui subscribes, as I indicated already, to classical realism, as defined by Hedley Bull (1966:361). This is classical realism as method rather than as a worldview.

It is also worth noting that Mazrui escaped the influence of Hans Morgenthau’s realism although the two were colleagues at the University of Chicago at one time and had interacted closely. Yet Mazrui (1980:1-20) does refer to some of the basic premises of a variant of realism, such as the idea that nuclear proliferation is not necessarily inimical to global security. It must be noted, however, that Mazrui’s argument about nuclear weapons is based on moral calculus rather than on the logic of deterrence. Mazrui (1980) is for total nuclear disarmament, but he is also against ‘nuclear apartheid’; his advocacy about nuclear proliferation was premised on the assumption that ‘a dose of the disease becomes part of the necessary cure’. As he later elaborated: ‘Some degree of proliferation may shock the five principal nuclear powers out of their complacency. The proliferation would gradually convince them that this system of a few select nuclear powers cannot be long sustained. Therefore we should aim for global nuclear disarmament, universal renunciation of these evil weapons for everybody, not just for all but the five countries (‘the nuclear superpower’).’ (1999:5).

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strategies, including: classification or the usage of perceptive typologies, macro-history, and multi-disciplinary and multi-qualitative data orientation.

Classification makes it unnecessary to screen out different cases, opening the door wide for seemingly conflicting observations. Mazrui has a special liking and gift for classifying different concepts, events and processes in an original way. In the positivist social sciences, the necessity of classification, even its possibility, is likewise almost taken for granted. A related issue which arises is this: if classification occupies such a central place in the positivist project, and if postcolonial constructivism is anti-positivist in its orientation, then how can we resolve the apparent tension between postcolonial constructivism and positivist social science? Let me start, first, by re-stating the three reasons why I say that Mazrui’s scholarship (or postcolonial constructivism) is anti-positivist. Mazrui does not believe that a knowable reality exists out there which is driven by immutable natural laws and mechanisms, that inquiry takes place through a one-way mirror in which the usage of perceptive typologies, strategies, including: classification or the usage of perceptive typologies, macro-history, and multi-disciplinary and multi-qualitative data orientation.

Postcolonial constructivism deploys macro-history in search of broad changes and patterns in social processes. When Bull (1978:1) depicted Mazrui as ‘a most illuminating interpreter of the drift of world politics’, he was drawing our attention to Mazrui’s acute sense of macro-history. Mazrui himself had made it clear quite early on when he declared his commitment to ‘the study of global trends and their moral implications’ (Mazrui 1976a:xix). It was also remarkable that, despite the mutual respect each had for the other, Bull and Mazrui strongly disagreed on a macro-historical issue – international justice (Bull, 1977:74, 93-94). Postcolonial constructivists thus look for not only contradictions in social reality but also for linkages between sometimes seemingly unrelated phenomena. Macro-historical orientation in research makes the endeavor more sensitive to contrasts in social reality than micro-historical perspective as it presupposes wider knowledge and does not easily let its practitioner fall prey to absolute positions or pre-conceived claims and aspirations. With a clear sensibility to the notion that ‘social reality’ is too complex, postcolonial constructivism crosscuts disciplinary boundaries with utmost ease. Mazrui’s works show how totally unconcerned he had been about the imaginary boundaries between different disciplines (see, for instance, Mazrui 1994; 1991; 1990; 1983a; 1983b; 1976b and 1977).

With its emphasis on qualitative and historical method and with no a priori commitment to quantitative measurement and operationalization, postcolonial constructivism is also less constrained about the range of concepts it could use or the domain of data it could target. Mazrui relies most minimally on ‘quantitative’ data: his writings usually have no tables or graphs; they also generally lack footnotes and bibliographies. Postcolonial constructivism is not only accommodative of concepts which may not be operationalizable, it also rejects the notion that the data which is useful and reliable should come solely from empirical observation. In this sense, Mazrui is a ‘transfactualist’ who borrows a useful term from Jackson (2010:36-37)) who ‘holds out the possibility of going beyond the facts to grasp the deeper processes and factors that generate those facts’. Postcolonial constructivism is centered on overcoming rationalist limitations by allowing usage of data obtained through means other than observation and document analysis has other decisive advantages such as its openness to what pre-literary societies have to offer through non-written data. Mazrui (1991-99) has explicitly rejected the assumption, as he put it, that ‘thought is not thought unless it is also written’. His own writing style is testimony to the oral-written continuum.

Conclusion

More than four decades ago, John Nellis (1974:831-833) observed that Mazrui was ‘frequently and severely criticized by radical social analysts who find his traditional scholarship irrelevant and his liberal principles infuriating…’. Mazrui’s ‘traditional scholarship’ that was under attack, was one which anchored itself in the historical method, eschewed fetishism of numbers, and accepted permissiveness of normative bias in social inquiry. The issues raised by mainstream scholars in the 1970s about Mazrui’s scholarship in this way closely mirrored the fundamental schism which exists today between positivism and post-positivism. Mazrui’s corpus of writings and contemporary trend in IR seem to suggest that early in his career he was, in effect, breaking a new theoretical ground of social analysis, which may be called postcolonial constructivism.

References


O n the sidelines of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Cape Town in March 2013, I chaired a book launch starring Nigeria’s formidable first female finance minister, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, re- splendent in her trademark African traditional dress and matching head-gear. She talked unpretentiously, without the affected foreign accent of some Nigerians that have spent two decades abroad.

She had recently published a book titled Reforming the Unreformable on her time – between 2003 and 2006 – as finance minister of Africa’s largest economy, the world’s eighth most populous state, and its sixth largest oil-producer. She had been the architect of the deal to pay off Nigeria’s $30 billion debt (the second largest such debt of the oil-producer). She had been the architect of a bunker were formative experiences of powerful mandarins under military rule (‘Super Permsecs (permanent secretaries)’ of powerful mandarins under military rule). She revealed the perfecting of a system of sound planning and financial management of its oil resources; described Herculean efforts to fight vested interests at great personal cost; detailed how she had used her impressive international network to achieve Nigeria’s debt deal; observed that Nigeria’s political class appeared to be intimidated by its economic technocrats; and brushed off concerns about women not being equal to men.

Nigeria’s Iron Lady
Adekeye Adebafo
Reforming the Unreformable: Lessons from Nigeria
by Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala
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her among the ten most influential women in the world in 2011, while Foreign Policy listed her among the top 100 global thinkers in the same year. The 60-year-old technocrat’s brilliant economic credentials are from the prestigious Harvard and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), obtaining her doctorate in the latter institution. It is clear that the poor grasp of complex economic issues that many of Nigeria’s political leaders and parliamen- tary dunderheads have exhibited is what has given technocrats like Okonjo-Iweala their immense power, and a belief that they can take better decisions than the leaders they seek to advise.

In her book, Okonjo-Iweala describes in brutally frank terms the mutual antipathy between politicians and technocrats: ‘We would keep away from politics, since in any case most of the politicians left a lot to be desired. In fact, I could sense that the politicians felt our team did not appreciate them and regarded them with disdain.’ During the Cape Town book launch in March 2013, Okonjo-Iweala made the rather intriguing point that she eventually came to see no difference between politicians and technocrats, and noted that she had had to become a politician (while longing to no party) in order to be able to do her job effectively.

This phenomenon of political technocrats was particularly prominent during the era of the ‘Super Permsecs (permanent secretar- ies)’ of powerful mandarins under military rule in the early 1970s. It produced such prominent figures as Allison Ayida, Philip Asiodu, Abdulazeez Atta, and Ahmed Joda, who dominated General Yakubu Gowon’s ‘kitchen cabinet’.

Okonjo-Iweala grew up in a solidly middle-class Nigerian family with both parents being professors. Her upbringing was a happy, idyllic one full of ballet classes and piano lessons until the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970 forced her family back east, having lost all their savings. Her father was recruited into the Biafran army. Living on one meal a day, watching children dying, and sleeping on the floor of a bunker were formative experiences that made Okonjo-Iweala determined to succeed, and perhaps also contributed to her three-decade exile in graduate school and at the World Bank in Washington D.C., where she rose to become vice-president in 2002.

Okonjo-Iweala avoids such personal details in Reforming the Unreform-
able and focuses squarely on her time as finance minister between 2003 and 2006. The book took her four years to write. Despite the technical subject matter, it is highly readable, rich in detail, and devoid of complex economic jargon. The book is well-told and presents a bird’s eye view of Nigeria’s chronically underperforming and stag- geringly corrupt state. Her six-month stint as economic advisor to President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2000 had led to Okonjo-Iweala establishing a Debt Management Office and given her in- sights into the country’s parlous policy-making environment. The book covers the strategies of Okonjo-Iweala’s ‘Eco- nomic Team’; the actual implementa- tion of goals to address the structural constraints to private enterprise in Ni- geria’s economy through privatization, deregulation and liberalisation; restruc- turing the civil service, trade, tariffs, corrupt revenue-generating sectors; the bat- tle against corruption; the successful and titanically struggle to achieve the an- nulment of Nigeria’s debt; and the les- sons learned from the reform process.

Okonjo-Iweala herself recognises at the outset: ‘Nigeria has always been complex to govern in a way outsiders do not often understand or fully grasp’. She describes the country’s three de- cades of military rule as ‘politically and economically disastrous’ and castigates Nigeria’s ‘kleptocratic elite’ which she notes has ‘a very limited vision’. The country’s Lilliputian leadership had failed to raise $500 billion of oil earnings since the 1970s. Okon- jo-Iweala observes that the same rapa- cious elite may be one of the largest obstacles to reform, as it continues to feed at the trough of a parasitic state. She describes the deleterious impact of the ‘oil curse’ on Nigeria’s agricultural and other sectors, as well as its destruc- tion of the country’s moral and social fabric. She condemns ‘white elephant’ projects such as the Ajaokuta Steel Mills which was liquidated without any concrete results.

Before embarking on her reforms, Okonjo-Iweala obtained advice from Brazil’s former deputy finance minis- ter and a World Bank board member, Amaury Bier. In an impressive ex- ample of South-South sharing, based on Brazil’s own reform experiences, she quotes the late Brazilian leader in ‘Economic Team’ to fight the tough bat- tles in cabinet; have a comprehensive strategy; and ensure the sustainabil- ity of reforms by underpinning them with binding legislation. In crafting the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2007, Nigeria also looked to what Brazil had done and sought to adapt this example to its own legislation. The ‘Economi- ic Team’ – including individuals such as Paulo Guedes, Al-Rufi, Obiageli Ezekwesili, Nenadi Usman, Nuhu Ribadu, and Bode Augusto – crafted the National Economic Em- powerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) which set out to tackle four key challenges: poor economic man-

intellectual debate and disagreement or wide consultation with key interest groups. It is almost as if some of the genuine opposition to reforms is treated as treasonous, and critics of reform are sometimes unfairly branded as being part of the corrupt “vested interests”. Astonishingly, Okonjo-Iweala admits that the reformers actually stopped trying to gain the support of senior civil servants in their efforts to reform the civil ser- vice. It was no surprise that this particu- lar effort at reform failed spectacularly. The reformers often come across in the book as a secret society and cabal of un- accountable priests championing a reli- gion of neo-liberal reform. Such dogma was, however, not to be challenged, and anyone who tried, was brand- ed a heretic to be burned at the stake.

The NEEDS strategy – like the contin- ual New Partnership for Africa’s Develop- ment (NEPAD) championed by leaders like Olusegun Obasanjo and South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki – turned out to be a top-down plan imposed on the country without proper and wide- spread consultation and buy-in from critical civil society actors. The Ni- gerian civil society actors in the book remain mostly nameless and faceless. Their criticisms of NEEDS is never spelt out or explained. One does not have a sense that there was any seri- ous engagement with these groups. The core of Nigeria’s intelligentsia is cari- catured as ‘inclined towards socialism’, as if this somehow made this minority (certainly not a ‘core’, as Okonjo-Iwea- la asserts) less patriotic. She tends to lump all opponents of reform together, sometimes blurring the line between opportunist vested interests and gen- uine intellectual opposition. The views of Nigerian and African economists and think-tanks are also completely absent from the book, even as Western schol- ars like Columbia University’s Jeffrey Sachs are admiringly cited. Indigenous solutions to these deep-seated prob- lems rarely do not seem to have been taken as seriously as external advice.

Okonjo-Iweala seems to have an exaggerated faith in external civil so- ciety and other actors, many of whom, such as Ann Pettifor of the Jubilee 2000 campaign, she cites adoringly. Some of these individuals, like the Irish pop stars Bono and Bob Geldof, in fact formed a ‘celebrity group of the West’ to, among other things, promote the(Functionality: remove) as a woman; the governor of Del- tate, James Ibori, being convicted in Lon- don of corruption and money-laundering; TSKJ (a joint venture between Italian, American, and Japanese firms) paying $180 million in ‘kick-backs’ to win a $2 billion contract in 1995; and Siemens paying bribes totalling 10 million Euros to Nigerian government official between 2001 and 2004.

One of the author’s most interesting insights is the fact that state governors in Nigeria actually did not control the state’s revenue in managing billions of dollars in state funds. The fact that they have immunity from prosecution for criminal acts while in office often results in a culture of impunity. There is thus a dis- connect between state revenues, service delivery, and these governors being held accountable by their constituents for widespread theft of state resources. It would have been useful to obtain an outside perspective from the Nigerian civil society, and the Nigerian civil society actors in the book remain mostly nameless and faceless. Their criticisms of NEEDS is never spelt out or explained. One does not have a sense that there was any seri- ous engagement with these groups.

Okonjo-Iweala herself has acknowledged that her reform efforts could have benefited more from cultivating cabinet members and consulting more with civil society and the civil society. This suggests that rather than proceeding through intellectual argumentation and rational persuasion, it was often assumed that ‘vested interests’ would block reforms. Changes were therefore often ‘dictated through the back door’ of the notoriously authoritative president, Olusegun Obasanjo, without proper

In terms of other reforms, the author frankly concedes that customs reform was ‘not a great success’. She also notes the rise in the level of corruption and fraud, and anyone who tried, was branded a heretic to be burned at the stake.

The reforms recorded some nota- ble successes. A controversial Excess Cash Reserve Account (ECRA) was de- signed to ensure that savings for the future could be used to stabilise the manage- ment of Nigeria’s finances. The coun- try’s rampant state governors, how- ever, questioned its constitutionality. Half of the country’s revenue has to be shared by the federal government with its 36 states, the federal capital territory, and its 774 local government bodies. To increase transparency, Okonjo-Iweala published monthly in national newspa- pers the funds that state governors and local governments received, in order to empower their constituents to be able to hold them more accountable. Anoth- er major achievement of the reforms was the liberalisation of Nigeria’s an- thatised telecommunications sector in 2003, allowing private mobile phone operators like South Africa’s Mobile Telephone Networks (MTN) and Ni- geria’s Glo to provide services to mil- lions of Nigerians. Banking reforms also saw the consolidation of banks from 89 to 25 and the increase in their capital base from $15 million to $192 million. A competitive bidding process for contracts saved the country about $1.5 billion in two and a half years.

The climax of this rich story is un- doubtedly the historic debt deal after a successful two-year effort between the Nigerian government and the Paris Club between 2003 and 2005. Okon- jo-Iweala deserves the most credit for this impressive achievement. Before the debt deal in 2002, Nigeria’s annu- al external debt service to the Paris Club had reached $1.5 billion; and Nigeria’s debt had shrunk without any concrete results.

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most damaging corruption; developing measurable indicators for success; and withstanding personal intimidation — also seem rather academic and do not seem capable of addressing this cancer systematically at its roots. Part of the obvious problem which Okonjo-Iweala is unwilling to spell out is that fish rots from the top: many of the political leaders with whom she is working are part of the problem of corruption she is seeking to tackle. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) arraigned five governors in 2007, convicting two; Nigeria’s Inspector-General was convicted and sentenced to six months in jail; while several billions of naira in stolen money was recovered. The EFCC was, however, clearly used selectively by Obasanjo as a political instrument to jail; while several billions of naira in -five governors in 2007, convicting two; Crimes Commission (EFCC) arraigned the problem of corruption she is seeking with whom she is working are part of the most damaging corruption; developing technically gifted but staggeringly igno- rant about the political, social, and cultural environments in which they are operating, leading them often to cause more harm than good. Okonjo-Iweala unsurprisingly comes across as an ideological prosely- tiser for World Bank doctrines of growth, ‘good governance’, property rights, and private enterprise. Her economic ortho- doxy — and what critics dub ‘trickle-down economics’ that is obsessed with growth — has earned her many enemies on the in- telllectual left, though she often acted more pragmatically in government, not hesitat- ing to promote state intervention when she thought it the right course to take.

Though a competent economist, Okonjo-Iweala can sometimes come across as politically naive. Critics have charged her with lacking a political antenna: she received much blame for the bungled effort to eliminate oil subsi- dies of $8 billion in Nigeria in Oc- tober 2004. She had underestimated the widespread anger and cynicism of the Nigerian public towards a corrupt and copulent political class that was not trusted to spend any surpluses re- sulting from removing oil subsidies on the public interest. (Six people were killed in the ensuing demonstrations).

She again came in for scathing criti- cism when she pushed for removal of oil subsidies in her second stint as fi- nance minister in January 2012, which led to nation-wide demonstrations, and the government of Goodluck Jonathan eventually negotiating a compromise.

Okonjo-Iweala sometimes describes issues such as the impact of the remodel- ling of fuel subsidies on the poor and massive retrenchments of workers in cold, technical language that is devoid of empathy. It is almost as if workers are units of labour rather than real people with flesh and bones, and families to feed. In April 2014, she declared that the Boko Haram terrorist threat had been ‘isolated’ in Borno and Yobe states; a policy of ‘isolation’ was − there ever a wider reach. In terms of gender issues, Okonjo-Iweala also appears to promote the fight by individual leadership rather than by waging specific gender-focused battles, opening her up to charges that, like the original ‘Iron Lady’ — Brit- ain’s Margaret Thatcher — she is no different from her power-seeking male colleagues, and often fails to promote the cause of women systematically.

Okonjo-Iweala also pulls her punches in her complex relationship with President Goodluck Obasanjo. In January 2007 and 2011, she sometimes using ‘strong-arm tactics’ to describe an autocratic leadership style. She tried unsuccessfully to re- sign a few weeks into the job in 2003 after Obasanjo announced publicly the moving of the Budget Office from the finance ministry to the presidency without consulting her. A compromise was eventually reached, that other than the democratic wishes of African popu- lations, are extremely muted. Many of the officials of these institutions are often technically gifted but staggeringly igno- rant about the political, social, and cultural environments in which they are operating, leading them often to cause more harm than good. Okonjo-Iweala unsurprisingly comes across as an ideological prosely- tiser for World Bank doctrines of growth, ‘good governance’, property rights, and private enterprise. Her economic ortho- doxy — and what critics dub ‘trickle-down economics’ that is obsessed with growth — has earned her many enemies on the in- telllectual left, though she often acted more pragmatically in government, not hesitat- ing to promote state intervention when she thought it the right course to take.

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ment and poor governance; the coun-
try’s public institutions remain weak, 
while the state is still failing woefully to deliver public services in areas such as electricity and water. The author herself notes that Nigeria would re-
quire $10 billion annually in infrastruc-
ture investments – the amount that the coun-
try spent on food imports in 2010, even though it clearly had the capaci-
ty to feed itself. Despite $1 billion an-
ually being channelled into poverty re-
duction programmes (a condition of 
Nigeria’s debt annulment deal), such 
programmes have clearly failed to have 
any appreciable impact on relieving the 
misery of the country’s teeming mass-
es. This is despite widespread youth 
unemployment, even as 70 per cent of 
Nigerians are 30 years old or younger.

Okonjo-Iweala admits that her team of 
reformers underestimated how much 
time it would take to implement and 
embed their reforms. She also concedes 
that they had tried to take on too much 
at the same time, and should have better 
prioritised and sequenced the reforms. 
A decade after Nigeria’s historic debt 
deal, poverty and inequality continue to 
be unacceptable high in Nigeria, with an 
estimated 70 per cent of the population of 
160 million living below the pov-
ty line. The country’s public health and 
education sectors have crumbled, as 
has much of its infrastructure. Corrup-
tion remains as rampant and embedded 
in economic life as it was a decade ago. 
The economy, it seems, is growing, but 
the people are clearly growing poorer!

For all the load talk of Nigeria be-
ing one of the world’s fastest-growing 
economies since 2003, Nigerian econ-
omist Adebayo Adegje’s caution in the 
1980s – while serving as the Executive 
Director of the UN Economic Com-
mision for Africa (ECA) – against an 
approach of ‘growth without develop-
ment’ that resulted from the two Bret-
ton Woods institutions’ Structural Ad-
justment Programmes, does not seem 
to have been heeded. Even Okonjo-Iweala 
concedes at the end of her book that the 
jury is still out on whether her reforms 
had launched Nigeria on the path to 
sustainable growth and development. 
Particularly since her rampant tenure at MIT 
focused on regional economic develop-
ment and she served as Nigeria’s 
foreign minister for three months be-
tween June and August 2006, it would 
have been useful to have seen in the

The Great Lakes Region and Southern Africa in Historical 
and Contemporary Perspective
Moses Khisa
Politics, Religion and Power in the Great Lakes Region
By Murindwa-Rutanga
CODESRIA (in association with Fountain Publishers, Kampala),
(Fountain), 270 pages

Region-Building in Southern Africa: Progress, edited by Chris Saunders, 
Gwinyai A. Drziesa and Dawn Nagar
Centre for Conflict Resolution, Wits University Press and Zed Books, 2012, $40, 

PRP ‘focuses on the European inva-
sion of the GLR. It ana-
lyzes the factors that 
underlay the invasion, 
the demarcation pro-
cess that followed 
and the indigenous people’s 
responses to it. The book un-
covers the different 
forms of conflicts – 
endogenous and ex-
genous, popular and 
individualized, legit-
imate and anti-establishment, anti-im-
perialist, passive and militant, benign 
and virulent…’ (pp. 6-7). The concept 
Great Lakes Region, Murindwa-Rutan-
ga writes, was coined by the colonial-
ists to refer to the territory in east and 
central Africa endowed with a heavy 
concentration of large lakes and rivers 
(p. 8). A great deal of colonial conquest 
involved social reengineering, includ-
ing remaking natural resources such as 
water bodies. ‘In effort to export their 
history as they created their legacy, the 
British colonial invaders renounced four 
of these lakes after their English rulers. 
These were: Lake Naivasha, which be-
came Lake Victoria – the largest lake in 
the world with fresh water; Lake Rwi-
tanzigwe, renamed Lake Edward; and 
Lake Kivu, which became Lake George. 
Another lake on the border be-
tween DRC and Uganda was renamed 
Lake Albert’ (ibid).

The GLR was an area of intense and 
heated colonial rivalry, which on sever-
al occasions brought the major Europe-
an colonial powers to the brink of war. 
What unfolded in the colonization of 
this region was its transformation into 
a theatre of vicious inter-imperialist 
struggles which nearly led to a grievous 
impoverished war and the anti-imperial-
ist struggles which thrived in various 
forms (p. 65). Murindwa-Rutanga ably 
dissects these two forms of conflict, the 
inter-colonial rivalry and the anti-co-
lonial resistance. As colonial powers 
jockeyed for territorial control, the in-
digenous peoples exploited the mobiliz-
ing force of religion to fight the invad-
ers. The author finds that in the absence 
of organized state power to protect and 
defend the local people militarily, reli-
gion was a readily available substitute 
(p. 22). The conflict was compounded 
by the role of foreign African agents 
employed to impose colonial rule. 
While anticolonial leadership in much 
of the area that PRP covers came from 
indigenous religions, colonial adminis-
trative manpower was imported in the 
absence of established centralized po-
litical systems. As the author notes, ‘[1] 
here was no broad, visible, organized 
political structure in the area, which 
British colonialism could manipulate to 
introduce, promote, and protect British 
interests through its demagogy of pro-
tectionism called “indirect rule”’ (p. 93). 
Administrators and soldiers were thus 
imported from Britain, Buganda, 
Ankole, Tanganyika, and India.

The mounting colonial rivalry in the 
area reached fever-pitch levels by 1910, 
best captured in a telegraph by the Bel-
gian commander to the Acting Governor of the Uganda Protectorate: Last warning to commanders of British troops. By numerous letters I have informed you that I consider any forward movement of your troops [as] tantamount to an attack on our position. My forces... will open fire from now, and you defend yourself alone and entirely the heavy responsibility of the armed conflict which you are provoking.

The British on their part reacted to this stern warning by informing the "Belgian government immediately that the British forces in Mumbiro [the contested area] had been ordered not to make any forward movement without instructions directly from London... But the author's meticulous investigation finds that the British were issuing this pacific assurance when in fact preparing for war with a standby force of 800 King's African Rifles. In any event, a major war between British African soil was averted through a series of treaties, including the Anglo-German Treaty of 1 July 1980 and 26 August 1910, the Boundary Agreement of 19 May 1909, and the Anglo-Belgium Congo-Uganda Boundary Agreement of 14 May 1910.

Contemporaneous with heightened imperial rivalry, there arose a series of newly armed religious-inspired anticolonial movements, the most important being the Nyabingi Movement. This Movement is the central focus of PRP. The author traces the Movement's evolution from its formative stages to the peak of its activities in parts of Rwanda and Burundi, northern Tanganyika, eastern Congo-Zaire, and in parts of central, western and southwestern Uganda. 'Despite increased state repression, massacres, imprisonment and deportations, Nyabingi resistance continued burning brightly between 1910 and the mid-1930s' (p.102). The movement was anchored on Nyabingi indigenous religion, which the British administrators and other colonial authorities found to be mystic, troubling, and difficult to comprehend. Thus a colonial official was to lament with a sardonic tone of resignation, 'Nyabingi is a female spirit which is the god and religion of these people, and therefore the difficulty in eradicating the beliefs is extreme...' (p.133). In everyday life, Nyabingi was associated with a female spirit, believed to be living under the earth and appearing with 'rapid transformative powers into feminine personalities' (p.106). The movement produced a long list of female abogrova (priestesses), including the one-time influential commander Muhamuza. Others were Kaigirirwa, Wahire, Chandungusi, Mukeigirina, Nyinahatwa, and Kanyanya, who were either killed in battle or captured and deported to far-flung places.

In sum, in the early years of establishing colonial administration in the GLR, imperial rivalry raged on at the same time that a people's anticolonial struggle under the Nyabingi Movement intensified. Through careful archival research and life-stories, Murindwa-Rutanga methodically shows the relentless and protracted resistance put up by the areas of southwestern Uganda, Burundi, the Congo-Rwanda-Uganda borders and Tanzania, in the end engulfing and entrapping at least four major colonial powers: Britain, Belgium, France, and Germany. 'There were serious, long and bloody resistances emerging under the leadership of various personalities, with different historical origins, training, and experience...' (p.112). The unrelenting resistance forced the colonial authorities to make concessions including exempting certain areas like Butare, Bufundi, and parts of Bufumbira from taxation (p.153).

The movement's leadership employed a range of strategic and tactical maneuvers, posing a serious dilemma to the colonial forces. Most important was the planning and timing of their struggle to coincide with imperial rivalry and their capacity to incorporate new sections into the movement, and their ability to sustain the struggle for long spells (p.112). Although the movement was indigenous and steeped in tradition and folklore, it benefited from external developments, especially the First World War, getting new leadership from World War returnees and obtaining the enemy's military hardware, planning, and command (p.222). However, by 1939, the movement had considerably weakened (p.190). The author identifies several reasons for its defeat, including weak organization and lack of broader unity of peasants in the region, the failure to neutralize collaborators, either politically or militarily, and the use of pre-capitalist weapons and military methods (ibid). Also, successive defeats, massacres, tortures, imprisonments, public executions, and deportations demoralized resisters (ibid).

The Book's Strengths and Weaknesses

This book's invaluable contribution to the study of colonial rule and anticolonial movements in Africa cannot be overemphasized. The author offers a remarkable analysis of the mobilizing role of religion and the course of resistance in the GLR inspired by the Nyabingi Movement. The author aptly notes in the concluding chapter that 'The Nyabingi Movement is a concrete testimony to people's persistent struggles to defend their rights and independence.' This point is worth beholding because of the claims especially by official colonial historians who tended to distort the way colonial rule was received in different African communities. Murindwa-Rutanga's study brings out persuasively the manner in which indigenous Africans reacted with hostility to colonial invasion and waged protracted popular struggle against it. Secondly, PRP brilliantly illuminates the organizing role of indigenous religions, which brings to the fore a less appreciated role of African religions as distinct from the usual romanticized sorcery and witchcraft that had fascinated for long Western-Eurocentric scholarship.

Equally important to note is that, using official archival sources, Murindwa-Rutanga has written a work of social history that is nothing short of salutary historiography in its orientation, analytical rigor and methodological thrust. To brilliantly write salubrious history using official sources is truly admirable. The author is quite impressive in his ability to carefully and patiently read official colonial documents and bring out crucial messages, voices, and even silences seldom intended by the authors. In the end, he skilfully weaves a narrative that straddles the worlds of social movement literature, social history, and the legacies of colonial rule.

Finally, PRP shows the early forces and factors that forged and shaped the GLR. In a sense, the author's project parallels that of 'region-making' undertaken in the second volume under review by pointing to the early formation of the contemporary GLR. This is ably highlighted in the last page of the book's concluding chapter. Murindwa-Rutanga writes, 'this study has demonstrated that the real contestations for colonization of the GLR, as it is currently known, took place largely in the Kivu-Mulera-Rukiga-Mpororo region. All the contestations and negotiations marked the forging of the Great Lakes States as they are known today' (p.229). This is by far the boldest and most important statement of this work, yet it is the one that poses the biggest problem for the book. Like many ambitiously written books, this book's undoubted strength also turns out to be its weakness.

The curious reader will find a bit of disappointment that the book starts off quite promisingly as a study of the Great Lakes Region but quickly narrows down to southwestern Uganda with rather limited and isolated reference to developments across the borders in Burundi, Rwanda, Congo, and Tanzania. The author needed to demonstrate more persuasively how the movement reverberated across the vast GLR and the extent to which it shaped political developments, especially in the aftermath of its defeat. It would have greatly enriched the book's project had the author taken time to track the lasting legacies of the movement. For example, did the Nyabingi Movement have any bearing on subsequent agitations for independence and proliferation of post-independence social and political movements, including Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Movement, which the author only cursorily alludes to?

Relatedly, some readers may feel hard done by the author's conspicuous silence on contemporary political developments in the GLR since the book's concluding chapter alludes to the role of Nyabingi in forging today's states of the GLR. Social and political movements, including those steeped in religious belief like the Nyabingi, have sprung up in post-independence times, contesting precisely the same misrule, oppression, and exploitation that spurred Nyabingi fighters. Since the author makes mention of today's GLR states in the book's concluding chapter, it would be expected of him as a citizen-intellectual not to stop at outlining the excesses of colonialism and local resistance but also comment on contemporary political mismanagement including the despotic oligarchies of election rigging, political repression, and kleptocracy.

Region-Building in Southern Africa

The authors and editors of RBSA commendably assembled an impressive set of articles that offer incisive insights into the colonial antecedents to regionalism in Southern Africa: from the failure to start the promises and prospects as well as the continuing push for a bloc that remains under the shadow and towering influence of the region's economic and military hegemon – South Africa. Although some contributors to RBSA allude to the rising power of Angola, post-apartheid South Africa nevertheless remains the foremost benefactor in a region where the majority of states are materially impoverished. The anti-colonial and anti-apartheid provenance of southern African regionalism is unmistakable. The struggle against white minority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia, coupled with the protracted resistance against the lingering Portuguese colonial presence in Angola and Mozambique, provided the initial impetus for southern African unity. The regionalism started with the lose association of the Mulungushi Club, later transformed into the Front Line States (FLS) in 1975. This initial endeavor was primarily a political and military collaboration against late colonialism and white minority rule. Taking off from this early formative stage, the authors and editors of RBSA trace the traipsed evolution of arguably Africa's largest regional grouping, encompassing 'the entire southern half of the African continent as well as island-states off the East African coast' (p.6).

Outline of the Book

RBSA is a comprehensive volume, covering a wide range of themes in regional integration under the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
The book has five major parts. Part one, ‘Historical Legacy,’ has chapters by the distinguished Kenyan scholar Gilbert Khadiagala and a former Executive Secretary of SADC, Mbuenda. Khadiagala provides a broad but remarkably incisive introduction to the origins and processes leading to the formation of SADC in 1992. Mbuenda on his part gives an ‘insider’s view’ of the workings and failings of SADC. Part two (with four chapters) on ‘Governance and Military Security’ covers a wide range of topics: SADC’s decision-making architecture (by Chris Landsberg), elections and conflict management (by Khabebal Molatosa), peacekeeping (by Chris Saunders), and gender and peacebuilding (by Elizabeth Oritoit and Antonia Porter). The third part of the book shifts to addressing economic integration issues proper. Its three chapters include Dawn Nagar’s assessment of three initiatives under SADC: the Southern African Power Pool, the SADC Free Trade Area, and the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan. The other two chapters, one by Richard Gibb and the other by David Monyae, examine SADC’s Customs Union and its development finance institutions, respectively.

In part four (with four chapters), Scott Drimie and Sibathiso Gandure discuss the problem of food insecurity, noting that although SADC’s Heads of State and Government adopted the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in May 2004, progress is hindered by weak institutional policy frameworks. The second chapter on HIV/AIDS and human security by Gwinyai Dzinesa argues that ‘in Southern Africa, HIV/AIDS has deepened and prolonged household poverty’ (p. 200). As such, the region ‘remains the global epicenter of the HIV/AIDS pandemic’ (p. 210). In the other two chapters, migration and xenophobia by the eminent Cameroonian scholar Francis Nyamnjoh and Patience Mutusa and the second on climate change by David Simon (two subjects that animate global debate), the subjects are analyzed in the context of a region that has had a fair share of migration and climate change problems. Nyamnjoh and Mutusa address the ‘hard questions about the politics of citizenship in the region [and] the impact of neoliberal economic policies on livelihoods’ (p. 216). Simon on his part analyzes SADC’s policy on climate change, noting that ‘the first substantive and clear attempt by SADC to integrate climate change into its programs and activities was not made until 2008…’ (p. 238).

In the final part of the book, three authors – Mzikazi Qobo, Nomfun- do Xenia Ngwenya and Kaire Mbuya – respectively assess the contrasting influences on SADC’s three major external players: the European Union, the United States, and China. Qobo argues that SADC’s maintenance of its over-dependence on the EU has created a client relationship and ‘effectively locked SADC into Brussels’ sphere of influence’ and that the rise of emerging powers such as China, India, and Brazil has prompted the EU to consolidate its hold and increase its global market share relative to the rising powers (p. 251). As regards US-SADC relations, Ngwenya highlights the nuances in shifting US foreign policy in the region from the Cold War era through the Clinton, Bush, and Obama years. She notes the rising strategic place of Angola that is likely to disturb South Africa’s special relationship with Washington. Finally, on Sino-African relations, Le Pere argues that the historical dependence on the EU and US has recently been mitigated by China’s entry into Africa, providing different menu options and an alternative to the Washington Consensus. ‘But while Beijing spoke of engaging with African institutions on a multilateral basis, its Africa policy has been largely bilateral, a “divide and rule tactic”’ (p. 289).

In the concluding chapter, the editors draw from the foregoing sixteen chapters of the book to end with a prescriptive message for more region-building to tackle the region’s practical problems. In sum, the book undertakes a sweeping assessment of a complex set of issues in southern Africa with SADC as the pivotal player. Since its formation in Windhoek, Namibia in 1992, underscored by the editors in the introduction, ‘SADC has been the most important regional organization in southern Africa. It has constructed an elaborate structure to deal with economic, political and security issues…’ (p. 16).

What the Book Accomplishes

This volume has many accomplishments; I will focus on only a few. First, part one of the book, especially the chapter by Khadiagala, brilliantly traces southern African regionalism back to the 1960s and the informal Mulungushi Club (later FLS) of Presidents Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere. Khadiagala’s chapter is complemented by the ‘insider-view’ chapter by SADC’s former Executive Secretary, Kaire Mbuya. But as an anticolonial alliance, the collapse of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique, and the end of Ian Smith’s white minority rule in southern Rhodesia meant that the FLS had somewhat run its course. Thus, it was transformed into the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980 and later the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The transformation of FLS into SADCC and finally SADC, and ‘[the reemergence of South Africa within SADC marked a decisive transformation from a decolonization-driven regionalism to functional integration…’ (p. 33).

A key message in Khadiagala’s chapter, and indeed the entire volume, is that ‘Southern African regionalism has parallels with the European Economic Community/Union (EEC/U). The latter, which started as the European Coal and Steel Community, was based as a lasting solution to a security complex involving Franco-German rivalry, especially over the Rhine industrial frontier. Since the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, control over the Rhine area had remained a source of potential and actual armed hostility. Indeed, it was a major contributory factor to the outbreak of the Second World War. Therefore, the solution to the high-politics of securing geopolitical strategic interests in the realm of low politics – in functionalist economic integration. RBESA too suggests that economic integration, perhaps inadvertently, was born out of the high politics of fighting colonialism, apartheid, and white minority rule. But whereas the EU project was seen as a bulwark against armed conflict, SADCC and later SADC was intended to foster collective development based on historical political solidarity and security cooperation. Basing economic integration on security cooperation was a point of strength but also a problem. This leads me to the second key element of RBESA: quite apart from the EU integration process, the SADC gradualist integration has an inverted logic; it is a case of putting the cart before the horse.

While the EEC, and closer home the East African Community, started as an economic cooperation to cure political and security problems, SADC started as a security/political cooperation, which later gravitated towards economic cooperation. The Mulungushi Club and FLS were primarily anticolonial/anti-apartheid security cooperation arrangements while SADCC moved the cooperation to an economic level. The 1992 SADC Treaty sought to merge the two and achieve both political cooperation and economic integration, but little progress has been made so far. Little wonder therefore that SADC’s progress has been hampered by, among other things, the influence of individual national political leaders, state-centric approaches, and a less empowered secretariat. The elite group that started as the Mulungushi Club created a legacy of elite camaraderie that continues to hamper the growth of independent and credible regional institutions.

If the FLS forum was built around credible political and security consideration, the end of colonialism and apartheid meant that successful economic cooperation and integration would necessitate a kind of convergence of economic interests. This is something that the authors of RBESA fail to confront directly. By taking this tack, the book would have yielded theoretical insights especially in accounting for why the neo-functionalist approach has not succeeded in the manner that it worked with the EEC/EU. What is more, it appears that the shared need for accelerated socioeconomic development among southern African states is a necessary but not quite a sufficient condition to compel individual nation-states to fully embrace the agenda of full political and market integration. This political economy dynamic deserved more space in such an authoritative book than it was granted. In the absence of overarching cross-border interests, southern African states are engaged in individualized dependence on external patrons, especially China today, meaning that in turn the regional integration project has tended to be subordinated to foreign interests and calculations something sidelined in RBESA.

By Way of Conclusion

The two books offer contrasting and rich insights into two important regions of Africa. While Murindwa-Rutanga’s historically grounded work sheds light on European colonial rivalry over what became the GLR and the resultant indigenous resistances, especially the Nyabingi Movement, RBESA is a more contemporary analysis and policy-oriented study of previous as well as ongoing attempts at forging a regional bloc against the backdrop of a shared political and historical experience. Thus, if the first volume gives the reader important lessons in scholarship, such as the author’s meticulous use of official sources to weave a subaltern historical narrative, the second volume offers practical and invaluable policy lessons on the progress and prospects of regional integration. Regrettably though, both volumes fall short on the account of making a direct and persuasive link between the past and the present, between historical insights and contemporary realities. PRP dwells on how the Nyabingi Movement became a defining development in the making of the GLR but says little about its contemporary legacies. By contrast, RBESA starts off by acknowledging the historical bases of region-building in Southern Africa but grants little attention to how it is precisely that same history that explains not only the prospects for the region but also the impediments to its progress.
F or decades, exiled author Nurud- din Farah has dreamt, written and carried Somalia, ‘the country of his imagination,’ throughout his nomadic existence. His eleven novels, one non-fi-
crional study of the Somali diaspora, ar-
ticles, essays, broadcasts and interviews bear testimony to this fact and are literary manifestations of the tragic turn of events in post-colonial Somalia. He was forced to flee Somalia, after having incurred the wrath of Mohamed Siyad Barre, for his satirical and critical remarks against the Barre regime in his second novel, A Naked Needle (1978). Today, Farah has embarked on a literary pilgrimage and rightful place for himself among Anglophone-African writers and internationally. A Naked Needle is one of his least Somali novels and a very silly work, (when compared to his later works that engage explicitly with Somali politics, culture and society), as Farah puts it across in a conversation with Kenyan author and journalist Binyavanga Wainaina.

Farah’s trilogies entitled, Variations on the theme of an African Dictatorship (1978-83), Blood in the Sun (1986-93) and the latest, Past Imperfect (2004-11), are fictionalized accounts of the chaotic and turbulent periods of Somali history – the authoritarian and tyrannical regime of Siyad Barre (1969-91), the war with neighbouring Ethiopia over disputed Ogaden (1977-78) and the pitfalls of nationalism, the neocolonial dependency of the 1980s, the civil war of 1991, and the subsequent state-collapse of Somalia in 1992. On a broader basis, the books deal with the culture of silence and fear imposed by dictators on the people and other representations of dictatorship, the pitfalls of nationalism and how foreign aid can thwart cultural development and cause an erosion of self esteem in peo-
ple’s psyche and much more. The three books comprising the Past Imperfect trilogy – Links (2004), Knots (2009) and Crossbones (2011), historicize Somalia’s post-collapse era starting from the abrupt withdrawal of the U.S. troops in 1993, and the U.S. occupation in 1995, in Mogadishu to the infighting that followed much later between the Transitional Federal Govern-
ment and the hard-line Islamist factions. An overwhelming sense of foreboding and gloom descends on Crossbones, the final book of the trilogy, as the narrative revolves around the disappearance of a young Minneapolis-based Somali lad, ru-
moured to have joined the Al-Shabaab, the booming piracy business off the shores of Somalia, the alleged collabo-
ration of warlords with Al-Shabaab, and the impending Ethiopian invasion of So-
malia of 2006. The Somalis’ resentment towards their ‘age-old enemy Ethiopia,’ ‘the bully next door,’ further complicates matters in the Somali context in Crossbones (2012). The Somali radical religiousists are waiting for a confronta-
tion with Ethiopia in the hope of pitting the Muslim against the Christian-led Ethiopia, in spite of the fact that Ethiopia has a stronger military power, is an ally of the United States and has definitely more chances of gaining an upper hand in this battle of ideas. In deep contrast to the Muslim world is clearly at a crossroads as they split into radicals and moderates and it is against this turbulent background that the narrar-
tive of Crossbones is set. Clearly, there is no place more dangerous than Mogadishu considering the circumstances, especially for journalists reporting the war. Malik refers to the numerous slain journalists as ‘heroes of obtrusive-
ness’ as they are a highly endangered breed (247).

Farah’s novels are geared to see in Mog-
adishu against specific historical time-frames, However, in the latest, Past Imperfect trilogy, Mogadishu gains more prominence as it stands as a metaphor for the political vacuum and hollow authority of state-
less Somalia. So, when diaspora-returnees Jeebleh of Links, Cambara of Knots, Jeebleh and Malik, of Crossbones, are made to (re)visit Mog-
adishu, after decades, a deliberate strategy on the part of Farah, they are startled and emotionally pulverized as Mogadishu is nothing short of an inferno, having borne so much of the brunt of the violence and mayhem during and after the civil war. Things have fallen apart and Mogadishu, the erstwhile centre cannot hold any longer and is a breeding ground for war-
lordism, religious extremism, militancy, and increasingly, all kinds of criminality and mindless violence just as tar tar-infested and ‘dis-
cayed guts are rich with pockets in which germs find homes ..’ (112). In Secrets (1998), the final instalment of the Blood in the Sun trilogy, which is largely Farah’s complex artistic response to his personal visit to Somalia after many years, he is speechless at the Somali obsession with lineage and genealogy. Hence, in Secrets, we see the termite-eaten fundamentals of the Somali nation’s state-structures on the verge of collapse owing to the clan-
clan-clan politics of the early nineties that degenerated into the civil war. The civil war lead to more clan-bas ed ananisms and violence.

Several Somali poets and songsmiths have sung the glories of the Mogadishu of the past whilst bemoaning its present dev-
astated state. Lidwein Kapteijns shows how these poems by representing Mog-
adishu’s past in many ways also envision and try to influence the future. Mogadishu becomes the site of memory-making for the future because of its centrality to history. One of the most popular and celebrated Somali poets, Hadrawi, has a verse that runs thus: ‘You, umbilical cord of my country, nerve centre of my people, Mogadishu how are you?’ (Kapteijns: 40). One might argue that Nuruddin

Salvaging Mogadishu from Ruin and Rubble
Geetha Ganga

Crossbones

by Nuruddin Farah

Farah’s novels do something similar for different time periods.

The stark and grim images of the pro-
tracted war-recision are inscribed on the city. Farah
and is now deprived of its former dignity and glory and devoid of character. Note Farah’s own shock and dismay at Mogadishu’s sad plight: ‘In his own words’ ‘...I am aware of its unparalleled war-torn deceptitude: al-
most every structure is pockmarked by bullets, and many homes are on its sides, falling in on themselves’ (Farah, The City in My Mind).

In an analytical study of ‘ruins’ in war and post-
war Lebanese novels, Ken Seigneurie, contends that ruin and rubble provide key links in an implicit narrative and are indicators of atrocities committed in the past, ruin in the present and, most im-
portantly, necessity for action, to prevent what happened from happening again, a future utopia. ‘As metamorphosis of the past, ruins can be memory’s and art’s point of contact with historical experience’ (Seigneurie:18). Farah’s nostalgic written piece, on the Tamarind Market, one of Mogadishu’s oldest institutions in the city twenty four years later.

Mogadishu had known centuries of attrition; one army leaving death and destruction in its wake to be replaced by another and another and yet another, all equally de-
structive: the Arabs arrived and got some purchase on the peninsula, and after the commercial and along with it the Islamic faith, they were replaced by the Italians, then the Russians, and more recently the Americans… (Links 14-15).

Links is set in a Mogadishu with tall-tale marks of the American ‘invasion’. Jeebleh, the central protagonist sees for himself ‘the bullet-starred, mortar-struck, machine-gun showered’ three-storey building that was once a religious building and was damaged during the infamous Battle of Mogadis-
cio of 1993, the subject of the film Black Hawk Down, showing the war from a totally American perspective (Links: 71).

But when Malik, the journalist in Crossbones with expertise in reporting from the major conflict areas of the Somali war, encounters a town that is ‘disoriented by fresh ruins from the latest confrontation between the warlords and the Courts’ (26). As in a typical war novel or a film that lingers over houses with their insides caved in or a bullet-riddled statue, music over the rubble which ‘seldom divulges the secret sorrows it contains’ (26).

March/Mars 2015

AER VOL 11 No 1-March 2015.indd 13
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What is most tragic about the victims of civil war or natural disasters or calamities, according to Nuruddin is that often no one knows how many have perished. What is worse, ‘One never gets to hear the last words that passed their lips, or what, in the end, caused their death: a falling building, a bullet-wracked heart, a spear of bullet-shattered glass. Or sheer exhaustion with living in such horrid circumstances day in and day out?’ (26). Sadly, forensic technology is unable to help in such matters and inadequate documentation on the dead intensifies the tragedy.

As the governance of the city passes from one hand to the other, Mogadishu, acquires a different dimension and character which in turn is reflected in ‘the attitudes of the city’s residents, their dress habits and even… diet… depending on the power of the country’s competing factions (Farah, The City in My Mind). Hence, in Links, Jeebleh is privy to the great-divide in Mogadiscio, indicated by a green line demarcating the territories controlled by the two major warlords, Mohammed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi. And, by the time veiled Cambara of Knots is in Mogadiscio, the power-scales have tilted towards the Islamists and the Union of Islamic Courts, UIC, imposing rigorous cultural codes and taboos, especially of Islamic Courts, UIC, imposing rigorous cultural codes and taboos, especially on women, but also making up new ones.

A pervasive sense of authoritarianism enforced by the puritanical-religionists is strikingly evident in the few first pages of Crossbones, even as Cambara, propped in a body tent which appears more like a theatre prop or just a mere costume, saunters along the run-down East Wardhigley district of Mogadiscio. Crossbones contextualizes the time period during which the UIC took over the reigns of Mogadiscio, in the early 2000, and had expanded the rule of Sharia law making veiling de rigueur. Women in trousers and less restrictive dresses were whipped for supposedly sabotaging the Islamic way of life and ‘American-inspired bra contraptions’ were condemed. Beard-sporting youth clad in white robes are a common sight in the Mogadiscio depicted in Crossbones while some others are in military or ‘ill-matched uniform assembled from various post-col-lapse loyalties’ (26). Overall, Mogadiscio’s political contours have changed, suggesting ‘an empire of a different thrust’ [..] at work in Somalia (25). One hears echoes of the general frustration of many Somalis oppressed by the religionists through Bile’s words when he states that he prefers a spineless secular state to a religionist one run by a bearded cabal (120).

It is important to state here that several variations among the Islamists’ and not all are radical or violent as al-Shabaab.

Statelessness a boon or a bane is the pertinent question raised in Links. The immense potential of women as peace brokers is the central underlying theme of Knots, dedicated to the cause of women, while Crossbones is a narrative that is intertwined with recent news reports on Somali pirates. Furthermore, the diaspora engagement towards peace and reconstruction is also suggested in these books. Jeebleh of Links reappears along with his journalist son-in-law Malik in Mogadis and, in the process, attempts to debunk several myths pertaining to piracy off the Somali coast. Dumping of charcoal and toxic wastes, illegal fishing around Somalia’s coast are all issues that need to be highlighted and Farah wonders who are the real pirates and locates the stories in Puntland, one of the piracy towns in order to unearth the piracy itself: ‘nervous, self-murderous, on edge’ (293). HighBeard, The FootSoldier and KalaSaar are a few other characters; they do not sound like the names of individuals but are rather pointers to a degrading culture in stateless Somalia.

Crossbones adds to the existing rich international popular culture on piracy, including the recent film Captain Philips (2013). Farah has always contested and challenged prevalent stereotypical images of Somalia and Somalis and wonders if it is right to call the Somalis, turac baddad, sea bandits. He attempts to provide the Somali version of the piracy stories during the infamous Battle of Cape Guardafui. By acquiring the position of a name and thereafter an identity, he becomes suicide-bombers. The reason for its internationalization of Somalia’s piracy, according to Farah is that ‘the primacy of religion,’ and ‘Crossbones is a work of art that is representative of this major paradigm shift within Somali political history. The killer becomes a mujahid, and if killed, a martyr. Ahl, who has lost his son Taxliil, at the Al-Shabaab tries in desperation to trace his son’s whereabouts and engages in a conversation with one of the locals KalaSaar, brewing into the structures of the militant group. They try to find a clear distinction between words like ‘insurgents’ and ‘terrorists’. They theorize about the discontent Somalis who are indoctrinated into becoming suicide-bombers. The reason for this is self-hate, which results in ‘the nation murdering itself, and in the process of doing so, the individual committing suicide becomes a metaphorical death culture’ (Crossbones: 315). In the earlier novels of Farah, the family unit becomes a microcosm of the country’s political upheavals.

Farah takes to task the nation’s politicians, intellectuals, its clan elders, the imams, its rudderless youth and mainly the women who have foolishly let their nation down very badly. The veil-wearing submissive Somalis of the present generation are retrogressive, unlike the progressive Somalis of the past who were at the forefront of politics in Somali nationalist history. He even reproaches the present generation and the so-called intellectuals for a lack of vision for a better tomorrow: ‘We’re culpable in that we, who think of ourselves as educated secularists, have not inspired the younger generation, who are responding to our failure with rebellious rejection of everything we have so far stood for’ (314). This is Farah’s prognosis for ailing Somalia.

Jeebleh’s empathetic ‘listening’ while his traumatized friends narrate their war-stories during the infamous Battle of Mogadishu, the traditional practice of communal eating in Links, story-telling and healing in Knots and Taxliil, reuniting with his parents after renouncing FootSoldier, is Farah’s prognosis for ailing Somalia. The City in My Mind deconstructs the idea of a city’s past over its present. Crossbones, are joyful little tales superimposed on the war and horror stories of Mogadishu. Farah tries the same with himself. Disturbed at the denigration and shame Mogadishu has been put through in the last two decades, Farah superimposes images of the city’s peaceful past over the city’s present caos and crude realities, to stay at peace during troubled, uncertain times.

References


Environment, Agriculture and Cross-border Migrations
Edited by Emmanuel Yentsha Vabo

This book brings together contributions on the challenges of the environment, agriculture and cross-border migrations in Africa; key areas that have become critical for the continent’s development. The central theme running through these contributions is that Africa’s development challenges can be attributed to its human and natural ecology. Contrasted with the Cold War epoch, current developments have ushered us into a world of long and uncertain transitions characterized by a search for new pathways including investment in large-scale agriculture by big finance, attempting existing agriculture and reworking of social policy. A major twist relates to environmental questions, especially climate change and its global effects, leading to all forms of cross-border migrations and the emergence of new areas of strategic interest such as sub-regional developments as in the Gulf of Guinea. This book provides some intellectual clues on how to interpret these emerging predicaments and chart a way forward into a new era for Africa.


Pages: 172
L’ouvrage « Sécession du Sud-Soudan : dangers et opportunités » contient treize contributions réparties en trois chapitres. Le premier s’intéresse aux prémices de la discorde, le deuxième chapitre regroupe les différentes contributions qui évoquent les effets extérieurs, sous l’angle de l’ingérence, tandis que le troisième est consacré aux résultats et aux défis auxquels le Soudan et la région doivent faire face, dans la mesure où cette sécession n’est, aux yeux des auteurs, que le début d’une nouvelle ère, un processus d’émiettement « qui ne fait que commencer ». Les auteurs semblent être unanimes sur l’importance stratégique du Soudan (Nord et Sud), non seulement pour la région arabe, mais également pour l’Afrique entière. Cela explique l’intérêt que ce livre dont les auteurs partagent un souci intellectuel et une sensibilité pour des questions liées au devenir de la région menacée par des conflits récurrents. Ils considèrent que les défis sont doubles, ceux auxquels les deux États (après la sécession) doivent faire face et ceux qui relèvent de l’ordre sécuritaire dans la région. En effet, l’État naissant au sud est déjà menacé par l’absence d’un minimum de conditions de viabilité, et cette fragilité pourrait le pousser à la satellisation par des puissances extraréionales ; cela semble évident du moment qu’il doit prendre en considération des choix politiques indissociables des raisons qui l’ont poussé à faire sécession.

Du côté du Soudan nord menacé par des guerres sur la marge au Darfour à Kordofan et dans la région sud du Nil bleu, les défis sont multiples ; les contributions ont mis l’accent notamment sur les incidences économiques après la perte de la partie sud qui contient les trois quarts de l’économie arabe et le Sud du Soudan entre l’absent et la fête pour la population du nord, sous la naissance de la nouvelle entité de la crise du Soudan. Selon El Nour Hamad, une partie de l’élite égyptienne est restée prisonnière de la tendance coloniale de l’époque Khedroisi, et elle n’est pas parvenue à renouveler ses attitudes et ses approches bien que les gens aient changé, et que la région soit caractérisée par un contexte nouveau. Ces effets paradigmatiques, qui reproduisent des visions anciennes, en sus de l’hypothèse selon laquelle le Sud, le plus important, les conséquences néfastes de l’émiettement du Soudan non seulement sur ses deux États, mais sur toute la région arabe et africaine.


La deuxième entrée, relative à la dualité centre/périphérie, prend une autre signification. Il s’agit en fait des rapports entre le centre et la périphérie à l’intérieur du pays lui-même. C’est ainsi que les contributions incitent à repenser l’État dans son rapport avec les régions, celles qui se situent au centre et les autres qui se situent aux confins, qui se situent aux confins et sur la question de la distribution du pouvoir et de la richesse dans le pays et sur la distribution du pouvoir et de la richesse dans le pays et sur la question de précision. Selon El Nour Hamad, une partie de l’élite égyptienne est restée prisonnière de la tendance coloniale de l’époque Khedroisi, et elle n’est pas parvenue à renouveler ses attitudes et ses approches bien que les gens aient changé, et que la région soit caractérisée par un contexte nouveau. Ces effets paradigmatiques, qui reproduisent des visions anciennes, en sus de l’hypothèse selon laquelle le Sud, le plus important, les conséquences néfastes de l’émiettement du Soudan non seulement sur ses deux États, mais sur toute la région arabe et africaine.

La crise soudanaise, aux yeux des auteurs, ne peut être analysée sans prise en considération des rapports entre le centre et la périphérie. La première application de cette distinction entre les deux concerne les pays arabes, par exemple. Ces États s’étendent géographiquement dans des aires différentes et regroupent, par leur nature de situation géographique, des ethnies, des cultures différentes, sans oublier les autres défis liés aux questions linguistiques et religieuses. Cette relation ne peut pas fonctionner, selon les auteurs, de manière normale sans une compréhension mutuelle de l’autre et d’autre part. Les pays, par exemple, qui l’ont vu en fait des conflits récents en Afrique et dans le Monde Arabe. Pour eux, l’émietlement de ces situations de ces défis se pose comme problème primordial, et la sortie de la crise du Soudan avec un minimum de la crise et des défis qui s’imposent. Cela est d’autant plus important, c’est parce qu’ils sont devenus le premier objet des conflits récents en Afrique et dans le Monde Arabe. Les auteurs se réunissent, en effet, à une situation qui prévalait au Soudan bien avant la scission. Les auteurs partagent l’opinion que la situation dans le pays à partir de plusieurs entrées : les élites, religieuses, le contexte le plus significatif de l’histoire et le niveau des discours politiques, il y a une reproduction des défis et des effets de l’environnement arabo-africain.
s'ils trouvent un milieu propice, c'est pays étrangers ne réussissent que l'ingérence et l'intervention étrangère sont penchés sur cette question. L'idée L'intervention d'Israël au soudan » se plans », et Mahmoud Moharib dans : « eaux et aux rapports de forces dans les bénéfices liés à l'exploitation des soutenu ce processus pour en tirer dans les accords de paix et Israël a américaine a joué un grand rôle mesure de procurer le pouvoir, l'égalité un processus grave en encourageant de la guerre entre le Nord et le Sud, ils ont enclenché ne demeurent pas moins sans danger. Ils n'ont pas seulement divisé le Soudan en deux parties, ils ont enclenché un processus grave en encourageant les rébellions et les revendications séparatistes. Ils ont propagé une conviction que seules les armes sont en mesure de procurer le pouvoir, l'égalité, et la justice dans la distribution des richesses, seules les armes garantissent une patrie et une vie meilleure.

Il est clair que l’administration américaine a joué un grand rôle dans les accords de paix et Israël a soutenu ce processus pour en tirer les bénéfices liés à l’exploitation des eaux et aux rapports de forces dans la région. Des contributeurs comme Amani El-Tauouli dans : « La position américaine vis-à-vis du Soudan : trajectoires de réactions et nature des plans », et Mahmoud Moharib dans : « L’intervention d’Israël au soudan » se sont penchés sur cette question. L’idée centrale des contributions est que l’ingérence et l’intervention étrangère qui sert les projets et les intérêts des pays étrangers ne réussissent que s’ils trouvent un milieu propice, c’est à dire un milieu caractérisé par des conflits internes auxquels aucune solution adéquate n’a été suggérée et appliquée pour la concorde nationale. L’analyse est entamée à travers deux entrées, la première repose sur l’arrivée du Front national islamique au pouvoir, tandis que la deuxième prend en considération le cours des événements historiques internationaux, notamment depuis l’arrivée des Américains d’origine africaine aux postes de responsabilités au sein de l’administration américaine et l’intérêt que portent ces derniers à l’Afrique. C’est à partir de là que la relation entre l’administration américaine et le Mouvement populaire de la libération du Soudan qui adoptait le projet de la séparation a connu un changement qualitatif. Tel projet que le comité du Congrès pour l’Afrique a non seulement soutenu mais qu’il a encore élargi à la reconnaissance du droit à l’autodétermination pour d’autres régions « considérées comme marginalisées ». C’est ce sentiment de marginalisation qui a permis au leader du Front populaire John Garang de gagner des voix pour la cause et d’intégrer le plus grand nombre sous l’égide du Front (notamment dans les régions au sud du Nil bleu et les Monts du Louba).

Dans ce contexte beaucoup d’éléments et d’événements jouaient contre le régime central au Soudan notamment l’impact qu’a eu l’attentat président égyptien « Moubarak » en Éthiopie et qui a fini par l’administration, à l’époque du président américain Bill Clinton, a affaibli le pays et a poussé les leaders du Soudan, sous l’effet des conséquences économiques à mettre fin à la guerre et à accepter les négociations qui débuteraient sur la sécession du Sud du Soudan. On n’oublie pas, bien entendu, les attentats contre les ambassades américaines en Tanzanie et au Kenya qui semblaient constituer un avertissement pour le régime soudanais soucoupé et accusé d’avoir une main dans l’effervescence qui caractérisait la région. On se rappelle aussi l’attaque contre l’usine de la production des médicaments à Khartoum, accusée de produire des armes chimiques sans aucune preuve tangible. Les Américains ont joué un rôle important aussi dans les négociations de la paix et la mise en œuvre des procédures qui conduiront droit vers la scission. L’évolution de la situation de la guerre du Darfour a abouti à la mise en place de la Cour internationale et cela en faveur des sudistes qui bénéficient d’une supériorité démographique et numérique relative. Cela s’aggrave avec la nature du pacte fragile qui liait les deux parties en conflit, favorisant ainsi la séparation et non pas la conciliation.

Dans la sixième partie de l’ouvrage, Mahmoud Moharib, met en évidence l’intervention des Israéliens dans ce conflit. Il confirme que les contacts qui existaient déjà ont connu une évolution après 1954 entre le parti de la Nation (El Oumma) et Tel Aviv. Selon l’auteur, une réunion (arrangée par les services secrets britanniques) a permis le contact entre des représentants de ce parti et des responsables du côté israélien, comme le signalait le premier ministre israélien dans ses mémoires, ce qui peut être prêté comme une continuité de la relation aux plus hauts niveaux entre les deux parties, et qui explique pourquoi le parti de la Nation a bénéficié de l’aide financière de Tel Aviv sous forme de prêts après la rencontre avec Sadek El Mahdi. L’auteur signale aussi la densité des communications entre les deux parties à l’heure de l’attaque contre l’Égypte en 1956 tandis que les contacts avec les rebelles du Sud n’ont commencé qu’en 1963. C’est à partir de cette date qu’Israël commence à fournir des armes aux séparatistes et de l’aide pour qu’ils puissent consolider leur position face au régime central. Bien entendu, l’emiettement du Soudan permettra à Israël de mettre un pied sur le territoire du Nil. Les interventions, comme le confirme Madou Tourabí, dans la huitième partie, visaient « le contrôle et la maîtrise sur les parties du conflit et permettaient de parasiter le Soudan qui représente un risque stratégique potentiel pour Israël, les États-Unis d’Amérique et pour l’Europe ». Le retour à l’unité est-il possible ? Malgré sa reconnaissance du droit à l’autodétermination et à la séparation aux habitants du Sud, Chali Khouk l’un des contributeurs de cet ouvrage, ne considère pas l’événement comme une fin de l’histoire. Si cette séparation s’est réalisée aujourd’hui, un autre épisode peut intervenir et réunir les deux parties. Il rappelle la chute du mur de Berlin qui a réuni les Allemands. Toutefois, cela n’est possible que si les deux parties inscrivent leurs relations bilatérales dans un projet commun qui soutient l’intérêt des deux peuples, un projet caractérisé par le bon voisinage, l’arrêt de toute forme de violence et de discours de la haine, assurer le droit à la mobilité, la résidence, le travail et le droit à la propriété, en somme réunir toutes les conditions favorables à une vie commune dans la paix et la sécurité. « Reconstruire un Soudan uni est toujours possible, la balle est dans le camp des porteurs du projet d’un Soudan nouveau, les grandes idées ne meurent pas, même si la mort emporte les grands hommes ». Les chances sont là, même si cela paraît être un rêve lointain, les sudistes en baptisant le nouvel État « État du Sud de Soudan » veulent dire qu’une unité est toujours possible. Toutefois, est-ce que pour les deux peuples déclenchent une révolution contre les concepts et les discours qui nourrissaient et alimentaient la haine ayant conduit à la séparation ?

Bibliographie
Le Portugal et son impensé colonial
Cristina Robalo Cordeiro


Le lecteur du recueil se plaira à suivre, dans son enthousiasme, l’œuvre entière d’Eduardo Lourenço, qui a avancé, au cours de ces années, qui vont de 1960 à 2014, une réflexion sur ce que d’autres appellent le colonialisme portugais, dont le régime de Salazar a fait moins une doctrine (malgré quelques efforts théoriques) qu’une « narration » au sens que le mot a pris aujourd’hui, c’est-à-dire à une reconstruction fantastique, sinon déliée, du passé justifiant toutes les aberrations d’une politique en totale rupture avec la réalité du moment. Alors que toutes les puissances européennes avaient, depuis (au moins) dix ans, renoncé à leurs efforts théoriques) qu’une « narration » au sens que le mot a pris aujourd’hui, c’est-à-dire à une reconstruction fantastique, sinon déliée, du passé justifiant toutes les aberrations d’une politique en totale rupture avec la réalité du moment. Alors que toutes les puissances européennes avaient, depuis (au moins) dix ans, renoncé à leurs efforts théoriques) qu’une « narration » au sens que le mot a pris aujourd’hui, c’est-à-dire à une reconstruction fantastique, sinon déliée, du passé justifiant toutes les aberrations d’une politique en totale rupture avec la réalité du moment. Alors que toutes les puissances européennes avaient, depuis (au moins) dix ans, renoncé à leurs efforts théoriques) qu’une « narration » au sens que le mot a pris aujourd’hui, c’est-à-dire à une reconstruction fantastique, sinon déliée, du passé justifiant toutes les aberrations d’une politique en totale rupture avec la réalité du moment. Alors que toutes les puissances européennes avaient, depuis (au moins) dix ans, renoncé à leurs efforts théoriques) qu’une « narration » au sens que le mot a pris aujourd’hui, c’est-à-dire à une reconstruction fantastique, sinon déliée, du passé justifiant toutes les aberrations d’une politique en totale rupture avec la réalité du moment. Alors que toutes les puissances européennes avaient, depuis (au moins) dix ans, renoncé à leurs efforts théoriques) qu’une « narration » au sens que le mot a pris aujourd’hui, c’est-à-dire à une reconstruction fantastique, sinon déliée, du passé justifiant toutes les aberrations d’une politique en totale rupture avec la réalité du moment. Alors que toutes les puissances européennes avaient, depuis (au moins) dix ans, renoncé à leurs efforts théoriques) qu’une « narration » au sens que le mot a pris aujourd’hui, c’est-à-dire à une reconstruction fantastique, sinon déliée, du passé justifiant toutes les aberrations d’une politique en totale rupture avec la réalité du moment. Alors que toutes les puissances européennes avaient, depuis (au moins) dix ans, renoncé à leurs efforts théoriques) qu’une « narration » au sens que le mot a pris aujourd’hui, c’est-à-dire à une reconstruction fantastique, sinon déliée, du passé justifiant toutes les aberrations d’une politique en totale rupture avec la réalité du moment. Alors que toutes les puissances européennes avaient, depuis (au moins) dix ans, renoncé à leurs efforts théoriques) qu’une « narration » au sens que le mot a pris aujourd’hui, c’est-à-dire à une reconstruction fantas...

Sa vie d’élève et d’universitaire était chargée à la fois d’émotion, d’activité politique et culturelle. Son adhésion au FLN et sa conviction que l’université ne lui apprenait rien sur son pays n’encourage pas Zohra à continuer ses études, Samia également.

Beaucoup d’éléments ont contribué à la construction de l’identité patriotique de Zohra Drif d’abord, le rang social dont elle avait la chance de n’avoir pas empêché ces trois Françaises, cela n’a pas atténué les émotions qui naissent de la mémoire de leur histoire personnelle, à des parents et à rendre hommage aux femmes Algériennes qui ont joué un rôle important dans cette révolution. C’est aussi une reconnaissance à ses parents et à sa famille laçonne que le FLN n’est pas le seul à défendre la cause de la nation et de la liberté. Elle est persuadée que le FLN est en mesure de faire les changements nécessaires pour que l’Algérie devienne une nation indépendante et égalitaire.

Le livre est émouvant et riche en informations, Zohra Drif a réussi à communiquer son émotion au lecteur. On sent sa sincérité lorsqu’elle raconte la vie au quotidien de toutes celles et ceux qu’elle a côtoyés : les héros et héroïnes, les habitants de la Casbah. Ce livre facile à lire se caractérise par un regard, à la fois, perspicace et impressionnant sur le passé. Une démarche qui a permis à Zohra Drif de produire un roman biographique, avec des personnages vrais, vivants, mettant la dynamique sociale au cœur de l’histoire. L’œuvre jouit d’une valeur documentaire socio-historique sur une période précise de l’histoire, celle qui lui donne le privilège d’avoir sa place dans l’écriture de l’histoire de l’Algérie contemporaine.
Lorsque l'exil et la mémoire transforment une parole énonciative: un clin d’œil d’Alain Mabanckou

Kahina Bouanane Nour

Lumières de Pointe-Noire
Par Alain Mabanckou

Notes


3. Écrivain, et scénariste canadien d’origine haïtienne, vivant au Québec.

Regional Economic Communities
Exploring the Process of Socio-economic Integration in Africa
Akinpelo O. Oluyowo and Adehayi I. Adeniran

This book examines how existence of overlapping regional-based institutions has presented a daunting challenge to the workings of various RECs on the African continent. Majority of the African countries are members of overlapping and, sometimes, contradictory RECs. For instance, in East Africa, while Kenya and Uganda are both members of EAC and COMESA, Tanzania, which is also a member of the EAC, left COMESA in 2001 to join SADC. In West Africa, while all former French colonies, such as Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Togo and Benin Republic belong to the ECOWAS, they simultaneously keep membership of the UEMOA, though unrecognized by the African Union (AU). Such multiple and confusing memberships create unnecessary duplication and dins the light on what ought to be priority. Various chapters in this book have therefore sought to identify and profile solutions to related challenges confronting the workings of the RECs in different sub-regions of the African continent. The discourse ranges from security to the stock exchange, identity integration, development framework, labour movement and cross-border relations. The pattern adopted in the project engages devolution of related discussions from the general to the specific; that is, from the continental level to subregional case studies.


Pages : 148
Le sport moderne fut l'une des initiatives de transmission des valeurs culturelles du colon qui exerçait une politique de domination et d'assimilation des indigènes en vue de les civiliser et les intégrer dans la vie moderne ou occidentale. Dans ce cadre, la France a appliqué une politique d'organisation en matière de sport et d'éducation physique qui était assimilable à une mission civilisatrice appliquée dans toutes les colonies de l'époque dites de l'Afrique Équatoriale Française (A.E.F.) et l'Afrique Occidentale Française (A.O.F.), sans tenir compte des réalités endogènes à caractère culturel de chaque pays assujetti. Il n'y a pas de doute ici que le sport tel qu'il est pratiqué aujourd'hui est un apport colonial, nous pouvons voir néanmoins qu'en tant qu'instrument dominant du colon, ce dernier n'a pas pris en compte les réalités culturelles locales (jeux corporels traditionnels), autrefois accessibles à tous les couches sociales locales, et comme l'a noté Gouda : « Cette civilisation a opéré et agit comme si ces sociétés étaient sans passé, sans histoire, sans personnalité ni identité ». Le déploiement du sport a occasionné l'érosion des pratiques corporelles et leur non-intégration dans les différents plans d'épanouissement du sport institutionnalisé entraînant leur rélegation. Les pratiques physiques traditionnelles, pendant et après la période coloniale, sont l'apanage des groupes sociaux non-urbanisés. À l'accession de son indépendance, acquise le 15 Août 1960, le Congo Brazzaville commence à adhérer aux organismes sportifs internationaux afin d'exprimer sa souveraineté (identité, maturité, …). Commencent alors à paraître, à partir de 1960, des textes réglementaires pour l'éducation physique et le sport. Pour son rayonnement florissant sur le plan international, le pays va imiter l'organisation du sport fait pour un autre peuple, une autre culture, une autre économie, et butera sur des difficultés économiques importantes qui marqueront sa vie sociale et économique, laissant émerger la pratique du sport dans des installations toujours « archaïques » et insuffisantes. Le sport s'organise alors en fédérations et associations sportives (au nombre de vingt-trois en 2008).

Notes
2. Ibid.

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Par Joseph Bouzounzoula,

Bientôt ce voyage soit présenté d'emblée comme inachevé, il propose un certain nombre d'analyses et de réflexions sur l'organisation du sport moderne en Afrique noire en général, et au Congo Brazzaville en particulier. S'appuyant sur une approche socio-historique, l'auteur y analyse également l'évolution organisationnelle du sport et des pratiques corporelles traditionnelles de la période coloniale jusqu'à nos jours. Considérées comme héritage colonial, c'est à 1884 que remontent les premières activités sportives au Congo Brazzaville introduites par les commerçants et marins européens. Mais il ne faut pas oublier qu'avant cela, il existait des formes de jeux corporels traditionnels propres aux habitants de la région et à leur identité culturelle. Ces derniers, qui prennent leurs sources dans les ruminations proprement africaines, permettent la découverte d'un ensemble de valeurs morales (traditionnelles) spécifiques aux capacités organisationnelles des habitants de la région. La puissance colonisatrice, par l'intermédiaire des administrations, des colons et des missionnaires, a tenté d'imposer son type de civilisation dans tous les domaines de la vie, et en particulier dans celui du sport et de l'éducation physique. Si par exemple, les militaires (et colons) ont introduit le sport comme loisir (et entraînement), les maîtres et les missionnaires, dans une action destinée à transformer la société locale, voulaient éduquer par l'Éducation physique et sportive (EPS). Nous pouvons dire que la pénétration du sport a surtout été favorisée par le système scolaire (au début du XXème siècle), alors que les jeux corporels non traditionnels, jugés en marge de la modernité par le système colonial, ne pouvaient être enseignés ou transmis par l'école.

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