3 - In Search of an Explanation for the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974
Africa Review of Books,
Vol. 4 No. 1 (2008): Africa Review of Books, Volume 4, n° 1, 2008
Abstract
Haile Selassie, Western Education and Political Revolution in Ethiopia by Paulos Milkias. Cambria Press, 2006, xxii + 364 pp. ISBN: 1-934043-41-9
Ethiopia had more than its due share of wars and social turbulence through most of the known periods of its long history (upwards of two thousand years). Perhaps only one century (the 16th) compares with the 20th for the extent and intensity of the external and internal wars that the country fought, the population displacements and movements, and the massive destructions of property and national heritage. A considerable proportion of this turbulence and these wars were generated by a veritable and bloody social revolution that scholars have compared with the great social revolutions of the world – the French, the Russian and the Chinese. It is argued that social revolutions are rare phenomena in world history and that they are even rarer in the African context. It is therefore a matter of great intellectual importance to explain this phenomenon when it occurred in Ethiopia.
The revolutionary intellectuals did not by any means find it difficult to ‘understand’ it or to account for it. They saw a feudal monarchy in the kingship of Haile Selassie, a feudal nobility in the ruling class of the country, a subject peasantry in the rural producers akin to the French or the Russian ones before their respective revolutions, the petty bourgeoisie in the social group of teachers and students who agitated for the coming of the revolution and then provided the cadre (or the rebels) when it came. They characterised the country as backward, the economy as stagnant and the regime as oppressive. Thus, they concluded that this was a classic case of feudal oppression leading to revolution. This summary may sound like a caricature but it carries the essential arguments. The military government, which very quickly assumed the revolutionary mantle, went on to embrace the Marxist Leninist ideology and launched a massive propaganda that offered the above explanation, albeit in a much cruder form, to the people...
Keywords
- C. Clapham, Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
- The World Bank, World Development Report, 1978 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, August, 1978), p. 47.
- Shiferaw Jamo, “An Overview of the Economy, 1941-74,” in Shiferaw Bekele (ed.), An Economic History Ethiopia (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1995), p. 21.
- Ibid. 6 Imperial Ethiopian Government, The Third Five Year Development Plan (1968-1973) (Addis Ababa: Imperial Ethiopian Government, 1968), p.
- Tekeste Negash, Rethinking Education in Ethiopia (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1996).
- Asmerom Kidane, “Estimating the Ethiopian Population by Age and Geographical Distribtion 1935-1985”, Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Ethiopian Studies, vol. I (Moscow: Nuka Publishers, 1988), p. 63. This is a reliable estimate as it is based on the estimates of the Central Statistical
- Office.
- Ibid., p. 62.
- Alula Abate, “Demography, Migration and Urbanization in Modern Ethiopia,” in Shiferw Bekele (ed.), An Economic History Ethiopia (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1995), p.307.
- However, in the 1920s and early 30s, the major pressure or (to use a current buzz word) ‘conditionality’ set by the powerful European colonial countries was characterized by the demand for the effective and
- quick abolition of slave trade and slavery.But, in spite of the wishes of the rulers, the state was unable to ‘deliver’ promptly because the regional lords exercised considerable autonomy and were thus able to resist the pressure from the Centre.
- Gebre Hiwot Baykedagn raises this issue as the first item in the list of ten reforms he suggests in his article, ‘Até Menelikena Ityopya,’ It is also interesting to see Haile Selassie’s presentation of the issue in his memoirs: see E. Ullendorff (trans. and ann.), The Autobiography of Emperor Haile Selassie I: ‘My Life and Ethiopia’s Progress’ 1892-1937 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 75. It should be noted that Haile Selassie considered himself to be an opponent of feudalism.
- I use the expression ‘modern state’ for the imperial state even if the process of westernization was not completed. Seen against the structure of the traditional polity, which he inherited, it can be said that Haile Selassie left behind a relatively westernized state.
- Ahadu Sabure, Yäqädamawi Haylä Selassie Fesaména Yä-Därg Anäsas (Addis Ababa: n.p.), pp.215-217.
- C. Clapham, Haile Selassie’s Government (London: Longmans, 1969). See also his Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Patrick Gilkes, The
- Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in Ethiopia (London: Julien Friedman, 1975); J. Markakis, Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974).
- See Robert L. Hess, Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970); Gilkes, The Dying Lion.
- Some of the leading members of the Derg were born and raised in towns – Teferra Tekleab (already Marxist-oriented before the Revolution), Mengistu, Fekre Selassie, Moges, Legesse, and a few others. Other key soldiers from outside of the Derg but who occupied key offices in the security apparatus
- of the military regime had an urban background – Daniel Asfaw, Tesfaye Wolde Selassie, to name only two. Could this background have a correlation with their readiness to spouse the revolutionary ideology? It merits investigation.
References
C. Clapham, Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
The World Bank, World Development Report, 1978 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, August, 1978), p. 47.
Shiferaw Jamo, “An Overview of the Economy, 1941-74,” in Shiferaw Bekele (ed.), An Economic History Ethiopia (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1995), p. 21.
Ibid. 6 Imperial Ethiopian Government, The Third Five Year Development Plan (1968-1973) (Addis Ababa: Imperial Ethiopian Government, 1968), p.
Tekeste Negash, Rethinking Education in Ethiopia (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1996).
Asmerom Kidane, “Estimating the Ethiopian Population by Age and Geographical Distribtion 1935-1985”, Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Ethiopian Studies, vol. I (Moscow: Nuka Publishers, 1988), p. 63. This is a reliable estimate as it is based on the estimates of the Central Statistical
Office.
Ibid., p. 62.
Alula Abate, “Demography, Migration and Urbanization in Modern Ethiopia,” in Shiferw Bekele (ed.), An Economic History Ethiopia (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1995), p.307.
However, in the 1920s and early 30s, the major pressure or (to use a current buzz word) ‘conditionality’ set by the powerful European colonial countries was characterized by the demand for the effective and
quick abolition of slave trade and slavery.But, in spite of the wishes of the rulers, the state was unable to ‘deliver’ promptly because the regional lords exercised considerable autonomy and were thus able to resist the pressure from the Centre.
Gebre Hiwot Baykedagn raises this issue as the first item in the list of ten reforms he suggests in his article, ‘Até Menelikena Ityopya,’ It is also interesting to see Haile Selassie’s presentation of the issue in his memoirs: see E. Ullendorff (trans. and ann.), The Autobiography of Emperor Haile Selassie I: ‘My Life and Ethiopia’s Progress’ 1892-1937 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 75. It should be noted that Haile Selassie considered himself to be an opponent of feudalism.
I use the expression ‘modern state’ for the imperial state even if the process of westernization was not completed. Seen against the structure of the traditional polity, which he inherited, it can be said that Haile Selassie left behind a relatively westernized state.
Ahadu Sabure, Yäqädamawi Haylä Selassie Fesaména Yä-Därg Anäsas (Addis Ababa: n.p.), pp.215-217.
C. Clapham, Haile Selassie’s Government (London: Longmans, 1969). See also his Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Patrick Gilkes, The
Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in Ethiopia (London: Julien Friedman, 1975); J. Markakis, Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974).
See Robert L. Hess, Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970); Gilkes, The Dying Lion.
Some of the leading members of the Derg were born and raised in towns – Teferra Tekleab (already Marxist-oriented before the Revolution), Mengistu, Fekre Selassie, Moges, Legesse, and a few others. Other key soldiers from outside of the Derg but who occupied key offices in the security apparatus
of the military regime had an urban background – Daniel Asfaw, Tesfaye Wolde Selassie, to name only two. Could this background have a correlation with their readiness to spouse the revolutionary ideology? It merits investigation.