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EDITORIAL:

Some of the papers in this issue of the journal are on women. This was carefully weighed on our part. The papers are on women's health and women in development. The number of manuscripts on women and gender issues submitted to the journal, and, peer reviewed, focus, more, on these two areas. The papers that are published in this issue thus reflect the submissions. We hope to continue with publishing good quality papers on women and gender issues in all areas of focus: politics, economics, education, health, development and many others.

Olajide Oloyede

Certains des articles dans ce numéro de la revue sont sur les femmes. Cela a été soigneusement pesé de notre part. Les articles portent sur la santé des femmes et les femmes dans le développement. Le nombre de manuscrits sur les femmes et les questions de genre soumis à la revue, et, examiné par les pairs, se concentrer, plus, sur ces deux domaines. Les articles publiés dans ce numéro reflètent donc les soumissions. Nous espérons continuer à publier des articles de qualité sur les femmes et les questions de genre dans tous les domaines: politique, économie, éducation, santé, développement et bien d'autres.

Olajide Oloyede
Managing Editor/Rédacteur en Chef

Postcolonial debates in Germany – An Overview[1]

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Abstract

Historiographical works and public thinking in Germany have long considered the German colonial period to be marginal because of its short span – 30 years – compared to other colonial Empires. Throughout the last two decades, various studies have contradicted these ideas and emphasized the impact of German colonization not only on formerly colonialized populations but also on today's German collective imagination[2].
In 2004, the centenary year of the Herero and Nama genocide committed in Namibia during German colonization, there was noticeable change in German discussions on the topic. Since then, a renewed interest for postcolonial matters has been observed in public and scientific debates. Several associations have been created in Germany since the mid 2000s with the objective of decolonizing the public space, believing that the process of decolonizing has two sides and cannot only concern formerly colonized states, but also formerly colonizer states[3]. This article focuses on the main crosscutting themes of German postcolonial debates and the light they can shed on other larger European debates.
Keywords: *Postcolonial, Empire, Race, Diaspora, Germany, Namibia,*

Résumé
Abstrait

Les travaux historiographiques et la pensée publique en Allemagne ont longtemps considéré la période coloniale allemande comme marginale en raison de sa courte durée - 30 ans - par rapport aux autres empires coloniaux. Au cours des deux dernières décennies, diverses études ont contredit ces idées et souligné l'impact de la colonisation allemande non seulement sur les populations anciennement colonisées, mais aussi sur l'imaginaire collectif allemand d'aujourd'hui.
En 2004, année du centenaire du génocide des Herero et Nama commis en Namibie pendant

1 This article is an augmented version of the article that was published in the Journal *Raison présente*: Pape, Elise. 2016. "Les débats postcoloniaux en Allemagne – Un état des lieux, in: *Raison présente*, "Colonial, postcolonial, décolonial" (Eds. Roland Pfefferkorn, Abdelhafid Hammouche and Gilbert Meynier), 199, 9-21.

2 To review Germany's colonial history, colonization-related remembrance culture in Germany and scientific studies on the matter, see Conrad 2008; Lennox 2010; Repussard 2014; Zimmerer 2013.

3 For example, Zeller 2010: 66.

la colonisation allemande, il y a eu des changements notables dans les discussions allemandes sur le sujet. Depuis lors, un regain d'intérêt pour les questions postcoloniales a été observé dans les débats publics et scientifiques. Plusieurs associations ont été créées en Allemagne depuis le milieu des années 2000 dans le but de décoloniser l'espace public, estimant que le processus de décolonisation a deux côtés et peut concerner non seulement les anciens États colonisés, mais aussi les anciens États colonisateurs. Cet article se concentre sur les principaux thèmes transversaux des débats postcoloniaux allemands et la lumière qu'ils peuvent apporter sur d'autres grands débats européens
Mots-clés: *Postcolonial, Empire, Race, Diaspora, Allemagne, Namibie,*

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Introduction

Herero and Nama people genocide – Recognition and reparation at stake

In 1904 and 1905, Prussian army general Lothar von Trotha ordered the extermination of Herero and Nama people who were rising up against German colonial occupation in the then *Deutsch-Südwestafrika* colony (today's Namibia). Only 20% of Herero and less than half of the Nama survived the forced retreat to the desert and deportation to the concentration camps between 1904 and 1908. This genocide is considered to be the first in the 20th century but the German government refuses to recognize it as such, despite evidence from historical studies[4]. Yet, the debates triggered by the 100th anniversary of the Armenian genocide have induced a shift in position from German government representatives. In July 2015 Norbert Lammert, *Bundestag* president, publically declared that one cannot refer to the Armenian genocide without acknowledging the Herero and Nama genocide as well. Shortly after, the Foreign Affairs minister announced that the genocide committed in Namibia would be a one of the government's policy focus. They also both state that their declarations are not an official recognition from the German government. In 2015, the German and Namibian governments negotiated to establish

4 See Zimmerer and Zeller 2003.

a resolution on reconciliation by the end of 2016. Related debates have intensified since Germany voted a resolution in June 2016 on the memory of the Armenian genocide and Germany's indirect complicity in the massacres.

The unwillingness of the German government to address the Herero and Nama genocide as such, is partly because of the compensation claims an official recognition would raise. The stakes have been raised higher by the victims' descendants who ask for the territories that should have been theirs. Most of these territories currently belong to the German people living in Namibia, some of them, direct descendants of the *Reich* citizens that lived in Namibia at the time of Germany's colonial rule. The outcome of the negotiations can be considered as an important step in how modern society relates to its colonial heritage and how it should be compensated. Nevertheless, the German government stated even before negotiations started that if there is an official recognition at stake, any demand of compensation will be excluded.

Herero and Nama activists' central role in the recognition process and their actions' international scope need to be better presented. Since the independence of Namibia and the end of Apartheid in the 1990s, the Herero and Nama's fight has focused on the acknowledgment and reparation of the damage caused by Germany during the genocide. For instance, legal steps have been undertaken by the US against German companies. These actions are initiated for the most part by the *Herero People's Reparations Corporation*, a transnational association of descendants of Herero survivors living in Namibia, Germany, Great Britain, the United States and in countries close to Namibia such as Botswana. They claim, first and foremost, for the genocide of the Herero and Nama people to be officially acknowledged, for the bones of the victims, which form part of German anthropologic collections, to be returned and for a dialogue to be opened on reparation measures. These associations play a significant role in the intergovernmental negotiations. Since 2006, the Namibian government, criticized by NGOs for withdrawing from their previous commitments, has been pressured into officially supporting their claims to the German government. Various associations, including the *Herero People's Reparations Corporation*, felt left out in the negotiations and have been conducting campaigns since 2015 in Namibia and Germany with the slogan: *It cannot be about us without us. Anything about us without us is against us*. The first transnational conference gathered more than fifty Herero and Nama from all over the world as well as members of German civil society and took place in Berlin in October 2016 in order to debate how to include NGOs in the current negotiations.

Building the idea of "race" – German anthropological collections on the eve on the 20th century

From the middle of the 19th century, racist theories about the notion of race and racial inferiority[5] promp ted various anthropological collections and establishment of Center s. We can count four main ones in Germany at the beginning of the 20th century[6]. These Centers gather human bones from different regions of the world which are subjected to research in order to scientifically prove how races are different and unequal. These collections expanded a great deal during German colonialism. Thousands of skulls and skeletons, colonization victims for the most part, were transported from German colonies to Germany. A leading collector, Felix von Luschan, after spending most of his career studying human remains, concluded that humanity cannot be divided into races. However, some of his successors did not share his opinion. Eugen Fischer, a Professor of Medicine and Anthropology and a strong supporter of the Nuremberg laws, published, along with Erwin Baur and Fritz Lenz in 1921 *Human Heredity Theory and Racial Hygiene* (*Grundriss der menschlichen Erblichkeitslehre und Rassenhygiene)*, a book that was as a major source of inspiration for the Nazi ideology. In 1927, Fischer took part in the creation of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute of Anthropology, Human Heredity and Eugenics (*Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Anthropologie, menschliche Erblehre und Eugenik*) and became the first director, until 1942. The Institute, which took over Felix von Luschan's collection among others, applied eugenics and racial hygiene principles in different ways.

In 2011, two of the four collections were incorporated in the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation's funds in Berlin. After several requests for the return of Herero remains, it was granted in 2011 and 2014. The media coverage of the two restitutions played a role in today's rising awareness in Germany with regard to the existence of these collections and their original motive, thus raising awareness, though in a more limited manner, on how the idea of race was built – and how it can be taken apart.

Colonization and Holocaust, is there a link?: Revisiting history

Another debate central to German (post)colonial studies is the controversial link between Germany's colonial past and the Holocaust, as suggested by Hannah Arendt.[7] Different arguments are used to prove the existence of a link between the two: first, there is a continuity in the stakeholders involved. Eugen Fischer for example spent

5 See for instance Arthur de Gobineau's *Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races*, volume 1 & 2, Paris: Didot, 1853; vol. 3 & 4, Paris: Didot, 1855 and his Haitian detractor Joseph Anténor Firmin's *Of the Equality of Human Races. Positive Anthropology*, Paris: Librairie Cotillon and F. Pichon, 1885, 2nd edition, Paris: L'Harmattan.

6 For more information, see Stoecker et al. 2013.

7 Arendt 1951.

time in Namibia for research in 1908, where he carried out an anthropological study on babies born of African mothers and German or Dutch fathers. A large number of racial theories defended by Fischer under the Nazi regime were developed during these experimentations. Historians supporting the theory of a strong continuity between German colonization and Holocaust argue that the Namibian genocide put an end to a taboo and was the first application of an ideology advocating for the extermination of a human group on German territory.

Several historians also insist on the impact the colonization and genocide in Namibia had on German population's way of thinking. Postcards showing scenes in concentration camps or Herero and Nama people being executed are sent repeatedly by German soldiers to their loved ones in Germany. Gustav Frenssen's novel *Peter Moors Fahrt nach Südwest* published in 1906, in which the author tells the glorifying story of German soldiers participating in the genocide, became a standard read in German schools from 1908[8]. The idea of continuity between colonization and Holocaust[9] has been questioned by several historians, but it is more the degree of continuity that they disagree on, rather than the continuity per se.

Though the idea of continuity between German colonialism and Holocaust is contested, as it does not aim at putting the crimes committed in perspective; it is still an invitation to give the 20th century history another look and replace it in a larger context of legitimization of racial classification, reinforced during German colonialism and leading to the extermination of races considered as inferior and harmful in a German colony.

Decolonizing the public space – "Postcolonial" associations

A turning point was reached in the debate as (post-colonial discussions intensified with the centennial of Herero and Nama genocide and the 120th anniversary of the Berlin Conference in 2004, partly due to discussions initiated in German Studies Centers in the United States[10]. It increased the visibility over studies of postcolonial remains in the German public space carried out since the 1990s[11]. Starting in the middle of the 2000s, postcolonial associations (for example *Berlin postkolonial*, *Hamburg postkolonial*) are formed in various cities such as Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich, Freiburg, Hamburg, Leipzig and others, but also at a regional scale (for example *Hessen postkolonial*). Their members, from African, German and other origins, look for colonial remains in targeted cities and regions and engage in decolonizing activities aimed at both the public space and German collective mind.

8 See Kössler 2005.
9 See for instance Kundrus 2005.
10 For example Friedrichsmeyer et al. 1998.
11 For example Heyden van der and Zeller 2002; and Zeller 2000.

Their actions consist in organizing "anticolonial" guided tours of the cities where they are implemented, showcasing different remains from the colonial period, in educational activities in schools, museum exhibitions or advocating for the change of some street names chosen to commemorate key figures from German colonization or including racist terms. One instance of this process took place in 2007, when the Von-Trotha-Straβe in Munich was renamed Hererostraβe. Currently in Berlin, claims to change the name of the Mohrenstraβe[12], a street housing two key institutions and symbols of power, the Justice Ministry and the European Ethnology Institute of Humboldt-University, raise intense debates.

The Humboldt-Forum – towards a decolonization of museums?

Postcolonial debates have also gained some ground in Berlin these last few years with the "Humboldt-Forum" construction, a museum, cultural and scientific project that will open its doors in 2019 in the capital city and will house, among other collections, the Dahlem Ethnology Museum collections, which were up to now, in a neighborhood, west of the city. The new museum, to be housed within Berlin's castle,[13] currently, being reconstructed, raises a strong polemic. The display of ethnological objects – acquired for the main part within unequal relationships during German colonialism – in a reconstitution of the castle occupied by Prussian emperors who played a significant role in colonial history is described as a provocation by some of the opponents to the project, including many members of the African diaspora and postcolonial associations, grouped together in the "NO Humboldt 21!" collective. Others, like the President of the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation in Berlin (*Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz*), stressed, at the Origin of the Humboldt-Forum that architectural choices would lead to a better awareness of the colonial past in the museum conceptualization.

Since 2015, partly under the pressure of organizations protesting against the Humboldt-Forum, the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation (which the Ethnology Museum and the future Humboldt-Forum depend on) expressed its desire to reinforce the investigations of the provenance of items from formerly colonized regions. An "item provenance researcher" position (*Provenienzforschung*) was created at the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation in Berlin in 2016. Innovating experimentations have been carried out between 2012 and 2015 to reflect on how to address the colonial past in the ethnographic exhibition of the museum's items.[14] In various German museums, there were requests for the restitution of museum items initiated by the descendants of their original owners in the former German colonies.

12 *Mohr* is a German term considered disparaging for black-skinned people.

13 The former Prussian Imperial residence was destroyed under the German Democratic Republic in 1950, then replaced from 1976 by the GDR's Palace, which was also destroyed from 2006 onwards.

14 For more information about ongoing projects for the museum exhibit, see Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz 2015; Humboldt-Lab 2015.

Ethnographic collections have played a central role in the colonization process. After the geographic division of the formerly colonized regions, a race started to which European country would acquire the most items from the former colonies and was often described in social sciences as an attempt to better "possess" the colonized populations' cultures[15]. The purpose of exhibiting these items in European museums was to make cultures perceived as distant more accessible to local populations. The relation established with "the others" was built in a way mainly defined by museum decision boards and European institutions rather than within direct interactions with former colonies' citizens. In light of these elements, the study of contemporary postcolonial debates in museum institutions appears particularly fruitful.

Former colonies descendants' role

It is important to underline the central role played by people descending from former colonies in the current state of German postcolonial debates. We saw before how important are Herero survivors' descendants in debates around the recognition of the Herero and Nama people genocide. In a similar way, the German population's awareness of the consequences of the colonial past really started with the publication, in 1986, of a book written by a group of black and German women called *Farbe bekennen*[16]. The point of their piece was to highlight the presence in Germany of black German citizens and how they experience racism. It is one of the first published piece to emphasize the relation between colonial experience and racism. Two of the authors were daughters of a Cameroonian man who emigrated to Germany during the colonial period of the German Empire[17].

During the meetings that took place before the publication, several initiatives were created, in particular the "Black German initiative" (*Initiative Schwarze Deutsche*), which still leads actions against racism today. The autobiography by Theodor Michael, born in 1925 from a German mother and a Cameroonian father arrived in Germany in 1903, was part of this movement. The author wrote about his childhood, spent in human zoos with his father, brothers and sisters, how he survived World War II and how racism excluded him from the high economic growth between 1945 and 1975. He also discussed the unexpected turn in his life when he obtained a study grant; this, marked, the beginning of an uncommon career: first in the creation of German publications about Africa, then within the federal intelligence service. The title of his book, *German? And black as well!* (*Deutsch sein und schwarz dazu)* is yet another attempt to give black-skinned German citizens' existence a place in German collective imagination. The autobiography,

15 Somé 2003: 41.

16 Oguntoye et al. 1986. The title refers to a pun. The expression *Farbe bekennen* means "to stand by one's position". The term *Farbe* means "color", the verb "bekennen" means to recognize or to admit.

17 For more research on black people's experience in Germany, see Bechhaus-Gerst and Klein-Arendt 2003.

published in 2013, was listed as a bestseller by Spiegel periodical in 2013-2014[18].

Another significant figure in the ongoing changes to the postcolonial situation in Germany is Prince Kum'a Ndumbe III. Though, he is yet to be accorded enough importance in research. Alexandre Kum'a Ndumbe III was born in 1946 in Douala, Cameroon. He's the grandson of Kum'a Mbappe, one of the first resistance fighters during German occupation in 1884. At age 15, Kum'a Ndumbe III was sent by his family to Munich in order to finish his education. There he obtained his high school diploma, the *Abitur*, and continued with a History and German degree at Lyon II Lumières University in France, where he defended a dissertation in 1974 called *African policies in Hitler's Germany: 1933-1943. Northern Africa, Central Africa, South Africa.* From his thesis he published *Hitler wanted Africa: the Third Reich's project on the African continent*[19], in which he questioned the Nazi government's intentions to colonize, not only the East, but the entire African continent[20]. In 1989, he obtained his accreditation to direct research (HDR) in political sciences on African policies in German Federal Republic. In parallel to teaching history and German studies at Lyon II University, Berlin Free University and Cameroon's Yaoundé I University, he also published more than 30 non scientific books, mainly theater plays written in German, French and Duala. He was elected President of the Cameroonian Poets and Writers Association between 1981 and 1991. In 1985, he founded the Foundation "AfricAvenir" in Duala promoting the rebirth of the African continent through educational actions and emphasis on knowledge from an African point of view. Between 1989 and 2003, the classes he taught at the Free University of Berlin gained a lot of popularity. The auditoriums where he taught were always full; several students of his decided to commit to implementing both postcolonial and 'de-colonial' theories that they encountered. In 2004, a certain number of them opened a branch of AfricAvenir in Berlin. Since Professor Kum'a Ndumbe's departure from Berlin, there has been a non-negligible transmission from student to student of his teachings about postcolonial matters in Germany, a phenomenon that would benefit from a deeper, empirical study.

The importance of intergenerational relations

The point here is to emphasize the importance of intergenerational relations in this process. The students behind *Farbe bekennen* discovered the truth about the consequences of colonialism through talks with older African immigrants, who went to Germany as part of their studies in the 1970s. These students, from East and West Africa, created

18 The book will be published in French in Autumn 2016 by Editions Duboiris and in English in 2017 at Liverpool University Press.

19 Paris, L'Harmattan, 1980.

20 Publication was banned in Germany until 1993. When he heard about the ban, Jean-Paul Sartre published a shortened version of the text in his journal *Modern Times*.

the first African people association in Germany at the end of the 70s. Some of them were motivated, in their immigration to Germany, by reasons specific to colonization. For example, Mr. Safari[21] who originates from Tanzania, a territory that used to belong to the *Deutsch-Ostafrika* colony, told the story of his grandmother and how when he was a child, she would tell him about what had happened during German occupation, more particularly about the repression led by Carl Peters, the colony's founder, nicknamed "bloody hands" in Tanzania and *Hänge-Peters (hanging-Peters)* in Germany. She would frequently mention the cadavers and bones of rebel chiefs that were taken to Germany after they had been defeated. When Mr. Safari left for Germany, his grandmother gave him the specific mission of finding the human remains of these chiefs and bring them back to Tanzania.

In 1984, the aforementioned African students organized a conference on the occasion of the Conference of Berlin's Centennial, to which they invited Wole Soyinka and Ngũgũ wa Thiong'o. The young German students who wrote *Farbe bekennen* drew inspiration from the discussions that took place at the conference. Nonetheless, the preoccupations of these two groups – the group of students socialized in Africa and the group of young women brought up in Germany – were not the same. Whereas the former were more motivated by a claim for reparation of the damage inflicted by colonization, the latter were particularly determined to fight against the effects racism has within German society. In the early 1980s, the voluntary activities organized by these groups took different routes but were still closely linked, especially when children of African students came of age and engaged in the associations' activities as well as became in part members of both associations: the *Initiative für Schwarze Deutsche* and the "postcolonial associations".

Symmetrical perspectives – a marginal story?

The presence of the African diaspora and descendants of former German colonies seems central in how the debates progress since they allow for a more symmetrical appraisal of today's consequences of German colonialism. The so-called marginal role played by German colonialism was questioned in interviews and ethnographical observations of key figures in the African diaspora in Berlin, and, also, in multi-sited studies. For instance, several scientific studies[22] highlight the importance of the Conference of Berlin for many African people, contrarily to Europeans.

In 2016, my fieldwork in Berlin confirmed these observations. An interview with a member of African diaspora in Berlin seems to illustrate particularly well this feeling. Mr. X, originating from West Africa, arrived in Europe after graduating from high

21 The name was changed for privacy purposes.
22 For example Eckert 2013.

school. He first lived 10 years in France, before moving to Germany in 1982. When I asked the reason why he chose to live in Germany, a choice that implied an important investment, learning a new language to start with, Mr. X replied:

> Why did I want to come to Germany? Because this is where African borders were decided. When I was a child in elementary school, our teacher would always talk about the 'Conference of shame', because African borders had been decided in Germany without inviting any African representative. My family was impacted by the Conference, and is still split up today between several countries. I've always wanted to know this country, this city that decided today's African borders.

Here, it is not only the country that is named, but also the city. Several people I met in Germany and originating from the African diaspora, as well as people interviewed in Cameroon, talk about the need to rethink the borders separating the African countries and use the term of "deberlinization" of the African continent.

The importance of the Conference of Berlin was finally revealed in current demands issued by African diaspora associations regarding the creation of a monument in Berlin in memory of slavery, colonization and victims of racism. Public authorities haven not yet followed through with these demands. In 2007, a memorial stone, financed by private funds collected amongst people from the African diaspora and German civil society, was raised not too far from where the Conference of Berlin was held. This memorial stone recounts the event in a few words. Interviews of various actors of the African diaspora in Berlin have shown that politicians from different African countries ask to be taken to the Conference of Berlin's locations during their visit of Berlin and to see the memorial stone mentioned.

A multi-sited empirical approach is another essential tool to have a comprehensive point of view. Förster's multi-sited study[23] about the restitution of bones in Namibia for instance has evidenced the difference of importance given to the matter by both German and Namibian populations. For the first restitution of Herero skulls that took place at Berlin's Charity Hospital in 2011, a delegation of 60 Namibians, including members of the government, was present. The German government had no representative present apart from a secretary of state who left before the end of the ceremony. The other people present were Herero survivors' descendants living in Germany, a few people interested in the matter and journalists. One could say that the event was a small concern for the German population, or at least a concern that was not expressed through physical presence. The contrast with the Namibian welcoming crowd was all the more striking as thousands of people awaited the arrival of the restituted bones in front of Windhoek airport.

23 Förster 2013.

Conclusion

It is fair to say that from the mid 2000s, Germany has witnessed a "de-colonial turn"[24], along with particularly strong debates relating to the recognition of the Herero and Nama genocide, the anthropological collections that have contributed to the idea of "races", the relation between German colonization and Holocaust and the treatment of colonial remains in German public space. People with origins in German colonies played a central role in questioning whether the consequences of German colonialism are marginal in today's societies. We can wonder whether the intensity of current postcolonial debates and the number of "de-colonial" actions undertaken by German civil society can be partly explained by the burden of the Nazi past. Regarding the latter, some authors have agreed to say that this burden makes the German people more prone to self-criticism than in other national contexts[25]. In this perspective, we can wonder if Germany's general environment is not particularly fertile for civil society, stakeholders asking for recognition and reparation of colonial damage. The conflicts that were raised with regard to the Humboldt-Forum could lead to the colonial past being acknowledged in this innovating museum, which can have a domino effect by pressuring other European ethnological museums. On an institutional level, will postcolonial debates go far enough that a *real* decolonization of German public space becomes possible or will they only serve to maintain the status quo, as it is stated by opponents to the project? One of the topics broached by the objecting side concerns the relation between objects, human remains and humans: in many cases, it is true that collectors of ethnological items would collect human bones. In other cases, they would come back from their expeditions with African people, to be exhibited in human zoos in Europe. In the next few years, postcolonial debates led by European civil society could focus on the relation between objects and human beings and how human beings were objectified in the course of a colonial and postcolonial process.

Acknowledgement

Translated from French into English by Alma Labarthe

24 Lennox 2010: xvi.
25 See for instance Schultheis 1995.

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Women and Liberal Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Northern Uganda: community social work agenda revisited?

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Abstract

This paper examines women's participation in post-conflict peacebuilding activities within the neo-liberal peace theory and framework. Using qualitative approach, the study gathered information from 40 women and several key informants working and living in post-conflict northern Uganda. The paper utilizes this information in reflecting on how women live in and engage with their communities in post-conflict settings, and also assess the actual actions and initiatives that women develop in post-conflict situation, the space available to them and the emergent context. The paper also analyses the extent to which these factors shape community post-conflict adjustments. Key challenges affecting women's participation in the peacebuilding processes, mainly at grassroots and community levels are examined. The major conclusion of the paper is that liberal peacebuilding approach does not fully espouse, embrace or explain issues of critical consciousness, social and strategic agency nor does it prepare the women to effectively engage their society. I argue that this limitation and omission do not adequately prepare women to confront social issues and oppressive practices as well as challenge certain traditions and power structures, issues that are hall marks of community based social work.

Résumé

Cet article analyse la participation des femmes à la consolidation de la paix après les conflits dans la théorie néo-libérale et le cadre de la paix. À l'aide d'approche qualitative, l'étude a recueilli des informations à partir de 40 femmes et plusieurs répondants clés travaillant et vivant dans le nord de l'Ouganda post-conflit. Le document utilise cette information dans la réflexion sur la façon dont les femmes vivent et interagissent avec leurs communautés dans les situations post-conflit, et également d'évaluer les mesures et initiatives que les femmes développent en situation post-conflit, l'espace disponible pour eux et le nouveau contexte. Le document analyse également la mesure dans laquelle ces facteurs façonnent les ajustements post-conflit. Principaux défis touchant la participation des femmes dans le processus de consolidation, principalement à la base et au niveau communautaire sont examinés. La principale conclusion de l'étude est que la consolidation de la démarche n'est pas libéral épousent pleinement, embrasser ou expliquer

les enjeux de la conscience critique, sociale et de l'agence stratégique ni préparer les femmes à s'engager efficacement leur société. Je soutiens que cette limitation et d'une omission ne prépare pas adéquatement les femmes à faire face à des questions sociales et des pratiques oppressives et de contester certaines de leurs traditions et les structures de pouvoir, les questions qui sont des marques de Travail social communautaire.

Introduction

In this paper I reflect on the participation and involvement of women affected by conflict in their communities' social, economic, political and cultural lives. I examine how the women engage and disengage with their communities in the efforts to meet and realise their needs and rights. The women considered in this paper are formerly internally displaced persons as well as other women whose lives have been disrupted by conflict. I use northern Uganda as a case but reflect generally on women's experiences elsewhere in Africa and the developing world. I do not therefore use one activity or project or programme to assess their participation, involvement and engagement, but, the overall community engagement processes. My effort is aimed at examining the issues and the environment within which participation in the communities' economic, social, cultural, political and productive life generally interweave and how the women are influencing and being influenced by their own societies.

The focus is on the day to day interactions between women at household and community levels. A number of key questions are reflected on in the discussion: What space exists in the community for the women to engage with? How does the philosophy underpinning NGO work impact on women's ability and capacity to engage with their community? How is gender and culture implicated in women's efforts to engage their community and also attain socio-economic development? These questions are addressed within the framework of liberal peacebuilding theory, the strength and weakness of which is assessed. The empirical grounding of the questions derive from a qualitative study carried out in northern Uganda in the districts of Gulu and Amuru. The main focus of the study was on war affected-women initially living within the internally displaced persons camps and who have since returned home. Phenomenological and grounded theory approaches were employed to document the lived experiences of the women, with phenomenology offering insight into the meanings of adjustment and reintegration for participants, and grounded theory offering a rigorous and systematic way of moving between emergent empirical findings and a critical conversation with the existing literature. A theme of particular interest in this inquiry was how gender was implicated in the process of community reintegration, and the availability of resources and identities which were facilitative of this process. Interviews were conducted with as many women as possible until a saturation point with regards to the key issues under investigation had been reached. The interviews addressed the stated study aims:

exploring key issues around women participation in peacebuilding and the challenges there in, as well as how issues and challenges around their participation are negotiated. All interviews and focus group discussions were audio-recorded and later transcribed verbatim. These were then analysed thematically using Template Analysis (TA). TA is a useful method in analysing textual data emerging from fieldwork (Cassells et al., 2009; King, 2012). Template analysis involves reducing large amount of data into a framework of a few pages to simplify the process of analysis of substantial amount of raw data (King, 2012). What immediately follows discusses this theory.

Women and Peacebuilding

Contemporary debates on women's involvement in conflict and peacebuilding epitomise and accept the multiple roles that women play in conflict. For many years, women and girls were characterised as hapless victims of conflict often and always on the receiving ends of conflict violence. In many cases, therefore the complete repertoire of women's experiences of conflict was not documented or brought to the fore. In other cases even if some aspects were documented, the philosophy and the analytical frame work used still falls short of the depiction of real experience of the women to issues around conflict commencement, progression, its end and the rebuilding process.

Recent scholarship (e.g. Schnabel and Tabyshalieva, 2012; Schirch, 2012; Kadenke-Kaiser, 2012; Graybill, 2012; Adrian-Paul, 2012; Niaolain and McWilliams, 2013) all seem to point out at the post-conflict peacebuilding approaches not adequately capturing women's complete experiences or the documentation of the critical nature and varied nature and complexity of women's participation in conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives. This (complexity and variability of experiences) arguably should inform post-conflict planning approaches, framework and initiatives, as we are more likely to appreciate young women's strengths and resilience when we try to understand their experiences in totality. Moreover, there is also a widely-held view among scholars of women's participation in conflict that many post-conflict rebuilding and development initiatives including DDR do not effectively involve and embrace women, or their views. This too has been identified in northern Uganda. This therefore limits rooms for inclusiveness and the opportunity for women-oriented views to come on board (Kaufman and Williams, 2015; Bell, 2015). It is suggested that where power sharing deals are negotiated, it is important that women's participation in such deals are elucidated, increased and made more visible (Bell, 2015). Moreover, some viewpoints do not support women's involvement in power sharing presenting it as bad for women's equality and pushing other issues as more important than inclusion (for example stability), which contravenes resolution 1325 (Bell, 2015). The question to ask though is: don't men need stability the same way as women, if so then why the lack of emphasis on their (women's) involvement? Besides, women's capacity to

determine, influence or even steer the agenda of post-conflict discourse/ development processes are questionable. Bell (2015) acknowledges that despite those arguing against gender inclusivity, it is an important thing if post-conflict peacebuilding should be effective and meets needs of all categories of people in society.

Reviewing the implementation of UN resolution 1325 enacted in 2000, UN women (2015) notes the need for integrating women's participation in leadership, peace process and empowering women to stop conflict (nipping conflict in the bud, especially with those at grassroots and community levels). We should note that resolution 1325 emphasises gender perspectives, calls for consideration of women's special needs during DDR and post-conflict reconstruction issues, advises on measures that support women in all aspects of implementation of peace agreements and measures that ensures the protection of and respects for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary. I note that all these fall within the liberal peace agenda and framework and are intended to promote inclusivity. Kaufman and Williams (2015) raise many critical issues about women's roles in post-conflict peacebuilding. It is also possible that processes to involve women in peacebuilding at national and international level ignore subnational efforts at grassroots level, yet these could be more important for attaining and achieving sustainable positive peace. Moreover, resolution 1325 is criticised as failing to recognise the role of men and boys, and making wrong assumptions about how boys and men benefit from war/ development processes at the expense of women (Kaufman and Williams, 2015). This suggests that it is important to appreciate and contextualise women's experiences of conflict beyond the consideration under UN resolution 1325 and focus also on: a more nuanced analysis of the relationship between conflicts ending and the establishment of peace that ensures safety for girls and women; a more prominent exposition of the role played by women at grassroots level; need to appreciate also men's presence and location vis-a-vis the women; need to focus on gender neutrality; then appreciate how peace is "imagined" by the various groups affected or involved. Resolution 1820 was later added addressing specifically sexual violence against women, meanwhile resolution 2122 urges the parties including the UN agencies and financial institutions to support efforts at developing and building local institutional capacity so that they can promote more sustainable support to women in conflict and post-conflict situation.

It is suggested that while UNSCR 1325 calls for women's voices to be heard, it does not stand firm enough to propel the women at the centre of social change and social transformation initiatives. Care should be taken to avoid a tokenistic approach to women's inclusion and involvement in post-conflict resettlement and reintegration of society where a make-belief mantra of women's participation and involvement is preached when the actual power and influence is retained by patriarchal forces immanent within the social structure of society. More so, in many formerly conflict affected communities, the post-conflict planning and implementation regimes remain

very much controlled by male (and in some cases even chauvinistic) forces. Yet women's agency is also not adequately recognised, contextualised or nurtured, due in part to failure to adequately consider intersectionality of gender with such variables as age, ethnicity, nationality, religion, sexuality among others. Moreover, women may get excluded from the peace process overall and their voices made not count at all. It is important to note however that not all categories of men also benefit from women's exclusion. There are those whose participation would be equally limited or even worse than those for women, showing that gender alone is not the only key variable in the equation, with other issues determining the scope and space of participation in peace processes or development.

Efforts at post-conflict reintegration and inclusivity of women in development and peacebuilding process may be constrained by earlier underlying factors, pre-existing unequal power relations and women continued vulnerability within the post-conflict settings among others. Yet studies show that women experience significant rights violations in conflict situations (see Schnabel and Tabyshalieva, 2012; Schirch, 2012; Kadende-Kaiser, 2012; Graybill, 2012; Adrian-Paul, 2012; Seymour, 2012; Niaolain and McWilliams, 2013; McKay et al 2010; Honwana, 2006). This includes deliberate sexual violence during war, rape, forced pregnancy, abortion and forced sterilisation (we see cases in Northern Uganda, DR Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and even Southern Sudan in the various phases of the conflict). Women also suffer other socio-economic and physical violations which make them unable to effectively discharge their functions, including participation in peacebuilding initiatives.

Gendering traditional institutions and their utility and adaptations in post-conflict societies

According to UNIFEM (2012) seeking justice for women imply helping them to engage with such processes that shape future wellbeing, such as constitution making. It suggests that there is need to provide incentives to those working in transitional justice to bring out the gender lenses, analyse performance measures and reviews of individual and institutional reforms so as to remove barriers and improve access to justice for men and women in society. I note that evidence from practice in the context of conflict and post-conflict situations in northern Uganda and elsewhere suggest that the informal system of justice is the principal legal recourse in most cases, as they appear to be the most accessible and utilised by women in societies emerging from conflict.

It should be noted that in several communities affected by conflict, formal justice systems/mechanisms become weakened and in other cases even collapse, with cases reported where NGOs, traditional authorities and such related informal institutions taking up the space to execute public functions and keep a semblance of a functional society. Women have been noted to be one of the foremost individuals to create centres of governance at village and wider community levels where sense of accountability and responsibility is maintained and promoted to keep social harmony or enliven the spirits of community members.

In many conflict-affected communities therefore, women CBOs and other such organisations constitute important agents of social organisation with which social functions are executed and society kept moving during difficult times. Indeed, cases have been cited where difficult issues which had eluded formal institutions to resolve them) have been effectively resolved by local groups, further indicating their significance in the context of conflict. Women acting through their social groups and singularly have also made important contributions in fighting for their rights, making claims on spaces which belong to women and making inroads in male-dominated decision-making spaces and arenas. Many of these have included them working with male champions who believe in gender parity and progress and also enlisting local and traditional authority who are like-minded. Research in northern Uganda, among the Acholi community suggests that the protracted 20 years old war which raged in the region changed social institutions or the perceptions and interpretations of those institutions, customs and practices and made foreign and hitherto sanctioned practices and actions to creep within the Acholi culture. These then became entrenched and were made to pass as though they were genuine Acholi cultural practices and ideals. Due to the significant spread because of the conflict and the absence of a cultural regime to stem its inroads, these have been passed as Acholi cultural domains whereas not. These include issues such as the disenfranchisement of women, and the domination and meting of violence against women in the name of "chastisement". It also includes certain practices which denigrates women and also violates their rights to productivity and reproduction as well as other cultural rights of association and community engagements.

Yet a critical analysis of Acholi cultural institutions and practices in the pre-conflict days, pre-independence and perhaps before colonialism also suggests very strong and important positions of women in society, with decision making not arrived at except with the complete participation of women. It appears as if the control of women over production and reproductive roles even far surpasses that of the man, with the matriarch occupying an important role within the Acholi family and cultural setups. It is doubtful however whether she occupies the same space and holds similar power today. The same applies to children as has been discussed in earlier sections, regarding how society and social institutions were set up to enhance the protection and the promotion of the welfare of the child. It should be noted however that the fights against the entrenched nature of foreign customs and practices which has infiltrated Acholi culture is not only limited to the women and women organisations. It may well include both state and non-state institutions as they seemed to have permeated all aspects of life and have ended up misrepresenting the rich nature of the Acholi culture. Moreover, such groupings also play very important roles in resolving issues around rights violation especially that of women and the girl child and following up prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence cases. Evidence in Northern Uganda suggests that where grassroots women organisations are strong and effective, cases of gender-based violence and blatant violation of the rights of women and children reduce significantly.

While efforts may be put at transforming the justice systems, it is important to note that both tradition and customs evolves over time and therefore is subject to certain degree of influence. A contrast between negative cultural infiltration and positive cultural infiltration occurs, the adoption of which may depend on other issues and forces within society. This is where positive culture can be promoted and more negative ones modified or even discarded. UNIFEM (2012) laments however, that sometimes in the aftermaths of conflict, traditional institutions are used by others to keep women subjugated or previous unequal relations between men and women are restored instead of being improved. While this may be true in some cases, in most cases external researchers and authority espousing a neoliberal agenda may not open themselves to appreciate the utility of certain traditional viewpoints; yet the actual limitations and strengths of the presented perspectives are not even adequately scrutinised and evaluated. In this case, important and significant nuances in gender relations between the sexes are missed, such as key areas where women exert direct and indirect influences and even authority in them. We may report wrongly that old gender biases and practices are returning after the end of conflict when the reported old practices were actually not indigenous to the community.

The role of women grassroots' organization in promoting economic social and cultural rights in the aftermaths of conflict

The Village Savings and Loans Association (VSLA) model of community economic financing provides an important pedestal on which women influence, power and contributions to socio-economic life at community levels can be assessed. Initially introduced in northern Uganda by the American relief and development organisation, CARE International, to support women's socio-economic empowerment, with limited capital cash infusion by development agencies; the VSLA model currently permeates the entire northern Uganda and operates in self-financing modes with community members playing key roles in its sustenance.

The assessment of VSLA (village savings and loan associations) microfinance models in Uganda and related self-help groups (SHGs) suggests that women participants in VSLA and group micro credit scheme retain considerable power over income they generate through their participation. Instead, their significance as important economic actors beyond the productive abilities of tilling the land becomes paramount and recognised by their spouses and other family members (attested to by local leadership, opinion leaders and development agencies, as well as the cultural institutions). Indeed, these women transcend gender stereotypes of women as dependents and thus parasites on male finance and resources, showing significant agency in economic terms. Their movement to income "earner and generator," in a community setting where money was controlled by men, challenges prevailing gender dynamic and relations in resource ownership, generation and even control. Such women were also shown to exercise more power in the allocation of the funds to family needs and investments, and were less likely

to suffer gender-based violence or rights subjugation: productive, social, associational and movement wise. The latter perhaps in part explained by their new-found respect as they contribute immensely to family livelihoods, and due to the presence of a support base among the group members. Studies also show that one of the most insidious causes of domestic violence among couples is alcohol abuse. Consultation with women VSLA members indicated that they have greater appreciation for sobriety which has helped keep their families organised. The women also indicated that their participation in the group activities has also enhanced their own negotiation skills and made them learn how to resolve issues without resource to violence, an issue they have applied and impressed it upon members of their households.

It should be noted that in cases where women have already tested the benefits of freedom, ownership of resources and making their decisions count at household and community levels, the return or attempted efforts to return them to a pre-conflict power arrangements and gender relations which may denigrate women or limits their potentials is resisted (see Puechguirbal, 2010). Indeed, this is a very fertile ground for social tensions to be stoked and further increased in a post-conflict context where the women have moved to the forefront to play important role in the society and in all aspects of the social and productive sector and in others words many would have assumed and embraced roles which traditionally may be considered manly and a preserve of men or other powerful individuals within society.

It is important to also note that the resultant effects of war in many societies is the subjugation of men's manhood and the constriction of spaces within which men could exercise their power and authority as well as significance as men. In this way, therefore, the return to normalcy provides the opportunity for men to regain their authority, space and power. But the women may not be about to relinquish their new-found power and freedom (inherently a potential for conflict, which we see many women in northern Uganda managing by submitting to culturally executed relation with adaptive space for exercising greater social, cultural and economic rights, within the wider social domain). What we see in northern Uganda therefore is an attempt by women to retain some power and influence yet allow their men to be men in the Acholi cultural setting. In this case radical gender ideals are shunned in favour of incremental rights and changes which do not shake the foundation of social and community stability (see also Ochen, Kayiwa and Loum, 2017; Abola et al 2009). Studies in post-conflict northern Uganda also show that women may in some cases not resist prevailing social positioning (for example male leadership on economic, social cultural and even political issues) as they appear useful for social cohesion at individual relationship level. Yet when such relations are unpacked further it is apparent that women retain considerable influence on the social, economic and political aspects of life in their community. This discourse emerged clearly in meetings and focus groups conducted with women across northern Uganda in several studies over a six-year period. In this case therefore, the return of "authority power" to

the man is regarded as important for the established social norms and practices but does not in reality preclude women's participation or the elucidation of their interests and viewpoints.

My own view however, is that analysis of social change and progress should take cognisance of other situational factors in society. There must be a balance to be found between western gender norms and rights frameworks to the local situated realities within which these women find themselves or inhabit, and these realities should direct gender relation and actions. Perhaps there is no need to break families in the name of giving women greater financial and economic powers, when such can still be exercised within the current family relational frameworks. The important thing then is to focus on enhancing and increasing the influence of the women in the key decisions that are made in the household/family and how resources and finances are put to use, both those generated by her and others that are jointly generated.

In northern Uganda therefore, many NGOs and development organisations impose western-oriented idea premised on neo-liberal development ideologies which cannot be sustained or maintained by the social context that these people live in. For example my discussion with women in several social groups indicates that the need for family stability and other such issues may be much stronger in close knit communities than the need for financial independence or wealth accumulations by an individual family member. Yet such issues are rarely given consideration in development actions and economic planning. The eventual form of gender freedom will thus be negotiated, with the negotiations happening severally at various levels: individual; inter-male female relationship levels (couples); family level between families; and at inter-communal and inter-clan levels. Informal gathering such as family and clan meetings may set up expectations and standards that guide how individual family members relate to each other and other people outside the home, and many of these could be gender nuanced.

It should be noted however that enhancing women's roles in decision making may involve displacing male power structures and is bound to be resisted by certain elements in society. While this has been the case, motivation to participate should also come from the women in the community. There are cases where women require particular service or support but are not willing to cooperate for its establishment. While this may be the exception, it can scupper social development programs especially in cases where local politics and other ethnic lines of polarisation are strong enough to occasion some scissions in society. It is possible however (as shown by fieldwork in northern Uganda) that spaces and opportunity for cooperation remains stronger even when women belong to different political parties. In this case the central point of their cooperation is the rallying point (e.g. a VSLA or SHG) with political affiliations and belongingness regarded as a private matter which should not derail their wider cooperation objectives[1].

1 Focus group discussion, women Self-help groups, Northern Uganda

I note however that efforts at challenging institutions and existing power relations and patriarchal hegemony remain scanty and weak. It should be emphasised however that not all institutional structures are inherently against women and nor do they advance the views of men more than that of women, as new research have emerged showing that in any case male power structures nurtures and protects the interest of the female and children in several and very elaborate ways (Ochen, 2014; El Bushra, 2017).

Challenges to enhancing women's contribution to post-conflict peacebuilding and development

Analysis of several post-conflict situations (Uganda, DR Congo, and South Sudan) suggests however that many a time NGO programmes are abruptly ended at a time of great need. This is especially the case when it comes to supporting the civil society organisations to address emergent issues affecting women and children in the immediate, medium term and longer term aftermath of conflict. A case in point is northern Uganda which suffered an atrocious and brazen conflict for 20 years and when the peace agreements were signed by both government and the rebels, most of the development and humanitarian agencies ceased operation in the region, without due appraisal of the conflict trajectory, a thorough conflict analysis, and assessment of whether the remaining local organisations (including local governments) are prepared and equipped to take over the roles that the international agencies had been performing.

This failure to link process and outcome to sustainability of programme defeats the purpose of intervention as due attention needed to be given to the processes of adjustments and readjustments, the development and formalisation of social processes, socio-economic structures and the rejuvenation of local institutions. Moreover, analysis of the research evidence in several African countries (Rwanda, Burundi, DR Congo, South Sudan, Uganda), also suggests that few governments consider it prudent to fund and finance civil society organisations as the latter is held in fear by the state, and in extreme cases even accused of subversive actions. It should be noted that the reduction in the number of organisations working within northern Uganda also in a way constricted spaces for women empowerment and participation. This is because NGOs had played a key role in deepening and widening the spaces for women's involvement in post-conflict peacebuilding processes, with many women leaders and champions identified to lead and trained to lead processes of community engagements or contributions to the building of socio-economic infrastructure. In many post-conflict contexts as in northern Uganda, women have emerged conspicuously in standing up for their families, meeting needs of orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs) in their community and building a strong social capital base from which economic resources have been derived. In other cases, women have also played a key role in engaging communities and local governments as well as other actors to establish important facilities such as water points, community schools, and medical and recreational facilities (Ochen, Kayiwa and Loum, 2017). I note however that as most of these interventions were conceived and implemented within

a neoliberal framework, and are not particularly 'knee jolting' nor are they aimed at promoting critical consciousness among the target groups.

Moreover, few local organisations have in most cases developed robust and meticulous structures to avoid the pitfalls of intervention challenges, which have seen many NGOs foldout as quickly as they were formed. The capacity building of the civil society organisations should ideally therefore take the form of gradual mentorship which should include; infusion of technical skills together with inculcating a culture of leadership and commitment and drive that define women organisations that are dynamic, responsive, accountable and providing opportunity to grow and develop. This however does not appear to be what happens. Some peacebuilding programs and institutions do not integrate women's economic empowerment with the post-conflict interventions implemented (see UN 2015). This deprives society of the socio-economic outcomes of enhancing access to income for women and its potential for family-wide results/ outcomes. UN (2015) advances the need to involve women in post-conflict governance; restoration of social institutions for basic services; improving women's participation in decision making; participation of women in developing the programmes, designs, implementation, monitoring and evaluation; developing socio-economic infrastructure and psychosocial support.

Paternalistic presentation of conflict development perspective is rooted in neo-liberal development ideology where the focus is not so much on the communities and their capacity to sustainably address issues pertaining to war and conflict; but rather objectified aid delivery outcomes such as: the presentation of the quantities of relief items given or distributed; the presentations of kilometres of community access roads; kilogrammes of seeds distributed for farming to vulnerable communities; and the presentation of number of people provided with mosquito nets or particular products. The preoccupation also build on the nature of reporting requirements and the accountability for funds received which emphasise outputs and products at the expense of process, outcome and change which should be the main point of emphasis in a peacebuilding project or programme aimed at creating positive relationship at community level. It should be noted however that the key assumption and discourses of the global neoliberal approaches to peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction (which defies many interventions supported by traditional donors) does appears to be very much predicated on quick results and visible outcome to satisfy the curiosity of a donor preoccupations with a version of peacebuilding that does not epitomise the qualitative changes which are more often associated with psychosocial support interventions. I argue that where donors are preoccupied with specific outcomes and products, limited room will be given for NGO-driven community engagements, mobilisation processes, and actual time for preparation and project implementation.

Reporting process is thus not women and affected community-focused rather it is donor driven. It appears as if the interests of the donor agencies and organisations are more important than that of the communities whose life was to be transformed. This

scenario pulls the focus of the development from the project's target, and participants are used as mere pawns in a chess game whose protagonists do not care so much what happens to them rather only for the interest of the protagonist(donor) to be met and their constituency satisfied. Donor interests range from international relevance to political significance of the mother country in a particular developing country. This positioning also narrows the space with which women can engage the actors, engage society, and ends up constraining instead of deepening and widening the women's strategic and social agency to create change at individual and community levels. Within this neoliberal (peace) theory it should be queried how it is possible for the story of the young women burdened by conflict to be well told and relayed to capture her peacebuilding experience, or whether time will be given for the documentation, understanding and appreciation of this experience. As a result, limited space will also be available for activities and initiatives that build and promotes strategic agency.

I argue that donor interest on quick and quantifiable results puts implementing organisations under extreme pressure and thus make it more difficult to them to research, experiment with novel ideas and apply blended interventions which builds on the pace and strengths of the targeted communities (women inclusive). Within such an intervention framework, most of the planning is done for the women, with women representatives participating to confirm ideas already decided by implementation agencies, and their sub grantees implementing donor preferred peacebuilding model or activities. Recent scholarship postulates a more beneficiary/target group orientation than that of donor, at least in the presented theory of change and strategies of several organisations or donors (see UNDP 2015; Middling et al 2014). These are however still weak in addressing strategic community needs.

The shift away from donor orientation to victim/participant/ target group has helped to draw some attention to the unseen strength, resources and opportunities of the target group (in this case the women affected by conflict and their communities) as well as their inherent and very important roles in the rebuilding process. While this is a crucial development (shifting focus of programming to the target groups), they are starved of funding as few external donors are prepared to finance fairly open-ended programme or interventions whose major aim is social transformation, using methods and approaches that delay the documentation of development outcomes (often quantitative). Emphasis on local community organisations and structures such as self-help groups (SHGs) and village savings and loans associations (VSLSAs)who determine their own strategies present important opportunity for social development programmes to more emphatically address community needs/issues. In many communities therefore, women started taking centre roles in the process, with many recruited as change agents, or representatives of the development agency within the community (commensurate with new thinking).

Another issue is challenges arising from the nature of engagement. While women are brought on board to 'just make the numbers' in planning process, actual decisions are

in most cases taken elsewhere with participation only occasioned to rubber stamp and legitimise the idea that are already pre-determined elsewhere. Moreover, the fact that no formal DDR occurred (in the case of northern Uganda) at the conclusion of the conflict, and not as a result of a fully negotiated and signed peace agreement, this reduced the collective space within which the young women could meaningfully and more strategically be involved in the peacebuilding process and development. Opportunities for collectivist actions and participation as a group (interest group) also become thinner and much more remote in the peace process. Indeed the demobilisation process in the Northern parts of Uganda and its disjointed nature, with different organisations using varied and different approaches presented challenges in terms of the how women's interest groups could motivate women so affected to participate more effectively in the peacebuilding processes and the transition thereafter. There is also no evidence that issues agreed at the 2006 Juba peace process have informed subsequent post-conflict DDR programmes in Northern Uganda.

Another significant participation challenge is that most participation occurred within an "invited space" created and determined by and also controlled by the external development actors, who in many cases also had little understanding about local situated realities and community dynamics. Within such a space there is not much that young women can do and in most cases radical ideas deemed untoward or too revolutionary may not be entertained and in other cases, actively suppressed. In other words this development actor has the power to act as a censor on ideas that can be considered obnoxious or untenable. CSOs may also constrain the participation of its clients if it considers that particular resultant actions by the target group may affect their relationship with local or central government. Real participation thus rarely applies in such invited space as some good ideas and opportunities to influence the local environment, immediate environment and national development process gets thwarted.

Schirch (2012) further decries the limited amount of resources dedicated to women in post-conflict reconstruction. Schirch suggest that failure to provide adequate consideration of and support to women issues and interest in post-conflict situations reinforced earlier pre-war male dominance and advantage on aspects such as education, employment, with even bias on financial assistance to promote male interest and less resources are made available for issues such as trauma and healing from sexual violence earlier meted on the women. I note however that in the case of northern Uganda even men required psychosocial support and equally suffered for lack of care. Indeed experience from northern Uganda suggests that when the conflict ended in 2006 there was a sharp draw down of agencies doing psychosocial support (PSS), with reduced donor funding and concomitant interest of government programme going for physical infrastructure and such hardware interventions. Indeed, limited attention appears to have been given to the issue of personal recovery and healing which was needed to help fore most victims of rebel abduction, child, mothers and many other women who

experienced violence at the hands of both the LRA rebel and the government soldiers (see also Allen and Schomerus, 2006; Ochen, 2011; Ochen 2012; McKay et al, 2010).

How women confront social injustices in post-conflict society

Studies suggest that women suffer both private and public violence in conflict and post-conflict communities, which compounds their vulnerability and the multidimensionality of harm (Niaolain and McWilliams, 2013; Schirch, 2012). Analysis of the data emerging from northern Uganda suggest that similar challenges seem to be encountered by women individually, collectively and socially. Many of the incidents of violence however remains undocumented, un-reported and in some cases even unacknowledged by the legal framework and the civil society. Schirch (2012) suggest additionally that this violence could also be direct and structural, which occurs during and in the immediate aftermath of conflict; and in peace times. Moreover, as Niaolain and McWilliams (2013) show, women and men's security in post-conflict situation is not similar nor are they identical, with women's security risk and threat far more enhanced or heightened compared to that of men. Women remain vulnerable to sexual violence, physical violence and other such violations which affect their personal security as well as psychosocial and physical wellbeing. Reports from Northern Uganda suggest that many women have been attacked when they try to stand up for their rights for both personal protection, safeguarding their property and fight for the rights of their children. This has affected mainly widows and other female headed households, pitted against members of their own extended family and other community members. This surely confirms the widely held view within the literature that women face more significant obstacles to be secure and safe within the post-conflict and transitional environments; yet many times post-conflict dynamics and peacebuilding initiatives may not consider this as a special and unique security need which requires a more critical attention.

Recognising women roles in confronting injustice in their communities, and also organising change groups within the communities, Schirch (2012) contend that women are both victims of violence and also builders of peace. We should however recognise that women's experience of conflict is both individuated and collectivised, and varies from one context to another. In other words, no universal experience may be ascribed to them, even within African communities that appear similar historically, socially and politically. Moreover there are huge variances in women's capacity for peacebuilding, both contextually and individually. All these are issues which need to be borne in mind when analysing women's experiences of conflict.

Scholars such as Kumar (2012) and El Bushra & Sahl (2005) argues that it is imperative that gender roles during conflict are understood, as they change significantly and it is important that efforts at addressing conflicts aftermaths are not superficial aimed only

at alleviating misfortunes suffered by women, but aimed at structurally transforming society including the prevailing gender relations to achieve a more equitable situation (see Ochen et al 2010). Major challenge is that NGOs and government programming do not go deep enough to engage with the social and structural forces within society. I submit however that in some cases obstacles to women progress may be found not only among male counterparts but female leaders who themselves fear the accumulation of too much powers by fellow women or the appropriation of space they enjoy in their privileged positions. These may visualise further women emancipation, opening up spaces for women as threatening them and their continued stay at the top. I note however that more opportunities for structural changes within the socio-economic and political set up do occur in the aftermath of conflict. Question to ask then is whether these opportunities are taken or people look forward to returning to the old situation which may in fact not even hold particularly strongly within the new set up? These are issues to be revisited and discussed although as I note, while women desire and embrace gender changes in the post conflict roles and contributions, many still consider and upholds strategic gender roles disaggregation and the uniqueness of roles of traditional institutions, elders and men so as not to cause significant disruption to community wellbeing and social harmony. These are however contested viewpoints.

Objectification of women in conflict and post-conflict situation

An issue that is rarely discussed yet a challenge to the reintegration of women in peace time are the NGO objectification and subtle exploitation of women as intervention targets. Because donors and the global public are visualised as moved by the macabre and the horrific, only the negative aspects of the women's experiences are given during NGO resource mobilisation strategies and endeavours. In many cases therefore the positive aspects of the women and the success stories present among women is subjugated and deemphasised. Many NGOs thus feel happy presenting a morbid story line of the women experience of conflict or post-conflict and do not bring out the strong agential positivity that these women may as well exude. In other cases even sexism (a form of objectification) very much fuel violence against women. The objectification of women by development actors undermines their aspirations, and is an affront on their human rights and quest for social justice, yet many times the women beneficiary of service are so vulnerable that they cannot confront such violations. This pedantic and paternalistic approach to engendering peacebuilding to ostensibly redress social injustice ends up doing the exact opposite of what it is intended to do: objectify women and dehumanises them as mere pawns for resource mobilisation support to causes that the women so used to raise funds for may perhaps not even subscribe to or benefit from either individually or collectively. Perhaps a more

balanced approach is needed to enhance the relaying of the stories of these women and the presentation of their conflict and post-conflict realities? For this to happen it appears therefore that a rethink of post-conflict reintegration and development programming may need to be made and liberal peacebuilding approach and its assumptions revisited (see Richmond, 2009, 2010; Andersen, 2012; Permunta and Nkongho, 2014).

It is a contention among scholars of conflict that post-war reconstruction is to ensure war does not recur, and to address conditions that led to war in the first place, yet at times in post war reconstruction, women are not fully protected, with the protectors themselves becoming perpetrators of violence against women (Schirch, 2012; Schnabel and Tabyshalieva, 2012; El Bushra and Sahl, 2005). Feeling vulnerable and without help, women initiate coping actions which may put them in more detrimental situation and jeopardise both their security and physical wellbeing, but it should be noted that this is in most cased done to exercise some degree of agency in determination of livelihoods, survival or socio-economic progress. This is exemplified through forced prostitution, and in some cases exposure of the women to HIV. Northern Uganda HIV/AIDS figures far surpasses (almost double) that of the rest of the greater north, when north east and north west are considered. However even North-west and North East was not as that affected by the northern insurgency, as the north central. For Karamoja (in north east), it was mainly cattle rustling pitting communities against other invading rustlers. Some scholars have argued that sexual violence that was widespread and used as a weapon of war does play a big role in the spread of HIV/AIDs orchestrated by both government soldiers and rebels or dissident forces(see also Ochen et al 2010;O'Manique, 2005; Elbe, 2002; Fourie and Schonteich, 2001; Donovan, 2002; Card, 1996). Yet in many cases such areas do not even see adequate resources devoted to forestalling or mitigating the impact of HIV/AIDS and other diseases emerging due to the conflict; all of which significantly impinge on women agency to initiate and implement change in their communities.

Conclusions

Liberal peace theory seems to be at the centre of most peacebuilding and development interventions in conflict and post-conflict communities in Africa. While the neoliberal peacebuilding initiatives premised on liberal theory provide important benchmarks for supporting post-conflict reconstruction and the restoration of normalcy, it does not go far deep enough to enable an explication of particular important issues, especially those that challenge established power structures and social relations. Moreover, it has the dangers of being hijacked by development pirates who may not be happy seeing social progress across the whole community or society. Such pirates may be either men or women, local leaders, development actors or ordinary people within the community

who use their position or influence to hijack benefits of development programming. This is one of the drawbacks of representational participation in development activities, yet one may not be able to form a logistical point of view to bring all target groups on board. It does not thus effectively prepare the target groups, in this case women who have been severely affected by war and conflict, attain the confidence and capacity to engage effectively with the institutions of society and socio-economic and political processes around them.

The focus of most of the interventions as well as the preparation of the communities in post conflict situation has been on how they can access basic needs and not so much on how they can come out of the unwanted socio-political and economic conditions exacted on them, by the war its antecedents and apologists. As a result, critical consciousness is not built within the targeted individuals, and nothing other than mundane activities take place. Moreover liberal peace does not fully espouse, embrace or explain issues of critical consciousness and building social and strategic agency. I argue that this limitation and omission do not adequately prepare women to confront social issues and oppressive practices as well as challenging certain traditions and power structures in order to promote equity, service access and human rights protection. This perhaps also explains why few international NGOs if any handle issues that involve engagement within the conflict situation of northern Uganda, fearing state reprisals and perhaps suspension from operating. Perhaps this also explains why at some point in time women activism enters a dormant and quiet phase, as has been noted through scholarly research in northern Uganda. Women activism appears to be more rigorous during active emergency and in the early recovery phases, but tend to fizzle out as interventions moves towards more developmental and longer term issues. This is exemplified by fewer NGOs remaining on the ground, with more grassroots organisations attempting to take the vacated space. Perhaps these are the missing ingredients in the interventions which liberal theory formulations and its dynamics do not enable in the community or target groups, yet one would expect one of the main issues along which community capacity strengthened is the identification and redressing of injustices that emerge in the context of war and conflict; and what better way to do that than train and build critical consciousness in community members?

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Rural-Urban Disparities in Health and Health Care in Africa: Cultural Competence, Lay-beliefs in Narratives of Diabetes among the Rural Poor in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa

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Abstract

Rural-urban disparities in health and health care in Africa have been well described; yet, they remain relatively of less concern among many issues in health and health care in Africa. The disparities have been documented to exist in the utilization of cardiac diagnostic and therapeutic procedures, prescription of analgesia for pains, treatment of diabetes (e.g. gym exercise). Among the fundamental root causes of these disparities, which, can be gathered through studies of the health care systems (biomedical and African health systems) are variations in patients' health beliefs, values, preferences and behaviour. Informed by the need to address the seemingly wide rural-urban disparities in health and health care in Africa, this paper brings to the fore rural patients' recognition of symptoms, threshold for seeking care and the ability to understand disease management strategy, all of which are part of the variations in patients' health beliefs and values. The strategy adopted for foregrounding these disparities is through narratives of diabetes by patients in a rural context in South Africa. The chief aim is to contribute towards improving the quality of health care through incorporating patients' understanding of health. The narrative is subsumed under cultural competence and lay beliefs.
Key words: *healthcare, rural-urban disparities, cultural competence, lay beliefs, diabetes*

Résumé

Les disparités urbaines-rurales, de la santé et des soins de santé en Afrique ont été bien décrites ; pourtant, ils restent relativement moins préoccupant parmi les nombreuses questions de la santé et des soins de santé en Afrique. Les disparités ont été documentés pour exister dans l'utilisation de procédures diagnostiques et thérapeutiques, la prescription de l'analgésie pour les douleurs, traitement du diabète (p. ex., exercice de gymnastique). Parmi les causes profondes de ces disparités, qui, peut être recueillie grâce à des études sur les systèmes de soins de santé

(recherche biomédicale et les systèmes de santé africains) sont les variations de la santé des malades, croyances, valeurs, préférences et comportement. Informé par la nécessité d'aborder le vaste exode rural des disparités en matière de santé et de soins de santé en Afrique, ce document met en avant les patients ruraux' reconnaissance des symptômes, seuil pour demander des soins et la capacité de comprendre la stratégie de gestion de la maladie, qui font tous partie de la variation de la santé des malades, les croyances et les valeurs. La stratégie adoptée pour la mise en ces disparités est par récits de diabète par les patients dans un contexte rural en Afrique du Sud. L'objectif principal est de contribuer à l'amélioration de la qualité des soins de santé en intégrant les patients à mieux comprendre la santé. Le récit est subsumé sous la compétence culturelle les idées reçues.

***Mots clés** : soins de santé, disparités rurales-urbaines, la compétence culturelle, les croyances, le diabète*

Introduction

This paper is an outgrowth of a three-year study of the management of diabetes among the rural poor in the Eastern Cape province of South Africa. The study was conducted between 2011 and 2012 with a re-visit in 2016. It has one main objective: to show, through narratives, how poor women in the rural areas understand and deal with diabetes mellitus type 2 and the significance thereof in highlighting and addressing rural-urban disparities in health. Among the issues in health and heath care in sub-Sahara Africa, which has majority of its population living in the rural areas, rural-urban disparities seem to be less of a concern than it should be in many countries. Yet, the issue is well documented, with data showing that rural dwellers suffer disproportionately from chronic illnesses such as diabetes, arthritis and hypertension among other health conditions, and requiring determined attention. What gives rise to the disparities are multifactorial, nevertheless, the most significant factors seem to fall under socio-determinants of health such as the economic conditions of the rural poor, the literacy level or low levels of education of those in the rural areas and in some cases, environments harsh to rural living. For example, in many rural areas, the proximity of sources of water (streams and rivers, which are often polluted) to villages is quite a distance.

In terms of the quality of care experienced by those who have access to the bio-medical health care system, rural-urban disparities would seem obvious. In this regard, the disparities, as have been shown, exist in the use of cardiac diagnostics and therapeutic procedures, prescription of analgesia for pain control, treatment of pneumonia, arthritis and other chronic conditions. What is evident, in many studies that have explored health conditions and utilization of health care systems, is that rural dwellers tend to rely more on the African health systems than the bio-medical health system and are more likely to combine the two in the treatment of their ailments. The fact of this would seem to suggest variations in patients' health beliefs, values, preferences and behaviour.

Besides, many studies focusing on access to bio-medical health care have shown the extent to which this is greatly difficult in rural Africa than in urban Africa (Obuaku, 2014) resulting in significant reliance and utilization of the African health system. The point about access cautions against simply equating rural dwellers to African health systems in terms of utilization of health care, and urban dwellers with bio-medical health system, which seems prevalent in the literature. However, it does alerts us to significant rural-urban disparities in health care and draws attention to the long-known character of health policy and indeed economic development policy in Africa: urban bias, which is essentially the allocation of national resources disproportionately to the urban areas despite the rural areas containing the bulk of the population. It is long known, because, it has a long history, as a product of the desire of the newly independent African nations, to industrialize along the similar line of Western industrialization. Development economists have shown that most of the African countries' development plans, usually, five-year plans, excessively emphasize industrialization and tend to neglect rural development. This still persists and compounded by the changing urban landscape in Africa with increased urbanization, a product of population growth and migration from the rural areas and, as we see in some African countries, South Africa, for example, migration from countries with low-level wars.

Taking this point further, it is noteworthy to emphasize that contemporary statistics show that more than half the world populations live in urban areas (United Population Fund, 2007) 'including roughly 50,000 settlements of at least 50,000 people. It has been suggested that population growth in the future and beyond will be mainly in the urban areas especially in the 500 or more cities that have well over one million to ten million inhabitants and mainly in poorer countries. In sub-Sahara Africa, it is known that the bulk of the population lives in rural areas; however, as earlier pointed out, the proportion of the population living in the urban areas is rising and fast. With the growing population in the urban areas and the increase in the gap between the rich and the poor in most African countries, it is obvious that there would be risk to health especially where urban water supplies are polluted; as currently the case, badly planned areas have become more susceptible to crowding, experience the spread of infectious diseases, flooding and intermittent electricity. Despite this, it remains the case that urban health is relatively better than rural health. Those who focus on rural health in sub-Sahara Africa provide the general features, which only describe and explain it. One such studies, which has received world attention is a study of suspected malaria in the rural areas in Africa and Asia (Bangladesh, Ghana and Tanzania)(United Population Fund, 2007). This study randomized17,826 patients with suspected malaria in rural areas to rectal artesunate or placebo before referral to a healthy facility. The key point in the study is delayed treatment because of access to health facility in rural areas and the consequence thereof. This is a significant weakness of the health care system in Africa, generally: the failure to deliver effective treatment in time.

This failure evidently contributes to avoidable death. As the study shows, while mortality did not differ between groups, the composite of death and disability was significantly reduced in people who received aretesunate, in an analysis that was restricted to those with confirmed malaria. Crucially, the effect was largely limited in participants who were delayed for more than six hours before arriving at a health facility - the risk ratio was 0.4919 (95% confidence interval 0.32 to 0.77). Besides the clinical questions raised by the study, described as an "outstanding logistical feat", which "clearly highlighted that treatment of severe malaria in remote areas can reduce morbidity and mortality" (United Nation Population Fund, 2007) is the need for information on cultural beliefs about illnesses. This, with factors such as transport, distance, impressions of quality of care, will undoubtedly, contribute to highlighting the rural-urban disparities in health and health care in sub-Sahara Africa. It cannot be ruled out that those in the health sector, governments and policy makers are aware of this need especially because of documented variations in health which, include among others patient recognition of symptoms, thresholds for seeking care, the ability to communicate symptoms to health care professionals who would easily understand them, and the ability to understand prescribed management strategy of chronic illnesses and adherence to preventive measures and treatment regime. These factors are crucial in rural-urban health disparities. Understanding them would seem crucial in addressing the disparities. When the health system incorporates, at all levels, its understanding of health beliefs and behaviours, and, how these interact with disease prevalence and incidence, and treatment, then, surely, such a system becomes generally strengthened in terms of health care delivery to the wider population. This assumption underlies the current study, which focuses on the understanding and managing of diabetes among the rural poor. Of significance, as earlier noted, are cultural competence and lay beliefs.

Cultural competence and lay belief

To be sure, the idea of cultural competence, which arguably is integral in some bio-medical health care systems, remains conceptually, an idea that lacks consensus. The literature has been very wide ranging in its utilization: in some cases, it is articulated as cultural sensitivity; in some other cases, it is considered as cultural responsiveness or cultural effectiveness as in the work of many others (Betancourt et al, 2005). Nevertheless, cultural competence can be understood at two levels: at the level of the health care system, in particular, biomedical health care system. Included in this is the knowledge of the "other" - the understanding by the professional health care provider of the patient, in cultural context (Lavizzo-Mourey & Mackenzie, 1996). It can also be understood from the perspective of the patients; here one refers to lay beliefs and values in the understanding and management of diseases and illness. Regarding the former, a

health system can be considered culturally competent when such a system has a high level of awareness of the cultural context of the understanding and treatment (cultural knowledge) of a disease and illness, takes this into account at all levels of therapeutic care, including diagnosis, and, mindful of the dynamics resulting from differences in culture. Whereas, at the level of those receiving care, it refers to their values, the belief held by them, their understanding of disease and illness. This conception of cultural competence is put forward, only, when there is evidence of a certain level of integration and interaction of health beliefs and behaviour in the management of illness and treatment of disease.

This conceptualization of cultural competence enables a better understanding of practices such as lay diagnosis and treatment of illness and disease in the rural arrears. To some extent, there is similarity in this conception and the cultural competence in the well-researched health disparities along racial/ethnic lines. Researchers have shown that cultural competence has the goal of developing a culturally competent workforce and healthcare system for delivering the best quality care possible to patients' irrespective of their race, ethnicity, culture or language ability. The assumption, rightly so, is that there are gaps in healthcare among racial and/or ethnic minorities. Research has shown, also, that the gaps are a factor of a complex web of endemic problems such as poverty, racism and prejudice. Culture complicates this complex problem of healthcare disparities. In general, making cultural competence an integral part of healthcare is thus critical in that it promises the means for reducing the rate at which health disparities occur. It could also increase the likelihood of more positive healthcare delivery outcomes for all patients. This applies not only to racial/ethnic health disparities, which seem to get far more attention of scholars and researchers in the social and political sciences, but also to rural-urban disparities in healthcare. The rural-urban disparities in Africa have a different root: urban bias of national government developing plans, which was earlier highlighted

The study: Diabetes and its management

There is the consensus that diabetes is on the increase in many parts of the world. Researchers in South Africa agree that this is also the case in the country. As early as 2001, it was noted that the number of people with diabetes would increase from 135 million to 300 million by 2025 (Norris et al, 2001). Yet, it received less than the appropriate concern, especially in countries such as South Africa, largely as a result of the dominance of HIV/AIDS disease in public health discourse. HIV/AIDS disease also accounts for a sizeable chunk of the health care costs,[1] which does have a significant bearing on the care costs for other chronic diseases. However, with the concerted effort

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of health researchers and activists, there is a growing focus on diabetes and other chronic diseases such as hypertension and arthritis in South Africa. The rural areas remain less served with this new focus. Indeed, current evidence suggests that rural dwellers are less likely to receive appropriate and timely treatment for diabetes. This, as earlier noted, is a function of general systemic problems rooted in the socio-economic realities of the rural dwellers, who are less likely to have access to health care resources and high-quality care and medical insurance coverage.

Type 2 diabetes mellitus is the more common of the two types in South Africa, as in many other parts of the world. It is a chronic condition, which requires constant management if blood glucose levels are to remain stable and good health is to be achieved and maintained. Some people find diabetes a very difficult condition to manage despite a reasonable knowledge of it. This would suggest that knowledge of diabetes in itself is insufficient to explain why some people achieve satisfactory metabolic control, more readily than others. It has been hypothesised that psychological variables such as perceived locus of control (optimistic belief, for example) might have an important impact upon the quality of diabetes management and control. What would seem evident from study of which the current paper is an outgrowth is the importance of illness perception or what is known in the literature as illness representations (Oloyede, 2012). This refers to the beliefs or cognitive models that individuals construct about an illness, and hence is a means to understanding and making sense of the illness experience. The beliefs about an illness are considered to be important for determining an individual's response to an illness. Psychological models such as Leventhal's self-regulation model (Leventhal, Meyer, and Nerenz, 1980; Leventhal, Nerenz, and Steele, 1984) posit that people's cognitive representations of illness play an important role in influencing their strategies for coping with an illness and associated emotional responses.

According to the model, illness representations are directly related to coping and through coping to outcome. Coping is therefore seen as a mediating factor between the two. This has prompted further investigation to identify whether illness representations have a direct bearing on outcome and the extent to which these beliefs have predictive value in determining outcome. The results from such studies suggests a pattern of relationships that demonstrate that the components in the illness representation model (identity, label attributed to the illness and the associated symptoms; time-line, expected duration and course of the illness; consequences, short- and long-effects of the illness and its physical, social, economic and emotional effects; cause, factors considered to have led to the development and onset of the illness and cure/controllability, what the individuals believe that they or the medical professionals can do to control the illness or bring about recovery) are more strongly related to and better predictors of outcome than coping strategies (Orbell et al, 1998; Heijmans, 1998; Scharloo, 1998).

A result of the main study (Oloyede, 2012) shows that how the diabetes sufferers perceived their illness influenced their management of it. Although not always formally

considered in treatment, illness-related cognitions may manifest in varying degrees of illness-related disability, emotional distress and treatment adherence among patients, irrespective of their illness (Hagger and Orbell, 2000). This present study tries to elucidate this. There is a reductionist representation of rural dwellers and these have arguably done little to encourage their actual experiences with challenges of diabetes. In this study, a different approach is taken drawing on individual experience to highlight challenges for rural dwellers with diabetes and how they cope with it. The coping literature suggests two main types of coping strategies: emotion-focused and problem-focused. The former describes processes, primarily cognitive that are directed art lessening emotional distress, which can include the use of avoidance, minimization, distancing, selective attention, positive comparisons, and wresting positive values from negative events, The second of the two types, problem-focused strategies refer to the attempts at defining the problem, generating alternative solutions, weighing the alternatives in terms of the costs and benefits, choosing among them, and, acting.

Both types have been studied using a variety of research methods. However, in other to gain a perspective on the experience of rural dwellers with diabetes, the narrative approach is adopted. Williams (1984) argued that the chronically ill person engages in a 'narrative reconstruction' in trying to establish a functional purpose in relation to his/her body, the illness, society and his/her self. Burry (1991) suggested that chronic illness unfolds in such a way that the trajectory is uncertain and thus the situation is constantly changing, which means that individuals engage in negotiating the meaning of their situation. This would imply in the case of diabetes that the experience of attributing a meaning to the condition by rural dwellers and the way of life in the context of the illness in the rural areas in which they live would be fluid. Diabetes sufferers would be fully engaged in this fluidity both in terms of a person and member of society accordingly. The present study set out to explore how far the narrative approach could elicit data concerning the everyday experience of living with diabetes and how it is managed. The rationale for the utilisation of this approach is set out immediately below.

Method

For this study, the qualitative anthropological method of inquiry was considered useful especially because the questions surrounding the understanding and treatment/management of an illness or disease involves active listening for meaning in tone, word choice, body language, or spatial and temporal clues. In the wider literature, taking the patients' views into account, is considered important in developing services. This is similar to the issue at hand in this study. There has been a range of methods in identifying patients' views. For example, questionnaires have been used to determine patients' views especially in assessing their preferences. Surveys and consensus methods

such as Delphi and nominal group techniques are used to ask individuals to rate, rank or vote for different types of care or attributes of care. However, this study adopts the narrative approach which is a well-established qualitative method of research. Its advantage becomes clear when contrasted with the quantitative methods and its attempt to quantify components of experience, which does not capture the expressive quality of being ill, the complex and pervasive world of illness (Radley, 1993). Qualitative methods are better able to capture such complexities; however, some approaches still fragment the worlds of those who are studied by abstracting pieces of discourse from their social and temporal context (Murray, 1999). A narrative approach with its emphasis on preserving the contexts in which stories are told, allows the understanding of both the conditions of diabetes and the ordinary day-to-day experiences of coping with the disease by rural dwellers and commonplace interactions, reflected through their experience of diabetes.

By narratives is meant stories narrated by people about themselves or their lives. Such stories, which are usually about life events, are narrated in a manner that gives meaning to the life events through linking them to other life events, and by providing , according to Hyden (1997), temporal ordering of these events. Clandinin and Connelly (2000) suggest that narratives display the context for human activity – temporal, spatial, interpersonal and societal – because they are situated within a broader sociocultural context. Precisely because of this, narratives reveal structures and processes (including those relevant to race and class), not just personal realities (Murray, 1999). Bell (1999) notes that through the stories that people narrate, they construct identities, revise them and try out alternative configurations of self.

Over the years, health and illness researchers have built up a substantial body of knowledge in understanding illness experience using the narrative approach (see for example, Bell, 1999; Ezzy, 2000; Frank, 1995; Good, 1994; Murray and McMillan, 1988; Williams, 1988). Through narratives of ill people, it is known how illness becomes integrated into people's lives and the various socio-cultural factors that impinge upon the process. However, it is through the structure for the analysis of the narratives that one is able to get a clearer picture. Efforts have been made in this direction by a number of theorists. Nussbaum, 1986, Barnard, 1995 Frank, 1995 and Davies, 1997, for example, identified narrative' types'. Frank (1995) described three 'types' of narratives: a restitution narrative, wherein the teller minimizes the experience of illness and sees it as a temporary interruption that will be overcome; the chaos narrative, where the ill person loses any sense of order, meaning or purpose and is unable to articulate a coherent path for dealing with illness experience and thirdly, the quest narrative. This type of narrative is when illness becomes a challenge to be met. Quest narratives typically involves the narrator seeing himself/herself on a journey in which heroic acts will be necessary and where good can overcome evil.

In dealing with HIV-infected men, Ezzy (2000) factored in the temporal dimension, highlighting how key time is in people's framing of their lives. He suggested the following 'types' of narratives: *restitutive linear narrativism, which reflects* the assumption that the future can be controlled through people's actions. *Chaotic linear narratives*, Ezzy's second type, anticipate a life that cannot be brought under control, and will result in despair and depression. The third type is the *polyphonic narratives*. This type places emphasis in the present, with the future portrayed as uncertain and ultimately unmanageable. Spiritual experiences are included in the narratives and they tell about increased insights and deepened self-understanding. In the study reported here, the women were given the 'platform' to tell their stories of diabetes type 2. These stories are presented and then analysed.

Participants

The women in the study were part of a bigger focus-group study mentioned earlier. Participants for the bigger study were recruited over a 7 months period from hospitals and health service centres in the district municipalities of Nkokobe and Amahlathi. Both have a population of 143,167 and 137,618 respectively. There were 40 participants in the bigger study: thirty women and ten men. The average age of the participants was 44 years. The participants were considered eligible for the study if they were diagnosed as diabetic at least twelve months before the study. The average period since being diagnosed with Type 2 diabetes was 7 years. This paper limits its focus to three of the twenty women recruited for the larger study. It was evident in the focus-group study that the management of diabetes Type 2 by the rural women in the study was different from the men, hence this present study to explore this experience further.

Data collection procedures

The three women for this study were selected from three of the five focus groups in the bigger study. These were the women who were more outspoken in the focus groups. The most outspoken woman in each focus group was approached and asked if willing to spend an extra hour per week for a four-week in-depth, open-ended interviews. Three of the five women approached took part in the narrative reconstruction of their diabetes. These were those who availed themselves for the interviews. The interviews were conducted once weekly to allow for a review of the contents and identify questions that might reveal further information. Upon acceptance, a meeting was held with the four women during, which it was explained to them that there were no differences with the focus group study as such except that each one of them would have to be interviewed individually. The interview would be researcher-driven but they would be given room

to speak freely, just as in the focus-group study, on any issue relating to their experience of diabetes.

The interviews started in the fourth week of the focus-group study. The first set of interviews was mainly the description and discussion of the women's type 2 diabetes experience. They were asked to detail their experiences of being diagnosed diabetic, the relationship with health professionals, how they manage their diabetes, their family, spouses and family members' involvement with their management of their condition. Further questions were asked in subsequent meetings about the women's life before their diagnosis including what they do to sustain themselves in their rural setting. The last meeting focused on the women reflecting on life before and after diagnosis. The interviews were audio-taped and transcribed verbatim before being translated from Xhosa, the language of the participating women, to English. During the interviews, field notes of what was observed were kept which were used in the interpretation of the interview data.

Data analysis and reporting

The transcribed and interpreted data were read carefully to tease out core aspects, especially those that were connected to the socio-cultural context of the women participants. There was focus on health belief, coping style and social support. The identification of socio-cultural factors that moderate the effects of chronic illness is important for those who wish to understand the mechanisms of coping with it. For example, social support, which is broadly defined by Cohen and Syme (1985:4) as "the resources provided by other persons" has been shown to moderate the adverse effects of chronic illnesses and stress (Cairney et al., 2003). In actual sense, social support may take many forms such as received support (actual support) or perceived support (potential support), but conceptually two types have been distinguished. These are functional and structural support. The structural type of support refers to the quantitative aspects of support such as network size. Functional support refers to the qualitative aspects of interpersonal relationships, that is, the degree to which one believes help is available.

Results

The results of the study are presented through three descriptive narratives. Part of the ethical guidelines for conducting the study requires that the names of the study participants are not revealed. This was contained in the confidentiality agreement with the women. What this therefore means in the presentation of the narratives is that names will be altered. The ages are left, so also is the setting of the study.

Pinkie

Background

Pinkie is in her mid-50s and seasonally employed in an agricultural setting. She has been in this form of employment for almost 15 years; her earlier jobs were in a white-owned retail store as a shop cleaner and after 5 years as a shop assistant with stacking responsibilities. She was married briefly in her early twenties until she became separated from her husband in her late twenties when her husband left her for "other women" in Johannesburg. She has two children from the marriage and another from a male lover; all three are aged 32, 29 and 22 years. She grew up in a family of 7, three females and two males. Her mother worked as a domestic worker in a "rich white home"; her father was in the mines and came home once in a year which was not regular after sometime. All the children in the family had at least four years of primary school education with the support of their mother but were mostly self-sponsored after that. In her case, she stopped after 5 years of schooling when her mother became diagnosed with arthritis, which she later died of many years after. Within the family, she was the most economically active entering into paid part-time employment as a bagger for a grocery store in her teens before securing full time employment as a cleaner in a retail store. She looks after four of her grandchildren in a low-cost house; their parents are in East London, Port Elizabeth and Umtata and are all co-habiting.

Illness story

Pinkie was diagnosed, as diabetic at the age of 43 but before that has been experiencing what she never knew was diabetes type 2. This was almost 4 years before she was clinically diagnosed. She was hypoglaecemic most of the time and never paid attention to it. "I just was always tired and hungry. I didn't know why I keep becoming hungry because I ate *Pap* almost all the time. In the beginning, I thought I wasn't eating enough. I increased my intake and I must say it helped. I still do because it is now like medicine to me. One day … after I think a year or so of this *tiring problem*, I collapsed as I was coming back from town. I was lucky to have people around who rallied round and took me to the chemist…. You see, we use the small chemist for any type of ailment. …So, it was normal to take me there first. Hospital is far away and we have to take transport which is not easily available especially at the time I collapsed". After this experience, Pinkie became much more concerned with her condition. "I started to think about collapsing whenever I have to walk the distance to where I was working. Though nothing happened for some time but I think about it all the time. I made sure I ate. …. But it is not just the hunger thing

alone but my eyes were becoming weaker. I find that sometimes objects are not clear. At the same time I was having headache but it is the tiredness that was the most worrying." This constant worry precipitated anxiety, which manifested in regular passing of fluid – urination and sweating. "I then became sweaty and have to use the toilets every time." It was this experience that led to the first visit to the clinic. There, she was advised to see the Doctor, which she did on a second visit. "The Doctor told me to go for a blood test. I went and then went back for the result but the nurse that I saw said that I should come back because the Doctor was away on an emergency. …. When I eventually saw the Doctor, he told me that I seem to be diabetic and said I needed to do sugar test…. I was asked to go and weigh myself….Oooooo [exclamation]… I must have weighed heavy because I really was heavy. After this, I was then told that I needed to be taking some tablets everyday because I have too much sugar and that my weight was too much. They also said that I needed to do some exercise and eat certain food. … Hmmm. The food issue …. I can not understand because it was small quantity and I said to myself ….. In fact I asked the nurse, how can I eat so little when I feel hungry all the time. Don't you eat not to feel hungry? Don't you eat enough to have strength? I never quite understood the diet regime. …. I must say I have not taken to their advice on food intake".

In the years following the diagnosis, Pinkie has had to be slow down in her regular everyday task. She did not because of any particularly serious diabetic-related health problem but that she felt she needed to because she believed she was too active. "I just took it easy but as you know, you do not get yourself off activities in the rural areas. There is always what demands your physical energy and I did this but not much of it because I was too scared of collapsing… You see, I became a bit scared because of the children… Who do I leave them to? They needed me at that time because they were still struggling to get themselves together and I felt that I have to be there for them. They had no father as far as I was concerned. In a way, I was scarred of the future and have to place myself in the hands of God. I must say that it was not as I thought it to be. When I was told it is diabetic but can be controlled, I never for once completely believe because Doctors say that all the time and those they say that to suddenly die. Hmmm. …. Doctors. They are clever. Aren't they? They tell you nicely that things are under control but you discover that it is just to make you feel fine".

Pinkie has never had to take the drugs she was prescribed because "it is too much to put *poison* in your body". The fact that Pinkie has not been taken the relevant oral medication as prescribed, does not necessarily mean the end of life but the potential is there if the self-management of her condition does not include other component critical to the management of diabetes and the prevention of complications. Medical literature suggests that diabetes is the leading cause of blindness, kidney failure and foot amputation. The fact that Pinkie seems not to adhere to medication, which she viewed as "poison", reflects, to a degree, a major culturally related belief because she added "I have heard that this type of medicine, the ones you just take everyday, damage the [kidney]

and it is not lie if I have to go the traditional medicine route which has curative power. I have not done that but I am saying in our culture, it is believed that traditional medicine cures and it does. …. It does." Pinkie's management of her diabetic condition has, also, a strong spiritual dimension, which tends to provide her the hope, which she expressed in her story. "I have become convinced that that I shall overcome it although it is a long time now since I have taken prescribed drugs. I know people who are ill for a long time and they become well. I have this very strong thing inside me that this tired illness will stop. …. It has not been as serious as when I fainted but maybe because I now eat strong food [carbohydrate rich meal]. My children have been helpful too because they advised me not to eat too much salt. I believe strongly that it is what I have in me that says I'll overcome it that is more the reason for my hope. … Yes, I know they say it is long-lasting but body ailment can be cured unless it is time for one to go to one's maker."

Pinkie's story-telling style

Pinkie spoke about her diabetic condition freely. She never deflected the focus away from her experiences. She did not tell it in an abstract sense; she put it the way she understood it. She adopted a 'story-teller-approach', in order words, she had an air of confidence; the story was hers. She exuded knowledge of her experience but not necessarily an understanding of diabetes that is consistent with conventional understanding.

Lindiwe

Background

Lindiwe is a 54-year-old grandmother, born in the same village where she still lives. Her husband died a year before the present narrative of her diabetes mellitus type 2. She was brought up together with her six siblings by religious parents who were strict disciplinarians. She grew up being obedient and learned to be obedient to her husband whom, throughout their marriage, she never questioned. She married to a local boy when she was eighteen in a traditional Xhosa wedding. She did not go beyond primary school but considered herself to have education. She could speak English very well because she used to work as a 'helper' in the church and in the house of the English parish priest. Her first job was as a 'helper'. She was paid little but found the job delightful because she was exposed to English literature like the writings of the Bronte sisters and Shakespear's *Merchant of Venice*, *Macbeth* and *Romeo and Juliet* a story that cropped up in her dreams many times before she got married. She was proud to be married to her husband who was a chorister in the same church.

She could not go beyond primary school because her parents could not afford to have more than two of them in high school at the time. She could have got a sponsorship from the church to go to a teachers college but the parish ran out of funds and her set had to wait for their turn for sponsorship, which never materialised. This did not deter her from immersing herself in books. She continued to 'help' in the church many years after her marriage before she got a job as a 'bookkeeper' taking care of the "daily earnings" in a local white-owned hardware store. She did that for many years contributing to educating their children; two of the children went to university and two others went to a technikon. She is proud of the children and points to her own religious and disciplined home as the source of their success. She eventually stopped working in the hardware store when it was sold to a Xhosa businessman within the municipality but from a bigger rural town. The man had she been in the township of the rural town. She got a job 'helping' in one of the local primary schools three days a week.

Lindiwe's illness story

Lindiwe became diagnosed as a type 2 diabetic when she was 45. She was of the opinion that she had been diabetic at least three years before the diagnosis because she was well aware of the disease. She thought she did not pay attention to it at the initial stage of her suspicion because then she had arthritis which preoccupied her most of the time. She knew of two friends who were diagnosed as diabetic and "this was the source of her knowledge of diabetes. When I was diagnosed by the doctor, it was not a surprise to me. But before then, I mentioned it to my husband and in fact to my siblings on one occasion when they all came home for Christmas. It was not taken serious as such. I think it was because none of them understood what it was. Not that they have never heard of diabetes but not in the sense of having an enlightened discussion about it." Lindiwe concentrated on dealing with her arthritis, which became so serious at one stage that she was detained in hospital for two days. It was during this period that she was diagnosed as diabetic. This followed the "tests, which I did in hospital. … Apparently, the tests revealed what made the doctors to have me do all the tests that diabetic people do. After this, I found myself being told that I am diabetic and have to be on medication. Well, I did but this has not been regular… I suppose it has to do with not having time to go and get the drugs and also because they are not usually available. I take it occasionally though. But I must say that I pray a lot and this has helped over the years. ….. I can as well say it is because I pray that I do not think of medication, as I should. …. No, no, no, prayer is not a substitute for medication. I am not saying that but that it has given me strength and probably as a result, I think less of regularly taking the prescribed drugs".

After the diagnosis, Lindiwe took time to know more about diabetes because "I like to know about things that I do not know or know vaguely. I think it has to do with the person that I am. As I told you earlier, I always like to read and this must have been why I am this curious person. ….. I spoke to quite a few church friends who were nurses. It was from them I got to know more about diabetes. One thing that I did was to talk to the people I knew were diabetic especially the type [type 2 mellitus] that I have, which comes with old age. This was good because I understood from their experience what I should do but I was not so sure whether they did the right thing because they always ate all those things I was told to avoid". Lindiwe's husband was supportive because he "always was ready to listen whenever I talk about it but after a while, I think he became tired of listening [laughter]. I expected that." The fact that she had nurses that educated her about diabetes and a husband that listened and spoke to those with the disease obviously helped her in her management of the disease as spelt out in the literature. Though, it was not completely a textbook management of the condition. However, Lindiwe had a reasonable knowledge of diabetes, she did not visit the health centre to monitor herself. "It was too much a bother. You have to go some distance to see a doctor who sometimes might not be there. Besides, I do not experience anything serious but tiredness. I feel exceedingly tired sometimes and when I do, I know it is the diabetes and that I am doing something wrong. I have to tell you the first thing that comes to my mind is food. I have heard from those who are diabetic that you need to eat well…. Most of them that I know ate *pap* regularly, at least twice a day [laughter]. Well, most people here in the rural area eat *pap* everyday. It is just the quantity that makes a difference. I eat a lot of *pap* to keep going and avoid tiredness".

Lindiwe thinks that despite her reading of diabetes, her understanding of it and what to do comes more from her experience of it and experience of the disease by others who have it. She thinks the idea of daily drugs hardly is questionable. "I know this is medicine but how can you be taking drugs everyday for life? It is clear that this is not an illness that will kill you when you do not take the prescribed daily drugs. No, it won't! So, why should one take such medication? Why not pray everyday and have strong hope? Yes, you can take the drugs if you have it but not everyday." Apparent in her story is the acknowledgement of support in her management of her condition. "In my case, I can say that I received lots of support from my husband before he died. I receive support from family, relatives and friends. They know that I am diabetic because I never stop talking about it to people and because I told them how I once collapsed and how I always feel tired and hungry, they never wanted to see me do ant hard work. I think this has helped a lot. ….. Because people are always there when you need them or even when you do not need them. My children always say to me to go for a check-up, that they ill pay but going to east London or Port Elizabeth is just too much for me because that is where you get good specialists."

Lindiwe's story- telling style

Lindiwe spoke in a matter-of-fact educated manner and was seemingly knowledgeable in her description of her experiences. She was evocative about her background and spiritual belief.

Zoleka

Background

Zoleka is a woman of 60 who does not have formal education beyond primary school. She has four boys and a girl aged between 20 and 42 years. Three of them are in Queenstown, one in Umtata and the girl in Cape Town. She does not have any job and relies on state benefit and what she gets from her children two of whom have three of their children with her. She lives in a four room hut which she never stops decorating because she built it herself as "many other women" in her village. She likes to walk around the village because very many of the young ones are coming home with HIV/ AIDS and they needed support of "we the old ones". She has two sisters and a brother. They are all in the sixties and live in the same village.

Zoleka's illness story

Zoleka has been diabetic for well over 13 years. She is the second in the family to be diagnosed as diabetic. She also suffers from hypertension and has arthritis. She suffers intense pain in her joints regularly and seeks help from the local herbalists for her diabetes, hypertension and arthritis. The severity of her condition comes out clearly in her illness story. "I have experienced fainting four times this year alone. I do not know whether this going to stop but since the fainting began almost three years ago, what I do is to make sure that I am always around people or have people around me. I know that I give support to others especially the young ones but I also get support. It is the support that has kept me going because the pain on my knees is intense sometimes. It is the tiring disease that has concerned me most for sometime because I was told it is the cause of the fainting. When I experience hunger, it comes to my mind that I have to eat and I must say that has become my solution. I make sure of food especially starch. People say starch is good and I can tell you it is but I remember when I first went to the doctor and I was told I am diabetic, one of the things he told me which the nurse in the clinic also repeated was not to eat starch. .. I mean that he said I should eat little food and little starch. But this has not helped. I stuck to eating starch and my family makes

sure that I do get it regularly even when I can't cook because of tiredness".

There is ambivalence about prescribed drugs in her account. She accepts that doctors "know what they are doing and are very helpful curing people but sometimes the medicine they give is not strong to cure the person. Look at HIV/AIDS. …. No cure; people die. Look at me; I have this tiring illness they say will never be cured but can be looked after. Does that mean that doctors don't have the medicine for it? You see, the local herbalist has medicine for these ailments and it works. …. Well, it is true that I still continue to faint. If I eat at the right time and eat enough, there is no reason why I should faint. .. … I am sixty now and have all these illnesses one of which probably will kill me but I have not given up yet. I still think the fainting illness will be taken care of. It is just that I have pains and high blood [high blood pressure/hypertension]".

Zoleka's story telling style

There was a tinge of fatalism in Zoleka's narrative reconstruction. She also revealed fear and anxiety both of which were as a result of the intensity of her arthritis pain. The fact that she was diabetic and hypertensive did not help. She did not have the energy to narrate her illness and seemed downcast in the interview. She was however hopeful and beamed with vigour when she spoke about the support she gives to the young with HIV/AIDS in the village and the support she gets also for her condition. The fact of this reveals the critical role of social capital in illness management. It seems to be the critical capital in her life because it was when she mentioned it that she seemed "alive"

Discussion

The approach taken in the study being reported here was an in-depth focus but this does not allow for broad generalisation about the experiences of women, in the rural areas, diagnosed with diabetes mellitus type 2. This does not preclude the fact that it yields a deeper understanding of the experiences of these women in the management of the disease. Indeed, the main reason for focusing on individual narratives was to demonstrate the ways in which rural women uniquely negotiate their illness experiences in relation to cultural expectations. The narratives provided by the women do not easily map onto theories of narrative types, which was outlined earlier, in a straightforward manner. Frank's (1995) 'quest narrative' does not fully apply to the narratives. Their narratives were restitutive and were not on quest. Ezzy's polyphonic narrative, with its focus on present experience and spiritual insight, to some extent can give an understanding of all the narratives. Lindiwe did embrace spiritual values and ideas that seem to be consistent with polyphonic narrative, but she did not reflect on her experience of diabetes as such, that is from the perspective of Ezzy's polyphonic narrative. There was hardly any

evidence in her narrative of what has been termed illness epiphanies. The same applied to Zoleka and to a considerable extent, Pinkie. What would seem to be consistent in the narratives is the linear restitutive narrative.

The attempt to fit the narratives of these women into theoretical typologies seemed to be somehow problematic for the simple reason that individual experiences refuse to be ordered in predictable ways. Although, typologies are useful, especially in analytical sense, but they seem to simplify and indeed distort. This raises the methodological question of whether in interpreting narratives of the 'cultural other', so to say, distortions occur. This of course is by now a common methodological question in anthropology.

What is clear from the narratives is that the women did not cultivate the habit of attending health service centres for check-ups and hardly took the prescribed medication. After diagnosis, they did get information from the doctors but it was not what they felt they needed to make appropriate decisions to deal with their 'tiredness' and the feeling of hunger. They all had a positive perspective on food intake even though the type of food they consumed has a high calorie intake, which is not consistent with the medical literature on the management of diabetes. The fact that they use food to control their tiredness and hunger demonstrates a cognitive understanding of their diabetic condition. They spoke articulately about the role of food, describing in great details how this has helped during the interviews.

What was also common in the narrative is the little emphasis they all placed on prescribed drugs for their diabetes, which they considered to be toxic [poison]. This can only be understood as evidence of cultural related beliefs because there was reference to the efficacy of the medicine from their local herbalist. Of further interest is social support, which seemed to be an important resource to the women in the way they coped with their diabetes. Social support, in the rural setting as the narratives revealed, involved meaningful interactions between those who suffer from illnesses and those who are around them to provide help in any form that contributes to the sufferer's physical and psychological health. The latter was more the case in the present narratives, which revealed feeling of connectedness as central. In Zoleka's story, one detects reciprocity of support; she gave support for the young with HIV/AIDS and received support from others, in particular, significant others, and, this seemed to have a bearing on her psychological health. Although she was ambivalent about her illnesses – diabetes, hypertension and arthritis – she seemed hopeful that she would overcome them as the other two participants also felt. This sense of hope and transcendence are spiritual resources that the women deployed as part of their coping strategies. As Fryback and Reinert (1999), Landis, (1996) and Relf, (1997) have noted, spirituality is an intrinsic source that has a basis in religion and existentialism. It is described as a sense of hope and self-transcendence, which in turn provides purpose to life. There are researchers who view spirituality as providing a sense of purpose from which feelings of hope and self-transcendence emerge (for example, O'Neill and Kenny, 1998).

When one applies the idea of illness representation to probe the narratives, what would seem revealed, is that the women's cognitive representation of illness plays an important role in influencing their strategies of coping. This is consistent with the findings of the bigger study of which this is a part, and, other findings that apply the illness representation model. In terms of the structure of these representations, there were three cognitive dimensions and not all the five components suggested by Leventhal et al (1980; 1984). The three cognitive components are identity (they attributed tiredness and hunger to diabetes), consequences (in the sense of their tiredness and fainting) and cure/controllability (their belief that if they ate *pap,* then, they could prevent tiredness and fainting)

Conclusion

The aim of the present study was to show through narratives how poor women in the rural areas cope with diabetes mellitus type 2 as a factor of their cultural competence and lay understanding of the illness. This knowledge is crucial in addressing rural-health disparities in Africa. The disease is a leading cause of blindness, kidney failure and foot amputation. The narratives show that the women held a view of their condition, which hardly can be seen as a chronic view. In other words, in their understanding, diabetes was considered curable. It was however considered to have serious consequences for their lives. They saw it as the source of their fainting, but they seem to see its management as based on consumption of high calorie food. The fact that they perceived regular food intake as critical to their management of their diabetic condition reveals an understanding of that condition; an understanding that derives from experience but not from illness education from health professionals and which is not at all consistent with conventional understanding of diabetes and its management.

What is discernible in the narratives are stories of how and when they had become diabetic and how they have been coping with it. It is evident that they were not just describing a clinical case but talking about their lives. These narrative reconstructions, as Williams (1984) called them, were driven by the women's profoundly performative needs. The women constructed their accounts in such a way that they could make of diabetes in their own way in relation to their lives, as a whole. It included their history, culture and, indeed, the social structure, which has come to be, in them. They placed their knowledge in some wider context for biomedical knowledge, which suggests that the meaning they brought to the understanding of their diabetic is one that can hardly be ignored by health care officials located in urban centres. So, what can be drawn from this study regarding rural-urban disparities?

It is evident that in most African countries, resources are hardly allocated equitably. Socio-economic data reveal, to a degree, a more healthy, vibrant and prosperous urban

Africa than economically impoverished, largely unhealthy rural Africa, with less access to health or social assets. The uneven distribution of health prosperity, poverty and disease burden characterize the rural-urban divide in Africa. In addition, the current profile of health status in African countries reveals variable manifestations of rural-urban health and wellness disparities. With reported changing ecology, the rural population is subjected to increased level of vulnerability and unanticipated exposure to deadly diseases which are likely to exacerbate existing health disparities.

The literature on health and illness reveal, quite clearly, the contribution of research in the social sciences, and indeed, biological sciences, to the debate on the associations between disease and the multiple interactions among economic and environmental factors. Significantly, is how these manifest in the health and illness of rural and populations. In this regard, it would seem evident that the understanding of rural-urban populations' health conditions requires insights from research that examine these conditions in the respective geographical context and disparities between them. These disparities, as a matter of course, have been examined utilizing such concepts as vulnerability, susceptibility and access to health facilities. These concepts are used mostly to examine the health and illness conditions of individuals and groups. However, they have been used to explain variations when geographical disparities are delineated in rural-urban comparisons. In relation to the individual, an individual is said to be vulnerable when such individual is in a position of being hurt or injured or ignored as well as being helped by others (Aday, 1993); vulnerable groups are those that have disproportionate risk or susceptibility to adverse outcomes (Sebastian, 1994). Susceptibility refers to situation of being subject to influences or risk for an adverse outcome. In epidemiological research, risk, a concept popularized in the social sciences by Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990), is widely used in mapping disease and studying health and illness of vulnerable populations'. In rural-urban health disparities, which refer, simply, to differences in health status of rural population as compared to urban population, and, differences in health status that occur among population groups in each context, defined by specific characteristics.

From the highlight above, there has been much progress in studying rural-urban heath disparities; nevertheless, serious challenges to our understanding remain. Despite the relative long history of biomedical treatment of illness and disease in Africa, cultural understanding and treatment of such illness still persists. This is even more so where access to biomedical health facilities is less; lay beliefs and cultural understanding would seem to inform treatment of most diseases and illnesses in such cases. Such treatment, however, requires a certain level of understanding and competence for success. This aspect, which applies more to the rural area, needs to be drawn out in the examination of rural-urban health disparities. This is the point of this paper.

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Gender Revolution Prospects in Nigeria: Implications for Marriage Timing and Fertility

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Abstract

We hypothesise that the prospects of gender revolution (GR) is rising in Nigeria and may be swaying marriage timing and fertility. The 1990 and 2013 NDHS data and 45 in-depth interviews were analysed. The analysis suggests that the prospects for the emergence of GR increased between 1990 and 2013. Women with high GR status positively predicted marriage timing in 2013 as against the inconsistent association observed in 1990. Similarly, high GR status negatively predicted children ever born (CEB) in 2013. Also, qualitative data suggest a general preference for completing education and participating in labour market before marriage among women. The findings suggest that as the proportion of women with improved GR status increases across Nigeria, delayed marriage is likely to soar and sustainable fertility decline achieved. Social policy to accelerate female education and labour force participation along with realistic economic recovery strategies are therefore of critical importance.
***Keywords**: Female education, Labour force participation, Age at marriage and Children ever born*

Résumé

Nous avons l'hypothèse que les perspectives de l'révolution (GR) est en hausse au Nigeria et peut être mariage se balançant le calendrier et la fertilité. Les 1990 et 2013 et 45 données NDHS entrevues en profondeur ont été analysés. L'analyse suggère que les perspectives pour l'émergence de GR a augmenté entre 1990 et 2013. Les femmes à haut statut GR prédit positivement le moment du mariage en 2013 à l'encontre de l'association cohérence observé en 1990. De même, l'état haut GR prédit négativement enfants nés (CCS) en 2013. Aussi, les données qualitatives semblent indiquer une préférence générale pour l'achèvement de

l'éducation et la participation au marché du travail avant le mariage chez les femmes. Les résultats indiquent que la proportion de femmes à l'amélioration de l'état développe dans tout le Nigéria GR, le report du mariage est susceptible de monter en flèche et la réduction de la fertilité durable obtenus. Politique sociale pour accélérer l'éducation des femmes et la participation au marché du travail ainsi que des stratégies de rétablissement économique réaliste sont donc d'une importance critique.
***Mots-clés** : l'éducation des femmes, la participation au marché du travail, l'âge au mariage et enfants*

Introduction

Gender revolution (GR) and its association with demographic behaviour are well documented in industrialised societies (Goldscheider, Bernhardt, & Lappegard, 2015; Lesthaeghe, 2010). GR is construed as a significant change in gender roles whereby women (including women with babies) previously restricted to private sphere dramatically joined the public sphere hitherto dominated by men (Goldscheider et al., 2015). Goldscheider and colleagues considered the close up of the gap between private and public spheres as the first half of the GR. It is clear that demographic transition and increased demand for women's labour, owing to expanded industrial sector, were important precursors of the emergence of the first half of the GR in those societies (Goldscheider *et al.*, 2015; Lesthaeghe, 2010). However, the GR theory failed to account for the likelihood of the revolution emerging in settings where primordial demographic behaviours predominate and industrialisation remains limited, with about 70 percent of the citizens in agricultural employment. In fact, in such societies high level of unemployment is a common trait in the male population talk less of demand for female labour force supply.

In this study, we employed qualitative and quantitative data to explore the prospects of the emergence of the first half of the revolution (the commencement of convergence of the private and public spheres) in Nigeria. The country's experience of demographic transition has either not taken off or stalled; industrialisation is very low, roughly 70 percent of her population is engaged in subsistence farming, and high level of unemployment prevails (Asaju & Adagba, 2013; National Population Commission [Nigeria] and ICF Macro 2014). Also, the studies in Western societies concentrated mainly on demographic change as a consequent of the revolution and other changes in the family (Oppenheimer, 1973, 1994; Watkins, Menken, & Bongaarts, 1987). This study examined the likelihood of GR as a cause of changes in demographic behaviour in Nigeria. Specifically, the study investigated the likely influence of GR on marriage timing and fertility. This focus is significant not only because we know little in this regard but because high fertility is still a cardinal demographic phenomenon Nigeria is struggling to tackle. By extension, could the emergence of GR in Nigeria bring about

the much expected sustainable fertility decline? Thus, we hypothesised that the prospect of GR in Nigeria is high and it is swaying marriage timing and fertility in the country.

Literature: Emergence of Gender Revolution

How did the private and public spheres emerge in the developed societies of North America, Europe and in parts of Asia? Before the industrial revolution in the mid-nineteenth century, human population survived on agro-based subsistence economy (Stanfors & Goldscheider, 2015). Both men and women raised families that combined reproduction and production (Brewster & Rindfuss, 2000). Thus, husband and wife operated in one sphere—the private sphere. The industrial revolution changed this situation. Industrial revolution took production from the family domain into factories, and paid employment became available. Industrialisation marked the emergence of the public sphere. The period witnessed the movement of production from private (family domain) to public sphere (factories). Men were the first to seek and secure paid employment in the emerged public sphere and left the private sphere to women (Cotter, Hermsen, & Vanneman, 2011; Goldscheider et al., 2015). Although research has shown recently that public sphere existed earlier in institutions such as the church and government, the scale of the engagement of men in such institutions was limited, compared to that of the industrial revolution (Stanfors & Goldscheider, 2015).

Men maintained sole engagement in paid employment up to a middle 20th century, thus being the breadwinners in their families for over a century. However, with time some factors promoted the involvement of women in paid employment, taking them from the private sphere to the public sphere, first in Europe and North America and later in East Asia (Lesthaeghe, 1998; Lesthaeghe, 2010). The most important accelerating factors were the rise in female education and women occupations such as nursing, teaching, librarianship, telephone operation as well as being secretaries, typists and clerical officers (Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Oppenheimer, 1973). The changes in gender ideology from the traditional that was more restrictive on female labour force participation to a more egalitarian or liberal attitude towards female involvement in working away from home also promoted female labour force participation (Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Thornton & Freedman, 1979). Development of household equipment, improvement in female wages, the effect of demographic transition on fertility and female life expectancy, and the emergence of effective contraceptives were other factors (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015; Goldscheider et al., 2015; Lesthaeghe, 2010; Macunovich, 2012; Stanfors & Goldscheider, 2015). Women's entrance into the labour market that closed the gap between private and public spheres marked the beginning of the first part of the GR in industrialised societies (Stanfors & Goldscheider, 2015).

Gender Revolution Interaction with Marriage Timing and Fertility

The preceding section has shown clearly that female employment in paid work is the key component of GR; it characterised the first half of the revolution. The influence of GR on the timing of marriage has been a subject of debate in the literature. A survey of the controversies shows two main views. On the one hand, is Gary Becker's economic independence theory, which posits that when women engage in paid work and secure independent income, the benefit of marriage to such women evaporates (Becker, 1981; Sweeney, 2002). This theoretical position argues that females marry early in pre-industrial society because their existence is a function of the economic status of their respective husbands. Thus, in such societies, the significance of women tends to be in marriage. Typically, according to this school of thought, women in pre-industrial societies specialise in home-making while men are breadwinners. Hence, the differentiated sex role informs the practice of early marriage. Therefore, women participation in paid work in the wake of the industrial revolution that guaranteed their economic independence removed their expected gain in marriage. As a result, young women realised that marriage was less attractive compared to working in the labour market (Sweeney, 2002). The popularity of delayed marriage increased the age at marriage among women. In this light, there was a negative association between GR and age at marriage in the Western world.

Some recent studies have indicated support for the independence hypothesis asserting that GR played a key role in demographic behaviour in developed societies (Goldscheider et al., 2015; Mason, 2001). Widespread disinterestedness of women in starting family and the adoption of non-traditional family attitudes such as married but remain childless are manifestations of the negative association between GR and marriage timing among women (Choe, Bumpass, Tsuya, & Rindfuss, 2014; Goldscheider et al., 2015). Some scholars argue that the conflicting demands of paid employment and commitments of marriage relationships reinforced disinterestedness in marriage (Mason, 2001).

On the other hand, Oppenheimer, in her career-entry hypothesis, contested the major tenet of independence hypothesis (Oppenheimer, 1973, 1988, 1994). She argues, that, the relationship between GR and marriage is in fact positive. The career-entry hypothesis posits that with the change in the labour market, in which women participated in paid work alongside their male counterparts, the basis of marriage bargaining also changed. This is the sendse in which the attraction of men to women significantly tend to depend on her position in the labour market instead of traditional characteristics such as religion, family background and physical attributes (Oppenheimer, 1988; Sweeney, 2002). She argues that the convergence of sex roles as a result of women involvement in labour market makes them more marriageable. Oppenheimer argues that the change in women economic status may lead to delayed marriage because of a longer stay in the marriage market searching for a high-quality match that usually characterises educated

and employed young females (Oppenheimer, 1988). Goldscheilder and colleagues in a cross-country study reported findings that tilted more in support of Oppenheimer's argument, especially among younger cohort (Goldscheider, Turcotte, & Kopp, 2001).

Although Becker and Oppenheimer recognised the likelihood of delayed marriage as female participation in paid work got accelerated in their hypotheses, they maintained divergent explanations on the how of the delay. Becker argues that because marriage becomes less attractive to the educated and gainfully employed, they tend to postpone getting married (Becker, 1981). In contrast, Oppenheimer insists that it is rather the longer time it takes educated and employed women to get appropriate (high quality) potential partner in marriage market that results in delayed marriage (Oppenheimer, 1988).

In a similar vein, the association between GR and fertility has been a subject of debate. Becker's economic approach suggests that one of the consequences of changes in the family institution in industrial societies was fertility decline since the quality of children became more important than quantity (Becker, 1981; Watkins et al., 1987). Some recent studies have shown that because women gained economic independence owing to their participation in paid work, interest in reproductive activities, including childbearing and childrearing, began to dwindle (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015; Gerson, 2009; Lesthaeghe, 2010). Studies have, also, shown that the use of more effective contraception culminated in the attainment and maintenance of fertility in the Western world (Lesthaeghe, 2010; Mason, 2001). Also, the occurrence of sexual revolution motivated young people to question restriction of sex and childbearing to marriage and sustained preference for early sexual debut outside marriage, out-of-wedlock childbearing and decision to remain unmarried (Lesthaeghe, 2010). Such attitudes could have promoted sustainable fertility decline in industrial societies. Consequently, fertility declined; and, the diffusion of small family size in the population, increased the scale of the decline (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015). However, Oppenheimer challenged this position in the case of the United States (Oppenheimer, 1994). In fact, Brown and Guinnane argue that no acceptable explanation exists for the fertility decline in the Western world during the early period of industrialisation (Brown & Guinnane, 2002).

In Nigeria, the last few decades witnessed some noticeable strides on the journey to industrialisation, essentially propelled by the discovery of oil in the1950s (Effoduh, 2016). While female education is still largely low (Asaju & Adagba, 2013), the country has experienced some relative improvement in the last five decades (Anugwom, 2009; Grant & Behrman, 2010; Wusu, 2012). Earlier studies suggest that despite the growing proportion of educated women in Nigeria, the proportion in paid work is still disproportionately low (Anugwom, 2009). Some of the crucial factors influencing female labour force participation in the country include the geographic region a woman comes from, the marital status, religious affiliation and level of education (Gayawan & Adebayo, 2015; Iweagu, Yeni, Nwokolo, & Bulus, 2015). However, a relatively recent study that employed nationally representative data sets hinted that women's entry into

paid work has been growing in Nigeria (Wusu, 2012). Thus, these studies suggest GR indicators have been growing in Nigeria. Previous studies in parts of Nigeria observed noticeable trends in family formation with marginal changes in age at first marriage and female education as well as labour force participation (for instance, Adedokun, 1999; Adedokun, Oyetunji, Adeola, & Nelson-Twakor, 2000; Wusu & Isiugo-Abanihe, 2006; 2003). Such studies were limited in coverage. Also, we cannot overemphasise the need to validate and update findings of such studies in the light of new data.

Data and Method

This study used both the qualitative and quantitative data collection method. We generated qualitative data through 45 in-depth interviews (IDI) conducted in Lagos metropolis and Ogun state between April and June 2016 using a purposive sampling strategy. Participants included married women in paid employment in four sectors (education, banking, manufacturing and services sectors) and young female adolescents (in and out of schools). The sample was limited to the very diverse and representative Lagos metropolis and the adjacent settlements in neighbouring Ogun State, which allowed the management of meagre resources available for the study. We adjudged the carefully selected interviewees representative of the different parts of Nigeria. Trained field assistants equipped with 17-themes interview guide and recording equipment conducted the interviews. Table 1 below shows the background characteristics of the study participants.

The quantitative data consist of the first (1990) and latest (2013) Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS). The analysis used the weighted individual recode file representing the reproductive age women sample in 1990 (N= 8781) and 2013 (N= 38,948). However, this analysis extracted respondents within 35 and 49 age brackets to assess the timing of family formation and fertility among women who might have completed their reproductive goals. The surveys deployed a stratified/cluster random sampling strategy to generate a nationally representative sample for data collection exercise (further details on the sampling strategy see Federal Office of Statistics [Nigeria] and IRD/Macro Int. 1992; National Population Commission [Nigeria] and ICF Macro 2014).

We represented the main independent variable—GR—using two characteristics: paid employment and highest education level attained. These indicators perfectly fit the explanatory frameworks on GR presented in Goldscheider, Bernhardt and Lappegard (2015) and Lesthaeghe (2010). As explained earlier in this paper, the revolution is about the involvement of women in the public sphere hitherto dominated by men thereby closing up the gap between private and public domains (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015; Macunovich, 2012). Paid employment had two categories: did not work (0) and

worked (1). Highest education attained was categorised into no schooling (0), primary (1) and secondary + (2). We summed up the two variables using SPSS Compute Variable function to generate GR. The combination resulted initially into four codes (0, 1, 2, and 3). We reclassified the four codes into three through SPSS Variable Transformation process, which yielded 0, 1, 2 (2+3 re-coded 2). Through variable definition, we defined the three generated GR categories as Low (0), Medium (1) and High (2).

Table 1: Background characteristics of IDI study participants

Characteristics	**Number**	**Percent**
Age		
< 20	5	11.1
20 – 29	29	64.4
30 – 39	9	20.0
40+	2	4.4
Education		
Below Secondary	6	13.3
Secondary	15	33.3
OND/NCE	10	22.2
HND/BSc+	14	31.1
Occupation		
Previously employed	11	24.4
Services/Manufacturing employee	14	31.1
Teachers	4	8.9
Students/secondary school leavers	16	35.6
Religion		
Christians	21	46.7
Muslims	24	53.3
Marital status		
Not married	24	53.3
Married	21	46.7

Procedure

We employed the NVIvo 10 software to conduct a content analysis of the qualitative data. After the transcription of the audios of the interviews and word processing it, we imported the files into the software. The coding used the themes, which include women's priority between education and marriage, the perceptions of women on the timing of marriage and female employment, the perception of young women on female education and employment, and influence of female employment on household responsibilities. The themes were in tandem with the basic characteristics of existing gender revolution framework (Goldscheider et al., 2015). The coding enabled the achievement of proper organisation of the data into the themes that were directly related to the objectives of the study. The coded narratives were used to prepare global views of the expressions of the study participants on study objectives. The global views enhanced understanding and interpretation of the data. Striking and representative excerpts from the narratives were selected and presented to corroborate the global views in the results section.

Quantitative The analysis sought to explain two dependent variables: (a) marriage timing indicated by age at marriage and (b) fertility captured through children ever born (CEB) to women (35-49).The analysis took account of confounding factors that are capable of influencing age at marriage and fertility. These include age, place of residence (urban (1) and rural (2), religion (no religion/others/traditional (0), Christians (1), Muslims (2)), contraception (used (1) and did not use (0)), child mortality (no child died (0), at least one child died (1)), and partner highest education (none (0), primary (1) and secondary + (2)). Another important variable included in the adjusted models was a birth cohort. This was categorised (as dictated by the data) into 1940-1949 (coded 0) and 1950-1955 (1) for the 1990 NDHS and 1963-1969 (0) and 1970-1978 (1) for 2013 NDHS. The purpose for the inclusion was to adjust for the likely influence of the period the respondents were born, which could reflect differences in social changes they might have experienced. Also, we added age at marriage, child mortality and marital status (never married (0); ever married (1)) to the list of confounding variables while constructing the fourth CEB models. Child mortality is the product of the combination of variables 206—number of sons that died and 207—number of daughters that died. We added those variables because it is well established that they are important predictors of fertility (Isiugo-Abanihe, Ebigbola, & Adewuyi, 1993).

Univariate analysis of the NDHS data employed descriptive statistical techniques to explain the socioeconomic and demographic backgrounds of the sampled women by year of survey and region (north and south). This level of analysis involved all variables that we used in the quantitative segment of the study. The multivariate analysis considered the association between GR and the two dependent variables using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression. At the level of multivariate analysis, we examined the

association between GR and the dependent variables while controlling for the effects of the named confounding characteristics. In all, we constructed eight OLS adjusted and unadjusted models. We used the IBM SPSS version 23 software in conducting all quantitative analysis.

Results

Table 2 shows the comparative distribution of women between 35 and 49 years of age in 1990 and 2013 NDHS by selected background characteristics and region. The table presents the descriptive statistic on GR, the timing of marriage, fertility indicator and the confounding variables. Of importance is the birth cohort. It reveals the majority of the respondents were of the 1950-1955 cohort in 1990 and the 1970-1978 cohort in 2013. Thus, the sampled women in the two surveys belong to two distinctive generations. In this light, the analysis compared women who most likely got exposed to different degrees of social change.

The survey data show that substantial differences exist in the proportion of women in each category of GR between the north and south as well as between 1990 and 2013 within each region and between regional and national levels—Table 2. While a vast majority was in the low GR category majority of their counterparts in the south were in medium and high GR groups in 1990. A similar pattern occurred in 2013. Nevertheless, noticeable improvement occurred in GR between 1990 and 2013. Overall, the table suggests that the South experienced a substantial degree of progress in GR compared to the north, even higher than the national average. On education and labour force participation, which are the two variables combined to generate GR, the proportions of educated women (at least at primary level) and those who were in labour force grew significantly between 1990 and 2013. Expectedly, the proportions in the south were higher than in the north, and the national average, which corroborates the pattern exhibited by GR distribution.

The IDI data reveal a deep appreciation of female education by women of reproductive age interviewed. Almost all of the interviewees, married and unmarried, opined that education should be acquired as the means of gaining self-respect in society and as a means of realising economic independence. The participants highlighted that formal education should no longer be the preserve of male children. They accentuated that embracing education was important for women to participate in the labour force and the opportunities in society. The participants explained that they and most other women and young females now desire and participate actively in modern employment just like their male counterparts, before thinking about marriage. The spectrum of their opinion indicates that women now desire good jobs to be economically independent and be able to support their families.

The opinions expressed by the participants suggest that some fundamental social changes were taking place. Conscious preference for education among women and young females as well as the desire to get into paid work signal the beginning of a new era. Women used to be kept as homemakers in Nigeria, the desire for education and to participate in the labour market were the preserves of males. The views expressed by the study participants indicate that a departure from that trend was in progress. According to the interviewees, married women and young females now pursue education and paid work instead of only preparation for marriage to become homemakers as in the past. In this study, 39 (87 percent) of the participants already possessed secondary or higher education, which reflects their appreciation of the value of education (see Table 1). In particular, 24 (53%) had post-secondary qualifications. Also, it is astonishing that 18 (40 percent) were in paid employment in various sectors. Also, 11 of them were employed previously but now out of a job, which indicates they were likely engaged in paid employment and not self-employment. Thus, GR is gradually taking root in Nigeria. The excerpt below corroborates the growing importance of female education and labour force participation in the study setting.

> It is very important for females to go to school. Why should only males go to school? Males and females are both humans. Most men of today are not even interested in marrying illiterate ladies. For women, it is important for us to go to school. The trend now is that after education paid employment. After working for some months or years, a lady can then get married. [A 21-year-old Christian undergraduate]

Table 2: Percentage distribution of women aged 35-49 by selected socio-demographic characteristics by north-south regions in Nigeria, NDHS 1990 and 2013.

Characteristics	1990 NDHS	2913NDHS				
	North N=1076	South N=1339	National N= 2414	North N = 6772	South N=4987	National N=11760
Gender Revolution						
Low	76.1	18.6	44.2	54.9	6.3	34.3
Medium	22.6	51.7	38.8	24.7	26.2	25.3
High	1.3	29.6	17.0	20.4	67.5	40.4
Birth cohort						
1940-1949	43.9	43.9	46.5	-	-	-
1950-1955	56.1	56.1	53.5	-	-	-
1963-1969	-	-	-	34.4	35.9	35.0
1970-1978	-	-	-	65.6	64.1	65.0
Education						
None	97.2	62.0	77.7	70.2	12.1	45.6
Primary	2.2	29.6	17.3	15.3	34.7	23.3
Secondary+	0.6	8.4	4.9	14.5	53.2	30.9
Paid employment						
Did not work	98.5	94.5	96.3	71.8	57.6	65.8
Worked	1.5	5.5	3.7	28.2	42.4	34.2
Age *(median)*	40.0	40.0	40.0	40.0	40.0	40.0
Marital status						
Never married	0.1	1.0	0.6	0.4	3.5	1.7
Ever married	99.9	99.0	99.4	99.6	96.5	98.3
Age at marriage *(median)*	15.0	18.0	17.0	15.0	20.0	17.0
CEB *(median)*	6.0	6.0	6.0	7.0	5.0	6.0
Place of residence						
Rural	87.0	72.4	78.9	72.9	38.0	58.1
Urban	13.0	27.6	21.1	27.1	62.0	41.9
Religion						
Christianity	10.3	74.8	46.1	20.6	83.2	47.1
Islam	87.6	14.2	46.9	77.8	14.9	51.1
Others	2.2	11.0	7.1	1.6	2.0	1.8

Contraception						
Did not use	97.8	88.7	92.8	91.7	67.8	81.6
Used	2.2	11.3	7.2	8.3	32.2	18.4
Partner's Education						
None	90.0	45.9	65.8	61.3	11.4	40.5
Primary	6.3	35.6	22.4	13.0	32.3	21.0
Secondary+	3.7	18.4	11.8	25.6	56.3	38.4
Child mortality (mean/SD	0.5(0.5)	0.6(0.5)	1.4(1.8)	1.5(1.9)	0.6(1.1)	1.1(1.6)

What is the role of GR in the age at marriage that characterised the two regions in Nigeria during the period under investigation? The regression models address this question, and the IDI data elucidate further. First, we look at the regression models on GR and marriage timing. Table 3 and 4 show the unadjusted and adjusted standardised coefficients of Least Square regression on the association between GR and age at marriage (model 1 to model 4). At the national level, medium and higher levels of GR were significantly associated with age at marriage relative low GR level in the two surveys—coefficients in the last column of the tables. The association remained significant after adjusting for the confounding variables. Further, the national regression models suggest that high GR category had a stronger positive association with marriage timing indicator than medium category in 1990 and 2013 surveys (though the adjusted association for medium GR was not significant in 2013 survey). Therefore, at the national level, women in high GR status were most likely to delay marriage.

Table 3: Unadjusted standardised coefficients of OLS regression on the association between GR and age at marriage among married women (35-49) in Nigeria, NDHS 1990, 2013

Characteristics	Model 1					
	North		South		National	
1990	β	S.E	β	S.E	β	S.E
Gender Revolution						
Low (ref.)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Medium	.31***	.28	-.12**	.19	.22***	.13
High	.08**	1.03	.03	.25	.27***	.19
R	.31		.14		.28	
R Square	.10		.02		.08	
Adjusted R Square	.10		.02		.08	
F	5***		12.72***		104.21***	
Characteristics	Model 2					
	North		South		National	
2013	β		β		β	
Gender Revolution						
Low (ref.)	-		-		-	
Medium	.06***	.13	.06*	.34	.12***	.12
High	.27***	.14	.29***	.32	.44***	.11
R	.26		.24		.40	
R Square	.07		.06		.16	
Adjusted R Square	.07		.06		.16	
F	251.13***		152.80***		1101.51***	

**significant at p< 0.05; **significant at p< 0.01; ***significant at p<0.001; (r) = reference category*

Moreover, the regional differences veiled by the national level association is revealed by the coefficients in column two to five in Tables 3 and 4. In the north, we observed a significant positive association between age at marriage and medium as well as high GR categories in both surveys in the unadjusted models. After adjusting for the confounding variables, medium GR in 1990 and high GR in 2013 remained significantly positively associated with marriage timing indicator. In contrast, in the south, surprisingly though, we observed a significant negative association between medium GR in 1990 in both unadjusted and adjusted models. Conversely, in 2013 survey, medium and high GR were significantly positively associated with marriage timing in the unadjusted model, but adjustment for confounding variables resulted in just high GR remaining significantly

positively associated with marriage timing. This result suggests that around the 1990s, women in medium GR category likely got married earlier than those in the low category in southern Nigeria. However, the situation changed after that (around 2013), medium or high GR status could get married relatively late among women

Table 4: Adjusted standardised coefficients of OLS regression on the association between GR and indicator of age at marriage among married women (35 -49) in Nigeria, NDHS 1990, 2013

Characteristics	Model 3					
	North		South		National	
1990	β	S.E	β	S.E	β	S.E
Gender Revolution						
Low (ref.)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Medium	.26***	.29	-.08*	.33	.15***	.22
High	.05	1.04	.06	.40	.19***	.33
R	.38		.22		.34	
R Square	.15		.05		.11	
Adjusted R square	.14		.04		.11	
F	22.73***		8.63***		37.91***	
Characteristics	Model 4					
	North		South		National	
2013	β		β		β	
Gender Revolution						
Low (ref.)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Medium	.01	.13	.02	.35	.02	.13
High	.13***	.19	.19***	.35	.19***	.15
R	.32		.30		.45	
R Square	.10		.09		.21	
Adjusted R Square	.10		.09		.21	
F	94.87***		58.20***		332.33***	

**significant at p</= 0.05; **significant at p< 0.01; ***significant at p<0.001; (r) = reference category; Models adjusted for age, birth cohort, place of residence, religion, and partner's highest education attained.*

The IDI data appear to corroborate the quantitative segment of analysis. Almost all the participants indicated that marriage is still important to young people, but there was an emphasis on the necessity of completion of schooling beyond secondary education before venturing into it. Off course, Secondary and postsecondary education assist in delaying marriage to a considerable extent (Adedokun, 1999). Some participants suggested 22 to 23 years age at first marriage while some others felt 25 to 27 years were appropriate. On the average, the study participants suggested that most young women now consider marriage between age 22.5 and 26 years. This preference was because of the new drive of getting appropriate educational training to qualify for labour market opportunities. Also, most of the study participants discussed the importance of contracting marriage only after obtaining educational skills that would facilitate their self-reliance and economic independence. The desire to avoid marriage was gaining root to the extent that participants who got married at a relatively early age were full of regrets, that if they had known they would not have married at such ages. One popular reason was the dependent life they lived whereby their husbands dictated everything about their lives. The interviews suggest that the key drivers of the changing marriage timing perception among young women in Nigeria, at least in the south, are the strong desire for education and subsequent participation in the labour force. The excerpt below demonstrates the opinion spectrum on prevailing age at marriage among the study participants.

> The appropriate age a lady should marry is 23 years. If she should start education early, she should complete schooling and get married at 23. The maximum age I think a lady should get married is 25 years. Even for those who do not have formal education, this suggested age still applies. [A 22-year-old Muslim undergraduate]

Moreover, national CEB declined from 6.2 in 1990 to 5.5 in 2013. However, while it declined from 6.0 to 4.8 in the south, it increased from 6.0 to 7.1 in the north—Table 2. To assess the association between GR categories and the fertility pattern, we built models 5 to 8 presented in Tables 5 and 6 below. The unadjusted regression coefficients in the last column of Table 5 reveal that GR was significantly positively associated with CEB at the national level in adjusted and unadjusted models in 1990 survey. The role of GR in the fertility indicator was almost nil owing to the one percent (1%) coefficient of determination of the model. In fact, the models for the two regions were not fit because the F statistics were not significant. Conversely, in 2013 survey, the association between GR and CEB was significant and negative across national and regional levels. The national coefficients show that high GR had stronger negative effect on CEB ($\beta = -40$, $p<0.001$) than medium GR ($\beta = -11$, $p<0.001$). The coefficients for north and south exhibited a similar pattern.

The adjusted models presented in Table 6 show that medium GR significantly but negatively predicted CEB in the North, but the association was positive at the national level in 1990 survey. The 2013 adjusted model presents a consistent pattern. There was a significant and negative association between high GR and CEB in the two regions and at the national level. Thus, indicates that women of high GR status were likely to report lower CEB compared to those in low GR status. The analysis on GR implications for fertility suggests that the role of GR in 1990 in the behaviour of fertility was not important at all. However, although GR explained only 6 percent at the regional level and 13 percent at the national level of CEB variations, the improvement in GR in 2013 made a consistent negative impact on the fertility indicator. High GR status resulted into lower CEB among women in all parts of the country. This position persisted even after adjusting for the confounding factors.

Further, we explored the changing perceptions/experiences of IDI participants on childbearing/fertility in the study settings. First, married participants were asked to share their experience and that of fellow women about the likely impact of involvement in paid work on childbearing behaviour, including sex with husbands, the frequency of pregnancy, the number of children and child spacing. Out of the 21 married women interviewed, only four expressed that their current or past work did not affect their childbearing behaviour. All others explained that

Table 5: Unadjusted standardised coefficients of OLS regression on the association between GR and CEB among women (35 - 49) in Nigeria, NDHS 1990, 2013

Characteristics	Model 5					
	North		South		National	
1990	β	S.E	β	S.E	β	S.E
Gender Revolution						
Low (ref.)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Medium	.07*	.24	-.01	.20	.09***	.13
High	.02	.86	-.05	.22	.06*	.17
R	.07		.04		.09	
R Square	.01		.002		.01	
Adjusted R Square	.003		.00		.01	
F	2.45		1.14		9.53***	
	Model 6					
Characteristics						
	North		South		National	
2013	β	S.E	β	S.E	β	S.E
Gender Revolution						
Low (ref.)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Medium	-.04**	.09	-.05		-.11***	.07
High	-.25***	.09	-.28***		-.40***	.06
R	.24		.24		.36	
R Square	.06		.06		.13	
Adjusted R Square	.06		.06		.13	
F	206.95***		145.03***		886.22***	

**significant at p< 0.05; **significant at p< 0.01; ***significant at p<0.001; (r) = reference category*

their participation in the labour force had an impact on the frequency of sex with their husbands. For instance, a woman said sometimes she would be too tired to welcome sex because of her engagement at work. Another participant said many times she got worn out because of her work and used to appeal to her husband to postpone sexual touch until another time. A few participants hinted that their work did not affect pregnancy frequency because their work was not strenuous and the number of children to bear should be left to God. However, most of the participants were of the opinion that the desire to have good quality children and work pressure made them cut down their family size. Although most of the participants indicated non-use of contraceptives, they were vehement on the necessity of proper spacing between children because the combination of work's burden and management of many children could be very stressful. The quotes

below epitomise the popular opinion during the interviews.

> Yes, work affects sex, especially because of the kind of traffic situation in Lagos. A woman gets home from work tired will be unwilling to have sex. Work affects how often to become pregnant because going on maternity leave affects productivity. For instance, the pressure of work forced me to limit the number of children I have [A 44 years old Christian employee]

Table 6: Adjusted standardised coefficients of OLS regression on the association between GR and CEB among women (35 - 49) in Nigeria, NDHS 1990, 2013

Characteristics	Model 7					
	North		South		National	
1990	β	S.E	β	S.E	β	S.E
Gender Revolution						
Low (ref.)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Medium	-.08**	.19	-.03	.12	.07**	.15
High	-.004	.71	-.03	.17	.01	.22
R	.68		.41		.33	
R Square	.46		.18		.11	
Adjusted R Square	.45		.17		.11	
F	73.88***		80.57***		28.80***	
	Model 8					
Characteristics						
	North		South		National	
2013	β	S.E	β	S.E	β	S.E
Gender Revolution						
Low (ref.)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Medium	.003	.07	-.01	.11	-.01	
High	-.06***	.10	-.06**	.11	-.07***	
R	.65		.69		.70	
R Square	.42		.48		.49	
Adjusted R Square	.42		.48		.49	
F	447.92***		400.75***		997.07***	

**significant at p< 0.05; **significant at p< 0.01; ***significant at p<0.001; (r) = reference category; Models adjusted for age, birth cohort, child mortality, contraception, age at first marriage/ cohabitation, marital status, place of residence, religion, and partner's highest education attained*

Discussion

This study has examined GR prospects in Nigeria and the implications for two critical aspects of reproductive health behaviour—marriage timing and fertility. The quantitative and qualitative data analysed lend some degree of support for the hypothesis tested that the prospects of GR is rising in Nigeria and it is swaying marriage timing and fertility.

Men largely dominated the public sector while women were restricted more to the private sphere in Nigeria for a long time. The survey data analysed demonstrated that the private-public sphere dichotomy predominated in Nigeria up to the 1990s. However, with time a negligible proportion of females began to take advantage of formal education and subsequently engaged in paid work to boost their economic independence (Federal Office of Statistics [Nigeria] & IRD/Macro International, 1992). Since then, there has been a significant improvement in the proportions of educated women and women in paid employment in Nigeria (Grant & Behrman, 2010; Wusu, 2012). Given that rising female education and labour force participation typify GR, obviously, the revolution is emerging in Nigeria (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015; Stanfors & Goldscheider, 2015). As a result, this study found increased proportion of women in medium and high GR categories in 2013 national survey data, at national and regional levels.

Moreover, the qualitative data espoused that self-consciousness of the importance of education has grown markedly among women in Nigeria and the drive to qualify for paid work is now very high. There is an increasing realisation among women that education is the reliable pathway to self-respect and economic independence. Consequently, although Nigeria is not a fully industrialised nation, women are no longer entirely restricted to the private domain, and obviously, the private-public dichotomy has diminished significantly. The findings suggest that the occurrence of GR is likely in societies where industrialisation is still limited. Cotter and colleagues' assertion that GR in 'later' industrialising societies may not follow exactly the path of the Western world where GR was a concomitant of industrialisation supports this observation (Cotter et al., 2011).

Further, we examined the likely influence of the emerging GR for marriage timing. The findings appear to have lent substantial support for Gary Becker's economic independence approach and partially consistent with Oppenheimer's marriage hypothesis. We observed a significant and positive association between GR and age at marriage at regional and national levels. This type of relationship suggests that women in medium or high GR were likely to delay marriage compared to their counterparts in low GR category. In this regard, educated women who were in paid work, thus with some relative economic independence may postpone marriage because they had an alternative (maybe better alternative) than the traditional economic benefits women derive from marriage. Their participation in labour force created this alternative and enabled them to possess economic independence that diminishes marriage gains, which

is consistent with Gary Becker's independence hypothesis (Becker, 1981). Although the age at marriage increased marginally, the propensity for the further rise is likely to grow.

However, within over two decades, the increase in age at marriage observed appears limited. The marginal increase observed in the analysis might have stemmed from Oppenheimer's argument. She argues that women participation in the labour force may make them more attractive and marriageable, thereby promotes negative association between GR and age at marriage (Oppenheimer, 1988, 1994). So, one plausible explanation for the persistence of low age at marriage despite the visible improvement in GR in Nigeria could be that improved GR status makes such women more attractive to suitors and therefore get them married early (Sweeney, 2002). Thus, the expected effect of improvement in marriage regarding delay or postponement is eroded, keeping marriage timing similar to traditional regimes. Further, we observed a negative association between medium GR and age at marriage relative low GR in unadjusted and adjusted 1990 models in southern Nigeria. Within Oppenheimer's framework, the situation in the south in 1990 might be that women in such GR category were more attractive in the marriage market (Oppenheimer, 1994). Consequently, they got married earlier than their counterparts of low GR status.

On implications of GR for fertility, national CEB declined by roughly one child between 1990 and 2013. The CEB pattern observed suggests fertility is still high in Nigeria and the rate of decline is still abysmally slow. However, the negative association observed between high GR and CEB in 2013 at all levels implies that women with improved GR status were likely to report lower CEB. These results suggest that the prevailing CEB that varies between 4.8 and 7.1 is most likely to decline everywhere in Nigeria as improvement in GR progresses. When the fertility decline accelerates at the national level, Nigeria may begin the journey towards replacement fertility. Studies in the Western societies reported similar demographic changes, including sustained fertility decline enhanced by GR (Goldscheider et al., 2015; Lesthaeghe, 2010) owing to the incompatibility between women labour force participation and traditional reproductive behaviour (Fuwa, 2014).

This study has a few limitations we considered important to highlight before concluding the paper. First, the NDHS data analysed was cross-sectional. Therefore, our interpretations do not imply cause-and-effect relationships. Second, we conducted a comparative analysis of 1990 and 2013 NDHS. This comparison may not be a perfect representation of reality relative to what we could have obtained if the two data sets were from a panel survey design. Third, the qualitative data collection exercise took place only in urban Lagos and adjoining settlements in Ogun State owing to the meagre financial resource at out our disposal. The assumption was that the purposive sample could be representative of other cities and rural areas in Nigeria. It is likely that this assumption may not be universally correct. As a result, we suggest that further studies should replicate this investigation using the qualitative tools in other cities and selected rural communities.

Despite the limitations highlighted above, the findings are insightful and have far reaching implications. The analysis suggests that the prospects of the emergence of gender revolution (GR) increased between 1990 and 2013. On implications, women of high GR status positively predicted marriage timing in 2013 as against the inconsistent association observed in 1990. Similarly, high GR status negatively predicted CEB in 2013. Qualitative data suggest a general preference for completing education and labour force participation before marriage among women. The findings suggest that as the proportion of women with improved GR status increases across Nigeria, delayed marriage is likely to soar and sustainable fertility decline achieved. Social policy to accelerate female education and labour force participation along with realistic economic recovery strategies are therefore imperatives.

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Party identification and service delivery protests in the Eastern Cape and Northern Cape, South Africa

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Abstract

Service delivery protests against municipalities in South Africa have become common. This article discusses the relationship between party identification and these protests. It presents an in-depth analysis of two qualitative case studies: one in the Eastern Cape Province, where protests have mainly been about the shortage and poor quality of housing, and one in the Northern Cape, where protests were mainly aimed at getting the mayor to resign. A widely held view in the social movement literature is that the stronger the identification with the ruling party the less likely people are to protest, even when they have cause to do so. In South Africa, the connection between party affiliation and social movement is blurred. We found that partisan protesters were consequently able to navigate successfully between the party and concerned residents' groups. There is a pressing need to consider what norms and values these protests will transmit to future generations.
***Key Words**: service delivery protest, partisanship, identity, political action, South Africa*

Résumé

Les manifestations de prestation de services contre les municipalités d'Afrique du Sud sont devenues courantes. Cet article traite de la relation entre l'identification des partis et ces protestations. Il présente une analyse approfondie de deux études de cas qualitatives: une dans la province du Cap oriental, où les manifestations ont principalement porté sur la pénurie et la mauvaise qualité des logements, et une autre dans le Northern Cape, où les manifestations visaient principalement à obtenir le maire démissionner. Une opinion largement répandue dans la littérature sur le mouvement social est que plus l'identification avec le parti au pouvoir

est forte, moins les gens sont susceptibles de protester, même quand ils ont des raisons de le faire. En Afrique du Sud, le lien entre l'appartenance à un parti et le mouvement social est flou. Nous avons constaté que les manifestants partisans étaient en mesure de naviguer avec succès entre le parti et les groupes de résidents concernés. Il est urgent de réfléchir aux normes et aux valeurs que ces manifestations transmettront aux générations futures.

***Mots clés**: protestation de prestation de services, partisanerie, identité, action politique, Afrique du Sud*

Introduction

Studies of South African civic life, both during and after apartheid, reveal a rich history of an active civil society (Von Holdt *et al*., 2011; Makino 2009; Marais et al., 2008). From 1994, civil society organisations that had previously led protests against the apartheid government began to support – and even form alliances with – the ruling African National Congress (ANC) (Kabane 2011; Odendaal 2011). South Africa has witnessed, since then,' a dramatic increase in the number of community protests, with some 14,740 being reported in 2015 (Mbeki 2016). In discussing recent service delivery protests, this paper reflects on the role of South Africa's civil society in relation to national political institutions and their reciprocal roles in facilitating community development.

By 'service delivery protests' we mean collective action by a group of community members against a local municipality because of poor or inadequate provision of basic services, as well as a wider spectrum of concerns including government corruption, rampant crime and unemployment. The causes of the protests are varied and complex, ranging from systemic or structural factors to problems pertaining directly to governance (Matebesi & Botes 2011; Ngwane 2011). The protests may reflect the extent to which formal institutional channels for citizen engagement with the state have failed (Runciman 2014; Tapscott 2010), but conversely they may reflect the freedom of expression that South African citizens enjoy in the post-apartheid era (Bond 2010). What remains generally undisputed, though, is that the increasingly violent nature of the protests has weakened local government capacity and hindered basic service delivery.

International scholarly interest in protests has grown, and the upsurge in service delivery protests in South Africa has stimulated research (Alexander 2010; Karamoko & Jain 2010; Booysen 2009; Friedman 2006). Many of the studies are of single cases (Bernstein & Johnston 2007), focusing primarily on the frequency and nature of the protests (Karamoko & Jain 2010), or relying on media reports and 'rapid response' research designs (Alexander 2010). Taking a different slant, we explore the relationship between party identification – the extent to which one identifies with a political party – and service delivery protests. We base our discussion on two case studies involving South African local community groups, one an urban community from Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape, South Africa's fifth largest metropole, and the other a rural community

from Olifantshoek, a small town in the Northern Cape. The studies were done between 2007 and 2014, using an interpretive qualitative approach based on fieldwork consisting of in-depth interviews with representatives and members of the two community groups and purposively sampled councillors, community members, and a scan of all media reports about these protests (consisting of over 60 newspaper clippings). The two case studies could help to determine the extent to which Lowrance's (2006: 167) claim that 'the closer one identifies with the state, the less likely one is to protest, even when significant grievances exist' is applicable in South Africa.

In this paper we attempt to answer two questions: Does party identification in South Africa deter service delivery protests? and: Why do communities in South Africa mobilise against their local municipalities despite the availability of several democratic institutions? Note that in asking our first question we are looking specifically at the extent to which membership and support of the ruling ANC discourages people from embarking on service delivery protests or, contrary to the findings of the literature, encourages them to do so. We agree with the view widely held in the social movement literature that identity or identification – one's cognitive, moral and emotional connection with an entity – is an important determinant of protest behaviour (Opp 2009; Poletta & Jasper 2001; Melucci 1988). However, we disagree with the view that close identification with a political party makes one less likely to take part in protests, even when one has serious grievances (Lowrance 2006). If this view is correct, that makes it hard to find a plausible reason why many South African communities who support the ANC continue to protest against that same party. Our suggestion is that, given the current democratic deficit that exists in participatory governance structures in South Africa, communities see any push in the direction of further concentration of power in the hands of unresponsive office-bearers at local government level as dangerous.

Party identification perspectives and their application to South Africa

Here we explain the central assumptions of the theory of collective identity and consider how applicable they are to South Africa, which is currently experiencing the conflicted group identities and loyalties that are typical of communities grappling with strong undercurrents of instability. Studies of partisanship make important contributions to the literature on collective identity theory and consequently party identification. Partisanship, according to Lodge (2000: 98) 'involves the factional exercise of rhetorical manipulation or raw power'. The term 'partisanship' is often incorrectly equated with 'party identification'. The latter is a narrower term, meaning a person's self-identification with a political party. 'Partisanship' is a broader concept, involving developmental learning and intergenerational transmission, 'including a complex transition to general consistency in an individual's loyalty to a party, political preferences, and expectations' (Smirnov *et al*. 2010). Party identification is more short-lived than partisanship: it

depends on one's social and political experience, and party identification may not always converge with one's core values, beliefs and preferences.

Collective identity theories provide a rich analytical foundation for the study of service delivery protests. Models of collective identity are diverse, representing attempts to capture different kinds of problems (Ostrom & Ahn 2009). There is, however, a degree of consensus that identity is one of the important social explanations for collective action (Opp 2009; Van Zomeren *et al.* 2008). Lowrance (2006: 168) defines identity as a 'complex, evolving, multilayered, and situational relationship between an individual and a group or number of groups'. The concept became attractive to scholars in the quest to answer three questions: 'why collective actors come into being when they do' (identity explains why interest tends to emerge); what motivates people to act (collective identity provides a more complete explanation of 'the pleasures and obligations that actually persuade people to mobilise' (Polleta & Jasper 2001: 284); and what the reasons are for a movement's strategic choices (protest tactics are also influenced by collective identity) (Polleta & Jasper 2001).

Identity is not the only important determinant of protest behaviour. Other factors that make people mobilise, according to theories of collective action, are strong discontent, personal influence and social incentives (Olson 1965). Klandermans (2014) argues that identity (membership of a group), instrumentality (participating in political protest to change one's circumstance), and ideology (views or beliefs) are the three fundamental reasons why people participate in political protests. It has also been found that participation in protests was particularly high when people had acquaintances who were critical of the state or had previously participated in protests (Tapscott 2010).

According to Opp's (2009) influential interpretation based on the works of several scholars, most definitions of collective identity or identification with a group refer to selective incentives. Those who identify with a group find it rewarding when they act in the interest of the group and costly when they do not. Opp (2009: 110) notes that 'if somebody is strongly attached to a group, this means she or he is interested in the welfare of the group'. In another variant of this proposition, Polleta and Jasper (2001: 168) claim that:

> The key to ethnic protest is the identity that one holds. Those who identify as 'Israeli', that is, those Israeli Palestinians who identify with the Israeli state, are less likely to engage in system-challenging protest activity than those who do not, irrespective of the level of grievances held.

In other words, identification with the state is an important stabilising factor and although grievances are an important motivator of any political action, their impact can be weakened by party identification.

Historically, studies in long-standing democracies postulate that party identification is a dynamic psychological phenomenon that is influenced by short-term political forces.

These forces could spring from short-term evaluations of the parties, the president and the economy. In America, for example, individual-level party identification changes over time to ensure correspondence with views about the role the government should play in the economy and society of the country (Montgomery *et al*. 2015). In another example, Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2014) show how partisanship in Brazil is responsive to government performance in the short term. They attribute the wave of massive protests in Brazil in June 2013 to the decline in support for the governing Worker's Party. This party's affiliation decreased by 4% between May and July of the same year. In contrast, scandals, recessions, and landslide elections do not greatly affect party identification. Large shifts in party attachments occur only when a party's social image changes, as for example when African Americans became part of the Democratic Party in the South after the Voting Rights Act was passed (Green *et al*. 2002). Similarly, while economic studies of voting have diverse findings, they tend to agree that the economy is a significant predictor of vote choice (Lewis-Beck *et al*. 2008).

In contrast to the view of protest politics as seditious radicalism, the surge in protest activity has also been linked to the normalisation of contentious politics in countries like Argentina and Bolivia. Adherents of this view claim that individuals who protest are generally strongly interested in politics and likely to engage in community activities, and that protest is a supplement to traditional forms of participation, such as elections. Interestingly, the difference in protests between Argentina and Bolivia has been ascribed to the degree to which actors within government (the governing political party, the MAS) and in Argentina by non-government actors (the piquetero movement and various trade unions) lead demonstrations in Bolivia (Moseley & Moreno 2010). Arce and Mangomet (2012) highlight the complex nature of movement of individuals between parties and social movements. They show that activists move between the two spaces to advance their goals, engaging in protest because they assume it will be instrumental in attaining a particular goal, but also because they find protest rewarding *per se*.

In studying partisan identity and protests in South Africa, we find no shortage of motivators, or what Lowrance (2006: 169) calls 'lightning-rod issues', for aberrations like service delivery protests. Faced with the reality that the state is generally unresponsive to demands raised through formal institutional channels, disaffected citizens and the organisations that represent them have increasingly sought alternative means to express their grievances. Pieterse (2003: 118) puts it plainly:

> Organizations that act outside of constitutional and legal frameworks will continue to flourish and find community support as long as the government remains incapable of fulfilling crucial … functions. As long as the government remains deficient in capability and resources (exacerbated in a context of fiscal conservatism), alternative, informal and democratically ambiguous formations will emerge to fill the vacuum.

The foregoing discussion explains much of the collective behaviour of South African citizens outside of politics. Why then do people who identify with the ruling ANC continue to participate in protests against the ANC government? One explanation offered by South African scholars is that it has to do with the dual nature of protests: factional struggles on the part of protest leaders to shift power within the local ANC, and the struggle of the masses to obtain socioeconomic rights (Twala 2014). However, dissatisfaction with service delivery and the way that important people in the ruling party reacted to protests about this may also have contributed to the factional struggles in the ANC. Furthermore, the ANC has a long history of anti-democratic conduct of its own internal affairs and in relation to South African society as a whole. And the party has been struggling to deal with the sources of the party's structural decline, the erosion of trust in the party, recurrent internal party controversies, hostile intra-party leadership factions, internecine strife and countless corruption scandals (Hamil 2014). We contend that the decrease in electoral support for the ANC, which was most evident in Gauteng during the 2014 national elections (Greffrath & Duvenhage 2014), was largely a result of the ruling party ignoring the widespread call by numerous socio-economic and political forces, including party members, to abandon e-tolls (electronic road tolling system) in the province (Motale 2015) An interesting finding from Table 1 is that the ANC has lost more than 20% of its support in Nelson Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth's municipality) and this in just 10 years (from 2006 to 2016).

Table 1: General voter turnout and local government election results for ANC (%)

Municipality	2000		2006		2011		2016	
Port Elizabeth (Nelson Mandela Bay)	Turnout	Result	Turnout	Result	Turnout	Result	Turnout	Result
	61.86	65.73	56.13	66.53	64.65	51.91	63.86	40.92
Olifantshoek (Gamagara)	54.31	64.34	47.95	69.24	54.62	63.45	57.18	48.68

Source: Compiled from various reports on local government and national and provincial election results (Electoral Commission of South Africa)

Although ANC electoral support has been decreasing since the country's first national elections in 1994, those who identify closely with the party are more likely than the non-affiliated to be primed by partisan considerations when evaluating party performance. Such partisans are normally more resistant to any negative information about the party (and the state, in the case of ruling parties). This sense of partisan identity was evident in the COSATU Workers' Survey of 2008 (Buhlungu & Tshoaedi 2012), which showed

a general decline in satisfaction with service delivery among COSATU members. However, COSATU members, unlike other ANC supporters, remain generally reluctant to participate in service delivery protests because, among other things, of their 'continued faith in the ANC to deliver' (Mosoetsa 2012: 163).

The cases and context

We chose the communities of Port Elizabeth and Olifantshoek and their struggles with their local municipalities for our empirical study. Port Elizabeth is part of the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality, South Africa's fifth largest city, with an estimated population of over 1.5 million. It is the centre of the motor vehicle manufacturing industry in South Africa. The surrounding areas are heavily industrialised and intensively farmed. According to the 2011 Census data, the municipality has an unemployment rate of 36.6% and a dependency rate of 46% (Statistics South Africa 2011). Olifantshoek, the second largest of the five towns that form part of the Gamagara Local Municipality, is largely a farming area. The iron ore mine at Sishen drives its development. Like most black and coloured residential areas in South Africa, the townships of Olifantshoek are under-serviced and residents are still living in abject poverty. Unemployment is high, with 46.9% of the population being unemployed and approximately 40% relying on social grants. This translates to a dependency rate of 58.4% (Statistics South Africa 2011).

Figure 1: Map of case study areas



Findings and discussion

In this section we consider three broad themes: the protestors' identity, their main grievances, and their strategies and tactics.

Who are the protestors?

While partisanship implies a close relationship with one political party, partisans often have a multitude of relations with or connections to other external groups. A number of interviewees in Port Elizabeth confirmed that the main protagonists in the protests were members of the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP), including municipal officials. For example, a former councillor said 'this whole fracas started as a result of the internal rift between the local ANC and its alliance partners, especially the SACP', and also asserted that key Metro municipal officials, who were SACP members, had instigated the unrest while ostensibly working for the Council (interview, Former Councillor A, 18 April 2007). Another study also confirmed the role of the SACP in mobilising the community of Khutsong (Gauteng Province) to protests against the failed attempt to incorporate the area into another province (Matebesi & Botes 2011).

Another interviewee, the Director of the Urban Services Group, regarded both ANC and SACP members as responsible for promoting the unrest agenda at the time (interview, 18 April 2007). Several councillors also asserted that the protests had been led by the ANC against itself – for example, one councillor said: 'It started with us, the leaders. If we did not agree on certain issues at council or ANC meetings, some leaders would leave meetings to go and mobilise the community. The attitude and behaviour of some political leaders actually indicated that conflict [was] looming' (interview, Councillor B, 19 April 2007). In the same vein, another councillor said that 'certain ANC comrades' had 'influenced the public to resent other comrades' and that the unrest was 'primarily a manifestation of the nomination process of the local ANC branch' particularly in the Kleinskool area (interview, Councillor C, 19 April 2007). Table 2 gives an overview of the protests in Port Elizabeth.

Table 2: Summary of protests in Port Elizabeth, 2005–2015

Area	Organisers	Main grievances	Duration
Kwadesi	ANC members	Poor municipal service delivery and lack of housing	1–16 May 2005
Kwazakhele	ANC members	Poor housing delivery	02 Feb 2012
Walmer	ANC members	Poor service delivery	12 Aug 2012
Walmer	Walmer Steering Committee	Failure of Nelson Mandela Metro Municipality to fulfil promises to build RDP houses and improve road infrastructure	31 Oct 2012
Walmer	Walmer Steering Committee	Lack of housing, electricity and proper sanitation	29–30 May 2012
Walmer	ANC members	Lack of housing, electricity and proper sanitation	2 July 2012
Missionvale	Coloured community	Slow rate of housing delivery and other services	18 Oct 2013
Walmer	Walmer Steering Committee	Lack of consultation on the removal of illegal electricity cables	15–16 May 2014
Joe Slovo and Kwadesi	Secretary of the Branch Executive Committee	Municipality giving away community's sites to people from other areas	22 Sept 2014
Motherwell	Community members	Eviction from illegally occupied newly built houses	19 June 2015
Walmer	Walmer Steering Committee	Shortage of teachers at local schools	26 July 2015
Walmer	Walmer Steering Committee	Unresolved matters between community and Nelson Mandela Metro Municipality on service delivery	12–13 Aug 2015
Motherwell	Community members	Eviction from illegally occupied newly built houses	7 Nov 2015

Source: Authors' compilation

Note: RDP houses are those built under the post-apartheid Reconstruction and Development Policy, now called the Housing Subsidy Programme (Venter *et al.* 2015; Rust & Rubenstein 1996)

The Olifantshoek Concerned Residents (OCR) association was formed in 2009 by five active members of the local ANC Youth League (ANCYL). To emphasise the association's allegiance to the ANC, one protest leader said its members had been raised within the ANC and had 'always voted for it' (interview, Chairperson of ANCYL and OCR Forum member, 01 March 2013). This illustrates the divided loyalties that characterise community protests in South Africa (Langa & Von Holdt 2012). For instance, another ANCYL member said, 'Yes, we remain loyal to the organisation – in fact, we will vote again for the ANC in 2014 [with reference to the General Elections that took place in May 2014] – but we want to get rid of the rotten dogs within the party' (interview, Member A of ANCYL and OCR Forum member, 01 March 2013). Table 3 shows the Olifantshoek protests.

Table 3: Summary of protests in Olifantshoek

Area	Organisers	Main grievance	Duration
Olifantshoek	Local ANC members	Service tariff increases by the local Council led by the Postmasburg-Olifantshoek Residents Association (Posra)	Feb–March 2001
Olifantshoek	Disgruntled members of local ANC branch and ANC Youth League members	Corruption claims, and calls for the removal of the now late Mayor Maria Diniza	May–Sept 2012

Source: Nkosi (2012)

Studies in South Africa show the significance of civil society organisations in providing communities with a non-institutional space (Dawson & Sinwell 2012) or a fluid space (Langa & Von Holdt 2012) outside of the state. This enables activists to move regularly back and forth between institutional (or party) and non-institutional spaces to air their collective grievances (Steyn 2012).

The protestors' main grievances: evidence of factionalism within the ANC

The most common grievances mentioned by the protestors in Port Elizabeth and Olifantshoek were the poor quality of basic services such as water and electricity provision and the shortage of housing. During nine years of sporadic outbreaks of service delivery protests in Port Elizabeth (2005–2014), failure to provide houses has been the most pervasive grievance (SABC, 2014; SAPA 2012; Matyu 2005). At the time of our 2007 interviews, the municipality accused the province of excessive bureaucratisation and failing to release allocated housing subsidies timeously. In turn, the provincial leaders berated the municipality for its limited capacity for sustained delivery of good quality housing (Matavire 2005). The former Mayor's views on the problem were insightful:

In respect of the housing problem, the Provincial Government communicated only with the local Department of Housing on issues related to housing. Not all politicians are informed about the complex issues around the allocation and building of houses… The Provincial Government is much to blame for this. For example, they will only inform us at a very late stage that we should take note of new amendments and directives made in the allocation of housing subsidies, which are in contrast to what we have been sharing over months with the local community. Unfortunately, people on the ground do not understand these complex issues. How do you go back to people and say, 'Sorry, all the information that we have been sharing with you for the past six months has changed'? (Interview, former Mayor of Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, 2 May 2007)

The grounds for the protests in Olifantshoek were laid in 2009 when the OCR complained about local ANC members being exploited by ANC leaders for personal gain during elections and about alleged corruption in a community development trust. The protest about the trust was led by the chairperson of the local ANC branch. Going beyond these original concerns, the OCR's central grievance in 2012 was about the Mayor of Gamagara Municipality, whose resignation it demanded. The Mayor was accused of displaying disrespect for the community, and making empty promises about jobs, bursaries and infrastructural projects (focus group discussion with OCR leaders, 01 March 2013).

The final precipitating factor that led to violent protests and the closing down of schools for more than eight months in 2012 was the request to OCR leaders to provide evidence to corroborate the allegations they had made (Public Protector of South Africa 2012). In a turn of events that would become a sad episode in the history of protest behaviour in South Africa, the community forcibly shut down schools in Olifantshoek. The same protest tactic of closing schools would later be used in several areas in the Northern Cape, resulting in the closure of over 60 schools and affecting more than 16,000 learners (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2012).

Our argument is that in addition to the 'genuine concerns' about basic services, another, hidden, factor fuelled the protests in both cases: factional fights within the local ANC. Several scholars have convincingly shown how factions that lose out on leadership positions and local business opportunities (and thus power and money) use service delivery protests as a means to settle scores (Langa & Von Holdt 2012). A Port Elizabeth resident, for example, said that 'some councillors are perceived to be "anti-development" and tend not to be supportive of any local development project that they are not directly involved in' (interview, Councillor B, 9 April 2007). In this regard, a councillor in Port Elizabeth said:

> Other factors apart from the perceived lack of service provision also contributed to the unrest. Mainly disenchanted ANC members who were not on the nomination lists mobilised the community. They were frustrated because they were positioning themselves for the forthcoming elections. (Interview, Councillor C, 9 April 2007)

A further analysis of the factors that fuelled the protest points to lack of transparency in internal party processes. For example, when the OCR leaders were asked why they had targeted the Mayor, they responded that she was the head of administration and therefore had to take responsibility for the municipality's failure to deliver services. She was also accused of using the municipality and the mines to settle internal ANC party disagreements, repressing dissent, side-lining outspoken residents and rewarding those who were close to her (interview with community member, 01 March 2013). Amid calls

for her resignation, the Mayor insisted that she had been 'appointed by the ANC' and would not resign 'unless asked to do so by the party' (*NoordKaap Gazette* 2013).

The foregoing accounts must be understood against the background of a state confronted with the latent and embedded political and historical pressures of apartheid, and a citizenry who believe they are entitled to demand better services from the government. Forums and mechanisms of political representation and accountability in South Africa have proliferated, but their effectiveness and inclusiveness have lagged behind (Matebesi & Botes 2011). Communities are therefore challenging the existing, legally enforced power balance between citizens and the state (Runciman 2014). In this regard, Von Holdt (2013) argues that while the new economic and political elites have grown stronger and stronger, citizens have been increasingly marginalized, and the protests are the manifestation of communities' real grievances and of ANC members' infighting to secure lucrative positions and tenders. Our study's findings largely supported the grievances as a cause of the protests and to a lesser extent the infighting.

The protestors' strategies and tactics

We analysed the strategies and tactics the protesters used to sustain mobilisation against local municipalities. Scholars have described partisan activists' ability to move between the party and civil society organisations (Moseley & Moreno 2010). We found a paper trail of evidence in both our case studies showing that the protestors had tried on several occasions to engage their local municipality. We found evidence that the more traditional forms of protest followed such attempts: holding public meetings, mounting demonstrations, presenting petitions, and so on. The protest leaders' mobilisation strategies were centred on scapegoating. A councillor in Port Elizabeth said: 'Some of my colleagues and municipal officials were quick to run and share sensitive council information with other members of the ANC or community leaders.' Similarly, an OCR leader described how their complaints about the mayor were ignored: 'There is one public tap for about 300 people and one toilet shared by five families. But the brother of the mayor has a tap in his yard. [Would] this not anger you?'

By blaming their grievances on an intransigent and unresponsive local municipal system, rather than on party political infighting, protest leaders were able to undermine the efforts of local municipal and political leaders to respond to the residents' initial demands. This tactic has enabled protest leaders throughout South Africa to mobilise and sustain their protests against local municipalities. According to DeNardo (1985), groups may use both intimidation and violence to multiply the disruptive capacity of activists. This perhaps explains why the sporadic service delivery protests in Port Elizabeth since 2005 have been marred by violence.

In Olifantshoek, most interviewees said they supported peaceful protests, but were against

the closure of schools and the destruction of private property and public facilities. The residents claimed there were high levels of intimidation: anyone who spoke out against the closure of the schools ran the risk of having their house torched (interview with community member, Olifantshoek, 01 March 2013) An unfortunate consequence of all this was that most matriculants and other pupils were forced to repeat their grades in 2013, when schools reopened after the intervention of the Public Protector (*City Press* 2012). The protest leaders also change tactics as they deem necessary. The Chairperson of the OCR said:

> We never planned any violent strategy, but we were led by decisions taken by the community. The public spaces of dialogue were failing us and we had no choice but to implement the suggestions made by the community. In the absence of strong legitimate and functional participatory structures, communities in South Africa will continue to use violence. This is the only language our government understands. (Interview, 1 March 2013)

Further comments can be made about the strategies of partisan protest activists. First, it is evident that partisan activists exploit the sporadic and fragmented nature of community forums by both engaging and eschewing partisanship. They accomplish this through successful movement between the party and the noninstitutionalised space created by protestors. Chen and Goren (2014: 5) note that party identification acts like a 'running tally' whereby citizens 'adjust their partisan attachments to ensure correspondence with their stands on political issues'. Thus partisan activists can have agency by engaging in the realms of both the party and the community forums.

Second, the Olifantshoek case serves as a prime example of patronage politics. Patronage and contentious collective action (such as service delivery protests) are distinct strategies that sometimes overlap to address grievances and resolve problems (Auyero *et al*. 2009). The OCR leaders first adopted intimidation and violence as their strategies, but swiftly changed tack or refused to accept responsibility when asked why they were using schools as bargaining power.

Third, the Port Elizabeth case reveals another side to partisan protest leaders: their underhand tactical operations. While OCR leaders were open about their involvement in the protests, and at one stage lived on a farm on the outskirts of Olifantshoek in compliance with their bail conditions, community members in Port Elizabeth complained that some protest leaders would mobilise the community through meetings, but would 'never show up during the day of protests' (interview, Community member B, 18 April 2007). In arranging these meetings, the activists' mobilisation tactic was to publicly express the collective grievances of the community and thus attract attention. Hodder (2014: 12) describes such tactics as 'instrumental, personalistic, and self-centred behaviour'. This supports Smirnov *et al*.'s view (2010) that people faced with a social

dilemma may engage in partisan activity because it offers benefits that compensate for the costs of participation. In the case of the no-shows, the aim was to avoid exposure of their involvement in the protests, for fear of victimisation.

Conclusions

The cases of Olifantshoek and Port Elizabeth shed light on the way partisan protest activists move between the party and the community. The findings enhance our knowledge of the fluid space occupied by partisan activists and help us understand the strategies that service delivery protesters use in South Africa. Our study offers three important insights.

First, the conventional view sees social movements as distinct from and in contrast to the party. It is not surprising, then, that the central proposition of studies on identity is that people who identify with a party are loyal to it. This would mean that people who identify with the ANC would be less likely to engage in service delivery protests. But we found that, far from this being the case, it was ANC members who led the service delivery protests in our two cases. However, this finding should be approached with caution since the social identities of a party member and a member of a civil society organisation are often intertwined and inseparable from each other in South Africa.

Second, while the distinction between the party and non-institutionalised tactics such as protests is useful for analysing how social movements often make demands on the state, it is less useful for understanding the ways activists work both inside and outside the party realms to promote civil society organisations' goals. Our study shows that the struggle for political power and thus for the control of the party authority structures first proceeds through party internal structures. And if unresolved, these party struggles are likely to become more intense and hostile (Tyoden 2013). This view is consistent with the instrumentalist view that partisanship drives collective action among those who are motivated to defend their own interests, ideology and issues.

Third, previous research has shown how partisan activists may exacerbate peoples' discontent in order to stimulate higher levels of participation in the protests. And, as this study showed, since political parties are clearly stronger and more influential than individual partisan activists, these activists sometimes operate covertly to reduce exposure and thus survive in patronage networks. The fundamental struggle of partisan activists is not only about communities' grievances but also for recognition and legitimacy.

Generally, the study showed the usefulness of protest politics as a legitimate means of political expression, but also that the interaction between local municipalities and communities is critical for managing strained relations. For example, the trauma that parents and children suffered because of the intimidation involved in the school closures in Olifantshoek must not be understated. The children suffer the most. A

recent UNICEF report found that children in such situations are at risk of truancy and repeating grades and tend to have lower educational aspirations and achievement levels than children who have not been exposed to violence. And there may also be long-term economic consequences, such as increased rates of unemployment in adulthood and a greater likelihood of living below the poverty line (UNICEF 2014).

Exposure to violence in childhood can lead to aggression, social withdrawal and difficulty in relating to others. Future behavioural problems may include an increased risk of perpetrating violence against others, including physical fights with peers, dating violence and bullying (Vagi *et al*., 2013). There are crucial questions to be asked: Irrespective of the extent to which communities identify with the state, does the perceived poor quality of service delivery warrant the burning of public facilities and the closure of schools? Are these the norms and values that South Africa wants to instil in future generations?

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The Social Act of Exchange in Power Relations: The study of the Phenomenon of *Nichekeleko* at the Weighbridges in Zambia.

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Abstract

This article examines the widely practiced phenomenon of Nichekeleko at the Weighbridges (WBs) in Zambia. The commonly held understanding of Nichekeleko by the Zambian people is that, it is corruption; ranging from bribery, theft, embezzlement, gratification to favouritism. Sociologically, the phenomenon was conceived as a social act of exchange within the context of power relations by the actors who engage in it. Foucault's notion of power relations and Bourdieu's concepts of "practice" and "fields" provided the theoretical framework for the study. Power was considered as a system, and a network of relations, encompassing the whole society than a relation between the oppressed and the oppressor. Methodologically, this study was based on mixed method research; the large part of it involving participant- observation, interviews and administering of questionnaires

The argument in this paper is that failure to analyse corruption from a linguistic and philosophical perspective implied in 'Nichekeleko' reduces the practice to mere violation of the law or moral rules. A much closer look at corruption from a language vantage point provides us with essential dimensions of the practice, why, and how it has persisted in Zambia

***Key words**: Corruption, Nichekeleko, Power relations, Social act of Exchange, Practice.*

Résumé

Cet article examine le phénomène largement répandu de Nichekeleko sur les ponts Weigh (WB) en Zambie. La compréhension commune de Nichekeleko par le peuple zambien est que c'est de la corruption; allant de la corruption, le vol, le détournement de fonds, la gratification au favoritisme. Sociologiquement, le phénomène a été conçu comme un acte d'échange social dans le contexte des relations de pouvoir par les acteurs qui s'y engagent. La notion de relations de pouvoir de Foucault et les concepts de «pratique» et de «champs» de Bourdieu ont fourni le cadre théorique de l'étude. Le pouvoir était considéré comme un système et un réseau de relations englobant toute la société plutôt qu'une relation entre l'opprimé et l'oppresseur. Méthodologiquement, cette étude était basée sur la recherche de méthodes mixtes; la plus grande partie implique l'observation des participants, des interviews et l'administration des questionnaires

L'argument dans cet article est que l'échec d'analyser la corruption d'un point de vue linguistique et philosophique implicite dans 'Nichekeleko' réduit la pratique à la simple violation de la loi ou des règles morales. Un examen plus approfondi de la corruption d'un point de vue linguistique nous fournit des dimensions essentielles de la pratique, pourquoi et comment elle a persisté en Zambie
***Mots clés**: Corruption, Nichekeleko, Relations de pouvoir, Acte d'échange social, Pratique.*

Introduction

The phenomenon of *Nichekeleko* has widely been considered to be a problem by Zambians. Its persistence remains a major concern. The word, literary, means "cut a slice for me or what is in it for me?" This somehow explains its everyday usage by the people of Zambia to mean corruption, such as bribery, theft, embezzlement of funds to the exchange of small improper gifts and use of personal connections to obtain favours. The fact that *Nichekeleko* is generally considered as corruption is understandable given that many reports in Zambia show its prevalence in all sectors of the economy since the government introduced the privatization program. Viewed as corruption, it is argued that the phenomenon is on the increase, especially since the past 24 years when state assets were privatised.. In this sense, the phenomenon is not new in Zambia (Mbao, 1998; Ndulo, 2004). Fundanga (2009) states that,"privatization program was introduced in compliance with the ideology that state property was unable to operate efficiently and only an economy which is based on private property can be effective." The government introduced the Zambia Privatization Act (ZPA) Chapter 386 of the Laws of the Republic, aimed at converting state property into private hands so that it can fulfil the demands of the economy and operate more efficiently. A five-year plan was put in place, which included all sectors of the economy, to improve performance and efficiency. In the transport sector; government targeted the Zambia corridor-highway: road transport, railways and airports. The objective of the programme was to reduce the cost of doing business and improve quality of services. However, the road to privatization was not easy; the concern for the loss of jobs led resistance to the privatization (Mbao, 2006). But this did not stop privatization. Actual experience has shown that in many of the firms that were sold, existing jobs were preserved while in a number of others, jobs have been lost. A good example is the sale of the publicly owned transport firms such as United Bus Company (UBZ), Contract Haulage (CH) and Zambia Airways (ZA) to private investors.

Workers in the transport sector were highly affected by job losses as most of them could not be absorbed by new owners of the privatized firms. Job losses meant dwindling income. In order to survive , those who lost their jobs started running private business such as operating minibuses or taxis that were mostly defective and usually fail to meet the required motor vehicle safety standards. To avoid the vehicles being impounded by the officials the owners resort to bribery as well as instructing their drivers to avoid

the Weighbridge (WB) or road blocks during official hours. Bribery became a survival strategy. So, to those who engage in it, it was an act of exchange: *I give you money in exchange for passage*. This social act, *Nichekeleko* was considered as corruption and linked to privatization my commentators. Attempts to deal with it, as it increases with the fragile economy, led the government to enact the Penal Code, Chapter 246 of the laws of Zambia. But the problem still persists. So, how can this be explained? To explain it, it is necessary to study the act itself. Hence this study. But to study it, it is critically important to make sense of the word *Nichekeleko*, which is generally used to describe the act, as corruption.

Nichekeleko

The common *Chewa* sayings and proverbs that are implied in the word, *Nichekeleko* are: *Thandizo* and *Wafwilisho* (both meaning support). *M*ost academic literature ignore these about *Nichekeleko*. Instead, the word "corruption" is often used to analyse it. Generally, measures to deal with corruption in Zambia are well documented in several regional and international instruments. For instance, the United Nation Convention against Corruption (UNCAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) protocol against Corruption, the government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) enactment of statutory instruments number 12 of 2005, (s) 3 (Lubinda, 2013) and the re-introduction of the Public Service Code of Ethics in 2010. The earliest juridical framework aimed at reducing it is found in the Public Bodies Corrupt Act of 1889, the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1916, which penalized it in the public sector through law enforcement agencies. These prevention strategies have failed to reduce it because the focus remains at the surface level in the sense of not understanding the act as one reflecting gift exchange or support. The point being made here is that the English translation of the word overshadows the literal meaning of it. Implied in the word, is *Ulemu*, (respect*)*. Therefore, the over reliance on the word "corruption", as if it were a label for a pre-existing fact to analyse *Nichekeleko* at the Weighbridge fails to understand the embodied social relations. Actors who engage in the phenomenon see it less as corruption and hence its persistence as shall be discussed. I focus on the lived experiences of Weighbridge Operators (WBOs) and Truck Drivers (TDs) at the Weighbridge station. The WBOs are stationed at the Weighbridge (WB) and TDs pass through it from Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Republic of South Africa (RSA).

Michel Foucault's theory of power relations and Pierre Bourdieu's notion of practice, habitus and fields provided the appropriate theoretical thinking tools. The theories are particularly important because they allowed us to delve into individual and institutional practices, which embody power. Further, the theory has proven useful as a theoretical

lens in gaining a better understanding of the life-worlds of the respondents. The term "life experiences" was conceived by Habermas (1987: 124) as the "culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of interpretive patterns" that guide the individual's interaction with others and social institution.

The primary concern of the life experience research is to arrive at a point where actors in social relations reach a common understanding regarding the reasons and functional nature of power relations. The argument is that there is an ideal type of relations of power which without suppression or coercion influences actors to engage in the phenomenon of *Nichekeleko* at the WB.

In reviewing Michel Foucault theory of relations of power in connection to the meaning of the word "corruption", Friedrick (2004) observed two schools of thoughts. Firstly, the Universalist defines corruption using certain common properties with the principle that such properties make certain behaviour corrupt in all societies. The problem with this as applied to *Nichekeleko*, is that it does not situate *Nichekeleko* contextually - linguistically and socio-culturally. This failure suggests that people's ways of thinking and acting is missing in any universalistic understanding of *Nichekeleko*. Such understanding is that it is corruption. As Wierzbicka (1997) notes, there are links between the social relations of a society and language spoken.. Words reflect not only the existence of a certain social ritual but also the way of thinking about life's important events. How we interpret words and actions are critical. For example, when the word *Nichekeleko* is applied to non-permanent relationships at the WB, it is seen as meaning "corruption", but when applied to closer patterns of relationships; it refers to someone who must share his life. This means that the word highlights assumptions of special relationships based on intimate communication. This means that when the universalistic word, corruption, is used to analyse practises at the WB, it misrepresents the social actors' ways of thinking.

On the other hand, the relativist definition of corruption as applied to Nichekeleko, is rather reactive and narrow in content because it is detached from society's complex social systems. A relativist definition of corruption, states that it is caused by cultural and moral attitudes (Unzieks, *et al,* 2000). But the problem, in regards to *Nichekeleko* is that it still does not see it from the perspective of the social actors as support. When the word *Nichekeleko* is used to describe the phenomenon at the WB, by its very nature, in *Chewa*, it is a cultural weapon for supporting one another, materially and emotionally. Most scholars (Bohannnan, 1997; Gluckman, 2004) on the subject of linguistic sciences states that, "concepts taken from one cultural system cannot be unequivocally used to name practices in other systems and that literal meanings should be interpreted in the context of an entire cultural system" (Gluckmann, 2004: 23-27). This does not seem to be the case among the relativist scholars of corruption such as de Mari (1984) and de Sardan (1998).

Descriptions of local practices should, Bohannnan (1977) argued, be sensitive to indigenous concepts. According to him, it is important to fit these practices and concepts 'into the larger conceptual system of the people who use [them]' (p. 406). By contrast with other languages, Gluckman argued that many of these concepts can 'without distortion after careful and perhaps lengthy descriptions and discussions, be given English equivalents' (1955). This debate has recently resurfaced in differences between Stephen (1995) and Jones (2007) about the usefulness of local terms in understanding people's beliefs. As Wierzbicka argues, local concepts 'reflect ways of living and ways of thinking characteristic of a given society;' so that 'language and patterns of thought are interlinked' and 'conceptual systems are entrenched in languages' (Wierzbicka, 1997: 308). The weakness of the relativist is that the focus is on "*why*," but ignoring the larger micro socio-political environment in the context of power in which it occurs. Therefore, relativist argument bases its findings on cultural theories but fall short of asking the more fundamental questions of "*how*" corruption have survived changes in society. The study described here examined *Nichekeleko* at the Weighbridges: the act and why it has persisted at Weighbridges in Zambia.

Method

Data used for this article was drawn from a bigger study undertaken at the Kafue, Kapiri-Mposhi and Kafula-futa WBs. Zambia has ten provinces and these WBs are located along the main inter-territorial roads leading to Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The study was conducted at the mentioned weighbridges because of their axle-load[1] activities such as the offloading of over weighted trucks, weighting, the charging of WB fines and detention of defaulting TDs. Participant observation was the major method; interviews were conducted, focus group discussions were organised and questionnaires administered. I observed the weighing of 750 truckloads per week, gently paying attention to *Nichekeleko* by Weighbridge Officers (WBOs), as individuals, and, as a group.

I interviewed the WBOs, TDs, and administered questionnaires to them to establish the TDs and the WBOs' gender, age employment status and years of experience in WB operations as well as truckload driving. The TDs were the first to be sampled based on nationality and years of experience. I sampled 120 TDs out of a population of 740. Only 96 drivers responded. In order to select the 120 TDs, I used simple random sampling technique. I first used nationality to select the drivers who later spoke to other drivers they knew. Then, I selected WBOs based on their rank and years of experience. 64 respondents out of 96 sampled in a population of 125 WB operators were selected. I

1 The axle load of a wheeled vehicle is the total weight felt by the roadway for all wheels connected to a given axle. Viewed another way, it is the fraction of total vehicle weight resting on a given axle.

also sampled 18 policemen and Anti-corruption commission officers who were selected based upon their availability and knowledge of the activities of *Nichekeleko*. The data from this group is dependable because they shared their experiences as law enforcement officers on the subject of corruption. We also interviewed them on the challenges of weighbridge functions. The overall population of the study was 854 comprising of WBOs, TDs, Anti-Corruption Commission officers and traditional leaders. The sample size was 207 out of a total population of 854.

The decision to administer a questionnaire was taken to determine the degree to which *Nichekeleko* was perceived as a major problem and purely for statistical purposes. Questionnaires are perceived somewhat scientifically neutral and provide a formal measurement. Indeed, the questionnaire was administered by targeting a broad range of individuals. Focus group discussions were equally used in addition to interviews . I also had a focus group with three traditional leaders. The traditional rulers were selected because of their influential position as village heads, their proximity to the WB and their role in local government as the mediator between the local people and political officials in Kapiri-Mposhi and Kafue council. They often voice the needs and concerns of the local communities (or at least their interpretation of them) under their control to the local government officials for appropriate attention. We particularly selected traditional leaders to help in shedding some light on of *Nichekeleko* experiences and some important changes that have occurred over time, which are explained in the discussion on findings.

One comment from the discussion triggered a chain of responses. For example, at the community level with traditional leaders and village headmen, the discussion shifted from experiences of WBOs to the specific role of individuals at the WBs. Accordingly, two different focus group discussions were conducted at Kafue and Kapiri-Mposhi WBs. These included a focus group discussion with 2 traditional headmen and their subjects.

Data Analysis and Interpretation

Audio-recorded data was transcribed and translated from Kiswahili, Chinyanja and Ichibemba into English. Recordings of interviews and focus group discussions were in these languages. It allowed participants to fluently express their beliefs, experiences and convictions about the *Nichekeleko* phenomenon. This study used the method of inductive content analysis as the basis for its data analysis. Patton (1990) holds that, "the strategy of inductive designs is to allow the important analysis dimensions to emerge from patterns in the cases under study without presupposing in advance what the important dimensions will be." Hammersley *et al.*, (1995: 209) suggest that in analysing qualitative data, the initial task is to find concepts that help "make sense of what is going on". Patton (1990) seems to suggest that these concepts about data analysis start arising

during data collection and that marks the beginning of the analysis and this continues throughout the study. For a mixed study such as the current one, data collection and analysis go hand in hand to build a coherent interpretation of the data.

The genesis of data analysis was in the data collection phase itself and not after. From the focus group discussions, participant observation and interviews, I began developing tentative understandings as regards the research questions. Patton (2002) holds that as the researcher continues interacting with the data, the researcher starts making sense out of what people have said by looking for patterns and integrating what different people have said after which they are interpreted (Patton, 2002). Miles *et al.,* (1984) advice that analysis should start off with data reduction. This involves careful reading of the recorded material, identification of the main emergent themes and categorization of the data for analysis to data organization. This means that information should be assembled around certain themes and points. In this study, patterns of behaviour were identified from the interviews, participant observations and focus group discussions. There are two methods used in the sociology of analysing data namely:

(a) Words or phrases generated by techniques for systematic elicitation.

(b) Free-flowing texts, such as narratives, discourses and responses to open-ended interviews.

The mixed methods technique helped us to categorize *Nichekeleko* phenomenon into various patterns of behaviour from the actors. Narratives helped me to exploit clues about what actors indulging in *Nichekeleko* do. It helped me to begin examining patterns of behaviour and speech, the repetition of the words in the process of weighing truckloads. The idea here was to understand WBOs experiences from the narrations they gave to me whilst attached to the WB. The understanding of the phenomenon under study and outcomes emerged from interaction with WBOs and their lived experiences in WB operations.

Discussions of Findings

Key reasons for understanding the persistence of *Nichekeleko* in Zambia are presented within the three themes discussed during focus group discussions, Interviews, participant observation and administering of questionnaires. These namely are: behavioural patterns, the contractual process during weighing truckloads, institutional responses to the literal meaning of *Nichekeleko* by the actors who engage in the phenomenon in the context of power relations at the WB. These highlighted themes contextualized in relations of power, give rise to the persistence of *Nichekeleko* in Zambia. The themes are discussed in sequence as patterns of behaviour perpetuating the problem. By observing WBOs in weighting the truckloads, the first theme we found influencing the persistence of *Nichekeleko* phenomenon based on relations of power between them is the literal

meaning of the word *Nichekeleko* itself in *Chewa*. The word is a product of social actions between TDs and WBOs. This is a situation where the body makes itself heard in the language. One is not always told what to do, but his actions are always interpreted as in the cultural literal sense. Thus; this study has been situated using Michel Foucault's power relations to expose the persistence of *Nichekeleko* within the context of power. At the WB these ways of thinking are embedded in ways of operating constituting a case of relations based on practices locally conceptualised as "*Nichekeleko*".

The second theme relating to the persistence of *Nichekeleko* is reflected in the *Ubuntu*[2] ideology. The philosophy of *Ubuntu* can be mirrored on the practice of *Nichekeleko* in terms of the social relations at the WB, in materialistic and non- materialist ways. Thus, in order to get inside the idea of *Ubuntu* at the WB, one must understand the views of people who are involved in the *Nichekeleko* phenomenon. Sogolo (1993) stated the importance of having an understanding about *Ubuntu,* since its meaning is still relevant today. Data on the *Ubuntu* ideology was sourced through interviews and observation of WBOs as they performed their duties. I listened and interpreted the common words that are spoken during the weighing process. The word *Muntu* was constantly spoken as a sign of praise for action or a way of greeting by WBOs. *Ubuntu* cultural norms have been orally translated from generation to generation over a long time and have never been produced as literature or in written form. However, the word *Ubuntu* has not been immune to misuse and over use, as it is a strong and loaded concept of values. In the Zambian context, the word, even though spelt differently, from isiZulu, is written with an adjective as '*Umunthu maningi"* meaning a full human being.

The adjective implies that a person is not just an ordinary human being, but one who provides practical service to others is a real human and friend. This ideology drives the WB community. There is sincere warmth with which WB operators treat both strangers and members of the surrounding community and visitors. This overt display of warmth is not merely aesthetic but enables formation of spontaneous relationships (co-operatives if you will). The resultant collaboration within these spontaneous relationships transcends the negative aspect about *Nichekeleko* phenomenon at the WB and gives functional significance to the value of support; hence the reasons why the phenomenon has persisted. Warmth is an essential condition for WBOs to work efficiently even though sincere warmth may leave one vulnerable to those with ulterior motives. *Ubuntu* is inclusive. It is best realized in deeds of kindness, compassion, caring, support, solidarity and sacrifice (Tefo, 1998). Such acts produce positive results both for individuals and the community. It makes it possible for an individual to count on and

2 See an extended discussion of Ubuntu in isiZulu roughly translating to mean "human kindness. It is an idea from the Southern African region which means literally "human-ness", and is often translated as "humanity towards others", but is often used in a more philosophical sense to mean "the belief in a universal bond of sharing that connects all humanity." See Muleki Munyaka (2009) and Mkgethi Motlahi especially chapter 4 on the philosophical variation in a number of languages in African countries on the meaning of Ubuntu.

expect the meaningful support from fellow human beings at the WB especially during times of need. *Muntu* (human being) is one who is expected to share the resources with which he is blessed with. It is not uncommon for surrounding communities to request the WBOs for transport for their children who are late for school as they cannot afford a bus fare, and have only managed boarding fees. This gesture by the WBOs and TDs to offer free transport to financially disadvantaged parents and friends of WBOs is an action of *Ubuntu*. It is such actions that contribute positively to those in need; they maintain and preserve community cohesion. This shows the link in practice between *Ubuntu* (an African Ideology) and *Nichekeleko* (in terms of its literal meaning as support) is the best way in which actors contribute to society. This can further be illustrated by popular *Chichewa/Nyanja* proverbs such as:

> "Mwanawamnzako ngwako yemwe, ukachenjera manja udya naye" (your neighbour's child is your own, his/her success is your success too) (Mchombo, 1964).

This proverb clarifies the main principle in *Nichekeleko* phenomenon as "providing support'; those with money help those without. In a literal sense, *Nichekeleko* at the WB is the basis or source of feelings for compassion, responsible for making life more humane for others, in particular those financially in need. This mirrors the *Ubuntu* ideology in practical sense through *Nichekeleko* in relations of power in Zambia. The ideology of *Ubuntu* is demonstrated in action, through practices of the *Nichekeleko* phenomenon based on social connectivities. The purpose for which the "*Ubuntu*" ideology in South Africa and the *Nichekeleko* phenomenon in Zambia serves is a moral one for supporting one another. It is the way in which one relates to other people and one's surroundings, hence its persistence.

At individual level, *Nichekeleko* is more of an "expression of social solidarity and instrumental ties" similar to what Hwang (1987) termed "collective ties". These behavioural patterns do not happen in a vacuum, but within power relations; not fixed but fluid. For example, interviews with Jeff, a WBO for over fifteen years explains his actions as follows:

"*sometimes TDs are let free not because they have bribed me but because of the emotional and social support I have rendered that has been built on trust over the years" (RDA staff,* 2015).

From Jeff's narration, I noted that it is the emotional and social support built on trust entrenched in WBOs that triggers them to engage in *Nichekeleko*.. Therefore, any study of corruption that understands it as a transaction between power and money (Scott, 1969) must also take into account transactions between power and influence, power and networks and the language used by participants. This social relation approach in studying corruption is neglected in most academic literature.

Focus group discussions with traditional leaders revealed that the concept of *Nichekeleko is* not but became actively used after the privatization exercise. The concept was new in operation and not in formation. Previously the concept of *Nichekeleko* was inactive; instead, the concept, ''*Katamulomo*", understood to mean the same as *Nichekeleko,* but only used by cross boarder traders of Congo and Zambia, was in use. The word *Katamulomo* equally reflected lived experiences of actors involved in cross boarder trading to mean social support between them. There is a link between cross boarder traders and WBOs since actors of *Nichekeleko* and those of *Katamulomo* are the same. In short *Nichekeleko* is a new version of *Katamulomo* except that it is exclusive to WBOs. This also probably explains the irreversibility of *Nichekeleko* in Zambia.

Further, the persistence of *Nichekeleko's* is anchored on the homology between actor's innate behaviour and WB functions. The link between actors' inner behaviour and functions assisted me to explore how *Nichekeleko* is carried out at the WB in Zambia. For example, the overt type of *Nichekeleko* (what some will refer to as bribery and favouritism, but understood as explained earlier) in the weighing process is embedded in them. This type of *Nichekeleko* takes places at three stages, namely: initial, negotiation, agreement and enforcement stages. The issue is that certain social relations in the initial and negotiation stage of the weighing process triggers the *Nichekeleko*. In the initial stage, there is an initiator and the initiated; the communication between them is so complex. This stage starts with a greeting, smile, nodding of the head even whistling and so on and forth. Ferguson (1998), on a similar issue discussed a special kind of relationships that take place between actors in all situations where both sides have power but different kinds of power and in different degrees, depending on circumstances often imposed from without. The key to the relationship is based on the one who needs something and the other who has the ability to do something. In other words, the *Nichekeleko* at the WB right from the initial stage should be interpreted as particularistic ties.

What I observed is that it is not only money that is exchanged during the initial stage, but it is also an avenue for the making of friendship. There is a willingness to help to do good things to the WBO and the TD which is not restricted to time of *need* alone. Therefore *Nichekeleko* cannot just be considered, as it is, to an illegal activity at the WB but that of social support. At the heart of the social relations is the idea that the WB is a meeting site for initiation, negotiation, agreement and sanctions, usually associated with the individual's way of life. The WB is a place that provides opportunities for interaction and negotiation that occurs between TDs and WBOs. It is a place of relations for familiar persons where an outsider becomes no stranger to the *Nichekeleko* phenomenon.

A theme that emerged from the data shows how the institutional designs of anti-corruption institutions create an environment for *Nichekeleko* to flourish based on social relations and, on the other hand how the presence of the phenomenon in anti-corruption institutions has seriously affected the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures and efforts everywhere. The sources of data came from analysing laws, by-laws, internal

regulations, guidelines of the major anti-corruption institutions, most notably, the ACC commissioners and interviewing general staff members.

What has been omitted in the ACC corrupt practices Act is the recognition of *Nichekeleko* as an informal practice that takes place between actors in relational power. When is ignored, is that *Nichekeleko* reflects personal judgements about human relations. For example, during interviews with 2 ACC officers, they had this to say, "the ACC as an institution; from time to time seconds employees at the WB, as part of an operation to prevent corruption according the Act No.12 of 1996. The Act states that officers shall be seconded to any public office for corruption prevention". Nevertheless, as soon as they are on secondment they are meshed into *Nichekeleko* through a network of relations. They discard their office hierarchies in favour of fluid network models that make it harder for senior staff to infiltrate, disrupt and dismantle. From interviews with two informants familiar with WB operations, this favours the persistence of the *Nichekeleko* such as gift-giving and fuzzy business careers by ACC officers, too. The use of the concept, corruption, does not reflect the lens of those involved in it. If the concept *Nichekeleko* was used to analyse behavioural conduct at ACC, it would expose innate characteristics that have provided an opportunity for the persistence of the problem. The argument here is that the generalised corrupt practices of individuals at ACC is nothing but *Nichekeleko* conceived as "support for the other" relations of power. At the heart of these relations are concepts such as ''*Malume*" meaning "uncle" who are invited for lunch by junior ACC officers. The concept of *Malume* is one of the *Nichekeleko derivatives* with an innate characteristic of support. It is difficult to separate the word *Malume* from the individuals' indulgence in *Nichekeleko* due to the fact that the word has a hidden, elusive power and the act is social. It facilitates the *Nichekeleko* phenomenon in institutions in Zambia. My argument is that *Nichekeleko* phenomenon makes sense only to those who understand its rules and norms. Most anti-corruption agencies ignore the interpersonal social relations of the actors involved in the practice. My data analysis revealed that the phrase "corruption", when used, suggests that at the moment of speech, the speaker is not interested in the particular actor's way of life, and view him exclusively as a law breaker, which is inaccurate, but a normal phenomenon reflected in the lives of those who participate in it. It means, as *Nichekeleko*, a habitual practice of social support. In short, the involvement of WBOs in *Nichekeleko,* as social support involving multiple interactions within a specific socio-political environment, is missing in most ACC laws. The anti-corruption laws fail to capture interpersonal relations that are too revealing, in the phraseological sense, during the weighting process of truckloads. For example the word "*Bwenzi*" and "*Abale*" in Chic*hewa* and Kiswahili refers to people who work together; we see this pattern of interpersonal relationships at the WB. Yet in the anti-corruption law, this is not the case. Instead, most part of the law, relies confusingly on the English word "Corruption" thereby losing sight of the vital *Chewa* linguistic meaning as social support, which involves actors in exchange of gifts, moral and emotional support

in a context of power relations. Simply put these patterns of interpersonal relations have provided an opportunity for actors to engage in the *Nichekeleko* hence its persistence in Zambia.

Conclusion

This article examined the understanding of *Nichekeleko* at the WBs in Zambia by zooming into the complex power relations between actors involved in the phenomenon. One of the major themes to emerge from this study, is the importance of understanding local practice within the prism of the locals.

Most often, commentators view *Nichekeleko* as illegal or immoral actions but the practice should not be dismissed as immoral and illegal; it has to be contextually understood as habitual practice of social support.

Nichekeleko seems to be a way of life by those who indulge in it. One basic tenet of *Nichekeleko* is the notion or expression of sharing of gifts and social support. It is these features that distinguish it from behavioural conduct construed as transgression. The study has shown that, as long as WBO's power, as a form of public power, is delegated and exercised by individual WBOs, the incentive to indulge in the *Nichekeleko* activities will always exist.

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Non-meritocratic Factors and the Recruitment Process in Oyo State Civil Service, Nigeria

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Abstract

This study focuses on non-meritocratic factors that influence recruitment process. The main purpose was to investigate the factors that influence recruitment and selection in Oyo state civil service apart from merit, and ascertain perceived consequences of non-meritocracy in the recruitment process. The survey research method was adopted; quantitative and qualitative techniques were employed in the collection of data. Results show that the dynamics of the recruitment and selection processes in Oyo State civil service are driven more by non-meritocratic influences such as ethnicity, religion, statism, politicization etc. which have become embedded into the socio-economic and political organization/structure of Nigeria. Merit is undermined, thereby making efficiency and effectiveness difficult to achieve in the civil service. We suggest, like many others, that meritocratic principles should be firmly entrenched in the Oyo State Civil Service and that the recruitment process should be devoid of non-meritocratic factors.

Keywords: *Bureaucratic organization theory, Civil service, Meritocratic, Non-meritocratic, Recruitment*

Résumé

Cette étude porte sur les facteurs non méritocratiques qui influencent le processus de recrutement. L'objectif principal était d'étudier les facteurs qui influent sur le recrutement et la sélection dans la fonction publique de l'État d'Oyo, à l'exception du mérite, et de déterminer les conséquences perçues de la non-méritocratie dans le processus de recrutement. La méthode de recherche par sondage a été adoptée. Des techniques quantitatives et qualitatives ont été utilisées pour la collecte de données. Les résultats montrent que la dynamique des processus de recrutement et de sélection dans la fonction publique de l'État d'Oyo est davantage motivée par des influences non méritocratiques telles que l'ethnicité, la religion, l'étatisme, la politisation, etc. Nigeria. Le mérite est miné, ce qui rend l'efficience et l'efficacité difficiles à atteindre dans la fonction publique. Nous suggérons, comme beaucoup d'autres, que les principes méritocratiques soient fermement ancrés dans la fonction publique de l'État d'Oyo et que le processus de recrutement soit dépourvu de facteurs non méritocratiques.

Mots clés : *Théorie de l'organisation bureaucratique, Fonction publique, Meritocratique, Non méritocratique, Recrutement*

Introduction

Every organisation is established with a definite goal or objective in view. The accomplishment of such goals and objectives lies in the hands of the organisation's workforce. They must therefore be well-suited to meet the requirements of the organisation. In an attempt to study the reasons for the inefficiency of the Nigerian civil service, scholars have examined various factors, among which is the recruitment process, in particular, the recruitment process to reflect the principle of Federal Character {Ishaq, (2013); Okeke-Uzodike and Suddan, (2015); Okereka, (2015); Igbokwe-Ibeto and Agbodike, (2015)}. This Principle is essentially non-meritocratic, yet, serve as the overarching recruitment policy in the civil service in Nigeria. In this study, we focus on non-meritocracy in recruitment in the civil service in Nigeria. Specifically, examine the non-meritocratic factors that influence recruitment process in the Oyo State Civil service, and determine the effects that these factors have on a rational bureaucratic organization.

It is however ironic that the processes provided for by the Constitution and the Civil Service Rules and Regulations (policy guidelines), emphasize key attributes such as transparency, uniformity, standardization and meritocracy, which are key features of the Weberian bureaucratic model. Despite all these, the composition of most Ministries, Departments and Agencies, reflects the recruitment of mediocre personnel (Eneanya, 2009), which seems to result from non-meritocracy in the recruitment process. These non-meritocratic factors have hitherto not been systematically studied as a core influence in the recruitment process. They have only been studied as causes of productivity and

inefficiency. It is against this backdrop that this study looked at the influence of non-meritocratic factors on recruitment process in Oyo State Civil Service as well as to identify the perceived consequences associated with the influence of non-meritocratic factors on recruitment processes in Oyo State Civil Service.

Effects of the Influence of Non-Meritocratic Factors on Recruitment Process.

Recruitment is important in the over-all productivity of an organization; it is linked to performance. The objective of every organization is to achieve productivity, which Igbokwe-Ibeto and Agbodike (2015) define as a measure of how well resources are brought together in an organization and utilized, to accomplish a set of results. To be productive is to reach the highest level of performance with the least expenditures or resources.

Non-meritocratic factors in the recruitment process of a country's civil service will likely endanger the socio-economic development of the country. While looking at the challenges facing the Nigerian Civil Service, Okereka (2015) observed that the recruitment and selection system in the Nigerian Civil Service is bedeviled by factors that are hindering and stilling the climate of meritocracy that is critical to actualizing the potency of the civil service; in engineering administrative efficiency, organizational effectiveness and socio-economic development. The concomitant consequences of this untoward practice against the merit philosophy is the up-holding of mediocrity as standard performance. The civil service therefore is occupied with docile personnel whose faith is determined by politicians, right from the point of entry through the career ladder. It is therefore difficult for these caliber of civil servants to protect the profession against the overriding influence of the political leaders. Thus, their docility results in inefficiency and ineffectiveness.

Bureaucracy and Meritocracy

The civil service is a bureaucracy, which Weber conceived as the most effective form of organization because it is logical, and, does not allow for personalized, non-rational, emotional relationships to get in the way. Weber's bureaucratic theory has continued to influence the management and administration of both public and private large scale, social, economic and political organizations in the modern world (Clark, 2012).

In the pre-bureaucratic times, religion, customs and all other forms of sentiments defined people's attitudes and values. Giddens and Sutton (2013) posited that the idea of bureaucracy shows the transition of people from making decisions based on superstition, religion, custom and long-standing habit. However, decisions were now made by engaging

a rational, instrumental calculation that now takes efficiency and future consequences into account. Modern society should be disenchanted by sweeping away the forces of sentimentality and embracing rationalization. Therefore, in a bureaucratic structure, there is little room for sentiments but actions are taken according to the principles of efficiency and on the basis of technical knowledge. In order to achieve the greatest good for a large number of people, merit must be given prominence for tenure jobs, and a body of rational laws formulated by experts who must be impersonal in their approach to official duties are indispensable.

The principle of merit in appointment/recruitment as advocated by the Bureaucratic model must be recognized as a power for good. Even though meritocracy does not "conclusively" lead to the choice of the "most" competent, it is definitely a sure way of excluding the absolutely unfit that socio-cultural influences might bring in (Sundell, 2012). Meritocratic appointment will help to guarantee that those who attain office are qualified for their posts. Competitive examinations and educational and experiential requirements for office will help to screen candidates based on their abilities. Although some scholars such as Merton, have criticized the efficiency of the bureaucratic model as being too rigid and disallowing the use of initiative or discretion, however Sundell (2012) opined that the assessment of the risk level of patronage, nepotism (and other socio-cultural factors) should determine the best way to recruit. If there is a high risk of patronage and nepotism, then more meritocracy is needed in the recruitment process than the use of discretion. Nigeria, being a heterogeneous nation with issues of ethnicity, religion and political patronage bothering its affairs, would suffer most likely if the principle of meritocracy is sacrificed on the altar of use of discretion/initiative.

The theory identifies the importance of meritocracy in organizations, especially in the area of who to recruit, the strategies to be adopted for the recruitment process and how the workforce is prepared for performance. The bureaucratic model emphasizes the importance of rationality. Rational actions puts aside the institution of sentimentality which characterized what propelled decision-making in the pre-bureaucratic times. Recruitment managers (human resource managers) ought to consider the consequences that improper recruitment would do to the organization, in the long run. Rationality of decision, in recruitment process, involves carefully selecting the candidate that would contribute his/her own quota to the goals of the organization, hence leading to organizational performance.

Methods

The survey research method was adopted for this study because the method is well suited for the study of a large population. A field research was conducted, triangulating both the quantitative and the qualitative methods of survey research. The study employed

the exploratory research design. It was also non-experimental and cross-sectional in nature. The exploratory research design was considered appropriate because we sought to explore the subject matter, which has been long enduring, and, to test the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study. It was cross-sectional in design because it took a sample or cross-section of the entire civil servants at a point in time. Moreover, since the research study dealt with individuals, non-experimental research design was employed because it does not involve the manipulation of variables or controlled settings. We used the survey research method because of the large population.

The study population comprises employees of the Oyo State Civil Service. The Oyo State Civil Service has three categories of employees: the junior staff, senior staff and the administrative staff. Junior employees are graded from Level 01-06, while grade levels 07-14 represent the senior staff. Grade levels 15-17 are administrative staff grades. All the Oyo State Civil Service employees are employed in the state government ministries, state government agencies and parastatals. There are 13 ministries, and 42 agencies and parastatals with offices in in the Oyo State Secretariat. This research focused on the 13 ministries that form the core of the civil service; these are:

i. Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development
ii. Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
iii. Ministry of Environment and Water Resources
iv. Ministry of Finance and Budget
v. Ministry of Health
vi. Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism
vii. Ministry of Works and Transport
viii. Ministry of Justice
ix. Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban development
x. Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs
xi. Ministry of Trade, Industry, Investment and Co-operatives
xii. Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Welfare
xiii. Ministry of Youth and Sports

The participants for the study are workers on grade levels 01-14. This is because workers in this category would have undergone the recruitment process conducted by either the Oyo State Civil Service or the Personnel Management Board of each ministry. The total population for workers in the core ministries at the State Secretariat is 4676 (figure derived from the Bureau of Statistics, Oyo State Secretariat, 2016). The sample size of 406 was determined using the Taro Yamane formula.

This study adopted the probability proportional to size sampling technique. Since all the selected ministries are not the same in size (population figure), the probability proportional to size and weighing average was utilized in determining the sample size of respondents in each of the ministries. To ensure proportionate representation of the

respondents, the total number of administered questionnaires (406) was multiplied by the population of staff in a specific ministry and divided by the total population of workers in Oyo state ministries. Table 1 shows the distribution of questionnaires according to the selected ministries. Thirteen ministries were used in this study, representing the core formulation and implementation agencies of the government. A total number of 406 respondents were sampled using the simple random sampling technique. This method provided equal chance of representation for the respondents.

Table 1 The distribution of respondents according to different ministries (using the probability proportional to size technique)

Ministry	Population figure	Proportion	Sample
Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development	736	$\frac{406 \times 736}{4676}$	64
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology	874	$\frac{406 \times 874}{4676}$	76
Ministry of Environment and Water Resources	228	$\frac{406 \times 228}{4676}$	20
Ministry of Finance and Budget	153	$\frac{406 \times 153}{4676}$	13
Ministry of Health	401	$\frac{406 \times 401}{4676}$	35
Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism	186	$\frac{406 \times 186}{4676}$	16
Ministry of Works and Transportation	736	$\frac{406 \times 736}{4676}$	64
Ministry of Justice	152	$\frac{406 \times 152}{4676}$	13
Ministry of Trade, Industry, Investment and Co-operatives	266	$\frac{406 \times 266}{4676}$	23
Ministry of Lands, Housing, and Urban Development	562	$\frac{406 \times 562}{4676}$	49
Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs	120	$\frac{406 \times 120}{4676}$	10
Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Welfare	201	$\frac{406 \times 201}{4676}$	18
Ministry of Youth and Sports	61	$\frac{406 \times 61}{4676}$	5
Total	4676		406

Source: Researcher's Computation (2016)

Data was collected using both quantitative and qualitative techniques. Both methods helped to derive a richer information, where the limitation of one method was covered by the other. The quantitative technique gathered information from a vast group of civil servants in different ministries who have undergone the recruitment and selection processes of Oyo State, whereby they offered their evaluative perception of the conduct of the recruitment process. While the qualitative method offered an in-depth knowledge of the processes of and influences involved in the recruitment processes of the Oyo State Civil service, as those who are involved in the recruitment processes were interviewed.

The quantitative data for this study was analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) to allow for a descriptive analysis of univariate and bivariate distributions that are relevant to the study. Qualitative data, collected through the In-Depth Interview and Key Informant Interview method was transcribed; and data was analyzed using content analysis. Also, verbatim quotations were used in the course of the analysis where appropriate. It is important to note that throughout the analysis, triangulation of quantitative and qualitative data was adopted. Concerning confidentiality, this research ensured a great deal of confidentiality in order to protect participants who willingly gave out information that might offend the top echelons. As regards willingness, no respondent was compelled to give information. Hence, this research aimed at ensuring that the parties concerned understood the trends of this issue and start working on the solution in order to achieve better efficiency in the civil service.

Data Analysis and Discussion of Findings

From the 406 administered questionnaires, only 350 questionnaires were retrieved; this is a response rate of eighty-six percent (86%). The socio-demographic data presented in Table 2 which forms the background characteristics of the participants in this study consisted of age, sex, marital status, level of education, grade level cadre, religion, and ethnicity particularly their state of origin. On the average, sampled civil servants were 39 years old with their ages ranging from 21 to 56 years. This provided higher chances of receiving sufficient information from civil servants across a wider age range. Majority of the respondents were in their 30s (42.2%); those in their 40s make up 35.5% of the study population. A tenth of the respondents are either in their 20s or close to retirement. The bulk of the study population can thus be considered as in their 'productive' years. An analysis of their gender showed 56.6% male and 43.4% female; male employees are generally more than female employees as Damina, Osagbemi, Dongurum and Laka (2012) and Gberevbie (2010) have highlighted with regard to employment figures in the Nigerian civil service.

Table 2 also reveals the ethnicity of civil servants. The three major ethnic groups in Nigeria seemed not to be well represented in the state civil service. Virtually all

the respondents are Yoruba, no Hausa and only one out of the 350 respondents is associated with the Igbo ethnic group. It appears ethnicity in the civil service was more of a constant than a variable. Another interesting aspect of respondents' background characteristics is that one may expect that since almost all the sampled civil servants are Yoruba, there will be an even representation of the workers from the five south-western states where the Yoruba people are located. However, this was not the case. Table 2 shows that about 91.6% reported to be indigenes of Oyo state leaving out just 8.4% of the respondents to other states within the country; which comprises respondents' whose state of origin is within the south-west region (7.5%) and those outside the south-west region (0.9%). This signifies the predominance of state indigenes over non-indigenes in the Oyo State Civil Service. The implication of these figures corroborates with the assertion of Akinwale (2014) that there is often discrimination in state civil service for non-indigenes who seek employment.

Data on the marital status of respondents showed that four out of every five civil servants that were interviewed were currently married, leaving out less than 20% who are single (that is, not married). This is not surprising as most of the respondents are in their middle ages, and culturally expected to be married at such ages. The educational categorization shows that majority of the respondents are graduates (64%) and about a quarter have received a post-graduate degree, cumulatively, about 88% have gone through tertiary education. This figure is also not alarming since most of the civil servants represented in the study fall under the senior cadre (73.4%), and as such, they are expected to have a minimum qualification of tertiary education to occupy such position. Two cadres of civil servants were represented in this study; a quarter of the respondents (25.1%) are in the junior cadre, and 73.4% are in the senior cadre.

Table 2: Frequency Distribution of Background Characteristics of Respondents

	Frequency	**Percentage**
Sex		
Male	197	56.6
Female	153	43.4
Marital status		
Single	61	17.9
Married	276	81.2
Widowed	3	0.9
Age		
20-29	32	11.3
30-39	119	42.2
40-49	100	35.5
50+	31	11.0

Religion		
Christianity	198	56.6
Islam	152	43.4
Ethnicity		
Yoruba	346	99.7
Igbo	1	0.3
Hausa	-	-
Educational qualification		
Primary	1	0.3
Secondary	39	11.4
Tertiary (1st Degree)	219	63.8
Tertiary (Postgraduate)	84	24.5
State of Origin		
Oyo State	317	91.6
Other state (within South-West)	26	7.5
Other state (outside South-West)	3	0.9
Grade level		
Junior cadre	88	25.1
Senior cadre	257	73.4
No response	5	1.5

Source: Field Survey (2016)

Meritocracy in the Civil Service

Presented in Table 3 is the respondents' opinion about appointment into the Civil service. This question sought to understand if meritocracy was the only route through which an applicant can be recruited into the Oyo state civil service. Only 7.5% and 22.5% of the respondents strongly agreed and agreed respectively while 8.1% of the respondents were undecided. However, 48.4% disagreed while the remaining 13.4% of the respondents strongly disagreed with the claim that merit is the only consideration or route through which an applicant can be recruited. This suggests that there is a presence of other factors asides merit in Oyo State Civil Service recruitment. Maidoki and Dahida (2013), Akinwale (2014), Gberevbie (2010), Igbokwe-Ibeto and Agbodike (2015) had posited that the recruitment policies and procedures in the Nigerian Civil service is highly controversial and complex in nature. Hence, the tenet of merit and technical competence as rooted in Weber's bureaucratic model seems not to be predominantly applied in the Oyo State Civil Service.

A qualitative analysis of this section also buttresses the opinion that merit is not the only consideration to securing an appointment with the Oyo State Civil service. Some of the interviewees expressed their opinions on the issue-

"no. it is not all about merit. Just like we have the VC list and Deans' list in the University system during admission; so also we have the Governor's list, the Commissioner's list, the Permanent Secretary's list and more like that when recruitment is conducted. Will you say that is merit?"
(IDI, male, senior cadre, GL 12)
"Well, merit is said to be the major consideration but there are other ways for those who know their way."
(**IDI, female, junior cadre, GL06)**
"*Yes, I think merit is a major consideration. You cannot deny the existence of other factors but I think Oyo state civil service commission tries their best to recruit based on merit*."
(IDI, female, senior cadre, GL14)

Non-meritocratic factors influencing Recruitment Process in Oyo state Civil Service

In Table 3, various non-meritocratic factors influencing recruitment process in Oyo State civil service were identified. From the factors identified, a high proportion of respondents asserted that being an indigene of the state (statism) was the most crucial factor affecting recruitment process. This was evident as the average mean score of respondents' rating for statism was 3.96 out of a total of 5. The influence of 'godfatherism', nepotism and ethnicity were rated next to being an indigene of the state in the recruitment process with an average mean of 3.93, 3.88, and 3.18 respectively. On the other hand, religion was indicated by respondents to be the least non-meritocratic factor to be considered in civil service recruitment process. As established, religious factor has the lowest mean of 2.03. Similarly, recruiting based on payment of bribe was also one of the factors that respondents perceived to least influence recruitment process.

Godfatherism

As indicated in Table 3, 76.3% of the respondents believe that a strong godfather can get his candidate an appointment into the civil service in Oyo state, irrespective of the candidate's qualification. Also, 75.7% of the total respondents responded positively to the assertion that candidates in the merit list can be denied the job if a political godfather has his own candidate. This is in line with the studies conducted by Adeyemi and Osunyikanmi (2015) and Onwe et. al (2015) who posited that the list of the political bigwigs in the society usually outweigh the results derived from the recruitment and selection exercise conducted by the recruiting bodies. This throws merit to the wind.

Onwe et. al (2015) further posits that "top citizens of the state" such as members of the state house of assembly, commissioners and special advisers to the governor, are given the privilege to present their candidates which gives them the opportunity to reward party loyalists.

When the issue of godfatherism was further probed during the interview session, it was discovered that it was accepted by most of the interviewees as the norm which operates in the Oyo state civil service recruitment –

> *"And the one you're calling godfatherism and nepotism- how can you have an uncle or aunty in a top position that can help you get what you need and you will say no? In this economy that people are looking for job? Even those who are qualified are still on the streets, not to talk of those who are not really qualified. Yes it happens in the Civil service but it is not really so bad considering the state of the* country."
> (IDI, male, senior cadre, GL12)

Further insight into this issue was sought from the Key Informant Interview respondent at the Civil Service Commission, who had this to say about the prevalence of godfatherism –

> "In the typical Nigerian society, there is no place that such things don't happen. The Commission tries her best to be impartial; but it is faced by strong pressures of political godfathers and personal pressures from family and friends. These things happen in an informal way but we try our best to curtail it."
> (KII, CSC staff, male, senior cadre, GL 14)

Statism

The opinions of the respondents were sought in order to investigate the prevalence of statism over merit. Although 78.4% of the total respondents posit that indigenes of the state are given more consideration than non-indigenes; 67.7% of the total respondents also opined that it is more advisable for non-indigenes to change their state of origin to Oyo state in order to be considered for recruitment. This depicts the prevalence of favouring state indigenes over non-indigenes. The Nigerian society, and the African society at large, hold family and tribal/ethnic values in high esteem which can be to the detriment of a sound and rational recruitment process and the unity of the nation at large (Salawu and Hassan, 2011). As seen above, what obtains is not a national unified identity but family and state identity. Edosa (2014) observed that states and

local governments in Nigeria often discriminate against people/applicants who do not hail from their geographical boundaries. The above clearly reflects the influence of sentiments and emotions in the recruitment processes of Oyo State Civil service.

Furthermore, some of the interviewees had this to say about the influence of statism in the recruitment process.

> "The truth is that you cannot have food now, and see that your son is hungry and yet give the food to a neighbor or stranger. How can an Oyo indigene be denied and the job be given to an outsider? It is rather better for the non-indigene to then change his or her qualification to Oyo state."
> (IDI, male, senior cadre, GL14)
> "There is no written policy anywhere that Oyo state civil servants must be indigenes of the state; although preference is given to indigenes of the state. However, in exceptional cases, employment is given to non-indigenes; for instance, if a serving corps member does exceptionally and excellently well, he can be given a full appointment (regardless of the state he hails from). In another way, if a non-indigene, female I mean, gets married to an Oyo man, then it will make it easier for the woman. Though we know that she is not from Oyo, but the husband's origin as an Oyo man will make up for it.
> (KII, CSC staff, male, senior cadre, GL12)

Apart from the "advice" given by the respondents that non-indigenes should consider changing their state of origin to Oyo state in order to stand a better chance for appointment, an interesting and recurring notion is that female non-indigenes could stand a better chance if they get married to a male indigene. This was also affirmed by a female interviewee:

> "like I said earlier, all these things happen if you know your way. I'm from Osun state but since I married an Oyo man, but I had to claim my husband's state of origin. That made it easier for me. And some other ladies that are non-indigenes did like that also. So yes, I believe the issue of ethnicity happens."
> (IDI, female, junior cadre, GL06)

Religious Factor

Religion, as a social factor, seems not to be an element influencing recruitment process in the Oyo State Civil Service recruitment. From Table 2, the distribution of the respondents shows an almost equal representation between the two major religions that the respondents posited that they practice; 56.6% Christian and 43.4% Muslims. Hence, their opinions on the influence of this social factor on recruitment process cannot be construed as being biased. The above data hereby suggests that candidates' religious affiliation does not influence the recruitment outcome in Oyo State Civil service. This position refutes the findings from the studies of Maidoki and Dahaida (2013) and Omisore and Okofu (2014) that religious factor has a strong influence on the recruitment processes in the Nigerian Civil service.

Table 3: The Prevalence of Non-Meritocratic factors in Oyo State Civil Service Recruitment

S/N	Influence of non-meritocratic factors on recruitment process in Oyo state civil service	SA	A	UN	D	SD
		Freq. (%)	Freq. (%)	Freq. (%)	Freq. (%)	Freq. (%)
1.	A candidate can only get appointed into the Oyo State Civil Service by merit	26 (7.5)	78 (22.5)	28 (8.1)	168 (48.4)	47 (13.4)
2.	With a strong godfather, an applicant can get appointed into the Oyo State civil service regardless of his/her qualification	110 (31.4)	157 (44.9)	30 (8.6)	39 (11.1)	14 (4.0)
3.	Candidates on the merit list can at times be denied the job if a political godfather has his own candidate	118 (33.7)	147 (42.0)	34 (9.7)	45 (12.9)	6 (1.7)
4.	Indigenes of the state are given more consideration for appointment than non-indigenes	117 (33.7)	155 (44.7)	28 (8.1)	39 (11.2)	8 (2.3)
5.	Regardless of qualification, a candidate can be denied his employment if he/she is not Yoruba	54 (15.5)	107 (30.7)	57 (16.3)	111 (31.7)	20 (5.7)
6.	Regardless of qualification, a candidate can be denied his employment if he/she is not an indigene of Oyo state	41 (11.7)	113 (32.4)	57 (16.3)	123 (35.2)	15 (4.3)
7.	Your religious affiliation could determine whether you will get recruited into the civil service or not	14 (4.0)	24 (6.9)	37 (10.6)	157 (45.0)	117 (33.5)
8.	A job position could be created in order to employ a relative of a top government official	3 4 (9.8)	100 (28.7)	6 8 (19.5)	108 (31.0)	3 8 (10.9)
9.	Unnecessary offices are created to recruit people favoured by a politician or godfather	40 (11.5)	114 (32.8)	6 9 (19.8)	9 7 (27.9)	2 8 (8.0)
10	Appointment can be secured into the civil service by paying money to a government official	33 (9.4)	71 (20.3)	69 (19.7)	126 (36.0)	51 (14.6)

11	Lobbying an administrative cadre staff is one of the ways to secure appointment	22 (6.4)	86 (24.9)	65 (18.8)	128 (37.0)	45 (13.0)
12	For non-indigenes, changing one's state of origin to Oyo state gives candidate a higher chance of consideration for a job	36 (10.3)	201 (57.4)	44 (12.6)	49 (14.0)	20 (5.7)
13	Knowing someone in the administrative cadre will help you get a job in the Oyo State civil service	41 (11.7)	132 (37.8)	61 (17.5)	93 (26.6)	22 (6.3)
14	Knowing someone who knows someone influential in the Oyo state civil service can help you get a job	74 (21.2)	203 (58.2)	3 4 (9.7)	32 (9.2)	6 (1.7)

Source: Field Survey, 2016

Perceived consequences associated with the influence of non-meritocratic factors on recruitment process.

When recruitment exercise is permitted to be influenced upon by non-meritocratic factors such as statism, nepotism, ethnicity, religion, godfatherism instead of merit, the process of recruitment could best be described as poor and improper. This study investigated the perception of respondents on likely consequences of a poorly conducted recruitment process. The opinions of the respondents were sought on this issue because they have observed this phenomenon and its consequences in their workplace (Civil Service). As summarized in Table 4, 78.0% of respondents in the study believed that there would definitely be negative consequences attached to a recruitment process that is not guided by the principle of merit. However, 22.0% of respondents disagreed to the notion that negative consequences could result from recruitment of personnel based on non-meritocratic factors. This is represented in the table below:

Table 4: Percentage distribution of respondents' opinion on the consequences of non-meritocratic recruitment

Recruitment without merit will result in negative consequences	**Frequency**	**Percentage**
Yes	256	78.0
No	72	22.0
Total	328	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2016

From these, respondents opined that if any of the aforementioned factors influences civil service recruitment, 67.4% agreed that such an individual will lack passion for the job he or she was employed to do and 58.4% reported that they would not always

meet targets and demands given to them, a large proportion (53.5%) also admitted that such an individual is unlikely to arrive early to work. With respect to knowledge about work roles, 53.5% disagreed that anyone whose recruitment was influenced by socio-cultural factors will have adequate knowledge of how to perform their duties. Work commitment may also be challenged if the due process of recruitment was not followed. The respondents report that regular presence at work, maintaining good relationship with other colleagues, time management skills and dealing with confidential information do not necessarily correspond to the recruitment process.

Table 5: Frequency distribution of perceived consequence of non-meritocratic factors on recruitment process

Perceived consequences of non-meritocratic factors on recruitment	**Agreed**	**Disagreed**	**Undecided**
	Freq. (%)	**Freq. (%)**	**Freq. (%)**
Lack of passion for the work	230 (67.4)*	77 (22.6)	34 (10.0)
Early arrival to work	101 (29.5)	183 (53.5)*	58 (17.0)
Commitment to work	110 (32.4)	189 (55.6)*	68 (12.0)
Absence from work	117 (34.3)	136 (39.9)	88 (25.8)
Always finish work on time	91 (26.6)	185 (54.1) *	66 (19.3)
Always meet work targets and demands given to them	81 (23.8)	199 (58.4)*	61 (17.9)
Adequate knowledge of their Responsibilities	160 (46.8)	132 (38.6)	50 (14.6)
Adequate knowledge of how to perform their duties	116 (34.1)	182 (53.5)*	42 (12.4)
Effective time management	110 (32.5)	144 (42.6)	84 (24.9)
Good working relationship with their colleagues	199 (58.2)	82 (24.0)	61 (17.8)
Consultation with supervisors when needed	197 (57.8)	89 (26.1)	55 (16.1)
Deals appropriately with confidential Information	147 (43.4)	128 (37.8)	64 (18.9)

Note: values in parentheses indicate percentages
*indicates aspects where over half of the respondents confirms a negative effect of socio-cultural factors of recruitment on job performance

From Table 5, these perceived consequences are measured with values of motivation and ability. Motivation, in order to examine if candidates who are recruited through non-meritocratic factors have an intrinsic drive for their work. One of the consequences of poor recruitment is employing people who lack a motivation for what they do, especially intrinsic motivation. Ability talks about the knowledge and skills to carry out the assigned tasks. Another consequence of recruiting people on other factors apart from merit is that they might lack the knowledge and skills required to carry out the tasks assigned to them. To buttress the above, the interviewees had these to say about the effects of recruiting personnel based on non-meritocratic factors –

> "there are many instances that we have unqualified people in whom their sponsors believe that all they need is training on the job and they will know it. This is not always effective. Some of them don't even have the zeal for that job, they were just thrown into it because that was the space/place their godfather got for them. They end up not doing their job well."
> (IDI, female, senior cadre, level 14)

Also, another interviewee reported thus:

> "I feel the major disadvantage to recruiting people on other basis rather than merit is that some of them will know what to do and how to go about their work yet they won't discharge their duties well or at the right time because they feel that their godfather will always be there for them. So, who can hold them to ransom? Or who dares to punish them? And the way civil service is structured is such that dereliction of duty by one person can affect the work of others; this will affect the overall performance of such department. It's a chain process. So if recruitment is based on merit, it will have a positive effect on the performance and efficiency of the Oyo State Civil Service."
> (IDI, male, senior cadre, level 12)

Another respondent opined that

> "If true merit is applied, truly it would lead to better performance by the civil service generally. Since they are very skilled at what they do, they will apply that skill to their work."
> (IDI, female, senior cadre, level 14)

The Weberian principle provides the platform to ensuring efficiency of administration in the civil service. The ability of the government and recruiting bodies to absorb the best qualified, technically competent, disciplined and committed personnel, without being influenced by sentimental and primordial issues, would in turn help government to achieve the goals of governance and administration (Igbokwe-Ibeto and Agbodike, 2015). Such civil servants will be able to facilitate improved implementation of government policies and programmes.

Discussion

This study highlights the non-meritocratic factors in the Oyo State Civil Service recruitment process and the implications. The bureaucratic model suggests that a systematic set of laid-down rules guide the action of employees in a bureaucracy; recruitment process should be similarly guided by laid-down rules. Therefore, whom to recruit into the civil service should be a factor of a rational process carried out according to laid-down rules. The principle of meritocracy in recruitment ensures that there is a rational selection of candidate based on the ability, competence and skills of the individual. When personal bias and other forms of sentiment influence the recruitment process, it could have a negative consequence on the organization. Socio-cultural factors such as ethnicity or statism, political patronage, nepotism, religious affiliation etc. are mostly factors arising out of emotions/sentiments and personal bias. They constitute non-meritocratic factors that hinder a rational recruitment process. For example, non-recruitment of non-indigenes, qualified for a job on sentimental basis.

The sentiments attached to decision-making in Nigeria have contributed to the low performance of the civil service in the country. Sentiments attached to recruitment process could lead to recruiting employees ill-qualified for a position. This point is clear in Weber's bureaucratic model; recruitment should be based on the technical competence of individuals and should be devoid of the traditional system which gave room for sentimentality and a system of ascription. Nepotism, statism, godfatherism, ethnicity are all factors arising out of sentiments and such has a negative consequence on the civil service when the principle of meritocracy is not allowed to run its course. The efficiency of the Civil service goes beyond a good organization structure. Despite the tailored structure of the Nigerian Civil Service, a good performance is not guaranteed if a credible recruitment process is not enthroned. One of the key principles emphasized upon in the Weberian Bureaucratic model is recruitment and promotion of officials based on merit. It is only when the principles of bureaucratic administration are adhered to that an effective decision making, optimum use of resources and attainment of organization goals can be realized. Hence, the recruitment of officials should be based on rationality – that is, merit and qualification. The traditional type of administration, which was the previous model, focused on appointment based on personal relations and preferences; whereas the bureaucratic model insists that every official should receive appointment only on the basis of merit and technical qualification. It is further characterized by the principle of impersonality that strongly counters the presence of undue influences which is a negative aspect of the traditional administration system.

Conclusion

The non-meritocratic factors that influences recruitment process in the Oyo State Civil Service was examined in this study. Concerning the influence of meritocracy as the determining factor of recruitment process in Oyo State Civil Service, 61.9% of the respondents believe that merit is not the only route/way through which a candidate can get employed into the service. This posits that three out of every five civil servants in the Oyo State civil service believe that there is the existence of non-meritocratic factors in the recruitment processes. This corresponds with the study of Maidoki and Dahida (2013) and Akinwale (2014) that the system of recruitment in Nigeria is based on the spoils system where merit is sacrificed.

Different non-meritocratic factors were examined such as statism, nepotism, godfatherism, religion, ethnicity and findings revealed that all these factors except religion have a strong influence on the recruitment process of the Oyo State Civil Service. Statism and ethnicity were separated because the study sought to check the dominance of indigenes as compared to non-indigenes. Statism seems to be the most prevalent non-meritocratic factor as even candidates from other states in the same Yoruba ethnic group/origin have just a representation of 7.5% out of the total population. It was further asserted from the analysis of both the quantitative and qualitative data that Oyo indigenes cannot be denied recruitment just in the bid to favour non-indigenes. Edosa (2014) had likewise observed that states and local governments in Nigeria often discriminate against people/applicants who do not hail from their geographical boundaries.

Activities of patrons and their clients, usually referred to as godfatherism, seems also to be recurring in the Oyo State Civil Service. It is however a disturbing factor as candidates with the technical competence who made the merit list could at times be denied an appointment because a godfather has his own candidate who must be recruited at all cost. Qualification of the godfather's candidate might be irrelevant, depending on the position of such godfather in the society. This is in line with the assertion of Onwe et. al (2015), that the list of the political bigwigs in the society usually outweigh the results derived from the recruitment and selection exercise conducted by the recruiting bodies.

However, religion as a non-meritocratic factor seems not to be so relevant in influencing the recruitment process in Oyo State Civil Service. While eight of every ten civil servants believe that a candidate's religious affiliation has nothing to do with the recruitment process, only one out of ten civil servants agreed that it could influence recruitment process in Oyo State Civil Service, while the remaining one civil servant of the fraction stands undecided about the premise. This is in dispute with the assertions of Maidoki and Dahaida (2013) and Omisore and Okofu (2014) that religious factor

do influence recruitment processes in the Nigerian Civil service. The consequences associated with recruiting people based on other factors apart from merit is seen in the performance of such people. Incompetence, inefficiency and low performance are the perceived major consequences attributed to recruiting civil servants on the basis of non-meritocratic factors.

From the foregoing, it has become necessary to review the choices that have hindered the efficiency of the civil service and design new policies that will lead to a better performance of the civil service in Oyo state, and in Nigeria as a whole. The importance of recruitment process in an organization, especially in the civil service, cannot be over-emphasized. Therefore, attention should be paid to the process that brings in the personnel into the organization and it should be devoid of non-meritocratic factors especially on the basis of statism or ethnicity. The system of corruption should be investigated and dealt with by the recruiting bodies and the government. Investigations should be made to discover officials who collect money from applicants on the basis of recruitment and proper justice meted out to them. Furthermore, the system of corruption where candidates change their state of origin to that of Oyo state should be frowned upon. Hence, it is the responsibility of the government and recruiting bodies to embrace diversity of prospective employees (candidates). Finally, meritocratic principles should be firmly entrenched in the Oyo State Civil Service.

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