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La Revue Africaine de Sociologie est une publication semestriel du CODESRIA à Dakar, au Sénégal. On accepte tout article des chercheurs africains et non-africains concernant la problématique des analyses sociales de ce continent et en général. La Revue axiste d'abord comme support pour l'extension de la pensée sociologique et anthropoloque entre les chercheurs en Afrique. Tout travail pertinent venant de l'extérieur du continent est néanmoins aussi considéré. Des contributions ou en français sont acceptées.

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EDITORIAL:

In this issue, we publish a health study in line with our policy to feature research on illness and disease in Africa every now and then. HIV/AIDS disease seems to dominate health research in Africa in the past two decades with the result that researchers tend to overlook similar deadly diseases and illnesses. Malaria remains one of such illnesses. The WHO World Malaria Report 2012 estimates about 219 million cases of malaria in 2010 and an estimated 6000,000 deaths. In as much as these figures are high, the report qualifies as good news given that between 2000 and 2010, malaria mortality actually fell by 26% according to the same report. In sub-Sahara Africa, where malaria is deadly because of the mosquito friendly climate and frequently poor prevention and treatment, it decreased by 33%. The report estimated that 1.1 million deaths were averted globally as a result of scale-up intervention. It is against this that the study by Ali Arazeem Abdullahi, Cecilia Van Zyl-Schalekamp and Anton Senaka can be contextualized.

Olajide Oloyede
Managing Editor

Negation and Affirmation: a critique of sociology in South Africa

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Abstract

This paper critically evaluates the epistemological basis of the academic discipline of sociology in South Africa. In particular, it contextualises, and therefore subjects to critical scrutiny, the assumptions made (and not made) by South African sociologists in their writings about the discipline of sociology in South Africa. Secondly, it seeks to make an epistemic intervention on the current debates on epistemological decolonisation of the social sciences in the South African academy. The issues raised in the paper no doubt go beyond the South African academy and speak to issues raised by sociologists in other parts of the African continent and in the Third World generally.

Keywords: academic dependency, endogeneity, sociology, South Africa

Introduction

Sociology, quite like philosophy, is said to be characterised by critical self-awareness. That is to say, sociologists do not only write about societies, which are the objects of their enquiry; they tend also to write about the discipline self-consciously as sociologists. In this regard, South African sociologists are no exception. One often encounters articles dealing with the 'state of the discipline' of sociology in South Africa (Burawoy 2004, 2009; Cock 2006; Dubbeld 2009; Hendricks 2006; Jubber 1983; Mapadimeng 2012; Sitas 1997; Uys 2004; Webster 1985, 1991, 2004). Such writings, however, tend to focus on how sociology in South Africa should face up to its immediate socio-political environment rather than the epistemological issues which constitute it. The recent focus on the notion of 'public sociology', inspired by Burawoy, is a case in point. This practice, as pointed out by Oloyede (2006), tends to confuse sociologists with activists. The present paper will move away from such discussions and focus, instead, on epistemological issues. This paper comprises three main parts. The first part of the paper contextualises discussions on epistemological decolonisation. The second part, which dovetails with the first, provides a brief survey of sociology in South Africa. It subjects to critical scrutiny

the assumptions made (and not made) by South African sociologists – at least those who have written about sociology in South Africa. While the use of (secondary) sources in this paper is comprehensive, the length limit means that the paper cannot be exhaustive. The third section of this paper briefly discusses measures which may be taken to reverse some of the problems under critical scrutiny.

II

Tracing the roots of 'academic dependency', Syed Farid Alatas (2003: 600) states that: 'To the extent that the control and management of the colonised required the cultivation and application of various disciplines such as history, linguistics, geography, economics, sociology and anthropology in the colonies, we may refer to the academe as imperialistic.' For his part, Zeleza (1997: ii) argues that the literature on Africa, in the Northern academy, has always been 'self-referential, few scholars paid attention to the writings of African scholars or to what African scholars had to say'. Instead, discussions tended to centre on ill-equipped theoretical fads that gained currency in the western academy. So ubiquitous was this practice that 'each generation [of western scholars] produced its Livingstones who rediscovered Africa through the prevailing epistemological fad. Thus, Africa always appeared as nothing more than a testing site for theories manufactured in the Western academies' (Zeleza 1997: ii). Such fads range from modernisation theories, dependency theory, neo-Marxism, post-coloniality, post-modernism and so on. Indeed, 'there seemed to be a reputational lottery for those who could coin the most demeaning defamations of Africa and its peoples' (Zeleza 1997: ii). There are also, in fashion, concepts, such as, 'kleptocracy', 'patrimonial states', 'primordial states', 'predatory states', 'failed states' and so on. This labelling, Zeleza argues, was the final straw between African scholars and their western counterparts. African scholars were called upon to 'negate' these existential and epistemological 'negations'. That is not to suggest, however, that there are no African scholars who engage in such labelling.

Writings on Africa are replete with Africa's 'otherness' or what Mafeje calls 'negations' (when referring to the social sciences generally) or 'alterity' (when talking about anthropology in particular). Africa is almost always presented as a 'representation of the West's negative image, a discourse that, simultaneously, valorises and affirms Western superiority and absolves its existential and epistemological violence against Africa' (Zeleza 1997: iii). Let us, at this point, bring the story closer to home, South Africa. It has been suggested that the social sciences in South Africa thrive on essentially racist paradigms: that the black majority are either spoken of or spoken for (Sitas 1998:13). For Mafeje (1971, 1976, 1996), the epistemological basis for the social sciences has always been 'imperialistic'. Sociologists and anthropologists tended to produce writings which were 'doubtful, mistaken and pernicious' (Magubane 1973). Such writings are

accepted as working truths, their methodological and theoretical flaws notwithstanding (Magubane 1973, 2007). For Magubane, these writings constitute little more than a defence of economic and political interests of the white minority. However to speak about the social sciences in general is too big a task. Hence we shall limit ourselves to the academic discipline of sociology in South Africa. Following Alatas (2003), when we speak of the West, we refer in particular to the UK, the US and France, insofar as they have a global reach in terms of their research output in the social sciences.

It has been pointed out by various authors that the writings of black sociologists hardly feature in the reading material in many departments of sociology in South Africa (Adesina 2005, 2006a; Jubber 2006). Alatas (2012a) argues that standard sociology textbooks, when referring to thinkers of the 19th century, make no reference to sociologists outside of Europe. In fact, the history of sociology is equated with the history of western modernity; no reference is made to Ibn Khaldun to give but one example. Alatas refers to this erasure as the 'New Orientalism' (Alatas 2012a). In doing so, he departs from Edward Said's notion of Orientalism in that he transcends the Orient/Occident dichotomy and highlights, instead, the fact that academics have gone beyond the pejorative ways of writing about the Orient. Instead, the trend has taken the form of marginalising writings and writers from areas other than the West. The Third World, Alatas (2012a) argues, is simply not seen as a source of ideas/theory – but that of data gathering.

The upshot of this marginalisation is 'Hidden Eurocentrism' (Alatas 2012b) which consists in (i) the desire to apply, universally, categories which come from particular locales (e.g. the UK or the US) to the rest of the world; and (ii) the internalisation, on the part of Third World scholars, of ideas which are superimposed on them by an academic orthodoxy – something which leads to lack of 'self-understanding'. The critical issue, therefore, is for Third World sociologists to put scholarship outside of the West on a par with western scholarship – through research and teaching. This is what Alatas (2012a) calls a 'sociological fusion' e.g. just as we borrow and domesticate art, cuisine, music etc. we can do the same with ideas. This is clearly no invitation to parochialism. It is, Alatas argues, one of the ways of transcending 'academic dependency' or the intellectual 'division of labour' between the North and the Third World.

Chief among the sociologists who champion transformation of sociology (and the social sciences generally) in South Africa are, respectively, Adesina (2002, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008a, 2008b, 2010), Mamdani (1992, 1993, 1998a, 1998b, 2008), Lebakeng (2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2010), Seepe (1998, 2004), Thaver (2002), and Hendricks (2006). They argue that the process of knowledge-making in South Africa ought to take Africa as its reference point or that it should be rooted in its 'ontological narratives' (Adesina, 2006b: 2). It is said that presently, sociology in South Africa is characterised by a two-fold problem: 'negations' and 'extraversion' (Adesina, 2005, 2006a, 2008a, 2010). At the level of epistemology South African sociologists take the West as

their main point of reference. Thaver (2002) points out that this practice does little to inspire the contemporary generation to study sociology.

Much of this extraversion can be traced to what Adesina (2006a) calls 'status anxiety' – the unjustified worry on the part of South African sociologists about what the countries of the North will say about them. Yet, as Adesina reminds us, it is primarily because the so-called 'founding fathers of sociology' (Durkheim, Marx and Weber) were rooted in their locales that their works have universal appeal. This rootedness in one's locale is fundamental to 'endogeneity' (Adesina 2006a; Hountondji 1997). Hountondji (1997: 18) describes 'as endogenous such knowledge as is experienced by society as an integral part of its heritage.' This remark is important in the current fight for epistemological decolonisation.

Be that as it may, the call for epistemological decolonisation (and therefore higher education curriculum) is not always met with enthusiasm in the South African academy. Take, for example, Morrow's (2009: 37) claim that 'sometimes when people advocate "curriculum transformation" – especially in the social sciences – they have in mind simply changing the content of the curriculum'. Unfortunately, Morrow provides no reference as to who these 'people' are. Nor does he substantiate his assertions. Out of courtesy, it would be helpful to point out in what ways proponents of transformation fail to face up to his epistemic challenge. He goes on to tell us that 'epistemic values are those values that shape and guide inquiry, which has as its regulative goal to discover the truth about some matter...' (Morrow 2009: 37). There is no gainsaying this remark. However Morrow ought at least to obey his own rule. In dismissing and lumping together unnamed authors, labelling them 'people', he is not engaged in good scholarship. Related   to Morrow's assertion is Sitas' (2006: 357) claim that efforts to 'indigenise' will fail if they do 'not take as its founding rules part of any canon'. He argues that sociologists in South Africa are offered no 'creative breathing space' by 'indigenisation'. He dismisses as 'simplistic critiques' attempts at 'deconstructing' and 'negating' 'that which constitutes ones "alterity"' (Sitas 2006: 357). He argues that Southern sociologists must shy away from the culture of 'imitation'. Yet it would seem that grounding on a 'canon' sociological writings in South Africa is itself a 'culture of imitation'. Adesina's (2005b: 257) question is apposite in this regard: 'Is Sociology the specific ideas of a dead "sociologist" or a distinct approach to the study of society?' While it has been stated earlier that proponents of epistemological decolonisation and curriculum transformation are hardly taken to task, Sitas has attempted to do so. It is for this reason that one will examine at some length his intervention on this issue.

Among the statements Sitas (2006: 360) make may be mentioned: 'critique and deconstruction [on the part of Third World sociologists] provide no sociological answers to the phenomena outside the sociologist's window'. Implicit in this statement is the assumption that sociologists need necessarily to be politically engaged to do justice to their discipline. Yet we know, following Oloyede (2006: 247), that 'sociologists do

not have to be political activists for the discipline to be elevated to a glorious height. What would seem critical is the importance of all perspectives in the discipline in the understanding of the life-world'. Sitas tells us that in critiquing Eurocentrism and imperialism Third World sociologists engage in a form of reductionism because they ignore dissenting and critical voices in the West. That is not an entirely accurate assessment for the simple reason that: (i) Third World sociologists have as their polemical target those voices in the West which are imperialistic, not all of western scholarship; and (ii) at times Third World scholars rely on Northern scholarship even as they criticise it e.g. the so-called political economists such as Samir Amin, Dani Nabudere, Issa Shivji, Yash Tandon etc. rely heavily on Marxism even when they critique Eurocentrism and imperialism. One may point out that Sitas contradicts himself when he says in labelling western scholarship 'Eurocentric', Third World sociologists reduce 'in one grand counter-gesture many insights, points of dissent and critical engagement of a complex intellectual heritage' (Sitas 2006: 360). This is necessarily so because he (Sitas 2006:357) had already accepted that Third World sociologist rely on Foucault and Derrida, two French scholars who are part of the 'complex intellectual heritage' – and most people readily accept that the two were critical dissenting voices within the West.

One may point out, too, that Sitas' idea of a 'canon' is partial to Marxism – referring as he does to Marx as 'the grand old man' (Sitas 2006: 375 fn 3). Yet he criticises the writings of Third World scholars for being replete with 'borrowings'. One recognises that Sitas does not explicitly posit Marxism as the only canon, for he does speak of 'any canon'. It is nevertheless clear from his work that he conceives of sociology as an insurrectional discipline (Sitas 1997a, 1998, 2004, 2006). But there is, unfortunately, nothing insurrectional in the works of Durkheim and Weber who are conventionally known as part of the 'canon' of the discipline. Further, scholarship which adopts insurrectional language but which is nevertheless not rooted in its locale can be said to be just as problematic – for more on this issue, see Mafeje's paper 'On the Articulation of Modes of Production' (1981), a critique of Harold Wolpe's thoughts on the nature of capitalist relations and labour-reproduction in 20th century South Africa.

Further, Sitas is less than charitable when he says: 'Unfortunately, the emphasis on discourses (and texts), their [African sociologists] constructions and inventions encouraged by postcolonial theorists, despite their critical and emancipatory promise, prove to be frustrating. By prefiguring processes of signification and discursive power, they leave the "steering media" of money and power and more importantly the institutional matrices that constrain social life and indeed their own claims, untouched (Sitas 2006: 362).' The works of Foucault and Said, respectively, were not limited to 'discourse' and the 'text'. Said has written, sometimes at great personal risk, about the situation in Palestine and Israel so much so that he had to deal with death threats and burning of his office in 1985 (Said 1999: 107). We may also mention the influence of Foucault's writings on gay and lesbian movements. In the South African context: Mafeje and Magubane not only

wrote works of socio-political and economic relevance but were members, respectively, of the Non-European Unity Movement and the African National Congress (ANC). That these two sociologists spent over 30 years in exile because of their writings (and political engagement) is a case in point. We may for good measure also mention the likes of Ruth First, Absolom Vilakazi, Harold Wolpe etc. as some of those social scientists who brought to bear their political thoughts on their scholarship.

Sitas (2006: 364) goes on to argue that African scholarship is characterised by 'contrasting essentialisms of Afrocentric intellectual thought pioneered by African-Americans like Asante'. This statement is not altogether justified. It is a casual reading of African scholarship something which Asante has repeatedly written about. He (Sitas 2006: 369) says the 'reclamations journey' i.e. 'negation and affirmation', endogeneity, Africanisation etc. 'leads to intellectual cul-de-sac'. 'The only way out', he counsels, is the 'quietism of borrowing from antinomical and critical concepts from discourses incubated in the centre [i.e. the North]' (368). Sociologically, one might argue that this proposal courts the charge of intellectual imperialism perceptively identified and critiqued by Syed Hussein Alatas (2000). This refers to the willingness, on the part of Third World scholars, to be dominated, at the ideational level, by western systems of thought without the West necessarily playing any active role in such intellectual dominance.

One agrees with Sitas (2006: 369), however, when he says that much of what has been written by South African sociologists consist mainly in 'borrowings' i.e. applying uncritically western theories to African conditions. The same point was made Hendricks (2006: 88). Yet it is difficult to understand why Sitas sees this as a problem when he himself prescribes that the 'peripheral sociologist' should borrow from the 'cannon'. Sitas (2006: 374) concludes his paper with several recommendations. He says 'South African sociology' has 'some major tasks'. One might wish to question the idiom of a 'South African sociology'. This is necessarily because precisely what constitutes South African sociology as an object of inquiry, is not a given. Thus such a claim cannot be made *a priori*. Additionally, given that he concedes that there is a lot of 'borrowing' on the part of South African sociologists, in what sense can one talk of a *South African sociology*? Tina Uys, former president of SASA, also made the same mistake. In her 2003 SASA presidential address, audaciously entitled 'In Defence of South African Sociology' (2004), she goes on to defend *their* 'contribution' to the discipline. Yet, in her defence she relies heavily on Goran Therborn's 'three spaces of identity' (Uys 2004). There is nothing wrong with borrowing, but there seems to be a discrepancy between defending a brand called 'South African sociology' while essentially regurgitating sociological theories from elsewhere. Let us suspend this line of enquiry and return to Sitas' recommendations.

Firstly, he says sociology in South African 'can become a platform for a broader African cosmopolitan project, which, for the first time will not be a study of, or the discovery of the "other", but a project of *self*-discovery' (Sitas 2006: 374). This is precisely what Mafeje and Magubane have been doing and saying since they began their careers in

the 1960s (see Mafeje 1991, 1996, 2001a; Magubane 1971, 1973, [1968]2000). Strictly, Sitas is less than generous in this regard, with no acknowledgement or awareness of the task Mafeje and Magubane set for themselves. This is so because, far from highlighting originality in his ideas, he demonstrates the concerted erasure and assiduous avoidance of African (black) scholarship in the South African academy. Such erasure and avoidance was identified by Mamdani: 'The notion of South African exceptionalism is a current so strong in South African studies that it can be said to have taken on the character of a prejudice' (Mamdani 1996: 27). It is easier for South Africans to compare themselves with people from the US and the UK than to make comparisons with people within the continent. This, to some extent, can be traced back to South Africa's isolation, due to apartheid, from the rest of the continent until 1994. Thus, the preference for Euro-American material, on the part of South African sociologists, only serves to confirm the 'prejudices instilled through Bantu education – that Africa lies north of the Limpopo [river], and that this Africa has no intelligentsia with writings worth reading...' (Mamdani 1998b: 72).

Secondly, Sitas argues, South Africa 'offers an exceptional social laboratory for the entire planet' (2006: 374). Interestingly, this recommendation seeks global recognition without making any reference to what local sociologists should do to address their current state of their discipline. It is silent on how Africans should generate theories and paradigms of their own so as to enhance African scholarship. The question is not just doing research locally. Such research abounds. The issue is to theorise about local conditions as opposed to waiting for the West to do so. It is not unfair to say this recommendation perpetuates the already existing division of labour in global scholarship, where Africa is a place to extract data for westerners to theorise. Thirdly, he says 'the country [South Africa] harbours the institutional capacity to explore whether indigenous and endogenous know-hows within a "pluriverse" of languages can explicate inequality, interconnectedness, organisation and social evolution' (Sitas 2006: 374). Again, the efforts Mafeje (1991, 1992), Magubane (1979, 1996) and others made have been primarily to explicate inequality among other things.

To be fair, the paper under criticism here is not representative of Sitas' *oeuvre*. Nor is it a definitive statement on his work. It is discussed here for its relevance on the issues under review in the present paper. Readers may be aware of Sitas' book, *Voices That Reason* (2004), which carries a highly pertinent and thought-provoking message on the issues we discuss. 'The book asks us to consider the possibility of a sociology "with" people. A sociology that is emphatic to people's cultural formations, one that risks failure in its counsel for social action and one that is *pace* postmodernism apodictic in its claims' (Sitas 2004: x). In addition, '[a]s an experimental text it must be used with the playfulness it invites and the disagreements it warrants...' (Sitas 2004: x). The foregoing disclaimer works quite badly for the important 'theoretical parables' which Sitas discusses in the book. This is so because in subsequent pages of the book Sitas states, quite correctly, that:

> We do have much to contribute to one another and, of course, to the rest of the world: if we could only harness what is almost there, full of potential and promise. We cannot remain data collectors, i§mmune deficiency samples, genetic codes, case studies, junior partners for others, elsewhere forever. We need to take hold of the trove of traditions and wit... that characterise our work, our failed social experiments, our distinctive voicing. (Sitas 2004: 8)

This is an important message which coincides with that of many other African scholars. It should be noted, however, as we did earlier on, that while Sitas attempts something of an Africa-centred theoretical approach, he sees his work as primarily insurrectional. Pursuing engaged scholarship and attempting grounded theory are not, of course, mutually exclusive. In his own words, Sitas argues:

> In a previous piece titled "The waning of sociology in the South Africa of the 1990s", I positioned my work within an intellectual formation that, despite boundaries, engaged with the social movements around us. Inside that formation subscribed to some important biases: socio-political traditions that have been militant, community-sensitive, rooted in the country's labour movement and the grassroots cultural movements that were spawned during the intense period of resistance after 1976. Within that broad area of affinity I was particularly attracted to networks in KwaZulu-Natal that had some allegiance to the non-violent and communitarian traditions that have run in the province from Ghandi's ashrams to the present struggles. (Sitas 2004: 9)

As stated earlier, the focus, on the part of South African sociologists, on political issues at the expense of the theoretical confuses sociologists with activists. It is useful also to look at Sitas' inaugural lecture, 'Neither Gold Nor Bile', delivered at the then University of Natal in 1995, and later published in the *African Sociological Review* in 1997. While the book is empirically-grounded and makes an attempt at grappling with some South African ontological narratives, the absences of writings by African social scientists dealing with similar issues is glaring. In many ways, one might argue that the book does precisely what Sitas warns against, *viz.* exporting data and importing theory. The prevalence of Euro-American scholars, with whom Sitas engages, both approvingly and disapprovingly, is surely not likely to be missed. A cursory look at the reference list confirms this point. To show just how Sitas avoids engaging with African scholars, he argues thus:

> Honest analyses of the collapse of visions, dreams, narratives and meta-narratives have been the preserve of novelists from Armah, Ngui, Achebe to Okri, Hove and Mahfouz, rather than the preserve of social science... (p18) To date no sociologist has had the courage to undertake research on the quality of vision embodied in the texts such as Armah's *The beautiful ones are not yet born*, with its fearless airing of post-colonial corruption... (Sitas 2004: 114)

This is sufficient to make one cringe with embarrassment. A significant number of African social scientists hold positions in American and European universities largely because of their 'fearless airing' of the issues which Sitas claims they have not raised. From Mkandawire to Mazrui to Zeleza and others, some African scholars cannot remain in their countries of birth because of their 'fearless airing' of 'corruption' and many other issues. The issues raised by the said novelists have been the subject of empirical investigation and vigorous debate among CODESRIA-affiliated scholars.

It is important to note that in calling for endogeneity or an endogenous approach to knowledge-making, African sociologists are not calling for a return to a *status quo ante*. Endogeneity, put simply, says knowledge is first local before it becomes universal. It takes into account the influence of other knowledge systems but says, in the Mafejean fashion: we ask 'to be taken on our own terms' (Mafeje 1991: iii). While not exclusivist, or seeking to 'draw invidious distinctions between human beings', it nevertheless takes its locale very seriously. It consists in recognising that social science is ideographic not nomothetic (Adesina 2008b; Mafeje 1991). It does not, it should be noted, 'seek to substitute one erasure for another' (Adesina 2006b: 144) in a battle of essentialisms. For as Zeleza (2004: 26) puts it: 'The issue has never been a question of engaging the world, for as African scholars we have always been engaged. Indeed, we cannot avoid being engaged even if we wanted to. My issue is about the nature and import of that engagement.' Endogeneity is at its core is an affirmation of one's locale.

III

To see the Eurocentric and 'extraverted' (Adesina, 2005, 2006a, 2010; Hountondji, 1997; Mafeje, 1992, 2000a) nature of the writings within and about Africa, it is necessary to examine briefly the discipline of sociology in South Africa. By 'extraverted' or 'extraversion' we mean the 'knowledge production process, where data is exported and theory imported. [Where] scholarship [becomes] little more than proselytising and regurgitating [of] received discourses – left or bourgeois – no matter how poorly they explain our lived experiences' (Adesina, 2006b: 138). Sociology in South African universities is said to have been characterised by five different and competing paradigms, viz. functionalism, Marxism, phenomenology, pluralism and 'Calvinism' (Webster 1985, 1991). Whether it was in the service of the apartheid regime or of the 'social movements', sociology is said also to have always been in the public domain (Burawoy 2004, Hendricks 2006, Webster 1985, 1991). What is clear from the literature on the nature of sociology in South Africa is that its practitioners have yielded no sui generis theoretical insights. Or, their writings have never led to any 'epistemic rapture' – to borrow Adesina's concept (2010). This is confirmed by Hendricks (2006: 88-89) when he says:

> Virtually all the sociological theories, all the major concepts come from outside
> the continent while we are firmly rooted here and our major intellectual and
> political preoccupations are located in our national and continental homes... De-
> veloping an African sociological discourse through the promotion of an African
> sociological community is an extremely difficult exercise against this background
> and in the current environment African sociologists have applied metropolitan
> ideas and concepts without subjecting them to critical scrutiny and they have
> not, in the main, developed concepts appropriate to the study of African societ-
> ies. Attempts to indigenise sociology in Africa have been inchoate, unsystematic
> and anecdotal. It is not surprising that these have thus far not accomplished
> much popular acceptance by African sociologists.

With regard to teaching material, Jubber (2006: 339) comments thus: 'As an external examiner in sociology departments in South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Kenya and Tanzania, I have found that most courses rely heavily on curricula derived from USA and British sources, often based on those from departments in which the lecturers had studied. The indigenous and the local appears, if it appears at all, as a kind of afterthought, the last section of the curriculum...' For a useful, though descriptive rather than analytic, historical review of research and publishing of sociology in South Africa consult Jubber's paper entitled 'Sociology in South Africa' (2007). Writing from a different, though not dissimilar context, Alatas (2003, 2012a) talks about the intellectual 'division of labour' between the West and the Third World, wherein Third World scholars conduct empirical studies with little (and usually imported) theoretical grounding while western scholars produce works of both theoretical and empirical significance.

Some of the pitfalls highlighted above cannot be said about the writings, respectively, of Mafeje and Magubane two sociologists who spent the better part of their lives in exile. It is true that they borrowed a great deal from Marxism, but their writings were, notwithstanding their absence in the country, rooted in the place they knew best – the country of their birth (South Africa) and the African continent at large. Their sophisticated deployment (at times repudiation, in the case of Mafeje) of Marxian concepts, rooted (ontologically) as it was in Africa, produced works of 'epistemological rapture'. Conversely, their white counterparts were never able to produce such works insofar as their writings were never really rooted, epistemologically and existentially, in Africa – they had been strongly influenced by Euro-American writings (see Jubber 1983, 2006, 2007; Webster 1985, 1991). As a counterbalance, Mafeje's (1971, 1981, 1991, 1996, 2001a) and Magubane's ([1968]2000, 1971, 1973, 1979, 1996) writings are instructive in this regard.

The key issue which sociologists in South Africa fail to do is to take their objects of enquiry on their own terms, a fact which leads some of them unduly to superimpose their preconceived schemata on local data (Mafeje 1981, 1991). In doing so, they perpetuate what Mafeje (1976, 1998, 2000a, 2001b) refers to as 'negations'. Three

examples will suffice. First: In South Africa, one often reads sociology articles in which authors talk, with reference to black South African families, about 'extended families' or 'households' (Rabe 2008; Russell 2003a, 2003b; Ziehl 2001, 2002, 2003). Now given that western families usually take the form of 'nuclear families', Eurocentric sociologists in South Africa often narrate, because they cannot conceive of any other family structure outside of the one just mentioned, of an 'extended family' or a 'household'. Yet *usapho* (a family) among amaXhosa, for example, is not limited to one's immediate biological relatives i.e. parents and siblings – nor, for that matter, is it limited to living in the same house/home. It also includes 'uncles', aunts, grandparents and even people who are not even related by blood but through *isiduko* ('clan name'). Thus a man and a woman who share the same *isiduko* can never get married because they are considered siblings. Also, in many South African languages, the concept of a 'cousin' or an 'uncle' on one's paternal side of the family simply does not exist. For example, my father's younger brother is not 'uncle' but *utat'omncinci* or *ubab'omncane* – literally 'younger father'. Similarly, his children are not 'cousins' but my siblings – *abanta'kwethu*. Thus, 'uncles' and 'cousins' – to use familiar terminology – do not belong to an 'extended family' or 'household' but are members of the family *tout court*. This may not always be easily intelligible to some, but it makes a lot of sense when one immerses herself in the ontological narratives of her objects of enquiry.

Second: Let us take the widely used, but manifestly misunderstood, concept of '*muti*' – and it is usually used in pejorative terms – as a second example. *uMuthi*, simply put, means medicine. Yet by some unsociological logic – in South African public discourse and, by extension, in the academy – the term is used to mean or is associated with 'witchcraft', so that when one uses *umuthi* s/he is, *ipso facto*, practicing witchcraft.[1] Yet, properly understood, even a cough syrup or an aspirin from a 'western' doctor or pharmacist is itself *umuthi* (insofar as it is medication). We do not here wish to get into a discussion about how the concept came to be equated with witchcraft (in South African public discourse and academia) largely because that is not very puzzling – colonialism/ racism had a lot to do with that, very much like the idea of a 'witchdoctor'. Colonialists used the latter term when referring to African herbalists and 'traditional doctors'.

We cite the example of *umuthi* to highlight the kind of erasures prevailing, even post-1994, in South African media and in the social sciences. Note, too, the different ways in which we spell the word – the Anglicised, and therefore pejorative, spelling reads '*muti*' when the word really is *umuthi*. Related to this is the problematic idea of '*muti* killings/murders' that we often read about in the newspapers and anthropology and sociology journals. Cruel murderers kill innocent people, remove their body parts, and then 'analysts' and journalists refer to such murders as '*muti* killings/murders' – not brutal murders as Northerners would most likely call them. The assumption is made, of

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1   I do not deny that even black people have come to adopt this negative usage of the term. But my view is that 'witchcraft', properly understood, is ukuthakatha not umuthi.

course, that such practices have a lot to do with black people's ways of living. The very fact that such killings are associated with *umuthi* is a case in point. The conflation of *umuthi* with brutal murders gives offence, since most accounts of 'muti killings/murders' rely on tabloids and hearsay. For an academic account (in our view questionable) of '*muti* killings/murders' see Vincent's paper 'New Magic for New Times' (2008a). Vincent is, of course, not alone in these kinds of negations (see Bishop 2012; Labuschagne 2004; Steyn 2005; Turrell 2001).

Vincent, relying on Jean and John Comaroff's (1999) notion of 'occult economies', continues to propagate 'negations' by associating *umuthi* with witchcraft. While she (Vincent 2008a: 43) acknowledges that *umuthi* is medicine, she is unable to transcend 'the epistemology of alterity' upon which her chosen theoretical scheme is founded as she continues to lump together medicine with the alleged use of body parts. If it is indeed the case that people who claim to be 'traditional healers' use body parts, then we are no longer talking about medicine, we are talking about *ubuthakathi* or witchcraft (should there be such). That these purported traditional healers never carry out these murders themselves, but simply delegate or hire people for this 'specialist purpose' (Vincent 2008a: 43), should itself raise questions about their authenticity as 'healers'. A minor but related point is that Vincent (2008a: 43) states that '*muti* is derived from *umuthi* meaning tree'. That is not entirely accurate. Her definition of *umuthi* is derived from isiXhosa. Yet even in isiXhosa a tree is not *umuthi* but *umthi* – *thi* is prefixed with *um* not *umu*. In the same language, medicine is not *umuthi* but *iyeza*. *Umuthi*, which refers to medicine, is isiZulu not isiXhosa and a tree, in the former, is *isihlahla* not *umuthi*. This may appear trivial or pedantic but it is necessary in highlighting the casual and grossly inaccurate manner in which some white academics write about their black counterparts in South Africa. Even when they evince a genuine interest in knowing and writing about black people, they fall short of paying careful attention to detail so as authentically to represent their objects of enquiry.

Part of the reason why some white scholars, and some of their black counterparts, continue with these inaccurate assumptions is that they conflate herbal medicine with spirituality or mysticism. There is no reason to suppose that the two are mutually embedded or mutually reinforcing. Indeed these are two different things. It is an error of thought or a logical fallacy to suppose that they are one and the same, a 'category mistake' as Gilbert Ryle would have it. Strange as it may sound to some ears, one need not be *isangoma* or a 'traditional healer' to have knowledge of herbal medicine. The end result of the negations is self-hatred (which manifests itself in various ways) on the part of black people. For example some people would make fun of an acquaintance that uses *umuthi* – thereby implying that there is something wrong with such a practice.

Here is a third example: Standard writings about the cultural practice of *ulwaluko* variously refer to it as 'traditional circumcision', 'initiation' or 'rite of passage' (see Kepe 2010; Peltzer & Kanta 2009; Vincent 2008b, 2008c, 2008d among others). The problem

with these categories is that this practice becomes nothing more than a medical procedure which is marked by a public ceremonial event – for circumcision is a medical procedure, the removal of the foreskin, and initiation is a ceremonial event which marks membership of a group. Quite apart from these standard categories, this practice is, properly understood, a social and educational process – an articulation of a people's way of living. AmaXhosa refer to this practice as *ulwaluko*. Neither circumcision nor initiation comes close to capturing what is meant by this concept. *Ulwaluko*, far from being a ceremonial event which marks membership of a group, and a medical procedure, is an educational process which marks a transition from childhood to adulthood. The purpose of *ulwaluko* is to build strong character traits, independence, teach responsibility etc. Similarly, it is not uncommon to find in the literature on *ulwaluko* reference to those who have returned from *esuthwini* – 'initiation school' – as 'recently initiated men' or 'newly initiated men' (see Bottoman 2006; Vincent 2008b, 2008c, 2008d). Again, this category falls short of capturing what it means to partake in *ulwaluko*. Here, too, it is wise to adopt the isiXhosa concept of *amakrwala* rather than 'recently initiated men'. This is so because talk of recently initiated men suggests an end product of an event. Yet being *ikrwala* (singular for *amakwrala*) suggests a continuation, not an end, of the education process. Further, while the literature abounds with talk of 'traditional nurses' and 'traditional surgeons', amaXhosa speak, respectively, of *amakhankatha* and *iingcibi*. While these writers may get away with talk of traditional surgeons, they are not justified in talking about traditional nurses. This is necessarily so because the people they refer to as nurses, play, above everything else, the role of educators. Further, instead of speaking about 'initiates' when referring to boys *esuthwini*, amaXhosa speak of *abakhwetha* or *umkhwetha* (singular). This is so because far from being an initiate, *umkhwetha* is akin to a pupil or a student. Against this background, it becomes clear that *ulwaluko* is not a mere 'medical procedure' but an educational/sociological process. These are only three examples, more may be enumerated.

   The abovementioned negations are not merely acts of omission or failure adequately to analyse how black people live (as suggested by Webster (1985, 1991)), they are, more importantly, the problem of the 'ontological disconnect' (Adesina 2011, Private Communication) between white and black people in South Africa; particularly the failure on the part of white sociologists to root themselves locally not only epistemologically but culturally and existentially. For example, Webster (1985, 1991, 2004) writes about how white sociologists were heavily influenced by theoretical trends in the UK and American universities. He (Webster 1985: 45) writes that, 'South Africans studying abroad were to play an important role in introducing these [Marxian] ideas, particularly through Southern African Studies, into the university curriculum when a growing number returned to university posts in South Africa.' He says that this rise in Marxian ideas in the South African sociological scene coincided with the rise of Black Consciousness (BC) in the 1970s. Adding that Marxism gave them (white sociologists) a 'coherent

alternative'. In the context of apartheid, it is difficult to understand why left-leaning white sociologists sought a coherent alternative from outside of South Africa instead of joining forces with their black counterparts. Writing about the history of sociology in South Africa, Jubber (2007: 536) observes:

> In South Africa, during the most oppressive years of Apartheid, research and writing in this field was hazardous due to the enactment of legislation that curtailed the freedom of speech and publication and hence a fair amount of sociology dealing with politics was published by people in exile (e.g. Magubane, 2000). While seditious or insurrectional political sociology was proscribed and policed, less threatening publications were tolerated. One field in which sociologists were particularly productive was in counting the human and economic costs of Apartheid, and in proposing alternatives to it, or at least ways in which it could be humanized. The least politically threatening kinds of political sociology were the studies inspired by American studies of voting behaviour.

The last sentence in the foregoing quote is surely telling. In his 2005 Presidential Address of the South African Sociological Congress, Adesina (2006a: 256) stated, plausibly in our view, that:

> The first line of research is premised on taking ourselves seriously. I have noticed how eagerly we adopt every new concept and author that reaches our shores from the global North - the rapid uptake on the idea of "Public Sociology" being the most recent case. Yet we hardly give ourselves, our scholarship, and local resources the same degree of scholarly attention.

It is interesting to note that, while in the 1970s and 1980s Webster saw in Marxism a coherent alternative to Black Consciousness, he has today found one in Burawoy's notion of 'Public Sociology' (see Webster 2004). The problem with Webster's embrace of this idea is not simply that it denies endogenous alternatives, but that it prescribes to South African sociologists what they have been doing along. Webster is fully aware of this fact but does not see it as a problem. Indeed he says: 'While it may be self-evident to South African sociology, by naming some of its activities "public sociology" Burawoy was giving these activities legitimacy' (Webster 2004: 27). It is not clear whether legitimacy (as opposed to self-determination) is really what is at stake here. For 'if what we say and do has relevance for our humanity, its international relevance is guaranteed' *(Mao Zedong quoted in Mafeje 2000a: 67).*

So just as presenting Marxism as an alternative to liberalism (which was brilliantly critiqued by BC members) was itself a preservation of whiteness and an avowed refusal to be of Africa, presenting public sociology as an alternative is itself a denial of Africa as a source of knowledge. Marxist sociology in South Africa had no critique of the nexus between race and class (Magubane 1979). It only saw apartheid in class and less so in

racial terms – it equated black workers' struggle with that of their white counterparts, thereby assuming, problematically, that they were both only fighting against capitalism. In doing so, the question of whiteness (a category of supremacy) was left unaddressed. Ashwin Desai (2010: 123) observes: 'It was almost as if since their [Marxist sociologists] emphasis was class, race did not exist and therefore did not have to account for its under-representation.' Mafeje observes:

> Southern African Whites, as a general category, not isolated individuals, are not willing or prepared to relinquish their hegemony established since the conquest of the sub-region. This includes white intellectuals of all persuasions. The difference between the right and the left amongst them is how their vested interests are rationalised. While right-wing intellectuals make no bones about their belief in the inherent inferiority of the Africans, liberals and left-wing advocates recognise only the incompetence of the Africans and reserve the right to guide them until they attain the required standards... This is so self-evident that such do-gooders do not have to account for themselves. (Mafeje 1997c: 1)

It is not surprising, then, that even in the post-1994 period, Andile Mngxitama, a newspaper columnist, would accuse white South African sociologists, who only do class analysis at the expense or race, of 'hiding white privilege' (Mngxitama 2009 in Akpan 2010: 117-8).

For Biko ([1978]2004), as with Mngxitama, the point was/is ultimately to render whiteness – liberal or not – irrelevant. This message was never taken seriously by Marxian sociologists, yet one suspects that had they done so, a real 'alternative' would have been found. This is so because in adopting Marxism, or Burawoy's public sociology, (white) South African sociologists were, epistemologically speaking, no less extraverted (or academically dependent) in their writings than their functionalist, pluralist and 'Calvinist' counterparts. Mafeje (2000a: 67) makes a similar point when he says: 'Southern African white settlers... are unable to deal with their Africanity for they have persistently played "European" to the extent that they unconsciously granted that they were aliens whereas blacks were "natives"'.

IV

One of the measures which may be taken to reverse some of the problems we have discussed is not simply to generate insights from empirical studies but also to engage other African scholars on how they attempted to theorise on these issues. One such scholar whose works remains pertinent is Archie Mafeje. Briefly, Mafeje's (1981, 1991, 1996 2001a) approach is simply that epistemological assumptions should not be allowed to dictate what people make of the conditions in which they live. Most of the time researchers get caught up, when conducting research, in their theoretical

schemata rather than try to build theory from the ground up. But it may be objected to this view: that there is a sense in which this approach invariably becomes a 'theoretical framework' or an 'epistemological assumption' in itself. In that the researcher is, by adopting it, guided by the view that he should not superimpose himself. That, so it seems, is *ipso facto* a 'framework' *in itself*. In the preface to his book, *The Theory and Ethnography of African Social Formations*, Mafeje (1991: 1) says: 'Although I do academic work and believe in academic standards, I do not believe in erudition (which is another way of inhibiting the deprived and disadvantaged from writing what they know and think)...' More important are the words in parentheses, for they speak eloquently not only to the theme of the book but really to his approach to research – which, he tells us, is not predicated on any epistemology.

The idea of taking objects of analysis on their own terms lies at the heart of Mafeje's scholarship. He referred to this approach as 'authentic interlocution' or 'authentic theoretical representation' in social scientific writings (1981, 1991, 1996, 2000a, 2001a, 2001b). His method is explicitly 'discursive' (Mafeje 1991: iii). Magubane (2007: 3) adopted the same method when conducting archival research on racism: 'I allow my chosen authors and their texts to speak for themselves in the same way anthropologists, through their field notes, allow their subjects to speak.' In adopting this approach, Mafeje, as with Magubane, is not refusing to be analytically universal. But rather, this is an attempt to study societies or 'social formations' from 'inside outwards' so as the better to 'relate them to their wider social environment' (Mafeje 1991: iii).

Several of Mafeje's critics (see Moore 1998; Nabudere 2008; Sharp 1998) object that this approach is no different from positivistic or 'value-free' approaches of old colonial anthropologists. They take issue in particular with the following:

> As I conceive it, ethnography is the end product of social texts authored by the people themselves. All I do is to study the texts so that I can decode them, make their meaning apparent or understandable to me as an interlocutor or the "other". What I convey to my fellow-social scientists is studied and systematised interpretations of existing but hidden knowledge. In my view, this was a definite break with the European epistemology of subject/object... It was simply a recognition of the other not as a partner in knowledge-making, but as a knowledge-maker in her/his own right (Mafeje 1996: 35).

Mafeje never spotted the double-standard in what he was saying. Indeed this was (as analytic philosophers would have it) a *tu quoque* fallacy i.e. mounting a critique against your opponent while you are guilty of the same offence. For, as his critics correctly observe, this was predicated on positivistic notions of a 'neutral' researcher. So while Mafeje's approach was brilliant, it was not at all new. Still, his position is not the weaker for it. Critics of Marxism cannot hope to overthrow 'dialectical materialism' by merely pointing out that the idea of 'dialectics' is derived from Hegel. They would have to

do more than that. At any rate, one is inclined to think that the critical issue with sociology in South Africa remains that of the 'ontological disconnect' between West-centric researchers and their objects of enquiry or, indeed, local researchers who refuse, existentially and epistemologically, to be *of* this continent.

It is interesting to note, however, parallels between some black writers in South Africa, the rest of the African continent and the Third World generally. For example Adesina recommends, in an attempt to extirpate extraversion, that we '[make] ourselves the objects of critical scholarly engagement' (2006: 257). Elsewhere, he (Adesina 2008a: 148) advises the new generation of African scholars to (i) have 'deep familiarity with the literature and subject'; (ii) 'an artisanal approach to field data and writing'; (iii) 'immense theoretical rigour'; and (iv) 'an unapologetic and relentless commitment to Africa'. Mafeje (1994: 210), for his part, argues that 'as African history unfolds, we must prepare ourselves for new intellectual tasks and not a mere repetition of what has been conceived elsewhere... It is incumbent upon transcendent African intellectuals to develop new concepts and organisational forms for dealing more effectively with the emerging African reality.' For Hountondji (1997: 36), 'in order to de-marginalise Africa and the Third World, scholars in these areas ought to make a conscious effort towards a critical but resolute reappropriation of [their] own practical and cognitive heritage, a negation of the marginality of [their] endogenous knowledge and know-how...' This is not dissimilar to Alatas' recommendations for a reversal of academic dependency. Assuming that mechanisms have been put in place, Alatas argues that to reverse the problem of academic dependency Third World sociologists ought first to conduct serious research on the said problem. This could take the form of teaching, publication and organising and sharing knowledge at international conferences.

Second, this can be achieved through writing textbooks which, in addition to featuring the usual 'founding fathers of sociology' i.e. Marx, Weber and Durkheim, feature marginalised thinkers from the Third World e.g. Ibn Khaldun, Jose Rizal, W.E.B. Du Bois etc. We include Du Bois on this list of Third World sociologists insofar as he was self-referentially African – at least in the latter part of his life. Thirdly, collaboration among Third World scholars would be of great assistance. In the African context, one might mention the pan-African social science network, Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) based in Dakar, Senegal. For Mafeje (1992: 27), 'to achieve the so-called indigenisation of the arts and sciences in Africa, African researchers and intellectuals must find a base within their societies and the region in general – something which some African organisations are seriously attempting.'

V

It is clear from the foregoing sections that the major problem with the sociology in South Africa is that it is characterised by West-centred theories and conceptual frameworks. To the extent that these theories explain South Africa, so it is argued, they only succeed in presenting it from the perspective of western scholars. The problem is that of 'academic dependence' on western categories (paradigms and theories). This problem, it has been argued, has two interrelated features. These are what Mafeje terms, respectively, 'negations' and, following Hountondji, 'extraverted discourses' or 'extraversion' for short. In addition, while western scholars engage in meta-theoretical and theoretical research, African scholars tend to engage in empirical research. This in turn entails global intellectual division of labour in the social sciences. African social scientists, so it is argued, export empirical data to the North and then simply import theories to the continent without due regard to whether such theories fit or not. Interestingly, western scholars tend to conduct studies both of their own countries and of other countries (academic imperialism?) while Third World scholars tend to limit their studies to their countries. Yet in spite of being confined to their locales, Third World scholars have no problem importing theories instead of generating their own.

The above notwithstanding, Mafeje's and Magubane's attempt, along with Adesina and others, is to build a case for a 'home-grown' approach to sociology in South Africa. Correctly, they do so in an attempt to do away with the practice of importing theories from the North and using them uncritically to analyse local data and conditions. The practice of academic dependency, it has been argued, has the unintended consequence of producing graduates who have no critical understanding of their own societies (Adesina 2005). Further, as Mamdani points out, it encourages the idea that Africa has no intellectuals or that it has produced no scholarly work worth reading. The call for endogenous knowledge is especially important in this regard insofar as curriculum and pedagogic issues are concerned. Sociology which is epistemologically grounded in Africa has the potential to inspire graduates to search for alternatives even on matters outside of the academy – especially in a country like South Africa, where the nation is still trying to find itself. Perhaps this is part of what Mafeje (2001c: 6) had in mind when he said: 'South Africa is not only a divided society but a society that is not aware of itself.'

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Perceived Threat of Malaria and the Use of Insecticide Treated Bed Nets in Nigeria

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Abstract

Using multiple qualitative methods, this study investigated the perceived threat and perceived susceptibility of children under five years of age to malaria, and willingness of the caregivers to use the ITNs in the prevention of malaria in selected rural and urban areas of Nigeria. TThe health belief model (HBM) is the theoretical anchor of the study. Samples included mothers, fathers and grandparents whose child/ward had manifested malaria symptoms at one time or another and who had reported or failed to report such cases at the available health centres. Other respondents were community leaders, health workers and traditional pharmacists popularly known as elewe-omo. The study found that malaria was perceived as a serious health problem and a threat to the children by the majority of the respondents. However, high perceived threat of malaria did not guarantee widespread use of the ITNs owing to limited access and poor distribution networks. Some measures for equitable and sustainable distribution and use of the ITNs in local communities have been recommended.

Keywords: malaria; children; insecticide treated nets; health belief model; caregivers; Nigeria.

Introduction

Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) is a malaria endemic region. This however varies from one region or country to the other, owing to diverse socio-political and ecological variables. In Nigeria, more than 90% of the population is exposed to malaria infection, out of which over 40% suffers from at least one episode of malaria annually (Abdullahi et al. 2009: 7102). Malaria is said to be responsible for more than 50% of outpatient visits, 40% of hospital admission, and 10% of maternal mortality (Okafor and Amzat, 2007: 156). Children younger than five years of age are the most vulnerable to malaria

infection and it is reported that more than 250 000 children in this age group die from malaria-related complications every year in Nigeria (FMoH, 2009: 10) representing 30% of infant mortality (Okafor and Amzat, 2007: 156) and 25% of the global malaria deaths in children (Abdullahi et al. 2012; Abdullahi, 2011).

The Nigerian government has stepped up its efforts to tackle malaria, with a renewed interest in the past decade. As a result, an integrated approach has been adopted. For instance, Nigeria was a signatory to the Roll Back Malaria Summit (widely known as the Abuja Summit) to achieve universal coverage of insecticide treated bed nets (ITNs) for children younger than five years of age (Amzat, 2011). Consequently, as part of the efforts to encourage mothers to use the bed nets, government of Nigeria, at various levels of governance, has embarked on free distribution of ITNs to caregivers of children younger than five years of age (Abdullahi, et al. 2012). However, research outputs have consistently shown that apart from limited access to ITN, most parents across the different Nigerian communities have negative attitudes towards the use of the treated nets (see Adedotun et al. 2010; Amzat, 2011; Olasehinde et al. 2010; Oyedeji 2009). The question is why? This question underlies the study.

The study was informed by the relatively high incidence of malaria in the Kwara State of Nigeria and the widespread reservation for the utilisation of treated bed nets. A Surveillance Report on Malaria Cases and Deaths obtained from the state's Ministry of Health indicates that of a total of 150 127 outpatients recorded in children and pregnant women in 2008, children accounted for more than 140 000; of the 7 920 in-patients, children accounted for more than 7 000; and of the 31 deaths recorded, 24 were children (Kwara State Ministry of Health, 2008). Also, the mere passive acceptance of treated bed nets supplied by the health system as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) may not guarantee a successful utilisation Hence, there is the need to examine how people in local communities perceive and define the threat of malaria in children vis-à-vis the utilisation of treated bed nets. An understanding of the nexus between perceived threat and utilisation of treated bed nets is necessary to design appropriate health policy that captures community understanding of perceptions and prevention of malaria in children.

The study is theoretically framed within the health belief model. The need to borrow some insights from social psychological models, particularly the health belief model (HBM), to understand and predict health care seeking behaviour and health behaviour change has been suggested (Jegede, 1998). This follows increased emphasis on interdisciplinary approach to the understanding of health behaviour change. HBM has been adjudged to be a useful tool in predicting health behaviour change. It remains the most widely used theory in predicting and understanding health behaviour change in relation to HIV and AIDS (Family Health International [FHI], 1996) and food handling behaviours (Hanson and Benedict, 2002: 25). HBM assumes that health seeking behaviour or health behaviour change is influenced by certain cognitive variables as well as established mechanisms to minimize the occurrence of disease within the social system. HBM suggests that individuals faced with alternatives would choose the

action that would lead most likely to positive outcomes (Munro et al. 2007: 4). For a change to occur in health behaviour (in this case, for caregivers to use treated bed nets to prevent malaria in children), HBM holds that a person must hold the following beliefs:

- Perceived susceptibility to a particular health problem, in this case malaria – whether the children at risk of malaria.
- Perceived seriousness of the health condition - how severe is malaria in children? What are the social and health consequences of malaria?
- Belief in effectiveness of the new behaviour – whether treated bed nets are effective against malaria transmission.
- Cues to action - witnessing the death or illness of a relative due to malaria.
- Perceived benefits of preventive action - if using treated bed nets can prevent malaria infection in children").
- Barriers to taking action – impediments to using bed nets.

Therefore, the health belief model appears to be a landmark and powerful theoretical framework in social psychology capable of predicting and understanding health behaviour change, particularly where the individuals weigh the benefits against the perceived costs and barriers to change, to the extent that, the benefits outweigh costs. However, there is a dearth of malaria studies in Nigeria where HBM has been used to understand and predict the use or non-use of treated bed nets in the prevention of malaria in children. This study attempts to fill this gap.

Study Areas and Methodology
Study Areas

This study was conducted in two selected rural areas and one urban centre in Kwara State, Nigeria. The two rural areas were Okanle and Fajeromi in Ifelodun Local Government and the urban centre was Ilorin, specifically, in Ilorin-South Local Government of the State. There are two main climate seasons in the State: the dry and wet (raining) seasons with an intervening cold and dry harmattan (windy) period usually experienced between December and January. On the one hand, the city of Ilorin is usually characterised by stagnant waters during the raining season which are often important breeding grounds for mosquitoes. These are most common in areas without tarred roads. Similarly, in dry season, drainages are usually blocked thereby constituting environmental hazards and breeding grounds for mosquitoes as well. This is worsened by inhabitants' nonchalant attitude and poor waste management practices. In rural areas on the other hand, the surrounding is often bushy during raining periods also providing enabling environment for mosquito breeding even though it could also serve as sources of health to the local people. Figure 1 and figure 2 show the environmental characteristics of the inner area of Ilorin and Okanle during the raining season.

Figure 1: Environmental Characteristic of Inner Area of Ilorin during Raining Season

Figure 2: Environmental Characteristics of the Rural Areas during the Raining Season

Kwara State was created in May 1967. It is located between Latitudes 110 2' and 110 45'N and between Longitude 20 45' and 60 4'E. The State has a population of more than two million people based on the 2006 census (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2009: 34). It occupies a land area of about 32 500 sq kilometres. The people of the State are divided along four major ethnic groupings with four corresponding languages: Yoruba, Nupe, Baruba and Fulani. The State is bounded in the north by Niger State, Osun and Ondo in the south, Kogi in the east and Oyo in the west and shares an international boundary with the Republic of Benin. Figure 3 presents the map of Kwara State showing the study areas.

Figure 3: Map of Kwara State Showing the Study Areas

Ilorin

Kwara State is divided into 16 local government councils with the headquarters in Ilorin. The topography of the city is generally undulating. The elevation of the land on the western side ranges from 273m to 330m (900ft-1000ft), while the eastern part varies from size 273m to 364m (900ft-1200ft). Ilorin is the political headquarters of the State. The core indigenes of the city are Muslims with a significant number of immigrant Christians. For political and administrative convenience, the city is further divided into three local governments one of which is Ilorin South where the majority of the participants in this study were drawn.

Ilorin South Local Government was created in 1996 with the headquarters located at Fufu; a drive of about 30km from the State Capital. In terms of people, history, culture and geography, Ilorin South is highly complex and heterogeneous. The Local Government occupies a land area of about 174 km² with a population of about 209 251 based on the 2006 census (Federal Republic of Nigeria [FRN], 2009: 34). The Local Government is made up of urban, semi-urban and rural settlements with three districts (Akanbi, Balogun Fulani and Okaka/Oke-Ogun) and at least ten wards.

Living in an urban or semi-urban area in this Local Government ideally places the inhabitants in an advantaged position of a 'high degree' of accessibility to formal health care services that include both private and public health facilities located within these areas as against those in the rural regions who are extremely disadvantaged. However, most of the public health facilities are in appalling conditions; most are ill-equipped, short staffed and lack basic health facilities that could enhance treatment of diseases including malaria. The Children Specialist Hospital, from where the urban respondents were drawn, is located in Centre Igboro in Ilorin South Local Government Area. The facility is one of the oldest meant for children in the State and the Local Government in particular.

`At the time of the study, the Children Specialist Hospital had a staff contingent of about 65 nurses with only two permanent medical doctors [a consultant and a general practitioner] assisted by at least four medical doctors of the NYSC. The laboratory scientist is supported by a lab technician; two X-ray technicians with two supportive staff; a pharmacist with about four supporters and a nutritionist. Despite the fact that the hospital is one of the highest revenue-generating hospitals in the State, according to one of the staff interviewed, the hospital is faced with numerous challenges. At the time of the study, the hospital did not have oxygen cylinders or refrigerators. The weighing scale and suction pump were non-functional. There was erratic power supply and insufficient medical doctors. Recently, a non-governmental organisation (NGO) known as the Wellbeing Foundation came to the rescue of the hospital. The NGO helped to give the hospital its present new look when it undertook the renovation with the provision of a borehole for water supply, a children's ward, a doctor's consulting room, nurses' bay and bathrooms in the maternity unit, an ambulance and mosquito netting throughout the facility. Figure 4 presents the pictorial characteristic of the Children Specialist Hospital.

Figure 4: The Children Specialist Hospital

Okanle and Fajeromi

Okanle and Fajeromi are located in Ifelodun Local Government of Kwara State. The Okanle Village Area Council was established in 1956 with other seven villages that included Fajeromi (Okanle Descendant Union [ODU], 2009: 3). Okanle is less than 2km away from Fajeromi. The villages are about 30km from Ilorin along Offa/Ajase Ipo Road and exactly 6km from Idofian town. Although a number of people engage in buying and selling as well as craftsmanship farming remains the primary source of livelihood. Household income is usually generated from farm produce as well as buying and selling.

Like many other rural areas in Nigeria, the people of Okanle and Fajeromi have limited access to basic social amenities including health care facilities. The roads leading to both communities from both Arugbo and Idofian are not tarred and as a result difficult to traverse. The only community health centre that served the people was established in 1978 through the initiatives of both communities. The facility has however been taken-over the State Government. As at the time of the study, the community health centre had no designated medical doctor. The facility was run by a nurse. Thus, health matters, including malaria, were usually handled by the only designated nurse. Indeed, the hospital lacked basic health facilities with just two beds in a dilapidated building (see figure 5 and figure 6). Most of the rooms in the health centre have been abandoned because the roofs were collapsing. The people sometimes travel to Idofian or Ilorin to consult with medical professionals where health problems are beyond herbal medicines and the capacity of the village facility or where health providers are not available for consultation.

Figure 5: The Two Beds Available at the Health Centre

Figure 6: Abandoned Store at the Health Centre.

Data Collection, Sampling Technique and Population of Study

This study design employed was qualitative methodology. The study mainly used data from 40 semi-structured interviews, 20 in-depth interviews and four Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) conducted with caregivers (male and female). Purposive sampling technique was used to select the participants. Subjects were mainly mothers, fathers and grandparents of children under the age of five years whose child or ward had manifested malaria symptoms at one time or another and who could have reported or failed to report such cases at the available health centres. However, the majority of the respondents were women because they were in the best position to discuss the issues under investigation. Other respondents were health workers selected from the Okanle/Fajeromi Basic Health Centre and the Children Specialist Hospital in Centre Igboro in Ilorin as well as traditional pharmacists popularly known as *elewe-omo*. This category of respondents was selected from *Oja-tuntun* in Ilorin. None of them was available in the rural areas. In all, a total of 99 respondents participated in the study out of which 11 of them were health workers and traditional pharmacists. The study employed an 'etic-reflective' approach for the presentation of data collected. This approach of presentation serves two functions; it does not only report the substantive content of the research but also takes seriously issues of reactivity and reflexivity (Darlington and Scott, 2002: 160-161).

Results
Perceived Threat, Severity and Susceptibility to Malaria

Local discourses about malaria are found to be entrenched in indigenous illness representation in various communities - an indication that malaria has been an age-long disease. "Iba" is a popular Yoruba term used to describe malaria among the people studied and used as a general term to accommodate different phases or dimensions of malaria sometimes with some prefixes and suffixes. In the communities' understanding of "iba", a distinction is often drawn between "abo-iba" and "ako-iba" where "abo" refers to "female" and "ako" to "male". Literally, "abo-iba" refers to "female-malaria" which connotes non-severe or mild malaria. "Ako-iba", on the other hand, literally connotes "male-malaria" which can mean "strong", severe or complicated malaria. The "abo - ako" distinction originated from the belief that a male child is "stronger" than a female child. More so, the distinction between "ako"- and "abo-iba" depends on the perceived symptoms, manifestations and duration of malaria at any point in time. For instance, "iba-apanju" (symptoms of typhoid fever) was misrepresented by the majority of the respondents as an example of "ako-iba". This episode of illness, as perceived by the local people, is believed to turn the colour of the eyes-balls into yellow according to the respondents. The distinction between "ako-iba" and "abo-iba" in children was drawn based on the knowledge of malaria in the adult population. However, such distinction does not accurately correspond to the biological distinction of complicated and uncomplicated malaria. The correspondence between biological and local constructions was only observed in the understanding of symptoms of malaria in children. In most cases,"iba" in children is often recognised by vomiting, unnecessary quietness or weakness, chills, anorexia (a prolonged disorder of eating due to loss of appetite), yellow urine, weight loss and body temperature.

Within the context of the current study, perceived threat and severity of children to malaria was overwhelmingly acknowledged by the majority of the caregivers interviewed. A significant number of the caregivers interviewed were of the opinion that malaria is a serious health problem and a major threat to children. The threat posed by malaria to children was articulated by one of the participants in Fajeromi who recalled that her one year old boy had manifested malaria symptoms and treated more than four times since he was born less than a year ago. "This malaria thing is my greatest worry", she said. Another caregiver in Ilorin argued that her presence at the Specialist Hospital where she was interviewed marked the 3rd time she was consulting doctor at the hospital since she gave birth to her daughter a year ago. "I am tired. I don't know what to do again to prevent my children from having malaria", she said. The majority of the caregivers acknowledged the fact that severe complications might develop in children if proper treatment is delayed. However, the treatment

option often adopted by the majority of the caregivers was herbal medicines. The proceeding statements describe the perceived threat, severity and susceptibility of children to malaria infections by the caregivers interviewed.

> I believe malaria in children should be taken very seriously because it is very dangerous. It can lead to harmful outcomes. In fact, it can kill. That is why I react quickly when I notice the symptoms in my children. I think what makes malaria a threat to little children is because they cannot tell exactly how they feel when they are sick. Many of them cannot talk convincingly… That is when parents become panic (a mother of one year old child in Fajeromi).

> Based on my experience, I do believe that malaria is a very dangerous disease. It is terrible. It causes a lot of distress. It can drain the blood. It causes unnecessary calmness in children. It often affects my children. The elder one was brought back from school just yesterday due to malaria (a mother from Ilorin).

One of the most important variables in the HBM is 'cues to action'. Apart from exposure to information through the mass media, witnessing the death of a relative due to a particular health problem (e.g. malaria) could promote positive health behaviour change (in this case the use of treated bed nets). Thus, when questions were asked about 'cues to action' during the study, that is, whether or not respondents had witnessed deaths of children caused by malaria, a significant number of respondents answered in affirmative. A 28 year old young mother of two in Okanle cited an example of her sister's child who died as a result of what she and other relatives believed was caused by malaria. She mentioned that when the case was initially reported at the community health centre, there were no medical personnel to attend to the patient. The parents were therefore forced to report at the health centre in Idofian which was more than 5km away from the community. The boy, according to her, unexpectedly died the following morning. The woman narrated the incident in the following statement:

> There were times when children had died from malaria-related symptoms in this village. This happened to my sister's child very recently. The child died after a brief illness everybody suspected to be malaria. He did not die at the local clinic because when they took him there, there was no doctor or nurse to attend to him. He was rushed to Idofian. He died the following morning. The boy was about two years old. He was living with his grandmother in the village. The biological mother lives in Lagos (a young mother of two children under five years in Okanle).

Perceived Benefits and Barriers to the Use of ITN

The familiar saying that "prevention is better and cheaper than cure" may have driven the invention, development and subsequent popularity attached to the bed nets to prevent malaria occurrences, especially in children. Unlike the untreated traditional bed nets, the ITN is made up of certain chemical combinations that can weaken or kill mosquitoes on contact and this has attracted considerable research interest over the last two decades. In fact, studies have consistently proven that ITN is one of the most effective preventive strategies in malaria control in children and the cheapest modern malaria control strategies (Frey et al. 2006: 3). The use of treated bed nets may however be influenced by some of the variables as proposed in the HBM. They are belief in effectiveness of the new behaviour ("treated bed nets are effective against malaria transmission"); perceived benefits of preventive action ("if I start using treated bed nets, I can avoid malaria infection in my children"); and barriers to taking action ("I don't like using treated bed nets because it makes me sneeze and makes me feel hot").

Therefore, the interviews conducted and the FGDs revealed that it is a common knowledge in the communities studied that new born babies are placed under the nets at birth to avoid mosquito bites. One of the grandmothers interviewed posited that "it is a tradition that when mothers give birth they should use net to cover the new born baby because of mosquitoes". The nets she meant however were the untreated traditional bed nets which were readily available in the markets in the big cities. The use of the net was not necessarily to prevent children from catching malaria. Rather, the net is used to avoid mosquito disturbance and allow children have normal sleep. Unfortunately, untreated nets do not provide adequate and full protection against malaria (Osondu and Jerome, 2009).

Therefore, a significant number of the respondents interviewed in this study had no access to the treated bed nets. The majority were not also aware of their effectiveness and usefulness. A mother in Okanle submitted that "those nets distributed by the government (she meant to say the treated bed nets) are not always available in our hospital. So, we don't normally see them". A pioneer member of the community association and a community leader in Fajeromi recalled that "only nine pieces of the bed nets were allocated to the whole community from the headquarters months ago". Thus, four different categories of users of bed nets were identified. In the first category were caregivers who had heard and used the ITNs for their children in the past. These people were just four in rural areas and three in the urban area. Five out of these got the ITN either through a friend who worked at the Local Government Council or from the market place and not necessarily through the government free distribution channels. However, these respondents had mixed feelings about how effective the bed net was. Some caregivers reported that using bed-nets had helped the family's well-being in

general and that they and their children did not get ill as often when the bed-nets were being used. One of the fathers in Fajeromi said his wife had informed him prior to the study that mosquitoes had suddenly disappeared from her room. This was attributed to consistent compliance with the usage of the ITN. Yusuf et al (2010) had reported less fever in households with ITN. However, some of this category of respondents felt otherwise. Three of the people who had used the bed nets prior to the study believed it was not effective. They claimed that it is not advisable to use the bed nets when the weather is hot. It makes one to feel hot and sneeze at the same time. This agrees with study where compliance with ITN was reported more during the raining seasons than hot and dry season (Frey et al. 2006).

In the second category were caregivers who had heard of the bed nets but who had not used it for their children. The respondents in this category were the majority. Lack of access was largely due to poverty, scarcity and non-availability. However, some members in this category wished to use ITN but had no access to them. They alleged irregularities in the distribution of the bed nets. In the third category were caregivers who had not heard of the ITN and as such had not used it before. In the last category were caregivers who did not believe in the effectiveness of the ITN. According to these respondents, the use of ITNs was not necessary since children are exposed to mosquitoes both day and night. Thus, studies which found that mosquito bed nets were not perceived as effective in the prevention of malaria infection simply because mosquitoes bite day and night underscores the relevance of the perceived threat as contained in HBM. According to a 48 year old mother in Fajeromi:

> Let's face the reality. There is no way we can prevent children from having ma-
> laria if malaria is truly caused by mosquitoes. We just have to continue to pray to
> God for his protection. The belief that the bed net or what do you call it prevents
> malaria is not true. In a large family like ours there are many children to be cov-
> ered with the bed net … So, I don't think we should deceive ourselves. There is
> no way we can prevent malaria because children play day and night. Most times
> children move around the village without any clothes on them. The only effort I
> make is to use broom to chase away mosquitoes before going to bed.

The majority of the caregivers attributed limited access to ITN to certain social vices believed to be common in the way and manner the bed nets are distributed. These include corruption, maladministration, favouritism and nepotism at the government levels. Some respondents accused government officials of hoarding the bed nets only to be sold later to business women in the market who buy and sell them at higher prices. Fortunately, a number of health officials interviewed also accepted that corruption hinders accessibility to the ITNs. However, some of them also pointed accused fingers at some caregivers. They claimed that some caregivers collect the bed nets at the health facilities for free but resell to marketers at the local market for reasons attributed to

poverty and greed. One of the nurses at the Children Specialist Hospital claimed she was aware that bed nets are sold for as much as N400.00 ($3) at one of the most popular markets in the city of Ilorin where baby materials are usually sold.

Based on these challenges it can be conveniently argued that high perceived threat and susceptibility to malaria may not promote the use of the treated bed nets, especially where there are institutional, cultural and political challenges. In other words, other socio-cultural, political and economic constructs are also important determinant factors. Alternatively, therefore, caregivers depend on alternative preventive kits and strategies. In urban areas there were numerous malaria preventive devices that included different brands and qualities of insecticides but very few were available in the rural areas. The majority of the respondents in the rural areas depend on local plants known as *ewe-efon*, to prevent mosquito bites. The use of local plants was perceived as an age-old practice by the people. A woman in Fajeromi reported that:

> In this community we have local plants that are "mosquito chasers". We use them to prevent mosquito bite. We call it "ewe efon". Once the mosquitoes perceive the smell they just run away. You can place it by your side when you go to sleep. You can use it when it is wet and dry. When you burn the dry leaves the smoke chases the mosquito away.

Discussion

The most vulnerable populations to the threat of malaria in Nigeria, like other endemic places, are children below the age of five. Similarly, epidemiological studies have consistently shown that morbidity and mortality due to malaria have continued to occur mainly among children in Nigeria (WHO, 2011). This usually occurs during the first and second year of life given the infant's biological dispositions; when infants are yet to acquire adequate clinical immunity against malaria parasite (Sadiq et al. 2009). Similarly, this study revealed that malaria cases are common in the studied communities. The health officials interviewed provided account of the occurrence, vulnerability and threat of malaria to children in the communities based on the number of casualties and episodes of malaria previously treated at the health facilities. One of the senior nurses at the Children Specialist Hospital in Ilorin recounted that more than 70% of reported cases of illness in children treated at the facility (which included complicated cases such as anemia and convulsions), a day before the interview, were malaria-related. A similar notion was shared by the only designated nurse at the Okanle/Fajeromi Health Centre. She maintained that at least 3 out of every 5 sick children presented at the health facility were malaria-related.

One of the cornerstones to preventing the occurrence of malaria, especially in children, has been through persistent and correct use of ITNs. ITN has been widely acknowledged to be an important and effective malaria preventive device. Correct use of ITNs could prevent as much as 336 000 malaria related deaths in children every year (Alaii, 2003). Based on this positive note, the government of Nigeria has reviewed its malaria policies to reflect the use of ITNs. In Kwara State government has promised to provide ITNs for children younger than five years of age hoping that parents of these children would adopt the ITN as part of strategies to prevent children from contacting malaria (Abdullahi et al. 2012; Saraki, 2009). This was to avert or reduce malaria related morbidity and mortality in children.

Experts in social psychology have gathered a large body of findings suggesting that "while people are seeing and listening to the world around them, social knowledge that corresponds to perceived stimuli is spontaneously and immediately activated in memory without people's awareness of it" (Ferguson and Bargh, 2004). Therefore, perception is central to the analysis of socio-cultural phenomena as well as health behaviour change (Jegede, 2002). As proposed in HBM perceived susceptibility to a particular health problem, perceived seriousness of the health condition and cues to action are important factors in health behaviour change. In a study of caregivers' acceptance of using Artesunate suppositories for treating childhood malaria, Hinton et al. (2007) discovered that 29% of caregivers refused to accept the use of this alternative care for fear of side effects (i.e. perception of effectiveness of health behaviour). Respondents in Hinton's et al. study mentioned lack of spousal approval as well as concerns about safety and the practical challenges of administering to a reluctant child as reasons for rejection (Hinton et al., 2007: 639).

As shown in the current study, the majority of the respondents considered malaria a serious threat to children. They also acknowledged the fact that severe complications might develop in children if proper treatment is delayed. However, the use of insecticide treated bed nets was very low. Even though the majority of the respondents had heard about the bed nets, many had not used it for their children. Among the few who had used the ITN prior to the study a significant had mixed feelings about the effectiveness of the bed nets. While some caregivers reported using the bed nets, a significant number only keep them in the house, reasons attributed, largely, to heat, sneezing and weather. This suggests that sometimes high perceived threat and susceptibility to a particular disease, cues to action may not guarantee the use of the treated bed nets, especially where there are institutional, cultural, ecological and political challenges. Amzat (2011) has succinctly argued that low ITN coverage, ownership and usage in Nigerian communities are due to poor public health system and lack of political will on the part of the government.

Conclusions

Malaria is a serious health problem and one of the major childhood diseases in Nigeria. Following the World Health Organization's recommendation, ITNs have been proposed for all people vulnerable to malaria infection with a special focus on children younger than five years of age by the Nigerian government. Thus, an increased public awareness and health benefits of the ITNs have been reported and documented across African indigenous communities (see Blackburn et al. 2006; Muller et al. 2008; Osondu and Jerome, 2009). For example, in Kenya, ITN coverage increased rapidly from 7% in 2004 to more than 60% in 2006, leading to a significant reduction in childhood mortality (Fegan et al. 2007). A study conducted by Muller et al. (2008) in the North-Western Burkina-Faso demonstrated an overall increased household ownership from 16% to 28%. However, with specific reference to Nigeria, research outputs about household coverage of ITNs and ownership have been discouraging. As shown in the current study and others, there is no certainty that the targeted populations are actually in possession of the ITNs and where they are usage is not guaranteed. Afolabi et al. (2009) reported low levels of ITN usage in Nigeria. Jegede et al. (2006) also found low levels of ITN awareness in Nigeria. Unless the socio-cultural issues as well as individual factors surrounding knowledge, treatment and correct use of the ITNs are resolved, malaria would continue to threaten children and the entire Nigerian society.

Therefore, for equitable distribution of ITNs in Nigeria a number of individual and societal variables need to be improved upon. This is better anchored on behavioural theory of health service utilisation. At the societal level, the alleged allegations of corruption and mismanagement must be addressed very urgently and sincerely. This also requires an urgent need for constant political will to implement health policies aimed at empowering local communities particularly in the prevention of malaria in children in order to reduce morbidity and mortality associated with malaria infections in local communities. This would require a desire to fight against corruption at the level of procurement and distribution of the ITN. Proper machineries need to be put in place to ensure that the ITNs get to the intended population groups. This should include proper monitoring and evaluation.

At the individual levels, the implementation of health education and promotion programmes that are community-friendly and sustainable is also very important. Caregivers should be educated, particularly those with low socio-economic status on the importance, proper and correct use of the ITNs. While the immunization opportunity remains an important avenue through which ITNs can be distributed to caregivers, affected communities through their own social capital and structure could be encouraged to take responsibility for the distribution of ITNs. The Kenyan and Burkina-Faso's experiences clearly demonstrate the importance and effectiveness of a

combined approach of social marketing and mass free distribution if ITNs for a rapid achievement of high and equitable coverage, ownership and use of the ITN.

Acknowledgement

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Women and Development in Urban Senegal: Microcredit and Social Capital

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Abstract

The challenging living conditions of many Senegalese families, and the absence of a providing spouse, have led women to covet new economic opportunities, such as microcredit loans. Microcredit loans offer Senegalese women the possibility to financially support their households and become active participants in their economies. The study takes place in Grand-Yoff, an over-populated peri-urban area of the Senegalese capital city Dakar, where most people face daily survival needs. This research examines the relationships between microcredit activities and the social capital of Senegalese female loan recipients. The study finds that the impact and success of microcredit are intimately tied to the female borrowers' social capital. Household members, kin groups, communities, social and business networks, formal education, training, professional and business experience are all important sources of social capital for female borrowers. Sources of social capital for the participants in the study can be dependable and enriching, but in many cases reveal themselves to be treacherous, jeopardizing the survival of their households and businesses. The study shows that a providing spouse, formal education, training, business experience, and belonging to social and business networks facilitate women's success in their microcredit and entrepreneurial activities. It is recommended that microcredit services and programs in Senegal offer their female clients assistance and additional basic services

Introduction

"Since I got the loan and built my oven, I feel like I am really doing business," says a Senegalese businesswoman who sells smoked fish. Like many women in Senegal, she has been a beneficiary of microcredit loans to start her own business. For the past two decades, international aid has turned its attention to helping women in poor countries. Many development projects geared toward women in developing countries have focused on reproductive health, literacy for girls, and the AIDS epidemic, especially on the African continent. However, in recent years there has been an interesting shift in aiding women in the area of microcredit or microenterprise, whereby loans are given to women to aid them in starting their own small businesses.

In most African countries women tend to account for an average 51% of the population, and make up about 65% of the rural labour force (UNDP 2009). In

addition, women tend to shoulder the greater burden of child and family welfare, social and community obligations, engaging in more than one economic activity as well as undertaking domestic chores. In connection with the growing emphasis on poverty reduction, microcredit has been recognized as the most necessary and the 'missing ingredient' in poverty alleviation (Pitamber 2003). This optimism was best illustrated at the Microcredit Summit in Washington D.C. in 1997 when 20 billion dollars were devoted to microfinance programs worldwide, demonstrating that the self reliance of the poor is an attractive approach for development agencies and donors alike.

In 2004, the Group of Eight (G8) confirmed the importance of microfinance as a development tool against poverty, putting it at the forefront of the strategies described in the G8 action plan. In 2005, the former UN Secretary General Koffi Annan declared the year as "the year of microfinance." Since then there has been a multitude of microcredit services around the world targeting women to help them start microenterprises. In addition, Mohammad Yunus' Grameen Bank has further popularized the concept of lending to poor women. This trend has accelerated the creation of many women's savings and credit cooperatives and microcredit programs in Senegal.

Senegalese women, like many West African women, have traditionally been engaged in commercial activities. However, a lack of substantial resources or access to credit has prevented most of them from entering the formal sector or starting their businesses. Many micro-enterprise projects have begun in Senegal and are funded by local and international aid organizations, the Senegalese government, microfinance institutions, banks, and cooperatives. There has been a proliferation of microcredit institutions and services in the capital city of Dakar, the Senegalese urban epicenter. In 2004, there were 805 financial structures geared towards micro lending in Senegal, and 68 women savings and credit cooperatives have been functioning as of 2006. Savings and credit banks have increased from 60 in 1992 to 800 in 2004 (ANSD 2009).

This paper examines the relationships between microcredit/microenterprise activities and the social capital of Senegalese female loan recipients. The women in the study reside in Grand-Yoff, an overpopulated peri-urban area of the capital city Dakar where most inhabitants are faced with dire survival needs. Many residents in these neighbourhoods are migrants from rural parts of the country and levels of poverty in these areas are exacerbated by their overpopulation. Grand-Yoff is known for its popular neighbourhood's women savings and credit cooperative (*Mutuelle d'Epargne et de Crédit des Femmes de Grand Yoff*), which is the pioneer neighbourhood women's savings and credit institution in Dakar. The area is also characterized by a plethora of microcredit institutions, making it an ideal place to conduct the study.

I conducted interviews, surveys, participant observation and focus groups with a total sample of 166 female participants who are microcredit recipients, and some of their household members. The study's findings show that the participants' sources of social capital are intimately linked with the success (or lack of) of their

microcredit/microenterprise ventures. This study contributes to the development literature by testing conventional knowledge that microcredit is a key to women's financial autonomy, and an effective tool for poverty alleviation. Lessons learned from Senegalese women will be valuable by adding to the already existing literature on poor women and microcredit, notably in urban areas.

Research Site

Dakar's peri-urban area of Grand-Yoff was chosen as an appropriate site to conduct the study. Generally, peri-urban areas represent a bridge between the city and the village because many residents in such areas migrate from the interior of Senegal, in particular, the rural parts. Such areas are overpopulated and as such poverty level is high. Grand-Yoff is known for its popular neighbourhood's women savings and credit cooperative (*Mutuelle d'Epargne et de Crédit des Femmes de Grand Yoff)*. This is the pioneer neighbourhood women's savings and credit institution in Dakar, with the hallmarks of a cooperative. These women's savings and credit cooperatives are all over the city and other regions of Senegal. Before conducting eight months of field-research, I spent three months of preliminary work studying how the cooperative functions through its personnel, committees and members. The women's savings and credit cooperative of Grand-Yoff functions as other banks and cooperatives because it has personnel on site, and kiosks with tellers dotted around the neighbourhood, mainly in the Grand-Yoff market. There are many Microcredit institutions in the area, creating great competition for the neighbourhood's cooperative. I found that the cooperative functions on solidarity, reciprocity, and trust because its members share commonalities. This is parallel to traditional savings groups in Senegal: *tontines*, *Nat* or *Mbotay*.

Dakar

Dakar is the capital city of Senegal. It is overpopulated because people, usually from rural areas, have been migrating to the city since independence in search of economic opportunities. In 2008, the population of Dakar was estimated at 2,482,294. This represents one quarter of the entire population of Senegal living in an area of only 0.3% of the country (ANSD 2009). The population in Dakar is young, with 68% under 30 years of age (ANSD 2009). The living conditions in Dakar, while difficult, are far better than in other parts of the country. The chance for survival of children living in Dakar is much higher than in other parts of the country. For every 1,000 children born in Dakar, there are 79 who die before reaching 5 years of age, compared to 200 out of 1,000 dying in other regions of Senegal (ANSD 2009).

Dakar's privileged position comes from the fact that it overwhelmingly outnumbers other regions in economic opportunities and infrastructures. The majority of infrastructures in Senegal - especially businesses, hospitals, clinics and schools – are found in the city. Dakar's process of urbanization finds its roots first in the fact that it was the capital of francophone West Africa during colonization, and hence privileged by the French. The development of the industrial and business sectors, along with the expansion of the informal sector attracted people, especially, the young, from other parts of the country. The continued rural exodus has, to a degree, contributed, to the city's infrastructural decay (ANSD 2009). High levels of unemployment, especially in its peri-urban areas, also characterize Dakar. According to the Senegalese National Statistics Agency (*Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie*), 51.4% of the unemployed are men and 48.6% are women, with 83% of all workers in the informal sector (ANSD 2009). Newcomers to the city, undoubtedly, increase the unemployment numbers. According to 2008 statistics, 35.8% of all unemployed in Dakar have been unemployed in the past year (ANSD 2009). However, the high unemployment in Dakar notwithstanding, living conditions are still better than in other parts of Senegal.

Many recent internal migrants reside in the peri-urban areas of Dakar (35.5% of its population). These peri-urban areas are peripheral, socially, geographically, and economically. The majority of the residents in such areas are poor and many families live in very crowded and insanitary conditions. In fact, living conditions are worse than those in the center or other parts of Dakar because of a lack of access to basic services such as health care, education, and transportation. These services are either far removed from the residents or too expensive for them to afford.

It has to be said that, generally, migration has been increasing in Senegal, and many of the migrants are international migrants from other West African countries; half of these migrants reside in Dakar. The study's research site which is the peri-urban area of Grand-Yoff is very much home to many international migrants who usually come from English speaking countries. Many of these migrants, especially those from Nigeria and Ghana have the reputation of conducting illegal activities and are often viewed with great suspicion by Senegalese people. These migrants have not traditionally moved to Senegal in great numbers, but lately they have become very visible. Other international migrants come from neighbouring countries, such as Guinée or the Ivory Coast, and have been settling in Senegal for generations.

Grand-Yoff, Dakar

Grand-Yoff was created in 1950 by peasants, with only two families living there in the beginning. My field research took place in the two neighbourhoods of Grand Yoff: Cité Millionnaire and Arafat. These two neighbourhoods are next to each other and are the most populated in Grand-Yoff. As earlier mentioned, Grand-Yoff is a poor and working class peri-urban area where people struggle for survival needs, especially food security. Municipal workers that I spoke to at the Grand-Yoff's city hall estimate the population of these two neighbourhoods to approximately 200,000, which represents half of their estimation of Grand-Yoff's population. These numbers are far above those estimated by the Senegalese National Statistics Agency (*Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie*) and the city of Dakar for 2009: about 200,000 people for all of Grand Yoff. These discrepancies can be explained by the fact that people are constantly moving in and out of peri-urban areas because many are seasonal dwellers or recent migrants to the city.

Grand-Yoff is one of the 19 communes or districts found near the capital city of Dakar. The area is an ethnic mosaic because all ethnic groups in Senegal are represented. The continuous rural exodus to Dakar explains why all ethnic groups live there because they find cheap housing in peri-urban areas compared to the center or other parts of Dakar that are expensive for them. Many residents of Grand-Yoff, especially women, form associations according to kin or occupation. Many of the study's participants belong to associations formed along ethnic lines; this allows them to have a support system. The area is home to one of the major markets in Dakar (*Marché Grand-Yoff*), which offers many residents informal employment.

The neighbourhoods of Cité Millionnaire and Arafat are filled with buildings where people rent rooms. Families share one or two rooms and live in very tight spaces with only a couple of bathrooms on every floor. This explains why children stay outside to play or chat with others once they are old enough. Most women in the study rent one or two rooms. Husbands and young adults are often absent from home, as they are day-workers and return home late. Hence, Grand-Yoff appears to be a dormitory because its population seems to double at night, though it still remains heavily populated during the day. In addition, housing in Grand-Yoff does not follow construction norms. That marks a striking difference with middle and upper class neighbourhoods in Dakar. Streets and yards are not paved or cemented except the major roads. This is very common in many peri-urban areas in Dakar. The streets are unsanitary and contain sewage, which generates bad odor, a factor in bringing about many diseases. Migrants, making the area a "bridge between the village and the city", import many habits or ways of living found in rural areas into Grand-Yoff. For example, there are cattle kept in front of houses because of lack of space in most homes, which creates more unsanitary conditions for

residents. The habit of keeping cattle in front of houses is not very popular in middle and upper class neighbourhoods of Dakar, where residents see themselves as more "modernized." Many workers in Grand-Yoff transport goods on horse-carts, which is a means of transportation in villages.

Women in Grand-Yoff usually sell goods at the market, in front of their houses, by the corner of the street, or door-to-door. Some also sell goods outside of the neighbourhood, usually downtown, while others are housemaids in other neighbourhoods. In general, in the neighbourhoods of Cité Millionnaire and Arafat, where the women in my sample live, women are usually very occupied with menial jobs. Their lives are fast paced and they are constantly roaming around to earn a living so that they can feed their families. Almost all women in the sample were responsible, financially, for themselves and their children. Most men in Grand-Yoff also have activities in the market where they sell goods or offer their services. As many men and women migrate from rural areas to the city to search for jobs, they often leave their partners or families in the village because they cannot afford to take care of them were they to live together in the urban areas.

Access to health care is a huge problem for residents of Grand-Yoff. Besides the Grand-Yoff hospital and a few other clinics or health centers, there are no health facilities in the two neighbourhoods. Some of the clinics operate at a cheaper cost, but medication remains very expensive in Senegal. The hospital only admits patients if they have insurance or after they have paid all or a big portion of their bill. Most patients go to the Grand-Yoff hospital from other areas of Dakar and Senegal for treatment, as outpatients, to be tested, or hospitalized. Often times, the population living in the area cannot afford to go to the hospital because they do not have the financial means. Many of the participants told me how expensive or impossible it is for them and their families to go to the hospital. Unless they have serious illnesses or experience a bone fracture, they prefer to go to the cheaper clinics or health centers in the area. The two neighbourhoods of Cité Millionnaire and Arafat do not have health clinics, and the population has to go to health facilities outside the area. This lack of health facilities is a common trait of most peri-urban areas of Dakar.

The commune of Grand-Yoff has 11 elementary schools and one junior high school. None of these schools are in the two neighbourhoods where I conducted my research. These two neighbourhoods are the most populated and represent half of the populations of Grand-Yoff. There are some private elementary schools that are set up to serve the residents of these neighbourhoods. There is a private Catholic high school in the outskirts of the area, but as is the case with the hospital, most residents of Grand-Yoff can barely afford to send their children to the school. In fact, most students at the private high school come from middle and upper-class neighbourhoods. Many of my participants struggle financially to keep their children in school and find it more challenging when their children become teenagers and are in high school. A few of my respondents say that their children have dropped out of high school or attend irregularly because they

are faced with financial burdens. Their home conditions are generally not favourable for success at school.

There is a lack of security in Grand-Yoff that most people and some of the participants blame on the new and rapidly increasing immigrant population from Anglophone countries, especially Nigeria and Ghana. According to a municipal advisor, these populations are involved in many illegal activities, notably drug trafficking, prostitution, and rape. This can be explained by the fact there is no order or policing in the area. Furthermore, residents who are not from Dakar may engage in activities they would not conduct in their home communities especially because of an absence of or low level policing.

Microcredit and Social Capital

Microcredit borrowers rely on their relations and networks - "social capital" - to conduct their business activities and take care of their survival needs. The basic idea of social capital is that one's family, friends, and associates constitute an important asset that can be enjoyed, called upon in times of need, or leveraged for material gain. In development theory, the concept of "social capital" offers a way to bridge sociological and economic perspectives, thereby providing potentially richer and better explanations of economic perspectives (Woolcock and Narayan 2000). Microfinance models and programs tend to rely on the poor's support systems, especially their social networks, as is the case for women's credit groups, to ensure high repayment rates, but also reduce their administrative costs. Social capital is a determining factor in the design, process and success of microcredit services both on the lender and borrower's ends. The focus on sources of social capital for the poor, especially women, is very important in analyzing the effectiveness and impact of microcredit.

Social Capital in Microfinance Models

Social capital has been a central concept in social sciences since the 1980s. The concept has been the focus of influential scholarly writings from French sociologist and anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu, and American sociologists Robert Putnam and James Coleman. Bourdieu (1992: 119) defined social capital as "the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition." Policy makers have been relying on social capital theories to design development interventions towards poverty alleviation. Development and microfinance programs are sought to strengthen and develop the social capital of their target populations. In contrast to earlier basic needs or welfare approaches to poverty alleviation, the potential

of social capital theory lies in its recognition of social networks and associational life as resources for fueling development from the bottom up (Rankin 2002). Microcredit or microfinance models have been specifically designed according to the idea that the poor's social networks or associations allow for the trust and reciprocity necessary to their success in acquiring and using loans.

Family members, social networks, formal education, training and business experience are great sources of social capital, for they provide microcredit borrowers the ability to succeed in their lives and business activities. Microfinance programs bank on their borrowers' social capital because it allows them to minimize their operation costs, especially in group lending where they put the responsibility and pressure of loan repayment on the groups of borrowers who must not default on their payments for fear of not being able to get further loans. Mainstream development agencies such as the World Bank and the CGAP (Consultative Group to assist the Poor), the populist Grameen Bank and many microfinance institutions have designed models through which the poor receive credit on the basis of their membership in self-regulating solidarity groups. According to Mayoux:

> The existence of social capital in the form of indigenous networks and norms of association is seen as substituting for financial collateral in the selection of loan beneficiaries and loan disbursal and recovery. It is also seen as enabling the tar-geting of poor women in view of their limited access to resources (and also, often implicitly, their inherently co-operative nature). This decreases both costs and risk, thereby enabling rapid expansion for large scale poverty-targeted delivery. These prescriptions are informed by the experience of large-scale microfinance provision by programmes like Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (2001: 438).

In group lending, each member feels the urge, and pressure from all members of the group, to repay, for the fate of the group relies on her or him. Hence, notions of "solidarity" and "trust" are the heart of social capital when it comes to group-based microcredit. However, many scholars have been questioning this enthusiasm about social capital and in particular the notions of solidarity, trust and reciprocity as key to financial sustainability, poverty alleviation and women's empowerment.

Microcredit programs (à la Grameen Bank) are aimed at strengthening social capital and contribute to female empowerment. However, sources of social capital for female borrowers can be treacherous. Policies by the World Bank and the United Nations, as well as some studies on urban poverty assume that people form harmonious communities within a free market society, and thus fail to acknowledge the potential for conflict (Bahre 2007). Family units (including extended family members) and social networks are not always harmonious, and present female borrowers with a lot of hurdles. For example, many of the study's participants do not have spousal financial support, and often struggle with informed decision-making; these, can

tremendously jeopardize their loan use, as they might not be able to invest it into their business because of household needs or lack of control over their loans. Spousal relations are a key component in the analysis of microcredit as it relates to women and the household. Furthermore, extended family members such as in-laws that reside with female borrowers also play a pivotal role because they are part of the household decision-making. Many of the participants in the study are very mindful of their in-laws, especially mother in-laws, who often have a say in their marriages (from the support they get from their husbands to how they raise their children).

Social networks can also reproduce social inequalities among women, leaving the most disenfranchised on their own. The mere formation of solidarity groups does not guarantee progressive outcomes and may in fact perpetuate existing social hierarchies (Rankin 2002). Romanticized views of social capital in the development and microfinance literature as they pertain to women mask the realities of poor women across the globe; most struggle daily to pay back their loan, often at the risk of losing their social ties. Some scholars have questioned the underlying assumption of micro-credit programs that, the material benefits borrowers receive in the form of access to credit, are an acceptable exchange for their contributions in the form of social capital and interest rates; instead, many programs deplete the social capital of borrowers (Tata and Prasad 2010). Many borrowers become estranged from relatives and friends after borrowing money from them, often to repay their loans, and not being able to pay them back. In that regard, microcredit might indeed harm the social capital of borrowers who feel the pressure to repay their loans.

In the Household

We can argue that the first and most basic source of social support or capital is the family unit. In Senegal, most households are complex in nature, including the nuclear and extended family members. Household members play an essential role in the lives of female microcredit borrowers and are a source of support in their daily activities. Spousal support is an important source of social capital for married people, especially women who need their husband's support with finances and decision making in the household. Roughly 70% of the study's total population of women (and 74% of the closely studied participants) is married, while the remaining are divorced or widowed. The average number of children per women is 6. Therefore, in these women's households, there are quite a few mouths to feed, when one adds their husbands and/or extended family members who might live with them.

As discussed earlier, most women in the study (80%) are financially supporting their households. Most participants' husbands are retired, unemployed or have very irregular income. Only few husbands earn a steady income that allows them to be their households'

breadwinners. Among the participants in the study, 87% are financially responsible for their households' nutrition, while 74% pay for children's schooling expenses and 70% pay for health visits, treatments and medicines. That leaves these women in the same predicament as their divorced or widowed counterparts who are left to fend for themselves and their households. Many husbands do participate financially, however the daily allowance, *dépense quotidienne*, they provide their wives is hardly enough to cover for food, let alone all other needs such as doctors' visits, medicines, school expenses or transportation. As Aissatou noted: "No man's *dépense* is enough nowadays. As wives, we always have to find ways to supplement it."

Spousal support is not only limited to finances, but also matters in terms of decision-making, and negotiation leverage for women in their households. Many women have to ask their husbands' permission to acquire loans or engage in business activities. Others hide their loans from their husbands for fear that they would take control of it. In their study of women and credit in rural Bangladesh, Goetz and Gupta (1996) found that husbands actually control their wives' credit investment and income generated from it. Therefore, female borrowers might not receive the spousal support they need and find that their married life and responsibilities may interfere with their acquisition of loans and business aspirations. That brings to light the idea that social capital does not necessarily contribute to female borrowers' entrepreneurial success or empowerment.

Senegalese women culturally 'stand behind their husbands' and would often share their loans with them. Some of the participants mentioned that they care about their husbands' masculinity and do not want them to feel worthless because they cannot provide for the household. Therefore, many women back their husbands financially so that they can retain their symbolic power as providers. These are negotiation tactics that allow women favours and consideration from their husbands and improve their spousal relations. In their study of women and microfinance in the rural Senegalese town of *Gossas*, Kah et al. (2005) found that women help their husbands financially because it lifts their voice in the household and their husbands listen to them more often. According to the authors, when income earning wives in the community pay for school fees and medicines for their children (what are usually husbands' responsibilities), their standing within the family changes greatly as they enjoy greater freedom and influence. Here, microcredit increases the social capital of female borrowers when they reinvest their business profits into the household and help their husbands financially.

In most of the development and microfinance literature there are shortcomings in the discussions of social capital within the household from a gender perspective. The ideal household is generally treated as the basic unit of impact assessment, and assumptions are made about mutual rights and responsibilities in, for example, collateral requirements under which women must get their husband's signature in order to acquire a loan (Mayoux 2001). Intra-household relations in Senegal make women vulnerable to their husbands and often times in-laws. Most women in the study do not encounter

resistance from their husbands in their decision to acquire loans, but a few report that they must hide it from their spouses for fear that the latter would ask for it.

Acquiring loans requires tact and discretion because one does not want to make it public at the risk of having spouses, relatives or friends borrow money or ask for financial help. Women's ability to use savings and credit can be limited by vertical relations within households and kin groups. Furthermore, husbands do not often trust that their wives are smart or savvy enough to engage in microcredit activities that can result in substantial profits; many fear that their wives would not be able to pay back their, which would put their families in deeper predicaments. While women are also afraid of defaulting on their loans, they feel the pressure and obligation to earn money in the absence of a non-providing husband.

Married participants in the study, whose husbands financially provide for the household, are freed to invest their loans into their business. These women are in the minority and spousal financial support is a great source of social capital. However, some of these women mentioned that they still have responsibilities towards their children and extended family. For instance, many are financially responsible for their aging parents and some siblings. Furthermore, they might have to occasionally supplement the household allowance provided by their husbands. Most importantly, they do have enough collateral or social capital at the household and financial level, to be able to maximize their chances at succeeding in their microcredit activities.

Older children and extended family members are also a source of support for female borrowers who need assistance with household chores in order to attend to their business activities. The teenage or adult daughters or relatives of the women in the study help them with cooking, cleaning and child-care. Polygamy also enhances the social capital of many women who share their household's responsibilities with their co-wives. For instance, Khady, Diarra and Mariama all benefit from the fact that not living with their co-wives frees them from attending to their husbands' needs every day of the week. In these cases, polygamy empowers women and contributes to their personal, social and financial autonomy.

Some participants do not have to pay rent because they live in other family members' houses. Victoria, one of the poorest women in the study, lives for free in her relatives' house with her children and husband. Bousso and her children live in the house she inherited from her father along with her siblings and their family, while Aissatou moved into the house she inherited from her late mother with her husband, two children, niece and nephew. For these women, not having to pay rent provides them with financial and social support. Their fate is certainly different from that of Astou who struggles to pay her monthly rent for the one room, split in two, where she lives with her five children.

Social, Credit, and Business Networks

People connect through a series of networks where they tend to share common values with other members. To the extent that these networks constitute a resource, they may be seen as forming a kind of capital. Membership of networks and a set of shared values are at the heart of the concept of social capital (Field 2008). Belonging to social groups or organizations is an important source of social capital for female borrowers who join networks of savings and credit or business, which contribute to their entrepreneurial success. Most participants in the study belong to the neighbourhood's women's savings and credit institution (*Mutuelle D'Epargne et de Crédit des Femmmes de Grand-Yoff*) in which they save money individually and collectively and acquire loans and mortgage as well. The structure of group-based micro-credit programs can provide opportunities for micro-business owners to increase entrepreneurial networking and social capital, which, in turn, can influence business performance (Tata and Prasad 2010). Many women in the study also belong to trade networks or groups such as the women's cereal co-op, *Jokko*, where, about a dozen women process cereal into finished products that they sell individually or collectively out of their processing shop. Another women's association in Grand-Yoff is *Renafcos*, a national network of female merchants. We must not neglect the traditional and predominantly female self-selected saving schemes, *tontines*.

Tontines remain very important social and financial networks for women because they are self-selected savings groups and provide them with an opportunity to reinvest their money into important household and business needs. *Tontine* members contribute regular amounts with each member taking turns to receive the contribution of the whole group, thus getting access to a lump sum from a series of small contributions. However, *tontines* are not always as reliable as microcredit loans because there is no guarantee that all members will necessarily make their scheduled deposits, or that they will make it on time. Furthermore, political intrigue is common whereby the *tontine* leader might provide favour to some members. As such, many members do not always get their money on time or as promised.

A shortcoming of much of the literature on microfinance and women's empowerment is the idealisation of 'community', seen as a prime source of social capital and harmonious horizontal relations between women (Mayoux 2001). Stories of people in charge of *tontines* embezzling their members' money are multiple, making it harder to join or trust *tontines*. Many participants in the study no longer trust *tontines* and exclusively save their money with Microfinance Institutions (MFIs). The conflicts experienced within *tontine* networks are an example of the erosion of trust and reciprocity among women, putting to question the romantic notion that associations of women always feature tacit or enduring trust and solidarity. Bahre (2007: 52) argues: "Solidarity is not opposed to conflict, nor does conflict necessarily take place outside of the realm of solidarity. Instead

rivalry, conflict, jealousy, and aggression can be at the heart of solidarity networks." The lack of reliability of *tontines*, forcing many women to blindly turn towards MFIs, puts them at the risk of jeopardizing their financial future because of high interest rates and unforgiving repayment schedules.

Many women belong to cooperatives where they save their money in order to fund their business ventures. In fact, women, who take up activities, which usually follow gender divisions of labour, dominate cooperatives in Senegal. Female members of these cooperatives share the same craft, i.e. tailoring, knitting, weaving, food processing, restoration and commerce among other business activities. As most forms of networks, cooperatives are a great source of social capital for women because they provide their members with financial security, connections and often training and skills. However, social and business networks and groups require a lot of work for their members to sustain all the benefits they provide. Connections require work, and solidarity within networks is only possible because membership gives rise to profits, both material and symbolic (Bourdieu 1980). For instance the cereal co-op *Jokko* merged in its beginnings with another co-op, *Ndamlee*, processing fruits and vegetables into juices. However, *Ndamlee* has never been as successful as *Jokko*, but rather is an example of a failing business.

In an interview, Diatou, *Ndamlee*'s president said: "One must be very patient and dynamic to remain in a co-op. Many members neglect the work because they give priority to their personnel activities. Sometimes I have to pay our processing shop's rent by myself or with other members who are more committed to the work. We still haven't paid rent for this month." During the interview, a member of the co-op passed by in a hurry and Diatou stopped her to remind her that her services were needed. The member reassured Diatou that she would come later and hurried away. But, Diatou did not seem convinced. As she mentioned, many members are not as dedicated to the co-op's work as they should be. That showed the amount of work and stress that co-ops' leaders go through in order to get the members to commit to the work. It is not surprising that this co-op is not as successful as *Jokko*. They decided to split from *Jokko* because they could not work together anymore and found it better to be autonomous from each other. Members of *Jokko* hinted that *Ndamlee*'s lack of success is due to the fact that its members are not "serious" workers and that their president is not open and dynamic enough to lead the co-op.

Jokko and *Ndamlee* are, respectively, examples of a successful and a failing cooperative. One important point to note is that members of the failing co-op *Ndamlee* live in a middle class area and in a housing community for military officers. Hence, these women are all wives of government employees and do not face the same realities of the members of cereal co-op *Jokko* in Grand-Yoff. These two cooperatives have both received credit and training from the Grand-Yoff's women's savings and credit institution and continue to be involved in group-based credit programs. Ironically, the women members of *Jokko*

are the ones who have been able to make their business thrive and are able to provide for their families on their own. The success of the Grand-Yoff's co-op shows that microcredit can indeed create conditions for the acquisition and increase of social capital through associations. However, the co-op members residing in Grand-Yoff have to work hard to create and maintain the conditions that guarantee their financial success. Middle and upper-class female members of social and business networks are better suited to succeed in their microcredit and entrepreneurial pursuits because they have more social and financial collateral and support. Therefore, microcredit can indeed reproduce inequalities among women, leaving the poorest to remain disenfranchised.

Social and business networks are at the core of associational life for female entrepreneurs in Senegal. The members of a national network of female merchants, *Renafcos*, know too well the benefits that their association provides them. Because of the political ties of their president, a government advisor, and women in their committee, they are given privileges that other female networks and groups do not have. As patronage is a reality in Senegalese politics, people tied to the government usually acquire favours that others normally would not. As mentioned earlier, this network benefits from very significant amounts of credit and donations (from foreign donors) among other favours. These favours are far beyond those of the neighbourhood cooperative or other women groups in Grand-Yoff. This highlights the fact that individuals and groups of people are able to acquire unequal amounts of social capital according to their socio-cultural, political or financial leverage. In that regard, Bourdieu (1980: 2) argues that the notion of social capital was the sole means of describing the principle of the social assets which was visible where different individuals obtain a very unequal return on a more or less equivalent capital (economic or cultural) according to the extent to which they are able to mobilize by proxy the capital of a group (family, select clubs etc.). Therefore, the connections women groups possess, in terms of credit and business, influence their clout and consequently their social capital.

Formal Education, Training, Skills and Business Experience

Formal education is a very important asset, especially for women in developing countries, who are the most disadvantaged in that regard. Acquiring formal education, a high school degree and university degrees opens the door to formal jobs. Hence, formal education is a major source of social capital. Many poor women in poor countries, and Senegal in particular, are illiterate and that in itself alienates them from entering the formal economic sector or acquiring loans from banks. Training, skills and business experience are also important sources of social capital for women entrepreneurs. Roughly 35% of the women in the total study population are illiterate, while 36% have only acquired a primary school education and 26% have acquired a high school education,

with only 3% obtaining a high school degree. We must note that a minority (13.5%) of these participants acquired training and skills towards their business activities. The fact that only a quarter of the study population have obtained some high-school education and less than 5% a high-school degree explains that this sample belongs to the informal sector, and covets microcredit loans for their household and business survival.

Illiterate women or those with little formal education find it hard to understand the financial conditionality and delivery process of microcredit. No woman in the sample of 23 closely studied cases has a high school degree, however 35% have acquired some secondary school education. These women are the ones who are usually the most successful or savvy in their businesses because their level of literacy is enough for them to acquire basic understandings of the financial facts and implications of loans. Marie, the most successful participant, has almost completed her high-school education and acquired secretary and accounting training. Before embarking on her school uniform sewing business, she previously owned a restaurant business in downtown Dakar that ultimately closed doors. Therefore, Marie has what is the required to ensure her business success: formal education, training and business experience. These contribute greatly to Marie's social capital as a woman, and an entrepreneur, especially because she is divorced with two daughters.

Another participant, Khady, who runs her husband's dry-cleaning business, is better-off than most women in the sample because she has a high-school formal education along with secretarial training and teaching experience. She was able to manage her family dry-cleaning business. Her husband mostly lived with his second wife in a suburb of Dakar, where he owned a livestock farming business. Khady is financially independent from her husband and takes care of her household with the profits from their dry-cleaning business. Polygamy allows women who have co-wives, to maintain different economic spheres among themselves. Diarra is equally successful with her home-based juices and ice business; this is because of her high-school education, secretarial and nursing job experience. An amputated leg does not prevent her from running her business. Her education, training and professional experience have allowed her to create and run a successful business from home. Formal education, training, skills, professional or business experience are important variables in the success of women entrepreneurs.

The irony with the conceptualisation and design of microfinance services is that they are catered to poor women, who often hardly have the required social capital to thrive in their micro-businesses. Business experience, training and skills are helpful to illiterate women or those with less formal education. The study found that most microfinance institutions do not offer the training and skills workshops - especially financial guidance - usually included in the programs of many development organizations and women cooperatives. Training and skills workshops range from basic accounting skills to professional training and skills learning. The study participants who are members of the *Jokko* and *Ndamlee* co-ops received intensive training from the neighbourhood

women's savings and credit co-op that offers its members training and skills workshops through the NGO *Enda Graf*. The members also received training in food processing and accounting, and attended periodic follow up meetings with trainers at the women's savings and credit institution.

Many study participants complained that they lacked financial guidance in their microcredit activities along with training and skills. These services were always available to women borrowers and often made the difference in their business success. Many women joined the co-ops in order to receive training and skills, but also financial backup by virtue of members' savings and credit. Hence, the social capital of borrowers who belonged to co-ops, networks and other groups can be more significant than individual borrowers.

Conclusion

Microcredit offers Senegalese women, especially the poorest, an opportunity to take care of their household needs and create or sustain their micro-businesses. Microcredit has become a response to the failure of the Senegalese welfare state in providing adequate basic social services for households, such as education and health care. In recent years, many studies, especially those focused on the South-Asian context (India, Indonesia), are questioning the "promise" of microcredit and exposing its negative financial and social consequences.

A demographic analysis of Senegal reveals a population characterized by its youth and rapid increase in size as a result of a high fecundity rate. Senegal is a relatively urbanized country that is still characterized by a very important rural exodus despite many rural development programs. That explains the overpopulation of peri-urban areas in Dakar, for they offer rural migrants better living conditions. High levels of poverty are related to the lack of access to health care and education that characterizes many segments of the Senegalese population. Many Senegalese families struggle for daily survival, leading many women to covet new economic opportunities, such as microcredit loans. Microcredit loans offer Senegalese women an opportunity to become active participants in their economies by starting or sustaining their micro businesses. But, microcredit also presents much inconvenience, making it challenging for poor women in Senegal to extract profits from it.

Female microcredit borrowers rely on their associational life and social networks to succeed in their lives and businesses. Household members, kin groups, communities, social and business networks, formal education, training, professional and business experience are all important sources of social capital for female borrowers. Sources of social capital for the participants in the study can be dependable and enriching, but in many cases reveal themselves to be treacherous, jeopardizing the survival of their households and businesses. Support from husbands and household members can

provide women with the personal and financial support they need to thrive in their businesses. On the other hand, many women's credit and business involvement are limited by their husbands' lack of support or cooperation, or other dire household conditions. Social, credit and business networks and groups provide women with credit and entrepreneurship opportunities, but also have the potential for conflict and lack of trust and solidarity. Finally, female borrowers who have acquired some - preferably substantial - formal education, training, professional or business experiences thrive better at their credit activities and entrepreneurship.

The study shows that a providing spouse, formal education, training, business experience, and belonging to social and business networks facilitate women's success in their microcredit and entrepreneurial activities. For the minority of women in the study whose husbands are their household breadwinners, microcredit makes a real impact on the well-being of their selves and their household members. These women are able to improve the well-being of their families by taking care of additional needs. Formal education is a very important asset for female borrowers because it helps them understand the financial conditions and ramifications of their loans. The women in the study who have acquired some high school education fared much better in their credit and business operations than their uneducated counterparts.

The participants who belong to cooperatives that make profits from their production and sales are able to earn a steady living and take care of the health, education and nutrition of their households. Therefore, one of the most important conclusions of the study is that the household impact of microcredit is intimately tied to the borrowers' household conditions and social capital. The Senegalese informal sector is the niche for most women entrepreneurs because of their socio-economic disadvantage, their high levels of illiteracy, and lack of access to many markets. As microcredit services and strategies try to fill the gap in terms of women's access to credit, female entrepreneurs still remain primarily represented in the informal sector because of their structural limitations. Therefore, female borrowers need access to bigger and more important economic markets in order to thrive in their entrepreneurship.

Many women in Senegal give priority to ceremonies where they have to make a financial commitment, whether or not their finances can handle it. Some may consider these to be irresponsible decisions from women who cannot financially handle participating in ceremonies, but for many Senegalese women and participants in the study, forgoing their financial participation and responsibilities in ceremonies is a social and cultural risk they cannot take that would compromise their social and symbolic capitals. Therefore, priorities in the lives of female recipients are diverse, and not limited to pivotal survival needs such as food, education or health care for the household.

Recommendations

The most responsive microcredit models in Senegal are those of development organs, (mainly NGOs), women's cooperatives and groups because they adopt integrated approaches, thereby addressing women's needs in conjunction with micro-lending. NGOs and cooperatives usually offer training, skills and basic accounting or numeracy workshops, financial guidance, healthcare plans, or health and literacy workshops to their clients. Many participants who are members of the Grand-Yoff women's savings and credit institution have received training and guidance pertaining to their business and credit operations. These integrated models are efficient alternatives to traditional models of microcredit, usually applied by MFIs and banks.

For microcredit to be a sustainable development strategy for Senegalese women, it is recommended that credit institutions offer their clients, especially women, other basic services that are pivotal to their well-being and entrepreneurial success. In addition, microcredit services and programs will be better suited to their clientele by lowering their interest rates, reducing their penalties and fees, and offering repayment schedules that are more flexible. The development shift from passive assistance for women and families to microcredit strategies needs to retain the provision of basic services needed for the survival of households. For that reason integrated development approaches are wise strategies because they guarantee the sustainability of development interventions, for one cannot "just simply give - or lend - money to the poor."

A municipal advisor at Grand-Yoff city-hall was correct in coining Grand-Yoff "the mirror of Senegal" because of its ethnic diversity, but also the fact that it displays most of the ills in the country. In that regard, peri-urban areas in Senegal, and most developing countries, provide great insights into the lives of the poor. Hence, there is a need for a paradigm shift in development studies and programs to put more attention on the realities of the urban poor who might be as disadvantaged as rural ones. If there are more infrastructures in urban areas of developing countries compared to rural parts, it still remains that the urban poor has to struggle for access to basic services.

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Provider expectations and father involvement: learning from experiences of poor "absent fathers" in Gauteng, South Africa

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Abstract

The phenomenon of absent fathers is prevalent in South Africa and has been singled out as a huge social challenge both in the public and policy debate. However, there has been little scholarly research on how men construct their role as fathers and on factors that constrain paternal involvement. This paper discusses constructions of paternal roles in South Africa, specifically in poor and black communities. The paper also seeks to understand how conceptions of fatherhood shape the type and extent of father involvement. Drawing from focus group discussions held in Gauteng's poor and black communities with fathers that did not live with their children, this paper argues that fathers are predominantly seen as providers. This prevalent construction of fathers as mainly agents for financial and material support of children and families precludes the emergence of alternative fatherhood roles. Besides, unemployment and poverty affect fathers' ability to live up to provider expectations. Hence, many fathers retreat or are excluded from playing an active role in their children's lives. It is essential that social policy and community interventions promote multidimensional fatherhood so as to offer fathers with alternative roles which can be carried out even in situations of unemployment and poverty. Besides, unemployed and poor fathers need social assistance if the society is going to succeed to keep them involved in their children's lives.

Introduction

Paternal involvement is associated with positive outcomes for households and children, including children's improved access to resources in the community, increased protection, and higher level of households' expenditure (Redpath et al. 2008a; Morrel and Richter 2006). Referring mostly to international studies, Peacock et al. argue that "the engagement or presence of a father or father figure in the life of a child is said to positively affect the child's life prospects, academic achievement, physical and emotional health and linguistic, literary and cognitive development" (Redpath et al. 2008b: 33). Men's participation as parents can also be positive for the health and well-being of women as research in Central America shows that "women with children are more

vulnerable to poverty if fathers neglect their financial responsibilities" (Redpath et al. 2008b: 34). On the contrary, father absence can exacerbate household poverty and "can also have significant psychological implications for the cognitive, physiological, and socio-emotional development of the children, although such effects are not uniformly found and are certainly conditioned by a variety of characteristics of the child and family unit" (Mott 1990: 499).

South Africa has a large number of absent fathers and consequently children who do not have daily contacts with their living fathers (Morrel and Richter 2006; Holborn and Eddy 2011). This phenomenon has been identified as a huge social challenge both in the public and policy debate. Notwithstanding the extent of the problem and the rising awareness on the detrimental consequences it has on the country's social development prospects, there has been little scholarly research on how men construct their role as fathers and on factors that constrain paternal involvement. This paper discusses constructions of paternal roles in South Africa, specifically in poor and black communities. The paper also seeks to understand how conceptions of fatherhood shape the type and extent of father involvement. Drawing from focus group discussions held in Gauteng's poor and black communities with fathers that did not live with their children, this paper argues that fathers are predominantly seen as providers. This prevalent construction of fathers as mainly agents for financial and material support of children and families precludes the emergence of alternative fatherhood roles. Besides, unemployment and poverty affect fathers' ability to live up to provider expectations. Hence, many fathers retreat or are excluded from playing an active role in their children's lives. The paper first outlines the theoretical framework which informs this research with particular focus on various ways of conceptualising fatherhood and paternal involvement. It proceeds to present the extent of father absence in South Africa before spelling out the research methodology. Research findings are then presented with focus on the predominant construction of fatherhood, its relationship to alternative father roles and its impact on paternal involvement. After the findings, a short discussion confronts this research's findings to insights from relevant existing literature. A conclusion sums up the main argument.

Theoretical framework

There has been a great deal of interest in the study of masculinity and fatherhood and related social dynamics. Fatherhood is generally understood as "the social role that men undertake to care for their children" (Morrell and Richter 2006: 18). It refers to physical and emotional presence in the child's life. The literature on fatherhood has argued that father involvement has positive socio-psychological outcomes for children. Besides, positive father involvement also benefits the mother and advances the cause of gender equality (Peacock et al. 2008b).

In conceptualising father involvement, Pleck distinguishes various modalities such as engagement, accessibility, responsibility and influence (Pleck 1997). Building on this early conceptualisation of father involvement, scholars have underscored the multiple and wide ranging parameters of the practice of fatherhood and show how it is related to the diverse fatherhood arrangements (Marsiglio et al. 2000). According to Marsiglio, the practice of fatherhood can be captured in three dimensions: paternal motivation, paternal involvement and paternal influence (Marsiglio et al. 2008). Paternal motivation refers to reasons why men would want to participate in their children's lives. These reasons range from love for one's child, pressures to act as masculine adult males, early family experiences to perceptions about the extent children need their involvement or financial resources. Paternal involvement comprises aspects such as engagement, accessibility, responsibility and cognitive representations of involvement. Engagements are direct interactions with children. Accessibility involves activities regarding supervision and the potential for interaction. Responsibility refers to the father taking final sense of duty over the child's well-being. Cognitive representations of involvement refer to mind states such as anxiety, worry and contingency planning related to a child's well-being (Ibid). The third dimension of the practice of fatherhood is the influence of fathers on children. The four general features of paternal influence are nurturance and provision of care, moral and ethical guidance, emotional, practical, and psychosocial support of one's partner and economic provision (Ibid). These features of paternal influence are important for children's well-being and development. It thus appears that exercise of fatherhood has to be conceptualised as multidimensional.

Like the social world, fatherhood is socially constructed. This means that predominant conceptions of paternal involvement change over time. Lamb describes the different dominant paternal roles in American social history (Lamb 2000). Dominant father roles have shifted from being the moral teacher and guide, to having responsibility for bread-winning, to being a role model for especially sons, and finally to being a nurturing and active father. These changes have been influenced by processes like industrialisation, economic disruption and dislocation, labour market change and demands for gender equality (Ibid).

Historically, the two most dominant father roles have been providing or/and care-giving. Traditionally, fathers have been regarded as mainly providers. However, as a result of women's increasing entry into the labour market, there has been emergence of a new fatherhood model which has emphasized the need for fathers to be involved in care-giving activities. Research has shown that society and social policies do not always do justice to both equally important father roles, often emphasizing one at the expense of the other (Roy 1999; Khunou 2006). Fathers themselves have negotiated variously these roles depending on the socio-cultural and economic contexts.

Scholars have highlighted the link between provider expectations and father involvement (Roy 2004). While noting that specific contexts may lead to different

expectations for economic provision, Roy has pointed out that "provider expectations can discourage as well as encourage men to become involved fathers" (Ibid). This article examines how fathers in poor and black South African communities construct their role as fathers and the effects of such fatherhood constructs on their involvement in their child's life.

Since this research specifically targeted "absent fathers" in order to capture how they construct their role as fathers, it is opportune to outline how this concept is understood in this paper. Father absence has two meanings. The first meaning has to do with physical absence caused by factors such as "situations of divorce, domestic instability, work, and social dislocations, including wars" (Morrell and Richter, 2006). However, fatherhood goes beyond mere father physical presence because "a father might well be physically present, but emotionally absent, or physically absent but emotionally supportive" (Ibid). Besides, father presence can be characterized by abusive conduct towards his child or her wife. The second meaning of the concept "absent father" thus refers to a father's emotional disengagement from one's child life regardless of whether he is physically present or distant. Morrel notes two problems associated with the absent father argument. The first problem is that "it is difficult to show that physical absence of the biological father is as serious for the child as is often argued" (Ibid) as father presence can also be negative in some cases. The second problem stems from the fact that "men have used the argument that children need their (biological) father to pursue anti-feminist campaigns designed to return women to their dependence on men or to reduce their autonomy" (Ibid). Other students of family dynamics in South Africa have noted that the discourse on the phenomenon of absent fathers in South Africa has focussed on co-residence and has thus failed to recognise the extent of father-child connections and paternal support that transcend co-residence (Madhaven et al. 2008). While acknowledging the difficulty of coming up with an operational definition of the concept "absent father", for the purposes of this research, the term refers to fathers that did not live with their child, did not maintain communication and did not pay maintenance.

Whist the extent of physically absent fathers in South Africa may be well publicised, little is known about the extent of emotionally absent fathers, which will even include many fathers that are physically present in households. Besides, little is known about how men, particularly African men relate to their role as fathers and how they make sense of the phenomenon of absent fatherhood. Aware of some of these knowledge gaps, previous research on fatherhood and masculinity has called for "more research on men's roles in the family" as this is considered to have "the potential to 'inform the development of new programmatic approaches that might feasibly engage men's concerns and needs, and more effectively involve men as actors in community coping strategies" (Morrell and Richter 2006). It is opportune to provide a succinct discussion of the phenomenon of absent fathers in post-apartheid South Africa.

The phenomenon of absent fathers in South Africa

The phenomenon of absent living fathers is prevalent in post apartheid South Africa. One father out of two is absent from his child's life in South Africa. This stems from Richter's estimation that around 54% of men aged 15-49 years are fathers, but that nearly 50% of these fathers did not have daily contact with their children (Ibid). Trends of absent fathers display a clear racial dimension with African children under 15 years having the lowest proportion of present fathers in 2009 at 30%, compared to 53% for coloured children, and 85% for Indians, and 83% for whites. A clear rural-urban dimension is also discernible in fatherhood trends with "55% of African rural children under the age of 15 having absent living fathers compared to 43% of African children in urban areas" (Holborn and Eddy 2011).

Father absence is again confirmed by a look at how orphans are cared for. Data from 1995 and 1996 show that only 41% of maternal orphans lived with their fathers, whereas nearly 80% of paternal orphans were living with their mother (Ibid). It means that few fathers actually look after their children once their mother dies. In comparison to other countries in Southern Africa and East Africa, South Africa had the lowest percentage of maternal orphans living with their biological fathers (Ibid).

Recent data suggest that there has been an increase of absent fathers from the end of apartheid to the present day. The proportion of African children under the age of 15 years with absent living fathers increased between 1996 and 2009 from 45% to 52%. There has also been an increase of absent fathers for coloured children (from 34% to 41%), and for white children (from 13% to 15%). The proportion of children with absent living fathers decreased only among Indians (from 17% to 12%) (Ibid).

Women disproportionately bear the brunt of the absence of fathers in homes. Desmond and Desmond estimated in 2006 that only 48% of fathers in South Africa are present in the homes of children under the age of 18 compared with 80 per cent of mothers. They added that, "in 96 per cent of households headed by men, a female spouse of the head was also present, compared to only 21 per cent of female-headed households that had a male partner of the head present" (Desmond and Desmond, 2006: 232). This partly justifies why efforts for increased involvement of fathers in their children's life constitutes a significant contribution to the liberation of women and advancement of gender equality.

This widespread father absence in South Africa begs for rigorous socio scientific explanation. To date, there have been little empirical explanatory studies in this direction. Hence, our knowledge of the key drivers of the phenomenon of father absence is still speculative. The widespread father absence originates from historical, economic and cultural processes that have shaped the South African society in the past hundred years. However, this paper does seek to analyse this set of explanatory factors. It focuses rather

on one of the factors which constrain father's involvement in their child's life namely provider expectations. The paper seeks to examine how fathers construct their role and the extent to which this perception limits their involvement in their child's life. How were data for this paper collected?

Methodology

This paper draws from a research on absent fathers. Focus group discussions with absent fathers in four African and poor communities (Alexandra, Doornkop, Tembisa, and Soweto) were conducted in the period from August 2011 to October 2011. Participants were fathers that did not have regular contacts with their children, did not communicate frequently and did not pay maintenance.

In an effort to capture absent fathers' perspectives on fatherhood and reasons why they had been absent in their children's lives, the focus group discussions dealt with four themes namely men's conceptions of fatherhood, reasons for their absence from their children's lives, their perceptions of the consequences of father absence on the child and on the father and their recommendations in addressing the phenomenon of absent fathers. In each research sites, focus group discussions lasted for 3 to 4 hours. These conversations with absent fathers were recorded and later transcribed. Atlas.ti was used to analyse the rich primary data collected through the above described process.

Some 34 fathers took part in the focus group discussions in the four research sites. Age of fathers ranged from 22 to 54 with the majority of fathers (20 out of 32 or 68.7%) being under 35 years of age. Some 65.6% of the fathers were unemployed and only 34.3% reported being employed. However, given the type of jobs available in townships, it is likely that the few fathers that are employed receive a low salary. How did these fathers construct their role? How do these fatherhood constructs relate to the new fatherhood model? What effects do these conceptions of fatherhood have on paternal involvement in the South African socio-economic context?

Findings
Fathers saw their role primarily as providers

When enquiring on participants' conceptions of fatherhood, it emerged that fathers saw themselves primarily as providers. Though the term "provider" assumed broader significance, by far most fathers expressed a materialistic interpretation of the concept. For this group of men, the provider role referred to father's obligation to supply one's child or family with material goods or financial means. Masculinity and fatherhood were primarily understood in terms of one's ability to provide. In the course of the four focus group discussions, primacy on father's provider role was expressed recurrently. A Doornkop

father stated: "that is just that. As a father, you have to go and look for a job so that you can take care of your child". This was echoed by a similar statement uttered by a father in Tembisa: "We are the ones who must all the time come up with plans to ensure survival in the house." Another father referred to the social pressure generated by the primacy of the provider role: "whether you are unemployed or employed, you must provide".

These voices of fathers point not only to the prevalence of the provider role, but also to the dominance of the social representation of fathers as people who work. Previous research on fatherhood has demonstrated the long association of fatherhood with employment. This partly explains the traditional dichotomy between men's place in the public sphere and mothers' relegation in the care-giving activities in private place of the household. However, for the majority of fathers who were unemployed, the primacy of the provider role was experienced as a huge constraint on their capacity to exercise fatherhood as the paper will later show.

Care-giving presented as the preserve of women

Emphasis on the provider role was expressed in a way that rejected care-giving activities as the preserve of the female partner. While few fathers embraced involvement in care-giving activities, many fathers still dissociated themselves from this type of involvement which they considered naturally suited to female partners. Here is how a father in Tembisa distanced himself from care giving activities while insisting on the male provider role: "The woman is somebody who is supposed to take care for the child. They are born to do that. She is responsible in any way for the child. When a child cries, he does not say "Papa". He says "Mama", from a young age. When he starts to talk he says "Mama". Women are responsible for the social well being of the children. And we are responsible for financial well-being of the child. If we can change and say that I'm guarding the child. I nappy him, I bath him and I say that the woman must go and look for a job, it won't work. It will look like we are crazy, it will seem like the nation is going crazy".

Fathers justified this separation of roles appealing to nature and God. They represented men as incapable of providing good care to children, particularly babies. In contrast, women were said to possess innate ability to look after children and natural bonds with their offspring which render baby rearing easy. As a father in Tembisa expressed it, "you see we are not caring, if we are to be honest. If you are left with the child for the day, you will find that the child is dirty, the child hasn't eaten for the whole day. Actually there is nothing that you do. You will go and spend time with the guys, drink beer or do whatever whereas the child will be suffering. But a woman, no matter whenever, whatever you can do, first thing when the child wakes up, she will ask where is my son. But for guys, it is difficult for us because with us this thing, we were not meant to possess

it, you see?" Belief in the natural difference between a mother's and father's ability to care for the child was again expressed with emphasis in contrasting terms: "you can't take care of the child the way a mother takes care of the child. As a father you can love your child. ..And be patient…But you can't have the same patience as the mother. A mother's love and a father's love are different. They will never be the same. Do you understand me, my brother? …You can never love the child the way a mother loves a child, do you understand? You can love him but you can't love him the way his mother will love him, you get me my brother? …A mother's love and a father's love are not the same. They can never be the same". By ascribing women's care ability to nature, fathers did not look at care-giving role as a set of skills that can be learned and perfected. Fatherhood and motherhood were thus understood as deterministic and static phenomena.

Fatherless fathers and the risk of a vicious cycle

It was also notable that a number of fathers stated that they did not know how a father should behave vis-a-vis his children as they did not have a father figure in their life. The fact that some of these absent fathers did not themselves have an involved father points to the possibility of a vicious cycle. As expressed by a father: "we did not know our father and he never did anything for us. We do not have any father idea". Many fathers had similar explanation of their current deficient fatherhood practices. Another father spoke of the generational transmission of negative fatherhood models: "You are a grown man like this and I think your father has never given you a bath or put nappies on you and dressed you. It is highly rare. You see. If you grow up with that stereotype, it becomes difficult to change and accept that in your adulthood you are going to do these things". This underscores the crucial role of a present and involved father in serving as a role model for his offspring. Given the high number of children that now grow without regular contact with a father figure in post apartheid South Africa, it is highly likely that fatherless fathers end up themselves as uninvolved fathers, thus perpetuating a vicious cycle. The question on how to prevent this kind of vicious cycle for future generations by providing current children with positive fatherhood experience or training should therefore form part of the policy and advocacy debate.

Unemployment, poverty and fatherhood

Fatherhood is associated with employment. An unemployed father who is unable to provide for his family sees himself as emasculated and unable to fully assume fatherhood. Unemployment is rife in South Africa. Young black and township dwellers are disproportionately affected by the lack of jobs in the economy. Research has shown that unemployment and poverty are closely associated in South Africa to the extent that

"employment is a key factor in avoiding poverty". Hence, it is likely that unemployed fathers live in poverty in a social environment that is also marginalised from the mainstream economy.

Effects of provider expectations on paternal involvement

Caught up in difficult economic circumstances, many fathers fail to live up to the provider expectations. It is therefore unsurprising that many men buckle under this pressure, or their relationship with the mother buckles under this pressure, and they end up becoming estranged with their children. Inability to provide material or financial support makes fathers feel like a failure. A participant to the Alexandra focus group discussion conveyed this experience in unambiguous terms: "Something that may sometimes lead me backwards is that I don't have the capacity to provide. I mean to provide financially. That is why I lose the title to be a father. By that I also feel like I am failing myself because at the moment I want to be with my family. I want to enjoy the kind of life that I want to enjoy with the family that I know is mine. I have started myself but due to the reason that I am not working I am failing that and it is painful, to be honest." As a result of difficulties in conforming to successful provider expectations, many fathers retreat from their child's life. As a father put it: "it happens sometimes you have a boy of six years and you were working by the time that boy was born maybe 2 to 3 years. Now you loose your job. You start feeling the distance, you start making the distance. You think in yourself, all the time I go to visit my child, I don't have anything. I must stop going there, how is my child going to look at me, what will my child say". A Tembisa father spoke of self-isolation as common natural reaction from fathers who become unable to provide. He stated "I don't know about other guys but I think it's our nature. Once you don't have anything, as a man you isolate yourself."

Other fathers are excluded by the mother of the child or her family against their will when they are or have become unable to make any material or financial contribution to the child's life. A father in Devland (Soweto) reported how his former partner would keep her away from his child: "Even now, I am unable to see her (the partner) because I don't have money and because I don't have money for the child… When I try to talk to her, she makes me to talk to her mother and I am not allowed to talk to her". A participant to the focus group discussion in Alexandra reported his friend's experience in these terms: "Just because by the time they had children he was not working, he is called a useless man. He cannot even access his children because he is not bringing anything in their life."

Overemphasis on provider role by fathers themselves, by mothers and their families make it difficult for alternative father roles to develop and be promoted. Nevertheless few fathers demonstrated that they valued or were encouraged to assume alternative

father roles such as taking part in childcare, in children's recreational activities or just being there. A father stated: "the mother of my child ended up telling me, no, you must come and see your child with or without money. When you get there hey you find the bonding, the love, you forget that you don't have money, the child grabs you, you see? So that is something I have realised." Other participants underscored the importance of moving beyond the provider role and placing equal premium on emotional connection to one's child: "It is about spending time with the child and whereby you can develop a bond with your child and so that he can always know that my father taught me this". Another father concurred: "not that because I am unemployed I must abandon my children. No, you can be around your children even if you are unemployed, show them that love." Fatherhood should not be given instrumental value, but rather be approached as a value in itself. As a participant put it, "the mother should value more that the man can come, the presence of the person coming. Even if he brings something, if he brings money, but what they should value more is the human being coming." Without providing excuse to fathers who default on child maintenance, the call for moving beyond "economic fatherhood" is recognition that material contribution is neither the full extent of fatherhood nor its most important manifestation. Valuing father's emotional connection with the child may be, in some circumstances, the most effective way to promote their economic contribution.

Discussion

Findings from this study resonate with similar research conducted with fathers in low income African American communities in the US. In his study on the construction of roles for paternal providers in low income and working class families, Roy also noted the prevalence of the provider role in how fathers constructed their paternal involvement (Roy 1999, 2004). Due to lack of stable employment, many non resident fathers failed to live up to the provider expectations. Roy's comparative analysis of low income and working class groups also lead to the conclusion that "the importance that families assign to men's providing may play out differently in diverse social contexts. For example, men's providing is particularly salient for non-middle class families who urgently need resources" (Roy 2004). This socio-economic contextualisation is indeed in line with the dynamics found in South African poor black communities where men are under huge pressure to fulfil their provider role as discussed above.

Unlike in South Africa where unsuccessful providers often retreat or are excluded from being involved in their children's lives, Roy's research shows that fathers which failed to provide financially provided a variety of in kind contributions and displayed alternative paternal roles (Roy 1999, 2004). This allowance for fathers to assume alternative roles ran contrary to family welfare policies which prioritized finances over

care. In this regard, the US child maintenance system shows similar characteristics as the South African one, particularly in their emphasis on fathers' financial contribution and non-recognition of alternative father roles.

Findings from this study are also consistent with Roy and Morrel conclusions on a similar subject. Roy argues that "provider role expectations can discourage as well as encourage men to become involved fathers" (Roy 2004). The South African case discussed above has shown that predominant constructions of fathers as ATMs (providers) curtail their paternal involvement. This study also illustrates with new empirical materials drawn specifically from a previously under-researched social group how in a South African context where fathers are primarily represented as providers, men that are unable to provide for their families are more likely to deny or flee the fatherhood roles.

The fact that fatherhood is socially constructed also means that current and predominant fatherhood ideas should be viewed as dynamic rather than static or deterministic. This study has shown that a significant number of fathers continue to hold traditional views about paternal roles. They tend to naturalise gender roles and perpetuate old fashioned clichés between male and female roles. The rigidity that comes with such often dualist and dichotomist view of gender roles constrains adaptation to changing circumstances and wide adoption of the new fatherhood model.

Conclusion

This paper has examined fathers' conceptions of their roles vis-à-vis their children. The enquiry has focused on understanding how fathers relate to various possibilities of paternal role such as economic provision, care giving, and other forms of social fatherhood. The paper has also sought to analyse how predominant constructions of fatherhood impact on paternal involvement in the lives of the child. These questions have proved crucial in helping to understand why so many fathers are uninvolved in their children's lives.

Fathers saw themselves and were largely perceived as providers. This refers to material and economic provision to the child and to the family. Other paternal roles such as care giving, helping with education, involving in recreational activities with the child, or just being there were given less importance. The dichotomy between gender roles was particularly striking. Fathers predominantly saw care giving as the preserve of mothers who are thought to be naturally equipped for it whereas men were considered to lack such skills. The deterministic and naturalistic construction of these gender roles made it difficult for men to envisage that they could perfect their skills in baby rearing and care giving.

Dominant constructions of fathers as providers clash with the stark reality of endemic unemployment and poverty in poor and black communities. Many fathers are presented

with intractable dilemma: they find it difficult to live up to their own conceptions of fatherhood and their communities' expectations. However, fathers and communities do not easily accept in kind contributions to the child or alternative paternal roles. As a result, many fathers either retreat or are excluded from their child's life. In the context of poor and black communities in townships, provider expectations prevented the emergence of paternal roles associated with the new fatherhood model and constrained paternal involvement. It is essential that social policy and community interventions promote multidimensional fatherhood so as to offer fathers with alternative roles which can be carried out even in situations of unemployment and poverty. Besides, unemployed and poor fathers need social assistance if the society is going to succeed to keep them involved in their children's lives.

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Trust Creation in the Informal Economy: The Case of Plastic Bag Sellers of Mwanza, Tanzania

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Abstract

Consideration is made of the early stages of trust in a tiny political economy. The article presents an embedded account of the social status and economic position of plastic bag sellers of Soko Kuu market in Mwanza, Tanzania, to demonstrate the dilemmas of trust faced and the solutions that are found. Evidence is taken from interviews with boys and young men whose profession consists of the wholesale purchase and individual retail of different types of plastic bag in the main market of Mwanza. The reputation and standing of bag sellers is very low, presenting a tough challenge for maintaining networks of trust within their own professional group or when bridging trustful relations to other economic groups. Plastic bag sellers tend to be young and bearers of a reputation for thievery. At the same time, the fact that they achieve relatively high levels of profit in such an informal setting presents a puzzle as to how the trust needed for all economic activity has been secured. Acknowledging the lack of institutional guarantees for entrenching or enforcing these relationships of trust, the phenomena of anchors of trust is identified as having supported the early hardening of social norms between parties. Amongst plastic bag sellers, the dire need for short change in order to make a sale ignites participation and cooperation with goods sellers, who in turn come to distinguish between good and bad plastic bag sellers. Trust anchors are the positive opposite to social dilemmas: opportunities for building relationships of trust, based on mutually understood vulnerability. For future social policy attempting to grapple with the informal economy, such zones of trust creation must be identified and worked with.

Introduction

> Your corn is ripe to-day; mine will be so to-morrow. 'Tis profitable for us both, that I shou'd labour with you to-day, and that you shou'd aid me to-morrow. I have no kindness for you, and know you have as little for me. I will not, therefore, take any pains upon your account; and should I labour with you upon my own account, in expectation of a return, I know I shou'd be disappointed, and that I shou'd in vain depend upon your gratitude. Here then I leave you to labour alone: You treat me in the same manner. The seasons change; and both of us lose our harvests for want of mutual confidence and security.
> —David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature [1]

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1   Hume, D., *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978 [1739–40]), 2nd Ed., pp. 520–1.

Some level of trust is necessary for any transaction.2 Industrialised or developed economies guarantee efficiency through the mature use of institutional securities to contract but even the most secure institutions will rest on some interpersonal knowledge foundation for three reasons. First, newcomers must be oriented towards rules and practices and so depend on the interpersonal education of economic and legal institutions - the populations most dependent on orientation being fresh migrants and the young.3 The second reason institutions are not entirely sufficient guarantors of conduct is that the institutions are human-made and so human-breakable, a dilemma popularly described as the problem of the legislators—who regulates the regulators?4 Any structure built by humans can be broken by humans, no matter how cleverly designed. And so, even though contemporary political science focuses on institutional design, we know that political and economic stability do not ultimately lie in the strength of the pots but in the potter's hands. Thirdly, transaction costs would be too high without any trust.5 Highlighting the need in words akin to Hume's, Arrow posits that

> Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, cer-
> tainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued
> that much of economic backwardness in the world can be explained by a lack of
> mutual confidence.6

Agency-centred trust creation is under-studied and yet of such fundamental importance. In order to gather evidence on the interpersonal development of trusting-trustworthy relationships in Tanzania, therefore, focus is made here on a tiny political economy that exists in the private and informal sectors. As a case study, the informal sector displays an absence of institutional guarantees of trust. Contemporary literature's distinction between the "informal" and "formal" economy we take to be synonymous with the distinction between economic activity outside and inside systems of state regulation, respectively. The term "informal sector" first came into use with Hart's analysis of the

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2   *Ostrom & Ahn, 2009, p. 23. See also Zak, P. J. & Knack, S., 'Trust and Growth'. The Economic Journal, Vol. 111, No. 470 (2001), pp. 295–321.*

3   *Hursthouse aptly describes how, in general, ignoring the importance of the young and their gradual process of habit maturation and inter-generational formation has come at the peril of theories of human conduct. Hursthouse, R., On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 14. As she explains, Aristotle 'never forgets the fact that we were all once children. To read almost any other famous moral philosopher is to receive the impression that we, the intelligent adult readers addressed, sprang fully formed from our father's brow. That children form part of the furniture of the world occasionally comes up in passing (about as often as the mention of non-human animals), but the utterly basic fact that we were once as they are, and that whatever we are now is continuous with how we were then, is completely ignored.'*

4   *From the Latin 'Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?'—attributed to Roman poet Juvenal. See Satire VI, 'The Ways of Women', lines 347–8. Found on: http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/juvenal_satires_06.htm (accessed 14/08/12).*

5   *Arrow, K., The Limits Of Organization (New York: Norton, 1974).*

6   *Arrow, K. J., 'Gifts and Exchanges'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1972), pp. 343–362, p. 357.*

Ghanaian economy,7 and was popularised with study of Kenyan employment conditions.8 We employ Bagachwa and Ndulu's definition: 'a set of activities that lies largely outside of government regulation and supports.'9 It should be noted that this definition returns to Hart's original understanding of the informal, criticised as tautological and dualistic. Breman complained that the distinction was 'analytically inadequate' and further warned that by grouping economic activity arbitrarily 'we lose sight of the unity and totality of the productive system.'10 But though the border between the informal and formal is drawn somewhat arbitrarily, it is a border marked by local authorities on a daily basis—invented and so important.

This article examines closely the political economy and trust dynamics of plastic bag sellers of Soko Kuu market (literally, main market) in Mwanza, the second biggest city of Tanzania,11 located on the bay of Lake Victoria. In 1892 Mwanza was officially recognized as an outpost of the German colonial government and is situated within the Sukumaland area, dominated by those of Sukuma ethnicity, Tanzania's largest single ethnic group.12 Nevertheless, despite the relative homogeneity of Mwanza's early history, the city's opportunities have 'attracted large numbers of male and female immigrants from both the surrounding region and other parts of the country, a process reflected in Mwanza's multiethnic, polygot population.'13 The population of Mwanza City is 477,000,14 with census findings from 1948 onwards displayed in figure 1. Although recent data on the city's ethnic composition is not available due to the government's avoidance of these topics in censuses,15 the population is understood to be ethnically diverse16 with the Sukuma comprising the largest single group and other important ethnic groups

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7   Hart, K., 'Informal Income Opportunities in Urban Employment in Ghana'. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1973), pp. 61–89.

8   International Labour Organisation, *Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya* (Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 1972); see, by way of explanation of various uses of the term, Bagachwa, M. & Ndulu, B., 'Structure and Potential of the Urban Small–Scale Production in Tanzania', Ch 4 of Swantz, M. L. & Tripp, A. M., *What Went Right in Tanzania: People's Response to Directed Development* (Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, 1996), pp. 70–1.

9   *Ibid*, p. 71.

10   Breman, J., 'A Dualistic Labour System? A Critique of the 'Informal Sector'. *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 11, No. 48 (Nov 1976), pp. 1870–1876, p. 1871.

11   Flynn, K. C., 'Food, Gender, and Survival among Street Adults in Mwanza, Tanzania'. *Food and Foodways*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1999), pp. 175–201, p. 176.

12   Flynn, K. C., *Food, Culture, and Survival in an African City* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 8. See also The United Republic of Tanzania, *Mwanza Region: Socio–Economic Profile* (Dar es Salaam: National Bureau of Statistics & Mwanza Regional Commissioner's Office, September 2003), 2nd Ed., p. 5.

13   *Ibid*, pp. 11–12.

14   Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania, 'Local Democracy in Mwanza, Tanzania'. Excerpt of report, found in: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), *Democracy at the Local Level in East and Southern Africa: Profiles in Governance* (International IDEA publication, 2004), p. 39.

15   The last racial census was conducted in Mwanza in 1957. See *Tanganyika African Census Report* (1957) (Dar es Salaam: Government printer, 1963). Flynn, 2005, p. 12.

16   Suriano, M., 'Popular Music, Identity and Politics in a Colonial Urban Space: The Case of Mwanza, Tanzania (1945–1961)'. Ch 12 of Locatelli, F. & Nugent, P. (eds.), *African Cities: Competing Claims on Urban Spaces* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), p. 263.

such as the Kerewe and Zinza making up other blocks of the city's population.[17] Figure 2 gives the ethnic composition based on the 1957 census, conducted by the colonial authorities of Tanganyika. The sellers of Soko Kuu market are understood to reflect the diversity of Mwanza City, with Flynn noting the market to have '200-plus food vendors of primarily Sukuma, Jita, Kerewe, Kuria, Ha, Haya, Nyamwezi, and Chagga descent' in her 1990s fieldwork.[18]

Figure 1 Population of Mwanza City, Tanzania[19]

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
17   *Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania, 2004, p. 40.*

18   *Flynn, 2005, pp. 47–8.*

19   *1948, 1957 and 1967 data obtained from Henin, R. & Egero, B., 'The 1967 Population Census of Tanzania: A Demographic Analysis'. University of Dar es Salaam, Research Paper No. 19 (1967), p. 49; 1978 data obtained from The United Republic of Tanzania, 1978 Population Census Volume IV: A Summary of Selected Statistics (Dar es Salaam: Bureau of Statistics, 1982), p. 9; 1988 data obtained from The United Republic of Tanzania, Sensa 1988: Preliminary Report (Dar es Salaam: Bureau of Statistics, 1988); 2002 data obtained from The United Republic of Tanzania, Census 2002: Analytical Report (Dar es Salaam: Bureau of Statistics, 2006), p. 18. Found on: http://www.nbs.go.tz/takwimu/references/2002popcensus.pdf (accessed 1/10/12). Data from 2002 is a summation of the populations of Ilema and Nyamanga Districts of Mwanza Region, which is where the city of Mwanza is located.*

Figure 2 Ethnic composition of Mwanza City, Tanzania20

Ethnic group	Percent of city population
Sukuma	29%
Nyamwezi	10%
Luo	6%
Haya	6%
Kerewe	4%
Manyema	4%
Ha	3%
Jita	3%
Zinza	3%
Ganda	2%
Zaramo	2%
Kwaya	2%
Kuria	2%
Nyasa	2%
Others	22%

Though the focus on the main market of Mwanza does not purport to be generally representative of East African socio-economic conditions, the choice of investigating local market interaction supports the research question by exhibiting a zone of mature commoditisation of economic activity and specialisation of labour, both of which emerge hand-in-hand with the destabilisation of relations of reciprocal custom. As Bryceson remarks, African market towns 'are centres of proliferating relations of commodity production and exchange, transcending the ethos of household self-sufficiency that prevails in the countryside.'[21] In this way, detailed study of one particular market is made here to open questions indicative of a wider trend, presenting a useful focal point for discussion of the dynamics of trust creation peculiar to the urban environment. The purpose is to get to grips with a single example of trust formation that can begin analysis on how trust is formed and maintained. Particularly, by engaging in a detailed case study, an interpretation of the movement from interpersonal practice to the establishment of norms can be most easily worked towards. By noting the importance of anchors of trust in translating interpersonal relationships into stable and community-wide norms of behaviour, the case study highlights useful tools for later comparative analysis.

20   *East African Statistical Department, Tanganyika Population Census 1957: Tribal Analysis (Nairobi, Aug 1958), p. 237.*

21   *Bryceson, D. F., 'Birth of a market town in Tanzania: towards narrative studies of urban Africa'. Journal of Eastern African Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2011), pp. 274–293, p. 286.*

    Evidence is taken from interviews with boys and young men whose profession consists of the wholesale purchase and individual retail of different types of plastic bag in the main market of Mwanza, an economic activity firmly located in Mwanza's informal sector. Twenty in-depth and semi-structured interviews were conducted over August 2010, in addition to time spent observing the business setting and practices. Interviews were each allotted an hour, though were sometimes concluded earlier due to emotional tension, especially amongst the youngest participants. Interviewees were given no financial incentive to come to the interview but were offered a drink and something to eat. All questions and answers were conducted in Kiswahili, the lingua franca of East Africa and normally participants' first language, with translation into English provided through the assistance of a local interpreter. The topics discussed included a full explanation of the dynamics of the profession plus a detailing of the participant's personal history and aspirations. At the close of each interview, interviewees were gifted with financial compensation for the time spent away from work, amounting to just over half a day's typical profit. They were not told they would receive this prior to the interview but news did in part spread.[22] Initial contact with interviewees was normally made through spontaneous introductions at their place of work and the interviews took place in a cafe five minutes' walk from the market. Some participants were snowballed for by asking respondents if they could introduce the researcher to other bag sellers they know. The total number of bag sellers is not a fixed number because it fluctuates daily but, nevertheless, the figure of 20 respondents represents a substantial proportion, approaching perhaps half the total number. Figure 3 shows the location of Soko Kuu in Mwanza City, and figure 4 displays the market itself. As can be observed, Soko Kuu is not an unmanageably large market. The research site included the street-selling zones surrounding the gazetted buildings (the blue and red areas).

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22   *This did not distort participation much as most candidates were actually disappointed upon learning from peers that this was all they would receive.*

Figure 3 Mwanza City, Tanzania23

23   *Flynn, 2005, p. 11.*

Figure 4 Soko Kuu, Mwanza City24

The focus in this paper is on an economically challenged population, studied from the perspective of their profession, that 'laissez-passer by which the individual finds a place in two-dimensional social space: a situational work location on the horizontal plane and a vertical position within the society's social hierarchy.'[25] While much political economy inquiry into sub-Saharan Africa explores citizens' socio-economic challenges in getting by, we look here into a type of work qua profession, some members of which suffer greatly from poverty, while others do not. The point is to capture trust creation—a factor often missed when attention is placed on poverty or dependency.[26] As Bryceson remarks, '[e]mphasis on the problems of the continent's mega cities has been unduly pessimistic

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24   *Adapted from Google Maps. Found on: http://maps.google.com/ (accessed 16/03/10).*

25   *Bryceson, D. F., 'Africa at work: transforming occupational identity and morality'. Ch 1 of Bryceson, D. F. (ed.), How Africa Works: Occupational Change, Identity and Morality (Warwickshire: Practical Action Publishing, 2010), p. 4 (emphasis in original).*

26   *For an extreme example of how emphasis on poverty and dependency can lead to impoverished analysis of Mwanza, Tanzania, see the documentary film Darwin's Nightmare (France, Austria & Belgium: Hubert Sauper, 2004) and the excellent review, Molony, T., Richey, L. A. & Ponte, S., "Darwin's Nightmare': A Critical Assessment'. Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 34, No. 113, pp. 598–608.*

about the scope for proactive rather than reactive or even degenerative human agency in African urbanisation.'[27]

Under analysis are the early stages of forming trusting-trustworthy relationships in a tiny political economy. To this end, the study first presents an embedded account of the status and economic position of plastic bag sellers of Soko Kuu. Due to a number of factors, the reputation and social standing of bag sellers is very low, presenting a tough challenge for when they attempt to strike up relationships of trust. Nevertheless, the fact that plastic bag sellers achieve relatively high levels of profit in such an informal setting presents a puzzle as to how the trust needed for all economic activity (and especially informal economic activity) has been secured. Acknowledging the lack of institutional guarantees for entrenching or enforcing these relationships of trust, the phenomena of anchors of trust is identified as instead supporting the early hardening of social norms between parties. Trust anchors are the positive opposite to cooperative dilemmas: opportunities for building relationships of trust, based on mutually perceived vulnerability.

Plastic bag selling in Soko Kuu

It is common amidst local markets of East Africa that plastic bags are bought as additional items and not distributed freely, even when accompanied by a purchase. However, Soko Kuu stands out as different from many markets of the region by the fact that there are also specialist bag-only sellers, detached from the particular stalls or vending points. Whilst other markets—even within Mwanza—store such carrier bags with the goods on sale, goods sellers in Soko Kuu do not. The main reason for this difference is that the market activity of Soko Kuu has become dominated by the outside street selling that has mushroomed alongside a drastic to-and-fro between hawkers and Municipal Council authorities. It is illegal to sell on the streets outside the market and the local authorities periodically raid such zones, spoiling and confiscating goods.[28] At the same time, because of the convenience of not having to enter the market, and the greater likelihood of getting lower prices from those who do not need to factor rent or taxes into their costs, purchasing on the streets immediately outside the market is preferred by most. Inside, the market is increasingly being used as a wholesale supply point, also because of the night-time security that can be guaranteed there. The fresh fish, meat and chicken sales continue vibrantly due to the superior storage points offered by the market infrastructure. Over time, however, the exodus of the majority of sales to the streets—which lack the space and organisation to have proper stalls or selling spaces—has inhibited the standard practice of storing

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27 Bryceson, 2011, p. 287.
28 *See Burbidge, D., 'A View of State-Citizen Interaction in Kenya and Tanzania'. Ch 9 of Kankindi, A., Odhiambo, T. & Burbidge, D. (eds.), Governance Papers 1: Governance Challenges in East Africa (Nairobi: Focus Publishers, 2011).*

plastic bags at market stalls. In response to this situation, specialist plastic bag sellers meet demand in a more flexible manner.

The entire population of plastic bag sellers is male and the age range is relatively wide.[29] The two youngest interviewees were 13 but there was consensus amongst the plastic bag sellers on knowing and dealing with colleagues as young as six, seven, eight and nine, and one 14 year-old respondent recounted how he had started bag selling at the age of six.[30] The oldest respondent was 30 and this is believed to be the uppermost example. The average age of respondents was 18.

The bag seller population represents a diverse and energetic section of the male youth, very much exploring the path in-between departure from school and basic career aspirations. The job consists of patrolling the points of sale of Soko Kuu and searching for customers in need of carrier bags and they usually spread over one arm the different sizes of bags they are selling to be easily identifiable. Bag sellers will normally be ready to offer their item as soon as a goods transaction is spotted, but will sometimes be called for by goods sellers if no bag seller is immediately forthcoming. Soko Kuu opens at 8am and closes at 6:30pm, though selling occurs before and after this time in the adjacent streets.

The reputation of a bag seller

In her anthropological account of Soko Kuu, Flynn notes the 'crowd of characters' that form the mosaic of market life:

> There were customers pushing through the crowd to make their purchases,
> joined by an occasional thief stealing fruit or a partial sack of grain, as well as
> the destitute begging for handouts. The resulting clamour was augmented by
> Soko Kuu's location between busy Rwagasore and Market streets, the congested
> Mwadeco bus station and a crowded taxi stand...31

As a professional group, bag sellers are perceived to be carrying out a low-skill job with small but consistent profits. What most marks their reputation, however, is a strong conviction amongst goods sellers and customers that they are thieves. Bag sellers are known to be operating against a backdrop of poverty, of which they exhibit some of the most prominent examples, and this encourages the view that they would do anything to make ends meet. In addition, the general understanding in urban Tanzania of a well

29   *Why no females are involved in the profession is not fully known. Respondents commented only that bag selling was not for girls and that there are no female bag sellers. It is generally understood that young women in difficult financial situations can find much easier employment as house-helps, and are likely to in any case be strongly put off by the aggressive attitude of the male bag sellers that dominate the profession. For comment on this in the related area of Mwanza's street children populations also being dominated by males, see Lockhart, C., 'The Life and Death of a Street Boy in East Africa'. Medical Anthropology Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2008), pp. 94–115, p. 112, note 1.*
30   *Interview 6, Alex, 14.*
31   *Flynn, 2005, p. 47.*

brought up child tends to prioritise the importance of school education and so those bag sellers under the age of 16 and working on weekdays will likely constitute, in the eyes of others, examples of problematic upbringing. Of the 20 participants, two were total orphans and six had only one parent (additionally, many of the parents were not in frequent contact). The family is generally understood in Tanzania as the most important body for moral formation and so non-schooled youths operating largely independently of their family structure presents to market users clear signals of low social status.

The importance of age in categorising reputation and social standing in Tanzania also plays an integral part in the political economy of Soko Kuu. Elders must be greeted with "shikamoo" (greetings or, literally, I hold your feet) and they will respond with "marahaba" (very well or thank you). In this vein, those older have a commonly appreciated responsibility to guide and watch over the behaviour of youths. Most particularly, all youths can be reprimanded as if they are one's very own children.

It was difficult to get at whether or how regularly bag seller interviewees engaged in stealing. Instead of asking directly, which might have compromised respondents' openness, the researcher inquired whether interviewees knew of peers who stole, and whether the general perception that bag sellers were thieves had truth to it. From responses to these questions it can certainly be maintained that stealing does occur but that the practice is engaged in only partially.[32] Bag selling involves running from stall to stall and navigating deftly narrow avenues and spaces of the market. Bag sellers, especially young ones, do therefore sometimes use their profession as an excuse for pick-pocketing and stealing from stalls. Interestingly, many bag sellers resent the reputation because such thieves may not be real bag sellers at all and yet go a long way in staining public perceptions of the group. However, this diversity in professional membership is apparent to bag sellers and not to others. As one bag seller mused, 'With that place [the market], everybody has their own character. Some are thieves, others are good.'[33] The same respondent explained the difficulty of forming friendships because of this tension: 'In the market I do have friends but I don't encourage friendship. Sometimes you can invite someone to your house and then you find that they have stolen everything.'[34] The perception of the prevalence of thievery is the single biggest determinant of bag sellers' reputation in the eyes of goods sellers. As one respondent noted, 'My mother normally tells me she does not like this business because she thinks I'm becoming a thief.'[35]

Despite this reputation, bag sellers strongly believe themselves to be equal members of the market when that identity is politicised in response to coercive action by the Municipal authorities. As one respondent explained, 'I've done this business for a long time and I know myself that what I'm doing is legal [...]. But there are those people

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32   *Interview 4, Dole, 20/21; Interview 8, Isaac, 13; Interview 9, name withheld, 16; Interview 17, Jose, 14; Interview 20, Sabato, 18.*

33   *Interview 9, name withheld, 16.*

34   *Ibid.*

35   *Interview 8, Isaac, 13.*

who are just thieves [...] and they give us a bad name.'[36] The episodes when the local authorities conduct sweeps against illegal street selling epitomize this unfortunately Janus-faced perception. Bag sellers carry their bags on their arms and so have no problem escaping the Municipal raids. Some, however, pity their fellow traders (many of whom are middle-aged women) and so stand and fight against the authorities to give goods sellers more time to gather their items and escape. Speaking of the Municipal authorities, one seller recounted: 'They don't come to us [bag sellers] directly. We are there because of those people selling tomatoes. When they beat them we feel so bad that we sometimes fight the Municipal and then they fight back.'[37] The contradictory reputations of bag sellers come to the fore in the very same instance because some can use the confusion caused by the raids as a chance to steal. As one interviewee explained: 'The Municipal normally harass the hawkers. You find that those selling bags run with them and then the hawkers think the bag sellers are stealing from them as they run.'[38] This poor reputation—whether justified or not—presents a serious challenge to trust creation both within the group of bag sellers (bonding social capital) and the group's links with goods sellers or customers (bridging social capital). The question then is, given the inability of frequent interaction alone to produce trust, how have bag sellers developed adequate systems of identifying trustworthiness, sufficient for participation in an informal and intensely competitive political economy?

Daily profit margins

As has been advanced theoretically, trust is a necessary prerequisite for economic activity, especially in the informal sector. The very fact that bag sellers have found a niche of profitable economic activity, whose services are relied upon by the whole market population, therefore shows that they have somehow managed to overcome the lack of confidence brought on by their reputation. That bag sellers have succeeded in maintaining and promoting a position within the local political economy is evidenced by an examination of their levels of profit. In mid-2010, the wholesale purchase and individual retail of the two most commonly sold plastic bags gave an average profit of 95 TSh per item. These two bags are normally bought in batches of 50 and there are no costs in sourcing as the reams of bags are sold wholesale at one stall within the market. Figure 5 shows the buying and selling prices of these two bags.

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36   Interview 20, Sabato, 18.
37   Interview 2, Michael, 19.
38   Interview 17, Jose, 14.

Figure 5 Prices and profit margins per bag for the two most used bags (TSh)39

Bag	Buying price	Selling price	Profit per bag
Small blue	50	100	50
Medium black	60	200	140

Interestingly, the same prices for each of the items were maintained by every respondent even though it is commonly understood throughout local markets of East Africa that prices are open to bargaining. The main reason for the rigidity of the prices lies in the fact that there is no variation in the quality of the good. Additionally, plastic bags are very low cost items whose prices cannot be easily broken down by the Tanzanian currency. 100 and 200 TSh prices are represented by single coins, the equivalent of 0.07 or 0.15 USD respectively.[40] Rarely, but sometimes, bag sellers will allow a bartering down of prices by 50 TSh for the small blue bag if this is all the money the buyer has. This would only be accepted by the bag seller if he wishes to get rid of a final batch of bags and the buyer has the correct amount in change.

Whilst prices are on the whole fixed, costs are not constant. In the economy of Soko Kuu bag selling, there are clear economies of scale for those bag sellers with the capital to buy larger wholesale batches. Figure 6 shows the changes in profit per item when buying wholesale in different amounts.

Figure 6 Profit per sale of medium-sized black plastic bag (TSh)

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
39   *Buying prices shown per bag, calculated according to wholesale batches of 50.*
40   *The equivalent USD is provided at the exchange rate used by IMF staff in 2010. See International Monetary Fund, 'World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011'. Tanzania 2010 IMF staff estimate. http://www.imf.org/ external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/index.aspx (accessed 21/08/11).*

This market structure rewards stable and disciplined bag sellers, an interesting phenomenon given the fact that most bag sellers are already aspiring towards building up capital in order to expand into another business. Bag sellers are reinforced in the perceived benefits of this through participation in the bag selling wholesale market whereby capital retention is rewarded through greater profit margins.[41]

Answers as to daily levels of profit amongst bag sellers gave an average of 2,825 TSh, the equivalent of 2.11 USD.[42] Levels of daily profit depended on hours worked and skill at spotting sales. Bag sellers can work seven days a week but most take Sunday off and many go to work somewhat intermittently during the week. For the sake of providing a yardstick for analysing the profitability of the profession, assuming a five day week schedule, a typical plastic bag seller would earn 734,500 TSh per annum (549 USD), almost the same as Tanzania's 2010 average GDP per capita of 733,303 TSh (548 USD).[43] The level of profit is relatively large given the economic background of bag sellers. Interestingly, although plastic bag sellers have a much lower social standing than goods sellers and hawkers, their level of daily income can be higher. Achieving this sort of profit and handling this amount of economic activity demands, of course, networks of trust.

The journey to plastic bag selling

Almost half of respondents had come from neighbouring towns or rural areas, with the others having been born in the city of Mwanza. For those who had come from other areas, Mwanza presented all the attractiveness of African city life.[44] 'The way it appears,' explained one participant, 'it looks more developed. Where I am from, it is a village.'[45] The enduring attractiveness of Mwanza for the young males mostly lay in the relatively easier ability to get money. As one respondent claimed, 'I found it to be a very good place where you can just get money. In Musoma you need to cultivate and wait for the harvest before you can get any money.'[46] Some of the bag sellers who grew up outside of Mwanza do in fact use a portion of their income to visit their place of origin. However, their general impression is of others wanting to follow their example

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41   *Interview 8, Isaac, 13.*

42   *It could be criticised that answers were inflated to impress the listener but it is equally likely that some respondents felt the need to tone down accounts of their daily profit in the hope of receiving financial support from the researcher. Against the view that figures were lied about is the fact that independently produced answers clustered around similar figures.*

43   *International Monetary Fund, 2011.*

44   *Evans, R., 'Poverty, HIV, and Barriers to Education: Street Children's Experiences in Tanzania'. Gender and Development, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2002), pp. 51-62, p. 56; Bryceson, D. F., 'The Urban Melting Pot in East Africa: Ethnicity and Urban Growth in Kampala and Dar es Salaam'. Ch 11 of Locatelli, F. & Nugent, P. (eds.), African Cities: Competing Claims on Urban Spaces (Leiden: Brill, 2009), p. 251.*

45   *Interview 2, Michael, 19.*

46   *Interview 15, Willi, 18.*

and come to Mwanza which, together with the developed attachment of the city as a new home,[47] means none of the respondents expressed a desire to return to their place of origin more permanently.

The question of how one gets into the practice of bag selling starts to shed light on the intricate networks involved in the profession. Overwhelmingly, the practice of selling bags has spread through the relationships of friends and family. A common remark was: 'There's this day I was with a friend. He said, "Why don't we go selling bags?" He really managed to convince me. The following day I went with him.'[48] This very same respondent in turn convinced another, who recounted in a separate interview: 'Hamisi introduced me where to buy the bags and my sister gave me some money.'[49]

The experience of one brother teaching the other was indicative of the trend. Chema came to stay in Mwanza from Tarime in 2008. His younger brother soon followed him and first worked with an older lady, helping her to sell tea at the market. Chema, after himself discovering and starting the business of bag selling, told his brother to follow and quit the tea selling:

> You know, when he started, he came to the market with the tea and started selling tea. So he sold his tea and then I told him, "Put that tea aside." Then I bought a few bags for him and I gave him. He sold the bags for three to four hours and then he got a profit of 1,500 TSh. The following day he came again with the tea. After selling the tea for some time, then I gave him some bags. He sold again, and got 1,500 TSh. Then it went like that, the third day, the fourth day, the fifth day. Then he went to—you know with the business of tea, he was employed by another mama—so he went and told this mama that now, from today, I want you to give me time so I sell here up to this point and then I continue with my selling of bags. But the mama did not like it and she started to envy him. Then that is when he decided. I told the brother, "Why don't you just leave that work, come and do your business?"50

Because the two brothers' parents lived in Tarime, the rejection of the relationship with the befriended mama represented a severe loss in social security. At the same time, however, the increased income from bag selling meant the brothers went on to hire a basic room and no longer had to stay on the streets. This dynamic display of reorganising social relationships and working quickly towards finding accommodation is in strong contrast with Lockhart's account of experienced Mwanza street boys who, despite strong ambitions, put off practical steps towards improving their condition.[51] The youths investigated by Lockhart between 1997 and 1999 did wash cars for money but the social hierarchy they were involved in meant profit was looted from them by older gangs

47   *Interview 5, Hamisi, 18.*
48   *Ibid.*
49   *Interview 9, name withheld, 16.*
50   *Interview 1, Chema, 22.*
51   *Lockhart, 2008, p. 112.*

of street dwellers.[52] The contrast between that account and the present one suggests it would be beneficial from a policy perspective if further exploration was made into what informal economic activities support a practical pursuit of childhood and young adult aspirations, and what activities instead reinforce reluctance towards investing in self-development. The present account suggests that economic activities enjoying economies of scale help discipline the self-employed into saving and developing more of a daily work routine. The best scenario for a young, out of school aspirant seeking to move away from poverty would therefore be a business holding economies of scale for incremental expansion. This would need to be combined, of course, with opportunity for the safe storage of capital.

Some previous exposure to the market, either as a buyer or as a seller,[53] climatises one to the bag selling industry and builds confidence for taking up the profession. Participation in bag selling normally requires an end to school commitments. All young sellers expressed a strong desire to return but cited reasons of financial constraint as to why this was not possible.[54] One respondent explained how:

> I went up to Standard 7 [end of primary school] but I did not do exams. I am out of school because I did something wrong. I beat a student there and was told to not come back for three months. After those three months I did not go back.[55]

Whilst most bag sellers received encouragement from family or extended family in Mwanza because it would help contribute to household income, one respondent revealed the extent to which he was deceiving his mother, a seller of vegetables also in Soko Kuu, in order to continue working despite her disapproval:

> I used not to do business before. I used to just help my mother with her work there. She sells vegetables. [...] Before, because I used to help my mother with her business I used to see these others selling bags. One day I asked my mother for 3,000 TSh saying I wanted it for clothes. I was lying to her and I bought bags with it. Then I sold the bags and made profit. [...] She doesn't like me selling. I time her [schedule] and hide [when she comes]. I make sure she sees I'm the first one home. [...] Normally I have to take food from her to home. If she sees me then I just say I am here for the food. When I get the food I rush home and put it there and then rush back to the market and make sure my mother doesn't see me. [...] My father is worse: he really doesn't want me to do this business. But he leaves early for work and comes back late.[56]

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52   *Ibid, pp. 102–3.*
53   *Respectively, interview 10, Juma, 17; interview 6, Hassani, 13.*
54   *Answers to such questions may have been biased in the hope that the interviewer might take pity and provide financial support.*
55   *Interview 10, Juma, 17.*
56   *Interview 13, Dayson, 15.*

Relationships and networks with goods sellers

The point of contact for introduction to the business of bag selling constituted a key relationship of trust. At the same time, in order to grow in the business, extensions and fresh connections of trust have to be made. Buyers to the market are numerous and inconsistent and so provide few opportunities for building strong relationships. Two other relationships will therefore be considered in understanding the networks of trust important for the bag seller. The first is between bag sellers and goods sellers; the second between bag sellers themselves.

The relationship between bag sellers and goods sellers is prefaced by the reputation of the unknown bag seller as a thief. At the same time, there is interdependence between the two groups as bags are wanted when making sales of goods and bag sellers want goods sellers who will look out for them over their peers when in need of a bag. The interdependence is part of day-to-day market life:

> If you are a new person here you just try to build trust with the sellers [of goods].
> After some time the customers will come and the sellers will know you. [...] The
> way you can build trust is by knowing a seller who sells and you are standing by.57

Bag sellers do not have the constancy in location or uniqueness of product that could bridge relationships of trust with market customers but goods sellers do. Fostering relationships with the latter therefore facilitates indirect customer loyalty for bag sellers.

Forming a relationship of trust with a goods seller is relatively easy. It involves being open to lending a hand when asked, perhaps in moving market goods or in supplying a bag on short-term credit. Such practices are subtle indicators of reputation and implicitly check whether a bag seller is a thief or not by testing the self-giving of their disposition. It seems as humans we find it difficult to perform Machiavelli's suggestion 'to choose the fox and the lion' at the same time,58 and so can quickly be found out to be foxes or lions on the basis of how we perform small acts. There are no fool-proof tests, and this is not a commitment to some kind of theory that once a free-rider, always a stupidly obvious free-rider, but it is nevertheless worth highlighting that goods sellers do employ tests, and these work a lot of the time. Asked how he has managed to build up such strong relationships with goods sellers, for example, one 17 year-old bag seller responded, 'They give money for you to buy them something and bring it back. If you don't steal the money but bring them what they want then you win their trust.'59 Whereas a test of trust might be assumed as in itself already a breach of trust, one participant proudly expressed how he thought such goods sellers 'treat us as humans.'60 If reputation can be built up

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57   Interview 5, Hamisi, 18.
58   Machiavelli, N., *The Prince* (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth, 1993 [1513]), p. 138.
59   Interview 10, Juma, 17.
60   Interview 3, Nashon, 24.

enough, it is more likely to lead to another avenue of income: carrying the goods of a customer for the rest of their shopping time, in exchange for a tip.[61]

The general relationship of goods sellers to bag sellers is tense because of the poor reputation of the unknown bag seller. As has been shown, saving grace lies in the interdependence between the two professions.

Relationships and networks between bag sellers

The economic consideration of competition in the context of scarce resources is even more extremely exhibited in the case of bag seller-on-bag seller trust because direct competitiveness seemingly replaces any notion of interdependence. It is the most important professional relationship for bag sellers—if only because bag sellers themselves are the only group who do not start with the premise that bag sellers are generally thieves—and thus has led to innovative methods for trust indication. Exploration of trust creation between bag sellers forms the remainder of the chapter. The discussion first looks at the low level of general trust and then shows the interpersonal avenues bag sellers have used to overcome this. The focal point for disagreement between bag sellers is competition for sales. As mentioned previously, there is very little room for bag sellers to incite or retain customers through integrity or salesmanship. The buyer is usually committed to the purchase simply by nature of the fact that he or she has already purchased goods that need to be carried. In addition, the prices of the bags are commonly known and kept to. The question for the bag seller, therefore, is not how well one sells but how many one sells. Lack of ability to elicit added value to their product increases the propensity towards shameless competition between bag sellers.

The main manifestation of peer-on-peer competition comes through barging a fellow bag seller out of the way so that one gets the sale. As one respondent explained, 'That type of life is there whereby we disagree mostly. If there is a customer then we rush to overtake the others to get the sale.'[62] Another respondent commented, 'Sometimes we don't get on well. A customer comes and both of you want to sell so you disagree and maybe you fight.'[63] Fighting can be immediate or outside the market, after it has closed. In this way, bag sellers who have upset others may be tagged for a later beating, so long as they are someone without too many friends to stick up for them. There is a central area of dispute as to whether sales should go to the bag seller who spotted the sale first or the bag seller who arrived first. Asked whether he would fight someone for a sale, one respondent answered, 'I'd fight; I'm the one who saw it first.'[64] However, he acknowledged that his energetic commitment to selling at every opportunity was not

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61   Interview 20, Sabato, 18.
62   Interview 16, Lameek, 18.
63   Interview 10, Juma, 17.
64   Interview 19, Joanes, 17.

shared by everyone, and added that '[a]t the end of the sales in the evening they will come for you.'[65] Such areas for conflict had come to be expected: 'Some disagreement is normal. You might find that it is you who identifies a customer first and then it is you who might disagree or fight a bit.'[66]

Bag sellers complain at the lack of trust between themselves, not because it leads to worse sales but because it creates an unhappy and upsetting working environment. One bag seller complained, 'There is this disagreement or envy. That is there if there is someone selling more.'[67] Another bag seller lamented, 'We don't have that unity. [...] We found ourselves in the market and no-one knows one another's background. We just see each other and then go home. I don't know if that unity will ever be there.'[68] Asked whether he has friends who are also bag sellers, one respondent answered: 'No, we do not have any good relationship amongst ourselves. We are not even united. We are everyday fighting amongst ourselves.'[69]

The irrelevance of ethnicity in the professional setting

Scholarship has gone a long way in demonstrating how tribe and ethnicity do not play determinate roles for sociological outcomes but are nevertheless sometimes operative in the politicisation or entrenchment of group identities by elites in scenarios of scarce resources or insecurity.[70] The intensely competitive environment of bag selling in Soko Kuu would, therefore, normally be expected to result in ethnic division—not because the ethnicities are themselves opposed but because there is a lack of generalised trust or formalised justice. The competitive and easy descent towards physical violence should encourage individuals to bind themselves ethnically for the sake of protection. The absence of tribal division is, therefore, deeply curious.

Tribe or ethnicity did not feature in interviews as a natural consequence of comment around the topics of bag selling and personal biography; discussion of the importance of one's ethnic group had to be brought up by the researcher. As one respondent remarked:

> With the question of tribe it is not there at all and I have never thought about it. With me I was born here [Mwanza], went to school here. I cannot even speak the [tribal] language. I just know my tribe because that is what my parents are, but I can only speak Kiswahili.71

65   *Ibid.*
66   *Interview 13, Dayson, 15.*
67   *Interview 3, Nashon, 24.*
68   *Interview 20, Sabato, 18.*
69   *Interview 1, Chema, 22.*
70   *Esman, M. J., Ethnic Politics (New York: Cornell University Press, 1994); An Introduction to Ethnic Conflict (Polity Press: Cambridge, 2004); Chabal, P. & Daloz, J., Africa Works: Disorder As Political Instrument (Oxford: James Currey, 1999); Horowitz, D. L., Ethnic Groups in Conflict (USA: University of California Press, 2000); and Berdal, M. & Malone, D. M. (eds.), Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (London: Lynne Reinner, 2000).*
71   *Interview 20, Sabato, 18.*

A higher than usual number of Kuria featured in the sample as compared with the percentage of Kuria in Mwanza (9 of the 20 respondents), most likely due to the way in which bag sellers often entered the profession through suggestions of family, as outlined previously. However, when questioned on whether tribe had any significance for one's profession, or whether one could rely on other Kuria sellers more, for example, respondents insisted it did not make a difference.[72] If one gets into a fight, friends are the ones who protect you, not coethnics.[73]

Kinship and tribe did have some significance when participants reflected on how strong their safety net was if things were to take a turn for the worst and they were no longer able to support themselves; if respondents had family, they would at those times turn to them for help. In this vein, one interviewee commented that, 'We get along well with our own tribe. We are united so even if one is injured we look after them.'[74] The importance here, however, was on family obligations if things go wrong. From the purely professional perspective of bag selling, coethnicity does not guarantee someone will not steal one's sale. The roots of this detached attitude towards ethnicity in day-to-day interactions run deep. On the one hand, Mwanza has acted as an identity melting-pot by virtue of it being a fast-growing city, and so those who deal with the buzz of Soko Kuu market enjoy exposure to all walks of life the city has to offer. The sheer number and small size of tribes in Tanzania ensures the need to move out of the confines of one's relations, especially in an urban setting. On the other hand, however, this development can be attributed to Tanzania's nation-building endeavour, which placed the common language of Kiswahili in pole position and was led since independence by the political theory and public policy of President Julius Nyerere. None of these reasons can be dealt with adequately here but it is important to at least flag up the deeper trends at play in the evolution of Tanzanian urban identity. One Haya bag seller from Kigoma commented, 'My friends are of different tribes and even some of them I do not know their tribe.'[75] And, as another respondent judged, 'A friend can help you more than a relative.'[76]

The relevance of age in the professional setting

Competition for sales and the resulting fights that break out is, however, intensely connected to age. As has been pointed to above, age plays an enormous role in determining status within the community of Soko Kuu. At the same time, this can be understood as an integral element of social life throughout the continent. As Chabal affirms, age is significant not just in terms of social hierarchy and political prominence – both of which are undeniably crucial – but also in terms of one's own identity. However irrelevant

72   *Interview 9, name withheld, 16; Interview 15, Willi, 18.*
73   *Interview 15, Willi, 18.*
74   *Interview 1, Chema, 22.*
75   *Interview 5, Hamisi, 18.*
76   *Interview 3, Nashon, 24.*

it may seem in the era of fast modernity and sweeping globalisation, the notion of age group continues to have strong resonance in everyday life.77

Amongst bag sellers of Soko Kuu, there is a clear and frequently referred to division between "older" and "younger" bag sellers. When asked to say at what age one becomes an older bag seller, answers clustered around 17 to 19. The threshold is sometimes vague and one's membership in either category will also depend on the ages of those one socialises with.

Older sellers frequently expressed their deep resentment at the younger sellers. As one 18 year-old recounted,

> There are these small children. Actually they are not supposed to be selling.
> Those selling with tables don't like them and chase them out, but they have come
> for their needs, the same way you have. [...] There are people who feel they are
> not supposed to be there; they are a nuisance.78

Other older sellers showed contempt for the supposed financial needs of the young ones, and felt they should in any case be in school. As men, older sellers believed they had greater responsibilities and more of a need for sales. On the issue of responsibility to earn enough to provide for others, however, the reverse was often the case. Younger bag sellers frequently had siblings depending on them for food and support in going to school.79 All unmarried, the older sellers couched their greater right to work not on responsibility towards family but on the principle that they were past school and so this was their only option to earn: 'Those who are older than us don't like us. They try to chase us away, saying we don't have needs like they do.'80

Age difference takes on most relevance when fights break out between bag sellers. As one respondent explained, 'Yes, normally if someone takes your customer then there is a problem. If he is older then you let it happen. If they are your age you fight.'81 As seniors, the older bag sellers bear responsibility for setting the trend of what is appropriate and acceptable behaviour. The importance of this is also reinforced by the general impression that it is the younger sellers who are thieves (because they are small, fast and have been brought up badly). In this vein, older sellers can subject those younger than them to quite harsh reprimands. One 14 year-old complained that '[o]lder ones really do bad things to us.'82 A 13 year-old explained how, 'With us of the same age we rarely fight. It is the older ones who are the fighters, especially when we get a customer they chase us away.'83 There is no option to complain to the Municipal authorities about this treatment

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77   *Chabal, P., Africa: The politics of suffering and smiling (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009), p. 39.*
78   *Interview 20, Sabato, 18.*
79   *Interview 7, Alex, 14.*
80   *Interview 2, Michael, 19.*
81   *Ibid.*
82   *Interview 17, Jose, 14.*
83   *Interview 8, Isaac, 13.*

because bag sellers found by the police are detained and fined for selling in the market without license.

By mutual agreement, older bag sellers tend to sell in the outside streets of the market and younger bag sellers in the market's interior. This is in part a convenient distribution of labour because the inside is packed and so harder for bigger bag sellers to get around quickly.[84] It is also, however, because of the common desire that conflict will be avoided if each group keeps to their own territory.[85]

An anchor of trust

Given the vortex of competition for sales, quick resort to physical violence and the reputation of thievery, it is difficult to imagine how trust creation can occur. Certainly, for some, the torrent of a chaotic market can seem like a good example of all that Hobbes had in mind—and so working towards institutional rule presents itself as the only viable solution for pacifying human relations. Closer examination, however, reveals some subtle dynamics at play that provide room for agent-led trust generation and maintenance. The phenomenon is surprising because it has emerged in the midst of what most would agree is an environment that fits the scenario of scarce resources and competition. To describe the mechanism at play we employ the term trust anchor, defined as a common point of interaction where persons may signal willingness to cooperate and have their disposition reciprocated for mutual confidence in the medium and long terms. Trust anchors do not occur where trust is always promoted or guaranteed; they are zones where indication of one's disposition towards self-giving can be signalled if one so desires. Trust anchors are points at which persons leave themselves open to being taken advantage of in the short term, for the sake of possibly developing a trusting-trustworthy relationship over a longer period. In this sense, anchors of trust occur where the signalling of trustworthiness is agent-led—a positive opposite to the concept of social dilemmas.

The most important trust anchor for relationships between bag sellers themselves and between bag sellers and goods sellers of Soko Kuu is the giving out of small change. The following dictum is widely held amongst bag sellers: 'Sometimes I can lose a sale because I don't have change.'[86] Amongst markets throughout Mwanza there is a serious shortage of small currency such that sellers of all goods will often be unable to transact because their customer does not have the exact cash and is demanding change. For those who sell low cost items—with plastic bags ranking as one of the most low cost items available—the problem is intensified as the majority of transactions involve the customer giving a coin or note larger than the price of the good. Because of the dense concentration of bag sellers, it often only takes a moment's hesitation for the opportunity

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84   *Additionally, only the older sellers sell the very large bags, which also require more room when being carried.*
85   *Interview 2, Michael, 19.*
86   *Interview 15, Willi, 18.*

of a sale to be lost. Thrown into the mix of hefty competition, the question of who will give you change sorts the angels from the devils.

What makes available change special? Interestingly, available change counts as a public good, but one that needs to be maintained by users at the microeconomic level. A public good is one 'that must be provided in the same amount to all the affected consumers'.[87] The concept is normally broken down into two identifiable properties: excludability and subtractability, whereby a public good cannot be excluded from those who wish to consume it and suffers little diminishment through use (low subtractability). By way of some examples, typical public goods include state-funded schools (no-one is barred entry and teachers teach each pupil the same) or public roads (everyone can use them and the road does not disappear once used). With change, the need to enforce how a single large note is equivalent to a particular collection of coins renders change non-excludable at the aggregate level. Additionally, by its nature it does not diminish through use. At the same time as holding these characteristics, however, the system of keeping change available can only be ensured indirectly by government as most exchanges are not between government and citizen but between citizens. It therefore also exhibits an elementary trust game at the micro level: if we both cooperate in making trust available to each other we can both trade with ease; if you refuse to reciprocate my giving of change to you, I lose out and you gain for now, but I will likely refuse you next time you ask. Like prisoners' dilemma games, the non-cooperative position of hoarding change forms the Nash equilibrium in the one-round game, though not the collectively best outcome. In the medium and long-term, failing to strike up relationships of mutual cooperation damages one's interests severely. Making change available to others is therefore an act of vulnerability that seeks to establish a long-term relationship. Crucially, although change is a public good (and thus non-excludable at the macro level), its benefits can be excluded locally against persons committed to free-riding. It is in this particular aspect that making change available becomes an anchor of trust for those seeking cooperative relationships.

hen in need of change, '[y]ou try and ask your fellow bag seller'.[88] The responses and types of relationship described as resulting from whether the bag or goods seller helps or not were numerous. Pragmatically, some answered that, 'It depends with how much change I have.'[89] Others, however, demonstrated how they had fostered particular relationships:

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[87]　*Varian, H. R., Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach (London: Norton & Company, 1999), 5th Ed., p. 618.*

[88]　*Interview 20, Sabato, 18.*

[89]　*Interview 12, Benedicto, 30.*

...normally they need small change, like 100, 50 or 200 [TSh]. Most of the time I have some and you find that the vegetable sellers or the onion sellers don't, and they have a customer that wants change back. So they call me, and they know that I am ready to give them change. While you find that, unlike me, the others will not give. Some of them are mean and greedy or they don't want to give out their change. Because of that they like me.90

One respondent complained how, 'Even a good friend won't give you change',91 and another expressed that,

I don't have much problem with it unless I have a customer who needs change. I then go to the mamas [goods sellers] who give change. [...] They [other bag sellers] will tell you, "What if I get a customer who needs change?" Even me, I would not give out change.92

When asked whether he would give goods sellers change, the same respondent answered, 'Yes, I would, because even when I ask them for change they will give it.'93 Here, the respondent had formed relationships of trust with goods sellers but not fellow plastic bag sellers. Indeed, what qualifies making change available to be an anchor of trust is the fact that reciprocal self-giving creates a mutually beneficial relationship that is increasingly relied upon as it is built, pushing towards expanding inclusiveness between persons from the micro towards the macro. Streams of trust building are therefore possible if reputations of reciprocity can be maintained across a broader population category.

The age division between older and younger bag sellers presents a barrier that is yet to be surmounted by the trust anchor of making change available. If someone of one age bracket gives change to someone of the other age bracket, his generosity will not be reciprocated. A 16 year-old commented, 'I prefer the older ones. These small ones don't give out change easily. [...] The smaller ones don't trust the older ones.'94 Representative of the common wisdom of the younger bag sellers, 13 year-old Isaac explained:

I don't like it [the work of bag selling] because we are beaten when we sell [by] fellow bag sellers who are older. [...] If they come for you for change and you tell them you don't have change, they beat you and chase you away. And they then get the sale.95

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90   *Interview 1, Chema, 22.*
91   *Interview 19, Joanes, 17.*
92   *Interview 13, Dayson, 15.*
93   *Ibid.*
94   *Interview 9, name withheld, 16.*
95   *Interview 8, Isaac, 13.*

As an anchor of trust, giving out change signals trustworthiness and therefore acts as a motivation for the formation of both bonding and bridging social capital amongst persons of Soko Kuu. It has not overcome all divisions but has created links between persons willing to cooperate and mutually benefit from the availability of change, and thus counts as a zone for the growth of trusting-trustworthy relationships.

Conclusion

Previous sociological literature has emphasised the importance of repeated interaction for trust creation but little attempt has been made to scratch beneath the surface on what repeated interaction is trust fertile and what repeated interaction is trust barren. Separate to this discussion, Africanist scholars have discussed the value of gift exchange and how important it was for the bonding of community in traditional societies. Chabal goes so far as to note an oppositional position between the two camps of anthropology and the social sciences on this point:

> As anthropologists have detailed, the prevalence of gift or giving in 'traditional' societies is to be explained in terms of a political economy of exchange and reciprocity that is alien to commodity trade and profit-making. It is part of an array of obligations that sustain identity, virtue and good relations within a group and between communities. However, most social scientific interpretations of gift centre on the instrumentally rational nature of what serves both as social lubricant and as an incipient form of social security.96

This article demonstrates how there is no reason to polarise these two approaches, so long as appreciation is made of the capabilities of persons to signal trustworthiness. The political economy of plastic bag sellers in Soko Kuu keenly represents understandings of competition and scarce resources in a setting without formal regulations, and yet trust creation is nevertheless apparent at trust anchors, in tandem with the very same style of moral deliberation felt to hold such force in so-called "traditional" societies.

Some of the trust-creating dynamics can be seen in the way goods sellers test bag sellers with small tasks in order to identify the latter's habits of disposition. However, the strongest trust anchor—partly because of the extent to which it can be easily habituated—is found in making change available to others. As an indicator of good conduct, giving out change stabilises relationships of mutual exchange. By taking the question of signalling trustworthiness before that of signalling trust, empirical application has yielded a fruitful display of an agent-centred example of the formation of trusting-trustworthy relationships. Whilst many of the mechanisms at play are already understood in behavioural economics in terms of the effects of institutions, we have focused here on how the structure of an economic setting neither ensures nor excludes cooperative behaviour in and of itself, and how social dilemmas can be turned around by agents as opportunities for signalling trustworthiness.

96   *Chabal, 2009, pp. 72–3 (emphasis in original).*

Éducation relative à l'environnement et médecine traditionnelle : cas des femmes déplacées internes de la crise postélectorale de 2010 en Côte d'Ivoire

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Résumé

Quatre paradigmes orientent la recherche en Education Relative à l'Environnement (ERE); ce sont entre autres le paradigme positiviste-béhavioriste; le paradigme interprétatif-humaniste; le paradigme sociocritique et le paradigme de la réflexivité. Si les trois premiers trouvent un terrain privilégié de recherche, le dernier par contre est en pleine construction dans ce champ d'ERE. C'est donc à cette finalité que répond cette production scientifique qui met en exergue, la médecine traditionnelle et la planification familiale comme objet de recherche de l'ERE en prenant comme espace empirique, le cadre postélectorale de 2010 qui a vu le déplacement forcé de la couche de population vulnérable (femmes et enfants). Partant des résultats de recherche effectuée dans la région d'Aboisso (Sud-Est Ivoirien), qui a permis d'interroger 213 femmes déplacées internes du fait de la crise post-electorale, 17 tradipraticiennes et 4 médecins, l'analyse qualitative et quantitative fait ressortir que l'adoption de la médecine traditionnelle, comme pratiques sanitaires alternatives à la médecine moderne par les femmes déplacées internes dans un environnement de crise où le système sanitaire est complètement déstructuré, dépend fondamentalement de trois logiques : santé, écologique et économique. Cependant ces trois logiques s'articulent autour de l'éducation à l'environnement qui structure la représentation sociale de ses acteurs et l'ancrage de cette forme de médecine dans leurs pratiques.

Mots clés : Contraception verte, Crise postélectorale, Education relative à l'environnement, Femmes déplacées internes, Médecine traditionnelle.

Abstract
Ostensibly, four basic paradigms do serve as the investigating frameworks

for related researches focusing on environmental education (that is, the behaviorist-positivist; the interpretive-humanist; the socio-criticist and the reflexivist). While the first three schools of thought are presently popular amongst researchers, the fourth is still largely unpopular, though presently emerging, in this field of environmental education. It is against this background that my research seeks to understand the interconnections between the production highlights of traditional medicine and family planning as a search for EE is taking an empirical space (part of the post-election in 2010 in Ivory Coast that led to forced displacement of vulnerable population – women and children), engaging all useful approaches. Based on the results of my research in the Aboisso (Southeast, Ivory Coast), which employed questionnaire technique to interrogate 213 internally displaced women (due to the post-electoral crisis in the country); 17 therapists and 4 doctors. Both qualitative and quantitative analyses of the sourced data revealed that the adoption of traditional medicine as an alternative to modern medicine by internally displaced women in a crisis situation, where the health system is completely unstructured, depends fundamentally on three determinants: health, ecological and economic. However, these three approaches are premised on extant environmental education, which considerably structures the social representation of the actors and the utilization of this form of medicine in medical practices.

Keywords: Green contraception, post–election crisis, environmental education, internally displaced women, traditional medicine.

Introduction

Depuis le démarrage de la crise ivoirienne, une forte mobilité de la population est observée à travers le pays avec un pic après la crise postélectoral de Novembre 2010 ; les femmes et les enfants restent ainsi les plus vulnérables de cette situation. Par ailleurs, à la suite de l'embargo sur les ports d'Abidjan et de San-Pédro, l'importation de médicaments s'estompa, mettant alors à mal, le système sanitaire moderne et les différents programmes de planification familiale en cours dans le pays. Les déplacés internes en Côte d'Ivoire, les femmes en particulier appauvries par la situation s'en remettent alors à la médecine traditionnelle, à leur pré-acquis de l'environnement (éducation à l'environnement) surtout dans la contraception en vue d'éviter des grossesses non désirées, dans une période aussi difficile. L'objectif de cette production scientifique est de comprendre les déterminants et les logiques qui fondent l'appropriation de la méthode contraceptive issue de la médecine traditionnelle, basée sur les connaissances

de l'environnement, des plantes, par les femmes déplacées interne du fait de la guerre vers la région d'Aboisso, proche de la frontière du Ghana, en Côte d'Ivoire. Les personnes déplacées à l'intérieur de leur propre pays sont des personnes ou des groupes de personnes qui ont été forcés ou contraints à fuir ou à quitter leur foyer ou leur lieu de résidence habituel, notamment en raison d'un conflit armé, de situations de violence généralisée, de violations des droits de l'homme ou de catastrophes naturelles ou provoquées par l'homme ou pour en éviter les effets, et qui n'ont pas franchi les frontières internationalement reconnues d'un État. Aussi la question principale qui a guidé cette démarche a été la suivante : Qu'est ce qui fondent l'appropriation des méthodes de contraception basée sur la médecine traditionnelle (formalisée par une éducation à l'environnement) par les femmes déplacées interne du fait de la guerre vers la région d'Aboisso, proche de la frontière du Ghana, en Côte d'Ivoire ?

Cet article a certes un fondement empirique mais dépeint une portée sociale et sanitaire ; ainsi, en période de crise armée, la médecine traditionnelle basée sur une bonne connaissance de l'environnement (éducation à l'environnement au préalable) soutient néanmoins les pratiques contraceptives modernes. Ces méthodes nécessitent qu'on s'y attarde dans les différents programmes d'aides aux déplacés de guerre afin de mieux soutenir psychologiquement ces femmes déplacées et en difficulté.

Les fondements théoriques d'une telle démarche sur la recherche conciliant les concepts de Planification familiale, crise armée ne sont pas récentes mais celles qui lient tout ceci aux concepts de médecine traditionnelle et à l'éducation relative à l'environnement sont en construction. Epistémologiquement, une telle démarche s'en trouve renforcer par l'approche socioconstructiviste dans la mesure où elle aide à mettre en évidence, que certaines interactions sociales et contextuelles sont susceptibles de faire progresser l'acteur social 'femme déplacé interne' au niveau de ses structures cognitives. C'est donc une mise en relation entre le cognitif de ces femmes et le social dans la genèse de l'intelligibilité qui les conduit à l'appropriation de la médecine traditionnelle que cette approche socio-constructive structure dans cet article. En outre, l'approche réflexive renforce cette démarche. En effet, l'apport de cette dernière approche réside dans sa capacité à exhumer le principe de la continuité de l'expérience acquise (Dewey, 2007) par ses femmes déplacées internes au cours de leur vie et par la trajectoire de la prise de décision d'adoption de la médecine traditionnelle par ces femmes dans leur mode de contraception. En outre, s'appuyant sur une perspective mixte d'abord quantitative, ensuite qualitative, cette production scientifique organise à partir des réponses du questionnaire adressé aux enquêtés, une statistique descriptive des déterminants à l'adoption de la médecine traditionnelle par les femmes déplacées internes dont la logique est finalement discutée qualitativement. Cette vue s'accapare ainsi les recommandations sur la mixité des approches de Johnson et Onwuegbuzie (2004) qui y voient une robustesse au niveau de la validité des résultats de recherche.

Contextuellement, cette recherche a eu lieu dans la région d'Aboisso dans le Sud-est

de la Côte d'Ivoire qui a accueillie le tiers des déplacées de guerre depuis Novembre 2010. La ville d'Aboisso est située dans une zone de forêt à relief de collines et de vallées dans le Sud-Est de la Côte d'Ivoire. Elle se trouve à 120 km d'Abidjan et à 60 km de la frontière avec le Ghana.

Carte 1: Site de l'étude (Aboisso/Côte d'Ivoire) (2011)

Les données recueillies, proviennent de l'Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations (OIM) (2009) et des données de la préfecture d'Aboisso (2010) sur les migrations internes des femmes. L'enquête s'est déroulée sur deux semaines durant le mois de février 2011 sur 213 femmes déplacées internes du fait de la crise postélectorale, 17 tradipraticiennes et 4 médecins, arrivés à Aboisso entre Septembre 2010 et Janvier 2011. Un échantillonnage non probabiliste de type accidentel a été utilisé dans le choix des répondants. Aussi, les trois instruments de collecte que sont le questionnaire, le guide d'entretien et la grille d'observation ont-ils été utilisés sur tous les répondants en vue de permettre une triangulation des informations et parvenir à un niveau de saturation acceptable de la vérité scientifique. L'analyse de contenu des données d'entretien, ainsi que le traitement statistique des questionnaires semi-dirigés ont été effectué sur Excel et sur le logiciel Sphinx Lexica V5.

## Logique de santé, logique écologique et logique économique en contexte de crise sociopolitique

Les données recueillies lors de cette recherche exposent que sur 73% des femmes déplacées et enquêtées utilisent des méthodes contraceptives issues de la médecine traditionnelle. Parmi celles-ci, seulement 13% demande l'avis de leur conjoint. La méthode la plus utilisée à 86% est la purge d'écosses d'arbres écrasées. Le reste en tisane de feuilles qu'elles boivent. 93% des cas, utilisent ces méthodes pour éviter l'implantation de l'œuf fécondé dans l'utérus; les cas de fécondation et d'ovulation sont absents de leur discours. 37% des femmes utilisent les conseils d'un tradipraticien (spécialiste de la médecine des plantes), le reste fait de l'automédication (55%) ou sur conseil d'amis (8%) ayant une bonne connaissance de l'apport de la nature à la contraception. Le choix de la méthode traditionnelle, basée sur la connaissance de l'environnement, provient du manque d'argent à 15%, du comportement du conjoint à 52% et des conditions actuelle de vie 33%. Parmi ces femmes déplacées, 37% de nationalités étrangères avouent pratiquer la contraception traditionnelle depuis plus de 5 ans, tandis que 83% des ivoiriennes avouent avoir migré vers cette méthode du fait de la crise postélectorale et 53% de celle-ci compte bien y rester. En outre, 43% disent avoir des diarrhées, 35% des vomissements et 22% des menstrues irrégulières à la prise de ces méthodes traditionnelles sur l'environnement. Enfin, 73% avouent que la purge a plus d'effet escompté que l'absorption de tisanes. Ainsi ces résultats seront discutés dans les lignes suivantes.

Logique de santé

A l'observation de ces résultats, il ressort qu'en contexte de crise armée et avec une déstructuration du système de santé, l'instinct de survie ramène aux prénotions que les acteurs sociaux ont de l'environnement et de son rapport à la santé. L'acteur-patient dans ce cas de figure se trouve confronté à deux logiques, une logique de santé moderne et une logique de santé traditionnelle faisant appel à des prénotions et prédispositions écologiques. Aussi, la crise post-électorale de 2010, qui a vu la déstructuration du système sanitaire a inhibé la logique de santé moderne avec son corollaire de programme de santé publique, de distribution de médicaments pharmaceutiques. Cette logique de santé moderne étant avant tout basée sur une logique de profit, économique conduit l'acteur-patient à reconsidérer son rapport avec sa logique de santé lorsque le système est en crise. Aussi, cette logique moderne de santé obéit-elle à un itinéraire thérapeutique que le patient suscite quand ce système moderne existe et lorsque l'acteur patient a confiance en lui. Or dans le cas ivoirien et dans un contexte de déstructuration, les acteurs patients déplacés internes n'avaient plus confiance en leur système sanitaire. Magezi (2012) indique que cette logique est fortement corrélée à la communauté et le rôle qu'elle joue sur l'acteur-patient. Il va même plus loin en indiquant que cette logique de santé moderne dans un contexte africain est fortement annexée par une démarche de spiritualité de la part de l'acteur-patient. Aussi dans le cas où cette logique de santé moderne viendrait à être en crise, Pretorius (1991) indique que la medecine moderne et la medecine traditionnelle travaillent pour le même tandem : logique de santé. Ainsi recourir à la medecine traditionnelle pendant que la medecine moderne est en crise, explique surtout une volonté de survie. De plus, recourir à la medecine traditionnelle comme instrument de prevention pour des préoccupions de planification familiale est suscité selon des acteurs-patients, à une volonté de ne pas se laisser piégé par une incertitude grandissante dans un contexte de crise armée. Aussi certains auteurs tels que (Stepan, 1983) indiquent que ce saut de la logique de medecine moderne à une logique de medecine traditionnelle provient du fait que l'acteur-patient considère ces deux logiques comme des dimensions non opposées d'une même matrice à savoir ' la logique de santé'. Mais cette assertion de Stepan ne fait que relever les travaux de Spring (1980). Ainsi, pour ce dernier, l'attitude de l'acteur-patient, dans notre cas de figure, les déplacés interne de guerre, se justifie par les representations que ceux-ci se font de leur logique de santé. Aussi l'acteur-patient adopte t-il le système de santé dans lequel il est inscrit et y circonscrit une logique de rationalité (logique économique). En outre, Spring indique que l'acteur-patient ne peut s'inscrire que dans quatre systèmes ou schémas de collaboration (Stepan, 1983) entre logique de santé moderne et logique de santé traditionnelle. Ce sont le système exclusif ou monopolistique, où seul est possible la medecine moderne tout en excluant toute autre forme de soins; le système tolerant, qui tire sa source de la

politique du 'laisser-faire' fondée exclusivement sur la médicine allopathique et recusant virtuellement l'existance de la médecine traditionnel; le système inclusif ou parallèle qui legalise concommitemment la medecine allopathique et la medecine traditionnelle tout en permettant à deux ou plusieurs modes de traitement de coexister ; enfin le système intégré, plus avancé, qui combine tant la médecine moderne que la medecine traditionnelle dans la formation des étudiants en medecine. Par ailleurs, Pretorius (1991) complète cette classification en precisant que les pays francophones, anciennes colonies françaises n'adoptent que le système exlusif (Stepan, 1983). La Côte d'Ivoire n'y deroge donc pas. Cependant, si l'acteur-patient adopte la medecine traditionnelle alors que la logique légale de santé propose un système exclusivement moderne, c'est que dans sa representation, il y voit dans son système de santé, un système parallèle permettant un saut alterné de la medecine moderne à la medecine traditionnelle. Ainsi en cas de crise dans la medecine moderne tel que ce fut le cas, en Côte d'Ivoire durant le crise post-électorale, l'acteur-patient, deplacés de guerre a très vite fait son « saut » en vue de retrouver sa guerison. Spring (1980) conceptualise la relation entre ces deux types de logiques de medecine et le decloisement fait par les acteurs-patients africains.

Figure 1: Modèle analogique de la relation entre la médecine biomédical et la medecine traditionnelle (Spring, 1980, p. 59)

Mais dans une situation d'urgence, le choix d'une médecine traditionnelle en réponse à une médecine moderne positiviste (Yao, 2004) en crise, requiert des prénotions et une bonne maitrise de la logique écologique et de ses implications sanitaires.

Logique écologique

Le rapport à l'environnement a depuis longtemps constitué un lien d'intimité entre l'Africain et son espace environnemental. Ce rapport d'intimité s'intensifie au fur à mesure que cet environnement se sacralise par des rituels institués. Cette sacralisation donne alors à l'environnement Africain, un enjeu de spiritualité et d'intimité permanente avec les ancêtres ; des ancêtres gages de la connaissance thérapeutique issue de l'environnement. Aussi si cette connaissance de l'environnement est due à une transmission des ancêtres qui peuvent se faire soit en songe, soit par un rituel initiatique en forêt sacrée, il demeure que de nouveaux protocoles existent dans l'appropriation des connaissances écologiques qui construisent la maîtrise de la thérapeutique de santé. Cette logique écologique est sans nul doute, un ancrage de l'appropriation des protocoles écosystémiques de l'environnement par le patient ou le thérapeute. Ainsi la reconnaissance d'une thérapie basée sur des enjeux environnementaux indique essentiellement que l'un ou l'autre de ses acteurs aient déjà eu une expérience positive du rapport entre la logique écologique de santé et sa santé individuelle. L'environnement constituerait alors dans ce cadre la base d'un développement consciente du rapport écologique à la santé. Dans une telle structuration définie par l'environnement biophysique des plantes, le caractère thérapeutique de ces dernières repose donc sur une articulation des connaissances que le thérapeute a des implications des plantes sur la santé individuelle. Cette logique écologique qui est avant tout un écosystème entre le patient, le thérapeute et la plante, peut prendre divers itinéraires selon Yoro (2012). La logique écologique voudrait également que l'on « … comprendre le rôle des différents facteurs environnementaux (physiques, économiques, sociaux, politiques et culturels) qui empêchent ou facilitent de tel comportement, de telle habitude de vie ou thérapie… » (Yoro, 2012, p. 50). Ainsi reprenant les résultats de Paul (1955), Yoro indique que la logique écologique rend intelligible, le « …processus dynamique déclenché par la rencontre des systèmes médicaux non occidentaux avec la médecine occidentale. » (Yoro, 2012, p. 50). La logique écologique dans ce cadre ne serait non pas seulement systémique au sens de la relation Homme-Nature, mais également contextuelle, prenant en compte les réalités anthropiques africaines. Mais cette réalité complexifiée, car intégrant une démarche spiritualiste dans sa construction et dans sa guérison, prouve que les protocoles appliquées dans le développement de la médecine traditionnelle fondée sur les plantes sont dans la plupart des cas, métaphysiques. On en veut pour preuve les discours des répondants de cette étude où les schèmes « Dieu », « Gnamien », « …le tout-puissant … », « …l'être suprème… » conjuguent la rationalité

que le patient et le guérisseur accordent à leur protocole de soin. Aussi, la logique écologique dans cette structuration de santé humaine dépasse t-elle donc le cadre du rapport physique, pour intégrer le psychique du malade et de sa perception de la maladie, de son guérisseur mais également de sa représentation de la plante et de la confiance qu'elle accorde aux plantes dans sa démarche guérison. L'environnement et l'espace physique de plantes recéleraient alors un alliage de connaissances et de valeurs traditionnelles que le patient et le guérisseur renforcent par une mixture et une collaboration complice qui implique le supranaturel. La dimension écologique de l'itinéraire thérapeutique traditionnelle dépasse de loin la logique écologique de la médecine moderne où la mesure fait force de loi. Dans un tel contexte, le calibrage des dosages se fonde inexorablement sur l'expérience du guérisseur et les souvenirs d'« …un songe que lui aurait révélé les ancêtres… » (répondant de l'étude). La logique écologique entretient de ce fait, une redéfinition du concept de guérison et une réappropriation de l'itinéraire thérapeutique, du rapport de confiance entre l'Homme et la Nature. Ainsi, dans un contexte de crise post-électoraliste où les structures sanitaires occidentales ont été complètement paralysées en Côte d'Ivoire, la logique écologique refait surface en insistant sur la capacité des plantes à la guérison et surtout sur leurs capacités de prévention. Les plantes qui sont utilisées sont dans la plupart de ces protocoles médicales traditionnelles sont tenues secrets par la praticienne, et très peu d'informations sur le protocole de soin est manuscrit. Alors il y'a très peu de preuves évidentes qui peuvent faire l'examen approfondi dans une démarche scientifique minutieuse. Ainsi l'herboriste ou la guérisseuse combine le rôle de pharmacien, de docteur en médecine avec des croyances culturelle/spirituelle/religieuse particulières à sa région d'exercice (Rastogi & Dhawan, 1982). Mais des trois formes de pratiques (préventive, curative et chirurgicale) initiées par le guérisseur, thérapeute ou tradipraticien, celle de la prévention retient particulièrement notre attention dans cette production. Selon Kassaye et Al. (2006), cette prévention peut prendre la forme d'isolation avec les maladies contagieuses, d'interdiction ou de contrôles de mouvements. Mais cette prévention dans le cadre d'une planification familiale serait en outre justifiée par une logique économique.

Logique économique

La décision de pratiquer ou non la médecine traditionnelle est davantage motivée par des préoccupations économiques, que par l'attirance d'une efficience inouïe de cette médecine sur la santé humaine. En effet, la rationalité économique défendue par Adams Smith indique que le patient effectue un arbitrage entre le coût de santé et l'opportunité de santé. Ainsi, il serait guidé par des déterminants assez objectifs tels que le prix des soins, sa capacité financière ou budget alloué à sa santé, sa connaissance d'une médecine alternative à la médecine occidentale et surtout au contexte sociale

dans lequel il baigne. La logique économique dans la médecine traditionnelle aurait alors deux dimensions ; une du côté du patient et l'autre du côté du thérapeute. Aussi, celle du côté du patient revêt une approche inhérente à la recherche d'une solution à ses problèmes de santé, tandis que celle du thérapeute conquiert une approche économique non exprimée. Dans tous les cas, ces différentes approches reviennent dans une analyse d'anthropologie économique. L'anthropologie économique a pour objet l'analyse théorique comparée des différents systèmes économiques réels et possibles. Ainsi, pour élaborer ces théories, elle tire sa matière des informations concrètes fournies par l'historien et l'ethnologue sur le fonctionnement et l'évolution des sociétés qu'ils étudient (Godelier, 1965). Ainsi l'économique du thérapeute obéit à un système culturel, social et politique. Cette dynamique interne complexe justifie le rapport à l'économie de la médecine traditionnelle. Cependant, même si cette économique a un fondement transactionnel entre la patiente et la thérapeute traditionnelle, il ressort également que cet échange est pécuniaire et ritualiste. Ainsi dans l'étude menée et qui supporte cette production scientifique, plusieurs cas d'échanges entre l'acteur-patiente et la thérapeute ont été identifiés:

Cas 1 : la thérapeute-tradipraticienne démarre sa consultation du patient par une séance de prière ; cette prière en langue locale « agni » ou « n'zima » demande à 'Dieu, le tout puissant' de prendre possession du malade et d'agir sur ses organes génitaux afin d'interrompre toute forme de grossesse. Ces prières sont suivies de mixture de plantes que le guérisseur ou la thérapeute frotte sur le bas du ventre de la patiente. Ainsi, cette thérapeute lui donne trois décoctions bouillies et embouteillées, qu'elle demande à la patiente de boire et de se laver les organes génitales après tout rapport sexuel, protégé ou non. La transaction économique qui suit les soins est la remise par la patiente de 2000F CFA, à laquelle s'ajoute une pièce symbolique de 10F et un savon de Marseille 'BF' à la thérapeute.

Cas 2 : le thérapeute commence par une consultation en questionnant la patiente du mal dont elle souffre, cette dernière lui fait connaitre son besoin d'arrêter sa grossesse d'une semaine et lui demande de fournir une potion permettant de faire revenir ses menstrues. La thérapeute lui procure alors des plantes à purge et la transaction s'achève par la remise d'un montant inférieur à 1500 FCFA de la part de la patiente.

 Cas 3 : la thérapeute démarre sa consultation sans poser de question à la patiente. Cette dernière entre dans l'entrée-couchée de la thérapeute ; sans poser de questions à la patiente, la thérapeute brule de l'encens et invoque l'esprit des ancêtres. Ce rituel se précise par des chants en langue 'Agni' et se conjugue avec des transes spontanées. La thérapeute alors indique le mal dont souffre la patiente et lui de demande confirmer cette consultation. Si ce n'est pas le cas, la thérapeute reprend alors le rituel jusqu'à ce que la patiente confirme les propos de la thérapeute. Si cela est effectué, la thérapeute embaume la patiente d'une pommade faite à bases de racines écrasées avant de lui remettre une décoction de feuilles et de racines de plantes que la patiente boira à la maison et des perles

qu'elle portera autour du bassin. A sa suite, la thérapeute-tradipraticienne demande à la patiente de revenir dans une semaine avec un poulet de couleur unique (soit noir ou blanc), trois colas, un pagne que la patiente aura déjà porté et trois pièces de 500 FCFA. Le pagne remis une semaine plus tard sera par la suite embaumé par la thérapeute-tradipraticienne et remis à la patiente qui devra la porter en cas d'accouplement.

Les deux premiers cas observés durant l'étude indique qu'il existe un seul temps économique entre les deux acteurs en présence. Par contre, le dernier cas expose quant à lui deux temps économiques : le temps du crédit et celui du paiement. Ainsi, la thérapeute fournit gratuitement les soins de planification familiale à la patiente en attendant que cette dernière ait les moyens de subvenir à ses charges de soins. Cette dernière dimension est valorisée dans le discours des répondants de cette étude dans la mesure où la situation de crise politique a considérablement réduit de moitié la capacité financière de ces femmes déplacées et accrut leur vulnérabilité à la pauvreté. Les situations de crédit de soins de santé qu'offre la médecine traditionnelle, donnent ainsi une alternative majeure de santé face à la médecine moderne où des transactions au comptant, d'appartenance à une couverture sociale, plus contraignante sont renforcées. Ainsi, la logique économique dominée par un souci de consommation à terme de santé contribue fortement à expliquer l'adoption de la médecine traditionnelle en contexte de crise, des femmes déplacées internes.

Education à l'environnement et trajectoire d'adoption de la médecine traditionnelle en contexte de crise par les femmes déplacées

L'appropriation d'un ensemble de mécanismes liés à la médecine traditionnelle par les acteurs en présence (l'acteur-patiente déplacée de guerre et la thérapeute-tradipraticienne) implique que ceux-ci aient auparavant une prénotion de la biodiversité et de ses implications sanitaires ; cette préoccupation nous amène à interroger leur niveau d'éducation à l'environnement et ses implications sur la santé que ces acteurs ont reçues. Ainsi, revient-il de questionner le concept d'éducation à l'environnement.

Education à l'environnement

Investiguer le concept d'éducation à l'environnement, revient à clarifier ses origines théoriques. En effet, l'on ne peut parler d'éducation à l'environnement sans le situer par rapport à l'éducation relative à l'environnement. Deux concepts clés que les praticiens du développement à tort ou à raison confondent. L'éducation relative à l'environnement a trois dimensions : l'éducation à l'environnement, l'éducation par l'environnement et l'éducation pour l'environnement. L'éducation relative à l'environnement est lui-même définit selon l'Unesco (UNESCO/PNUE, 1978) comme : « … un processus permanent dans lequel les individus et la collectivité prennent conscience de leur environnement et acquièrent les connaissances, les valeurs, les compétences, l'expérience et aussi la

volonté qui leur permettront d'agir, individuellement et collectivement, pour résoudre les problèmes actuels et futurs de l'environnement». Aussi, plusieurs auteurs ont-ils collaboré à reformuler cette définition au fil des années. C'est en cela, que nous trouvons que la définition fournie par Sauvé (1997) contribue pleinement à éclairer cet article : « …L'éducation relative à l'environnement (ERE) est une dimension intégrante du développement des personnes et des groupes sociaux, qui concerne leur relation à l'environnement. Au-delà de la simple transmission de connaissances, elle privilégie la construction de savoirs collectifs dans une perspective critique. Elle vise à développer des savoir-faire utiles associés à des pouvoir-faire réels. Elle fait appel au développement d'une éthique environnementale et à l'adoption d'attitudes, de valeurs et de conduites imprégnées de cette éthique. Elle privilégie l'apprentissage coopératif dans, par et pour l'action environnementale. (p. 53) ». De cette définition, la dimension transmission/formation retient une place de choix. En effet, les connaissances sur l'environnement en Afrique ont constamment été construites sur la promotion des valeurs environnementales et ses conséquences sanitaires sur l'homme en sont dans la plupart des cas transmises de génération en génération, de mères en filles, de pères à fils ou d'un oncle à un neveu. Ainsi, les questions de santé écologiques ou environnementales sont les thématiques valorisées dans la promotion de l'ERE. Aussi, si l'on adopte une médecine traditionnelle ou la moitié du protocole de guérison est fondé sur les plantes. Cela suppose fortement une acquisition de connaissances sur l'environnement (éducation à l'environnement) et de la biodiversité dont l'ancrage seul pourrait permettre la restitution à des fins de santé. L'éducation à l'environnement a donc trait à la transmission de connaissances sur l'environnement et sur les valeurs de celles-ci d'un maître à un élève. Dans notre cas de figure, les thérapeutes indiquent plusieurs sources de formation : 87% d'entre-elles disent détenir leurs compétences par des formations de vie, en étant assistante d'une tante, d'un oncle, ou d'une mère, elle-même tradi-praticienne. Le reste dit détenir sa compétence à partir de pratiques mystiques ou spirituelles, et également des songes. Cette éducation à l'environnement s'accompagne de visites en forêt d'où elles (tradipraticienne) font l'extraction des plantes servant à leur protocole de santé. Arrivé à ce stade, nous parlons d'éducation par l'environnement ; aussi l'immersion en forêt constitue t-il un lieu de prédilection permettant un formatage de l'ancrage des pratiques de médecine traditionnelle chez la thérapeute-tradipraticienne. Dans un dernier temps, lorsqu'il pratique la médecine traditionnelle, l'éducation pour l'environnement fait son apparition car met en œuvre ce qu'il a apprit de l'environnement et de ses implications sur la santé humaine. L'Education pour l'environnement est donc le stade ultime dans l'accomplissement de la médecine traditionnelle. Il permet au thérapeute et à l'acteur-patient de s'approprier le processus de la médecine traditionnelle. En somme, il ne peut avoir de médecine traditionnelle fondamentale sans une bonne dose préalable d'éducation à l'environnement au niveau des acteurs de cette médecine.

Education à l'environnement et trajectoires médicinales des femmes déplacées internes

Le fait que l'un ou l'autre de ses deux acteurs pratiquent la médecine traditionnelle obéit à une trajectoire médicinale. Mais cette trajectoire repose fondamentalement sur les structures de l'éducation relative à l'environnement que sont l'éducation à l'environnement, l'éducation par l'environnement et l'éducation pour l'environnement. Ainsi, dans un premier niveau, il revient nécessaire dans cette trajectoire pour les deux acteurs complémentaires de la médecine traditionnelle de maitriser les connaissances sur l'environnement et plus précisément sur la botanique. Cela suppose alors une transformation de leur représentation de l'environnement et de sa biodiversité. A partir des travaux de Sauvé et Machabée (2000), reprenant ceux de Abric (1994) et Flament (1994),

> « …la représentation sociale selon les courants structuralistes, comportent un noyau central composé d'éléments qui sont tributaires de la trame culturelle du groupe social qui la génère. Elle comporte également des éléments périphériques qui résultent de l'expérience cumulative personnelle (idiosyncratique) du sujet à l'égard du sujet appréhendé ; ces éléments s'organisent en schèmes plus ou moins structurés et cohérents, qui constituent en quelques sortes des bribes explicatives de l'objet en question. C'est le noyau central, plus stable, qui détermine la signification fondamentale et l'organisation de la représentation. Quant aux éléments périphériques, ils absorbent et interprètent la nouveauté provenant de l'extérieur : les schèmes se réorganisent de façon à permettre une adaptation de la représentation aux nouvelles informations ou encore les schèmes se modifient, entrainant progressivement une remise en cause des éléments du noyau central, jusqu'à une transformation de ce dernier. » (2000, p. 184)

Ainsi, adopter la médecine traditionnelle comme schéma médicale conduit à modifier les connaissances de la médecine moderne chez l'acteur-patient et à renforcer sa représentation de l'environnement. Aussi, cette définition de Sauvé et Machabée (2000), contribue t'elle à inscrire le comportement des patients au regard de la médecine traditionnelle dans une dynamique sociale que la crise postélectorale a renforcé. La médecine traditionnelle apparait alors comme la finalité d'une éducation environnementale que les patientes déplacées de guerre ont reçue dans leur quotidien, juste avant que n'apparaisse cette crise postélectorale. Ainsi les résultats de cette étude indiquent que bien des participants pratiquaient la médecine traditionnelle bien avant la crise. Aussi parmi ces femmes déplacées, 37% de nationalités étrangères avouent pratiquer la contraception traditionnelle depuis plus de 5 ans et 83% des ivoiriennes avouent avoir migré vers cette méthode du fait de la crise postélectorale. On comprend bien que l'ancrage de la pratique de la médecine traditionnelle dans les habitudes des déplacés se situent davantage dans leur connaissance de l'environnement naturel sur la santé que sur des pratiques par mimétisme ; même si dans le contexte de crise, cette dernière avait une place de choix selon les discours des répondants. Finalement, il ressort que le niveau de confiance en cette médecine s'est accru durant cette période, les effets indésirables sur la santé qui sont apparus tels que la diarrhée, les vomissements et les

menstrues irrégulières n'ont aucunement résigné les candidates à cette forme de santé. Puisque 53% des femmes interrogés indiquent vouloir continuer à pratiquer cette forme de médecine. Ainsi, le fait de pratiquer la médecine moderne et d'alterner pour une médecine traditionnelle préventive est selon les répondants, nouvelles dans leur pratique. En effet, la plupart des femmes qui utilisaient la médecine traditionnelle bien avant la crise, avait opté pour une médecine traditionnelle d'urgence puisque la plupart des cas de planification familiale qui était décelé, était celle de l'interruption de grossesse. Ces interruptions de grossesse étaient faites suite à la purge de mixtures de plantes qui favorisait quelques jours plus tard, la venue des menstrues. Certaines femmes (83%) disent même en abuser puisque les conséquences néfastes sur la santé reproductive ne s'étaient jamais présentées. Aussi, accordent-elles une importance toute particulière à cette pratique médicale qu'est la purge de mixtures de plantes et d'écorces d'arbres, puisque selon elles, ces pratiques médicales ancestrales étaient très '…à la mode chez nos mamans…' dans les temps anciens et ne souffraient aucunement '… de problèmes de fibromes, comme on le constate de nos jours avec la médecine moderne…'. '…la médecine traditionnelle est un don de Dieu…' serait alors le fondement spirituel de l'ancrage de cette pratique médicale chez ces femmes déplacées de guerre ; pour qui cette période de crise postélectorale qui a vu des familles disloquées et dont '…Dieu seul est notre réconfort…' reste le slogan dans une quête de stabilité psychologique. Ainsi, le fait que ces femmes déplacées et vulnérables de la crise post-électorale adoptent la médecine traditionnelle provient non seulement de l'éducation à l'environnement qu'elles ont eu dans le passé, mais également à cause de la dimension spirituelle qu'elle accorde à cette médecine. En effet, en énonçant que '…la nature est un don de Dieu et toute médecine qui provient de la Nature est bénie par Dieu…' ces femmes accordent une foi inébranlable à la guérison ou à la prévention que pourrait procurer cette médecine. Ainsi la représentation sociale de cette médecine traditionnelle qui est non seulement socio-construite au fil de leurs expériences, est solidement ancrée dans le noyau central de cette représentation sur la médecine 'bénie par les ancêtres' et voulues par 'Dieu'. Ainsi, toute forme de pratiques médicinales traditionnelles allant dans le sens de son appropriation permet une protection des Dieux.

Démarche de la planification familiale et Médecine traditionnelle : enjeux d'un objet de recherche pour l'Education Relative à l'Environnement

Pour achever cette discussion, il revient de s'interroger sur l'opportunité pour l'éducation relative à l'environnement de mener des recherches sur la médecine traditionnelle africaine et ses implications dans la planification familiale. En effet, la recherche en Education relative à l'environnement, en a proposé bien des problématiques. Ainsi, Janse van Rensburg (1994) (1995), à la suite d'une analyse des paradigmes en Education relative à l'environnement, qu'elle préfère qualifier d'orientations, distingue quatre orientations de recherche en Education relative à l'environnement : une première orientation, celle de la gestion, qu'elle associe au

paradigme positiviste-béhavioriste; une deuxième orientation, celle de la résolution de problèmes, qui correspond au paradigme interprétatif-humaniste; une troisième orientation, dite critique, qui correspond au paradigme sociocritique; et une quatrième orientation, émergente, celle de la réflexivité. Elle est d'ailleurs d'avis que les trois premières orientations sont marquées, bien que de manière différente, par des a priori modernistes qui limitent leur capacité à contribuer au changement social : la première, par sa vision instrumentale de l'Education relative à l'environnement limitée au changement de comportement des individus par l'intervention d'experts, la deuxième, par sa croyance démesurée dans le pouvoir de la sagesse pratique, et la troisième, par sa croyance dans un éclairage rationnel qui découlerait de la participation démocratique à la recherche. La réflexivité représenterait donc une nouvelle orientation, susceptible de renouveler les fondements de l'Education relative à l'environnement (Berthelot, 2007, p. 28). L'école Européenne de l'éducation environnementale contrairement à l'école Nord -américaine, soutient que les courants principaux au lieu d'être présenté sous le format de Robotton et Hart (1993) méritent qu'on les situe en prenant en compte leurs implications dans l'actualité socio-économique. Cette conception présente la dynamique de l'éducation relative à l'environnement. C'est pourquoi la question de la médecine traditionnelle et de ses implications sur la planification familiale reste un enjeu de taille pour la recherche en Education relative à l'environnement. Elle s'intègre ainsi dans la dernière orientation de recherche proposée par Berthelot (2007), puisqu'elle questionne la réflexivité de l'objet 'médecine traditionnelle' sur le développement du capital humain de l'Africain en contexte de crise. Aussi la contraception, qui est l'ensemble des méthodes visant à éviter de façon réversible et temporaire la grossesse, trouve tout son sens dans ce questionnement puisqu'à travers elle, un concept urgent apparait : la contraception verte. La contraception verte oblige la connaissance de l'environnement, des plantes et des vertus qu'elles procurent dans le cadre de l'espacement des naissances, et à ce titre milite en faveur de la systématisation de la recherche. Ainsi, cette nouvelle vision a deux dimensions : une dimension éducative et une autre environnementaliste ; du point de vue éducatif, cette vision doit intégrer les 3 perspectives (à, dans, pour), le triple point de vue (Mayer, 1997) où l'on donne la même importance aux connaissances (à l'environnement), aux valeurs (dans l'environnement) et aux comportements (pour …). Du point de vue environnemental, la vision doit intégrer les préoccupations pour la perte d'éléments naturels et leur détérioration, la conscience de l'épuisement des ressources. C'est ce qui nous amène à parler de durabilité et de viabilité. En effet, les plantes servant aux soins, ne sont pas inépuisables. Dans ce sens, l'éducation relative à l'environnement jouerait alors un rôle majeur tant scientifique que social dans leur conservation et leur pérennisation.

Conclusion

Dans cet article, il s'est agi de comprendre les déterminants et les logiques qui fondent l'appropriation de la méthode contraceptive issue de la médecine traditionnelle, basée sur les connaissances de l'environnement, des plantes, par les femmes déplacées interne du fait de la guerre vers la région d'Aboisso, proche de la frontière du Ghana, en Côte d'Ivoire. Aussi, revenait-il d'analyser l'implication de l'Education relative à l'environnement à l'adoption de la médecine traditionnelle préventive dans la résolution des préoccupations de planification familiale durant la crise postélectorale de 2010. A l'analyse, l'adoption de l'itinéraire thérapeutique issue de la médecine traditionnelle, par les femmes déplacées internes est soutenue par plusieurs logiques (Santé, écologique et économique). Mais une dimension reste centrale à chacune d'entre elles, celle de l'ancrage d'une éducation à l'environnement préalablement acquise au fil des années. L'éducation relative à l'environnement est donc au terme de cette production, le fondement de la médecine traditionnelle africaine, car socle d'une maitrise par les acteurs en présence (le patient et le thérapeute) du rapport Homme-Nature et de ses implications sur la santé humaine. Mais cette confiance en la médecine traditionnelle durant la crise postélectorale est également due à la dimension spirituelle que cette médecine s'y prête dans son protocole ; ainsi, en s'y référant, les patientes y ont trouvés un refuge psychologique puisque selon elles, leurs représentations, c'est une médecine de 'Dieu le tout-puissant'. Ainsi, par cette production scientifique, l'Education relative à l'environnement argumente l'orientation 'réflexivité' longtemps recherchée par ses auteurs en exposant finalement le concept de 'contraception verte' qui selon elle, résume au mieux la réflexion sur le lien entre planification familiale, médecine traditionnelle et Education relative à l'environnement.

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Nietzsche l'islam et la globalisation

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Résumé :

« le printemps arabe », ou les révolutions du siècle, se sont déclenchées avec une aspiration d'un monde sous développé a la liberté, la modernité et la démocratie. Les faits nous mènent vers un total détournement des buts de ce « printemps arabe ». Obscurantisme, islamisme, jihad, théocratie s'installent. Le siècle exprime en fait un nouveau concept de révolutions postmodernes ou la société se trouve en intersection entre philosophie, politique et religion. Les trois pivots de tous les faits sociaux.

Mots clés: révolution, Islam, globalisation, démocratie, jihad, volonté de puissance. Modernité, postmodernité

Abstract:

"Arab Spring", or the revolutions of the century broke out with a suction underdeveloped world has freedom, modernity and democracy. The facts lead us to a total diversion goals of the "Arab Spring." : Obscurantism, Islam, jihad, theocracy dominate . The century in fact expresses a new concept of postmodern revolutions or the society is in intersection between philosophy, politics and religion. The three pillars of all social facts.

Keywords: revolution, Islam, globalisation, democracy, jihad, will for power. Modernity, post-modernity

Introduction

« Danger effroyable ; que la politique d'affaires américaine et la civilisation inconsistante des intellectuels Viennent à s'unir »[1]

Lorsque des émeutes se sont déclenchées dans le monde arabo-musulman en prenant forme de révolutions, tous les observateurs se sont attendus à des révolutions « modernistes », certains ont même cru férocement à une révolution qui pourrait restructurer la vie vers un progrès libérateur. Le seul prototype de la révolution étant la modernité et les lumières. Avec le temps et le déroulement des évènements, la révolution prenait contrairement à ce qu'on attendait d'elle une forme plutôt contre le progrès et les lumières, en faveur d'un

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1   *F.Nietzsche, Volonté de puissance, seule édition complète de France, traduction G.Bianquis P86§251*

obscurantisme théocratique des plus redoutables sous une connotation de renaissance.Le caractère religieux et spécialement islamiste qui commandait, dominait et dirigeait ces émeutes ne pouvait qu'éveiller les soupçons politiques et philosophiques. Ces« émeutes de misère » en réalité et islamistes par détournement n'étaient de fait, ni spontanées ni réformistes.Additionnées à une montée du terrorisme islamiste soit en Europe soit en Amérique et une   multiplication spectaculaire des communautés musulmanes dans le monde, investis et nourris par un laxisme et une impunité du pouvoir politique des grandes puissances, la montée de l'islamisme ne peut que susciter la méfiance et le faux semblant.

Est-ce la révolution qui a été trahit par une contre-révolution ou alors nous assistons à la formation d'un nouveau concept de la révolution qui serait plutôtpostmoderne, une révolution contre la modernité sous la forme d'une renaissance des origines primitives de l'homme. ?

Sommes nous en train de cultiver les conséquences et les enjeux de la déconstruction postmoderniste ? Le nouvel ordre mondial n'est–il pas l'enjeu politique fondamental de la déconstruction philosophique postmoderne inaugurée par Nietzsche?Quel rôle joue la combinaison de l'Islam et le nouvel ordre mondial? N'est-elle pas la même combinaison de la foi, la renaissance et la volonté de puissancetelle énoncée dans la philosophieNietzschéenne?

La révolution du 18ème siècle était la révolution de la raison sur l'instinct, une révolution ou la raison organisatrice prenait larelève. Tout se rationnalise, la philosophie, l'art, la politique, la science. La raison fut posée et décrétéemaitre absolu, l'homme moderne s'y soumet comme à une lumière sacrée, le siècle des lumières en dira long en ce qu'il fut le siècle de la sortie de l'obscurantisme et de l'ignorance pour inaugurer un nouvel âge éclairé par la raison, la science et l'humanisme, la raison, la lumière et le progrès furent les valeurs guides et gestionnaires.Montesquieu,Voltaire,Diderot,Rousseau ou encore Beaumarchais en furent l'expressionFrançaise. Plusieurs monarques d'Europe comme Frédéric II de Prusse ou Catherine II de Russie entament d'ailleurs des politiques réformatrices et très modernes pour l'époque. Ces monarques seront appelés «Despotes éclairés». Lesmomentscruciaux seront les révolutions, américaine de 1776 et française de 1789 qui marqueront l'émergence des démocraties populaires.Cette lumière de la raison marque une vision renouvelée et élargie du monde du dernier quart du 17eme siècle. Cette vision moderne s'affirme à partir de caractéristiques fondamentales.

1- la primauté de l'esprit scientifique sur la providence divine.

2-la réflexion politique contractuelle enfantant la démocratie, la liberté et la légitimité.

3-les progrès de l'esprit critique prônant la raison comme maitre et législateur.

4-Desacralisation des monarchies.

5-L'affirmation des idées de tolérance entre religions.

6-Le déisme.

7-L'idée de progrès contre la tradition et la répétition.

8-Séparation entre le politique et le religieux.

Cependant, on assiste a une transmutation postmoderne qui fait que les révolutions

du 21ème siècle émanent comme un total retournement de l'instinct sur la raison. Avec la déconstruction philosophique et les faillites politiques, la raison dévoile son impuissance et sa fragilité. L'instinct, la nature et la sensibilité reviennent   en force comme repèresabsolus et l'action dévoile sa supériorité par rapport à la réflexion .Les connaissances ne sont plus valides que par leur dimension pragmatiques. L'art et la philosophie du corps dominent, les démocraties font faillites sans pouvoir se rectifier.

Les révolutions postmodernistes se sont affirmés par :

1-Le retour à la foi et au spirituel au détriment de la rationalité.

2-la politique de domination de l'hégémonie financière et bancaire.

3-le procès de la raison.

4-La faillite des systèmes socialistes et démocrates.

5-l'eveil du conflit religieux.

6-la nécessitée du retour aux origines et àl'attachement aux traditions.

7-l'infusion et l'ingérence entre le politique et le religieux avec une montée islamiste spectaculaire.

8-l'émergence d'élites puissantes et mondiales imposant la politique de la hiérarchie des supérieurs.

De la révolution moderniste à la révolution post moderniste on est en droit de se poser les questions nécessaires.

Pourquoi les grandes puissances ont opté pour l'islamisme ? Est-ce   un choix strictementgéopolitique reflétant des intérêts et des rapports de forces ou de surcroît un choix politique véhiculant une perspective philosophique postmoderne.

Le retour   du siècle à l'ère primitif et la politique instinctive de la mort et de la domination tel que les grandes puissancesl'ont décrété et planifié en nourrissant une montée islamiste sans égale et sans précédent et en misant sur l'islam comme religion de domination et de conquête, n'est en fait qu'un effet tardif de la déconstruction philosophique postmoderne des aprioris des « lumières » et de la modernité .Le procès de la raison etses aléasidéologiques et politiques, ses limites, ses méfaits ont signé sa faillite et se sont prononcés sur son impuissance .On assiste bel et bien à une renaissance, une renaissancede l'instinctprimitif dionysiaque de la puissance chaotique et la hiérarchie naturelle, la politique de la mort et de l'historicité au détrimentde la politique de la raison et de l'éternité. Une renaissance des origines primitives de l'instinct de puissance animal en substitution à l'instinct de conservation et de l'adaptation rationnelle. Le passage de l'homme de la sphère primitive et animale à la sphère de la culture, longtemps pensé comme un point de non-retour, est en fait en train d'être déconstruit. En effet, la caractéristique du siècle,est une montée islamiste dans tout le globe. Une

montée   spectaculairejusqu'au soupçon. L'islam comme religion de domination et de conquête prend la relève au christianisme comme religion d'amour, et de tolérance. L'islam apparaît comme une transmutation dionysiaque de l'être. Une transmutation déjà souhaitée et prônée par Nietzsche dans ses coups de marteaux à la décadence chrétienne,de part son absence de valeurs de santé,de force et de puissance. L'occident est diagnostiqué par Nietzsche de malade. Sa maladie réside dans son aspect grégaire et ses valeurs universelles et non identitaires, l'humaniténʾest qu'une chimère produite par la culture et la modernité. L'homme nʾest qu'un vivantdéterminé par ses conditions et ses possibilités biologiques, géographiques etgénéalogiques, le conflit est un fait naturel.

Selon Nietzsche,La vie impose des êtres organiques, dont la différence de qualité et de puissance est la première caractéristique. l'humanisme   revendiquantl' universalité et l'égalité se construit en réalité contre la vie et la nature organique des phénomènes .Ces affirmations solennelles de Nietzsche trouvent leur échos dans le plan de la globalisationet le nouvel ordre mondial qui est en train dese reconstruire l'être du monde via l'islam comme étant une religion de guerre et de contrôle absolu des populations .La raison se déconstruit au profit de la foi et de l'instinct de conquête et de puissance, l'islam étant le meilleur représentant du mélange dionysiaque du vivant humanisé.

Le choix du siècle est en fait un choix philosophique de la postmodernité dans ses racines et généalogiques dans   ses   tendances et sa portée. C'est le siècle post moderniste par excellence. La post modernité avec ses déconstructions fondamentales à savoir la déconstruction de la raison, de la liberté, de l'égalité et enfin de la démocratie. La post modernité prône essentiellement ce retour au fondamental, aux origines, et à l'ère primitif de l'homme vrai qui a étésouillé par la culture et la civilisation. Ce fut la prophétie de Nietzsche.

Si les grandes puissances optent pour l'islamisme comme allié et comme technique de commandement de la masse et même comme un choix de futur, c'est qu'un projet contre la modernité est en train de se tisser et à long terme. La globalisation comme une volonté de puissance et d'hégémonie mondiale reconnaît dans l'islam la matière première   et le pragmatisme le plus efficace pour   la domination de la « plèbe » et des « inferieurs »,autrement de la multitude. Commander, nʾest –il pas autre chose qu'unifier la masse autour   du « même »,de « l'identique », et de l '« unique », par la force du domptage des instincts faibles, dieu et la foi semblent être les meilleurs unificateurs des pulsions et ramificateurs de la volonté .La compatibilité du projet de puissance de la globalisation avec les préceptes islamiques est sans détour. Les grandes puissances financières veulent avoir main mise sur le monde, ce nʾest certainement pas par la raison, la liberté et la démocratie qu'ils y   arriveront,mais par l'islam comme idéologie de conquête et d'asservissement de la multitude. Autrement par une dictature qui déguise l'auto cruauté en vertu en créant des peuples de « self-dictators » via une foi d'obéissanceabsolue. L'islam comme religion assure la puissance des puissants et l'obéissance des moins puissant. Ce que Nietzsche appelle la hiérarchie naturelle de tout

vivant et du cosmos en tant qu'organisme.

Nietzsche en rêvait déjà, il citait cette nostalgie de la renaissance de cette force et cette puissance primitive de l'homme barbare et conquérant de l'islam. Il existe une complicité inhérente entre la pensée Nietzschéenne, d'une part, le projet de puissance de la globalisation et l'islam comme religion de pouvoir et de domination. Cette complicité fera régner ce que le plan des grandes puissances financières ont appelles la **renaissance** signifiant l'éveil dionysiaque de la barbarie comme instinct primitif et noble et la hiérarchie naturelle de la distinction biologique entre les faibles et les forts, du supérieur et de l'inferieur dépassant ainsi les valeurs de la modernité de l'égalité, de la paix et la coexistence.La critique Nietzschéenne est virulente contre la modernité qui a effacé ces qualités naturelles par les valeurs décadentes et dégénères de la liberté et la démocratie. Cette modernité est une maladie selon Nietzsche car elle supprime la hiérarchie naturelle et opte pour l'absence totale de toute hiérarchie,et supprime de ce fait l'instinct le plus vital à la vie et à la santéàsavoir, l'instinct de puissance et de domination. L'annulation et la castration de cette pulsion primordiale de la puissance et de la supériorité chez l'homme ne peuvent mener qu'à la dégénérescence totale et l'altération de l'espèceselon Nietzsche,La maladie n'étant pas autre chose pour lui que faiblesse et absence de contrôle et de puissance physiologique. La renaissance et l'éveilde l'instinct de puissance primitif et barbare seront le grand destin de l'homme car c'est la que résidera la « grande santé » et la « grande politique ».

« Le christianisme nous a frustrés de l'héritage du génie antique, il nous a frustrés plus tard de l'héritage de l'islam .La merveilleuse civilisation maure de l'Espagne, plus voisine en somme de nos sens et de nos gouts que Rome et la Grèce, cette civilisation fut foulée aux pieds, pourquoi ? Puisqu'elle devait son origine à des instincts nobles,à des instincts virils, puisqu'elle disait oui à la vie. »[2]

Ainsi dit et contrairement aux préjugésintellectuelles, on peut avancer le fait que l'islam   est profondément Nietzschéen et que Nietzsche est plus compatible avec l'islam qu'avec aucune autre religion ou aucune autre philosophie.Le mariage de la déconstructionNietzschéenne avec l'islam ne peut qu'enfanter la globalisation.La haine et le mépris de Nietzsche pour l'Europe et les européens, sa vénération et sa nostalgie pour les anciennes cultures « nobles » de l'antiquité, son sarcasme et son dédain des valeurs chrétiennes et de l'humanisme naïf et décadent, son regard sceptique et soupçonneux des fins et des buts des philosophes et de la connaissance en général, n'est que le champ des jeux et des enjeux de ce qu'on est en train d'appeler en ce siècle de « révolution pour la renaissance » actualisée comme une volonté d'islamisation du monde sous le couvert de « l'humanisme » la « démocratie » et la « liberté », quoi de plus fort que de déconstruire des valeurs faibles en jouant de leur faiblesse .Nietzsche voue une vénération spéciale à la culture orientale et aux races primitives et nobles, comme il les appellent, y compris les « arabes », qu'il considère bien supérieurs aux européens .L'arabo-musulman est une

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2   *Nietzsche,   uvres, Laffont, l antéchrist, $1, p.1041.*

figure parmi d'autres figures d'une possibilité de l'éveil de la grande santé et la grande politique de l'instinct de puissance et le salut du monde de la maladie et la décadence qui lui a été imposée par la modernité et spécialement le christianisme.

« au fond de toutes ces races aristocratiques, il est impossible de ne pas reconnaître le fauve, la superbe brute blonde rodant en quête de proie et de victoire, ce fond de bestialité cachée a besoin de temps en temps d'un exutoire, il faut que la brute se montre de nouveau qu'elle retourne a sa contrée sauvage, aristocratie romaine, arabe, germanique ou japonaise, héros homériques, vikings scandinaves, tous se valent pour ce qui est de ce besoin .Ce sont les races nobles qui ont laisse l'idée de « barbare »sur toutes les traces de leur passages …cette audace des races nobles, folle, absurde, spontanée, la nature mémé de leur entreprise imprévisibles et invraisemblables … leur indifférence et leur mépris pour la sécurité, le corps, la vie, le bien être, la gaieté terrible et la joie profonde qu'ils goutent a toute destruction, a toute les voluptés de la victoire et de la cruauté. »[3]

La postmodernité inaugurée par Nietzsche a alimenté le projet de puissance de la globalisation qui trouve dans l'islam son idéologie parfaite. La domination financière et économique est tributaire de la domination politique, la politique de l'esclavage et l'asservissement de la   « faiblesse » dans toutes formes, ce qui ne peut s'accomplir à merveille qu'à travers l'islam comme un ensemble de préceptes de foi qui structurent l'âme et le corps par la peur et l'activisme fanatiques. L'islam est l'idéologie parfaite pour le pouvoir et la domination. De ce fait on assiste à l'éveil d'un débatintenable et sansprécédent dans une perspective moderniste, à savoir le débat à propos de la « chariaa ». Tout penseur, tout chercheur et surtout les investigations Américaines savent que trop bien le caractère primitif et sauvage de la « chariaa », ceci n'empêchera pas la création de chercheurs, de centre de recherche propagandistes de l'islamisme financés par les grandes puissances. Une puissance n'agit jamais sans but, sans plan, et sans intérêt. L'éveil du débat global et international sur la « chariaa » n'est pas innocent, c'est plutôt la clé et le point d'orgue de la déconstruction de la modernité et l'instauration d'un nouvel ordremondial, l'ordre de la renaissance de l'èreprimitif, de la barbarie et la hiérarchie naturelle,considérées comme faits et valeurs nobles,nécessaires et utiles.

L'homme moderne est pour Nietzsche comme pour l'islam une aberration et une décadence. Le siècle de la renaissance a besoin de race « noble », une race de conquérants et non une race de « savants ».

« Ce n'est ni de prophètes, ni de thaumaturges dont nous avons besoin, mais d'hommes supérieurs …qui suscitent notre sourire pour leur naïveté et leur profonde connaissance, des hommes tels Alexandre, Césars, Mahomet, Napoléon.»[4]

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3   *Nietzsche, œuvres, R.Laffont, généalogie de la morale, $11, p790.*
4   *A.Philonenko, Nietzsche, le rire et le tragique, p103.*

Rien de plus structurant à la vie et à la santé selon Nietzsche que le chaos, le danger, la guerre, et le conflit .Une culture noble et supérieur est une culture, de conquête, de foi, d'instinct, de barbarie et de sauvagerie, de héros et de conquérants, seules conditions pour stimuler la force vers la puissance pour la domination et le commandement et l'acceptation de la hiérarchie naturelle de la vié. La hiérarchie entre les faibles et les puissants, ceux qui commandent et ceux qui obéissent .Ce qui coïncide parfaitement avec les préceptes de l'islam que nous citerons plus loin.

Les intersections entre Nietzsche et l'islam
1-le jihad

A l'origine de l'aversion nietzschéenne pour la modernité, spécialement le christianisme qu'il caractérisedenihilisme, il y a cette substitution de la pensée logique et la contemplation àla vie active comme réelle affirmation de soi et surpassement du danger par la conquête. En fait l'homme moderne selon Nietzsche a perdu le sens de la vie le jour ou il a perdu le gout pour les conquêtes et les gloires. L'homme moderne s'est tellement sclérosé avec la raison et la logique jusqu'à perdre le vrai rapport à la vie et à son corps qui n'est qu'un rapport de volonté, de domination et de commandement instinctif et naturel. Le repèrefondamental pour Nietzsche est anthropologique et généalogique renvoyant aux sociétés primitives et à la santé originaire qui faisait que les ancêtres de l'homme jouissaient d'une santé naturelle de part la force de leur instinct. Les guerres, les conquêtes, l'extension du champ du pouvoir et l'accroissement des forces sont des données naturelles qui ont structuré toute culture noble et toute supériorité hiérarchique. Ainsi ce que Nietzsche appelle extension et conquête, le musulman l'appelle « jihad » et « ghazawette ». Tout comme chez Nietzsche, l'homme dans la religion musulmane ne vient pas au monde pour se conserver, mais pour croitre, se multiplier et mourir. La volonté de puissance est l'instinct le plus fondamental chez tout être organique et l'homme ne fait pas l'exception. Cet instinct peut être Dionysiaque ou Apollinien, autrement, il est conquête, déchainement, démesure, destruction, crimes et chaos ou alors, création de formes, de beauté, de schèmes, d'illusions et de mensonges.

La modernité a signé la mort de Dionysos et la victoire d'Apollon, ce qui a créé un homme hémiplégique, avec une hypertrophie de la conscience et des physiologies dégénérées et décadentes, impuissantes et incapables d'affirmation, de conquête, et de puissance de la vie réelle. L'homme moderne a perdu le gout de la puissance et l'esprit de conquête, il est tombé dans la décadence de l'inactif et la conservation par les sublimations compensatoires minées par la culpabilité et la frustration.Appolon a été séparé de Dionysos ce qui a crée le vivant moderne malade et la décadence de la culture. Pour Nietzsche la renaissance existe dans l'unité originaire entre la puissance et la forme, le chaos et l'organisation, la forme qui obéità l'instinct et l'instinct qui commande

la raison et non le contraire. La modernité est un renversement et une perversion des rapports de forces originaires .Dans le commandement de l'instinct de puissance se situe « la grande santé » et la « grande politique » selon Nietzsche, ce qui concorde avec la théorie du « jihad » et du « dieu » miséricordieux dans la religion musulmane. L'unité originaire en substitution àla culture et la modernité qui a signé la victoire d'Apollon et le flegmatisme du vivant transformé en « humanisme ».

«Nous sommes malades de cette modernité, malades de cette paix malsaine, de cette compromission, de toute cette vertueuse malpropreté …Cette tolérance et cette largeur du cœur qui « pardonne « tout, puisqu'elle comprend tout est pour nous quelque chose comme un sirocco. Plutôt vivre parmi les glaces qu'au milieu de vertus modernes et d'autres vents du sud»[5]

Le « jihad » est la forme la plus dionysiaque de la volonté de puissance et la psychologie de dépassement de soi par le dépassement du danger et la domination de soi et de l'autre. Ainsi dans « ainsi parlait Zarathoustra »,dans les paragraphes « de la guerre et des guerriers » et « de la victoire sur soi-même" On pourrait facilement déceler la filiation entre le « jihad » comme art et style de vie dans la religion musulmane et Dionysos guerrier comme physiologie de puissance et de domination chez Nietzsche. La guerre est le seul remède à toutes les décadences et une culture noble se reconnaît à sa prédisposition à la guerre, au combat et la lutte pour l'extension et le paroxysme de la puissance. La guerre et le combat ne sont pas seulement le seul art de vie pour la santé et la gloire, mais aussi le seul remède à ceux qui ont faiblis et dégénérés. Une vie biologique ou organique n'est possible sans la pulsion primordiale de grandir, de croitre et de devenir plus puissant et plus fort, cette pulsion, n'est jamais silencieuse, elle est continuellement active mais ne se manifeste que dans le conflit, le combat et surtout dans la résistance, tout vivant a besoin de résistance par rapport à une autre force pour grandir et devenir, à l'origine de toute maladie et décadence il y a justement l'absence de conflits et de combats qui permettent l'exercice de la force et la domination.

« La guerre comme remède : Au peuples qui deviennent faibles et misérables on pourrait conseiller la guerre comme remède ; a condition bien entendu qu'ils veuillent a toute force continuer a vivre ; car pour la consomption des peuples, il y a aussi un traitement de choc .Mais vouloir vivre éternellement sans pouvoir mourir, c'est déjà un symptôme de sénilité dans le sentiment .Plus on vit pleinement et vigoureusement, plus vite on est prêt a risquer sa vie pour un seul sentiment agréable. »[6]

Tout comme chez Nietzsche, le jihad est tridimensionnel, il signifie, la lutte, la résistance et l'endurance, il s'étend à la lutte contre soi même, contre ses propres faiblesses, la lutte contre l'autre pour vaincre, commander et dominer et la lutte contre la vie pour se surpasser, croitre et grandir. Il s'agit de se dominer, dominer l'autre et dominer la vie.

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5   *Nietzsche, œuvres, Laffont L'antechrist$1, p1041*
6   *Nietzsche, œuvres, Laffont, Humain trop humain II § 187 p.900*

« Ne sont pas égaux ceux des croyants qui restent chez eux sauf ceux qui ont quelques infirmité et ceux qui luttent corps et biens dans le sentier d'Allah donné a ceux qui luttent corps et biens un grade d'excellence sur ceux qui restent chez eux, et a chacun Allah a promis la meilleur récompense ; et Allah a mis les combattants au dessus des non combattants en leur accordant une rétribution immense »[7]

Il existe vingt six versets qui incitent les croyants à la lutte et au combat, autrement le « jihad » dans ses formes tridimensionnelles. L'œuvre de Nietzsche est marquée dans sa totalité par les termes de : force, domination, puissance, combat, lutte, et résistance, au point qu'on pourrait avancer sans exagérer que la philosophie de Nietzsche n'est autre qu'un éveil de la force et la lutte, meurtrie et castrée par la culture européenne et la religion chrétienne, autrement par la modernité .Vivre c'est se tyranniser soi même et les autres et la vie ne peut avoir d'autre valeur ni d'autre sens à part le combat et la résistance pour le plus de puissance. Il est évident que le terme de « jihad » dans la religion musulmane aussi bien que le terme résistance et lutte ne se concrétisent pas uniquement en guerre, mais dans toute création et toute construction, qu'elle soit Dionysiaque ou Apollinienne, autrement qu'elle se dévoile par le sang, la cruauté, le crime et la destruction ou par la création poétique, philosophique, scientifique et religieuse. Pour Nietzsche l'homme est géré par ses instincts Dionysiaques et Apolliniennes, qui ne sont que volonté de combat et de résistance pour la conquête et la gloire, dans tous les cas l'homme n'est qu'un conquérant, et selon la prédominance du type d'instinct qui le génère, il réalise ses gloires, ainsi il peut conquérir par la création Apollinienne de formes et de schèmes tel dans le domaine du savoir et de l'art ou alors conquérir par la destruction, le crime, la guerre et la barbarie, mais dans les deux cas l'homme ne fait que se battre et conquérir, ce qui vaut exactement le terme de « jihad » en islam. Ainsi on peut avancer que le « jihad » tel exprimé et explicité en islam se traduit dans la pensée Nietzschéennepar la volonté de puissance qui n'est autre que volonté de résistance et volonté du paroxysme de la santé. Que serait-ce le prêche de Zarathoustra sinon un prêche pour le combat et le dépassement des limites ou le surpassement de l'homme vers le surhomme,ce qui coïncide en fait àla quête de tout le mouvement islamiste et la stratégie des puissants de la globalisation.

« Le but n'est pas le bonheur, c'est la sensation de puissance. Ily a dans l'homme et dans l'humanité une force immense qui veut se dépenser,créer, c'est une chaine d'explosions continues qui n'ont nullement le bonheur pour but »[8]

Ainsi selon les intuitions Nietzschéennes, l'homme n'existe que par et pour sa volonté de puissance, ce qui anime et gère tout son agir, sa pensée, ses créations et ses constructions c'est la recherche de cette jouissance intérieure du sentiment de puissance, la jouissance d'avoir vaincu, et d'avoir surmonté, de s'êtreaffirmé, et d'avoir surpassé toutes les résistances, les obstacles et les souffrances. La volonté aime tellement vaincre

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7   *Sourate An-Nisâ 4, 95*
8   *Nietzsche, la volonté de puissance, t1, traduction de G.Bianquis, seule édition complete en France, p215, §48.*

et gagner qu'elle se crée parfois ses propres résistances. Le « jihad » n'est en fait que la traduction de ce sentiment primitif et physiologique chez tout être organique de lutte, de conquête et de victoire au sens Apollinien ou Dionysiaque. Jihad et volonté de puissance sont à la limite du synonyme.

« Partout ou j'ai trouvé quelque chose de vivant, j'ai trouvé de la volonté de puissance, et même dans la volonté de celui qui obéit, j'ai trouvé la volonté d'être maitre ….et la vie elle même m'a confié ce secret : vois m'a-t-elle dit, je suis toujours ce qui doit se surmonter soi mémé »[9]

Le Jihad, signifie en langue arabe: l'effort ou le fait "d'exercer une force". Dans le Coran, l'expression «ad-jihad bi anfousikoum», et «al-jihad fi sabil Allah» signifie combattre et lutter pour dieu, la foi s'exerce par "al-jihad", ce combat comme le stipule zarathoustra va du combat contre soi-même jusqu'au combat contre les autres et enfin le combat pour sa foi, en islam il vade l'élimination des infidèles, au combat contre soi-même pour pouvoir emprunter le chemin du salut. Dès lors il existe en fait deux types de "jihad", le jihad par l'épée et Le jihad par le cœur, le «Grand Jihad», invite les musulmans à combattre afin de s'améliorer ou d'améliorer la société, et l'extension de la "omma" qui légitime les guerres et les conquêtes. Fait est qu'entre la volonté de puissance chez Nietzsche et le "jihad" en islam nul nuance n'est possible. La volonté de puissance, intuition fondamentale chez Nietzsche qui loin de vouloir l'argumenter comme un concept, est plutôtdéveloppé comme illustration généalogique, génétique et physiologique inspirée de la psychologie primitive des ancêtres de l'antiquité, c'est dans ce sens qu'il approuve dans l'antéchristl'islam comme religion de domination et de puissance préférable au christianisme et la modernité qui ont pervertis la puissance en décadence etdégénérescence.

« Ô vous qui croyez ! Qu'avez-vous ? Lorsque l'on vous a dit : "élancez-vous dans le sentier d'Allah"; vous vous êtes appesantis sur la terre. La vie présente vous agrée-t-elle plus que l'au-delà ? – Or, la jouissance de la vie présente ne sera que peu de chose, comparée à l'au-delà ! »[10]

« Si vous ne vous lancez pas au combat, Il vous châtiera d'un châtiment douloureux et vous remplacera par un autre peuple. Vous ne Lui nuirez en rien. Et Allah est Omnipotent »[11]

« Légers ou lourds, lancez-vous au combat, et luttez avec vos biens et vos personnes dans le sentier d'Allah. Cela est meilleur pour vous, si vous saviez »[12]

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9   *F.Nietzsche, œuvres, Laffont, Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra, de la victoire sur soi même, p372.*

10   *Sourate Baqarah, verset 216*

11   *Sourate Tawba, verset 38, 39*

12   *Sourate Tawba, verset 41*

Zarathoustra est en parfaite harmonie avec Mahomet et les oligarques internationaux du club Bilderberg[13]vers la gloire du surhomme dans l'empire du nouvel ordre mondiale ou les supérieurs et les puissants s'imposent comme maitres du monde moyennant la « charia » pour la «plèbe du monde » et la volonté du surhomme pour les maitres.

Le nouvel ordre mondial est l'antéchrist.l'homme est investit dans sa vitalité, sa force et la puissance de ses instincts, la raison ne fonde rien et ne guide aucune dimension de l'être, elle formule, donne formes et apparences et contribue au mensonges de la volonté, elle ne véhicule aucune possibilité de « vérité », la vérité est au service du plus puissant, ou la vérité est celle que le plus puissant saura imposer avec toutes les techniques médiatiques et cybernétique, ou le philosophe n'a plus de raison d'être et les cheiks se rallient aux prêtres et aux rabbins avec un parfait mensonge de l'universalisation de la démocratie et la liberté, qui n'est autre que carnaval et occultation. La renaissance de la loi de la jungle raffinée et déguisées par une démocratie pervertie et travestie en paravent et tactique de manipulation.

2-le refus de la démocratie et de l'état

La démocratie pour Nietzsche est le pire des systèmes politiques, il est le miroir de cultures malades et décadentes, qui par épuisement de la volonté de puissance créent des valeurs de faiblesse déguisées en vertus. En effet la tolérance,l'égalité, la liberté ne sont en réalité que des effets de physiologies faibles incapables de s'affirmer dans le conflit et la domination, ils optent pour l'universalisation des valeurs et des idées qui les arrangent et qui soient compatibles avec leur état physiologique et leur intériorité subjectives.

L'humanisme, la tolérance et la démocratie ne sont en fait pour Nietzsche que des émanations et des rejaillissements de sentiments personnelles qui trouvent leur origine dans une décadence et faiblesse physiologique et vitale qui fonctionnent par le ledénie de la faiblesse et l'impuissance à vivre la vie tel que la nature la veut, une vie de combat, de commandement et de domination, pour les sublimer en valeur morale.L'humanismechez Nietzsche tue la vie en la réduisant à un simple désir de conservation et une tranquillité flegmatique.l'humanisme sera le mensonge de l'homme moderne et la démocratie sont ses béquilles, c'est   le fruit des transmutations historiques et généalogiques qui ont finit par une victoire Apollinienne via le meurtre de Dionysos, autrement une maladie physiologique qui rompt avec l'unité originaire de l'instinct de puissance et ou l'homme renonce à l'exercice de sa puissance.A l'encontre de la démocratie qui prônel'humanisme, la justice égalitaire au détriment de la hiérarchie naturelle, il fait resurgir l'oligarchie et la domination des qualités supérieurs sur les qualités inferieures, autrement le retour à la hiérarchie naturelle de l'être .Prôner la domination de la majorité dans une culture, c'est exposer tout le corps social à la déchéance, c'est comme exposer un corps à la contagion

13   *Voir, Tribune de Genève, Les «maîtres du monde» à Saint-Moritz, par Roland Rossier, 11-12-13 juin 2011, p.1.nombre d'oligarques internationaux de premier rang.*

de cellules malades, étant donnée que la majorité ne représente que la qualité décadente de toute culture. La destruction et l'effondrement de la démocratie seront une condition fondamentale pour Nietzsche à toute vrai « renaissance ». Cette renaissance n'est possible qu'a travers un chaos fondateur semblable au chaos originelle, il s'agit de semer un chaos total, une destruction absolue de la modernité et ses aléas,essentiellement la démocratie pour pouvoir réaliser ce retour fondamental à l'unité originaire et ressusciterDionysos. Une vraie renaissance pour lui est tributaire d'un éveil dionysiaque destructeur qui mettra la démocratie dans son champ de mire.

Cette définition de la renaissance et le chaos comme une condition de possibilité est la stratégie de la globalisation et la version appliquée des « révolutions arabes ».Un observateur avisé pourrait relever cette similitude entre l'intuition du chaos tragique « originaire » et « créateur » chez Nietzsche exposé dans *la Naissance de la tragédie* et *Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra*et la stratégie du chaos suivis par les grandes puissances pour la renaissance du tragique en substitution au raisonnable et scientifique. Les révolutions post modernes sont en effet des révolutions pour la renaissance dutragique, de la hiérarchie naturelle des supérieurs et le retour a l'unité originaire de Dionysos et Apollon, la puissance et la foi, c'est l'effondrement de la modernité et la renaissance des origines primitives de l'être ou la pulsion de puissance dionysiaque prend la relève. Leterrorisme, la barbarie, la férocité et le caractère sanguinaire de la "charia » et la « khilaffa » et l'islamisme n'en sont que l'illustration de la stratégie de la mondialisation qui n'est autre que la volonté de faire du monde un empire régné par les « supérieurs », Les « grands » et les « puissants » ou l'empire des "surhommes » tel prôné par Nietzsche.

« Un monde qui s'effondre est un plaisir, non seulement pour le spectateur mais aussi pour le destructeur .La mort est non seulement nécessaire, laide n'est pas assez dire, il y a de la grandeur, du sublime, dans les mondes qui s'effondrent .Des douceurs aussi, des espérances et des couchers de soleil empourpres .L'Europe est un monde qui s'effondre .La démocratie est une forme décadente de l'état » [14]

Ainsi pour une culture noble, une culture de la hiérarchie, de la distinction et de la grande santé, l'effondrement de la démocratie, et de l'humanisme sont nécessaires et constituent les conditions de possibilité à toute vrai renaissance. La différence, la distinction et la qualité des rapports de force naturels, constituent les faits les plus fondamentaux dans l'histoire du vivant, il serait même de la grande injustice chez Nietzsche de mélanger les dons, les mérites et les qualités, l'inégalité est un fait naturel et la justice est une justice de « rang ».Cette inégalité de rang, de distinction est bel et bien la pierre angulaire de la religion musulmane spécialement.

« …Il est un mot qui résonne désagréablement dans une époque de « droits égaux pour tous » : c'est la hiérarchie… »[15]

14   *Nietzsche, œuvres, Laffont, Antéchrist, §61, p1101.*
15   *Nietzsche, la volonté de puissance, III, § 701.*

En effet, dans la religion musulmane, il n'existe pas de patrie ni de société, mais l'esprit de communauté, l'état est proscrit et seuls les prêcheurs de dieu gouvernent et jouissent du pouvoir du commandement, l'égalitéest impossible car la hiérarchie est distinctive entre ceux qui commandent et les « sujets » qui ne sont que « raiiya », il n'existe pas de droit mais la loyauté, « walla », et la loyauté suppose une supériorité des plus puissants et des moins puissants.L'obéissance et la loyauté sont parmi les fondements de la religion musulmane et les conditions nécessaires à la foi, au paradis et à la vie même. Une obéissance absolue et une loyauté aveugle, ce qui sécurise tout pouvoir et tout commandement. Un bon musulman est tenu par le jihad, l'obéissance et la loyauté. Un homme sain et en bonne santé chez Nietzsche est tenu par la lutte et l'acceptation, ou le "grand oui », ainsi la santé de la communauté réside dans la hiérarchie des rangs, la lutte pour ce qu'on est, autrement la lutte dans son rang sans aspirer à un autre rang ou à une autre perspective, l'acceptation de la vie, de ses propres possibilités, de ses propres biens, de sa propre réalité, la révolte est une décadence et un chaos de la hiérarchie naturel .L'acceptation est pour Nietzsche ce qu'est l'obéissance et la loyauté est pour la religion musulmane.

« Ô vous qui croyez ! Obéissez à Allah, obéissez au Messager et à ceux qui détiennent le commandement. » [16]

L'imam Ismâ'îl ibn Muhammed Taymy (m.535) a dit :
« Obéir aux dirigeants est une obligation, cela fait partie des traditions les plus exigées dans le Coran et la sunna. »[17]

Abû Hureyra rapporte que le Messager d'Allah a dit :
« Celui qui m'obéit, obéit à Allah ; et celui qui me désobéit, désobéit à Allah. Celui qui obéit à son émir, m'obéit ; et celui qui désobéit à son émir, me désobéit. »[18]

Ibn 'Umar rapporte que le Messager d'Allah a dit :
« Tout musulman doit écouter et obéir, bon gré mal gré, sauf si on lui ordonne de désobéir (à Allah), auquel cas, il ne doit pas écouter ni obéir. »[19]

Anas ibn Mâlik rapporte que le Messager d'Allah a dit :
« Ecoutez et obéissez, même si on désigne pour vous commander un esclave abyssin dont la tête ressemble à un raisin sec. » [20]

16　*Les femmes, v.59*
17　*El Hudja fî bayân el mahadja, 1/466*
18　*Authentique : el Bukhâry (7137), Muslim (1935), el irwâ (2/160)*
19　*Authentique : el Bukhâry (7144), Muslim (1839)*
20　*Authentique : el Bukhâry (7142), el irwâ (2455)*

Abû Hureyra rapporte que le Messager d'Allah a dit :

« Tu es tenu d'écouter et d'obéir dans l'aisance comme dans l'adversité, bon gré mal gré, et même si on te lèse dans tes droits. «[21]

Hudheyfa ibn el Yaman rapporte que le Messager d'Allah a dit : « Ecoute et obéis même si on te frappe et qu'on te prend tes biens. »[22]

On comprend ainsi l'intersection entre Nietzsche, l'islam et la globalisation, ou le nouvel ordre mondial, àsavoir la hiérarchie naturel, le nécessaire asservissement de la masse, la nécessitée d'une puissance qui commande, qui domine et unifie, le refus total de la démocratie, la liberté, l'égalité, la lutte et la résistance à partir de soi et pour soi, comme seul art et style de vie sain et possible, l'esprit de conquête, l'action dionysiaque et déraisonnée, de sorte que tout vivant n'est conditionné que par ses propres instincts de victoires.Avoir la foi, aimer soi même, et accepter son sort et son destin et travailler à son élévation et sa grandeur, tels sont les seules valeurs réelles de la vie qui unifient Nietzsche et l'islam dans le concept de la globalisation. L'éloge que fait Nietzsche à Mahomet est très significatif dans ce sens.

« Les grands réformateurs tel Mahomet, s'entendent a donner un nouvel éclat aux habitudes et aux biens des hommes, non pas en les incitant a s'efforcer a « quelque chose d'autre », mais en leur faisant voir cela même qu'ils veulent et peuvent avoir comme quelque chose de plus élevéepour y découvrir plus de raison, de sagesse et de félicité qu'ils n'y trouvaient jusqu'alors »[23]

Ainsi dit on peut observer une transmutation du concept de la " révolution" ainsi que du concept de la "renaissance" de la modernité à la postmodernité, de la construction rationnelle du monde à la déconstruction de la raison, de la transparence et la lumière de la raison à l'obscurité et la profondeur de la nature et de l'esprit, de la logique a la foi.

Tel est le gigantesque projet du nouvel ordre mondial et de la globalisation ou quand le philosophique transperce, marque et nourrie les transmutations politiques. La modernitécomme transmutation philosophique du rationalisme, Descartes, Kant et les contractuels acrée le phénomène de laséparationdu politique et du religieux, le public et le privée, l'étatdétient le monopole du pouvoir et de la gestion des affaires, des intérêts et des besoins de la cité, l'état est le seul législateur, l 'économie est une affaire de l'état, elle n'est ni indépendante ni autonome, ainsi on pouvait observer que c'est la politique de d'état qui décide et détermine la politique économique, le politique était fondamentalement le pouvoir et le pouvoir ne peut qu'être politique .

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21   Authentique : Muslim (1836)

22   Authentique : Muslim, Abou Dawoud

23   F.Niietzsche, fragments posthumes du Gai Savoir, II[19].

Dans ce siècle de la renaissance déconstructive de la postmodernité, on peut observer une seconde séparationc'est la séparationentre le politique et l'économique et plus précisément, laséparation de la politique et du pouvoir, de sorte que le politique est destitué de son pouvoir, le politique destiné a la masse se résumera nécessairementa la religion, l'état ne gère plusni l'économie ni la finance, elle gèreuniquement la manipulation de la conscience collective,en contre partie, l'économiesera autonome et se gère par les monopoles, de sorte que la politique n'a plus aucun pouvoir de décisions mais plutôt un pouvoir formel et d'apparence, destiné à l'asservissement de la multitude et la manipulation mentale, ce qui coïncide avec le pouvoir du religieux et explique leur alliance post moderne. Le vrai pouvoir est aux mains des financiers pour qui,la politique n'est que moyen second de domination de la masse .Le pouvoir de décision revient à la finance des puissances internationales et le politique leur servira de paravent en l'impliquant essentiellement dans le religieux et spécialement l'islam comme idéologie de masse et la « chariaa » comme instrument puissant d'asservissement de la « plèbe mondiale".L'achèvement de la démocratie sera la condition nécessaire à toute renaissance postmoderne et la garantie de l'édifice de l'empire du nouvel ordre mondial. L'égalitarisme moderne ne peut, selon Nietzsche permettre une haute culture de l'esprit et ne fait que favoriser le ressentiment des incultes. La démocratie, telle que Nietzsche la conçoit, est une idéologie du troupeau qui cherche la sécurité et le bien-être, aux dépens de la puissance et la supériorité principes de guerres et de génie d'où la critique nietzschéenne incessante de l'éducation démocratique moderne qui entrave le développement physique et intellectuel et ne produit que des individus décadents et flegmatiques.

«La démocratie moderne est la forme historique de la décadence de l'Etat»[24]

''L'instinct démocratique déclare la guerre au rang, à la hiérarchie, les faibles veulent détruire ce qu'ils ne peuvent saisir, ce qui les humilie. …Terrible conséquence de l'"égalité' : finalement chacun se croit le droit de toucher à tous les problèmes. Tout sens du rang a disparu». [25]

Le sens de la renaissance subit lui même une transformation et une mutation, ainsi la renaissance ne veut plus dire comme l'a signifié la philosophie des lumières, sortir de l'obscurité vers la lumière et de l'ignorance vers la connaissance, mais plutôt, le retour aux origines.Lerecommencement du passé,le renouvellement de l'ancien,Ce qui s'adapte chez Nietzsche à son intuition de la régénérescenceet l'éternel retour du même. La renaissance tel prêchée par les révolutions post modernes, n'est autre que la régénérescence du temps primitif et originel d'avant la modernité. Le nouvel ordre mondial est ainsi une volonté de renaissance du rêve de l'empire par les conquêtes et les richesses. Il s'agit du retour à la nature, à l'instinct primaire, à l'ordre de nature, à la pulsion de force organisatrice,

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24 *Nietzsche, œuvres, Laffont, Humain, trop humain, I, § 472.*

25   *F.Nietzsche,la volonté de puissance,III, $238,seule edition compléte de France,traduction de G.Bianquis*

autrement a la hiérarchie de l'être tel que la nature la conçoit, du moins puissant au plus puissant, la raison universelle organisatrice ne sera que décadence et dégénérescence car la raison universelle n'existe pas, il n'ya que la raison du plus puissant qui domine, commande et gère, c'est cette hiérarchie et cet ordre que la démocratie, la modernité et le rationalisme a déjoué et trahit et de ce fait a mené la totalité de l'être et le vivant dans la décadence et le chaos de rang et de l'ordre.Cette perspective est l'intersection et le point commun entre Nietzsche, l'islam et la globalisation.

''Comprend –on enfin, veut on enfin comprendre, ce qu'était la renaissance ?la transvaluation des valeurs chrétiennes, la tentative de donner la victoire, avec tous les moyens, avec tous les instincts, avec tout le génie, aux valeurs contraires, aux valeurs nobles …il n'y eut jusqu'à présent de problème plus crucial que celui de la renaissance …il n'ya jamais eu de forme d'attaque plus fondamentale, plus droite, plus sévère, dirigée contre le centre, sur toute la ligne attaquer a l'endroit décisif, au siége même du christianisme, mettre sur le trône papal les valeurs nobles, c'est a dire introduire ces valeurs dans les instincts ."[26]

« Le printemps arabe », programmé, planifié, et bien ficelé au terme de « renaissance », soutenu et financé par le groupe Bilderberg, répond parfaitement a la perspective que nous donne Nietzsche de la renaissance comme introduction des valeurs moraux dans les instincts et l'écartement de la morale et des valeurs chrétiennes qui ont crée les valeurs de la démocratie et la liberté. Il s'agit en effet d'une renaissance des origines primitives de l'être. Une renaissance qui réalise a la fois l'instinct de conquête de Mahomet et l'Islam, instinct de puissance et de richesse chez les grands financiers du monde, et la prophétie de Zarathushtradu surhomme cruel, implacable, insensible qui ne se veut que lui-même. Nous entrons sans aucun doute dans la culture mondiale du surhomme, de la cruauté, du crime et de la guerre qui est certes une renaissance d'un point de vue chronologique, mais un désastre d'un point de vue Anthropologique et généalogique. Lamodernité avec tous ses aléas philosophique et politique s'écroule, le cogito, la logique du sens, la liberté, la tolérance, la démocratiese décomposent et s'obscurcissent laissant place a l'instinct et la logique du vivant ou la dynamique de la puissance et la cruauté jaillit et s'impose comme éléments physiologiques fondamentales nourrissant la pulsion de guerre et l'incessante volonté de gloire et victoire. Le vivre ensemble ne sera surement pas possible dans un esprit cosmopolitain de paix et d'acceptation, l'homme cherchera la guerre la il se trouve et se trouvera, des plus petites positions et situations de pouvoir aux plus grandes. La renaissance prendra le sens dans cette perspective, du retour de la fauve et de la bête aveugle qui ravage tout dans son passage pour s'affirmer et imposer sa volonté. L'islamiste, qui tue, égorge, terrorise, sème la terreur, viole, sexualise tout, vole, ment sans vergogne, multiplie ses discours, s'impose partout et instrumentalise tout, qui n'a pas de patrie car comme conquérant il considère que la ou il va c'est sa patrie est la parfaite illustration de la volonté politique des puissants de faire renaitre cette brute pour

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26   *F.Nietzsche,œuvres, R.Laffont, L'antechrist$61.*

le maintient de l'équilibre naturel et la hiérarchie de la force et des plus puissants, les maitres et les seigneurs du monde actuellement nommés, le cercle de Beldenbergs. L'ère de la tolérance et la justice égalitaire est révolue, pour céder place au retour de la puissance qui s'exerce par la cruauté et l'asservissement des grands aux plus petits, des forts aux faibles en vue d'une continuelle et éternelle répétition ou la mort est synonyme de gloire.

' …il faut ici aller au fond des choses et se défendre de toute faiblesse sentimentale ; vivre c'est essentiellement dépouiller, blesser, subjuguer l'étranger et le faible, l'opprimer, lui imposer durement nos propres formes, l'incorporer et au moins, au mieux, l'exploiter…"[27]

Mahomet, Zarathustra, et Bildenberg en total harmonie et accordance rythmique pour la résurrection de l'antéchrist, et l'émergence du surhomme. Tel est le siècle des révolutions postmodernes.

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Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity, by Mahmood Mamdani. USA: Harvard University Press, 2012. ISBN No: 978 0 674 05052 5 – Hardcover, pp. 154.

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Chroniclers of the British Empire foreground the momentous shift in policy, from direct to indirect rule, occasioned by developments in India in the year 1857. It was in this year that except 7,796 of the 139,000, sepoys of the Bengal Army in a spectacular uprising, known as the Sepoy Mutiny, turned against their British masters. Colonial authority was indeed challenged in that singular historical moment of the mutiny but, more significantly, the very logic and foundational ethic of the colonial project had been rendered banal. Responsibility for formulating anew the logic of colonial rule and thus redeeming Empire from its mid-nineteenth-century crisis fell on the best of British colonial minds. In their bid to rest the colonial project on a more enduring framework these colonial thinkers denounced the difference effacing pulse of the civilising mission by recommending instead, as an antidote, the recognition and protection of difference. Thus, the transition from direct to indirect rule epitomised, in terms of policy, the attempt to render the colonial enterprise as more secure. The figure of Sir Henry Maine was key in the intellectual endeavour to reconstitute the colonial architecture. His contribution was significant far beyond serving as the bedrock for a number of policy measures instituted throughout the British Empire from the 1857 crisis onwards, in that his works became compulsory reading for colonial administrators.

In this short but enlightening book of three chapters that began their life as Du Bois memorial lectures, Mahmood Mamdani, maps the history of what he refers to as "a new form of colonial governmentality born in the aftermath of the mid-nineteenth-century crisis of colonialism' (pp. 6). A critical exposition of the new logic and ethic of colonial rule as it evolved from the pen of Sir Henry Maine in India to that of the Dutch scholar Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, "whose object of reflection was the Dutch imperial project in Aceh in the East Indies" is offered in the first chapter (pp. 2). In the main, Maine wrote in response to the 1857 crisis of Empire in India. He begins his attempt to rehabilitate the colonial project by seeking first to diagnose the real cause of the crisis. And this he found to be the failure of analysis "a failure to understand the

nature of native Indian religious and social belief" (pp. 9). This 'defect of knowledge' was itself a consequence of two related developments: an over-reliance by Orientalists studying native institutions and culture on Sanskrit texts rather than observing the daily lives of natives. Moreover, even when they did gesture toward observing daily life, Orientalists erroneously focused their inquiry lenses exclusively on "the more urbanized and cosmopolitan coast as opposed to the more rural and traditional hinterland" (pp. 9).

Unknown to Orientalists, the hinterland, 'real India' as Maine called it, was home to the real native, virgin of foreign corrupting influence. For this reason he held the hinterland to be a more reliable repository of authentic native cultural and religious knowledge. Thus, to restore historicity and agency to the colonised it is to the 'real India' that one must turn for clues on Indian law and custom. As Maine proceeds with his task of recovering authentic India he inadvertently paints an elaborate portrait of the native. Locked in a separate conceptual world, the native - unlike the settler who is defined by history - is defined by geography. Unlike the settler who habits the modern dynamic world of civilisation, the native is construed as a function of culture – "culture thought of as part of nature, fixed and unchanging" (pp. 6). In the world of the native, abstract civil law is an anathema; it is the "despotism of usage" or custom that rules. These claims by Maine point to the fact that native is not a primordial or originary condition, but a construct; it is "the creation of theorists of an empire-in-crisis", concludes Mamdani (pp. 6).

Maine deploys a series of conceptual binaries to paint the imaginary figure of the native and make sense of the non-Western world in which it dwells. In this wise the modern, civilised West becomes the condition of possibility for the not yet, primitive, customary, non-West. To accentuate the distance between the two worlds of the native and the settler Maine turned to a theory of history and a theory of law. Mamdani notes that in this mode of thought, "the social became the privileged theoretical arena for understanding the nature and dynamics of society in the West" (pp. 14). Conversely, culture and geography became the key concepts with which to make sense of the native and the non-West generally.

Mamdani retrieves from Maine's different intellectual works a multi-layered argument which has been advanced to establish the credentials of the West as the progressive, dynamic, and civilised part of the world. The non-West emerges in the process as its Other: a stationary, custom-bound and backward looking place of culture. At this point Maine appealed to the theory of legal evolution according to which law generally evolves from an unwritten customary affair to written codes in order to lend conceptual depth to his distinction between the progressive West and the stationary non-West. The task of codifying law is the responsibility of aristocracies. In the West they did this successfully. Primarily because the ruling oligarchies in India tended to become religious, rather than civil, the rigidity of primitive law "arising chiefly from its early association and identification with religion" continues to pin society to the earliest forms of habiting the world (pp. 15).

Maine over and above holding the West as an exemplar of progress valorised it as an exception in human social evolution. To substantiate this claim he turned to the theory of history by asserting that: "the stationary condition of the human race is the rule, the progressive, the exception" (pp. 16). With evident self-satisfaction, he upheld the West as an epitome of that exceptionality. Further, to establish the stationary, non-progressive character of the non-West, Maine focussed on kinship which is held to be a principal political factor signifying primitivity. Kinship, he recognised, served not only as the bond knitting natural groups together; beyond that, it governed the processes by which new groups were integrated into the original group. For this reason he would characterise kinship as legal fiction. The kernel of Maine's argument was that societies where kinship is the norm stand at the beginning of historical time. In these ancient societies individuals had no standing but were accorded status as members of a particular group. Notably, Maine's analysis of kinship societies inverts Marx's earlier conclusion that modern industrial societies were the mirror in looking at primitive societies recognised their future image. For Maine, the reverse held true: "the primitive condition of the progressive societies is best ascertained from the observable condition of those which are non-progressive" (pp. 19).

If kinship served to root non-progressive societies in their primitive state, the transition from 'Status to Contract' signalled the movement of progressive societies forward (pp. 19). Essentially, the distance between status and contract is one between two kinds of laws: culture-bound customary law and abstract civil law. The latter is liberated from the strictures of time and circumstance; it thus dynamises society. However, the former, because it is context-bound and unchanging, hinders civilisation. Maine, at this juncture, felt sufficiently armed to launch his critique against liberal Utilitarians - purveyors of the civilising mission. Of their many defaults, the inability to discern the specificity of the primitive Indian society and the non-West generally was the most grave. Impelled forward by ignorance they assumed all societies to be attended by the same notion of sovereignty where the sovereign legislates, imposes duty and threatens sanction where the law is disobeyed. This rendered even more pronounced, remarked Maine, their lack of insight essential to properly governing customarily organised societies where the sovereign does not legislate but rather "the great bulk of men derive their rules of life from the customs of their village or city" (pp. 23). This deficit in knowledge caused Utilitarians to impose abstract civil law on Indian natives, thereby alerting them to the fact that they lived under foreign Western rule – hence, the mid-nineteenth-century crisis of Empire.

The goal, ultimately, for Maine was to help salvage the Empire from its crisis. Queen Victoria's Proclamation of 1858, captures the essence of the Empire's response to the crisis. At the core of the response was the doctrine of non-interference in matters pertaining to the private domain and religion more particularly. However, as Mamdani demonstrates, the doctrine of non-interference soon turned into a license for unfettered interference as

the colonising power arrogated unto itself the responsibility for specifying that in which it will not interfere; secondly, the content of the authentic religion with which there was to be no interference and, lastly, the authority designated to preserve religion in its pure form. In effect, the principle of non-interference left colonial authority with added power. This includes the power to specify those (often groups) who were to be protected. With time the will to protect turned into a technology of governance, i.e. indirect rule. Under indirect rule the preoccupation was consequently no longer to civilise but to preserve, not to assimilate but to protect. However, the indirect rule state was more than just a benevolent protector of groups and custom. The now expanded logic of such a state was "to remake subjectivities so as to realign its bearers. This was no longer just divide and rule. It was define and rule", explains Mamdani (pp. 42). It is this reformulated logic and ethic of colonial rule that the Dutch Arabist Hurgronje elaborates in Aceh in the East Indies in 1891 in order to help resolve the problems plaguing Dutch rule.

Formulated in India in the aftermath of the 1857 crisis, indirect rule as a new form of governmentality *a la* Foucault had as its main concern the definition and reproduction of difference as custom. If India provided the material for its theory, Africa was the theatre where its performance was perfected. Suggestively titled '*Nativism: The Practice,*' the second chapter shifts focus away from the theoreticians of indirect rule in India and the East Indies to Africa, Sudan in particular, for a nuanced analysis of how it managed and reproduced difference in practice. In this chapter, the author creatively works over the same material in his earlier work **Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror**, to a slightly different effect.

To remake colonial identities the indirect rule state spoke the language of law, distinguishing first between natives (herded into different tribes) and non-natives (said to belong to races). Segregated further, natives (tribes) were horizontally categorised into indigenes (native) and settlers (non-native) depending on whether one was indigenous to a particular locality or not. Notably, the distinction between races and tribes gave birth to and was itself sustained by a regime of legal plurality. Under this regime, races lived under a single law: civil law. Tribes were ruled through customary law but "there was never a single customary law to govern all tribes as natives…there were thus as many sets of customary laws as there were said to be tribes" (pp. 47-48). What the plurality of customary laws ensured was that cultural difference was preserved, reinforced and reproduced through the local state – native authority. The distinction between native and non-native tribes was not an idle administrative trite. It conferred on native tribes an exclusive set of privileges unavailable to non-native tribes, chief amongst those being the right of access to land.

Mamdani points out that, at an intellectual level, colonial rule was underwritten by a tendentious form of colonial historiography. The moral of this historiography was that Africa was a place mired in historical stagnation without any evidence of historical movement forward. Where such movement occurred, the impetus of necessity emanated

from the outside – "with light skinned or fine featured migrants from the north civilising natives to the South" (pp. 54). This Hamitic Hypothesis, as Mamdani labels it, was patronised by both colonial and nationalist historians. In Sudan it was the colonial administrator Harold MacMichael who gave to the thesis its most elaborate scholarly articulation. In the two-volume study named **History of the Arabs in Sudan** he wrote the history of Sudan as that of 'Arabisation'. According to MacMichael, it was Arab immigration from outside Sudan that catalysed the society's movement forward and consequently conferred upon it a new historical identity, i.e. Arabic language, culture and genealogy. Following the example set by a number of archaeologists, anthropologists and political scientists, Mamdani stitches together a brief outline of an alternative historiography. Fleshed out more fully in his earlier book **Saviours and Survivors** its major propositions were: rather than lead to Arabisation, early immigration into Nubia and Beja by Arab refugees was to result in de-Arabisation as these immigrants adopted the languages of their hosts; in addition, a myriad of factors including the recruitment of royal slaves into the state bureaucracy and the system of land grants (*hakura*), which institutionalised individual tenure, ensured the transformation of the sultanate of Dar Fur into a trans-tribal and multi-ethnic social formation.

As further evidence for the de-tribal nature of Sudan, Mamdani briefly traces the history of the rise and fall of the Mahdiyya - "a broad anti-imperialist alliance of a multitude of ethnic groups" (pp. 65). With its cadres drawn from the Arab north, from the West (Darfur and Kordofan) as well as the South and regions bordering it (the Nuba Mountains) its trans-cultural and multi-ethnic character immobilised the logic of indirect rule. As a consequence, when the British finally defeated the Mahdiyya Movement at the battle of Omdurman, to forestall a recurrence and bring the lessons of 1857 India to bear, they tribalised Darfur. Darfur province, writes Mamdani, "was parcelled into a series of homelands, *dars*, each identified with a tribe administratively tagged as native" (pp. 71).

As to be expected, colonial rule triggered an anticolonial response aimed at decolonisation. Decolonisation was often defined by the twin-tasks of reforming the indirect rule state as well as re-writing colonial historiography which underpinned the colonial enterprise. By anticolonial logic, the reformation of the colonial state was the responsibility of the political class, and the re-writing colonial historiography was deemed the task of the intelligentsia. In the concluding chapter Mamdani critically analyses two exemplary efforts: firstly, to deconstruct colonial historiography by the Nigerian historian Yusuf Bala Usman and, secondly, to reform the colonial state by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere the first President of Tanzania.

Usman earns focus in the chapter for his labour towards an alternative African historiography. In this regard, his first intervention was to problematise the related questions of historical sources and authorial objectivity. As Usman argued that if oral sources in African history needed to be approached with a certain element of

circumspect, the same critical attitude was called for in reading "the written records of European travellers, traders, missionaries, companies, governments and their agents" (pp. 89). His point was simply that not only oral but also written sources were susceptible to bias. His second notable intervention was to critique the deployment within history of the discourse of tradition. This notion of tradition, amongst other things, served to normalise the prejudice that African societies were stagnant or unchanging prior to external intervention. Through his study of the history of Katsina, beginning in the fourteenth century, he archived the long process of identity formation and change within the larger context of societal change. Furthermore, Usman mastered enough evidence from the (genealogical) history of the Fulfulde-speaking Fulani, the Hausa speaking Habe and other groups to prove that ethnic groups did not constitute the natural and/or basic units of society in pre-colonial Africa as most historians tended to think.

Mamdani ends the book by challenging the conventional reading of President Nyerere's legacy. Rather than read Nyerere's legacy through the common - somewhat jaded - prism of a failed socialist experiment (Ujamaa) he represents him as a successful reformer of the colonial state. Integral to this process of reform was the abolition of all race-based distinctions in law as well as ethnic based distinctions in customary law. As a corollary, Nyerere embarked on a political project to smash native authorities. While Nyerere's nation-building reforms fundamentally transformed the colonial state, abolishing in the process both the settler and the native, their limit was to compromise the democratic project.

With **Define and Rule** Mamdani has certainly added a new layer to the existing repertoire of the late colonial state. Here, however, are a few major problems with Mamdani's otherwise illuminating analysis. To begin with, Mamdani writes of colonialism, in his earlier texts as well, i.e. **Citizen and Subject** as though it were only a formal political process guided in its unfolding by the colonial state and its leading *dramatis personae* acting out or enforcing their will on hapless natives. Thus, because Mamdani privileges the colonial state and its institutions in his analysis he limits his reading of colonial thought/discourse to the official colonial archive - writings of public colonial state officials - in this instance, that of Sir Henry Maine. In this process, he edits out writings and activities of non-state colonial figures, actors and intellectuals. Therefore, when Mamdani claims that the desire to remake colonial subjectivities emerges in and through the logic of the indirect rule state it is because his obsessive gaze on the official colonial archive, colonial state and its formal institutions does not permit him to look beyond state-centred processes, especially non-political cultural spaces. Interestingly it is in these spaces where, through various disciplining practices, the concern had from conception been the making and re-making of colonial subjectivities long before the shift towards indirect rule.

Mamdani roots the concern with colonial subjectivities exclusively within the ambit of the indirect rule state; he states that "[U]nlike the preceding era of direct rule, its ambitions (meaning the indirect rule state) were vast: to shape the subjectivities of the colonised population" (pp. 8). Later in the text he argues that "[T]he focus of colonial power, after 1857, was to define colonial subjectivity…Key to understanding the form of governmentality pioneered by Maine is the relationship between law and subjectivity" (pp. 44). Contrary to the above claim evidence from anthropological studies suggest an ever present concern with compiling official ethnographic records, recasting modes of self-identification and the ways-of-being of the colonised. All of these were colonial practices and rituals within and through which subjectivities of the natives were constructed. This resulted in a contradictory process which at once aimed at civilising natives while serving to naturalise 'tribal' difference.

The second problematic aspect of Mamdani's analysis is that, in his reading of the official colonial archive, he distils views of public colonial state officials as self-contained in and of themselves outside of the much larger and longer intellectual history of European colonial thought. To substantiate this, Mamdani locates both the discourse and challenge of difference squarely within the geography and temporality of the indirect rule state. More precisely, he holds indirect rule to be a *sine qua non* for the challenge of difference. This is how he makes the point: "[I] argue that it is under indirect rule colonialism that the definition and management of difference was developed as the essence of governance" (pp. 2). Elsewhere in the text he restates the point by claiming that "[T]he language of pluralism and difference is born in and of the colonial experience" (pp. 44). To clinch the argument he turns to Sir Henry Maine, a key theoretician of indirect rule, whose main contribution was arguably to render an already existent discourse of difference more productive rather than originate it.

We do now know from history that Europe's encounter with the non-West, Africa specifically, since the 1500s has been enabled, if not governed by, a set of ideas constructing this part of the world as its Other. It is this same discourse of difference that mercantile Europe turns to in order to rationalise enslaving and subjugating non-Western peoples (treating them as non-beings, essentially) when it had discovered for itself norms of human difference. Thus, when European Enlightenment reason accentuates the distinction between the civilised West and the unhistorical non-West it was itself drawing on an already existent discourse of difference. While Maine's ideas and the discourse of difference as it emerges within the indirect rule state may have their own specificity they must be located within this much longer and larger intellectual history of thought, which is not the preserve solely of colonial state officials, in order for them to gain their fuller meaning. In this way we shall realise that Maine was actually being typical when he distinguished the progressive West from the stationary non-West. In the same breath, we shall see the paradoxical nature of the direct rule state which, in the face of promised sameness (assimilation), continued through the grammar of tribalism and anthropological studies to manufacture, reproduce and essentialise difference.