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Mouvement altermondialiste et réponses institutionnelles: Quelle vertu, quel danger?

Résumé

On présume trop souvent que lorsqu'un mouvement social est fermement établie avec une identité perceptible et des revendications distinctes et pragmatiques, la négociation avec les pouvoir publics et les forces sociales dominantes s'est imposée. Au cours des dernières années, le mouvement altermondialiste a formulé de nombreuses propositions telles que la réduction de la dette, le changement des règles internationales du commerce, l'imposition internationale, etc. Cet article cherche à analyser la manière dont ces différentes propositions faites par le mouvement sont reçues et instrumentalisées par les cercles politiques et les instances bureaucratiques. Notre analyse démontre que peu de mesures politiques concrètes ont été adoptées en réponse aux propositions formulées par le mouvement. Le mouvement altermondialiste, sans aucune structure formelle et basé sur divers réseaux avec des priorités idéologiques souvent divergentes et ses alliances confuses avec des forces et des institutions externes tel que les partis politiques, ne semble pas en mesure de mener des négociations réelles avec le pouvoir public. La conjoncture actuelle donne en fait à ce dernier la possibilité de sélectionner les propositions altermondialistes, ainsi que l'ampleur des réformes à effectuer au gré de ses propres priorités. Le système ne se sent guère menacé par les demandes altermondialistes et, l'institutionnalisation accrue du mouvement, laisse présager de nouveaux pièges d'où la nécessite de nuancer et de stimuler davantage d'analyses et réflexions sur le mouvement.

Introduction

Les études sociologiques, ainsi que celles venant d'autres disciplines sociales notamment la science politique, évoquent ces dernières années que, la mondialisation accompagnée par l'affaiblissement de l'espace politique nationale, a fort bouleverser la structure et le rôle des mouvements sociaux. Selon François Dubet, cette nouvelle situation nécessite les mouvements sociaux de se repositionner vis-à-vis trois principales fonctions. Le premier concerne la nécessité de défendre des identités spécifiques. La seconde implique la défense des protections sociales existantes et la lutte contre l'inégalité produite par mondialisation. Le troisième est la demande de reconnaissance des individus et de leur capacité d'agir contre le marché et l'identitaire communautaire. Lorsque les mouvements se constituent en opposition à la mondialisation, réclamant le respect des identités, la construction de nouveaux règlements internationaux, et le développement de la démocratie contre l'hégémonie de la puissance économique, ils travaillent ainsi pour combiner chacun de ces trois approches. Ils cherchent également à se situer au même niveau que les forces qu'ils s'efforcent de combattre (Dubet, 2004: 714). Bref, certes que la mondialisation ait

profondément déstabilisé les mouvements sociaux, elle les a également offert une nouvelle espace politique pour action.

Dans cet article nous prenons le cas du mouvement altermondialiste pour voir comment ses terrains d'actions se définissent et s'amplifient dans le contexte de la mondialisation accrue actuelle. Nous nous intéressons surtout à ses capacités de formuler les propositions concrètes et de créer la pression politique pour négociations auprès les autorités et les forces sociales dominantes. Ainsi faisant, nous espérons pouvoir insister que l'objet de l'observation sociologie doive aller au-delà d'exposés simples sur les effets de la mondialisation à la mobilisation collective ou de prises de positions émotionnelles envers les mouvements sociaux tel que l'altermondialisme. Elle doit notamment apporter de l'analyse critique sur leur évolution, leur structure et leurs capacités de produire des résultas distincts – informé par des travaux théoriques et empiriques appuyés.

En raison de son émergence en force et de son caractère pluraliste, le mouvement altermondialiste est habituellement considéré comme un phénomène singulier. Pour cette raison, le mouvement fait fréquemment l'objet d'appréciations positives. Samir Amin affirme que l'altermondialisme 'doit être considéré comme un progrès civilisationnel' car il est construit sur 'le principe fondamental de la pratique démocratique: refusant la hiérarchie verticale, promouvant des formes horizontales de coopération dans l'action'. (http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/noticias_textos.php?cd_news=349). Selon le Dictionnaire altermondialiste élaboré par Attac sous la direction de Jean-Marie Harribey, le mouvement 'vise à l'émancipation de l'humanité, sous une forme qui n'est pas encore précisé dans le détails et qui s'exprime de manière pluraliste' (Harribey, 2006: 28). Des chercheurs engagés, mais également des sociologues et politologues aguerris accordent à ce mouvement une importance considérable. Ainsi, dans un de ses derniers livres, Alain Touraine affirme que 'le mouvement altermondialiste occupe une place aussi importante que le socialisme aux premières décennies de la société industrielle' avec un 'appel à une gestion démocratique des grandes transformations historiques' (Touraine, 2005: 47-48).

Le projet politique du mouvement altermondialiste représente-t-il un nouveau paradigme politique? Est-il si révolutionnaire? Cherche-t-il une rupture totale avec l'ordre économique et politique actuel, comme beaucoup semblent le penser? Si l'on regarde plus soigneusement, il est évident que l'esprit général du mouvement se base notamment sur des actions non-violentes, la pratique démocratique, la justice sociale, la paix, la solidarité, etc. (voir le site web du Forum social mondial: www.portoalegre.2003.org, par exemple). Il ne cherche pas à renverser le système ou à le remplacer par un autre, malgré son affirmation qu' 'un autre monde est possible'. D'ailleurs, le mouvement fut connu initialement comme 'antimondialisme' – ainsi montrant son caractère essentiellement contestataire. Pour but de montrer que le mouvement n'était opposé qu'aux formes de la mondialisation type néolibérale et qu'il était aussi apte à proposes des contres propositions plus égalitaires et démocratiques, les dirigeants du mouvement ont rapidement préféré de se distancer de l'image de l''anti' à un pragmatisme radical de l''alter' (Cassen, 2004; George, 2002). Ces dirigeants ont aussi amorcé à condamner la violence provoquée par des 'casseurs' ou des anarchistes, ou des raisonnements gauchistes ultra critiques fondés sur simples dénonciations du néolibéralisme et sans aucunes propositions concrètes.

Une vision plutôt circonspecte permet au mouvement non seulement d'éviter la confrontation directe, voire violente, avec le système, mais également d'établir des liens salutaires avec des institutions et des acteurs étatiques afin de leur soumettre ses propositions. Le mouvement appelle ainsi à la protection du secteur public, à l'arrêt de la privatisation et à la limitation de la puissance des sociétés multinationales. Il réclame l'élimination de la pauvreté, le soulagement de la dette du tiers monde, l'accroissement des ressources financières par l'aide au développement, ainsi de suite. C'est pour cette raison que le mouvement juge important de créer des alliances avec des élites et des gouvernements nationaux progressistes. Il sollicite également le renforcement du système des Nations unies, tout en exprimant son opposition aux organisations Bretton Woods: la Banque mondiale (BM), le Fond monétaire international (FMI) et l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC).

La littérature sur le mouvement l'altermondialiste, pour la plupart, s'intéresse notamment à ses multiples terrains d'action, aux acteurs sociaux qui le constituent, ainsi qu'à ses thèmes de revendications. Jusqu'à ce jour, la relation entre les exigences du mouvement et les attitudes des institutions envers ce dernier a été peu abordée. Le mouvement présente les caractéristiques des 'nouveaux mouvements sociaux'[1] puisqu'il se distance des partis politiques et cherche à mobiliser des forces socioculturelles et des attributs politique supplémentaires qui visent à changer la structure mondiale du pouvoir et de l'ordre politico-économique. C'est dans ce contexte que l'examen des relations entre le mouvement altermondialisme et le pouvoir décisionnel devient particulièrement utile et intéressant.

Les sociologues Donatella della Porta et Mario Diani, qui ont examiné en détails les liens entre les diverses catégories de mouvements sociaux et leurs effets sur les politiques publiques, affirment que 'tous les mouvements font des demandes sur le système politique' (della Porta et Diani, 1999: 233). Alberto Melucci pour sa part explique que les mouvements sociaux ont naturellement la vocation de 'repousser au-delà des limites fixées par le système politique existant' (Melucci, 1996: 35). Mais quels genres de demandes provenant des mouvements sociaux ont la potentialité d'être reçus positivement par le système? La réponse a une telle question nécessite de prendre compte le contexte historique, social et politique au niveaux national ainsi bien qu'au niveau internationale.

Michel Wieviorka suggère qu'un mouvement social constitué présente deux faces articulées. L'une est offensive véhiculant un contre-projet, mais l'acteur reste 'plutôt négociateur, capable de s'appuyer sur son identité pour entrer dans des discussions avec des adversaires et des partenaires' (Wieviorka, 2003: 28). La seconde face est défensive dans laquelle le mouvement reste préoccupé par la dégradation des conditions du travail ou des acquits sociaux; il se conteste à son adversaire, mais il 'oscille fréquemment entre l'apathie, et la rupture violente, sans grande capacité à s'installer dans un espace de négociation' (ibid: 29).

Peut-on dire que l'altermondialisme dans son courant essentiel est un mouvement composer de ces deux faces? En ce qui regarde de son côté défensive, il est clair que le mouvement s'exprime son préoccupation par rapport la dégradation des conditions de vie des classes populaires et des pays pauvres – une conséquence due à l'essor du système néolibérale omnipotent. Quant à la face offensive, le mouvement, par des biais

de différentes manifestations (par exemple: contres sommets, manifestations populaires, forums sociaux), essaie d'avancer non seulement des propositions discernables, mais aussi essaie de donner une identité pragmatique. Pour autant la question se pose: le mouvement est-il aussi soucieux d'entrer dans des négociations avec ses adversaires?

De même, étant donné que le mouvement altermondialiste cherche à travailler avec le 'système' plutôt qu'à le détruire dans son ensemble, la question est donc: comment ce dernier réagit-il? De quelle façon les différentes propositions faites par le mouvement sont-elles reçues et soutenues par les institutions dominantes? Ces institutions et les forces sociales qui y sont associées sont-ils vraiment ouverts aux différentes approches et propositions avancées par le mouvement?

La structure et les propositions

L'altermondialisme est un réseau mondial dans lequel 'se trouvent insérés' beaucoup de mouvements qui 'revendiquent haut et fort leur ambition de conduire les luttes transversales' (Sommier, 2003: 29-30). Ce réseau est constitué des organisations de la société civile, des campagnes spécifiques, ou des initiatives ou des rassemblements populaires de l'échelle locale comme global, ainsi bien au Nord et au Sud. L'originalité du mouvement demeure surtout dans sa disposition de rassembler des individus, des groupes et des associations idéologiquement plutôt hétéroclites – de l'extrême gauche au démocrate chrétiens. Le mouvement n'a aucune structure organisationnelle, il fonctionne essentiellement 'par espaces d'agréation' et son action collective est 'particulièrement fragmentée et redéployée selon les multiples formes d'oppression contre lesquelles il s'agit de lutter' (Reynié, 2007: 171).

Les méthodes d'interventions ne sont pas ne plus définies. Elles varient entre la plaidoirie, le lobby, le recours à l'expertise et l'action directe. Mais elles se privilégient constamment une stratégie qui tente d'influer l'opinion publique, le média et le pouvoir décisionnels afin de dénoncer les conséquences pernicieuses du système néolibéral et fustiger les acteurs et institutions dominantes. En dépit de cette diversité dans sa structure et dans ses méthodes d'interventions, le mouvement présente une identité collective de résistance contre les structures du pouvoir (Dubet et Thaler, 2004: 561-64) ou offre de l'espace pour mener une action commune contre les structures et conséquences négatives de la mondialisation actuelles ainsi que pour proposer des idées et propositions alternatives (Farro, 2004: 635).

Dans le passé, le mouvement altermondialiste a été régulièrement l'objet de la critique tantôt par ses adversaires, tantôt par ses associés, pour son incapacité d'avancer des alternatives palpables. Aujourd'hui le mouvement dans son ensemble présente une vaste palette de projets et des pistes d'actions. Toutefois, un certain nombre d'idées et de propositions figurent au cœur du mouvement (voir schéma[1]). La dette est par exemple un 'objet privilégié d'engagement' au sein du mouvement altermondialiste (Agrikoliansky, Fillieule et Mayer, 2005: 68). Des réseaux d'ONG, des syndicats, des centres académiques ou d'autres se sont souvent unis pour soulever la question de l'annulation de la dette auprès des chefs d'états du G8, des donateurs multilatéraux et bilatéraux, et des créanciers. A ce sujet la campagne du Jubilé 2000 a représenté un point culminant. Depuis 2000, la campagne a continué à fonctionner suivant différentes modalités, accompagnée d'un débat animé sur la question de

l'annulation partielle ou totale de la dette ou encore à propos des réparations de dommages.

En ce qui concerne la campagne liée aux règles de commerce international, l'accent est mis sur les problèmes provoqués par la maintien des barrières commerciales de la part des pays industrialisés envers les produits du tiers monde, tout en pratiquant une politique de vente de type *dumping* dans le sud. Le Trade Justice Movement en Grande Bretagne, constitué de 83 ONG des plus importantes parmi lesquelles se trouve l'Oxfam, appelle à un changement fondamental des règles injustes et des institutions régissant le commerce international (www.tjn.org.uk et www.oxfam.org). Au cours des dernières années, de nombreux autres réseaux ont cherché à mettre en lumière les problématiques liées à la mondialisation néolibérale et au commerce, notamment le Global South (Philippines), Third World Network (Malaisie) et Foundation for Science and Ecology (Inde). Ces réseaux ont également tenté d'établir des alliances avec des dirigeants politiques de pays émergeants tels que le Brésil et l'Inde.

Quant aux propositions concernant les impositions globales, Attac (Association pour la taxation des transactions financières pour l'aide aux citoyens) a un rôle clairement prédominant. L'argument principal du mouvement est qu'un petit impôt universel sur des revenus de devises étrangères devrait décourager à la spéculation et, d'une manière générale, créer une source importante de financement public pour le développement humain. Avec ses affiliations dans 39 pays et plusieurs milliers d'adhérents, ces dernières années Attac est devenu un point focal pour le mouvement anticapitaliste et la lutte contre la 'dictature du marché' (voir www.attac.org).

Finalement, le commerce équitable a pour objectif d'améliorer les vies des producteurs de faible revenu dans le tiers monde par la vente de leurs produits sur les marchés occidentaux. De plus, il cherche à devenir un acteur puissant susceptible de 'modifier des règles commerciales internationales inégales, donc injustes' (Yilmaz, 2005: 2). Divers organismes se sont engagés dans ce processus, tels que Max Havelaar, Transfair, Fairtrade, Artisans du monde, etc. Mais le concept actuel du commerce équitable ne remet pas en cause le système des échanges internationaux. Il risque également 'de s'enfermer dans une vision caritative ou paternaliste' (Harribey, op cit.: 70) en ce qui concerne les relations avec le Sud.

En observant les propositions émergeantes du mouvement altermondialiste concernant la réduction de la dette, le changement des règles et des barrières commerciales, l'imposition globale et le commerce équitable, on constate que dans l'ensemble, on peut dire que, le mouvement – malgré la fragmentation structurelle – est capable de produire revendications sensées. Il parvient de tempérer la reproche que 'les altermondialistes seraient d'éternels protestataires incapables de produire les revendications constructive' – pour reprendre les termes d'Agrikoliansky, Fillieule et Mayer (d'Agrikoliansky, Fillieule et Mayer, 2005: 39).

Deuxièmement, le mouvement ne soumet au système aucune demande impossible à réaliser. Il exige en effet un changement visant à atteindre un degré plus important de gouvernance et de justice sociale ainsi qu'un développement économique plus redistributif. Il ne cherche pas particulièrement à prendre le pouvoir étatique. Dans ce sens, le mouvement reste pleinement 'réformiste', créant de ce fait un espace propice aux dialogues avec les établissements bureaucratiques et politiques. Les résultats d'un

sondage auprès des 545 participants du deuxième Forum social européen à Paris en novembre 2003 ont d'ailleurs souligné que seulement quelques huit pour cent s'opposaient radicalement aux processus de mondialisation économique (*Libération,* 12 novembre 2003). Une autre enquête couvrant presque 1.000 personnes et organismes de la société civile a également constaté que seulement cinq pour cent s'étaient identifiés comme totalement opposés au système actuel (Pianta et Silva, 2003: 44).[2]

Troisièmement, le mouvement altermondialisme s'efforce de créer le rapprochement avec une partie de l'adversaire en donnant une identité positive – surtout en montrant qu'il existe des points d'intérêt commun. Il affirme que le mouvement non seulement consent de fonctionner dans le système actuel, mais il vise également à renforcer la capacité du développement de l'état et du système multilatéral. Ils offrent ainsi la possibilité à différentes forces sociales influentes (les élites et les administrateurs progressistes, les agences internationales comme l'ONU et les mouvements sociaux) de prendre part aux questions principales abordées par le mouvement.

Intérêt institutionnel à l'égard du mouvement

Indubitablement en raison de son caractère réformiste, les institutions politiques ou de développement répondent de façon positive à un certain nombre de propositions avancées par le mouvement. De plus en plus, des personnalités politiques, chefs d'état ou de gouvernement et certains partis politiques ont montré de l'intérêt pour le mouvement. Non seulement des chefs d'état de gauche comme Lula, Castro ou Chavez, et des tiers-mondistes tels que Mandela, Mahathir ou Mugabe, ont soutenu le mouvement, mais aussi des hommes politiques de centre-droite comme le Président Chirac (Said et Desai 2003: 59-61; Boniface, 2003). D'une certaine manière, les propositions concernant les problèmes liés à la dette du tiers monde, aux barrières douanières, au commerce équitable et à l'imposition mondiale prennent place dans un contexte nouveau de négociations, par exemple au sein du millénaire pour le développement des Nations unies. Pour les gouvernements ou les agences internationales de développement qui visent sérieusement à réduire les inégalités sociales et la pauvreté, les propositions de la société civile devraient, à priori, apparaître comme avantageuses, leur permettant ainsi d'établir une base politique plus large. Cependant, on peut se demander si les institutions politiques et de développement ont évolué assez rapidement pour s'adapter à cette 'nouvelle' conjoncture.

Au niveau national, des gouvernements ont accordé un certain degré d'importance aux différentes propositions issues du mouvement altermodialiste. Prenons les cas de la Grande Bretagne et de la France. La Grande Bretagne est le pays où le mouvement lié à la réduction de la dette du tiers monde, ainsi que le mouvement concernant les règles internationales du commerce, demeure le plus fort. Par conséquent, les leaders politiques et les gouvernements sont restés à l'écoute des diverses demandes provenant de ces mouvements. En effet, on peut dire que la recommandation récente de Tony Blair pour créer un Plan Marshall pour l'Afrique avec un budget total de 25 milliards de dollars destinés à l'annulation de la dette sub-saharienne et au maintien de

l'aide publique à 0.7 pour cent du PNB par les pays riches est d'une certaine manière un résultat perceptible de l'influence de ces mouvements (*Le Monde,* 14 mars 2005).

Quant à la France, elle a connu la naissance et la popularité ascendante d'un mouvement puissant comme Attac, réclamant des contrôles et des impositions internationales sur les marchés boursiers. Il n'est pas étonnant donc que cette proposition soit reprise par le président Chirac pour instituer un prélèvement international de solidarité sur des transactions financières et des ventes internationales de billets d'avions pour financer le combat contre le sida et des activités de développement dans les pays en voie de développement (*Le Monde,* 27 janvier 2005; *The Times,* 27 janvier 2005). Rappelons également que son cabinet avait financièrement soutenu le 2ème Forum social européen à Paris en novembre 2003,[3] et que Attac demeurait un des principaux organisateurs de cet événement.

Ces indicateurs récents tendent à suggérer qu'il y ait un intérêt manifeste pour le mouvement altermondialiste de la part du pouvoir public dans certains pays. De plus en plus, diverses forces politiques de droite comme de gauche s'accordent à dire que le processus actuel de mondialisation économique doit être accompagné d'une forme d'empathie humaine afin de garantir sa propre survie. Des journaux tels que *The Economist* et le *Financial Times,* qui représentent un forum puissant du modèle économique libéral, affirment aujourd'hui que l'inégalité économique internationale croissante, signalée par le mouvement altermondialiste, est une question qui requiert une certaine attention.

En Europe, la dimension de compassion humaine est notamment reprise par les partis politique sociaux démocrates ou chrétiens. Leurs dirigeants et un certain nombre de leurs adhérents voient la nécessité d'ajouter une dimension sociale au processus de la mondialisation économique. Certains spécialistes croient que le mouvement altermondialiste a gagné en stabilité et légitimité suite au soutien enthousiaste de ces démocrates chrétiens et d'organismes charitables chrétiens (Askolovitc, 2003). En tout cas, ces partis politiques en alliances avec d'autres forces politiques ont joué un rôle essentiel pour l'annulation d'une partie de dettes des pays très pauvres et ont également fortement soutenu le jubilé 2000 (Tagle et Patomäki, 2007: 5). De même, beaucoup parmi eux admettent l'utilité de la taxe Tobin; le sujet a d'ailleurs été débattu dans de nombreux parlements nationaux et au parlement européen (Patomäki, 2007: 20-23). Ces instances reconnaissent également le rôle positif du commerce équitable pour la paysannerie et les artisans au sud (Yilmaz, 2005: 2). Toutefois, ils expriment de la retenue concernant les règles et barrières commerciales internationales, ceci afin de protéger l'intérêt économique national ou de la Communauté européenne.

Par ailleurs, les socialistes européens, les communistes (réformés) et les partis verts ont habituellement soutenu le mouvement. A titre exemple, *l'Humanité,* journal lié au parti communiste français, écrit dans un éditorial:

> Les altermondialistes ... sont des gentils utopistes, sûrement utiles à nous alerter sur les dérives les plus graves du système.

Toutefois, ce journal affirme également:

> Pour le reste, les choses sérieuses, c'est une autre affaire. Les altermondialistes rêvent. Les gouvernements gouvernent. Chacun chez soi (13 novembre 2003).

Néanmoins, l'intérêt de divers partis politiques pour le mouvement s'est sensiblement accru. La deuxième édition du Forum social mondial en janvier 2002 à Porto Alegre, par exemple, a été représentée par trois candidats présidentiels et six ministres français; et tous les partis politiques ont été représentés (Sommier, 2003: 303). De même, pendant le Forum social européen tenu à Paris en novembre 2003, la plupart de partis politiques français ont essayé d'organiser des événements ou d'influencer la discussion. Des observateurs avisés offrent deux principales raisons à cela: tout d'abord, de nombreux altermondialistes sont, à l'origine, des militants déçus par les partis politiques dont ils faisaient partie (Hassoux, 2003); ensuite, beaucoup de jeunes (donc potentiellement recrutables par les partis politiques) sont attirés par le mouvement. En effet, un mouvement comme Attac a plus d'adhérents que les Verts et à peine trois fois moins que le Parti socialiste (Boniface, 2003). En raison de cette influence croissante, les divers groupes politiques ont pris conscience de l'importance primordiale de maintenir des contacts avec le mouvement, notamment en fournissant des soutiens financiers[4] et organisationnels.

Parallèlement, des personnalités actives dans le mouvement altermondialiste ont ouvertement offert aux partis politiques de reprendre leurs idées et leurs propositions. Par exemple, l'un des principaux dirigeants derrière l'organisation du Forum social européen à Paris[5] a déclaré que l'intérêt grandissant du monde politique pour les altermondialistes était 'une forme de reconnaissance'. Selon ses propres termes,

> C'est la démonstration du poids croissant du mouvement social et citoyen dans l'opinion publique. Je dis aux partis politiques: Allez-y, récupérer-nous! Appropriez-vous nos idées! Même: mettez en œuvre concrètement nos propositions (Libération, 4 novembre, 2003).

Toutefois, on ne peut affirmer avec certitude si ce type de contact et de dialogue avec les partis politiques aide effectivement le mouvement altermondialiste à maintenir une influence soutenue sur le système. Malgré les efforts de certains partis politiques pour amplifier les contacts avec le mouvement, le bilan général est que les gouvernements, les corps bilatéraux et les institutions internationales du développement ont été lents à reconnaître l'intérêt croissant de l'opinion publique envers ce mouvement. Comme le déclare Timothy Shaw, dans l'ensemble, les études de développement ont échoué à suivre le discours contemporain des mouvements transnationaux et 'les administrateurs, les analystes, les conseillers, les universitaires et les praticiens professionnels dans le domaine devraient employer la critique et les suggestions avancées par des groupes anti-mondialistes tels que www.attac.org et www.nologo.org' (Shaw 2001: 165).

Contraintes

Malgré ces diverses potentialités, de nombreux problèmes persistent, et ceux-ci proviennent tant du mouvement altermondialiste que du pouvoir décisionnel. En ce qui concerne les mouvements sociaux, le sociologue Claus Offe soutient qu'ils sont 'incapables à la négociation parce qu'ils n'ont rien n'offrir en échange de la concession faite à leurs demandes' (Offe, 1985: 830). Cet auteur, qui a analysé les rapports entre les mouvements sociaux et la politique institutionnelle, avance que les syndicats, qui pourraient par exemple garantir une baisse de salaire en échange du maintien d'autres

avantages acquis, contraire aux nouveaux mouvements sociaux liés à la paix ou à l'environnement ne semblent pas en mesure d'offrir rien en échange aux autorités.

Les mouvements sociaux sont fréquemment peu structurés, avec des variations notables dans leurs démarches, leurs rythmes et leurs actions. Il est vrai que cette manière de fonctionner lui offre la possibilité d'éviter les hiérarchies, de réduire les distances pour monter des d'actions et de conserver l'autonomie de chaque membre (Reynié, 2007: 171). Ils manquent néanmoins d'une entité légale pour respecter les décisions formelles, ce qui rend les accords et les projets conclus avec les institutions étatiques très difficiles à concevoir et à mettre en oeuvre. En effet, comme indiqué au début de cet article, le mouvement altermondialiste, puisqu'il fonctionne en réseau, n'a aucune structure organisationnelle. Il a ni siège, ni adhérents. Ainsi, la question suivante se pose: qui peut parler au nom de qui, et concernant quelles décisions? Pour cette raison, le Forum social mondial (FSM), qui fonctionne comme porte-parole du mouvement, se trouve de plus en plus paralysé dans ses démarches car il n'a aucune capacité décisionnelle.

Le mouvement altermondialiste a sans aucun doute fait preuve d'une grande capacité de mobilisation populaire et de dénonciation des effets négatifs du système néolibéral. Il a désigné les compagnies multinationales et les institutions financières et commerciales – notamment le FMI, la Banque Mondiale et l'OMC – comme ses adversaires principaux.[6] Néanmoins, lorsqu'il s'agit d'instaurer une relation d'échanges et de dialogues politiques, l'état reste l'institution la plus légitime. Des états puissants peuvent bien évidemment emmener des pressions sur ces institutions, mais le fait que le mouvement doive passer par l'état rend la négociation encore plus complexe. Etant donné l'intérêt géopolitique et la croyance relativement généralisée sur la nature bienfaisante de l'économie de marché, on ne peut avoir aucune garantie concernant le soutien de ces états aux demandes du mouvement altermondialiste.

On constate notamment un manque de clarté et de détermination au sein du mouvement par rapport à la nature et à l'intensité des relations à entretenir avec les autorités. On observe surtout l'inquiétude permanente que ces dernières visent uniquement la cooptation du mouvement, voire son discrédit (surtout celui de ses dirigeants). Ces craintes, en grande partie légitimes, ont provoqué un certain repli du mouvement sur lui-même, même dans les occasions où des pourparlers se présentent naturellement. Voici un exemple: lorsque le président Chirac, souhaitant promouvoir son image internationale, a proposé la taxe aérienne, Attac France a gardé ses distances par rapport au projet, redoutant la récupération politique. Le résultat est que Attac France n'est pas un protagoniste dans cette initiative.[7]

De même, la structure et le fonctionnement des institutions politiques présentent de nombreux obstacles aux revendications émergeant des mouvements sociaux. Alberto Melucci, par exemple, présente le système dominant comme essentiellement hostile aux mouvements sociaux: celui-ci tente la plupart du temps de faire obstruer, de contenir et de réprimer l'action collective (Melucci, 1996: 301). Dans ce sens, les mouvements sociaux sont avant tout perçus par le système comme des 'fauteurs de troubles'. Par conséquent, si un mouvement social donné ne devenait suffisamment pas puissant pour menacer la base du système et les privilèges des élites, il aurait plus réellement obligation de dialogue de la part du système.

Cependant, aucun système ne peut rester entièrement monolithique en terme de composition sociale et d'intérêts. Certaines forces politiques au sein du système semblent plus tolérantes que d'autres ou partagent certaines valeurs de base avec les mouvements sociaux. D'autres trouvent un terrain commun pour leur accorder un certain degré de soutien. Il existe par ailleurs des forces sociales contestant le pouvoir depuis l'intérieur du système et qui peuvent s'aligner avec les mouvements sociaux afin d'atteindre leurs buts politiques. De toute façon, le monde politique est inévitablement très sensible à l'opinion publique (Guigni, 2004: 9). En conséquence, lorsqu'un mouvement attire un public assez large et que les médias se montrent intéressés, les autorités publiques sont automatiquement influencées. Bien évidemment, ce processus aboutit rarement à la formulation concrète de politiques publiques, et cette dynamique varie selon le contexte politique et culturel dans lequel naissent les mouvements sociaux, ainsi que selon le degré de souplesse politique des autorités publiques. En résumé, le soutien institutionnel des mouvements sociaux est une question complexe et peut rarement être garanti.

Conclusion

Dans le cas précis du mouvement altermondialiste et plus particulièrement en raison de son caractère réformiste, on peut présupposer que les propositions émergeant du mouvement tel que l'annulation de la dette du tiers monde, des échanges commerciaux plus favorables aux pays pauvres ou l'imposition mondiale pour des projets sociaux disposeraient de meilleures chances d'exécution par les cercles politiques et bureaucratiques. Cela leurs permettrait surtout de les élaborer et de les réaliser conjointement avec les groupes et les mouvements sociaux concernés. Cependant, il ne faut pas être naïf au point de croire que l'approbation de la substance du problème par le système signifierait automatiquement qu'on soit arrivé à un accord sur les moyens ou les méthodes à employer. Le sujet de la réduction de la dette en est un bon exemple: tous sont d'accord pour dénoncer l'injustice sociale et les difficultés économiques provoquées par l'endettement des pays en voie de développement, mais la façon de résoudre ce problème divise toujours les institutions financières, les gouvernements occidentaux et les mouvements sociaux. Pendant ce temps, les dettes de pays pauvres continuent de s'accroître – 2.5 fois plus en 2005 qu'en 1985 (Tagle et Patomäki, 2007: 1).

Certes, le mouvement altermondialiste, fragmenté en divers réseaux et sans une organisation cohérente, n'est pas bien placé pour conduire des négociations substantielles avec le pouvoir public. Mais il faut également insister sur le fait que le système pour sa part s'est montré peu accommodant envers les demandes modérées du mouvement. Il est certain que la proposition de l'imposition mondiale, le problème de la dette ou les régulations commerciales plus significatives évoquent des relations de puissance entre pays pauvres (emprunteurs) et pays riches (prêteurs). Le système présente des limites idéologiques, puisque la propriété privée et corporative, la libre circulation de flux de capitaux, l'investissement et le commerce accru tout comme les modes de consommation sont considérés comme inséparable du progrès social et de la prospérité économique. Il est donc assez inconfortable pour une structure bureaucratique de se montrer réceptive aux appels radicaux en intégrant les changements souhaités dans le processus de planification et l'attribution des

ressources. Toutefois, le point essentiel qui devrait être souligné est que même les appels du mouvement altermondialiste pour des réformes minimalistes et ne présentant aucune menace effective au système sont à peine entendus. Il est vrai que des partis politiques ont commencé à montrer de l'intérêt pour le mouvement, comme nous l'avons vu plus haut, mais les conséquences de cette évolution sur une éventuelle amélioration de la communication avec le système sont difficiles à évaluer. Dans l'ensemble, peu de décisions politiques concrètes ont été adoptées suite aux demandes avancées par le mouvement.

On peut donc affirmer que l'intérêt institutionnel pour l'altermondialisme ne se manifeste pas simplement parce qu'il y a des propositions, ou parce que le mouvement est clairement réformiste. Il s'exprime plutôt lorsqu'on observe une influence marquante du mouvement sur l'opinion publique. La hardiesse du mouvement a également provoqué un certain sentiment de crainte parmi les haut dirigeants politico-économiques – les obligeant ainsi à lui accorder une certaine attention. Le mouvement n'a cependant pas fait preuve d'une grande vigueur au cours des dernières années. De fait, les rassemblements altermondialistes comme le FSM attirent de moins en moins de participants. Le mouvement a atteint une étape où l'organisation de forums, de rencontres et d'échanges d'idées n'est plus suffisante. Des actions concrètes doivent être menées. Est-ce que ceci devrait impliquer une participation plus structurée au sein du système (par exemple en créant des alliances étroites avec des partis politiques ou en contestant directement des élections et en prenant des positions officielles)? Ou le mouvement devrait-il emprunter un chemin plus radical, comprenant des luttes politiques directes et plus structurées? Ce débat est déjà récurrent depuis quelques temps au sein du mouvement altermondialiste, et depuis le FSM de Nairobi en janvier 2007, on parle ouvertement de 'l'essoufflement', voire de la 'panne' du mouvement.[8] Manifestement, peu de chefs d'états ou de représentants de partis politiques ont exprimé de l'intérêt à l'égard de l'événement et le Forum économique de Davos n'a fait qu'écarter les thèmes sociaux abordés auparavant, comme la responsabilité sociale des entreprises, la pauvreté, la redistribution de la richesse, etc.

Faut-il conclure de ces observations que le rapport de force n'est plus en faveur du mouvement altermondialiste aujourd'hui et que les réponses institutionnelles vont encore faiblir? Notons que même si ces dernières restaient effectives, nous ne pourrions avoir la certitude que les changements liés à l'attitude officielle ou aux décisions politiques formelles n'affecteraient pas la santé générale du mouvement. Jusqu'ici le mouvement altermondialiste a maintenu son caractère autonome et sa structure 'informelle'. En évoluant vers une 'institutionnalisation' plus importante, il doit inéluctablement fonctionner dans une logique d'ONG nécessitant une structure administrative avec du personnel et un bâtiment. Cela requiert notamment de créer des activités dans un cadre 'politiquement convenable'. Cela nécessite également de chercher des fonds auprès des autorités pour assurer sa survie. La conséquence logique est que les autorités auront alors les moyens nécessaires pour 'coopter' plus facilement la branche réformiste du mouvement et écarter ou même criminaliser les radicaux. Le dilemme fondamental est que, malgré ces dangers de glissement du mouvement vers une *ongisation* et un contrôle officiel accru, sans alliances avec des forces étatiques et

Schéma 1: Un aperçu global des interactions entre les propositions altermondialistes et les établissements politiques et bureaucratiques

Campagne	Organisations principales	Base sociale	Revendications	Degré de contact avec les établissements	Tensions potentielles
Réduction de la dette	Jubilée 2000 et ses variantes	Eglises	Réduction et annulation de la dette	Contacts substantiels avec les partis chrétiens démocrates; déclarations de chefs d'état et gouvernements en faveur de la réduction de la dette lors de diverses réunions; participation d'ONG sur l'initiative de la FMI et de la Banque mondiale dans le cadre du projet de réduction de la dette pour les pays pauvres très endettés (PPTE)	Jusqu'à ici la réduction de la dette est limitée et même lorsque des annonces sont faites, l'exécution reste lente; la couverture médiatique accrue des déclarations fréquentes des gouvernements riches et des institutions internationales de financement donnent l'impression au public que le problème de la dette est largement résolu.
Changements des règles et des barrières du commerce international	Oxfam, Global South, Third World Network	ONG concernées par la justice sociale et économique	Démontellement des règles et des barrières commerciales injustes	L'influence significative du mouvement sur les médias, certains partis politiques et ministres du commerce; le mouvement reçoit un soutien financier des institutions publiques et des fondations philanthropiques	La 'campagne d'accès au marché' pour les produits du Sud d'Oxfam est soutenue par la plupart des pays en voie de développement et beaucoup d' ONG mais les gouvernements du Nord la trouvent exaspérante
Initiative d'imposition mondiale	Attac	Économistes et institutions de développement anti-néolibéraux	Impôt universel sur les devises étrangères pour décourager les spéculations et la volatilité financière et pour créer une source de financement public pour le développement social	ONG qui ont participé aux groupes de travail pour élaborer diverses idées, projets et législations sur des impositions mondiales avec des gouvernements, des partis politiques, des parlements et des agences bi et multilatérales	Les gouvernements européens hésitent à pleinement approuver l'imposition mondiale par crainte du mouvement de capitaux et l'opposition des Etats-Unis; même en cas de promulgation de certaines législations et d'appui institutionnel, les projets qui devraient réellement mettre en œuvre ces mesures restent complètement flous
Commerce équitable	Fédération internationale du commerce alternatif, Association européenne de commerce équitable, Réseaux européens de magasins du monde, Organisation internationale du commerce équitable de 'labellisateurs'	Consommateurs aisés et socialement avertis	Orientations plus responsables des consommateurs et expression d'appui vers les producteurs et leur environnement	Les divers gouvernements et les établissements de distribution ont montré de l'intérêt pour des projets de commerce équitable	Les tensions sont probables lorsque le commerce équitable commence à tenir un important pourcentage des parts de marché et que les gouvernements et multinationales tentent d'influencer ce secteur avec davantage d'investissements et le contrôle politique.

des dirigeants progressistes, il est difficile de concevoir des transformations sociales prépondérantes. C'est à ce stade que les incertitudes, voire les périls, subsistent.

L'expérience du mouvement altermondialiste nous montre qu'il est, en dernier ressort, semblable à beaucoup d'autres mouvements sociaux qui doivent nécessairement gérer ces tensions vis-à-vis du système avec des conséquences hautement incertaines d'abord pour la santé générale du mouvement lui-même et puis pour les transformations sociales convoitées. Le mouvement l'altermondialiste reste singulièrement compliqué car il est constitué d'un réseau nonstructuré représentant de divers groupes d'individus et organisations avec des priorités idéologiques souvent divergentes. Comme constaté auparavant, ses alliances avec des forces et des institutions externes subsiste vastement embrouillées – surtout avec les partis politiques. Notons surtout que, cette situation demeure malgré que mouvement ait prit des importantes dispositions réformistes. Le risque encore plus fatal serait évidement que le mouvement s'affronte des nouvelles difficultés dans la mobilisation des organisations associatives et des milieux populaires du Nord comme Sud, et qu'il n'arrive pas dénoncer vigoureusement les effets malfaisants du système néolibéral.

Que signifie tout cela en termes d'observations finales? Il signifie tout simplement que le mouvement altermondialiste malgré son identité avérée avec d'une certaine capacité de mobilisations et d'avancer des propositions précises et mesuré, n'est réellement pas en mesure d'imposer ces revendications auprés le pouvoir public et forces sociales dominantes et de produire des résultats escompté. La conjoncture actuelle donne à ces derniers la possibilité de sélectionner les propositions altermondialistes, ainsi que l'ampleur des réformes à effectuer au gré de ses propres priorités. En conclusion, on pourrait dire en effet que le 'système' ne se sent guère menacé par les demandes altermondialistes et, l'institutionnalisation accrue du mouvement, laisse présager de nouveaux pièges, d'où la nécessite de nuancer et de stimuler davantage d'analyses et réflexions sur le mouvement.

Notes

1. Analysés par les sociologues européens dans le passé, voir pour une plus ample explication (Nevue, 2000: 66-74).
2. Malgré cela, l'impact politique de cette petite minorité composée d'anarchistes, de l'extrême gauche, de syndicalistes militants, d'écologistes radicaux, etc., qui veulent que le système capitaliste soit plus au moins anéanti, ne doit pas être sous-estimé, car par leur militantisme, les demandes avancées par le camp 'réformiste' sont souvent mieux écoutées par le système.
3. A la hauteur d'un demi-million d'Euros (Jaigu, 2003).
4. Outre l'attribution d'un demi-million d'Euros par le gouvernement français comme indiqué auparavant, la municipalité socialiste de Paris a offert une million d'Euros et divers appuis logistiques ont été fournis par les maires communistes de quatre municipalités périphériques où la plupart de événements du forum ont été organisés (Jaigu, 2003).
5. Le chef de l'Attac France Jacques Nikonoff.
6. Considérés souvent fondamental en formation de l'identité collective et pour désigner un adversaire (voir Melucci, 1985 : 789-816).
7. Cette inquiétude de récupération politique d'ailleurs persiste même envers les partis politiques qui soutiennent ouvertement le mouvement, par exemple les partis de gauches ou les verts.

8. Le FSM a publié d'une série d'articles suite à son septième édition à Nairobi accordant une grande place à ces questions.

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Population Projections for Malawi and its Regions, 1998-2023

Abstract

The main objective of this paper is to critically evaluate the most recent projections prepared by the National Statistical Office (NSO) and provide alternative projections for Malawi. The Epidemic Projection Package (EPP) developed by UNAIDS and the SPECTRUM programme developed by the Futures Group were used to model the Malawian HIV epidemic, to project future trends in HIV/AIDS and population and to estimate the demographic impact of AIDS. The national HIV prevalence surveys among pregnant women from 1985 to 2000 served as the data sets used to calibrate the input HIV prevalence values for the model, while demographic data obtained from the 1998 Malawi Population and Housing Census acted as a base for population projections. The results indicate that the population of Malawi will continue to grow despite the negative impact of HIV/AIDS epidemic. The population of Malawi is expected to increase from 9.92 million in 1998 to 13.52 in 2010 and to 16.84 million in 2020. The population projections presented in this study are not about predicting the future so much as they are about exploring the consequences of today's trends. These are intended to show what the future will look like if today's trends continue for the next decade or two. As in the case of Malawi, the predicted future is sufficiently undesirable that it should serve to focus our attention on implementing programmes today that will protect people from HIV infection and promise a brighter future.

Introduction

Population projection is a scientific attempt to peep into the future population scenario, conditioned by making certain assumptions, using data relating to the past available at that point of time. Predicting the future course of human fertility, mortality and migration is not easy, especially when looking beyond much further in time. Medical and health intervention strategies, food production and its equitable availability, climatic variability, socio-cultural setting, political economic conditions and a host of other factors influence population dynamics, making it a somewhat unpredictable exercise. Therefore, caution must be exercised when either making or using the population projections, and the context of various conditions imposed should not be lost sight of on the basis of past behaviour and the likely future scenario assumed.

Different population projections at the country level are made by the Government and National and International agencies from time to time. In addition, individual demographers make projections for the country as a whole and sometimes at the sub-national level. The international agencies that make projections for the world as a whole and for individual countries are the United Nations Population Division, the

World Bank and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) etc., (see for example, United Nations, 2003). One major problem with population projections by international organisations is the need to come up with comparable statistics. A recent report from the US Bureau of Census notes: 'Not only must the assumptions be appropriate for the particular country in question, but consistent assumptions must be made when projections are carried out for more than one country'.

For Malawi, with an apparent high population growth rate, continued high but slowly declining fertility, worsening mortality due to HIV/AIDS epidemic, young age structure, recurrent drought and associated famine, rampant poverty and its ongoing social, economic and political changes, the need of population projections cannot be overemphasised. With decentralisation process there is a need to come up with population data at regional, district and sub district levels.

The paper intends to achieve two objectives. First, to review the existing population projections especially those prepared by the National Statistical Office (NSO).[1] Second, to prepare fresh population projections for Malawi using 1998 as a base.

This paper commences with an overview of population projections in Malawi including a brief discussion of the weaknesses of existing population projections. This is followed by a review of existing population projections of the population of Malawi and a discussion of the method used for the projections in this publication.

Population Projections in Malawi

Population projection methodologies vary widely in terms of degree of sophistication, data requirements and detail of results. There is not any methodology that can be considered to yield absolute error-free results. It should be noted that the accuracy of the projections does not only depend on the calculations involved, but also on the assumptions underlying future levels of fertility, mortality and migration as well as on the accuracy of the base year population data.

Since the mid-1980s, NSO has prepared four sets of population projections (Malawi Government, 1984, 1994, 2002, 2003). The first detailed sets of official national population projections were prepared by the NSO in 1984 based on the 1977 census (Malawi Government, 1984). These were based on three differing fertility assumptions and two mortality assumptions. In particular, fertility was assumed to remain constant; to decline at a slow pace and to decline at a fast pace. Mortality was assumed to remain constant and to continue to decline at a slow pace. In either case, international migration was assumed to be negligible. Surprisingly, even at a time when this assumption was being made, some Mozambican refugees were trekking into Malawi! The NSO recommended that constant fertility and slow decline in mortality scenario should be used for planning as it was deemed to be realistic.

The second set was prepared in 1994 using the 1987 census as a base (Malawi Government, 1994). In this case three sets of projections were introduced to cover the period 1987 to 2012.

The projections were based on one mortality assumption (slow decline) and three fertility assumptions (constant, slow decline and fast decline). The variant based on slow decline in fertility and slow decline in mortality was recommended for planning

purposes. The only problem with this set of projections is the fact they did not implicitly take AIDS assumption into account.

The third set was prepared in 2002 based on the 1998 census and was later revised in 2003 to incorporate region and district level projections (Malawi Government, 2003). This set of population projections covered the period 1998-2023. The projections were produced using RUPMENU and RUPAGG programmes developed by the US Bureau of the Census (Arriaga, E.E. et al.,1994). However, based on the belief that the results of the 1998 census were affected by HIV/AIDS, this set of projections was prepared using the 1977 as population estimates.

The 2003 set of projections contain a number of problems. First, it is usually advisable that whenever one is preparing population projections one should formulate several scenarios. This was done in projections based on the 1977 and 1987 censuses (Malawi Government, 1984, 1994). In this case only one scenario was produced. Why was this case?

Second, the 1987-1998 inter-censal population growth rate was two percent per annum. This was believed to be an underestimate by many researchers (see for example, Palamuleni, 2002). To date, NSO has not yet explained why this was the case. Surprisingly, the 2003 NSO projections estimated that the population growth rate in Malawi was 3.32 percent. Surely there is a need to explain why this is the case.

Third, if you calculate percentage distribution by Region and districts for the projected population once notices that the percentage distribution for the population in Northern Region declines from 10 percent in 1999 to 9 percent in 2023. This is not consistent with the trend observed since independence in 1964 and not in line with expectations. On the one hand the preparation of projections at districts and regional levels is commendable. On the other hand are the projection results realistic? One wonders.

Fourth, the set provides projections for the four major cities. This is commendable. However, there is no discussion on how were the cities were projected.

Fifth, both international migration and internal migration were assumed to be zero. For international migration probably this is acceptable. But for internal migration this is not realistic. Internal migration should not be assumed to be zero. It is true to say that migration assumptions are the most difficult to include in any population projection. As such most available sets of projections at national level assume that the net international migration in zero. At district and regional levels it is not safe to make this assumption as evidence suggests that there is a lot of movement taking place at these levels. The fact that the 1998 census did not collect information on migration is not sufficient reason to ignore migration in the estimating future population sizes of the country and its subdivisions. There are some indirect estimation procedures that could be used to gauge the nature and patterns of internal migration in the country.

Sixth, the projected estimates of fertility and mortality are not consistent with other available and accepted estimates. The analytical report indicates that the Total Fertility Rate for Malawi in 1998 was 6.5 children per woman. On the other hand, the results of the projections suggest that in 1999 the TFR was 6.7. Does this mean that fertility is increasing in Malawi? What was the TFR estimate for 1998 used in the projections? The same can be said of mortality estimates. The analytical report suggests a reported

CDR of 20.9 whereas the projected CDR for 1999 is 23.1. Does this indicate worsening of mortality conditions in Malawi?

Furthermore, another problem with the NSO projections is associated with the fact that no explanation is made regarding how the initial estimates of fertility and mortality were calculated. It is mentioned that 'life tables for the districts were used', but no mention is made on how these life tables were calculated. Closer examination of the expectation of life by districts suggests that reported life tables were used. If this is the case has Malawi reached that stage when we can completely trust the reported mortality statistics? Furthermore it is mentioned in the report that in some districts 'expectation of life at birth was so low that national estimates were used'. What does this tell us about the quality of mortality data?

Why did the NSO use the 'P/F Trussell Variate' to estimate fertility when the analytical report of the 1998 census used the Gompertz Relational model? This also leads to another related problem which any student of the demography of Malawi should take note.

Lastly, the population projections did not take HIV/AIDS into account. In the section that described the methodology followed in projecting the population the only reference to HIV/AIDS was made as follows: 'As the Malawi population is greatly impacted with the HIV/AIDS, there is no doubt that the mortality measures calculated for 1998 are affected by this impact. Malawi has experienced declining life expectancy at birth from around 49 years observed in 1987 to around 42 in 1998. The present projection assumes that this trend will be reversed due to reduced incidence of new cases as the various awareness campaigns leads to changes in behaviour and those affected die off'.

From the inconsistencies presented above one thing is clear: 'little is known about the demography of Malawi'. In particular there is a need for more studies on the population of Malawi in order to establish the levels, trends and differentials in fertility, mortality and migration. This calls for more demographers interested in the population of Malawi to critically evaluate the existing demographic data and establish the nature and patterns of demographic variables. It is for this reason that another set of population projections in Malawi was prepared. The exercise was carried out not to duplicate the work of NSO but to present a more plausible scenario since the projections were found to deficient in a number of ways. In order to come up with plausible assumptions it was felt necessary to re-examine the existing knowledge of the components of population growth in Malawi.

Components of Population Growth

The population of any given area can change as a result of people being born into that population (fertility); people dying (mortality), people moving out of a given area (emigration/out-migration) and people moving into a given area (immigration/in-migration). Before one prepares population projections one has to have a good understanding of the levels and trends in fertility, mortality and migration. In this section, we will examine each of these factors in some detail.

Fertility

It is generally accepted that, like in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, fertility in Malawi is declining (Malawi Government, 1994; Palamuleni 2002). However, the

nature, pattern, causes and consequences of this trend are not yet fully determined. To an inquisitive researcher several questions come to mind. What has been the role of the family planning programme or the population policy in influencing fertility decline in Malawi? Is the rate of decline the same throughout the country? At what pace is fertility declining? Has fertility decline reached the ten percent cut-off usually associated with incipient decline? It is important that these questions are answered now before any meaningful assumptions regarding future trends in fertility can be made.

Any demography student conversant with the theory of demographic transition would certainly believe that the modest gains in social and economic development Malawi achieved during the thirty years of political independence would translate into fertility decline. In an attempt to establish future trends of fertility we explored several possibilities. First we examined the trend of fertility between the 1997 and 1987 censuses. During this period, the available statistics indicate that fertility declined from 7.6 to 7.4 children per woman, implying that TFR declined by three percent in ten years. Assuming that this trend will continue in future (1987 onwards) TFR would be 7.2 in 1998 and reach 6.7 in 2020. In addition, with this rate of fertility decline, fertility will reach replacement level in 2250. However studies suggest that fertility decline in Malawi was much faster than this since TFR was found to be 6.7 in 1992 and 6.5 in 1998 (Malawi Government, 1994, 2002). Second, the trend of fertility between 1987 and 1998 was examined. During this period fertility declined from 7.4 to 6.5 children per woman, implying that TFR declined by twelve percent in eleven years. Third, the trend of fertility between 1992 and 2000 was examined. During this period fertility declined from 6.7 to 6.4 children per woman implying that TFR declined by twelve percent in eight years and replacement level fertility would be reached in 2115.

The question that remains is which of these scenarios is plausible for Malawi. This question is not that simple. The answer depends on a number of factors all of which are beyond the control of an ordinary demographer and relate to the nature and pattern of social and economic development the country will follow: political situation, good governance, developmental programmes include poverty alleviation, family planning, HIV/AIDS and other reproductive health initiatives, climatic changes, drought and associate food shortages, just to mention a few.

Mortality

Like fertility, mortality can either lead to an increase or decrease in the population of any given area. Other things being equal, if mortality conditions are worsening the population of any given area will decline and vice versa. In this case, it is important to find out the levels and trends of mortality in Malawi.

A number of mortality studies conducted in the country indicate that mortality rates declined during the period after independence to the late-1980s (Malawi Government, 1984, 1994; Ndawala, 1989, 1994; Palamuleni, 1987, 1993, 1994). Thereafter, differing opinions emerge. On the one hand, there are those that suggest a continuation of mortality decline but at a reduced pace (Malawi Government, 1994). On the other hand, some commentators have suggested an increase in mortality. This has largely been attributed to the AIDS epidemic.

The effect of AIDS on the projected population of Malawi remains a debatable subject. First, there are studies that indicate that the population of Malawi will not be

greatly affected by AIDS (House and Zimalirana 1992). Second, there are those that argue that the population of Malawi will greatly be affected by the AIDS epidemic, to such an extent that life expectancy will decline to 39 years (World Bank, n.d.; UNDP, n.d.; USAID, n.d.).There is no doubt that AIDS will affect the population of Malawi.

Migration

Another factor worth examining is migration. Two forms of migration are important, namely internal and international migration. When examining this factor it is always important to remember that from early last century Malawians have tended to move to more remunerative places such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana. At the same time, the country has played host to people from Mozambique (Palamuleni 1992). There is no doubt that the magnitude of international emigration has decreased drastically from the mid-1970s. However as a result of the forces of globalisation, some other patterns have emerged. One notable feature of the new emigration patterns is that of skilled professionals (also known as the brain drain): doctors, nurses, university lecturers, etc., and this trend is likely to increase. However, the numbers involved are relatively small.

In terms of immigration Malawi has played host to thousands of Mozambican fleeing from an oppressive colonial government, a war of liberation and armed conflicts within the country. This led to an influx of refuges in the mid-1980s. However, these refugees were repatriated in the early-1990s. The impact of these immigrants on the social, economic and demographic situation in Malawi are well documented and need not be repeated here. But it suffices to note that the refugees were included in population projections. As a result of this a somewhat large population estimate is expected. The impact of refugees on the Malawian population varies from one area to another as the available evidence indicates that some districts recorded more refugees than others. At regional level it could be demonstrated that the Southern Region was the most affected followed by the Central Region with Northern Region being least affected (Palamuleni, 2002, 2005).

Population projection methodology used in this study

The cohort component method was used for projecting the population of Malawi. In each scenario two steps were followed. First, population projections were prepared for the whole country. Second, projections were made for the each of the three regions separately and the sum of the three yielded projections for the Republic of Malawi.

As the name itself implies, the methodology first requires projections of the components of population growth, namely fertility, mortality and migration. Once the future levels and patterns of fertility, mortality and migration are obtained, these are used in conjunction with a base population to obtain the projected population.

SPECTRUM software that was developed by the Futures Group was used to project the population of Malawi (Stover, 1999; Stover, Kirmeyer 1999). Two modules of SPECTRUM have been used, DemProj and AIM (AIDS Impact Model). DemProj projects the population by age and sex and displays a full range of demographic indicators while AIM calculates the number of people infected with HIV, AIDS cases, AIDS deaths, AIDS orphans and other consequences of AIDS. The AIM model includes a calculation of infected children. The model calculates the number of

infected children from the age-specific infection rates among women, the age-specific fertility rates, the perinatal transmission rate, the non-AIDS age-specific death rates and the distribution of the time from birth to AIDS death for infected new-borns.

Base data

Every population projection has a starting point that is usually the date for which the requisite data on the total population by age and sex are available. In the case of the population projections presented in this publication, the most recent census, the 1998 Malawi Population and Housing census, was used as the base data. This means that the year 1998 was used as a starting point of the projections. The reported age-sex distributions were adjusted using a PAS spreadsheet AGESMTH (Arriaga, E. E. et al., 1994). The smoothed age-sex distributions based on the Arriaga Method were adopted (Arriaga, E. E. et al., 1994).

Projection Assumptions

Fertility Assumption

SPECTRUM requires TFR assumptions for each year over the projection period as well as the distribution of the fertility by age group of the women. The UN sub-Saharan fertility pattern was used.

Mortality Assumptions

SPECTRUM requires assumptions about male and female life expectancy at birth for each year over the projection period. The North family of the Coale-Demeny model life table was used. Assumptions with regard to life expectancy at birth were made by using the UN working mortality model for mortality improvement according to the initial level of mortality. For countries with life expectancy at birth below 55, eo is expected to increase by 2.5 years every five years.

Migration Assumptions

The available studies on migration in Malawi indicate that Southern Region has been experiencing net out-migration whereas the Central Region has been experiencing net in-migration, and the Northern Region has moved from being a net sender to a net receiver (Palamuleni, 2005). In view of the above it was assumed that Southern Region would be losing 5000 people a year, of whom 2000 would go to the Northern Region and the reminder to Central Region.

HIV/AIDS Assumptions

The Estimation and Projection Package (EPP) is used to estimate and project adult HIV prevalence from surveillance data. The input to EPP is surveillance data from various sites and years showing HIV prevalence among pregnant women. EPP is used to fit a simple epidemic model to data from urban and rural sites. The prevalence projection produced by EPP can be transferred to Spectrum to calculate the number of people infected, AIDS cases, AIDS-related deaths, etc. EPP was developed by the UNAIDS Reference Group on estimates, models and projections and programmed at the East West Center.

Data for the EPP that were used to prepare inputs for the regions AIMs were taken from various ANC sero-prevalence surveys conducted in Malawi starting in 1990. In the case of the 2001 data, we took the reported prevalence rates that were used in preparing state-level estimates of the HIV positive urban and rural populations and calculated the weighted averages for prevalence in each state. The resulting curve for the trend in prevalence that was fitted to the EPP was checked to make it fall as close as possible between 1999 and 2001 figures.

The prediction is that the prevalence of HIV rose rapidly from the late 1980s to a peak of 11 percent in 2000, declining thereafter only slightly with prevalence of around ten percent by 2024. The predicted levelling off of the epidemic is a result of saturation of the most susceptible group in the population. This is explained by the fact that entry of new uninfected group members and exit of infected members due to death and migration could cause equilibrium to be reached. This, however, does not mean that the incidence of HIV is zero; this simply implies that new cases are balanced by death and migration.

Results

Population growth and population size

Table 1 presents the results of projecting the population of Malawi based on the medium scenario as described above. The population of Malawi is expected to increase from 9.92 million in 1998 to 13.52 in 2010 and to 16.84 million in 2020. It is projected that the population of the Northern Region increase from 1.23 million in 1998 to 1.73 million in 2010 and will reach 2.37 million in 2023. In addition, the population of the Central Region is projected to increase from 4.06 million in 1998 to 5.93 million in 2010 and will reach 8.5 million in 2023, while the population of the Southern Region is projected to increase from 4.63 million in 1998 to 5.86 million in 2010 and will reach 7.17 million in 2023. Table 2 provides a summary of the most recent projections of the population of Malawi.

Table 1 indicates that population projections by NSO are lower that those produced by the US Bureau of Census and United Nations up to 2005 and thereafter the opposite is true. Also projections based on the US Bureau of Census and United Nations are close to each other although the former are lower than the latter. Overall, in the 'short run', there seems to be consensus amongst the various demographers about the future size of the population of Malawi. However, significant differences emerge in the 'long run'. These differences can be attributed to the fact that the various projections are based on difference sets of assumptions regarding fertility, mortality and migration as well as on different sets of base data.

Sex and age structure

The sex ratio of the population is expected to continuously increase from 96 males per 100 females in 1998 to 99 in 2010 and 101 in 2023. This could be attributed to higher mortality prevailing among females that is assumed to continue in future. The projections also indicate a continuation in the process of ageing. The proportion of the population under 15 years of age will increase from 44 percent in 1998 to 46 percent in 2013, before gradually declining to 45 percent in 2023. This means that during the period under review the population of Malawi will still be youthful. Other things being

equal, this is the direct consequence of the slow decline in fertility in the projected period.

The proportion of the elderly aged 65 years and over is projected to decline from 3.88 percent in 1998 to 2.6 in 2010 and to 2.6 in 2023. In absolute numbers, there will be around 46,5000 persons eligible for old age pension in 2023 against some 38,5000 in 1998.

The median age of the population is expected to decrease from 18 years in 1998 to 17 years in 2010. Thereafter the median age is expected to remain constant at 18 years.

Vital rates

The crude birth rate is expected to fall from 52.7 live births per 1,000 population in 1998 to 45.6 in 2010 and around 41.6 in 2023. The crude death rate will decrease from 24.7 to 23.6 in 2010 and 19.6 in 2023. The AIDS epidemic is known to have a substantial impact on adult mortality and also life expectancy. As a result of HIV/AIDS, life expectancy for males is expected to have dropped by three years in 2003, nine years in 2013 and 12 years in 2023 compared to what it would have been in the absence of the HIV epidemic. Similar values for females are 5, 13 and 15 years respectively. These figures suggest that the demographic impacts of AIDS are more serious among the female population than the male population.

Discussion

This study presented alternative population projections for Malawi and its regions. It also addressed the demographic impact of AIDS in the country. Malawi is unique as it combines a severe epidemic of HIV with one of the highest TFR on the continent. In such context, the rate of natural increase of population is expected to continue being positive.

One may first question the validity of the TFR estimated during the various surveys used for references in this study. The continued increase of the population pyramid among those aged less than ten years suggests a very little decrease in fertility rate in the past decade. In addition, some important changes are taking place in Malawi in the past one and half decades and some of these changes may contribute to the decrease in fertility. Chief among these is the high rate of contraceptive prevalence among sexually active women. Although previous data on contraceptive use are scanty, the use is expected to be much lower than the current rate. Available statistics seem to suggest a very small change in age at marriage (mean age at marriage increased from 17 years in 1977 to 18 years in 1998), a rise in the proportion of unmarried women at the age of 30 years (from seven percent in 1974 to 42 percent in 1995).

The estimates used for the prevalence of HIV and its projections are based on solid data and are quite conservative. Available data indicate a stabilisation of HIV prevalence rates in Malawi in the second half of the 1990s in accordance with the model used in this study.

According to reports by the US Census Bureau, population growth rates will remain positive in all sub-Saharan African countries but will be reduced significantly due to AIDS. For all 21 sub-Saharan African countries, the annual rate of population growth from 1990 to 1995 will be 2.2 percent rather than the 2.6 percent that would be projected without AIDS.

The last important component of the population growth rate is migration. It is, perhaps, the most difficult one to apprehend as quality data on its magnitude are rare and as predictions are almost impossible to make. Migration was usually ignored in previous modelling work aimed at national predictions on the assumption that most migrations occur within countries and that the balance across countries might be zero. The situation is clearly different for most sub-national populations such as regions or provinces, districts and cities, which experience high positive net migration rates.

In conclusion, the present study provides an insight into the demographic impact of AIDS in a high-fertility urban setting of Africa. Most importantly, the study revealed that, in a high-fertility society like Malawi, population growth will still be positive. This means that as more attention and resources are diverted to combat HIV/AIDS, a focus should also be on the negative impacts of the ever-present rapid population growth.

In addition, the study revealed that the epidemic has already had a significant demographic impact on the population of Malawi and will have even greater impact in the future. However, the future course of the epidemic and its demographic consequences could be altered through effective interventions, such as behavioural change toward safe sex, control of sexually transmitted diseases, and interventions for reducing mother-to-child transmission.

Notes

1. The National Statistical Office (NSO) is a government department responsible for collecting, analyzing and disseminating population data through demographic surveys and censuses. As such the population projections produced by NSO represents the 'official' projections of the country.

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Table 1: Projections Assumptions for Malawi and its Regions, 1998-2023

		1998	2003	2008	2013	2018	2023
Fertility	Malawi	6.5	6.3	6.0	5.8	5.5	5.3
	NR	6.5	6.3	6.0	5.8	5.5	5.3
	CR	7.1	6.8	6.6	6.3	6.1	5.8
	SR	6.1	5.9	5.7	5.4	5.2	5.0
Mortality (M)	Malawi	40.1	42.6	45.1	47.6	50.1	52.6
	NR	43.3	45.8	48.3	50.8	53.3	55.8
	CR	44.0	46.5	49.0	51.5	54.0	56.5
	SR	34.3	36.8	39.3	41.8	44.3	46.8
Mortality (F)	Malawi	43.2	45.7	48.2	50.7	53.2	55.7
	NR	49.5	52.0	54.5	57.0	59.5	62.0
	CR	51.0	53.5	56.0	58.5	61.0	63.5
	SR	40.3	42.8	45.3	47.8	50.3	52.8
Migration	Malawi	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	NR	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000
	CR	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000
	SR	-5000	-5000	-5000	-5000	-5000	-5000
HIV/AIDS	Malawi	14.5	14.8	13.5	13.2	13.3	12.9
	NR	11.5	13.0	12.0	11.4	11.6	11.5
	CR	9.4	11.0	10.4	9.9	10.0	9.9
	SR	19.7	18.7	16.9	17.0	17.2	16.7

Table 2: Projected Population for Malawi and Regions, 1998-2023 (No migration)

		Population in Million						
	Malawi	NR	CR	SR	Malawi	NR	CR	SR
1998	9.9	1.2	4.1	4.6	100.0	12.4	41.0	46.6
1999	10.2	1.3	4.2	4.7	100.0	12.4	41.2	46.3
2000	10.5	1.3	4.4	4.8	100.0	12.5	41.5	46.0
2001	10.8	1.4	4.5	4.9	100.0	12.5	41.7	45.8
2002	11.1	1.4	4.7	5.0	100.0	12.5	42.0	45.5
2003	11.4	1.4	4.8	5.2	100.0	12.6	42.2	45.2
2004	11.7	1.5	5.0	5.3	100.0	12.6	42.5	45.0
2005	12.0	1.5	5.1	5.4	100.0	12.7	42.6	44.7
2006	12.3	1.6	5.3	5.5	100.0	12.7	42.9	44.4
2007	12.6	1.6	5.4	5.6	100.0	12.7	43.1	44.2
2008	12.9	1.7	5.6	5.7	100.0	12.8	43.4	43.9
2009	13.2	1.7	5.8	5.8	100.0	12.8	43.6	43.6
2010	13.5	1.7	5.9	5.9	100.0	12.8	43.9	43.3
2011	13.8	1.8	6.1	6.0	100.0	12.9	44.1	43.0
2012	14.1	1.8	6.3	6.1	100.0	12.9	44.3	42.8
2013	14.4	1.9	6.4	6.1	100.0	12.9	44.6	42.5
2014	14.8	1.9	6.6	6.2	100.0	12.9	44.8	42.2
2015	15.1	2.0	6.8	6.3	100.0	12.9	45.1	42.0
2016	15.4	2.0	7.0	6.4	100.0	13.0	45.3	41.7
2017	15.8	2.1	7.2	6.5	100.0	13.0	45.6	41.4
2018	16.1	2.1	7.4	6.6	100.0	13.0	45.8	41.2
2019	16.5	2.2	7.6	6.7	100.0	13.1	46.1	40.9
2020	16.8	2.2	7.8	6.8	100.0	13.1	46.3	40.6
2021	17.2	2.3	8.0	7.0	100.0	13.1	46.6	40.3
2022	17.6	2.3	8.3	7.1	100.0	13.1	46.9	40.0
2023	18.1	2.4	8.5	7.2	100.0	13.1	47.1	39.8

Table 3: Projected Population for Malawi and Regions, 1998-2023 (with migration)

	Malawi	NR	CR	SR	Malawi	NR	CR	SR
1998	9.9	1.2	4.1	4.6	100.0	12.4	41.0	46.6
1999	10.2	1.3	4.2	4.7	100.0	12.5	41.2	46.2
2000	10.5	1.3	4.4	4.8	100.0	12.6	41.5	45.9
2001	10.8	1.4	4.5	4.9	100.0	12.7	41.8	45.6
2002	11.1	1.4	4.7	5.0	100.0	12.8	42.0	45.2
2003	11.4	1.5	4.8	5.1	100.0	12.8	42.3	44.9
2004	11.7	1.5	5.0	5.2	100.0	12.9	42.6	44.5
2005	12.0	1.6	5.2	5.3	100.0	13.0	42.8	44.2
2006	12.3	1.6	5.3	5.4	100.0	13.0	43.0	43.9
2007	12.7	1.7	5.5	5.5	100.0	13.1	43.3	43.6
2008	13.0	1.7	5.6	5.6	100.0	13.2	43.5	43.3
2009	13.3	1.8	5.8	5.7	100.0	13.3	43.8	43.0
2010	13.6	1.8	6.0	5.8	100.0	13.3	44.0	42.6
2011	13.9	1.9	6.2	5.9	100.0	13.4	44.3	42.3

2012	14.2	1.9	6.3	6.0	100.0	13.5	44.5	42.0
2013	14.5	2.0	6.5	6.1	100.0	13.6	44.8	41.7
2014	14.8	2.0	6.7	6.1	100.0	13.6	45.0	41.3
2015	15.2	2.1	6.9	6.2	100.0	13.7	45.3	41.0
2016	15.5	2.1	7.1	6.3	100.0	13.7	45.5	40.7
2017	15.9	2.2	7.3	6.4	100.0	13.8	45.8	40.4
2018	16.2	2.2	7.5	6.5	100.0	13.8	46.1	40.1
2019	16.6	2.3	7.7	6.6	100.0	13.9	46.3	39.8
2020	17.0	2.4	7.9	6.7	100.0	13.9	46.6	39.5
2021	17.4	2.4	8.1	6.8	100.0	14.0	46.8	39.2
2022	17.8	2.5	8.4	6.9	100.0	14.0	47.1	38.9
2023	18.2	2.6	8.6	7.0	100.0	14.1	47.4	38.5

Table 4: Comparisons of Different Sets of Projections

		US	UN	NSO
2000	10.5	11.3	11.5	10.5
2005	12.0	12.7	12.9	12.3
2010	13.5	14.3	14.3	14.6
2015	15.0	16.1	16.0	17.0
2020	16.7	18.0	17.8	20.1
2025	17.8	20.0	19.7	22.2

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The Intellectual Dimensions of Corruption in Nigeria

Abstract

Against the background of the deepening crisis of the Nigerian academy, this paper undertakes a critical analysis of the intellectual dimensions of corruption in Nigeria. It argues that the incorporation of the academy, particularly its intellectual components, into the 'corruption enterprise' has impacted on corruption discourses and analyses – most notably the polarisation into two realms, the public and the private. This characterisation represents in itself a distinct dimension of intellectual corruption, apart from its other forms as analysed in the paper. This development has had negative implications for both state and society, particularly on their democratisation and developmental drives through the reversal and perversion of routinised academic culture of quality teaching, research and publication. Unless critical measures are taken to sanitise the Nigerian academy within a broader framework of a reformist state, the crisis of the academy being a reflection of the deepening crisis of the state, the paper submits that corruption analysis and their outcomes may not advance the anti-corruption crusade of government.

Introduction

Corruption is unarguably one of the most topical issues in the discourses of the deepening crisis and contradictions of post-independence Nigeria. The level of attention devoted to it may not only be due to its rapid and unprecedented expansion to all facet of human endeavour and its menacing consequences, but also because of the seeming fecklessness of successive attempts at combating it. The problem has become so endemic that, as the present writer (Omotola 2006; 2004) has pointed out, one can begin to talk about the political culture of corruption in the country. To be sure, Transparency International, an international non-governmental organisation that is reputed for its exploits in its measurement of countries' Corruption Perception Index, ranked Nigeria as the most corrupt among the 52 countries ranked in 1996 and 1997. This could be regarded as of little significance as the country was then under the firm authoritarian grip of the military. The hope that the advent of democracy in 1999 would mark an appreciable breakaway from the past, including the country's perennial problem of corruption, largely remains in the pipeline. Nigeria, in what seems senseless squandering of hopes, ranked as the most corrupt in 2002, the second most corrupt in 2003, and the third most corrupt in 2004 (Omotola, 2006). These findings point to the fact that the anti-corruption war has hardly made a positive impact in the country perhaps due to the depth of the phenomenon.

Although the monumental upsurge in corruption has been accompanied by a corresponding emergence and growth of academic scholarship on the subject, it is

however a development that presents us with a paradox. While scholars have undertaken to unravel the causes, consequences and possible solutions of corruption, discourses on its intellectual dimensions are still far from crystallising. The result is that analyses of corruption in Nigeria tend to be undertaken in two realms. These are the public (others) and private (we) realms, the former connoting the government and characterised by strong radicalism and the latter representing essentially the academic community but not limited to it and characterised by liberal tendencies in analyses. There are, however, some notable exemptions to this latter categorisation (for example, Social Science Academy of Nigeria, SSAN, 2002; 2004). In spite of its concern, the SSAN would appear to have been mostly interested in the general theme of the governance of higher education in Nigeria, with occasional inputs on ethical issues and corruption in the ivory tower. As it rightly noted in an editorial comment: 'Nigeria's educational system is presently in a deep, infectious and outrageous crisis that cries, loudly and painfully, for attention' (SSAN, 2001: ii). Ever since and even before, the SSAN has continued to devote a substantial portion of its resources to the challenges posed by the crisis of the Nigerian academy.

Against the background of this renewed concerned about the deepening crisis of the Nigerian academy, this paper critically examines the phenomenon of corruption in the academy, with emphasis on its intellectual dimensions, which seem so far to have eluded serious attention. It is this obviously yawning gap and how to fill it that this study addresses. In it, we argue that the incorporation of the academy particularly its intellectual components into the corruption enterprise, has impacted on corruption discourses and analyses most notably in the polarisation into two realms that is, the public and the private. This characterisation represents in itself a distinct dimension of intellectual corruption. Taken together, these developments have had implications for both state and society particularly with respect to its democratisation and developmental drives. Unless critical measures are taken to sanitise the system within a broader framework of a reformist state, the deepening crisis of the academy, being a reflection of the deepening crisis of the state, corruption analyses and their outcomes may not advance the anti-corruption crusade of government. In the end, it is the democracy and development agenda (which ideally should be people-centred) that will suffer. The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. The next section conceptualises intellectual corruption. This is followed by a discussion of the various dimensions of intellectual corruption. We then critically analyse the basic undercurrents of intellectual corruption. The last substantive part discusses the implications of intellectual corruption for national development, before concluding.

On Intellectual Corruption

What does it mean to describe someone as an intellectual? What are the main responsibilities of an intellectual? It is only by engaging these questions that we can advance to conceptualise intellectual corruption, the concept of corruption having become so familiar and less controversial. Generally speaking, intellectuals are those who cherish and pursue truth and knowledge not only for their own sake, but also for the advancement of the society. Montefiore (1990: 20) defines an intellectual as 'anyone who takes a committed interest in the validity and truth of ideas for their own

sake'. Addressing the same issue from a functional perspective, Said (1994: 3) defines intellectuals as 'those engaged in the production and distribution of knowledge'.

By implication, an intellectual basically has a responsibility to promote intellectualism. Or, as Adele Jinadu puts it, the basic task of intellectuals is essentially that of intellectual responsibility to, and for the pursuit and defence of, the truth and of the conditions that make them possible (Jinadu, 1997: 170; 2002: 178). Other responsibilities of the intellectuals are generally referred to as social responsibility, that of community services which Szacki (1995:235) explains to be primarily involving 'political involvement, with coming out of laboratories and libraries'. While both components of intellectual responsibilities – projecting and upholding the truth and community services – are important, the task of defending the truth at all times, whatever the odds, seems paramount. For, it is the truth, what Ronald Barnet (1997:47-61) characterises as 'the whole truth', that legitimises 'our knowledge activities in higher education'.

The foregoing raises some problems. For one thing, how do we explain the truth? What appears to be the truth to one person may wear a contrary look to another. Yet, we can simply explain the truth in this context as the pursuit of teaching, research, publication and community services, which represent the main planks of intellectual architecture (see for example, Bargh et al., 1996; Evans, 1999; Havey and Knight, 1996; Tenuche and Omotola, 2004; Omofa, 2005), within the best tradition of academic culture and excellence. For another, what conditions make the pursuit of the truth possible? In this context, the most notable of such conditions include the issues of academic freedom, autonomy and funding.

The issues of academic freedom, autonomy and funding have been central to the discourses of the deepening crises of higher education in Nigeria (SSAN, 2002; 2004). As a concept, academic freedom connotes 'freedom to think in peace, without distractions of worldly commitments'. (Butteridge, 1969: 190). It has also been defined as 'the freedom of members of the academic community, individually or collectively, in the pursuit, development and transmission of knowledge, through research, study, discussion, documentation, production, creation, teaching, lecturing and writing' (Adejoh, 2004: 38). This freedom is generally seen as a matter of right, not concession. Both the Kampala Declaration and African Charter acknowledge this when they note that:

> Every African intellectual has the right to pursue intellectual activity, including teaching, research and dissemination of research results, without let or hindrance subject only to University recognized principles of scientific inquiry and ethical and professional standard (cf. Adejoh, 2004: 39).

With this background, we can now proceed to conceptualise intellectual corruption. We first examine the concept of corruption. Simply defined, corruption connotes the perversion of generally acceptable standards and ways of doing things for personal or other forms of benefits, often with negative consequences for the entire system and society (Ackerman, 1999). Accordingly, intellectual corruption connotes the perversion of intellectual responsibilities, be it deliberately or not, for personal gains at the expense of the system. This has manifested itself in several dimensions in Nigeria. For instance, the ultimate task of upholding the truth, whatever the odds, which requires that intellectuals continue to remain focussed and committed to a regime of

routinised academic culture symbolised by quality teaching, research and publication, has suffered serious reversal and perversion in recent years. More than ever before, the Nigerian academy is increasingly becoming crisis-ridden, radiating its deficiencies in sustaining the best academic tradition of excellence that characterised the decades of the 1960s and 1970s (Erinosho, 2004; Tenuche and Omotola, 2004; Obi and Agbu, 2002; Olukoju, 2002). Even in the realm of social responsibility where many Nigerian intellectuals would appear to have suddenly emerged as trail-blazers, particularly beginning from the Babangida regime (1984-93) till now, most of their activities have been an object of serious criticism. The argument is that they offer insincere advice and policy options to the government so as to advance selfish interests (Jinadu, 1997; 2002; 2004; Adekanye, 1993). These and related perversions fall into our conception of intellectual corruption.

Dimensions of Intellectual Corruption

The foregoing provides the foundation for the analysis of the intellectual dimensions of corruption in Nigeria. These dimensions encompass the domains of academic recruitment, publication regime, promotion, extortion and mentoring. The requirements for recruiting academics into higher institutions, be they federal or state, like other government establishments, are very clear. First, the issue of merit based on academic qualification is of utmost importance. Next is the question of federal character, a power sharing device in Nigeria that seeks to prevent a situation whereby any given institution is dominated by people from a particular background to the marginalisation of others. This is predicated upon the necessity to avoid a situation whereby the dominant group can hold others and the system to ransom. Consideration is also given to the location of such institutions especially in terms of lower cadre staff. But today, the whole idea of recruitment along these lines has been reversed. Federal universities are the worst hit, where in the last couple of years, most universities have become federal only by name. At all levels – management and academic – the recruitment enterprise has been effectively privatised and based on a system of patronage where the ultimate decider is 'man know man'. As long as one belongs appropriately to the right camp (and you must strive to be seen so by the powers that be), recruitment into the university system becomes a formality, not minding the qualification, competence and capability of the person to deliver. This was the personal experience of this researcher in his search for placement in the academics. For example, I lectured part-time for three and half years at Kogi State University (KSU), Anyigba, 'our' state university. Throughout this period, recruitment was undertaken at least three times but I was not considered despite the fact that all stakeholders including management kept eulogising what they called my academic potential, because there was no 'godfather' to push my case for me.

Closely allied to the above is the issue of promotion exercise. While the rules are also very clear, emphasising quality of teaching, research and publication, as much as professional association membership and participation, it would appear that circumventing these criteria has become the rule rather than the exception in most instances. As it has become of recruitment, so also has promotion been privatised and used as an instrument of reward to the 'loyal' academics and penalty for 'deviants' who have refused to play along. It is so serious now that the promotion of the loyal boys is

not only regular, but in some cases, also accelerated even when the so-called deviants have been in the queue for years stagnating. Omofa (2005) noted this at KSU and warned in a public lecture organised by the university's ASUU about the impending danger such portends. Since the system has become prebendal and neo-patrimonial based on incorporation, the place of academic research and publication has waned probably because the managers of the system can always devise an escape route for their clients. This is usually done either by changing the rules of the game at critical moments in a way that will accommodate their interests, or by issuing letters of acceptance on papers that are at best merely under assessment and at worst only exist at the realm of imagination. These are concessions that the 'bad boys' will never enjoy.

The publication regime remains one of the most notorious areas of intellectual corruption. Perhaps, the schismatisation of the system into the pro and anti-elements has contributed to this. Since the emphasis is on 'publish or perish', at least for those caught on the wrong side of university politics, the tendency has been to devise alternative means of surviving that are usually criminal. These include the resort to desk-top publishing made possible by the revolution in information technology, and the use of road-side publishers that have no regard for publication ethics as a way of circumventing the rigours of academic publishing. The academic landscape has always witnessed the massive proliferation of journals, which suffer major deficiencies in all respects. The phenomenon of volume one, number one has been a recurrent decimal in journal production in Nigeria. After the first issue, many of them go into extinction. Those that manage to survive are few and far between, and have been totally commercialised and politicised. And because they depend on financial contributions from prospective authors, little attention is accorded to peer review by many of those journals. This is worse with the surging private journals established as business ventures. This development is most rampant in the South Eastern part of the country where several of such outlets are commonplace. For these and related reasons, Nigerian journals can hardly be found beyond the publishing institutions with very low patronage and readership and can hardly compete in the international arena (Tenuche and Omotola, 2004; Erinosho, 2004). In separate studies, Tenuche and Omotola (2004) and Erinosho (2004) lend credence to these incidents. Specifically, Tenuche and Omotola found out that most journals in Nigeria remain in circulation because of subscriptions from contributors, which range between N3 – N10,000.

The issue of academic book publishing is not very different. Though a general problem, the case of edited books is worse. We have seen instances where the editor(s) of a book only publish(es) himself with few other chapters from colleagues. Where the book enjoys some geographical and institutional spread, we still discover that some editors have more than the two papers as demanded by the ethics of standard publication. To make matters worse, most of these books are published by road-side printers, with little or no professional expertise regarding book publishing, let alone having independent assessors to assess the publishability of manuscripts. The result is the massive proliferation of books without a corresponding production of knowledge. Such books have become the order of the day across Nigerian higher institutions. The excruciating condition of this development may have informed a new regime of censorship across universities where lists of accepted journals and publishers are gradually being generated and institutionalised. Though far from crystallising and

uniform, it has been such that most of the applicants for the 2005 promotion exercise at the University of Ilorin, Nigeria, where I lectured, failed because these new regulations were fully applied.

Academics have also demonstrated their ingenuity to devise means of extorting money from students. In most cases, this is usually done through the production of handouts, otherwise known as reading material. While the production may not be entirely bad in itself, the form and character it has assumed is worrisome. First, in the absence of a regulated price regime, such materials are sold at exorbitant prices. For instance, a twenty-page material goes between N200 and N300. Second and more worrisome is that such handouts are forced on the students with the use of open threats of failure (carry-over) against the students: 'if you don't buy we will be here together next year to celebrate your academic funeral'. 'I will be glad to teach you the course again', etc., are some of the ways of threatening the students into submission. I was a victim of these slogans in my university days as an undergraduate in the late 1990s. And despite institutionalised sanctions against such practices, it is far from being totally over as they continue by other means.

Admittedly, the authorities of most universities have responded very well by deligitimising the production and sales of handouts. In some places where it has not been totally outlawed, a regime of regulated pricing has been instituted, as has been the case at the University of Ilorin. In such cases, the request must first be made by a majority of the students in a letter to the head of the department (HOD). The HOD will then liaise with the lecturer in charge to work out the modalities and price. Such regulatory measures have also been put in place concerning sales of books such that no lecturer is allowed to sell books directly to students. The new regime is that such books be deposited at the school's bookshop where interested students can buy them. Nice measures! Yet we observe that these are honoured more in the breach. From personal experience and observation, these measures have not been able to yield the magic formula for taming the monster of academic extortion. In some instances where students have written to their HODs for handouts, it has always been at the behest of the course lecturer via the use of subtle threat or a gentleman's agreement with the students. Today, students are still forced to buy books at exorbitant rates. As long as the affected staff is in the good books of authorities, there may be no raising of an eyebrow and vice versa.

Beyond extortion through sales of books and handouts, academics also extort money directly from their students. It is now commonplace in higher institutions for lecturers to demand money in exchange for marks. In some other instances, lecturers hide under the pretext of 'consultancies' in order to extort money from their students, especially those under their project supervision. This is done in many ways. For one, the lecturer may allow the student to do the work, which must be submitted to him/her for typing, editing and binding at a fee usually imposed by the lecturer. In some other instances, the lecturer undertakes to write the project and deliver a finished product to the student, also at a fee. Some 'liberal' ones however give the student the freedom to do the work but the latter must type and bind at a given place dictated by the lecturers usually owned by his or her or relatives. This latter dimension is the most common and seems to be gaining increasing patronage especially in the face of increasing economic hardship.

The scourge of sexual harassment represents another dimension of corruption. Although there has been widespread argument as to the question of who harasses whom between the lecturers and the female students (see Fayankinnu, 2004; Ezumoh, 2004; Pereria, 2004), the fact remains that sexual harassment has become a frequent feature of staff-students relations in Nigeria. The academic dimension is that sex is now traded for marks. There have been several instances where those that refuse the advances are victimised, especially by deliberately failing such students. Unfortunately, higher institutions in Nigeria do not seem to have well institutionalised mechanisms for redressing this ugly development (see Erinosho, 2004). The result is that such cases are most often ignored, swept under the carpet and the victims having to contend with the psychological trauma associated with it. Only recently specifically August 2005 was a lecturer in the department of English at the Lagos State University, Nigeria caught in a widely celebrated case of sexual harassment. In this case, the student reportedly accepted to play along, with the active connivance of the university authority to which she had reported the case. In most universities in Nigeria, several lecturers have had one reason or the other to appear before disciplinary panels for sexually related allegations but discharged for want of evidence. These are well captured in a preliminary but comprehensive study on the subject at Lagos State University (see Adedokun, 2005).

Understanding Intellectual Corruption

The Nigerian academy has boasted of itself as one of the best across the globe in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, exhibiting the best of academic tradition and culture (see Ajayi, 2002; Yaqub, 2002). During this golden era, academics live up to their intellectual responsibilities of quality teaching, research, publication and community services. Beginning from the 1980s, there has been a reversal of the trend. Why has this been so? First, any attempt to understand the crisis and contradictions of intellectualism in Nigeria must of necessity begin with the crisis and contradictions of the Nigerian State. By implication, the deepening crisis of the Nigerian State offers a good point of departure in explaining the crisis of Nigerian academy. It would be recalled that the decade of the 1980s was an era of economic recession in Nigeria, as in several other African countries. The search for an enduring solution led to the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) whose conditionality the Babangida regime implemented. Studies have continued to show how the SAP regime brought about more severe distortions and disarticulation in the domestic political economy in forms of rising inflation, unemployment, inequalities and dependency (see, Olukoshi, 1991; 1993; Badejo, 1990). As the cost of living heightened, with the poor getting poorer, Nigerians had to devise alternative coping strategies. While the entire country was engulfed in this struggle for survival, especially the rural settings, (see, Mustapha, 1993), the universities suffered serious consequences.

The most glaring effect on university education was the fluctuating fortunes of funding. This resulted in a series of strikes and confrontation between the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), accompanied by the search for greener pastures at home and abroad. On the home front, the military government through patrimonial incorporation had to co-opt articulate scholars and critics into top government positions such as Ministers, advisers and ambassadors. The potency of ASUU's

engagement with the state led to the hardness of the latter in its deployment of force against the former, resulting in massive exodus of scholars from Nigerian universities to foreign lands (Amuwo, 2003; Olukoju, 2002). Those who could not make it along the above route had little or no choice than to devise alternative means such as venturing into several other engagements – trading, part-time jobs etc., all with implications for their intellectual responsibilities.

The deepening crisis of the funding of higher education in Nigeria (Adegun, 2002; Olaniyan, 2002; Odekunle, 2002; Obikoya, 2002), coupled with the foregoing, was to have negative effects on academic research, publications and conferences. Scholars now find it extremely difficult to be represented at reputable international conferences owing to financial constraints. Locally too, several hitherto reputable and regular journals disappeared also for similar reasons. Given the condition that you either 'publish or perish', Nigerian scholars had to evolve coping strategies for sustained academic research and publishing. It is perhaps this that led to the idea of the proliferation of journals across disciplines and institutions, which hardly go beyond their domains. They also go into extinction shortly after their debut and have limited reach, not beyond what Olukoju (2002:6) called their 'captive market'. This is a situation whereby students were required to subscribe to the journal as part of their registration requirements.

It is however important to note that the problem cannot be totally blamed on the Nigerian state. The universities too have contributed to the crisis in many respects. The task of governing the universities rests with their management. Unfortunately, most managers of the system, particularly Vice Chancellors, have come to see their offices as their own share of the national cake. As such, basic rules must be relegated to the background so as to accomplish their primordial agenda. In furtherance of this, they may deliberately refuse to promote and ensure quality assurance in recruitment, promotion and publication. As Omofa (2005: 12) has pointed out, the question of fairness, equity and justice have been replaced by considerations regarding identity, particularly ethnicity, religion and several other political factors. As such, the best brains are sacrificed to roam the street while the mediocre fill the system.

While it is true that Nigerian universities have been under-funded, it is equally true that university funds have been mismanaged. This takes the form of over-invoicing, allocation of contracts to oneself or agents and direct embezzlement of funds. This may have been made possible by the fact that some Vice Chancellors have become sort of emperors, who run the system like an estate (Iyayi, 2002: 31-32).

The complete politicisation of the system is another dimension of the crisis. It is such that while some enjoy a good patronage from the system for playing along, others are periodic victims of victimisation. The response of ASUU to this hardness through a radicalised struggle has not helped matters either. While the instrumentality of strike seems the only language that the managers of Nigerian universities and State understand, it has to be observed with moderation. The inability of ASUU to do this has added to the deepening crisis of intellectual corruption. This is because academics always look up to ASUU for rescue during crises. Now that ASUU has become seemingly irredeemably incapacitated to act effectively, given its castration in most universities, Nigerian academics are wont to devise other means of survival.

Implications for National Development

The deepening crisis of Nigerian academy, particularly the phenomenon of intellectual corruption, has had direct impacts on national development. The first and most basic is in terms of the loss of power it has brought to bear upon the state. The perversion of intellectual responsibility with the active connivance of the managers of the system and some segment of the academics has contributed to the massive exodus of scholars from the ivory tower. While the problem may not be about the exodus per se, it becomes worrisome given the fact that it is unidirectional, without an influx of expatriates to Nigerian universities. Worse still, it is the best brains that are lost to the outside world. The implication is that the affected constitute 'a permanent loss of skills to a country's economic development' (Amuwo, 2003: 98). This is basically so because, as Amuwo has argued:

> They do not participate in their country's socio-economic production and knowledge structures. While they may be involved in disaporic skills and logistics networks with their countries of origin, their location outside of the main theatre of domestic knowledge production has effectively resulted in creating a missing link in intellectual capital and energy extant at home (2003: 98).

The foregoing has had implications for the quality of education in the country. Most graduates today can hardly compete favourably internationally. Observers now talk about half-baked graduates who are not well grounded in the basics and methodologies of their disciplines. This has been most played out in terms of the quality of post-graduate research in the country. Apart from 'the low level of theoretical, comparative and applied perspectives' that has characterised postgraduate research, studies have shown, drawing lessons from the social sciences, that graduate training in Nigeria:

> has not been internationally competitive. A lot of their products are poorly equipped; lack the international exposure that can mainstream them into the current debates and discourses in their disciplines (Obi and Agbu, 2002: 49).

Closely related to the above is the sharp decline in the number of qualified and competent hands in universities to handle post-graduate training. It is disappointing to observe that some Nigerian universities of the second generation (established in the 1970s) do not have well-functioning post-graduate programmes for lack of qualified manpower. Those that manage to initiate them have been epileptic in their operations, resulting in a longer duration of programme at greater cost to students. To survive the system, students too, like their lecturers, have had to engage in some other money-making activities to supplement their ever-dwindling financial base due to the declining state of the economy. The implication is that they too have limited time for their research, with telling impact on the quality of the students and their research.

The cumulative effect of these has been the emergence of an image crisis for Nigeria within the international knowledge community. The most eloquent testimony has been the declining recognition accorded Nigerian certificates not only abroad but also at home. Graduates from Nigerians universities now find it hard to enrol for direct post-graduate studies abroad. While there are obviously some exceptions, it however constitutes a dimension of the country's image crisis. Even at home, some employers now have to subject graduates from Nigerian universities to a multi-stage test to ascertain the authenticity of their degrees. This is apart from the fact that some

institutions, most especially state universities, have been blacklisted as below the standard, where anything goes.

By implication, there is bound to be a dearth of intellectual and intellectualism. The best hands are hardly recruited as forces of identity have taken the lead in every issue relating to university governance. And since such people depend on patronage to survive, the managers of the system are wont to capitalise on this weakness to perpetuate all sorts of atrocities. The most notable of this is the total rape of academic freedom that is so pivotal to the University system as a whole and the academics in particular for the effective discharge of their responsibilities. Today, the question of job security that has for long been associated with the academic community is fast disappearing into thin air. Lecturers are now being sacked without recourse to the due process. ASUU that has usually been a beacon of hope for the redress of these vices seems to have lost out completely in the struggle and can no longer play the role of a balancer. In some cases, it is either they no longer exist or have been crippled. Where they exist, they do at the mercy and instance of management and to that extent could be seen as an appendage of management with no power of its own. This underscores the depth of this dimension of the crisis, having implications for academic productivity and enthusiasm.

In the final analysis, it is the Nigerian State and society that suffer. Across time and space, the importance of scholars, especially in terms of their intellectual responsibilities, has always been acknowledged. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Marx and so on were great intellectuals who made great contributions to the governance and development of the societies in which they lived. Scholars have also been seen as central to the sustainability of the democratisation and development project in their countries. They are expected to provide the knowledge framework through which the state and society can be mirrored. Unfortunately, the deepening crisis of the academy has not enabled them to do this well. While some have been in government in various capacities for long, we cannot say in precise terms what their role in the governance of the country has been. But there is a feeling that their activities are driven more by concern with coping with the strain and stress of a dwindling economy than any selfless commitment to promoting good governance. Yet there is a seeming acute shortage of manpower in the midst of plenty. This paradox derives from the fact that in terms of quantity, there are excesses but when measured quality-wise, there are serious shortages. Nothing captures the scenario better than this:

> The most critical issue ... in Nigeria is the glaring decline of capacity in a period of national reconstruction, democratization and globalisation, when such capacity is most needed ... The 'brightest and the best' are abandoning research for the lush splendor of the private sector, the allure of political office, or the hard-currency denominated paychecks of the international arena. Those left behind clearly survive under desperate conditions, especially if they are unfortunate enough to be on the wrong side of the local politics. The state of social science research is dire; but there is still more hope (Obi and Agbu, 2002: 50).

Conclusion: Is There Really Hope?

The paper has examined the intellectual dimensions of corruption in Nigeria, its causes and implications. Our analysis indicates that the Nigerian academy is enmeshed in a deepening crisis of integrity, which has taken heavy tolls on the intellectual

responsibilities of scholars. In the long run, it is the state and society that suffer the most, given the inevitable consequences of this state of affairs for the democracy and development projects of the country. It is therefore important that urgent steps be taken to address the situation.

Since the problem is largely a reflection of the deepening crisis of the Nigerian state, whatever measures to be taken must happen within a broader framework that targets the state for reform. There is a need to critically re-interrogate the Nigerian state to ascertain why it has been dependent, unproductive and predatory, and appropriate measures must be designed to address these problems. Democratising public policy making processes at all levels of governance, decentralising political power to reduce competition for the centre and efforts made to sustain the democracy project, can be helpful. It is within this framework that higher institutions stand the chance of pursuing university autonomy, adequate funding and greater productivity.

There is also the need to address the problem of internal democracy that is conspicuously absent in the universities. This tendency has contributed more to the rape of academic freedom, leading to a sharp decline in the discharge of the intellectual responsibilities of scholars. The question of funding also remains central. As centres of knowledge production and dissemination, universities should be able to develop independent sources of revenue for their needs. They can do this by partnering with the private sector, generating the mass body of knowledge necessary or the advancement of businesses, science and technology. However, only a regime of good governance predicated upon accountability, transparency and control can sustain this.

Above all, there is need for a sustained effort to change the value system at all levels. The fact is that Nigerians have jettisoned the values of honesty, hard work, discipline, self-reliance and so on. The get-rich-quick syndrome would appear to have taken over. This has contributed to the collapse of most basic ethical issues in teaching, research, publication and community services. Only a sustained socio-political re-engineering that emphasises value reorientation at all levels may serve to reverse the trend. It may even be appropriate to inculcate such values into the academic curriculum of schools beginning from the elementary schools to university level. The assumption is that when the mind is right, the actions are likely to be right too and vice versa. Since this is a long-term measure, punitive measures that can serve as deterrents to others should be institutionalised for the short run. This should be done in an open, transparent and just environment. The effective execution of these measures offers some hope.

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Post-apartheid Politics of Integration at a Residential Student Community in South Africa: A Case Study on Campus

Abstract

Student Village[1] is post-graduate residence at a historically white university in South Africa. Over eleven years into a new epoch of non-racialism in South Africa, some students lived in racially segregated communes. There existed a strong notion in the residence being studied that cultural differences between different races made it difficult to share living spaces. This study tries to explain why and how this occurs. Black participants emulated a black township lifestyle, which they considered as the only genuine black culture. This article sees this construction of black culture as part of black students' struggle to resist experiences of white, Afrikaner culture and domination at the university.

Introduction

Policies introduced after South Africa's first democratic election in 1994 were based on a legal and constitutional framework that promoted a democracy rooted in the ideals and principles of non-racism. Transformation policies encouraged reconciliation, reconstruction and development and also became an important tool to this end. The idea of national unity and reconciliation was the spirit within which these policies were promoted. It was also a central idea through which the institutionalisation of a human rights discourse became a priority (see Republic of South Africa 1995; Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1998: vol. 1, chapter 4, para 3). It was central to the process of transformation to address cleavages and systematic inequality that are a consequence of a long history of race and formal racial ordering in South Africa. In the spirit of national unity and reconciliation, transformation policies aimed to go beyond fostering tolerance amongst different groups. They are understood as part of a broad process of racial integration. This article is concerned with the politics of racial integration against the backdrop of transformation in the South African higher education sector. It is situated in the continuing and as yet incomplete process of transformation characterising both institutional life and political discourse in South Africa.

A National Committee for Higher Education, appointed in February 1995 by government, proposed policies for the transformation of higher education. A central feature of the transformation framework was 'increased participation' or 'massification' (Naaido 1998; National Commission on Higher Education 1996). This aimed to provide part of a remedy to the crisis of apartheid's segregated admission policy. Constituencies that were previously not able to access some institutions of higher learning would as a result gain access to any university. The introduction of black[2] students into institutions of higher learning that had previously been reserved

for whites was expected to rouse conflict, tension, social dislocation and even social fragmentation, rather than an 'easy-fit' and evolutionary assimilation (Moraka, 2003). For most of the white students – an erstwhile privileged ruling minority – this was their first contact with the previously structurally subordinate majority on constitutionally egalitarian grounds, and vice versa. To facilitate this process, so-called transformation policies were formulated (Department of Education 1997; 2002).

It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the range, extent and contestation of arguments around racial integration. As a point of departure a broad description of a racially integrated society will suffice. Michael Banton captures the ideal of racial segregation as a stage where racial distinctions, though not fully ignored, are disregarded. He argues that when the stage of racial integration has been reached, 'race has much less significance than the individual's occupation and his status conferring roles' (Banton 1967: 73, Kitano 1991: 14). Banton's conceptualisation of racial integration is as good as any useful description of the intent of transformation policy in South Africa. I draw also on the premise that the voluntary sharing of 'intimate spaces' such as bathrooms and kitchens in residential places is a key indicator of non-racial practice amongst individuals of different races. The degree of racial integration provides both a qualitative indicator and a socio-political yardstick of the success of transformation policies.

The study on which this paper is based set out to describe and explain social interaction at a post-graduate student community where it was apparent that racial segregation was occurring, eleven years into the democratic dispensation. This paper looks specifically at the nature of racial segregation in this community and students' own perceptions and experience of it. This case study is concerned to establish what this group of students thinks about how they live and why they adopt living as they do via making use of two research techniques: participant observation and in-depth interviews.

The university's history and its process of transformation

This university is situated in one of the leading cities in South Africa. The university's media of instruction were initially dual medium (both English and Afrikaans). But in the early 1930s the council of the university passed a motion that the 'services of the University be instituted primarily to meet the needs of the Afrikaans-speaking section of the community', and Afrikaans would be the sole medium of instruction (Official History I, 1960: 66).[3] According to the university's official history, the making of an Afrikaans university in the service of the volk was the 'hope and ideal' of this university from its inception. A decade after the formation of the university, the editor of student newspaper, who later became a professor at the university, wrote that the university (then still a dual medium institution) should strive to 'one day completely feel at home on Afrikaans soil within our *volkslewe*' (Official History I 1960: 50).[4]

Loosely translated, *volkslewe* or 'life of the people' refers to the repertoire of social norms and everyday practices (including language) seen to represent a particular culture. The university would encourage and ideologically sustain the *volkslewe* of Afrikaans-speaking whites (See for example, Hugo 1941). Such sentiments need to be understood as part of the broader struggle and aggressive mobilisation of Afrikaner nationalists in South Africa at the time. (Du Toit and Giliomee 1983; O'Meara 1983;

Dubow 1987; Marks and Trapido 1987, Dubow,1994; Grobbelaar 1989). From as early as the 1930s and during the apartheid era that began in 1948, it was increasingly 'ethnic and political loyalty' that determined appointments, curriculum and the composition of the student body at this university (Mouton 1993; Mouton 1997; Southey and Mouton 2001; Mouton 2004).

At the beginning of the 1980s this particular university had a sizeable student body of which over two-thirds came from the Transvaal and half of these specifically from the greater metropolitan region in which the university is situated (Official History II 1987: 17). Only nine percent of the student body were white English speaking students. Addressing this English minority at the university in 1982, the vice-chancellor and rector said (in English): 'In welcoming such students in our midst, all we ask is: please come with an open mind and join in the exercise, but not with a total disregard of the ruler' (ibid). This statement underscores white Afrikaner hegemonic interests at the university, and power relations that privileged white Afrikaner *volkslewe*. By this time, the university could quite correctly claim that 'there is virtually no state department that has had nothing to do with the university', including 'official bodies, institutes, councils, corporations, firms etc – too many to name'.[5]

In 1987, the university reported rather dispassionately that after the Second World War, others races, '*anderskleuriges*', were gradually been drawn in closer proximity to whites. Although '*anderskleuriges*' had always knocked at the door of the university, in the early 1980s, 'the knock had become louder' (Official History II 1987, 400).[6] The university argued that given the context, it would have to make concessions to the demands of history, guided by the assertion of the 'Afrikaans character of the university' (ibid). At this stage, the university had begun to enrol a few non-whites, '*nie-blankes*', 'as individual cases' (Official History II, 1987: 401; Official History III 1996: 493).[7]

The university became increasingly concerned about the implication of this contact with non-whites, as far as the sharing of both public spaces (lecture halls, libraries, laboratories etc.) and more intimate spaces like its residences or *koshuise* were concerned (Official History II 1987: 402). The university's residences were considered a very valuable aspect of student life. Koshuise were among other things a 'home away from home' – a space of 'enthusiasm' and 'oneness' that 'drew the great majority of students with abundance' (Official History II 1987: 339). In the spirit of volkslewe, one student reported in a university publication that lodging in one of the university's residences made it possible for students to deliver a 'positive and useful contribution to his community'.[8]

In the period between 1982 and 1992, student numbers at the university increased from 16,854 to 23,375. During the same period, there were significant political changes in South Africa leading to formal negotiations with black political leaders in the early 1990s. On 16 October 1989, the university council took the decision that 'The [university], in line with other South African universities, sees itself as an open university'. Although admission to the university would solely depend on academic merit, the council added the important proviso that there should be 'recognition by the applicant of the traditional Afrikaans medium of instruction and character of the university' (Official History 1996: 31).[9] Eighteen months before the council's decision, on the 29th of March, 1988, the rectorate had already decided that students

that were not white, i.e., other '*bevolkingsgroepe*' (population groups) would live on the west wing of the upper level of one of the university's buildings (not an official residence)[10] (Official History III 1996: 31 and 473).

In its fourth volume of its official history, the university refers to the years 1993-2000 as a 'decade of transformation and restructuring'. Writing (in English) in 2002, the principal of the university reported that: 'the traditional Afrikaans character of the institution made way for a South African university community ... In short, the [university] became one in which South Africans could feel truly at home' (Official History 2002: i). He suggested that the university no longer had an Afrikaans character. In other words, it was now an institution of higher learning that was not a terrain of power for a white Afrikaans collectivity. There was no longer a need for 'outsiders' to acknowledge a 'ruler', i.e., a white Afrikaner hegemony. None is excluded, or even marginalised. Also, the university had become a community, a 'home' – the very symbol and expression of cohesion, acceptance and belonging. This statement clearly contradicts any sentiment that the university would be involved in a project to cultivate the volkslewe. Like other universities in South Africa, the university was to write and implement numerous transformation policies, according to the guidelines set out in the White Paper on Higher Education and the Higher Education Act of 1997 (See for example, University Policy 1998; 1999a; 1999b; 1999c). It is through these transformation policies that the university works towards what it calls a 'multicultural tuition'. These policies encompass 'the admission of students; democratisation and equity; quality assurance and academic restructuring and the pursuit of greater effectiveness and efficiency' (Official History, 2002: 8).

There exists a large body of literature that debates the various ways through which transformation can cultivate 'campus diversity' (Cross 2004) at historically white universities. This extensive literature addresses, inter alia, policy making, financing the cost of massification, restructuring the curriculum, leadership and the increasingly neo-liberal context of education (See for example, Cloete and Bunting 2000; Cloete and Moja 2005; Jansen 2003; 2005 and Wolpe 1995). By and large, this literature grapples with the often nebulous and tangled process of decision-making and constraint within the higher education sector emanating from the broader political life of the country that affect the nature and context of institutional change in South Africa.

Less attention has been given to analysing group identities and power relations that are emerging amongst students themselves, i.e. – the 'small politics' amongst student groups on the ground. Franchi and Swart (2003) and Walker (2005) respectively illustrate some of the various tensions that are associated with new processes of identity construction amongst university students in post-apartheid South Africa. This kind of empirical study creates space for a reconceptualisation of the shifting meanings and changing roles of identities like 'race', 'ethnicity' and 'culture' as groups mobilise around various claims to difference in a changing higher education environment.

Walker (2005) identifies 'default identities' at Northern University,[11] a historically white Afrikaans university in South Africa. 'Default identities' are those institutional and individual identities that enable the persistence of race by processes that either erase it or make it more obscure. Walker argues that 'default racism' makes possible the existence of a powerful institutional discourse of transformation that admits black students into the university, whilst simultaneously maintaining their exclusion. In

other words, despite the 'open' policy of historically white Afrikaans universities, and even the statement by vice-chancellor and principal of this university, that the university is 'truly home' to 'all South Africans' (Official History IV, 2002: i), black students could still feel marginalised and excluded from the life and community of the university.

According to Walker 'default identities' are 'characterised by a lack of reflexivity about norms of privilege of power'. At Northern University, Walker found that 'default racism' masked racism under the rubric of individualisation. Default racism was articulated in various ways, including a 'naturalising discourse which explains primary interactions grounded in sameness as normal' (Walker 2005). It is through this discourse of sameness and individual preference that students explained their lack of initiative to form relationships across racial boundaries. Students did not mention race as a factor that influences their association, or lack thereof, with one another. There is congruence between Walker's findings and those of Franchi and Swart (2003), namely a tendency not to articulate, but rather to 'silence' race. Franchi and Swart investigated the influence of race on how students, at the University of the Witwatersrand, constructed their identities in post-apartheid South Africa. They reported a paucity of reference to racial categories in students' self-reported identities. One possibility was that young people were attempting to move away from racial categorisations in ways that may not have been possible during apartheid. However, Franchi and Swart concluded that the limited use of racial markers probably indicated a 'silencing of race' or an attempt to 'deracialise identity', especially amongst those who continue to benefit from racially organised systems of privilege:

> ... the silencing of 'racial' identity is seen to fulfil the strategic function of self-presenting as aligned with the new dispensation's ethos on non-racialism and the ideals of national unity and reconciliation, at a time when the focus on 'racial' identity would serve to expose and denounce the illegitimacy of this privilege (Franchi and Swaart 2003: 230).

Fieldwork at Student Village[12]

Student Village is a post-graduate 'informal' residence housing around 290 students. The majority of students at Student Village were black South African students. The different sexes lived separately and each student had his or her own room. The kitchen and bathrooms in each unit were shared and all the residents had access to one laundry room, and a recreational facility with a television room. Student Village is a self-catering residence. This means the university provides stoves, refrigerators and in some instances microwave ovens in each unit. The units can accommodate between four and ten students. Each unit had at the least its own kitchen, a common room, a toilet and a bathroom. Student Village consists of forty units or communes, sixteen of which accommodated women at the time this study was carried out.

Whilst 'formal residences' generally accommodated undergraduate students, 'informal residences' accommodate postgraduate students, and at times a handful of senior undergraduate students. Student Village is an example of the latter. Of all these residences – both 'formal' and 'informal' residences – Student Village was the cheapest at the time the study took place.[13] At 'formal residences' the placement of students is guided by a racial quota prescription. The percentage of each race was calculated with 'consideration of the previous year's representative composition' of

the total student enrolment (University Policy 2003). (White students were and still are a numerical majority in the 'formal residences'.) According to the university administration, there were no prescriptive race quotas for student placement at 'informal residences' at the time. In this latter case, a student whose name appears on the top of the waiting list would be offered whichever vacant room was available.

However, Student Village's units are essentially racially segregated. White students generally lived together, although one or two so-called Asian South Africa students were at times interspersed amongst them. Black students on the other hand, shared living spaces with one another. In general, it was the case that black and white students did not share the same units at Student Village in other words. Also, in many instances, black residents of the same nationality shared the same unit. Put differently, the type of segregation at Student Village divided black students into separate subsets of people according to their nationality and ethnicity. At the same time, it isolated black students from the rest of the mainly white student body.

As a new resident at Student Village in January 2003, I held informal conversations with some of the other black students. Many that I spoke to considered racially segregated quarters to be comfortable, and in fact preferred them. It became more and more apparent to me that the pattern of racial segregation at Student Village was imbued with a sense of ordinariness and a spirit of normality. This immediately raised questions around the experience and construction of race in Student Village residents' everyday lives. It also raised concerns around the efficacy of transformation policies at the university. How much had transformation policies – that were so intimately knitted into the principles of non-racism and the vision of national unity – achieved? What were the reasons for the kind of social interaction between students and why did they accept this state of affairs?

It is important to emphasise that a case is chosen. Stakes (1998) argues that a case study should not be viewed as a methodological choice, but rather as 'a choice of the object to be studied'. For Stakes, a case study draws attention to the question of 'what specifically can be learnt from this single case'. A researcher who chooses a case study has designed a study that 'optimises understanding of the case, rather than generalisation beyond'. In contrast to studies of topics that are more general, Stakes emphasises the particular specifics of the case. He lists three types of case studies: The first is the intrinsic case where 'one wants better understanding of this particular case' and not necessarily an understanding of any phenomenon. In other words 'the researcher temporarily subordinates other curiosities so that the case may reveal its story'. The second is a collective case study, where a researcher studies a number of case studies jointly as an inquiry into the phenomenon, population or general condition. The third category of is the instrumental case study, where a particular case is examined to provide insight into a social phenomenon or even a refinement of theory. The case is looked at in depth, scrutinising and detailing its context and activities as a way of pursuing an understanding of the phenomenon or theory. According to Stakes's categorisation, this study approached Student Village as both an intrinsic and an instrumental case study. It is instrumental in that it aimed to refine the researcher's understanding of the experiences and consciousness of students given structural changes, i.e. policy, in their environment. It does not attempt to generalise its conclusions about social interaction at Student Village to any other residence at the

university or elsewhere. As an intrinsic case, Student Village reveals its story of racially segregated living that contradicts the spirit of racial integration in South Africa.

I collected data over a period of twenty months. In my role as a participant I recorded students interaction amongst themselves (for example, in their units, in the laundry or television room); their responses to notices about sport, administrative issues, and other organised activities; the organisation of their living spaces; their relationships with cleaning workers and the matron, and so on. As an insider I myself participated in everyday life at Student Village. I was part of many conversations and debates, and had a number of close friends. Hence, I was able to record some intimate parts of many students' lives, and had a real sense of their aspirations, setbacks and experiences. (Only some of these data are presented here, see Moguerane, 2006). In addition I carried out fourteen in-depth 'Problem Centred Interviews' (Witzel 2000).

Witzel's 'Problem Centred Interview' can be viewed as a corrective to the tendency for interviews to operate as 'question and answer' sessions – especially semi-structured interviews (Witzel 2000). This technique aims to encourage the participants to tell a story of their experiences – a life story so to speak, but focusing on an area that will most elucidate how they understand and experience certain social phenomena.[14] It is also intended to draw specific attention to the differences between the manner in which researchers conceptualise the meaning of social phenomena (through the lens of their theoretical perspectives) and how individuals understand themselves, give various meanings to, and experience the same phenomena. All fourteen interviews were recorded and transcribed.

Culture and intimate spaces at Student Village

Racially segregated living spaces in this case were part of an undocumented but openly practised 'policy'. Student Village was not the only 'informal residence' whose living quarters exhibited a racially organised pattern. In general, students hardly ever share flats with others of a different race at 'informal residences'. In response to my question as to why people were living separately, the administrator who was in charge of the section that handled student accommodation[15] said that conflicts typically occurred between students of different races and/or nationalities whenever they shared living spaces. She argued that the organisation of living quarters at Student Village for example, was a case of 'cultural' segregation,[16] rather than racial segregation.

Students themselves had a preference for this 'policy'. All but one participant argued that there are cultural differences between different groups. These were said to make it difficult, if not altogether impossible, to share living spaces with another of a different race especially. Even participant G who strongly felt that Student Village's units should be racially mixed, was also motivated by the idea that there are 'cultural' differences between races and that they are important. He felt that the university should encourage a mutual understanding between races about their unique 'cultural' characteristics by facilitating racially mixed units.

> ... we differ in characteristics, we differ in colour, but when we stay together, we should be able to integrate ... I should know what happens among whites: how do they feel when they are in a situation of what nature? How do they handle problems? When they do not

> have food how do they behave? Do they also ask for help like Ubuntu of the black person, or maybe they do it in their own way? (Black man, Participant G)

Respondents generally perceived 'cultural' differences to be natural and irreconcilable. They also articulated the so-called 'culture' of different groups as if it were homogenous and unchanging. Although culture was most often seen as something innate, sometimes participants would acknowledge the role of socialisation, and would mention the role of upbringing and education for example. Participants moreover argued that it is natural for a group of people to be drawn to those who are 'culturally' most like them. An Indian man, who shared a unit with two white men and a Chinese man said:

> ... we want to live with our friends, and obviously, a lot of the time, birds of a feather flock together, and so therefore people in the same race ...our friends tend to be those people who are similar to you, right? Unfortunately a lot of the time it ends up being those who are more than just similar to you on an emotional level, but sometimes those that are similar to you on a racial level. Uh, let me put it to you this way right, you walk into a room full of white people, and there's one black person other than yourself, who would you go talk to first? (Indian man, I)

Race, 'culture' and community: white participants

Participant A was a white Afrikaans-peaking woman. She lived with six other white women in the unit. One room in the unit was unoccupied and this had been the case for at least one semester when she was interviewed. The interview took place in their kitchen, which had been stylishly transformed into a comfortable living room. She and her housemates had brought tablecloths, curtains, cushions, vases and other accessories to convert the standard bare kitchen that is characteristic of such units into a homely living area. This revamping of the kitchen was common in white students' units. All seven of these women had previously lived in the same 'formal residence' (undergraduate) at the university and had become close friends. Hence, they decided to share a unit at Student Village together. Moving into Student Village with friends from the formal residence was a frequent occurrence amongst white residents, and it shaped their experience of community at Student Village.

Participant A said her main focus was her final year project although she often went out with her housemates given their history. She mentioned this close relationship with her housemates as one of the reasons why she had very little interaction with other residents at Student Village, including those of other 'cultures'. She explained that she left the 'formal residence' and moved to Student Village in order to withdraw from active communal life with a large number of students. She described the formal residence as a site for a dynamic and vibrant social life, characterised by many activities and interaction with many students, both black and white. At Student Village she could live and interact closely with only those she already had established a level of intimacy with. Participant A expressed her willingness to live with other races, but argued that the university is aware of the difficulty posed by cultural differences between groups.

> I don't mind to live with other people I don't know ... race, uhm, I think for the university it is better to put people together with each race, each culture, together, *daar gaan baie*

> *bakleiery wees,* [there will be much fighting] because the culture is very different (White woman, A).

Participant A spoke about her experience in the formal residence to raise her concerns about racially mixed units at Student Village. During one year of her time at the formal residence she shared a flat with four other whites and one Indian woman. They shared one common room, a toilet and a bathroom. Participant A recalled a sense of loneliness and isolation that the Indian woman experienced whilst living amongst five whites. For this reason she was also concerned about being the only white person in a unit should Student Village move towards racially mixed units.

> But yah, maybe, they must put the same amount of uhm, let's say Indians and white people in one [unit] but not one Indian girl and four white girls in one place because I don't want to be the only white girl in the other cultures' houses ... She was on her own. She didn't mingle with us ... maybe it's the culture thing. She never came over. She was always studying or in her room ... I would see her once every two days if I went to the bathroom or something like that (White woman, A).

She tried to explain the lack of any meaningful interaction between the Indian women and the white women in the light of the very distant and disengaged interaction that existed between white and other students at the 'formal residences'. With visible frustration she described how many of the black women were never interested in the different range of social activities that made the formal residence such a vibrant place of interaction. These activities include sport, music concerts and even rituals that had traditionally been performed in the 'formal residences' for many years. She thought that one of the reasons why black women seemed disinterested in social activities was probably cultural differences between themselves and whites, but perhaps also a reluctance to 'mingle' with whites. She also suspected that black women could have felt threatened and endangered in some way. She did feel however, that if black women had 'really wanted to belong' at the formal residence, they would have taken part in these social activities.

Participant D was the other white Afrikaans-speaking woman who participated in the study. She was also interviewed in a kitchen that had been transformed into a comfortable living area. Like Participant A, she explained that she moved to Student Village because she wanted to have more privacy and less interaction with others. She then moved into a room at Student Village that had been vacant for a while. At Student Village she lived with six other white women. These included her three friends from the 'formal residence' and the black woman, participant M. Theirs' was the only exception to the dominating pattern of racial segregation at Student Village. (The circumstances under which this came about will be described at a later stage.)

Participant D's understanding of the contact and relation between blacks and whites at the university was also influenced by her experiences at a formal residence. Every year black women had occupied five of the fourteen rooms in her corridor at the 'formal residence'. They shared bathrooms, toilets as well as laundry rooms that were all situated in the corridor. Like Participant A, she described a very distant and disengaged interaction between black and white women. Also, her view of the interaction between the black woman (Participant M) and the white woman, echoes Participant A's apprehension around the sense of loneliness and exclusion surrounding being the 'only white (in this case black) girl in the other culture's houses'. According

to Participant D, the only black girl in the unit kept to herself. She referred to all seven of the white women jointly as 'we' and described the lack of real contact between 'them' and the black woman:

> We don't see her too often ... She's mostly in her room ... we just see her if she maybe wants to make her food ... yah, she's always busy with her friends (White woman, D).

Indeed it took some weeks to locate Participant M in order to ask her to participate in the study. Clearly she did not spend much time in the unit. As the only black resident to share a unit with white residents at Student Village, her experience was clearly vital towards understanding the dynamics of social interaction and the possibilities of racial integration at Student Village. For many weeks, Participant M was not present at her unit. According to the cleaning lady, at times Participant M was absent for many days on end. According to another black student who was not part of the study, Participant M spent most of her time in another unit for black women at Student Village. Two or three days after leaving her a message at this latter unit, contact was made and an interview was scheduled. Surprisingly, Participant M's experience of her interaction with the white women in her unit contradicted that of Participant D.

Participant M said living with students of another race did not bother her. She explained that before coming to study at the university, she had studied at another South African university where it was quite common for blacks and whites to share small flats at the residences. She said she also came from a suburb that she described as being 'predominantly Afrikaans' and so she was 'used to them'. This conveyed her understanding of Afrikaners as a unique and different group. Participant M portrayed her relationship with her housemates as characterised by a sense of familiarity and casual acquaintance. She emphatically and repetitively said that she has had no problems with them whatsoever.

> Yah, we are not friends, like friends, like we can go out together or something, but we're just housemates: if I need something I'll just knock in one of the girl's rooms: 'Don't you have some pritt [paper glue]? Don't you have some sugar?' – something like that, but obviously sometimes if everybody is sitting in the living room. I just join them ... I didn't experience anything strange with them. I can't lie. There's nothing. There is nothing (Black woman, M).

Instead, she felt that she and her housemates experienced interpersonal conflicts that one would expect to find when students of any race shared a unit. It was apparent that Participant M was continuously separating incidents of disagreement that could be a result of racial prejudice, from those that could simply be related to interpersonal issues. Particularly interesting was her description of her relationship with one white woman in the unit whom she found to be disagreeable. This woman would neither greet her, nor speak to her. Participant M had begun to suspect that this white woman was 'having a problem with [her]' because of her race. She then started to observe the relationships between this particular housemate and the rest of the white women. She subsequently came to the conclusion that in fact this white woman had 'a problem with everybody' because she was 'very reserved', not because she was racist.

I suggest that perhaps those factors that imbue racially segregation at Student Village with a sense of ordinariness can also be expected to normalise the distance and disengagement in the interaction between different races. In other words individuals

did not expect their level of interaction with those of another race to exceed extremely limited levels of familiarity. This is likely to be the case in the context where many aspects of contact between different racial groups are hostile and aggressive.

Race, 'culture' and community: black and Asian participants

There was a general feeling amongst both of the Asian men and the black respondents that it would be possible to implement racially mixed units at Student Village, were it not for the characteristics of white 'culture'. However, at the same time, when asked to provide specific examples, these participants singled out only Afrikaans-speaking whites and Afrikaner culture as a barrier against racially mixed units.

Participant L was an Asian man, who shared a unit with three Afrikaans-speaking whites. He was the only resident who was not black who watched television in the residents' TV room. He was also the only participant in Student Village's soccer team who was not black. He was one of a handful of residents whom I observed to have continual interaction with students of a different race at Student Village. Participant L described Afrikaners as a group that is ill equipped to interact with others on the basis of mutual respect. He suggested that Afrikaners had the kind of upbringing that did not expose them to people of different backgrounds. Moreover, he argued, Afrikaners were brought up to believe that they were superior to other groups. He explained that although he was on good terms with his Afrikaner housemates at Student Village, there was a level of intimacy they could not reach because his housemate 'placed demands' on him. Amongst such demands was the expectation that he should not have romantic relationships with white Afrikaner women. He related a fight between himself and one of his housemates given this expectation. As far as participant L was concerned, given the nature of Afrikaners, racially segregated units at Student Village made sense and were in fact necessary.

> There are many whites here who have this ingrained belief that they are like God's gift to humanity, and they think that they are some kind of superior existence, but I don't let their lies be my problem. If that's the way they were brought up and taught, that's their problem ... I won't let it enter my doorstep because I had another problem with another guy here, one of my neighbours (Asian man, L).

The other Asian man, participant L, explained that although formal residences where undergraduate students lived were racially mixed, an Afrikaner 'culture' dominated these residences. He suggested that as soon as students move into postgraduate informal residences, like Student Village, where there are no racial quotas, students who are not white Afrikaners immediately opt not only to separate themselves from white Afrikaners and their 'culture', but also to live with others who are most like themselves. Black participants also referred to activities in the formal residences as part of a distinct Afrikaner culture that permeated everyday life there. They viewed these experiences as a form of Afrikaner culture to which they were forced to conform.

> ... I mean look, the [university] believe it or not has Afrikaans hostels. I mean, uh, and sorry, that influence is great. It's a great experience, uh, it's fun whilst it lasts but I am not gonna be – what do you call it – brainwashed into that kind of environment, be part of a group, basically conform to a culture, but one that is foreign to me. I mean, most people, what they do is they generally go into a sort of a submission or they basically alienate themselves (Indian man, I).

> [At Student Village] there is a bit more freedom yeah, compared to the res [formal residence], and here there isn't so much uhm, forced interaction with people you know. You can do your own thing at your own time. [At the formal residences] they wake you up in the middle of mid-night to go sing for boys [a frequent event called Serrie], and yah, you need to account for your every movement and, you know, we leave high school, you are thinking: freedom at last. And you get here [formal residence] and you know, there's this whole thing which has you restricted (Black woman, F).

Black participants made reference to Afrikaner 'culture' as domineering and repressive. This claim was made in relation to the construction of an alternative black 'culture'. Whilst the former was viewed as burdensome, oppressive and coercive, the latter was described in the context of vibrant, urban townships where blacks could freely express their 'culture' and identity. Black students generally understood the 'predominantly black' Student Village as a community much like the township. In effect, at Student Village, black students' everyday life was similar to that of black youth in a South African township at some levels: inter alia, food and cuisine, language, music, gender relations (See Moguerane 2006). For example, instead of preparing what one respondent referred to as the 'Western food' served at the formal residences, black students often cooked *pap*[17] and relish. They listened mostly to *kwaito*[18] music, South African jazz and gospel music, and rarely spoke to one another in English. Black students that addressed other black residents in English were in fact often sneered at, and usually labelled as not being really black 'inside'. Black residents generally spoke to one another in so-called indigenous languages, or in 'township talk', otherwise known as *tsotsi taal*. This is a constantly evolving, urban dialect, mostly used in South African townships. It is made up of a mixture of all South African languages, and often reflects various trends in popular culture (Rudwick 2005). At Student Village this township lifestyle held – in a sociological sense – black students together.

> I'm staying in a township; I am a township boy. I'm a typical township boy. I am more comfortable at Student Village because Student Village is predominantly black, so that's why [I moved to Student Village]. It's one of those reasons (Black man, B).

> Uh, this [Student Village] is like predominantly black people – it's not like I'm racist or something, but I kinda feel at home? ... I don't have problems with white people. I prefer being with my black brothers and sisters. We gotta understand each other, you know. I have white friends, and Indian friends – all cultures but, I just love it when I'm around my own black brothers and sisters. They don't mind my music, you know, my location [township] life and all that kinda stuff (Black man, K).

Most black residents generally spent most of their leisure time on Student Village's premises – especially women – whilst their white counterparts generally spent weekends and public holidays elsewhere. Whilst white participants described Student Village as a residence with a heightened sense of privacy, black participants saw Student Village primarily as a residence where they could interact with other black students. In other words, for many black students, Student Village was a place for academic activity, but also an important space for social interaction and entertainment. A number of black students would often remain there during university vacations. Some women even brought their children or other relations to spend time with them at Student Village during these vacations. One of the everyday experiences that exemplified township life at Student Village were the many parties that black residents

hosted that were characterised by loud music and liquor. These took place often during the week as well as on weekends.[19] A black woman describes Student Village in these terms:

> ... sometimes you'll see people throw parties until early morning – especially black people – you know. You can hear a radio from House 20 whilst you are in House 13 [more than 10m away] (Black woman, E).

In fact, many black participants often mentioned that black people had a predisposition towards noisiness. They described how this 'cultural' difference between blacks and whites caused many clashes between the races at the formal residences where corridors and flats were racially mixed. Black 'culture' in these terms included a preference for noisiness, which whites were assumed not to tolerate. Moreover, a noisy township lifestyle was understood as the authentic black 'cultural' experience.

> No, thanks [to desegregated units at Student Village] – for the sake of peace. You know. Yes, heish, you know, the way we grew up. It's just, ag, mina I'm a township girl. I mean they [whites] are from the suburbs. They can't stand the noise (Black women, F).

Although the construction of black 'culture' certainly excluded whites and other races that did not live in black townships, it also excluded black individuals who did not emulate this township-like life. There was an implicit suggestion that such individuals are in fact not genuinely black. At the same time however, this same construction of black 'culture' also held the possibility of counting and accepting as black, all those who emulated a township 'culture', regardless of the colour of their skin, including whites. This can be clearly seen in the narrative below, where respondent K does not consider his black housemate from Uganda to be black at all.

> [My housemates], they are all black, then there's one who's not. He is from Uganda ... I've learnt like with Ethiopian people, they're not black man, they truly suck ... Let me say something: to me, I feel being black is not about the colour. It's about the soul – what you kind of believe in, in life, you know, because sometimes we do cross some white folk with a black soul. Uh, let me just put it to you: white life sucks. So, I mean, if a white person is prepared or to, you know, not really live whatever the kinda of lifestyle they are living, but try to at least adopt our culture because I think it's the best. (Black, man K).

Though black culture was a construction that clearly excluded categories of people, coloured and Indians for example, black participants described only white culture as being irreconcilable to blackness. The excerpt below shows how participant K compared his experience at a racially mixed formal residence and a 'formal residence' that had racially segregated corridors. At the residence he preferred, black students had separate corridors from their white counterparts. According to both participant K and participant J, black men lived a township life in their own corridors, and they were relatively unmonitored. Participant K remembered his experience within the black only corridors as thoroughly enjoyable. On the other hand, at the residence where corridors were racially mixed, he felt almost overwhelmed and 'controlled by the white system'.

> [Life in the segregated corridors] Ha, that was tight [very good, thoroughly enjoyable]. That was the best actually. Oh, it was the best. Okay, it was uh, predominantly black, okay […] Yah, okay, I liked it as well because you know, this confrontation [with whites], yah, I'm kind of done with it. Yah, and you know, it was just nice, just crazy. It

> was crazy, like black *lokshion* [township] life actually, basically nice. Ah, [a racially mixed formal residence.] I have to use this word: it sucks. I mean, uh, we were more like, I felt, like controlled by the white system because the HKs [House Committee members] – they were white. Everyone is like white – the housefather, uh, the matron – everything. The food sucked, and everything so, I didn't like that (Black man, K).

Yet participant J who also lived in this racially segregated formal residence also remembered how beneath this pleasant township-like experience, lingered a sense of fear and powerlessness at what white men could do to black men. He explained that because white men were assured unquestionably of the university's protection, black men were always at the risk of being belittled and also physically assaulted by them. He said black men feared physical assault, which occurred during (some) nights when (some) white students would storm into the corridors of the black students.

> When you enter the dining hall, you'll just be finding they [whites] would laugh at you, you know, just clearly. It would be for no apparent reason ... We [blacks] always used to be underdogs. So for a fight to occur it, I mean, it must have been initiated by them ... They would just see you and tell you some crap. When you respond they just kicked your ass and that's how it started. I can say we were afraid of whites (Black man, J).

The feeling of being controlled by whites and a sense of powerlessness was a thread that ran through black participants interviews as they described their previous experiences of racially mixed living spaces at this university ('formal residences'). This feeling was expressed in various ways. Sometimes it was a sense of fear and intimidation, as articulated by participant K above. Like him, some black participants felt that they were being overwhelmed by 'whiteness'. At other times black participants felt that whites did not relate to them as equals, and expected them to behave like servants. Participant E described how white women would shout at black women at the formal residence, telling them to keep their noise down.

> Saying [that] you are making a noise, okay, I do understand. But coming in and shouting at me is another level because I mean we're the same level you and I. See? And then you are coming as if, like, you have authority over me or something (Black woman, E).

In the context of South Africa, white is a social category that includes all groups that are not black, coloured or Asian. Whiteness is also a contested and fluid category. Yet it was Afrikaans-speaking whites that were singled out by black and Asian students as an obstacle to racially mixed living quarters at Student Village. In spite of this, Afrikaans-speaking participants were not found to have any greater propensity towards a construction of stereotypes than other participants. This lack of a more pronounced stereotyping and racism amongst white participants has three possible explanations: In the first place, a black researcher carried out the interviews. It could be that white participants were even more cautious than other participants, not to portray themselves as racist. Secondly, because of the place of Afrikaners in South African history, Afrikaans-speaking whites were easy scapegoats. Other participants could justify their own process of stereotyping by casting in principle blame onto the group that was historically responsible for apartheid. Although these reasons cannot be completely disregarded, this study suggests that the role they played is relatively minor in the light of the third possibility. This is that there exists a set of power relations that continue to consolidate a white Afrikaner hegemony at this particular university. This is despite the discourse of transformation and the implementation of its policies. The university

historically trained only Afrikaans-speaking whites, and the medium of instruction was only Afrikaans (see above). It was a political home and an ideological think-tank for the then Afrikaner white ruling class. Arguably it is in fact this historical background that provides a sociological explanation for a context wherein a hegemonic discourse around cultural differences between the races can both exist and thrive. Overall, other groups experience a relative sense of powerlessness and alienation at the university, most especially poorer black students, some of whom lived at Student Village at the time of this study. This resonates with the 'default racism' identified by Walker (2005) at the historically white Northern University, as outlined above. Whilst there exists a powerful discourse of transformation and inclusion at this university, black students experience a sense of powerlessness and exclusion from life at the university.

> Another thing that is very clear I think if you look at the [university] we as blacks we are lacking in terms of, we don't have that sense of belonging to this institution ...we are only here for studies I think, but we lack that thing of a sense of belonging that this is our university: [that] we can do anything that we like, we are students, so there is a sense of belonging lacking (Black man, B).

It is within this context of both sociological and psychological powerlessness that racially segregated living spaces such as occurs at Student Village were normalised. Such living spaces became 'safe retreats' where black students in particular created the space to cultivate their own sense of belonging and autonomy. The case of Student Village represents at least one attempt to resist the pressures to conform to what is perceived as a foreign, coercive 'culture'. It follows that where a group is resisting what it perceives as an alien 'culture', there is a tendency to recreate and emphasise a distinct indigenous 'culture' – a 'real' or 'natural' 'culture'. These constructions of an indigenous 'culture' are synthesised into already existing notions of 'culture' in everyday practice and language on the wider university campus. In the specific case of Student Village, the notion of a genuine, indigenous blackness was drawn mainly from a knowledge and experience of township life.

White privilege and the politics of space at Student Village

Access to and control of living spaces was a field of incongruous and ambiguous power struggles between less affluent black students and white university administrators. For example, students that live in the university's residences do not require a readily available cash flow for sustenance and commuter costs to nearly as great an extent as those that live in privately owned communes and flats, and sometimes even family homes.[20] Further far fewer white graduate students were in need of university accommodation, than black students from the lower socioeconomic classes. Hence, there were often more vacant rooms available for the use of whites at Student Village than the number of whites who wanted them. In the process of carrying out interviews, I counted at least five vacant rooms in the four white units visited (all of these rooms had been vacant for at least six months.)

Whilst whites units were characterised by an excess of space, overcrowding was not an anomaly in black students' units. Often, black students hosted 'squatters' in their rooms. Squatting was both a consequence of a need by many less affluent black students for university accommodation, as well as a part of survival strategies amongst

black students at Student Village. Space was one of many valuable commodities that could also be shared and traded, like foodstuff, toiletries, small amounts of money etc. It was as a consequence of both a desperate attempt to access available accommodation at the university and a measure of good fortune that Participant M ended up sharing a unit with white students.

Respondent M moved to the university from a city 1600 kilometres from where the university is situated. When she first arrived in the city, she immediately applied for a place at any of the university's residences. She was placed on the waiting list, as is the practice. There were no vacant rooms available at the time. In the meanwhile, she moved into a bed-and-breakfast establishment. After two months in the city, the cost of rent had depleted all her finances, and she could no longer afford to pay rent every month and commute to campus daily. After many visits to their offices, the residence administrators eventually bent to her request and found her a room at Student Village. Respondent M explained that though she had accepted the room, she had felt that its living conditions were appalling. It seemed that a black man who was the caretaker at the time intervened, seemingly out of sheer embarrassment when he opened the room for her. He asked that respondent M be allocated a room that had then just become vacant in one of the units that accommodated white students. In that sense respondent M was accepted as a special case.

> The room that I was put in, it was not in a condition that a person can stay: the carpet was smelling and stuff. I went to [the caretaker] then he told me that the room you are allocated in, you can't sleep there, it's smelly and even the walls [are in a terrible condition – KM]. I just told him that if it's having some windows, or air and the roofing, I don't mind, because I was so desperate. I told him that I don't have money to live in a private accommodation anymore (Black woman, M).

However, respondent M explained that when she moved into this unit, she had discovered that there was in fact another room that had been vacant in the unit all along. This was in addition to the room that she had just been offered. This room remained vacant for the rest of the semester.

The university administrators did not disclose to those black students needing accommodation that vacant rooms were available in white units. Yet desperate black students often contested the boundaries of white power and privilege, and made definite claims to access resources at the university, including space. They motivated and legitimised these claims with reference to a democratic epoch, wherein equal rights and opportunity are enshrined in the constitution. The desperate need for accommodation notwithstanding, politics of identity and autonomy in the context of what black students perceive and experience as white Afrikaner 'culture' and control surfaced. Some of these students were only willing to accept accommodation at those places like Student Village, where they would live only with other black students. In particular they desired as little contact with Afrikaans speaking whites as is possible.

For example, participant J fiercely insisted that he would never have accepted an offer to a room in white students' units at Student Village. This was in spite of his desperate need for accommodation at the time, and the 'fights' between him and the white administrators over accommodation. Although he felt that he had a legitimate claim for space as a student of the university, participant J thought racially mixed

quarters were hostile territory where black students' freedom is hindered and undermined.

> ... at the moment, I'm convinced that if they [whites] don't like blacks, they don't like me, because I've never been in a situation whereby I come to a place – a white dominated place, and they just treat me good. So I'm under the impression that, you know, whites don't like me. I can't live with those boys. I won't be free, you know. I won't be myself. I won't be happy – let's just put it like that (Black man, J).

White students had a far greater leeway to choose both their housemates and the units they would like to stay in because there were often many vacant rooms available in their units. Black students were simply slotted onto the next available room in black units. This greater capacity to choose whilst having access to more space often allowed and motivated white students to move into Student Village's units with friends they had known for a few years at the formal residence. These students had a greater opportunity to transform the often alienating nature of institutional life into an environment that was more conducive to interaction in their units should they choose to do so. How white students communally planned and transformed their kitchens into more intimate living spaces, whilst black students kept them bare and (frequently dirty over weekends) is and was a poignant metaphor in this regard. With relatively few options to access community and holding social mechanisms (in comparison to white students), mobilising around a somewhat romanticised sense of township life was one way to forge togetherness and connectedness in the stark alienating nature of institutional life at Student Village, and this is what they do.

Conclusion

This article suggests that racial identities in post-apartheid South Africa have predictably been 'maintained' and continue to exist under the rubric of notions of the importance and significance of so-called 'cultural differences'. At Student Village the belief existed that there are 'cultural differences' between races. In this sense Student Village is characterised by a racial tolerance, rather than 'racial integration' as defined by Michael Banton.

These findings are understood to be evidence of inter alia the persistence and resilience of white Afrikaner hegemonic elements at the university. In other words, power relations between different races at the university – which cannot be viewed as unexpected in the light of the university's position in South African history – were skewed towards the systematic privileging of white students. At the same time, black students generally experienced feelings of alienation and powerlessness. These feelings were articulated as: having a lack of 'belongingness', being 'afraid', as well being 'underdogs'. Yet, black students were not passive victims in this regard. Racially segregated residences like Student Village became 'safe retreats' wherein black students established more holding and connected communities, cemented through a common identity of township life. A township way of life characterised the everyday life of black students at Student Village in significant ways. Through it, many South African black students at Student Village created a home for themselves and also a common identity of genuine 'blackness'.

Although racial segregation (under the guise of cultural segregation) disadvantaged poorer black students access to the costly commodity of living space,

racially segregated 'safe retreats' like Student Village were and still are a part of an active struggle of resistance against white Afrikaner hegemony at this university. This paper argues that it is through the use of a discourse of 'culture' that (perhaps as to be expected) ongoing racism and racial ordering are legitimised and sustained at Student Village. The paper has suggested in analysis that the discourse around 'cultural differences' is a 'silencing of race' (Franchi and Swart 2003) through a euphemism that is being used by different collectivities in various ways during the yet incomplete process of transformation at this university and indeed in South Africa overall.

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Notes

1. Student Village is a pseudonym for the post-graduate university residence where the research was carried out.
2. Although 'black' in the past has been used more inclusively to encompass all people of colour who were excluded from full citizenship under apartheid, 'black' has also been used to refer only to the subcategory of black Africans. My use of the term 'black' in this particular instance in the article denotes the more inclusive use of the word. Hereafter however, even though I acknowledge the difficulties of either black or African, since both these categories are socially constructed and can be problematised, I will use the conventional differentiated terminology since the respondents invariably did distinguish among black, Indian, white and coloured people. This does not mean I accept this particular categorisation as primordial.
3. In order to ensure anonymity, all documents that are written by the university, including the four volumes of its official history are used without any reference to the name of the university. For this reason, these particular sources are listed as Official university documents, and are not part of the overall bibliography. I only make reference to their titles and dates of publication, as well as the place of publication if the particular document was not published at the university. I use [university] to indicate those places where quotations from sources or from the transcripts of the interviews contained the name of the university.
4. Editor of the student newspaper: 'Sal ons kollege sig eendag helemaal tuis voel as Afrikaanse bodem te midde van ons volkslewe'.
5. 'Daar is feitlik geen staatdepartement waarmee die [universiteit] nie te doen gehad het nie, en daarby is daar talle halfamptelike liggame, institute, rade, verenigings, korporasies, firmas, ens… te veel om op te noem' (ibid. 407).
6. 'Dit het meegebring dat anderskleuriges ook aan die deur van die [Universiteit] kom aanklop het. Die klop het al harder geword' (ibid. 400).
7. In 1969, a daughter of the Japanese consul-general in South Africa was the first non-white student to be admitted to the university. A few other individuals of other races were granted a limited access to the university as well. For example, in 1974, an Indian physician was allowed to use the library. Some academics were also granted permission to assist in the supervision of black postgraduate students who were enrolled elsewhere.
8. 'Koshuise, huis weg van huis ... huis van gemeensaamheid ... van lewensvreudge .. [daar is] 'n groot meerderheid wat met oorgawe daarin opgaan ...' (ibid. 339); According to one

student in *Skakelblad,* living in the residence ensures that 'hy na afloop van sy universiteitsopleiding 'n positiewe en nuttige bydrae aan sy gemeenskap lewer', ibid. 339.

9. 'Die [universiteit], in lyn met alle Suid-Afrikaanse universiteite sien himself as 'n oop inrigting. Toelating vir studie geskied alleenlik op grond van bewese akademiese meriete, asmede erkenning deur die applikant van die tradisioneel Afrikaanse voertaal en karakter van die Universiteit.'
10. This building was not one of the university residences. It was where the student council and other student bodies had their offices.
11. Northern University is a pseudonym that Walker uses for the university which she studies.
12. Given the high cost of accommodation, an increase in student numbers, and the need for more affordable housing, on 3 June 1992, a working committee of the university council was commissioned to proceed with the planning of a 'students' town', Student Village, covering an area of 22 968m^2 at a total cost of R6.1 million. At the beginning of 1993, 264 senior students moved into Student Village's 29 houses (Official History III 1996: 540-541).
13. At the time of the study, the cost of accommodation at Student Village was at least 18 percent cheaper than that at the formal residences, and about 24 percent cheaper than a shared room in one other 'informal residence'. It was also about 31 percent cheaper than a single room in this other residence.
14. In this particular study, in order to generate storytelling, and to probe how residents understood race and its influence on who they shared intimate spaces with, they were asked to talk about: (i) how they made the decision to live at Student Village; and (ii) their experience of their place of residence before Student Village and how Student Village compares to it. It was then possible to introduce and tackle issues of race according to the context of discussion that the participants created in their narratives.
15. Personal Communication, 3 September 2004, with Head of Residence Administration, at the university.
16. Respondents themselves spoke about culture in very reified terms: 'blacks do this ... white do that or black culture is this ... white culture is that etc'. In order to convey respondents' own perceptions and their own sense of reality, I use terms like black 'culture', township 'culture' etc in ideal typical terms, in order to reflect the respondents own understanding of the concept. The words 'culture', 'cultures', 'cultural' are inserted in quotation marks to reflect that although respondents tend to understand culture in this manner, I accept culture is a notion and a social practice that is fluid and changing. Accordingly, quotation marks are not used in the excerpts of the narratives included in the text. This paper conceptualises culture as a discursive concept rather than as a word with a particular meaning. Even its use by respondents at Student Village shows its pervasiveness, fluidity and elusiveness. 'Culture' referred to different categories at different times, ascribing to them meanings that were often contradictory. For example, in some contexts 'culture' was used to refer specifically to ethnic divisions amongst people of one nationality, and in other contexts, was used as a less antagonistic and confrontation-like euphemism for race. In yet other contexts 'culture' was used to refer to individuals' habits. These habits were at times assumed to be innate, whilst at other times they were understood as a consequence of upbringing.
17. Porridge prepared from maize meal.
18. A music genre that emerged in the 1990s in Johannesburg, and particularly popular amongst black youth, especially those in the townships.
19. Sometimes some of the researcher's housemates hosted 'house-parties' and invited residents from other units. They played music at very high volumes even if the parties were held during the week. Her unit was not the exception however. Black residents often hosted house parties in their units, and other black residents typically brought their own food and

beverages. Although sometimes these parties were a celebration of birthdays or other special events, there was not always a particular reason why a resident hosted a party. Although it was not only black residents that held parties, they tended to host parties much more frequently. This higher frequency was not only due to the fact that black students were a statistical majority, but also particularly because unlike their white counterparts, Student Village was the place where black students had fun and entertained themselves. It was my experience that this environment negatively affected one's academic performance.

20. University accommodation presents the following advantages: Students do not have to pay monthly rent. The cost of this accommodation becomes part of the university fees, and so one could at least hope to make arrangements for these fees to be paid through a bank loan or any other form of sponsorship – even if it is at a later stage. At the formal residences, the cost of food also becomes a part of the university fees. Students that cannot afford to buy their own provisions at informal residences like Student Village are sometimes allowed to make arrangements to eat on campus. Also, one does not have to worry about the additional costs of water and electricity, which have to be paid on a monthly basis at privately rented places of accommodation. There are also washing machines and dryers available at no cost, and so students have access to a free launderette at all times. Another added benefit of accommodation at the university is of course, the fact that the rooms are already fully furnished, and it is not necessary to buy any furniture, unlike moving into a private flat. Even if a student were to reside at one of the informal residences more costly than Student Village, that should not be interpreted as evidence of the availability of funds. Being accommodated at any university residence, whatever its cost, is a far more preferable situation than cheaper accommodation elsewhere. Private accommodation necessitates a *readily available* cash flow, which even the most expensive of the university residences would not require to as great an extent.

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Shopping for Health: Affliction and Response in a South African Village

Abstract

Much research on health-seeking behaviour focuses on the influence of folk beliefs. The role of traditional practitioners and healing practices feature prominently. On the other hand, in thinking about service delivery in the health sector, policy experts working for governments and the development fraternity focus on physical infrastructure, supplies, equipment, and resources, human and financial, as the critical elements in ensuring quality provision by providers and consistent use by consumers. Folk beliefs about illness causation and treatment and how they may or may not influence service use do not feature in policy discussions. Nor are they a major feature of medical curricula. This paper shows, as does other evidence, that this approach to health education and policy making is inadequate. It addresses three questions. How do the people of Tiko respond to ill-health? What influences their health-seeking behaviour? What do their responses imply for public policy generally and health policy and practice in particular? It shows that, as elsewhere, response to ill-health is pragmatic and pluralistic. Folk beliefs are important in decision making. So are other factors, including experiences with the formal health system and access to social and financial resources. It shows that the search for therapy is not a powerless and blind search, but one based on rational decision-making, in which many actors participate. It adds to the evidence that building functioning health systems and delivering services that address users' needs demands more than technocratic fixes.

Introduction and background

Poor people in developing countries are burdened by ill-health (Narayan and Petesch, 2002), often the cause of their poverty. High HIV/AIDS prevalence and infection rates, as in South Africa, exacerbate suffering. Many factors influence people's response to ill-health, including entrenched beliefs (Greenfield, 1987; Sachs, 1989; de Zoysa, Bhandari, Akhtari & Bhan, 1998; Whyte, van der Geest & Hardon, 2002).

We examine responses to ill-health in a rural South African village and the ideas and reasons underlying them. The village, Tiko (fictitious name), is located in Limpopo Province. Its 3776 inhabitants include 926 Mozambican immigrants,[1] mostly 1980s war refugees. Both groups are of Shangaan identity. Due to cultural homogeneity, they share beliefs about illness and illness causation and exhibit similar health-seeking behaviour. In the case of illnesses the diagnosis and response of Mozambicans first 'found' in South Africa[2] are influenced by pre-existing folk knowledge within the host community.

Drawing on research in other contexts, we address three questions: how do the people of Tiko react to illness? Why do they react the way they do? What do the reactions and their justification imply for public policy in general and health policy and practice in particular? Our research reinforces findings elsewhere, particularly about pragmatism and plurality of response to ill-health. In addition to affirming and sometimes interrogating factors commonly cited as influencing health-seeking behaviour (Pronyk, Makhubele, Hargreaves, Tollman & Hausler, 2001; Hundt, Stuttaford & Ngoma, 2004) we highlight the role of users' encounters with providers, and of social networks. The influence of these factors has been amply explored in some contexts (Scheper-Hughes, 1992; Greenfield, ibid.), but not in South Africa.

Data collection

We draw on ethnographic material collected over 18 months.[3] The large size of the predominantly South African sections of the village compelled us to design the study around a core group of informants experiencing poor health at the time, and those who, during earlier phases of the project, had been ill or care-givers. Interviews and informal exchanges identified more informants. We observed social-grant claimants on pension day and identified TB sufferers and stroke victims. For the smaller immigrant community, we convened a meeting to explain the research, and asked people to share their experiences with us and convey our request for interviews to those absent.

We conducted 55 in-depth interviews mostly with older adults and held informal discussions with other villagers of various ages. Respondents were mostly older adults. Although this focus seems to bias the research and poses questions about representativeness, it can be justified by young people' limited knowledge of complex illnesses, their causes, and therapy options. As the research progressed it became clear that older people chose therapy for members of their households or influenced their choices.

Affliction, diagnosis and response: Tiko in a wider context

Regardless of geographic or social context, ill-health is attributed to numerous causes. Some illnesses, including mild, easily treatable ones, those linked to old age and others common in young children, are attributed to God's will. Some, such as epilepsy and seizures, are attributed to ancestors or spirits, others to natural causes. Yet others, including protracted difficult-to-treat illnesses, are attributed to human agency: poisoning, witchcraft, or sorcery (Steen and Mazonde, 1999; Cumes, 2004; Janzen, 1978; Ngubane, 1977). Therapy choices are guided by knowledge of, or beliefs about, their relative efficacy. Elsewhere in South Africa (Ashforth, 2000; Niehaus, 2001), depending on the presumed cause of affliction and appropriate therapy, sufferers look to allopathic or traditional medicine. Villagers in Tiko share many of these beliefs and exhibit similar reactions. Besides beliefs, however, personal experience, rumour and material circumstances influence behaviour. Social and kin networks and the wider community are important sources of advice.

Therapy-seeking in Tiko: Diagnosis

Afflictions are divided into four broad categories and grouped according to cause and appropriate therapy. Illnesses such as malaria, the common cold (*mukuhlwana*) and

minor ailments are attributed to natural causes, hazards of everyday life that only God can explain. Others are attributed to eating particular types of especially processed food, or eating it too often and in large quantities: diabetes (*mavabye ya chukele*), hypertension (high blood), *ndatswa,*[4] rheumatism (sugar, cooking oil, refined mielie meal, exotic chickens, and salt). Still others are attributed to pollution. Ritual pollution can result from failure to observe conventions governing particular rituals. It is said to cause *tindzaka* (with TB-like symptoms), *vukulu* (many forms of childhood physical disability), and HIV/AIDS whose symptoms and mode of transmission confuse people. TB, said to afflict miners and ex-miners, is attributed to pollution by dust. Its likeness to *tindzaka,* however, also confuses.

Some afflictions are attributed to human agency: witchcraft or 'feeding' (*xidyiso*). Huntingford (1963: 175) describes witchcraft as 'the power to kill or injure people by means of spells'. It is in this sense that the people of Tiko use the term.[5] As elsewhere (Ferguson, 1999), witchcraft is believed to involve not only the use of spells but also poisons and other 'medicines'. *Xidyiso* is something that, once ingested, turns into a live organism that 'moves about' and eats the victim from inside the body. The ingesting can be physical, or occur through a dream. The most dreaded witchcraft-related affliction is *xifulana* or *xifula,* which manifests itself in stroke- and septicaemia-like symptoms, severe headache or stomach-ache, and bodily swellings and wounds. It 'attacks' when the intended victim jumps over or steps on 'medicines' laid along a path or at the entrance to a homestead by a witch. Like *jogu* among the Dagomba (Bierlich, 2000) and inner *lubanzi* among the Bakongo (Janzen, 1978), its treatment by hypodermic injection is said to lead to certain death.

The suspected cause of an illness guides the search for therapy, but there are exceptions. It is believed that, regardless of presumed cause, some afflictions such as *tindzaka, ndatswa* and *xifulana* are treatable only by traditional therapy. Some, such as TB and HIV/AIDS, are considered treatable by both traditional and allopathic therapy; others such as 'sugar diabetes' and 'high blood' only by biomedicine and do not respond to traditional therapy. Afflictions for which allopathic therapy is considered unsuitable are those attributed to ritual pollution and witchcraft, the latter being fairly common.

With few exceptions, chronic afflictions are attributed to human agency, but not always with complete certainty. Exceptions include diabetes, high-blood pressure, and *ndatswa.* The perceived connection between human agency and illness is evident from an informant's response when asked where her son was. He was at a traditional healer's because 'they made him run mad' (*va mu hlanganise engcondo*). A witch, she believed, was behind the affliction.

Within the village, information is widely exchanged about many matters, including health. Information sharing at times of illness is especially important. In Congo, Janzen (op cit: 4) found the role of kinsmen whom he called the 'therapy management group' significant. In Tiko this role extends beyond kin to include people who take an interest in a patient's well-being and volunteer advice. We call them the 'therapy reference group'. This phenomenon, hitherto unexplored in the literature, consists of friends, neighbours, and other contacts of the patient and wider family. Therapy referees suggest a diagnosis and advise on 'the best' sources of therapy, or about

practitioners who excel at treating particular afflictions. This advice influences decisions about therapy seeking.

Reaction to affliction

People react to illness in four ways: they do nothing and wait 'to see what happens'; self-medicate; or visit clinics, hospitals, and traditional therapists. Responses are pragmatic and follow no particular pattern or sequence. As elsewhere (Steen and Mazonde, ibid; Bierlich, ibid.), depending on one's circumstances and world view, reaction might involve one strategy or several, separately or simultaneously.

Waiting 'to see what happens'

This happens when an illness is in its early stages or does not cause intolerable discomfort. The sufferer seeks to establish how serious it might be and hopes that it will go away by itself.

Self-medication

Usually the first line of defence, it entails the use of traditional and allopathic medicines separately or in combination. It is premised on the belief that a problem – cuts, fevers, colds, sores, headaches, and other minor ailments and injuries – is easily treatable and does not require specialist attention:

> When I have a headache, I take a piece of those sacks that long ago they used to pack mielie meal. I burn it and inhale the smoke. The headache will stop.

As elsewhere (Heald, 1999), self-medication focuses on the afflictions' somatic features. Many people are knowledgeable about herbs and concoctions for treating specific afflictions. When members of a sufferer's kin and social network believe they know the problem and that it is treatable using certain 'medicines' that are readily available in the local bushes or at home, they are prepared and administered. People also have knowledge of allopathic medicines and the illnesses they treat. If available over-the-counter they use them without reference to a specialist. Some obtain medicines from relatives and friends in the formal health system or within their social networks. During fieldwork, people asked about medicines for joint pains, heart palpitations and worm infestation. Some asked about the 'proper' use of medicines acquired through contacts.

Herbalists, healers, diviners and prophets

The literature assigns them the generic label 'traditional healers', a term which raises questions about what is traditional about so-called traditional medicine and healing practices. Leonard (2000: 93) usefully applies it to 'rural health practitioners whose techniques resemble health practices that existed before the spread of "western" medicine into the rural areas'. He does 'not imply that all traditional healers use herbal medicines, nor that no non-traditional healers use herbal medicines' (ibid). He distinguishes traditional from non-traditional practitioners 'by method of practice, not by types of medicine used' (ibid.). We adopt the same usage.

People seek treatment from three types of traditional practitioner: herbalists (*magedle*); healers (*inyanga*); and diviners (*sangoma*). In practice some of their

functions overlap. Here we present ideal types as given by informants, for purposes of classification. *Magedle* are not necessarily formally trained; they acquire knowledge of herbs from healers either as patients or through apprenticeship. Apprenticeship can be with kin who inherited their knowledge. Some *magedle* buy medicines from specialists and practice healing as a business. Informants claimed there are 'hundreds' of them in the village and that some are crooks who dabble in witchcraft and claim powers they do not possess, in order to rip-off patients and 'buy themselves something to eat'. *Inyanga* are a notch higher than *magedle* and considered to be more powerful. To become one, a person must undergo formal training in diagnosis and healing, usually at the prompting of ancestral spirits. *Sangoma* are diviner-healers; they, too, are formally trained under the influence of ancestor spirits.

Ideally, as among the Zulu (Ngubane, ibid: 101), *sangoma* uncover the real cause and meaning of an affliction using the divinatory technique of 'throwing bones' (Cumes, ibid), while *inyanga* dispense treatment. In practice, however, there is little difference between them, with many combining divining and healing functions. This probably explains why writers (Cumes, op cit.) and even people in Tiko use the terms interchangeably. Besides traditional practitioners there are prophets (*maporofeti*). These are clerics or officials of charismatic churches whose healing techniques include prayer, rituals, and the use of allopathic medicines and other substances. Although their services are sought after by practising and non-practising Christians, they are particularly popular with churchgoers.

When an affliction fails to respond to self-medication but is judged not to warrant a trip to a *sangoma* or *inyanga,* herbalists are the second line of defence. People visit them to treat mild or non-life-threatening afflictions. Diviners and healers are the third line of defence, consulted about serious and life threatening afflictions or, within the limits of their knowledge, mysterious ones. This mirrors behaviour among the Gisu of Uganda who consult diviners 'only at times of acute personal crisis' and not 'for routine matters or to give advice more generally'. Diviners are 'are course of final resort', a sign that 'all other means have failed', and 'part of a desperate search to locate the source of misfortune' (Heald, ibid: 97). As elsewhere (Farmer, 1992, Abrahams, 1994; Offiong, 1991) attributing illness to witchcraft explains the search for those responsible in order to initiate counteractive action. Further, recourse to divination amounts to a 'special focusing on the nature of disease' and 'a shift from the somatic to the social, from the visible to the invisible' (Heald, op cit: 106).

For illnesses that require observation, prophets and traditional therapists provide residential facilities. Patients stay until after recovery or when the therapist or relatives no longer believe it possible. The patient is then taken home to die. The decision to give up is often forced by the need to minimise costs. If a patient dies in residence, cleansing rituals for the healer's premises must be paid for. In some instances, rather than give up, relatives opt for allopathic services, usually too late for treatment to be effective.

Allopathic services

Within the region almost every village has a clinic or access to one nearby. There are also health centres with wider coverage. Some people opt for self-medication first, while others use clinics or health centres, even for minor ailments. Going to allopathic practitioners, especially private ones, is easier for those with health insurance.

The public health system encourages visits to primary care facilities first and to hospitals only when referred by health personnel. Non-compliance renders patients liable to pay fees. Otherwise free treatment is guaranteed. Nonetheless, despite free treatment at clinics, some sufferers attend only after illnesses have escalated, sometimes with chances of successful treatment considerably diminished. They are then referred to hospital where some die shortly after admission. This is why hospitals represent 'places of death' in people's minds, especially the elderly, many of whom believe that, once admitted, 'no one comes out alive', and that, therefore, hospitals should be avoided.

Therapeutic choices

Choice of therapy is not always straightforward. Nor are therapies used in linear fashion. Therapy seeking is pragmatic, sometimes entailing simultaneous use of different therapies. If an affliction does not respond quickly, alternative diagnosis and treatment are sought, on grounds that the current therapist 'cannot manage'. In some cases switching is gradual, involving back-and-forth movement as patients shop around to maximise the potential of each type. Nonetheless, dissatisfaction, even over a short period, may lead to frustration and resignation. An informant with a longstanding nasal problem illustrates:

> They said 'it is flu; take these pills'. I did not get well, so I decided not to go back. I saw that even if I went back, it wouldn't help. They don't give you good medicine. I decided to stay home.

As for traditional healers, he was tired of them as well:

> They are expensive, those people. I don't want to go there. They give you useless medicine and then take your money and buy mielie meal.

Resignation, though, usually happens when an affliction is not accompanied by severe discomfort and can be tolerated. Many factors influence choice of response.

The nature and seriousness of an illness is one. The more serious an affliction appears, the speedier the reaction; perceived severity also influences type of therapy sought. An informant who dabbled in traditional medicine and whose eye had been surgically removed at a local hospital illustrates:

> When you feel pains all over your body, we go and dig up some medicine and steam you to make you sweat. Then we wrap you in blankets so that the illness can come out ... Nothing really injured my eye. It just started; just like that. Some people said I had been bewitched, that it was *xifulana.* But I couldn't understand how or why. I hadn't quarrelled with anyone. Eish! The pain was unbearable! I discussed it with my wife. We decided to go straight to hospital. There was no time to look for traditional healers.

Alternatively, when an illness causes anxiety about its cause and progression, therapy is sought. The type sought depends on the supposed cause and, by extension, therapy believed to be effective. An informant, with an eye problem attributed to ritual pollution but untreated for years, eventually travelled to seek traditional treatment. During the interview, months after treatment, she said nothing had changed. She had not sought allopathic treatment, believing it was unsuitable. In-depth discussion pointed to possible hypertension. Besides an early ocular paralysis, she experienced night sweats and palpitations but showed little enthusiasm for our suggestion that she try allopathic therapy.

Distance: Distance is an important influence over whether or not to seek allopathic care. As an impediment it is especially significant for hospital care. Hospitals are far from the village and visiting entails paying for transport from meagre resources. Referrals from clinics may be deferred while alternatives are considered, until forced by escalation in suffering. Paradoxically, when traditional therapy is deemed necessary, distance diminishes in importance. People usually opt for non-local experts who do not know them personally, some operating from distant places. Informants justify this by arguing that expert healers do not necessarily live in the village. Also, as they are not plugged into the local rumour mill, confidentiality is guaranteed. Further, going to non-locals ensures that local ones do not bewitch people for financial gain. And divination is more likely to be accurate if the diviner has no access to personal information about patients. Conversely, access to rumours by locals raises doubts:

> He is going to tell me lies. If you're from here, he is going to tell you lies .... They will make you fight with people. Someone from far away will tell me the truth.

Nonetheless, local experts have their uses, as the case of a young man treated successfully by a local *inyanga* for *xifulana* demonstrates. The treatment followed failure by tablets from a private doctor and medicines from two non-local *inyanga* to cure him. The local *inyanga,* who volunteered his services while visiting the patient's family as a friend, supplied the medicine the young man believes cured him.

Lack of drugs: South Africa has a relatively developed health-care system with facilities within easy reach of users. However, they are routinely short of medicines, especially for chronic illnesses, and do not satisfy demand. Some informants claimed to have visited clinics several times and found no medicines. Some were given only painkillers, even for illnesses they believed merited 'strong medicine'. The belief that clinics do not have medicines or that they have only weak ones discouraged visits especially for minor illnesses or those for which alternative treatment could be found.

Poverty: In Africa and the developing world (de Zoysa et al., 1998; Bierlich, ibid; Narayan and Petesch, 2002) access to health facilities is difficult for many and transport usually has to be paid for. Inability to pay becomes a barrier to access. Similarly, in Tiko seeking treatment may entail expenditure on transport. Poverty compels people to defer visits. In private clinics patients pay upfront or immediately after treatment; those without means do not go there. Although traditional therapy must be paid for, it is generally affordable, made so partly by therapists expecting payment only after recovery. Some healers ask for a deposit (*xichela mhuri*) but the amounts are usually symbolic. Nonetheless, traditional therapy is not necessarily cheap. Some therapists let clients decide how to pay: cash, goats, chickens, cattle. Others charge as much or even more than allopathic treatment would cost:

> Inyanga don't ask for money before you are cured. When you get well, however, they say 'I want my cow'. That may mean 500 rands, or even 1000. But some ask for a cow of 100 rands. With modern doctors you pay for the medicine they give you. If it is 20 rands, you pay 20 rands. If it is 100 rands, that's what you pay. So, as you see, even *inyanga* can be expensive.

For some people, cost is a deterrent to seeking traditional therapy:

> I have not been to a traditional healer in this country. I have not been there because traditional healers want money. In Mozambique I had people to pay for me. Now the only help I get is from clinics.

Things have not always been like this. Traditional medicine, we learned, has been invaded by greedy people who treat it as a business:

> In the past healers were good. They never asked for much money. When one treated you and you got better, they would ask for two rands; that was the cow. These days, healers want real cows. We no longer have healers. They are all tsotsis (crooks) now.

When patients are kept under observation, upkeep has to be paid for; costs escalate. When a therapist is not within walking distance transport costs are high. Nonetheless, payment in instalments might mitigate the financial impact, and assistance can be sourced through kin and social networks. Consequently, although it influences response to illness and choice of provider, poverty alone neither always nor necessarily constitutes a barrier to treatment-seeking. There are, however, instances where patients, with or without assistance, cannot afford non-local specialists. Therefore, in Tiko as elsewhere, the very poor die of treatable illnesses because of poverty. The testimony of an informant with a grandson afflicted by tuberculosis shows poverty as an impediment to access:

> They gave him treatment but it got finished. So when you want to go back, you need money. But I don't have money. What can I do?

Conduct of health workers. As elsewhere (Jewkes, Abrahams & Mvo, 1998) informants accused health workers of misconduct, citing neglect, rudeness and disrespect. One elderly man's experience was typical:

> I can give an example of myself, the way I was once treated. You see, I am blind. They put me in a ward with people who can see. The nurses disappear at night. You want to go to the toilet; you need help. They can call them but they don't come ... Sometimes they say 'why don't you die; you are so old, why don't you die?'

Such misconduct discourages visits to particular facilities in favour of others within easy reach. Where only the clinic providing poor service is accessible, people visit only after exhausting other options. Even last resort visits may occur under duress: 'I did not want to go to hospital. They forced me, saying that if I didn't go, they would tie me up with a rope ... and take me there.'

Besides rude behaviour, neglect of patients' psychological needs influences therapy-seeking. Rather than reassure patients, some health workers are dismissive of their fears and concerns. HIV/AIDS sufferers are especially vulnerable. While nurses are local, they are trained in Western-oriented paradigms and institutions and, for the most part, seek to assert their modern identity and distance themselves from traditional beliefs and practices. While formal health systems are opening up to traditional medicine, the Western orientation remains dominant. According to a retired nurse,

> People feel they don't get what they need. Traditional healers first throw bones. At the clinic they measure temperature and blood pressure. If a patient's leg is swollen, he expects you to tell him that it is *xifulana.* But at the clinic they just dress his leg. It does not make him happy.

Research elsewhere (Scheper-Hughes, ibid) shows that when allopathic therapists are not reassuring, people look to traditional practitioners for treatment and explanations that lessen fear and anxiety. In Tiko, one informant with an illness that caused his hands and feet to swell was referred to hospital without being told what might be wrong. At the hospital he was examined, given painkillers, and told to return home. He

subsequently switched to traditional therapy. It had no effect, but the healer's diagnosis boosted his morale. When his condition worsened, his relatives forced him to return to hospital. He was given painkillers and other medication which diminished neither his faith in the traditional healer, nor his scepticism about allopathic therapy. By the time he died he had been to hospital a few times, and still knew nothing about his illness. Doctors had conducted tests which he described in full, but had still not explained what was wrong with him. The suspense only aggravated his disaffection with the formal health system and the people who work in it.

There are grounds for doubting traditional practitioners' understanding of illness and its causes (Green, Zokwe & Dupree, 1995). Within the sufferers' scope of comprehension, however, their diagnoses make sense, as they are couched in shared cultural idioms. Allopathic practitioners on the other hand, do not involve patients in the treatment process, usually leaving their anxieties intact. Heald (op cit.102-103) illustrates:

> ... the doctor assesses the significance of the symptoms, gives a diagnosis and prescribes a remedy, or refers the patient to a hierarchy of specialists. Almost total credence is demanded of the patient ... The divinatory situation is essentially different in its power relationship. Here ... it is the client who is the arbiter of truth; it is a system where both clients and doctors share the same cultural idioms, the same assumptions about ... the cause of misfortune.

Leonard (op cit. 99) also points to neglect of patients' need for information. Of 450 consultations observed in Cameroon, in only 71 cases were patients given information about the diagnosis and medicine prescribed. In only 29 cases were patients told what to do to increase chances of recovery or avoid similar illnesses in future, something traditional practitioners commonly do (Caplan, ibid.). Thus the greater faith traditional practitioners enjoy.

Dissatisfaction with particular types of therapy: Dissatisfaction with a particular type of therapy leads to a search for alternatives. The change may be preceded by persistence with the unsatisfactory therapy in the hope that it will work. One informant, who believed he had tuberculosis but turned out to have asthma, used traditional medicines for over ten years while changing practitioners four times:

> I began taking traditional medicine in 1990 until 2001. In 2001 I gave it up because I had seen that it wasn't helping me. I started using pills from the doctor.

Another person who initially believed he had *tindzaka* but turned out to have tuberculosis spent 'a long time' using medicines from two traditional healers. Experiencing little improvement after paying large sums of money, he eventually switched:

> I thought it was *tindzaka.* I went to a traditional healer. He said it was *tindzaka.* Then I discovered that he couldn't manage; so I went to another one. He said it was *tindzaka.* But his medicine wasn't working. I decided to try the health centre because I saw that the illness was getting worse. I decided that it was better to try the health centre for some pills. The nurses referred me to hospital to see a doctor.

Some people switch from traditional to allopathic practice on the advice of traditional practitioners who have run out of ideas. Others may switch from allopathic to traditional on the advice of health workers who, despite their Western-oriented training, believe in its efficacy against 'African' afflictions. Still others combine

allopathic and traditional therapies because 'one strengthens the other'. Some believe allopathic medicines are weak and ineffective on their own. The 'weakness' therefore justifies the search for traditional supplements or alternatives. When alternatives are believed to be effective while allopathic remedies are believed to have failed, faith in the latter is undermined. This happened when an informant was recommended for surgery following failure by allopathic medication to un-block his urinary tract. Before returning to hospital for the operation, a friend advised him to try a traditional healer. Within days the problem had resolved. He still reported to hospital to 'prove to the doctors' that their decision to 'cut me open' had been made in haste and was mistaken. The experience boosted his faith in traditional therapy and dimmed his view of allopathic medicine.

Beliefs about certain types of healing techniques: This point relates to the previous one. There are types of treatment that folk knowledge deems unsuitable for certain illnesses and that if used they are dangerous, or even fatal. 'African' diseases belong to this category. It is believed allopathic practitioners know little, if anything about them, and that, consequently, they cannot treat them. This view, by no means unique to Tiko (Janzen, op cit.), represents a fairly common scepticism towards allopathic medicine.

As elsewhere (Rasmussen, 2001), witchcraft is assigned a central aetiological role in illness causation and often invoked when illness or events are deemed serious or mysterious. One testimony illustrates:

> When it started, I thought it was just an illness because it made me vomit. With time, however, my stomach started rumbling. I thought I had been bewitched, that it was *xidyiso*. Even my children believed it was *xidyiso*.

In such circumstances people choose traditional rather than allopathic treatment because witchcraft-related afflictions are generally considered incompatible with allopathic treatment, as are those linked to ritual pollution or violation of taboos. Nonetheless, some beliefs, shown by the testimony below by a respondent who had heard 'stories', are based on rumour and speculation:

> At the clinic they don't give you good medicine. Even those private doctors, when you go there, they want 100 rands. But they don't give you good medicine. They want you to go back and then they ask for 80 rands. When you go back again, they ask for 60 rands. But the medicine they give you does nothing. For example, Dr. X has a beautiful building and he lets you watch television. But he knows nothing. I'd rather go to a diviner.

There are, however, illnesses believed treatable by both traditional and allopathic therapy. The decision about which to use then depends on a number of factors, including ease of access. But one approach may be preferred because of entrenched beliefs about its relative efficacy or suitability.

Religion and therapy: Churches usually condemn traditional therapists. Self-avowed born-again Christians claim not to believe in traditional therapy or to trust *inyanga* and *sangoma*. They claim to use only allopathic and prayer therapy, the latter dispensed at church. Those who admit to using traditional medicine outside church claim to consult only herbalists. Herbal medicines, they argue, do not compromise their religious values because they are not dispensed in shrines where healers and diviners confer with oracles and ancestral spirits. Christianity, however, does not necessarily erase the belief that there are illnesses that allopathic therapy 'cannot manage' and which can only be effectively treated by traditional therapy, sometimes of

the 'demonic' variety. Consequently, Christians stricken by them consult healers and diviners clandestinely. Those who have not yet suffered such misfortune admit to willingness to do the same should the need arise. Only one woman, newly born again and suffering from TB-related complications, said she would rather die:

> It is better to die. It is better to die. I swear to God, I'd rather die. I'd rather go to church. But to a traditional healer? It is better to die. They ate my money. I will never go there again.

Her views had been shaped by past negative experience with traditional practitioners. She had spent 'a lot of money' on treatment that had not worked. She then received allopathic treatment, with positive results. Perhaps the best explanation for the gap between what self-avowed Christians say and do, and why people maintain a large repertoire of responses to affliction, comes from a TB patient who, for some time, had tried different therapies. He had been eclectic in his choices because 'when a person is sick, he will try anything to get better'.

Information sharing: Sharing information extends from diagnosis to identifying solutions. Many decisions such as where to go for treatment, or whether to go at all, are made on the basis of information, including rumours, acquired in this way. One rumour concerned doctors in public hospitals:

> I trust only private doctors. Those in hospitals arrange with mortuary owners to kill patients. If they pay him 1000 rands do you think he won't kill more than 20 people to make money for himself? Don't you know it happens? Don't you know it? Me, I know it.

The case of a young man who discovered that one of his legs had swollen while he slept, illustrates the influence of information sharing on response. Some people suggested it was *xifulana* and volunteered names of traditional therapists. Others advised a trip to a clinic or hospital for 'proper' diagnosis. He went to a private clinic first. The doctor suspected diabetes. He referred him to a hospital for a fuller examination. Given earlier suggestions that it could be *xifulana* and his fear that by going to hospital he risked being treated by injection, he rejected the doctor's advice and returned home. Encouraged and sometimes accompanied by his father, he visited several traditional healers. His behaviour supports Janzen's view that ultimately 'the lay therapy manager retains the right to choose the therapist even after a consulting doctor – diviner – has made his diagnosis and recommended action' (Janzen, op cit.:130), and demonstrates the influence of therapy referees over patients and their therapy managers. Further evidence of the influence of therapy referees is provided by an informant who, when asked how he had known about the therapists from whom he sought treatment for supposed TB, eventually diagnosed as asthma, responded: 'it was my friends. When they saw how ill I was, they told me which healers to go to. But they didn't help'.

Also, when negative information circulates about particular services, similarly negative views are formed, which influence people's willingness to use them. This partly explains the negative attitudes elderly people hold about hospitals. They believe nurses are hostile and that they inject elderly people with dangerous substances to 'finish them off'. Since people 'are killed there', they fear going to hospitals:

> We fear hospitals because we hear nurses do not like old people. I hear they ask old people whether they are not tired of living. They say there is little medicine and they want to keep it for the young. They ask why we don't want to leave the medicine for

> young people. You know what that means. That's why we are afraid; it is better to stay here and die at home.

The belief that health workers harm rather than care for the elderly is not unique to Tiko (Scheper-Hughes, ibid.). Nonetheless, some fear hospitals and not allopathic therapy itself. Although reluctant to go to hospital, some were willing to submit to examination and treatment if 'doctors' visited them at home. One such informant feared going into hospitals for reasons she could not articulate:

> I don't know why I fear hospitals. I don't know what I am afraid of. If you ask me why, I can't tell you. My entire life, I have not been to a hospital. Even pills, when I see them, I tremble. If I take them, I just vomit.

According to her daughter-in-law:

> Some old people have ancestors who do not allow them to go to hospital. Like my mother-in-law, even if you show her pills, she begins to tremble. So we take it that her ancestors don't want her to go to hospital. Since childhood she has not been to a hospital. Even the hospital card she doesn't have it. Even when she is seriously ill, she does not go to hospital.

The age (group) of a sufferer: People generally take young children for allopathic and only rarely for traditional therapy. Several reasons account for this behaviour. When children are ill, they just cry; they lack the ability to express what they are suffering from. Parents or guardians cannot therefore diagnose the affliction, as they might for adults who are able to articulate their problem. Children have weak bodies that can be easily overcome by serious illness, hence the imperative to seek rapid diagnosis and treatment at a health facility. Quick reaction is considered especially necessary when a child cries incessantly or is visibly weak and unable to play or eat. Illnesses for which traditional therapy is sought are those believed to be 'African' or related to bewitchment. Nonetheless, people believe that children do not have personal enemies and thus are not targets of witchcraft.

Therefore, save for 'African' conditions such as sunken fontanelles, illness is almost always attributed to natural causes suitable for allopathic treatment. Only when this is judged to have failed and theories formulated about other causes such as ritual pollution or taboo violation by their parents, is traditional therapy sought. Traditional medicines are believed to be 'too strong' and potentially dangerous or fatal if given to very young children. Allopathic therapy is considered safer because medicines are manufactured specifically for children and dispensed in carefully determined quantities. Nonetheless, one informant had different reasons:

> I am a traditional healer. If my child has flu, I take him to the clinic because the law tells us that there is medicine for children at the clinics. It is also because illnesses like flu and diarrhoea cannot be cured by traditional healers.

Therefore the age group of a patient is important. Notably where ritual pollution is believed to have occurred or taboos violated, the cause of resulting illness is straightforward, in which case the decision to visit traditional therapists is made easily. Conditions attributed to these causes include nearly all physical deformities and disability.

Lack of time: Lack of time, especially for women, is important. The imperative for treatment is weighed against the obligation to cook, look for firewood, fetch water,

work in the fields, and other chores. This prevents some women from seeking care for themselves and their children, especially for illnesses considered non-life threatening, including dermatological disorders and worm infestation. Sometimes serious afflictions such as malaria are reacted to with procrastination. Gender-specific barriers such as 'lack of time' become particularly important when people are referred to hospital. The three district hospitals serving the area are far from the village, and a visit there might entail a whole day away from home.

Discussion and conclusions

What do these findings say about health-seeking in Tiko? They affirm findings in other contexts that pragmatism and pluralism underlie health-seeking. They show that, as elsewhere, beliefs about illness and illness causation influence people's therapy choices. They show that alongside beliefs, experience with the formal health system, every-day events such as household chores, and poverty, are important influences. They affirm that decisions about therapy seeking and management are usually collective rather than individual, and that therapy management groups play a key role. They highlight the importance of therapy referees whose role in guiding therapy managers has not been explored by other research.

The most immediate implication is that there is more to planning service delivery than focusing on infrastructure and supplies. Even where these are available, folk ideas about aetiologies of disease prompt responses to affliction that point away from the formal health system. Its use and usefulness to the users for whom it is intended is thereby diminished. Also, users may be repelled by the way the formal system works. Strategies for building functioning health systems or improving delivery must therefore reach beyond infrastructure, supplies and skills, and examine how health systems interface with local users and function in practice.

This paper shows the imperative for Western-oriented health professionals to be sensitive to the beliefs and motivations of the public they aspire to serve and, consequently, to take their perceptions, needs, and demands into account. Chances of improving care and realising its benefits increase if patients' aspirations and expectations are understood, by reference to their ideas about illness. As Janzen (op cit: 191 & 192) points out, 'many symptoms and complaints can only be understood by grasping concepts latent in a culture and in conditions affecting sufferers'. While people may accept and appreciate the 'unique competence' (Janzen, op cit:223) of Western medicine, the enduring importance of traditional therapies is captured by the pragmatism and pluralism service users exhibit as they 'shop around' for different therapies. The need for sensitivity to users' beliefs and motivations is particularly urgent where HIV/AIDS infection rates are rising. Making the formal system attractive and responsive to users can only enhance the effectiveness of facility-based strategies for checking the pandemic.

Testimonies about the conduct of health personnel suggest that supervision is inadequate. It is possible, however, that as elsewhere (Jewkes et al., ibid) reasons for misconduct go beyond lapses in supervision. A limitation of this study is that health personnel were not systematically interviewed. Such research would provide deeper insights into the workings of the health system and how delivery could be enhanced. Users' testimonies show that efforts to improve delivery must take into account the

supply and demand side of the system. Moreover, studies in other contexts (Tendler, 1997; Golooba-Mutebi, 2005) show that lapses in supervision lead to weaknesses in performance and, consequently, alienation of service users. Strengthening regulatory and supervisory or support functions should boost the quality of services and, consequently, user confidence.

Our findings question the common assumption that traditional therapy is cheaper than allopathic. Although important, cost of care is only one of many factors that influence therapy-seeking behaviour. When faced with life-threatening afflictions requiring traditional therapy, people go to great length, often at great expense, to locate a reputable practitioner. On the other hand, citing lack of money, they procrastinate about going to hospital. As a barrier to access, therefore, the relative importance of cost depends on context. Method of payment, the nature of an affliction and how it is understood within a cultural setting, experience of the formal health system and second-hand information, may be as significant as cost of care. The role of everyday activities and events points to the imperative for bringing services closer to users. Many informants recall the 'good old days' of mobile clinics that used to bring services to the village, and when nurses made home visits.

Beliefs about afflictions, their causes and suitable treatment suggest a need for context-appropriate education about diagnosis and treatment of common illnesses – tuberculosis, stroke, diabetes and high blood pressure – and various infections that lead to physical impairment because of inappropriate or inadequate treatment. Such education should diminish exposure to quack traditional therapists. The story of an immigrant woman with a tapeworm infestation, untreated for a long time, supports this reasoning. She believed that passing bits and pieces of the worms in her stool was evidence of possible bewitchment (xidyiso). Further discussion revealed that one of her grandchildren had an advanced infestation of ascaris worms. Our suggestion that she seek allopathic treatment for herself and her granddaughter was a revelation. It should not have been.

Notes

1. Agincourt Health and Population Unit: 2003 census.
2. They include HIV/AIDS (*ma-egisi*) and high-blood pressure (high blood) diabetes (*mavabye ya chukele*).
3. The research, conducted during 2001/02, focused on 'household structure and wellbeing of Mozambican immigrants and their South African hosts'.
4. Burning sensation in the feet, accompanied by 'black dots' on the soles.
5. When speaking English they use 'witchcraft' for the Shangaan word *vuloyi,* and 'witch' for *noyi.*

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Steve Biko and Stoned Cherrie: Refashioning the Body Politic in Democratic South Africa

Abstract

Steve Biko was a well-known hero and martyr of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. Detained, tortured and ultimately murdered in detention by the security police in 1977, he became a symbol of resistance in the mass mobilisations against apartheid that characterised the 1980s. His face appeared on the t-shirts of activists at rallies and funerals of others killed at the hands of the state. In contemporary, democratic South Africa, the politics of protest has given way to a new dynamic of black economic empowerment, the rise of a new black middle class and, with these, expressions of confident middle class black individuality. The mass character of politics prior to 1994 has given way to the more prosaic forms associated with a constitutional democracy. But there have also been ways in which these two tropes have melded. The present article examines the use of Steve Biko's image in post-apartheid South Africa by home-grown design label Stoned Cherrie on its high fashion t-shirts and asks how we are to read this gesture.

Introduction

> Practices of dress/performance/display have the capacity to either contest or reinforce existing arrangements of power and flesh out the meanings of citizenship (Landes, 1995: 101).

Roland Barthes pointed out that fashion is serious and frivolous at the same time. Fashion has the ability to imply novelty, the compulsion for change and difference at the same time as normalising and reproducing dominant mores. Fashion, as a system of communication which employs the body as a medium upon which to write its messages, constructs images of masculinity and femininity and acts as a meeting point for relations of power, be they of gender, class, race or sexuality. Fashion is at once fantasy and social regulation – a place where we find and construct images of imagined selves and desires which in turn serve to construct versions of both the aspirational and the despised self. In fashion we find not only fictions of the self but also fictions of a more social kind – of national identity and political selfhood.

This article is an attempt to suggest a variety of possible readings of one particular fashion moment in contemporary South Africa: the employment of the image of martyr of the anti-apartheid movement, Steve Biko, on haute couture women's t-shirts by award-winning local fashion brand Stoned Cherrie. Judith Butler (1996: 122) has argued that forms of protest which have the greatest efficacy are those that, while drawing on existing cultural conventions, are not immediately legible, 'the ones that

challenge our practices of reading, that make us uncertain about how to read, or make us think that we have to renegotiate the way in which we read public signs'. Stoned Cherrie's use of Steven Biko's image as a fashion accessory is provocative because it instigates a renegotiation of meaning both of the past (apartheid, the anti-apartheid struggle and its heroes) and the present (femininity, African identity, the distinction between the public and the private, the body and the social). Conventional practices of interpreting both the feminine and the political are here challenged giving rise to multiple possible readings which are difficult to order hierarchically or to reduce to a single overarching logic.

Steve Biko

Steve Biko (1946-1977) was the first president and one of the founders of the Black People's Convention (BPC) which was established in South Africa in 1972. The BPC was an umbrella body for some 70 different South African black consciousness groups and associations, including SASM (the South African Students' Movement) which played a significant role in the Soweto uprisings of 1976. In 1973 Steve Biko was banned by the Apartheid government. The terms of his banning order restricted him to his home town of Kings Williams' Town in the Eastern Cape.

On the 21st of August 1977 Biko was detained by the Eastern Cape security police and held in Port Elizabeth. On the 7th of September he sustained a head injury during interrogation. The doctors who initially examined him, naked, lying on a mat and manacled to a metal grille, disregarded overt signs of neurological injury. By the 11th of September he had slipped into a continual, semi-conscious state and the police physician recommended a transfer to hospital. Instead he was transported 1200 kilometres to Pretoria – a 12-hour journey which he made lying naked in the back of a Land Rover. A few hours later, on the 12th of September, alone and still naked, lying on the floor of a cell in the Pretoria Central Prison, Steve Biko died. The then South African Minister of Justice, James Kruger initially suggested Biko's death was the result of a hunger-strike – a claim that was dropped following local and international media pressure. An inquest was conducted which revealed that Biko had died of brain damage, but the presiding magistrate failed to find anyone responsible, ruling that Biko had died as a result of injuries sustained during a scuffle with security police whilst in detention.

The brutal circumstances of Biko's death caused a worldwide outcry and he became a martyr and symbol of resistance to Apartheid. In the wake of his death, the South African government banned a number of individuals (including journalist Donald Woods) and organisations closely associated with Biko. The United Nations Security Council responded by finally imposing an arms embargo against South Africa. The three doctors connected with Biko's case were initially exonerated by the South African Medical Disciplinary Committee and it was not until a second enquiry in 1985 that any action was taken against them. The police officers responsible for Biko's death applied for amnesty in 1997 to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission which had been set up in 1995 to bear witness to, record and in some cases grant amnesty to the perpetrators of human rights violations during apartheid. The Commission found that Biko's death was a gross human rights violation.

Biko was to become a prominent martyr of the anti-apartheid struggle and his image was a ubiquitous presence on the t-shirts of political activists at the height of political ferment in the 1980s. Then, the wearing of Biko's likeness, cheaply reproduced onto mass manufactured ordinary cotton t-shirts, communicated a clear message: defiance of the apartheid regime and political alignment with the ideas ad purposes of the black consciousness movement. In post-apartheid South Africa, Biko's image has once again emerged on t-shirts but here the sign is more difficult to read.

Stoned Cherrie

Stoned Cherrie is a South African fashion brand established in 2000 by black female entrepreneur, Nkhensani Nkosi. Stoned Cherrie has set out to become a home-grown 'super brand' that is styled as an expression of afro-urban culture. In 2002 the brand won the 'best ladies' wear' category at the South African Fashion Awards. Variously labelled the 'high priestess of South African fashion' and 'celebrity mastermind', in addition to being a fashion entrepreneur, Nkosi holds a degree in Industrial Psychology and Sociology and is an acclaimed actress, entertainer, writer, television producer/host and media personality. Nkosi says of the Stoned Cherrie philosophy:

> I like the idea of boldly moving forward and daring to be different and daring to be proud to be African. Stoned Cherrie is a unique African urban brand ... I am proud that we are able to translate what are old ideas into something new and provide the nostalgia that is part of our celebration. I am proud that we have been recognised by the industry as being at the forefront of redefining African street culture in a way that is exciting and revolutionary (Nokia Cape Town Fashion Week Spring/Summer 2005/ 6www.capetownfashionweek.com).

Stoned Cherrie's 'look' is often described as distinctively 'African'. Moreover, the A-line skirts which the label made famous are small at the waist and full at the hips which is said to suit the 'more rounded figure of an African woman'. Designs are described as an eclectic combination of 'ancient' African beadwork, trimmings and traditional Xhosa styles combined with 'serious urban flare'. The fabric use is often unique: 'seshweshwe bridal material and hardy Xhosa cloth' (Sampson, 2003), waists are belted, skirts cut on the cross.

One of the moves that the brand is most well-known for is t-shirts featuring covers of *Drum* magazine which have been hugely successful not only locally but also on the international fashion market. In 2003 Nkosi signed a deal with Bailey's Historical Archives in Johannesburg for the exclusive right to use images from *Drum* magazine directly on fabric. *Drum* was the first magazine that aimed to portray the situation of black South Africans in-depth, for black readers. The publication achieved renown in the 1950s for its investigation of racial discrimination under apartheid and perhaps even more notably for its vibrant photographs. The signature black and white images of *Drum* documented the jazz singers, political figures and sporting heroes – even the criminals – who defined the era (Penderis, 2005).

Ron Irwin (2004) argues that the use of images from *Drum* magazine has a special resonance in South Africa:

> The 1950s is often looked upon by locals of all races as not only the beginning of the modern anti-apartheid movement, but also the beginning of black protest culture. *Drum* was the era's primary print outlet, and its black and white images have a bittersweet

> poignancy. By wearing Stoned Cherrie clothing, black South Africans can feel they are taking back the censored past of their parents and grandparents.

But while an avowedly political project, *Drum* was also always associated with a knowing, chic urban black elite at play. Its tone was often irreverent and its coverage by no means limited to the serious political concerns of the day. In that sense, the decision, by Stoned Cherrie to employ the image of Steven Biko on its designer t-shirts can be understood in part as following the logic of the *Drum* project, but also as departing significantly from it. Biko was an irreducibly political figure, his tragic death as clear a marker as there ever could be for apartheid in its most bloody and brutish manifestation. How are we to read the inversion of this overtly political symbol in the service of a seemingly very different purpose: the apparently frivolous and purely decorative project of fashionable adornment with its associated connotations of bourgeois excess and circumscribed hyper-femininity? There are a number of possible readings which chaotically clamour to be heard, some of which are suggested here.

Reading one: profaning Biko

One reaction to the appearance of Biko's image on the fashion catwalk has been outrage at the deployment of his likeness for such an overtly commercial purpose. Those who take this view invoke Biko's socialist sympathies, suggesting a sense of disrespect and betrayal of his legacy at finding his face adorning the ramparts of one of capitalism's most extreme expressions of consumerist excess. Lwandile Sisilana (2004) takes this view, asserting that these icons stood for certain principles and they would not like to be remembered in this way. 'Is Biko's memory, then, not being killed: killed, that is, by being improperly remembered?,' Sisilana asks. He argues that not only is the manner of the remembering improper but also the vehicle: 'he might have issues with being associated with the black middle class he did so much to warn us against'.

The argument here is that this form of popularisation of political figures is an empty and meaningless form. The faces of political figures are worn without the wearer having any real knowledge of the ideas and philosophies that the image stands for. Similar indignation is expressed about the wearing of Che Guevara t-shirts or Tupac styling himself 'Makkaveli' or his Outlawz giving themselves names like 'Kastro', 'Kaddafi', 'Edi' (for Ugandan dictator Idi Amin) and 'Napoleon'. What this reading suggests is that there is a 'true' and authentic way to wear a t-shirt with a political icon emblazoned upon it and an unacceptable, fake way of doing so. To be authentic means to have a true knowledge of what the person stood for and to be truly and consciously aligned with those views. It means moreover that the wearing is done for a solemn political purpose rather than a decorative one.

The view of fashionable dress as decadent and wasteful has a long heritage in the Western Christian tradition. Perhaps the most influential of proponents of this outlook was Thorstein Veblen whose *Theory of the Leisure Class* was first published in 1899. His view of fashion as self-indulgent conspicuous consumption was taken up by Jean Baudrillard in the 1960s. Left-wing thinking, until recently, has been dominated by the idea that fashion can be understood as little more than 'the search for distinction by the upper middle classes' (Entwistle and Wilson, 2001: 2).

The outrage that some feel at the perceived prostitution of Biko's image for commercial gain is rendered more intelligible perhaps, and certainly more poignant, if we recall the circumstances of his death. Again and again, the image is of a naked Biko – manacled to a grille, in the back of a Land Rover, on the floor of a cell. The stripping of Biko was clearly a crucial component of his persecution. Kate Soper (2001: 21) argues that the preservation of human dignity and autonomy is closely bound up with the wearing of clothes and the choice of what one wears. It is precisely because of this that one, very insidious way of exercising control over others is by means of control over their mode of dress. Nowhere is this more cruelly exemplified than in the denial of clothing altogether. To take away a person's clothing is to take away their human dignity. 'As all prison camp guards and torturers have always been well aware, to force strip the victim is to initiate the process of dehumanisation, to signal contempt for personal identity by playing with or mocking at the aspiration to preserve it' (Soper, ibid.). The painful circumstances of Biko's humiliation and subsequent murder are, for many South Africans, emblematic of apartheid in a more general way. This is what being a martyr means: it is to stand for or represent a broader set of circumstances, experiences and beliefs. The use of this particular image then to make a fashion statement, to express individuality and empowerment in a milieu of fun and frivolity seems, to many, profane.

Reading two: making politics hip

But the reading of fashion as merely trivial and sacrilegiously worldly, is perhaps too naïve a contention given our contemporary acknowledgement of the inevitability and validity of multiple meanings and interpretations of a single sign. While structuralists like Roland Barthes (1985) and Alison Lurie (1981) attempted to approach fashion as a system of signs which could be read like a language, the messiness and complexity of fashion as it is lived and practised in everyday life, resists a single or definitive reading. As Fred Davis has argued, fashion is more like music than speech, suggestive and ambiguous rather than bound by precise grammatical rules (cited in Entwistle and Wilson, 2001: 3).

In contrast to the idea of the fashion industry's disrespectful trivialising of Biko and his legacy, Stoned Cherrie and others have painted a picture of fashion in contemporary South Africa as avowedly political both in terms of its effects and intentions. Speaking with South Africa's *Sunday Times* of the *Drum* project and specifically of her Biko shirts, Nkosi said it was seen as a 'test phase to see if people would actually wear an outfit with a photograph of a black man with his fist in the air' (20 April, 2003). 'Part of my thinking was to make history part of popular popular culture ... We are currently negotiating our identity as South Africans. There's a new kind of consciousness about. I would like most people to learn about the history of their country from my clothes' (cited in Sampson, 2003). Nkosi has attributed the success of her clothes to the fact that they 'express a social and political awareness and make us feel proud of who we are' (Cowrie, 2004: 10).

This reading, then, would suggest that the intentionality is more subtly political than the usual practice of display for a political purpose as in for example, the deployment of purple, white and green by British suffragettes or the wearing of (leader of the then banned African National Congress) Oliver Tambo t-shirts at 1980s funerals

of activists killed by police in South Africa. The argument is that the deployment of Biko's image by Stoned Cherrie can be read neither as 'merely' decorative nor entirely apolitical. To be sure, wearing a Stoned Cherrie t-shirt featuring Biko's face is not necessarily an indication of a deliberate intention to commemorate his legacy specifically and knowledgeably. Nor is it an indication necessarily of support for the particular political ideas that he stood for. Indeed it is unlikely that the wearers of these t-shirts would be able to say very much at all about who Biko was. Nevertheless there is a more general politics present here: a politics in which is echoed tropes of self-affirmation, black pride, the legitimacy of the anti-apartheid struggle in a general sense and the celebration of freedom. In many ways it is a quite profound political point that so uncontested is the legitimacy of the struggle that its most hard-bitten ideological purists are now the new 'cool'. It represents a sense in which 'politics' itself has become somewhat 'fashionable' with contemporary youth who experience their own lives as lacking in clear goals or focus looking back with nostalgia at an era where the enemies were clearly defined, the opportunities for acts of daring abundant and the heroes larger than life.

Parkins (2002: 101) has argued that fashion and commodities can become 'sites for the declaration of a political allegiance and the contestation of existing political arrangements'. However, the question would then become, what is this particular deployment of the political on the part of Stoned Cherrie declaring allegiance to? And is it contesting or affirming existing political arrangements? In his book, *Long Walk to Freedom,* perhaps the most iconographic of all South African political figures, founding democratic President Nelson Mandela describes an event at his school, Healdtown, whose significance for him was 'like a comet streaking across the night sky'. The occasion was a visit by Krune Mqhayi who, appearing on stage in Xhosa dress and holding an assegai aloft, tells the audience: 'The assegai stands for what is glorious and true in African history. It is a symbol of the African as a warrior and the African as artist'. Mqhayi is unequivocal in his rejection of Western culture: 'What I am talking to you about is not ... the overlapping of one culture over another. What I am talking about is the brutal clash between what is indigenous and good and what is foreign and bad ... We cannot allow these foreigners who do not care for our culture to take over our nation. I predict that one day, the forces of African society will achieve a momentous victory over the interloper' (Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom,* 1994, p. 41).

Black consciousness, Ngugi wa Thiongo (2003) has recently argued, is about 'the right of black peoples to draw an image of themselves that negates and transcends the image of themselves that was drawn by those who would weaken them in their fight for and assertion of their humanity ... It seeks to draw the image of a possible world, different and transcending the one drawn by the West by reconnecting itself to a different historical memory and dreams'. For wa Thiongo, the main challenges of Biko's life, thought and legacy are 'to disengage ourselves from the tyranny of the European post-renaissance memory and seize back the right and the initiative to name the world by reconnecting to our memory'. He argues that while the state can create an enabling democratic environment and resources, 'no renaissance can come out of state legislation and admonitions ... renaissance, as rebirth and flowering, can only spring from the wealth of imagination of the people, and above all, from its keepers of

memory'. One possible reading then is that Stoned Cherrie's appropriation of Biko's memory and legacy is part of this renaissance springing from the imagination of our own people, reconnecting us with our legacy and memories. This is certainly the reading that the brand's founder has offered. The alternative is that it represents a selling out to the European interloper, proof that Mqhayi's optimism was ill-founded.

Stoned Cherrie's founder, Nkhensani Nkosi, is not oblivious of the importance of the question as to which of these two readings is the most compelling. In interview after interview she is concerned to describe the *Drum* project in avowedly political terms, as 'making history part of our popular culture'. Moreover, she sees her overall approach to fashion design and clothes as explicitly political in that these forms of expression are central to the building of an authentic African identity which looks to its own imaginative wellsprings in the crafting of a new nation rather than settling for imitation: '[clothes are] about our identity and our pride, about who we are ... [Stoned Cherrie is] ... a mouthpiece for an expression that never found a vehicle and a reaction to pessimism that black South Africans could not make a mark in a fashion scene so dominated by European designs'. Nkosi has described herself as 'exhilarated' that people are increasingly excited to be South African and are embracing their identity instead of looking to the West: 'There's a new sense of expression, boldness and attitude, a new confidence; we are trying to define ourselves and are not hero-worshipping other cultures. And it's a state of mind; a question of headspace rather than of age or demographic' (cited in Kennedy, 2004).

Nkosi is by no means the only local designer to describe her project in such explicitly political terms. On the contrary, this reading of the role of fashion in the new democratic order enjoys a wide consensus. Co-founder of youth media company Black Rage Productions (which is among other things home to an urban culture focused website www.rage.co.za) Maria Mcloy writes:

> 'It used to be that wearing locally-made clothes was considered cheap and Italian designs were en Vogue. Not anymore: any truly trendy type in their right mind only wants to wear local designer wear from designers like Black Coffee, Loxion Kulca or Sun Goddess ... and Stoned Cherrie ... People are coveting funky fashions by up and coming young designers available in cool small boutiques' (*Mail and Guardian,* 'We Had a Dream', 17 June, 2005). Fashion Week organiser Dion Chang concurs: 'Five years ago people wanted Guess and Diesel but kids of today want Darkie or Native; that gets more street cred than international designs. Ten years into democracy there's a whole generation who want to believe in South Africa and want to wear clothes that have a sense of where they come from so we've stopped copying Europe and America. If you're wearing a Stoned Cherrie shirt it speaks volumes and makes a strong statement about what you feel about your country and yourself' (ibid.).

Reflecting back on Stoned Cherrie's unveiling of its third collection in August 2001, *Sunday Times* journalist Craig Jacobs chose to headline his story 'Seams like liberation. A Celebration of Democracy'. The header went on to declare that designers were 'breaking away from the dictates of the West, tipping the African aesthetic into the mainstream' (*Sunday Times* 25 April, 2004). Jacobs points out that the use of 'a black man with his fist in the air plastered onto t-shirts' (ibid.) was not the only item of explicitly political symbolism in that landmark show. It was also the show in which Soweto supermodel Nompumelelo Gwina strode down the ramp wearing the highly recognisable colours of the African National Congress: black, green and yellow. A

local Afrikaans newspaper was to comment of the show that it had a 'strong ANC focus' (Jacobs 2004). Far from merely sporting the logo colours of a political party, however, the reference here was more subtle and complex since it was common to see young activists in particular, literally wearing the colours of the liberation movement as they draped themselves in the banned flag at mass rallies at the height of the struggle in the 1980s. More sobering was the reference to coffins also draped in flags at weekly funerals of activists killed in violent confrontation with the apartheid security forces that the image also explicitly echoed.

While the imagery is described both by Nkosi and by aficionados of the South African fashion industry as 'symbolising a breakaway from the Eurocentric dress of the West and a return to our African heritage', in reality the references are much less broad than this and much more explicitly positioned within a particular political tradition than general references to the legitimising mantle of 'African heritage' would suggest. When European fashion was touting military-style cargo pants and camouflage prints Stoned Cherrie, concerned to avoid merely copying international trend by rote, hardly resorted to an aesthetic of traditional African battle dress. Instead, the military references were to Umkhonto we Sizwe (the spear of the nation) the military wing of the African National Congress in exile. Indeed the association with *Drum* magazine and the Sophiatown milieu of the 1950s is specifically non-traditionalist in its references. *Drum* magazine's projected audience as Sarah Nuttall has pointed out was expressly cosmopolitan (2004: 436). As Lewis Nkosi's *Home and Exile* puts it: 'the new African cut adrift from the tribal reserve – urbanized, eager, fast-talking and brash' (1983: 8 cited in Nuttall, 2004: 436).

Reading three: fashioning the self

Biko's ideological progenitor, Frantz Fanon, in his celebrated essay 'The Fact of Blackness' (1952: 1) describing the consciousness of being black in a world of white power, argued that to be black in a racist culture is to be defined in relation to whiteness. Moreover, he suggested, the converse is not true. 'The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man'. Kadiatu Kanneh (1998: 160) has argued that in this context of invisibility and negativity with regard to the representation of blackness in the popular imagination, 'the changing meanings of Black styles and fashion in music, dress and hair point to a healthy and active resistance'. Kobena Mercer (1994: 100) similarly writes that 'the question of style can be seen as a medium for expressing the aspirations of black people historically excluded from access to official social institutions of representation and legitimation in urban, industrialised societies ... [B]lack peoples ... have developed distinct, if not unique, patterns of style across a range of cultural practices from music, speech, dance, dress and even cookery, which are politically intelligible as creative responses to the experience of oppression and dispossession'. Richard Majors, in his study of black masculinity and sports refers to what he calls 'cool pose' as a set of lifestyle behaviours 'often developed and used by black men as a response to the limits that institutionalised racism places on their other opportunities for self-expression' (2001, 209). Style and dress then, are far from innocent of racial politics even when adopted without straightforward political intentionality.

Nuttall (2004: 432) has referred to this phenomenon as the 'stylizing of the self' in which young people 'seek to transform themselves into singular beings ... the rise of the first-person singular within the work of liberation'. In this labour of constructing the self historical materials drawn from a rich struggle heritage clearly are valuable resources but, Nuttall argues, 'new youth cultures are superseding the resistance politics of an earlier generation, while still jamming, remixing, and remaking cultural codes and signifiers from the past' (2004: 436). For Nuttall, Stoned Cherrie's designs 'speak in several registers' (ibid.) so that the use of Steve Biko's image is less about affirming a message of black consciousness than 'that a sartorial style is being marked as in-your-face contemporary through the remixing and recoding of an icon' (2004: 437). The class connotations too are more complex than the straightforward critique of middle class excess would suggest. Designs draw on street and township cultures, affirming the vibrancy of an urban working class milieu, including for example branded overalls, denim wear and sports shoes.

More latterly, Stoned Cherrie's Biko t-shirts have inspired another remarkable range of clothing named after Hector Pieterson, reportedly the first child to be killed in the 16 June, 1976 Soweto uprising and one of the most recognisable visual symbols of anti-apartheid resistance. Abasha Creations is co-founded by Pieterson's youngest half sister and distributes the Hector Pieterson range of clothes and accessories. It is significant perhaps that contemporary political figures are not celebrated or seen as appropriate fashion accessories with the possible exception of founding father President Nelson Mandela. A harkening back to struggle heroes past is a far safer option than the more overtly political and thus potentially controversial and necessarily 'serious' business of positioning oneself within contemporary political debates and aligning oneself with contemporary political figures. Nelson Mandela is contemporary but he is also the supreme representative figure of the incontrovertibly heroic nostalgic political as opposed to the messy normalcy and ordinariness that inevitably is associated with politics in the present. In this sense to remain only at the level of celebrating past heroes while disengaging from the political in the present is potentially conservative and politically emasculating in its implications. It is easy to side with what history has proven right. Far more morally taxing is to make decisions and choices on matters which history has yet to judge. It is moreover politically far more provocative and thus far more bold to deploy contemporary figures for ends which are subversive of their own self-projection. Lipovetsky (1994, cited in Parkins, 2002: 15) defends fashion as the 'ultimate phase of democracy' because of the importance he assigns to the role of the frivolous in the development of a critical, realist, tolerant consciousness. When satirist Pieter-Dirk Uys appears as Winnie Madikizela Mandela draped in a Nelson Mandela T-shirt we are challenged on multiple levels: an Afrikaner-Jewish drag queen impersonating a black woman who many see as the 'mother of the nation', who also happens to be the disgraced former wife of the iconic founding father of the nation. Loren Kruger (1997: iv) has argued that the hybridity of this image challenges South Africans 'to think sceptically about national icons and founding fictions'.

Reading four: using the past for profit

A different version of the argument from authenticity is to point out that not only is the use of political icons in this way potentially emasculating but it is also, of course, not

particularly original. One could argue that Stoned Cherrie merely replaced, for financial gain, the ubiquitous image of legendary revolutionary Che Guevara, now sported on a million off-the-peg t-shirts, with the face of Steve Biko. Even in local terms the idea was foreshadowed by Marianne Fassler's 1994 ball gown which featured leopard prints and Nelson Mandela's face in ANC colours (Jacobs, 2004). It was Fassler who designed the dress teeming with African beads that actress Alfre Woodard wore to the Golden Globe Awards in 1999 to much acclaim.

Nevertheless, while not entirely new, there is no doubt that we are given pause by this most recent of indications that capitalism is undaunted in its ability to absorb and tame forces of radical opposition. Biko's was a profound and far-reaching social critique. Ironically, perhaps, he advocated psychological liberation of the self in the mould of Fanon as a necessary condition for political and social liberation. In contemporary consumer society the idea of self-liberation is much in vogue but the link with the political and the social is lost in what Christopher Lasch (1979) has famously called a 'culture of narcissism'. Lasch writes (1979: 96): 'The disparity between romance and reality, the world of the beautiful people and the workaday world, gives rise to an ironic detachment that dulls pain but also cripples the will to change social conditions, to make even modest improvements in work and play, and to restore meaning and dignity to everyday life'.

The dominant ideology of South Africa's anti-apartheid struggle emphasised its mass character – the unity and oneness of the oppressed. In the 1980s t-shirts featuring the images of jailed, killed or exiled activists were a ubiquitous feature of marches, rallies and mass funerals. These were cheaply and quickly produced protest items frequently manufactured in low-tech circumstances using hand silk screens and low-budget production processes. In Stoned Cherrie's appropriation of struggle icons these are used as items of consumption not in the construction of a mass political movement but of individual subjectivity. Here the low-budget item of mass identification whose specific purpose is to signal the subsumption of individual identity within the goals of a broader political movement becomes re-interpreted and reconstituted as an expression of individualism, creativity and the watchword of the new dogma, entrepreneurship. To 'make a fashion statement' is to make an individual statement with the adornment of one's own body. The political icon is here specifically removed from its mass political (struggle) context and placed in a new context, more particularly a context characterised by a certain decadent celebration of the self. It was precisely this celebration of the self and of individuality which was frowned upon by the mass populist politics of the liberation struggle era with its emphasis on duty and self-sacrifice in the service of a goal much greater than any single person. The fact that the contrast is so stark is what makes it startling.

Reading five: contesting dominant gender norms

Craig Native, whose street-styled denim is worn by US rocker Lenny Kravitz, is another South African designer who uses clothes to challenge dominant norms and expectations. In his collection inspired by South Africa's obsession with sports he combined the springbok rugby emblem with a pink T-shirt, subverting the iconic symbol of white male heterosexual masculinity. Does Stoned Cherrie provide a comparable contestation of dominant constructions femininity? For Stoned Cherrie's

2002 SA Fashion Week show which took place in the renovated industrial space of the Turbine Hall in Johannesburg's Newtown, the brand adopted the themes of initiation, courtship and marriage to create what one observer termed 'elements of femininity from shebeen queen to heroine chic ... a powerful female urban aesthetic that could stand its own in any capital' (Blignaut, 2002).

This suggests a further possible reading of the effects of Stoned Cherrie's use of political icons in women's fashion: that of contesting the construction of the fashionable female subject as decorative but apolitical. Women's fashionably dressed bodies typify docile femininity. In contrast, Stoned Cherrie fashions and in particular the use of political icons to emblazon them suggest a mode of defiant challenge which deliberately calls on the onlooker to look again (Parkins, 2002: 107) thus employing the mechanism of the gaze but turning it against itself. This subversion of the accepted binary opposition between the ornamental and the political (Parkins, 2002: 108), calls into question the accepted logic of feminine docility. In this sense the brand is part of a generalised assertion in the culture of women's political and economic ascendancy: the celebration of women in South Africa's 'new gender order'.

Clearly we can be critical of this strategy in that it is necessarily a strategy of middle-classness, a strategy which affirms the constitution of the self through consumption and one which is by definition available only to the privileged few. However, it might be argued that while the majority of South African women would not be able to afford a Stoned Cherrie garment, the effect of the contestation of femininity's apolitical status is useful to all women. The effect of Stoned Cherrie is to reconstruct practices of conventional hyper-femininity, as represented by the world of modelling and high fashion, as 'political', thus serving to confirm that women, even in their capacity as icons of hyper-femininity, are political subjects. In this way, what are usually assumed to be clear lines of demarcation between fashion and politics are unsettled. This echoes Parkins's observations about the way in which the suffragettes of the early twentieth century made use of practices associated with fashion to both contest contemporary constructions of the political terrain and to offer a new version of what it could potentially mean to be a 'political' subject (2002: 101).

Stoned Cherrie's rise to prominence coincides with a more generalised feminisation of South Africa's public sphere with the entry of a large number of women into the national parliament and the rise to prominence of women in business, the media and a range of other social spheres, as well as a greater political focus on issues regarded as 'women's concerns' or the domain of 'women's rights' such as rape, abortion, and economic empowerment. Rita Felski (1995: 90) has described a similar milieu in Britain at the close of the nineteenth century in terms of a 'new prominence of icons of femininity in the public domain, and a concomitant emphasis on sensuousness, luxury and emotional gratification as features of modern life' (cited in Parkins, 2002: 98).

On the other hand what is being affirmed here is a particular version of (socially sanctioned slim, beautiful) femininity. As Entwistle (2000) has argued, dress is always about bodies – and not just anybody's dress can be deployed to refashion the body politic. Dress is a situated bodily practice. Part of the reason why Stoned Cherrie t-shirts work is because of the clash of cultural meanings created by the juxtaposition of the apparently frivolous, feminine with the seriousness of austere struggle images. The

unlikelihood of the juxtaposition between fashion and politics is only startling however because of the ubiquity of the distinction in the culture between the public and the private, the bodily and the social. The clash also only 'works' because it is a clash between the legitimate, culturally acceptable femaleness (hyper-femininity) of the models and a world from which femininity is traditionally excluded. Stoned Cherrie's use of political images like Biko's incorporated into fashion designs destabilises the binary opposition between the private sphere as the realm of consumption and the public sphere as the realm of politics. As women's clothing it also embodies a challenge to the idea that women and their interests in fashion and clothing demarcate them as part of the non-political private sphere and thus excluded from the political sphere. But it does not express or affirm a dissident or counter-hegemonic femininity in the sense that not just any body is paraded on the cat walk in a Stoned Cherrie t-shirt. The disparity of meanings that is ignited is bounded by traditional notions of feminine acceptability.

Conclusion

Practices of dress, both ceremonial and workaday, historically denote forms of citizenship in a variety of ways. In this sense, dress is an arena of political struggle which can be used either to confirm or subvert acceptable tropes of citizenship and the dominant norms of state power that enforce them. Clothing can be seen to be incorporated in a broader spectrum of symbolic political practices which, as Felski (1995: 150) argues, need not simply be seen as reproducing or reflecting an already constituted politics grounded in the economy or the state, but can be seen to operate as instruments of transformation, ways of reconstituting the social and political world. Dress, then, reflects not only something about the body and character of the wearer but also about the body politic, the character of the state. Stoned Cherrie makes this interaction very explicit with its use of the colours of the ruling party and the icons of the anti-apartheid struggle. But while the relationship is thus rendered explicit its meaning is by no means clear.

Sarah Nuttall argues that new stylisations of the self, embedded in cultures of the body, 'represent one of the most decisive shifts of the post-apartheid era' (2004: 449). The resultant mix of meaning and intentionality, of interpretation and legibility is chaotic and complex, defying easy readings in terms of race, culture or political identity. The patterns are promiscuous and conflicting, mutating readily, combining in a heady blend of past, present and future which is at once a reflection of lived experience, historical memory and memory-making and of as yet unrequited aspiration. In contrast to the dominant sense of belonging arising from shared oppression and shared political aspiration that characterised resistance politics in the pre-liberation period, contemporary South African fashion which is consciously looking to South Africa's political history for inspiration, offers the possibility of identity through consumption.

While there are those who shake their heads at the transient, ephemeral, and thus inevitably alienating nature of this form of identity construction, at the fact that one can through fashion associate oneself with a collective project but without any real personal investment or commitment to its continuity (Soper, 2001: 29), such a reading risks underestimating the extent to which structures of racism are profoundly

embodied experiences. It is one of the central elements of racism's colloquy that individuality is denied; to be black is to be representative of a group while to be white as Richard Dyer (1997) points out, is to be unique and infinitely diverse. The end of the political austerity and intensity of the apartheid period has opened up the space for greater political playfulness which is seen in the use of struggle icons in fashion in ways that would previously have been unthinkable given the status of these figures as serious political symbols. To insist that Biko's image can stand for one set of ideas only is to calcify the image and its meaning and in effect to deny that the image can be part of a (privileged) world of choice, diversity and hybridity.

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The Diaspora and Domestic Insurgencies in Africa

Abstract

This article engages the emerging discursive reconstruction in the West of the African diaspora, in particular, the debate that the African diaspora plays a prominent role in promoting domestic insurgencies and armed conflicts in their home countries, especially in the post-9/11 dispensation. Based on a taxonomy of the African diaspora vis-à-vis other significant diasporic populations, the article critically explores the views held by many Western Africanists and policy makers about the instrumentality of financial remittances and other logistical support from Africans in the diaspora in the instigation, aggravation and prolongation of political insurgencies and extremist activities in their home states. The author argues that the emerging reconstruction of the image and role of the African diaspora in political conflicts on the continent is essentially a consequence of the post-9/11 re-securitisation of Africa as a zone of error and anger by influential policy makers in the West.

Introduction

The term diaspora comes from the ancient Greek word for 'dispersal' or 'scattering' of things and people. The conventional meaning of the concept is scarcely different from its Greek origin. In contemporary parlance and usage, diaspora refers to a community of people that have been forced or compelled to move from their traditional homeland to a new settlement, without completely losing all the elements of their original identity. There are two key aspects to this definition. The first is forced, involuntary or induced migration of an extraction of people to a new settlement. Historically, various ecological and anthropogenic (human-instigated) factors have contributed to forced or induced movement of people into the diaspora. The ecological factors include famine, drought, aridity, flooding, and so on while the anthropogenic factors include war, persecution, inquisition, repression, as well as bad governance and prebendal corruption, which lead to impoverishment of many. The two factors are not mutually exclusive. In other words, there have been times in history when an interplay of ecological and man-made factors has provoked an outflow of people from their traditional homelands to seek refuge abroad as we have seen in some of the Complex Political Emergencies (CPEs)[1] that have occurred between the 1980s and 2000s in some of the Sahelian countries of Africa (for example, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Chad, Niger and Mali).

The second important aspect of the definition of diaspora is that the diasporic community usually retains and tends to perpetuate some element(s) of their original identity, which may include aspects of their culture, religion, history and perhaps ethno-racial homogeneity and solidarity. Because identity is a dynamic phenomenon, some of the elements of the original identity of a diaspora population undergo

significant transformation and change over the succeeding years and generations. The negotiation of the identity characteristics of the diaspora population with the dominant culture or population and their subsequent transformation usually depends on the peculiar histories and relational circumstances of the groups. Apart from the tendency to retain aspects of the original identity regardless of any practical transformations, many diasporic communities (but by no means all) do retain ancestral and social linkages with the homeland population or sections of the latter. The tendency to maintain ancestral connections is stronger among first and early generation of migrants, exiles and, to a lesser extent, conscripts and deportees.

Some of the classical and recent movements of populations into the diaspora include (cf. Wikipedia, 2007; Bridge & Fedorowich eds., 2003):

- The Jewish diaspora, referring to the several generations of Jews that resettled in different American, European and Middle Eastern countries beginning from 70 CE through the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Although the majority of them have returned to Israel since 1948, a significant number of Jews still remain in the diaspora from where they continue to champion the Israeli cause.
- The Korean diaspora: These are different generations of people that emigrated from the Korean peninsula to the Americas, Europe, China, Japan, and other South East Asian countries during the Japanese colonial occupation (1910-1945), and the peace treaty division of the peninsula into two republics, and the Korean War (1950-53). A relatively high wave of emigration of people has continued from Communist North Korea to South Korea and elsewhere as a result of the brutal dictatorship and economic crisis in the country.
- The Cuban diaspora: the exodus of over one million Cubans following the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and the communist dictatorship that followed the revolution. The largest community of the Cuban diaspora is found in the state of Florida in the US.
- The Tamil diaspora: referring to people of Tamil Nadu and Sri Lankan Tamil origin who have settled in many parts of India, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, Mauritius, Fiji, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, French Caribbean islands, Europe, Australia and North America. The majority of the Tamil diaspora are refugees and exiles fleeing the separatist civil war waged by the militant Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, popularly known as the Tamil Tigers) against the Sri Lankan government since 1983.
- The Somali diaspora: These are the millions of ethnic Somalis and refugees who live mostly in the neighbouring East African countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti), as well as Europe, Australia, New Zealand, North America, and the Middle East. It is estimated that about half of the Somalis were forced into the diaspora following the dictatorship of Siad Barre (1969-1991) and breakdown of the state of Somalia and civil war since 1991.
- The Arab Maghreb diaspora consists of people from the North African countries, notably Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. The largest Maghreb community outside of North Africa is in France, where it is estimated that North Africans make up the majority of the country's five million Muslim population.
- The South Asian diaspora includes millions of people from India and the Indian sub-continent (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) whose descendants

live in the Americas, Europe, East Africa, South Africa, United Arab Emirates, Singapore and Japan. The majority of the diaspora migrated from the region to other countries in the colonial and post-colonial time in search of greener pastures, while others fled political instability at home. Over 80,000 South Asians (mostly Indian and Pakistani merchants) were expelled from Uganda by the repressive regime of Idi Amin in 1975 and the majority of them were offered asylum by the UK, US and Canadian governments. Migration from the South Asian region to the developed countries has continued in contemporary history.

– The Chilean diaspora: A fairly small but widely dispersed community, mostly political refugees, who fled the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1981) following the 1973 coup. Most of this diaspora population live in neighbouring South American countries (Argentina and Brazil), Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Mexico, Sweden and North America.
– The Chechnya diaspora: These are nationals of Chechnya that fled their homeland during the insurrection against Russia that started in the 1990s. The majority of the Chechen refugees live in the East European countries of Azerbaijan, Armenia and the Republic of Georgia. Others can be found in the EU and North America.
– The Afghan and Iraqi diaspora: These are millions of people that have fled prolonged cycle of wars and political violence in Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein's dictatorship and the first Gulf war in Iraqi, as well as the post-9/11 US-led invasion of the two countries. The majority of the Afghan and Iraqi diasporas are scattered in the oil-rich Gulf countries, Europe and North America.

The African Diaspora

The African diaspora consists broadly of Africans and people of African origin domiciled outside the continent, who may or may not hold the nationality of an African state, but generally perceive themselves and are perceived by others as having an African ancestry. Pursuant to the goal of promoting the new Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) the African Union's (AU) panel of experts in April 2005 adopted a more utilitarian (albeit conceptually problematic) definition of the African diaspora, hitherto regarded as the AU's definition. According to this definition, the African Diaspora consists of peoples of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union. The AU definition is uncharitably utilitarian because of its emphasis on the contribution to the development of the continent and the AU as an essential criterion for anybody of African descent domiciled abroad to qualify for as an African diaspora. But it suffices to say that the logic behind this proviso is not defensible as it tends to strip the bulk of the Africans, struggling under difficult and hostile socio-legal conditions to eke out a living in different countries of the global North and thus have nothing to contribute to African and AU development, of their legitimate claims to an ancestral homeland. Many of the Africans in this category are languishing in various refugee detention camps and prisons in the US, Canada and Europe on charges relating to lack of valid immigration papers and desperate survival-induced crime usually committed because the accused is forced to resort to underground economy given of their inability to obtain legal work and resident permits. Are these new generation of African

immigrants in the West fleeing war, political repression and hopeless poverty (worsened by prebendal corruption and bad governance), and who the West is unwilling or at best reluctant to tolerate, not entitled to the dignity of an African diaspora identity? Consequently, how would the AU panel of experts on the Definition of the African Diaspora classify those Africans and people of African descent abroad who at one time have probably contributed to African development (what ever that might mean) but at other times have contributed to funding political insurgents and ethnic armies in their home countries? One could go on to critique of the AU definition. It simply does not make conceptual or even legal and political sense.

The operative concepts in the definition of the African diaspora should therefore not be the political agenda and utilitarian rationality of contribution to African development, but rather historical and genealogical root (real or fictive), self-perception and/or the perception and classification by the significant others in one's [new] place of settlement.

One can identify some three major categories of the African diaspora. The first category is the descendants of the generations transported into the Americas and Europe during the trans-Atlantic slave trade between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Walter Rodney (1972) estimates that over 16 million Africans were carted away to the western hemisphere in this deplorable history of human trafficking. The majority of descendants of this category of the African diaspora are presently found in Brazil, the US, Colombia, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Cuba, Venezuela, Jamaica, France and the UK. Because of the violent manner in which they were conscripted, exported and treated in the diaspora, it was impossible for most of the African deportees and their descendants to retain or preserve their specific ancestral origin (i.e. where exactly they originated from in the African continent). As a result of this violent and violational history, contemporary descendants of this first generation (read: category) of African diaspora have little physical connection with the African homeland beyond the fictive and symbolic. In fact, in many western countries like the US and UK, the relationship between descendants of this first generation of the African diaspora and the late colonial and more recent post-independence generations of African immigrants is one of suspicion, distrust and tension. A much healthier relationship existed during the heydays of pan-Africanism when the educated elites of both sides forged a common front in the diaspora to fight the scourge of racism in the West and colonialism in the African continent.

The second category of the African diaspora are the late colonial and early post-independence (mostly 1950s-1970s) emigrant populations and settlers in the West, as well as their descendants. They are mostly professionals and guest workers that voluntarily migrated to the West in search of further education and greener pastures. A much more limited proportion of them fled their countries because of political persecution at home. This category is relatively mixed in terms of demographic characteristics. But, by and large, they tend to be fairly well established and settled, especially in countries like the UK, US, and Canada. In France where the majority of this category of African immigrants are from the Arab Maghreb Islamic cultures and therefore represent a more radically antithetical civilisation, there tends to be more institutionalised segregation and hostility against the highly deprived populations of Africans. The vast majority of the over five million French Muslims are from the Arab

Maghreb North African countries. In all, the connection between this category of migrants and their homelands in Africa is mixed. The first generation of this category of migrants for understandable reasons have stronger attachment and connection to Africa than their relatively more westernised offspring and descendants. Among the latter, significant variations are still discernible in terms of affinity to Africa and the later generation of African immigrants depending on factors like the cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds of the diasporic population.

The third category of the African diaspora embraces those fleeing socioeconomic decline (partly related to neo-liberal economic reforms), broken and breakable states, wars, hopeless poverty and political persecution that have characterised the majority of the African countries since the 1980s through the 2000s (AWEPA, 2004: 1). Like the second category, this cluster is extremely mixed and includes Africans of all hierarchies, occupations and age groups – professionals, politicians, working class, jobless school leavers and graduates, children and families of the political elites, prostitutes, refugees, asylum-seekers, students, guest workers, etc. This forced emigration has contributed, among other things, to Africa's brain-drain – the movement of highly skilled persons to seek a livelihood abroad (AWEPA, 2004, AU, 2006: 26). While the vast majority of these migrant populations are found in Western Europe and North America, a significant number of them are also scattered in other regions of the world – the oil-rich Arabian Gulf states, South East Asia, China, Australia, Eastern Europe, Russia, and Latin America. Hence, there is increasingly a noticeable 'diversification of destinations' (Adepoju, 2004a) away from the traditional developed Western economies. Being a highly variable cluster, this category comprises large numbers of lawful and illegal migrants, the majority of whom may not have any plans of returning to their home countries in the foreseeable future because of the deplorable conditions back home.

Emigration from Africa has become highly commercialised in recent years, involving a number of syndicates, pimps, and commission agents that use various vicious devices like trickery, kidnapping, deception, intimidation and blackmail to recruit and export young impressionable emigrants into the diaspora for income generation purposes (Adepoju, 2004a). A large number of young girls and women are recruited into this ungodly trafficking, making up a racket of 'feminization of migration' from sub-Saharan Africa (Adepoju, 2004b). Consequently, because a large number of these African emigrants are unsettled and face harsh economic, social and legal conditions, many of them tend to melt into underground economies or operate a transitional lifestyle, moving from one city or country to another in relatively short intervals in search of greener pastures. It is this category of African emigrants, part of what is branded 'the unwanted migrants', which has been on the increase since the mid-1990s, that most developed countries are reluctant to accept (Carling, 2007:1).

Intra-African Refugees, Exiles and Guest Workers

Intra-African migration has been on the increase in recent years and decades, but this is an aspect significantly neglected by mainstream migration research. There are both 'traditional' and 'modern' patterns of intra-African migration. The 'traditional' is linked to historically enduring forms of mobility such as nomadism and movements across commercial trade routes. It is a process underpinned by the porosity and

artificiality of African international borders. The modern variant has to do with labour mobility, refugeeism and political asylum. The push and pull factors underlying the modern type of intra-African migration have to do with deteriorating political, socioeconomic and environmental conditions, as well as armed conflicts. These conditions are more or less similar to those responsible for the emigration of the third category of the African diaspora. It is estimated that there are over 16.3 million intra-African migrants, including voluntary labour, refugees and asylumees in the continent (AU, 2006: 3).

The combined effects of hyper-inflation, economic collapse and political turbulence in Zimbabwe have triggered a mass influx of Zimbabweans to neighbouring South Africa and other parts of the world. An estimated 2-3 million Zimbabweans presently reside in South Africa, the majority of whom are believed to be illegal immigrants and the International Organisation for Migration estimates that the South African government deports an average of 3,900 Zimbabweans weekly (see Wines, 2007). Similarly, uncertain economic conditions at home have pressured a large number of skilled professionals from different African countries (Zambia, Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda) to the booming economies of South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Gabon, leading to what Adepoju (2003; 2004a) depicted as 'the altering of brain drain to brain circulation within the African region'. Further, there is a growing migration from West Africa to the North African countries of Libya, Morocco, and to a lesser extent, Tunisia. Whereas a preponderant representation of these emigrants consists of casual labour, others are 'rovering labour' using the Arab Maghreb countries as a transit to the European Union – mostly Spain, Italy, Portugal and Malta.

Following recent and contemporary wars and political violence there are tens of thousands of Rwandan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania and Uganda; Sudanese-Darfur refugees in Chad, Chadian refugees in Nigeria, Somalian refugees in Kenya, Ivorian refugees in Burkina Faso and Ghana, Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea, Congolese refugees in Gabon, Burundian refugees in Uganda, and so forth. The vast majority of the refugees live under deplorable humanitarian conditions.

Diaspora Populations, Exile Communities and Political Insurgency in Africa

A considerable number of publications on African civil wars that emerged since the late 1990s have tried to establish a strong connection between large number of diaspora, migrant and exile communities of African origin on the one hand, and the prevalence and promotion of insurgency on the continent. The various works of Paul Collier and his colleagues of Western Africanists in the World Bank and elsewhere on the economic agendas of civil wars, in particular the theory that most civil wars are instigated and driven by rebels' greed for strategic resources as opposed to legitimate grievances, have provided great impetus to the thesis that diaspora remittances are contributory to the instigation and sustaining of rebel insurgencies in fragile states (cf. Collier, 2000a; Kaldor, 2001: 7-9; Berdal, 2003). Collier (2000b) particularly argues that given the fact that rebels do not have the same capacities as constituted governments to generate the necessary revenues to finance insurgency activities, they are therefore inclined to indulge in illicit activities (for example, predation of natural

resources and drug trafficking) and informal fundraising from sympathetic diaspora communities. Collier (2000b: 13) further submits that 'diaporas are so dangerous' and this especially because:

> Diasporas sometimes harbour rather romanticized attachments to their group of origin and may nurse grievances as a form of asserting continued belonging. They are much richer than the people in their country of origin and so can afford to finance vengeance. Above all, they do not have to suffer any of the awful consequences of renewed conflict because they are not living in the country. Hence, they are a ready market for rebel groups touting vengeance and so are a source of finance for renewed conflict. They are also a source of pressure for secession.

While not implying that diaspora activities and income are the major causes of political insurgencies and civil wars in Africa, exponents of war economies and predation theories are generally of the view that diasporas and external migration populations contribute to the promotion, aggravation and prolongation of wars (cf. Collier & Hoefller, 2000; Kaldor, 2001:7-9; Berdal, 2003; Sage, 2007), by activities such as:

(a) Fund-raising among themselves and from external sympathisers to purchase ammunition and other military supplies for home-based insurgents and rebel factions. Examples of this occurred among diaspora populations during the Nigeria-Biafra civil war in the late 1960s, the Ugandan liberation war in the 1980s, the Eritrean separatist war against Ethiopia, and the recent civil wars in Liberia, Burundi and Somalia.

(b) Colluding with rebels, warlords and some external business agents to loot strategic natural resources like diamond, coltan and timber in their home countries, helping to secure external black markets for looted resources and ultimately recycling part of the revenues to support the conflict agendas. Examples of this are found in the civil wars in Angola, the DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

(c) Increasing the risk of return to violence among post-conflict societies through perpetuation and activation of animosities, inflammatory propaganda and mobilisation for violence, and continued provision of financial and logistical support to disaffected and recalcitrant persons or groups. There are multiple instances of this dimension in the political conflicts and wars in Burundi and Rwanda (pre- and post-genocide), Somalia, and Liberia.

(d) Direct mobilisation and invasion of homeland as was the case by the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that mobilised from their exile base in Uganda to invade their home country and seize power in Kigali in the aftermath of the genocide in 1991.

The success of the RPF was to inspire, first, the anti-Mobutu movement and later, the anti-Kabila movements in the DRC supported by Rwanda and Uganda (Nkandawire, 2002: 203). Similarly, the vanguard and backers of the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) that invaded Sierra Leone in 1991 consisted of (sub)-elites that lost favour with the embedded patron-clientelist network of the corrupt All People's Congress (APC) regime, as well as outspoken critics forced into exile by the dictatorship (see Zack-Williams, 1999: 159; Richards, 1996). Nkandawire (2002: 202) describes this brand of insurgency that has characterised a few of the African civil wars as 'rovering rebel movements returning from exile'.

The notion that diasporas, exiles and migrant communities play a significant role in backing insurgencies in their home countries has attracted considerable interest on the part of Western governments (especially that of the US) following the events of 11 September 2001 and the determination to target terrorist financing worldwide (Berdal, 2005: 694). It is this view that many policy makers among Western governments and key international organisations tend to accept as self evident truth and thus a guide to policy.

The viewpoint that financial and logistical support from diaspora communities forms a significant source of backing and incentive for political insurgencies in transitional societies, especially in the prosecution of ethnic and identity-related struggles for collective self-determination, is supported by a range of contemporary experiences in Africa and beyond. In some of the recent and present wars in Somalia, Kosovo, and Sri Lanka, diaspora finance has been mobilised by local warring factions through deliberate lobbying by the home groups and reciprocal solidarity from migrants and exiles. Also, the fungibility of financial flows from diaspora remittances has meant that part of the remittances intended for legitimate humanitarian assistance to war-affected relatives and family members back home has often been channelled by recipients into the war project. Perhaps the most prominent case in support of the relationship between diasporas remittances and political insurgency in the home country is that of the civil war waged by the Tamil Tiger against the government of Sri Lanka. As Berdal (2005: 694) articulated the discourse:

> [the] elaborate overseas support structure set up and carefully nurtured by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) unquestionably provided vital economic support from diaspora communities for the movement military struggle. This overseas income by one estimate as much as 60 per cent of its overall income enabled the Tamil Tigers to pursue a more direct and high-intensity campaign against the Sri Lanka state security forces.

The Other Side of the Diaspora

Significantly, the Sri Lankan example is not generalisable and therefore does not make the relationship between diaspora populations and political insurgencies as straightforward as many predation theorists contend. There is an element of context-specificity to the history of civil wars and the role of diasporas. While in a limited number of cases, diaspora remittances and support have contributed to the prosecution and prolongation of the war project, in many other instances, diaspora finances have proved a crucial source of humanitarian aid, and to a much lesser extent, some conflict circumstances have witnessed a complex articulation of both (i.e. insurgency support and humanitarian relief). In many conflict zones and at different stages of war when international aid has dried up and donor fatigue set in (for example, the later stages of war in Sierra Leone, Somalia, Liberia, and elsewhere in Kosovo, El Salvador, and so on), diaspora revenues have provided an essential source of sustenance to marginalised and dispossessed groups (cf. Berdal, 2005: 695; Nkandawire, 2002; Carment, 2007). In fact, both war-torn Somalia and the unrecognised de facto state of British Somaliland are two economies in Africa that have been hugely dependent on diaspora remittances to remain afloat in the face of the multiple international sanctions imposed on the countries (Menkhaus, 2004: 41). Furthermore, many recent studies have shown the immense contributions of various diaspora organisations in promoting post-war

recovering and peace-building through constructive political participation, engineering positive political and economic reforms, helping to attract direct foreign investments to their homelands, reconstruction of destroyed public and community buildings, and funding small and medium scale developmental projects (Gundel, 2002; Frost, 2002; Zack-Williams & Mohan, 2002). Social development networks of Sierra Leoneans, Somalis, Afghans and Bosnian at home and abroad tend to have some of the best practices of this positive model.

In its 'Draft Strategic Framework for a Policy on Migration in Africa', the African Union (2006) recognises the developmental importance of diaspora remittances in the following terms:

> The total global volume of remittance transfers to developing countries far exceeds official development assistance (ODA) and has important macro-economic effects by increasing the total purchasing power of receiving economies. African countries receive significant amounts of remittances relative to size of GDP. Remittances are used by migrants' families to meet daily subsistence needs, health and education, but are also invested in improvements to land, homes, entrepreneurial activities, et cetera. Identifying ways to maximise the developmental effects of remittances, and improving remittance transfer mechanisms are therefore topics of growing importance to Africa.

It will therefore be preposterous to dismiss diaspora remittances and their overall developmental significance on account of either the role played by some diaspora populations in promoting political extremism in their home states or the post-9/11 international suspicion and apprehension over transfers by Africans in the diaspora to families, friends, groups, organisations and agencies back home. What many Western pundits and policy makers incensed against diaspora remittances do not seem to recognise is that there is an element of cultural obligation to transfers from the perceptibly more privileged Africans in the diaspora to their less privileged counterparts at home and this cultural practice goes back to colonial and, in some instances, pre-colonial history. In virtually all African cultures, the idiom that migrant relatives are better exposed and more well-to-do than those at home, and that wealth is meaningless unless the more privileged use it in uplifting the less privileged around them is well embedded in the peoples' world view. It is an element of world view further strengthened by the fact that many African states are poor, corrupt and insensitive to the wellbeing of their citizens. It therefore becomes obligatory on the relatively more well-to-do to make sacrifices to provide welfare support – benefits that the state ordinarily provides in Western countries – to their less-privileged relatives and clients. Many postcolonial theorists in fact argue that this cultural imperative, believed to be intrinsic to patrimonialism, partly explains why the African governing elites are lured to use their offices to steal public funds and amass spoils for the benefit of their large number of dependants and immediate constituencies (extended families, clans and so on) (see Grugel, 2002; Young, 2004).

Post-9/11 Construction of Terror in Africa and the African Diaspora: Some Concluding Remarks

It is not a historical accident that in the post-9/11 international climate, the African diaspora is perceived differently from most other diasporic populations. Images of 'evil', 'danger', 'criminality', 'disease', 'disorder', 'anarchy', and 'mindless violence'

have characterised the perception of Africa in the West since pre-colonial history – a characterisation that historically resonates with the discourse of Africa as the 'the dark continent' (cf. Helman & Ratner, 1993; Kaplan, 1994; Linklater, 1996). Whereas the Chinese diaspora, Indian diaspora, Korean diaspora, Jewish diaspora, Chilean diaspora (to mention a few) are, in Western constructions, perceived as promoting development in their home countries (cf. Marienstras, 1989; McKeown, 2000; Butler, 2001), the perception of the African diaspora has been radically changed since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Prior to this time, the African diaspora was nothing more than unwanted guest workers and hassles in the West, taking advantage of economic opportunities in the developed western countries to advance their wellbeing and those of their relatives back home (AWEPA, 2004). The events of 9/11 and American-led global war on terror have radically altered this 'greener pasture-seeking, survivalist' perception. The new reconstruction has meant that the image of 'terror' and 'danger' now supersedes the idiom of 'greener pasture-seeking survivalism'. Either way, the reality is that the African immigrants are increasingly not welcome in the West and, evidently, they have become more unwelcome in the post-9/11 dispensation than previously.

Africa is increasingly securitised as a zone of terror in the US and, to a lesser extent, EU foreign policies, and the African diaspora is perceived as partly bankrolling terror and insurgency in the beleaguered continent. The new realisation that there are large Muslim population in Africa north of the equator (West Africa, Sahel-Arab Maghreb and the Horn of Africa) has suddenly fuelled disquieting discourses of anger and error in the West since the commencement of the global war on terror (Mazrui, 2005: 15; Keenan, 2004a).

Senior officials of US European Command (EUCOM), senior US government officials, CIA counter-intelligence reports and western media have played a big part in the redefinition of Africa as a potential breeding ground for Islamist militancy and a safe haven for terrorists, including the perception of the African diaspora as willing accomplices and champions of political violence (Keenan, 2004b; Diallo, 2005). EUCOM has been chiefly instrumental in sensitising the Washington administration to the huge security gaps in Africa, emphasising the vulnerability of US interests to terror, criminality and instability in the region (CSIS, 2005: vii). EUCOM and other protagonists have spoken in increasingly exaggerated language of terrorists fleeing the war in Afghanistan and the crackdown in Pakistan, swarming across the vast, ungoverned and desolate regions of the Sahara desert through Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania Keenan, 2004a: 477).

General James L. Jones, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Commander of EUCOM, posits that:

> We are seeing evidence that terrorism is moving into Africa, especially the radical, fundamentalist type. The countries on the rim of the Mediterranean Sea – Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Morocco – are the most pressing concern for the Command, but failed states further south also pose problems. Terrorists see the continent as a place to hide, a place to train and a place to organize new attacks. While terrorism based in Africa is a long-term threat to the United States, it is a more immediate one to Europe. The Mediterranean that separates Africa from Europe is no longer a physical barrier; it's a pond that people can step over.[2]

With no central government for over 15 years, the failed state of Somalia has been hyped as a safe haven for terrorists uprooted from the Middle East and the various warlords and militia groups in the country are said to be funded by a Middle Eastern terrorist mafia. Nearly all Islamist fundamentalist groups in North Africa and the Sahel, including those waging political struggles prior to 9/11, have been branded 'Al Qaeda subsidiaries', 'surrogates', 'sympathisers', 'subcontractors' and 'beneficiaries of international Jihadist funding' (Keenan, 2004a). The proximity of North Africa to Europe and the Middle East has also been exaggerated to allege that terrorist organisations and Al Qaeda cells from the Sahara are infiltrating Europe through the backdoor (Diallo, 2005: 25-30). Subsequent incidents of terrorist bombings in many parts of North Africa and the Horn have been high-profiled by the US and its allies to declare Africa north of the equator a zone of terror.

One of the most striking attempts to draw a connection between post-9/11 terrorist tendencies, geo-political situations in Africa and the African diaspora populations is found in the recent study by Andre Le Sage (2007). Sage (2007: 8-10) argues that African countries have multiple vulnerabilities to terrorism, which are associated a variety of 'permissive factors', including inter alia:

– Physical safe havens: availability of diverse 'ungoverned spaces' that include 'dense urban areas (particularly "slums"), rural desert areas, maritime zones, and sections of "weak" or "failing" states that fall outside governments' controls'.
– Legal Safe Havens: 'Lack a suitable legal framework to outlaw terrorism, the provision of material and financial support to terrorists, and incitement to commit terrorist acts' in various African countries.
– Financial Safe Havens: 'African countries are also vulnerable to terrorist efforts to mobilize and transfer funds for their operational purposes. An estimated $125 billion moves through the remittance, or hawala, economy each year, and many countries are highly dependent on remittances for their financial well-being. Remittance systems are largely unregulated arrangements for money transfers based on trust. They are particularly popular among diaspora communities to send relatively small amounts of money to family abroad in a way that helps avoid taxes and fees and reaches locations where traditional banks are not present. International pressure has induced larger remittance companies to adopt some minimum standards of information collection regarding customers. However, efforts that over-regulate or close remittance companies do not stop the practice of hawala, but rather they push it further underground and out of sight. There is also the special case of South Africa, ... which has sophisticated financial systems that are not yet adequately monitored or regulated and may be subject to abuse.'

It suffices to say that the arguments of Sage, who is am employee of the US National Defence University – an ideological think tank of the Pentagon – as well as many other similar proponents of 'terror' and 'danger' in Africa are exaggerated half-truths that tend to exploit African vulnerabilities to serve America's present global governance agenda. The widely publicised connection between diaspora finance/populations and terrorism in Africa is largely speculative and groundless, with very tenuous empirical details. Clearly, it is against the backdrop of the post-9/11 re-securitisation of Africa as a zone of 'terror' and 'danger' that one can begin to understanding the changing

reconstruction of the image of the African diaspora as a community inclined to promote and finance political extremism, including terrorism, insurgencies and subversion, especially, against African states aligned with the West in the global war on terror.

Notes

1. CPEs is a concept enunciated by the UN in the 1990s to describe the proliferation of major crises in transitional societies, the majority of which were intra-state conflicts, characterised by multi-causality, and requiring multi-dimensional international responses, including a combination of military intervention, peace support operations, humanitarian relief programmes, high level political intervention and diplomacy (see Francis, 2005:14-15).
2. See, Noticias.info, 'European Command Combating Terror Threats in Africa', 8 October 2004. http://www.noticias.info/Archivo/2004/200410/20041009/20041009_35557.shtm. Website accessed on 1 September 2005.

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RESEARCH REPORT

'Spoiling Property': HIV/AIDS and Land Rights in Kombewa, Kenya

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Introduction

Africa generally and Kenya in particular is home to many severe diseases. Some of these diseases include sleeping sickness, bubonic plague, smallpox, influenza, malaria, yellow fever, syphilis, gonorrhea, and other venereal diseases. However, in the last two decades or so, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) have become a serious health and development problem. At the moment, HIV/AIDS related deaths outweigh those from other killer diseases. The pandemic has thus assumed an ominous place as the primary infectious cause of mortality.

Since its discovery over a decade ago, global statistics indicate that of the 2.9 million HIV-related deaths in 2003, 2.2 million were from sub-Saharan Africa (UNAIDS 2004). Alarmingly, the sub-Saharan African region contains only 10 percent of the world's population, but accounts for 60 percent of the worldwide HIV/AIDS cases (25 million HIV/AIDS cases out of the worldwide total of 39 million) (UNAIDS Africa Fact Sheet 2004). And in addition, more than 55 percent of the total infected are women (Whiteside 2001) with over 12 million orphaned children.

The first HIV/AIDS case was reported in Kenya in 1984 (Wambui et al., 2002). On the 25th November 1999, the disease was declared a national disaster (NASCOP 2000), by the former president of Kenya, Daniel arap Moi. By June 2000, 1.5 million people in Kenya had died of HIV/AIDS and this cumulative number was expected to rise to 2.6 million by 2005. The death rates from HIV have reached 150,000 persons per year. These are likely to continue to rise because of the large number of people who were infected in the 1990s (NASCOP 2005, 2). Regionally, of all the provinces in Kenya, Nyanza has the highest prevalence rate at 15 percent in adults, while in the division of Kombewa has prevalence rates standing more than 22 percent (NASCOP 2005).

While Kenya has about 1.6 million orphans, Kombewa has by far the highest level of orphanhood, with almost one in five children less than 15 years having lost one or both of their biological parents to HIV/AIDS. This rapid pace at which the epidemic moves through the society and the expanding numbers of HIV/AIDS-related deaths together with the socioeconomic impact provide impetus for further analysis of the relationship between HIV/AIDS and the various segments of not only the economy but also population in a broader manner.

Context of the Problem

As expected, the disease has brought with it new social and economic burdens on the various segments of the population. For instance, prolonged illness and early death of adults in their prime age alter social relations, including institutions governing access to and inheritance of land. Prolonged morbidity and mortality also contributes to the disposal of critical assets including land to cater for the care, treatment and funeral costs. In addition, prolonged illness affects the utilisation of land, particularly for the affected households and individuals. All these changes would have dimensions across age and gender. As a result, HIV/AIDS is deepening poverty, reversing human development achievements, worsening gender inequalities, eroding the ability of governments to maintain essential services, reducing labour productivity and supply, and putting a brake on economic growth. The worsening conditions in turn make people and households at risk or vulnerable to the disease, and sabotages national efforts to improve treatment and care (Louwenson and Whiteside 2001: 4).

However, the intensifying responses to the disease have either focused on prevention, care treatment and impacts on limited sectors and people or the nature of the disease, the ways it is transmitted and the reasons why it is so devastating in its impacts (CODESRIA 2003; Okuro 2003). We lack the broader picture of the implication of HIV/AIDS with regard to development, poverty reduction and livelihood sustenance, especially within the rural areas (CODESRIA 2003, Okuro 2003). Moreover, research carried out so far has also been mainly in the biomedical sciences to the extent that limited effort has been made to address non-medical concerns. Such issues obscure as much as they reveal, and all too often produce stereotypes that detract from the critical questions of economic, political, and socio-cultural dimensions of HIV/AIDS (CODESRIA 2003). For the rural poor, we need a more creative and informed analysis on how HIV/AIDS impacts on land rights and livelihoods strategies of orphans and widows.

Despite the many people dying from HIV/AIDS-related sickness, there are always those who are living and are drawing their livelihood solely from land, as land still remains one of the most significant factors in rural development, particularly in Kombewa. However, we lack a broader analysis of the relationship between HIV/AIDS and land rights particularly taking into consideration of the many widows and orphans left behind as a result of HIV/AIDS. As the disease enters its third decade so is the realisation that widows' and orphans' ability to own, control, and have access to land, and other properties is increasingly becoming threatened.

This paper endeavours to provide an understanding about the relationship between HIV/AIDS and land rights in Kombewa division. The paper particularly seeks to answer the question: to what extent has the emergence of HIV/AIDS impacted widows' and orphans' land rights, particularly the ability to hold, use and transact land at the local level? The paper relies on testimonies from HIV/AIDS infected and affected households. The real names of the respondents are concealed to protect their anonymity.

Area of Study

Kombewa is one of the administrative divisions of Kisumu district, Nyanza province. Geographically, it is situated towards the western side of the country. It borders Lake

Victoria on the eastern side. The region is mainly inhabited by a section of the Luo community known as Jo-Seme and by a few immigrants (Jodak) from neighbouring clans such as Jo-Asembo, Jo-Kisumo and others. The division has shorelines to the east. Along the shorelines, fishing takes up the greater part of peoples' time although it is by no means a major economic activity.

Half of the division is dry and of low agricultural potential. The main crops grown include maize, millet, cassava, groundnuts, and cowpeas. Unreliable and inadequate rainfall patterns have seriously affected agricultural activities, which to a large extent remain a source of livelihood for about 90 percent of the population. There are high incidences of livestock diseases such as *nagana,* foot and mouth, and tick-borne diseases. Women in Kombewa bear disproportionately large share of both domestic and agricultural work. They spend many hours during planting, weeding and preparation of the crops in addition to fetching firewood and water. However, they are faced with inhibitive cultural practices such as limited access to land and other productive properties, inheritance of widows, exclusion of women in strategic decision-making, and restrictions on family inheritance.

Despite the prevalence of other diseases such as malaria, HIV/AIDS remains the major challenge facing the people in Kombewa division. In rural as well as urban areas, HIV/AIDS has caused great suffering and has placed a heavy burden on the health service delivery system. Its effects are felt in every sector of the economy since many resources and time are needed to care and cater for the sick person's welfare. The prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS in the division, according to the latest District Development Plan (2005), stands at 38 percent and is among the highest in the country.

Literature Review

Studies that draw an explicit linkage between violations of widows' and orphans' property and inheritance rights and their consequences with respect to HIV/AIDS in Kenya are still relatively rare (Okuro 2002:11; Aliber et al., 2004; Strickland 2004). What exists is a relatively isolated literature, which discusses land tenure and the consequences of land tenure reforms (Shipton 1988; Okuro 2005). Others have analysed the systematic impact of the spread of HIV/AIDS on individuals, households, and government efforts together with survival strategies (NASCOP 2005).

This however has not been the case regionally. From the mid-1990s, anecdotal works emerged in eastern and southern Africa that attempted to link HIV/AIDS and agrarian processes, looking at the alterations of social relations at the household level occasioned by the ravages of HIV/AIDS (UNICEF 1999; Nzioki 2001; Kyalo-Ngungi 2001). These studies analysed the extent to which HIV/AIDS may be restructuring agrarian economies in these regions (Walker 2002). The studies agreed that with HIV/AIDS there is the likelihood of the violation of orphaned childrens' land rights (Mullin 2001), alteration of widows' relations to land (Manji 1999), and distress land sales to defray medical expenses (Muchunguzi 2002; Eilor and Mugisha 2002; Drimie 2002a&b; Strickland 2004; Drimie and Gandure 2005). These findings have provided meaningful indicators on the impact of HIV/AIDS on land rights.

However informative, some of these works are merely speculative and moreover, it seems highly problematic to extrapolate these finding to Kombewa, as in each locality HIV/AIDS has its own unique origin, geographic pattern of dispersion, and affects

particular population segments in different ways. The specific cultural, social, economic and class contexts relating to each locality are also likely to differ, and research carried out in one particular locality may only provide useful materials which can inform analysis of situations elsewhere.

Until 2006, there were three major studies that seem to have linked directly HIV/AIDS and land rights in Kenya (Wambui et al., 2002; HRW 2003a; Aliber et al., 2004). The first two studies (Wambui et al., 2002, HRW, 2003) provided the empirical evidence regarding the assumptions concerning the negative impact of HIV/AIDS on land use, land rights and land administration. They suggested that HIV/AIDS is creating serious tenurial insecurity for vulnerable groups such as widows and orphans. These findings are however negated by the third study done by Aliber et al., 2004. Aliber raised several objections to the general assumption that tenure loss due to HIV/AIDS is rampant in Kenya. Aliber particularly argued that for the two study sites, no evidence of distress sales of land due to HIV/AIDS was experienced; and while there was some evidence of widows having their land grabbed by the family of the deceased husbands, there was not always a link to HIV/AIDS in these cases (Aliber et al., 2004: 143).

In addition to the contradictions, all these studies had methodological weaknesses, some depending on a sample size of less than 30 households. This means that their findings merely indicate trends that need a thorough investigation through more intensive research. It is with this understanding that the studies recommended a comprehensive impact analysis of the link between HIV/AIDS and land rights. Moreover, the studies lacked a clear theoretical grounding, which could place HIV/AIDS firmly within the context of other processes. These are the gaps that this paper endeavours to fill in the context of Kombewa.

Theoretical Background

This paper has adopted a Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) in understanding the link between HIV/AIDS and land rights in Kombewa. In academic circles, this approach is relatively new. Its history can be traced to dissatisfaction with previous approaches such Modernisation and Basic Needs Approach in addressing development generally and poverty in particular. By the 1990s, the approach had taken shape attributed to the renewed concern to take a more human or people-centred approach to development and partly to the blossoming literature that considerably changed the definition of poverty away from an income and consumption focus (Tobin 2003: 9).

Since its introduction by Robert Chambers and Gordon Conway in 1991, important donor institutions such as Care, Oxfam, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the UK Department of International Development (DFID) have adopted and used it as a basis for their development programmes and practices. Although the approach has been defined differently by development experts, in this paper, a livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base.

This approach argues that people's choices of livelihood strategies and the livelihood outcomes that result from these choices depend on a mix of assets they have (DFID undated). In the rural areas, the five groups of assets include: human capital, natural capital, financial capital, physical capital and social capital (Seeley 2002; Tobin 2003:11; DFID undated). These assets constitute livelihood building blocks. In addition to these five groups of assets, in this paper we include the political capital, which is based on the ability to influence policies and decision making in the rural areas.

SLA is a useful tool to analyse the impact of HIV/AIDS because the approach is people-centred and responds quickly to changing circumstances. It looks beyond the health side of the disease to all aspects of life. It emphasises the effects of HIV/AIDS not only on sufferers, but also on non-sufferers, especially within the household. In addition, the framework acknowledges that those living with HIV/AIDS have other and perhaps more pressing concerns than sickness. They are still people not just 'patients' and they have livelihoods to support and sustain. The framework is handy in understanding the livelihood choices of vulnerable groups, to take into account different social axes of difference, to identify the connection between different livelihoods assets, and to build upon people's strengths as a starting point. As the study shows, HIV/AIDS does affect every part of a livelihood. Some livelihoods are more obviously touched than others. For the rural poor such as in Kombewa, land remains a fundamental asset and determinant of secure livelihood and its access, ownership and control are critical in potentially breaking the cycle of HIV/AIDS and poverty.

HIV/AIDS and Land Rights in Kombewa

Historically, women in Kombewa have accessed land by virtue of their relationship to men, for instance, as fathers, husbands, or sons. Thus for women, security of tenure is determined the security of marriage, lineage ties to the kin group, respectability and age. The totality of these meant that when a married household is in crisis, for example, through death of the husband, separation or divorce, such a woman's vulnerability became significant. The extent of the vulnerability for women generally and for widows in particular has been worsened by several factors. These factors include: colonialism which entrenched male ownership of land; male preferences in land inheritance; male privilege in marriage; male bias in state programmes of land distribution; gender inequality in land markets; biased institutional practices; poverty; domestic violence; and women's lack of awareness of their rights.

HIV/AIDS is unique. The disease is exacerbating discriminatory property and inheritance practices. For example, HIV/AIDS has led to the rapid transition from a situation of relative wealth to that of relative poverty among the affected households. Second, the disease is associated with stigma and discrimination against affected households reducing their capability to cope and sustain livelihood, as some are forced to surrender household property and other assets to relatives. In Kombewa, the stigma associated with HIV/AIDS places the entire blame on women. Third, the disease compromises the ability of households to cope with economic challenges and is forcing many to sell off productive assets to cover medication and funeral costs. Fourth, the disease is contributing to rising numbers of relatively young widows and orphans. The majority of these widows are uninformed on their cultural rights and are

rarely with much negotiating power when it comes to property rights. Fifth, the disease affects the most productive age group, for instance, those in the age bracket of 18 to 49. In addition, the disease also affects people who are responsible for the support and care of others, for example, children, elderly and extended family members. It does not kill at once but continuously and systematically strips individuals and households of their social and economic ability to regenerate livelihoods. HIV/AIDS thus creates new problems and challenges hitherto not experienced in Kombewa.

HIV/AIDS has become a stand-alone factor leading to the violation of widows and orphans rights to land at least in the last two decades. These violations are interrelated and include: distress land sales, land disinheritance, and land dispossession. In the following pages, we discuss the three Ds in detail with relation to HIV/AIDS while also considering the operation of land markets in Kombewa.

Distress Land Sales

HIV/AIDS does not result immediately in distress land sale once a household is affected or infected. It systematically follows the unique way in which the disease impoverishes households in the rural areas through depletion of livelihood building blocks. In Kombewa, and particularly due to prolonged sickness, HIV/AIDS has increased the loss of finance and the increased cost of living. It has also increased burdens of care-giving and orphan fostering, and eventually has led to a general disintegration of family ties (also see Drimie 2002: 13, Strickland 2004: 19).

Several respondents and focus group discussions highlighted instances in which increased financial costs associated with HIV/AIDS forced some households to capitalise upon land to offset costs stemming from HIV/AIDS. These costs included medication, care and funeral expenses. There were also situations where the increased economic cost of HIV/AIDS sickness forced some widows to sell land to enable orphaned children to go to school, to facilitate marriage for their children, or to establish homesteads. In offsetting funeral expenses, focus group discussions identified households where land was sold to transport the deceased to ancestral homes or to pay hospitalisation bills. Some key informants also mentioned feeding of mourners as the motivating factor for disposing of land. It was however during the period of prolonged sickness that several parcels of land were sold to either buy drugs or other medical bills as the testimony of Caroline Abonyo, now a widow with four male children and two girls, demonstrates:

> … my husband had around six ha of land in different places. He fell sick in 2000 while working in Nairobi [...] He stopped working and returned to ancestral home... while at home his health did not improve. We had to look for money to take him to the hospital ... in the year 2001 he sold one parcel at Kshs. 15,000 to establish a home and to seek for treatment. Things did not improve. In January 2003, my husband, without my knowledge, sold another parcel at Kshs 21,000 ... I was against the sale, but he did it in cohort with the assistant chief who by then was also very sick and desperately needed money ... there was nothing I could do. I have 1.5 ha left for my children. My husband eventually died on May 14th 2005. The assistant chief has also died and that parcel was sold at a low price and not even paid for fully according to the records ... However, the person who bought the land insisted having paid for it in full ... I am still following the matter.

The above testimony demonstrates a number of key issues as far as the people living in Kombewa are concerned. One has to do with the cultural need to establish a home. Among the Luo, it is rather less complicated to establish a home when the both the wife and the husband are still living. And should one partner, especially the man, feel threatened health-wise the priority always becomes the need to establish a home for his children who could live without cultural encumbrances should he pass on. Secondly, there is the impoverishment associated with HIV/AIDS sickness that leaves individuals and household with limited choices and forces them to dispose of productive assets such as land at a very low price to seek medication. Lastly is the discriminatory property and inheritance practices and corruption that make women and widows particularly powerlessness on land issues.

The second form of distress land sales in relation to HIV/AIDS in Kombewa division are those in which widows – at times in partnership with their orphans – sell off land. The majority of widows who sell land in this manner are those who lost their husbands while living in their own homesteads. In Kombewa, widows left within their own homesteads exercise more freedom when it comes to disposing land. This freedom is however not shared across Kombewa. In some locations such as in East Seme, widows even within their own homesteads experienced difficulties in trying to sell land to pay for medication. Due to HIV/AIDS-related costs, these widows are actually selling land that was allocated to them in 'trust' for their surviving male children. Although there are several cases in the division, two stand out as an illustration. Dora Odhiambo, 31 years old and widowed in 2002, stated:

> ... when Odhiambo died, he left me with nothing. I remained with his children to feed and to take to school. I had no proper house. The children had no clothing. Life was terrible but I had to start somehow. In the year 2003 I had to sell one of the pieces of land Odhiambo left, at least to build a house and to seek treatment particularly for my last born child. Although I have not yet built a house I have kept the money somewhere, but not in the Bank. I have used part of the money for treatment but some is still remaining. Next year I will also use some of it to pay school fees for my son.

While the testimony continues with a similar story as the previous one, it however underscores the extent to which HIV/AIDS-related costs can leave certain households with no adequate housing and even make it difficult for orphaned children to go to school. Boone Asaria, a 38 year old widow also sold sections of her land after the death of her husband. Her testimony is different being that she has been able to keep records for all her land transactions to ensure buyers pay her in full. In fact, her case illustrates the extent to which land seems to be the only property to lay hands on in case of any economic distress for many widows and orphans. She recounted:

> ... my husband died when the children were still very young. Now my son is an adult and I am like his father. I have to take responsibility. And in such a kind of situation *giri ema itonygo* [one has to survive with anything at his or her possession]. In 2001 I was forced to spoil my property. I sold my land ... give out as bridewealth for my daughter in-law who is my son's first wife. In 2002 I fell sick and had to seek treatment. I had to sell the second piece of land ... treat myself and to give as bridewealth to my son's second wife. He is my only surviving son and I have all the reasons to assist him. He is now having four children: three with the first wife and one child with the second wife … in the same year I sold another piece of land ... to seek treatment for my daughter…

The testimonies shows that some widows indeed exercise a remarkable degree of freedom concerning their ability to hold, use and transact land at the local level after the death of their husbands. The freedom is determined by several factors such as age, social status, and respectability. While these widows are selling land to offset HIV/AIDS-related costs in addition to other costs, the long-term impact the productive asset liquidation in terms of a secure livelihood for surviving orphans is least taken into consideration. In addition, the testimonies indicate that contrary to the interpretations provided by Aliber et al., 2004, land sales occasioned by HIV/AIDS are rampant at least in Kombewa where the prevalence is relatively high. Several key informants talked about 'spoiling property' to cover medical and funeral expenses occasioned by HIV/AIDS. It indeed captures the powerlessness and poverty that the disease places on vulnerable households. The other significant issue that also comes out of these testimonies is that people living with HIV/AIDS do not cease to be a family member, a community member or a landholder. HIV/AIDS may alter access to finances but the persons with HIV/AIDS are still persons, they live with the disease and grow older with it although their fortunes change over time. Even with changes in fortunes they too need to earn a living, raise children, and even struggle to cope with day-to-day crises.

The third aspect concerning HIV/AIDS and land sales in Kombewa relates to fathers-in-law or widowed mothers-in-law selling their parcels to either to pay medical bills or to pay for funeral expenses. These cases are rampant, particularly when the in-laws have not sub-divided the land amongst their male children and are living together in one homestead. Those interviewed admitted selling their land parcels to seek treatment and care for their sons or daughters, thereby leaving nothing for their daughters-in-laws and orphaned grand children. For example, Majiwa Omollo, whose husband died in 1991, recounted her predicament:

> ... in this home I have not sold any land ... my mother-in-law is the one selling land. I had to acquire the space I am living in today by force. My father-in-law died without sub-dividing the land and for that reason we are all living in one block ... My mother-in-law started selling land in 1998 to treat her son and her daughter who were diagnosed to be suffering from HIV/AIDS. Both died. Two years later, another brother-in-law fell sick ... My mother-in-law sold another land to treat him. He too died. Today, I am the only surviving daughter-in-law; all others have died. They have left children. I have five children, four male ones and a daughter. I don't know how my male children will survive, where will they get land? Recently my mother-in-law took a loan from a neighbour and she is now asking me to sub-divide for her a section of my compound to help her pay back the loan. It is difficult.

HIV/AIDS targets very productive adults, and relatives usually struggle using their limited resources to sustain them either in terms of drugs or medical treatment. However given the prolonged periods of sickness, many such households eventually enter conditions characterised by poverty, destitution, and vulnerability to the extent that they find it difficult to resist further consequences of HIV/AIDS. The deterioration of livelihood building blocks experienced by HIV/AIDS-affected households eventually will force certain households to dispose of productive assets such as land often with tenuous results considering the many widows, orphans and the survivors whose livelihoods depend directly on land.

The story above is not only limited to widowed grandmothers. Focus group discussions and key informants also identified several cases of grandfathers selling their parcels of land to seek treatment and care for their adult children, to the disadvantage of surviving orphans and widows. They usually start off by selling other household items like livestock, furniture, clothes, television set and other household goods in order to cover such costs as clinic visits, medical treatment, supplies, and funerals (also see Drimie 2002: 14; Stricland 2004: 16; Drimie and Gundure 2005: 28). After selling off these household goods, eventually they end up turning to selling productive assets such as land, as the testimony by Awuor Ochoro illustrates:

> I had four sons but now they have all died. Because they have died with their wives it must be because of HIV/AIDS. I had a lot of land in this village but now I don't have it anymore. I have been selling my land to treat my sons since 1998. At first I used my cows, they got finished and I had no other option but to sell land ... My only surviving daughter-in-law has no land, neither do my grandchildren, but I am happy to have used what I had to treat my sons ... God knows these children would one day be people ... They will have to buy land elsewhere.

These land sales to meet medical and other cost occasioned by HIV/AIDS is leading to impoverishment and disempowerment for HIV/AIDS-affected widows and orphans. Moreover, the manner in which they are done, in addition to its consequences, makes it a less sustainable adaptive strategy in the context of HIV/AIDS. It seems as if the care and support required for HIV/AIDS patients cost much more than the ordinary illnesses from which subsistence farmers from Kombewa have commonly suffered. What emerges from the discussion above is that HIV/AIDS narrows livelihood options and the disposal of productive assets and the depletion of savings to meet medical and other expenses are becoming a visible consequence of the pandemic in Kombewa. The disposal of productive assets, particularly land, has had four important implications for the surviving widows and orphans. First, it jeopardises land inheritance for surviving male and female orphans. Second, it limits the ability of HIV/AIDS-affected households to participate effectively in subsistence farming either through land rental or sharecropping. Third, it increases the vulnerability of the HIV/AIDS-affected households and reduces their resilience to absorb further shocks. Lastly, it compromises the ability of affected households from preventing and mitigating the disease at the household level.

Land disinheritance

This phenomenon has been referred to as either property grabbing or property stripping in some studies (HRW 2003a: 16; Drimie and Gundure 2005: 28). Land disinheritance involving orphans and widows over customary land is not very new in Kombewa. However, it has been catalysed by the increasing numbers of deaths due to AIDS and the additional stigma and economic burden associated with AIDS. In some instances, widows are blamed for killing their husband by infecting him with HIV, and in-laws use HIV/AIDS as a justification not only for disinheritance but also in order to discriminate against the widow. In other cases, in-laws refuse to recognise AIDS as a cause of death even when it is documented as the cause. Often in such cases, widows are accused of witchcraft. Many such widows are infected with HIV or living with AIDS. Land disinheritance, harassment, and eviction often take place when their

economic and health conditions are rapidly deteriorating. Consequently, such young widows and their children are left without shelter, means of livelihood, and a support network in the community (also see Drimie 2003; HRW 2003a&b; Aliber et al., 2004).

Our study suggested that after the death of their spouses, these young widows and orphans are left at the mercy of indifferent in-laws and relatives who target their husbands' properties including land. As the testimonies will endeavour to illustrate, these widows often have little or no choice. They either choose to appease their in-laws through allowing them to take whatever they want in exchange for peaceful coexistence, or protect their property at the risk of being turned off their family land for being 'tough-headed'. They suffer the double tragedy of losing both the property and being expelled from their matrimonial homes by ruthless in-laws who view them as intruders upon their husbands' death. The following testimonies by two young widows from South West Seme Locations of Kombewa division (Meresia and Orwa) respectively, are illustrative of the problems young widows undergo after the death of their spouses:

> (Meresia) my relatives chased me away after the death and burial of my husband in 1999. They said they did not know me. They told me to go and live in town where we used to live with my husband. My husband's relatives branded me the name of town wife and not home wife. I pleaded with them they refused to give me even a small piece of land to build a house ... my late husband had land he was to inherit and his family members decided to sell one section of it and divided the rest among them ... I had to use my husband's benefits to buy land and construct a house ... the land where I live with my children is not enough.

> (Arwa) When my husband died in the year 1999, we had two parcels of land, however we only cultivated one. After his death my brother in-law started to cultivate the other. He did not ask me for permission since I thought he was just cultivating it for the season. However, he continued cultivating it. When I asked him that I wanted to cultivate the land he asked me to show him the land I came with from my natal home ... Because I wanted peace with him I decided to forget about the land and I continued to cultivate the one my husband left me cultivating ... The land is small but I have to make the sacrifice to enjoy my peace since my deceased husband too did not process the title for the land that I am currently cultivating.

These young widows' security of tenure is to a large extent related to their marriage. This means that any marriage problem such as marriage dissolution or death of spouse brings with it certain tenure insecurity, which is much more severe when HIV/AIDS is in the picture. However, in Kombewa, marriage alone does not increase tenure security. Marriage needs to be reinforced or complemented by other factors to avoid pejorative tagging such as 'town wife' and 'ancestral home wife'. These factors include socio-cultural ties, fulfilment of certain obligations to a range of kin and/or family members, respectability, age, and social status. This explains why several disinherited widows were accused of having not established meaningful relationships and asserted their rights as permanent members of their husbands' community. These are indeed worsened by patriarchal laws and traditions prevailing in Kombewa and are denying women the ability to own and inherit land.

In some cases, land disinheritance is accompanied by violence particularly against widows and orphans (HRW 2003b). The violence meted on the widows and orphans living within HIV/AIDS affected-households is first related to the stigma and

discrimination particularly when a widow is suspected of having been responsible for the husband's death. Second, it has to do with the land scarcity and the need to sub-divide land among surviving male adults or orphans. Related to this is the presence of 'illegitimate children' or those children born out of wedlock. Third, it has to do with the lack of secure tenure for widows and orphans. Lastly, it has to do with the accomplishing of certain cultural obligation amongst them including widow inheritance. In Kombewa, this form of violence is spontaneous. For example, it will initially take the form of occasional insults. These insults result in physical assault and eventually in forceful eviction, burning of widows' houses and destruction of other property. In reality widows in Kombewa experience all these forms of violence as the following testimonies show:

> ... at first my brother in-law insulted me and my children accusing me of having infected my husband with HIV/AIDS. My in-laws called me a prostitute. In the year 2000, one of my brothers-in-law assaulted me physically. He wrongly accused me of having let my goats graze on his plot ... the plot was actually mine but I had known him to be interested in it and the grazing goat was just an excuse. I reported the matter to the assistant chief who promised until today to arbitrate the case. In the year 2001, I went to establish a second hand cloth business in Kisumu town. Hearing that I am in Kisumu, my brother-in-law pulled my house down and even ploughed my cassava garden. He argued that I was remarried in town and I don't deserve having a house within their compound ... I eventually decided to leave the issue as I can still live on the small remaining plot.

Some widows have been forced by this violence to migrate either back to their maternal homes or to market centres and along the beaches. Such markets include Akado, Rata, Reru, Kombewa, Holo and Bar Korwa. Focus group discussions referred to several widows and orphans whose land rights have been violated and have been forced to migrate from their supposed homes to the markets where they are involved in small scale trading activities to cater for their own needs and those of their orphaned children. These findings indicate that land disinheritance occasioned by HIV/AIDS is widespread and needs to be addressed. The findings also show that many widows and orphans are fleeing from land rights-related violence and are struggling to survive albeit in an unfamiliar and at times very hostile environment. Lastly, the findings illustrate the expanding number of orphans without not only rights to land but also other productive resources for recovery from shocks occasioned the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

In Kombewa, HIV/AIDS cannot be ruled out when it comes to the land disinheritance of widows and orphans. HIV/AIDS affects very young adults and it is within the same group that its impacts are severe. As the case of Kombewa indicates, most of the widows facing eviction from their marital homes are young and have not actually established themselves within their extended family network. As HIV/AIDS continues to disintegrate extended family ties and in some cases dissolving certain households, these young widows and orphans are left at the mercy of indifferent in-laws whom are themselves reeling under the stresses occasioned by HIV/AIDS. Little wonder very few within the extended family care about the plight of these young widows and orphans.

Land Dispossession

Land dispossession is not very different from land disinheritance. However, land dispossession is common on non-customary holdings or rather on land parcels acquired through purchase. This means that land dispossession affects more urban and averagely well-to-do widows. As such, land dispossession does not cut across all HIV/AIDS-affected households. The target groups include total orphans, widows whose husbands were in formal employment and/or were migrant labourers, and generally those widows with established means of livelihood sustenance such as regular paid employment or small businesses. As the testimonies below will demonstrate, land dispossession in Kombewa has taken two major forms. These include illegal boundary creeping and/or boundary adjustment.

The reasons advanced for land dispossession include young widows' and orphans' lack of involvement in land issues such as land transactions. These are strengthened by discriminatory customary land practices. In addition there are the high rates of morbidity occasioned by HIV/AIDS in Kombewa. HIV/AIDS limits the capacity of the affected households to use the land effectively. Infected members become too weak to work in the fields and the increasing burden of caring for them prevents other household members from working in the fields. This does not only render fields fallow for a long time but also invites land dispossession (also see Drimie 2002: 13). For example, Grace from South West Seme of Kombewa division recounted:

> ... we bought land (about 2 ha) in our village in the year 1998. In 1999 my husband died of HIV/AIDS. After his death we decided to settle at home and do some subsistence farming. During the same year, we started experiencing family disputes with my mother and later brothers in-law. In the year 2000, I decided with the help of the church to establish a home far a way from my in-laws. It is this decision that made me realise that I had been dispossessed of the land we bought with my late husband. The seller argued that my late husband was just contemplating to buy land and he had not even started the process of paying for it ... I did not obtain from my husband any documentation for the land purchase. Moreover it was like a gentle man's agreement.

This shows that land dispossession in the context of HIV/AIDS in some cases results in land disputes. And that the potential for land disputes is even higher when both spouses have died and left young dependents. As the above testimony shows, the widow seems to have refused to establish a home with the assistance of her husband's brothers or relatives but instead sought help from the church. She chose to not to undergo a cultural practice referred to as 'wife inheritance'. This validates the assertion by Drimie that many customary tenure systems provide little independent security of tenure to women on the death of their husband, with land often falling back to the husband's lineage. While this may, traditionally, not have posed problems, it may create serious hardship and dislocation in the many cases of HIV/AIDS-related deaths (Drimie 2002b: 21). Although similar, Akinyi's narration tells more when HIV/AIDS and land dispossession is considered. She said:

> ... on the contrary, it is me who used my savings to buy land after my husband's death in 2000. I did this because we did not have enough land for our children. However, in 2002 my neighbour illegally adjusted the boundary between my land and his ... I asked my in-laws to help me but the neighbour was adamant. He argued that I paid him little money

> and he could only readjust the boundary after I add him money. I did not have the money that he was asking for. I decided to have what he was willing to give me.

As in other testimonies, prolonged illness and care due to HIV/AIDS limits the ability of individual affected households to effectively utilise land resources or even to rent it out at a fee. The consequences for these people are clearly demonstrated in the testimony. These have been compounded by a poorly developed land market in Kombewa (Okuro 2005), limited participation of widows in land issues, being widowed and left without the husband's protection in the context of HIV/AIDS, and the general disintegration of family and cultural ties that offered some protection to those with secondary rights to land. The situation is not favourable for widows with who relatively are better-off – for instance those in formal employment such as nurses, teachers and other civil servants. Unique for this category of widows is their resilience to migrate from where they were originally married for various reasons including discrimination, stigmatisation, violence, harassment and the need to remain anonymous.

While many orphans are affected by land right dispossession in the context of HIV/AIDS, the experience of total orphans is unique. It is unique because either their guardians and/or neighbours orchestrate it. In Kombewa this was found to result from the tender age at which most orphans are orphaned, discrimination and the stigmatisation that go with HIV/AIDS death, lack of clear legal rights for orphans, the secretive land transactions in Kombewa, powerlessness associated with children, and the overburdening of extended family network by HIV/AIDS. It is important to observe that, as a result of HIV/AIDS, the survival of the extended family and the social fabric of community support systems underpinned by traditional systems of land rights are increasingly under pressure (also see Drimie 2002: 7). In addition, there was the tendency of orphaned children to migrate at a tender age to live with relatively affluent relatives, where their needs in terms of food, clothing, and school fees were provided for. These factors have connived to catalyse the land dispossession of orphaned children in the era of HIV/AIDS. The social security principle in the form social capital protection of vulnerable groups, which was imbedded within the traditional systems, is hardly functioning in the era of HIV/AIDS. The many total orphans who have been dispossessed off their land rights by uncles and other neighbours invalidate this. Nixon, an orphan from Central Seme of Kombewa division was very categorical about the issue. He said:

> ... many orphans particularly those that their parents bought land and died without informing them of its size and location, are seriously disadvantaged. For example, the land seller may twist the land sale, or he may offer surviving orphans small plot as compared to the one negotiated for by the late parents. Other unsympathetic sellers may as well deny land sale altogether.

In Kombewa, HIV/AIDS is emerging as the leading factor that will determine who gets land, how the land is to be used and how it will be subsequently to distributed in the future (also see Walker 2002: 33). In the last two decades, the evidence gathered seem to suggest that traditionally cherished modes of land access are also readjusting to the new socioeconomic environment occasioned by HIV/AIDS. The manipulation and reinvention of cultural norms and values when it comes to property rights deny these

young orphans a critical source of livelihood and exposes them to extreme poverty and destitution. The testimony by Victor and his brother Charles is one illustration:

> ... we were in a polygamous family of eight children, two girls and six boys ... our parents bought several parcels of land both in the village and even in the neighbouring villages. Our father died in 2000 and shortly after my mother died ... after that we remained with our stepmother who later passed on in 2002 ... when my uncles sought to divide and distribute the land after the death of our parents, we were discriminated against. We got nothing. They argued my mother came with us and that we were not the legitimate children of his late brother. Furthermore, one of them argued that it was my mother who brought death to our family.

Conclusion

The paper has confirmed that HIV/AIDS has had an impact on land issues at the local level in Kombewa. In addition, the paper has illustrated how HIV/AIDS-affected households are facing difficult economic choices as their limited resources, including land, are increasingly diverted to the cost of care and treatment of those infected by HIV/AIDS. The totality of all these are driving these households into poverty and destitution and eventually increasing their vulnerability to HIV/AIDS infection. In Kombewa, HIV/AIDS has worsened the situation of vulnerable groups, specifically widows and orphans, who are systematically disinherited and dispossessed of land, which may well be their main source of livelihood. The distress land sales, land disinheritance and land dispossession have thus generated land disputes in Kombewa that need to be investigated.

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DEBATES

'Forward to the Past': Dilemmas of rural women's empowerment in Zimbabwe

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Introduction

A number of African philosophers have contributed various perspectives on African discourse on development (Wiredu, 1980, 2000; Masolo, 1994; Oruka, 1997; Gyekye, 1997; Karp and Masolo, 2000; Achieng-Odhiambo, 2000; Kebede, 2003) although not much philosophical consideration has been directed at the nexus between cultural revitalisation, women and development within a postcolonial context. More often that not, debate on African development in this postcolonial era has assumed the nature of the irresolvable conflict at the heart of the whole African postcolonial enterprise between modernity and tradition, otherwise put as the two schools of universalism and particularism respectively. While the particularist school argues that the rehabilitation of African tradition and its institutions is the only route to development, the universalist school on the other hand maintains that development in Africa hinges on a successful exchange of the traditional cultural institutions for the modern ones (Kebede, 2003).

The current policy by the Zimbabwean government to strengthen traditional leadership and their attendant institutions reflects a particularist position that development in Africa requires a successful restoration of traditional African cultural institutions and references together with the requisite philosophical thinking. This work, which is an attempt to look at rural women and the patriarchal hold, comes at a time when issues of gender, women's empowerment and emancipation are so topical in the country with the Ministry of Women's Affairs, Gender and Community Development almost stealing the show during the 2006 debates in parliament and outside with its Domestic Violence Bill, which has now been enacted into law. It also comes against the backdrop of reports that traditional chiefs are instituting 'reforms' with regard to the general conduct of rural women in line with traditional cultural expectations.

This paper, therefore, constitutes an attempt to apply analytic and philosophical reasoning to the 'noble' attempt by government of engaging in what may be described paradoxically as 'marching forward to the past'. It examines whether the government, in doing so, is not, at the same time, undermining much of what it had achieved since independence in the emancipation and empowerment of rural women by once again

strengthening the patriarchal hold. The term empowerment is here used to refer to deliberate efforts by government to bring people who are outside the decision making process into participating (Rowlands: 1999) by undoing such things as negative social constructions, so that the people affected would come to see themselves as having the capacity and the right to act and influence the course of their own life and that of the community in which they live. In the end this work also seeks to elaborate a framework likely to promote a positive process of change without falling into what Wiredu (1980) identified some time ago as pitfalls that can afflict the modern African society, namely, anachronism, authoritarianism and supernaturalism.

Theoretical framework

This work is located within the broader framework of the tradition versus modernity debate, also mirrored in the antagonism between universalism and particularism in African philosophy. The position that the recent drive in Zimbabwe to revitalise traditional leadership and their attendant institutions undermines the positive achievements made since independence in the emancipation and empowerment of the rural women by further strengthening the patriarchal hold is the focus of this analysis. The investigation considers the existential realities of the rural women and how they are affected by the revitalisation of traditional leadership institutions. The work reflects on concrete lived experiences of the rural women as they interact with their environment in their bounded locales defined in terms of belonging to this or that chief. As Gyekye (1997) noted, the attempt by Africans to develop or situate themselves most satisfactorily in the social, political and intellectual formation of the contemporary world have been beset by daunting problems, failures and frustrations. It is against this backdrop that this work seeks to draw on the analytical tools of philosophy that entail the critical and systematic examination of fundamental ideas underlying human experience and existence, to bring to light some of the unintended effects of the revitalisation of traditional leadership institutions on the life of rural women. While there may be differences here and there on the position of women in the different tribal groupings and from one chief to the other, the fact that most tribes are patriarchal allows for a treatment of Zimbabwean rural women as one group with almost similar experiences.

Discourses on Development

'Development' in all its many senses and with its complex associations with ideas about progress, modernity, and rationality, is an important theme in African philosophical literature (Karp and Masolo, 2000). As a number of postcolonial African intellectuals may bear testimony, the topic of development is so complex that it sends all those who attempt to theorise about it in various directions depending on their academic slant and in some cases political persuasion. Within this complex and sometimes confusing terrain can be identified various schools of thought, some of which are at loggerheads with each other. This work singles out one of these perspectives for discussion in this work, that is, the particularist school. The particularist school is always looked at in contradistinction to its universalist counterpart. In philosophical terms the universalist school holds that successful development in Africa depends on a complete overhaul or transformation of the old,

retrograde and traditional African worldview and its replacement with key aspects of Western modernity that have seen the transformation of the Western world into what is claimed to be a 'developed' or 'modernised' one. Hence the transformation of Africa from being traditional to becoming modern, for this school, depends on the extent to which Africa successfully imbibes Western modes of thinking and existence. In other words modernisation in Africa is seen as requiring a whole change of worldview, a complete shift of paradigm. On the other hand there are those to whom the issue of the role of indigenous values and institutions in the development of Africa remains a matter of grave concern. It is against this backdrop that there is now an increasing demand among Afrocentric scholars, development experts, and African philosophers that indigenous institutions, values, and practices should be recognised as the motor of participatory development strategies in Africa. As such there is not only a growing demand to utilise indigenous institutions, but also to rationalise and formalise them as the basis for social transformation in Africa. This position represents the particularist school of thought. The motivation is to look inward and from within the African traditional culture to find appropriate ways of transforming communities for the better without compromising on authenticity and African identity, that is, without uprooting the African from his or her humane social and existential framework.

Recent developments in Zimbabwe traceable to the so called 'fast track' land reform movement that started in the year 2000 have also witnessed a renewed focus on traditional leadership institutions and their role as the guardians of tradition and custodians of the land. Traditional leaders have been identified as important agents of development by the ZANU PF government and they have been called on to partner government in issues of development, especially in the rural areas where they have dominion. This renewed focus on traditional leaders has also seen their empowerment and revitalisation of their almost defunct roles as well as other traditional practices that had remained forgotten since independence. While there could be all sorts of hypotheses (some of them political survival) to explain this sudden valorisation of traditional chieftaincy by the government, one thing that cannot be doubted anymore is that the whole institution of traditional leadership has been rejuvenated.

This restorationist agenda fits in very well within the particularist school of thought on development which holds that the only route to true African development lies in a successful revitalisation of African traditions. True African development requires an authentic African foundation that can only be found in its unique ideas that formed the basis of life and social organization before the unfortunate encounter of the African world with European modernity. This restorationism is in part driven by the ingrained feeling among many of what it means to be postcolonial and it forms the basis for arguing for a rehabilitation of tradition and all its nostalgic paraphernalia. In order to move forward there is need to rewind the clock and establish links with familiar landmarks of yesteryear so that the journey into the future can be undertaken with a much more focused and clearly defined African purpose.

In this endeavour philosophy is assigned an important role to play. As a critico-creative enterprise philosophy has to engage itself in, among other things, creatively destroying the relic of the African colonial inheritance as a prerequisite to authentic development. It has to help the Africans fight the unfortunate tendency of submissive dependency manifesting itself in the uncritical imitation of the West. In other words

African philosophy must assist Africans find their way back to the village; it should play a major role in assisting the African successfully undertake what Mazrui (1999) paradoxically describes as 'marching forward to the past'. This is the cultural restorationist task for postcolonial African philosophy. In Zimbabwe this is the logic behind all the efforts to salvage chivanhu, that is, that whole gamut of practices, beliefs, leadership institutions, social arrangements, norms and values that characterised life in traditional indigenous societies so that it can constitute the basis for fashioning an authentic formula for development for the country.

This argument and drive for authenticity has grown even stronger today as relations between Zimbabwe and the West continue to be strained because of the land issue. The government has redirected its efforts towards a restoration of what it views as the people's pre-colonial philosophical thinking and cultural references. This they argue will enable indigenous peoples to interpret and organise the modern world from their own standpoint without always having to look up to the West to put in place a development agenda for them. This sits well with the Afrocentric argument that in order to deal with the contemporary challenges confronting the continent Africa needs to look from within her traditions and be able to place them at the centre of African development. This Afrocentric position is at the heart of the debate in this paper as it represents a whole new philosophy that the ruling ZANU PF government has adopted and has been strengthening since the year 2000.

Developments since independence

A number of eminent scholars have produced illuminating work on the plight of women in Zimbabwe since independence (Gaidzanwa 1985, Kazembe 1986, Batezat and Mwalo 1989, Tichagwa 1998, McFaden 1999, Lewis 2003, Esof 2005, to select just a few), and much more research has continued to be produced in this area. This paper is not going to spend time describing or enumerating efforts undertaken by government to uplift the status of women since independence save for highlighting only those aspects that have a bearing to this discussion. One thing that is clear from the outset is that the government was committed to changing the plight of women in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980. As noted by Batezat and Mwalo (1989), at independence women were for the first time in the history of the country officially recognised as an oppressed group and as such were the target of a conscious government policy to change their situation. The government wanted to transform the status of women so that they could assume their rightful position in society and work alongside their male counterparts in the development of the nation.

To achieve this goal a number of initiatives were undertaken that ranged from landmark legal reforms that were meant to safeguard the rights of women such as the famous Legal Age of Majority Act of 1982. Since then legal reforms have continued with the enactment of several laws, the most recent being the much publicised Domestic Violence Bill of 2006 which has now become law. The point being made is that the commitment of the government to raise the status of women has never been in question right from the beginning. As soon as it became a member of the United Nations and the now African Union the government ratified a number of regional and international instruments and protocols that had a strong bearing on the status of women in the country (Tichangwa: 1998). Over the years the government has always

had a Ministry to deal with issues of gender and women's affairs, thus demonstrating its unwavering commitment to the upliftment of women. The idea was to eliminate all customary, social, economic, and legal constraints that inhibited women's full participation in the development of their country. In its national gender policy the government spelt out one of its aims as that of ensuring that women, especially those in the rural areas, become aware of their social, economic, political and cultural rights. This in itself was recognition of the disparity between the plight of rural women and their counterparts in the urban areas. While the government appears to have made these strides, all of which are undoubtedly commendable, developments since the turn of the century raise some important issues. Connected to the fast track land reform and the emergence of serious opposition in the political landscape and further compounded by the hostile attitude of the international community towards the country, there have been new developments that may have far-reaching consequences for the empowerment of women in Zimbabwe, particularly in the rural areas.

With the adoption of its anti-imperialist, anti-Eurocentric and Afrocentric stance at both the national and international level, the government has instituted a number of reforms whose overall effects are yet to be fully documented. While the government has always been cognizant of the position of chiefs and traditional leaders, there has been a sudden surge in interest in the status of traditional authorities, including attempts to restore the power and other ceremonial functions of customary leaders. Thus over the years a number of steps have been taken to improve the status of traditional leaders judicially, materially and politically. A number of traditional leaders who were stripped of their position as chiefs during the colonial period are being restored. More and more chiefs are being installed. Besides being on the government payroll, positive discrimination is being used in giving these traditional leaders farms acquired during recent land tenure changes, vehicles, and electricity supplies at their homesteads. Through the new Ministry of Rural and Social Amenities standard homes are being constructed for the chiefs on the basis of restoring their traditional status. There is a conscious and deliberate government policy to transform chiefs, to empower them, to make them a strong arm of government and even an adjunct of the ruling ZANU PF government.

In previous years, traditional leadership functions since independence were to some extent usurped by Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) and Ward Development Committees (WADCOs). These functions are being restored to their pre-colonial owners. It is ironical that it is the same government that had no faith in the traditional leadership as champions for positive change that has suddenly reinvested its faith in them. The question that most people have asked is why this sudden interest in traditional leadership? While there is still speculation, one thing that has now become almost clear and uncontested is the ZANU PF government's own political survival. To be able to control the rural electorate in the face of serious opposition the ZANU PF government required focal persons, that is, respected individuals in society who were capable of influencing events in their communities and the only people who could assist in that endeavour were the traditional leaders because of their direct control of the rural populace. Because of the attention (both materially and politically) that the ruling ZANU PF government is giving them, most traditional leaders have unquestionably become partisan to the extent that some of them threaten their subjects

suspected of belonging to the opposition with expulsion from their areas of jurisdiction.

The renewal and rejuvenation of this traditional leadership institution also means much in terms of the power relations obtaining in the rural areas. Some the traditional leaders have become so overzealous in the exercise of their power and because this power is openly backed by the government, a number of them are coming up with various initiatives ranging from rules of governance to codes of conduct for their subjects, some of which may be in contravention of the national constitution itself. Since they have been given their powers back a number of traditional leaders have instituted several changes in the areas of dominion that they believe are reflective of what used to obtain before the transformation brought about by colonialism. As a result a number of traditional practices and belief systems are being resuscitated by these traditional leaders. Among those that come to mind are the national rain ceremonies and Chief Makoni's controversial virginity testing. While the government may surely be against some of the reforms being instituted by the traditional leaders, they go uncensored because the government seems prepared for that trade-off as long as the traditional leaders continue to play an important role in the political survival of the ruling ZANU PF government.

Meanwhile, since Zimbabwe is mostly a patriarchal society, the reforms these traditional leaders are instituting are invariably patriarchal driven and as such pro-male and without doubt anti-women. Through this revitalisation of traditional leadership institutions, government has facilitated a reawakening of the patriarchal values and customs some of which were fading with the passage of time. There is a clear resuscitation of male dominance and ultimate control of events in the rural areas that has a negative effect on women and their capacity to participate openly in the affairs of their community and to make decision for themselves.

One step forward and two steps backwards

The institution of traditional leadership under discussion encompasses village heads, headmen and chiefs together with their council of elders. By tradition most of these leaders are male. Since independence male reaction to legislation that sought to change the status of women has reflected their concern to maintain the status quo within the family and control over women's labour and sexuality (Batezat and Mwalo: 1989). Men have always wanted to keep intact institutionalised values and practices that would continue to keep women within their subordinate position, silent and disempowered. Traditional African culture played an important role in limiting women to restricted social roles and operating mainly as wives, daughters and mothers. Venturing outside these prescribed social spaces attracted criticism and scorn from both the males and other women who had remained adherents of the traditional order. Now with the restoration of traditional leadership institutions one can imagine with a fair degree of assurance the role that these traditional leaders will play, especially with the help of their predominantly male council of elders, in the subjugation of the women.

A contentious issue that has characterised the debate is whether the empowerment of women would not result in the disempowerment of men. However while in a broader sense women's empowerment is aimed at not only changing the nature and direction of

forces (such as legal and institutional) that marginalise women but also at revisiting perceptions of custom and culture which perpetuate the subordination of women and the girl child, most conservative men view it as a threat to the status quo. Research has shown that rural areas abound with such kinds of men. Many of the traditional leaders being thrust to the fore to champion the restoration of traditional cultural values, morality and custom that formed the bedrock of social organisation and life in indigenous pre-colonial societies are taking the opportunity to reassert male dominance and control.

Therefore the whole move towards cultural conservatism and traditionalism is inevitably privileging the male figures and hence strengthening the patriarchal hold. As Lewis (2003) observed, salvaging a receding past, while seen as the antidote to a host of colonial and neo-colonial ills, has its own problems. Fictions of an undiluted African culture are suddenly thrown into prominence and they are placed at the disposal of men to use as weapons for enforcing women's obedience, with the charge of 'Westernisation' being proffered for any women who may fail to conform. Women so castigated are pressurised to modify their 'untraditional' behaviour or lose respect. As society tries to re-imagine its past it reawakens those inventions about what ought to be the correct behaviour for an African woman. Often these imaginaries are embedded in the repertoire of beliefs, images and stories from their traditional past, a past constructed and being reconstructed by the dominant males. As Meena (1992) pointed out, women who are independent minded, assertive and aggressive are depicted as evil, vicious, immoral and uncultured while the more submissive, humble and dependant characters are regarded as having the ideal qualities of the African woman. It is also important to note that while several legal reforms have been instituted to challenge the status quo in order to empower women in Zimbabwe patriarchal values have not died but have continued to simmer under the surface waiting for an opportunity to re-emerge. Now with this government thrust to empower traditional leaders as custodians of culture and tradition the opportunity seems to have availed itself for the patriarchal values to reassert themselves.

At this point it may be important to highlight specific developments that have been witnessed in the country that are meant to subordinate women. That traditional leadership institutions would work to reverse other positive developments recorded so far in the empowerment of rural women comes out clearly the moment one looks at the very structure of these leadership institutions. The village head, the chief and the council of elders are predominantly male except in very exceptional circumstances. This situation places the male members of the society in a position to institute policies and recommend to women behaviour that conforms to their male expectations. Chief Makoni is a good example. The reintroduction of virginity testing for girls alone instituted by Chief Makoni in his area, while representing a moral retrieval system to combat the spread of the deadly HIV and AIDS pandemic, resonates with a gender biased approach to maintain and further reduce women to sex tools for men (Gundani: 2004). It is probably in this area that the much criticised law in Zimbabwe of the Access to Information and the Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) could be put to better use in protecting the vulnerable girl child rather than protecting corrupt government officials against exposure for their evil deeds.

While some may argue that the chief receives support from women in his community it needs to be pointed out quickly that such women must be few in numbers because, by its very arrangement, the traditional leadership institution only allows elderly women to participate in such important deliberations. However in traditional African culture those elderly women are not really women for they have been socially constructed as 'male-females' due to their menopausal status (Mugo: 2004). Furthermore due to the fact that throughout their entire life the elderly women were socialised to accept male dominance and that they are now taken as the custodians of tradition, an honour in itself, they are reluctant to question the rationale of any such practices. And after all with their lack of exposure and in most cases tired bodies they are less likely to dream of rocking the boat. The men are delighted to get them on board and work as partners in maintaining male domination.

Cases abound in rural areas of traditional leaders who have prescribed dress codes for women and not for men. In a number of rural areas women are discouraged from wearing trousers or miniskirts and in some cases they can be fined for doing so (ZBC TV Programme: Toringepi 2006). To justify the imposition of such restrictions, traditional leaders and their mostly geriatric teams often appeal to supernatural explanations whose validity can not be questioned, for example, that too much freedom for women would upset clan spirits resulting in them withholding the much needed rains as punishment. Thus to avoid such disasters women are required to put on the kind of attire that is traditionally acceptable in the eyes of men. This in some way is only a pretext for exerting control over women. In other places women who are unmarried cannot have a rural home registered in their name, but it must be in the name of their male sibling no matter how young.

While things such as these may not appear so vital, they do affect the self esteem of the rural women and stifle thinking. Furthermore strengthening traditional beliefs systems inevitably rekindles the suspicion of witchcraft and it is rural women more that anyone else who bear the brunt of the humiliation associated with this practice. Some traditional leaders have already promised to ask government to revisit the Witchcraft Suppression Act and accord them the power to handle complaints of this nature in their areas of jurisdiction. The rekindling of traditional belief systems also means that cases of giving away the girl child to appease avenging spirits could now be silently on the increase, as most rural elders in Zimbabwe still believe in that practice. The chiefs are also reintroducing a number of taboos, most of which target women of child bearing age from exploring or venturing into specific areas and participating in certain activities because they are 'not clean' as they still experience monthly periods. All these are examples of how women have once again fallen victim to the male orchestrated tools of subordination.

In some of the traditional court sessions that the writer witnessed, unless women are directly involved in the case as the accused, complainants or witnesses they are encouraged to respect their male counterparts who are regarded as more intelligent by keeping their mouths shut. In cases that involve domestic misunderstandings between men and women in the villages, women stand very little chance of obtaining a favourable ruling because of the bias and geriatric composition of the council. Women are already regarded with much suspicion in the rural areas as they are regarded as the trouble makers because are traditionally taken as rumour mongers, liars and of weak

minds and generally untrustworthy. Only elderly women are an exception. Even where a man has been required by the traditional fine system to brew free beer for the village elders and other members of the community, the practice hurts the women more than it does to the guilty husband because the wife has literally to do everything in that brewing process while the men merely offer the use of the homestead. This is unlike the civil courts where each man must suffer his own punishment.

In the past two decades encouraging strides had been made regarding the empowerment of women, even while rural men were lagging behind. A major problem that had remained was the issue of negotiating on equal terms as partners in the home on a number of issues such as pregnancy and child bearing. Informal discussion with a number of rural men revealed that while women have been allowed by their husbands to use family planning methods such as the popular pill, when the man decided to have a baby the woman was simply ordered to stop, in most cases with no negotiation. Now given the ongoing rejuvenation of the patriarchal hold being premised on 'returning to out traditions' and 'our own ways', negotiation based families are likely to be replaced in no time with a domineering male chauvinistic attitude, buttressed by the village elders who all of a sudden have become champions of a new renaissance. In all this the point being made is that signs are already there that a number of women will suffer because of this return to the source that is being championed by the traditional leaders with the blessing of government. The general philosophy among most elders is that tradition must be supported because it represents things that have always existed, and what has always existed is useful and normal and it is what defines who we are as a people. This kind of thinking inevitably strengthens the patriarchal values which have the negative effect of further subordinating rural women. One wonders whether rural women are not being sacrificed on the altar for other reasons that could be politically motivated under the pretext of preserving African cultural values.

Conclusion

The paper has attempted to demonstrate how the government programme to empower traditional leaders and their attendant institutions is in turn strengthening the patriarchal hold that it declared to be a retrogressive force at independence in 1980. The effects of these reforms have witnessed a further erosion of the status that women had acquired over the years. As the custodians of tradition the chiefs and their council of male elders are working to restore the normative status of men as was defined prior to the coming of the whites. The suspicion of the West deriving from the government's anti-imperialist rhetoric has also translated into a kind of strong cultural conservatism and restorationism with innuendos of male dominance especially in the rural areas. From these developments an important lesson one may draw is that a serious examination of traditional African traditions is at all times necessary if they are to be made viable frameworks for development. The traditional leaders who have always been wary at the waning of their power as a result of what they describe as bad influence from the West also require a reorientation to be able to distinguish appropriate values from the past against those that are outmoded to avoid the danger of rendering whole communities under their jurisdiction anachronistic.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Adésínà, J. O., Graham, Y. & Olukoshi, A., eds., 2006, *Africa & Development. Challenges in the New Millennium. The NEPAD Debate.* Dakar: CODESRIA & London: Zed Books (XVI + 288 pages).

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This book is the first major attempt on the part of African academics and other intellectuals to evaluate the achievements and failures of the New Partnership for Africa's Development. NEPAD, the economic programme of the African Union, is the latest in a succession of pan-African institutions which seek to grapple with the development challenges facing Africa. Since NEPAD's policies and strategies impact on the economies of African countries and on the lives of ordinary Africans, it has attracted the attention of scholars, activists and development practitioners. In 2002, a year after NEPAD was established, there were public protests in South Africa against the initiative which were led by civil society intellectuals. This set the debate around NEPAD in motion. Adésínà et al.'s book contributes to the debate from within a tradition of scholarship that is socially grounded.

Many of the issues raised in the contributions to this book, which originated at a conference in 2002, speak to recent developments captured in the Sachs, Annan and Blair Commissions' reports on Africa. These are discussed in the book's introduction. With the exception of the chapters by Maloka and Sangare (who only makes cursory reference to NEPAD), most contributions are critical of the NEPAD policy document because its growth-centred development path disadvantages the poor. It is crucial that its neo-liberal approach to development is subject to critical scrutiny, but that scrutiny must also supply viable alternatives. This is what Adésínà et al.'s book attempts to do. Most of the contributors, however, acknowledge that the margins for promoting alternative development based on people-centred principles have narrowed under the constraints of neo-liberalism sponsored by the Bretton Woods institutions.

The book is made up of three parts. Part 1 offers an assessment of the NEPAD document in terms of the two perspectives that dominate the debate within Africa: Adésínà and Taylor represent the perspective that is critical of the neo-liberal foundations of NEPAD, while Maloka provides an example of a perspective that is more sympathetic towards NEPAD because it is perceived to be a genuinely African initiative. Part 2, the chapters by Moyo, Sangare, Keet, Ya'u & Chenntouf, is concerned with the principal sectoral challenges to Africa's quest for sustained development. Part 3, the chapters by Randriamaro, Uche & Anyemedu, addresses the challenge of financing Africa's development.

Two perspectives

In Chapter 1 Adésínà states that 'It is difficult to quarrel with a document that sets peace, security and good "governance" as conditions for sustainable development or the accelerated reduction and elimination of widespread poverty' (p.36), but he cannot

agree with NEPAD's framework and development paradigm (which are based on the neo-liberal post-Washington Consensus of the World Bank, advocating increased liberalisation of economies, growth-centred development and 'trickle down' economics), for none of these have produced a real reduction of poverty. Adésínà feels that the NEPAD document does not recognise that twenty years of neo-liberal policies in Africa have failed to remove the structural impediments which disadvantage Africa in the global trade system; or that there are competing models of capitalism. He is convinced that 'What Africa needs ... is a coherent platform for pooling the resources of the African countries for focused and effective trade negotiations, [which] challenge ... the prevailing norms within WTO' (p.54).

In Chapter 2 Taylor offers similar criticisms of NEPAD's development policy. He argues that government elites in Algeria, Egypt, Senegal and South Africa are using NEPAD to promote the economic interests of their own countries at the expense of poorer African states. Furthermore, he asks: What is new about the new developmental agenda? Why is it inadequate? He laments that despite the disillusionment with globalisation, African elites have failed to provide alternative leadership so the world can be run more equitably; the leaders of NEPAD continue to work according to the old hegemonic rules for 'Their own policies aid and abet the very marginalisation and immiseration they now decry' (p.81). Taylor argues that African government officials do not act in the interests of the under-classes, and that the poor need to organise to bring about change that serves their interests.

Maloka is sympathetic to NEPAD. In Chapter 3 he tackles the critics of NEPAD by brokering a dialogue between NEPAD and its critics. Maloka acknowledges shortcomings in the NEPAD process, for example the campaign which initially focused on the private sector, the G8 countries and multilateral institutions but which neglected to address major concerns of African civil society. He argues that subsequently NEPAD has begun addressing these criticisms. Maloka (and NEPAD) are convinced that NEPAD's African development strategy is not at fault and that many of the criticisms are as a result of misinformation or misunderstanding. He also offers an alternative genealogy of and rationale for NEPAD. While the reviewer does not share Maloka's position vis-à-vis NEPAD policy, this different perspective enriches the NEPAD debate.

Sectoral Challenges

In Chapter 5 Moyo examines NEPAD's agricultural policy and agrarian transformation. He questions NEPAD's commitment to social justice and equity in general, and within the agricultural sector in particular. For example, NEPAD calls for the reform of national regulatory systems, yet ignores the need to reform the regulation of the transnational agrarian market system and the global 'multilateral governance systems which affect agriculture' (p.121). This echoes similar criticisms levelled at NEPAD by Adésínà and Taylor. He observes that the NEPAD document does not offer a vision whereby land and agrarian reform and an industrial development strategy will jointly lead to development. Moyo proposes an integrated development strategy that revolves around five core elements: 'land reform, integrated trans-sectoral rural production ... rural infrastructure development, institutional reform, and regional integration' (p.136).

In his analysis of the nature of industrialisation in Africa in Chapter 6, Sangare discusses a number of problems that retard industrialisation in Africa. These include, for example, Africa's inability to create the conditions that will attract the type of long-term foreign investment necessary for industrialisation; dependency on primary production and outward orientated production which leave Africa's economies vulnerable to external shocks like price fluctuations in international markets; and bad management of firms. His proposal for the 'industrialisation of complementarity' through endogenous inter-sectoral linkages would minimise external shocks while accelerating the horizontal integration of African countries into the global economy. This industrial development framework is similar to the Lagos Action Plan.

Keet's interrogation of NEPAD's trade policy and trade regimes in Chapter 7 is rigorous and uncompromising. She also covers issues like the vulnerability of African economies to external price shocks and NEPAD's reluctance to challenge the WTO. The reviewer refers to two of the aspects of NEPAD's trade policy in order to demonstrate the quality of her contribution to The NEPAD Debate. With regard to the relationship between infrastructure development and economic growth, she warns that 'setting up sophisticated structures in advance of and to stimulate such economic process, without the necessary systems and appropriate infrastructure to maintain and service them, and without the economic agents and activities to fully utilise or effectively employ them, could simply create more vast "white elephant projects"' (p.154). In relation to NEPAD's model of inter- and intra-regional harmonisation and regulation of manufacturing processes and standards, and of trade, economic and investment policies and practices, she argues that such financial harmonisation with increasing liberalisation favours companies and investors from wealthier African countries like South Africa. Repatriating profits back to their countries perpetuates existing imbalances in Africa. Keet nevertheless sees that such regulations may provide greater financial transparency, social and environmental responsibility and democratic accountability but wonders whether this is the priority for NEPAD right now. She suggests that NEPAD introduce compensatory and redistributional mechanisms to counter the negative effects described above. (Such proposals are not new.) She also supports preferential trade tariffs between members of NEPAD. Keet notes that such preferential terms run counter to WTO rules and regulations.

Ya'u examines information and communication technology (ICT) in Africa in Chapter 7. One of his major criticisms of NEPAD is that it does not say how ICTs are to be deployed to promote development, democracy and good governance. He also criticises NEPAD's market-driven policy framework which is primarily concerned with profit-making and therefore lacks commitment to making ICTs universally accessible. His conclusion is that the digital divide is increasing. WTO agreements, for example the protection of property rights, make it difficult for developing countries to access computer software and newer technologies. Ya'u is concerned that ICTs contribute to development, and proposes that 'we ... engineer the hardware core of globalisation to produce an inclusive and human-development-orientated software framework for a truly global world of even opportunities'. However, he overlooks the value of Open Source software and the Shuttleworth Foundation's work in South Africa to make ICT accessible to the poor.

Chenntouf's chapter is devoted to the educational and scientific policies of NEPAD against Africa's declining human resource development and diminishing competitiveness in the global economy. He does not evaluate the relevant objectives and priorities in the NEPAD document, though he is concerned that the objectives will come to nought if African states do not invest in education and the knowledge revolution. His observation that in the twenty or so years immediately following political independence, many African states made considerable headway in the field of education and training is historically significant. From the 1980s, a reduction in public spending on education in almost all sub-Saharan countries was promoted as part of the World Bank/IMF structural adjustment policies. Chenntouf calls for continent-wide coordination and planning, that is also responsive to local conditions, and that draws together the educational, cultural and scientific sectors.

Financing of Africa's development

In chapter 9 Randriamaro uses a gender perspective to examine NEPAD's 'development discourse' and its policies and thinking about how Africa's development can be financed. For example, she shows that NEPAD, and other initiatives like UNECA's Compact for African Recovery (CAR), which do not offer 'any form of protection for domestic industries ... [are] a major threat to local enterprises, specially MSEs, where women predominate' (p.229). She calls for NEPAD to abandon the Washington Consensus and adopt a human rights framework that can ensure economic and social justice, and make a clear political choice in favour of the most disadvantaged, including poor women. She points to the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes, which was developed 1996, as a more appropriate approach.

In Chapter 10 Uche discusses why the ECOWAS Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development, as an example of an African attempt to fund the promotion of economic development and reduce poverty, failed. According to Uche the most damning reason was the lack of commitment by African states to ensure financial support.

The lack of direct foreign investment leaves Africa largely dependent on foreign aid to finance its development. In the last chapter Anyemedu discusses the problems that result from reliance on donor aid and private capital (mainly foreign investment) to finance Africa's development. Though Anyemedu appreciates the dilemma facing NEPAD and the tension between the idealism of self-reliance and the pragmatism of the current African situation, he notes that foreign aid from multilateral and bilateral donors is more often than not accompanied by economic and political conditions that entrench dependency and undermine self-reliance. Anyemedu challenges the view that industrialisation in Africa needs to be dependent on foreign investment. He proposes that NEPAD spearhead the promotion of domestic savings mobilisation to generate development financing.

Although the reviewer shares the dominant discursive framework that emerges in the book vis-à-vis NEPAD's development policy, he thinks the interests of diversity and debate would have been furthered had a few more apologists for NEPAD been included in the volume.

The book is an example of socially engaged scholarship, which is probably why many of the contributions go beyond merely critiquing to propose alternatives which are people-centred. Although this is done unevenly it is, in the reviewer's opinion, one of the strengths of the book and an area that requires further attention. The reviewer looks forward to further publications from CODESRIA that draw on scholarship that is socially grounded to present viable alternatives for Africa's development.

Mahmood Mamdani, *Scholars in the Marketplace: The Dilemmas of Neo-Liberal Reform at Makerere University, 1989-2005,* Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2007. xvii +262pp. ISBN 9970-02-612-7 (paperback).

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Reforms in the higher education sector in Africa have stimulated enormous scholarly interest among researchers of diverse regional and disciplinary backgrounds. While much of the interest has produced useful studies on the effects of privatisation on relevance, equity and access, some studies have simply been celebratory. Particularly worrying have been those findings that dubiously corresponded to the ideological predisposition of the sponsoring institution.

Conceptually, there are three generations of studies that more or less lie in-between the desire for dispassionate interpretation and those others that seek ideologically to conform. The first are World Bank (and similarly oriented institutions) studies. The Bank is of special interest in this regard since it has been a key actor on the higher education scene in Africa owing to its fiscal influence. The findings in studies it sponsors tend more or less to correspond to the policy justification it pronounced for education reforms in Africa in the early 1980s and the reversals it has made since then.[1] The Bank framed and treated education like any other investment that was subject to the market logic. This resulted in the emphasis on basic at the expense of higher education.

Second are studies of a more critical nature sponsored mostly by a number of major foundations. These studies critique the direction of education reforms, identify the main shortcoming in the process and seek to provide resources aimed at revitalising the sector. Though these studies represent the first initiatives at understanding the effects of the reform process, they only mildly question the market logic underpinning these reforms and as such end up implicitly celebrating the idea that they ought to question.

The third are a set of recent studies designed and driven by the research interests of independent individuals or institutions. Though these studies are also informed by the ideological predispositions of the authors and institutions that they are associated with, they are based on extensive and thorough empirical work and deal with a comparatively longer historical time frame. These strengths, combined with the fact that they are also informed by a sound methodological approach, reveal them as more rigorous and 'radical' than the first two sets of literature.

Mahmood Mamdani's study titled *Scholars at the Marketplace* belongs to the third category of literature. The study has several advantages; the first is associated with the author and the other revolves around the choice of topic. As a Ugandan and former professor at Makerere, Mamdani has unmatched understanding of the dynamics of reforms at the university. This combines very well with the fact that Mamdani has wide experience of the African education scene having researched and taught at various universities in Africa and served as president of the premier social science organisation in Africa, CODESRIA.

The author's choice of Makerere is perfect. Makerere has been at the centre of the reform process since 1992. It is a pioneer of privately sponsored student programmes in the East African region and has been lauded severally by the Bank as a leading institution where reform is concerned.[2] It is the oldest university in the region and among the first to seriously embrace the idea of reforms floated by the Bank. With such a head start, Makerere has obviously attracted enormous attention. But the attention has, until recently, largely been laudatory. Most analyses have paid lip service attention to the critical issues of what impact such reforms have had on the historic role of the university in both human manpower development and national service and on issues of quality, relevance and access.

Mamdani addresses these two questions. He shows that the reform process in Makerere was driven by the lecturers under a policy framework defined by the Bank. The context is important: at the behest of the Bank, the Ugandan government simply abdicated from its responsibility of financing university education. It allocated funds, but these were normally lower than what the university requested; when it dispensed the allocation, this was significantly lower than what was promised. As such, the university began to explore alternative avenues of funding its operations. It shifted its focus to raising money from fee-paying students who did not qualify for public sponsorship. In other words, privatisation grew as 'a survival strategy than a first preference' (p. 3). The more fee-paying students the university attracted, the less funding it received from the state. Eventually the government excused itself from funding higher education while the university began to see privatisation as a source of additional funds. At the time, 'the overriding view was both short term and narrowly financial, that privatization would lead to a financial gain without a cost' to the university (p 29).

Reform started as a move towards simple privatisation, but was soon overridden by commercialisation and vocationalisation. Though the university administration preferred privatisation, the combined force of academic staff and students at Makerere put their weight around a form of privatisation that entailed a profit-maximisation and income-maximisation strategy (pp. 30-31). This involved getting commercial units to become profit-making while professional schools would become fee-earning. To induce them into achieving these objectives, financial and administrative decentralisation was allowed in turn so that as fee-earning units attracted more students, they also retained most of the income generated and proceeded to manage the programmes independent of the central administration.

Mamdani shows that this process took place in a piece meal fashion through a process of trial and error. The result was that 'the structure was in place for gradual dismantling of the public university and its step-by-step replacement by a privatised

university'. In Mamdani's apt words, the university 'system of decision-making' was so 'comprehensively decentralised that no one, neither the centre nor any of the constitutive units, any longer had a comprehensive idea of the "reforms" in the university'. The result, he adds, was that each 'faculty saw the university from only its own vantage point. Eventually, no one really knew what the elephant looked like. Meanwhile, the elephant was being transformed from a public to a private beast' (p. 32).

The initial idea of privatisation rested on the assumption of admitting private students to external programmes and slowly expanding into evening and later into day programmes. It was also assumed that such students would be admitted into professional faculties thereby leaving the heart of the university academic programmes in the Arts, Social Sciences and Science untouched. Such a scenario, it was assumed, would leave the core university function of intellectual quality and national service intact. But by 1996, this assumption had been overturned as Faculty of Arts became the hub of the market-driven courses admitting more private students than most professional and technical faculties for both evening and day programmes. From then onwards, not only were the academic programmes at the heart of the academy privatised and commercialised, the Faculty of Arts led the way to vocationalisation as opposed to professionalisation. Vocationalisation dealt a major blow to the quality of education while decentralisation ensured the remedial steps would be almost impossible to effect.

The results of this process are discussed in chapter two to four of the study. The chapters review how reforms at Makerere led to the turf wars, commercialisation and decentralisation. The turf war pitted faculty against faculty, faculty against central administration, at times, leading some units to secede. Some departments conflicted with others especially when lecturers were poached to teach in other programmes. So insidious was the market ethic that had penetrated Makerere that many of the 'staff were no longer willing to do anything that was not directly paid for' (p.70). Furthermore, the increasing numbers of students had a serious negative impact on quality of education. For one, the university did not hire more teaching staff in response to expanding student numbers, thereby leaving teaching to an overworked staff that, in turn, did a poor job or left teaching to part-time lecturers whose qualifications were dubious at best (pp.111-119). Also, there was a problem of lack of lecture space as the university infrastructure was hardly expanded to meet increasing numbers. A member of one investigating committee referred to the teaching facilities in Makerere as slums (p. 134; see also pp. 136-142). The library facilities were in turn misused as the vocational students used it 'simply as reading space' and not as 'a source of reading and research material' (p. 145).

Vocational programmes were mostly run through evening classes. But the central administration did not adjust to this reality and university offices closed precisely at the time when evening classes began (p. 160). Then, there was the transgression of disciplinary boundaries as departments and faculties 'innovated' by creating interdisciplinary programmes that were hardly anchored in any disciplinary competence and that simply fuelled the turf war and the poaching of staff between departments all on the pretext of generating income. 'The cumulative outcome of these developments', Mamdani concludes, was 'the erosion of the public university called

Makerere and the dramatic growth, at first alongside it but increasingly in its place, of a private university with the same name but with inter-disciplinary vocational programmes, fee-paying students, a predominantly part-time teaching staff and a permanent administrative staff hired as coordinators' (p. 119).

Scholars in the Marketplace makes for very interesting reading. First, it explodes the myth that private-sponsored students were a money making venture. On the contrary, Mamdani shows that 'the university's income still came mainly from government' (p. 233). Second, it shows that academic standards have not only fallen well below quality, this has come at a cost to the research base that was at the core of the university mission. Instead, there is vocationalisation of the academic curriculum which, Mamdani recommends, ought to be separated 'from the academic university, and the non-research-based from research-based education' (p. 237). Finally, he argues that Makerere needs to re-think the nature of decentralisation in favour of separating the financial from administrative and academic (p. 238). This would deal with the unjustified resistance that staff mounted against well-intentioned reforms initiated by the central administration.

This is a fine study. Though one misses the Mamdani of *Citizen and Subject* and *When Victims Become Killers,* in *Scholars in the Marketplace,* the narrative approach more than compensates for the analytical hesitancy. Clearly, it was necessary that the data that Mamdani marshalled had to be presented in this format. Still, the concluding chapter could have been more rigorous in deploying the author's analytical skills to provide a more generalised, even comparative, treatment of higher education reforms in Africa. After all, Mamdani has been at the leadership apex of the African social science community and there are now enough studies for such comparisons and generalisations to be made. Mamdani's study of Makerere is microcosmic in many ways and perhaps the author has thrown a long overdue challenge to all of us to join in the discussion. Certainly, this is a useful intervention that ought to be replicated for Africa, if not for the East African region. The results can only be better.

Notes

1. On Bank policy on higher education in Africa, see Joel Samoff and Bidemi Carrol, 'From Manpower Planning to the Knowledge Era: World Bank Policies on Higher Education in Africa', UNESCO Forum Occasional Paper Series no. 2, October 2003.
2. See Wachira Kigotho, 'World Bank Praise for Top Ugandan University', in *Times Higher Education Supplement,* 2000 and Samoff and Carrol, 'From Manpower Planning to the Knowledge Era', pp. 28-31.

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