EDITORIAL

Jeff Lever and Momar-Coumba Diop have resigned as editors. We would like to thank them both for their sterling work and commitment to the *African Sociological Review*. Lever was a managing editor from inception in 1997, prior to which he was editor of the *South African Sociological Review* since 1992. During his tenure Lever set very high academic standards which have contributed markedly to the international reputation both journals enjoy. As editors, we all learnt an enormous amount from Lever's experience, knowledge and meticulous attention to detail. Diop joined the *Review* as managing editor for French submission in its second issue, and has contributed greatly to making the *Review* known in Francophone academic circles. We thank him for his dedication. The *Review* and its readers have benefitted enormously from the contributions of both men, and remain indebted to them for their efforts. We wish them well in their future endeavours, while hoping that the *Review* will continue to hold a special place in their hearts.

In this issue, we are very pleased to be able to publish the work of scholars in Sweden working on Africa. We hope to be able to do the same for scholarship of relevance to Africa in other countries and/or regions of the world. It would have been neat to have all this material from Sweden in one issue. Unfortunately, the uneveness of the peer review process and the delays caused by reports arriving very late have meant that some of the articles have had to be held over to the next issue. We apologise to these authors.

It may be of interest to our readers and subscribers that the CODESRIA General Assembly will take place in Kampala from 8 to 12 December 2002. We invite your participation and shall certainly be shopping around for papers to be considered for publication in the *Review*. We would also like to introduce a 'Letters to the editor' section in the journal as well as a 'Notes on campus' or similar page where young and established scholars may want to share their day-to-day experiences of teaching and researching in the African context. We are convinced that this will be of immense interest to our readership and we again invite your full participation.

Fred Hendricks

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'Down with the devil, Forward with Christ!' A study of the interface between religious and political discourses in Zimbabwe

Abstract

The relationship between religion and politics in Africa has been approached from a multipilicty of angles. Many commentators have analysed the role of churches in democratisation processes in the postcolonial period, while others have examined the impact of religion on ethnic imagination. African Traditional Religions and their contribution to African liberation struggles have also received considerable scholarly attention. This article builds upon the available reflections on religion and politics. It examines the interface between religious and political discourses in Zimbabwe from the late 1990s. While many scholars adopt a deterministic interpretative framework, I argue that there has been a dynamic interchange and free borrowing of phrases, catchwords and ideologies between the religious and political arenas. I also maintain that as the social, political and economic climate worsened in Zimbabwe, religious and political rhetoric became pronounced. Religion and politics influenced each other in ways that call for a rethinking of traditional formulations, I argue in the conclusion.

Introduction

Most studies on religion and politics in Africa adopt a mono-dimensional perspective on the subject. A review of the literature indicates a tendency to isolate the political appropriation of religion from the religious critique of politics. How religious ideas are manipulated by shrewd African politicians is a dominant concern (Pobee 1992; Muyebe and Muyebe 1999). Other scholars examine the role of the African church in politics (Ezeani 1998) or how the churches could enhance democracy and development in Africa (Mugambi 1997). In all these instances, researchers have been preoccupied with the question of how religion is a willing pawn in African political machinations. In tandem with this reading of the relationship between religion and politics, other writers prescribe a more assertive role for the African church as part of the nascent civil society. A few scholars have described the complex interaction between religious and political discourses, showing how there is constant mutual borrowing, adaptations and influences. This article utilises the political and religious situation in Zimbabwe from the late 1990s to illustrate the malleable nature of the relationship between religion and politics. I maintain that instead of interpreting the interface in a deterministic manner, there is need to appreciate that religion and politics influence each other in a myriad of ways, some blatant and others subterranean. The first section surveys the political and religious climate in Zimbabwe from the late 1990s to the early months of 2002. It highlights the worsening economic and social conditions, as well as the international ostracism of Zimbabwe due to her radical approach to the land question. The second section provides a summary of church-state relations. It explores the creative interaction between political and religious discourses by analysing slogans, songs, pronouncements and myths by actors in the two arenas. In the third section I argue for an unfettered approach to the issue of religion and politics in Africa.

'Things fall apart'? Zimbabwe in the late 1990s

After the attainment of political independence on 18 April 1980, Zimbabwe became a favourite nation within the donor community and international organisations. As the country scored spectacular successes in education, health, agriculture and other areas (Chitando 1998: 223), it was touted as one of the few success stories in postcolonial Africa. Its leader, Robert Mugabe, confounded critics by proclaiming a policy of national reconciliation. Such was the goodwill towards Zimbabwe that the international community chose to downplay the vicious state repression in Matabeleland during the 1980s. The overall promise that Zimbabwe showed was deemed greater than the cries of anguish, brutal murders and systematic persecution of a significant part of its population. Violence and memory (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000) have haunted inhabitants of the southern region of Zimbabwe where the state resorted to extreme measures to suppress dissent.

In line with the projected national goals of reconstruction and development, the state avoided meddling with the Lancaster House Constitution. This compromise document recognised private property rights in land. While land had been one of the popular grievances during the liberation struggle, the ruling party avoided this highly emotive issue while it sought to consolidate its grip on power. For most of the 1980s, the land question was strategically de-politicised (Tshuma 1997:124). In line with its socialist pronouncements, the state also promoted the rise of a labour movement to defend the rights of workers.

As the euphoria of independence waned, the ruling party increasingly found itself under attack from various angles. In 1988 University of Zimbabwe students staged a massive anti-corruption demonstration. They accused ruling party officials of lining up their pockets amidst increasing poverty. With the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) being implanted in 1991, the black majority began to question the dividends of political liberation. An opposition political party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), emerged and it attracted many urban supporters. Various studies have indicated that ESAP resulted in untold suffering for most of the vulnerable sections of the Zimbabwe populace (Gibbon 1995; Mlambo 1997). The socio-economic circumstances of most people deteriorated (Mupedziswa and Gumbo 2001:107), while many professionals became economic refugees within the Southern African region or further afield. Under the economic reform programme, professionals also became more militant and confrontational in their relations with the government (Gaidzanwa 1999:81).

As it dawned on the masses that political independence had not been translated into the economic miracle that many had anticipated, discordant voices became more pronounced. While popular music had called upon all Zimbabweans to pull together, in the 1990s protest music became more nuanced. Artists challenged the official version of progress and democracy, with some songs affecting a renegotiation of the meaning of independence in the late eighties and nineties (Vambe 2000:78). Various artists protested against the grinding poverty, deteriorating health delivery system, unfulfilled promises and other concerns. Some creative writers like Chenjerai Hove contested the foundational myth of national victory (Sibanyoni 1995).

It is against the background of an assertive labour movement, a restless peasantry and a worsening economy that Mugabe's appeal to the land issue in the late 1990s should be understood. He encouraged farm invasions, charging that blacks should claim back their land from white settlers. Dismissing concerns from the United States of America and the European Union as racist postures, Mugabe dubbed his quest to recover stolen ancestral lands a third *chimurenga*

(revolution). According to the ruling party, 'land is the economy and the economy is the land' (Moore 2001).

By January 2002, Zimbabwe was truly a nation in crisis. Within the Southern African region, neighbours were wary of the consequences of a possible economic melt down. Many donor agencies had withdrawn from the country, while global media networks beamed images of exaggerated chaos and upheaval. With ruling party militias wantonly terrorising civilians in the run-up to the March 2002 Presidential elections pitting Mugabe against Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change, one would concur that there has been a lack of commitment to democratic principles in post-revolution Southern African states (Melber 2001:18). As many professionals left the country in frustration and the government enacted oppressive pieces of legislation in an effort to further entrench itself, Zimbabwe mirrored the case of a country where so much promise was betrayed.

It would, however, be historically unsatisfactory to limit Zimbabwe's turmoil in the late 1990s to developments in the political and economic arenas. Events in the social sphere also contributed significantly towards the national pessimism. Like her Southern African neighbours Botswana and South Africa, Zimbabwe faced a devastating HIV/AIDS epidemic. The economically active age group was being decimated, and funerals became commonplace in the 1990s. Illness, disease and death combined to create cynicism and despair. Bryan Callahan has catalogued the hardships and tragedies that have shaken the country:

> Since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe's citizens have staggered under the weight of multiple burdens, including economic recession, IMF sponsored structural adjustments, government corruption, political violence, ethnic tensions, land scarcity, drought, and an HIV/AIDS epidemic that has killed many of the country's brightest and most productive people (Callahan 2001:85).

It is within this context of where all imaginable 'evils' have coalesced to make existence so burdensome that religious individuals and politicians tried to be relevant. Amidst the anxiety and exodus of skilled personnel, political functionaries and sacred practitioners employed an array of images, slogans and myths to capture the prevailing reality. In the late 1990s, politicians and preachers included songs, pithy sayings and cliches in their repertoires. How to name reality, prescribe solutions and project a more promising future when the country was undergoing troubled times became major themes in religious and political discourses in Zimbabwe.

Shared horizons: Religious and political discourses in Zimbabwe

Although Zimbabwe is home to a multiplicity of religions and worldviews, Christianity, African Traditional Religions and Islam tend to dominate the spiritual market. Due to its association with modernity and the colonial project, Christianity in its myriad forms largely defines the credoscape (Lundby and Dayan 1999:405). As in most Southern African states, Christianity dominates the media, leaving adherents of African Traditional Religions to protest against the lack of respect for autochthonous traditions (Mndende 1999).

Christianity succeeded in capturing popular imagination in Zimbabwe due to the high profile it enjoyed during the colonial period. African nationalists received their education at mission scholars and they have felt greatly indebted. According to Revd Ndabaningi Sithole of the American Congregation Church, 'it was the Christian Church that first introduced literacy which

was to give birth to African nationalits, medical doctors, advocates, businessmen, journalists and graduates' (Sithole 1970:98). Although some African intellectuals have attacked Christianity as a foreign ideology, millions of Africans have embraced the religion.

Alongside African Independent/Initiated Churches that epitomise indigenous responses to Christianity (Daneel 1971), the Catholic Church, various Protestant churches and Evangelical/Pentecostal churches constitute the main branches of Christian expression in Zimbabwe. While these movements had complex responses towards the armed liberation struggle, a number of scholars have highlighted the contributions of the different churches. These studies include the role of the Catholic Church (Linden 1980), the Evangelical Lutheran Church (Bhebe 1999), African Independent Churches (Daneel 1998) and other churches in the struggle for Zimbabwe.

An appreciation of the Christian contribution to the independence of the country facilitates an understanding of the largely cordial church-state relations in independent Zimbabwe (Hallencreutz and Moyo 1988). The formation of the black ruling elite in Christian contexts and its continued identification with the religion can also be explained against this general background. President Mugabe's pronouncements against homosexuality and the support he received from ZANU-PF members in parliament is informed by a specific reading of Christian ethics (Dunton and Palmberg 1996:13-14). However, as I shall illustrate below, it is the main-line version of Christianity that has dominated civil religion in Zimbabwe.

While Christianity has enjoyed a high profile in Zimbabwe, African Traditional Religions have met with mixed fortunes. During the liberation struggle (1972-1979), indigenous religions experienced a revival (Lan 1985). The quest to recover stolen ancestral land was sometimes given a spiritual dimension whereby territorial spirits like Nehanda and Kaguvi were deemed patrons of the revolution. However, with the attainment of independence in 1980, there was a gradual retreat from indigenous religions to Christianity. The religious symbols of African Traditional Religions were superseded by those from Christianity (Bourdillon 1984).

During the first decade of independence (1980-1990), there was a tendency for religious leaders to co-operate with the state. Apart from protests against state brutality in Matabeleland, the rhetoric of nation-building, reconciliation and progress succeeded in bringing together politicians and people from religious institutions. The appointment of Rev Canaan Banana as ceremonial President between 1980 and 1987 also symbolically indicated church-state partnership. With the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in the 1990s, a cleavage was affected between the church and the state. Many church leaders and preachers openly and strongly criticised the government of Zimbabwe for condemning many black Zimbabweans to a life of misery. The government accused such individuals of engaging in politics while hiding behind the pulpit. However, when the Zimbabwean crisis boiled over in the late 1990s, religious and political rhetoric went up by several decibels. The ensuing section analyses the metaphors and signifiers that were interchangeably employed.

Political and religious slogans in Zimbabwe

During the armed liberation struggle, combatants on the battle front and propaganda personnel in Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania and other stations actively employed slogans as a mobilising strategy and to raise morale. These were short, precise declarations that demanded the response of the audience. Slogans sought to forge a common identity between the combatants and peasant

supporters, as well as to articulate the goals of the struggle. Such slogans included:
- Forward with Unity: *Pamberi neKubatana*
- Forward with Bravery: *Pamberi neKushinga*
- Forward with the War: *Pamberi neHondo*
- Forward with ZANU: *Pamberi neZanu (Krieger 1992:98*)

In the postcolonial period, the slogans shifted from the militancy of the war to the struggle for peace, unity and development. Politicians began to exhort the nation to redefine national goals and aspirations. In the run-up to the June 2000 parliamentary elections, ZANU PF propaganda chiefs began to focus on the land issue. They portrayed the seizure of white-owned farms as the outpouring of revolutionary anger. The following slogan was coined:

Mover: Land *Ivhu*
Response: To the people *Kuvanhu*
Mover: To the people *Kuvanhu*
Response: Land *Ivhu*

This slogan communicates the aspiration that land should be returned to the people (defined and understand as blacks) and that the people should be reunited with their land. Central to this 'third uprising' is the conviction that ancestral spirits remained angry that the land had not gone back to its original owners. As in the liberation struggle, the slogan seeks to evoke deeply rooted and dearly held spiritual convictions. Political objectives are pursued using religious ideas in the ruling party's application of slogans about the land.
As the slogans became known by many people, some enterprising Christian preachers adopted their form but changed the words. By applying slogans in their sermons, preachers from mainly Evangelical/Pentecostal churches were demonstrating their contextual sensitivity and creativity. However, by critically engaging with the content and thrust of the slogans by ZANU-PF strategists, they sought to undermine nationalist rhetoric on land. Maintaining that land was not a priority, the young born-again preachers placed emphasis on moral adjustment and getting people to heaven. Although the Evangelical/Pentecostal movement in Africa has declared politics to be a 'wicked game', its closeness to the political terrain can be discerned from its appropriation of slogans. Where the slogans noted above focus on getting land to the people, born-again preachers dwelt on the need to get people to heaven. Thus:

Mover: People *Vanhu*
Response: To Heaven *Kudenga*
Mover: To Heaven *Kudenga*
Response: People *Vanhu*

Given the reality that knowledge of the ZANU PF slogans was a survival strategy for may Zimbabweans in the run up to the March 2002 presidential elections, one can appreciate the popularity of slogans during the particular historical period under review. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) also employed the medium of slogans to win popular support. Operating in a context where slogans were utilised to impart ideas concerning political programmes and to elicit commitment to specific aspirations, the Movement for Democratic Change also found it necessary to adopt the technique. For example:

Mover: MDC
Response: Is it *Ndizvo*

Respondents affirmed that 'MDC is it', effectively portraying it as an opportune replacement for ZANU PF. However, born-again preachers also deconstructed the slogan. They interrogated and repudiated the claim that a political party could change Zimbabwe's fortunes. Amidst the turmoil that engulfed Zimbabwe in the late 1990s, young preachers undermined the authority of both older politicians (Van Dijk 2000:17) and emerging ones. Where the MDC portrayed itself as the saviour of Zimbabwe, young preachers reiterated slogans that only Jesus had the answers. Thus:

Mover: Jesus *Jesu*
Response: Is it *Ndizvo*

While some Christian preachers reinterpreted slogans that were in vogue in the political field, some politicians combined concepts and ideas from the religious and political arenas. The desired effect was to bring religious people over to the side of politicians. Addressing the Day of National Prayer service held at the International Conference Centre in Harare on 12 January 2002, President Mugabe sought to strike a chord with the sensibilities of Christians, while seeking to achieve clear political goals. Cognisant of the fact that he was operating in a religious context, he altered the traditional slogans to suit the occasion. Where he had previously asked his audience to recognise the need for 'moving forward with revolution' and to 'put down stooges and surrogates', he was proposing a revised vision. He prefaced his speech thus:
Mugabe: Forward with Praying/*Pamberi Nokunamata*
Response: Forward/*Pamberi*
Mugabe: Down with the Devil and his demons/*Pasi naSatani nemadhimoni ake*
Response: Down/*Pasi*

In political rallies however, Mugabe denounced the MDC as a party possessed by demons from Europe and North America. He called upon both traditionalists and Christians to project his party as a righteous movement fighting 'darkness'.

Sacred sounds, profane improvisations: Religious and political songs

Songs have played an important role throughout human history. They evoke emotions, create a common sense of belonging and communicate dogmas effectively. Alongside slogans, political parties in Zimbabwe used songs to appeal to voters. During the liberation struggle, nationalists had used music to instil a sense of pride and interest in indigenous arts and culture (Turino 2000: 188). Songs were also utilised as a propaganda tool to encourage more young people to take up arms to fight the settler state. As the socio-economic conditions in Zimbabwe deteriorated from the late 1990s, political songs found their way back. Many of these songs were improvised versions of popular hymns and choruses, as the paragraphs below seek to highlight.
Due to the high rate attributable to HIV/AIDS, funeral songs dominated the air waves in Zimbabwe during the period under review. Hymns and choruses that consoled the bereaved and promised to reunite the living with the dead were electronically recorded and became well known in the country. Sociological studies of gospel music in Zimbabwe demonstrate a preoccupation

with death (Chitando 1999:337). Since Christianity is the dominant religion, even funeral ceremonies for traditionalists are sometimes accompanied by hymns and choruses, thereby extending the area of Christian influence. One widely circulating chorus was the following:

I will never cry *Handimbochemi*
When Jesus is there *Kana Jesu aripo*
To cry is cowardice *Kuchema utera*

Funeral songs in Zimbabwe are not traceable to specific denominations and they are truly ecumenical. The chorus referred to above featured at funerals for members of the Catholic, Protestant, African Independent and Pentecostal churches. It seeks to empower the living and to remind them of the permanent and comforting presence of Jesus. Calling for courage in the face of the sting of death, the chorus instils a sense of tranquility amongst the mourners. In the emotional turmoil instigated by death, the bereaved take solace in the love and compassion of Jesus. This chorus was appropriated by the ZANU PF Women's League. They substituted Mugabe for Jesus, confirming the controversial statement by the former deputy minister of Local Housing, Mr Tony Gara, that Mugabe was 'the other son of God'. Thus:

I will never cry *Handimbochemi*
When Mr Mugabe is there *Kana vaMugabe varipo*
To cry is cowardice *Kuchema utera*

The MDC also exploited the popularity of gospel music to convey its political agenda. Since the ruling party had a monopoly on broadcasting and only covered the opposition negatively, the MDC employed music as a communication strategy. They converted religious songs that addressed spiritual and material problems into commentaries on the Zimbabwean condition in the late 1990s. One such song was a popular track by the Methodist group, Rugare Ngariende St. Luke's choir. The song encourages people to call upon Jesus when they go through difficult times. However, it was changed to say that when things got bad and there was no peace in Zimbabwe, they had to call upon the MDC (Eyre 2001: 77-78). The Methodist choir sang:

When the load is heavy *Kana zvarema*
Call upon Jesus *Daidzai Jesu*
He is the good leader *Ndiye mutungamiri akanaka*

MDC supporters changed the words, replacing Jesus as the good leader with the purported visionaries of the party:

When the load is heavy *Kana zvarema*
Call upon the MDC *Daidzai MDC*
They are the good leaders *Ndivo vatungamiri vakanaka*

The deteriorating economic conditions also influenced the rise of protest gospel music in Zimbabwe. While Christian composers of the 1980s had released songs that dwelt on purely spiritual matters, a form-critical analysis of gospel music in the late 1990s demonstrates the recurrence of economic issues. Although they called for divine intervention, artists laid bare the

economic crisis that had engulfed Zimbabwe. Various gospel musicians protested against the devaluation of the local currency, high inflation, unemployment, retrenchments, high medical costs and other economic ills. Such religious songs illustrated the close relationship obtaining between religion and politics, since the economy was being run by politicians.

However, protest gospel differed from popular protest music by established artists like Thomas Mapfumo, Simon Chimbetu and others. In proffering solutions to the 'imbabwean condition' gospel musicians put forward expressly religious formulations. Where the ruling ZANU-F and the opposition MDC gave themselves a religious camouflage, gospel musicians effected radical desacralisation. Using the Christian trait of affirming that Jesus is Lord in the midst of other claims to lordship (Bediako 1995:61-62), gospel musicians have dismissed the contention that politicians can change Zimbabwe's fortunes. As audiences and congregations were bombarded with the theme that 'nly Jesus is the answer' a profound questioning of the political relevance of individuals like President Mugabe was being effected.

To illustrate the mutual influences between religious and political discourses in Zimbabwe, some gospel musicians borrowed phrases and slogans from political parties. After describing how the devil had held him captive in the spirit of poverty (Maxwell 1998), leading gospel artist Charles Charamba declared, 'own with the devil (*Pasi naye Satani*). The slogan to denounce political opponents had been taken to greater heights (or lowest depths) by President Mugabe during a campaign rally in Masvingo for the June 2000 parliamentary elections. Mugabe declared,

> Down with Tsvangirai
> Down with his wife and children
> Down with his dogs
> Down with his cups.

In the Zimbabwean context to say, 'own with ...'is understood as a call to utterly destroy that which has been denounced. By adopting the slogan in his song, the musician Charamba wanted to rally the Christian community together against the devil. Since militias trained by the ruling party actively sought to liquidate political rivals, the artist was urging the faithful to be equally zealous in defeating the prince of darkness. Whether such violent language in religious and political domains promoted national peace remained a simmering issue.

'Thus says the Lord...'Religious and political mythologies in Zimbabwe

As the economic hardships in Zimbabwe became acute in the late 1990s, many young professionals began to leave the country. Specialists in the health, education, information technology, banking and other sectors departed in frustration at low incomes, an uncertain future and in pursuit of greater career opportunities. As the brain-drain worsened, a number of prophecies began to circulate in predominantly Pentecostal/Evangelical churches. Testimonies about visions and pronouncements from God that the country would become a successful model for Africa and the world became widespread. As such, the faithful were to remain in Zimbabwe, awaiting the fulfilment of divine prophecies.

One of the most popular prophecies circulating in Evangelical/Pentecostal churches in Zimbabwe had to do with the reported prophecy of a seer from New Zealand. It was maintained that she had seen a vision in which Zimbabwe would prosper and become 'the Switzerland of Africa'. As the people became more faithful to God, fasting and confessing their sins, God would transform

Zimbabwe into a rich country, the prophecy maintained. Intercessors, evangelists and street preachers constantly evoked this prophecy in their quest to 'stop suffering' (Chitando 2000:60). The purported revelation was used to give believers hope and courage in an environment characterised by angst.

On the political front, Mugabe's staunch support for the land redistribution exercise generated the myth that he was a Messianic figure, a Moses-like character who delivered his people to their Promised Land. Traditional headmen, chiefs, prophets from African Independent Churches and bishops from main-line denominations united to portray Mugabe as the self-sacrificing and dedicated leader who would frustrate all imperialist manoeuvres aimed at derailing the final settlement of the land question. Madzibaba (elder) Nzira of the indigenous Johane Masowe weChishanu church claimed that he had a vision during the liberation struggle in which God showed him Mugabe parcelling out land to ululating land-hungry peasants. What the Muyebes noted of President Banda and Malawi is thus also applicable to Mugabe and Zimbabwe. They wrote:

> The Christian tradition is emphatic of the point that there is no other name, other than the name of Christ, by which human beings can be saved. This concept had similarities in the conceptual world of Malawian politics. An assertion was made to the effect that there was no other name, other than the name of Dr Banda, by which Malawi could have been liberated from the colonial regime (Muyebe and Muyebe 1999:72-73).

While some church leaders remained sceptical of Mugabe's 'fast-track' land acquisition programme for its negative consequences for Zimbabwe's economy, the state sought to promote those traditional, Christian and Muslim functionaries who supported its actions. From February 2000, the Johane Masowe weChishanu indigenous church began to receive extensive and favourable press coverage because its leader had declared Mugabe to be God's chosen instrument to bring the land back to its rightful owners. Whereas African indigenous churches had been previously cast as unsophisticated and backwards since they resisted the governments policies on education and immunisation, they were now being portrayed as bearers of true and revolutionary prophecies.

Church and state partnership during the crisis years in Zimbabwe also rallied around an oft-quoted biblical passage which calls upon believers to intercede with God on behalf of their nation. According to II Chronicles 7:14, 'If my people, who are called by name, will humble themselves and pray and seek my face and turn from their wicked ways, then I will hear from heaven and heal their land'. This divine promise, uttered to the biblical Israelites several millennia ago, became a statement of hope for millions of Zimbabweans. Ruling party officials pleaded with the church not to tire in their prayers for the country. Traditionalists and evangelicals maintained that the liberation struggle had seen the loss of too many lives, alongside generating curses and bonding with the devil. Zimbabwe's social and economic malaise at the beginning of a new century was attributed to negative spiritual forces. Exorcism and fervent prayer became key concepts in the search for solutions to national problems.

Appeals to religion in efforts to justify political power were also resorted to by the opposition MDC. Prophecies to the effect that Mugabe's reign no longer had divine approval became popular in opposition circles as the March 2002 presidential elections drew close. It was alleged that traditional spirit mediums had become possessed and issued oracles that proclaimed Tsvangirai as the rightful successor to Mugabe. Among the Shona people of Zimbabwe, oracles

have authority (Bourdillon 1990:101). Some Christian prophets and church leaders also portrayed the MDC as God's chosen instrument to cleanse Zimbabwe of corruption and to facilitate a fresh beginning.

Through the use of slogans, pronouncements and other communication strategies, political parties in Zimbabwe appropriated religious symbols. In turn, religions responded to developments in the political field in a myriad of ways. As the economic and political situation in Zimbabwe brought the nation under the international spotlight, religious personnel and politicians engaged in diagnosis and therapy, in efforts to find lasting solutions. However, this interface between religious and political discourses in Zimbabwe has methodological implications for our understanding of these fields, as I seek to argue below.

Religion and politics in Africa: A reappraisal

The dynamic interchange of slogans, songs and myths between the religious and political arenas in Zimbabwe calls for a reinterpretation of the relationship between religion and politics in Africa. As the study has shown, issues are more complicated than politicians simply using religion to gain political mileage. Religious people also appropriate communication strategies from politicians for their own concerns. It also emerges from the Zimbabwean case that the assertion that politics in Africa is expressing itself less in a political than in a religious discourse (Behrend 1999:38) is contestable. The political and religious discourses should not be reduced one to the other: in fact they influence each other in numerous creative ways and directions. As they seek to address the same human condition and to empower their followers to face an uncertain situation, religious specialists and politicians resort to the same techniques. While improvisation and critical application can be detected in both fields, it is clear that they apply similar strategies to name and tame the Zimbabwean reality.

While studies on prophets in African history are informative (Anderson and Johnson 1995), they tend to overlook the contemporary interpenetration of religious and political fields. Prophets do not just pose a religious and political critique of the ruling elites, their repertoire is sometimes embraced and enacted by the same politicians they seek to undermine. Similarly, although politics and the occult interact in ways that appear sensational in an African context (Geschiere 1997), a critical sociological analysis shows that the underlying factor lies in efforts to respond to economic pressures. In the Zimbabwean situation, heightened religious and political activities became pronounced from the late 1990s in tandem with a worsening economic environment.

The Zimbabwean case study also exposes the limitations of most studies on Evangelical/Pentecostal movements in Christianity in Africa. Emphasising the verbalised aversion of young African evangelicals to politics, some commentators have harshly concluded that theirs is an enslaving religion (Gifford 1990). However, this study has illustrated the extent to which evangelical preachers critically and constantly interact with the political sphere. Although they ultimately recommended divine intervention, street preachers in Harare systematically exposed the social, economic and political paralysis that vitiated Zimbabwe's efforts to become a vibrant nation state.

However, more work remains to be done to establish whether African Independent Churches are more susceptible to political acquiescence due to their healing role. This study has shown the willingness of the Johane Masowe weChishanu church leaders to openly support the ruling ZANU PF party. A more detailed analysis of how these leaders have influenced the politicians and how

other prophets contest their credentials is necessary. In addition, the impact of variables such as gender, religious affiliation, education, race and others on religious and political discourses in Africa requires continued analysis.

Conclusion

In this article I explored the mutual influences that characterised religious and political discourses in Zimbabwe from the late 1990s to the period just before the March 2002 presidential elections. Eschewing a deterministic approach, I illustrated the extent to which slogans, songs and mythologies were freely transported between the religious and political terrains. Occupying the same tight corner and space that Zimbabwe had become, politicians and religious specialists often found themselves engaged in closely related discourses. Since most studies on religion and politics in Africa have tended to subordinate the former to the latter, I also called for a more open-minded approach to the interface.

In conclusion, it should be noted that studies on religion and politics in various African regions such as Each Africa (Hansen and Twaddle 1995) or Southern Africa (Hallencreutz and Palmberg 1991) often create the impression that these two fields are sharply demarcated. This article questions such an approach to boundary distinctions by demonstrating the continuing flow of ideas and concepts between these imagined spaces. Indeed, another study could capture the extent to which actors and audiences constantly shift and blend across the religious and political terrains. In the specific case of Zimbabwe, the deteriorating social and economic conditions influenced the circulation of myths, songs, pronouncements and other communicative acts across the religious and political fields. Consequently, it became possible for evangelical preachers to reclaim the traditional African call and response formula and contemporary political slogans to proclaim, 'Down with the devil, forward with Christ!'

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Sites of Struggle: The Reorientation of Political Values in the Matabeleland Conflict, Zimbabwe 1980 -1987

1. Introduction

Zimbabwe is currently facing a political and economic crisis. In the presidential elections in March 2002, state measures to undermine and incapacitate the opposition have been commonplace. Legal steps to limit media and avenues of pluralistic expression are pursued vehemently despite national and international protests. Violence is part and parcel of the developments, conducted both by state agencies and different wings of the ruling party Zanu(PF). The pattern of influencing or coercing political allegiance through violent means is not new in the Zimbabwean post-independent history. Elections since independence 1980 have included elements of political violence and intimidation, as has student unrest and other expressions of government opposition. However, the most systematic use of post-colonial political violence and suppression of opposition politics remains the Matabeleland conflict of 1980-1987. This paper concerns this conflict, focusing on power relations, violence and public discourse, with the aim of showing how the Zanu(PF) government forcefully attempted to influence and instil certain political values among those they perceived as differently minded.

The paper takes a historical approach, discussing colonial power relations and their impact on the Matabeleland conflict, utilising Mamdani's notion of the intertwining of power and identity, and processes of fragmentation and differentiation in a colonial setting (Mamdani 1996). The paper notes that power competition between Zanu and Zapu both in pre-and post-independence constituted a foundation for how political expressions have been played out in recent history. An evident continuity is the suppression of political ideas opposed to those of the ruling group: during pre-independence the suppression of political opposition against the minority racist government; at post-independence the suppression of Matabeleland civilians' perspectives based on the perception of them carrying 'undesirable ideas'.

Whilst Mamdani's framework includes crucial tools for conceptually understanding power relations, this framework does not give extensive attention to how perceptions of rule operate. To gain insight into actors' decision-making a theoretical construct is added, in order to highlight the emergence, formation and reproduction of perceptions. Whilst Mamdani's framework is here labelled as an 'institutional framework', the added framework to address perceptions is noted as a 'mental framework'. The central notion of the latter is how memory and socialisation operates in relation to power relations, thereby considering conformity and identity formation in relation to values and beliefs of the ruling elite.

Beginning with a summary of the Matabeleland conflict, the paper subsequently outlines a historical context to conflict developments. Next the institutional and mental frameworks are put forward, whereafter these are used as tools for analysis when examining power relations, state violence and government discourse in the conflict. The paper closes by looking at lessons learned, and by discussing the contested space in which the politics of choice are played out.[1]

2. The Matabeleland Conflict

In the new independent state of Zimbabwe, 1980 marked the ending of fifteen years of civil war between the black majority and the governing white minority. In their fight for independence from British colonial rule, the black majority was split into two forces; Zanu(PF) and PF-Zapu, and their respective military wings Zanla and Zipra.[2] Having together (with common aims and goals) but separately (in different organisations) brought independence to the country, the two parties continued to operate after independence. In the 1980 general elections Zanu(PF) won an overwhelming victory, and PF-Zapu became a minority party in the subsequent coalition government.

At the time a great amount of enthusiasm for the future was the most obvious general expression, politically enveloped by the policy of reconciliation. However, tension lingered. Independence brought change - hope for some and uncertainty for others. For the black majority changes meant aspirations and prospects for a better standard of life with all its different components. For the white minority changes seemed to herald loss of security and privileges. The tension which later took shape in military confrontations and took Zimbabwe frightfully near a new civil war, did however not come from the white minority camp where observers feared it would originate. Instead it arose from political competition and lack of confidence between the two parties Zanu(PF) and PF-Zapu, and was most urgently felt in the military wings amongst the ex-combatants. The armed clashes with additional related incidents set off Zimbabwe's post-independence history in a direction which would directly affect the country's political, economic and military situation for the coming seven years. It would culminate in what the government called the ‘anti-dissident campaign’, or what others named ‘ethnic cleansing’. Here the dissident activities and the army intervention are termed ‘the Matabeleland conflict’.

During 1980-1983 the three contesting armies, Zanla, Zipra and the Rhodesian Security Forces, were amalgamated to form a new national army with a common loyalty and single allegiance. Initially the three forces were located in separate camps, where the processes of demobilisation and conversion of guerrillas into conventional soldiers took place. The mistrust between Zanu(PF) and PF-Zapu was not a sentiment created in isolation by this particular historical moment. It was an old feeling taking on new dimensions in the integration process. Since 1963 when former Zapu members formed Zanu, the two parties with similar political programs remained rivals. Although the two parties were national in character, one of the elements of difference between the two was ethnic support and identification. Zapu, led by Joshua Nkomo, was to a great extent supported by the Ndebele group of people (17 percent of the population), and Zanu, led by Robert Mugabe, had the backing mainly of the Shona group of people (77 percent of the population) (Berens 1988:3).

Due to historical reasons linked to both political and ethnic concerns, the army integration process was a volatile procedure and two armed confrontations took place between the Zanla and Zipra forces. At the end of 1980 Zanla and Zipra troops were transferred from their assembly points to housing schemes near Harare and Bulawayo, in which the two forces came to be located next to each other. Tension due to unsettled pre-independence differences flared and resulted in violence (Alao 1995:109). Two clashes, in 1980 and 1981 respectively, left 222 soldiers killed and hundreds wounded (Auret 1992:132). Concurrently with these incidents, reports of unofficial stockpiling of arms by the guerrilla armies circulated. Government forces located many arms caches, but others went undiscovered. In 1982 a stockpile of arms was unearthed on PF-Zapu property, after which the government concluded that PF-Zapu was planning a military coup. This led to the dismissal of Nkomo and three of his colleagues from the coalition government. In

addition, two key persons in the Zipra leadership, Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku, were arrested, and PF-Zapu property was confiscated.
These events provoked large-scale defections of former Zipra officers and combatants from the assembly points (Auret 1992:147, Alao 1995:109). The defected soldiers, named 'dissidents' by the government, returned to their home area Matabeleland North and South. For the ruling party's project of national unity and its position of hegemony, the dissidents were perceived as a threat. The dissidents themselves, however, experienced their desertion as necessary to avoid political and ethnic persecution. To emphasise their stance they resorted to acts of destruction and violence.
In addition to the former Zipra combatants, two other groups of 'dissidents' acted in Matabeleland. These were, first, bandits who took the opportunity to commit crimes for personal gains in the name of the dissidents. Second, there were a small number of infiltrated South African trained recruits, named 'Super Zapu' by the Zimbabweans. The Fifth Brigade, consisting of 7000 elite soldiers trained by North Koreans, was tracking these three groups of dissidents. To motivate such a comprehensive military operation, the Matabeleland conflict was given extensive media coverage with the dissidents being portrayed as a cohesive group, vast in numbers and political and ethnic enemies of the state. The Fifth Brigade's task, capturing dissidents and their sympathisers, was translated into harsh operations perceived as ethnic persecution by many victims. In government discourse the operations were justified by the threat to national unity and security that the dissidents were perceived to pose. However, on an operational level, military activity was geared toward the elimination of Zapu structures executed through army counter-insurgency operations. The crisis was further complicated by the external involvement of the South African government. Some of the dissidents, with political grievances such as the pace of the land reform, were considered an excellent breeding ground for South African influence and control. However, the attempt to infiltrate so-called Super-Zapu elements failed. Nevertheless, for the Zimbabwean government the external security threat allowed an additional justification for its heavy-handed security and military response. A State of Emergency was renewed, and for the following three years major curfew and search operations took place in Matabeleland. The deployment of the Fifth Brigade in Matabeleland resulted in a military intervention in which thousands of Ndebele people were abducted, tortured, raped and killed.
The Matabeleland conflict came to a conclusion in 1987 when Zanu(PF) and PF-Zapu signed a Unity Accord, and the two parties merged under the name Zanu(PF). Once the document was signed and the merger made public, violence ceased. An amnesty for the dissidents was declared, army personnel linked to atracities were given pardons. Politically Zimbabwe was on route to a one-party state, a goal that Zanu(PF) had included in its programme since 1977.

3. Power Relations under Colonial Rule

The developments in Zimbabwe 1980-1987 are clearly linked in a historical continuum. In order to undersatnd this point, pre-independence power structures and power relations are briefly outlined here.
In Rhodesia ninety years of colonial power and rule were marked by strategies of separation, both in terms of race and ethnicity. The dictate was social control through an elaborate central and local system, in which settlers had exclusive power and maintained a discriminatory franchise system. Ethnically, the indigenous population was ruled through division and differentiation. Intra

and inter-ethnic differences were appropriated and moulded, reflexively, dictated by the political and military aspirations of colonial rule. In this process of constructing difference through institutional power and in the cultural framework of every day life, perceptions of power and ethnicity took form and shaped peoples' understanding of events. Power relations were based on the rulers' right to absolute power. To exemplify the use of fragmentation and control, two of the most influential colonial policies are reviewed here.

In 1962 the Rhodesian government adopted 'Community Development' as a policy. It was associated with Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front government and served as the foundation for the government's entire rural policy. In an attempt to counteract growing nationalism and to legitimise claims for independence from Britain without majority rule, chiefs were reinvested with their two imperative powers lost after conquest. The Tribal Trust Land Act of 1967 gave the power to chiefs to allocate land, and the African Law and Tribal Courts Act of 1969 gave chiefs the powers to judge civil and certain criminal cases. The Secretary for Internal Affairs noted that local government in Rhodesia was 'very much part of the tribal authority' and aimed to identify African councils with 'traditional tribal government' (Bratton 1978:26). However, rather than deciding locally about local needs, the councils became instruments of state power, in which racist policies were 'decentralised' for implementation. Power was in practice tightly held by the principal field agent of the state, the District Commissioner, who controlled council finances, had the right to invalidate decisions of the chiefs, and above all was directed to 'inculcate a proper understanding of the disciplinary and penalising influences of Government in regard to national matters' (Bratton 1978:29). 'Tribal authority' was upheld by the chief, who through his position wielded power in economic, political, social, and judicial areas concerning African life (Bratton 1978: 18-29, Makumbe 1998:20-22).

As military resistance mounted against the Rhodesian government and local support was effectively mobilised by nationalist forces, administrative control over the extensive rural areas became increasingly difficult. The rural areas became the centre stage for both sides: settlers and guerrillas alike fought for the political allegiance of the rural population. To counteract the persisting insurgency government policy underwent a shift. In 1972 the community development policy was effectively dropped in favour of concentrated state control. The executive powers of Provincial and District Commissioners were increased and paramilitary tasks awarded to civil administrators. Collective punishment of the rural population was another administrative response to the insurgency. In 1973 Provincial Commissioners were empowered to impose collective fines, confiscate cattle, and resettle communities by force when contact with guerrillas was suspected. Military action was also taken in the form of collective punishment, as reprisals were meted out against villages seen as 'pro-terrorist'. The death penalty or life imprisonment was incurred by those engaging or assisting in 'terrorist activities', or those who 'failed to report the presence of terrorists'. Civilian administration and military activity thus became complementary and merged (Bratton 1978: 35-38).

Whilst the Rhodesian government increased military pressure, the guerrillas were able to stand their ground and spread. The Rhodesians realised that guerrilla success was dependent on civilian support, causing a change in their military strategy. Originally, the official government line stated that success hinged on winning the Africans' hearts and minds. However, on the operational level this was continuously overstepped. Eventually the idea was dropped, since - as the Ministry of Internal Affairs insisted - the blacks were 'too primitive' to appreciate such schemes and only

'respected force'. Consequently, in Rhodesian counter-insurgency operations, violence against civilians became a matter of routine. The logic was that civilians who supported terrorists, were themselves terrorists, and as one could not differentiate between 'supporting' and 'neutral' civilians, the guilt and punishment had to be collectively borne.

Pre-Independence Zanu and Zapu relations

The relationship between Zanu and Zapu was influenced by the former being born out of the latter. The Zapu split in 1963, which caused the formation of Zanu, created great tension in the two liberation movements for many years to come. As fighting between Zanu and Zapu supporters raged in 1963-1964, the colonial establishment steered clear of police intervention. The actors of the event, reinforced by the historical baggage of division, were unable to break the patterns of violence, fighting each other with a 'winner takes it all' mentality. This pattern continued during the liberation war, when members of the nationalist organisations at times identified each other as enemies - as two sides with irreconcilable difference - and in which the winner emerged at expense of the other. When political and military developments partitioned Rhodesia into separate Zanu and Zapu areas, coinciding with the ethnically divided geographical regions, a reinforcement of the Zanu/Shona - Zapu/Ndebele dichotomy took place. Despite this ethnic reinforcement, the engine for the dichotomous set-up seems nevertheless to have been intense power competition between the nationalist organisations - and/or between certain personalities within these structures.

Throughout the liberation war external forces, primarily the OAU and the Frontline states, attempted to bridge the gap between Zanu and Zapu. The were several reasons for repeated failure in this respect. First, externally compelled unity agreements no doubt had less chance of being seriously attempted. Second, any type of merger would have caused a shift in power structures. According to Dabengwa, the focus of unity attempts in the 1960s and early 1970s was on the armies rather than the parties, but these were aborted 'as politicians were wary of losing military control' (Dabengwa 1990:4). Thus, a political agenda had little clout lacking the weight of military might, a situation neither party was willing to adapt to. But with fluctuating internal developments in each nationalist party, their political and war achievements altered in velocity and momentum. This allowed for a certain political opportunism. When at a low point, each party at different periods discovered the virtues of a unity agreement. But then the other was not in accord. Hence, another reason for failed unity attempts was power competition, as the one with comparative advantage was unwilling to share its gains. Nevertheless, both parties and their military wings had unity supporters, particularly regarding an army merger (Dabengwa 1990:4). The merger that was in a measure successful, the Patriotic Front, was a political conglomerate which was to bring secure election victory to the nationalists and one united army to the new Zimbabwe. However, as in earlier experience, a competitive edge in the power competition caused a break-up. An assured electoral victory for one of the unity partners, without a merged Zipra-Zanla army, would cause tremendous post-war security problems. This fact the armed forces were clear about, judging from Dabengwa's observations. He notes that in 1979, when the PF was under stress, 'the military leaders of both Zipra and Zanla made it abundantly clear that their [the politicians] negative attitude [to unity] would complicate the integration effort after independence' (Dabengwa 1990:4). This insight was later to be borne out by the Matabeleland conflict.

4. Theoretical framework

The impact of colonial rule, and organised resistance to it, set the stage for post-colonial political culture and power relations. To analyse the background of the Matabeleland conflict, a theoretical understanding of colonial power relations is therefore crucial.

4.a. Theoretical Understanding of Colonial Rule and Resistance

A study in which power relations are central is Mamdani's research (1996) on the legacy of late colonialism in Africa. In his framework, colonial power and its institutional legacy, colonial fragmentary dualism, are conceptualised as the bifurcation of the state, separating the rural from the urban and one ethnicity from another. Central to this conceptualisation is the notion of rights. Urban power represented civil society and civil rights - the rights of citizens -, whilst rural power represented community and culture - the rule of subjects. Rights in Mamdani's framework are seen to be attributed to community: in the framework of customary law, the community is defined in ethnic terms, as the tribe; in the case of civil law, the community is the nation. The subjects derived their rights through membership in a tribe, the citizens through membership in the nation. Thus, in this conceptualisation, racial domination in the local state was grounded in a politically enforced system of ethnic pluralism. Ruled by customary law, the African was defined not as a native, but as a tribesperson. Customary law encapsulated the individual in a set of relations defined and enforced by ethnic identity, a law that in turn through colonial mandate was defined and enforced by the tribal leader (Mamdani 1996:18, 22-23, 286).

In Rhodesia, as other colonial experiences, colonial rule rested on force. The exercise of power was organised through division and segregation. In Mamdani's conceptualisation, colonial power was simultaneously both centralised and decentralised. Power was centrally orchestrated, but highly decentralised through the Native Authority in the local state. In turn, at the local level, power was centralised in the single and fused nature of the authority of the chief. Mamdani notes that 'To the peasant, the person of the chief signifies power that is total and absolute, unchecked and unrestrained' (1996:54). Mamdani also argues that the colonial experience was marked by force to an unusual degree. Day to day violence was embedded in the customary Native Authority in the local state. Falling under customary law, force and violence were perceived as codified and legitimate. Mamdani writes: 'From considering force and African custom, it was but a short step to considering Africans as accustomed to force - as, say, a European may be to reason (1996:157).

In Mamdani's understanding of colonial resistance, racist exploitation combined with tribal contradictions inherent in the system of local rule caused a dual response: resistance against the racial barriers in civil society, and resistance against the local contradictions caused by the rural form of rule. The site of the struggle became the customary, reproducing the notions of power and ethnic fragmentation within which they were institutionally operating. As ethnicity defined the parameters of rule, it also defined the resistance against it. The tension and contradictions which emerged from the colonial power thus laid the basis for its resistance. Therefore, ethnicity became a dimension of both power and resistance, as well as the problem and the solution (1996:8, 23-25).

What is of essential importance here, in adopting Mamdani's framework in relation to the Rhodesian experience, is how power and ethnicity from the onset of colonial penetration were

interconnected. The understanding of local state rule was inescapably linked to that of tribe. Governance of the rural areas was equal to control of natives, in a framework in which ethnic identity and separation were enforced politically. Force and violence became part of the understanding of governance and rule, as both were used by the local and the central state. Resisting colonial rule and its modes of governing resulted in a struggle in which ethnicity was the starting point. Violence was inherently part of the understanding of the governance and the applied method of solution. Thus, perceptions of differentiation fostered through the colonial experience, were linked to tribal belonging and its definition in power and governance.

4.b. Pre-independence perceptions of governance and rule

The perceptions of differentiation fostered through the colonial experience had 90 years to take root in Rhodesia. Generations of Africans grew up, were socialised, functioned, and in turn socialised their children about rule, control and resistance within this framework. For this they needed memories. Memory is an important device in the socialisation process and the moulding of perceptions. Memory, the past, and perceptions are intrinsically linked. This immensely central connection to human existence constitutes a basis for our understanding of our every day life and actions we take, a connection, which became central to how the Matabeleland conflict developed. By applying Mamdani's framework to the Rhodesian case in examining the basis of perceptions under colonial rule, the picture that emerges is that of power entrenched through all layers of society. Subsequently, the colonial differentiation process, intrinsically encompassing all social relations, inescapably became part of the actors' understanding of the world. This understanding sank into the unconscious level of functioning, perceptions and collective memory, being part of the meaning bestowed on the framework of existence. How does such a process take place? Tonkin notes that references to the past are continual. When we grasp a historical fact or interpretation we make an extremely complex collection of judgements in doing so. He notes that any representation of pastness is identity-constitutive, and can be shaped and elaborated into an identity support as well. Insofar as memorisations create the sense of a past - whether there is a coherent narrative or disparate individual recollections - they contribute to the experience of present group identity (Tonkin 1992:111). Past events are thus shaped reflexivively as a guide to future action, and are notably common to a particular kind of political culture and its associated social structure (Tonkin 1992:123).

Thus, the historical experience of colonial fragmentation and differentiation and resistance against it was a reality for Africans under Rhodesian rule. This reality shaped the understanding of the world, and, using Tonkin's understanding, through memory was 'identity-constitutive'. Applying this understanding to the Rhodesian historical experience, group identity formed in relation to two institutional structures: the racially differentiated rule centrally directed, and the tribally oriented rule through the customary Native Authority. Memory and identity formation in terms of rule had two foci: race and ethnicity.

The political culture emerging from an organisation of society based on oppression was one of force and control, violence and contestation between forces. Examples of power relations where actors functioned in democratic coexistence were scarce. Instead, actors where subjected to rules and perceptions in which the message clearly signalled that power, centrally anchored, must be locally maintained, steered, and controlled. At the local level there was one centre of power: the chief. Power was absolute. How then do actors respond to such a power framework?

Foucault is concerned with the methods of surveillance of individuals, and conceives power as a technique that achieves its strategic effect through its disciplinary character. In Foucault's view identities are shaped and moulded through the exercise of disciplinary power. Foucault argues that people need not be formed through socialisation processes to stop them from pursuing their first preferences - it is enough to shape their beliefs or expectations in such a manner that they consciously abstain from pursuing such a preference due to anticipated consequences (Nordlund 1996:31).

Gaventa also writes about the abstention of preferences. His focus is on the conditioning of reactions, which through indirect means cause psychological adaptations in the subjugated group. In response to continual defeat, perceptions change, and may lead to a greater susceptibility to the internalisation of the values and rules of the powerful. If socialised to compliance over an extended period, an acceptance of the political reality as offered by the dominant group may be cemented. This may also develop into a 'culture of silence', lending the dominant an air of legitimacy (Gaventa 1980:17-19, 21-22, 256).

Applying Foucault's and Gaventa's understandings to the Rhodesian experience, and using Mamdani's historical framework, gives us some insight into how perceptions of governance and rule may have formed. Africans were ruled locally by way of central direction, therefore, conformity to rule took place on two levels: conformity to racial ruling (centrally) and tribal ruling (locally). However, ninety years of colonial oppression did not only cause conformity. Memory and socialisation caused the internalisation of the values of the rulers. Using fragmentation and differentiation as a tool, colonial rulers were able to enforce the historical dichotomy between the Shona and Ndebele groups of people. Rulers particularly in the late colonial period repeatedly reinforced myths and perceptions related to the dichotomy, and over time the internalisation of difference became fixed. Thus perceptions of governance and rule formed over time carried the content of fragmentation and differentiation inherently.

Another important ingredient in Rhodesian colonial history is resistance. How did resistance influence perceptions? Irwin-Zarecka's work on memory and power argues that it is not the absolute weight of historically inflicted pain which matters to those who have suffered. Rather, it is how people perceive the consequences, mostly in terms of justice rendered but also justice attempted (Irwin-Zarecka 1994:97,137). Brickhill notes that in Rhodesia certain perceptions developed in the cause of guerrilla warfare related to the use of violence. The dual use of violence as a means in the political/military struggle and war, and as a force used under harsh conditions of discipline violence transforms into a 'methodology of mobilisation for war' (Brickhill 1990:18-21). Thus, under the condition of guerrilla warfare where a political goal is central, violence seems partly to gain a level of acceptance among both those affected, and those actively involved in it. Violence for the supported cause is perceived as 'just violence', as opposed to aimless force and brutality with no explanatory markers.

Where does this bring us in terms of the formation of perceptions under colonial rule? In line with Irwin-Zarecka's and Brickhill's understandings, perceptions of governance and rule, violence and resistance, are influenced by the underlying causes. How we perceive inflicted pain and violence is in accordance with the meaning we attach to it. It is the meaning given to an event, rather than the event itself, which is of importance (Irwin Zarecka 1994:49). Thus, memory and perceptions of violence and resistance are linked to actors' ideological stance. This ideological stance, giving an event its meaning, may override the importance of the event itself, such as 'just violence'.

In sum, perceptions formed under colonial rule carried layers of understanding. Firstly, an

understanding of governance and its structure: a strong central state and power infused local Native Authorities. Secondly, there is an understanding of modes of rule. Lastly there is resistance, based on ideological stance. These three layers of understanding regarding colonial power relations were framed by actors' socialisation and memory. Having conceptually separated perceptions linked to colonial power relations, it is important to note that in reality perceptions operate dynamically and interdependently. An understanding of power relations is based on peoples' priorities and ways of making sense of the past in a complex process occurring both consciously and unconsciously. The dynamics and interdependence of perceptions cause contradictions and complexities. For example, whilst there is an ideological resistance against racial oppression, internalisation of values of ethnic fragmentation is simultaneously present - causing resistance to carry ethnic differentiation as an inherent. This fragmentation will work against the primary cause, to resist racial oppression.

In terms of Mamdani's schema, a population functioning under the customary system carried over this mode of reasoning in relation to ethnic identity. Due to the way in which power was organised, power and ethnicity were institutionally and culturally linked. As ethnicity defined the parameters of rule, it also defined the resistance against it.

How is then the aforementioned line of thinking additional to Mamdani's framework? Mamdani's framework is understood as being focused on power relations looking at the '*institutional framework'*. What has here been argued is the influence of colonial power relations on perceptions, memory, and consciousness, thus a *'mental framework'*. Hence, we have adopted Mamdani's conceptualisation of colonial power relations, and with the support of notions of memory, perceptions, and power, we have built on the former framework to show how colonial legacy becomes part of the conscious and unconscious, and how people may experience history. Linking this to the Rhodesian experience, in terms of political culture, this means perceptions of power and ethnic differentiation became firmly cemented in peoples thinking and consequently acting. Having this historical understanding of the Rhodesian experience, power and ethnicity are inherently linked and embedded in the understanding of everyday life. Fragmentation and ethnic differentiation are through generations of exposure entering the subconscious of actors, moulding self-images and identity - inescapably a part of the personal content through which incidents and occurrences pass.

Thus, based on the above we can look at the Matabeleland conflict with the dual understanding of colonial power relations: one institutional framework and one mental framework. Both understandings have as a minimal communal starting point that the Matabeleland conflict could not have taken place *without* the historical baggage of colonial power relations, and particularly that of ethnic fragmentation and differentiation.

5. Power relations, Violence, and Public Discourse in the Matabeleland Conflict

A historical approach to the Matabeleland conflict opens up multiple angles of analysis, as does the context of 1980s. In this paper the focus is on three areas based on their centrality to how the conflict evolved, namely: power relations, violence and public discourse.

5.a Power Structures and Relations: Continuities and Shifts

Despite major changes in the political landscape at post-independence, certain power related

foundations remained. The Lancaster House Agreement stipulated strict rules regarding the acquisition of private land until 1990. Thereby economic power remained intact in settler hands. In terms of political power, nationalist parties were constrained by the provision that settlers retain 20 reserved seats (out of 100) in parliament. Furthermore, the inherited colonial administrative system, and particularly the segregated local government and judicial systems, underwent only peripheral changes in the 1980s. With hindsight, Rambanapasi noted in 1990 that 'there has been little change between the colonial and post-colonial regional policy frameworks even though the post-colonial regime has articulated an ideology of the state which substantially departs form that of the colonial state' (Makumbe 1998:38).[3]

Thus, despite majority rule and its concomitant transformation of power structures, only a limited alteration in the nature of power took place. In newly independent Zimbabwe there was in most cases no break with the forms of power specific to the formal institutions. Colonial rulers were removed, but replaced by others with similar powers. Continuity was particularly visible as some actors from the colonial institutions merely transferred into the new system. Thus, dissidents were met by state institutions such as the army and the police, using same methods as a few months earlier, though no longer formally 'the enemy'.

The shift from minority to majority rule, and the change of actors in power and in opposition, did however fundamentally transform political dynamics in Zimbabwe. With the legitimacy bestowed through democratic elections, struggles over power became significantly different. The 1980 general elections comprised the first opportunity for power relations between Zanu and Zapu to be openly weighed and measured. The periodical contest in elections opened a new sphere in political power competition, as the right to vote gave space for a qualitatively differently commitment regarding *choice* of political allegiance.

The need to win power through legal, administrative contest thus caused a shift in the competition between Zanu and Zapu. Other factors also influenced the shift. A salient difference was the empowerment the liberation war gave its victors. Both ex-Zipra dissidents and the new government came out of the experience of opposing power structures locally and centrally, having participated in defeating the mighty Rhodesian fire force. Both groupings had gained experience in the militariy and ideological fight for power. In the new situation however, only the government (and as it was perceived, Zanu PF) had access to the execution of state power. Thus the empowerment that had accrued to each side was used differently by the contestants in the conflict situation. The government hastened to protect its power, aiming to enlarge the hegemonic project through a one-party state. The ex-Zipra dissidents, unhappy with the army integration process and the Zapu/Zipra persecution, used their initial military empowerment by continuing the struggle as before, through sabotage and contacts with army forces.

The new majority rulers, Zanu (PF), had a history of dealing forcefully with internal opposition as well as fighting the colonial oppressors. The inherited state administration had the legal tools and experience necessary for dealing with 'subversion'. Furthermore, in the Fifth Brigade the new state had at hand a military force to eliminate 'malcontents'. The ongoing dissident activity posed a challenge to development and security, as well as an irritating threat to Zanu's power base. However, the Zanu(PF) government did not attempt conflict resolution or mediation during the conflict. Instead government actions had an explicit political purpose: to incapacitate its main political opposition through deliberate civilian targeting. Opposition (real or assumed) had to be eliminated. Applying Mamdani's notions to the Rhodesian case, one may argue that the citizens where white and settlers, and the subjects were black and natives. Independence brought a shift.

Colonial rulers were removed, but replaced by others with similar powers. Now the victors (Zanu PF) were in government and could be conceptualised as having assumed the role of 'citizens', whilst those dissatisfied with unfulfilled liberation war goals, were treated as 'subjects'.
What is central in the 'translation' of Mamdani's notion of citizen and subject to the post-independent era, are the power relation and the perceptions connected to it. Thus, a key for understanding the analytical usage of Mamdani's framework in this way is the dichotomy of rulers and ruled as mirrored from the colonial period, and the methods of control involved. The emphasis here is on the institutional and mental inheritance of the authoritarian use of power and how it was manifested after independence. The transfer of the citizen and subject concept into the post-independent era, is therefore not an argument that Zanu(PF) consciously placed Ndebele citizens as their 'rural colonial' subjects. Instead, the analytical usage of the Mamdani framework rather leans on the insight into how from the onset of colonial penetration power, ethnicity, and violence became interconnected. Thus, the Zanu (PF) being conceptualised as 'citizens' relates to the party's power ambitions and historically ingrained perceptions of authority, legitimacy and rule. This is exemplified through the ruling party's attempt to fundamentally suppress the existing opposition - as had the colonial rulers.
We can conclude, first, that no overnight changes took place regarding the structural way of organising power. The *nature of power* had not changed compared to that of the late colonial period. Centrally and locally, power was executed much in the same way as in the late colonial period, although the ideological basis was entirely different as were government ambitions for change.[4] The modes of rule as conceptualised by Mamdani had been transformed as the racially dominated rule had been replaced. Similarly and subsequently, resistance had also been transformed. *Power relations* between actors, primarily Zanu and Zapu, were distinctly different from pre-independence days. However, central to the understanding of post-independent power relations and the development of the Matabeleland conflict is that whilst power relations had changed, *perceptions* of power had *not* changed. The layers of understanding regarding power relations, framed by socialisation and memory, continued to operate. Thus, conformity to rule, internalisation of values and resistance to that which was perceived as oppressive, were in motion just as before independence. While the actors had changed, the way in which the new actors executed power in relation to opposition had not, as their mental framework remained in the colonial setting. Patterns from colonial rule of 'citizens' ruling 'subjects' were repeated and reproduced.

5.b. Power and Violence: The Fifth Brigade

(i) The 'Pacification of Undesirable Ideas'

The violence conducted by dissidents and other civil unrest prompted military action by the government. After the Entumbane clashes (1980/1981), military operations were carried out in Matabeleland North and South, and continued in various forms until the Unity Agreement was made public in December 1987. Neither ex-Zipra dissidents nor the government considered mediation and conflict resolution a possibility. The government's choice of a military strategy however caused a backlash. Rather than containing dissident activity the armed clampdown led to more army desertions and promoted further violence.
In 1983-1984 the Matabeleland conflict reached a peak in which the scale of organised violence

affected several thousand people. The army conducted unambiguous, indiscriminate and massive targeting of civilians through army counter-insurgency operations in Matabeleland North/South/Midlands provinces. Based on the assumption that the dissidents operated through Zapu political structures, the government attempted by various means to break down the opposition party's organisation. Bearing the colonial and liberation war experiences in mind, control of local structures was crucial. The focus was therefore not *per se* to eradicate dissidents, as claimed. The government's presentation of events, although possibly lacking in information and overview of dissident intentions, was used in the interest of the ruling party's power position. Since the legitimacy of the dissident cause was linked to the political standing that Zapu had achieved through the years, the threat of a power seizure was argued to be extensive, which in turn was used as a justification for armed confrontation.

The most brutal armed activities were conducted by the Fifth Brigade, which had been trained by the North Koreans to become a highly effective army unit. Having been formed in order to handle 'insecurity' by 'malcontents' and answerable directly to the Prime Minister, the Fifth Brigade acquired a particular status - one directly connected to the power of the state (interview Munemo, 1996).[5] Upon graduation, the Brigade received instructions to deploy in Matabeleland in counter-insurgency operations. In addition to capturing dissidents, the Brigade's task was politically to reorient Matabeleland civilians. According to Mugabe:

> They [the Fifth Brigade] were trained by the Koreans because we wanted one arm of the army to have a political orientation which stems from our philosophy as Zanu (PF). So when we deployed them in parts of Matabeleland North, their approach was not just to use the gun. It was also political, as was their approach during the war. You don't just act against the dissident. You also act with the population so that they can support the government (Five Brigade, 1983).

The Fifth Brigade's political objective regarding Matabeleland civilians proved in practice to be extremely harsh. The Brigade's methods were disclosed by the results of its first Matabeleland deployment (January -July 1983). Within the first six weeks more than 2000 civilians had been killed, thousands assaulted in public mass beatings, and hundreds of homesteads burnt. Most of the dead were killed in public executions. Those particularly selected were Zapu members, ex-Zipra combatants or army deserters. The Brigade pattern of intervention consisted of waves of intense brutality, followed by random incidents of beatings and executions (CCJP/LRF 1997: 23, 48, 50, 80, 83).

Central to the Brigade's military operations was the assumption that dissidents operated interchangeably as civilians/guerrillas and had local backing. Therefore brigade operations could not be solely focused on identifiable dissidents. Civilian targeting was a clear Brigade goal. Once the 'armed element was removed' a new phase followed where contacts were replaced with methods to 'alienate or pacify undesirable ideas still embedded in the local population' (interview Munemo,1996). Pacification through coercion took place in the form of 'pungwes', using the method of guerrilla political education extended to civilians during the war. The message was to desist from supporting dissidents, to agree that local political orientation was 'wrong', and to accept government authority.

When the Brigade redeployed (September 1983), the pacification campaign was evidently changed to tactics of terror in order to induce extreme fear. This required a political decision,

according Lt. Col. Munemo, as a campaign of such a natutre was beyond the authority of the army. The new strategy was of a clandestine character, as operations shifted from the village setting to interrogation camps. Civilians were assembled (without detention orders) and transported in truckloads to makeshift army centres in which conditions were created to induce maximum hardship. Survivors report the use of electric shocks, excessive beating, rape, genital mutilation and fundamentally dehumanising activities where ethnicity and sexuality were central. In addition to torture, detainees suffered food denial and forced labour (such as grave excavating). Corpses were buried inside the camp and in mine shafts.

(ii) The Militarisation of Ethnic Identity

An instrumental element in the Fifth Brigade operations was its ethnic stance. Victims' accounts repeatedly emphasise the ethnic discourse used by soldiers, victimising people identified with the Ndebele ethnic group, and stressing Shona superiority. Soldiers often told civilians that their task was to 'wipe out the Ndebeles', one of the reasons being the crimes conducted by Ndebele warriors on Shona ancestors (CCJP 1984:9, Werbner 1991:162, Alexander et al 2000:222). Lt. Col Munemo explained:

> The blunt truth is that we are dealing with a situation in which there was a forced feeling of superiority and inferiority complexes between the two tribes, shall we say. That is the truth. A subsequent explanation would be that it was a clear question of settling old scores between the two tribes (Interview Munemo, 1996).

In the Commander's view, when the ruling party claimed the Fifth Brigade as 'its' army, this also translated into an ethnic (pro-Shona) claim, which influenced the brigade's transformation into an ethnically and politically biased unit. Operating under the assumption that local structures supported the dissidents, it pinpointed the Ndebele civilians as justified targets. When orders had filtered down to the operational level, ethnicity crystallised further. According to Lt. Col Munemo, on that level political and ethnic identity had amalgamated into an enemy identification in which the insurgent was firstly of Ndebele origin, and secondly with Zapu as political affiliation. Further, the forms of violence used by the Fifth Brigade had culture-specific tendencies. For example, being aware that burial and mourning where tears of the living release the soul of the deceased were central in Ndebele culture, soldiers refused to allow corpses to be buried. Instead they allowed the dead to decompose publicly, and killed family members who wept. As the Commander admitted, that when it came down to soldiers executing operations in villages, the modus operandi 'could not have any sophisticated discourse, it became simply ethnic'. Lt. Col. Lionel Dyke, who led the first Task Force to Matabeleland at the inception of the conflict, stated the following regarding his successors' tactics:

> I support it [the government's strategy to deploy the Fifth Brigade]. I think quite often you have to be cruel to be kind. ... I believe the Matabele understand that sort of harsh treatment, far better than the treatment that I myself was giving them, where we would just hunt and kill if a man was armed - or find a man who was unarmed and seemed to be a terrorist, and take him away to be dealt with legally. That was the Rhodesian way of doing things, and I had been brought up to do. It was, I think, not all that successful. The fact is

> that when the Fifth Brigade went in, they did brutally deal with the problem. If you were a dissident sympathiser, you died. (Interview Dyke, 1994)[6]

The Fifth Brigade's actions went thus from a policy of pacification to a policy of terror tactics, and from an identification of the enemy as a dissidents with local support, to the insurgent as Ndebele. In both instances the Brigade's perspective became simplified and more extreme. How can we understand such a process?

Apter notes that political violence polarises people around affiliations such as race and ethnicity, feeds on divisions and intolerance, and generates extreme loyalties. As Apter formulates it: political violence 'turns boundaries in the mind to terrains and jurisdictions on the ground' (1997:1). This compartmentalisation planted from mind to ground is in Apter's view connected to boundary making and remaking. Political violence is explicitly designated for a reordering purpose: that of smashing the old in order to reset it anew. In the quest to reset boundaries, violence generates its own objects, and 'interior' meanings arise (Apter 1997:1). Apter also notes that once violence has begun, it develops within its interiority and its own rationality. It is divorced and above the rest of society. Apter reminds us that interpretations and explanations need not be convincing to outsiders, only to those involved. The collective's rules become binding, and penetration or violation of boundaries, goals or principles give rise to punitive outrage. Perpetrators invoke their own legitimising principles, aiming at altering boundaries, moral and territorial (Apter 1997:6,16, 17).

The extreme violence Matabeleland civilians were subjected to in the makeshift interrogation camps cannot be explained solely by dissident destabilisation in the region. The sadistic forms of torture conducted on arbitrarily selected men, women and youth had not much to do with the question whether anyone was sympathetic to dissident activity or not. Adopting Apter's conceptualisation, it was political violence 'designated for a reordering purpose'. The task was to 'smash the old' Zapu political affinity, and to 'reset it anew', into affirming government authority. But as the violence evolved, as Apter notes, it developed its own rationality. Clandestinely conducted in the makeshift camps, 'divorced from and above the rest of the society', the conduct of violence did not need to be understood or seen as justified by anyone other than members of the Fifth Brigade. Driven by the impetus to hate, they 'invoked their own legitimising principles', as Apter has put it. The Fifth Brigade's punitive outrage has been well documented by the CCJP in their report on the Matabeleland destabilisation, which gives many examples of horrifying, humiliating, and excruciatingly painful treatments of Matabeleland civilians (CCJP/LRF 1997).

The ethnic content in the extreme Fifth Brigade violence is also documented. The use of cultural markers in torture was striking. Appadurai, writing on collective behaviour and severe ethnic violence, notes that violence inflicted on the human body in ethnic contexts is 'never entirely random or lacking in cultural form'. A link is made between the forms of bodily violence and the relationship of purity to identity. The body constitutes the material form of the ethnic other, and is in horrible efforts 'exposed, penetrated and occupied' (Appadurai 1997:7).

How can we understand the extreme Fifth Brigade violence and its ethnic orientation from a historical perspective? To gain insight into the occurrences we link back to power and ethnicity in the colonial period. Mamdani notes that without taking into account how in the colonial context power was organised and how it was fought, one cannot understand the *force* with which resistance to the colonisers took place (1996:286-287). In the Matabeleland context, similarly, without taking into account both the colonial experience (how power was organised), and the experience of the liberation war, (how power/authority was fought), one cannot understand the

force by which the new government reacted toward the destabilisation taking place. Just as in the colonial experience when resistance, in accordance with the Mamdani conceptualisation, was shaped by the very structure it resisted, in the Matabeleland conflict, the government's response was shaped by the imprint of the colonial mode of rule. Thus, when rule and power were questioned by dissidents, rulers responded through state force. The government opted for the method and strategy used by themselves to fight colonial power (counter-insurgency), but with the power perception previously held by the colonial government. What forcefully came through in the Fifth Brigade activities was the notion that power embedded centrally in government must be enforced locally, and that those who opposed central power must be fragmented, removed, ousted, or exterminated. The method was, as in the liberation war, to erode military capacity partly by destroying the institutional structure. Thus, the Mugabe government's decision to respond with force against civilians (and dissidents), reflects a clear continuity with the Rhodesian government's response of force against civilians (and 'terrorists').

The way the Fifth Brigade's operations simply turned 'ethnic' can thus be seen as a response in which perceptions linked to the past operated dynamically and interdependently in the present. Subsequently the Fifth Brigade created an identity for themselves and another for the Matabele civilians. Here we can return to Irwin-Zarecka's point of how we perceive the meaning of an event. Identity formation, history and a cultural context are only relevant in relation to which meaning we attach to it, the meaning being a result of our perceptions. Hence, the Fifth Brigade's arrival at the 'ethnic turn' can be seen as a complex process of past and present operating simultaneously, in the context of a war resulting in a crude and unsophisticated formula of ethnic violence.

Although the Fifth Brigade acted in a seemingly isolated manner in the closed-off Matabeleland region, and where soldiers were carriers of individual perceptions of power, ethnicity and violence, it is however imperative to remember that the brigade acted on orders from Prime Minister Mugabe. How detailed their orders were, and how much of the brigade's operational methods derived from their North Korean training, is not documented. The fact remains that the actions that were taken were conducted by a state army, on the basis of a policy and executed based on oficial orders. The point made here is that whilst members of the government operated with their 'institutional' and 'mental' frameworks as a backdrop to current decision-making, so did the soldiers in the brigade. Thus, the simultaneous effect of a government's set of orders and a brigade's execution of them, both being influenced by 'institutional' and 'mental' frameworks, reinforced the outcome. Subsequently, Matabeleland became an arena in which historical experiences were released, relived and reformatted for current use.

5.c Power and Perceptions: Government Discourse

(i) The Mobilisation of Bias

In government discourse the public was not given much space to react to the state measures. Two issues were seemingly central in the messages presented to the public: to identify the enemy in the Matabeleland conflict, and to create consent for violence as the method chosen by the government to solve the conflict.

A conscious effort to steer public opinion in a specific direction is not an arbitrary affair. To put forward an official message to the public convincingly necessitates both specific strategies and

methods. In his writing on political violence, Apter argues that since such violence is interpretative, discourse plays an important role in legitimising it. The discourses are fictive and logical reconstructions of reality (1997: 2,6).
Herman/Chomsky examine propaganda and how to 'manage' public opinion through media propaganda campaigns. They conclude that propaganda can distort, misrepresent, and suppress evidence in conformity with elite priorities (Herman/Chomsky 1994:xiii). Through the media, privileged groups that dominate the society and the state defend their economic, social and political agendas. In this process a 'mobilisation of bias' and a 'manufacturing of consent' occurs through the selection of topics, distribution of concerns, filtering of information, emphasis and tone, and through keeping a debate within certain boundaries. In cases of conflict, the authors conclude, the processing of news fails to place public policy into a meaningful context (Herman/Chomsky 1994: xii, 298).
Throughout the conflict violence stood in the centre of events and interpretations. In media and government rallies government representatives openly stated that the authorities would 'eradicate', 'destroy', 'crush', 'wipe out', and 'kill' all dissidents.[7] The same line of argument applied to the apprehension of alleged dissident sympathisers. Mugabe reiterated that it was impossible to distinguish between dissidents and their sympathisers, and that both categories were just as guilty of dissident crimes. Therefore both were subject to the same measures. In executing these measures, it was unavoidable that innocent people were victimised in the process. Mugabe explained:

> The government is going to track down the dissidents until they are completely wiped out. Those who harbour and support dissidents will too be wiped out. We cannot select, because dissidents have no distinguishing marks (We will, 1983).

Seemingly, the fear of the 'wrath' of the government was intended to be greater than the fear of non-co-operation with the dissidents. The government message echoed past experience. During the liberation war collective punishment was meted out against civilians as the rural population supporting 'terrorists' were themselves seen as 'terrorists'. Subsequently, no differentiation could be made between those presumed guilty and those perceived to be innocent. Thus, the understanding that innocent people were victimised in the Matabeleland conflict allegedly in the process of dissident apprehension, mirrored somewhat the Rhodesian government's understanding of a similar setting during the liberation war, constituting an unmistakable continuity between pre- and post-independence forms of authoritarian rule and abuse of power.
In government discourse, in order to induce fear, create acceptance for violence, legitimacy for military and policy interventions, and minimise other resolution options, a partisan narrative disseminating values of the government was enacted, using the methods of propaganda. During the conflict and particularly at the height of the Fifth Brigade operations, the government enforced a news blockade by which no one external to the region was allowed entrance. A blanket censorship rested over massacres, executions and rapes.

Discourse Past and Present

How can we relate this development to our understanding of the Matabeleland conflict and the 'institutional' and 'mental' frameworks?

The production of authoritative messages with a political content, particularly in a conflict situation, for the purpose of convincing a population, can be conceptualised as the same as the intent to influence and shape perceptions. To overtly distort and suppress vital information can be conceptualised as tanatmount to the enforcement of power relations. In both cases the impact on perceptions is crucial as they are the foundation for actors' decision-making. We come back to our earlier discussion on Foucault's understanding of power as a technique. In Foucault's view identities are shaped and moulded through the exercise of disciplinary power. Individuals falling outside the adopted norm are given a certain identity. For fear of marginalisation and repression individuals conform as stipulated by the ruling elite.
Government discourse in the Matabeleland conflict was a forceful method to instil the hegemonic power relation for which primarily Zanu(PF) stood for. It skilfully used propaganda, divided the nation into those who were 'right' and 'wrong', those who were for unity and national security and those who were 'enemies of the state'. The government succeeded, following Foucault's vocabulary, in creating a norm through its disciplinary character. Subsequently, those who feared marginalisation or repression, conformed to the norm. The norm stipulated that government military intervention was legitimate, and the use of violence on civilians was justified.

However, the extent to which adaptation and conformity to norms can be achieved by rulers relates to the historical background, just as do power relations. The Smith government was, particularly during the liberation war, infamous for its propaganda, censorship and distortion of events. Particularly well know were the air-dropped brochures describing the perceived criminality of guerrilla combatants toward rural civilians. Thus, the colonial government created a norm and through its disciplinary character enforced it on its adversaries. However, its success was evidently limited. Zanu and Zapu mobilisation in the rural areas was not seemingly fundamentally affected by the Smith government's discourse. Why was the Smith government's propaganda strategy unsuccessful?
In the liberation war, the conflicting parties' objectives were clear: colonial minority rule versus independence and majority rule. Despite propaganda, distortions, and the suppression of information, taking a side in the war was not ambiguous for either party.[8] In the Matabeleland conflict however, dissident objectives were neither homogeneous, nor were they disseminated, while government objectives were enveloped in propaganda. However, judging from participation in demonstrations and rallies, and actions taken by the Zanu(PF) party, Youth , and Women's' organisations particularly 1985-1987, the government's discourse was seemingly *adhered to*. Why? What constituted the difference between Smith's and Mugabe's propaganda machines? In terms of method, not much. In fact, Mugabe's government reproduced most of the old techniques, including the airdropped folders - this time describing the perceived criminality of dissidents against rural civilians. However, what differed were *perceptions of those who ruled.* Coming out of a 15-year liberation war, many in the newly independent country saw majority rule as a historical accomplishment carried by its liberation movements, who now governed the country. Thus, a widespread perception of credibility for the rulers existed, which helped support a disbelief in eyewitness accounts regarding state violence in Matabeleland. Furthermore, the use of violence against opposition was historically ingrained - the rulers' legitimacy to act included historically violence both as a method and ideology. Thus, credibility, in addition to distortion and suppression of vital information, historically conditioned conformity to authority, historical legitimacy for violence against opposition, and fear of violence, were all elements at hand to the

government.
Through the skilful manoeuvring of these elements the government attempted to induce fear, create acceptance for violence, seek legitimacy for its military and policy interventions, and minimise discussion of alternative conflict resolution measures. Doing so, it reproduced the methods adopted during colonial rule. It utilised citizens' perceptions of credibility inherited from the liberation war resistance against colonial rule, and at the same time adopted colonial perceptions of absolute rule.

6. Lessons Learned: Sites of Struggle in the reorientation of political values

How can we understand the above continuities? Reflecting on the fact that institutions and positioning change, fluctuate and shift, it is important to point out that the Matabeleland conflict developed in non-linear manner. Complex patterns of responses to contradictions carried over from historical experience were played out in the contemporary situation, resulting in a diversity of reactions, based on actors' current goals and objectives. Thus, historical events and meanings attached to them were in a constant dialectic with current events, causing the foundation for the formation of perceptions to be in constant flux. Considering decision-making being based on one's perceptions of events and developments, it is clear that actors at a number of conjunctures made *choices* regarding positioning and which actions to take.

The Politics of Choice

The availability of choice in government policy decision-making during the conflict was an issue seldom stressed by government discourse, nor in parliament. Instead, reference was made to destabilisation as a war situation, and the inevitability of a military response. The state of emergency was extended every six months, without much discussion of alternative routes or methods to those chosen under the emergency situation. Government positioning was presented as *the* choice, whilst simultaneously barring other options from discourse space. The stress on inevitability of certain responses and actions includes an underlying assumption, that of freedom from accountability. How can one be accountable for a decision one was circumstantially 'forced' to make? This is exemplified by Robert Mugabe's reply regarding Fifth Brigade atrocities when he stated 'I won't apologise. This is what happens in a war' (*Tell me*, 1993). Thus during, as well as after, the conflict, there was a tendency to see government policy in terms of responses toward destabilisation as a one way street: the motion could only go in one direction on a path irreversibly taken. Such an interpretation of the situation reduced the complex and contradictory to a neat and linear context, in which distinct choices were not available. As Mamdani has argued, despite economic, sociological and cultural constraints, decisions are made. Interpreting circumstances however as a 'noncontradictiory whole' may lead to the kind of one-way process referred to here:

> It is tempting to read back from an event and to explain it as the necessary outcome of historically evolved circumstances or consciousness. Such a reading back obscures the element of choice that confronted participants at each step along this historical route (1996:226).

Thus, obscuring government choice during the Matabeleland conflict had less to do with real options than with the politics of choice, and had less to do with the 'necessity' of force than with political will.

Hence, contrary to the message that choices were not available, decisions and actions were taken not only by government, but all conflict actors. A myriad of choices were made based on a variety of criteria, such as instructions, group decisions or singular positionings. Decision-making took place in the dynamics of historical understanding and contemporary contradictions. Thus, we cannot understand the Matabeleland conflict without attempting to understand the complex and contradictory context in which it is played out. Within this context there must be an emphasis on choice, rather than decisions being 'necessary outcomes of historically evolved circumstances'. As the conflict was focused on power relations and political positioning, it brings to the fore the choice of political allegiance. The long experience of difference, polarising Zanu and Zapu, became overt in a new fashion after independence. Both Zapu and Zanu wanted state power to execute their programmes. Despite marginalisation and persecution of party members, Zapu made the choice to stay in the coalition government in order to influence decision-making. Zanu used military intervention in order to reorient the political values and beliefs of Matabeleland civilians, to shift political allegiance from Zapu to Zanu. Thus, in the conflict of power relations, the *space of choice* to choose political allegiance was crucial.

The Space of Choice

In his study of late colonial power relations Mamdani argues that the key to alien hegemony was a cultural project of harnessing the moral, historical and community impetus behind local custom. Custom was defined and enforced by traditional Native Authorities in the local state (1996:286). Customary law, unlike civil law, was in Mamdani's conceptualisation an administratively driven affair, for those who enforced custom were in a position to define it in the first place. Custom was, according to Mamdani, state ordained and state enforced. This led to the customary being more often than not the site of struggle. Custom was often the outcome of a contest between various forces, not just those in power or on the scene agents. The contest took place in an institutional context and framework which was heavily skewed in favour of state-appointed customary authorities (1996:22).

We have used the above understanding explaining how ethnicity and power became inherently intertwined in the Matabeleland conflict. Thus, as a result of resistance of colonial power both within the local state and against the central state, ethnic identity became part of the struggle. Before independence, the site of the struggle was the customary. The Matabeleland conflict on the other hand, took place after independence. Power relations between the major actors had been transformed, circumstances were changed. Elections were a measurement of loyalties and allegiances, and were (formally) the arbitrators of political strength. Actors had a choice when voting for whom to rule, albeit not their policies of rule. Nevertheless, power relations could, compared to Rhodesian pre-independence, be influenced through general elections. The site of struggle was no longer the customary. The contest between forces was not about custom and who enforced it. Where can one then conceptualise the site of the struggle in the Matabeleland conflict?

We noted above that as the Matabeleland conflict was focused on power relations, it caused political positioning and the choice of political allegiance to be central. Within Zanu many saw

Zapu as a stumbling block for the party's quest to implement a one-party state. Thus to Zanu's hegemonic project Zapu allegiance, values and beliefs were a hindrance. The space available for formal political choice - elections - gave nevertheless the right for political allegiance to be manifested and legally executed. Thus, to *change* the political allegiance of those who were a hindrance to the hegemonic project became imperative. In the Matabeleland conflict, the attempt to shift peoples' political allegiance is painfully apparent in the Fifth Brigade operations, where the alienation and pacification of 'undesirable ideas' and the enforcement of government authority in terms of a 'new political thinking', were rationales for executing military operations. However, the shift of individuals' political allegiance does not take place through prompted instructions, requests, or violence. In the conflict this is evident for example when Matabeleland inhabitants chose to keep their Zapu membership cards and loyalty, although forced *en masse* to buy Zanu(PF) cards and undergo political reorientation efforts at 'pungwes'. In Nkayi, Zapu committees were forced to rename themselves Zanu(PF). However, political allegiance did not shift. 'It was just on paper, we were all Zapu members', remembers a committee member (Alexander et al, 2000:225). In line with this reasoning it is clear, that in the Matabeleland conflict the subjects of the struggle were not the dissidents. They were a subordinate issue in the conflict. The subjects of the conflict were the population of Matabeleland who, despite massive state violence showed in two elections their political allegiance to the opposition party Zapu. Noting that the Matabeleland population were the subjects of the conflict, we can further conclude that the site of the struggle can be conceptualised to be the *space of choice* this part of the population exercised in terms of political values and beliefs. Thus, the contested space is the site in which people decided their political preference. What is the content of the struggle at this site? Why does this site propel such forceful reactions?

When conceptualising the site of struggle, we can separate between a 'physical' and a 'mental' site. Whilst the physical site can be understood to concern institutions, the mental site can be comprehended as the space of choice exercised by individuals. The institutional site can be influenced and controlled through administrative measures and changes in structure. For example, the two political institutions Zanu and Zapu united to form one party, causing changes in structure due the merger. Contrary to the physical site, the mental site cannot be controlled and change cannot simply be forged. In the case of the Zanu-Zapu merger, structure changed, but the meaning members attached to this change could not be enforced by party leaders. Thus, the space of choice in terms of the meaning given to the merger could not be controlled. The distinction between the physical and the mental is important. In the Matabeleland conflict the struggle does not concern the right to create democratic institutions, i.e. physical sites. This took place in the previous struggle fought in the liberation war. At post-independence through majority elections, two parties governed and democratic institutions were, in a general sense, in place. Thus, the struggle was not the *choice for creating* these institutions. Instead the struggle was the *space of choice* to democratically *utilise* those physical sites. That this space was utilised is evident as notwithstanding harassment, abductions, torture and murders of Zapu members prior to the 1985 elections, opposition party members did not refrain from Zapu political activism nor from going to the polls to vote for their choice of political party.

From the above reasoning we can conclude that the physical site, involving institutional change, may be forged through power. This is contrary to the mental site, where the space of choice is operative, because change in the mental site cannot be forcefully executed. Perceptions and thought cannot be controlled. Thought can be institutionally framed, influenced, co-opted or

finally extinguished, but even in the moment before a thought is finally terminated - it cannot be externally controlled. Yet for rulers to succeed in any kind of political transition, thought - in terms of actors' political positioning, values and beliefs - is imperative, as it is the basis for decision-making. We can now return to our previous conclusion on the location of site, and re-pose the question: what is the content of the struggle at this site? Through our reasoning we concluded that the site of struggle is the space created by the element of choice to exercise free political thought. The content of the struggle at this site is then on the one hand, the attempt to change individuals' political allegiance, and on the other hand, the right to utilise the exercise of free choice. In the Matabeleland conflict, the government and the ruling party Zanu(PF) fought to influence and control this site, forcefully attempting to shift Zapu allegiance to Zanu support. However, as apparent in the way Matabeleland inhabitants reacted, their political choices were not determined by state violence. The mental site is not a sphere that can be controlled. That is why the site of struggle being the space of choice is so powerful, and propels such forceful reactions. A conclusion drawn by Mamdani is that 'the most important institutional legacy of colonial rule, may lie in the inherited impediments to democratisation' (1996:25). Connecting this conclusion to our above reasoning, we may note that: if the mental site of struggle is the space of choice in terms of values and beliefs, in which the democratically elected government tried to forcefully alter perceptions in favour of its own hegemonic project, then the mental site constitutes an impediment to democratisation. Thus, the legacy of colonial power relations impedes democratic rule, although power derives from democratic elections. Put differently: even though institutionally power has been democratically established, the dialectics of the institutional and mental frameworks with current developments, overpower institutional democracy. Hence, even though in Zimbabwe the post-independent government was democratically elected, the unchanged nature of power inherited from the colonial era, in combination with authoritarian power perceptions, overruled the legally and institutionally established democracy.

Concluding remarks

Fifteen years have passed since the end of the Matabeleland conflict. The brutality of the state's armed forces has not repeated, i.e. systematic public executions and extreme violence against civilians have not been carried out as during the conflict. Continuities nevertheless exist. As the political crisis of Zimbabwe deepens, the government's agenda to maintain power becomes transparent. The authoritarian project of the state cannot be obscured by formal multi-party democracy and the existence of a plethora of civic organisations. Whilst land redistribution takes centre stage on the governments' discourse, the collapse of the rule of law, fundamental economic difficulties, and a crisis of political legitimacy framed by violence against real and perceived opposition, is the context of political existence in Zimbabwe today.
Subsequently, the struggle - as during the Matabeleland conflict - may still be conceptualised to be the space of choice in which Zimbabwean civilians' wish to exercise free political thought and preference of political allegiance. And, as in the 1980s, this site propels strong reactions, as the ruling party fights to influence and control the site, forcefully attempting to shift opposition allegiance to Zanu (PF) support. Thus, the critical difference between democratically established institutions and the right of utilisation of those institutions central to the Matabeleland conflict, remains crucial to the Zimbabwean politics of today. The post-colonial project of democratisation remains unfinished. At the beginning of the new millennium Zimbabwean citizens may arrive at the

same conclusion as fifteen years earlier: shifting from an authoritarian rule, change of institutions does not necessarily take place if not followed by a democratisation of perspectives.

Notes

1. This paper is based on 'Uprooting the Weeds: Power, Ethnicity and Violence in the Matabeleland Conflict 1980-1987', Ph.D. thesis, University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences., September 2001.
2. Zanu (PF): Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front). Zanla: Zimbabwe African Liberation Army, Zanu's military wing.
PF-Zapu: Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union. Zipra: Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army, Zapu's military wing.
3. In Makumbe's view, the central government's reluctance to decentralise power, authority and responsibility to local authorities resulted in democratic centralism, in which 'little, if any, real power, authority and responsibility was transferred from the centre to the periphery' (Makumbe 1998:39).
4. For details on government reforms in the 1980s, see Stoneman/Cliffe 1989:168-175.
5. Lt. Col. Munemo was Deputy Commander for the Fifth Brigade December 1982 – April 1983 under (now Air Marshall) Perence Shiri, where after he and Shiri switched roles. Lt. Col. Munemo was the Commander until July 1983, after which he left his position to take up specialised training in Nigeria (interview, 1996).
6. Lt. Col. Dyke's statement highlights existing perceptions linked to differentiation and violence. By stating that particularly *the Matabele* understand harsh treatment, implies a comparison to another group, disclosing differentiation between groups. By stating that the same group understands a harsh treatment 'better' than through corrective measures defined through a court of law, discloses the perception that to 'brutally deal' with the problem is legitimate. Lt. Col Dyke's support of the Fifth Brigade operations also indicates a perception of state power legitimately being absolute: the right to kill dissident 'sympathisers'.
7. For sources for these expressions, see Ministry of Information, 1983:4; Tribal Rule, 1983; Throw Away, 1983; Disarm Now, 1983; We will, 1983; Dissidents Caught, 1983.
8. This is not to ignore or deny the complexities in relation to guerrilla support, recruitment, and authority in relation to rural civilians. See Kriger (1992).

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Power, Education, and Identity in Post-colonial Zimbabwe: the fate of King Lobengula of Matabeleland

Introduction

With a higher rate of literacy and mass-education in Zimbabwe, books on history have become increasingly important. Previously history was orally transmitted, but today history books compete with each other on the book market. In this competition, authors draw on their Ndebele identity to justify their representation of Ndebele history, and simultaneously foster Ndebeleness through their writings. History is frequently used for political ends, not least by colonial powers and nation-states. Those who have the power to represent the past, have also the means to relate the past to the present political situation. By controlling the past, one can legitimise the present, and various actors often try to do that.

In this article, I show how the indigenous historian Pathisa Nyathi represents Ndebele history as opposed to how colonial authors represent that history, on the one hand, and to how authors of Zimbabwean schoolbooks represent it, on the other hand. My aim is threefold. I want to give an example of how indigenous authors in present-day southern Africa increasingly claim the right to define their own people in written form. I also wish to describe how Ndebele belonging has been built on colonial images and indigenous counter-images of the Ndebele as either 'cruel' or 'brave' warriors. And, finally, I want to show how Ndebele identity is simultaneously constructed in relation to the colonial past and the present Zimbabwean nation-state.

The writing of history is a political as well as a scientific project that is dependent on both the author's values and the methodology one uses. Writing history is positional, as Jonathan Friedman puts it, 'that is, it is dependent upon where one is located in social reality, within society, and within global process' (1992a:194). At the same time, the writing of history is built on a methodology that follows logical rules about sources and causality presented in a linear narrative form. An author's values are thus most evident when he or she is dealing with both politically important questions and a period in the past that is difficult to reconstruct because evidence is scarce. I illustrate this by analysing how Pathisa Nyathi, the various colonial authors, and some authors of Zimbabwean schoolbooks describe three key events in Ndebele history.

Memory-texts, the colonial library, and schoolbooks

In the following, I first present Pathisa Nyathi's representation of the Ndebele genesis. Nyathi is a former teacher and headmaster, who currently works as provincial Education Officer in Bulawayo within the Ministry of Education, Sports, and Culture. He is a well-known commentator in the city, and has written extensively on Ndebele history. Significant for Nyathi's historical texts are that they largely are based on oral history, that is on interviews he has conducted with elders in Matabeleland. The Ministry of Education promotes the teaching of national history and only approves texts written in English. Since many of Nyathi's books on Ndebele history are locally-patriotic and written in *isiNdebele*, they are not used as compulsory texts in school. In Matabeleland, they are either read outside the school curriculum, or introduced under the subject *isiNdebele*.

I first met Pathisa Nyathi at the Swedish Embassy in Harare in 1993, where he gave a lecture on early Ndebele history. The lecture was an English summary of a book manuscript written in *isiNdebele*, which was subsequently published with support from Sida, the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency. Two years later, I saw the book in many bookstores and libraries in Bulawayo, as well as in school libraries in rural Matabeleland. This book was the first volume in Pathisa Nyathi's trilogy on early Ndebele history (Nyathi 1994, 1996, 1999).[1]
Because of the self-defining character of Pathisa Nyathi's representation of the Ndebele genesis, it may be compared with what Valentine Mudimbe (1991:89ff) refers to as a 'memory-text'. A memory-text, Mudimbe claims, is beyond the difference between history and myth (cf. Levi-Strauss 1966). It is a discourse that via the retelling of a genesis 'validates a human geography'. A memory-text, Mudimbe writes, is

> both a legend and a dream for political power. In effect it links words and names to possessed things and spaces, designating motions of ancestors ... according to processes of appropriations of power and governance over new lands. (1991:91)

After presenting Pathisa Nyathi's description of the Ndebele genesis, I show how other, non-indigenous, authors have described three hotly debated issues in Ndebele historiography: the birth of the Ndebele state, a succession crisis within this state, and the end of the state. I also describe how some authors, and the sources they build upon, portray the Ndebele in a rather stereotyped way. These accounts were published before independence in 1980, and together they resemble what Mudimbe has termed 'the colonial library'.[2]

This library, Mudimbe (1994:xii) states,

> represents a body of knowledge constructed with the explicit purpose of faithfully translating and deciphering the African object. Indeed, it fulfilled a political project in which, supposedly, the object unveils its being, its secrets, and its potential to a master who could, finally, domesticate it.

However, the colonial domestication of the African object has not been unchallenged. As a part of their nation-state projects, independent governments in Africa have made strong efforts to establish their own knowledge-producing institutions, such as universities, compulsory school-systems, and publishing houses. In sub-Saharan Africa, the number of universities has increased from about ten universities in the 1960s to almost two hundred today (Sall 2002). Since the time of independence, primary and secondary schools, as well as publishing houses, have increased in number, often with the help of foreign aid. In Zimbabwe, the school system expanded greatly after independence, and the number of African publishing houses has increased since 1980. Many of the latter are members of APNET, the African Publishers' Network, which has its headquarters in Harare (Sida 2002).
After describing colonial representations of Ndebele history, I therefore also present how some Zimbabwean-produced books portray this history, and especially how they describe the fate of the second Ndebele king, Lobengula Khumalo. I concentrate on Zimbabwean history textbooks. After independence, new schoolbooks on history have been published by Zimbabwean publishing houses. Many of these books are written from a nationalist perspective. In Matabeleland, history

teachers have ambivalent feelings about this, since they do not always feel included in the nation-building project. Some people have also claimed that these schoolbooks on history are somewhat 'Shona' biased.

The changes within the educational system itself are part of a larger nation-building project, from which Ndebele-speakers to a large degree have been excluded. Already in the 1980s, Robert Mugabe and the ruling Zanu-PF party sent the North Korean trained Fifth Brigade to deal with so-called 'dissidents' in Matabeleland. In reality it targeted the political opposition and its supporters in southern Zimbabwe. In this conflict, a politics was carried out in which ethnicity was central. Shona-speaking soldiers were used against Ndebele-speaking civilians, and thousands of people in Matabeleland were murdered. Memories of these atrocities influence the current political situation in Zimbabwe, and they will continue to have far reaching consequences for Zimbabwean politics (Lindgren 2002, forthcoming).

The Zimbabwean nation-state has also been described as being built on Robert Mugabe as the father of the nation, and on the Zanu-PF party, and on symbols associated with the 'Shona' (e.g. Kriger 1995). For example, Zimbabwe took its name from the ancient ruins of Great Zimbabwe, which is of symbolic significance for Shona-speakers (see Jacobson-Widding 2000). One of the stone figures from Great Zimbabwe, a bird, is portrayed on the national flag, causing Mr. Siwela in Matabeleland to refer to this flag as the Zanu-PF flag'.[3] Old monuments of Cecil Rhodes have been taken away, and new monuments have been created, such as Hero's Acre where a monumental portrait of Robert Mugabe, with the stone bird on his tie, dominates a mural depicting the liberation struggle (see Werbner 1998). Names of cities and streets have also been changed. The Rhodesian capital Salisbury has become Harare; Rhodes Avenue was renamed Herbert Chitepo Avenue, and Manika Road replaced by Robert Mugabe Road.

PICTURE 1 AROUND HERE

Portrait of Robert Mugabe, Heroes Acre, Harare. Photo: Birgitta Hellmark Lindgren, 1997.

The Ndebele genesis according to Pathisa Nyathi

I present Pathisa Nyathi's lecture as I heard it, in the first person, but in an abridged version. Nyathi's representation of the Ndebele genesis is indeed, to restate Mudimbe's words, both a legend and a dream for political power, which links words and names to possessed things and places and designates motions of ancestors. My presentation of Nyathi's account is based on a tape-recording I made of his lecture in the spring of 1993. In summarising Nyathi's lecture I have, of course, edited it, but I have retained the chronological order in which he delivered it, and I have left his words and expressions as intact as possible.[4]

Nyathi opened his lecture as follows:

> I am here in defence of a manuscript, in defence of a people, in defence of the survival of a people. As Ndebele people we do not have a comprehensive book on Ndebele history, in *isiNdebele*, in our own language. Yes, we do have a few works in English. They obviously present this history from the victor's point of view and never from the vanquished's point

of view. We are making efforts therefore, funds permitting, to rewrite our own history in our own language and giving it our own perspective.

The Ndebele state was an offshoot from the Zulu state. The founder of the Ndebele state was Mzilikazi, who was a chief under the Zulu king Shaka. But Mzilikazi had an independent mind. He broke away from Shaka, not because of greed, as some people tell us, but because of the love for independence. He left Zululand in about 1820 with a small group, largely consisting of his own people, the Nguni section. Shaka, of course, sent some of his regiments to stop him, but they could not. Mzilikazi continued and more people joined him.

You realise this is east of the Drakensberg, and the people who joined Mzilikazi were largely of Nguni stock. However, the nation that Mzilikazi created was from a number of diverse disparate ethnic groups. From amongst the Nguni themselves there were several sub-groups. When Mzilikazi crossed the Drakensberg he was getting more people from non-Nguni stock, largely from the Sotho and the Tswana. Mzilikazi had that capacity of moulding a homogenous state from a number of diverse ethnic groups. Obviously they abandoned their cultures.

From there the Ndebele continued to the Pretoria area where they came into contact with Robert Moffat and other missionaries. At the same time the Boer moved north. The Boer moved quicker and had arms. In 1836 [1837-1838] the Ndebele had to move again. Mzilikazi split his people into two parts. While Mzilikazi and his regiments formed one part, a few men with women and children formed the other. Some people say

PUT MAP AROUND HERE

Migration route of Mzilikazi Khumalo and his followers between 1820 and 1840 from emerging Zululand to what became Matabeleland (Cobbing 1976, Rasmussen 1978), and approximate geographical use of Southern Bantu and Shona languages in southern Africa today (Bastin, Coupez, and Mann 1999, Bourdillon 1987, Doke et al. 1990, SIL International 2001). Map: Per Nordesjö.

Mzilikazi got lost, but the Ndebele do not think so. They say he was surveying the land. The truth is difficult to determine, but after two years without a king the group by the mountain installed Mzilikazi's first-born son as king.

However, Mzilikazi was still alive and he came back. There cannot be two suns in the sky at the same time. When Mzilikazi came back his son was probably sent south to live with his uncles in Zululand. Some people say he was butchered. This was in about 1839/1840. Mzilikazi regained his position as king, which he held until his death in 1868. With Mzilikazi's death came the issue of succession. Some people favoured Mzilikazi's first-born son who was sent to Zululand, while others favoured the son Lobengula, who eventually became king in 1870.

The same year Lobengula became king, Cecil Rhodes landed in Durban. At this time, missionaries, traders and hunters were already active in Ndebele territory. In Berlin in 1884, the colonial powers agreed on the rules of the game of colonisation and it did not take long before Cecil Rhodes and the British South Africa Company arrived in the area.

> There are some mischievous people who say Lobengula sold out the land. Lobengula signed a document, but he had no idea of the significance of this. And, let us be frank, whether Lobengula signed it or not does not matter. The country would have been colonised anyway.
> In 1890 Cecil Rhodes sent an invading force, calling themselves the Pioneer Column, into Matabeleland. Cecil Rhodes wanted to have a direct confrontation with Lobengula, but the British High Commissioner in Cape Town found out about the plans and demanded that the column withdraw. The column continued to Salisbury [Harare] in Mashonaland instead. People thought Mashonaland was an El Dorado where they could find gold, but they were disappointed. So they thought Matabeleland was probably the El Dorado where King Solomon's mines were. They wanted war and now they were looking for a pretext to attack Matabeleland.
> Starr Jameson, who worked for the British South Africa Company and was now in Fort Victoria, telegraphed to Cecil Rhodes that he wanted to make war on the Ndebele. Cecil Rhodes agreed by a quote from the Bible. They had then the Maxim machine gun, which had been developed by the engineer Hiram Maxim in the United States and now needed field-testing. There had been no serious wars since its invention and they were all excited about the war against the Ndebele and how it would work. Yes, they tested it, and yes, it succeeded.
> A first column left Salisbury, a second left Fort Victoria, and a third came from the south. In Fort Victoria a service was held where they prayed to God to give the Christian soldiers strength to defeat the Ndebele state, or, actually to destroy it. On 1 November 1893 Lobengula's best regiment lost an important battle. The spear was no match for the Maxim machine gun. But the Ndebele died fighting, because among the Ndebele a wound in the back meant that you were fleeing, and such men were worth nothing more than food for vultures. However, Lobengula left Bulawayo before the columns reached the city.
> Now, the Ndebele people are secretive people. They do not want to tell the truth. This is the case with Lobengula's fate. It is very clear that there were people with him. The field commander was there and came back. He knew exactly what happened to the king, but he didn't say anything. In any case, the Ndebele knew that if you capture the king there is no chance again in the future of resurrecting that kingship. It was therefore very important for Lobengula to flee rather than to be captured. You have only defeated a people when you have captured their king. This is why the Ndebele say the whites never defeated them, because they never captured Lobengula.

In Mzilikazi's migration from emerging Zululand, there are three events in particular that are often cited, and that seem to be important to British colonialists and academics, on the one hand, and to Zimbabwean nationalist writers of history textbooks, on the other. The first of these events has to do with the origin of the Ndebele state: Why did Mzilikazi Khumalo leave Shaka Zulu in the early-1820s? The second event is the succession crisis within this state: What happened with Mzilikazi's son Nkulumane, who was elected king about 1840? The third event is related to the end of the Ndebele state: What happened to Mzilikazi's successor Lobengula in 1893? I will address each of these questions in turn.[5]

The origin of the Ndebele state and Mzilikazi's migration

In my description of how western authors and colonialists have portrayed the Ndebele, I intentionally paint with a broad brush. In using Mudimbe's metaphor 'the colonial library', I admittedly class together several authors, and their sometimes internally different works, under a unitary label. These authors have produced well-researched academic works, which serve as the foundation of contemporary knowledge on Ndebele history. Yet, this body of literature has certain consequences for Ndebele-speakers in southern Zimbabwe. My aim is thus, not to dismiss British, western, or colonial works as bad or wrong, but to take Pathisa Nyathi's writings seriously and to describe the type of knowledge that he counters with his writings on Ndebele history.

To start with the first question, western scholars have given both internal and external explanations as to why Mzilikazi Khumalo and other political leaders left Shaka Zulu in what has been called the *mfecane*, that is the migrations northwards of Nguni-speaking groups in the early 19th century. Like Nyathi, some scholars emphasise internal Zulu politics and the expanding Zulu kingdom as the main causes of the *mfecane* (e.g. Omer-Cooper 1966, 1993). Others emphasise the Portuguese colonisation of Mozambique and the British colonisation of the Cape as the underlying causes of these migrations (e.g. Cobbing 1988, Wright 1989, 1995).

I here give three short 'internal' descriptions of why Mzilikazi left Shaka Zulu. These descriptions are taken from three books that were published in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. The first is Kuper, Hughes, and van Velsen's *The Shona and the Ndebele in Southern Rhodesia* (1954), the second is Harold Child's *The History of the amaNdebele* (1969), and the third is Kent Rasmussen's *Migrant Kingdom: Mzilikazi's Ndebele in South Africa* (1978). The first two works were influential as guidelines for colonial administrators, the third book is of a more strictly academic character. All three works continue to be cited in academic and popular writings on Ndebele history.

The social anthropologists A. J. B. Hughes and Jan van Velsen write about Mzilikazi that

> after a raid, he failed to hand over all the cattle he had captured, an act of treason punishable by death, of which Shaka came to hear. Mzilikazi decided that discretion was the better part of valour, and set out with his following for the high lands across the Drakensberg. (1954:47f.)

Likewise, colonial officer Harold Child writes that Mzilikazi was entrusted with a mission that included the raiding of 'Sotho tribes':

> The mission was successful and Mzilikazi returned with much booty in cattle but refused to hand them over to Tshaka [Shaka] as was customary. As a result of this in the same year he decided to flee the country with his people and possessions. (1969:6)

Finally, historian Kent Rasmussen, whose aim is to reconstruct Ndebele history in order 'to get the facts straight', argues that

> The flight of the Khumalo from Zululand is the first Ndebele national epic. It is the story of the birth of the nation; as such it has been subjected in Ndebele accounts to patriotic distortions. (1978:2, 20)

Rasmussen (1978:20ff.) then relates how Mzilikazi, a vassal of Shaka, 'failed' to hand over cattle to the latter after a raid. As a result, Shaka attacked Mzilikazi and drove him out of Zululand.
In comparison to Pathisa Nyathi's representation of Mzilikazi and his followers, these three descriptions portray Mzilikazi in a more negative light. In Nyathi's words, Mzilikazi 'broke' away from Shaka because of 'love for independence' and 'left' Zululand in about 1820. Hughes and van Velsen, Child, and Rasmussen describe how Mzilikazi 'failed' to hand over cattle to Shaka, an act of 'treason' punishable by death, and therefore had to 'flee' from Zululand. Not only does Nyathi portray Mzilikazi in a better light then the other authors, the agency in the conflict between Mzilikazi and Shaka is also ascribed to different persons. In Nyathi's representation, Mzilikazi is the deciding and acting agent, in the three other accounts agency is mainly ascribed to Shaka.
In the colonial representations, Mzilikazi and his followers are also portrayed as somewhat cruel warriors, who raid neighbouring people, steal their cattle, and keep it for themselves. This image of the Ndebele is common in colonial descriptions of Mzilikazi and his followers, both during their migration, as well as during later establishment of the Ndebele state in Matabeleland. After Mzilikazi had left Shaka Zulu, they migrated northwest. During this stage of their migration they were engaged in battles with Sotho-speakers, Boers, and Shaka Zulu's regiments, which both British missionaries at the time and later academics have commented upon.
Missionary Robert Moffat, for example, described how the Ndebele, before they left the northern part of South Africa, defeated the Griqua in battle,

> The Matabele, with the groaning and hissing signals of death, marched onward, levelling all they met with. In a few minutes the rout was general, when every Griqua and Bechuana who was still alive sought safety in flight. Of these, many took the wrong direction, and as the day approached fell a prey to their exasperated conquerors, who seemed determined not to let a single soul escape. ([1835]1940:6f.)

In a similar vein, David Livingstone (1857:10f.) has described the Ndebele as 'the most cruel enemies the Bechuanas ever knew'. In historical descriptions of the Ndebele, such images have been perpetuated to this day, and not only by historians. Social anthropologists like Hughes and van Velsen, Isaac Schapera, and N. J. van Warmelo have played their part in this. Schapera (1953:15) writes about a period of 'chaos' among the Tswana, due 'mainly to the successive onslaughts of invaders from the east', among them 'Moselekatse's Tebele [Mzilikazi's Ndebele] (1825-37)'; and van Warmelo (1974:76) states that 'the Tswana seem to have multiplied and prospered until in 1825 Mzilikazi appeared on the scene and began slaughtering them wholesale'. From many Ndebele-speakers' point of view, these descriptions are not flattering. Many men in Matabeleland conceive of themselves as proud and brave, not as descendants of 'cruel enemies' whose political leader was responsible for 'slaughtering' people 'wholesale'. More importantly, these colonial images not only belong to the past, they are repeated in representations of the Ndebele today, not least in Zimbabwean schoolbooks. They are part of a long tradition of describing the Ndebele as cruel warriors, and, in so doing, also depicting the Ndebele as a people potentially capable of waging war again.

The succession crisis and establishment in Matabeleland

The second event that a number of western writers have debated is the succession crisis within the Ndebele state that occurred, when after twenty years of migration, Mzilikazi and his followers

arrived in today's Matabeleland. What happened to Mzilikazi's son Nkulumane, who was elected king around 1840? When Mzilikazi arrived in Matabeleland, he split his followers into two parties. While Mzilikazi went northwest with one group himself, one of his chiefs took the other group to the north. The two groups were separated from each other for over a year, and the group without a king decided to install Mzilikazi's son Nkulumane as king. However, Mzilikazi and his group eventually came back.

Julian Cobbing (1976:258) states that according to one tradition Nkulumane was strangled on Mzilikazi's orders, but according to another he escaped south of the Limpopo River. However, Cobbing continues, it is practically certain that Nkulumane was dead at the time of Mzilikazi's death in 1868 and Lobengula's installation as king in 1870.

> The man who claimed to be Nkulumane after 1868 was an impersonator. Nkulumane was never after 1835 positively identified; and there is no single contemporary reference to his existence between 1841 and 1868. (1976:258)

Hughes and van Velsen state that when Mzilikazi came back he

> immediately executed a large number of those responsible for electing Nkulumane, and also had Nkulumane himself put away. To keep this murder secret he spread the rumour that his sons had been sent to Zululand for reasons of safety. (1954:49)

According to Pathisa Nyathi's account, which is built on oral sources, it was the missionary Robert Moffat who told Mzilikazi and his chiefs where to settle in today's Zimbabwe. Kent Rasmussen (1978:140ff) refers to such popular ideas as 'the Moffat myth', however, and argues that Moffat had nothing to do with Mzilikazi's later migration into what was to become Matabeleland. When the two groups met and Mzilikazi found out that Nkulumane had been elected king, Rasmussen writes, it 'is probable that Mzilikazi had him executed, but many Ndebele continued to believe Nkulumane was alive, and in exile in South Africa'. (1977:33)

Mzilikazi's behaviour when he entered what is now Zimbabwe has also been characterised as cruel. To kill one's own son is, of course, bad enough, but the image of Mzilikazi and the Ndebele as cruel warriors has also been ascribed to them in relation to Shona-speakers in the area. After Mzilikazi had settled in the highlands north of the Matopos, Hughes and van Velsen claim that

> It was from here that Mzilikazi directed his conquering and raiding expeditions. The Kalanga who remained in the area were incorporated into the Ndebele political organization, along with captured women and youths of some tribes which were raided. … His most profitable source of booty and young soldiers were the Shona, whose country became his favourite raiding ground. (1954:49f.)

The image of the Ndebele as cruel warriors helped to justify the war in 1893 and subsequent colonisation, and this stereotype is still often referred to, used, and spread. Sometimes this assessment of the Ndebele is not even tied to a particular person or event in the past, but is used as a general description of *the* Ndebele's 'usual technique' of fighting, that is as a description of how the author imagines the Ndebele: as cruel warriors. In a textbook from the 1980s, for example, the American historian William Lye writes:

> Even though the Ndebele were few in numbers, they struck terror in the minds of their neighbours. ... Their usual technique was haughtily to warn their foes of their coming, and then surround them by night. At dawn they would drum their heavy shields like thunder to startle their sleepy victims. Then they stormed the village, stabbing their short assegais into

> everyone in sight and firing the huts. No one survived except the young men who could be drafted into the regiments and young maidens who could reward the valour of the fighters. (1985:32f)

These examples should be seen as parts of a greater whole, in which the Ndebele have been over-represented in relation to warfare and as male warriors. Some authors have, to a certain degree, balanced their presentation of the Ndebele as cruel warriors by explaining the economic and social factors behind the Ndebele migration (see Cobbing 1976, Proctor and Phimister 1991). But there are numerous descriptions in the colonial literature of the Ndebele as cruel warriors, from Robert Moffat's 1835 portrayal of Ndebele who 'with the groaning and hissing signals of death, marched onward, levelling all they met with', to William Lye's 1985 description of Ndebele who 'stormed the village, stabbing their short assegais into everyone in sight'.

The fate of king Lobengula and the end of the state

The third event of importance for Ndebele-speakers, western scholars, and Zimbabwean national writers alike, is related to the end of the Ndebele state: What happened to Mzilikazi's successor Lobengula in 1893? Mzilikazi died in 1868, and his son Lobengula became king in 1870. At that time, missionaries had already started to settle in Matabeleland. In 1893, Cecil Rhodes's British South Africa Company and British soldiers marched together towards Bulawayo, the capital of the Ndebele state. King Lobengula and his regiments defended their city, but were, in the end, not able to resist the British army. Lobengula himself disappeared from the scene.
Of the various events in the Ndebele past, the fate of Lobengula is perhaps the most debated. As the *nkosi* ('king') of the Ndebele state at the time of the British invasion, Lobengula has been a strong symbol of the Ndebele as a unified people, even though they are a conglomerate of people from many different origins. Indeed, Lobengula may be feared as a unifying symbol as much by the present Zanu-PF government as by the British colonial administration. Perhaps it is a coincidence, but I have not yet come across a statue of Lobengula in Zimbabwe, apart from a two-metre-high sculpture hidden away in the backyard of the National Art Gallery in Bulawayo.

PICTURE 2 AROUND HERE

Statue of King Lobengula Khumalo in the backyard of the National Art Gallery in Bulawayo, 1995.

Within the colonial literature, several versions exist of the fall of the Ndebele state. According to most accounts, the British defeated the Ndebele in 1893, and King Lobengula died soon thereafter. In his book on the *The Matabele War*, Stafford Glass (1968:238) refers to a colonial report that confirmed that Lobengula had died of fever about 22 or 23 January [1894], some 30 or 40 miles south of the Zambezi river'. Prior to that, Captain Wilson and his men, who had set out to follow Lobengula, had all been found dead after a battle with Lobengula's body-guard at the Shangani River.
Hughes and van Velsen write about Lobengula that

> the most probable and generally accepted story is that he died somewhere near the Kana

> River, either by his own hand or as the result of the dropsy from which he suffered; the site of his alleged grave has been declared a national monument. But the Ndebele mostly hold that he did not die here, but survived somewhere in the north, a story which is also current among the Fort Jameson Ngoni. (1954:52)

In a similar vein, Julian Cobbing (1976:382) writes, 'Lobengula had disappeared at the end of 1893 and most traditions have it that he died in January or February 1994; he certainly never reappeared'. In a footnote, Cobbing adds: 'In June 1895 there were rumours at Tete that Lobengula was still alive and had crossed the Zambezi … that is unlikely however'.
Colonial administrative officer Jones (1945:19) is more certain about Lobengula's fate. Under the pseudonym Mhlagazanhlansi, he writes that 'from the full story, as it has come to us through the official investigation, it is possible to reconstruct the circumstances and conditions of the King's end'. He concludes that Lobengula poisoned himself and was buried in a grave in Matabeleland. This version is repeated some fifty years later in a widely-distributed national guide to the Matopos. Curator of Antiquities C. K. Cooke writes in this guide that Lobengula

> died as a fugitive and was buried at Malindi having, it was said, taken poison. How sad it is to think that only the grave, far from the haunts of the ancestral spirits, may be all that remains of Lobengula, second and last king of the Amandebele. (1992:16)

The fate of king Lobengula is a politically important event both for Ndebele-speakers and for western authors. Lobengula's death or disappearance marks the end, if not of the Ndebele nation as an idea, at least of the Ndebele state as a political entity. It is an event that is incorporated in people's memories throughout Zimbabwe. In contrast to the western authors' diplomatic handling of the early colonisers, Nyathi treats these head-on as invaders. He shows an interest in unifying the Ndebele as a people and lessening social tensions among Ndebele-speakers. In his account, Mzilikazi and Lobengula are the ancient kings of all Ndebele, whether of Nguni, Sotho, or Shona origin.
When Pathisa Nyathi says that Lobengula did not die and that the whites, therefore, never defeated the Ndebele, he is representing an inclusive Ndebele history in a public-spirited way. He identifies with the Ndebele, and his representation reinforces an Ndebele-speaking reader's identification with the Ndebele. His account of Ndebele history is both history and myth that aspires to increased political power for the Ndebele. In contrast, Glass, Hughes and van Velsen, and Jones not only state that Lobengula died, but also explain how, when, and where Lobengula died. Yet, they differ internally regarding the cause, the time, and the place of Lobengula's death. These authors are positioned within superior nation-states and superior academic communities. Their publications reinforce the existing power relations between these nation-states and communities, on the one hand, and the Ndebele as a people, on the other.
Pathisa Nyathi has come back to the fate of King Lobengula many times in written texts, for instance, in two chapters in his book on the period 1993-1995 (Nyathi 1996). His argument is that Lobengula did indeed cross the Zambezi River and migrate to the Ngoni in what is today northern Zambia. This is the interpretation that Hughes and van Velsen, in the 1950s, noted 'the Ndebele mostly hold'. When talking about Lobengula, Nyathi often uses the term disappear, as many other Ndebele-speakers do. 'When you disappear it is not the same as saying you are dead', Nyathi explains, 'it could mean you are dead, it could mean you are not dead'. 'Personally, I am convinced that the fellow crossed the Zambezi into northern Rhodesia, Zambia today'.[6]
I once asked a Mrs Mloyi about the fate of Lobengula. Mrs Mloyi is an old woman who lives in

Nkayi, not very far from the Shangani River where Captain Wilson and his men were killed while they were tracking Lobengula.

> I cannot say that Lobengula died. My father-in-law just said that Lobengula disappeared. By then people were telling lies. There were some people who tried to find his grave. ... My father-in-law used to get beaten because of it, because he knew that Lobengula didn't die, and up to now nobody knows where his grave is – not even one person.[7]

Whether Pathisa Nyathi and other authors are conscious of it or not, there is something more at stake here than an academic debate about 'getting the facts right'. When Nyathi writes on Ndebele history, he is simultaneously engaged in a self-defining project, and when western authors write on this history, they are engaged in a project of defining others. Pathisa Nyathi exclaims, 'You have only defeated a people when you have captured their king. This is why the Ndebele say the whites never defeated them.' In contrast, in the 1950s, when Hughes and van Velsen write that the site of Lobengula's alleged grave has been declared a national monument, they are writing about the nation of Southern Rhodesia, and they are making Lobengula's death both public and consistent with the British victory over the Ndebele.

Since independence in 1980, the Zimbabwean government has had an interest in building national unity, unfortunately by very brutal means. In the guide to Matopos, Cooke (1992) concludes not only that Lobengula died as a fugitive by taking poison and that he was buried at Malindi, but that he was the second and *last* king of the Ndebele, thereby ruling out the possibility of installing one of Lobengula's existing relatives as a third king.[8] This downplaying in the national literature of a subaltern representation of Ndebele history is seen by some Ndebele-speakers as part of the Zanu-PF government's continuous oppression of them. After the British conquest, they, as Ndebele, simply are not allowed to have a supreme leader, neither in the past, nor in the present.

Ndebele history and Lobengula in national schoolbooks

Although Pathisa Nyathi writes in opposition to the 'colonial library', he also writes against what we may call the Zimbabwean 'national library', and especially against how national history textbooks portray Ndebele history and King Lobengula. For any nation-state, mass-education is a means to legitimise the state, to foster its citizens, and to shape national unity (e.g., Anderson 1983). After independence in 1980, the Zimbabwean government prioritised educating teachers and rebuilding the school system. In this process, new history textbooks were also written, many of which are still in use today. Among them are Seidman, Martin, and Johnson's (1982) *Zimbabwe: A New History* (Book 1) for primary schools, Neil Parsons's (1985) *Focus on History* for secondary schools, and Proctor and Phimister's (1991) *People and Power* (Book 1) for studies at O-level.

Before they may be used in the schools, history books must be approved by the Ministry of Education. This means that they to a certain degree control which books are produced for educational purposes. There are three major publishing houses in Zimbabwe that publish history textbooks: Zimbabwe Publishing House, College Press, and Academics Books Zimbabwe. Publishing houses are aware that they must produce books that are in line with government representations of history when they contract authors to write history textbooks for the schools. They need their profits, and the market for schoolbooks is lucrative. As a result, all the different schoolbooks on history are rather standardised. On the one hand because of the colonial heritage, and on the other hand because of the present government's policy on education.

Many of the Zimbabwean history textbooks share three characteristics. The first characteristic is that they all are influenced by British history writing and colonial sources. Indeed, many schoolbooks are written by British or western authors, such as the ones mentioned above. As a consequence, in these books the descriptions of the end of the Ndebele state are similar to the colonial representations. In the same way as the colonial state had an interest in the death of Lobengula and the end of the Ndebele state, the Zimbabwean state has no interest in making Lobengula a hero or in resurrecting the Ndebele state or nation.

Although some of the Zimbabwean schoolbooks portray Mzilikazi and his followers in a more favourable way than is done in the colonial accounts, many schoolbooks share the colonial view that Lobengula died soon after the Ndebele conquest, and that with that, the Ndebele nation came to an end. For example, in *Zimbabwe: A New History*, Seidman et al. state that having fought off Captain Wilson's force at the Shangani River, Lobengula 'died soon after, in January 1894' and that 'his burial place was kept secret' (1982:54). And, in *People and Power*, Proctor and Phimister write that after having retreated towards the Zambezi River, Lobengula 'died a little while later in 1894' (1991:219). In the latter book, pupils are also given an assignment to 'write an obituary for Lobengula', as if to make sure they understand that Lobengula is dead and buried (even if some Ndebele-speakers say his spirit is guarding them).

The second common characteristic of Zimbabwean schoolbooks is that they are all very anti-colonial, often with a strong leaning towards Marxist theory. The series *People Making History* (Book 1-4), for example, is advertised as having been written from a 'socialist perspective'.[9] In this series, secondary school pupils are taught about socialist history and historical materialism (Book 1), and later, when studying for O-levels, about pre-capitalist modes of production in Africa, about various forms of capitalism, and, finally, about revolution and socialist transformation (Book 3). Within this discourse, the Ndebele state is sometimes portrayed as having been based solely on cattle rearing and raiding, and without the ability to produce enough food for its people.

In *Focus on History*, Parsons writes about the Mfecane wars and the Ndebele state:

> The Mfecane Wars saw the rise to power of a new type of state in Southern Africa - the military state. Men under the age of about thirty had to be soldiers. They lived together in regiments and did not stay with their families. In other words, they did not help to produce food or goods but only consumed them. The only food they produced was by hunting and herding … So the military states raided and conquered the surplus production of other people. (1985:81)

The old, colonial image of the Ndebele as cruel warriors is still evident in some of these Zimbabwean schoolbooks, not always in words but often in pictures. These pictures are almost always reproductions of colonial drawings and photographs of the Ndebele. Although some of these pictures are commented on in such a way that the pupils understand that they are colonial images of the Ndebele (e.g., Proctor and Phimister 1991:59), other pictures are simply reproduced, perpetuating the colonial image of the Ndebele as cruel warriors, and passing it on to new generations of Zimbabweans (e.g., Garlake and Proctor 1985:160, and, especially, Barnes et al. 1991:67).

DRAWING

Illustration of the Ndebele in the 19th century in Barnes et al. 1991, *People Making History*, Book

3, p. 67. The caption to the illustration reads: *Ndebele warriors*. The drawing comes originally from the National Archives Zimbabwe.

Finally, the third characteristic of Zimbabwean history textbooks is that they are all strongly nationalistic, describing pre- and post-colonial times with pride, and colonial times as times of oppression. Some of these schoolbooks are, however, in Pathisa Nyathi's terms, rather 'pro-Shona' and 'not very kind to the Ndebele'.[10] One example of the pro-Shona bias is Martin and Johnson's (1981) *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War*, which has been criticised for giving an overly one-sided, Zanu-PF point of view of the struggle for independence to secondary school pupils (see Bhebe and Ranger 1995:6). Another example is Parsons's conclusion in the chapter on 'the Mfecane wars and the Ndebele state' in *Focus on History*, which practically blames the Ndebele for the subsequent colonisation:

> The new Mfecane states turned from production to destruction and from trading to raiding. They did not solve the crisis. They made the crisis worse. Instead of opening up a new period of development for Southern Africa, the Mfecane Wars (like the slave trading wars elsewhere in Africa) opened Africa up to a period of European development through colonialism. (1985:88)

For any government, mass-education is a means to foster citizens and subjects, and the use of history is an important tool for doing this. There is a continuous public debate in Zimbabwe about 'western' values replacing 'African' values, and about the Zimbabwean youth forgetting their African past. The control of the production of Zimbabwean schoolbooks, and the standardisation of these texts as anti-colonial, socialist, and nationalistic, is an indication of this. Indeed, in 2001 it was decided that history should become a compulsory subject in school, and in Matabeleland it will replace the language *isiNdebele* as a compulsory subject. This has raised a number of questions among teachers in Matabeleland, among them, what kind of history will be taught in the future? Further, it makes it difficult for books such as Nyathi's works on Ndebele history in *isiNdebele* to reach a wider audience in the schools.

Contesting the past: power, education, and identity

To write history is a political activity in that the author is positioned in society and in the world, and from that position 'produces a relation between that which supposedly occurred in the past and the present state of affairs' (Friedman 1992b:837, see also 1995). Since a writer always represents the past from a subjective point of view, history is related to questions of identity. An author has to choose both which events to write about, and how to write about them. Moreover, various representations of the past, which have been published and distributed in books, influence people's memories of the past and shape different kinds of belonging in the present. Writers of history, Eric Hobsbawm (1992:3) has remarked, are always mixed up in politics, and they supply the raw material for ethnicity and nationalism.

Mzilikazi Khumalo's migration, from emerging Zululand in South Africa to what is today Matabeleland in southwest Zimbabwe, is a well-known story. It took place at a time when the British were colonising southern Africa, when Shaka Zulu was building his state, and when the Boers were setting out on their 'Great Trek'. The story of the migration has a beginning, a middle, and an end, it has main characters, and it has a geographical environment, as other stories

do. Since the political intrigues, military battles, and state-building projects during this migration have been documented by many people, various historians have had a relatively rich material to work with. At the same time, since it is a story told by many people at different times and in various languages, there are several versions in existence.

Most representations of Ndebele history have been written either by British and other western authors, or by the authors of Zimbabwean schoolbooks. Lately, Ndebele-speakers have also started to give their view of Ndebele history. Within this framework, Pathisa Nyathi's presentation of Ndebele history is similar to what Mudimbe terms a memory-text, which validates a people's geography via the retelling of a genesis. Nyathi emphasises that the formation of the Ndebele people was largely a result of voluntary acts. He describes Mzilikazi as a man with the 'capacity' to build a homogeneous state, a man who people 'joined' when they 'abandoned' their cultures. In Nyathi's representation, Mzilikazi's son Nkulumane is sent to the south rather than 'butchered', and Lobengula did not die but escaped; thus the whites never defeated the Ndebele.[11]

Today, not only writers, but also many musicians and artists, purposely produce indigenous representations of reality as alternatives to colonial and Zimbabwean national representations (Eyre 2001). Of the various ways available to combat colonial and national representations of reality from a subaltern position, the representation of a people's genesis from their own point of view is perhaps one of the most effective. This is especially the case if the genesis is told in the vernacular language and distributed to school libraries. Pathisa Nyathi is clearly identifying himself with the Ndebele, and his representation of the Ndebele genesis greatly influences an Ndebele-speaking reader's identification with the Ndebele.

The colonial accounts of Ndebele history and their images of the Ndebele as cruel warriors may, to generalise a bit, be equated with what Mudimbe has termed 'the colonial library'. These representations are, in Mudimbe's words, fulfilling a political project by deciphering the African object and thereby domesticating it. Along the same lines, the national accounts of Ndebele history in Zimbabwean schoolbooks may be regarded as belonging to a 'national library'. These representations are influenced by British history writing and sources, and often perpetuate the image of the Ndebele as cruel warriors and disperse it to new generations of Zimbabweans. These schoolbooks, too, fulfil a political project: to redefine the colonial era in the national attempt to shape Zimbabwean citizens.

The writing of history is both dependent on values, because researchers are guided by different values when representing history, and on methodology, because authors follow conventions about sources, causality, and narrative form. As stated, an author's values comes to the fore most clearly when he or she deals with politically significant events that are difficult to reconstruct because evidence is scarce. The different accounts, of the origin of the Ndebele state, of the succession crisis within this state, and of the end of the state, exemplify this. In descriptions of these three politically charged events, the positions of 'Ndebele', 'colonial', and 'Zimbabwean' authors are especially apparent since evidence of what actually happened is scarce and contradictory.

These conflicting indigenous, colonial, and national representations of Ndebele history should not be regarded as merely a game. 'It is not a question of semiotics, of sign substitution, of the intellectual game of truth-value and museological authenticity', to cite Jonathan Friedman (1992b:845). 'It is a question of existential authenticity of the subject's engagement in a self-defining project.' This is why Pathisa Nyathi writes about the Ndebele past in his own language, in *isiNdebele*, and this is why he maintains that Lobengula 'disappeared' rather than died. Colonial

and national representations promote certain other kinds of belonging, but Pathisa Nyathi's representation is both built on and fosters Ndebele identity. Ndebele-speakers who read Nyathi's account of the Ndebele genesis identify themselves with the Ndebele, not with the British or their descendants, or with the Zimbabwean nation-state.

During the colonial era, Mudimbe (1994:xii) writes, Europe subdued the world to its memory. The representation of the Ndebele past is still to a large degree subsumed by the European past, as well as by the past of the nation state Zimbabwe. Today 'the Ndebele' struggle, as Pathisa Nyathi puts it, is to 'present themselves to the world the way they want to be presented, and not the way they have been portrayed by other peoples'.[12]

Notes

1. Apart from Pathisa Nyathi's (1994) first book on the Ndebele genesis, which covers the period between 1820-1893, he has published two additional books in *isiNdebele* covering the period 1893-1895 and the year 1896 (Nyathi 1996, 1999). In these two books, he develops some of the arguments laid out in the first book in more detail (taped interview with Pathisa Nyathi at his office in Bulawayo, 15 March 2000.) Parts of the third book appeared in English as a series of articles on the Ndebele rising in 1896, published in *The Sunday News* between March and June 1996. Apart from his trilogy on early Ndebele history in *isiNdebele*, Nyathi has also written some other English texts on Ndebele history and culture, among them *Traditional Ceremonies of the amaNdebele*, (2001), and *The Material Culture of the Ndebele*, (forthcoming).
2. An earlier version of Nyathi's 'memory-text' in relation to the 'colonial library' is published in Mai Palmberg's (ed.) *Encounter Images in the Meetings between Africa and Europe*. See Lindgren (2001).
3. Discussion with Mr. Siwela outside his house in Esigodini, Matabeleland South, 14 July 1995. In this remark, Mr Siwela associated the stone figure from Great Zimbabwe, the national flag, and the Zanu-PF with the 'Shona'.
4. Lecture by Pathisa Nyathi on 'The History of the Ndebele 1820-1893', tape-recorded at the Swedish Embassy in Harare, 25 March 1993.
5. Apart for these three events, Nyathi takes up several other debated issues in his account. For example, many authors hold that it is wrong to categorise the Ndebele as a 'Zulu off-shoot', since Shaka Zulu's kingdom was yet to emerge when Mzilikazi Khumalo left 'Zululand' (e.g. Ranger 1994:187). The relation between Mzilikazi Khumalo and Shaka Zulu is also debated, and some scholars regard Mzilikazi as an independent leader rather than Shaka's 'chief' (see Cobbing's (1976) discussion on the relation between Mzilikazi and Shaka). And many of the various people who joined Mzilikazi Khumalo did not 'abandon' their cultures. Indeed, the 'Ndebele' are today best understood as a conglomerate of people of many different origins (Lindgren 2002).
6. Taped interview with Pathisa Nyathi at his office in Bulawayo, 15 March 2000.
7. Taped interview in *isiNdebele* with Mrs Mloyi at her homestead in Nkayi district, 5 June 1995. Roy Mpofu, interpreter.
8. According to Cobbing (1976:417ff.), the Ndebele did in fact install a third king, Nyamanda, in 1896.
9. Garlake and Proctor 1985, Book 1, back cover. See also Garlake and Proctor 1987, Book 2, Barnes et al. 1991, Book 3, and Prew et al. 1991, Book 4. All have been reprinted and are used in schools today.
10. Taped interview with Pathisa Nyathi, 29 March 1997, at his home in Lueve, Bulawayo.

11. I have concentrated on three key events: the origin, succession crisis, and the end of the Ndebele state. There are, however, several other examples of how, compared to colonial representations, Nyathi describes Mzilikazi, Lobengula, and the Ndebele in a more positive way. For instance, in contrast to Hughes and van Velsen, Nyathi states that Mzilikazi was 'surveying the land' rather than that he had 'lost contact' with his people before reaching today's Matabeleland. He claims that Lobengula was 'fooled' into selling land rather than that he 'granted concessions' to colonisers, and he argues that, in 1893, the Ndebele were attacked by an 'invading force' rather than a 'Pioneer Column' (see Hughes and van Velsen 1954:49ff., and Hughes 1956:4ff.).
12. Taped lecture by Pathisa Nyathi on 'The History of the Ndebele 1820-1893', recorded at the Swedish Embassy in Harare, 25 March 1993.

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Monopoly Politikos: How Botswana's Opposition Parties Have Helped Sustain One-Party Dominance

Abstract

The main thesis of this paper is that Botswana's opposition parties are accountable for their failure to provide the voting public with a meaningful alternative to the ruling Botswana Democratic Party. While conceding the explanatory importance of other factors such as resource capacity, this paper departs from conventional wisdom by focusing on the strategic and ideological weaknesses of the opposition parties. It argues that the opposition parties made a number of strategic errors which rendered them electorally unattractive before they could establish their legitimacy as contenders for government power. To break the monopoly of power that the ruling party has so far enjoyed, Botswana's opposition must transform itself into a meaningful competitor and government-in-waiting. To do that they must a) demonstrate that they have a viable, alternative economic management strategy to better satisfy the interests of a diverse voting public and b) develop broad based political strategies targeting the diverse voting public to build voter confidence in the capability of the party as a possible government. The ruling party's track record of four decades of sustained economic growth leaves a formidable challenge to the opposition.

Introduction

On the 16th October, 1999 the citizens of the Republic of Botswana went to the polls to determine which party would govern the nation for the next five years. This eighth round of General Elections, like the seven which preceded it, returned the same political party to power. Both the fact that the popular mandate has been monopolised by one party over eight five year terms and the fact that this has happened under conditions of free elections and adherence to the rule of law, have drawn a fair amount of debate and analysis over the past three decades. Analysts have pondered why, in a continent characterized by coercive rule and divisive politics, Botswana's multi-party system has endured way beyond the first elections that marked the end of colonial rule (Danevand, 1995; du Toit, 1995; Stevens and Speed, 1976; Wiseman, 1976). And in the light of post colonial Africa's record of single party and/or single person dictatorships, hard questions have also been raised over the failure of Botswana's seemingly multi-party electoral system to produce a change of government over such a lengthy period (Stedman,1993; Hyden and Bratton,1992; Wiseman, 1996; Bratton and de Walle, 1997; Daniel et al, 1998), particularly in the context of wide income differentials and persistent poverty.

In established modern liberal democracies, non-exclusive elections and multi-party competition for government power have come to be recognised as critical components of a functioning democracy. Ideally these processes are good indicators of the extent to which the political system allows for a) reasonably unfettered exercise of choice over who governs and b) accountable governance. In virtually all post-colonial polities in Africa, however, elections, if held at all, have not necessarily reflected unfettered choice on the part of those who vote. Nor have political parties consistently offered the electorate a meaningful choice. In Botswana, despite a legal-

rational apparatus that has guaranteed the integrity of free elections and multi-party political competitions for an unbroken record of more than thirty years, there are still many obstacles in the political system that undermine the quality and meaningfulness of electoral choice.

One of these is the inability of the opposition parties to respond to electoral need by offering a meaningful alternative. For instance, there are 22 out of 40 contestable constituencies where the opposition can give the ruling party serious competition for the electoral mandate if it chose to take the voters more seriously. And of these 22, four are unequivocally opposition strongholds, another four are fairly strong opposition constituencies weakened by spoilers[1], a further five are marginally strong opposition constituencies which the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) wins on account of big opposition split votes[2], and the rest are marginal BDP constituencies. In addition to the 22, there are other constituencies which appear as strong BDP constituencies at Parliamentary level, but where the opposition has been making significant inroads at local government level. The most dramatic of these inroads have been in the South East constituency where the electorate gave the ruling BDP 77 percent of its parliamentary mandate, but only 55 percent of the Local Government vote.

The ruling party's monopoly of the electoral mandate has been slipping as evidenced by the fact that support for the BDP dramatically dropped below 60 percent of the electoral mandate during the 1994 and 1999 elections, while that of the opposition climbed to an unprecedented high of more than 40 percent. Indeed, a thorough examination of the distribution of the votes suggests that the downward trend in the ruling BDP's support is significant and substantial, setting Botswana firmly on the road to plural politics despite considerable voter apathy. This paper will now examine how the opposition parties, particularly the two that have occupied the position of official leadership of the opposition, have contributed to ineffectual contestation for the ruling mandate.

From False Start to Political Oblivion: The Botswana People's Party

By all accounts, the Botswana Peoples Party (then Bechuanaland People's Party, BPP) was the first political party to engage in sustained nationalist politics in colonial Botswana. It had a head start on all subsequent parties in terms of mobilisation of both supporters and funds. Logically therefore, as the first political party to agitate for the transfer of government power from the British colonial administration into national hands, this should have been the party to lead Botswana to independence, had it won the confidence of the electorate sufficiently. But this party failed to attract enough electoral support for a number of reasons.

Most observers have cited the split of the party before the first General Elections as a major contributory factor (Polhemus, 1983; Nengwekhulu, 1979; Ramsay and Parsons, 1998; Stevens and Speed, 1976; Mokopakgosi and Molomo, 2000). There has been some debate on whether thissplit was due to personality clashes among the founder members of the party or serious ideological differences. Another factor that has also been cited is the deliberate sponsorhip of a rival but more moderate national party (the BDP) by the colonial administration (Nengwekhulu, 1979; Ramsay and Parsons, 1998; Mokopakgosi and Molomo, 2000). Further, lack of financial resources has been recognised as a major constraint, making it difficult for opposition parties to campaign effectively in all constituencies (Molutsi, 1991; Molomo, 1991; Otlhogile, 1991; Holm, 1987; Danevand, 1995).

While these factors have indeed played a very significant role in undermining the capacity of the

BPP to contest effectively for power, it is however also important to highlight the role played by the political strategy adopted by this party itself from the outset in the 1960s. As a party aiming to bring an end to colonial domination and build an independent state-nation, a major problem confronting its leaders was the issue of establishing both its own legitimacy and that of a democratic electoral process along conventional lines. This party was founded by Botswana nationals who had cut their political teeth in the black nationalist movement in South Africa as migrant workers (Nengwekhulu, 1979; Parsons, 1990). They had returned home when the black nationalist organisations there were banned. While their nationalist aspirations for independent statehood were considered legitimate among the local citizenry, their major challenge was to convince other contenders as well as the majority of the ordinary citizenry that this party and its leaders had a legitimate claim to be heirs to the colonially constructed polity. Principally, they faced the challenges of the colonial administration and western interests generally, and specifically the minority white ethnic group, the local intelligentsia, hereditary chiefs, and a yet to be captured electorate.

Botswana's hereditary rulers saw themselves as the most logical legitimate heirs to the polity the British had administered as a protectorate. They therefore envisaged an eventual transfer of power to themselves as a college of hereditary rulers representing the traditional tribal polities. To this college might be added a few educated nationals and perhaps representatives of the minority white settlers. Throughout the British colonial oversight, these chiefs had enjoyed a large measure of their traditional authority under the system of indirect and parallel rule. That is, they had governed their tribal subjects in tandem with representation of a white ethnic minority as members of the Joint Advisory Council. They could not envisage a situation where their right to power could be superseded by any other contender at the end of colonial rule: thus their vehement opposition to political parties and politicians generally, and to the Botswana People's Party as the first sustained organised political group.

For the BPP, however, both the hereditary rulers and colonial rule were to be a thing of the past in the building of a post-colonial state. The party envisaged no political role for hereditary rulers whatsoever and sought instead to build a state nation founded on equality of citizenship and popular conferment of government power. And in their campaigns for autonomous statehood for Botswana they made it strikingly clear that they were constructing a state-nation where arbitrary power would not be accommodated. Led by individuals who themselves had no traditional power base, the party's unequivocal rejection of traditional authority put the BPP on a collision course which would alienate them from the most powerful chiefs in the centralised Tswana Chiefdoms. And in the context of a predominantly (about 90 percent) rural population used to a traditional constitution where legitimate authority to govern was vested in the chiefs, the BPP's uncompromising stand on the chiefs did not resonate with the broad values of the population they sought to politicise, and from whom they would seek the mandate to govern.

Not surprisingly, the BPP and its leaders were seen as would-be usurpers: commoners who were challenging the legitimate traditional authority for power. This image did considerable damage to the BPP and overshadowed their nationalist calls for independent statehood. However, among detribalised urban populations as well as some of the ethnic groups who occupied a subject status among larger Tswana tribal polities, the BPP's unequivocal rejection of the chiefs symbolised a promise to end second class tribal citizenship. This was the case, for instance, among the Bayei ethnic groups in the Batawana tribal polity. It was also true of the Kalanga ethnic groups in the concession area of the Tati Company (in Francistown) as well as the North East administrative

district. Not surprisingly, these localities were the areas where the BPP was most successful in gaining the confidence of the electorate at the first general elections in 1965.

It should be noted, however, that the BPP's view of the role of chiefs in post colonial state building was not unique to the party. Most of Botswana's educated elites held similar views about the chiefs. In fact the precursors of the BPP had been founded as attempts to ensure that in the transition from colony to statehood, the chiefs should not be seen as the sole legitimate representatives of the people of Botswana. Leetile Raditladi's short lived Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party, for instance, had been founded out of fear that post colonial modernist government institutions might come to be dominated by traditional chiefs and white settlers as had been the case with the Joint Advisory Council (Maundeni, 1998; Ramsay and Parsons, 1998). He and other nationalist reformers, including the founders subsequently of the BPP, wanted a political dispensation which would ensure a greater political role for non-chiefs. But where earlier reformers had envisaged a greater share of political space for commoners, the BPP envisaged political space only on the basis of popular legitimation, and the abolition of the institution of hereditary power. When the BDP later came into existence, it had a similar view of eventually stripping hereditary rulers of political power, which was to be transferred constitutionally to elected institutions. But unlike the BPP, this was not an objective they trumpeted loudly during their initial search for political legitimacy (Polhemus, 1983; Charlton, 1993; Parson, 1990).

One of the BPP's false starts in search of political power was therefore in adopting a strategy that alienated powerful chiefs before the party could secure its own legitimacy and the necessary popular mandate. And the fact that the visible face of the BPP was that of commoners without a single traditional leader among them did not help allay the fears of their chiefly contenders to the post-colonial throne. A large part of this strategic failure on the part of the BPP probably arose from the fact that the leaders had spent a considerably amount of time immersed in South African politics, and were therefore not very sensitive to local power politics in their national home. This 'foreign touch' and lack of local sensitivity would alienate them, not only from the chiefs but from other powerful contenders such as the educated elite who had not participated in the migrant labour system (Ramsay and Parsons, 1998). But in relation specifically to the chiefs, the BPP strategy lost them potential strategic allies. Thus alienated, the chiefs used their powerful position to undermine the capacity of the party to canvas for political support in their tribal polities (Polhemius, 1983).

This contrasted sharply with the chiefs' attitude towards the BDP when that party later emerged under the leadership of one of their own, Seretse Khama. Although initially hostile to all political parties, the chiefs capitulated to the Khama-led BDP, assuming that at least this party would be more accommodating of hereditary rulers, being led by one. They therefore actively canvassed for electoral support for the BDP, and only appreciated after delivering the electoral mandate to this party that it was in fact no different from other political parties in terms of where it would seek to position the chiefs in the power structures. For the BPP, their strategic false start meant that it became effectively a party of the urban populations in Lobatse and Francistown. When it splintered before the first General Elections, this greatly reduced the nationalist appeal of both portions of the splintered party and permanently relegated them to the margins of political power, where they have since degenerated into political have-beens.

Another strategic false start which led to this sorry state of affairs was how the BPP managed its canvassing of support and membership among the local intelligentsia. There is some evidence to suggest that in its initial recruitment drive, the BPP had attracted notables among the local

intelligentsia who had shared membership of the short-lived Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party with Philip Matante and KT Motsete , two of the three founder members of the BPP[3]. Ramsay and Parsons (1998: p136) noted that by April 1961 some of these political luminaries had been alienated from the BPP. Seretse Khama similarly seemed to have briefly flirted with this party before dismissing it completely. But few analysts have really discussed in any significant detail why the educated elites were turned off by the BPP after initially flirting with it. Certainly, the composition of the membership of political organisations which had attempted to exist prior to the BPP suggests that the local elites were variously attracted to these emerging parties, and that there tended to be a coalescence of interests in such organisations from political activists who would later feature significantly in the major parties that contested the first and subsequent general elections.

In explaining the waning elite support for the BPP, most analysts tend to focus on the emergence of the BDP as a political contender, and the vision and leadership of Seretse Khama's stewardship of this party (Morgan, 1980; Charlton, 1993; Ramsay and Parsons, 1998). But for purposes of understanding the weaknesses of the BPP as a party and the opposition generally, it is critically important to establish what it was that repulsed the critical mass of local political elites from the BPP and its splinters, and what therefore drove these politically active individuals to search for a new political home.

Historians and political scientists have tended to make a great deal of the fact that the Colonial administration actively solicited and sponsored the emergence of the BDP as a more acceptable face of nationalist politics (Stevens and Speed, 1976; Ramsay and Parsons, 1998; Maundeni, 1998; Mokopakgosi and Molomo, 2000). This however tends to underplay the importance of the expressed desires and active search for a political alternative to the BPP by a number of educated local modernists. Long before the BDP came into existence, these political activists had been searching for a party that would adequately articulate their interests, and a leader with the right credentials to win their party the legitimacy it would need to muster a sufficient electoral mandate (Parsons, 1988). Their sojourn in several short-lived political formations, and their short flirtation with the BPP itself, is indicative of this search.

The BPP could not, however, house the aspirations of the emerging class of the educated and cattle-owning elites. The reason was that the BPP portrayed itself as a socialist party whose aim was to build a state which would seize and retain the basic means of production, including land and its resources, all industry, transport and communications, etc (Polhemus 1983:405). To a cattle-owning elite aspiring to transform their cattle holdings into wealth-creating commercial enterprises, this socialist rhetoric was hardly likely to attract their support and membership. Both the black elite and the minority white cattle ranchers aspired for a materially richer future based on private ownership of cattle and grazing land.

The colonial administration had made this aspiration an attainable possibility during the last decade of colonial rule by a) transferring unprecedented levels of capital resources into the Protectorate to support the development of the cattle-beef industry and b) releasing Crown Lands for the expansion of private freehold tenure (Morrison, 1993: 35). The full potential to realise the material wealth portended by this transfer of capital and privatization of state land was not an automatic right to be handed over to nationalists. Rather it was a bargaining tool subject to negotiation: principally in a political environment which would guarantee the continued ability for western capitalist investment to yield profit.

The strategic failure on the part of the BPP was not to recognise what was negotiable and the

terms of negotiation. In their promotion of hard line pan-African radicalism, the party had failed to appreciate a significant change in imperialist policies which was ushered in by the end of the Second World War when British dominance as the leader of the industrialised world declined and was replaced by the United States of America. Fearing a Soviet led socialist threat to the capitalist system among territorially colonised peoples of Africa, South America and Asia, the United States of America advocated an imperialist agenda where territorial possessions became outdated as mechanisms of world domination and political control. With this change of guard, former colonial territories would be kept safe for capitalist expansion through a strategy of political independence and economic development. By the beginning of the 1960s the American strategy had chrystalised into the United Nations First Decade of Development[4] which would see considerable technical and financial resources transferred from the West to former colonial territories to help them out of poverty under the ambit of capitalism and away from communism (Singer and Roy, 1993; Rist, 1997; Mason, 1997; Cuperer et al, 1997).

War-torn Europe would, in the meantime, also be assisted to reconstruct itself with loans and other assistance from the United States, thus firmly establishing the United States as a driving force of world events in both western Europe and the European colonies. The American agenda for the post-war period thus made it possible for a very reluctant colonial Europe to relinquish her colonial territories while investing in the economic development of these territories (Singer and Roy, 1993; Rist, 1997; Mason, 1997; Cuperer et al, 1997; Parsons, 1988). Most importantly for Botswana and other colonial subjects, the American-led agenda for 'de-colonisation with development' meant that successful nationalist movements would only benefit from western development assistance if indeed they could guarantee a safe haven for promoting capitalist accumulation while eschewing communism. The array of development assistance programmes that were unleashed with this American strategy had no counterpart of similar magnitude in the Soviet dominated socialist bloc, thus making a meaningful choice of development partners practically non-existent for emerging nationalist movements.

In relation specifically to political developments in Botswana and the development of the Botswana People's Party, this meant that the party's socialist rhetoric would not win it western support. In contrast, the decolonisation-with-development agenda spelt out by the United Nations First Decade of Development coincided with the aspirations of Botswana's budding elite for a materially richer national citizenship and statehood. In that context, the BPP's political strategy had, in the run-up to the first General Elections in 1965, alienated the most powerful potential allies among the local elites and the western industrialised world, effectively depriving the party of the following:

- A critical mass of the intelligentsia it needed to field contestants in all the constituencies as well as eventually to run a government;
- Sources of financial and technical assistance it required first to mount an effective election campaign throughout the whole polity, as well as to invest eventually in the economic transformation of Botswana (a country which then ranked among the poorest in the world);
- A large segment of the electoral support of powerful traditional chiefs and their tribal constituencies. It needed this support to win the mandate to form a government.

The end result was a party strong in socialist rhetoric but totally out of the league in the fight for the commanding heights of political power. And to crown it all it suffered internal conflicts and splits that reduced even the electoral support it had initially garnered among urban constituencies and tribally discriminated ethnic groups. Lacking both the human and material resources to

regroup and reformulate its policies to attract a wider constituency of supporters, the BPP eventually shrunk to localised political contests in a few constituencies, finally fading out of meaningful political existence in 1984.

Shaky Beginnings on Scientific Socialism: The Botswana National Front and an Ideology Without a Constituency

As the BPP declined, the mantle of leader of the opposition was taken over by the Botswana National Front which had come into existence after the 1965 elections. The founder of this party, Kenneth Koma, belonged to a genre of African leaders and political analysts who believed firstly that the greatest challenge facing the peoples of Africa was how to ensure that liberation from colonial domination would in fact free them from the shackles of exploitative systems of production that had historically characterised the advent of capitalism in the continent.
These leaders also believed that in the postwar period, it was now possible for formerly colonised societies to harness the technological advances of modern science and, with the aid of a political system where the state controlled the major means of production, engender non-exploitative economic development by by-passing capitalism (Ulyanovosky, 1984; Rodney, 1972; Abdi, 1973; Rosberg and Callaghy, 1979; Kader, 1985). According to this world view, political independence based on collaboration with western industrialised countries and capitalist enterprise was more of a change of guard than a substantive transformation of exploitative relations of production. As such, if these relations were not fundamentally geared towards the development of a socialist system they were seen as a mere change of the form (i.e. from colonialism to neo-colonialism) rather than change in the nature and extent of that exploitation. Indeed, the leadership of the BNF perceived the Botswana Democratic Party as more reactionary than the imperialist power it had replaced because it was a national party which governed under conditions of economic collaboration with its former colonial master.
But, like all other political organisations before it, the BNF has had to confront the practical reality of establishing its legitimacy as contender for government power, but now within the context of a post-colonial polity. Unlike in other African countries where similarly inclined Marxist leaders had first sought a revolutionary take-over of state power as a critical step towards establishing what they perceived as non-capitalist relations of production (Jowitt, 1979), Koma's party sought to contest for government power within the rules established by the 'neo-colonial' BDP dominated state (i.e. through electoral competitions). However, Koma charted for his party a strategy he envisioned would first build alliances among various disgruntled groups. With this 'front' he would wrest electoral power from the BDP, and then, guided by the principles of scientific socialism, gradually mould Botswana towards an equitable society dominated by workers, where, ultimately, there would be no exploitation of the labour of one class by another. As he emphatically stated , his party did not believe that 'the profit motive, individual material incentives, money, capital and private entrepreneurs are indispensable pre-requisites to development' (Polhemus, 1983: 409). But was this a view shared by the electorate and those that would be the vanguard of the socialist enterprise?
Unlike the BPP before it which had dismissed any significant role for the chiefs in its nationalist socialist agenda, the BNF sought actively to harness the power of the chiefs as the most important allies of the time. What the party had to offer in terms of political power to these temporary allies was actually much more than what the ruling BDP had offered. For instance, where the BDP

sought to strip the chiefs of power and transfer it to democratically elected institutions, the BNF proposed to accommodate them in the Legislature as full members (Parson, 1990: 110; Picard, 1987: 158). This strategy won the initial support of the electorate in the tribal constituencies of Chief Bathoen II of Bangwaketse, when the chief resigned his hereditary leadership position to take over the leadership of the party. But the strategy failed generally to attract more adherents from tribal constituencies essentially because, although it accommodated chiefs in the political power structure as a means of winning tribal votes, it threatened the material base of these traditional power holders.

Like the BPP before it, the BNF's commitment to vesting control of productive resources in the state and abolishing private land tenure basically meant that the royals, like other cattle owning elites, would not be able to realise the commercial value of their cattle-beef enterprise for private gain. On balance, therefore, the political gains by the chiefs would be greatly outweighed by their material losses in a socialist system of government. This was true not only in relation to the chiefs, but for all other cattle-owning elite classes, including the increasing number of educated individuals joining the formal sector of wage employment and the civil service (many of these initially invested their earnings in the expanding cattle-beef industry).

Independence under the leadership of the BDP had seen some increased transfers of western development resources into Botswana which made it clear that large cattle owners were going to reap material benefits of a magnitude they could not have envisaged previously. The combination of infrastructural developments (water, veterinary services, transport, etc), the opening up of access to international beef markets, as well as the BDP strategy of transferring the profits of this cattle-beef trade back to the cattle owners was an inducement that worked greatly in favour of convincing elites that their material future was safest under a non-socialist regime.

What this meant was that electorally, the BNF started off with a strategy that could not possibly win it wide support among the governing and propertied classes. And in the context of a largely rural society where political activists tended to be drawn predominantly from among the educated and cattle-owning elites, this did not auger well for the BNF's ability to attract a critical mass of political activists. With regards specifically to the chiefs as allies, by the 1980s it was clear that the BNF had milked all the political gains it could in trying to capture them as a constituency that would bring tribal votes to the party. The BNF had gambled on an assumption that such a group could be induced by the promise of political power to forgo the material benefits of their class and that they could later be discarded once they had served their purpose. But in fact most of these chiefs stayed firmly in support of the BDP despite that party's systematic stripping of their political power. And although most of their powers have in fact been transferred to more democratic institutions, they still play a considerable political role as symbols of past power structures and ethnic inequalities as witnessed by recent national debates on representation and the rights of minority ethnic groups[5].

Another not so successful area of alliance that the BNF sought to exploit for electoral gain was the issue of ethnic discrimination. Following in the footsteps of the BPP and its splinter groups, the BNF politicised the inequalities of citizenship stemming from a national identity that privileged Setswana culture and ethnicity above other ethnic identities and symbols (such as language). The BDP failed to address this as an issue and in fact seemed to perpetuate the problem by constitutionally recognising only the dominant Tswana polities as the 'principal tribes'[6]. The BNF calculated that it could mobilise electoral support by highlighting the injustices of Botswana's tribally biased constitution and promising to deliver a constitution that gave all ethnic and tribal

groups equality of national citizenship. While this political strategy had initially seemed to work in favour of the BPP and other opposition political parties in certain localised contexts, it did not bring any sustainable votes for the BNF. In fact, although ethnic inequalities (cultural, social and economic) and conflicts have been issues of political concern from the run-up to independence and since, as political issues they have never been successful vote catchers on any sustained basis.[7]
A possible explanation for the electoral failure of this strategy of politicising ethnic grievances was that it did not quite tally with the BNF's policy of maintaining the hereditary rights of chiefs in the legislature for the immediate future. The centralised former polities of Tswana chiefs encompassed a numeric minority of ethnic Tswana dominating a plural majority of other ethnic groups[8], many of who had their own traditional leaders. If the BNF was therefore going to give the powerful Tswana chiefs recognition as members of Parliament, then it also had to deal with the knotty problem of determining the limits of traditional hereditary power of dominant tribes vis-à-vis those of the subject peoples. In other words, the BNF had to determine which of the subject tribes would win recognition as traditional polities deserving representation in Parliament through their own chief, and which would be subsumed under the jurisdiction of the dominant Tswana chiefs.
A more compelling possible reason for the failure of the ethnic question as a vote catcher, however, is that as with the question of chieftaincy, the BNF strategy tended to focus on the cultural aspect of peoples' grievances and did not pay sufficient attention to the material base. So while indeed there were clear signs that for some ethnic groups such as the Bakalanga, Bayei, Bakgaladi, and Basarwa , the conferment of an equal national citizenship on individuals had not resolved outstanding local grievances concerning their subordinate ethnic status vis-à-vis the dominant local Tswana groups, independence under a BDP led government not only promised but actually delivered, material benefits that cut across the ethnic spectrum and have thus tended largely to outweigh the indignity of cultural subjugation. Arguably, this gave most ethnic groups space to separate their struggle for cultural equality from the question of political party affiliation[9].
For instance, the Bakalanga, who are often portrayed as the most likely constituency for politicised ethnicity, have never consistently supported any single political party as the sole legitimate representative of their aspirations for ethnic equality. While this ethnic group clearly initially supported the national opposition party in the North East and Francistown constituencies in the 1960s and 1970s, they have also largely supported the ruling party and other political contestants outside the situational specificity of the North East and Francistown areas. For instance the predominantly Kalanga council constituencies of Mathangwane, Marapong, Mosetse, Tutume East and West, Sebina and Maitengwe have historically supported the BDP with mandates which in 1989 ranged from 51 percent (Tutume West) to 84 percent (Mosetse) and averaged 60 percent. By 1999 this support was averaging 55 percent and ranging from 48 percent in Tutume to 75 percent in Sebina.
Of particular interest is the role the BNF assigned to students and student movements. Following the socialist strategy of identifying a revolutionary vanguard which would act as a vehicle of socialist ideology and help raise political awareness until the weak working class[10] had developed enough to take on that role, the BNF targeted students for radical ideological, political and organisational activity. This led to strident accusations from the ruling Botswana Democratic Party in the 1970s that the national university was being used for clandestine meetings at which plans were being made for a revolutionary and unconstitutional takeover of government (Picard,

1987: 172). It also saw some of these BNF youth and their leaders having their passports confiscated by the State on the eve of a planned travel to attend a youth conference in Cuba in 1978 (Polhemus, 1983:426). The clandestine nature of ideological study groups among students and other identified allies of the socialist revolution led to an unprecedented level of strident politicking in the 1970s with both the BNF and the ruling party accusing each other of undemocratic and unconstitutional tactics and threatening to use violence in their competition for power (Picard, 1987; Charlton, 1993).

As an electoral strategy however, the BNF's battle for the ideological soul of student politics and support effectively meant that the party was targeting a transient group that could afford to be highly revolutionary in rhetoric, safe in the knowledge that a university degree guaranteed them a secure place in the 'reactionary world' of civil servants and cattle-owning elite where they would not anticipate any revolutionary change in their lifetime. But it also meant that the party was building a cadre of potential elite recruits whose 'inherent proneness to turn bourgeois' (Ulyanovosky, 1984; 58), might be compensated by enhanced ideological conscientisation and the prospect of political power as revolutionaries who would, in the interim, become part of the governing class on behalf of the yet to develop working classes[11]. To enhance the potential vote of the youth in support of the opposition, the BNF pushed for electoral reforms which would lower the voting age from 21 to18 years.

The strategy of politicising students later paid off when some of these graduates of revolutionary study groups became electable in sizeable numbers in Botswana's urban areas in the 1994 elections. But the strategy suffered a backlash in the 1999 elections when competition for the commanding heights of the party's echelons of power led to major internal conflicts and the breakup of the party into factions, each claiming a revolutionary ideological purity not quite in congruence with the reality of the material position of these political activists. This resulted in the loss of half the gains the party had made in parliamentary seats in 1994.

But perhaps the weakest aspect of the BNF's political strategy for government power is that the party did not really have a coherent strategy at all from the formative years till the 1990s. During the first two decades, the party's attempt to wrest electoral power from the BDP were poorly directed and gave little acknowledgement to the importance of the voters. For instance, Stevens and Speed (1976: 387) noted that opposition parties did not seem concerned to make any political capital out of the fact that the BDP government's economic strategies were increasingly characterised by failure to meet the development needs of the poor and lowly paid working classes. Cohen (1976) similarly observed the lack of concern and debate over Government's economic strategy on the part of political candidates during the 1974 elections. Picard (1987) also raised concerns that 'opposition parties in Botswana appear to be caught in the historical circumstances of their formation and are becoming irrelevant to Botswana's evolving political systems' and that they do not focus on contemporary political issues.

The BNF set itself the task of opposing the dominant BDP not so much as a potential government-in waiting, but as a 'front' for a wide-ranging set of grievances which did not have a common base other the ruling party as their source. In fact, the party started off as an attempt to broker unity among existing 'socialist' parties (such as the BPP and its splinter groups) and other political contenders (such as traditional chiefs) who had lost the contest for the control of the state. When the attempt to unify existing opposition parties failed, the decision to create yet another socialist party was made which initially drew membership from the existing opposition groups, leaving those parties with dwindling numbers and eventual political oblivion. Correctly

judging the conditions unripe at the time for a potential socialist revolution, the BNF leadership calculated that they could use the rhetoric of scientific socialism to justify the array of conflicting interests that they would attempt to unify in opposition to the ruling party.

For a party with the ultimate aim of representing the interests of the workers, however, the BNF strategy was particularly instructive for its failure to address the growing plight of these workers under the economic management of the BDP government. It was only with the 1984 elections that Holm (1988;192) was able to observe that 'the BNF has appealed to the working class groups by criticizing the BDP for not allocating a sufficient proportion of the country's increased income to wage earners'. But he was skeptical about whether this critique had mobilised target voters since it did not form part of the BNF's campaign material. Parson (1990; 128) also noted that by capitalising on the economic concerns of the mass base in rural areas and social concerns on housing and working conditions in urban areas, the BNF had become the most successful party in capturing support from both the disaffected working class and disgruntled elites (Parson 1990: 129). But he also recognised the failure of the party to translate criticism of the BDP into electoral campaigns, attributing the failure to the BNF's inability to offer a clear and consistent alternative to the organisation and programme of the ruling party.

Molutsi and Holm (1990; 333) recognised similar electoral weaknesses occasioned by the reluctance of opposition parties to explore public opinion so as to prepare their political campaigns in response. They also noted that challenges to the government were rarely well coordinated nationwide, and that this reduced the threat of opposition activities to the top political elites (Molutsi and Holm (1990; 337). The party's political gaucheness was also demonstrated by its inability to seize the moment of its first major critical mass of parliamentary seats after the 1994 general elections to make political capital out of the BDP's failures. The BNF entered Parliament with 13 representatives but no clear strategy on how to use this power to score effective political points against the ruling party. Informative reports like the statutory Auditor General's Reports were not made much use of even though they clearly indicated serious lapses in the management of public resources by civil servants and poor accountability on the part of supervising Ministers.

For most of its political existence, therefore, the BNF does not seem to have made enough effort to develop clear, effective programmes and policy strategies that took full cognizance of the electorate as a source of potential power. While the same could be said about the ruling Botswana Democratic Party, incumbency gave the ruling party advantage as it has relied on technocratic civil servants to provide the necessary national development policies and strategies which the party could then legitimately claim for its own. But the BNF, as a party outside government power, needed to have alternative strategies to win the support of voters. However, the ruling party always took advantage of its position in power to react to the most electorally damaging criticism from the BNF.

By and large, the BNF's electoral failures can be traced to its strategy of attempting to be a political home for every elite group with a grievance, whether cultural, related to power politics, or specifically relating to structural problems of socio-economic inequality. As a result it has had no single coherent national policy addressing the specific problems of any single constituency. Each interest group was left to interpret the political goals of the party in relation to their own interests, and this led to persistent internal conflicts as each group attempted to take the commanding heights of power in the party structure to advance their side. The result has been a weak party with an unclear message for the electorate. Or, given the ideological inclinations of the

founder, it has been a party with a scientific socialist ideology that had no electoral constituency. For unlike similar socialist parties in western Europe which used scientific socialism as a political guide to action under clearly capitalist conditions (Sassoon, 1997), the BNF did not have a numerically significant working class constituency it could claim to represent.
The BNF's organisational weakness has also been reflected in the party's failure to come to terms with the reality of changes heralded by political independence - thus for instance its habitual dismissal of independence as having brought changes only in the flag and the national anthem. But for the rapidly increasing number of educated elites, cattle owners and small entrepreneurs, the reality was that independence brought real material gains[12]. Similarly, for the vast majority of the population who benefited from improved health and educational facilities, transport and communications, access to water, etc, independence was more than a simplistic symbolic change. So, though these qualitative changes also brought large and persistent income inequalities, the majority of the voting public saw both the shortcomings and the benefits, and therefore continued to give the ruling BDP government their electoral support. For the BNF, the result has been that thirty five years after it came into existence, it has remained largely on the sidelines of political power, skirting the BDP, but not making sufficient inroads into its power base to occasion a change of government.

The Road to Political Damascus: The BNF Discovers the Voters

Three years before the 1999 General Elections, a public forum was held at the University of Botswana to debate the question of whether the BNF was in fact ready to govern. The background to this public debate was rising concern over the anomalous situation where the electorate seemed to be heading for a possible transfer of government power to the BNF, while the BNF had not itself started to behave organisationally like a government in waiting. The example of Zambia's President Chiluba who seemed to spend more energies ensuring that his predecessor would not come back to power than in the actual governing of the country raised concerns that Botswana might be heading that way if there was an electoral victory for a party which was not ready to take on the mantle of government. This question (i.e. is the BNF ready to govern?) is still very relevant as it concerns the serious issue of whether Botswana's multi-party democracy will ever be seriously tested as an assurance of its consolidation.
Many of Botswana's political analysts will agree that the BNF is the only opposition party that has been persistent in its attempt to wrest electoral support from the BDP over the past three and a half decades. Some observers also concede that at least since the 1980s, but particularly in the 1990s, there have been signs that the party may at last be awakening to the realisation that the outcome of its quest for power depends on the electorate, and that therefore it must begin to address voters more directly. Molutsi and Holm (1990:337) for instance were encouraged by the development of dialogue between the grass roots and party leadership which they saw as portending the strengthening of the party's electoral campaigns. They also observed that policy debates had begun to emerge within the party congresses, which could lead to new initiatives relevant to changing socio-economic conditions and the needs of a rapidly urbanising population (Molutsi and Holm 1990 339). Charlton (1993: 350) also observed that the BNF has in recent years 'begun to tap the rich veins of academic research … both more coherently and to much greater effect than hitherto'.
These are just tentative indicators. There is as yet no concrete evidence that the BNF is generating

practical strategies to respond to the electorate through qualitative programme development and cogent policies. For instance, the leader of the BNF caused some activists to pull out of the party when he declared at a party conference in 1998 that the BNF was not a political party, but a Front. For those who joined the party in the hope that it was seriously considering contesting for the right to govern and that way to meaningfully represent the interests of its supporters, this statement suggested that it was not ready to take the mantle of government power. The party has still to clarify who its electoral constituency is given the current structure of the electorate. The party's ambivalence contrasts very sharply with the historical development of socialist parties in Europe where political activists realised early in the last century that to win the electoral mandate, they had to win the confidence of not just the working class but of middle class voters as well (Sassoon, 1997).

The BNF has yet to state clearly what the various constituencies it claims to represent as a 'Front' should expect to gain from this party by giving it their vote. Botswana's burgeoning class of local entrepreneurs has indicated a desire for a party which was serious both about contesting government power and about giving local entrepreneurs priority over competing foreign business. When, for instance Mr Leach Tlhomelang left the ruling BDP to form his own party in 1989, he argued that he was disillusioned with the BDP government's lack of commitment to local business, stating that government paid only lip service to the needs of local entrepreneurs. Similarly, he left the BNF when he realised it would not adequately represent these interests. Ephraim Setshwaelo's ill fated United Action Party similarly attracted professionals and business classes who had become disillusioned with the ruling party's ability to serve the interests of Botswana's growing class of potential entrepreneurs.

The verdict of Botswana's voting public seems to also suggest that both the poor rural and urban constituencies, and the burgeoning class of local entrepreneurship, are losing confidence in the economic strategies pursued by the ruling Botswana Democratic Party since independence. For the poor, this is in spite of large state transfers towards drought relief, support of small arable agriculture, small and medium enterprises, and various others programmes aimed at raising the livelihoods of these vulnerable groups. The younger generation of Batswana now clearly want jobs and have turned their back firmly on those production areas which tend to perpetuate poverty rather that alleviate it. Between the 1981 and 1991 censuses for instance youth participation in agriculture dropped from 70 percent to 30 percent. The 1997 Poverty Study showed that they want the security of formal sector incomes. The BNF has not developed a clear strategy of addressing these various electoral demands.

Despite this lack of clarity, the electorate has detected enough signals of response to reward the small overtures the BNF has made by cautiously increasing its support for the party. The 1994 elections gave the BNF its largest vote of confidence when that party won a third of the contested parliamentary seats. Although this support dropped to just 15 percent of the seats in 1999 due largely to the party's failure to remain internally cohesive in the face of possible electoral victory, indications are that the voters' confidence will hold. And that, theoretically, it could increase as the population becomes more urbanised, their economic base more diverse, and the party more responsive and proactive in its electoral campaigns. The strength of this support is reflected in the fact that despite a major split that dramatically reduced the party's organisational capacity in the run up to the 1999 elections, the BNF as a party was able to maintain between 25 percent to 57 percent of the aggregate local government votes in 60 percent of the national constituencies. However, the large gaps in voter support suggest that there is still some way to go before the

BNF can garner adequate voter confidence to wrest the mandate from the BDP. In the capital city where the BNF has a well established electoral support, it has an absolute majority only in the predominantly poor suburbs of the Gaborone South constituency. In the more affluent Gaborone Central and the mixed areas of Gaborone North and Gaborone West, its support is undermined by competition from its estranged off-shoot, the Botswana Congress Party. This support structure suggests that whether as a reflection of protest against the ruling party or affirmation of support for the opposition, the BNF enjoys support from a cross section of socio-economic classes in Gaborone: the poor as well as the affluent. In other urban areas, however, support for the BNF is more qualified (20 percent to 50 percent), suggesting that the party needs to work even harder before it can win the confidence of the voters in these constituencies.

A significant factor in voter cautiousness towards the BNF may stem from the fact that in the three and a half decades of its existence, it has been characterised by major splits on the eve of important electoral contests. For instance on the eve of the 1989 elections the party broke into factions which almost certainly cost it two constituencies (Mokopakgosi and Molomo, 2000: 8). The break-up in the run-up to the 1999 elections lost the party even more constituencies: occurring as it did after the BNF had made a historic break-through by winning a third of the 1994 parliamentary seats. The concern over the proneness to factional splits was raised at several fora around the countryside during public debates in the last two months before the 1999 General Elections.

Conclusion

The question of whether the Botswana National Front will ever rise above its internal conflicts to develop a vision that will help it to respond to electoral demands for meaningful competition for government power in the immediate future has not been settled. It would seem that this party will need dramatic transformations from within to rise above the shackles of its ideological inclinations towards meaningless elite alliances and consequent proneness to factional break-ups. The Botswana voters have sent clear signals that they are ready to give the opposition a try. But as the past patterns of voter behaviour also indicate, this promise is a qualified one dependent largely on how much the party is prepared to demonstrate concretely that it can be trusted with the popular mandate.

One of the challenges the BNF faces is whether it has the political maturity to develop an economic and political strategy where the aspiring local entrepreneur and the job seeker can be convinced they have a joint enterprise of mutual dependence which will be protected and nurtured by the state. Or will the party's inclination towards a state controlled economy lead it to reject the entrepreneur as nothing but an exploiter, and thus seek to perpetuate those sections of the BDP's past economic strategies that have demonstrably shown the greatest propensity for failure? Local private sector entrepreneurs have become a reality in Botswana despite the hostile environment within which they have had to operate under successive BDP governments.

Job seekers have also become disillusioned with the state dominated economy's capacity to create jobs. In an assessment of the size of the employment problem in Botswana H C L Hermans (1988) noted, after taking into account the country's resources held in the whole banking system and foreign reserves, that Botswana did not have adequate domestic resources to marshall into creating jobs at a rate that would meaningfully dent the rate of demand. He argued that this country would have to rely to a considerable extent on attracting foreign capital to complement

local resources. This poses yet another political challenge to the Botswana National Front and other socialist oriented opposition parties. Given their stated antipathy towards western capitalism how will the party deal with the problem of gaps in domestic capital resources? Will it, like the BDP before it opt for strategic alliance with 'the devil'? The BDP's past strategy has proven its merit by ensuring that the Botswana state came to accrue resources that it could not possibly have accumulated without access to the technology, management skills and market savvy of its multinational partners. But re-distributing these accrued resources into productive, employment creating activities has proven to be one of BDP's failures, resulting in a situation where persistent poverty has co-existed with increasing national wealth.

Notes

1. That is a chunk of the vote too small to constitute a split, but large enough to dent the margin the main opposition needs to beat the ruling party.
2. The BDP won the marginal opposition constituencies of Kgatleng West (46 percent), Francistown West (48 percent) Ngwaketse West (48 percent), Gaborone Central (48 percent) and Selibe Phikwe (48 percent) through split opposition votes. Similarly Kgatleng East (40 percent) went to the BDP due to splits.
3. These include AM Tsoebebe, Lenyeletse Seretse, Gaoleses Koma, MLA Kgasa, Benjamin Thema and other political activists who would later go on to found a rival party in the BDP (Maundeni, 1998; Ramsay and Parsons, 1998). See also Neil Parson (1988) for an insightful historical account of the emergence of the educated elite in Botswana between 1930 and 1960.
4. This has since been followed by several 'Decades of Development'. But the decade of the 1980s has been recognised generally as a 'lost development decade', because whatever gains poor countries made during the first two decades through infrastructural and social development were greatly reversed during the era of Structural Adjustment.
5. This debate arose out of an attempt by ethnic minority groups to remove, from Botswana's statutes, discriminatory sections that identity only the Tswana speaking groups as principal tribes whose paramount chiefs enjoy the right of membership of the House of Chiefs. Elsewhere (Selolwane 2001) I have argued that the timing of the debate is significant because it suggests that the nation has matured enough to deal with sectional interests and problems of group discrimination without fear of destroying national unity and stability. The debate can also be seen as a forum for re-negotiation of terms of realignment of interests and thus follows similar negotiations which had earlier led to the reduction of hereditary power and the ascendancy of a democratic distribution of power. The role of hereditary power in the development of democracy is once again being questioned as interest groups seek to balance the insterests of cultural traditions with the interests of expanding democratic rights.
6. At the onset of British colonial domination in the nineteenth century, the people occupying the current territory of Botswana varied in the level of political organisation they had reached. Generally the Tswana-speaking groups had developed larger, centralised polities while the non-Tswana groups tended to be less centralised and therefore more susceptible to incorporation into and subjugation by the more centralised states. But the process of subjugation of the non-Tswana groups under the centralised Tswana was not fully completed before European colonisation, and was in fact facilitated to its conclusion by this colonial process which conferred upon some polities the status of principal tribes, while reducing others to a subject people under the

administrative authority of the principal tribes.
7. For many western analysts who have commented on politics in Botswana, ethnicity and tribal identity has often been identified as a possible fault line along which the people of Botswana are divided and could be politicised. John Holm (1988: 191), one of the foremost promoters of the thesis of tribal politics, sees ethnicity as a major determinant of electoral choice, and has persistently argued that the citizens of Botswana vote along ethnic/tribal lines, deeming some political parties to represent their ethnic group. This view is also shared by Roger Charlton (1993: 347), Jack Parson (1993) and to some extent also du Toit (1995). As far back as 1977 Phillip Morgan had also identified ethnicity as holding possible clues to the direction of the party system in Botswana. Interestingly, hardly any citizen scholars except Patrick Molutsi (1997) share this perception on the political role of ethnicity, or give it the same prominence.
8. A myth that has been perpetuated in western scholarly circles is that Botswana is ethnically and tribally homogenous, and this is often used to explain why this country has never suffered divisive politicised ethnicity (Du Toit, 1995). But as Motsamai Mpho (1989) indicated, in the Batawana tribal polity alone, ethnic Tswana or Batawana accounted for just 20 percent of the tribal population the last time statistics were gathered along ethnic lines.
9. As Jacqui Solway (1994) noted with regards to Bakgaladi, the material benefits accruing from the educational and employment opportunities accorded by the fairly even national distribution of these services across the ethnic spectrum boosted the confidence of the youth from these historically subjugated people, thus making their national citizenship materially meaningful. Educated Bayei who have similarly benefited from the even distribution of educational and employment opportunities, have made it clear that their struggle for ethnic equality is not an issue for partisan politics.
10. In Marxist theory the working class is the class historically assigned the ultimate revolutionary role of ushering in socialism and the end of class societies.
11. Similar contradictions characterised the socialist movements in Western Europe where for decades up the end of the Second World War there was considerable debate on the timing of the workers' revolution and the end of capitalism (See Sassoon, 1997).
12. Comparisons can also be made with the development of socialist and communist parties in western Europe. According to Sassoon (1997), the socialist movement in Western Europe initially saw their ultimate political goal as the ending of capitalism and the capitalist state. But as the conditions of the working class clearly improved and demonstrated that it was not inevitable that they would be impoverished, by the end of World War Two most of the parties had come to terms with the fact that they would have to live with capitalism into the foreseeable future. Many political activists here began to reconstruct their parties as agents representing a wider circle of constituencies besides the working classes. And this led to electoral victories which saw many socialist and working class parties come into power either through outright electoral victory or in coalition with other parties.

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Sociology and Yorùbá Studies: epistemic intervention or doing sociology in the 'vernacular'?[1]

1. Introduction

At the heart of Sociology has been the need to find explanations beyond the particular instance or case being studied. It is precisely because Sociology aspires to being (indeed claims to being) nomothetic, that the claims of universality generally made for western sociology require critical assessment. The sociological concern is with generalisation and deriving theoretical insights from the particular. However, western sociology is deeply idiographic in its discourse and origin. We cannot understand Weber or Durkheim outside of the particular social context in which they wrote. It is, therefore, important to recognise what is idiographic about western sociology - regardless of the attempts to substitute it for global sociology. Insights rooted in other idiographic contexts cannot, therefore, be defined as *indigenous sociology* or worst still 'teaching sociology in the vernacular', which has been the dominant response to attempts to infuse non-western discourses into global sociology. Cultural studies, in this case Yorùbá studies, offer rich idiographic, local narratives which can contribute to a genuinely global sociology. This paper critically engages with the work of Akìwowo, the Nigerian sociologist, so intimately identified with the project of an African 'indigenous sociology.'

However, it is important to put our discussion within a wider context of the stirring among African scholars for a distinct African voice in their disciplines. Much of this was driven by the perceived need to overcome the negative representation of the African in dominant Western scholarship, especially in the social sciences. For decades, there have been calls for a culturally specific and locally sensitive production of knowledge. In 1993 and 1997, Onigu Otite repeated these calls for Sociology and Anthropology, respectively. The *Ibadan School of History,* for instance, was driven by the racist historiography of the colonial project. My argument, with these earlier efforts, as with Akìwowo, more substantively, is that most did not overcome the epistemic framework of the western scholarship that they sought to displace. This is what I refer to as the epistemic crisis in the efforts at displacing received western paradigms, and I explore this, briefly, in Section 2.

The specific agenda of this paper is Sociology, and it is in this respect that I focus on the distinctly seminal contributions of Prof. Akínsolá Akìwowo. He drew on the ontological discourses embedded in the oracular narratives of *Odù Ifá*[2]. However, the Akìwowo Project (as I call it) cannot be rendered as *indigenous sociology*, as he himself and the International Sociological Association establishment call it (Akìwowo, 1999; Archer, 1991; Albrow and King, 1990). The value of the Akìwowo Project requires that we go beyond Akìwowo himself, if we are to realise the epistemic potentials in sourcing from indigenous knowledge systems. Akìwowo's latest work (1999) provides a glimpse at the basis of such shift. The premise of this epistemic shift is what Akìwowo considers the 'fuzzy logic' in the oracular narratives of Òrúnmìlà (see Note 2). This is in sharp contrast to Aristotle's 'binary logic' (Kosko, 1994; Akìwowo, 1999). However, we need to go beyond 'fuzzy logic' to grasp the kernel of the epistemic challenge that the idiographic narratives of Òrúnmìlà offers.[3] Òrúnmìlà, I argue, is not a fuzzy logician. I developed this argument in Section 4. It is in engaging with epistemic issues (hence epistemic intervention),

rather than habituating western sociology, that we can enrich a genuinely global sociology. In section 4, I outline the framework of such epistemic intervention.
Given the extensive use of Yorùbá words and phrases in this paper (especially in section 3), I have provided a glossary of the Yorùbá words and phrases for the benefit of non-speakers of the language.

2. Sociology in Africa: crisis of received knowledge

An African 'interrogation' of Sociology begins with the universalistic (nomothetic) claims that Goldthorpe and others make for Western Sociology. It is an aspect of what we refer to as the crisis of western sociology. The same factors that inspired Gouldner's withering critique of Parsonian sociology also played an important role in widening the scepticism of African social scientists. What began as an anti-colonial, anti-imperialist demand for reclaiming the social sciences for themselves as Africans found allies within the Western societies. Many of the people that Otite (1993) identified as the third generation of Nigerian sociologists trained when these empirical crises were unfolding.
However, revolt against western sociology or paradigm has not always defined the discipline - and even at its height, it was patchy. Even now, the dominant response to the received paradigm has been acquiescence. This is not only in Sociology but also across the Social Sciences. The Marxist interjection remains marginal. Nevertheless, even among those whose scholarship falls within 'radical' discourse, the capacity for regurgitating the received paradigm remains acute. The application of 'sociological imagination' to the African situation may happen in some instances, but this broadly within received paradigms, which often impose categories on local experience.[4]
Critical engagement with received paradigms took different forms. There were those who applied the 'sociological imagination', and in whose hands the local conditions forced a rethinking of theory. Peter Ekeh's (1975) 'theory of the two publics' is such a seminal work in the area of Political Sociology. However, Ekeh's work was not about the rejection of western epistemic or paradigm in the analysis of public affairs - indeed the insight he offered was rooted within the Public/Private divide in western political sociology. Colonialism created a dual 'public': one civic, the other primordial. Corruption was not a mindless plundering of the public treasury. The one who plunders the civic public will not do the same when operating within his/her 'primordial public' (the domain of familial, local and ethnic affairs). Nevertheless, Ekeh's work is a resourceful application of 'sociological imagination' to his local contexts, even if rooted in the received paradigm of the private/public divide.
Often the critique of received western paradigms comes in the form of a demand for culturally relevant scholarship; a demand for the replacement of western discourses with those more relevant to Africa's development needs. Onigu Otite's 1997 address to the Pan-African Association of Anthropologists took such an instrumental view of Africanist scholarship.
The more radical critique of Western Sociology found greater resonance among Nigerian scholars of Marxist persuasion. Within Anthropology, for instance, the colonial instrumental manipulation of the field provided the basis for a revolt, while the immanent conservatism of Parsonian Sociology defined the revolt. In this Omafume Onoge[5] (1971 [1977], 1973) typifies the essence of the rebellion, and matched similar revolts among other African scholars in Anthropology such as Mafeje (1976, 1997), Magubane (1971), and Prah (1991). Within Political Science, Claude Ake's (1984) polemical attack on western *Social Science as Imperialism* typifies this revolt. In

Economics, Onimode (1992) provided a similarly critical voice.
In the same way that Ekeh represented a fresh and imaginative deployment of a received paradigm, much of the radical critique of western (bourgeois) discourse involved a radical rebuttal, but within the framework of the received paradigm and little engagement with local ontological discourses. Onoge (1977) is suggestive of such engagement with local ontological narratives or cultural studies, especially in the area of Sociology of Literature, which he pioneered at Ibadan.
The most persistent effort, in Sociology, at engaging with the narratives of local ontological discourses, and using these to raise a distinctly African voice has come from Professor Akínsolá Akìwowo. A discussion of Akìwowo's works is not new. My engagement with Akìwowo's works, and the specific direction that I believe is necessary to push his legacy, is best understood in the wider context of International Sociology. In other words, mounting an epistemic challenge rather than 'doing sociology in the vernacular'. I will review this context, briefly, before turning to the Akìwowo Project.

3. Sociology and Yorùbá Studies: the Akìwowo Project

A different and more recent idea of the crisis of western sociology is rooted in the consequence of post-positivism and the 'rise of globalisation'. As Archer noted in her 1991 ISA[6] Presidential Address:

> In the wake of positivism's funeral came a massive retreat from the kind of international endeavour within sociology, and a re-celebration of diversity, difference, locality, context specificity, and indigenisation. Hence the irony of an increasingly global society which is met by an increasingly localised sociology. (1991, p.132).

The funeral wake of positivism is perhaps most celebrated in Postmodernism's anti-foundationalism - a rejection of 'modern views of science, epistemology and methodology' (Rosenau 1992, p.109). Sceptical post-modernists, as Rosenau calls them, 'have little faith in reason, and they disavow conventional criteria for evaluating knowledge' (ibid). In its deconstructionist form (rooted in the works of Jacques Derrida and Jean-Francois Lyotard), postmodernism is a vehicle for a horde of epistemological anarchists. They affirmed the fringe; insist on difference without seeking common strands. Diversity and local narratives become an end in themselves. The world they claim they represent is the post-modern world of 'globalized, net-worked' terrain of ever-fragmented identities, in which culture and communication drive everything else (Castells 1996, Waterman, 1999).
For a President of the ISA, the post-modern 'horde' portends the end of scholarship, as she knew it: these were the new 'barbarians' at the gates of Rome. It became a negation of what the nomothetic aspiration of Sociology is all about. Archer's (1991, p.131) reaction was towards trenchant advocacy for:

> A single sociology, whose ultimate unity upon which humanity rests by acknowledging the universality of human reasoning, the unicity of humanity, and the endorsement of a single world whose oneness is based upon the adoption of a realistic ontology.

This precisely is the problem. The 'unicity of humanity' that requires that we have 'a single discipline' for 'a single world' is in the imagination of the conventional western sociologist. It is one

thing to defend foundationalism in sociology (at least some basis for epistemic adjudication) against the anarchist tendencies of postmodernism. It is an entirely different thing to assume that the dominant traditions in western sociology can pretend to speak for the global community of sociology. The nomothetic design that Archer saw in what she called 'the international endeavour within sociology' is one that has advanced not because of its universality but as an idiographic narrative of (a section of) the West, often part of the imperial agenda that has been called the 'triumph of the West'. The 'single humanity', that Archer pitches for, assumes its 'unicity' by denying a voice to the non-western voices. (And the non-dominant voices in the West, as well). When Archer argues that 'complementary work from outside the developed world is needed', the question is complementing what? At what point is this another phrase for the traditional demand by western scholars for a global division of labour in knowledge production where epistemic issues are the concern of western scholars and data gathering and lesser concerns are farmed out to non-western sociologists? I will argue later that in seeming to follow this demand for 'complementary work' Akìwowo undermines his most important contributions to Global Sociology. In 1999, Akìwowo was still concerned with 'indigenous sociology', which reinforces Archer's claim that his works were about 'teaching/doing sociology in the vernacular'[7] (Archer 1991, p.143).

An apparently different reaction to 'localised sociology', within the ISA, has been to 'embrace' it. Indeed the motivation within the ISA for founding the journal *International Sociology* is to provide a platform for articulating sociological insights from outside the West. As Martin Albrow (1987, p.2) remarked: existing outlets for scholarly works in sociology do not fulfil the purpose of global access to what 'sociologists from diverse cultural traditions and national origins' have to say (Cardoso 1986, p.1). Cardoso in *International Sociology*'s first edition states that the vision of the journal is 'to increase our knowledge about the contemporary societies and sociologists, by showing pluralistic paths of concern in sociology rooted in different historical and cultural traditions' (1986, p.2).

A discerning reading would show that rather than being divergent the concern of *International Sociology* is embedded in Archer's robust defence of epistemic unicity. By 1999, the concern of *International Sociology* seems to have coalesced around 'Indigenous Sociology' - but it is still largely about 'teaching/doing sociology in the vernacular'. I will suggest that it is important to take the Akìwowo Project[8] outside the tendency to 'embrace' and put into a 'ghetto' openings for critical epistemic interventions in the discipline, which is informed by the ontological narratives of the Òrúnmìlà oracular discourses. I have gone to this length to outline these reactions, precisely because I think it is in the epistemic openings that Akìwowo offers that we should take his project. Further, I have highlighted the role of postmodernism in the crisis of confidence within Sociology because unlike postmodernism's anti-foundational orientation, I would insist that epistemology is important and scholarly dialogue becomes impossible when we reject (as postmodernists do) any basis for intellectual adjudication.[9] In teasing out the epistemic openings in Akìwowo's works, the local narratives we are concerned with are different from, indeed hostile to, those of postmodernism.

3.1. The Akìwowo Project: a critical encounter

Over the last two decades, the Akìwowo Project has been concerned with infusing Sociology (*albeit*, indigenous sociology for him) with insights from the ontological discourses of the Ifá

orature[10] generally credited to Òrúnmìlà. There are two distinct components to the Akìwowo Project. The first concerns the extraction of concepts embedded in the ontological narratives of the Yorùbá language and oral literature. These concepts focus on sociational life. For Akìwowo, *Àjobí* and *Àjogbé* are two such important concepts (Akìwowo 1983). *Àjobí* reflects consanguinity and the social relations among those claiming such blood relationship or common ancestry. The norms that govern the relationship of those whose sociational life is defined by *àjobí* will be rooted in shared progenitors or ancestry and therefore the invocation of such common origin to reward or sanction specific behaviour. Statements like *'àjobí á da'*[11] or '"àjobí a gbè wá'[12] have meaning and resonance only when people are sociated by consanguinity.

Àjogbé (cohabitation), on the other hand, reflects a looser sociational life that the co-existence of larger number of people will involve. Proximity of living and interaction not defined by the 'glue' of shared ancestry will raise a different set of social problems - the normative framework must depend on new forms of sociational cohesion. For Akìwowo (1983) the social bonding derived from consanguine relations suffered under the pressure of Western culture 'which encouraged dissociation through competition, envy, and conflict over the means to success' (Payne, 1992, p.180). Sociational life deriving from cohabitation (*àjogbé*) replaced sociational life deriving from consanguine bonding. The affinity with Ferdinand Tönnies' concepts of *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft* is hardly a coincidence: the one defines 'relationships which have grown out of sympathetic sentiments' while the other refers to relationships 'which have been set up consciously and for a definite purpose' (Heberle 1948, p.233 [1937]). Often the coincidence between Tönnies' *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft* and Durkheim's idea of 'mechanical solidarity' and 'organic solidarity', respectively, is generally taken for granted. Heberle has however warned about the danger with such an assumption since Tönnies' concepts do not assume the two to be 'antithetical conceptional categories' (1948, p.233).

Mákindé's (1988) elaboration of Akìwowo's twinned concepts of *àjobí* and *àjogbé* suggests succession - one emerges at the breakdown of the other. It is in this sense that they bear greater affinity with the idea of the movement from traditional (or pre-modern) society defined by 'mechanical solidarity' to the 'modern society' that coheres on the basis of 'organic solidarity' in Èmile Durkheim's work. Akìwowo's rejoinders (1991, 1999) to Mákindé (1988), Láwuyì, and Táíwò (1990) do not suggest any fundamental disagreement with Mákindé's interpretation. Indeed, Akìwowo (1983) hinges the shift from *àjobí* to *àjogbé* (as the defining framework for sociational life) on the intrusion of European economic activities on African local lives, which 'led to the acquisition of profitable forms of money, sudden social upheavals which led to the physical separation of blood relations' (1983, p.19). Since Akìwowo does not suggest that the categories are purely ideal types states, we must accept the criticism of Láwuyì and Táíwò (1990) that the empirical coexistence of of *àjobí* and *àjogbé* did not receive sufficient attention in Akìwowo's original works nor adequate reflection from Mákindé. It may be less appropriate though to consider these concepts deriving from the Yorùbá lexicon as merely finding local words (in the collage of concepts) for what already exists in western sociological discourse. For instance, Durkheim's concern was with the shift in norms binding a (pre-modern) society that is defined by the ascriptive division of labour - something he assumed is 'mechanical' - to the modern society which he assumed is based on achievement and a division of labour that does not necessarily depend on what your forebears did. *Àjobí* and *Àjogbé* share the sense of a change in the premise of normative bonds holding the members together, but the assumption of ascriptive as against achievement orientation does not follow. Durkheim's pre-modern society does not necessarily

derive from consanguinity, neither is the modern society necessarily devoid of the moral authority and strictures of consanguine sociation.

Mákindé (1988, p.70) raised the problem of transition from *àjobí* to *àjogbé* forms of sociation, and what follows if the *àjogbé*-based sociation begins to disintegrate. This is an important question, if we are to avoid static discourses, and forms of sociation about which we have no idea of transmission, sociation and dissociation. Akìwowo (1999, p.129) answers thus: 'whether both or other forms of sociation discontinue or "break down" it would depend on how the *èmí* (life force) expresses itself in the individuals who are sociating'. That, one may say, is not good enough. While it introduces the 'spirit' dimension into the forms that 'concrete, tangible thing of flesh and bones' take (ibid), it reifies the actual concrete social relations. It is an issue to which I will return.

Láwuyì and Táíwò (1990), I believe, rightly drew attention to the imprecision and multiplicity of meanings in Akìwowo and Mákindé's use of key concepts in the Akìwowo Project. It is an issue on which I will elaborate in a moment since I believe this is at the heart of Akìwowo persistence in throwing up a collage of concepts and words and his interpretation of the oracular narratives in *Àyájó Alásùwàdà*. However, Láwuyì and Táíwò's call for precision seems to be based on an assumption of such 'rigour' and 'precision' in Western Philosophy and Sociology: indeed they used Aristotle as such yardstick. Here I believe they failed both to enter into the distinct logic embedded in the narratives of the esè Ifá and to appreciate the measure of imprecision in much of Western thoughts/discourses. Let me illustrate with the case of the Parsonian paradigm of structural functionalism. If you ask any second year Sociology student to outline Parsons' paradigm (or 'grand theory' as it was mistakenly called),[13] you will get a rapid rattle of 'the four functional prerequisites that a social system must meet for it to persist: adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latent pattern maintenance'. You get the impression that Parsons elaborated what each of these 'functional prerequisites' involves. How could Parsons' structural functionalism have maintained its hegemony in the classrooms of Nigerian sociology classes if he did not? The problem is that this is in fact the fiction repeated by teachers who probably never read the original text. Beyond an elaboration of adaptation and goal attainment, and the sub-systems that perform these functions at the level of the social system, the discussion about the other two was imprecise.

The second major strand in the Akìwowo Project is his idea of *Asùwàdà* and *Asùwàdà* Principles (1986, 1999). *Àsùwà,* he defines as 'what exists after different entities with given forms are shaped together to form a larger whole' (1999, p.131). If there is something within the Akìwowo Project that *he considers* as constituting a paradigm for the analysis of sociational life and a society, it is the *Asùwàdà* Principle: As he argued in his most recent work (Akìwowo 1999, p.117):

(1) The *Asùwàdà* principle rests securely upon an organismic system embedded in Yorùbá mythological metaphor.

(2) There is a clear and unambiguous interconnectedness of concepts that form the process-structure of the theory of the *àsùwàdà ènìyàn* (human society).

(3) *Àsùwàdà*, as a concept of the dynamic process-structure nature of humankind, culture, and society, is a vital mental orientation - a paradigm - to the systemic study of local human communities, ecologies and globality of human society. As a concept, *Asùwàdà* is only an approximation of the reality to which it is made to refer when employed in general discourses by non-westernised Yorùbá thinkers.

I suspect that what Akìwowo calls 'vital mental orientation' is what we might call 'an abstraction'. Akìwowo explained the idea of this human society as an 'organismic system' by reference to a particular narrative in *Ifá* text: the myth of *Akatagbirigbiri*. This myth involved the story of how the different parts of the body came to be together (Akìwowo 1999, p.133-4). In coming together to form an organismic entity, the various anatomical parts 'remained permanent with each other performing what became an intrinsic function' (*ibid*, p.133). It was in this association - where *Orí* [the head] came to be at the top - 'that each [anatomical part] realized its full potential as a relating individual' (*ibid*, p.134). When faced with the prospect that the cohering parts in this organismic paradigm could disintegrate, Akìwowo responded by claiming that such disintegration can be prevented by the deployment of *ìfogbontáyése* - literally 'using wisdom to make the world better'. Note that this is an inventive reaction to Lawuyi and Taiwo rather than something inherent in the original myth of *Akatagbirigbiri*. The myth itself, meant to address a different issue from its use by Akìwowo, did not envisage the possible disintegration of the sociation between the parts.

Meaningfulness and Engagement: Yoruba narratives in context

As I mentioned above, Akìwowo's efforts at providing indigenous basis for the Sociological enterprise is quite commendable; on its own it would secure Akìwowo's place. At the minimum, it provides the basis for what Archer calls 'teaching and doing sociology in the vernacular'. Providing a collage of 'Yoruba equivalents for Western sociological concepts' (Archer 1991, p.143) has both its advantages and disadvantages; the former if the enterprise is simply to teach and do sociology in the vernacular. At the University of Ifè in the 1970s, the project of teaching the full secondary school curriculum in Yorùbá (that Prof Babátúndé Fáfunwá championed) generated some excitement.[14] This is the context of the initial stirring of the Akìwowo Project. To the extent that Akìwowo regularly strayed in the direction of distinct paradigm - especially one deriving from his *Asùwàdà* principle - it is important to engage with Akìwowo regarding his use of Yorùbá language and the oracular 'poetry' he relies on. I will suggest that a bounding sociological imagination should be tamed by a grounded appreciation of Yorùbá semiotics and linguistics: it is one area in which the Akìwowo Project requires serious review. Let me expatiate. An engagement with Yorùbá language and 'orature' - as in Akìwowo's use of *Odù Ifá* - should recognise the following:

1. The distinctly ethereal and grounded nature of the language. Yorùbá language is broadly situational and at the level of what is called its orature (*esè Ifá* and *ohùn enu*), this situational use of words and phrases is even more profound.
2. An appreciation of wordplay is vital for a situational reading of Yorùbá language. The significance of rhyming sound; the rhythmic movement of even everyday phrases and the 'musicality' of the everyday dimension of the language is important. I will, indeed, argue that often the preference is for musicality above meaning. Indeed, it is in the rhythmical movement and musical connectedness of words and phrases that meaningfulness (or meaning) emerges. This is as much in everyday use of the language as it is in more specialised use in oral poetry. Prose and poetry share this penchant for musicality.
3. The tonal nature of the language - where minor inflections in sound may produce a dramatically different meaning to two words that share similar letters. For this reason, reading written Yorùbá becomes impossible, at some stage, without the tone marks. The nuanced nature of the language

requires attention to ethereal use and context of words and phrases.
4. One must make a distinction between words that exist as distinct words in themselves and those that can be created by linking a preposition or prefix and a noun or verb.
Let me use these issues in the language to define my engagement with the Akìwowo Project. This is at two levels. First is the situational reading of *Àyájó Alásùwàdà*; the second is Akìwowo's profuse adoption and manufacture of Yorùbá words for his project of 'indigenous sociology'. I will use the concepts of *àjobí*, *alájobí*, *àjogbé*, *alájogbé*, and *ìwà* (see the Glossary), to illustrate the latter.
Quite often in the Akìwowo Project, there is a tendency to deal with *esè Ifá* (verses in the corpus of Ifá oracular discourse) as poetry. This is a constant idea in Akìwowo's use and return to *Àyájó Alásùwàdà*. In a broad sense, it is poetry; in a more specific sense *Àyájó Alásùwàdà* is much more than poetry. While some *Odù Ifá* (stanzas in Ifá oracular discourse) are narratives that seek (by analogy) to comment on an event by drawing on the dialogue between Òrúnmìlà and other deities (Ògún, for instance), others have clearly more spiritual force. *Àyájó Alásùwàdà* falls into the latter category: it is a category of oracular narratives that combine 'poetic style' with invocation. *Ohùn Enu* or *ofò* (incantation), as the Yoruba call it, involves conjuring up spirits by incantation. It involves attempts to invoke spiritual forces to affirm or bring into being what the person chanting the incantation is demanding. In the specific case of *Àyájó Alásùwàdà*, we see several instances where the person chanting the *ofò* is attempting such invocation (cf. Akìwowo 1986, pp.347-351):
Alasuwada, It is You I call
To send all goodness to me. (Lines 66 and 67, p.348).
Origun Olu-iwa-aye: Help me to achieve my goal… (lines 90 and 91, p.349)
Origun: come forth and collect (*su-iwa-da*) for me
Ela wooro-wayi!
You are the *Alasuwada!* (Lines 98 to 100, p.350).
A contextual reading of the *àyájó* shows that *Orígún, Origun Olu-iwa-aye* and *Alásùwàdà* refer to the same entity (spirit-being). Further, *àyájó* is a special type of 'poetry': it is incantation. The chanting of incantation involves an attempt to invoke the spirit-being (*Alásùwàdà*) to affirm the chanter's words, to bring into existence something that the chanter desires e.g., *ire gbogbo* (diverse fortune[15]). What is the significance of this?
First, an attempt to derive sociological concepts or paradigms from *Àyájó Alásùwàdà* (or similar oracular 'poetry') must appreciate the instrumental nature of the narratives and the intention of the chanter. *Àyájó Alásùwàdà* is not the same as a regular dialogue in *Odù Ifá* where Òrúnmìlà expresses a philosophical viewpoint. The latter is *more* amenable to supplying the building blocks of a paradigm for sociological discourse. Second, considering that the objective of the *àyájó* is to invoke spirits that will confirm the desire for good fortune, harmony, and peace of the new human habitat being consecrated when *Àyájó Alásùwàdà* is chanted, the emphasis will be more functionalist in its approach to life. Such instrumental concern will privilege functionalist discourse and assumptions than other narratives in *Odù Ifá*. Akìwowo seemed less sensitive to this aspect of *àyájó*. I will raise the implications of this for the sociology of knowledge (production) in section 5 below.
In his 1991 reply to Láwuyì and Táíwò, Akìwowo pointed out 'that pragmatically a sentence in Yorùbá is capable of different nuances of meaning' (1991, p.248). While forming the basis for dismissing some of the criticism of Láwuyì and Táíwò, Akìwowo did not pay sufficient attention

to the nuanced nature of the language. I will argue that this is one of the more contentious aspects of the Akìwowo Project. Much of the collage of concepts that Akìwowo produces for doing sociology in the 'vernacular' involveS the manufacture of words which might not exist in regular Yorùbá lexicon and a tendency to infuse them with meanings that they do not have in ordinary use of these words. Let me illustrate with the conceptual derivatives of *Àyájó Alásùwàdà*.

Láwuyì and Táíwò (1990) have pointed out the multiplicity of meanings that a*sùwàdà* or *asùwà* have in Akìwowo and Mákindé's works - leading to conceptual 'fuzziness' - and that need not delay us further. Beyond this, as I noted above, is that a contextual reading of the *àyájó* shows that *Orígún, Orígún Olú-ìwà-ayé* and *Alásùwàdà* all refer to the same transcendental spirit-being with the capacity to do what the chanter of the *ofò* desires (at least so s/he thinks). While *Alásùwàdà* is the transcendental force that can bring asùwà (cohering or to cohere) into existence or motive force for every instance of asùwà, '*Asùwàdà*' does not exist as a distinct word in the lexicon of *Àyájó Alásùwàdà*. It had to be invented by Akìwowo for him to come up with the idea of 'a concept of the dynamic process-structure nature of humankind, culture and society' (1999, p.117).

A more dramatic form of such concept-invention (in the *concept collage* of Akìwowo) is the distinction between *àjobí* and *àjogbé*, and between *alájobí* and *alájogbé*. While the first three words exist in the Yorùbá lexicon as words, the forth (*alájogbé*) exists essentially as a conjugation of two words: the prefix *alá* and the verb *jogbé.* The latter means to cohabit. Fixing the preposition *alá* to the verb *jogbé* creates a word connoting 'someone with whom one cohabits' or a cohabiter. In the specific case, while *alájobí* is a transcendental force of consanguinity, *alájogbé* is not a comparable transcendental force but a conjugation of a prefix and a noun, verb or adverb. Yorùbá language provides for an infinite conjugation of preposition, prefix and nouns or verbs. If the objective of the Akìwowo Project were simply to teach and do sociology in the vernacular, and generate a collage of concepts, there might not be much of a problem. When the idea is to generate distinct paradigms and make an epistemic intervention in global Sociology, then it becomes a problem. Merely inventing words will not do. Often the Akìwowo Project skips between the two (as late as in Akìwowo [1999]) - with the sublime intention of epistemic intervention but ending up with a collage of Yorùbá words and phrases that can be assumed to be equivalents of concepts or ideas in western sociology.

A corollary of the above is the tendency to split words in ways that may undermine the intended meaning. Splitting words into their constituent parts may be useful in knowing their root-meanings, but it also risks de-contextualising the words or phrases. The meaningfulness of *asùwà* is in the whole of the *Àyájó Alásùwàdà* not splitting *Alásùwàdà:* first *asùwàdà*, then *asu-ìwà-dà,* then extracting *ìwà* out to give the impression that in *asu-ìwà-dà* good character raises the concern of positive conduct necessary for cohabitation that resonates with structural-functionalist sensibility. The danger is that it uproots the word *ìwà*, which in the context of *àyájó* would be *w'íwà* (to be or come into existence) as in *n'ígbà ìwá sè* (at the beginning of creation or something being brought into existence).[16]

This brings us to what I consider a fundamental limitation of Akìwowo's enterprise: the paradigm underscoring his works.

The Functionalist Crisis in Akìwowo's Paradigm: the limits of conformity

The fundamental problem with Akìwowo's '*Asùwàdà* principle' is paradigmatic. An aspect of this

has to do with the sociology of knowledge in his works. He failed to reverse the direction of interrogation in the interaction between Sociology and Yorùbá studies: while Yorùbá studies supplied his sociological enterprise with concepts, he did not approach Yorùbá studies with the critical requirements of Sociology.

Essentially, Akìwowo's paradigm is functionalist - *albeit* situated within *esè Ifá* rather than Durkheim or Parsons. As a general venture in idiographic account or the mythical discourses, this would not be such a problem. As a premise for a distinct epistemic intervention in 'global sociology' this discourse raises a wide range of problems, both old and new. This is one important area of the series of queries raised by Lawuyi and Taiwo (1990) to which Akìwowo might have been more sensitive. As they argued:

> The view that society has a purpose which it seeks to attain is one that has undergone considerable stricture in the history of sociological theory […] If Akìwowo wants to rescue that theory and cite it as a promising African alternative theory of sociological explanation, he should defeat those strictures. (Lawuyi and Taiwo 1990, p.138, also cited in Akìwowo 1999, p.118)

Akìwowo's response that his concern was to contribute 'to the mainstream of sociological theory, but not with the aim of defeating the strictures' (1999, p.118) is putting a gloss on the issue. He still needs to address the issue if he insists on reverting to such a paradigm of society and social life. *Asùwàdà* is purposive; *àjogbé* as a form of sociational life is defined from the perspective of common purpose among those living in the community (the *alájogbé*). Akìwowo (1999) failed to pay attention to this fundamental critique of his paradigm. His response (Akìwowo 1999, pp.133-4) was to insist on an even more truculent retreat into the organismic-functionalist paradigm, drawing on the myth of *Akatagbirigbiri*. There are two aspects to the crisis of *asùwàdà principle* as a source-code for an African contribution to global sociology.

First, if the idea is to contribute to 'the mainstream of sociological theory' but not avoiding the most notorious and 'the counter-revolutionary' aspects (Onoge 1973), then what is the value of another local (idiographic) illustration of what has already been accepted as an embarrassing child within the sociological family (even by mainstream western sociologists)?

Second, after decades of anti-colonial struggle, a century-old struggle leading to the defeat of apartheid in South Africa, and decades in which society was forced to acknowledge the systematic disregard for women's rights, how can an epistemic project in sociology be rooted in such (organismic) functionalism? Such a paradigm is not only reactionary, it fails the most basic of nomothetic aspirations: explain social relations and behaviour. The social fixity of society is only hegemonic at the level of the myths of the ruling powers of every society. The only fixed feature is not that things remain the same or 'traditions' remain fixed; it is in fact that the only constant thing is change. But this is not in the teleological and fixed destination of the movement from birth to death that the body (with all its 'sociating anatomical' parts) will experience.

The epistemic cul-de-sac into which the Akìwowo Project is locked is a result of an uncritical focusing on, and acceptance, of the functionalist narratives of *Àyájó Alásùwàdà*, which had a different intention from its use by Akìwowo: the *àyájó* is chanted in the consecration of a new human habitation (see my discussion above). Why did Akìwowo take such a stridently organismic and functionalist direction? I will suggest that it is biographical. Akìwowo's training and gestation were within the functionalist school. It is in our sensitivity to the specific intention of these idiographic narratives that they lend themselves to providing ontological inputs to Sociological

discourse. More significantly, it calls for a critical engagement with Yorùbá studies and the ontological discourses in Yorùbá 'traditional philosophies'. If the Akìwowo Project, has been more appreciative of the issue of the *sociology of knowledge production* - an important epistemic concern - the locus of the Ifá priest in the traditional Yorùbá social structure would have been brought to the fore.[17]

First, most *Ifá* priests were located at the heart of political power. It would not be a surprise if an Ifá diviner or priest within the palace pushed his narratives in the direction of organic functionalism. Outside of committing class suicide, as a privileged satrap in the palace of a 'monarch', the Ifá diviner-priest could hardly champion the revolution of the peasant populace or subvert the dominant structure of power! Beyond all the claims regarding the spirituality of the oracular discourses of *Odù Ifá*, it is in a more grounded reading of its process (and essence as a form) of knowledge production that a viable epistemic challenge should rest - not its disavowal. Indeed, the Ifá priestly class had a near monopoly on what may be called the formal system of education in pre-colonial Yorùbá areas.

Second, a primary difficulty with Akìwowo's works as a basis for epistemic intervention is that it started by trying to do sociology in the vernacular within the framework of Parsonian Sociology, without paying attention to the epistemic foundations of that tradition in Sociology. Akìwowo developed the collage of concepts in an *ad-hoc*, incremental fashion. The result is incoherence among the concepts in his *concept collage*. That is clear in Akìwowo's reply to Mákindé, and Láwuyì and Táíwò (Akìwowo, 1991, 1999).

The direction in which we can take the Akìwowo Project requires raising the epistemological issues. It is from here that we can move to construct distinct paradigms with concepts that are defined by both the episteme and the paradigm. In section 5, I provide some provisional notes on how we may do this.

4. "Fuzzy Logic" and beyond: some provisional notes

In the opening section of this paper, I raised the issues of the idiographic basis of knowledge production and the nomothetic aspirations of sociology as a 'science'. I argued that while the dominant tradition in western sociology asserts its nomothetic ambition; it is impossible to grasp Weber's work - or that of Goldthorpe or Archer - without an appreciation of their idiographic contexts. The same applies to Economics, Political Science, and Psychology. It is on this platform of the idiographic foundations of the nomothetic in western sociology that truly global sociology requires epistemic intervention from non-western idiographic local narratives. I will argue that in Akìwowo's later work he opens up such possibility with the idea of 'fuzzy logic'.

True, Akìwowo's adoption of fuzzy logic was almost as a pun-response to Láwuyì and Táíwò's charge that his concepts were too 'fuzzy' (too imprecise) to be of much use. In responding to this charge, *albeit* in a rather brittle manner (and evasive of the specific charge of conceptual imprecision), Akìwowo provided us with a basis for pushing a more robust epistemic enrichment of Sociology from Yorùbá studies. Akìwowo displaced the argument of imprecision by arguing, correctly in my view, that Láwuyì and Táíwò locked themselves within the prison of Aristotle's binary logic - which has defined much of what was considered scientific within western discourse. Akìwowo's recourse to 'fuzzy logic' derives from Bart Kosko's work. To examine the relevance of 'Fuzzy Logic', we need to look briefly at Kosko's elaboration of the 'logic'.

4.1. "Fuzzy Logic", "Asùwàdà Principle" and Òrúnmìlà

Fuzzy logic for Bart Kosko (1994) has two meanings. The first is "multivalue or 'vague' logic." 'Everything is a matter of degree, including truth and set membership' (Kosko 1994, p.292). The second meaning derives from the work of Lotfi Zadeh (Kosko's mentor and doctoral thesis advisor) - it means 'reasoning with fuzzy sets' (1994, p.292). Fuzzy set refers to 'a set whose members belong to it to some degree' (*ibid.)*. In the binary logic of Aristotelian discourse that prevails within western science and philosophy, an item belongs to a set (1) or it does not (0). This is most obvious in computer language where sets have the value 0 or 1. You are either tall or short; you cannot be tall AND short. In contrast, fuzzy logic rests on the position that membership is a matter of degree - not 0 or 1 but lying somewhere between 0 and 1. Instead of the binary logic (bivalence or bivalue) of Aristotelian discourse, Kosko - who went a long way to refine and expand Zadeh's original works - argues for multivalue or multivalence. Unlike the bivalent logic where the sky is either blue or white (as Aristotle famously stated), fuzzy logic argues that the sky is blue AND white. While Kosko acknowledges the pioneering works of some western logicians, mathematicians and philosophers[18] before Zadeh's work on fuzzy sets, it is to Buddha that he turns for inspiration. Where western science 'trades accuracy for simplicity' (Kosko, 1994, p.21), and 'there is little tolerance in (western) science for views that admit contradictions' (p.23), Buddha admits both. Fuzziness, he argues, 'begins where contradictions begin' (p.23). Where real life, for instance, is about degree of greyness, the dominant Western discourse is rooted in the binary units of 0 or 1. Scientific training involves replacing the complexity of the greyness of real life with the simplicity of bivalent reasoning, which then becomes the basis for ordering the real world. Binary voting systems demand that you vote for party A *or* B; fuzzy voting asks for the degree to which you agree with the various parties. Sociologists may be quick to point to Economists as the quintessential binary logicians in the social sciences - trading accuracy for simplicity in its (econometric) models - but neither Parsonian sociology nor Weberian sociology, for instance, escapes this problem. Parsons' idea of 'four functional prerequisites' for the survival and persistence of social systems is, perhaps, the most obvious example in Sociology. However, societies, as we know them concretely, are not defined by the neo-classical assumptions of self-equilibration. Indeed, change and disruption would seem more obvious than 'order' and equilibrium. Weber's 'ideal types' follow the same tendency to trade accuracy for simplicity. In epistemic terms, we are also often prone to defining some sociological analysis as positivist or phenomenological or 'critical realist' when most exhibit two or more tendencies to some degree.

In seeking to adopt 'fuzzy logic', Akìwowo notes that bivalent logic contrasts with what is found in many non-western faiths. The latter is a world of multivalence, not mutual exclusivity. The sky is not either blue or not blue, but *it is* in fact both at the same time. However, as noted above, Akìwowo's work remains firmly grafted in functionalism of the Parsonian variant. Fuzziness might have been raised as a pun response to his critic, it is not immanent to his discourse or his *Asùwàdà Principle*. Functionalism, like much of western philosophy and 'science', trades accuracy for simplicity. While much in the Òrúnmìlà discourses reflects the polyvalence of 'fuzzy' logic, I think what defines it and much of Yorùbá discursive narratives is the idea that two contradictory things do cohere and co-exist: or more appropriately, the mutual self-embeddeness of contradictory things. The narratives of Òrúnmìlà, and much of Yorùbá ontology, are dominated by such thinking and logic:

t'ibi, t'ire, l'adá ilé ayé
the world was created in the cohering of contradictory forces.[19]
In the specific dialogue that Òrúnmìlà had with Ògún,[20] which Akìwowo used to illustrate the point, marriage is not only about youth and about beauty; it is also about frailty and about old age. The two mutually cohere within the concept of marriage. One who marries the young beautiful bride today has a frail, old maid of the future embedded (immanent) in the beautiful, young bride of the moment.
While much of the Akìwowo Project has been about finding Yorùbá words and concepts that depict different aspects of sociational life, all too often the list he produces sound turgid. The central issue in the development of a new paradigm is not just about the development of concepts. Rather it is the shift in the framework of thought and, more foundationally, the question of how we make sense of things and how we produce knowledge: this is the epistemological aspect.
If Akìwowo's paradigm is, as he argued, embedded in the idea of *asùwàdà* as organismic functional sociational relationship, then we would neither have a paradigm shift nor provide anything new in epistemological terms. Logical abstraction is at the heart of neo-classical economics, Weber's sociology, and Parsons' structural functionalism. The latter would in fact be a more sophisticated expression of logical abstraction than Akìwowo's *asùwàdà.* Rather than *Asùwàdà*, it is in the thinking and logic of Yorùbá ontological narratives that we discern the basis for a paradigm shift. This is at two levels.
The displacement of Aristotelian binary logic and the affirmation of contingent co-existence of opposites in the narratives of Òrúnmìlà provide the basis for a distinct sociological paradigm. This is one in which the coexistence of opposites and the open-ended outcome of social interaction or contending social forces provide an analytical framework devoid of teleological discourse. History and contemporary social practices and sociational life are open-ended in their outcomes. Sociational and dissociational forces coexist, and when and how things move from sociational tendencies to dissociational ones depends on a concrete expression of social relations and deployment of forces. The cultural is embedded with contradictory forces. Resistance has conformity embedded, as conformity is embedded with the contestation of the terrain of its performance. Outcome is not fixed beforehand. When we confront class, ethnic, religious, gender (etc.) manifestations of mutually exclusive identities; it will not be that we take them as alternative identities - as Aristotelian logic that pervades the discourses suggests.[21] Rather it is in their inter-penetration and mutual embeddedness that we understand real, lived existence as multi-layered, contradictory and context-situated (rather than the postmodernist imagined identities). We are not 'either' / 'or'; we are often many things embedded in one. The negotiation of multiple identities - sometimes contradictory, sometimes not - is something we do everyday.
But is Òrúnmìlà a fuzzy logician? I will argue that it is only to some degree (no pun intended). Kosko acknowledged the contingent existence of opposites, but the weight of his fuzzy thinking would seem more concerned with multivalence, as distinct from binary logic. I would like to stress that the Òrúnmìlà narratives are defined largely by the mutual self-embeddeness of contradictory states or beings. Where the idea of fuzzy units stresses that 'membership of a set is a matter of degree', hence placement is matter of degree on the continuum between 0 and 1, I will argue that beyond this, the Òrúnmìlà 'logic' will argue that even at the point of the value 0, its opposite unit (1) coheres. For one, the unit 0 has no existence in the absence of the unit 1. The significance of 0 is in the existence of its 'opposite' unit: 1. To illustrate from a persistent idea in Yorùbá narratives: if we take conception as one end of life and death as the other, one is embedded in the

other not just as states of greyness. Death is immanent in life and vice versa. Death is not the termination of existence, only another state of existence! It is in this context that one understands the pervasive 'role' and reference to ancestors in traditional Yorùbá discourse and daily life. The ancestors are considered as ever present but in a parallel place of existence, of a kind, with capacity to affect what happens in the plane of the 'living'.

For want of a better way of phrasing it, I will call this logic in the Yorùbá discursive narratives *Ti'bi-t'ire* Logic. I will suggest that a focus on this logic as the basis for a renewed epistemological challenge within Sociology; the basis for a paradigmatic venturing into the heart of Sociology's nomothetic aspirations. It requires further study of Yorùbá ontological discourses. The difference with postmodernism is that these are not issues of imageries and imagined lives; the epistemological quest is in the context of the centrality of complementarity not difference for its sake. It is about affirming a definite basis for adjudication among competing explanations - competing (multiple) explanations cannot all be considered correct or true.

4.2. Methodological Aspects of an Epistemic Challenge

The second aspect of '*Ti'bi-t'ire* Logic' is methodological. Much epistemic debate in western social thought has been about positing knowledge production based on the senses to validate experience, on the one hand (Empiricists), and on reason (Rationalists) as the basis of knowledge production. In typical Aristotelian fashion, we are locked into the mutual opposites of Hegelian dialectics - thesis and antithesis. If you are an Empiricist, then you are not a Rationalist, and vice versa.

If we bring the discussion back to the possibilities of the *Ti'bi-t'ire* Logic of the Òrúnmìlà ontological narratives supplying the basis for an epistemic intervention in Sociology, the issue of the method of knowing becomes important. Much of the positivistic currents in western discourse have been about the contrast of the material (senses and reason) and the spiritual (faith/inspiration/illumination). If it is not verifiable it does not exist, and to put a Popperian complication on it; if it is not falsifiable it cannot qualify for science. I will suggest that this may not be a useful approach, nor is it borne out by actual practice in the natural sciences.[22]

I have raised these examples to draw attention to a critical area that within Aristotelian binary logic would have required either an 'is' or 'is not' answer. Within *Ti'bi-t'ire* Logic we have their mutual coexistence, as contending but also as mutually reinforcing forces. Every researcher can attest to the inspiring moments when the mind seems suddenly illuminated or flooded with ideas that one previously was unaware of or connections between observed phenomena not previously appreciated. Yet the same researcher would appreciate that these moments do not exist without the hours of plodding through the field or data; quietly sieving and re-sieving the little grains of knowledge. While the empiricist-positivistic tradition will privilege the latter; moments of what one should call divine inspiration or illumination are no less central to knowledge production - even if most are embarrassed even to mention it. Are these moments of inspiration less tenable as epistemic sources in the production of knowledge than when one plods through the field, the library, and the data in the quest to answer one's research or epistemological question?

While the Aristotelian logic will privilege one or the other, *Ti'bi-t'ire* Logic will argue that rather than being mutually exclusive, the three sources of epistemic vocation are mutually inclusive and interpenetrating. As Sorokin (1941) argues, reason, senses, and faith are not mutually exclusive. To 'sense', 'reason', and 'inspiration', one should add a fourth: *serendipity*. Discoveries of this

nature we will generally ascribe to 'accident', 'chance' or 'good fortune'. In a vocation that is rooted in an ontological narrative that assumes that there are no other sources of knowledge other than ourselves, we will insist on 'accident' or 'chance', but who knows?

5. Conclusion

In this paper, I have examined the crisis of development as partly a crisis of intellectual and epistemic nerve. The demand for an Afrocentric discourse has often not been matched by attention to epistemic issues. This is as much in Sociology as in other branches of knowledge. In exploring this theme, I have used the seminal works of Prof Akínsolá Akìwowo (and what I call the Akìwowo Project, generally) as the basis for going beyond this failure of epistemic nerve. In examining Akìwowo's works I have argued that while they hold some promise, there are serious epistemic problems in his use of idiographic narratives of the Òrúnmìlà orature to do this. A fundamental crisis is in his failure to address the problem around his insistence on an organismic functionalist paradigm. I have argued that contrary to the claims made for western sociology, its idiographic basis does not allow for the universalistic claims made for its nomothetic aspirations - and aspiration is not the same as its realisation. Rather than doing or creating 'indigenous sociology', I have argued for a global sociology that takes on board the idiographic narratives of other cultures and peoples within the global community of sociologists. The foundation for such epistemic intervention, rather than 'doing sociology in the vernacular', I argue, exists in *Ti'bi-t'ire* Logic. I have sketched some provisional notes on the potential of such logic for contribution to a global sociology.

Notes

1. The original version of this paper was commissioned for the 2000 J.F. Odúnjo Colloquium (Conference Centre, University of Ibadan. Thursday, 4 May 2000. It had the sub-title: 'between local narratives and global explanation'. A significantly re-worked version (more concerned with epistemic issues in Sociology) was presented at the Nigerian Anthropological and Sociological Association Conference (15 and 16 November 2000, Ilé-Ifè, Nigeria); as a Staff Seminar at the Department of Sociology in University of Ibadan, Nigeria, and the South African Sociological Association Congress (1-4 July 2001, Pretoria). The present version has benefited from comments from these meetings. I wish to thank several colleagues at Ibadan against whom I have bounced several ideas, many of which are reflected here. They include Prof. O. Olátúnjí and Dr P. Adédòtun Ògúndèjì, both of the Department of Linguistics and African Languages; Dr Délé Jégédé and Dr Ifeanyi Onyeonoru, of the Department of Sociology; Prof. J.A.A. Ayòadé of the Department of Political Science; and Dr. S.A. Òsúnwolé, of the Institute of African Studies. Above all, I thank Elizabeth Uduak, a wonderful partner, for her enduring enthusiasm for the overall project, as I do all my colleagues and students at Ibadan who seem thrilled or puzzled by some ideas expressed in the paper but never indifferent. The usual disclaimer applies.
2. This is the sacred oral poetry used by Ifá priests among the Yorùbá for purposes of divination and interpretation of events. The stanzas or chapters are referred to as Odù Ifá while the verses are referred to as esè Ifá. The Ifá priests serve as the repositories of this body of scholarly commentaries. Odù Ifá normally takes the form of dialogues between Òrúnmìlà, who established the Ifá priestly line, and other Yorùbá deities or stories driven by analogies.
3. A necessary aspect of the interaction between Sociology and Cultural Studies (as in the case of

Yorùbá Studies) and enriching the nomothetic orientation of Sociology is to engage in a reverse contribution. In other words, the sociological 'interrogation' of Cultural Studies and indigenous knowledge systems. The present tendency for uncritical reproduction of folk-narratives weakens the contribution of oral narratives (or orature) to the social sciences; even the idiographic concerns of cultural studies should be of a critical nature. This is where the innate scepticism of radical Sociology comes into play: scepticism not in the negation of the vocation of seeking knowledge, as postmodernism does, but in 'the admission of ignorance in the self and the questioning of truth' (Mamdani 1997, p.2).

4. Examples are Fádípè (1970), Olókò, and Labinjoh (1996).

5. The case of Professor Omafume Onoge is interesting considering that his doctoral thesis at Harvard University was done under the supervision of Talcott Parsons.

6. The International Sociological Association.

7. Interestingly, Margaret Archer refers to Yorùbá as 'vernacular'! What for Akìwowo and I is mother tongue as English is to Archer is to her a 'vernacular'. I have retained her phrase, 'doing sociology in the vernacular' precisely to highlight this problem and Akìwowo's singular failure to challenge that position.

8. I use Akìwowo Project to define not only what Prof Akínsolá Akìwowo himself wrote but as inclusive of the efforts of other scholars to build on his works: especially by Mákindé, Payne, etc.

9. More importantly, politically, postmodernism represents a grave danger for African scholarship, especially regarding the need for a socially engaged and relevant scholarship. I doubt if we can afford the idle scepticism of postmodernists or their preference for a self-centred hedonism. I also do not see the political usefulness of demanding that we *privilege* local narratives and act locally, when the forces of neo-liberalism, which are daily (mis-) shaping our lives and countries, remain global and daily engage in 'aster narratives' The suggested one-sided activism is impolitic: historically successful social movements have always combined the local and the global.

10. Orature: *oral* litera*ture*.

11. Literally: ' call the ancestors to witness against you and impose the punishment'

12. Literally: 'ay the ancestors aid us', or 'grant us success'.

13. This disavowal of 'grand theory' is something that US sociologists, in particular, suffered from in the 1950s, I suspect, following Karl Popper's vigorous rebuttal of the validity of inductive inferences as the basis for the production of knowledge. Popper sought to create a new epistemology based on what he called 'conjecture and refutation'.

14. The experiment, which saw the turning of the University of Ifè Staff secondary school into a vast language laboratory was soon caught in its own contradictions: the pursuit of ethno-linguistic exclusivity in the context the requirements of ethno-linguistic inclusiveness at the national level, and English as an important vehicle for international discourses. The weakness of the enterprise is also conceptua: it confused Afrocentrism with ethnocentrism.

15. I believe 'diverse fortune' is a more appropriate translation of *ire gbogbo* than the 'all goodness' that Akìwowo suggests.

16. Láwuyì and Táíwò as well as Mákindé were prone to this venture; the former following Wande Abimbola along a track that Abimbola did not consider viable for his lexical enterprise.

17. Mákindé, Láwuyì and Táíwò, as well as Payne all failed to address this point.

18. Mainly Jan Lukasiewicz, the Polish logician, Bertrand Russell and Max Black.

19. The problem of translation, that captures contextual meaning, is common. Here we face the same problem. It may seem straightforward to translate *ibi* as 'bad' or 'evil', but I think it misses

the situational meaning of the word. *Ibi* may be rendered 'negative', 'bad', 'evil' or 'something undesirable." *Ire* may be rendered 'good', 'positive'; 'something desirable'. *Ti ibi* (or *Ti'bi*) can be rendered as 'that which is undesirable' and *ti ire* (or *t'ire*), is 'that which is desirable'. A related, and closest in context-sensitive meaning is the Yorùbá word for placental - *ibi omo*: literally 'that which comes with a child but not desired' or 'the obverse of a child'. In a sense, the most context-sensitive meaning for the conjoined use of 't'ibi t'ire' would be 'the cohering of contradictory forces (or elements)'.

20. Ògún in Yorùbá belief-system is the deity of iron and war, with a fiery temperament; an enduring mythical person in Wolé Sóyínká's poetry.

21. For further discussion in respect of its expression in Labour Studies see Jimi Adesina, 1993, 'Rethinking Worker Consciousness: work, class and culture', *Annals of the Social Science Council of Nigeria,* No.5, and Jimi Adesina, 2000, 'Adjustment and the Transformation of Labour Identity: what's new and does it matter?' in Attahiru Jega (ed.) *Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria,* Uppsala, NAI.

22. The work of Francis Crick and James Watson in the unveiling of the structure of the DNA is a important illustration of this. Dr James Watson's recent account 'Discovering the Double Helix' (Watson, 1999) is an interesting account of chance encounters, miscues, bumbling, hard work, empirical work, intense rationalist effort, and 'wild' guesses that actually worked - out of several others that did not.

Glossary of Yorùbá Terms (grouped in clusters)

Àjobí: Consanguinity.
Àjogbé: Cohabitation.
Alájobí: A group of people in consanguine relations. Also used to denote the spirit of consanguinity.
Alájogbé: Group of people who live in close proximity.
Alasùwàdà: The transcendental force of sociation.
àsùwàdà ènìyàn: Human sociation or for Akìwowo: human society
Àsùwàdà: 'Bonding' or 'coming together' or sociation in Akìwowo's usage.
Àyájó: Verses from *Odù Ifá* recited in the form of *ofò.*
Àyájó Alásùwàdà: A special stanza chanted (almost as incantation) at the inauguration of a new human settlement.
Ibi: A negative or undesirable thing.
Ire: A positive or desirable thing.
T'ibi t'ire: undesirable and desirable thing; or cohering of contradictory things or forces.
Ìwà: A person's conduct or comportment.
Ifá: A unique Yorùbá deity (or *òrìsà*) distinct for divination. The priestly line of Ifá priest is reputed to have been founded by the mythical figure *Òrúnmìlà*.
Odù Ifá: Chapters (or stanzas) of the *Ifá* sacred oral text. The text is usually rendered as poetic verses, and recited orally by Ifá priests or devotees.*Esè Ifá:* Verses of the *Ifá* sacred texts.
Ògún: The deity of war or metal workers.
Ofò: Incantation or mystical poetry with assumed spiritual force; it is usually made of many sentences and is chanted.
Ohùn Enu: Literally 'sound of the mouth' but refers to statements involving the type of wordings

used in *ofò*.
Orí: 'Head'.
Origun Olu-iwa-aye or *Orígún:* Renderings for "the transcendental force".

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ADDRESS

Globalisation, Equity and Social Development[1]

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I feel privileged to be asked to be with you today to give this keynote address to such gathering of the South African Association of Sociologists here in Pretoria, a most unlikely site less than a decade ago. Globalisation is a much-discussed topic and some would argue that diminishing returns have now set in. Virtually every speaker or writer on globalisation starts off by pointing to how complex the concept is, adding that no attempt will be made to exhaust its myriad meanings and ramifications. Each speaker then proceeds to make incredible simplifications. I will start with the same disclaimer and then proceed in similar simplifying fashion. One source of complexity arises from the fact globalisation refers to both social and material processes and outcomes, on the one hand and ideational representations on the other. Thus while the literature is replete with accounts of what is happening to the material world of production and technology - compression of space, intensification of global movements of goods, labour and finance and greater reach of transnational corporations - it is also suffused with words such as ideology, culture, representation, *weltanschauung*, spirit, ethos, *imaginaire* and so on intended to capture the consciousness or the *zeitgeist* both of which are induced by cultural reflexivity, which itself is said to be an aspect of globalisation, or at least post-modernity. *Voila*. Even in the more solipsistic views of globalisation, in which focus has been entirely on its *imaginaire* or discourses, there is a presumption that changes in the material world are central to what is happening to our minds and spirits. It is ironic that when ideologies that claimed that, in the last instance, material conditions and structures of production constituted the base, while politics, culture, identities were superstructural, have suffered political defeat as a result of the collapse of 'actually existing socialism', the new debates on globalisation are replete with the crudest forms of materialism and technological determinism.

Globalisation apparently not only affects our economic fortunes and ideologies but our libidos as well. In a recent issue of the *Weekly Guardian* a book reviewer writing on two books on sex, globalisation, power and politics asks the questions: 'How Global is Your Sex Life? Do you make love in the bedroom or in the world?' (Brooks 1998: 19). I will not incriminate myself or anyone else by answering this question, at least not now.

But what is happening in the material world to induce new forms of consciousness and identities? We are told trade and financial flows facilitated by technological changes and the political options of the major economic powers, have led to globalisation. This, it is said, is unprecedented and leads to a post-modern world that transcends the enlightenment project of progress. Strangely, although economic theories of free trade and neo-liberalism seem to be at the core of the *zeitgeist*, it is also from economists that one hears the most scepticism about the novelty of globalisation and the sense of *déja vu*. Economic historians remind us that world trade today, estimated at 31 percent of world output, is below the level reached in 1913, which stood at 33 percent, and that the relative shares of developed and developing countries

have not changed significantly since the 19th century, despite periodic fluctuations and shifts in intergroup and intragroup trade. For Africa there are reasons to doubt the importance of the changes in the economic sphere. Africa's share of world trade is 2 percent - the same as it was at the beginning of the century. Africa's share of foreign direct investment remains limited and portfolio investment still flows pretty much along the same lines as at the beginning of the century, towards South Africa.

There is one disturbing similarity between the end of the 19th century and today. For Africa the globalisation of the 19th century earlier was characterised by systematic colonisation, partition of the continent and the introduction of a colonial division of labour that assigned the colonies specific tasks. Today African nations are sovereign. However, in the economic sphere today we see a return by African economies to their assigned colonial roles: Ghana is back to gold and cocoa; Zambia is back to a copper belt. And the many conferences on Africa and the normative discourse on good governance are reminiscent of the many conference held in Europe not only to partition Africa but also to launch various *mission civilatrices* through 'good governance', 'capacity building' etc. Once again the development project is couched in the language of *mise en valeur* of the colonial speech.

As I have suggested, the lexicon of globalisation includes the entire alphabet – from *angst* to *zeitgeist*. I will confine myself to issues related to social development if for no other reason than the fact that that is what I leave on. I will also concentrate very much on Africa. In the African case, one unresolved problem is that of 'nation building'.

One of the greatest challenges faced by African countries is the establishment of a state-society nexus that facilitates and promotes economic growth and structural transformation, that derives its legitimacy through popular participation and electoral process. and sustains social policies that ensure equitable entitlements of all its citizens to ensure that their capacities and functionings are adequate for a decent inclusion in societal affairs. I take it that whatever the outcomes of globalisation, many of these outcomes will demand autonomous national spaces and capacities. The nation-state still remains the privileged arena of any project of democratisation and social progress. Whether globalisation is positive or not will ultimately be judged by its compatibility with this project of setting up socially inclusive, democratic development states.

If somehow the dynamics of globalisation and the pursuit of the three objectives were perfectly harmonious, the problem I am addressing would not arise. Indeed, for some of the more Panglossian versions of globalisation in which the current order is the best of all possible worlds, all good things flow from globalisation: it leads to greater economic welfare; rewards 'factors of production' according to their productivity and allows nations and individuals to fully exploit their respective 'comparative advantages' and capabilities. It also frees individuals from the shackles of local tyranny, tradition and provincialism. In the axiomatic schema that informs this perspective, it is not necessary to introduce specific measures to address issues of poverty or inequity.

The point I will be making is that whatever the promise of globalisation, little has been done to equip states or international institutions to assume the weighty obligations on social justice and peace demanded of nation states and enshrined in the many UN resolutions. On the contrary, while globalisation generates serious problems for social harmony and development policy, it reduces the capacities of many states and societies to handle such problems. The reason is that while institutions charged with development policy are still national, the policy options are being narrowed and the effective constituency restricted both by constraints imposed by the new global regime on what is considered prudent and by the erosion of the fiscal capacity of the state.

Economic Growth and Development

I start with economic development.
Poverty and/or the fact of relative backwardness in both material well-being and technological mastery and a perception of being engaged in an international order of gross inequality and historical injustice has shaped the development agenda since the end of the Second World War. The quest for 'catching up' or 'bridging the gap' or a new international order was a central characteristic of the debate in the 1970s. More pronounced in the seventies than today, 'development' is still the iconic expression of the 'developing countries', a fact that accounts for the continued existence, at least at the level of rhetoric, of the 'Group of 77', 'Non-aligned movements', 'South-South co-operation', etc. Globalisation, from the developing countries' perspective will be judged by its effects on bridging this gap economic development and the eradication of poverty. Indeed, in the eyes of many policy-makers in developing countries the litmus test for any international order remains whether it facilitates economic development. Such a view can be culled from the many resolutions of 'South-South' conferences, from positions of individual governments and from the common positions expressed by the governments.
I am aware of the more cynical view that governments in the South are cabals of rent-seeking cronies or predatory thugs. And the egregious behaviour of a number of governments in the 'South' gives credence to this view. I am also aware of the severe criticism by post-modernists levelled against the notion of 'development' for its eurocentric premises, its teleologigal and linear trajectories that lead to Washington or Paris and its use as an justification for repression and Western interference in affairs of other countries. The income gap between the first of the world's people living in the richest countries and the fifth in the poorest rose from 30 to 1 in 1960 to 74 to 1 in 1997. Nevertheless, I am convinced that its central message of structural change and eradication of poverty remains valid and is on the agenda of most of the most thoughtful social movements. And in any case, virtually all projections of the eradication of poverty assume fairly high rates of growth.
For those of neoliberal persuasion the greatest promise of globalisation is improvements in economic welfare through more rapid growth. In the more axiomatic presentations open and 'market friendly' policies would lead to rapid growth that was labour intensive and, therefore, poverty reducing. The set of policies needed were said to be now quite well established and were available in the form of stabilisation and structural programs administered by the BWIs (Bretton Woods Institutions). The spectacular performance of East Asian economies has been used to make the case that integration into the global market does indeed lead to better economic performance and that it was domestic policies that must have accounted for the poor performance of many developing countries of Latin America and Africa. Conversely, the poor performance by African and Latin-American countries has been attributed to failure to integrate into the world system. In most developing countries, this message has been driven through structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), which have been the key instrument through which countries are expected to harness the benefits of globalisation by pursuing policies that 'open' their economies to global competition, foreign investment and technology. The last two to three decades have been spent 'opening' up economies through the liberalisation of trade and financial markets.
Although SAPs have yet to show much about development, the BWIs still stridently assert that not only do their policies lead to high growth rates but also that 'growth is good for the poor' (Dollar and Kraay 2000a). This view is that the rising tide lifts all boats except, of course, for those that sink. Even some of critics of globalisation have assumed that the policies intended to integrate developing countries into global markets promote growth and only fault

them for their failure with respect with other objectives such as equity or environmental sustainability. Indeed if governments accepted the Faustian bargain that involved loss of sovereignty as the price for being integrated in world market it was largely because they believed that, in return, they would enjoy increased growth. However as it turns the period over which globalisation is said to have accelerated has witnessed slower growth rates in virtually all regions of the world except Asia and the Pacific, prompting authors of a recent review of the evidence on growth and globalisation to declare that 'The Emperor Has No Growth'. (Weisbrot et al. 2000) Overall GDP growth of the world economics was 1.6 percent lower in the period 1981-96 than in the previous 15 years. The overview further notes that even where high growth rates were achieved, as in Southeast Asia, they were still better in the earlier period. The only regional exception to this trend was East Asia, which grew faster from 1980 to 1998 than in the previous period. But this is due to the quadrupling of GDP, over the last two decades, in China (which has 83 percent of the population of East Asia). For Africa economic growth in the adjustment years is 2.1 percentage points below that in the 1966-80 years.

Unphazed by this evidence, the World Bank's retort is that gains from globalisation can only be enjoyed by embracing its policies. In recent pronouncements, the World Bank compares the economic performance of 'globalisers' (which have cut tariffs significantly and increased trade relative to GDP significantly, with 'non-globalisers' and claims that the former, who presumably are following the advice of the BWIs, have outdone the 'non-globalisers'(Dollar and Kraay 2000b). However, as has happened many times before, the arguments that 'globalisers' have outperformed 'nonglobalisers' have been based on unconscionable play with the data (Rodrik 2000). In later writing, the World Bank has been more circumspect about the causal link and has become more aware of a whole range of reasons that might not make the process of globalisation pro-growth everywhere – for example the problem of 'path dependence' so that economies of scale and conglomeration are enjoyed by those in the lead, the problems of geography and sheer luck. Indeed one World Bank explicitly asks this question.

There are a number of reasons why globalisation might lead to an overall low rate of growth. One is the deflationary policies that it tends to encourage. To attract foreign capital and avoid capital flight, governments play it safe by avoiding anything that might make financial markets nervous. Consequently, governments have assumed a restrictive fiscal and monetary stance by aiming at lower government deficits and keeping interests high even in face of high unemployment, low investments and growth. When such policies are pursued by all countries, there will be an in-built tendency towards depression (Bhaduri 1998). The second is the nature of capital flows. Although gross capital flows are large, at the end of every business day net flows are much less than is suggested by the commotion and little of this is for long-term investments. In addition, the flows have been highly selective with Africa almost completely left out. Furthermore, the flows are highly volatile and their short-termism and speculative character have not made such flows particular suitable for development. The recent Asian experience suggests that such capital flows can undermine development efforts even in situations where the so-called economic fundamentals are good. One should add here that most of these flows have been driven by mergers and acquisitions and have not generated much new productive capacity.

Critics of structural adjustment policies have over the years pointed to the fact that short-term adjustment policies are undermining long-term development prospects by destroying the social capacities of the affected societies, by undermining the legitimacy of the state, by reduction in social and physical investment and by worsening income distribution thus accentuating conflict (Stewart 1994). Their excessive focus on stabilisation and their neglect of many other

development fundamentals such as investment, human capital and political stability had exposed orthodox stabilisation and adjustment programmes to widespread criticism.
Partly in response to this criticism and the obvious failure of adjustment to address problems of poverty and to place economies on a long-term growth path, the World Bank has begun to shift its focus towards poverty alleviation and has began to give support to social sectors on developmental grounds. Indeed it has gone as far as to propose a 'comprehensive development framework' which takes on board 'structural, social and human aspects' (Wolfensohn 1999). This in a way presupposes something reminiscent of 'developmental states' that the BWIs have spent years dismantling. The question that immediately arises is not whether globalisation allows replication of the quintessential 'developmental states' of East Asia. Rather it is whether globalisation will allow the emergence or survival of states that can sustain internal political and social arrangements that ensure social cohesion and improvement in well-being while meeting the exigencies of globalisation. Does globalisation allow the state in poor countries to play the entrepreneurial and mobilisational role that it has clearly played in virtually all cases of 'late industrialisation'? The lessons from the adjustment debacle would seem to suggest that 'opening up' the markets without an investment or development strategy can bring upon countries all the deleterious effects of globalisation with few of the advantages.

Democratisation

The second side of the triad is democracy and human rights. Does globalisation facilitate democratisation? One outstanding feature of the era in which attempts at democratisation are taking place is, of course, globalisation. There are different views as to what globalisation entails for democracy in the developing countries. Here again there are sharp divisions ranging from those which conflate economic liberalisation and political liberalisation to those who see the exigencies of globalisation as undermining democratic governance. In one view, the simultaneous occurrence of globalisation and Samuel Huntington's 'Third Wave' of democratisation would seem to suggest not only compatibility but also synergy between the two processes. The 'opening up' of economies and societies, the political conditionalities transmitted through global institutions. and the solidarity from movements encapsulated in the notion of 'global civil society' are generally supportive of efforts at democratisation in many countries. Globalisation lets a thousand flowers bloom. Since it is presumably predicated on hybridity, it breaks down the totalising tendencies of nationalism and promises endless choice in both political and economic markets. Those who hold to this view as the dominant effect of globalisation consider democracy and economic liberalisation as simply two sides of the same coin: the edification of a liberal order, a natural convergence of processes that mark the triumph of liberal capitalist order, and 'the end of history' (Fukuyama 1992) - an end-state towards which teleology has painstakingly moved us all along and which so much of humanity has foolishly and futilely resisted. This 'good-things-go-together' approach is often derived from first principles where liberal democracy and free markets always go hand in hand since both processes entail the dispersion of power and the emergence of a bourgeoisie or 'middle class' both of which are said to be good for democracy.
In the other view, the demands of globalisation, especially the erosion of national sovereignty and the uniformalisation of what are considered as 'fundamentals' in economic policy, limit the range of options for democratic régimes. Liberal democracy is premised on the sovereignty of nation-states and assumes that the state has control over its own fate, subject only to compromises it must make and to the limits imposed upon it by other actors. Democracy was not only premised on national sovereignty but even getting there was determined by patterns of national path dependence, as suggested in Barrington Moore's classical work. By eroding

national sovereignty globalisation undermines a central tenet of liberal democracy (Held 1991: 141) Globalisation has not only challenged this national space but has also unscrambled the paths through which nations could, given their past, move towards democracy (Ross 2000): This phenomenon is, of course, not confined to the developing world. Europeans talk about the 'democracy deficit' to describe similar situations: Ross argues:

> It is difficult to avoid the observation that in Europe, where the most propitious circumstances exist for democratic resolution of such difficult problems, responses to globalisation have involved a flight away from democratic responsibilities and procedures. Major matters concerning the daily lives and security of European citizens are now decided at the European level without these citizens being fully consulted. One frightening implication can be drawn. Globalisation, if it is a new stage in the evolution of capitalism, could constitute a significant threat to liberal democracy. (p. 254)

Globalisation as it has manifested itself in Africa tends to extrude the state from its local moorings, producing states that are not beholden to local interests and that are autonomous, not with respect to the global, but with respect to local politics and interest articulation. States seeking to signal foreign capital are tempted to assign maintaining functions to institutions immune to liberal democratic political control. Central banks are good examples of state institutions that pursue essentially 'gate-keeping' activities beyond the reach of democratic control. (Maxfield 1997) Politicians have been quick to exploit these features and exigencies of globalisation to shirk their responsibilities to the citizens by transferring all the blame to outsiders.

Although all international financial organisations now swear by democracy and insist on 'popular participation', 'transparency', and 'accountability', it is part of their conventional economic wisdom that the general public, including the elected political leaders, cannot understand the counterintuitive nature of good economic advice. Indeed until the recent wave of democratisation, it was assumed that the adjustment of economies from inward to outward looking ones would be best carried out by authoritarian regimes, which could ride roughshod over interest groups. A number of strategies were proposed to overcome the supposedly irrational political choices and resistance of organised urban interests to rational economic policies and/or the patron-client nexus underpinning state dirigisme. Solutions have included outright authoritarian methods à la Pinochet (Bienen 1990; Callaghy 1990) or stratagems that, by stealth or suddenness, would catch these groups unawares and generate policies that, by the time opposition is able to mobilise, will have become irreversible. (Waterbury 1989) Where democratic regimes already exist, the challenge for those who pursued this kind of analysis has been on how to circumvent the democratic process by strengthening the 'autonomy' of the bureaucracy or by creating what has been referred to as 'authoritarian enclaves' within the economy. The Central Bank has been a main candidate for such insulation, as have ministries of finance or teams of technocrats in key ministries. In some cases, nationals on the payroll of international organisations are attached to these ministries -- all to ensure their insulation and, one might add, their loyalty.

At the domestic level, many governments now seem to be leaning on technocrats much more heavily than their predecessors. The attraction to technocrats can be attributed to a number of factors. First, given their highly personalised rule and patrimonial-clientalist politics, some nments had an aversion towards technocrats and tended to alienate or marginalis them. This tended to undermine the public service by sidestepping bureaucratic demands for meritocratic criteria in promotions and job-assignments. The natural response of the new leaders has been to reverse that trend. Second, IFIs often insist on greater empowerment of certain key ministries. Third, the devastation created by the economic crisis has legitimised the role for

'conomic doctors'. Finally, social movements have had little capacity or interest in building up policy analytical capabilities within their own structures[2]. Few movements, including those in the opposition, have been able to articulate technically sound policy alternatives.

This quest for insulated technocracies poses the danger of encouraging the exclusionary exercise of political influence on the basis of technical knowledge. It is also likely to produce a Janus-faced polity in which politics are democratic but government is not. Admittedly, the role that technocrats can play and their impact on political choices is not unambiguous, there being significant variations in the performance of technocratic roles. There is, however, the distinct danger that the technocrats' professional instincts may persuade them to seek to circumvent politics and generate solutions that are politically irresponsible. Technocrats may narrow the choices of politicians by either being part of a transnational technocratic alliance, or by identifying themselves with particular international models of crisis management such as orthodox structural adjustment programmes. This is most likely to happen where such technocrats are nurtured and shielded by international financial institutions and therefore feel more accountable to these institutions than to the national constituencies. This exclusiveness is enhanced by the intellectual and ideological transnationalisation of key parts of the bureaucracy through admission into 'epistemic communities' in which economic orthodox prevails and also the perks that go with it. This goes counter to the creation of culture of consultation and compromise, as technocrats assert, with Thatcherite certitude, that there is no alternative.

These remarks may seem contradicted by the new emphasis by the international community on good governance, transparency and participation. Indeed, it is now argued that the preference by foreign direct investors for authoritarian regimes which could produce docile labour and keep away populist pressures for redistribution or, worse, nationalisation, is a thing of the past. Today's more mobile capital, so the argument goes, prefers transparency and presumably democratic governance. But much of this has more to do with the hollowing out of democratic institutions and the existence of an 'exit option' for capital which makes capitalists disinterested in dialogue and social contracts, and even less with commitment to democratic values and respect for outcomes of democratic decision-making.

If effective policy-making is being removed from national institutions, it matters little if they are democratic or not. What emerges from all this is that while globalisation may have undermined various forms of authoritarianism, it has also tended to hollow democracy and severely limit its reach, producing what has been referred to as 'low intensity democracy' or what I have elsewhere called 'choiceless democracies'. (Mkandawire 1999a)

Social Equity

The third side of the triad is social equity. Neo-liberal economic theory argues that in liberalised markets, economies will tend to converge. At the national level poor countries will become more egalitarian in the face of globalisation. These expectations are drawn from the axiomatic scheme of factor price equalisation which has little to do with historical experience or real economies of economies of scale, imperfect markets and structural rigidities. There has been a slew of studies on globalisation and inequality, with some measuring between-country income distribution, while others measure within-country inequality and still others measure income inequality among individuals. The general conclusion of all these studies is that t that global inequality has risen during the last three decades, mainly because of the increase in between-country inequality but also because of greater within-country inequality (Cornia 2000). In the first study to examine inequality among individuals on a world scale, Branko Milanovic (1999), comes out with some revealing data on the degree of inequality:

- The incomes of the bottom 5 percent declined while the richest quintile gained 12 percent in real terms, i.e. more than twice as much as mean world income (5.7 percent)
- The ratio of the average income of income of the top 5 percent to the bottom 5 per cent rose from 88:1 to 114:1 in 1993.
- The top decile of the US population had an aggregate income of the poorest 43 percent of the world's poor. In other words the total income of 25 million Americans was equal to that of two billion people.
- The richest one percent of people in the world receive as much as the bottom 57 percent.
- The global GINI coefficient is equivalent to that of South Africa's - over 60. In other words the distribution of income produced by apartheid in South has emerged naturally elsewhere. You didn't have to go through the whole hassle of apartheid to get the same GINI coefficient as the world has today.

Within-country income distribution has become worse virtually everywhere. All OECD countries, including the Nordic countries and Japan, experienced increases in GINI coefficients, with Japan's GINI coefficient jumping by 14 points from 0.30 in the 1980s to 0.44 in the 1990s. In much of the Soviet Union not only do we see sharp increases in income distribution but also a sharp reversal in such indicators as child mortality and life expectancy. The Asian Tiger economies, whose growth with equity was cited as evidence that there was no trade-off between the two, also witnessed reversals in trends towards growing equality. Latin America, already marked by high-income inequality, suffered a further decline. China, which enjoyed spectacular growth, saw its GINI coefficient rise from 0.28 in 1983 to .43 in 1995. This was largely due the re-widening of the urban-rural income gap. For Africa, it had been hoped that the end of 'urban bias' through structural adjustment programmes that putatively favoured the rural sector would reduce inequality. In the event, income inequality has increased due to increased income distribution with both rural and urban sectors.

Giovanni Cornia (Cornia 2000) argues that the traditional causes of inequality - land concentration, the 'resource curse', unequal access to education, urban bias - while explaining levels of inequality do not explain the recent increases. Instead, it is the new trends associated with globalisation that are responsible – technological change and the skill mix in labour use, the growing power of capital vis-à-vis labour and greater informalisation of labour markers, deflationary fiscal and monetary policies and the regressive incidence of costs and benefits, trade liberalisation and the greater gains of skilled labour, rising financial rents, the 'race to the bottom' policies adopted by countries to gain 'competitively' through an erosion of labour and welfare rights,. and significantly, through the erosion of the role the state.

Among the many constraints imposed by globalisation, the politically most salient relate to equity issues and social welfare in general. In the developing countries the first victim of globalisation has been the claims by states that they would intervene in the economy not only to ensure economic performance but also to bring about certain social outcomes such as equity and poverty alleviation. The rudimentary 'welfare states' that post-colonial regimes had instituted became objects of both ideological and fiscal attack. On the ideological plane, whatever gains had been accrued to the workers in the formal sector were now seen as 'distortions' in labour markets brought about by the activities of rent-seeking urban coalitions. Social expenditures were seen as straining the fiscus and as a source of financial instability. Attempts at basic needs or 'growth with equity' strategies of the 1970s were abandoned. Together with the disappearance of poverty from the policy agenda came the disappearance of 'development' as something that state policies deliberately pursued beyond simply overseeing the spontaneous market processes. Earlier 'developmentalist' arguments for social policy as one of the key instruments of development simply disappeared.

In addition, there has been an ideological assault on pro-active state policies. This is perhaps

the most insidious effect of global triumphalism. The ideological twist given to globalisation has tended to denigrate national ideologies and endeavours towards social change and to underrate social equity. More specifically, it has tended to suggest that notions of equity and social justice are hopelessly old fashioned, 'ideological', or simply doomed to be swept aside by the brute fact of globalisation. In this sense globalisation has either provided an excuse for those who would want to set aside the agenda for equity and justice, or has served to demoralise or disarm those who have sought to use national policies to address these issues. Even more significant is that policy-makers at the national level are at great pains to conceal whatever egalitarian inclinations they might have had. One has simply ceased talking about equity and poverty as this might scare 'markets'. The need to 'signal' foreign capital further re-inforces the persuasiveness of this ideological posture.

At the national level, social policy is not exclusively a state activity. But because the nation-state has been the focus of citizenship and to the extent that social policy is the outcome of struggles for inclusion and citizenship, the state will remain the prime site at which key aspects of social policy are constructed. However, with *state interventionism* under assault there are enormous pressures for states to leave social policy in the hands of NGOs. There is here an unintended convergence between the agenda of some of these networks interested in democracy and equality through 'strengthening of civil society' and the agenda of neo-liberal institutions interested in reining in the state to facilitate the 'free flow' of capital and other transnationalised resources. Laudable though the interventions of NGOs have been in these hard times, it is important to recall that experience thus far clearly demonstrates that the state has played a central role in social development and in none of the more recent successes of poverty alleviation have NGOs played a major role. The political message here is that NGOs should avoid becoming merely service organisations and should lobby for an increased enhancement of state capacity to deliver social services with a firm political commitment.

In any case the minimalist view of the state goes against all experiences of rapid development, social change and poverty eradication. History suggests that 'late industrialisers' have been successful only when they have *strategically* sought adhesion to the global order. This has happened through the inducement by the states for actors to undertake activities that captured benefits of dynamic comparative advantage and externalities. Among 'late industrialisers' social policy has had a dual function: to enhance the social capabilities to harness technology and new knowledge, and to give social direction to economic change. Both roles are of critical importance to 'late industrialisers'. This may partly explain why among the institutions that were adapted for such late industrialisation were those dealing with social policy. It was these very same 'late comers' that were also among the 'pioneers' of the welfare state.

At first sight, the experiences of the late Asian NICs would seem too diverse from this model tying up the two "externalities". By comparison with Western countries, East Asian governments are relatively low spenders on welfare and non-state agencies. However it is a bad measure since it underestimates the role of the state as a regulator which enforces welfare programmes without providing direct finance. The assumption of the social roles by the private sector was underwritten by the state, which provided a wide range of incentives favourable to this particular form of corporate governance. Nevertheless, the point remains that in every policy of economic development, there has been an explicit or implicit social policy, which has acted as an important lever in the process. On can go further and argue that for late industrialisers, social policy is the flip side of the open economy (1997a; Rodrik 1997b). To the extent, therefore, that globalisation undermines the nation-state - the quintessential space for social policy formation - it attacks one of the major pillars of industrialisation among 'latecomers'. We already see this in the collapse of investment in human capital in countries undergoing adjustment and the increasing inability to manage social

crisis and also in the political conflicts that have brought all development to a halt.
A number of social policy questions related to globalisation and financial flows should be highlighted. Premised as they were on state non-intervention in their allocation and on guarantees by governments or the IMF, these flows had some worrisome attributes. First, they weakened the fiscal capacity of the state and, consequently, the ability to finance social policy. High mobility of assets has led to low taxation. Moreover, there is strong evidence that as globalisation advances the tax burden of social insurance programmes is shifted from capital to labour (Rodrik 1997c). This has had obvious implications for social service provision, which depends on the fiscal health of the state.
Second, greater reliance on markets entails greater economic volatility. Available evidence suggests that developing countries have experienced higher volatility than industrial countries and within individual countries. In the current order, the costs of such volatility are unequally borne. The boom-bust recovery cycles tend to be regressive in terms of income distribution and poverty. Economic fluctuations have tended to affect the poor disproportionately. While most of the developed countries have maintained key features of the welfare system, which has provided some measure of security for the poor, most developing countries have been pushed towards austerity measures that provide only tattered safety nets, unlikely to hold more than a handful of affected citizens. As a consequence the social problems that retrenchment causes have arisen at precisely the time when the fiscal capacity of the state has not been commensurate with the demands for social provision. Thirdly, the need to 'signal' to foreign capital that a country is pursuing the right policies has often meant that social policy must be downplayed in public discourse. It is this policy stance that has induced fears of 'beggar thy neighbour' policies which can unleash a 'race to the bottom', as states seek to attract private investments and private investors playoff one state against another (Crotty et al. 1998).
While globalisation is accompanied by convergence at one level (e.g. patterns of consumption, incomes of skilled labour), it also unleashes greater domestic divergence, which heavily burdens social policies and political energies. All this at a time when both ideological shifts and fiscal crunch militate against proactive social policies. Globalisation based on social disarmament is likely to provoke conflict and backlash that may feed on the most reactionary and chauvinistic sentiments. Jeffery Williamson argues that it was this inequality produced by global economic forces before the First World War that was responsible for the retreat from globalisation after the War.
It is in recognition of this vulnerability that current understanding of poverty attaches some importance to security[3]. The key instruments proposed by both the IMF and the World Bank have included social safety nets which were introduced to address the adverse effects of SAPs and 'targeting the poor'. Initially, most of these measures were viewed as only temporary since their need would be diminished by the high employment elasticity of the growth promised by pursuance of structural adjustment programs. In the 'second generation' SAP, social policy was intended to enhance the efficiency of allocation of resources or to make the reform more palatable. The macro-economic model itself remained unquestioned although it is now increasingly seen to be failing as a developmental model.

National Sovereignty and Nation-building

Let me return to the question of nation-building.
In a world enamoured by the global interconnections and the imperatives of the global market, it is easy to forget that globalisation is constructed in and through territorially bound communities – the nation states. Indeed the hard architecture of globalisation is founded on the soft imagination of communities. Nations-states and localities within them continue to be

salient as sites of identities, and of social and economic struggles. Globalisation rests on the shoulders of nation states and while national spaces are denigrated, in reality nations retain a considerable degree of isolation from each other and national policymakers enjoy much more autonomy than is often asserted. And much of the talk of the demise of the nation-state largely refers to the weak and subordinate states. Different countries become globalised differently. Some take the lead others follow; some stumble into global markets while others strategise; some are dismembered by the process while others adopt measures that ensure social cohesion even as they go global. Consequently, the expectations that different countries entertain about globalisation and the agenda they seek to address in the context of globalisation will differ.

Ever since Dante's *De Monarchia*, the project of a global order has been pushed by a *hegemon* which has sought to give a moral gloss to its grandiose project of a borderless world dominated by its ethos and interests. Today the USA has assumed the role of the hegemon with its ethos and interests represented by global corporations and finance. Global corporations know that for all their high mobility, 'capital and technology must eventually touch down in distinct places' (Mittelman 19XX). Hence their interests in 'good governance', and the policing role of the US government, whose withering away would be a disaster for them.

As Sassen has aptly noted 'the global economy needs to be produced, reproduced, serviced and financed. It cannot be taken simply as given, or merely as a function of multinational corporations and financial markets'. We do not as yet have any global institutions that mobilise collective action against the disruptive externalities of globalisation or that channel processes of globalisation towards what we all collectively deem desirable. The result is that it is the nation-state that bears the cost and at the level of the nation One set of costs comes from the volatility of the financial flows and its effect on domestic financial institutions. Resolving the bank crises associated associated with such volatility can be extremely costly, taking as much as 41 and 55 percent of GDP in Chile and Argentina, respectively. It is the most vulnerable that bear the costs while the rich are protected by expensive bailouts by a financial system designed in their favour. Some of the measures introduced at the national level to stabilise the national currency involve holding reserves at levels far beyond what is required. Complete capital account liberalisation demands high interest rates that discourage investment and compels countries to cut down their import capacity by holding much larger foreign reserves than would is necessary. The losses in income due to foregone growth are part of the costs of globalisation. It has been estimated that for most poor countries, just maintaining the patent regime demanded by developed countries would cost one million dollars – equivalent to the cost of research in most national universities.

Now whether the teleology of the 'withering away of the state' ultimately holds, it should be borne in mind that, until then, for better or for worse, the state will be a key player in the lives of much of mankind. And, although states can and do foment internal conflict, often by omission rather than commission, they still remain the single most important mediating institution. Thus, the forced incapacitation of states is dangerously premature. The failure of states to perform their functions almost invariably leads to bloody conflicts as anomic violence and general lawlessness assume ethnic dimensions. This is not merely a speculative conjecture on my part. The collapse of the state has occurred in a number of African countries.

The point I am making is not that globalisation in its current incarnation is the source of the crisis of nation-building. Even in its more familiar neo-colonial form, the nation-building project faced many internal problems. It is important to recall some of the weaknesses partly because unless they are fully resolved, Africa's integration will remain problematic, to say the least. And here I can only discuss them telegraphically. The first problem has been the gross mismanagement of the 'nation building project' due to internal struggles, especially among the

elite. This has contributed to the erosion of legitimisation of the 'national project'. The second was the failure to manager the multiethnic character of African nation states. Confronted with the social pluralism of their countries, the nationalists had two options. They could either ride roughshod over social pluralism and produce political uniformity or they could design structures that produced a political pluralism congruent with that of the social pluralism of their societies. In the event, most chose the former option. African nationalism became a totalising ideology to combat real and imagined fissiparous forces such as the 'divide and rule' strategies of the erstwhile colonial masters and the 'tribalism' of some of the leaders. This choice, combined with the centralisation of power that it entailed, has meant that issues that could easily be sorted out at the local level have acquired a menacing national importance by leading to an overloading of the decision-making process. It has also meant that there are no local level governmental institutions to absorb some of the blows inflicted by globalisation. Furthermore, the elites tended to equate nation building with state building and over the years the latter completely overshadowed the former. Thirdly, the abuse and mytificatory deployment of nationalist ideologies have undermined them as ideas around which to rally Africa's young population. The rhetoric of the nationalists has become increasingly hollow and less convincing if for no other reason than the demographic changes that have taken place during the last 30 years. Seventy percent of the African population was born after independence, leading to 'national unity' being taken for granted, and its rhetoric is scoffed at because it has been used in a mystifying manner. Fourthly there has been the authoritarian turn in nationalist politics which has alienated significant segments of society. And finally there has been the weakening of much of the scaffolding for nation building in the process of adjustment to what is purveyed by the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) as the exigencies of the global system.

Given the egregious failure of African nationalism, it is now argued that in this 'post-colonial' era Africa should embrace and even celebrate globalisation. It has been assumed by some that the demise of nationalism would open room for multiple voices. And in any case, so it is argued, existing identities are socially constructed and have no inherent value. In some of the writing it is suggested that we are witnessing the separation of governance and territory reminiscent of the medieval period. It has become quite common to portray responses to globalisation as guided by fundamentally reactionary impulses driven by either chauvinism, or religious fundamentalism or the greed of rent-seekers - those who benefited from the old order of interventionism.

The response is not necessarily from feudal patriarchies whose hold on power is suddenly threatened by globalisation or of rent-seekers scared of competition. It is often from the downtrodden whose bearings are disturbed by processes that are much more distant and less amenable to the 'every day forms of resistance'. Social equilibrium is not valued only by the powerful but also by the weak. It is this that makes revolutions so particularly difficult since they invariably involve transcending the 'common sense' of prevailing equilibria. In any case, one of the effects of such localism is the weakening of nation states further, being 'hollowed out' by globalisation and contested by local forces.

In response to this crisis of legitimation, we have witnessed intensified struggles for democratisation. One of the effects of patterns of post-colonial development has been increased social differentiation along class or income lines. The current crisis and the patterns of adjustment adopted to address them have exacerbated these fissiparous pressures of inequality, especially with the indiscriminate rejection of the redistributive elements of nationalist policies mentioned above. This has increased the potential for ethnic conflict by intensifying intra-ethnic differentiation. The paradoxical consequence of such intra-ethnic differentiation is the placement of a premium on ethnic cohesion through intra-ethnic

competition in ethnic chauvinism as élites opportunistically harp on their ethnic ties with the poor. And so in the crisis years we have seen devastating ethnic conflicts in Africa. With one ideology that has so far provided some modicum of political stability severely eroded, claims of sub-nationalism have reared their heads. And hanging as a Damocles sword over the processes of both nation building and globalisation is ethnic conflict, real or imagined. In this era of globalisation even democratisation raises a whole range of issues about identities, some of which may have been concealed under pall of authoritarian rule. Some of the problems arise naturally, as it were. Liberal democracy is still largely premised on the existence of the nation state. It is this that spells out the boundaries of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship to a particular nation-state. It is perhaps not surprising that it is precisely during the current phase of democratisation that we see greater xenophobia. When the sovereignty of the nation-state is threatened at the same time as the rights of the citizens are widely recognised two questions immediately arise: who is the citizen with the right to enjoy the fruits of democratisation and who are the enemies of the nation? The most visible enemy is of course the migrant worker. All the talk about the end of the nation-state notwithstanding, there are yet no global instances that can assume its role. What we have instead is that, in the absence of efficacious nation-states, there is a revitalisation of localisms that pose enormous problems not only for the nation state but also for the global system as a whole. This erosion of state capacity accounts for some of the social conflicts that we witness today. Reconciliation of the nation state as a political order, as social order or 'imagined community' and as an economic entity is problematic enough even within a 'closed' model. Societies seek to address inequalities at these different levels – at the level of political rights, at the level of social and cultural rights and at the level of economic rights. Globalisation, too, has thus become entangled in its own contradictions. For, while its key actors demand political stability, its reach is extremely disruptive of social cohesion. What globalisation seems to have done is to make the reconciliation more complex and, some might say, futile. In the latter view the uneven operation of globalisation on each of these components produces crises of all sorts. Even worse, globalisation may obviate the need for reconciliation by simply negating the validity of the nation space within which the reconciliation is supposed to take place. The unraveling of social contracts that secured national peace partly explains why all kinds of localisms are increasing to challenge the national authorities, which have become too big for and too remote from local problems and too small and too weak to address global problems. Globalisation in its fundamentalism form of neo-liberalism turns out to be quite self-threatening. A fetishisized globalisation will bring to life other fetishes. It is true that the internal and external have become so deeply intertwined that it is difficult to tell which of these factors are more binding. Indeed it is a major feature of globalisation to seek to obliterate the distinction. It is also in the nature of nationalism to assert its real or imagined specificities in the face of such pressures.

Conclusion

There is no suggestion here that governments have been entirely deprived of the capacity to act on social issues. Rather the point here is that both the 'spontaneous' global processes and the absence of global institutions to manage these processes set enormous hurdles on the process of equitable development and democratisation in the 'developing countries'. Globalisation, thus far, has been singularly insensitive to these burdens and needs.
Whether one embraces globalisation enthusiastically or fatalistically, there are a number of things that need to be sorted out if some of the concerns of the 'developing countries' are to be addressed. At the international level there are frequent references to the need for institutional innovations to deal with globalisation. There is the feeling that the volatility of the

system not only poses serious economic threatens but overtaxes the political arrangements and social fabric of many countries. Consequently, following the financial crisis much has been said about the need for a new 'financial architecture'. However most of these debates have been confined to issues of the *stability* of the system and have eschewed addressing issues central to development. There is thus complete silence on the 'social developmental architecture' expected to accompany the restructuring of the financial system even though globalisation has led to volatility not only in financial markets but in product and labour markets as well. If so much time has been spent adjusting economies to the dictates of globalisation, we have to beginning to think of adjusting globalisation itself so that it meets social needs and is democratically anchored. This immediately raises issues of political power and capacities. Citizens of this major producer of gold must surely know that the true 'Golden Rule' is the one that says that the one who has the gold makes the rules!

In global discourse, there is an increasing tendency to formulate social claims as enforceable claims on the delivery of goods, services, or protections by specific others. This presupposes institutions that can act to enforce (or at least not hinder) their delivery. The commitment to poverty alleviation by the international community, its adhesion to a 'rights based' approach to development and the recognition of the existence of 'global public goods' presuppose the existence of supranational bodies that have the financial wherewithal for pursuing the global agenda. Neither the financial architecture nor the system of global governance has been reformed to address to address this new agenda. An important task therefore relates to the creation of global institutions that would ensure that the commitments to justice, equality and democracy are translatable into global and national policies. It is important that these values also permeate these institutions to avoid the bizarre situation where fundamentally undemocratic global institutions claim to be promoting democracy in the 'developing countries'.

The second task involves intellectually and ideologically challenging the view and discursive practices that too often fetishize globalisation into some exogenous force that ineluctably imposes its laws on the human race. Although globalisation is often treated as a mechanical unfolding of history which has come to rest in the present order of things, it is important to underscore the human agency behind it. It is the result of the hegemony of the USA and its use of its enormous political and economic muscle to open markets; it is the result of laborious rule making and institutional design to change the regulatory regimes in different countries; it is the result of ideological shifts away from nationalistic interventionist states towards more market friendly economics orders. The technology that undergirds it, the institutions that facilitate the movements of resources and the ideologies that sanction it, are all human. Globalisation is ultimately a human construct and perfectly amenable to human governance. As such, ideologies that inform the *zeitgeist* matter enormously for they shape our visions and the things we are willing to do to realise our visions.

If the promise of globalisation is not to produce the dystopia of 'clashes of civilisations', or nourish heightened senses of murderous ethnic, religious or local identities, or produce 'disposable people', then it is essential that the process of globalisation be deliberately and consciously harnessed to the achievements of poverty eradication, development and equity. While some talk of a new 'financial architecture' to manage the nominal world of finance, it is incumbent upon those interested in these objectives to insist upon a 'developmental architecture' which can manage the 'real world' economic relations at the global level, ensure democratic participation at the national level, and nurture systems of social welfare and security. We have all learned from Karl Polanyi that markets - local, national, or global - are sustainable only to the extent that they are embedded in political and social institutions Globalisation as the final arbiter of what is produced and who gets what sharply contradicts

our collective presupposition that the good life would involve meaningful choice, diversity and democracy We have to avoid a global order that is dominated by a Social Darwinism that rewards greed and produces disposable people.

It is probably the case that shared circumstances and immediate concerns will generate transnational movements as counterweight to capital. There is still controversy as to what form such movements will take. The inchoate movements that gathered last year to produce what is now known as the 'Seattle Debacle' may be far from reflective of this uncrystalised response to globalisation. But the message that has been echoed elsewhere is that the *invisible* hand can only function within *visible* social arrangements. Ultimately it will be struggles by people within spaces of the greatest affectivity that will dictate the course of events. These struggles may be local, national, regional or global. All this may sound utopian, but then who needs a map which shows where this Utopia is?

Notes

1. This paper draws on a number of papers I have written on globalisation especially (Mkandawire 1999b; Mkandawire and Rodriques 2000).
2. Monteciros (1993). 'Probably one of the most serious threats to the consolidation of Latin American democracies stems from the lack of institutionalised forms of communication between the newer, technical and the more traditional political elites' (p. 27).
3. The World Bank's recent report on poverty argues that *empowerment, participation* and *security* should be the cornerstones of the new anti-poverty approach.
4. As James Mittleman notes: 'Movements based in religion have reacted sharply to the trauma of globalisation, partly a recognition of the anomie associated with the ways that globalising tendencies are undermining the values of community and ripping the social fabric. So too religion embraces a shared a sense of transcendence, which is deemed compromised by the globalisation process. What is valuable is this script is the philosophical questioning about the lack of a spiritual dimension in economic integration, a concern implicit in the global resurgence of Islamic movements as well. As a secular paradigm, globalisation is faulted for being deficient in its moral foundation. In the West and perhaps elsewhere, this position is sometimes employed by political and economic groups who will not tolerate, and attempt to extinguish, the claims of others.' (Mittelman 1997: 20)
5.As John Gray points out: 'Economic inefficiencies of restrictions on free trade are so nearly self-evident that anyone who is critical of unregulated global free trade is easily convicted of economic ignorance. But the economic argument for unregulated global free trade involves a wild abstraction from social realities. It is true that restraints on global free trade will not enhance productivity, but maximal productivity at the cost of social desolation and human misery is an anomalous and dangerous social ideal'. (Gray 1998)
6. This is the central message of the report of the United Nations Research Institute on Social Development *Visible Hands* (UNRISD 2000).

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ADDRESS

Monuments, memorials and the mystique of empire: the immortalisation of Cecil Rhodes in the twentieth century

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The Rhodes Commemoration Lecture delivered on the occasion of the centenary of Rhodes' death, 26 March 2002

Today marks what is actually the third Rhodes centenary. The second centenary was in 1970 - the hundredth anniversary of Rhodes' arrival in Natal from England. That centenary was the occasion for the first Rhodes Commemoration Lecture at Rhodes University - delivered by Sir Harry Oppenheimer. The first centenary in July 1953 - the hundredth anniversary of Rhodes' birth - was certainly the most grand and upbeat of the three, especially in the country then known as Southern Rhodesia. There was a spectacular Centenary Exhibition in Bulawayo, opened by the Queen Mother. 125,000 commemorative silver crowns carrying Rhodes' head were struck by the royal mint - the only occasion the royal mint had ever struck a coin with the head of a commoner.
Not surprisingly this third centenary - the hundredth anniversary of the day that Rhodes died - is a much more low-key affair. In 1953 it was still possible to celebrate the life of the arch-imperialist. Nearly fifty years later that is clearly no longer the case. However, nor can we allow the day to slip by unnoticed at the university named after him.
How then do I approach this lecture? I could easily do a demolition job on Rhodes. There is plenty of ammunition for that: his more unsavoury utterances, his aggressive colonialism, and some of his dubious business dealings. But that will not be the focus or thrust of this lecture. Nor do I propose to offer a dispassionate, even-handed biographical sketch. That would be dry and tedious. And it is not possible to be dispassionate about Rhodes. After all, even in his life-time Rhodes aroused extreme emotions: he was both revered and loathed.
So what I am going to do is to focus mainly not on Rhodes' life, but on his after-life. It is quite remarkable how Rhodes' name has lived on in the hundred years since his death. He achieved a quite extraordinary immortality, especially in the two former colonies named after him, in Cape Town and Kimberley, and in Oxford. Indeed it seems quite likely that Rhodes carefully planned and choreographed his own immortalisation.
But first, for the benefit of those present who know only the name of Rhodes and very little about the historical figure, a brief outline of his life, in just a few sentences.
He was born in 1853 in the small Hertfordshire town of Bishop's Stortford, where his father was the Anglican vicar. In 1870, aged seventeen, he was sent to Natal, seemingly for health reasons, to join his brother Herbert who was cotton-farming in the Richmond area. About a year later he again followed his brother, this time to the diamond fields. There he would make his fortune and concoct grandiose ideas of imperial expansion. Elected to the Cape parliament in 1880 he used his political position and growing financial muscle to carry through his expansionist ambitions.

During the 1880s he manoeuvred to secure a route through the present-day Northern Cape, North-West Province and Botswana towards the territory north of the Limpopo. In 1888 his agents secured a dubious concession from the Ndebele chief, Lobengula. On the strength of this he founded the British South Africa Company and organised the white colonisation of Mashonaland in 1890. By this time he had become extremely powerful. His De Beers Consolidated Company had secured a monopoly over the diamond industry in 1888; he had obtained a foothold in the gold-mining industry through the Gold Fields Company; and he had become Prime Minister of the Cape in 1890.

Rhodes, it seems, had become too powerful - a case of hubris. He began to resort to violence to achieve his political ends. In 1893 his BSA Company launched an aggressive invasion of Matabeleland, conquering the territory. At the end of 1895 Rhodes' right-hand man, Jameson, tried to repeat the success of 1893 by invading the Transvaal to overthrow Kruger. The Jameson Raid failed miserably. It was a fiasco. Rhodes was disgraced and resigned as Cape premier. He was finished politically, but he remained influential and kept his business interests alive. From the late 1890s his health deteriorated and he died, aged 48, in his beachfront cottage at Muizenberg on 26 March 1902.

That is the barest of outlines of Rhodes' life - a life that has aroused enormous interest among later generations, so much so that there are more biographies of Rhodes - far more - than there are of any other figure in southern African history. In 1973 the historian, Lord Blake, delivered the fourth Rhodes Commemoration Lecture at this university. In his lecture Blake referred to the 1963 Lockhart and Woodhouse biography of Rhodes as 'the most authoritative' yet, and went on to say that he could not 'see anyone profitably essaying the same task for many years to come'. How wrong he was. Six more full biographies of Rhodes, and three short biographies have been published since Lockhart and Woodhouse, as well as five other books in which Rhodes is a central figure. The fascination with Rhodes is endless. Between 1897 and 1996 well over thirty biographies of Rhodes have appeared, including eight foreign language works. The longest period between the publication of different biographies has been no more than nine years. In two particularly prolific phases five biographies were published between 1910 and 1913, and seven between 1933 and 1936. Four appeared in 1933 alone. Add to this numerous articles and essays about Rhodes; eight novels in which he features, from F.R. Statham's *Mr Magnus*, published in 1896, to Anne Harries' *Manly Pursuits*, which appeared in 1999. Add also a few plays, a 1936 movie - called 'Rhodes of Africa', and the more recent big-budget TV series.

Why this fascination with Rhodes? How has he fared with his biographers? I will try to address these two questions together. There are three main categories of biography. First, there is the hagiography; then there are the critical studies; and lastly there are the biographies that present an intermediate, mildly critical view.

Until the 1930s the hagiographers held sway. Most of the early biographers were former associates, acolytes, admirers of Rhodes; men like Michell, Rhodes' banker, his former secretaries, Jourdan and le Sueur, and his architect, Baker. They were naturally concerned to represent their hero as favourably as possible. So they portrayed Rhodes as a visionary, a man driven by his ideals, and by a sense of duty and service towards Britain and southern Africa, an utterly selfless man who cared not at all for his own aggrandisement, nor for personal wealth, valuing money only as a means to realising his ideals. They saw Rhodes as a thinker and a man of action able to realise his objectives through his drive and charisma. The hagiographers laid the

foundation for the heroic image of Rhodes - an image that came to be increasingly challenged but has still managed to survive, at least in some quarters, into the twenty-first century.

The first critical biographies of Rhodes began to appear from the 1930s. J.E.S. Green was the first to challenge the image of Rhodes the visionary: 'he was essentially a big-business man', wrote Green, 'and like all big-business men he was out for big money'. This theme would be developed later, in the 1970s and 1980s, by historians like Phimister and Turrell who argued that Rhodes was first and foremost a capitalist who used political power and engaged in imperialist ventures to further his ultimate aim - the pursuit of profit, a pursuit sometimes characterised by unscrupulous, manipulative financial dealings. Then too the critical historians (and I count myself among them) have trawled through his speeches to expose his attitude to Africans - which was at best paternalist, at worst crudely racist. More recently Anthony Thomas, who made the TV mini-series on Rhodes, has described him as a pioneer of apartheid.

The third view of Rhodes - the intermediate position - is not wholly admiring, is mildly critical, but generally apologetic. One line of defence has been to describe Rhodes as 'a man of his time'. So Lord Blake in his 1973 lecture argued that Rhodes should be judged 'in his own historical context'. A problematic argument, I think. Yes, historians must have empathy and be finely attuned to context, but showing too much empathy can lead to the exoneration of just about any historical figure.

The most comprehensive biography of Rhodes, by Rotberg, published in 1988, falls into this intermediate category, being both critical and apologetic. Rotberg's biography differs from the others in that he adopts a psychohistorical approach to Rhodes. Drawing upon the expertise of a psychiatrist, Rotberg argues that Rhodes, during infancy, enjoyed especially strong empathy and unconditional love from his mother. This gave him a strong sense of self-belief, enabling him to go through life relatively free of shame and guilt.

Rotberg's interpretation is rather unconvincing. Indeed, the biographies of Rhodes, judged collectively, constitute an unimpressive corpus of work. There is a great deal of rehashing and recycling from one work to another. One is struck much more by the quantity of the biographies than their quality.

Rhodes' immortality has rested less on books, and much more on monuments, memorials and the ubiquity of his name. Listen to the words of the historian, Richard Wood, reflecting on the life of a white boy growing up in what was Rhodesia:

> Such a boy ... would possibly attend a school named 'Cecil John Rhodes', would go to a senior school and would be placed into Rhodes House, would look forward to the mid-winter holidays which were called 'Rhodes and Founders'; would, if he was lucky, be taken for holidays to Rhodes Hotel on Rhodes Estate and when he was not on holiday would possibly walk down Rhodes Avenue into town and draw money from the Rhodes Building Society and spend an afternoon watching a film at the Rhodes Cinema in the town. Rhodes' likeness would have been imprinted in his mind. He would pick up a bank note and holding it to the sun would see Rhodes' face imprinted in the note. He would walk down the main streets in the major cities and would see Rhodes' statue towering down from its pedestal ... The image was so firmly ingrained that Rhodes assumed almost God-like proportions in his young mind ...

Maybe that has some resonance for anybody here who grew up in the former Rhodesia 30 or 40 years ago.

In South Africa nowhere is Rhodes more commemorated than in Cape Town, where he lived for much of his life. One can walk through the Cape Town Gardens and encounter a large statue of Rhodes, then heading towards the city centre pass by the Rhodes Building. A walk down the main steps at UCT would bring one to another statue of Rhodes. Then one could drive along Rhodes Avenue before taking a turn-off up to the Rhodes Memorial.

In Oxford one can walk along High Street and come to another Rhodes Building, which is part of Oriel College, Rhodes' old college. High up on the front of the Rhodes Building is a statue of Rhodes; beneath his feet are statues of two lesser mortals, King Edward VII and George V.

While I was at Oxford last year I worked in the Rhodes House Library, and I gave a seminar in a series convened by the Rhodes Professor of Race Relations, attended by Rhodes scholars. There used to be a Rhodes Memorial Lecture at Oxford - one of these was delivered by Einstein.

How is it that Rhodes has become so immortalised? A look at some of the key monuments and memorial sites will provide clues. But first a few words about Rhodes' funeral - an event that certainly enhanced the Rhodes mystique. The laying to rest of Rhodes was spread out over two weeks following his death on 26 March. First there was a public lying-in-state at his Groote Schuur house, the first day of which was Good Friday. Then another in the Cape House of Assembly. There would be four funeral services, one at Groote Schuur, one at the Cape Town Cathedral, one in Bulawayo, and the final burial service at the grave in the Matopos. There was a week between the Cape Town Cathedral service and the final burial, as the coffin was taken slowly by train from Cape Town to Bulawayo, stopping at many points along the way. At Kimberley 15 000 mourners filed past. On 10 April the coffin was taken on a gun-carriage along a road hurriedly constructed for the occasion, to the grave in the Matopos. On the same day a memorial service was held at St Paul's Cathedral in London.

The funeral was more befitting royalty than a commoner. And its duration was such that it magnified both the historical figure and the memory of Rhodes. It was also a funeral marked by paradox. I refer to the Ndebele participation in the burial ceremony - this less than nine years after Rhodes' British South Africa Company had aggressively invaded and conquered the Ndebele kingdom. Ndebele indunas and their followers, even some who had fought against the Company in 1893, filed past the grave, paying homage to Rhodes.

Rhodes' grave in the Matopos would become in the twentieth century both a place of pilgrimage and a site of controversy. Rhodes himself had chosen his own burial site in 1896 while out riding in the Matopos. After his health deteriorated in 1897 he frequently reiterated his wish: 'Lay me there', he would say; 'my Rhodesians will like it: they have never bitten me'. Rhodes was well aware that Mzilikazi, the founding king of the Ndebele, was buried in a cave nearby. Rhodes once said, 'I admire the imagination of Umzilagazi. There he lies, a conqueror alone, watching over the land that he had won. When I die, I mean to be buried there ...'. So the two conquerors, the two founders, Mzilikazi and Rhodes, would lie not far apart, atop the mountain, each at once interred and enthroned.

In his will Rhodes prescribed the words that were to be on the brass plaque covering the grave: 'Here lie the remains of Cecil John Rhodes'. Nothing else - no birth-place, no date of birth, no date of death. The normal inscriptions were superfluous. Rhodes was placing himself beyond time and declaring himself immortal.

The grave enhanced the mystique of Rhodes. In the twentieth century it became a place of pilgrimage, a venerated site. Every new settler arriving in Rhodesia was expected to travel to the grave to pay homage to the 'founder'. Each year a memorial service was held at the site on the

Sunday closest to the anniversary of Rhodes' death. Other colonial heroes were buried there - Jameson, for instance, in 1920, 'in death as in life, at the right-hand of Rhodes'.
However, the grave would also become a site of contradiction and controversy. For some decades local Africans were not bothered by the grave. Indeed, after the funeral Rhodes' brother, Frank, entrusted the care of the grave to leading Ndebele indunas, who promised that they would keep their sacred trust. This they did - for many years the grave was watched over by an Ndebele guardian. The siting of Rhodes' grave close to Mzilikazi's tomb, far from being incongruous, was a cause for celebration among Ndebele cultural nationalists who, as late as the 1940s and 1950s, were happy to twin the two burial sites. These cultural nationalists argued that the annual ceremonies at Rhodes' grave proved that Europeans also engaged in ancestor worship. As late as 1953 Ndebele chiefs participated in a ceremony at the grave as part of the centenary commemoration of Rhodes' birth.
Rhodes, though, would not be left to rest in peace for all time. By the 1960s, as the African nationalist movement became more militant, so did attitudes towards the grave change. In 1961 one nationalist leader told a meeting that he would dig up the grave and send it to England as Rhodes had stolen the country from Africans. The nationalist leader went by the name of Robert Mugabe. In the early 1960s there was a petrol bomb attack on the grave.
Today the grave remains in place, but it is still a site of controversy. A campaign for its removal built up in the late 1990s, led by a self-styled 'war veteran', Lawrence 'Warlord' Chakaredza (now deceased). Chakaredza went on a tour of the United Kingdom telling people that 'Rhodes's remains will be fed to the crocodiles of the Zambezi river if somebody does not collect them'. But still the grave has had its defenders among local Ndebele. It was a tourist attraction and thus a source of income for local people. Rhodes had ceased to be venerated, had lost much of his symbolic significance, but he was still of some commercial value.
Although the grave remains, the ghost of Rhodes has been largely exorcised in Zimbabwe since independence. Statues of Rhodes were promptly removed from central sites in Bulawayo and Harare in 1980. Street names were changed. Soon after independence one ZANU (PF) MP told parliament that all pictures of figures like Rhodes should be moved into a 'museum of oppression', going on to say that he did not agree with the view of Dr Nkrumah that the only good imperialist was a dead one, 'because even beyond the grave men such as Rhodes exerted an evil influence'. Further testimony to Rhodes' immortality.
In South Africa, even in the post-apartheid era, Rhodes has fared rather better than he did in Zimbabwe. Nowhere in the country is Rhodes more commemorated than in Cape Town. There is to be found the most grandiose of all the monuments to Rhodes, the Rhodes Memorial, set in the foothills of Table Mountain. The original proposal, put forward by Earl Grey, had been for a massive statue of Rhodes, modelled on the Statue of Liberty, to be erected on Signal Hill - what would have been an extraordinary landmark, a monstrosity, indelibly stamped on the beautiful city skyline. This Cape Town was to be spared. Instead it got the Rhodes Memorial designed by the imperial architect, Herbert Baker, formally opened in 1912.
Sited on Rhodes' original Groote Schuur estate, the Memorial comprises three main parts. At the back, the highest point, is a Greek-style temple, fronted with columns. Inside the temple there is a bust of Rhodes in a contemplative pose. Wide stone steps lead down to the statue, 'Physical Energy', created by the Victorian artist, George Watts. On each side of the steps are four bronze lions, the work of the sculptor, J.M. Swan, who also made the bust of Rhodes.

In his overall design Baker aimed to express both thought, embodied in the contemplative pose of the bust, and action, manifested in Watts' statue. The lions were designed to express 'qualities of calm and reserved strength and power'. As a tribute to Rhodes the Memorial was skilfully conceived. It reflected both Rhodes' liking for classical architecture and his feeling for Table Mountain. Rhodes would have been delighted with the Memorial. It would surely have satisfied his yearning for immortality. Its prominent site and high visibility gives Rhodes an enormous, looming presence over Cape Town. It is a thoroughly imperial monument, embodying a conjunction of architecture and empire-building. In Watts' statue the rider, reining in his horse, peers into the distance. And like so many of the statues of Rhodes he faces northeast - the gaze of the empire-builder seeking further opportunities for colonisation on the road to Cairo.

Watts' statue has its own interesting history. There were actually three castings of the statue. Watts spent twenty years creating it. The first casting was completed in 1904, the year Watts died. The original plan was that this statue should be transported to southern Africa and erected near Rhodes' grave in the Matopos. This did not happen - the logistics of transporting it up into the Matopos proved impossible. But it did happen in somebody's imagination - the person who designed the book-plate for the library of the Consolidated Gold Fields Company. This book-plate comprises a picture of Watts' statue superimposed upon the grave in the Matopos. So the actual statue ended up at the Rhodes Memorial.

The second statue now stands in Kensington Gardens in London. This was Watts' gift to the nation. The third replica was cast in 1957 for the British South Africa Company and was unveiled in Lusaka in 1960 by the Queen Mother. When Zambia became independent a few years later the statue, so symbolic of colonialism, was removed and taken to the Department of Antiquities in what was then Salisbury. I understand that in the 1980s there were attempts to have this third replica brought to the Rhodes University campus. That did not happen, but we do see the statue all over Grahamstown, on Rhodes University stickers on the backs of cars.

In the decades after its opening the Rhodes Memorial became another place of pilgrimage, albeit not on the scale of the Matopos grave. But today the Memorial has lost much of its symbolic significance. Visitors would probably now go there more for the spectacular view than to pay homage to Rhodes. But the memorial has survived largely unscathed, although I understand that not so long ago a tin of red paint was thrown over Rhodes' bust.

The ghost of Rhodes has not haunted post-apartheid South Africa as much as it has post-independence Zimbabwe, where Rhodes has been more obviously a symbol of colonialism. In South Africa in recent years the main targets have been the symbols of apartheid and those Afrikaner nationalist figures deemed to bear the main responsibility for it - so we see the gradual eradication of names like Verwoerd and Vorster. Rhodes' symbolic presence has remained largely untouched.

What does the memory of Rhodes mean today? How should we be remembering him? A few concluding thoughts.

During the first five or six decades of the twentieth century, as long as the British Empire survived, the business of commemorating Rhodes was taken seriously by empire-minded people. But in the past forty years, since decolonisation, the cult of Rhodes has waned. And yet the name lives on. There are two main, related reasons for this. First, money: Rhodes' bequest. Rhodes' remarkable, continuing presence in Oxford is very largely due to the money he left the university, and to the scholarship scheme. The Rhodes Trust, the body that has administered his estate, came to be based in Oxford. And over almost 100 years more than 6000 Rhodes scholars, from all over

the world, have studied at Oxford. This leads directly into my second point. Rhodes has increasingly become a brand-name. The attachment of the name to the scholarships and to the renowned university of Oxford gives it connotations of excellence and prestige. When, in the 1990s, a former Rhodes scholar became US president those connotations were enhanced. Naomi Klein, in her book *No Logo*, argues that brands and designer labels have in many ways become more important than, and divorced from, the actual products themselves. So has the brand-name of Rhodes become increasingly separated from the historical figure of Rhodes. It is interesting that when in 1994 there was a debate in Senate about changing the name of Rhodes University, nobody as far as I know defended the name on the grounds that Rhodes was a heroic figure. The case for the defence rested on the brand-value of the name.

A few final words on Rhodes, as I have said little about him as a historical actor. In many respects he was an enigmatic, paradoxical figure. Perhaps that is why none of the thirty or so biographers have really been able to fathom him. On the one hand he was the supreme agent of both an aggressive, masculine, expansionist colonialism and a rather crude cultural chauvinism. He rode roughshod over African chiefdoms that stood in his way, and showed little respect for African culture. Yet he was capable of sensitivity, deep loyalty, and great affection to those around him. He was almost certainly homosexual, but in keeping with the codes and mores of his time, he probably suppressed or denied this orientation.

Rhodes has often been portrayed as a great visionary. I prefer to see him as an opportunist. He did have visions, but some of them were nothing more than boyish fantasies, such as wanting to reannex the United States to Britain, and many were not realised in his life-time. He was certainly no intellectual - it has often been said that Rhodes would never have won a Rhodes scholarship. He achieved his successes more by seizing opportunities, taking risks, winning round influential people, resorting to manoeuvring and machination.

A couple of years ago one of my students wrote in an exam one of those statements that at first glance you would think should be consigned straight into a book of howlers. He wrote, 'Rhodes made a fortune, doing no work'. Perhaps the student was trying to say that Rhodes was a nineteenth century 'casino capitalist'? Certainly Rhodes was adept at getting others to do his dirty work for him. And he did make a fortune, leaving an estate worth about £5 million, £50,000 of which went as an initial sum towards the founding of this university.

In the many biographies I have seen Rhodes compared with many of the supposedly 'great men' of history, most commonly with Caesar, Cromwell and Napoleon, but also with Alexander, Nero, Clive and Hastings, Bismarck and Hitler. In recent decades historians have, thankfully, abandoned 'the great man approach' to history. And, like many other historians, in examining Rhodes' career I can find little to acclaim or admire.

And yet he achieved this remarkable immortality. One of the very few people in history to have had a country named after him - not one but two. Then there are the statues and memorials, the names of buildings and streets. There is even a grass named after him, Rhodes grass.

A hundred years ago Rhodes, in being buried in the Matopos, was 'twinned' with Mzilikazi the founder of the Ndebele Kingdom that Rhodes' BSA Company conquered. Almost exactly a hundred years later Rhodes is now being twinned with Nelson Mandela, with the creation of the Mandela-Rhodes Foundation, a partnership between the Rhodes Trust and the Mandela Foundation. Another paradox? A coalition of two very different men - or perhaps a combination of Rhodes' financial might and Mandela's generosity of spirit. It is certainly a combination that

would have delighted Rhodes because it gives legitimacy to his name and ensures its perpetuation at a time when his reputation is at a low.

We distance ourselves from the political thuggery and land-grabbing of Robert Mugabe, but we must not forget that Cecil Rhodes was also a land-grabber, inclined to be high-handed in the exercise of power, and ready to resort to violence to achieve his political ends. We can be critical of a cosy pan-African solidarity which exonerates corrupt dictators, but we are also challenged to look critically at the record of British colonialism in Africa - a colonialism whose supreme representative was Cecil John Rhodes.

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RESEARCH REPORTS

Productivity among Nurses and Midwives in Botswana

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Background

In spite of the rapid economic growth, which made Botswana the envy of sub-Saharan Africa during the 1980s and 1990s, total factor productivity either stagnated or declined over the same period (Botswana National Productivity Centre, 1997). The performance of the public service in the implementation of policies had become a matter of concern, and the reform of the public service and the transformation of its mind-set were major challenges to the nation. Productivity improvement was seen as an important strategy for improving the standard of living and achieving sustainable economic diversification and growth in the long term (Botswana Government, 1991, 1997).

The Research Problem

There is an information vacuum regarding productivity in Botswana in general and productivity among nurses in particular. Hindrances to productivity have been suggested, but neither the Botswana National Productivity Centre nor other research institutions appear to know what the most important hindrances to productivity are (Botswana National Productivity Centre, 1997:5). There is, therefore, a need for systematic studies of productivity in different sectors of the economy in Botswana.
There has been, over the years, widespread concern about the performance of nurses and the quality of nursing services in general (Mothobi, 1982; Owuor-Omondi and Kobue, 1993). The

debate about the productivity and quality of nursing services has continued unabated among the general public, in the local newspapers and even in Parliament (Fako and Forcheh, 2000). The success of the Botswana Primary Health Care system falls squarely on nurses shoulders. The importance of the nurse in primary health care stems from the fact that nurses form the core of reliable permanent staff particularly for maternal child health and family planning (MCH/FP). They account for over 60 percent of the total trained health personnel in Botswana (Botswana Government, 1997) and are responsible for an estimated 314 health posts and 689 mobile stops nation-wide (United Nations Development Report, 1998). In these remote health facilities nurses are expected to do everything in maternal health, child health, family planning, health education and dispensing of medication (Akinsola and Ncube, 2000).

This study is concerned with the productivity of nurses working within the Primary Health Care System, under the control of the Ministry of Local Government in Botswana. The study establishes the nature, strength and direction of associations between productivity and background variables, work context variables, resources variables, recognition and support variables.

Measurement of Variables

In this study productivity is an aggregate measure of the frequency (rate) with which the nurse performs a set of routine activities, and the number (quantity) of such routine activities that she performs. This measure of productivity is concerned with the rate at which services are delivered, and the amount of services delivered compared with the time needed to deliver them.

A productivity index was computed for each nurse based on her indication of how often she conducted each of 32 routine nursing activities that make up the list of routine activities in three key areas of nursing practice consisting of five (5) routine clinical activities, eleven (11) routine antenatal activities and sixteen (16) routine postnatal activities. The five clinical activities included the following: treatment of nutritional deficiencies in pre-natal mothers; assisting in institutional deliveries; assisting in home deliveries; carrying out thorough physical antenatal examinations; and administering infant immunisations. The 11 antenatal activities included the following: educating fathers on the birth process; providing information on blood pressure; educating prenatal mothers on nutrition; educating prenatal mothers on personal hygiene; educating prenatal mothers on the process of birth; demonstrating prenatal exercises to expectant women; giving prenatal mothers time to ask questions; ordering tetanus toxoid for prenatal mothers; providing family planning education to men; discussing different types of contraceptives with clients; and attending to teenagers.

The 16 postnatal activities included visiting new mothers in their homes during the first week after delivery; providing information on breast feeding to mothers who have recently delivered; providing information on nutrition to mothers who have recently delivered; providing information on personal hygiene to mothers who have recently delivered; providing information on suitable contraceptive methods to mothers who have recently delivered; providing information on symptoms of childhood diseases to mothers who have recently delivered; advising mothers on the general assessment of baby s health; advising mothers about birth registration; providing information on child spacing to fathers; providing information on breast problems; providing information on perennial problems; providing information on anaemia; providing information on involution of the uterus; educating mothers about the need to boil drinking water; providing

information on appropriate weaning of the child; and educating mothers on the importance of attending the under-fives clinic.
For each of the 32 items a nurse was asked to choose only one of the following predetermined responses: 'most of the time'; 'some times'; 'rarely'; or 'never'. These four responses were assigned scores of 3, 2, 1 and 0 respectively. The aggregate productivity score on the 32 items was standardised so that it ranged from zero (0) to 100. A score of 100 indicates that the nurse was involved in each of the 32 activities most of the time, while a score of zero (0) indicates that the nurse was never involved in any of the activities. A nurse who might have been involved in a few activities most of the time, but hardly ever got involved in all other activities would have a relatively low score, indicating a general low level of overall productivity. Similarly, a nurse who only occasionally got involved in some or all of the activities would also have a relatively low score.

Data Analysis

The relationship between the level of productivity among nurses and several independent variables was examined. Statistical analyses of the data explored the effects of individual background factors, type of health facility, adequacy of resources, recognition and support from supervisors, etc., on productivity. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) and independent sample t-tests techniques were used to assess the relationship between productivity and qualitative factors.

Findings

Level of Productivity among Nurses

In all, 324 nurses, who worked mainly in clinics without a maternity ward (154), clinics with a maternity ward (96), health posts (61), and a few (13) who worked in primary hospitals, responded to items that were used in the calculation of nurses productivity. The mean productivity score for the sample was 69.5 with a standard error of 0.92 and a median of 72.9. Only 11.1 percent of nurses had an aggregate score below 50 percent. On the other hand, 29.3 percent of nurses had a score of 80 percent or higher. Half of the nurses scored between 60 percent and 80 percent. The results indicate that the level of productivity as measured by nurses' involvement in routine nursing activities in Botswana was generally high.
Nine of the 42 variables investigated were found to be highly associated with productivity among nurses. Six other variables were found to be moderately associated with productivity, while three variables showed a weak association with productivity among the nurses. None of the remaining 24 variables explored had a significant relationship with nurses productivity.

Productivity and Professional Training

Analysis of variance results indicated that there was a highly significant relationship ($p = 0.000$) between professional training and level of productivity. A pair-wise comparison of means using the least significant difference (LSD) statistic showed that enrolled nurse-midwives were significantly more productive than any other category of nurse.

Productivity and Midwifery Training

There was a highly significant positive relationship ($p = 0.000$) between midwifery training and productivity among the nurses. Nurses trained in midwifery were more productive (mean score = 76.1) than nurses without midwifery training (mean score = 66.3). Midwifery training should afford nurses more knowledge and understanding of issues concerning childbirth. It should give nurses greater confidence on matters pertaining to clinical, antenatal and postnatal care.

Productivity and Attendance of the Mehary Training Programme

Nurses who had attended the Mehary training programme were significantly more productive ($p = 0.000$) than nurses who had not attended the programme. The mean score for nurses who attended the programme was 76.9 compared with a mean of 67.5 for those who had not attended the programme. Nurses who had attended the Mehary training program obtained one of the highest mean scores compared to any other professional cohort in the study.

Productivity and Ability to Complete the Botswana Obstetric Record

There was a very strong positive association ($p = 0.000$) between nurses' ability to complete the Botswana Obstetric Record and productivity. The more comfortable a nurse was in completing the Botswana Obstetric Record, the more productive she appeared to be.

Productivity and Attendance of Village Health Committee Meetings

Nurses who did not attend any Village Health Committee (VHC) meetings were significantly ($p = 0.001$) less productive than those who attended one or more VHC meetings. The mean level of productivity among nurses who did not attend any meeting was 65.3 compared with means of 72.4, 72.2 and 75.3 for nurses who attended one, two and three or more VHC meetings respectively. The differences in the mean levels of productivity of nurses who attended one, two and three or more meetings were, however, not significantly different ($p > 0.30$ in all pair-wise comparisons).

Productivity and Number of Village Development Committee Meetings

There was a significant relationship ($p = 0.000$) between the number of Village Development Committee (VDC) meetings that a nurse attended per month and productivity. The significant difference ($p = 0.000$) was between nurses who did not attend VDC meetings and those who attended one or more meetings per month.

Productivity and Reliance on Peers and Supervisors

There was a significant relationship ($p = 0.001$) between peer reliance and nurses productivity. Nurses who always relied on peers for information were the most productive (mean = 74.9), followed by nurses who rarely relied on peers (mean=70.2), while nurses who only sometimes relied on peers for information were the least productive (mean = 66.8). Reliance on supervisors

had essentially the same impact on productivity, as did reliance on peers. For example, nurses who always learned from superiors were the most productive (mean = 75.0), followed by nurses who rarely relied on supervisors (mean=69.8) and nurses who only sometimes relied on peers (mean = 67.5). For both factors, very dependent nurses did not differ significantly from very independent nurses.

Productivity and Participation in Making Policies

Participation in making maternal child health and family planning (MCH/FP) policies was found to be positively and significantly ($p = 0.003$) related to nurse s productivity. Nurses who always participated in making MCH/FP policies were the most productive, (mean = 74.5), followed by nurses who only sometimes participated (mean = 72.0) while nurses who rarely participated in MCH/FP policies were the least productive (mean = 67.3).

Productivity and Workload

Workload was moderately related ($p = 0.021$) to nurses productivity. Nurses who reported a heavy workload had a higher mean productivity score (71.1) than those that reported a reasonable workload (mean score = 66.7).

Productivity and Perception of Health after Posting

The relationship between perception of health after posting and nurses' productivity was negative ($p = 0.038$), with nurses who perceived good overall health since posting obtaining a mean productivity score of 67.1 compared with means of 69.9 and 74.0 for nurses who perceived fair and poor overall health respectively.

Productivity and Involvement in the Community

A positive relationship was observed between productivity and involved with the community ($p = 0.022$). Nurses who were involved in the community had an average productivity score of 71.4 compared with 67.2 obtained by nurses who were not involved in the community.

Productivity and In-Service Training

The relative level of in-service training was moderately related to productivity ($p = 0.042$). Nurses who had not been to any form of in-service training in the previous six months were significantly less productive (mean = 63.7) than nurses who had been to one or more in-service training activities. The differences between nurses who had been to a few (mean = 71.1), to a reasonable number (mean = 69.7) or to many in-service (mean = 71.3) training activities were not statistically significant.

Productivity and Age

The age of a nurse was moderately related (p = 0.023) to the nurse's level of productivity. The most productive nurses where those in the 35-44 age group who had a mean score of 74.0. These were followed by nurses in the 30-34 age group with a mean of 72.4, nurses aged 45 years and over (mean = 71.1), nurses aged 25-29 (mean = 66.9) and the very young nurses aged 20-24 with the lowest productivity scores (mean = 64.9).

Productivity and Religious Affiliation

There were moderate differences (p = 0.025) between the level of productivity of nurses with different religious affiliations. Nurses affiliating to missionary Christian churches (Roman Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, etc.) with a mean score of 72.5, were significantly more productive (p = 0.01) than nurses from minority religions (Islam, Indigenous African religion, etc) with a mean score of 66.7. Nurses affiliating to missionary Christian churches were also slightly more productive (p = 0.072) than nurses who belonged to independent African churches (mean = 68.3).

Productivity, Type of Health Facility and Preferred Work Setting

The type of health facility in which the nurses worked and the type facility in which they preferred to work were both weakly associated with nurses' productivity (p = 0.089 and 0.061 respectively). Nurses who worked in clinics with a maternity ward were the most productive (mean = 72.7), followed by nurses who worked in health posts (mean = 69.9), then nurses who worked in clinics without a maternity ward (mean = 67.9) and lastly, nurses who worked in hospitals (mean = 63.5).

Productivity and Other Variables

It was interesting to note that a nurse's productivity was not dependent on whether or not she was satisfied with her job, income or workstation. Similarly, perceived inadequacies of equipment, transport and telecommunications facilities were not significantly related to productivity.

Discussion

With half of the nurses scoring between 60 and 80 percent, this study has found that the level of productivity as measured by nurses performance of routine clinical, antenatal and postnatal nursing activities was reasonably high in Botswana. While education has been found to be a good predictor of productivity (Uri, 1982; van de Gaag and Vijverberg, 1989) this study has shown that the most productive nurses are not necessarily those with the highest levels of education. Nurses with lower basic academic qualifications (enrolled nurses) were more productive than were those with higher basic academic qualifications (registered nurses). Enrolled nurse midwives were also more productive than were registered nurse midwives.

Midwifery training appeared to be one of the most important determining factors in productivity among nurses. The mean productivity score for midwives was more than 10 percentage points above the mean productivity score for non-midwife nurses. As a result of their training, midwives should have more knowledge and understanding of issues concerning pregnancy, labour and childbirth than should

non-midwife nurses. This knowledge should enable them to approach clinical, antenatal and postnatal care with more confidence than non-midwives.

It is not surprising that there should be a strong positive association between a nurse's ability to complete the Botswana Obstetric Record and her level of productivity. When taken together with the positive effect of midwifery training, the finding suggests that productivity in routine clinical, antenatal and postnatal heath care is significantly linked with the type of training received, and the competence of a nurse

This study found that nurses who did not attend any form of in-service training for a prolonged period of time were significantly less productive than nurses who attend some form of in-service training. This is consistent with studies of Dean et al (1978) and Wiseman and Page (1983), which have found that alternating work and study periods exposes people to innovative ideas during their study and gives them greater confidence thereby raising their level of performance. In-service training exposes a nurse to modern nursing methods and new approaches approved by nursing and heath authorities. Attendance of, and participation in in-service training activities should also accord a nurse the feeling of being professionally involved, which should give her the motivation to participate more fully in routine functions.

Attendance of Village Health Committee (VHC) and Village Development Committee (VDC) meetings appeared to have a positive impact on a nurse's productivity. However, attending several VHC or VDC meetings in a short period of time, did not lead to any more increase in productivity than attending one or two meetings. Attendance of VHC and VDC meetings is perhaps an indication that the nurse identifies with the community in which they work. Such nurses are perhaps very committed to their community and hence their jobs and would more likely sacrifice personal time at work to attend to their patients, thereby making them more productive than nurses who do not identify with the community. It could also be that nurses who attend VDC or VHC meetings are aware of the concerns of the community and criticisms levied at nurses, and hence understand the need to be more involved with their work.

The negative relationship between productivity and workload suggests that the relationship is co-relational rather than causal. That is, a nurse who is highly productive should feel a sense of a heavy workload, whereas a nurse who is unproductive may not know what all the fuss (of a heavy workload) is about. This interpretation is supported by the fact that nurses who reportedly experienced staff shortages were no more productive than nurses who did not experience staff shortages. Staff shortages are a reality of the work place as opposed to workload, which is a feeling arising from the work actually done.

A possible explanation of the negative association between overall health and productivity is that a nurse's sense of poor health may simply be an expression of work related stress. Nurses who are highly productive will tend to experience more work-related stress and report this as overall poor health, than nurses who are not so productive. Vecchio (1988:377) found that moderate amount of stress can stimulate individuals to work harder and accomplish more. However, when stress levels rise too high, employee performance is impaired.

The finding in this study that nurses in the 30-44 years age group were the most productive, suggests that this cohort has acquired sufficient experience in the job, and still has the necessary energy to do the job well. Older nurses on the other hand are getting tired, while younger ones are still not sufficiently experienced to be fully involved in the range of activities to score high on the productivity scale. The study found that the level of productivity of the youngest (under 30 years) and the oldest (over 44 years) nurses were very comparable. This finding is in line with several studies (Gindger et al, 1983;

Griffiths, 1997; Kutscher and Walker, 1960; Levin and Stephan, 1989; Rowe, 1988), which have found no relationship between age and productivity. The results of this study suggest that previous studies may have over-aggregated age to the extent that they missed out the important 30-44 years cohort. Older workers are likely to be good workers due to the experience acquired over the years (Schermerhorn et al, 1995). Such experience provides them with skills that compensate for decline in physical and metal abilities (Meier and Kerr, 1976), and equips them with knowledge, facts and principles that have a substantial impact on job performance (Rowe, 1988; Schmidt et al, 1986; van der Gaag and Vijverberg, 1989; Stukalov, 1982).

This study found that involvement of workers in the decision making process had a positive influence on work performance. Nurses who always participated in making MCH/FP policies were the most productive while nurses who rarely participated in MCH/FP policies were the least productive. Performance enhanced through involvement is derived from the intrinsic human need for recognition approval and status (Haralambos and Holborn, 1990). Involvement of workers in the decision-making process (participative management) saves time, reduces errors, absenteeism, turnover and grievances. It also increases efficiency, improves employee morale and attitude, improves quality of patient care and has led to increased productivity of up to 40 percent in some US companies (Johnson, 1981). An increase in the level of participative activity may also lead to an increase in productivity (Rosenberg, 1980).

This study found a positive relationship between productivity and reliance on supervisors. This finding is consistent with findings by Pincus (1986), Sakai (1992), Schermerhorn et al (1995) and Watson (1983) who have found significant relationships between job performance, communication satisfaction, communication climate, and personal feedback between top management and junior workers. Direct communication between superior and subordinates is crucial for enhancing productivity through developing intimate bonds (Sakai, 1992), while task feedback or knowledge of results motivates people towards higher performance by encouraging the setting of higher performance goals (Schermerhorn et al, 1995). Administrative recognition of employees is one of the major factors that improve worker morale, enhances the quality of worker s performance, and reduces the possibility of staff loss through burnout (Watson, 1983).

The study found a positive relationship between productivity and reliance on peers. Small groups of employees who meet regularly to discuss and develop solutions to problems encourage employee involvement and increases productivity (Schermerhorn et al, 1995). Team working and group solidarity may also increase job satisfaction and labour productivity (Wright and Edwards, 1998), while work improvement teams may lead to reduced absenteeism and increased productivity (Vecchio 1988:366). Campbell and associates (1990) concluded that self-managing teams tend to increase group performance. However, some researchers have found that group cohesiveness is only positively related to performance if the group's goals include high performance.

The type of health facility or work setting did not have a strong relationship with productivity. The moderately significant differences among nurses in different types of health facility probably indicates that nurses in hospitals and clinics without maternity to some extent tend to work in specialised units and, hence, may not have the opportunity to be involved in a whole range of nursing activities. On the other hand, nurses who are based in clinics with maternity would have the opportunity to be fully involved in all antenatal and postnatal health activities. Nurses working in health posts will tend to be involved in all aspects of health care as a consequence of working either alone, or with very few colleagues.

An important finding from this study was that the extent of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the job, salary and workstation were not related to productivity. Similarly, adequacy of equipment, transport and telecommunications as well as consistency of work with training, highest level of basic academic education, income levels and frequency of staff shortages were not related to productivity. These are work-related variables that one would have expected to affect productivity. Young workers who earn less have been found to be passive producers due to job insecurity and a threat of salary cuts (Mironov, 1990), while salary level has been identified as one of the major predictors of job performance among managers of restaurant companies (Summers and Hendrix, 1991). In an analysis of variables conducive to improved performance, Macarov (1982) concluded that paying money on a differential basis serves as an incentive to hard work and improves productivity. This relationship has however, been greatly undermined in social science research (Tausky, 1985; Vecchio, 1988), and is not supported by this study.

Conclusion

On a scale of zero to one hundred, this study found an average Botswana Nurse to be about 70 percent productive as judged by the frequency with which they perform a set of routine activities. Some 11 percent of nurses have a productivity score of less than 50 percent, but this is matched by the almost 30 percent who score 80 percent or more on this scale. Therefore, nurses in Botswana appear to be quite productive in their routine functions. The fact that productivity is not affected by dissatisfaction with salary, job and workstation, perhaps points to the professional manner with which these nurses work. That adequacy of transport facilities and telecommunications should not be related to productivity in this case is not too surprising since most of the routine activities do not require extensive use of transport and telecommunications. It is however, intriguing to find that factors such as adequacy of equipment, consistency of work with training and recognition from superiors do not affect productivity.

The study highlights the importance of midwifery training in the efficient delivery of the Botswana Primary Health Care system. Midwifes were found to be the most productive category of nurses in terms of the number of nursing activities that they routinely performed as well as the frequency with which they performed such activities.

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DEBATES
From Liberation Movements to Governments: On Political Culture in Southern Africa

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The Great Day
HURRAH for revolution and more cannon-shot!
A beggar upon horseback lashes a beggar on foot.
Hurrah for revolution and cannon come again!
The beggars have changed places, but the lash goes on.
- *W. B.Yeats*

Following the events at the time of writing during early 2002 in Zimbabwe, the above lines from a poem[1] created in another time and context seem to suggest that certain mechanisms and processes of societies in transition show similarities even in very different circumstances. Having said this, it is also clear that the following reflections do not characterise patterns of genuine - in the sense of exclusively - 'African' nature. They happen to be reproduced under the current set of circumstances in parts of Southern Africa as an aftermath to decolonisation processes emerging from a certain structural constellation shaped by a historic legacy. Nothing more, but nothing less. But enough to justify a critique of dominant political cultures and to question patterns of rule.[2] With the gaining of political power by liberation movements in the previous Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique in the mid-1970s, Zimbabwe in 1980 and Namibia in 1990, the final decolonisation of the African continent took its course. In 1994, a democratic political system under a lawfully elected ANC government was established in South Africa. The change from internationally ostracised minority regimes to sovereign state structures legitimised under international law had finally been completed. During this process the main goal was to obtain the right to self-determination, while the democratic reform of the countries' societies was given not the same priority. Against this background, this contribution will not claim to provide any recipes or 'democratic solutions', but seeks to offer some thought-provoking input to further reflections on the current socio-political environment and its constraints in terms of good governance issues.[3]

Prologue

There is no need to re-invent the wheel for the purpose of this article. It merely suggests that the

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[1] I am grateful to my colleague Bawa Yamba who made me aware of this verse.
[2] I take the liberty of doing so not from the position of a 'fence sitter': In 1974 I had joined SWAPO of Namibia as a son of German immigrants and was subsequently banned from entering Namibia and South Africa until 1989 and 1993 respectively.
[3] By doing so, I take the liberty to 'recycle' arguments previously presented in various other contributions (see Melber 2000, 2001a, 2001b and 2002) in a modified context.

post-colonial reality reflects the contradictions and challenges already described earlier on by various open and thereby critically minded scholars and writers on the continent. One of them, who had done so convincingly by means of what is in many ways a revolutionary novel has been Artur Carlos Maurício Pestana. He published the notes he collected in 1971 during his participation in the guerrilla war in the rainforest (the 'mayombe') of the Cabinda front in Angola for the MPLA under his *nom de guerre*. As a narrative it offers a remarkable degree of sensitivity and insight into the complexity (and limits) of social transformation subsequent to a situation of armed resistance against foreign occupation. During its course, the commander of the guerrilla unit ('Fearless') explains to the political commissar ('New World'), for whom he ultimately sacrifices his life in battle, in a revealing dialogue:

> We don't share the same ideals. (…) You are the machine type, one of those who is going to set up the unique, all-powerful Party in Angola. I am the type who could never belong to the machine. (…) One day, in Angola, there will no longer be any need for rigid machines, and that is my aim. (…) what I want you to understand, is that the revolution we are making is half the revolution I want. But it is the possible. I know my limits and the country's limits. My role is to contribute to this half-revolution. (…) I am, in your terminology, adventurist. I should like the discipline of war to be established in terms of man and not the political objective. My guerrillas are not a group of men deployed to destroy the enemy, but a gathering of different, individual beings, each with his subjective reasons to struggle and who, moreover, behave as such. (…) I am happy when I see a young man decide to build himself a personality, even if politically that signifies individualism. (…) I cannot manipulate men, I respect them too much as individuals. For that reason, I cannot belong to a machine. (Pepetela 1996:p. 197 and 198)

This conversation is more than fiction. It sets the parameters and social constraints for several post-colonial societies in Southern Africa with a history of armed resistance against settler colonialism.

The transformation of political rule

Governments were formed by the anti-colonial liberation movements, which had indeed been far from non-violent. They took over control of the state machinery and reorganised themselves as political parties. They claimed their legitimacy to rule stemmed from their emergence from the decolonisation process as democratically elected representatives of the majority of the people. Since then, with varying results (and sometimes with the use of further organised physical violence, as the case of Matabeleland illustrates most prominently), they have been able to strengthen their political dominance and maintain control over the state. This is true even if, as in Zimbabwe at present it, can be seen that these governments will not last forever.

The social transformation in these Southern African societies shaped by a settler colonial brand, however, can at best be characterised as a transition from controlled change to changed control and is hence similar to processes that took place elsewhere on the continent (see for their characterisation Ottaway 1997). The result is a ruling new political elite operating from commanding heights shaped in and based upon the particular context of the post-Apartheid societies by selective narratives and memories related to the war(s) of liberation and hence constructing or inventing new traditions to establish an exclusive post-colonial legitimacy under the sole authority of one particular agency of social forces (see Kriger 1995 and Werbner 1998b

for Zimbabwe; and Melber 2002 for Namibia). The mystification of the liberators plays an essential role in this fabrication. Hence, as Werbner (1998a:p. 2) reasons: 'The critique of power in contemporary Africa calls for a theoretically informed anthropology of memory and the making of political subjectivities. The need is to rethink our understanding of the force of memory, its official and unofficial forms, its moves between the personal and the social in postcolonial transformation'.

The situational application of militant rhetoric as a tool for inclusion or exclusion in terms of the postcolonial national identity is common practice. It demonstrates that the declared notions of national reconciliation and the slogan of 'unity in diversity' are not always receiving the desired acknowledgement in terms of political pluralism and permissiveness. Politically correct identity is instead defined increasingly by those in power along narrow lines of (self-)definition and (self-)understanding. As Yap has remarked in the case of Zimbabwe: 'whilst power relations had changed, *perceptions* of power had *not* changed. The layers of understanding regarding power relations, framed by socialisation and memory, continued to operate. … actors had changed, however, the way in which the new actors executed power in relation to opposition had not, as their mental framework remained in the colonial setting. Patterns from colonial rule of "citizens" ruling the "subjects" are repeated and reproduced'. (Yap 2001:p. 312-313; original emphasis)

This is reflected in a dichotomy of polarised perceptions along the we-they divide. If you are not with the liberator (as represented by the movement now party and state), you are considered to be an enemy. Given the blurred boundaries between party, government and state under a factual one-party system subordinating the state (see McGregor 2002 for Zimbabwe) and the growing equation of the party being the government and the government being the state, any opposition or dissent is considered to be hostile and branded as an enemy to the people and the national interest.

The goal of the struggle was national liberation defined as political independence in a sovereign state under a government representing the majority of the previously colonised people, who were excluded from full participation in society through the imposed Apartheid system. The power of definition concerning the post-colonial system of political governance was exercised during this process mainly by the national liberation movement in interaction with the international system represented by a variety of competing actors under the polarised conditions of superpower rivalry during the 1970s and 1980s. This also implies that the struggle had clear dimensions of exile politics and took also place in terms of international diplomacy. In her comprehensive analysis, Dobell (1998: 23) proposes that 'Namibia provides a particularly fascinating case study of the gradual dismantling of a century of colonial rule, and its ultimate replacement - through democratic means, and monitored by external powers - by a movement which, some would argue, had in certain respects come to resemble the forces against which it had originally struggled'.

The independence process resulted first and foremost in an internationally monitored and legitimated transfer of political power. That the political power exercised by and large met the definitions and expectations of a democratic political system was a desired result but not the main goal. After all, the democratically elected representatives of the population should have the discretion and power to decide themselves upon the character of the political system. The liberation struggle was understood and perceived foremost as the right to self-determination of the population on the basis of free and fair general elections. Once achieved, the task of formulating further specifications was left to those policy makers who emerged as representatives of the electorate as a result of such elections. It was therefore not democratisation, which was the priority on the agenda, but decolonisation. From a logical point of view this is an understandable

approach, since there is no democracy under colonialism. Hence only a decolonisation process provides the necessary framework for democratisation.
Both formal independence and a similarly formal democratic system have been achieved to some extent in a parallel process at the same time. But it is important to note that the goals are neither identical nor necessarily congruent. One might argue that the principles agreed upon by the parties prior to the elections undertaken in the cases of Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1989) and South Africa (1994) were a prerequisite for the implementation of a joint conflict resolution process and served as an agreed framework and point of departure for the foundations of the newly established state authority. They were in all three cases characterised by a notion of plural democracy. Others might counter-argue, however, that the democratic notion was designed to maintain a status quo under a controlled change in terms of securing the existing property relations and former privileges by those who benefited from the minority rule. Along these lines, Dobell (1998:p. 104) suggests for Namibia, that 'the nature of the transition process itself should be treated as an independent variable, which served to institutionalize democratic political structures (…) while simultaneously helping to construct perhaps insurmountable obstacles to the extension of political democracy to social and economic institutions'.
But what has been maintained with reference to the subsequent changes in the South African neighbour country, applies as much to the original scenario in the Zimbabwean and Namibian case: 'South African society, with its massive inequalities, racial and ethnic sensitivities and authoritarian legacies, is hardly an ideal environment for textbook liberal democracy. However although South Africa may not have the democracy it deserves, it may well have the democracy that it can sustain'. (Schrire 2001:p. 148) The word of warning from Hyden needs also to be kept in mind (2000:p. 19): 'Applying the principles of good governance to post-conflict situations is taking them to a new frontier, where the unknowns prevail'. He therefore urges for caution and prudence as salient attributes of any approach by the international community to promoting reconciliation and democratisation in post-conflict situations. This touches at the same time upon the aspect of democratisation as 'a transitional phenomenon involving a gradual, mainly elite-driven transformation of the formal rules that govern a political system'. This process is thus 'not an end-game; rather, it is a means to an end, which is democracy' (Gros 1998:p. 2).

Liberation without democracy?

The post-colonial politics of the ruling parties often displays a blatant lack of democratic awareness, together with forms of neo-patrimonial systems. A recent case study on Mozambique suggests that notwithstanding the three elections conducted between 1994 and 1999, 'they have not been accompanied by a steady institutionalisation and "Mocambicanisation" of democratic values, norms and rules". Instead, since 1999, the country endures a permanent political crisis'. (Braathen/Orre 2001:p. 200 and 201). Trends of an erosion of democratic values and norms despite the existence of institutions and a canon of virtues as enshrined by the Constitution are visible in the Namibian context (see Melber 2000 and 2001a) - though not yet with similarly devastating results. Tendencies to autocratic rule and the subordination of the state under the party, as well as politically motivated social and material favours as a reward system for loyalty or disadvantages as a form of coercion in cases of dissent, are obvious techniques. The political rulers' penchant for self-enrichment with the help of a rent- or sinecure-capitalism goes with the exercise of comprehensive controls to secure the continuance of their rule. Accordingly, the term

'national interest' means solely what *they* say it means. Based on the rulers' (self-)perception, individuals and groups are allowed to participate in, or are excluded from, nation-building. The 'national interest' hence serves the purpose 'to justify all kinds of authoritarian practice' and allows that "anti-national" or "unpatriotic" can be defined basically as any group that resists the power of the ruling elite of the day' (Harrison 2001:p. 391). Such selective mechanisms of the exercise and retention of power have little or nothing to do with democratic principles, but much in common with the commando structures that emerged during the days of the liberation struggle, especially in exile. As a South African political activist summarised the sobering experiences (Kadalie 2001): "Many of my former comrades have become loyal to a party rather than to principles of justice. (…) Unfortunately it is true that those who have been oppressed make the worst democrats. There are recurring patterns in the behaviour of liberation parties - when they come to power they uphold the most undemocratic practices."

In the meantime, in view of the sobering experiences which followed the initial euphoria over attaining sovereignty under international law, critical voices are mounting, including among those who followed and supported the liberation struggles with great sympathy or even as active supporters (Saul 1999, Melber 2001a). There is a growing tendency to analyse critically the processes by which victims in the role of liberation fighters became perpetrators (cf. Lamb 2001). Breaking the taboos in this regard is necessary in a debate, which deals increasingly with the content of liberation, and reflects (if not questions) the concept of solidarity of past years and marks the end of the cultivation of 'heroic narratives'(cf. Harrison 2001:p. 390 and Kössler/Melber 2002). The much-celebrated attainment of formal independence is no longer being equated with liberation, and certainly not with the creation of lasting democracy.There are increasing attempts to investigate the structural legacies, which in most cases set far too narrow limits to realising societal alternatives in the post-colonial countries. There is a growing insight that the armed liberation struggles were in no way a suitable breeding ground for establishing democratic systems of government after gaining independence. The forms of resistance against totalitarian regimes were themselves organised on strictly hierarchical and authoritarian lines, otherwise they could hardly have had any prospect of success. In this sense, the new societies carried within them essential elements of the old system against which they had fought. Thus aspects of the colonial system reproduced themselves in the struggle for its abolition and subsequently in the concepts of governance applied in post-colonial conditions. They share the binary view of the colonial discourse of the past (Ashcroft 2001:p. 21).

The result of such general conditions is that the new system has little transparency. Those in power are at best prepared to be accountable only to themselves as a new elite in the making, which cares more about external support and little about a notion of popular democracy (Good 2002). There is a lack of critical faculties and extremely limited willingness to accept divergent opinions, particularly if they are expressed publicly. Nonconformist thinking is interpreted as disloyalty, if not equated with treason. But the marginalisation or elimination of dissent limits drastically the new system's capability for reform and innovation. A culture of fear, intimidation and keeping silent reduces the possibilities of durable renewal at the cost of the public weal. In the long term, this means the rulers are themselves undermining their credibility and legitimacy.

The former liberation fighters also have an expiry date (at least biologically). That applies not only to the groups themselves but also to their potential clientele among the people, as the example of Zimbabwe shows. So cultivating the myth of the liberators is not enough for orderly conduct of government business. Thus the rulers' restriction of their coteries to their own groups of

functionaries from the days of the liberation struggles, as still can be seen today, is counterproductive. It is motivated primarily by the wish to reproduce kindred spirits in a cosy and familiar milieu. As a criterion for classification this has less to do with the concrete political-ideological persuasion of the party-liners than with their similar perception of politics, which is based on common personality structures and features of an authoritarian character. In this context, resolute democratic outlooks and convictions are hardly to be recommended.

Does power corrupt?

Similar mechanisms can be seen in many other societies around the world that are regarded as democratic states. That power corrupts is by no means a solely African truism. Nor that giving up power - even in democratically anchored and regulated conditions with a long tradition - is difficult for many once they have had a taste of it.
Nonetheless, it might be more than a coincidence that it was precisely in Southern Africa that the 'Third Term Movement' founded by Namibia's President Nujoma arose. True, Zambia's President Chiluba was unable to continue it, but Malawi's President Muluzi can be seen as another brash aspirant for a third term. A principle enshrined in the country's constitution which limits tenure to two terms of office is to be repealed by means of a parliamentary majority. In formal terms, such a procedure can be regarded as legal. But legitimacy also has moral and ethic dimensions, which require respect as part of the lasting consolidation of democratic rule: 'Legitimacy without morality', as Seepe (2002) recently titled a critique of the South African government, 'subverts democracy'.
The argument used to support extending the mandate of heads of state armed with sweeping executive powers - that only an incumbent can maintain the continuity of reasonably stable political conditions - unintentionally signals a lack of democracy. In reality, a sustainable democracy calls for the consolidation of socially institutionalised and legal frameworks, which enable the process of open political communication regardless of the persons in power (Abbink 2000:p. 7). The challenge lies exactly there. The real test of a democracy is how peacefully and constitutionally a country carries out a change in its political leadership (Hughs/Mills 2001).
More than forty years ago, the Martinique born psychiatrist and political revolutionary, Frantz Fanon, who had joined the Algerian liberation struggle, described in his manifesto *The Wretched of the Earth* presciently the internal contradictions and limits to emancipation in anti-colonial resistance and organised liberation movements. Writing at a time when the Algerian war of liberation had not even ended Fanon prophesied the abuse of government power after attainment of independence and in the wake of establishing a one-party state. In a chapter entitled 'The Pitfalls of National Consciousness' he predicted that the state, which by its robustness and at the same time its restraint should convey trust, disarm and calm, foists itself on people in a spectacular way, makes a big show of itself, harasses and mistreats the citizens and by this means shows that they are in permanent danger (Fanon 2001:p. 132). He continues by criticising the abuse of power exercised by the party, which 'controls the masses, not in order to make sure that they really participate in the business of governing the nation, but in order to remind them constantly that the government expects from them obedience and discipline. (…) The political party, … instead of welcoming the expression of popular discontentment, instead of taking for its fundamental purpose the free flow of ideas from the people up to the government, forms a screen and forbids such ideas'. (Fanon 2001:p. 146 and 147) The growing blending of party, government

and state among the 'liberation movements in power' indicates a very similar development in the post-apartheid era of Southern Africa.
The specific constellation based on the use of force to gain liberation from undemocratic and repressive conditions like those that prevailed in the colonial societies of Southern Africa was hardly favourable for the durable strengthening of humanitarian values and norms. As part of abolishing anachronistic, degrading systems of rule it created new challenges on the difficult path to establishing sound and robust egalitarian structures and institutions, and in particular to promoting democratically-minded people. But independence without democracy is still far from being liberation.
As Fanon (2001:p. 165) further argued: 'The national government, if it wants to be national, ought to govern by the people and for the people, for the outcasts and by the outcasts. No leader, however valuable he may be, can substitute himself for the popular will; and the national government, before concerning itself about international prestige, ought first to give back their dignity to all citizens, fill their minds and feast their eyes with human things, and create a prospect that is human because conscious and sovereign men dwell therein'.

Challenges to civil society actors

The governments of the post-Apartheid states - at this stage of writing at least in Namibia and South Africa - are, in contrast to the previous minority regimes, beyond any doubt broadly legitimate. In the context of a political culture claiming to be committed to the values and virtues of pluralism in a liberal or even popular democracy, critical voices should however not automatically be associated with disloyalty to the existing system. After all, this has been one of the aims of a struggle against the totalitarian regimes previously in place - to abandon the intolerant authoritarianism shaping the colonial societies under minority rule and to allow for a variety of views. Unfortunately, this seems not to be the common and accepted understanding of many of those in control of political power in post-Apartheid societies, who seem to feel mainly 'accountable to themselves' (Good 1997). While the existing political orders are able to claim in contrast to the preceding minority regimes a democratic legitimacy among the overwhelming majority of the population, they often fail to recognise the difference between a formal and a moral legitimacy. In other words, the mere fact that one is formally entitled to take certain decisions and actions on behalf of others without further consultation, does not always justify such decisions or actions from a moral or ethical point of view.
As part of the historical legacy, those who were fighting against institutionalised discrimination and oppression under totalitarian structured societies tend to resort to similar mechanisms of control once in power themselves. They are tempted to marginalise those who beg to differ or are perceived as different from the accepted norms under the newly imposed discourse of nation building. Regarding the background to this disturbing phenomenon, the Managing Editor of the South African daily *Business Day* has characterised intolerance as one of post-colonial Africa's most chronic diseases. Malunga (2000:p. 7-8) states that 'It is always going to be difficult for people who were oppressed for almost five centuries not to be paranoid and think that every criticism of them is fanned by the erstwhile oppressors'. But notwithstanding this difficulty, he concludes 'If Africa is to outgrow the quagmire caused by paranoia about criticism, which rears its head with monotonous regularity, it first needs to do a rigorous interrogation of itself before pointing outside. We should throw out the mentality that says, "If you are not with us, you are

against us".'
None less than the charismatic leader and elder statesman Nelson Mandela (2001) could afford to explicitly support such a permissive and open minded approach towards enhancing a vibrant civil society in an interview with the *Mail & Guardian*: 'We must welcome differences of opinion. They will always be there. One of the most effective weapons in dealing with different opinions is tolerance - the ability to take criticism and not personalise it, even if a prominent individual is specifically identified and becomes a target for criticism. Tolerance is one of the best ways to solve major national issues'.
The then Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cape Town argued in her address to a graduating ceremony at the Faculty of Humanities in December 2000 strongly in support of a position that defines loyalty as an identification with values and norms. 'Responsible citizenship is not just about the observance of laws, it is about protecting the foundations of democratic society. There must be a culture of robust open and public debate, tolerance of different viewpoints and people with the courage of their convictions to express their views, even if these might not be popular'. According to her, 'courage is the most important virtue, the foundation that underlies and gives reality to all other virtues and personal values. Without courage we become conformists'. (Ramphele 2000) This understanding reminds us of the powers of civil courage and civil disobedience as a relevant engine for social change. After all, it could well be argued that without non-conformity Apartheid might still exist. On the other hand the end of Apartheid is not the end of history. While the challenge today is not to overthrow legitimate political systems and structures by illegitimate means, the task remains to improve society in favour of more justice, equality and humanity. There is wide scope in any given society of this world - including those in Southern Africa - for such efforts.

Epilogue

In Namibia's capital Windhoek, the Robert Mugabe Avenue starts at a corner of Nelson Mandela Avenue. It later crosses the Laurent Desiré Kabila Street (probably the only one, at least outside of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in this world). The Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe Avenue are both intersected by the Sam Nujoma Drive. This unique constellation of a remarkably symbolic road network is a tempting scenario for a diversity of interpretations. It might be enough here to simply conclude, however, that it illustrates the variety of options current political leaders - particularly in the (Southern) African context - have at their hands with regard to the ultimate course of their careers.

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RESEARCH NOTES

Beyond Democratic Constitutionalism: On the Twofold Meaning of Democracy and Democratisation

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A Persisting Dilemma

For meaningful communication on theoretically relevant issues to become possible, common concepts are required. Democratic theory is far from such an ideal state of affairs.

One fundamental and persisting dilemma in democratic theory springs from the tension between, on the one hand, democracy conceptualised as a form of rule characterised by *universal suffrage, regular elections and basic civil rights* and, on the other hand, democracy conceptualised as *political equality in actual practice.* Modern political scientists push mostly in the former direction, while ordinary citizens all over the world, in thinking and talking about democracy, seem most often to favour the latter type of interpretation.

The persistence of this dilemma, in the face of all efforts exerted in order to prove the rightness of either position, raises the question whether the dilemma, or contradiction, cannot be overcome. There are in principle two ways of doing this. Either one relegates issues assumed by many to be essential to democracy, such as social justice and equality in society at large, to the realm of hypothetical empirical prerequisites or correlates, conceptually disconnected from democracy 'as such' (Tingsten, 1945; Huntington, 1991); or one holds that democracy can be meaningfully conceptualised only in the context of its own realisation in actual practice - including possibly also the counterfactual conceptualisation of partial or total non-democracy in the context of democracy's non-realisation (Sen, 1981; Bangura, 1992; Held, 1995). The former is the 'minimalist' position, predominant in modern political science. The latter position is contextual and thus by necessity broader. It is not absent in political science but tends naturally to be interdisciplinary. Dahl (1982, 1989) – a living classic in modern political science – wavers creatively between the two positions.

We shall return in the following to Sen's and Held's conceptualisations of democracy. At this initial stage of the presentation, however, I summarize the second position by quoting the political scientist Bangura's political-economy-inspired formulation intended to be of particular relevance to modern Africa (1992: 99-100):

> While it (democracy) is an ideal to be cherished, democracy must make sense to the interests of the contending social groups. These interests do not have to be narrowly defined as economic; they can also be social and political. Linking democracy to the restructuring of the economy allows individuals and

organizations to pose the question of democratic governance of public resources much more sharply.

My own striving is to conceptualize *constitutional issues* and *issues of popular or citizen sovereignty/autonomy* as *two distinct but linked dimensions of actually existing democracy and ongoing processes of democratisation*. By viewing democracy simultaneously as institutional norms and relations of power - culture as well as structure - I thus align myself with the second of the two indicated positions. This is done with reference to my own formulations in a recent essay on popular sovereignty and constitutionalism in democratisation (Rudebeck, as revised 1998) as well as in other works (Rudebeck, 1991 and 2001). The implicit or underlying empirical references are mainly African, although most of them could well have been to almost any place in the world.

Context of Discuussion and Theoretical Issues

The historical context is that of the democratisations occurring in various parts of the world during the 1980s and 1990s, with more specific empirical reference to Africa. The issue raised is that of the consolidation/sustainability or not of the newly introduced democratic systems. This is an analytical issue and, at the same time, a query about ongoing histories. As a significant starting point for the analysis, the following empirical generalisation is offered: In order for democracy as a form of rule to become sustainable, it appears that constitutionalism would have to be supplemented with a measure of popular sovereignty going beyond the mere introduction of universal suffrage. The notion of *constitutionalism*, or *rule of law*, underlying this formulation is quite conventional: *The institutionalisation of government, administration and judiciary, as well as of the freedoms of organization, expression and property, into regular and predictable forms*.

This can obviously be either democratic or non-democratic, but it is difficult to see how a democratic version could be conceptualised without universal suffrage. Thus we get *democratic constitutionalism* - synonymous with the established political-science definition of democracy and formulated as follows: Rule based on universal suffrage, regular elections, legal guarantees for free discussion and opposition for everybody, the legally recognised right to associate and organise freely, and institutional safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of power.

Popular sovereignty is defined in a wider, more sociological, sense: Shared power defined in terms of social contents, with regard to actual and effective participation in the making of decisions on matters of common concern and significance. This concerns the larger political system as well as daily social life, economic production, places of living and work, and local decision-making.

Constitutionalism and popular sovereignty, as now defined, are two crucial aspects or dimensions to be distinguished in the historical processes leading up to existing democracy in today's world. Together they make up democracy in the making and in function - in the context of its own realisation.

In the European historical experience of democratisation, constitutionalism was generally the project of hitherto dominant social forces yielding to demands for political

power-sharing raised by earlier excluded groups and classes. Conversely, popular sovereignty within politics was generally and naturally the project of the mounting social forces, manifesting themselves through a politically oriented civil society. In the process, constitutionalism was democratised - democratic constitutionalism gradually gaining legitimacy as a form of rule integrating at least a measure of popular sovereignty and the relative upholding of the rule of law. Thus 'actually existing democracy' was installed.

Turning our eyes to the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America today's or yesterday's 'third world' - the claim for popular sovereignty was certainly important in earlier anti-colonial struggles, which were both conceived and perceived by the participants themselves as democratic struggles. In the first decades of independence, particularly in Africa, this element of popular sovereignty was, however, not generally underpinned with constitutionalist practice. It was therefore undermined and largely lost. Highly authoritarian single-party and military regimes came to predominate. Coupled with economic stagnation or decline, this paved the way in the nineteen-eighties and nineties, first for structural adjustment reforms under international pressure, and then also for new democratic demands and movements. The origin of the latter was both external, imposed 'democratic conditionality', and internal, rooted mainly in the middle and urbanised strata of society.

Such democratisations have been marked predominantly, although not exclusively, by the constitutional aspect of the process. Popular sovereignty, beyond democratic constitutionalism as such, has so far been weak or sometimes even absent. This means that the power games of hitherto ruling elites are now being played out in new and more democratic constitutional forms, while not necessarily (yet) involving the formerly excluded groups in any deeper sense. Consolidation, therefore, often seems far away.

Popular Sovereignty

While the term *democratic constitutionalism*, as used above, is not likely to be controversial, the term *popular sovereignty* is, on the contrary, not self-evident for the conceptual purposes at hand. The first task is therefore to try to clarify a bit further the meaning of popular sovereignty. This includes questioning the terminology. The second task, which follows from the first one, is to raise the issue of an alternative term/concept. The third task is to discuss possible implications for the conceptualisation of democracy and democratisation.

The key meaning of popular sovereignty in the sense used here is *equalisation of power with regard to rule over matters of common concern and significance*. Democratic constitutionalism alone does not guarantee such equalisation. It can come about only if social and economic relations of power are also modified outside the constitutional system - in 'civil society' as it were. When this happens, citizens will be able to assume responsibility for the development of their own societies. This in turn is crucial to the legitimation and thus to the consolidation of constitutional democracy as a form of rule. An early original contribution to the civil-society debate of the last decade was by Bangura & Gibbon (1992). Others who have inspired my own thinking are Phillips (1995), Mamdani (1996), Leys (1997), Therborn (1997), Beckman (1998), Gibbon

(1998), Mustapha (1998), and Törnquist (1999).
The use of the term 'popular sovereignty' made here may not evoke universal approval. The term is not unambiguous. Many political scientists, in particular, might want to reserve it for the constitutional realm, which would seem to run counter to the distinction emphasised. On the other hand, the two separate dimensions of democracy under consideration do reflect different and originally opposed traditions in democratic theory, as clearly brought out, for instance, by Held (1995: 38-47). The key characteristic of western or liberal democracy is in fact to have combined constitutionalism and popular sovereignty (Hermansson, 1986) - although, as we need to add, at the cost of limiting the latter notion to its constitutional expression in the form of universal suffrage. Another ambiguity might arise from the fact that the term 'popular sovereignty' has often been misused by communist ideologues. This is unfortunate but does not affect my own usage of the term.
Thus, my tentative conclusion is that the use of the term 'popular sovereignty' as in the present text can well be justified. Nevertheless, the question still remains whether any better alternative exists. In considering this question, we are greatly helped by the works of David Held and Amartya Sen.

Autonomy as an Alternative to *Sovereignty*

Only in the process of revising my first formulations on democratic constitutionalism and popular sovereignty did I become acquainted with David Held's concept of 'equal autonomy' for citizens founded upon 'the principle of autonomy' (Held, 1995: 71, 145-156). The close affinity between this and my own combined notion of constitutional democracy plus popular sovereignty ought to be noted: 'Contra state sovereignty it (*i.e.* "the principle of autonomy") insists on "the people" determining the conditions of their own association, and contra popular sovereignty it signals the importance of recognizing limits on the power of the people through a regulatory structure that is both constraining and enabling.' (Held 1995: 147). Thus 'popular autonomy' or 'citizen autonomy', drawing upon Held's argument on the intrinsic quality of democracy of people's equal autonomy in 'the determination of the conditions of their own lives' (1995: 147), might well be conceived of as analogous to 'popular sovereignty' in the context of the present argument.
There is furthermore a close link, explicitly noted by Held (1995: 155), between his 'principle of autonomy' and Amartya Sen's concept of 'entitlement' (Sen, 1981: 1-8, 45-47) - equal autonomy in Held's sense resting upon a set of 'entitlement capacities' designating 'the rules and resources people must be able to draw upon in order to enjoy the opportunity to act as citizens' (1981: 155). Granted that 'popular sovereignty' matched by democratic constitutionalism clearly signifies popular *entitlements* to legitimate power in society and thereby to basic resources, the conceptual link between Sen's 'entitlement approach' and my own argument on democratisation should also stand out.
'Entitlement' is another word for legitimate access to resources people need, if they are to be able to act as sovereign or autonomous citizens. Entitlements according to Sen (1981: 46) 'depend on the legal, political, economic and social characteristics of the

society in question and the person's position in it'. This is another way of saying that entitlements depend both on constitutional rules and on social structure.
As pointed out, my first dimension, *democratic constitutionalism*, is synonymous with the established political-science definition of democracy. As such, it is reasonably clearcut. In the present exercise it has been taken as uncontroversial as long as it is contained in itself. It has not been accepted, however, as sufficient for a full conceptualisation of democracy and democratisation. This, I have argued, requires a second dimension to be combined with the first one.
So far our discussion indicates that any one of the following four terms may be used to denote the second dimension of actually existing democracy: namely *popular sovereignty*, *citizen sovereignty*, *popular autonomy* or *citizen autonomy*. No simple or clearcut criteria, allowing for a definite terminological choice between these four, have been found. At least provisionally, a certain indeterminacy will therefore have to be accepted.

Democratic Constitutionalism and Popular Sovereignth/Autonomy Conceptually Combined

According to Held (1995: 159), 'an inquiry into the conditions of... realization' of political principles 'is an indispensable component' of their 'proper understanding'. Without such inquiry, 'the meaning of political principles remains poorly specified and endless abstract debates about them are encouraged'. Questions to be answered on the meaning of the principle of political autonomy include: 'What arrangements have to be made, what policies pursued, in order to render citizens free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their association? And how can these be decided upon?' (*ibid.*).
These are questions that need to be asked as well *about the 'principle' of democracy* and its realisation. What arrangements have to be made in order to render citizens sovereign/autonomous in the exercise of their democratic rights? If such questions are not posed and answered, the meaning of the principle of democracy will remain poorly specified.
This is precisely what the two-dimensional conceptualisation of democracy in its context of realisation is about. The abstractions of democratic constitutionalism require popular or citizen sovereignty/autonomy for their concrete realization. Citizens' self-determination requires constitutionalism to survive over time. Neither one of the two dimensions may be sustained on its own. Democratic legality will not be legitimate unless concretely realised. Democratic legitimacy will not be sustained unless bound by rules. Legality and legitimacy are interlocked but not identical (Rudebeck, 2001).

The Form of the State

What form of state would facilitate democratic rule as now conceptualised, in for instance Africa today? Raising this question is a logical next step in our discussion, although it will only be hinted at here (cf. Olukoshi, 1998).
A democratically constitutional state where the citizens themselves decide, actually and

effectively, on matters of common concern and significance would be characterised by far-reaching functional decentralisation: matters of concern to all citizens would be decided at the most general level, matters agreed to be of concern only to the individual would on the contrary be left to her or him, while the majority of issues would be autonomously worked out by large or small groups of citizens at various levels in between, in forms bound by democratically made law and adapted to the type of issue at stake and number of citizens involved as well as to the cultural context..
Under such a form of state, there would for instance be very limited space for the kind of arbitrary presidential rule so prevalent in Africa today, even under democratic constitutionalism. At the national level, parliamentary rule would generally, by opening up opportunities for public debate on national issues and informed consensus, most probably be more appropriate than presidentialism. The overriding point of such institutional arrangements would be to achieve legitimacy for the democratic form of state by democratically legal means, while securing legality through broadly based social, economic and cultural legitimacy.

Going Beyond the National Level

In recent decades the issue of globalisation has begun to enter democratic theory in crucial ways (Held, 1995, i.a.). Democracy requires a people of citizens, a *demos* in the language of classical theory. But the nation-state no longer provides clear definitions - if it ever has - of the people assumed to hold rulers accountable for their acts. People are linked to various territories and often have criss-crossing identities and loyalties. Villagers living in distant areas may be directly affected by decisions made in the metropoles of the world, by decision-makers far out of reach even for the national governments of the villagers in question.
The globalisation of decision-making affects people in all countries and all states of the world, although not equally. It is intimately linked to the issue of control over developmental resources. Democratisation, in many countries, implies in the first place equalisation of the power to control those developmental resources which can, at all, be controlled from within the given single country. This in itself is highly significant, as countries are usually full of manifold resources as well as people in need of utilising them.
Still, many resources of crucial developmental importance cannot be controlled from within particular countries, as they are in the hands of outside forces, including donors of development assistance. Even if the countries in question were to be perfectly democratised internally, their citizens would still in several ways be in the hands of decision-makers they could not control. This problem obviously affects debt-ridden, poverty-ridden, economically undeveloped and dependent countries, such as many African countries, worse than it affects better-off countries. Sustainable democratisation, thus, cannot be limited to the local/national level. Theoretically, the problem now indicated can only be fully resolved by regional and, in the end, global democratisation.
The foregoing analysis has only touched indirectly upon the issue of globalisation in relation to democratisation. One underlying assumption is, nevertheless, that

democratisation within the various countries of the world might, in the long run, also facilitate the growth of democratic relations beyond the national level.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Kiraitu Murungi. *In the Mud of Politics*. Nairobi. Acacia Stantex Publishers. 2000. xvii+208pp.

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In a newspaper article in August 2000, I dismissed Kiraitu Murungi, the author of the text under review, as one of the most nuisance politicians to appear recently in Kenya. Reading through this book, which is his autobiographical reflection on recent democratisation trends in Kenya, I notice just how hasty my dismissal was. The text is rich in detail about the internal dynamics of opposition politics in Kenya, details that could never be gleaned from the newspaper reports I used to pen the dismissal. However, there is no reason to recant my summary dismissal of Murungi and his recent politics. Rather, the text makes it clearer that opposition politics in particular and Kenyan politics in general has moved into greater morasses of nuisance and selective blame, a direction that makes the struggle to institute fairness, justice and reasoned dialogue at the national level more difficult.

In the Mud of Politics is divided into eight chapters plus a preface authored by Prof. Peter Anyang Nyong'o. The book tackles the problems of Kenyan politics as seen by Kiraitu Murungi. Given that Murungi has been an able, active and formidable participant in the democratic struggles in Kenya, the text is written from an informed perspective and speaks to many of the problems Kenyans experienced and continue to experience. This review interpretes Murungi's perspective as stemming from political society, albeit an opposition one. It recognises differences within political society; those in and those out of government and the nature of their struggles for power. It also recognises the differences between the political society in general and civil society. By adopting this interpretation, the review raises the questions of how these various realms operate, speak to and against each other in their struggle to connect with and win the support of a wider public that bears diverse ethnic, religious, racial, and, more importantly, political orientations and persuasions.

The orientations and persuasions of the wider public are crucial to the politics of democratic transition in Kenya and need to be used to critique the process and participants in the struggles. Ultimately, it is this public that installs members of the political society in power. They therefore form a crucial reference point for understanding the trials, travails and tribulations of democratisation in Kenya. The notion of the 'politics of selective blame' is deployed to identify one reason why the Kenyan democratisation process stalled as the opposing groups and factions degenerated into reactive rather than proactive politics. The story Kiraitu Murungi tells approvingly speaks to such a politics of selective blame, this being a politics of vilification and unbridled regime demonisation, a politics of a particular instance in the changing global geopolitics that criminalises one regime or practice and vindicates the other. This politics is particularly biased and discriminatory. It expediently employs selected factors to push for the democratic agenda in Kenya, thereby driving invidious wedges between people and groups.[1]

Murungi sets out his study with a one-chapter background of how he became involved in Kenyan politics. In very broad strokes, he jumps from Meru North where he was born in the heat of the colonial state of emergency and repression of Mau Mau to the authoritarian politics of the Moi regime. Though he inadequately tries to make up in very few concluding pages (see pages 196-198), the unexplored gloss here is the connection between colonial autocracy, presidential authoritarianism in the Kenyatta era and worse forms of repression under the Moi regime. The authoritarianism of the Moi regime did not drop like manna from heaven, rather it was carefully created and nurtured through the post-independence construction of Kenyatta's presidential authoritarianism. This gloss is both telling and politically expedient. It is also a common strategy of writing among some recent analysts of the democratisation process in Kenya[2] Many of these analysts are closely associated with the battery of non-government organisations working to reform the state and achieve a society that respects human rights, allows for freedom of speech, press and movement. The contradiction lies in the need to achieve democracy, fairness and justice based on an intellectual and political tradition of selective blame.

Having glossed over a whole history of presidential authoritarianism before 1978, Murungi details in chapter two how arbitrary detentions and torture under Moi led him into self-imposed exile in the USA. This is followed with his involvement in the struggle for political pluralism and entry into parliament in chapters three to five. These chapters engage his experience as the Member of Parliament for South Imenti, the struggle for constitutional reform in 1997 and work as a parliamentarian. Murungi states his position as a fighter against rural poverty and the rights of the rural folk in Imenti through a critical review of the agricultural and human rights policies that have worked to further entrench poverty and maintain conditions inimical to the total human development of Kenyans.

In part II of the text, the author revisits the question of human rights arguing that it involves a total focus on the economic and social being of citizens. His focus is on the grassroots, seen largely as rural Kenya, a grassroots constituted largely by peasants, a nebulous category that Murungi fails adequately to characterise. With a specific focus on agricultural policy, the author articulates the plight of rural people in relation to state policies on coffee and tea marketing. The analysis of the plight of farmers is closely related to the question of participation in decision-making, freedom of expression and participation in electing their leaders at various levels. Again, Murungi is keen to blame colonial policies for initiating such unresponsive policies and the Moi regime for perpetuating them. In chapter seven, Murungi discusses his views on the contentious issues of ethnicity and multi-party politics; land and ethnicity; on lawyers and politics, political defections in Kenya's politics of pluralism and the role of women in Kenyan politics. This is a highly opinionated chapter and likely to provoke some reasoned debate with the author.

Certainly, Murungi has a right to dismiss ethnic clashes as 'artificial creations' by a few self-centred politicians (p. 161), but this does not addresses the instances of historical injustice and poor social relations among communities living in the areas where such clashes were engineered and evidenced. And though Murungi discusses ethnicity in relation to the land question (pp. 166-70), a more candid interpretation must analyse the way communities in Rift Valley and related areas co-exist. This will establish other sources of conflict apart from the economic one that Murungi succinctly describes. As David Ndii has correctly cautioned, pinpointing specific politicians as the inciters of ethnic violence 'does not explain why, in the absence of a perceived historical injustice for the politicians to exploit, the hordes of young men who perpetrate these heinous crimes are so readily gullible to every other opportunistic politician's ploys'.[3]

Generally, the text is refreshingly frank and candid on many issues. Murungi's focus on agriculture clearly bears out his contribution as a fighter for the thousands of Kenyans who have bore the brunt of bad politics, mismanagement and authoritarianism under the Moi regime. Murungi articulates his arguments against Kenyan politics designed around *harambees*, dismissing this approach as promoting a culture of dependency and handouts. He shows how parliamentarians have become crudely involved in this culture, parading as democrats while remaining crude power brokers, political entrepreneurs and turncoats who believe in nothing but their personal egos. For Murungi, hard work and just returns are prerequisites if rural constituencies are to be developed. He argues that development should be a holistic initiative from bottom-up, not top-to-bottom. Murungi derides parliament as a 'house of shame' where rubber-stamping is rampant because the ruling party remains in control. He reproduces sections of his contributions in parliament on various issues in pages 97-128. He dismisses both fellow politicians and political parties as inept, mediocre and visionless in his conclusion. Murungi maintains that the nature of the work of a parliamentarian does not allow him to remain steadfast as a critique of government.Overall, Murungi paints a pessimistic picture of Kenyan politics which raises a question of what options Kenyans have.

Murungi gives scant attention to the challenges and failures of the democratisation process in Kenya as stemming from a combination of causes within and beyond the Moi/KANU government. Where he does, these factors are hardly explored in detail. Most of the text blames the stalled democratic initiatives on KANU's intransigence and Moi's authoritarianism. However, one would wish broadly to include the inherent unfairness, inequality and inequity of the global system, internal ethno-regional socio-economic differences, the obstinacy of the sitting KANU government, plus the dishonesty, greed and lack of vision and strategy in the opposition as an alternative government. Murungi is more interested in blaming KANU for all the democratic ills, economic problems and social upheavals bedeviling Kenya. This marks out his perspective as stemming from an opposition political society that has adopted a political and intellectual strategy of 'selective blame' to unseat the Moi regime. Clearly, this strategy has not worked over the years. This raises questions about the appeal opposition political society commands among the wider voting public.

What crops up when Murungi's perspective is identified with selective blame is the opposition's fixation on raw power, a fixation recently articulated by Murungi through the GEMA ethnic caucus, a grouping of ethnic bossmen/women from the related Kikuyu, Embu and Meru ethnic communities. Those involved believe that the only way to halt the problems afflicting Kenya is to get rid of Moi. Indeed, such fixation on raw power led opposition politicians to degenerate into 'Moi Must Go' sloganeering. Backed by no concrete strategy for power takeover, this sloganeering has convinced Murungi and others of the need to form ethnic forums and use ethnicity to get rid of Moi from power. Recently Murungi articulated this ridiculous thinking in both electronic and print media, the same ethnic canvassing that opposition politicians continually accuse Moi/KANU of adopting.

It must be remembered that political society depends for its success in assuming power on marshalling the support of the generality of citizens to whom they articulate an alternative and better program of human betterment than the incumbent. However, due to the abnormal fixation on raw power and sloganeering, all opposition groups in Kenya have not produced any better democratic and developmental program than the sitting KANU government. For a while, during the early multi-party days in 1990, the opposition groups rode on the wave of public hate for

KANU. They squandered their chances by reproducing within their microcosms divisive and overtly undemocratic tendencies. Such tendencies have not marked them out as any different from the KANU government. Indeed, though the opposition parties have benefitted from the positive presence of articulate and better minded politicians like Peter Anyang Nyong'o and Katama Mkangi, others still hang onto the illusory thinking that the hate Kenyans nurture against KANU must remain the only reason for a power transfer in their favour. The nuisance of such thinking is that gone are the days when something became bad simply because it was owned, aligned or associated with KANU or Moi. The days of 'Moi Must Go' sloganeering are over and every party must distinguish itself through its vision, national agenda and pragmatic strategy for national betterment. Ironically, as is evident in this book, Murungi does not even attempt to put his vision for Imenti in the context of the national policies of his sponsoring party.

Nowhere is the assumption that KANU is bad and the opposition good better illustrated than in Murungi's discussion of political defections in chapter seven. Apart from erroneously assuming that defections only occur from the opposition to KANU, the author also suggests that these occur only after inducement by KANU. Murungi derides those who defect as weak and unprincipled politicians who, for one reason or another, are easily swayed by such inducement because 'they were committed to themselves, and their personal advancement' (p. 179). While many of the defections in Kenya are clearly motivated by personal gains and inducements, there are certainly many exceptions. For instance, the changing nature of Raila Odinga's politics does not cohere to the conjectural pattern of inducement Murungi pens. A contributory factor to political defection in Kenya is the nature of opposition politics that rotates around sloganeering, the big man who bank rolls the party and ethnicity. The ethnic card was better illustrated by the 1997 Ngilu wave. It entailed a strategy of fielding ethnic bossmen/women in every province to deter Moi from gaining the mandatory 25% of the votes in at least five provinces. Apparently, there was a perceived calculation to catapult Mwai Kibaki into a run-off with Moi, a calculation that hinged on the demographic strength of Kibaki's ethnicity, the Kikuyu. Other than hoping to get rid of Moi, this calculation lacked any other legitimate vision for the betterment of Kenya. Thus, even if Raila Odinga defected for personal gain, numerous other precipitating factors can be observed.

Further, it ought to be pointed out that the political opposition in Kenya today is a product of defections from KANU. Even if there are numerous well-meaning politicians within the contemporary opposition, it is also true that many like Mwai Kibaki are relics of KANU in the opposition diaspora. Some of them have reproduced within the opposition tendencies that they carried from KANU. Apart from Odinga's National Development Party, for instance, all the other opposition parties have been unwilling to hold internal elections for their top offices periodically and remain extremely intolerant of internal debate and dissent. Further, the same parties have treated with alacrity attempts by some politicians to defect from KANU. In so doing, these parties have demonstrated a willingness to overlook the corruption records of potential defectors. Thus, some allegedly corrupt politicians like Cyrus Jirongo have been openly welcomed into the opposition fold while allegedly corrupt opposition politicians like Paul Muite continue to occupy important positions without recourse to the same rules applied to admonish the sitting government. Consequently, the main problem for the voting Kenyan public is that this very political opposition continues to accuse the sitting government of corruption without distinguishing itself as a viable and credible alternative worth their trust.

That the political opposition in Kenya hopes to unseat a regime associated with numerous ills

against the wider society is beyond doubt. But so far, they have been unable to effectively connect with the wider public whose vote they need to unseat KANU's monopoly of power. To connect with the wider voting public, a strategy of convincing Kenyans to vote out KANU needs to be adopted and it must transcend the kind of selective blame dotted in the text under review. This alternative needs more rigorous attention than can be seen in this text. It must not only promise a better future, it must also identify the possible means of attaining this future. The challenge is evidently enormous, but anything other than a hypocritical mandate is a welcome start. The current opposition has been unable to produce such a winning strategy. It has allowed itself to become a reactive rather than proactive alternative. Murungi's text illustrates clearly the nature of opposition politics in Kenya whose basic principle is unbridled regime demonisation and a narrow focus on raw power. With these as the baseline focus of political opposition, the wider voting public does not feature in the immediate vision of this political society. For Murungi, the focus is Imenti South while for the various parties, including KANU, it is their respective ethno-regional bases. What is needed is a wider cross-ethnic appeal for the opposition through a well-articulated program of reform. As things stand now, Murungi's autobiography will remain a litany of complaints against KANU. Since KANU has a penchant for thoroughly letting Kenyans down, this autobiography will in the future contain encyclopedic data on the pitfalls of a KANU government. It does not have prospects for a chapter on an opposition government. Finally, a methodological point. If Murungi can afford to extensively read and quote texts he used in writing this book, he must certainly include endnotes and page numbers. This is basic enough and the editors should have insisted on proper footnotes and a bibliography. Footnotes and bibliographies are not a preserve of academics.

Notes

1. See Godwin R. Murunga, 'Globalization and the Politics of Selective Blame in Kenya, 1963-1990'. Paper Presented during the International Conference on Mainstreaming Democratic Governance in the Social Sciences, Humanities and Universities for the 21st Century between 29th September to 1st October 1999 organised by the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of the University of Dar es Salaam..
2. See for instance, Willy Mutunga, *Constitution-Making from the Middle: Civil Society and Transition Politics in Kenya, 1992-1997*., Nairobi and Harare: Sareat and Mwengo, 1999).
3. See *Sunday Nation*, July 23 1995, p. 7.

Jessop, Bob. 2001. *The Regulation School and the Crisis of Capitalism: Volumes 1 – 3*. Cheltenham. Edward Elger.

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The persistence of endemic crises in Western capitalism, despite the hegemony of over two decades of neo-liberalism, has led to renewed interest in institutional and evolutionary approaches to socio-economic theory. Yet, institutionalism is an extremely broad theoretical tradition,

encompassing critical development theories and paradigms primarily focused on the advanced societies. Amongst the latter, there is little doubt that one of the leading schools of thought is regulation theory, whose dominance is only now being challenged by an offshoot, business systems theory. However, regulation theory is considerably more explicit in its aims of developing a 'critical political economy of contemporary capitalism', albeit at the price of giving less heed to national particularities than the latter. Nonetheless, regulation theory is an extremely broad school of thought, with its basic analytical tools being deployed to explain issues ranging from work organisation to regional development issues. This has made for a somewhat diverse literature; there are few general works that fully encompass the breadth of this tradition. In an attempt to fill this gap, Bob Jessop has compiled many of the most important articles on regulation theory into a five volume collection; a monumental task, but, there is little doubt, also a labour of love. The first three volumes form the subject of this review.

Entitled *The Parisian Regulation School*, the first volume encompasses classic essays by, inter alia, Aglietta, Lipietz and Boyer. After a general series introduction, Jessop provides a brief but solid overview of the Parisian school. The latter was founded as a result of debates over Michel Aglietta's (1974) doctoral thesis. In it, Aglietta posed an obvious question: it may be easy to explain why capitalism has periodic crisis, but how does it avoid them? (p. xxv). Aglietta argued that analyses of economic reproduction through market forces needed to be complemented by an understanding of the mechanisms of social regulation. Inspired by this, subsequent contributions focused first on explaining the periodic crises in post-war France, and, by the mid-1980s, on developing an understanding of the nature of the 'Atlantic Fordist' accumulation, and its associated, institutional 'mode of regulation'. Whilst more explicitly radical than many overseas manifestations of regulation theory, the Parisian school is politically diverse. Aglietta's work partially constituted a dialogue with Althusserianism; later Aglietta distanced himself from the regulationist mainstream (p. xxvii). Meanwhile, Lipietz has progressively flirted with Trotskyism, Maoism, and, more recently, green politics. Boyer represents one of the more pragmatic figures in the Parisian school, and, whilst affirming the Parisian school's Marxist roots, has also drawn extensively on non-Marxist writers such as Keynes, Schumpeter, and Polanyi (p. xxvii). Boyer has also been the most open to a multi-disciplinary approach, and this may partially explain his current status as the doyen of the Parisian school (p. xxvii).

As Jessop notes, the Parisian approach centres on four key concepts. Firstly, an *industrial paradigm* is about the institutional and social regulation of labour. Secondly, an *accumulation regime* is 'the complementary pattern of consumption and production' that is reproduced over time. Thirdly, a *mode of regulation* is the configuration of institutions that stabilises an accumulation regime. Finally, when the above three complement each other for a enough time to create the conditions for a long-wave of growth, this can be described as a *model of development*. (pp. xxvi-xxvii).

Part One of the volume, entitled *Background and General Presentation*, provides a solid overview of the foundation and central principles of the Parisian school. The opening chapter is an interview with Alain Lipietz, by Jane Jenson. Lipietz stresses that regulationism, rather than a holistic paradigm, is about models of development in terms of accumulation and regulation. The complexity of social relationships (e.g. surrounding wage labour) makes crisis inevitable. A mode of regulations is simply a set of *habitus* (Bourdieu's term for a particular mindset, associated with a particular culture and willingness to play by the rules of the game) and a set of evolving institutions. Intriguingly, Liepitz refers to regulation writers as the 'rebel sons of Marxism',

differing from the tradition in that they reject the neutrality and non-social character of the forces of production, in other words, the notion that particular forces of production will pull behind them relations of production, politics, ideology, etc. To Lipietz there are so many possible forms of compromise under capitalism that the issue of socialism 'is not on the agenda'; contemporary capitalism is no longer working, but the outcome is open-ended. Lipietz argues that the way ahead is a 'new form of compromise', that may – given the persistence of patriarchal relations, the nature of citizen-state relations, etc. - take decades to work out. Classical Fordism is in crisis, but this may ultimately result in hyper-Taylorism rather than a benign flexible specialisation; progressives need to push for a new compromise that places a premium on increasing leisure time. The Lipietz interview is of particular interest in that regulationists have often been criticised for having little to offer in the way of progressive alternatives. Lipietz's solution is the broad 'rainbow view' echoed, inter alia, by members of the anti-globalisation movement.

Chapter 2 consists of Boyer's introduction to the English translation of his work, *The Regulation School*. What Boyer has to say is most welcome in terms of his efforts to link together trends in scholarship in history, economics and labour studies. Unfortunately, the reader's path is occasionally obscured by the cobblestones of his characteristically opaque prose, in this and other essays by him in this collection. In Chapter 3, Lipietz provides further detail on regulationism's debt to classic Althusserianism, and its critique thereof. In the current rush to discard Althusserianism as wholly mistaken, it is indeed useful to highlight some of the issues this perspective raises, at least as a starting point for debate.

Part two, entitled *Some Early Works*, contains a number of classic papers, most notably Aglietta's 'Phases of US Capitalist Expansion'. With seminal brushstrokes, Aglietta links major developments in the emergence of modern America: the drive westwards, the civil war, and mass immigration to the development of a set of institutions supportive of capitalist growth, and subsequent crises. In what was originally a 1978 article in *Review*, Mike Davis laments the dead hand of rational choice neo-classicism over the disciplines of economics and economic history, and the possibilities of the regulationist alternative. Unfortunately, whilst rigor mortis has palpably set in, rational choice economics remains dominant some twenty years later, and for at least a decade has been shamelessly haunting the disciplines of sociology and politics. Davis's article is thus still of great relevance, even if his understanding of regulationism now seems somewhat mechanistic. Whilst by no manner light bedtime reading, Boyer's paper on historical patterns of wage formation in twentieth century France is empirically rich, and concludes with some valuable insights on unemployment and wages during the 1970s recession. Boyer's chapter is followed by one by Robert Delorme on theories of the state, and two consecutive chapters by Liepitz. The first is entitled 'Towards Global Fordism'. Particular insightful is Liepitz's critique of the war Keynsianism of the Reagan years and its inherent contradictions; again, this chapter makes most timely reading given the gradual drift of the current Bush administration towards similar remedies. Many of the themes raised are picked up again in the subsequent chapter, entitled 'Accumulation, Crises, and Ways Out'. Here Lipietz is prophetically dismissive of high-tech solutions to the crisis of capitalism of the 1980s.

Part three, *Commentaries and Critiques*, contains a number of useful debates, including the regulationist/post-Fordist contestation, the latter the subject of a paper by Michael Barbrook. Associated with the magazine, *Marxism Today*, post-Fordist thinkers highlight the obsolescence of the old class struggle, and the need for new coalitions working for a better life for all, in a reformist manner. In contrast, Liepitz argues for a more radical - but rather vaguely delineated -

red-green alternative that conscientiously distances itself from reformist neo-liberalism. Some of the issues raised are echoed in Brenner and Glick's overview of regulationism; again, they stress the need to move beyond the politics of amelioration. The closing chapter of this volume by Tickell and Peck, argues that regulationism focuses too much on accumulation and too little on regulatory mechanisms and processes. Indeed, they suggest that the latter can be studied independently of regulationism; regulation theory provides some interesting insights, but represents an incomplete start to a new critical path of social enquiry.

Volume 2, entitled *European and American Perspectives on Regulation*, introduces five further schools of regulationism that are offshoots of the original Parisian school. The first, the Grenoble school, actually predates classic regulationism in its focus on the relationship between two tendencies suggested by Marx: the tendency for profits to fall, and the tendency towards the equalisation of profit rates. More squarely within orthodox Marxism, Grenoble theorists eschew the terms Fordism and Post Fordism (p. xxv). The opening chapter of this first section of this volume, by Gerard de Bernis, highlights the central concerns of Grenoble thinkers, namely the structural conditions that sustainable inherently unstable processes of accumulation. They see regulation not as simply a set of institutions but rather what can be loosely referred to as the social and structural aspects of capitalist accumulation. Again, in the following chapter, De Bernis further elucidates some of these points. Here, De Bernis closely examines the nature of the concept of crisis, concluding with a brief – but now very timeous look – at the problems posed by the re-emergence of deflation; there is little doubt that, to date, no satisfactory way of regulating out of the crisis has been found.

Part 2, entitled *Social Structures of Accumulation*, looks at the radical American regulationist school, associated with the analysis of social structures of accumulation (SSAs). The opening chapter is David Gordon's seminal piece on 'Stages of Accumulation and Economic Long Cycles'. Gordon seeks to provide some theoretical tools for understanding the widely noted - although still contested - pattern of economic long waves (Kondratieff waves). Economic crises are likely to trigger crises in SSAs and vice versa. Gordon provides some exciting insights into the nature of this relationship, but, regrettably, pulls his punches: his conclusion is in his own words, 'modest and tentative', leaving the reader somewhat dissatisfied. This paper is followed by one by Michael Reich, looking at the origins and growth of SSA analysis. Reich concludes by an assessment of recent trend in US capitalism: it is suggested that it may either remain locked in a period of unsustainable short term profit seeking, or entering a new era, where expansion is fuelled by profit led, rather than wage led growth.

Part three contains papers on the Amsterdam school, a loose-knit body of thinkers that explore the centrifugal tendencies in contemporary capitalism. Kees van Pijl looks at the implications of hegemonic neo-liberalism: above all, severe economic shocks may shake political structures, in turn producing outcomes hostile to the existing order. Henk Overbeek looks at the decline of British capitalism. He concludes that the remedies it imposed shattered the fractional compromises that made Thatcherism possible. However, this has yet to result in a new unity around really meaningful alternatives.

In some ways more sociological than economic, the German regulation school - the subject of part four - focuses on social institutions and the state from a regulationist perspective. To German regulationists, the state 'helps exemplify the complex connection between relation of production, accumulation regime, mode of regulation and social action' (p. 108). Progressive politics should operate within and against specific 'modes of socialization', a distillation of much of what

regulation theory is about, a questioning of the order of things, and attempts to define better ways forward with the imperfect material at hand. The following two chapter in this section, by Joachim Hirsch, with Josef Esser and Juergen Haeusler respectively, provide a critique trends and alternatives in contemporary German politics.

Part five looks at Nordic models. Close to the Parisian school, the Nordic tradition seeks to accord more attention to national modes of growth, focusing specifically on the Scandinavian countries. Consisting of two chapters by Lars Mjoset, this section accords specific attention to theories of corporatism. Mjoset argues that the performance of corporatism is partially about shifts in the domestic balance of power, and the relative position of export led versus protected sections of the economy. Again, the closing section of this volume deals with commentaries and critiques. The opening chapter by Bob Jessop looks at the methodological foundations of regulationism, and its specific approach to theory building. Particularly useful is Jessop's detailed dissection of the distinction between the primarily economically focused Parisian school, and the more societally focused SSA and German traditions. Regulation is founded on a realist methodology and ontology, is rooted in the political economy tradition and is concerned with shifting forms and mechanisms for securing the reproduction of capital as a social relation (p. 356). In his chapter, David Kotz argues that Parisian regulationism is in the scientific Marxist tradition, and SSA theories in the critical Marxist one. He concludes by suggesting that the one is too structuralist and the other too voluntarist; there is a need to find a middle ground between these two traditions. In critiquing Bob Jessop's interpretation of regulationism, Werner Bonefield argues that he has veered too strongly into the scientific Marxist camp, and has left little room for critical theories of action. In the following chapter, Colin Hay enters the lists on behalf of Bob Jessop. Hay argues that Jessop leaves room for both the 'optimism of the soul' and 'the pessimism of intellect'; the struggle for social transformation is partially about recognising the limited parameters in which it is possible to operate. The final chapter, by Michael Webber and David Rigby, provides an overview of competing theories of economic change in the post-war period. This is a very general overview, but helps locate regulationism within broader debates in the humanities.

Entitled *Regulationist Perspectives on Fordism and Post-Fordism*, Volume 3 explores the dynamics of the crisis of Fordism, and the search for alternative forms of work organization. There are, of course, many edited collections dealing with this subject. However, this volume is unique in its explicitly regulationist orientation. Nonetheless, a few of the included essays do not seem regulationist at all, most notably some of the those included in the forth part of the volume; it seems that coherence may have been sacrificed on the alter of comprehensivity. Part one, *Introduction and Key Issues*, is opened with an essay by Mark Elam on 'The Post-Fordist Debate'. This provides a very nice overview of the subject area, and helps locate regulationism with broader debates. This is followed by a masterful overview by Bob Jessop, who provides a very capable dissection of the concepts 'Fordism' and 'Post-Fordism', so widely deployed and so little understood. Part two looks at *The Origins of the Fordist Labour Process*. Karl Dasbach looks at the origins of Fordism at Ford itself. This empirically rich account is marred only by a rather cursory treatment of Taylorism. Whilst Dasbach does acknowledge Ford's debt to the latter, he tends to give Taylor less credit than he deserves in mapping out a comprehensive - yet so repressive - structure of work organisation. Rather different is Bruce Pietrykowski's account of 'Fordism at Ford', which focuses exclusively on two plants, Highland Park and the Rouge, and accords more attention to processes of employee resistance and unionisation.

Part three, *The Crisis of Fordism*, is opened by a general overview of the literature on flexibility, supplemented by some empirical evidence, by Boyer. Boyer concludes that 'flexibility' remains a contested concept, and open to a number of different interpretations; however, the debate is open-ended, and there remains a vital need to identify new organisational forms that are both viable and humane. These themes are taken up again in a subsequent essay by Boyer, who argues that current trends are contradictory. Moreover, organisational forms currently being experimented with will not always prove the most viable in the long term. He concludes that a composite model is most likely, with particularly high degrees of concentration in high-tech industries. An essay follows this by Andrew Glyn, in which he evaluates the regulationist notion that the crisis of Fordism reflected concerns over productivity. He concludes that slowdowns in technical productivity were often the most severe in industries not normally associated with Fordism; rather they seemed to reflect the social problems encountered when increasing work intensity. This is followed by a review article of Piore and Sabel's 'The Second Industrial Divide' by a team of scholars led by Karel Williams. They conclude that the book is largely an exercise in futurology and meta-history than a sustainable account, a critique that provides a useful starting point for regulationist perspectives on work organisation.

Entitled *Beyond Fordism to...?*, Part four is opened by an account by Horst Kern and Michael Schuman on trends in work organisation in Germany. In practice, this article tells more about the dynamics of German politics than a detailed review of trends in work organisation. This shortfall is somewhat redressed by a subsequent account by Schuman (writing alone this time) on the German car industry. In a paper entitled 'The Japanization of Fordism', Stephen Wood provides an interesting critical account of the concepts of neo- and post- Fordism from an alternative perspective. Rather different is the Leborgne and Lipietz essay on post-Fordism. They conclude that there is a start choice between unsustainable development, ecologically destructive and short-term growth, or an ecologically and macroeconomically stable alternative.

The final section of this volume, *General Reviews*, is opened by an essay by Andrew Sayer, in which he explores the institutional prerequisites for growth; in the end, this is more than through techniques of work organisation, encompassing education, the social and institutional form of capital and state-capital relations. There is a provocative account by Jamie Gough, on the importance of assessing value relations when evaluating post-Fordism. Gough's conclusion's are very much more in the critical Marxist than orthodox regulationist traditions. The final essay in this volume, Paul Hirst and Jonathen Zeitlin, explore the barriers to flexible specialisation, which, they conclude is only possible through an active industrial policy.

There is little doubt that this series provides a valuable resource not only to those interested in regulation theory, but to all concerned about contemporary trends in work organisation, macro-economic policy and politics. In the interests of 'facilitating' cross-referencing, the various contributions are reproduced in the format and layout in which they were originally published. Indeed, an unprincipled scholar could quickly amass an impressive reference list of sources, without venturing beyond a single volume of this series! Unfortunately, this also means that most pages have double pagination (that of the original journal and the current edited volume), which can be rather confusing at times. Also, some of the typefaces employed by the various journals have reproduced more clearly than others. Finally, whilst there is a name index at the back of each volume, there is no subject index. This is a serious omission, and marginally impairs the worth of this collection. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that it constitutes an invaluable contribution to the literature.