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Les Tribulations de la Sociologie gabonaise: science des problèmes sociaux ou science des faits construits?

Résumé

L'Histoire, le Droit et l'Economie sont des disciplines connues et bien instituées au Gabon. Ce n'est pas le cas pour la sociologie qui, introduite à la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines depuis 1970, reste une discipline très mal connue, parce que insuffisamment tournée vers la résolution des problèmes pratiques, notamment du développement, mal appréciée parce que toujours perçue comme ancrée dans la mise en évidence des dynamismes sociaux et des stratégies des groupes. Dans la mesure où la pratique des recherches sociologiques est insuffisante pour convaincre de l'utilité de la sociologie, une certaine tendance est née, celle qui transformera peu à peu le sociologue en expert. Le présent article s'efforce de donner une image du sociologue et de la sociologie en présentant non seulement les pionniers de la sociologie gabonaise et leur lieu d'exercice, mais aussi les difficultés d'acclimatation de la sociologie, en partie, liées à son orientation qui tendrait non pas à s'occuper du devoir être, mais à dévoiler la nature de la société, ses hiérarchies et ses dynamismes.

Abstract

Economics, Law and History as disciplines are well known and established in Gabon. This is not the case with Sociology, which even though introduced in the Faculty of Letters and Social Sciences since 1970, is still not well known due to the fact that it tends rather to solve practical problems, especially those related to development. It is also not well appreciated because it is always seen as rooted in and brought to the fore by social dynamics and group strategies. In a case where the practice of sociological research is insufficiently convincing about the use of Sociology, a certain tendency will arise, that which, bit by bit, will transform the sociologist into an expert. This article sets out to present a picture of the sociologist and of sociology in Gabon. In so doing, it does not only present the pioneers of Sociology in Gabon and where they operate from, but also the difficulties of the domestication of Sociology, which is partly linked to its orientation that has tended to minimise its own existence and institutionalisation, and to dwell instead on society and its hierarchies and dynamisms.

Introduction

Qui veut comprendre la situation actuelle de la sociologie gabonaise ne peut s'empêcher de la confronter avec l'évolution sociale du pays depuis quarante ans. Pour des raisons évidentes, nous commencerons par « l'an zéro », c'est-à-dire 1960. L'octroi de l'indépendance inaugurait une nouvelle ère économique, politique, sociale et scientifique.
La présente communication entreprend de poser trois problèmes:
- la périodisation des conditions socio-historiques de l'émergence de la sociologie au Gabon de 1960 à nos jours;

- l'orientation épistémologique de la discipline à travers les objectifs socio-politiques et pédagogiques assignés à l'institution universitaire;

- l'orientation théorique et méthodologique des recherches sociologiques au Gabon.

I – Les pionniers de la sociologie gabonaise

La naissance de la sociologie gabonaise est le fait de deux générations de sociologues qui ont couvert les vingt premières années de l'indépendance.

1.– Les deux pionniers de la première décennie post-indépendante [1960 – 1970]

Dans les travaux sociologiques et anthropologiques des années 1950 – 1960, l'ouvrage de **Georges Balandier**, Sociologie actuelle de l'Afrique noire, apparaît comme une contribution majeure à la connaissance de la société gabonaise. A cette époque, G. Balandier ne considérait pas que sa tâche unique consistât en une explication du réel, encore moins en une justification du fait accompli. Il tenait déjà la sociologie pour un instrument de critique sociale, mieux, comme un moyen de changer la société. Une telle orientation, explique la prévention du régime contre une science qui tendrait à dévoiler la nature vraie de la société post-coloniale, de ses dynamismes et de ses hiérarchies.

Laurent Marie Biffot est le premier psycho-sociologue gabonais formé dans les universités françaises. Chercheur à l'Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer (O.R.S.T.O.M.), il effectue ses premiers contacts avec le terrain africain, notamment au Congo Brazzaville avec **Roland Devauges** (1958) et au Gabon (1961).

L. M. Biffot a enseigné la sociologie et la psychologie sociale à l'université nationale dès sa création en 1970, puis dirigé l'Institut des Recherches en Sciences Humaines (I.R.S.H.), créé en 1976, après le départ de l'O.R.S.T.O.M. du Gabon.

Au delà de nombreuses enquêtes de terrain, de plusieurs articles ronéotypés par le Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique et Technologique (CENAREST) dans le cadre de l'Institut de la Recherche en Sciences Humaines, L. M. Biffot aura contribué à l'émergence d'une réflexion psycho-sociologique des problèmes engendrés par la décolonisation avec notamment : « facteurs d'intégration et de désintégration du travailleur gabonais à son entreprise » (1961) et « Genèse des classes sociales au Gabon » (1977).

S'il n'est pas du tout évident que **L. M. Biffot**, à ses débuts comme à la fin de sa carrière universitaire, faisait de la Recherche – Action, ses interrogations premières l'avaient conduit à comprendre les processus par lesquels les nouveaux immigrants des campagnes s'organisaient en ville et dans l'entreprise. La décomposition sociale et les recompositions des rapports sociaux s'expriment ici en termes d'intégration, désintégration, somme toute une sociologie qui manquait parfois de rigueur conceptuelle et restait assez peu portée sur la dynamique conflictuelle.

2. – Les pionniers de la seconde décennie post-indépendance [1970 – 1980]

A partir de 1970, une nouvelle génération de sociologues sort des Universités françaises : **Jean Ekaghba Assey** (Paris V)[1] **Jean Aboughe Obame (**Paris V)[2], **Nzoughet Mendome Edane** (Paris V)[3] et **Jean Ferdinand Mbah** (Paris V)[4].

Comparativement aux travaux de **L. M. Biffot**, une approche rétrospective des travaux des pionniers de cette génération met en lumière les caractéristiques suivantes :

• Essentiellement théorique, la sociologie de la seconde génération cherchait à résoudre les problèmes préliminaires de méthodologie et d'épistémologie ;

• En étroite liaison avec la critique de l'anthropologie classique, elle orientait davantage son questionnement à la fois vers la sociologie dynamique qui a institué la critique de la société coloniale et de la tradition désormais remaniée, manipulée – et en dehors d'elle – puisqu'elle demeurait consciente de son caractère d'opposition à la structure sociale post-coloniale ;

• Sans récuser la pluralité des approches, les sociologues de cette génération tenaient la sociologie pour un instrument de critique sociale, mieux comme un moyen de changer la société[5]

Parmi ces quatre sociologues, deux ont pour activités principales, l'enseignement et la recherche[6], les autres ont exercé dans les secteurs privé et public.

3. – Les sociologues de la troisième génération post-indépendance [1980 – 1990]

On peut distinguer quatre types de cursus en ce qui concerne les sociologues de la troisième génération[6]:

• les sociologues entièrement formés en France : Gaston Noël Mboumbou Ngoma (I.E.D.E.S.), Guillaume Moutou (Tours) ;

• les sociologues formés au Gabon et en France : Daniel Mba Allogo (Nantes), Joseph Moutandou Mboumba (Strasbourg), Anaclé Bissiélo (Paris VII), Jean Marie Vianney Bouyou (Paris V), Marcel Bridon (Poitiers), Mesmin Noël Soumaho (Paris V) et Marcelle Bisso Bika (Rouen) ;

• Les sociologues formés entièrement au Canada : Fidèle Pierre Nzé Nguéma (Laval) ;

• Les sociologues formés au Gabon (après la réforme du Département) et au Canada : Mathieu Ekwa-Ngui, Flavien Heke Ella, Jean Pierre Ndong Ovono et Ignace Mesmin Ngoua Nguema (Laval).

La caractéristique principale de cette génération est l'hétérogénéité des cursus. Elle se traduit, sur le plan épistémologique, par une différence thématique et théorique très prononcée. En effet, on constate une identité thématique – « développement » - entre ceux des sociologues formés entièrement en France et ceux formés entièrement ou partiellement au Canada. Par contre, les approches sont à la fois convergentes et divergentes pour ceux formés au Gabon et en France. On peut signaler par exemple que J. Moutandou Mboumba, M. Bridon sont sensibles à la

problématique du développement, tandis que A. Bissiélo, J. M. V. Bouyou, D. Mba Allogo, M. N. Soumaho et M. Bisso Bika s'occupent respectivement des objets relatifs à l'organisation, l'espace urbain, la classe ouvrière, l'éducation, le politique et le syndical.

II – La sociologie, Science des problèmes sociaux ?

L'implantation de la sociologie au Gabon commence avec l'Université en 1970. Elle est enseignée, pendant près de dix ans, au sein du Département philosophie – sociologie – psychologie. Ce Tronc Commun, nécessaire au début de l'organisation de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines, limitait l'enseignement de la sociologie à l'initiation.
En 1980 – 1981 intervint l'autonomie du Département de sociologie. Cela entraîna une redéfinition des programmes par les enseignants, notamment **A. Diaz, A. Dejean, P. Nguema Obam, Sidibe Sayon, J. Ekaghba Assey et J. F. Mbah**. Cet effort de réflexion déboucha sur l'organisation générale du Département avec la création d'un second cycle complet[7].
Pendant six ans, la sociologie prit pied dans un climat où son image de discipline tonitruante coexistait avec celle d'absence de débouchés et de la nécessaire orientation vers la professionnalisation. A cette époque déjà, les formations pour D.E.S.S. et l'Institut de Démographie et de Statistiques étaient suggérées aux étudiants de Licence. Quid des rumeurs infondées mais non moins récurrentes sur la détestabilité de la sociologie ?

1. – Les fondements de la réforme du Département de Sociologie

En 1987, les programmes d'enseignement conçus et dispensés à partir de 1981, vont être revus et corrigés, sur l'initiative de G. N. Mboumbou Ngoma, chef de Département, assisté d'un certain nombre d'enseignants dont M. Alihanga, P. Ayamine Anguile, R. Ondo. Cette refonte s'inspirait alors des programmes de l'Institut d'Etudes sur le Développement Economique et Social (I.E.D.E.S.). L'objectif visé était d'orienter le Département vers la « sociologie du développement » pour sauvegarder, semble-t-il, la sociologie menacée de disparition. Une telle orientation accréditait donc la prévention des autorités contre le caractère critique de la sociologie et le fait qu'elle puisse devenir un moyen de changer la société. La proposition initiale de transformer le Département de Sociologie en « Département des Sciences du Développement et des Ressources Humaines » devint, avec l'arrêté n° 000616/MESRS, du 19 novembre 1987, « Département des Sciences Sociales ». Trois missions lui furent assignées :

• « Assurer » un enseignement général de niveau universitaire (…) permettant de présenter des candidats à l'Institut des Planificateurs de l'Education et de la Formation qui doit s'ouvrir à Libreville, à l'Institut de Formation et de Recherche Démographique de Yaoundé, ou à tout établissement de 3e cycle formant des planificateurs, des statisticiens ou des démographes ;

• Former des cadres immédiatement utilisables sur le marché de l'emploi dans les domaines de la planification des ressources humaines et du développement, de la statistique et de la démographie, d'autres spécialités pouvant être ouvertes selon les besoins du marché de l'emploi ;

• Procéder à des enquêtes sociales sur les problèmes inhérents au développement du Gabon »[8]

En conclusion, « la création de ce Département (…) devrait avoir un impact bénéfique sur les services de statistique et de planification en leur fournissant du personnel immédiatement utilisable (…). Sa double vocation d'établissement d'enseignement général universitaire et d'enseignement professionnel ne permet pas le strict respect les normes académiques universitaires en matière de quotas horaires par année d'études »[9].

2. – Les nouveaux programmes d'enseignement issus de la réforme du Département

L'année 1987, représente beaucoup dans l'évolution de la sociologie au Gabon et notamment à l'université. En effet, en combinant le manque de sociologues formés et la paralysie dans le domaine théorique, la peur de la diffamation de la sociologie crée, comme le dit J. Labbens, « un climat propice aux sociologues, mais défavorable à la sociologie »[10]. Le contenu de la formation comportera huit matières :

Sciences sociales,
Méthodes quantitatives,
Informatique,
Démographie,
Planification,
Socio-économie du développement,
Administration et Législation du Travail,
Administration et gestion des entreprises.

Dans le premier cycle, on revient à la situation antérieure, celle du Tronc Commun où la sociologie totalisait 13 heures sur un volume horaire de 51 heures hebdomadaires en Duel.
Le second cycle est structuré, à partir de la Licence, autour de quatre certificats :

- Sciences Sociales (Tronc Commun) : 4 H 30 seront consacrées à la sociologie (sociologie de la mobilité et stratification sociale, sociologie du travail, sociologie urbaine et rurale) ;

- A Planification du Développement ;

- B Planification des Ressources Humaines : on ne comptabilise que 2 heures pour la sociologie de l'éducation ;

- C2 C Mathématiques Sociales ;

- C2 D Anthropologie Economique et du Développement.

En Maîtrise, le constat est le même. A l'exception de 4 heures consacrées au Séminaire de Méthodologie, il n'y a aucun enseignement de sociologie dans les quatre certificats de spécialité.

3. – Les travaux de recherche des étudiants

Les différents travaux présentés par les étudiants de fin de cycle, reflèteront, pour la plupart, l'orientation développementiste, avec les questionnements suivants :

« La petite et moyenne entreprise est-elle capable de relever le défi du sous-développement encore latent dans les sociétés gabonaises ? »

« Pourquoi et comment l'orientation multipolaire du processus du développement basé sur les PME agricoles peut-elle constituer une alternative en tant que stratégie du développement du Gabon ? »

« Quelles sont les retombées socio-économiques et culturelles d'un tel développement ? Cette option paysanne serait-elle propice au développement rural ? »

« Peut-on affirmer que cette urbanisation effectuée avec l'aval de la multinationale SHELL – Gabon sur l'investissement a entraîné un véritable développement ? »

Il est évident que la thématique du développement ainsi présentée[11], laisse découvrir une série de problèmes sociaux relatifs au sous-développement ici mal cernés, à l'entreprise agricole comme alternative assez peu définie, aux effets induits du développement en milieu rural et en milieu urbain. Si l'avenir du Gabon est dans le développement, le sociologue doit y faire face et la recherche qu'on attend de lui porte sur le présent, un présent reflété par l'avenir et remodelé en fonction de lui. On aboutit donc facilement à la situation où « le sociologue n'est pas fait pour la sociologie, mais la sociologie pour le sociologue »[12]: la sociologie en question est ici celle du développement.

Dix sept ans après la création de l'Université, on peut revenir aux observations de P. Achard sur le développement et la sociologie du développement : « il est possible de reconnaître dans la notion de « développement » non un concept scientifique mais une opération politique, et de construire une sociologie critique des rapports internationaux, en montrant quelle est la sociologie qui permet d'expliquer le fonctionnement social du terme »[13]. Le développement séduit les enseignants et les étudiants du Département alors même que le statut, la spécificité et la nature des recherches que la sociologie du développement implique, restent entièrement posés. Mieux, en lisant J. Lombard, A. Guichaoua et Y. Goussault, la sociologie du développement « ne semble répondre ni à une spécificité thématique (…), ni s'appliquer à un ensemble de sociétés particulières (…) appelées (..) le Tiers Monde » ou simplement « la sociologie du développement n'a pas d'autre spécificité que d'être née à un moment de crise des sciences sociales face aux interpellations que leur opposaient les mutations brutales du Tiers Monde »[14]. L'attrait que la thématique du développement exerce sur le monde universitaire gabonais confirme précisément une orientation sociologique primordiale sur deux plans :

• La nature de l'objet sociologique, ici la quête et l'étude des problèmes sociaux inhérents à la mise en place des structures de l'Etat au lendemain de l'indépendance ;

• Le comportement du sociologue qui s'est transformé progressivement en expert du développement.

C'est pourquoi il apparaît opportun que l'on revienne à cette interrogation fondamentale concernant « la sociologie du développement » qui, selon P. Achard, aurait plongé les sociétés primitives « dans le monde moderne en les munissant d'une sociologie » et que cette opération historique avait permis au politique « d'opérer sur l'universitaire », ce qui a fondé une sociologie du développement comme « récupération des travaux ethnologiques dans un champ sociologique néo-colonial. C'est-à-dire que la constitution de ce champ a eu pour effet de fournir une réponse néo-coloniale (le développement) à un questionnement ethnologique anti-colonialiste.[15]. En cherchant à promouvoir la sociologie par la sociologie du développement parce qu'apparemment plus proche des préoccupations des populations et de l'Etat, la sociologie a été dévoyée, car comme le souligne J. Labbens, « toute recherche, si elle est bien faite, a généralement deux conséquences : elle apporte une contribution à la science ; elle contribue au prestige de ceux qui l'ont organisée et réalisée (…). Autrement dit (…), la fonction manifeste (avancement de la science) s'accompagne d'une fonction latente (renforcement de l'institution, prestige du chercheur) »[16].

Dans la situation du Département que nous avons évoquée, la connaissance n'était même plus une fin ; elle devenait un moyen au service du sociologue et du Département. C'est pourquoi, il était presque impossible, dans ces conditions, d'entreprendre une recherche exigeante et d'accomplir des travaux de qualité. A la logique imprimante de la thématique du développement, d'autres logiques récurrentes dans l'exercice de la sociologie, notamment celles de l'expertise et de la mise entre parenthèses de la méthodologie, informent, accréditent et singularisent l'orientation exclusivement utilitariste de la sociologie. Ceux des sociologues et enseignants qui croient en l'utilité de la sociologie devraient s'interroger sérieusement pour que l'appel aux sociologues ne discrédite ni les sociologues, ni la sociologie. Car, il appert que, « pour répondre aux questions qu'on lui pose, le sociologue doit nier la spécificité de sa discipline. Il ne peut donc, trop souvent, qu'aligner avec prétention quelques statistiques, affirmer sentencieusement quelques tautologies bien sonnantes, reprendre à son compte les idéologies dominantes du milieu où il vit. C'est ainsi qu'en surestimant les possibilités de la sociologie, on en arrive à annihiler pratiquement la possibilité d'une recherche authentique et les conditions d'un enseignement sérieux »[17]. Il faut donc que l'on arrive véritablement à restreindre, dans notre temps de travail, l'importance des contrats d'expertises et de consultation, nationaux et internationaux, publics et privés. Il faut rompre avec l'état d'esprit qui est à la survie financière et matérielle, car si la « marchandisation » du savoir social est consubstantielle à l'histoire des sciences sociales et humaines, elle est aggravée dans notre pays et laisse aucune possibilité aux universitaires de voir quel jeu ils jouent et qu'on leur fait jouer[18].

Si la tendance à l'expertise marginalise la recherche fondamentale et rend difficile la possibilité d'une recherche appliquée ouvertement publique, elle reste l'apanage d'un groupe restreint d'universitaires qui paraissent intégrés à la sphère du pouvoir et dont la production ne parvient pas encore à poser le problème du lien entre connaissance sociale et pouvoir politique sous la forme de l'existence d'une couche sociale spécialisée.

III – La sociologie, science des faits construits

La pratique de la sociologie, du point de vue universitaire tout au moins, est récente au Gabon. Pour les deux premières générations qui se sont efforcées de construire la sociologie au Gabon, la lutte en faveur de la sociologie scientifique impliquait une action dans trois directions :

- Obtenir la reconnaissance de la sociologie comme science théorique, de caractère empirique, soumise à des règles analogues à celles des autres sciences et conçue, par conséquent, d'une manière très différente de la pratique suivie jusqu'alors ;

- Créer des filières nécessaires à la formation de sociologues ;

- Développer l'enseignement et la recherche sociologique qui, pendant près de dix ans, ne figuraient que comme matières congrues inscrites au programme d'un enseignement de tronc commun avec la philosophie et la psychologie.

Ces trois directions convergeaient vers un objectif commun : l'institutionnalisation de la sociologie au Gabon.

1. – La pratique sociologique de la première génération

G. Balandier n'a jamais enseigné au Gabon, mais son influence s'exerce à travers ses ouvrages et ses cours à la Sorbonne et à l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales où les sociologues de la deuxième génération ont suivi ses enseignements. Il a particulièrement dirigé J. Ekaghba Assey.
L. M. Biffot, bénéficiant de la structure locale de l'O.R.S.T.O.M., a mené quelques enquêtes de terrain avant de s'engager dans la formation des sociologues en 1970. Son action sera néanmoins limitée par l'organisation même de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines à ses débuts (Tronc Commun Philosophie – Psychologie – Sociologie) et par ses nombreuses activités extra académiques qui ne lui auraient pas donné la possibilité d'exercer une réelle influence dans les milieux académiques.

2.– La pratique sociologique de la deuxième génération

Si la sociologie au Gabon reste attachée au nom de G. Balandier, il n'y a pas véritablement de continuité entre la première et la seconde génération. Cependant on note une convergence, puisque aucune des deux générations n'a jamais mis en doute la légitimité de la sociologie comme science et son indépendance à l'égard de la politique.
A partir de 1980, s'instaure peu à peu, avec l'autonomie du Département, une tradition et une culture scientifiques. Les programmes élaborés traduisaient, sur le plan du contenu, le souci théorique des enseignants qui avaient pour tâches d'élever le niveau de conceptualisation et de la discussion dans le sens d'une plus grande abstraction. C'est précisément là que commencent les tribulations.
La déconvenue de la sociologie a lieu en l'absence de L. M. Biffot, A. Diaz et J. F. Mbah affecté à l'Ecole des Cadres du Parti puis au Lycée d'Etat de Koulamoutou en qualité de professeur de français. C'est le triomphe des non sociologues qui auront réussi à isoler Achille Dejean, Paulin Nguema Obam et J. Ekaghba Assey. On peu parler d'un effet conjugué des enseignants formés à l'Université Pontificale de Rome (Martin Alhianga, Jean Robert Eboulia), des enseignants aux cursus philosophique et anthropologique (Rose Ondo, Pierre Ayaminé, Paulin Nguema Obam), des sociologues entièrement formés en France et engagés dans la mouvance du développement (G. N. Mboumbou Ngoma, G. Moutou) qui a joué en faveur d'une orientation résolument tournée vers l'étude des problèmes sociaux.

3 – La pratique de la troisième génération

Les sociologues de la troisième génération ne seront pas exemptés de ces tribulations. Beaucoup plus hétérogène, mais pétrie dans le clivage épistémologique de la deuxième génération, la troisième génération va également se scinder en deux tendances :

- la première, de tradition française, orientée vers la réflexion théorique, est constituée par certains des enseignants formés à l'U.O.B. et en France ;

- la seconde, mue par le pragmatisme des anciens abbés enseignant au Département, orientée vers le développement et le communautarisme, est représentée par une autre frange d'enseignants formés à l'U.O.B. et au Canada.

Avec le retour à l'ancienne dénomination, le réaménagement des filières va recouper les préoccupations épistémologiques précédemment évoquées. Ainsi, la « Planification du Développement » devient Sociologie du Développement ; la « Planification des Ressources Humaines » se transforme en Sociologie du Travail. La filière «Sociologie de la Connaissance » sera organisée avec pour visées fondamentales, l'enseignement et la recherche.

Aussitôt cette nouvelle organisation mise en place, s'est posé le problème de l'émergence du discours scientifique puisque l'espace du Département était désormais réparti en trois entités. Des récriminations injustifiées furent adressées à la filière connaissance sur son orientation trop théorique ; ces récriminations reflétaient simplement l'hypertrophie de la fonction didactique. En effet, le cours universitaire pour un certain nombre d'enseignants de la filière développement ne constitue pas comme cela est sa vocation, une conversion des énoncés scientifiques en énoncés didactiques mais plutôt le lieu de conversations sur les problèmes sociaux. La même dérive s'observe dans la filière Travail avec les enseignements comme « Planification des ressources humaines », « Administration et Gestion des entreprises » et « Connaissance et Administration de l'entreprise gabonaise ». C'est à ce niveau qu'apparaît le surinvestissement idéologique de ces enseignants qui ont du mal à distinguer sociologie et étude des problèmes sociaux et y voient dans la sociologie une discipline par trop critique, donc subversive. On peut comprendre ce surinvestissement idéologique comme une irruption du politique dans un lieu où le discours est, par définition, de nature scientifique. Se considérant comme des universitaires intégrés à la sphère du pouvoir, le surinvestissement idéologique crée chez eux une réelle difficulté à passer du statut d'enseignant universitaire à celui de producteur de discours dit scientifique ou reconnu comme tel. Et même si le développement apparaît comme une entreprise consciente de fabrication idéologique dominante articulée aux mécanismes de la domination idéologique, cela reste « un phénomène volontariste, aléatoire, hétérogène, qui ne traduit, ne reflète, ni ne concrétise les productions culturelles et idéologiques, conscientes et inconscientes, d'une couche sociale donnée »[19].

Si l'on a pu constater une relative homogénéité des cursus comme un élément intégrateur ou comme un point d'articulation des rapports scientifiques entre procès de production des connaissances et processus de transmission en ce qui concerne, les pionniers des deux premières générations, la situation sociologique depuis 1980, se caractérise par l'hétérogénéité scientifique avec le flux d'enseignants ayant étudié au Canada. Cette hétérogénéité est devenue déterminante et peut expliquer le net clivage intellectuel qui se manifeste dans le Département et s'exprime par deux tendances :

- la première, centrée sur la thématique du développement est connue pour ses tendances a-théoriques. Elle s'illustre dans l'étude des problèmes sociaux, investigations qui se

caractérisent par la désorganisation conceptuelle ou encore le refus de tout effort systématique en vue d'une intégration de la théorie sociologique ;

• la seconde, préoccupée par le défrichement de nouveaux domaines de l'activité scientifique, réaffirme que le cours universitaire a pour vocation, la conversion des énoncés scientifiques en énoncés didactiques en même temps qu'il peut constituer le point de départ pour une recherche menée ultérieurement. C'est pourquoi, il doit être dispensé de manière à transformer des problématiques et des objets hétérogènes en objets de connaissance circonscrits ; il doit consister à déployer dans le Département, espace discursif reconnu et diversifié, des textes et travaux soumis à la confrontation, à la discussion.

Il importe donc que les sociologues se rendent compte, dès à présent, que s'ils veulent constituer une communauté scientifique et s'intégrer dans l'ensemble de la société, ils doivent réorienter la thématique du développement qui, introduite et appliquée pour servir les intérêts des dirigeants, n'a pas véritablement trouvé d'écho dans les différentes couches de la société, à l'exception de l'élite. L'enseignement de la sociologie doit viser non seulement à assurer une formation scientifique, mais surtout à créer un état d'esprit qui conduise à voir en elle une discipline de transformation intellectuelle et sociale.

Conclusion

Le développement de la sociologie au Gabon, à travers son implantation à l'université, a montré qu'il y avait de nombreux obstacles. Si l'organisation des enseignements et de la recherche a été difficile en raison de la suspicion qui s'étendait d'un groupe d'enseignants à la sociologie elle-même, cette situation résultait de l'influence de certaines personnes qui, ayant écrit, avec plus ou moins de bonheur, des études plus ou moins documentées sur des sujets sociologiques, anthropologiques, s'occupaient également des tâches d'enseignement. Mais c'est davantage les sociologues eux-mêmes, notamment ceux qui ont adopté l'orientation qui, analysant la structure sociale en termes de modernité, de développement ont par là même homologué une image irréelle de la société gabonaise et nui à une réflexion théorique cohérente sur l'étude empirique des phénomènes sociaux.
La situation actuelle reflète bien cette double tendance idéologique avec le questionnement suivant : doit-on impérativement disposer d'une théorie cohérente avant d'entreprendre l'étude empirique des faits sociaux ou est-il plutôt indispensable de parvenir à la connaissance par des recherches sur le terrain, c'est-à-dire sur les problèmes sociaux avant de formuler des concepts théoriques ?
Ces quarante premières années de l'indépendance ont été marquées par la perplexité, car les sociologues ayant reçu une formation spécialisée sont peu nombreux et confrontés à la tyrannie de la sociologie spontanée. La sociologie ne pourra émerger qu'en conséquence de l'érosion du développementalisme, de l'expertise, lesquels font obstacle à l'éclosion d'une communauté scientifique à même d'entreprendre une réflexion sur la fonction sociale et le discours produit par le sociologue.

Notes

1. J. Ekaghba-Assey : *l'Economie moderne et les relations inter-ethniques dans la région de*

Lambaréné (Gabon). Thèse Doctorat 3ᵉ cycle Sociologie – Paris V – Sorbonne, 1974.

2. J. Aboughe-Obame : *Acculturation et sous développement au Gabon* – Thèse Doctorat 3ᵉ cycle Sociologie Paris V - Sorbonne, 1975.

3. Nzougne-Mendome Edane : *L'Evolution socio-économique de Libreville depuis 1960. Pour une problématique des classes sociales dans la ville africaine.* Thèse Doctorat 3ᵉ cycle Sociologie, Paris V, Sorbonne, 1977.

4. J. F. Mbah : *Le tribalisme, survivance et/ou adaptation de l'idéologie dominante au Gabon* – Thèse Doctorat 3ᵉ cycle Sociologie – Paris V, Sorbonne, 1979.

5. Lire à cet effet, J. F. Mbah : *La Recherche en Sciences Sociales au Gabon*. Paris L'Harmattan 1987.

6. J. F. Mbah est enseignant permanent à l'Université depuis 1979. J. Ekaghba Assey, ancien directeur de l'Institut de recherche en sciences humaines, enseigne également à l'Université. J. Aboughe-Obame a exercé à ELF-Gabon pendant plusieurs années tandis que Nzoughet Mendome Edane était Conseiller au Ministère de l'Habitat et de l'Urbanisme.

7. Notre contribution avait été en outre, la proposition de deux enseignements : le premier, sur l'idéologie, le second sur les études africaines. Beaucoup plus tard, en 1991, ces enseignements seront dispensés dans la filière que nous avons organisé, sociologie de la connaissance. L'effort de réflexion sur les programmes se poursuivra en 1996, avec la proposition d'un autre enseignement consacré à la culture et à l'identité.

8. Document intitulé Réforme du Département de Sociologie de la Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines – Annexe 2.'Ce document a été rédigé par le Chef de Département de Sociologie de l'époque, p. 5.

9. Document Réforme du Département, idem. p. 7.

10. J. Labbens : « Les rôles du sociologue et le développement en Amérique Latine », *R.I.S.S.* – Unesco, vol. XXI (1969), n˚ 3, p. 462.

11. N. Etsang Ngoua : Le développement des petites et moyennes entreprises (PME) face aux entreprises étrangères au Gabon – Mémoire de Maîtrise de Sociologie, Libreville, 1985. - M. Mba Obiang : *Esquisse d'une stratégie de développement du Gabon à partir de la petite et moyenne entreprise agricole : cas du Woleu-Ntem* – Mémoire de Maîtrise de Sociologie – Libreville, 1991. T. Mba Akue : *Le paysan fang face à la problématique actuelle de la cacao-culture et perspective du développement rural (cas du village Bikodom)* – Mémoire de Maîtrise – Libreville, 1993. -S. Yoya dit Yauyalt : *Gamba du campement de pêche à la cité pétrolière* – Mémoire de Maîtrise- Libreville 1993.

12. J. Labbens : op cit. p. 462.

13. P. Achard : « Sociologie du Développement » ou Sociologie du « Développement », *Revue Tiers Monde*, T. XXIII, n˚ 90, avril – juin 1982, pp. 257 – 258.

14. J. Lombard : « Une sociologie à la recherche de son identité : espoir d'un bilan », *Année Sociologique*, Vol 42, Paris, PUF 1992, p. 87. - A. Guichaoua – Y. Goussault : *Sciences sociales et développement* – Paris – Armand Colin (Collection « Cursus »), 1993, pp. 91 … 98.

15. P. Achard : op cit , pp 257 – 258.

16..J. Labbens : op cit, p. 462.

17. P. Labbens : op cit, p. 462.

18. Lire à cet effet l'ouvrage de J. Copans « *La Longue marche de la modernité africaine* » Karthala, Paris, 1990.

19. J. Copans : op cit, p. 318.

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The impact of globalisation on environmental politics in South Africa, 1990 - 2002

Introduction

Until 1990 South Africa had a strong, vibrant civil society mobilised around resistance to apartheid. With the expectation of democratisation, the hitherto embryonic environmental movement gained confidence and gathered expertise. That provided the impetus for a broad, deep and inter-sectoral participation in environmental policy making, which by 1998 produced new legislation.

Subsequently key civil society activists were drawn into the post-apartheid state, and without the democratic movement having a coherent strategic plan to maintain grassroots structures, civil society was decimated. Despite progressive environmental policies there has been little effective implementation. Furthermore in adopting neo- liberal policies the post-apartheid state has increasingly left the allocation of resources to the market and eroded the tradition of mass political participation.

However, increasing globalisation is partly offsetting some of these negative trends. A global civil society is emerging around, for example, HIV/ AIDS, trade, genetic modification, privatisation, deregulation, jobs, and third world debt. These networks are helping to regalvanise environmental and developmental movements in contemporary South Africa. The opportunity provided by the hosting of Rio +10, the World Summit for Sustainable Development, and the parallel civil society summit due to take place in Johannesburg in 2002, may be giving further impetus to this process.

1. Environmentalism and the environmental movement in South Africa

This paper follows Mittelman's conceptualisation of the environment as 'a political space, a critical venue where civil society is voicing its concerns' (1998: 848). Collective action in the name of environmentalism in South Africa is extremely diverse and reflects the social divisions of class, race, ideology, geographic location and gender. These diverse forms never constituted a social movement in the sense of a co-ordinated formal alliance that is mass based and has a shared vision and set of objectives. Neither was there an environmental movement in South Africa in the sense that Giddens regards a social movement as a 'collective attempt to further a common interest or secure a common goal, through collective action outside of the sphere of established institutions' (Giddens, 1994: 24). Nor did collective action constitute a social movement as 'a collective actor constituted by individuals who understand themselves to have common interests and, for at least some significant part of their social existence, a common identity' (Scott, 1990: 6). However in the period under review there has emerged an informal partial, fragmented network of environmental initiatives of diverse social composition and with inchoate ideologies of varying shades of 'green' and 'brown'. In combination, their multiple voices involve what Castells has called 'a creative cacophony' (1997: 69).

This 'cacophony' reflects how in South Africa since 1990 there has been a reconfiguration of the discourse on environmentalism. Prior to the nineties, the dominant understanding of environmental issues in South Africa was an authoritarian conservation perspective. This focused exclusively on the preservation of presumed 'wilderness areas' which often involved the removal

and social dislocation of indigenous people, and the protection of threatened species of plants and animals and neglected human needs. The legacy of this perspective is that many South Africans view environmental issues with suspicion as 'white, middle class issues'. Farieda Khan has pointed to 'the negative, environmental perceptions and attitudes of many black people, ranging from apathy to hostility' (1990: 37) seeing it as 'peripheral to their struggle for survival' (1999: 1). Only from the 1990s has an alternative environmentalism begun to emerge. This perspective views environmental issues as deeply political in the sense that they are embedded in access to power and resources in society. It is critical of the earlier victim-blaming approach and insists on the need for development to overcome poverty. It draws on the ideologies of 'environmental justice' and of green politics to emphasise the importance of linking the struggle against social injustice and the exploitation of people with the struggle against the abuse of the environment. It links urban or 'brown' issues in a more holistic environmental perspective. This alternative environmentalism has not only emerged in the South. Writing of environmentalism in the North, Castells points out that 'since the 1960s environmentalism has not been solely concerned with watching birds, saving forests and cleaning the air. Campaigns against toxic waste dumping, consumer rights, anti-nuclear protests ... and a number of other issues have merged with the defense of nature to root the movement in a wide landscape of rights and claims' (1997: 132). Environmentalism in South Africa has followed a similar trajectory. The emergence of this alternative perspective was due to a number of overlapping factors in the early 1990s. The unbanning of political movements and the prospect of a new democracy unleashed huge creative potential from within civil society. The return of many exiles infused local environmental and land reform initiatives with stronger linkages with the unbanned political movements and with global trends from which local initiatives had long been isolated. The possibility of consigning apartheid to the landfill of history meant that anti-apartheid fora could begin to address the implementation of a broad human rights culture which included environmental rights (Sachs, 1990).

In the 'cultural effervescence' which marked the period of South Africa's transition to democracy, 'rainbow alliances' between trade unionists, poverty activists and environmentalists emerged around a number of key environmental issues including the importation and disposal of toxic waste, air and water pollution, the adverse impacts of mining on the environment and human health, and the crying demands for land restitution and redistribution. Mainstream newspapers and the South African Broadcasting Company began to cover environmental issues more thoroughly, whilst from the new environmental initiatives emerged a lively journal called *New Ground* published by the Environmental and Development Agency.

At this time in South Africa - and globally - a core vision emerged which cohered around the of comprehensive banner of 'environmental justice'. Castells maintains that the concept of environmental justice as 'an all-encompassing notion that affirms the use value of life, of all forms of life, against the interest of wealth, power and technology, is gradually capturing minds and policies' (1997: 13 2). In South Africa it focuses on poverty as a fundamental cause of environmental degradation.

Widespread poverty and inequality is the legacy of 300 years of colonialism. Apartheid, as the final wave of successive colonial segregationist and land-grabbing policies, had, in separating people from their land and concentrating them in marginally productive 'homelands', impoverished the rural millions and created a major ecological crisis. This was further exacerbated by attempts to prevent urban migration, and to treat black people in cities as 'temporary sojourners'. The logic of the apartheid ideology therefore justified the dormitory nature of urban townships, locating

them close to the most polluted industrial areas and failing to provide them with safe energy, water and green spaces. Apartheid spatial planning led to environmentally unsustainable cities, with glaring disparities in the allocation of municipal resources, disturbingly inefficient transportation systems, and urban insecurity on a massive scale. Rural environmental injustices included the exposure of residents of former asbestos mining towns to asbestos residues (Felix, 1991: 33-43) and the location of a national nuclear waste disposal site within 24 km of villages in the Leliefontein 'coloured' reserve in Namaqualand after ruling out areas within 50 km of 'white' municipalities in the same district (see Fig, 1991).

The notion of redressing environmental injustices achieved an organisational form in the Environmental Justice Networking Forum (EJNF) which was founded after an international conference hosted in Pietermaritzburg in 1992 by Earthlife Africa, a voluntary organisation of environmental activists which had been founded three years previously. Earthlife had, in a short time, established a number of branches in South Africa, Namibia and Uganda, with a significant presence in the universities. It spearheaded protests and campaigns on issues such as toxic waste and the nuclear industry. In particular it had led the movement against the importation of mercury waste by a British company, Thor Chemicals in the Natal Midlands, which had led to the deaths and poisoning of a number of workers and nearby residents (Butler, 1997: 194-213). It also took a lead against the location of hazardous waste landfills in residential areas in Gauteng (Margolis and Chloorkop). By 1992 it had crafted links with other NGOs, trade unions, and civics (township residents' associations) and hence the proposal to establish EJNF was met with great enthusiasm. Within a five-year period, the EJNF had developed a significant national and provincial presence, with over 550 affiliates around South Africa.

EJNF articulated its commitment to working with the poor and the marginalised in a broad project of transformation. In its statement it projected its adherence to the new paradigm of environmentalism:

> Environmental Justice is about social transformation directed towards meeting basic human needs and enhancing our quality of life - economic quality, health care, housing, human rights, environmental protection and democracy. In linking environmental and social justice issues the environmental justice approach seeks to challenge the abuse of power which results in poor people having to suffer the effects of environmental damage caused by the greed of others. (*Environmental Networker*, various issues)

Environmental justice in South Africa thus extends far beyond protesting the inequitable distribution of pollution. It also included an emphasis on access to basic resources such as land and water and the participation of communities in decision making (Macdonald, in press). EJNF played an important role in the War on Poverty Campaign launched in 1997 by the South African Coalition of NGOs. It co-ordinated a special national hearing on poverty and the environment in 1998 (Butler and Hallowes, 1994.)

During this phase, the EJNF was not the only environmental initiative to emerge in civil society. Apart from this coalition, broadly six types of (sometimes overlapping) initiatives developed:

(i) A new wave of metropolitan environmental NGOs

Attracting donor finance, these groups were formed and staffed by environmental professionals and political activists, taking on projects generally aimed at poverty alleviation or redressing past

injustices. Based in the larger cities, these organisations had strong links with local campaigns and also engaged with government in policy- related processes.

(ii) Residentially based local campaigns

Usually based on activists within grassroots citizens, residents or youth groups, these coalesced around the resolution of particular environmental problems or activities. A large range of these campaigns emerged, both in affluent and non-affluent communities. These relied on local voluntary support and occasionally, corporate or other sponsorship for their existence.

(iii) Single issue campaigns

 These campaigns ranged from resistance to the siting of hazardous waste landfills, incinerators or nuclear facilities in specific areas, the combating of urban industrial and mining pollution, and the mining of conservation areas. Often these campaigns received support from established NGOs, public interest law firms, and coalitions.

(iv) Professional consultancies

This period saw the steep rise of a wide number of firms, often small or medium sized, to address the growing need for professional environmental services, particularly in the fields such as public participation, the management of environmental impact assessment processes, and development facilitation. On occasion, the government hired NGOs to act as consultants to particular processes.

(v) Environmental education

A major expansion in the field of environmental education occurred at primary, secondary and tertiary level with schools taking on numerous projects, and universities and technikons beginning to extend and consolidate their environmental courses. Initiatives at Howick (the environmental education network centre for SADC hosted by the Wildlife & Environment Society) and Rhodes (degrees and diplomas in environmental education) helped build an educational network across the region.

(vi) Inter-sectoral initiatives

There were attempts to forge links between environmental issues and the workplace, which witnessed collaboration between elements of the progressive trade union movement and environmental activists. These initiatives addressed issues such as the poisoning of workers by mercury at Thor Chemicals, and a complex of diseases - mesothelioma, asbestosis and lung cancer - resulting from asbestos mining.

These environmental initiatives which emerged in the mid-1990s were a reflection of the political diversity of South African society. The traditional preservationist organisations, privileged under apartheid, had now to concede that they were not the only roleplayers.

All the key informants interviewed for this paper emphasised the fragmented nature of environmental initiatives in South Africa. Some emphasised how environmental politics reflected a complex interplay with the politics of race, class and gender. According to one informant, 'What really hampers the movement in South Africa is that there is still that old divide and rule perspective, black and white, and when you do a thorough study you find that whites are only talking of animal conservation but people's environmental issues are quite different. It's more about poverty alleviation and job creation' (Interview with Mandla Mentoor, August 2001). On the other hand, there have been numerous initiatives that transcend racial lines, particularly in the work of the EJNF and specific campaigns, for example around the impacts of mining on community health, in which grassroots community organisations have forged linkages with public interest law firms, environmental NGOS, medical and other specialists. Alliances have also occurred with respect to nuclear issues, community-based natural resource management, urban greening, and numerous other questions.

Perceptions of the differences within environmental initiatives vary. Another informant stressed the division between grassroots and professional environmental organisations. In his view this amounted to a rich diversity which involves covering all the key environmental issues: 'In the case of a scientifically based organisation like the Endangered Wildlife Trust, we can see to it that the Brenton Blue butterfly doesn't become extinct because of some developer. We can advocate for biodiversity conservation based on our scientific knowledge of endangered species. At the same time the grassroots organisations are lobbying for better quality of life, better standards of sanitation and water supply and all of that is good for the environment as well so there's much less pollution going into rivers. So really, the environment movement, because of its diversity in South Africa, is managing to cover all bases and in that we are very strong' (Interview with John Ledger, director of the Endangered Wildlife Trust, August, 2001).

However all informants agreed that the environmental organisations had achieved a great deal, particularly in terms of creating greater environmental awareness and in terms of policy formulation.

2. Public participation in environmental policy formulation

The power of these environmental initiatives 'peaked' between 1990 and 1994 and was evident in the strong participation of civil society in CONNEPP, the Consultative National Environmental Policy Process. Public participation represented a strong contrast to the apartheid years when policy was formulated by a small homogeneous group largely to serve white minority interests. CONNEPP arose out of work that had been done in terms of a process known as the Environmental Mission, which occurred during 1993. Funded with Canadian government support, the Mission consisted of a team of South Africans joined by a number of international environmental experts largely from developing countries. The Mission was aimed at supporting the ANC-COSATU-SANCO-SACP coalition on the eve of its coming to power, by taking evidence around the country on environmental problems, and proposing policy solutions which the incoming government could consider (Whyte, 1995). The Mission report was formally presented to President Mandela, but no further action was taken. Eventually the remaining South African members of the Mission, with Canadian and Danish financial support, persuaded the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism to sponsor a participatory process to involve citizens across the country in the formulation of a new post-apartheid environmental policy.

CONNEPP was launched at a conference involving over 500 representatives of all tiers of government, business, labour, NGOs, civics, traditional leaders, youth and women's organisations. It went on to hold a series of sectoral and provincial conferences, to produce discussion documents that were widely disseminated in a number of official languages, to invite suggestions for a Green Paper, invite further comments on it, and hold a smaller 200-person report-back conference. The process, although highly contested between business and other sectors, was perhaps one of the most thorough and inclusive processes since the formulation of the Reconstruction and Development Programme in the early 1990s. It resulted in the formulation of a White Paper, which subsequently took legislative form in the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA), No 107 of 1998 (Fig, 2000).

The principle of community involvement was incorporated into NEMA. One of the key objectives of the Act was co-operative governance, aimed at extending environmental management to sectors and groups in civil society. The Act marked a significant shift away from traditional environmental management by giving those affected by environmental degradation opportunities for redress through mechanisms for conflict resolution, fair decision-making, the protection of those reporting on environmental transgressions and recognition of people's right to refuse to work in harmful environments. NEMA thus enshrined important new environmental principles, including that the polluter should pay for any damages; that whistle-blowing by members of the public would receive legal *locus standi*; that the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism was to act as the 'lead agency' in national environmental matters.

But NEMA was by no means the only instrument for better environmental management. Environmental rights had been incorporated into the Bill of Rights in South Africa's 1996 Constitution. The National Water Act of 1998 represented a significant attempt to redress inequitable access to water. It was estimated that 12-14 million South Africans had no access to clean water and 20 million with no access to 'sanitation'. The act abolished riparian rights, placed ownership of water firmly in the hands of the state and introduced principles of environmental justice in water management by establishing water reserves dedicated to meeting the basis needs of people (*Reconstruct*, 10 October 1999).

By 1998, therefore, some good environmental policies had therefore been achieved, with considerable buy-in from a wide range of citizens and civil society organisations.

3. Participation reversed

However, since 1998 there has been widespread concern about the lack of implementation, specifically that the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism has failed to give substance to the inclusion of communities in environmental management. One of the key institutions created by the act was a National Environmental Advisory Forum (NEAF) - a stakeholder structure appointed by the minister to advise on matters of environmental management and governance. Not only was the NEAF a victory for the broadening of participation in environmental governance, but it reflected the multi-sectoral bargaining which took place in the development of the policy through CONNEPP. Furthermore, it replaced the structure detested by the NGOs and CBOs, the Council for the Environment, an advisory structure enshrined in previous apartheid legislation and which was staffed almost entirely by conservative white males mostly associated with the former apartheid regime. The Council had been the subject of a committee of enquiry chaired by Rupert Lorimer in 1994, which

recommended its replacement with a more representative body. Three years after parliament approved NEMA, the more representative National Environmental Advisory Forum has yet to be appointed.

Furthermore, the current Minister Mohamed Valli Moosa and his Director-General Dr Crispian Olver have already commissioned a thorough review of NEMA.. Unlike the inclusive CONNEPP process, the review is happening behind closed doors and without any cognisance of the participatory spirit of the Act nor the policy making culture from which it emerged and which it tries to promote. The review is said to be revisiting the important principles enshrined in the Act, as well as departing from the 'framework' nature of the Act by adding substantive chapters on biodiversity, coastal zone management and pollution control. Normally these substantive issues would merit their own legislation, and have themselves been subject to participatory processes leading to green and white papers. It is quite unclear how these issues will be incorporated into the Act, whether the legal drafts will respect the participatory processes, and whether the participatory structures like NEAF will be retained.

Many development projects are being undertaken in direct contravention of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) regulations. An example is the construction of environmentally damaging infrastructure such as a road to the port area of the Coega Project in the Eastern Cape before the completion of the EIA. This is being opposed by an NGO coalition which argues that the Coega development represents a major test of the post-apartheid state's commitment to NEMA and the regulations governing development projects (Rogers, 2001).

This lack of implementation of the participatory clauses of NEMA and the spirit of CONNEPP and the act reflect a weakness in state capacity, a lack of political will, the enhanced influence of the private sector over the state, and the demobilisation of popular sectors in civil society. According to one informant, these policies are 'really poetry more than anything else. There are no targets or objectives. The Department of Environment and Tourism itself is a complete shambles' (Interview with key informant 5, August 2001).

4. The demobilisation of civil society

Despite the euphoria of attaining a democratic system of government without descent into civil war, there had nevertheless been a widespread demobilisation of civil society in the years immediately after 1994. Many key activists in environmental initiatives moved into government, academia and highly-paid consultancies. Networks such as the EJNF grew too quickly and without the depth to ensure consolidation at the centre or in some of the more vulnerable provinces. Strong grassroots environmental networks in, for example, the rural Northern Province, which had been active during CONNEPP, did not survive the turn of the millennium. Civic structures, and their national movement SANCO, were further weakened, especially after many officials entered local government. This seriously impaired managerial capacity in many environmental organisations.

According to one informant, many environmental activists retreated into privatised concerns. They 'decided to have children and buy houses. They got all cynical' (Interview with key informant 3, August 2001). In addition, many former activists who had worked voluntarily, subsequently utilised their expertise to transform themselves into highly-paid consultants. 'The spirit of voluntarism seems to have disappeared'. (Interview with key informant 3, August 2001).

Many informants emphasised the lack of capacity in the environmental movement and the absence of any congruence between ideology and practice. 'We have increasingly got people who want the best car and their personal lifestyles are not mirroring what they say their beliefs are' (Interview with key informant 3, August 2001).

There is also a problem of political opportunism. In the changed political environment, according to one informant, some individuals used environmental issues 'as a stepping stone into power politics ... They wanted to get money from donors to fund personal agendas' (Interview with key informant 3, August 2001).

When the Government of National Unity took power in 1994, the Environmental portfolio had been allocated to the former ruling National Party and not the ANC. This delayed transformation at the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. Personnel had also to be found for the nine new provincial environmental departments, absorbing scarce capacity from civil society at the periphery. The ANC itself had not developed strong plans to deploy capacitated individuals to the environmental sector, nor were those MPs appointed to the parliamentary portfolio committee on environment at all experienced in the issues over which they enjoyed decision making power. The deficit in capacity has been compounded by a high turnover of responsible government officials at the centre.

As the popular sectors of civil society have weakened, so has their influence over government policy. Doctor Mthethwa from the Group for Environmental Monitoring said, 'What worries us is that government seems mostly prepared to listen to industry and industry is able to enthusiastically lobby government with a blank cheque' (*Reconstuct,* 3 September 2000).

Another environmental activist, 'Bobby' Peek of GroundWork, warned that 'it is conceivable that pollution-affected communities, particularly poor communities, will be excluded from agreements whose effects directly impact on their health and well being' (*ibid.;* also see Peek, 1999).

As one informant expressed it, 'from 1994, environmental debates were coming up very well. It's just now that they have toned down, no longer making noise' (Interview with Pelelo Magane, trade unionist, August 2001).

It might have been expected that such 'noise' could have been amplified by environmental activists mobilising around the post-apartheid legal regime. A clause in the Bill of Rights specifies the right to a clean and healthy environment . However to date this has not occurred partly because rights discourse was not a part of anti-apartheid struggle politics, and the specific nature of South Africa's transition to democracy.

5. Impact of neo-liberalism on environmental management

The transition to democracy between 1990 and 1994 was the result not of a 'miracle' or the seizure of power, but of a negotiated settlement that involved many explicit and implicit compromises. These compromises left key elements of apartheid privilege and power intact. Overall the South African transition was characterised by accommodation and appeasement of two sets of interests - those of white power and privilege and those of domestic and international capital. It was widely believed that this pattern of appeasement was unavoidable firstly, to prevent civil war or a seizure of power by the military, and secondly, for South Africa to survive economically in the context of globalisation. 'The main political compromise eventually negotiated has to be understood as an attempt to hold it all together and avoid a Bosnia' (Interview with deputy general secretary for the South African Communist Party, Jeremy Cronin, 1998).

Yet, with time, this tactical compromise deepened into a full-scale acceptance by the ANC of neo-liberal values and policies.. This has been accompanied by a virtual abandonment of the erstwhile commitment to mass participation in policy making. In this complicated context a key challenge for civil society is to strengthen democratic practices and institutions within the post-apartheid state. This is especially true in relation to environmental issues. As Gray writes, 'Effective state institutions are needed to monitor the impact of humans on the natural environment, and to limit the exploitation of natural resources by unaccountable interests' (Gray, 1998:201). But democratisation in South Africa has coincided with a deepening process of corporate- led globalisation which has helped to erode short-lived vestiges of people's power, to strengthen the interests of an emergent elite, and to weaken the capacity of the state relative to capital and the market.

Globalisation is a very contested concept. Arundhati Roy (200 1) asks, 'is globalisation about "the eradication of world poverty" or is it a mutant variety of colonialism, remote-controlled and digitally operated?' (Roy, 2001:6) Gray maintains that behind all the various meanings of globalisation 'is a single underlying idea, which can be called de-localization: the uprooting of activities and relationships from local origins and cultures' (Gray, 1998: 57). In his analysis globalisation means a global free market which: degrades the environment, undermines democratic institutions - 'an unfettered market is incompatible with democracy', loosens social cohesion, and is driven by a technology which results in growing unemployment.

Many theorists agree that the link between globalisation and marketisation means increasing environmental degradation. As Mittelman points out, 'with hyper-competition for profits, the market is breaching nature's limits' (1998:847). 'In a world in which market forces are subject to no overall constraint or regulation, peace is continually at risk. Slash-and-burn capitalism degrades the environment, and kindles conflict over natural resources' (Gray, 1998: 196). Globalisation 'co-incides with new environmental problems such as global warming, depletion of the ozone layer, acute loss of biodiversity and forms of transborder pollution' (Mittelman, 1998: 847).

The ideological core of globalisation is a neo-liberalism which has impacted on the economic policies of the post-apartheid state. The Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) launched in June 1997 'reflects a textbook case of economic reform according to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)' (Interview with economist Stephen Gelb, 1998). The central pillars in the GEAR strategy were fashioned in accordance with standard neo-liberal economic principles - deficit reduction, trade liberalisation, privatisation, and the shrinking of the state. The post-apartheid state bought the neo-liberal argument that severe adjustments were needed to attract foreign investment which would spur growth, thereby generating a trickle-down improvement in living standards. Neo-liberal thinking is evident in the interpretation of macro-economic stability as requiring fiscal discipline, deregulation, privatisation and export- led growth. GEAR involved a voluntary form of structural adjustment. However 'there exists no example internationally where neo-liberal adjustments of the sort championed by GEAR have produced a socially progressive outcome' (Marais, 1998: 171). Under GEAR the taxation of the wealthy has declined. There has been no significant job creation; in fact jobs have declined since 1994 and poverty and inequality are deepening.

Vast racialised discrepancies in wealth and income remain with white families on average earning twelve times as much as black families and more than half of all African families living below the official poverty line. Whites still dominate middle and upper levels of the civil service and while

black ownership has been introduced in some of the country's largest conglomerates, the economy still remains in white hands. South Africa remains a highly divided society marked by extremes of privilege and deprivation. The extent of this deprivation is evident in an extensive crisis which extends into all aspects of most black South Africans' lives, for example, a housing shortage of at least 1.3 million units; poor educational services resulting in only 11% of Africans graduating from high school - the figure for whites is 70%; and the lack of basic infrastructure such as sewage systems, electricity, piped water and waste removal in many black communities.

Access to such basic infrastructure is clearly part of social citizenship, but the GEAR policy blocks the resources required to achieve this. It is a policy which demonstrates how the transformation of South Africa is constrained by the compromises which marked our negotiated settlement, and the hegemonic status of neo-liberalism.

How has GEAR impacted on environmental management? Budgets for environmental services have been cut, despite the creation of provincial departments with responsibility for environmental management. These departments have had to decrease their expenditure on areas of their responsibility such as nature conservation, resulting in great damage to the provincial conservation estate, and hence the foregoing of tourism revenues and their potential local multiplier effects.

A lack of inter-ministerial and inter-departmental co-ordination (despite the establishment of such mechanisms under NEMA, the Committee for Environmental Co-ordination) has led to the promotion of unsustainable development practices. Housing policies have replicated the worst kind of apartheid housing on an even greater scale, privatisation of waste collection entrenches former apartheid urban resource allocation, the monopoly electricity utility is encouraged to expand significantly its output of nuclear energy, and the Spatial Development Initiatives of the Department of Trade and Industry have established industrial white elephants such as the Saldanha Steel plant, the unnecessary Coega harbour, and plans for export-processing zones. Great encouragement is being given to the development of biotechnology, including the semi-secretive licencing of experimental planting of genetically modified crops without the necessary environmental and health safeguards. The state is also supporting the commercialisation of local biodiversity by foreign companies without insisting on sufficient plans for benefit sharing and the protection of community rights. In terms of land reform and restitution, the rights of poorer communities have been de-emphasised at the expense of privileging the claims of an emergent group of commercial farmers. Neo-liberal ideology militates against the expansion of the state's capacity to monitor infringements of pollution regulation and to act against polluters. Recently former mine and factory workers whose health had suffered due to direct contact with asbestos and mercury opted to litigate in British courts because they lacked confidence in the local justice system to redress their claims.

The above examples are not exhaustive. They reflect only some of the impacts of macroeconomic policy on the state of the South African environment.

6. Impact of global environmental civil society

However there is increasing resistance to these neo-liberal policies globally. This is the contradictory process at the heart of this paper. The contradiction is between on the one hand, a neo-liberal globalisation which is not only leading to increasing environmental degradation, but is eroding the capacity for collective action through an individualism which atomizes people and

which is expressed in an increasing retreat into purely private and often materialist concerns. On the other hand, collective action to promote democracy, human rights and the protection of cultural and biological diversity is growing.

The force of significant resistance was first evident in Seattle in December 1999 which brought a ministerial rneeting of the World Trade Organisation to an end. This was followed by the 12,000 protesters who met in Prague in September 2000 to object to the cornerstones of international global capitalism: the World Bank and the IMF. It was also reiterated at large scale protests at summit meetings in Quebec City (against the Free Trade Association of the Americas), in Gothenburg (against the Council of Ministers of the European Union) and in Genoa (against G7 leaders) during 2001. The Genoa protests were said to involve some 200,000 people. In South Africa the protests led by the Campaign Against Neo-Liberalism (CANSA) at the meeting of the World Economic Forum in Durban in June 2001 were a local expression of this resistance.

This resistance constitutes a form of 'globalisation from below' that is offsetting some of the current global trends which involve increasing inequality, exclusion and environmental degradation. While the concept of a 'global civil society' is highly contested, it is arguable that such a terrain is emerging marked by a transnational network of individuals and groups with a shared commitment to a broad political agenda which includes non-violence, social justice, and feminism as well as environmentalism. Falk (1992) argues that this is disseminating powerful new social identities and new images of solidarity and connectedness 'on behalf of an invisible community or polity that lacks spatial boundaries'. (Falk, 1992:224) It is based on new technologies which facilitate communication across the boundaries of space and time.

In his somewhat triumphalist account, Castells has emphasised the capacity of the environmental movement to adapt to the new technological paradigm. He views environmentalists as 'at the cutting edge of new communication technologies as organising and mobilizing tools, particularly the use of the Internet. World wide web sites are becoming rallying points for environmentalists around the world' (Castells, 1997: 129). Many environmental activists in South Africa are part of these worldwide networks which share information, provide support and reinforce common values, beliefs and purposes. They benefit from structures such as the Third World Network which is an important site for deepening public understanding of globalisation and how it is eroding the capacity of national governments like South Africa to formulate policies which in turn erode citizen participation in decision making, a process especially stark in the economic arena, epitomised by the World Trade Organisation. In addition there are significant national networks linking environmental activists. An example is the National Land Committee which services more than 726 rural communities. This organisation's capacity to communicate and share information with affiliates has been 'greatly facilitated' by the introduction of e-mail (Lebert, 2000: 13).

Despite the general demobilisation and depoliticisation of civil society, environmentalists and related activists have gained new ground in their associations with global campaigns and initiatives. It is clear that international collaboration is increasing. The siting of the World Commission on Dams in Cape Town led to the involvement of a local NGO, the Environmental Monitoring Group (EMG) in leading the worlds' NGO submissions to the commission. EMG co-ordinated global tribunals which attracted communities from around the world which had been affected by large darns. Representatives from these communities were able to bear witness to their experiences, which were entered as evidence before the World Commission.

In terms of protecting South Africa's significant biological heritage from bio-piracy (commercial appropriation without benefit to local people) and genetic pollution, South Africans have been

influenced by international campaigns launched by Genetic Resources Action International, the Third World Network and the Gaia Foundation. These organisations have long worked closely with African governments and NGOs to ensure that Africa's genetic resources remain under local control. The drawing in of South African environmentalists has led to the formation of NGOs such as Biowatch South Africa and a campaign promoting a moratorium on genetic modification, the South African Freeze Against Genetic Engineering (SAFeAGE).

Informants had contradictory views on the value of global meetings. One informant found them inspirational: 'I think its important to attend these things because it does inspire you and give you energy'. (Interview with key informant 6, August, 2001). Another informant was very negative about 'the environmental militancy' which he understood as 'a kind of new international terrorism' that emerged that these meetings (interview with John Ledger, August, 2001).

In this context it is very significant that Johannesburg won the bid to host the 'Rio + 10' conference, which has become known as the World Summit on Sustainable Development. Since the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the 'Earth Summit', at Rio de Janeiro, there is a widespread understanding that the goals of sustainable development have proved elusive. Various explanations stress a lack of resources and capacity, the lack of political will on the part of governments, and the impotence of governments in the face of many current environmental problems and macro-economic policies.

Furthermore, as Wilson and Law point out, 'The problems faced by the world in 2002 bear a striking resemblance to those faced in 1992, but in many cases they are even more serious' (Wilson and Law, 2001: 14). These problems are highlighted in Southern Africa with its pattern of deepening poverty and inequality, rising military expenditure, armed conflict and environmental deterioration 'This trend is likely to continue as long as the underlying causes - the abuse of power, inequality, and the quest for excessive profits - are further institutionalised and entrenched' (Wilson and Law, 200 1: 14).

While the agenda of the summit has not yet been determined this event in September 2002 is an important opportunity to assess and evaluate progress made over the intervening decade, including a formal review of Agenda 21. At the time of writing, a year prior to the summit, the summit had already become a focal point for regalvanising environmental interests and activism. Being the hosts of the Global NGO Forum, the South African environmental NGOs have become reanimated in their efforts to promote the alternative environmentalism described above. Under the umbrella of the South African NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) and the leadership of the Rural Development Services Network, the environmental NGOs have attempted to close ranks with the development sector. NGOs formed part of a multi-stakeholder forum which is being consulted by the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism as well as by the specially created non-profit company tasked with the organisational logistics, the Johannesburg World Summit Company.

Workshops involving national and regional (Southern and Eastern African) groupings have been held and a delegation from South Africa attended the initial preparatory conference in New York, stopping over in Rio on their return to consult with the hosts of the 1992 Global Forum. South African environmental and development NGOs are being supported in their Rio + 10 work by the Heinrich Boell Foundation of the German Green Party.

The approaching summit is also having an impact on the development of new movements, capitalising on youth energy. The Earth Justice Movement, recently formed at meetings in Cape Town and Johannesburg, has begun to attract interest in other African countries such as Ethiopia,

and to stimulate the involvement of youth from the LTK to assist South African organisations in their summit preparations. Further donor support, originating from Denmark, has been assisting in the formation of resources for public interest law firms like the Legal Resources Centre to take up environmental issues under the aegis of NEMA. In particular, pollution-blighted communities on the West Rand, a gold mining area close to Johannesburg, have required legal support to challenge mining companies and government over the continued hazard of dust from mine dumps which impacts negatively on the community's health. The resources will assist the lawyers to take on cases which will uphold the principles of NEMA to establish legal precedent, to assist community whistle-blowers, and to empower people on the ground to secure their constitutional rights of citizens to a 'safe and healthy' environment.

Anti-globalisation work around the world has focused attention on the World Trade Organisation and in particular, to the inequitable WTO Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). TRIPs has provided protection to corporate holders of patent rights at the expense of major sectors: those in need of 'essential medicines' to combat the effects of HIV/AIDS and other killer diseases; those communities whose 'traditional knowledge' is being expropriated and patented without any compensation, and those farmers whose traditional access to seed and seed exchange is being compromised by patents held by large corporations. In South Africa, the work of the Treatment Action Campaign in pressurising the government to import cheap generic retroviral medicines rather than the expensive patented versions has paid off. Pharmaceutical transnational corporations were obliged to back down in April 2001 rather than sue the state, as the result of a major protest campaign supported by Medicins sans Frontières. This campaign has underlined the necessity for the review or scrapping of the TRIPs Agreement. Medicine and seed access advocacy groups recently formed the TRIPs Action Network in Brussels on 21 March 2001 which will co-ordinate global NGO activity for the WTO to end its punitive patents policy.

Africa has played a leadership role in questioning TRIPS, calling for an end to patents on all life forms and advocating the expansion of the rights of communities and small farmers. This has taken the concrete form of the development by the Organisation of African Unity of model legislation which, so far, has been endorsed by meetings of African trade ministers (Ekpere, 2000). Since South Africa is not in agreement with the OAU model legislation, and has been a signatory to the notorious UPOV 1991 Treaty (protecting the rights of commercial plant breeders rather than communities and small farmers), it has distanced itself from a common African position and has become isolated from the Africa Group in trade negotiations at Geneva (Interview with the Geneva-based convenor of the Africa Group of Trade Negotiators, Felix Maonera, Addis Ababa, 6 May 2001). It has become a challenge for concerned South African NGOs to reverse this position, and recently an NGO trade network was founded which has demanded more access to the Department of Trade and Industry's policy formulation processes (Interview with environmentalist Jessica Wilson, convenor of the South African NGO trade network, and delegate to the first New York preparatory conference of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Cape Town, 19 June 2001).

However several informants were cynical about the potential local impact of the summit. It was wen by some as a dangerous distraction from the real work of policy implementation. For instance, 'it's wonderful that South Africa is hosting the summit, but one of our concerns is that many of the agencies from central to provincial government, down to NGOs are going to immerse themselves in this world summit and they won't get the work done that needs to be done on the

ground' (Interview with John Ledger, August, 2001). Another informant admitted that he had been seconded to spend fifty percent of his time with the Department of the Environment on the summit (Interview with Salim Fakir of the IUCN national office, August, 2001).

Preparations for the summit are causing dissension. For example, according to an informant, there are inter-sectorial squabbles forming around the event. 'Already there's infighting around the summit. The land-based NGOs and human rights and development NGOs need to work together' (Interview with environmental activist Bev Geach, August, 2001).

Others felt that the impact would be transitory. 'My concern with the summit is that: We've had enough, we've seen people come and go and they just pass our people by' (Interview with environmental activist Mandla Mentoor, August 2001).

According to Lloyd Mdakane of the secretariat preparing for South African civil society's participation in the summit, fierce debate will take place on 'the control of power, how the world is being governed, and how globalisation has become a heightened form of imperialism'. (*Mail & Guardian*, 28 September 2001). To some informants this focus on exposing the power relations dominating the globalisation process has negative connotations. For example, 'The world summit is a marvelous opportunity for people to come and bash the Americans for example and George Bush for not coming on board at Kyoto and I'm afraid that's what one has seen in Seattle and Genoa. I find that quite scary' (Interview with John Ledger, August 2001). Certainly the organisation of the summit is imposing heavy demands on already overstretched organisations and individuals.

Conclusion

Whereas in the early years of democratisation post-apartheid policy formulation emphasised transparency and participation, there is now a tendency for policy to become exclusionary. The more centralised environmental networks such as those that were active in the 1990s are no longer acting as a strong interlocutor with government. Hence, to date, the government's reversal of position has yet to be challenged by civil society.

This paper has shown that the potential to revive a somewhat dormant environmental movement has, to a significant extent, been restimulated by global-level issues and events. Anti-globalisation campaigns, the rejection of the WTO patent system the growing development of a coherent pan-African position on community rights, and global mobilisation against large dams, have all led to renewals of South African NGO environmental activism. The most significant global-level event, the hosting by Johannesburg of the World Summit for Sustainable Development in September 2002, has also served as a lodestone for galvanising new waves of NGO and CBO environmental activity.

This new wave of globally stimulated activism has in turn helped to renew confidence in initiating local campaigns. One example of this is the growing citizen mobilisations around government plans to develop a pilot Pebble Bed Modular Nuclear Reactor, sited either at Koeberg or Pelindaba, with associated problems of transporting nuclear fuel, as well as plans for the incineration of nuclear waste at Pelindaba.

South Africa needs such strong environmental initiatives with a transformative capacity, initiatives which constitute a 'network of social change with the capacity to counteract the networking logic of domination in the informational society' as Castells claims for the women's and enviromental movements globally (Castells, 1997: 326). This would involve the coherence of two movements

that in South Africa, as in other societies like the US, were historically splintered: the movement for the protection and conservation of wilderness and biodiversity, which developed quite separately from the focus on issues generated by urbanisation - issues such as clean and sufficient water, sewage and sanitation services, waste management, cheap energy, safe transport, and healthy workplaces. In his account of this splintered trajectory in the US, Gottlieb emphasises that this could lead towards an environmentalism 'that is democratic and inclusive, an environmentalism of equality and social justice, an environmentalism of linked natural and human environments, an environmentalism of transformation' (Gottlieb, 1993: 320).

If we conceptualise the environment as a political space, then environmental initiatives in civil society can be understood as a form of resistance to neo-liberal globalisation. Mittelman views the environment as representing 'a marker where, to varying degrees, popular resistance to globalization is manifest. Slicing across party, class, religion, gender, race and ethnicity, environmental politics offers a useful entry point for assessing counter-globalisation' (1998: 848). In South Africa, with its persistent inequalities, questions of class, race and gender cannot so easily be transcended. Environmental politics in South Africa needs to redress such divisions and, in doing so, retain its counter-globalising thrust.

Acknowledgement

Notes

1. The research on which this paper is based involved (i) a literature review of selected primary and secondary sources, (ii) interviews with twelve key informants selected for their expertise on environmental issues in South Africa, (iii) participant observation in various environmental initiatives.

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Susan C. Ziehl
Documenting Changing Family Patterns in South Africa: Are Census Data of any Value?

1. Introduction

A number of scholars have shown an interest in the question of whether modernization; urbanization and\or industrialization have resulted in an homogenization of family patterns in South Africa (Marwick,1978; Pauw,1973; Simkins,1986; Beittel 1992; Russell,1994; Amoateng,1997; Moller,1998). This has generally taken the form of asking whether among Black South Africans, in particular, extended family households have become less common and nuclear families more common over time. Although few of these writers actually mention the name of William Goode (1982), their work can be seen as an attempt to test (or at least respond to) his thesis that industrialization results in the simplification of household structures and a movement towards the nuclear family pattern.

One of the arguments of this paper is that the empirical bases of these studies are inadequate, either, because they do not involve longitudinal data and\or are not generalizable to South African society as a whole. Against this background, the question is posed as to whether a comparison of 1991 and 1996 census data provides more accurate information - at least for recent times. It will be pointed out that there are still significant problems around the use of census data for the identification of family patterns in this society - in particular around the question of change. Finally, the paper provides a comparison of the item on the South African census questionnaire dealing with relationships between individuals in households, with that used in other societies and asks whether a change in the wording of this item may lead to better results.

2. Previous research

While some have argued that it is politically, ideologically and\or academically incorrect to ask whether Black South Africans are moving in the direction of the nuclear family pattern (Russell,1994), this has not perturbed scholars from entertaining this question. For example, in 1961 Marwick studied a predominantly Nguni-speaking African township near Johannesburg to determine 'the changes in domestic organization that Africans undergo on moving from traditional subsistence activity to participation in modern urban industrial life' (1978:52). He concludes that his data 'has shown that the patterns of domestic organization move in the direction of those normally found in industrial societies' (1978:52). He bases this assertion on the fact that the most common household structure was the nuclear family (48%) which together with other households 'which one would expect to find among any urban dwellers' - persons living alone and couples without children - constituted 71% of all households:

> '... the shift in social composition of the domestic group has been from an extended family defined by patrilineal descent, patrivirilocal residence and polygyny to complete and incomplete forms of the nuclear family, along with a somewhat larger than normal proportion of extended families, among a few of which traditional principles of social organization have been superseded by the more elemental link between mother and child'. (1978:46).

Similarly, Pauw's study of residents of Duncan village in the 1960s showed relatively high levels

of extended family households (58%) but 12 years later when he researched the residents of Mdantsane (to which many of the Duncan Village residents had moved) he found a substantial drop in the number of multi-generational households (1973:208). In this regard, Simkins comments that 'the general hypothesis would then be that (all other things being equal) the newer the African settlement, the higher the proportion of nuclear households' (1986:28). Simkins further claims that his own calculations from the 1980 Current Population survey show very little difference in the household patterns of Blacks living in metropolitan, urban and rural areas which prompts him to conclude that:

> 'the transformation of African household structure, discussed by Marwick (1978) and Pauw (1973) in the case of urban areas, has penetrated the entire society. Simulation work suggests that this transformation had largely been complete at least as far back as 1960.' (1986:38).

Table 1

Distribution of Households by type 1980 (%)			
	Metropolitan (City)	Urban (Town)	Rural
Single Person	7%	6%	2%
Single Parent	7%	9%	8%
Nuclear	41%	43%	37%
Extended & Compound	45%	42%	53%
Source: Simkins 1986:37.(Unpublished tabulations from Current Population Survey.) (Some categories combined for presentation).			

However, the general tenure of Simkins's analysis is one of caution and uncertainty. So, for instance, he indicates that since the nuclear family concept is being challenged due to the rise in the divorce rate there is a problem 'of deciding on the pattern to which the distributions might converge' (1986:40). Indeed, he cites Burman & Fuchs (1986) who suggest that the rise of the divorce rate among Whites may result in their household structures becoming more complex. Secondly, he points out that issues around the sexual ethics of Africans are 'complex and by no means fully understood' (1986:40). More specifically, he contends that there are pressures towards the adoption of both more tolerant and stricter sexual mores which have implications for rates of illegitimacy and by extension, extended family households. To this he adds 'accordingly there are questions about the prospect of uniformity in South African household structures' (1986:40). He nevertheless offers a number of observations: (1) 'Cultural inter-penetration ... might further reduce the force of differing traditions'; (2) 'the closing of the income gap between Black and White will make smaller households - insofar as they are desired - more affordable' (3) the move towards greater private provision of housing 'will allow more scope for the realization of desired household structures' (4) the impact of the abolition of influx control on household structures is unclear but probably will not be great (1986:38-41). Simkins concludes his analysis with the following comment:

'Perhaps just over half of South African households are nuclear in structure ; most of the rest are extended or multiple[1]. If there is a trend towards the nuclear household, it is a very weak one. More complex forms will be distributed in varying measure and to a very substantial degree throughout South African society for as far ahead as one can see'. (19886:41)

Beittel (1992) has also contributed to this debate - albeit from a different angle. Taking as his main focus the question of the sources of household income, and using data on households in Soweto, Beittel claims that there has been 'no linear path of development culminating in a homogeneous mass of urban workers who are fully dependent upon wages for subsistence' (1992 :224). Rather, he claims that the development has been cyclical, with periods of economic expansion being associated with greater reliance on wages and economic stagnation or contraction with reliance on non-wage income: rent (from lodgers); market sales or trade; transfer payments (pensions for example) and subsistence (maintaining the home). Beittel is also interested in the question of household structure and claims that in this regard there has also been no general trend towards uniformity (1992:225). In the case of Whites, he asserts that the initial difference in the household composition patterns of poor and skilled whites was eliminated by the 1930s - the typical pattern being the nuclear family plus servant and very high levels of dependence (90%) on one wage. By contrast, 'among the African population one finds sharply increasing proportions of female-headed households and strong pressures toward multi-generation households' (1992:225). He bases these claims on historical sources as well as data produced by the Bureau of Market Research (BMR) on 'African multiple member households in Johannesburg from 1962 to 1985.' These show that average household size declined from 1962 to 1970; increased from 1970 to 1980 and declined thereafter (1992:218). They further show a steady increase in the proportion of female headed households as well as the proportion of 'other household members'. The latter is defined as 'relatives not the children of the "household head" and non-related household members' (1992:218).

Moller is another scholar who has taken a position with respect to this debate. Having as her main concern the well-being of the elderly, Moller makes the following comment:

'Contrary to common knowledge, the multi-generation household is not on the decline: the majority of African elderly still live with children and grandchildren ... factors such as respect for the elderly in the family setting; improved services and government transfers to elderly households, the African renaissance and demographic trends bode well for the continuity of the multigeneration household as a living arrangement of choice in future' (1998:1).

She bases this claim on a comparison of three national surveys: the Multidimensional Survey (1990); the Living Standards and Development Survey (1993) and the October Household Survey (1995) which 'indicates that the proportion of older black South Africans living in two, three and four generation households has remained fairly stable since the early nineties' (1998:4).

Table 2

Generations in Households					
Survey	One	Two	Three	Four+	Total

MDS 1990	8%	34%	57%	1%	92%
LSDS 1993	9%	30%	58%	3%	91%
OHS 1995	11%	37%	49%	3%	89%
Sources: Multidimensional Survey MDS 1990: Ferreira et al., 1992:105; LSDS 1993: Moller & Devey,1995:5; OHS 1995 database. Own calculations. In Moller,1998:4.					

By contrast, Amoateng (1997) claims that his research data support the convergence hypothesis:

> 'Survey data from an African and coloured community on the Cape Flats are used to support the thesis of convergence between black family patterns (sic) and the nuclear family patterns (sic) among their white counterparts. We find that exposure to urban-industrial conditions is generally associated with an increase in the number of nuclear family households among the two ethnic groups' (1997:22).

In particular, Amoateng's research shows that in each of the residential areas 'nuclear family households' (which includes single parent families and couple households) accounted for about two-thirds of all households - the 'traditional nuclear family' making up 54% and 44% of households in the 'coloured' and African residential areas respectively (1997:33).

Table 3

Distribution of Types of Households and Community				
Type of Household	Belhar		Mfuleni	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Nuclear Family Household	**456**	**66.38**	**103**	**62.42**
Traditional Nuclear	369 (80.92)		73 (70.87)	
Father-Child Unit	14(3.07)		10 (9.71)	
Mother-Child Unit	51(11.18)		12 (11.65)	
Couple Household	22(14.82)		8 (7.77)	
Extended Family HHS	**212**	**30.86**	**31**	**18.79**
Extended Nuclear	177 (83.49)		21 (67.74)	
Multi-generational Nuclear	17 (8.02)		5 (16.13)	
Extended Couple	18 (8.49)		5 (16.13)	
Traditional Extended	-			
Unrelated Persons	**8**	**1.16**	**10**	**6.06**
Single-Person Households	**11**	**1.6**	**21**	**12.73**
TOTAL	**687**	**100**	**165**	**100**

In sum, a number of scholars have made pronouncements on the question of whether there has been a convergence or divergence of family\household patterns in South African society. Three main positions emerge: (1) Black South Africans are increasingly approximating the nuclear family pattern (Marwick; Pauw; Amoateng); (2) Substantial differences remain and are likely to continue (Simkins; Moller & Beittel). But there is a third position which in my view is the more appropriate and that is one which says that we need to be very circumspect when we make pronouncements about how family patterns may or may not be changing - especially if our point of reference is South African society as a whole. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, with two exceptions (Simkins & Moller) only, the studies referred to above involve relatively small localized communities which makes the drawing of inferences to the population as a whole problematic. Secondly, again with two exceptions (Moller & Beittel) none of these studies are longitudinal in the sense of providing data from the *same* community at two *different* points in time. In other words the crucial ingredient for any claim about how a phenomenon (family patterns in this case) has changed, namely a 'before picture' with which to compare contemporary data, is absent. So, for instance, Marwick compares his 1961 data with Hammond-Tooke's survey of '29 homesteads among the Bhaca' conducted in 1949; the 1951 British census and a 1966 study of households in a Melbourne suburb (1978:41). Even in the case of Moller who bases her assertions on three large scale nationally representative sample surveys, the latter were conducted by three different institutions, the samples were very different in size and the method of drawing the samples also varied.

Some of these scholars readily admit the limitations of the data which they have used to support their claims. Beittel, for instance, indicates that the BMR data 'are plagued by many shortcomings' in part, because they only refer to 'multiple households' - leaving out single person households and also because they report on 'average (rather than actual) household composition' which means they 'undoubtedly conflate significant differences among quite distinct household types' (1992:228-229). It is possibly in recognition of the absence of appropriate longitudinal data on a national scale, that Simkins makes use of an urban\rural comparison in formulating his views on the changing nature of family and household structures in South African society as a whole or, as he puts it, 'universalizing' the accounts of scholars like Marwick and Pauw (Simkins,1986:28). Against this background, the question arises as to whether census data are of any value in documenting changes in the family patterns of the various communities that make up South African society. A census is (or at least aims at being) comprehensive i.e. covering the entire population and is conducted periodically (every 5 years).

But before doing so, it is important to clarify the meaning that is attached to the central concepts used in this paper. A great deal has been written on the concept of 'the family' and the necessity of defining it broadly enough so as to avoid elevating the nuclear family to the position of moral norm against which all other family types are measured. Here it is defined as a social institution comprising an ideological component and a concrete component where the former refers to a set of ideas about marriage; procreation and residence and the latter to the actual domestic arrangements (households) which people reside in. This definition is deliberately abstract in order to avoid the prescriptiveness of 'the family equals the nuclear family approach'. In this definition of the family as social institution, the specific *content* of family ideology and the actual configuration of household structures is not determined *a priori* but can be filled in after

investigation. The concept of 'the family' broadly defined is however not the main concern of this paper. Rather, what is at issue is what I have described as the concrete aspect of the family as institution (household arrangements) and more particularly the notion of family pattern. The latter in turn is defined as a series of household arrangements which individuals participate in, in the course of a life time. In other words, a family *pattern* is defined as a series of *household structures* which mark off the different phases of the domestic life cycle of individuals. For analytical purposes, two ideal types of family patterns are identified - the first is called the nuclear family *pattern* and the second the extended family *pattern*. The nuclear family pattern consists of three household types and five phases:

1. Nuclear - when ego is born
2. Couple - when ego marries
3. Nuclear -when ego has children
4. Couple - when the children leave home
5. Single person - when ego's spouse dies.

The extended family pattern consists of two household types and many more phases:

1. Extended family when ego is born
2. Nuclear family when ego's grandparents die
3. Extended family when ego marries and goes to live with her husband and his parent(s)
4. Nuclear family when ego's husband's parents die
5. Extended family when ego's son brings his wife and children to live with them

As will be noted from the above, the nuclear family household is common to both family patterns. This is why it is inappropriate to seek evidence of a community following one family *pattern* or the other, in the prevalence of nuclear family *households* alone. This is a common mistake made by researchers who see the nuclear family household as part of a domestic life cycle involving other household types, but do not acknowledge this in the case of extended family households (see Marwick and Amoateng). Similarly, it is also inappropriate to seek evidence of a *change from one family pattern to another* in the frequency with which nuclear family households occur. Rather, it is more appropriate to ask if there has been any significant change in the frequency with which other i.e. non-overlapping, household structures occur. More specifically, with respect to the convergence\divergence debate we should ask whether White South Africans who have traditionally followed the nuclear family pattern, are increasingly living in extended family households. Conversely, in the case of Black South Africans, we need to ask whether they are increasingly living in single person and\or couple households. This is the approach that will be used in the present paper.

3. Census data

The most recent South African census took place in October 1996. It was the first to be conducted within the context of a democratic South Africa and covered the entire country i.e. included the former homeland areas (Transkei; Bophutatswana and Venda). The results met with a fair deal of controversy. This was mainly around the question of the total number of individuals

enumerated. A Post-Enumeration survey was conducted in November 1996 and the numbers adjusted accordingly. The size of the total population was increased to 40 583 573 (Statistics SA,1996:4).

Like other census questionnaires, the 1996 one contained an item on the number of individuals in households as well as the relationship between household members and the 'head of the household'. The latter was defined as 'the person who assumes responsibility for the household' (Statistics S.A., n.d:7) (Enumerator's Manual). The options given for the question of relationship to household head were:

1. Head/acting head
2. Husband/wife/partner
3. Son/daughter/stepchild/adopted child
4. Brother/sister
5. Father/mother
6. Grandparent
7. Grandchild
8. Other relative (e.g. in-laws)
9. Non-related person

Statistics South Africa (SSA) analysed and made public the data on the number of individuals in households as well as the number of individuals who were classified in each of the above categories. In other words, the number of household heads; number of spouses\partners etc. It did not, however, analyse the data in terms of the actual structure of households. Below I present these data and ask if they are useful in illustrating the differences in the family patterns followed by Black and White South Africans. This is followed by a discussion of their utility in documenting any changes that may be taking place with respect to family patterns.

3.1 Documenting Difference:

Table 4

HOUSEHOLD SIZE BY RACE S.A. Census 1996				
Number of People	African		White	
	N	%	N	%
1	1125533	17.23	276609	18.66
2	988104	15.12	446881	30.14
3	891923	13.65	262739	17.72
4	881078	13.48	277212	18.70
5	763258	11.68	136583	9.21
6	596830	9.13	52124	3.52
7	430192	6.58	18474	1.25

8	300096	4.59	6969	0.47
9	323337	4.95	4134	0.28
10+	233648	3.58	767	0.05
Total	6 533 999	99.99	1 482 492	100

Table 4 provides data on the differences in the size of households. It indicates that households consisting of 4 or less persons are more common among Whites than Blacks - the opposite being true of households containing 5 or more individuals. Since extended family households are larger than single person and couple households and usually larger than nuclear family households, these data provide some support for the claim that Black and White South Africans follow different family patterns. However, data on household size is of limited value in documenting family patterns since the larger size of Black households could be an indication of higher levels of fertility rather than differences in household structures *per se.* So, for instance, a household of 6 people could consist of a married couple with four children or a three-generational extended family. Similarly, a household of 3 people could consist of a woman; her daughter and grandchild or a married couple with one child. In other words, there is no necessary connection between the size and structure of households.

Table 5

Relationship to Household Head (Individuals) S.A. Census 1996						
Total	Black	'Coloured'	Asian	White	Unspecified	Total
Head of household	22.2	23.85	23.9	34.76	16.77	23.49
Husband/wife/partner	9.53	14.87	18.6	24.56	10.94	11.86
Son/daughter	40.42	41.35	42.4	32.29	39.31	39.67
Brother/sister	4.09	2.07	1.99	0.92	2.48	3.5
Father/mother	1.17	0.82	2.11	1.39	1.21	1.19
Grandparent	0.7	0.23	0.34	0.2	0.54	0.59
Grandchild	13.43	10.18	4.59	1.15	10.28	11.57
Other relative	3.72	4.71	4.95	1.54	3.88	3.61
Non-related person	1.78	3.02	0.86	2.68	9.39	2.03
Unspecified	2.96	1.01	0.34	0.51	5.19	2.48
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 5 provides data on the proportion of individuals who were classified in one or other of the categories for relationship to household head. It shows that over 13% of Black children were living in households headed by a grandparent compared with less than 2% in the case of Whites. But once again, these data provide only limited evidence of the different family patterns followed by the various population groups since differences in fertility may also play a role here; there are numerous problems around the question of headship (see later) and the unit of analysis in this instance is the individual rather than the household. Conversely, in the case of Table 4, the unit of analysis is the household but we are only given information on the *number* of people in households rather than *their relationship*. How then do we obtain census data on the actual structure of households i.e. where the unit of

analysis is the household and the information pertains to the relationship between household members?

This has required a special request on my part to Statistics South Africa and many months of email communication during which I, at times, received data that can only be described as meaningless. Eventually, it emerged that a special programme had to be written to 'marry' two data sets that are usually kept separate: data pertaining to households (where information on household size and other 'household variables' is located) and data pertaining to individuals (where information on relationship to household head is located). I am extremely grateful to Piet Alberts and Wanda Steyn at Statistics South Africa for the effort they put into identifying the problem and finding a solution to it. The process involved, *inter alia*, identifying a number of categories of household structure and determining the number of *households* that fell into each of the categories[2]. Household structure was operationalised as follows: Households consisting of:

1 A head only (single person) (1);
2. A head and spouse\partner only (couple household) (1&2);
3. A head; spouse\partner and child\ren only (nuclear family) (1,2&3);
4. A head plus child\ren only (single parent household) (1&3);
5. A head; spouse; child\ren & grandchild\ren (extended family household) (1,2,3&7) etc.

Initially we made use of 12 categories (as indicated in Table 6(a) in Appendix) but this proved problematic since about a quarter of all households fell into the 'missing values' category. There were two reasons for this: in some questionnaires the relationship to household head was not indicated (this can be called the non-response category) in others, the combination of relationship between household members was not covered by the original categories. The number of categories were then increased to 25 - primarily to take account of households with a basic structure and indicated in the first categorisation plus an 'additional relative'. In this way the proportion of missing values were reduced in the case of Black South Africans to less than 1% and unspecified to less than 14% (see Table 6b). By combining household structures that seem to go together e.g. nuclear family plus brother\sister and nuclear family plus 'other relative' the 25 categories in Table 6b have subsequently been reduced to 10. Table 7 below provides the data from this analysis and compares Black\African and White households[3].

Table 7

Household Structure South African Census 1996 Blacks and White		
Relationship to head of household	Black	White
Head living on his/her own	16.97%	17.88%
Head and spouse	7.14%	22.99%
Head, spouse and children	19.75%	31.31%
Nuclear Family & other relatives	7.20%	3.45%
Head and children	14.53%	5.03%
Head, Children and\or grandchild & other relatives	14.43%	1.12%

Head & other relative	4.52%	1.42%
Head & non-relative	2.10%	5.08%
Unspecified	13.32%	7.61%
Missing value	0.05%	4.12%
Total	100.00%	100.00%
Own calculations from data provided by Statistics S.A.		

The first noticeable feature of this comparison is the marked similarity in the proportion of single person households (head living on his\her own). There are special reasons for this, which I will visit later. The second noticeable feature is that in the case of Whites, three phases of the nuclear family patterns as described earlier account for over 72% of all households whereas this applies to only 44% of Black households. This finding clearly suggests that, on the whole, Black South Africans do not follow the nuclear family *pattern* whereas Whites do. Additional evidence of this can be found in marked difference in the proportion of 'head and spouse' households. As I and others have argued elsewhere, it is extremely unusual for Black married couples to live on their own - either before the birth of children or once children have married and\or had children of their own (Manona,1988; Ziehl,1997). This is a crucial feature of the nuclear family pattern which is established by the rule of neolocalism i.e. that a couple sets up a home independent of either sets of parents upon marriage. Do these data indicate that Black South Africans follow the extended family pattern? The answer to this is less clear-cut. Comparing the data to the description of the extended family pattern made previously, it emerges that only a minority of Black households (between 30 and 40%) fall into the nuclear family and extended family household categories (i.e. nuclear family plus grandchildren of the head or nuclear family plus parent\s of the head). There are a number of reasons for this. The first is that many of the households under 'unspecified' could be extended family households. If we add these to the percentages already mentioned, we are brought to a figure of 50% of Black households falling within one of the phases of the extended family pattern (more or less as described earlier). This could be a 'real finding' i.e. a reflection of real life experiences, or a function of the inadequacies of the options given on the census questionnaire regarding the relationship between individuals in households. So, for instance, it is impossible to determine whether an 'other relative' is the spouse of a head's child (in-law) or a niece; cousin etc. Moreover, as noted before there are also major methodological problems around the question of headship that need serious attention if census data is going to be of any use in documenting family patterns in South Africa. The most we can say on the basis of the census data presented here is a negative statement to the effect that Black South Africans generally do not follow the nuclear family pattern.

3.2 Documenting Change

When discussing the use of census data in relation to the convergence\divergence debate (i.e. whether Black South Africans are increasingly approximating the nuclear family model and\or White South Africans the extended family model), I will use the same procedure as under 3.1. In other words I will start with the data analysed and published by SSA and then my own calculation of the relationship between individuals in households.

A crucial ingredient in support of any claim with respect to how family patterns have or have not changed over time is longitudinal data i.e. data taken from the same community at two different points in time. In theory, census data is longitudinal and comprehensive. Table 8 presents data from

the 1991 and 1996 censuses on household size. It would appear from this comparison that there has been a massive increase in the number of one-person households amongst Blacks from 1991 to 1996. There are two reasons why such a conclusion would be premature or inaccurate. Firstly, the 1991 census excluded the former homeland areas whereas the 1996 census covered the entire country. The empirical\geographic bases of these censuses are therefore different making any comparison problematic. But secondly, and more importantly, in the 1991 census domestic workers living on the property of their employers were classified alongside their employers' households; in 1996 they were classified as separate households[4]. This is probably the major reason for the increase in single person households and the data in Table 8 cannot be used to make any claims about whether or not Black South Africans are moving away form the extended family pattern.

Table 8

HOUSEHOLD SIZE BY POPULATION GROUP 1991 and 1996				
Number of People	Black		White	
	1991	1996	1991	1996
	%	%	%	%
1	6.89	17.23	15.22	18.66
2	11.46	15.12	25.27	30.14
3	13.48	13.65	17.41	17.72
4	14.95	13.48	18.73	18.7
5	14.16	11.68	12.57	9.21
6	18.69	9.13	8.3	3.52
7	5.49	6.58	1.36	1.25
8 +	14.87	13.12	1.14	0.8
Total	100	100	100	100

The only other avenue available to us is to focus solely on 1996 census data and compare households in rural and urban areas. Table 9(a) provides such a comparison. It shows that households containing 4 or less people are more common in the urban than non-urban areas while the opposite is true of households of 5 or more individuals. This can be seen as evidence of the claim that urbanization is associated with a reduction in the size of households and possibly the adoption of the nuclear family pattern. However, as noted earlier, size is not the same as structure.[5]

Table 9(a)

HOUSEHOLD SIZE BY URBAN\RURAL & POPULATION GROUP				
Number of People	African		White	
	Non-Urban	Urban	Non-Urban	Urban
1	13.68%	20.29%	13.31%	19.12%
2	11.91%	18.16%	34.16%	29.73%
3	12.26%	15.14%	18.32%	17.67%

4	13.33%	13.80%	18.36%	18.73%
5	12.70%	11.04%	9.83%	9.16%
6	10.75%	7.72%	3.73%	3.51%
7	8.17%	5.03%	1.24%	1.26%
8	5.90%	3.25%	0.48%	0.48%
9	6.55%	3.25%	0.40%	0.28%
10+	4.76%	2.32%	0.16%	0.06%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

What then of comparing 1996 census data on household structure with data from previous censuses? There are two problems with this. Firstly, data on household structure from the 1991 census were not analysed or published. To some extent, this is not surprising given that the possible response categories were not coded. Secondly, even if they were and the analysis had been done, there would be problems of comparison given the different geographical bases of the censuses. The only previous census for which data on 'household' (called family) structure was analysed and published is the 1970 one. However, here there are even more problems since the unit of analysis here was 'the family' (in fact the nuclear family) and not the household as such and Blacks were excluded completely (see Simkins, 1986 & Ziehl 1997, for a discussion of the limitations of 1970 census data on 'families' and Table 10 in appendix).

We therefore turn to a consideration of 1996 census data which compares household structures in urban and non-urban areas. The data in Table 11 shows that households associated with the nuclear family pattern are more common in the urban than non-urban areas (a difference of 17% in the case of Blacks). But again caution is advised since a large proportion of the single person households - especially in the urban areas - are probably domestic workers and there is a major difference between this kind of single person household and one that follows the death of a spouse or occurs between leaving the parental home and getting married. We need to know a lot more about these single person households (age; marital status for example) before we can say that they do or do not fall within the nuclear family pattern as described earlier. We are therefore forced to rely on the data pertaining to couple households (head & spouse\partner) since it is the only remaining non-overlapping household structure. In other words, it is integral to the nuclear family pattern and not the extended family pattern. In this regard, the data show that couple households are almost twice as common in the urban than non-urban areas in the case of Blacks. It is also noteworthy that single parent households (head & child\ren) and extended single parent households plus other relatives (head, child, grandchild and other relatives) are significantly more common in non-urban compared to urban areas (18% vs 11% in both cases). Given the format in which the data has been made available, the data on the 'couple household' is the only reasonably sound evidence of a move from the extended to the nuclear family pattern associated with urbanisation.

Table 11

Household Structure South African Census 1996 Blacks and Whites by Urban\Rural

	Black		White	
Relationship to head of household	Urban	Non-Urban	Urban	Non-Urban
Head living on his/her own	20.69%	13.41%	18.32%	13.35%
Head and spouse	9.80%	4.59%	22.24%	30.71%
Head, spouse and children	22.02%	17.58%	30.73%	37.17%
Nuclear Family & other relatives	7.13%	7.27%	3.41%	3.72%
Head and children	11.31%	17.61%	5.21%	3.22%
Head, Children and\or grandchild & other relatives	10.55%	18.18%	1.14%	0.84%
Head & other relative	4.89%	4.14%	1.46%	1.17%
Head & non-relative	2.45%	1.76%	5.29%	2.98%
Unspecified	11.09%	15.45%	7.73%	6.45%
Missing value	0.07%	0.02%	4.48%	0.36%
Total	100.00%	100.00%		
Own calculations from data provided by Statistics S.A..				

4. Going Forward

The general tenor of the above discussion is that census data is of limited value in documenting any changes that may or may not be taking place with respect to family patterns. This section discusses some of the major problems and makes recommendations for future research.

4.1 Household Head

If the concept of 'household' is a problematic one, the notion of 'household head' is even more so. Since the first item on the census questionnaire requires the details of the household head (or acting head), it can only be assumed that the first question an enumerator asks of the person who opens the door of the dwelling is 'who is the head of this household?' In everyday language, the notion of 'head' carries the meaning of 'the person in charge', a control centre, a position of power and\or authority. But whereas it may be relatively easy to identify the person who is head of a bank or a head of state, it is not at all evident that this is the case in families. Indeed, it is unlikely that all members of a household would agree on who the head is. Against this background, the much documented and discussed increase in 'female headed households' could be a function of an increasing tendency on the part of women to identify themselves as household heads rather than an increase in households headed by 'husbandless' women. At the very least, this could be one of the factors behind that trend. But there are also other meanings that could be attached to this concept. The head could be the person who owns the dwelling; earns the highest income; pays most or all of the rent; has been an occupant of the dwelling the longest. Therefore, depending on the specific meaning which the respondent attaches to this concept, a different person's information will be entered in column 1. Identifying 'the correct person' person as the head of a household may be of little significance when it comes to counting the total population or determining the size of households. But it is of great significance in attempts to determine the structure of households where it is useful to have a

consistent reference point for making sense of data on the relationship between household members. In none of the census questionnaires of other societies that I have at my disposal, is the notion of household head used. Rather, as can be noted from the excerpts below, there is a tendency to favour the instruction that the details of 'an adult' be entered on the first line.

Instruction in other census questionnaires:

French: 'Inscrivez sur la 1re ligne l'un des conjoints d'un couple (et, sur la 2e ligne, l'autre conjoint) ou, a defaut, l'un des adultes habitant dans le logement'. ('On the first line, write the name of one of the spouses (and, on the second, the other spouse) or, if not applicable, indicate the name of one of the adults living in this dwelling'. Options not coded.

Australian: 'Enter the householder or any adult household member as 'Person 1', and if present, the spouse or partner as 'Person 2.'

Canada: 'List below all persons who usually live here, at this address, as of 15,May,2001, even if they are temporarily away. Don't forget to include yourself. Begin the list with an adult followed, if applicable, by that person's spouse or common-law partner ... Children should be listed immediately after their parent(s)'.

United States: 'Please answer the following questions for each person living in this house, apartment, or mobile home. Start with the name of one of the people living here who owns, is buying, or rents this house, apartment, or mobile home. If there is no such person, start with any adult living or staying here'.

England: 'List all members of your household who usually live at this address, including yourself. Start with the Householder or Joint Householders'.

Germany: 'Ab der nachsten Seite richten sich Fragen an alle Personen im Haushalt. Tragen Sie zunachst oben auf der ausklappbaren Lasche die Namen aller Personen, die am 25 April 2001 zu Ihrem Haushalt gehorten, in der folgenden Reihenfolge ein: Ehegatten, Kinder, Verwandte, sontige Personen'. ('On the next page answer the questions for all persons in the household. ... first open the flap and indicate the names of all individuals who, on April 25 2001, belonged to this household, in the following order: Spouse, Children, Relative, other person'.)

Italian: 'Nell'elencare le singole persone della famiglia, deve essere scrupolosamente osservato il seguente ordine:
- Intestatario del foglio di famiglia (indicare preferibilmente la persona a cui e intestata la scheda di famiglia anagrafe);
- Coniuge o convivente coniugalmente con 'intestatario del foglio di famiglia ....' ('When listing the individuals in the family, the following order should be strictly followed:
- Holder (head?) of the family form (preferably indicate the person who is the holder\head? on the card at the family registry'.

As can be noted, with the exception of England (where only 'householder' is used); Germany and

Italy, there is a tendency to ask that the details of any adult be entered first, either as a first or second option. But while this (an adult) is an improvement on the 'head' concept (being somewhat less subjective), it is not necessarily best suited to an African society where a large percentage of households include adults of different generations. Obtaining a consistent reference point for generating data on household structure will therefore not necessarily be obtained in this way. Rather, my recommendation for future censuses is that the first instruction be that the details of *the oldest individual* who was present in the household on census night, be entered in column 1. This is not only less subjective than the headship notion but means that the number of categories that need to be provided as possible answers to the relationship question, is reduced (e.g. no need for 'parent' or 'grandparent'). It is to the question of the categories used in the coding of responses that I now turn.

4.2 Categories

One of the reasons it has been so difficult to identify household structures from the data on 'relationship to household head' is that the categories are ill-suited for the identification of households other than the conventional nuclear family and the two additional phases of the nuclear family pattern. Firstly, there is no specific category for 'foster child' and since fostering is a common practice in African societies and is one of the ways in which families become 'extended', this needs attention. However, it is not at all evident that this concept should be used since 'fostering' has very different connotations in Western as opposed to African societies. In the former case the foster child is usually a stranger (non-relative) whereas in the African setting it is usually a relative - niece or nephew of one of the adults in the household. Moreover, some adults may regard the individual as simply 'a child' rather than a 'foster child' of the household. Introducing a new category called 'foster child' will therefore not necessarily solve the problem of identifying the actual (kin) relationship between household members. I will propose a different solution below.

Similarly, the child category includes step-children and adopted children. This means that it is impossible to identify complex family situations arising from divorce or death from the data available. That is, to distinguish between first time married couples living with their biological children from what I have called 'remarriage families' where one of the spouses has been married before or an 'adoptive family'.

Thirdly, the 'other relative' category is too broad. Included in this category (technically speaking) would be foster children; brothers- and sisters-in-law; parents-in-law; cousins (first and second); nieces and nephews etc. However, if we wish to identify an extended family from this categorisation we need to be able to distinguish between daughters- and sons-in-law on the one hand and parents-in-law, on the other. If, for example, we wanted to identify a three-generational extended family from this categorisation where the 'head' is a member of the oldest generation we could find the head (1); the head's spouse (2); child (3) and grandchild (7) but not the child's spouse (son-in-law or daughter-in-law) as these are subsumed under the 'other relative' category alongside cousins etc. as mentioned above. Similarly, if the head is in the middle generation, and the older generation is made up of his\her spouse's parents we need to be able to distinguish between 'parent\s-in-law' and other relatives which, given the present categorisation, is not possible. It is therefore recommended that some of the relationships included under 'other relative' become categories on their own. However, it is not recommended that the wording 'in-law' be retained.

One of the points of debate around the question of how Black families may or may not be changing has been the claim that there may be a move away from patrilineality as the basis for household

formation in favour of matrilineality (see Marwick above). In other words, the question has been whether extended households are formed when a son brings his wife into the household containing his parent\s or a daughter brings her husband into the household. In the first instance, the youngest generation (grandchildren) is related to the oldest generation through the male line and in the second through the female line. It has further been argued that high rates of illegitimacy are responsible for the move towards matrilineality (or an adapted form thereof). Here, an extended family would be formed when a daughter remains in the parental home with her child\ren but no spouse. To determine whether this trend is indeed occurring, we would need to distinguish between a daughter and a daughter-in-law, son and son-in-law. But the 'in-law' concept is part of the discourse associated with the Western (as opposed to African) family system and, as such, will not necessarily be meaningful to a large section of the South African population. It is therefore recommended that separate categories be created, not only for sons and daughters but for 'son's wife' and 'daughter's husband'. It could be argued that disaggregating the categories in this manner will result in too many categories. However, given my initial recommendation that the concept of 'head' be replaced with 'oldest member of the household', this problem can be avoided to some extent.

Using this approach, the following categories are recommended after the question: "How is this person (i.e. person 2,3,4 etc) related to person 1?":

1. Husband\wife
2. Daughter
3. Daughter's husband
4. Daughter's child.
5. Son
6. Son's wife
7. Son's child
8. Brother\sister
9. Brother's child
10. Sister's child
11. Other relative (please specify) ....

4.3 Problems with recording the data

Since a census is a massive undertaking, it is to be expected that a large number of errors will be made in recording the data. Cross-tabulation of 'relationship to household head' and age, revealed that this is indeed the case. It emerged that there were more than 32 000 heads under the age of 5 years; more than 25 000 aged 5-9; almost 34 000 between the ages of 10 and 14 etc. Similarly, there were thousands of grandparents under the age of 5 and grandchildren aged 80 years or more. These are clearly errors either in the recording of the data on the census questionnaire or of data input. Others could be due to a failure to distinguish between the respondent and the head or acting head of the household, i.e. the person who happened to be at home when the enumerator visited the dwelling or the most literate person in the household as opposed to the 'head of the household'. Indeed, this is likely to be the case in South Africa where illiteracy rates are the highest among the older generation. But how does one deal with these errors? Does one just eliminate the 250 000 records that appear to be mistakes on the grounds that they represent only a small percentage of all cases (less than 3% in the case of household heads)? What then of the 3% of household head aged

over 80 years? Are they also to be eliminated? In social scientific research, the appropriate procedure would be to check for errors of data-input by revisiting the relevant questionnaires. However, given the large number of records involved, this is clearly not feasible in the case of census data.

4.4 Quo Vadis ?

A census is undertaken by a government for its own purposes. In the case of South Africa, these have been to determine the size of the population; its distribution between the provinces and various indicators of poverty (socio-economic status) that can be used to monitor the Reconstruction and Development Programme. Against this background the question of family\household structure has not enjoyed a high priority.[6] Moreover, in third world societies in particular, censuses are conducted within the context of financial and political constraints. An example of the latter would be the instruction to Statistics South Africa only to use unemployed individuals as field workers.

Given the above, it is recommended that the question of documenting changes in the family\household structures of South Africans be taken up by the Social Scientific community. More specifically, it is suggested that a family research project be undertaken with the following characteristics:

1. It should be led by a team of Anthropologists and Sociologists who are knowledgeable and have experience in the field of family studies;
2. It should include a survey based on a nationally representative sample of South African households;
3. The questionnaire should have as its prime focus the question of household structure;
4. The response options on the questionnaire should be geared towards the identification of extended family households in particular;
5. The domestic life cycle of a nationally representative sample of individuals should be documented;
6. Only well-trained field workers with first hand knowledge of the kinship systems as well as the language of the particular community in which they are deployed, should be used and
7. Sufficient funding be made available to adequately compensate those involved in the project.

5. Conclusion

While the gist of this paper has been that there are a number of problems with the use of census data for the identification of family patterns in South Africa, this should not be taken to mean that they are of no use at all. Indeed, as has been shown above, the comparison of Black and White household structures using data from the 1996 census shows that these two communities follow significantly different family patterns. On the question of change or whether there has been a convergence of family patterns, the data are less useful, but they do show that in the case of the Black community, couple households are more common in the urban than non-urban areas - a finding which supports the view that urbanisation is associated with the adoption of the nuclear family pattern.

It has furthermore been argued that there are significant problems around the use of the concept of household head and the specific categories of 'relationship to household head' which presently appear on the census questionnaire. Alternatives have been suggested and while these may also be problematic in some respects, they are at least offered as a starting point for a discussion of how census and survey questionnaires can be modified to provide more accurate data on the actual configuration of household structures in South Africa and how these may be changing. Census-type data will never provide a complete picture of the family life experiences of individuals in any society

and, as such, need to be complemented by smaller scale in-depth analyses of specific communities as well as studies of the domestic life cycles of specific individuals. However, at present, the census remains the only source of nationally-representative data on household structures in South Africa.

Notes

1. Simkins defines an extended family household as consisting of 'one family nucleus plus at least one other relative (such as a grandmother or an uncle)' and a 'multiple family household' as having 'at least two family nuclei, with or without extensions'.
2. Since data on the relationship between people in households was regarded as an 'individual' rather than a 'household' variable; the former had to be brought over and matched with the 'household data'.
3. The main focus of this discussion will be a comparison of Black and White households. However, where the data for the other population groups have been analysed, they will also be provided. Statistics South Africa notes that it 'has continued to classify people into population group, since moving away from past apartheid-based discrimination, and monitoring progress in development over time, involves measuring differences in life circumstances by population group' (SSA,1996:np). The categories used as Black\African; Asian\Indian; 'Coloured'; White and 'Unspecified'. In the latter case the person did not wish to describe themselves in terms of any population group or race.
4. I am grateful to Wanda Steyn and Piet Alberts for this information.
5. There is only one exception here and that is the single person household where size does correspond to structure (there is one position and one person).
6. This may be changing as evidence is sought for the claim that Aids is resulting in a massive increase in 'children-headed households'. What is disconcerting, though, is that the raw figures in Table 12 may already be used for this purpose.

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Appendix

Table 6a

Household Structure S.A. Census 1996 All Population Groups						
	Black	'Coloured'	Indian	White	Unspec.	Total
Head living on his/her own	16.99	8.26	5.55	18.63	15.37	16.2
Head and spouse/ partner	7.14	8.09	8.02	23.89	9.24	9.98
Head and spouse/ partner and children	19.76	35.41	45.92	32.78	28.63	23.89
Head and children	14.54	8.76	7.44	5.28	9.54	12.3
Head, children and grandchildren	6.75	4.46	1.24	0.29	3.48	5.32
Head, children and parents	0.55	0.39	0.53	0.34	0.49	0.5
Head and spouse/partner, children and parents	0.34	0.75	2.57	1.08	0.8	0.55
Head and spouse/ partner, children, grandchildren	3.63	5.38	1.79	0.62	2.63	3.22
Head and other relatives	1.05	0.53	0.36	0.2	0.58	0.84
Head and non -relatives	1.25	1.23	0.66	2.81	3.87	1.5
Head and grandchildren	2.58	0.95	0.27	0.16	1.32	1.98
Missing value	25.42	25.79	25.64	13.93	24.04	23.72
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Own calculations from data provided by Statistics South Africa.						

Table 6b

Household Structure (2) S.A. Census 1996 (Blacks Only)

Relationship to head of household	Number	Percent	
Head living on his/her own	1107519	16.97%	16.97%
Head and spouse	465820	7.14%	7.14%
Head, spouse and children	1289257	19.75%	19.75%
Head ,spouse, children, sister/brother	63986	0.98%	
Head, spouse children, other relatives	110084	1.69%	
Head, spouse, children and parents	22021	0.34%	
Head, spouse, children and grandchildren	237146	3.63%	
Head, spouse, child, grandchild and other relatives	36791	0.56%	7.20%
Head and children	948682	14.53%	14.53%
Head,children and grandchildren	440592	6.75%	
Head, children and parents	35985	0.55%	
Head, children, sister/brother	99367	1.52%	
Head, children, other relatives	96909	1.48%	
Head and grandchildren	168550	2.58%	
Head, children, grandchildren, an other relatives	73828	1.13%	
Head, grandchild and other relatives	27569	0.42%	14.43%
Head and brother/sister	190420	2.92%	
Head and grandparent	2834	0.04%	
Head and father/mother	16005	0.25%	
Head, and other relatives	68350	1.05%	
Any H/H containing head, grandparent and other relatives	16828	0.26%	4.52%
Head, and non-relatives	81381	1.25%	1.25%
Any H/H containing a non-relationship to head	55430	0.85%	0.85%
Unspecified	869300	13.32%	13.32%
Missing value	3106	0.05%	0.05%
Total	6527761	100.00%	100.01%

Table 9(b)

	Coloured		Indian		Unspecified	
	Non-Urban	Urban	Non-Urban	Urban	Non-Urban	Urban
1	12.78%	6.97%	7.70%	5.44%	5.88%	8.38%
2	17.29%	12.54%	13.87%	12.60%	8.87%	13.70%
3	17.93%	15.74%	16.62%	17.30%	11.76%	16.18%
4	17.60%	19.81%	19.36%	25.07%	13.76%	18.78%
5	13.31%	16.73%	17.52%	19.48%	14.68%	16.96%
6	8.38%	10.97%	10.88%	10.70%	11.85%	9.92%
7	4.93%	6.66%	5.99%	4.99%	8.98%	5.83%
8	2.99%	4.12%	3.13%	2.29%	7.06%	3.66%
9	2.80%	3.76%	2.92%	1.61%	7.90%	3.27%

10+	1.99%	2.71%	2.00%	0.51%	9.27%	3.32%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Source: Own calculations from data provided by Statistics South Africa.						

Table 10

COMPARISON OF 'FAMILIES' IN SOUTH AFRICA -1970			
FAMILY TYPE	ASIANS	'COLOUREDS'	WHITES
Husband and Wife	9.2%	10.7%	24.7%
Father, Mother and Children	77.4%	69.1%	68.2%
Father and Children	2.4%	3.0%	1.0%
Mother and Children	11.1%	17.2%	6.1%
TOTAL:	100%	100%	100%
Average Family Size	5	5.2	3.7
* Multi-occupancy rate	1.432	1.192	1.073
Source: 1970 Population Census in Simkins,1986:33-35. * Number of 'families' per household; Simkins' calculation (1986).			

Table 12: Age of Heads of Households. Total Population

Age	Number	Percent
37290	32 264	0.34%
37384	25 469	0.27%
37542	33 764	0.36%
15-19	154 335	1.65%
20-24	495 309	5.30%
25-29	924 786	9.89%
30-34	1 185 102	12.67%
35-39	1 228 663	13.14%
40-44	1 097 082	11.73%
45-49	922 613	9.87%
50-54	727 883	7.78%
55-59	642 491	6.87%
60-64	551 074	5.89%
65-69	494 285	5.29%
70-74	315 660	3.38%
75-79	244 727	2.62%

80-84	103 884	1.11%
85+	172 661	1.85%
Unspecified	-	
Total	9 352 052	100.00%

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ADDRESS
Challenging Subjects: Gender and Power in African Contexts

Plenary Address, Nordic Africa Institute Conference: 'Beyond Identity: Rethinking Power in Africa', Upsala, October 4-7th 2001

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>*"What is certain is that 'normality' cannot be separated from the hierarchization of identities. The great hegemonic, rational, political-philosophical mechanisms are precisely what fabricate normality, with the consent of the group concerned" (Etienne Balibar 1998: 777)*

There is no word for 'identity' in any of the African languages with which I can claim any degree of familiarity. Perhaps there is good reason for this. In English the word 'identity' implies a singular, individual subject with clear ego boundaries. In Africa, if I were to generalise, ask a person who he or she is and his and a name will quickly be followed by a qualifier, a communal term that will indicate ethnic or clan origins (See Omoregbe 1999:6). To this day, African bureaucracies use forms which require the applicant (for a passport, a driving license, to gain to access to public education, housing or health services) to specify 'tribe'.

The idea of identity is an interesting one to most Africans, largely because it has remained so vexed. We seem to be constantly seeking the integrity and unity that the notion implies, without succeeding in securing it, or coming to terms with it. We are being asked to think 'beyond identity', when for many of us, identity remains a quest, something in-the-making. I think that the reason that African thinkers - or indeed other postcolonial subjects - may balk at the prospect of working 'beyond identity' is clear. It relates to the contentious nature of the term in our upbringing, as a site of oppression and resistance. We recall distasteful colonial impositions that *told* us who we were: a race of kaffirs, natives, negroes and negresses.

Speaking for myself, I must say that I was not much aware of these things growing up in a postcolonial city inhabited by people from all over the world: Lebanese, Syrians and Egyptian business people and professionals, Indian doctors, Pakistani teachers, Englishmen, Scotsmen, and Irish nuns, Italian construction engineers, Japanese industrialists, Chinese oil workers, and a fair representation of Nigeria's many ethnic groups, Muslims and Christians. There were differences, true, but I recall learning to eat with chopsticks, to make fresh pasta, and appreciate good coffee at an early age, alongside all the usual West African cultural details.

I seem to recall that I 'grew' a more specifiable 'identity' only when I was sent away to school in Europe by parents hoping to protect me from the horrors of the Biafran civil war, which after all, started in Kaduna in 1966. I developed an awareness of my difference, my Other-ness, when I was far away from home, family and the cosmopolitan community I had known. It was in an English boarding school that I was first compelled to claim and assert an identity, if only to correct the

daily nonsense that I was subjected to by teachers who were often as parochial as my peers. Maybe the support system 'back home' had been unrealistically reassuring, but we had been raised to assume that we were 'citizens of the world' in a world that now turned out to be deeply divided. In England, these cosmopolitan wings were clipped down to more parochial size, insofar as I was now reduced to being a 'coloured girl' or a 'black', to be treated variously as though I was an orphan, a refugee or an immigrant. Furthermore assumed to have an 'identity problem'. It is possible that this formative experience gave rise to my longstanding interest in working on the subject of identity.

It was on my many visits and eventual return to Africa that I gradually realised the nature of the problem. Not only is there no all-encompassing concept for identity in much of Africa, but there is no substantive apparatus for the production of the kind of singularity that the term seemed to require. The petty bureaucratic insistence on tribal and racial markers, our new flags and anthems, and even the grand national stadiums and basilicas could not and still cannot be compared to the imperial administrative and ideological apparatus that lay behind the production of English culture, and its more encompassing political front, British identity. So how was British-ness produced?

Perhaps we should recall that these European psychotechnologies have been implicitly designed to serve the administrative, bureaucratic selection and social control needs of late capitalist welfare states (Donzelot 1980, Rose 1985). The focus on mental measurement, was motivated by the administrative need to find ways of distinguishing between those who were 'fit' from those who were 'unfit', initially for military purposes (Rose 1985). Later selection and testing was turned to civilian application, in differentiating 'the deserving' from 'the undeserving' poor, as a means of determining whether individuals would be entitled to work, welfare, education, health, residence permits, or not. Petty bureaucrats were thus providing with gatekeeping devices that were always heavily imbued with racism and sexism. In the colonies, the same tools were deployed in the selection of a suitably fit yet docile, exclusively male labour force, suited to the dangers of deep shaft mining and the like (Bulhan 1981). Given that the centuries-old technologies of the self[1] and the nation have been developed in such close liaison with the twin projects of industrial capitalist development and imperial expansionism, can these concepts and tools be usefully turned around and deployed to assist in the oppositional project of decolonization, democratisation, and women's liberation?

<center>***</center>

Returning to the matter of identity in Africa, here even the 'raw material' at hand in our strangely constructed and fragile nation-states vexes the question, nationally and individually. Nigeria illustrates the typical conundrum because like the vast majority of African nation-states it does not have a single language that everyone learns. Rather there are a plethora of tongues, and most citizens grow up speaking two, three or even four languages[2]. If there is an homogenizing, unifying language at all, it is that thing called 'broken English', actually a Creole product of the creative grafting of so many of our tongues onto the standard issue English of Janet and John delivered through the colonial missions and schools. Never very concerned with correctly mimicking His Master's Voice, imparted through the royal cadences of the BBC World Service, Nigerians crafted a new use of English, one quite incomprehensible to those whose command is restricted to the Queen's version.

One might also invoke the example of Afrikanerdom, and the great lengths that it took the Boers and the *Broederbond* in their plan to coerce the all-white nation of their dreams out of the African

land they had occupied. McClintock provides us with an astute analysis of this bizarrely contrived moment in history, and draws out the manner in which gender dynamics have been at least as central to nationalist projects as to racist ones (McClintock 1995).

In my own case, I could claim three continents in my global ancestry. If I limit myself to discussion of my African (Nigerian) aspect, I would still have to address the fact that this includes several local ethnicities and creeds, the result of at least one jihad, and various migrations across the Savannah lands, up and down the tributaries of the River Niger. English-ness, however, seems to be the simplest aspect of who I am, perhaps because identity is at best a gross simplification of self-hood, a denial and negation of the complexity and multiplicity at the roots of most African communities. Better still, everybody has quite clear ideas about who and what the English are, so that it flows easily as cultural currency, retaining a degree of value that appears to have survived the loss of its colonial possessions. The same may not be said for all the other selves I so casually lay claim to, for none of these travel quite so easily, and the difficulties of communication and mis-identification are profoundly exacerbated by the prevailing mystiques surrounding women of a different 'race' or nationality.

In short, the implication of history for our sense of who we are is complicated, and extends far beyond the scope of academic theorisations of identity, notably within twentieth century psychology[3]. By and large these have not been alert to considerations of power or politics, and could even be said to have obscured them.

Contemporary conceptualisations of 'identity politics' largely by political economists have also proved insubstantial, tautological even. 'Identity politics' is a term used to describe mobilisations around what now *appear* to be primordial notions of self-hood and community. These are in fact very new inventions, albeit inventions that seek to assert their own primordial character by making frequent reference to old books and holy scrolls, and to mythical, grandiose histories, in much the way so skilfully laid out for us by Benedict Anderson in his seminal discussion of nationalism, nearly twenty years ago (1983). Valentin Mudimbe (1989) is among those who have challenged the construction of 'Africa' by imperial Europe.[4] The difference between the nationalisms of the past and the proliferating identities of today seems to lie in the fact that whereas the former assisted in the construction of the nation, the latter constantly threatens to fragment and implode it. Nonetheless, today's identities are just as historical and political, despite the scholarly insistence on substituting culturally deterministic arguments for previous biological arguments now no longer in vogue. Furthermore, in the post cold-war era, identity is the main site offering anything that *resembles* resistance to US-style globalisation. Thinking beyond identity therefore runs the risk of suggesting that identities - oppressive or liberatory - have no relevance to politics. The generic response to manifestations of identity within Western institutions has been to put together some kind of training workshop in 'multiculturalism' or 'diversity management' to facilitate the necessary socio-cultural adjustment. But what should Africans be adjusting to in the era of globalisation? As young urban Africans rush to embrace the often violent and misogynistic North American ghetto cultures of rap, hip hop and Rambo-style machismo, their elders cannot but view this as a form of maladjustment! While swallowing the prescriptions of macroeconomic advisers, governments still express a concern for political and cultural integrity to be preserved somehow. The first reflexes of nationalist men still convey unitary (masculine) notions of patriotism, national unity and integrity, largely through restorationist appeals to implicitly masculine constructions of African culture[5]. The critics of this simplified response have correctly taken issue with the limitations of patriarchal nationalism, but without fully acknowledging that

this is what they are doing, and developing the insights that a gender analysis would yield.[6] Meanwhile the 'market forces' quietly deplete the sovereignty of the state and corporate cultures infuse the public and the civic spheres of organisation with the style and ethos of a well known 'global' fast food outfit, applying the same management systems, procedures and practices.

It may well be true, as I have suggested, that existing theories of identity do not have much explanatory power in African contexts. But does this inadequacy mean we can just make a note, perhaps adopt the North American rhetoric and procedures of 'diversity management' to deal with some of the consequences of identity in our organisational social and cultural life, and move on?

The English word identity is closely linked to others - the notions of integrity and security. I would like to suggest that much of what we are grouping under the dubious rubric of 'identity politics' is actually about popular struggles for material redistribution and justice, and related desires for existential integrity and security. Put simply, poverty is probably the worst threat to integrity and security worldwide. *It is a threat that cannot be adequately addressed through the cultural lip-service strategy of recognition and celebration, because poverty, and its offspring, insecurity and loss of integrity, are all matters of global and local political economy, matters that demand redistribution and justice.*

The present moment is one in which the integrity and security of today's prime target Others have never been more profoundly threatened. As non-Americans we all find ourselves being subjected to a high technology financial, political and informational onslaught emanating from the epicentre of global power, and backed up by the military muscle currently flexing across our TV screens. Recent events only underline the precariousness of our situation, and suggest that we do need to take matters of identity very seriously, not just as some kind of psychological artefact or cultural consumable, but as a matter of profound political, economic and military strategy, and counter-strategy. Identity is all about power and resistance, subjection and citizenship, action and reaction. I would suggest that *rather than simply passing over identity in order to rethink power, we need to profoundly* rethink *identity if we are to begin to comprehend the meaning of power.*

This is one sense in which 'identity' is a challenging subject: it challenges us to rethink power, and all the banal and brutal simplifications and subjections that have accompanied the exercise of power by the ruling regime. That some of these simplifications, and their financial accompaniments, have given rise to forces that now exhibit degrees of agency and strategy that threaten the global order can only add to our sense of urgency.

Postcolonial thinkers challenge the hegemony of the colonial regime, and the coercive manner in which it has produced us as subject peoples, reduced, simplified and embedded us in dubiously defined nativist notions of custom and creed, notions so thoroughly imbued with insecurity and mistrust, that they manifest in spasms of internecine enmity and hatred. That these enmities are often more imagined than real can be seen in the record of history. One might even go so far as to suggest that they have been discursively *orchestrated*, first by colonial regimes, then by subjective conservatism of postcolonial rulers, and later compounded by the duplicity of global economic institutions that deny their own agency attributing responsibility to an abstraction - to 'market forces'. How can an abstraction have systematically eroded the promises of decolonisation, denied the aspirations of generations of young Africas, and depleted the collective desire for democratisation and development? It is a dangerous abstraction indeed that leaves people outside the imperial heartlands impoverished enough to clutch at tribal straws and drown their sorrows in the elixir of fatalism, many now shunning secularism because of its apparent association with the

dubiously-regarded fat cat West?

With such an efflorescence of identities and what *appear* to be identity-based conflicts, it is worth reminding ourselves that the substantial part of African history lies outside the established instances of war and slavery, displaying a diverse tapestry that includes centuries of peaceful co-existence, migrations and movements across the continent and round the world, long before the barriers came up, and, ironically, the word 'globalisation' was suddenly on everybody's lips. The proof of this generally hospitable relation to one another can be seen in the fact that while the affluent nations of Europe, America and Australia make a great deal of noise about refugees and fear being swamped, the vast majority of refugees have never left the continent. Rather, hundreds of thousands of men, women and children have been absorbed by impoverished African communities, accepted as guests and been given land to farm for their own use.[7]

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Once born, any given identity spans the distance between subjectivity and politics, between micropolitical and macropolitical. It is no accident that this is an idea that has been well developed within revolutionary feminist thought, dedicated as it is to transforming women's lives. The politicisation of personal experience has been a key strategy of women's movements all over the world. As a result of the accumulated experience generated by the democratic praxis of women's movements, feminist theory has developed a sophisticated understanding of power that can usefully be brought to bear on considerations of identity, an understanding that highlights the workings of power from the bedroom to the boardroom.

There is a certain holism in all this, yet our theorisations of identity remain Balkanised within the artificial boundaries of academic disciplines. Identities exist *across* the separated-out terrains of politics, economics, sociology, anthropology and psychology. All identities have histories, as Freud pointed out quite some time ago, and they all involve questions of power, integrity and security, questions that have emotional as well as political currency (Freud 1976, 1977, Mitchell 1974). Somehow we still seem unable to get an analytical handle on the complicated relation between the production of individual identities and the production of communal identities. It is here that the inadequacies of theorisations of identity can be located. What does an understanding of gender theory contribute to this?

All identities are gendered, perhaps dangerously so.[8] Again we can thank Sigmund Freud for placing gender at the centre of theorisations of identity (Freud 1977). Within postcolonial feminist circles there has been an intellectually fertile debate on nationalism and its discontents, as revealed through gender analysis (e.g. McClintock 1995, Yuval Davis and Anthias 1989, Lazreg 1994, Badran 1994). How is it then that some postcolonial theorists choose to ignore the relevance of gender to our understanding of national identity and nationalism (Bhabha 1986, 1990; Mamdani 1996, 2000). Equally problematic are those who would deny that gender has any relevance to matters authentically African by inventing an imaginary precolonial community in which gender did not exist (Oyewunmi 1999). Yet there is ample evidence to suggest that gender, in all its diverse manifestations, has long been one of the central organising principles of African societies, past and present. Working with this insight adds much to our analysis, as the burgeoning literature on gender and postcolonial states adequately demonstrates.

The manner in which identity and power are configured by gender in postcolonial African states today is mediated by complicated gender politics. We all know that women are more pervasively governed by the dictates of custom and community, and correspondingly less able to realise the

rights afforded to citizens-in-general through the trope of civil law. This is why one of the strategies of feminist jurisprudence in African contexts involves enabling a more gender equitable access to civil law, generally understood to be a better vehicle for the protection of women's rights, and the realisation of their citizenship. This is most obviously so where customary laws still afford women only minor status, and customary practices can be said to violate the physical and emotional integrity of women.[9] What this means is that if the state is indeed bifurcated along the tropes of civil and customary legal systems (Mamdani 1995), the implementation of both are also deeply gendered, and unevenly so, with consequences that seem to me to be well worth exploring further.

The last two decades or so have seen the feminist movement becoming increasingly internationalised, with feminist struggles being pursued through international as well as local organisations and networks. The uptake of demands originating in women's movements by the international development industry is now an important variable in this process of internationalisation. But what were the conditions that gave rise to it? During the 1980s, the deleterious impact of structural adjustment packages on all but the duplicitous elite living in the capitalist periphery exacerbated the feminisation of poverty to such an extent that the gendered nature of global economic strategies and their consequences could no longer be denied.[10] Once the international agencies trumpeted their interest in women, the African governments of the 1980s were quick to see the potential benefits of adopting a posture that involved too, albeit on largely instrumental grounds (Mama 2000a). How else do we explain the rather contradictory establishment of national machinery for women all over Africa, at a time when macro-economic imperatives require the state to reduce its sphere of operation, not expand it! I am suggesting that these national structures and gender policies are not adequately provided for in national budgets, because they have been established on the assumption that they will attract donor funds. Elsewhere I have explored the contradictions and challenges of postcolonial African gender politics in more detail, using the example of Nigeria's military regimes (Mama 1995, 1999, 2000). It is important to note that there were also local political pressures that led African governments to engage with gender in one way or another. For less-than-democratic regimes, women have provided a foil for tyranny. Mobutu is well known for his corruption, brutality and sexual profligacy. As if to divert attention from these he embarked on a highly publicised 'mass promotion' of women during the crisis of the 1980s, not as equal citizens in his dictatorship, but in the circumscribed roles of wives and mothers. By reinscribing Zairois women in this way, he not only reaffirmed a particular form of masculine control over women, but also extended the reach of his dictatorship, both temporally and territorially. Re-asserting the subjugation of women appealed to the ordinary men who might well have felt emasculated by their own experience of Mobutu-style patriarchy, and indeed to the many women who felt flattered by this sudden attention.

In Zimbabwe, the Mugabe government has played a contradictory game of gender politics. Here the initial commendation of women's role in the liberation war and the support for women's legal and civil rights soon gave way to a series of retractions. If the early 1980s saw the mass detention and abuse of hundreds of women by the police in 'Operation Clean Up', the 1990s were characterised by the refusal of the law courts to uphold women's rights to inherit property and own land under civil law. Discriminatory judgements are invariably based on male judges' assertions that such rights are not 'customary' (ZWRCN forthcoming, Nkiwane 2000).

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A feminist analysis of postcolonial states links the violent and destructive manifestations of modern statecraft with the persistence of patriarchy, in all its perversity. It approaches authoritarianism in a manner that draws on the insights of feminist studies, building on work that begins to explore the complex resonances and dissonances that occur between subjectivities and politics, between the individual and the collective. It offers a powerful rethinking of national identity, and opens up possibilities for imagining radically different communities. At a more concrete level, I suggest that the accumulated experience of participatory democratic organising within women's movements provides ample evidence that there are other, more inclusive ways to govern and be governed than those assumed by contemporary liberal democratic systems.

The examples I have given so far illustrate the instrumental uptake of international gender discourses by authoritarian regimes currying favour with the international community, while at the same time consolidating their hold on power by placating those they govern with affirmation of conventional gender identities. Other examples might address the manner in which these dynamics play out down the line, and use a similar analytical strategy to explore the various complicated manifestations of gender politics in all the organisational forms that comprise postcolonial society: corporate, governmental, non-governmental, and community-based. For example, in the new South Africa it is worth investigating how financial liberalisation and the adoption of corporate managerial procedures has affected the implementation of national and institutional policy commitments to transformation and gender equality. How has the macro-economic policy affected the availability of resource and capacities for the realisation of democratic promises?

Finally, allow me to suggest that within women's movements, perhaps because of their widespread adherence to participatory democratic organisational practices, we can discern the emergence of new and more challenging identities. Here we find women-people intent on creating autonomous spaces in which to work at elaborating and developing their own individual and collective agency, women who dare to differ and sabotage the patriarchal precedents of received 'identity politics' being reproduced by the old regime.

At the present time, if we choose to look beyond the sinister machinations of the late capitalism and listen beyond the battle cries of powerful men, we will hear the quietly persistent challenge articulated by women. We can take heart in the fact that there are communities all over the world resisting fundamentalism, militarism and war-mongering, grouping and regrouping and innovating political, economic and cultural strategies in the interstices of power. The intellectual challenge of identity lies in the exercise of adding gender to the arsenal of analytical tools required to rethink identity, so that we can deepen our understanding of power, and increase our strategic capacity to engage with and challenge its destructive capacity. Being an optimist, I assume that we still have the chance to do so.

Notes

1. Derived from Foucault, and subsequent applications of his work in France and Britain (Donzelot 1979, Rose 1985, 1989, Hollway et al 1984).
2. One estimate states that there are 'at least 250 language groups' in Nigeria (Appiah & Gates 1999).
3. The 21st century is seeing a more critical movement within psychology gain promising ground in its theorisation of 'subjectivity' as historically-constituted, multiple and above all, dynamic. This

paradigm shift dates back to the early 1980's (Hollway et al 'Changing the Subject', 1984).

4. Even earlier, Edward Said challenged the hegemonic construction of the Orient by the Western cultural and political apparatuses (Said 1978).

5. These have included Negritude, Pan Africanism, *Africanité*, *Auhenticité*, Black Consciousness and the African Renaissance.

6. McClintock (1995) discusses this occlusion in the work of Fanon and Bhabha., but a similar point could be made regarding the work of Appiah (1995), and others.

7. This is not to deny the manifestations of xenophobia, but rather to note that this is not by any means the usual response to the problems of neighbours. Where it does exist, the postcolonial state is often duplicitous, and the people in question have been stigmatised and incarcerated in camps as a precondition for the delivery of 'aid'.

8. A reference to McClintock's opening statement 'All nationalisms are gendered, all are invented, and all are dangerous'. (1995: 352)

9. The networkWomen and Law in Southern Africa has been engaged in such work since 1988.

10. However the manner in which gender has been addressed, largely through an affirmative women-in-development paradigm leaves much to be desired. The marked persistence of gender inequality and injustice indicates a high degree of what the industry refers to as 'project failure'.

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RESEARCH REPORTS

HIV/AIDS in Kenya: Moving beyond policy and rhetoric

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1. Introduction

HIV/Aids has a profound effect on national development and security. It kills young economically productive people, brings hardship to families, increases expenditure on healthcare and adversely affects the country's development. By depriving the economy of a qualified and productive labour force, restricting the tax base, and raising the demand for social services due to the increased number of orphaned children, widows and the high cost of healthcare, Aids poses a great challenge to Africa's development. Further, the loss of skilled uniformed officers has security implications (World Bank Report 2000, UNAids 2000).

'Aids', as stated by former Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda during the Economic Commission of Africa conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in December 2000, 'is a disease that affects us silently, persistently and destroys us ruthlessly sucking away the life and vitality of our families'. This statement acquires meaning when one looks at some statistics. UNAids (June 2000) estimates that globally there were 36.1 million people living with the virus by the end of 2000, 5.3 million of them became infected in 1999 alone.

An analysis of HIV infections by geographic distribution reveals that the highest concentration of the epidemic is in sub-Saharan Africa accounting for approximately 70 per cent of all infections worldwide (National Aids Control Council, NACC 2000). The region accounts for 85 per cent of the estimated deaths due to HIV/Aids since the beginning of the epidemic.

The question that remains unanswered is 'why does the prevalence of HIV/Aids vary greatly in different settings?' Two decades after the disease was discovered, the diverse dynamics of its transmission are still only partly understood (Carael and Holmes, 2001).

This is particularly true in sub-Saharan Africa where HIV spreads heterosexually in adults and where it has stabilised at 30 per cent in some cities and is showing little or no sign of decline (Ferry et al, 2001). However, the burden of HIV/Aids epidemic is not equally distributed over the continent: the prevalence of HIV infection is generally higher in East and Southern Africa than in West and Central Africa (UNAids 2000, Auvert et al 2001)

The impact of the pandemic is staggering when viewed country by country. For Kenya, life expectancy has declined to 52.8 for males and 53.4 for females in the years 2000-2005 from the projected 64.1 and 67.5 for males and females, respectively (NACC 2000).

By June 2000, it was estimated that Aids had killed 1.5 million Kenyans since the epidemic started in the early 1980s. It is estimated that the national adult HIV prevalence rates increased from 5.3 per cent in the 1980s to 13.1 per cent in 1999. Prevalence is generally

higher in urban areas with an average of 16 per cent to 17 per cent than in rural areas, with an average of 11 per cent to 12 per cent (NACC 2000).

Ignorance, poverty, high incidence of sexually transmitted diseases, socio-cultural beliefs and practices, civil strife and deficient public health care systems are the main factors for HIV/Aids spread in Africa. In addition, lack of resources to finance the implementation of cost-effective interventions is a major source of concern for the sub-Saharan region. HIV/Aids-related discrimination and stigmatisation is widespread and occurs in every sector of the society; in schools, in work places through enforced testing and lay-offs; in the markets through ostracism of the identified trader and within families and communities. The fear, ignorance and lack of open dialogue about HIV/Aids and the difficulty of involving all of society, including families and communities in the search for solutions, has placed tremendous pressure on family bonds.

The main purpose of this paper is to give an insight into the Kenyan scenario with the primary objective of providing an analysis of the impact of the HIV/Aids pandemic and the capacity of health-care systems in the provision of care for those living with the disease. It looks at the national and international policies on HIV/Aids with a view of identifying existing gaps in the current situation, and most important, the paper provides views on critical areas if Kenya is to change the current trends in HIV and Aids.

2. What is the impact of HIV/Aids in Kenya?

The impact of HIV/Aids has been felt across all national sectors and structures including education, health, agriculture and industry. Kenya has a high literacy rate of 76 per cent for males and 67 per cent for females. However, Aids is threatening to reverse enrolment and completion rates.

UNAids (2000:27) states: 'Skilled teachers are a precious commodity in all countries but in many African countries they are leaving schools and dying at an unprecedented and shocking rate'. The HIV/Aids epidemic affects the education sector in at least three major ways: (i) the supply of experienced teachers is reduced by Aids-related illness and deaths; (ii) children are kept out of school if they are needed at home to care for sick family members or to work in the fields; and (iii) children may drop out of school if their families cannot afford school fees due to reduced income as a result of an HIV/Aids death (UNESCO 1995, NACC 2000).

In the health sector, the rapid increase in the number of reported cases presents a significant challenge. Indications of a serious strain on the sector include shortage of drugs and patient care supplies. There are also inadequate diagnostic capabilities at various levels including blood screening equipment and their maintenance, overcrowding in the health facilities, irregular supply of testing reagents, high turnover of qualified health personnel making continuity impossible. Further, HIV has caused a major resurgence of tuberculosis, which presents an immense public health problem particularly with the emergence of drug-resistant forms of tubercle bacili.

HIV/Aids impacts the health sector in three main ways: (i) it increases the number of people seeking healthcare services; (ii) it increases the overall cost of health care in the country; and (iii) there is depletion of human resources including both trained and skilled including doctors, nurses, technologists and other service providers. The Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1997 in Kenya

estimates the direct cost of treating a new HIV/Aids patient at KSh34,680 ($444), while indirect costs amount to KSh538,560 ($6,904) or a total of KSh573,240 ($7,349).

The bed occupancy rates due to HIV/Aids, estimated at 50-55 per cent in rural areas and 30 per cent at national hospitals, greatly constrain hospital facilities, undermining other operations (NACC 2000). Further, the quality of health care has worsened, as the number of HIV/Aids patients increases. It has also eroded the health sector budget, thus denying the preventive component of health service delivery its share (NACC 2000).

The agricultural sector has not been spared either. Agriculture is Kenya's primary economic activity, engaging about 80 per cent of the labour force and accounting for 25 per cent of the gross domestic product. The impact of HIV/Aids on this sector is posing a threat to the country's food security. Fertile land remains idle due to shortage of labour as a result of illness, caring for the infected persons and death (World Bank 2000, Cohen 2001). The morbidity and mortality in the agricultural sector leads to loss of skills and experience; increased recruitment and training costs, terminal benefits or pension funds for the dead and funeral costs.

Crop varieties are also declining and changes in cropping patterns are occurring. Cash crops are abandoned in favour of less labour-intensive subsistence crops (Guerry 2000; UNAids 2000; Topouzis 1998; Bollinger et al. 1999; Egal et al, 1999). Livestock production is also affected as animals are sold to generate cash to buy medicine for the ailing and support their families.

HIV/Aids has had adverse effects on the workforce at all levels, including skilled and unskilled labour in both urban and rural areas. The projected labour force loss due to Aids in 2005 in the following countries is: Tanzania -9.1 per cent; Kenya -8.5 per cent, Uganda -16.3 per cent, Ethiopia -8.3 per cent, Rwanda -10.7 per cent and Eritrea -2.8 per cent (ILO, 1998). Analyses of several Kenyan firms show that HIV/Aids will increase labour costs (in terms of absenteeism, labour turnover, healthcare costs, burial fees, recruitment and retrenchment costs) by 4 per cent by the year 2005. Within the next 10 years, the impact of HIV/Aids is expected to reduce Kenya's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 14.5 per cent (NACC 2000, UNAids 2000:3/51).

In addition, the impact of HIV/Aids on the population may cripple effective demand for manufactured products, thus rendering the industrial sector vulnerable (NACC 2000). National economies are clearly at greatest risk when HIV affects the principal foreign exchange earning sectors. Kenya's late development of a National Prevention Policy has been directly linked to the fear of losing its valuable tourism industry (Cohen 1992:1, UNECA, 2000).

The military and police forces have also been hard hit. Throughout the world, soldiers are among the most susceptible people to HIV/Aids because they live away from home and are thus more susceptible to temptations for casual sex. It is important to note that HIV transmission is five to 20 times more likely where other sexually transmitted infections (STIs) occur (Grosskurth et al 1995, Gilson et al, 1997). As a result of such factors, HIV/Aids now represents a direct threat not only to socio-economic integration and political stability but also to national security (NACC 2000). The scenario within the Kenya Police Force (KPF) illustrates how serious the problem is. For instance, anecdotal data indicates that yearly deaths of officers rose from 25 in 1989 to 520 in 1998. Although this may not be purely as a result of

HIV/Aids, its role is significant and presents a big challenge to security especially in the current wave of crime in the country (Kenya Police Force, KPF Annual Report, 1999).

3. Are there members of the society who are more vulnerable to HIV/Aids?

There are a number of groups and categories of people whose vulnerability to HIV/Aids and its impact is higher than other members of the community. These include children, the youth, women and the disabled. According to the UNAids December 1998 report, Aids orphans (defined as children who have lost one or both parents to Aids before the age of 15 years) number 8.2 million to date and 95 per cent of them live in Africa. Before the onset of Aids, about 2 per cent of children in the developing countries were orphans. By 1997, Aids orphans accounted for 11 per cent of all children in Africa (UNAids, 2000).

The capacity of the extended families to absorb such children has been stretched to the limit, resulting in children-headed households with little supervision and parental guidance as they grow up. Also, child-labour among the orphans who have dropped out of school is common. And because of lack of parental supervision, such children are likely to be delinquent (African Development Forum, ADF 2000).

The number of HIV/Aids orphans in Kenya is projected to exceed 1.5 million by the year 2005. These children are at greater risk of malnutrition, illness, abuse, sexual exploitation, stigma, discrimination and school dropout. Several studies in Africa have shown that uninfected children of HIV seropositive women have a much higher mortality than children of uninfected women living in the same environment.

Another vulnerable group comprises the youth who are key to the future course of the HIV/Aids epidemic. Young people, between the ages 10 and 24 years, account for more than 50 per cent of new post-infancy infections worldwide. This age group constitutes more than 30 per cent of all people in the developing world, where the epidemic is concentrated and in Kenya 60 per cent of the population is under age 20 (UNAids 1999:27). Youth vulnerability to HIV infections is increased by such factors as early sexuality due to cultural, economic and media influence.

The problem is worsened by the inability of parents, leaders and teachers to discuss sexual matters with young people (Amuyunzu 1997). Various questions still present when assessing youth in relation to HIV/Aids (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, UNECA 2000: p1416) include: What is the changing socio-economic and political context for youth? What cults and organisations exist among young people themselves? What do we know about risk taking and orientation towards the future? What do we know about youth cultures of resistance? If Kenya desires to preserve its future leaders, these issues should be addressed through the implementation of targeted and timely interventions.

Gender differences and biases have become more accentuated, as infected women bear the brunt of rejection in higher proportions than their male counterparts. Women are also disproportionately responsible for the care of those infected with HIV/Aids, often without sufficient information, medication and support.

There is evidence of discrimination against widows and children from inheritance of family property of the deceased spouse (NACC 2000). It has been established that in sub-Saharan Africa over 20 per cent more women than men are living with HIV. A number of gender elements have been identified by UNECA (2000: 5-7) as needing attention if there is to be a

realistic chance of containing the pandemic. These include sexual violence and economic pressures on women that contribute to a high rate of commercial sexual activity. Other factors are stigmatisation and powerlessness of women with respect to use of condoms; lack of privacy; domestic violence; polygamy, early marriages and sexual activity for girls, and illiteracy.

People with disability form another category of vulnerable groups yet they are rarely considered in reproductive health discourses. The vulnerability of these members of the society emanates from their inability to access services such as education, health and career development. In many communities sexual abuse and rape is common as established by a study conducted by the African Medical and Research Foundation in 1999. The researchers found that sexual abuse of people with mental disability was high and yet the abusers were never apprehended. The Kenyan law refers to people with disability as idiots and imbeciles. Consequently, they cannot defend themselves in court and the abuses go on unabated (AMREF, Unpublished).

The vulnerability of children, youth and women is doubled when they have a disability. Focus has to be shifted towards understanding the conditions and needs of people with disabilities, both the infected and affected (see also the PRSP, June 2001). The elderly are also a forgotten segment in terms of HIV/Aids and they are only recognised as care givers to Aids orphans but not as people at risk of HIV infection.

4. What are the main predisposing factors to HIV infection?

There are several situations that present risks to HIV/Aids among any given population. These include poverty, STIs, drug and alcohol abuse, cultural influence and civil conflicts. The poor are defined as those members of the society who are unable to afford minimum basic human needs comprising of food and non-food items. The poor constitute slightly more than half the population of Kenya. Women constitute the majority of the poor and also the absolute majority of Kenyans (IPRSP 2000).

According to evidence of health status, the prevalence and incidence of sickness are similar for both the poor and non-poor. However, their response to sickness is markedly different. An overwhelming majority of the poor cannot afford private health care (76 per cent rural and 81 per cent urban) and rely on public health facilities. However, 20 per cent of the urban poor and 8 per cent of the rural poor have found even public health charges unaffordable. Furthermore, 58 per cent of the urban and 56 per cent of the rural poor reported that they do not seek public health care because of the unavailability of drugs (IPRSP). If you add HIV/Aids to this scenario then you have a real catastrophe.

UNECA (2000: 16-18) links poverty to many of the characteristics prevailing in the developing world. Poverty often means lack of information; entails the inability to manage risk and it drives women to unprotected sex. Poverty contributes to migration, which is a major risk factor for HIV. Poverty is closely associated with factors such as malnutrition, susceptibility to other diseases, and risk of harmful traditional practices such as early marriages (see also Zulu et al, 2000 and Magadi et al, 2001). The retrenchment of civil servants does not take into consideration the care of orphans and the health needs of the people infected and affected. As a result people are poorer and as stated by Kenneth Kaunda

during the ADF meeting in Addis Ababa (2000): 'Poverty is a fertile ground for Aids and Aids feeds on poverty'.

Another predisposing factor to HIV is sexually transmitted infections (STIs), which have a direct linkage to HIV transmission. It is reported that individuals with ulcerative STIs have an increased risk of transfer of HIV infection by factors of two to four times. Research conducted by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and AMREF in Mwanza, Tanzania, showed that a modest syndromic management approach to STIs reduced the prevalence of HIV by 40 per cent (Grosskurth et al 1995, Gilson et al 1997). Barriers to effective management of STIs include inadequacy of essential supplies and drugs; lack of trained personnel; inadequate management of STIs; limited contact tracing and poor referral system; inadequate health seeking behaviour; limited sensitivity and specificity of syndromic approach; and reluctance of the private sector to accept the syndromic approach (NACC 2000).

The abuse of alcohol and other substances is becoming a serious risk factor to HIV infections for Kenyan youth (Amuyunzu et al 1999, Johnston 2000). Substance abuse inhibits the ability of the individual to make rational decisions. The need to provide for their addictions inclines the abusers to crime and sexual activities that expose them to the risk of sexually transmitted infections including HIV/Aids. In a study conducted by Johnston (2000) it was concluded that young people who experiment over time with beer and cigarettes particularly are more prone to contracting an STI than those who never experiment with those substances. Injecting drug use directly exposes the abusers to HIV although at the moment there are no data to suggest that it is a big problem in Kenya.

Culture and religion have a big role to play not only because HIV/Aids has been moralised in the region but because culturally prescribed roles disadvantage some segments of the communities and increase their vulnerability to HIV and other STIs. In Kenya, it has been reported that young women in the age group 15-24 years are two to three times likely to be infected as males in the same age group (Okeyo et al 1998:12). In some situations, HIV/Aids related symptoms are given cultural relevance far removed from biomedicine such as curses, taboos and breaking of societal norms. These beliefs may hinder people from seeking appropriate care and using proper preventive measures. Furthermore, certain religious doctrines and practices forbid the use of preventive and protective measures. For instance, the Catholic and Muslim opposition to the use of condoms is one barrier in the face of HIV/Aids (Amuyunzu et al, 1999). Misconceptions regarding sexual and reproductive health information also act as barriers. Many adults in Kenya are weary of their children being given sex education because of the unfounded fear that it will encourage them to be 'promiscuous' (Fugelsang 1997, Amuyunzu 1997).

The marriage institution has also contributed due to the obligations that are socially and culturally instilled. Some women continue bearing children with the knowledge of their HIV positive status because that is what is required of them or due to their innate need to leave behind an offspring to propagate their lineage. Widow inheritance and the overall subservient nature of women put them at risk. Lack of male circumcision has also been related to increased risk to infection (Carael and Holmes, 2001).

Political conflict within the country and across the borders also predisposes people to HIV/Aids because it leads to displacement that exposes the victims to harm. Such conflicts are accompanied by rape of women. Even if not forced, the women use sex as the only means of

survival and escape. The civil strife in Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi has led to mobility of displaced people, which has contributed to the spread of HIV infection and the resulting consequences. The refugee communities suffer even more due to the trauma and abuse they endure.

5. Is the health care system capable of addressing HIV/Aids?

The capacity of the healthcare establishment to effectively address HIV/Aids depends on the government and international policies. Internationally, governments are expected to provide healthcare for their citizens. However, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Policies of Structural Adjustment applied to developing countries unable to repay loans may promote the spread of HIV/Aids (Lurie et al. 1994). These policies require governments to reduce spending on health and social services such as education, increase personal tax and ensure currency devaluation. These conditions oftentimes reduce the buying capacity of individuals, thereby rendering them poorer.

The annual requirement for HIV prevention alone in Kenya is estimated at 40 million Kenyan Pounds ($1,025,641) excluding the cost of care. An effective approach to the containment of HIV/Aids requires an active voluntary counselling and testing programme. The question that has to be addressed is whether there is adequate capacity for government and private health facilities to provide adequate reliable testing facilities. The current dire situation of the health facilities characterised by lack of drugs and other supplies, inadequate facilities and limited staff, depicts a system that cannot cope with the demand for services (NACC 2000).

Hospitals with the ability and mandate to perform HIV testing are oftentimes scattered and inaccessible to a large segment of the population. The Kenya Government is yet to put in place a system that enables those who have tested HIV positive to live with access to long-term counselling, antiretroviral drugs and treatment for opportunistic infections.

Policies related to medical insurance and social security have to be looked into because they determine to a large extent the decision whether one should be tested or not. For instance, if an individual needs a mortgage, should he be tested? If this implies that if found positive he does not get the loan, why should he bother? Hence, an assessment of whether the health establishment can cope requires a thorough analysis of other closely related issues and national as well as international policies on HIV/Aids.

The Ministry of Health (MOH) strategic plan 1999-2004 is expected to catalyse the implementation of priorities contained in Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1997 on Aids in Kenya. This paper signalled the intention of the government to support HIV/Aids interventions, protect the rights of the affected and provide care for the infected and affected. It recognised that responding effectively to the crisis requires 'a strong political commitment at the highest level and the implementation of a multisectoral prevention and control strategy'. The Kenyan President, Daniel arap Moi, declared Aids a national disaster in December 1999. Although 15 years late, the declaration has created a favourable environment for mitigation against the HIV/Aids scourge.

The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP) 2000-2003 identifies people as the most precious resource because of their potential to work for the betterment of the nation. In article 9.12 it is noted: 'control of HIV/Aids is central to an effective poverty reduction strategy' (p 20). The IPRSP presents four main strategies on HIV/Aids namely blood

screening, promotion of condom use, development of a national communication strategy and management of STIs (p72). It is interesting to note that care for the infected has been included in the proposed strategies.

Another policy document is the National Aids Control Council (NACC) Strategic Plan of 2000-2005 in which five priority areas have been identified. These are prevention and advocacy; treatment, continuum of care and support; mitigation of the socio-economic impact; monitoring, evaluation and research; and management and co-ordination. Within the priority areas, a variety of interventions and activities have been identified for implementation in order to achieve defined objectives for each. In the absence of a cure for HIV/Aids, the plan allocates most resources to preventive activities, which focus on the youth and community mobilisation to achieve the desired social change in sexual behaviour.

At the international policy level the joint United Nations Programme on HIV/Aids (UNAids) has the main task of identifying practices around the world that work in responding to the HIV/Aids epidemic, and to examine how and why they work. One important international focus has been the development of a vaccine which is seen as the only way, apart from behaviour change, to fight HIV/Aids.

Leadership is a crucial aspect at all levels. The African Consensus and Plan of Action drawn during the ADF Addis Ababa meeting (December 2000) looked at the role of leadership in combating Aids. Leadership is viewed at different levels: personal, community, national, regional and international.

Personal leadership involves individuals' need to break the silence and adopt positive behaviour change. Community leadership involves respect for the rights of people living with Aids and caring for Aids orphans and increasing access to information and treatment for all community members. National leadership is mobilisation of resources; increasing access to quality care and strengthening HIV/Aids control councils.

Regional leadership involves learning from other countries, creation of regional partnerships and ensuring peace within the region while international partnership involves reduction in the cost of antiretroviral drugs, stepping up research on HIV/Aids, debt relief and providing coordinated, transparent and accountable international support.

6. Can Kenya learn from others?

Kenya can learn from her neighbour Uganda which has brought estimated HIV prevalence rate down to about 8 per cent from a peak of over 20 per cent in the early 1990s with strong prevention campaigns. Uganda was the first government on the continent to recognise the danger of HIV/Aids to national development. Acknowledging this fact, President Yoweri Museveni took active steps through action by the government and other groups in society, including religious leaders and community development organisations (UNAids June 2000). Kaleeba et al (2000) identify three main factors that have contributed to the reduction of HIV infections in Uganda: (i) a two-year delay in the onset of sexual intercourse among youths aged 15–24 years. Among girls the median age at first sexual intercourse increased to 16.6 years and among boys to 17.4 years; (ii) sharp increases in condom use from 15.4 per cent to 55.2 per cent among men, and from 5.8 per cent to 38.7 per cent among women; and (iii) a drop of nearly 50 per cent in the proportion of men and women exchanging sex for money and a 9 per cent decrease in casual sex among the young people (males aged 15–24 years).

Community-based organisations have come together to provide support and care to the infected and affected. Succession planning has been implemented to ensure that children are well prepared for the death of their parent(s) and are adequately cared for thereafter. Uganda is one of the few countries in the world that have active participation of soldiers in the HIV/Aids campaign and care (Uganda People's Defence Forces Post-Test Club, 2000). Another good example is Senegal, which has maintained a low HIV prevalence at 5 per cent due to various reasons. The leadership of the National Aids Control Programme has been consistent which allows the office holders to strategise and oversee the implementation of the priority activities. The country has also embarked on a vigorous HIV/Aids campaign that has actively involved Christian and Muslim religious leaders who use their gatherings as dissemination forums for HIV/Aids information. The one most important action by the government has been not to wait for the problem to reach epidemic levels. This is one area, unfortunately, where Kenya failed from the very beginning.

7. Success stories in Kenya

The UNAids Best Practice Collection (Issue 1, 1999) cites two Kenyan cases which the country can adapt or scale up. The first focuses on children and young people namely the Mathare Youth Sports Association (MYSA). The second is a community mobilisation project: the Diocese of Kitui HIV/Aids programme. The MYSA programme, which started in 1994, is implemented in Mathare, the largest slum in Nairobi. The project's objective is to fight HIV/Aids by promoting healthy living, teamwork and involvement in community-improvement activities. The main activities have involved training footballers to be peer educators on HIV/Aids. The adolescents stress abstinence from sex; but for those who are sexually active, they emphasise the importance of using condoms and staying faithful to one partner.
The programme is estimated to have reached some 20,000 young people between 1994 and 1997. In 1997, 25 girls and 26 boys completed advanced courses in peer education, while 25 girls and 25 boys completed the basic course. The project has demonstrated that adolescents and other young people can be effective peer educators for HIV prevention, and that their mobilisation is a useful strategy for prevention and attitudinal change. However, adequate training and materials are essential to support the work of peer educators and to help maintain their motivation. These materials need not be of high cost, but the support must be ongoing and secure.
The Diocese of Kitui HIV/Aids programme is implemented in Kitui and Mwingi districts in eastern Kenya. These districts are within the semi-arid belt and most of the people depend on small-scale farming and livestock. Poverty is widespread and there has been a marked migration of men between the ages of 16 and 50 to larger Kenyan towns in search of employment. The HIV/Aids programme started in 1992 with two main objectives: to reduce the prevalence of HIV infection; and to enable people infected and affected by Aids to live positively.
The main activities include pre- and post-test counselling, home visits to families affected by HIV/Aids, group counselling sessions with people living with HIV/Aids (PLWHAs), community education, services for people with STIs and preparing people for death. Other services include encouraging economic activities for PLWHAs, and providing simple curative

medicines and basic support for needy clients. The programme has taken into account the diverse needs of specific groups of PLWHAs and has devised effective strategies for each. The different groups include PLWHAs with HIV-relevant medical conditions such as TB and STIs, sero-positive or potentially sero-positive infants, elderly caregivers, and people who are in the terminal stages of Aids. The success of this programme has illustrated that PLWHAs are a major resource that should be used in the fight against HIV/Aids.

8. What are the HIV/Aids challenges for Kenya?

Several issues need to be addressed if Kenya is to contain the spread of HIV and adequately take care of the infected and affected members of the society (See also Foote and Akukew, 2000). The Ugandan case illustrates the role active leadership can play in bringing down the level of HIV infections. In fact, Peter Piot, the Executive Director of UNAids observes, 'sustainable and systematic alleviation of HIV impact also comes from ways in which resources are deployed. Social immunity comes when Aids resources are not about short-term projects but instead go across all planning and social sectors through decentralised mechanisms that push funds to district level where they really make a difference'. (ADF 2000).

The success of any intervention will depend on the support received from the government. Access to antiretroviral drugs is currently out of reach of many infected people yet the government can make use of the existing regional and international networks to bargain for reduced costs of these drugs and subsidise the costs. The government, communities and individuals have to actively take a leadership role. Kenyan leadership organs need to go beyond well-written policy documents, position papers, and speeches to steer the country into targeted and committed action. This requires recognition of the needs of different categories of the citizens. There are those who are not infected (who are the majority) whose needs are different from PLWHAs. There are people who are vulnerable such as women, children and people with disabilities whose needs have to be understood and appropriately addressed. For the country to address these needs effectively it would require different strategies and activities for a more comprehensive and integrated approach.

There is no doubt that access to antiretroviral drugs prolongs people's lives and improves the quality of that life. It is sad that only 1 per cent of the 25.3 million Africans living with HIV have access to these drugs. Geeta Gupta, the President of the International Centre for Research on Women (ICRW), observed in 1999: 'we have today therapies and treatments to substantially improve the quality of lives of those living with HIV and Aids in the countries that can afford them'. It is the duty of the government to ensure that these drugs are available to people who need them. Effective management of opportunistic infections should also be implemented in order to alleviate the people's suffering and to prolong their lives. This will effectively change the hopelessness that accompanies an HIV positive result and will re-energise the country's economy that has long been affected by the loss of skilled manpower. Promotion of VCT is pertinent because it will enable individuals to take action early before the depletion of their immune systems.

Prevention has been and continues to be promoted as an important measure of containing the spread of HIV in the region. However, although condom use has been widely promoted in Kenya, its effectiveness has been hampered by inconsistent and improper use and

myths/misconceptions regarding its efficacy and role in sexual intercourse (Nyagero et al, 2000, Obiero et al, 2000, Amuyunzu et al, 1999). There is need for increased promotion campaigns that address these misconceptions and focus on the proper use of the condom. Although there is evidence that many people are aware of HIV (over 80 per cent of the Kenyan population in general) behaviour change lags behind. The main goal of information and education campaign has to be the prevention of new infection, which requires that it has to be targeted while taking care of the diverse cultural and religious mores of the people. Young people should be used in the formulation of programmes addressing their needs. The MYSA approach, for example, could be scaled-up in many of the most affected areas, especially in urban slums. The media practitioners should be brought on board and used as important catalysts in the control and management of HIV/Aids.

With Aids orphans projected to hit the 1.5 million mark by 2005, programmes such as the one of the Diocese of Kitui could be scaled-up in order to adequately address the needs of these children. Succession planning has to be adopted as a process of preparing the children and the community for the demise of the infected parent(s). Efforts have to be made to prevent mother-to-child transmission (PMCT) of HIV in order to reduce the number of children born with the infection. While promoting this strategy, long-term treatment has to be considered to prolong the mother's life to reduce the number of children who are orphaned at an early age. A moral question on PMCT hinges on the focus of saving the child and neglecting the mother. What are the chances that the child will survive after the mother's death? Who will care for the baby if the mother's survival is not a central part of the PMCT intervention? Responding to these questions would require the government to plan for the provision of antiretroviral drugs to the women on a long-term basis.

Poverty will continue to influence the patterns and levels of HIV/Aids in Kenya and other parts of the region. The current trends indicate that the poverty levels are on the rise unless specific, community-based measures are put in place. Although the government is currently engaged in the preparation of a full Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), a lot will depend on the implementation of the proposals made therein. A major problem is the reduced expenditure on social services, including health and education (under the prodding and watchful eye of the IMF and the world Bank). In addition, privatisation and retrenchment of civil servants are some of the measures proposed and being implemented for the improvement of the economy. Invariably, these processes are relegating many people into poverty and thereby increasing their susceptibility to HIV infections. For those already infected, a reduction in their access to healthcare implies a quicker progression to Aids. There is a need to consider the needs of orphans and the elderly especially those from poor households.

It is also necessary to stem tribal/clan/border clashes that are oftentimes politically instigated and result in a lot of displacement. Such displacements lead to an increase in poverty and consequently increased susceptibility to HIV and Aids especially for women and young girls. The street people are exposed to a myriad of problems including lack of shelter, food and medical care. Those displaced are oftentimes engaged in sex for survival and sustenance. Other displacements that may exacerbate the level of suffering include evictions of slum dwellers and the perennial land grabbing that often results in many people having no shelter and other means of survival.

The role of research cannot be overstated especially if a local solution to HIV/Aids has to be attained. The Ministry of Health has not been very supportive of Kenyan scientists engaged in

HIV/Aids research. There is need for the government to support local scientists in their endeavour to mitigate the HIV/Aids pandemic because there lies hope of getting an affordable and sustainable solution.

The healthcare infrastructure is a central part to the effective control of HIV and for the management of people who are living with the virus. Kenya must reinvigorate the healthcare system and reposition HIV/Aids as an important national issue. Budgetary allocations to healthcare must reflect the current emergency situation. The country needs to call on international assistance to revamp the public and private healthcare infrastructure, train and re-train health practitioners, and develop effective community-based systems. Efforts should be made to improve healthcare facilities at the local level to provide VCT and follow-up for people who test HIV positive. The current practice is for people who are down with Aids to be taken to the rural areas where the caregivers are least prepared to cater for their physical, medical and emotional needs. The facilities closest to the people (dispensaries, health centres and private owned clinics) should be facilitated to provide back-up services to the rural inhabitants.

Other areas that require sensitisation and advocacy at national and community levels include gender issues and cultural practices especially those that expose individuals to HIV/Aids. Religious conflicts that have characterised the fight against HIV/Aids have oftentimes diminished the gains made and hence, an effort should be proactively made to bring their leadership on board. Controversies on condom use remove focus on the most pertinent issues, which are the reduction of HIV transmission and management for those already infected and affected.

Conclusion

In sub-Saharan Africa, the predominant mode of HIV transmission is sexual intercourse between men and women although there is a large variation in the rate and extent of the spread in different populations. The impact of the pandemic also differs and is dependent on vulnerability to the virus and exposure to the predisposing factors discussed. This paper set out to provide a review of the impact of HIV/Aids in Kenya and it has illustrated the debilitating effect on all sectors of the nation. It is important to acknowledge that HIV/Aids affects both the poor and non-poor members of the society. However, as observed by the World Bank (2000) the pandemic affects the poor more than the non-poor nations and people: 'it may eventually become the disease of the poor'. Given this important distinction, it follows; therefore, that any strategies developed to mitigate the scourge should be sensitive to the different needs and disease patterns.

This paper has illustrated that the high levels of infection among the 15-49 year olds, who account for 80–90 per cent of all infections in the region indicate a depletion of Africa's skilled human resources. This has repercussions on people's survival especially on a continent that has been and continues to be impoverished by poverty, war, preventable communicable diseases, droughts and floods and brain drain to the more developed west. The lack of a properly equipped and managed health sector to deal with simple medical needs adds to the general hopelessness. This partly explains why stigma, shame, despair, and anguish continue to predominate human stories, the media, art and people's views about HIV/Aids.

The paper identifies that the main challenge for Kenya is to prevent infection among the 86 per cent of the adult population not yet infected and to enable the infected 14 per cent to have longer and better quality lives. This is a challenge that can only be met through a multi-sectoral and multi-pronged approach. Policy documents are important but more than that, there is need to implement what is therein. It is only through targeted interventions that Kenya will preserve and retain its people who are the most important resource for achieving sustained development. That is why the country needs to go beyond policy and rhetoric into focused and timely interventions for it to counter the numerous challenges emanating from HIV/Aids.

Although the impact of HIV/Aids is expected to be worse in the next five years before it stabilises, there is a glimmer of hope with the reduced cost of anti-retroviral drugs and the promotion of voluntary counselling and testing (VCT), which enables people to know their status and consequently take action. For this to be realised, political will and well-planned interventions are important prerequisites.

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Justice Perceptions in the Workplace: Gender Differences in Kenya

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Introduction

Gender inequality is a global concern (Bradshaw and Wallace 1996), and as indicated by the United Nations Decade (1975-1985) and the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, gender inequality in developing nations is receiving much of the attention (Kibwana 1995). At the heart of the gender equality issue is the concern with justice. The argument is that, on average, women and men have similar abilities and talents, and therefore should be treated and rewarded equally. When they are not, injustice exists. This 'battle' has not yet been won in modernized societies but there do exist policies and laws in most of these societies that support, in varying degrees, the equal treatment of women and men. Developing nations, like Kenya, are just as enmeshed in this struggle over gender equality, but in most instances the degree of inequality is greater and there are fewer legal structures that support equality (Hughes and Mwiria 1989; Miller and Yeager 1994; Kibwana 1995). Another major difference between developed and developing nations is the availability of data on gender inequality. Developed nations have the capacity (via government and scientific institutions) to collect, analyze and disseminate huge amounts of data that can be used to document gender inequalities. Developing countries lack these capabilities (and data) and as a consequence we hear pleas for '…valid, reliable, timely, culturally relevant and internationally comparable data' on gender inequalities (Adhiambo-Odual 1995 : ix; Nzomo 1995 : 65).

Our purpose in this paper is to provide such data and help fill this gap. The data we report are quite specific, however, and are not intended to document all forms of gender inequality. They are descriptive data on the perceptions women and men in the modern Kenyan workforce have about how just (fair) their workplace treatment has been. There, of course, are many gender differences that have justice implications. These include the distribution of household duties, access to education, labor force participation, pay, political involvement and access to positions of authority. In all of these areas Kenyan women are disadvantaged (House-Midamba 1990; Kibwana 1995; Shaw 1995). We limit our study to gender differences in the modern (formal) sector workplace because it is the modern sector that will continue to grow and gain in importance, and it is the workplace in this sector

where female inroads are critical if gender economic equality is to be realized. The women pushing for change in Kenya are likely to be the more highly educated (House-Midamba 1990), so it is important to document the degree to which such highly educated women perceive injustices in the workplace. As we will argue when justice theory is presented, if these more 'elite' women do not perceive injustices, then it is unlikely that they will be initiators of attempts to reduce gender inequalities.

Justice in the legal sense refers to women and men objectively receiving what the law designates they should receive. Justice studied from a social science perspective refers to an individual's *subjective perceptions* of whether s/he is treated fairly or not (Mowday 1982; Markovsky 1985; Hegtvedt 1994). Examining these justice/injustice perceptions is important because an individual's attitudes (e.g., job satisfaction and political views) and behaviors (job quitting , union involvement and political activism) are affected more by their subjective perceptions of the fairness of differences than by the so-called 'objective' differences that an observer might identify (Sheppard, Lewicki and Minton 1992). Documenting whether women and men perceive similar levels of justice in the workplace is, therefore, an important first step in understanding and addressing gender equality/equity issues in Kenya. Data from a national sample of female and male agricultural technicians in Kenya allow for doing this.

After reviewing the justice arguments and describing gender inequality in Kenya, we will show that educated women in the modern sector perceive greater injustice in the workplace than their male counterparts. We will then suggest that this perception of injustice is one of the ingredients necessary for the kind of female-initiated action and change argued for by most of those studying gender inequality in Kenya.

Basic Justice Arguments

The literature on justice has focused primarily on distributive and procedural justice. Both are important dimensions of justice, and both must be studied to obtain a complete picture of gender differences in perceptions of justice. Below we define each and indicate implications for our study of gender inequality.

Distributive Justice

Cohen and Greenberg define distributive justice as the person's 'application of a normative rule to the allocation of resources to recipients' (1982 : 1). 'Justice exists when there is congruence between expectations for outcomes based on the normative rule and actual outcomes (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995 : 259)'. *In*justice, then, is perceived when there is an incongruence between the expectations and outcomes. Distributive justice theories are concerned primarily with how individuals evaluate and react to reward *distributions* that they perceive as just or unjust. Specifically, the theories delineate a process whereby perceptions of injustice in the distribution of rewards produce emotional distress for a person that then often leads to attempts to restore justice (Adams 1965; Hegtvedt 1994; Homans 1961; James 1993; Jasso 1980; Mowday 1982). This basic 'justice restoring' argument has been supported by empirical research in both laboratory and field settings (Hegtvedt 1994; James 1993; Sheppard, Lewicki and Minton 1992). Restoring justice from the perspective of the 'injured' party may involve affective, cognitive and/or overt responses on the part of that individual (Adams 1965; Markovsky 1988). Affective reactions are usually argued to occur prior to

the cognitive and behavioral reactions (Markovsky 1988). For example, an 'affective' justice restoring response to what is perceived as an unfair performance rating could involve becoming dissatisfied with one's superior and concluding s/he is inept. This dissatisfaction could lead to calculatively (cognitively) considering to search for another job, while actually quitting would be an example of an overt response. This series of responses, together, has restored justice in the mind of the individual because the individual has left a work environment where his/her skills were not properly judged.

Although most of the justice research is based on Western data, there is considerable interest in cultural differences (James 1993). This comparative research, however, is mainly about Western and Asian differences and we know of no sustained programs of research on justice in African nations. A primary interest in these studies has been with what are called justice allocation principles. Three of the justice allocation principles given the most attention are: equity, need or equality. These are three answers to the question 'what is fair?'

Fairness according to the *equity principle* exists when there is an equivalence of the person's outcome to input ratio relative to the same outcome-input ratio for some comparison other. If the comparison other is another person, then one's outcome-to-input ratio is compared with the outcome-to-input ratio of that other person. If the comparison is intra-individual, then the person compares his/her current outcome-to-input ratio with the same ratio at an earlier point in time or when he person was with another employer. The equity principle has been found to be relied on more in judging fairness when individual performance (as compared with group performance) is given priority (Hegtvedt 1994) and in societies with individualistic (instead of collectivistic) values (James 1993). An example is when employee pay is based on the person's productivity. There would be pay differences across employees because of productivity differences, but these pay (outcome) differences would be considered fair based on the equity logic.

The *need principle* refers to allocating rewards to those who do not have the inputs that are normally considered as deserving of the rewards. This principle is invoked more often when the allocation system is designed to be humane based on a sense of good and morality (Hegtvedt 1994). An example would be a welfare based distribution where employees who have to support a larger family are paid more.

The *equality principle* (equal distribution regardless of inputs or needs) is more often the standard when individual differences are not considered as critical (or are to be avoided) (Sheppard, Lewicki and Minton 1992), or when a goal is to reduce conflict that might emerge in a competitive environment. For example, this justice principle is preferred more in Far East Asian societies (e.g., South Korea) where the collectivity is considered more important than the individual.

In Western societies both equality and equity norms are valued, but in a particular configuration (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995). The equality norm is applied to the *opportunities* to achieve outcomes, whereas the equity norm is applied to the *distribution* of outcomes. Thus, economic *in*equality (the distribution of outcomes) in Western nations is considered fair by its citizens. If equality of opportunity exists, then one must accept personal responsibility for his/her outcomes. These outcomes will be different because individuals will either differ in their inputs or will differentially take advantage of the same opportunities to utilize their skills and talents. Because of this equity based relationship between inputs and outcomes, the outcome distribution is considered fair (unequal but equitable).

These basic justice arguments are posited by theorists to apply universally, that is, the claim that injustice leads to emotional distress which, in turn, leads to justice restoring attempts is believed to hold universally. What is situation- and cultural-specific is the allocation rule (equity, equality or

need) that is used by the person in evaluating what is just. As will be shown, our measures of distributive justice capture an equity-based form and a form of justice that is not dependent on any particular allocation rule.

Procedural Justice

Whereas distributive justice refers to the fairness of the distribution of rewards or outcomes, procedural justice refers to the *fairness of procedures* used in deciding on the outcome distribution (Folger 1987; Lind and Tyler 1988; Thibaut and Walker 1975). Thus, it refers to the process whereby the distribution of rewards was created. Research has shown that procedural justice is at least as important to an employee as distributive justice (Sheppard, Lewicki and Minton 1992). Also, it is often claimed that perceptions of procedural justice have a positive causal impact on perceptions of distributive justice (Randall and Mueller 1995). That is, if one believes that the decision making process is fair, then the distribution of rewards is more likely to be perceived as fair. If workplace procedures (like how salaries and promotions are determined) in Kenya favor men, then women should perceive greater procedural injustice. The examination of procedural justice allows us to capture more the equality of opportunity component that characterizes Western perceptions of justice.

Because the Western employment relationship and the value of individualism has been largely instilled (forced?) in the modern sector of Kenyan society as a consequence of British colonization, other Western influences, and Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) (Miller and Yeager 1994), we expect both distributive and procedural justice in the workplace to be salient concerns for both working women and men. Because they are salient concerns, determining gender differences in perceptions of both dimensions of justice should help us document the potential for reactions to gender inequalities in Kenya.

Gender Inequality in Kenya

Throughout the colonial period, women in Kenya experienced considerable social, economic, and political inequalities relative to men (Hughes and Mwiria 1989; Miller and Yeager 1994; Stichter 1977). The colonial state, for example, neglected women's education and training. In addition, the state favored males in the provision of paid labor needed by settler economies thus resulting in women being grossly underrepresented in paid labor. Most female employees served as unskilled labor in agriculture (Stichter 1977). As found in most developing nations (Boserup 1970), those who joined the nonagricultural sector (e.g., manufacturing) tended to concentrate in low paying jobs. For pay, existing evidence reveals that early female entrants into formal employment earned considerably less than male employees (see e.g., Kenya Colony and Protectorate 1955; Stichter 1977). During 1925, for example, women earned 10-12 shillings per month for unskilled labor in agriculture while men earned between 12-14 shillings (Stichter 1977). During the 1950s women's earnings in Kenya were uniformly less than those of men in all branches of industry and in domestic services; in agriculture they earned about half of what men earned (Kenya Colony and Protectorate 1955).

It was in light of the above inequalities that the Kenyan government, soon after independence (1963), adopted an ideology of African Socialism that was committed to bringing about equality among men and women in terms of equal participation in development and an equal share of its rewards and opportunities (Miller and Yeager 1994; Republic of Kenya 1965; Stichter 1977). The new ideology,

it could be argued, symbolized a desire by the government to promote equal representation and treatment for the sexes within the various institutions in the country, thereby conferring to Kenyan women both an equal role in development and an equal share of its rewards and opportunities. This equality has not been reached, however, and in fact, there has been very little progress, with even some reversals (Francis 1995; House-Midamba 1990, 1996; Kameri-Mbote and Kiai 1993; Kibwana 1995; Kobia 1993; Landau 1995; Miller and Yeager 1994; Sørensen 1992; von Bülow 1991, 1992). Although current gender inequality in Kenya is the consequence of a number of factors including cultural traditions and norms, religion, patriarchy, and government policy, there are two factors that standout in understanding present-day inequalities. The first is the unanticipated consequences of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) imposed in the early 1980s by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The programs were primarily macroeconomic strategies emphasizing economic liberalism, deregulation of prices, privatization of public enterprises and cutbacks in social services and employment. They were designed to aid the fragile and unstable governments and economic and social institutions of the post-colonial African nations. These programs are viewed as unsuccessful by many, however.

SAPs have failed to correct the deepening social, economic and political crises. If anything, adjustment measures have contributed to economic deterioration and generated political and social crises in Kenya (Nzomo 1995 : 48). SAPs are accused of neglecting entirely human and social adjustment problems, and '…the social costs have weighed most heavily on the low-income population, the vast majority of whom are women' (Nzomo 1995 : 43).

The second critical factor perpetuating gender inequalities is the Kenya Constitution. Discrimination on the basis of race, place of origin, political opinions, or color or greed is not allowed, but 'discrimination on the basis of sex is not expressly outlawed by the Constitution of Kenya or any labour relations law' (Kibwana 1995 : 14).

Although gender based inequalities in Kenya predate independence, it was not until the mid 1980s that Kenyan women began to openly voice their concerns about their disadvantaged position. Specifically, the United Nations Decade for Women Conference that was held in Nairobi in 1985 seems to have ignited a desire among Kenyan women to evaluate their position in society and assert themselves in the struggle for equality with men. Soon after the conference, the subject of the unfair economic and social role of women in development in Kenya assumed a prominent position. In the debate that has ensued, Kenyan women have been concerned with equality of opportunity in education, the labor market, government (political) appointments, and political representation (Hughes and Mwiria 1989).

The prospects for reducing gender inequalities depend on altering culturally embedded attitudes about sex roles; changing laws about sex discrimination; government and nongovernment organizations being more affirmative about the employment and treatment of women; the active involvement of traditionally important women's organizations; and the active involvement of women themselves in promoting gender equality (Khasiani 1993; Kinuthia 1993. Nzomo 1993, 1995; Thomas-Slayter and Rocheleau 1995). With the resilience of patriarchy, the absence of women in positions of power, and the lack of legal recourse, the recent literature on gender inequality seems to be pointing to two of these factors: greater active involvement of women and the increased reliance on women's organizations.

There exists a remarkable tradition of women's organizations in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Kenya (House-Midamba 1996; Landau 1995; Nzomo 1993; Sørensen 1992; von Bülow 1991, 1992). These authors document the importance of these groups (both formal and informal)

throughout this century in combating patriarchy and economic deprivation. As a recent example, House-Midamba (1996) documents how women's organizations were important in the recent shift from single party to multi-party elections in Kenya.

The direct personal involvement of women is stressed in the section on women and participation in decision making in the 1995 volume on the 'Women and Autonomy' seminar (Nzomo 1995 : 52-53):

> Reliance on government action, its benevolence and good faith, may not prove very useful in attaining women's empowerment. Women must therefore first and foremost find autonomous channels of empowering themselves which are independent of government. Kenyan women may for example need to take the initiative in transforming socio-cultural attitudes and values that obstruct their advancement. There is need for women to empower themselves.

In sum, there still exist numerous and extreme forms of gender inequality in Kenya. Although legal and structural changes are needed to reduce this inequality, it is believed that women must personally become involved, individually and through women's organizations, if change is to occur. This involvement requires not only an awareness of the inequality but the perception that it is unjust. As argued above from the perspective of justice theories and research, it is people's perceptions of injustice (rather than any 'objective' inequality or injustice) that affects their attitudes and behaviors. There is little valid and reliable data on the degree to which injustice is perceived by either women or men in Kenya. Our objective is to provide this documentation. Implicit in this documentation is the hypothesis that women will perceive greater injustice than men.

Data and Methods

The Sample

The data were collected in Kenya between November 1991 and July 1992 (Mulinge and Mueller 1998). Surveys (self-administered questionnaires) were administered to a probability sample of 1850 technically trained agricultural workers (individuals who have formal training in agriculture or in an agriculturally related field such as plant breeding, horticulture, agronomy, plant pathology, entomology, and soil conservation) employed in three modern employment sectors as follows: public sector, 1,102 respondents; parastatal (semi-public) sector, 503 respondents; and private sector, 245 respondents. In 1991 the agricultural sector employed 272,000 or 18.9 % of those in the modern (formal) sector labor force in the Kenya.

To obtain a broad sample of agricultural technicians, it was necessary to sample the private, public and parastatal (semi-public) sectors. The private sector includes firms owned and funded by international or local commercial companies and/or groups of investors with the sole goal to generate profits through user charges for goods and/or services. They operate in a competitive market. Five private organizations were selected and contacted. Four agreed to cooperate: BAT Kenya Limited, Brooke Bond Kenya Limited, Kenya Breweries Limited and East African Industries Limited. All agricultural technicians who were not on annual or study leave were given questionnaires.

The public sector refers to the Ministry of Agriculture, the major employer of agricultural graduates trained in the local universities, colleges and institutes.[1] The sample was drawn from the division of Agricultural Education, and specifically, the District Agricultural Extension Services branch of this division. From this division, six administrative districts (Bungoma, Embu, Nairobi, Nyeri and South Nyanza) were randomly selected from the 41 districts in the country. In each sampled district all

agricultural technicians who were not on annual or study leave were given questionnaires.

Organizations in the semi-public (parastatal) sector are semi-autonomous government monopolies established through an act of parliament with the primary purpose of offering government controlled services such as power and lighting, telephone and postal services and research or the development of technical knowledge and innovations to the public. The largest of these, the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), was established after the collapse of the East African Community in 1977. In 1979 KARI was established to conduct research in agriculture, as well as in numerous related areas. In the semi-public sector, research centers rather than administrative districts were the sampling units. Eight research centers from the 24 centers engaged in agricultural research were randomly selected. Questionnaires were distributed to all agricultural technicians on duty at the time of the survey.

Because agricultural production is the mainstay of Kenya's economy, these agricultural technicians in these three sectors are critical to the economic well-being of the nation. These technicians are either engaged in educating farmers about better farming techniques, commonly referred to as extension services, (as is the case for those in the public and private sectors) or in agricultural research (as is the case for those in the parastatal sector). Also, although the headquarters for the organizations are mostly in urban centers, the technicians operate out of district towns or rural trading centers.

Structurally, the organizations in these three sectors are not significantly different from each other nor are they unusual relative to organizations in the industrialized nations in the West. Organizations in the three sectors are characterized by hierarchical authority structures. In all three sectors, education level is the primary determinant of the beginning job level. All sectors have internal labor markets (ILMs) with the early promotions in the public and semi-public sectors being based mainly on tenure. Those employed in the private sector usually have 'proved' themselves in the public or semi-public sectors first. Seniority based promotions are somewhat less frequent in the private sector. No striking differences in management styles are found among the Kenyan organizations in the three sectors, nor are they notably different from those found in the West. This is understandable considering that virtually all organizations in Kenya have been established utilizing British and American structural models. Indeed, most of these organizations have at one time or another relied on Western expatriates in fashioning their organizational and management structures. Some, and especially those in the private sector, still have the highest positions in their hierarchies occupied by expatriates.

The overall response rate for the study was 78.22% (1447 cases). The sample size used in the analysis is based on eliminating cases according to a listwise deletion procedure. This resulted in a sample size of 1,367 cases used in the analysis.

Measures

Perceptions of both distributive justice and procedural justice are measured. Distributive justice is captured by an often-used and validated general justice measure (Iverson and Kuruvilla 1995; Price and Mueller 1986; Wallace 1995). Procedural justice is measured by a scale developed for this study. Both measures capture the degree to which the individual perceives that s/he is fairly treated in the workplace.

Four items using Likert scales with five response categories (strongly agree; agree; uncertain; disagree; strongly disagree) are used for the *general distributive justice scale*: (1) I am fairly

rewarded considering the responsibilities that I exercise (money and recognition are examples of rewards); (2) I am not fairly rewarded taking into account the amount of education and training I have (R: reverse coded); (3) I am fairly rewarded for the amount of effort I put forth; (4) I am fairly rewarded in view of the amount of experience that I have. As the content of the items indicates, this scale asks for a justice perception based on taking into account the person's inputs (e.g., education, training, effort and experience) and one's outcomes (rewards). Thus, it measures equity based justice. The range of possible values is 4 to 20 when the items are summed to form the scale. The alpha reliability coefficient is .87.

As described above, procedural justice refers to the fairness of the procedures and methods used to distribute workplace rewards, rather than the fairness of the distribution per se. It is measured by four items (with five Likert response categories) designed for this study that ask about the degree to which promotion procedures are perceived as proper or improper. The four items are: (1) promotions and pay increases in this organization are based primarily on how well you do your work; (2) the decision making processes in my organization are unacceptable to me (R: reverse coded); (3) the criteria used for promotion in this organization are unacceptable to me (R); (4) promotions in this organization are based primarily on 'pull' and 'politics'(R). When the items are summed, the range is 4 to 20 and the reliability alpha is .85. Procedural justice is correlated at .27 with distributive justice for women. The correlation is .36 for men.

Analysis

Analysis of variance is used to compare perception differences across the three sectors and t-tests are used to determine if women and men differ in their perceptions of these two types of justice. The t-tests are conducted for the total sample and separately for the public, parastatal and private sectors. The small number of females in the private sector (N= 5) makes gender comparisons and t-tests for this sector essentially meaningless. Nevertheless, we present these data to provide as complete a picture as possible. The fact that so few women are employed in the private sector speaks for itself.

Results

Table 1 compares male and female perceptions of justice for the total sample. The 'Total' column gives us some idea of the degree to which these respondents perceived justice or injustice. For the distributive justice scale, where the possible range is 0-20, with a high score indicating high perceived justice, the mean is 10.9, indicating neither high nor low perceived justice.[4] For procedural justice, where the range also is 0 to 20, the mean of 9.6 also indicates no extreme feelings about justice/injustice. Our primary concern is with gender differences. For the total sample (see Table 1) females perceive less distributive and less procedural justice.

Table 1. Mean Gender Differences in Justice Perceptions for the Total Sample

Justice Perception	Total	Male	Female
Distributive Justice	10.91 (4.04)	11.24* (4.09)	10.09 (3.79)
Procedural Justice	9.61 (4.02)	9.98* (4.12)	8.70 (3.64)
N	1367	975	392

[a] Values in parentheses are standard deviations.
The possible range for distributive justice and procedural justice is 0-20.
*p < .05; All are 1-tailed t-tests for the gender mean differences.

Table 2 compares male and female perceptions of justice across the three sectors, and within each sector. Before examining gender differences it is meaningful to look at sector differences (see the 'Total' columns under the public, parastatal and private headings). Analysis of variance, with post hoc Scheffé tests (see table note b), shows greater perceived justice for both justice variables for private sector employees compared with public and parastatal employees. Also, public employees (9.38) perceive greater procedural justice than parastatal employees (8.58). In general, the greater the role of the private sector in the workplace, the greater the perceptions of justice. Put the other way, any involvement of the government (public and parastatal sectors) seems to instill a greater perception of *in*justice on the part of those employed in those sectors; the private sector clearly instills perceptions of justice.

Table 2. Mean Gender Differences in Justice Perceptions by Economic Sector[a]

Justice Perception	Public			Parastatal			Private		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Distributive Justice[b]	10.43 (4.09)	10.56 (4.19)	10.22 (3.92)	10.45 (3.45)	10.66* (3.48)	9.76 (3.30)	13.62 (3.82)	13.74* (3.73)	8.80 (4.55)

Procedural Justice[b]	9.38	9.66*	8.92	8.58	8.77*	7.97	12.44	12.50	10.00
	(3.72)	(3.76)	(3.60)	(3.90)	(3.94)	(3.71)	(4.10)	(4.10)	(3.39)
N	775	481	294	387	294	93	205	200	5

[a] Values in parentheses are standard deviations. The possible range for distributive justice and procedural justice is 0-20. [b] ANOVA with post hoc Scheffé tests for sector differences showed greater perceived distributive and procedural justice for all private sector employees compared with public and parastatal employees. Public employees perceive greater procedural justice than parastatal employees. *$p < .05$; All are 1-tailed t-tests for the gender mean differences for the particular sector.

Comparing men and women within each of the three economic sectors reveals some sector differences (see Table 2), but does not alter our finding that women consistently perceive less justice. In the public sector, where the government ostensibly has taken steps to increase gender equality, women still perceive less justice, but only for procedural justice. In the parastatal sector, distributive justice and procedural justice are perceived less by women. Finally, the data for the private sector show that females perceive less distributive justice than males.

In sum, in no gender comparisons do men perceive less justice than their female counterparts, and there are six (of a possible eight) comparisons in which women perceive significantly less justice than men.

Discussion and Conclusions

Gender inequality is a global issue that developing nations like Kenya are attempting to confront. From a justice perspective, confronting inequality involves making changes in both allocation procedures and the actual distribution of rewards. By most standards, this objective gender justice (equality) has not been attained in either developed or developing nations, but the gender gap remains larger in developing nations. Creating objective justice is only one piece of the puzzle, however. An individual's attitudes and behaviors in reaction to injustice are a function of that person's subjective assessment of what is just. On one hand, if people perceive justice in the workplace, even when there is injustice, then they are going to be satisfied and not proponents of change. On the other hand, perceived injustice can lead to attempts at change even when justice exists by some objective standard. In either situation, it is the person's perception of justice that is the critical factor in whether that person will be active in supporting change. For this reason, our goal in this study has been to provide national data on gender differences in perceptions of justice in the modern workplace in Kenya. Such data are critical in assessing what women and men believe about the fairness of procedures and the distribution of rewards in the modern Kenyan workplace.

Using two measures of perceptions of justice we found considerable evidence that women working as agricultural technicians perceive greater workplace injustice than their male counterparts. Specifically, without regard to employment sector, women perceive greater injustice than men--in a general sense when they are asked about their rewards given their inputs (distributive justice) and with regard to procedures used by the organization in making promotions (procedural justice). When employment sector is considered, it is only in the parastatal sector where women perceive less justice for both types of justice. There are three questions to be considered. First, why do Kenyan women perceive less justice than men? Second, why is it the parastatal sector for which gender differences

exist for both types of justice? Third, what are the implications of these gender differences for changes in gender inequality in Kenya? We address all three questions.

First, why do women perceive less justice? The basic causal argument of the equity version of justice theory is that if women have inputs that are similar to those of men, but their outcomes are lower than men's, they will evaluate the situation as unjust. Additional data from the sample allows us to compare women and men on the inputs of education and work motivation and the outcomes of earnings, benefits and number of past promotions. Women technicians earn 4299 Kenya shillings a month while their male counterparts earn 6677 shillings; women receive fewer benefits than men (5.38 to 5.89); women have been promoted fewer times than the men (.89 to 1.09).[3] These three differences are significant at the .05 probability level. However, there are no significant gender differences for two critical inputs: mean education (13.79 to 13.82) or mean work motivation (12.22 to 12.18).[5] Given these *similar inputs*, but *different outcomes* that favor men, the differences in justice perceptions we have found are consistent with justice hypotheses. If women are comparing their outcome to input ratio to the same ratio of their male counterparts, women should perceive less justice. This is precisely what we found.

Second, why were there gender differences for both types of justice only in the parastatal sector? This was not anticipated or hypothesized on the basis of justice theory, but we can offer a plausible explanation. The agricultural technicians sampled in the public and private sectors were essentially all extension personnel whereas those employed in the parastatal sector worked in agriculture research centers. The extension personnel work independently of each other, whereas the researchers work in groups and must collaborate in solving problems. It is in these collaborative settings (parastatal) where gender differences are more likely to be perceived on a day to day basis and thus be translated into justice perceptions. Certainly justice theorists would argue that the frequency with which injustices are experienced would positively influence the perceptions one has of any injustice that exists, and these group settings in the parastatal sector would produce more frequent experiences of injustice. This causal logic is important because it suggests that women who work side by side with men are those more likely to perceive injustice than those who work more on their own. Modernization will certainly produce more work situations where women and men work together, and it is likely that women and men will be jointly involved in the organizations and associations supportive of change (Thomas-Slayter and Rocheleau 1995 : 17). Our data and arguments from justice theories about women using men as reference points suggest that such situations could be an unexpected source of increased perceived injustice for women.

The third question concerns the implications of our findings for the likelihood of change in Kenya and in developing countries in general. The major issues are what is referred to as the 'paradox of the contented female worker' and whether perceived injustices are translated into action and change. There are both micro- and macro-implications to be considered. The micro-component refers to whether individuals who perceive injustice actually translate this perception into personal dissatisfaction with the source of the injustice, and because of this, act in some way to restore justice. The macro-component refers to how such injustices perceived at the individual level can be translated into change at the societal level. We address the micro-level concern first.

There is now a large body of Western research (Crosby 1982; Hodson 1989; Mueller and Wallace 1996; Phelan 1994;) documenting that women, who by objective standards, are not equitably treated and rewarded in the workplace when compared with men, are *not* less satisfied with their jobs or less committed to their employer. This has been called the 'paradox of the contented female worker'

(Crosby 1982). The inference in these studies is that women do not consider this objective inequity to be unjust and thus they are not less satisfied or less committed than men. Because this paradox is consistently found, considerable effort has been devoted to trying to explain why objective injustice does not lead to dissatisfied female workers.[6]

There appears to be no paradox in Kenya - educated women in the modern sector, who by objective standards are treated unfairly, perceive less justice than men in the same work settings. We believe this is explained by a combination of four factors. First, there actually has been less done objectively in Kenya than in the West that is directed specifically at reducing gender inequities. Although seniority as the basis for pay and promotions is institutionalized (especially in the public sector), there is no Office of Economic Opportunity, no affirmative action policy and no comparable worth programs and most important, no constitutional law against discrimination on the basis of sex. Second, the women's movement is in more of an infant stage in Kenya, as compared with Western nations. It was not until the mid-1980s that concerted efforts were made by women to create a greater awareness of gender injustices. As a consequence, there has not been enough time for a 'mellowing' of views about gender injustices. Third, and related to the previous point, there have been gains by women in access to education, labor force participation and pay over the past couple decades (Hughes and Mwiria 1989), but as reported above, women still lag considerably behind men. Relative deprivation arguments (Davies 1962; 1969) claim that following a period of high expectations and accompanying rewards, discontent will be highest when rewards start to taper off but the expectations still remain high. It is possible that these women, all of whom have been educated for employment in the modern sector, have found that their workplace experiences do not match their lofty expectations, and this has been translated into perceptions of greater injustice. Fourth, our data indirectly suggest that women are using men as their comparison group in assessing whether there is injustice. This is because the men are rewarded better in terms of pay and management positions, and this should lead to perceptions of injustice on the part of the women. If women were comparing themselves with other educated women in the workforce (as is claimed in explaining the paradox found for Western women), then we would expect these women to perceive justice, which, of course, they do not. Also, if Kenyan women were comparing themselves with the conditions of women in the past and the uneducated women in the traditional Kenyan workforce, then they should perceive justice, because their own pay, benefits and promotion opportunities are far superior to those of working women in the past and those not in the modern sector. However, and to reiterate our initial point, if women are comparing themselves with male agricultural technicians in the modern sector, then they would be expected to perceive injustice, as they indeed do. In sum, Kenyan women may have improved their position dramatically relative to women in the past, but they still lag behind their male counterparts. This is salient to them, and they view it as unjust. Put another way, there is no 'false consciousness' on the part of these women.

We now address the likelihood that such awareness of injustice can be translated into societal level change - the macro level concern. At the 'Women and Autonomy in Kenya: Policy and Legal Framework' Seminar (February 17-18, 1995) a number of recommendations were made that were specifically directed at producing greater gender equality. Among the recommendations offered are those summarized by Nzomo (1995 : 52-53): (1) government and nongovernment organizations must actively work at removing negative attitudes and social practices that promote discrimination against women, (2) women's organizations must play a leading role in supporting change, (3) social support systems are needed to aid women in meeting the demands associated with their multiple household

and work roles in Kenyan society, (4) women must find channels independent of the government for empowering themselves, and (5) private and public employers must actively promote fairness in the workplace.

Explicit in these recommendations and in those by many others (e.g., House-Midamba 1996; Landau 1995; von Bülow 1991, 1992; Sørensen 1992; Thomas-Slayter and Rocheleau 1995) is the need for active involvement of women, individually and in organizations, in working toward gender equality. The consensus seems clearly to be that without their active involvement, equality will be slow in coming, if at all. Justice theory and research is clear about what is necessary for individuals to become upset and attempt to alter current conditions - the individuals must perceive injustice associated with the current conditions. Our research has shown that highly educated women in the formal sector do indeed perceive greater injustice in the workplace than do their male counterparts. *The importance of them perceiving injustice and not just inequality is critical*. Inequality, if institutionalized, as is true in Kenya, becomes internalized and accepted from generation to generation through socialization. When the inequality is interpreted in moral (justice) terms, the potential exists for the kinds of involvement of women recommended above. To be stressed, however, is that our data indicate that the potential for this involvement exists; there is no guarantee that the necessary action will be taken. A number of questions are yet to be answered. Are these perceptions of injustice strong enough to lead to active involvement of these women in the kinds of women's organizations so historically important in Kenya and viewed by most as so critical leading to change? Will these educated women identify enough with the uneducated rural women to work for their equality? Do less educated rural women (the majority in Kenya) also perceive injustices, or do they only perceive inequalities that they have learned to accept? Are gender based inequalities outside the workplace (e.g., household, healthcare, politics) also perceived as injustices? Will the strongly encouraged (World Bank 1992) downsizing of the public sector (where at least women and men perceive the same level of distributive justice) and the privatization of the parastatal sector have unexpected consequences for gender inequalities and injustices? If the public sector is reduced in size and privatization expands, will Kenya experience what we found for the private sector—a segment of the modern economy that largely excludes women? Our research has not answered these questions, but perhaps it will spur interest in approaching gender inequalities from the perspective of whether such inequalities are perceived as injustices.

To conclude, we must offer the caveat that our analysis was based on one developing society, only modern sector employees, and a relatively homogeneous segment within that sector. Whether our findings would be replicated in the larger population remains an unanswered question. However, we have used a relatively large national sample and provided data important to documenting perceptions of injustice in Kenya, and we have strongly argued that the perceptions that exist signal the existence of an important ingredient of change. This is far from trivial, because as Hegtvedt and Markovsky remark, the '...issues of justice and injustice are fundamental problems inherent in the maintenance of social order, the existence of inequality, and the fomenting of social change' (1995 : 257).

Acknowledgment

Notes

1. There was a structural reduction policy during this time in Kenya to reduce the size of the public sector, but there were no forced layoffs. Instead, early retirement was encouraged with lump-sum monetary payments. This was referred to as 'the big handshake'.

2. The means for data using a very similar scale are as follows: South Korean teachers (10.7) (Jo 1995); employees in a U.S. Veterans Administration hospital (11.4) (Agho 1993); Canadian lawyers (13.4) (Wallace 1995); U.S. Air Force medical personnel (15.2) (Price and Kim 1993). These comparative data suggest that the Kenyan employees perceive somewhat less justice than has been found with a similar scale in Western studies.

3. Using a list of 18 benefits (e. g., life insurance, paid sick leave, paid vacation, savings plan) employees were asked to mark the benefits they currently receive from their employer. The number marked was recorded for each respondent. The values given represent the means; women averaged 5.38 benefits, while the men average 5.89. Number of times promoted is the number of promotions received since joining the organization.

4. The means for data using a very similar scale are as follows: South Korean teachers (10.7) (Jo 1995); employees in a U.S. Veterans Administration hospital (11.4) (Agho 1993); Canadian lawyers (13.4) (Wallace 1995); U.S. Air Force medical personnel (15.2) (Price and Kim 1993). These comparative data suggest that the Kenyan employees perceive somewhat less justice than has been found with a similar scale in Western studies.

5. Education is years of schooling. Work motivation is a 3-item scale that measures the degree to which the employee feels work is central to one's life. The items are: (1) work is something people should get involved in most of the time; (2) work should only be a small part of one's life (reverse coded); (3) work should be considered central in life. Likert response categories running from strongly agree to strongly disagree were used. The items were summed to obtain the score for each employee. Means by gender are reported. The range of the scale is 1 to 15, with a high score indicating strong work motivation.

6. Some of the arguments have been as follows. (1) Women have different values. They value intrinsic rewards (like friendly workplaces and supportive supervisors) more than extrinsic rewards. As a consequence, the extrinsic reward differences usually found are not important to them and therefore they do not perceive injustices. (2) Women have been socialized (in childhood or in the workplace) to expect less than men. So when their rewards are less, they do not perceive less justice. Phelan (1994) calls this the entitlement explanation. (3) Women compare themselves to other women rather than to other men. Because other women are receiving rewards similar to their own, they do not perceive greater injustices than the men. Although there have been no powerful tests of this third argument, it is the explanation most have relied on to account for the paradox (Hodson 1989; Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995; Mueller and Wallace 1996).

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Community Attitudes Towards Casinos and the Estimated Magnitude of Problem Gambling: The Mpumalanga Case

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1. Introduction

Over the past three years the casino industry in the Province of Mpumalanga, South Africa, has established itself as a prominent economic and social force. It provides direct jobs for 1 150 employees while more than 1 million visitors, who wagered approximately R3 billion, frequented the casinos in 2000 (Ligthelm 2001(b):2). Since the casinos in Mpumalanga were the first to be established under the new gaming dispensation in South Africa, they have been in operation for a sufficient length of time to allow proper evaluation of aspects such as community attitudes towards casino gambling, levels of participation in gambling and the extent to which gambling is seen as a social problem.

This report presents the results of a community survey aimed at monitoring community perceptions of and trends in gambling behaviour. The results of the survey also provide an indication of the possible magnitude of 'at risk' (problem) gambling in Mpumalanga. This information could be of great value in policy development and decision making with respect to the government's endeavour to design appropriate measures of the casino industry (*Sake Beeld* 2001:3).

2. Research Methodology

The survey was designed to encompass the whole income spectrum of the community. Two sub-surveys were conducted, one telephonically and the other through personal interviews. In-home access to Telkom telephones was used as a proxy to distinguish between the affluent and poor segments of the population. Since the income differential and socio-demographic differences (for example work status and educational level) have been found to correlate closely with Telkom telephone subscription/nonsubscription, access to Telkom telephones was regarded as a valid variable for distinguishing between the two segments (Ligthelm 2000:35).

2.2 Survey Methodology: Telephone Survey

The survey was conducted among the Mpumalanga population irrespective of the location of sample elements In other words, the survey therefore included inhabitants of the three towns in which the casinos are located as well as the non-casino towns. The survey was conducted among 450 households. Telephonic contact was made with households after 19h00 on weekdays or during weekends to allow for randomness in the gender composition and work status of respondents. Confirmation of age was requested of respondents to ensure that only persons 18 years and older participated in the survey. The 2000 Mpumalanga telephone directory was used as

a sample frame to randomly select the households to be interviewed. The sampling procedure culminated in the following number of useable questionnaires by selected area (Table 1).

Table 1: Number of Sample Units by Area

District	Casino	Sample units	
		Number	**%**
Nelspruit, White River, Nsikazi	Emnotweni	98	22,0
Highveld Ridge	Graceland	25	5,6
Witbank, Middelburg	Champions	110	24,7
Other magisterial districts	None	212	47,7
Total	-	445	100,0

The same prestructured questionnaire was used for the collection of data in both subsurveys and was pretested prior to conducting the survey in October and November 2000.

2.3 **Survey Methodology: Personal Interviews**

As indicated above, use of the telephone directory as a sample frame excluded non-Telkom subscribers from the telephone survey. To ensure the inclusion of respondents without Telkom subscription in the face-to-face survey, a screening question was asked at the beginning of the interview to establish whether or not sample elements had access to a Telkom telephone at home. A negative answer to this question ensured inclusion in the survey. Households located in the three casino towns were selected for interviews. The following areas were included:
- Emnotweni casino: Nelspruit, White River, Kabokweni, Matsulu, Kanyamazane and Pienaar
- Graceland casino: Secunda
- Champions casino: Witbank and Middelburg.

Personal interviews were conducted with 150 respondents, 50 in each of the three casino towns. Interviews were conducted at various locations in and adjacent to each town. To ensure the inclusion of households living in areas with the lowest Telkom telephone penetration, the following locations were selected for interviews: shopping malls in close proximity to taxi ranks and shopping malls within township areas. Since there are no proper sample frames for households without Telkom subscription, the sample units (household members) were selected by interviewers at the identified locations. The interviewers were requested to pose the screening question (Telkom subscriber or not) and continue with the personal interview if respondents were eligible for inclusion.
Estimates show that 85 % of housing structures (formal and informal) in Mpumalanga do not have any Telkom telephone connections. Consequently, the weighted total presented in the article, where Telkom subscribers and nonsubscribers are jointly shown, is weighted as follows: Telkom subscribers 0,15 and non-Telkom subscribers 0,85.

3. **Survey Results and Findings**

Figure 1 shows the response to the question 'Has **any member of your household** participated in any of the following gaming activities during the past 12 months?' The figure shows a fairly high participation rate of Mpumalanga households in the National Lottery and casino gambling. Almost three out of every four (75,3 %) households participated in the National Lottery during 12 months preceding the survey conducted in November 2000. The figure for involvement in casino gambling amounted to almost one in every two households (45,5 %) during the year preceding the survey. These percentages correlates closely with a similar question asked in a survey in the Vaal Triangle area in 2001 where 80 % and 45 % of respondents confirmed their participation in the National Lottery and casino gambling respectively (Ligthelm 2001:20). A considerably smaller percentage of households participated in other forms of gaming, namely:
- machines outside casinos: 20,6 % of households
- wagering horses: 20,3 % of households
- sports betting: 8,9 % of households
- internet/on-line gaming: 0,6 % of households.

It is also interesting to note that almost one fifth (18,0 %) of Mpumalanga households did not participate in any form of gaming during 2000. The 20,6 % involvement in gambling on machines outside casinos is interesting in the light of the fact that route and site operations are not yet legalized in South Africa. It should further be recognized that participation in any form of gaming by Mpumalanga residents does not necessary imply that participation took place within the province.

**Figure 1: Participation of Mpumalanga Residents in Gaming Activities**

Figure 2 shows the response to the question: 'How would **you** respond to the following statement: Casino gambling is an important leisure activity for South Africans?' Both positive and negative responses to the statement manifested prominently. Just less than a third of respondents mildly/strongly disagree (29,6 %) with the statement. On the other side of the scale more than half mildly/strongly agree (54,2 %) with the statement. These two sides of the pendulum are even clearer if only strongly disagree and strongly agree are considered. Almost a quarter of respondents (24,8 %) strongly disagree with the statement while 40,5 % strongly agree.

Figure 2: Response to the statement: Casino gambling is an important leisure activity in South Africa


Figure 3 depicts the personal views of respondents on casino gambling. Among those expressing an opinion, the majority 58,8 % believe casino gambling is acceptable, 21,3 % occupy a neutral stance and only about one fifth (19,9 %) find casino gambling unacceptable.

Figure 3: Personal views of respondents on casino gambling

The above findings for the Mpumalanga population correlate closely with a similar question posed to the United States population in 1999. One study showed that 57 % of the US population find casino gambling acceptable while 15 % are opposed to it. (AGA 1999:10).

Table 2 contains the responses to the question: 'What would you regard as the most positive effect of casino gambling?' Interviewers were requested not to indicate any possible examples to respondents to avoid repetition of the example as the answer. The figure reflects the general responses of the 60 % of the respondents who answered the question. The rest of the respondents (40 %) either indicated that they don't know or that they can't say.

The most important positive aspects mentioned by respondents are winning money (49,1 %) and entertainment (35,6 %). Some less important positive aspects indicated by respondents are the creation of job opportunities (6,2 %), safe environment within which gambling can be practiced

(4,6 %) and the enhancement of tourism (3,1 %).

Table 2: Positive Effects of Casino Gambling as Perceived by Respondents

| Response	Percentage
Winning money	49,1
Entertainment/relaxation	35,6
Creation of job opportunities	6,2
It is safe/no fighting/fair gambling unlike in streets	4,6
Encourages tourism	3,1
Nontaxable income	1,1
Generating funds for the country/welfare	0,2

The negative aspects of casino gambling mentioned by respondents are contained in table 3. As is the case with the positive aspects, 60 % of respondents mentioned specific negative aspects. The figure reflects these responses. For Mpumalanga as a whole, just more than half the negative effects mentioned by the respondents, relate to losing/wasting money (33,1 %) and family problems (financial and relationships) (18,8 %). Other negative effects reported during the interviews are the incurrence of debt (9,6 %), the addictive nature of casino gambling (8,9 %), the creation of poverty (6,5 %) and community and social problems (5,4 %).

Table 3: What would you regard as the most negative effect of casino gambling?

Response	Percentage
Losing all your money/wasting money	33,1
Family problems (financial and relationships)	18,8
Debt/gamble into debt	9,6
Addictive	8,9
Various reasons	6,7
Impoverishment of people/poverty	6,5
Community/social problems	5,4
Not enough jobs created	4,5
Other	3,4
Crime outside casinos/dangerous after winning money	3,1
Total	100,0

The results of the survey confirm that approximately one third of the Mpumalanga population visited the Mpumalanga casino nearest to their residence during the twelve months preceding the survey. This figure closely resembles the 29 % of USA households that visited a USA casino during 1998 (AGA 1999:21). The visiting pattern of casino patrons to their nearest Mpumalanga casino is shown in figure 5. The weekly (29, %), monthly (30,9 %) and less often than monthly (37,5 %) visitors are fairly evenly distributed with only 2,1 % of the patrons visiting the casino on a daily basis.

Figure 4: Visiting Pattern to Mpumalanga Casinos

This visiting pattern is slightly higher than the following pattern reported for Australia's Melbourne casino in 1997 (Sharley 1997:26):
- Daily – weekly: 24 %
- Fortnightly – monthly: 26 %
- Every 2-6 months: 29 %
- Once yearly: 9 %
- First time: 11 %

The possible extent of problem gambling in the community was established by the following question: 'Do any of your family members currently have casino gambling-related problems?' No less than 5,7 % of respondents affirmed knowledge of a family member experiencing gambling-related problems. The results also show a greater prevalence of casino gambling-related problems in poorer households (7,2 %) (i.e. households without Telkom telephones) compared with more affluent households (2,7 %) (households with access to Telkom telephones). For purposes of this question, 'family members' is interpreted in a broader sense, including family other than only household members. Some remarks on interpreting the response to this question, are in order. Since more than one respondent may have family connections with a person experiencing casino gambling-related problems some over-reporting may have occurred. This is particularly true for the shopping mall personal interviews where contact with respondents is concentrated in a relatively small population and area. On the other hand, underreporting may result from the sensitive nature of the question and a possible reluctance to divulge family-related issues to strangers (interviewers). It should also be taken into account that the family member with problems might not necessarily reside within Mpumalanga.

A few positive and negative effects of casino gambling were assessed through respondents indicating whether a number of statements were applicable to them. Although an extensive list of such statements could have been included in a questionnaire (see University of Western Sydney 1996: 43-46), the telephone survey allowed for the inclusion of only a few statements. Hence, only four positive and four negative statements covering financial, work-related, relationship and personal aspects were included. Table 4 summarises the response of gamblers who frequent their local casinos to these statements.

Table 4: Would you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding casino Gaming? Subscribers and Nonsubscribers

Statement	P/N[1]	Weighted total			
		Agree	Disagree	Can't say	Total
(a) When I gamble I risk only what I can afford	P	50,5	36,7	12,7	100,0
(b) Gambling has given me pleasure and fun	P	82,3	9,0	8,7	100,0
(c) I have gone gambling with family and friends	P	77,3	16,8	5,9	100,0
(d) When I gamble I feel relaxed	P	75,8	13,8	10,3	100,0
(e) I've borrowed money to gamble	N	15,3	76,9	7,8	100,0
(f) My gambling has stopped me working/studying efficiently	N	5,2	86,9	7,8	100,0
(g) I spend more than I can afford on gambling	N	13,8	75,9	10,3	100,0
(h) I have been for help with my gambling	N	4,6	85,4	10,0	100,0

[1] P = positive statement and N = negative statement

Although the reaction to the statements in table 4 shows fairly satisfactory responses, some instances of problems related to gambling can be detected. The statements, as contained in the questionnaire, are presented below. (Reaction to the statements was requested only from respondents visiting a casino during the preceding year.)
Statement: '*When I gamble I risk only what I can afford*'.
Only 50,5 % of respondents agree with the statement while 36,7 % disagree and 12,7 % 'can't say'. This points to the fact that probably more than a third of respondents gamble more than they can afford.
Statement: '*I've borrowed money to gamble*'.
No less than 15,3 % of respondents agree with the statement and 7,8 % 'can't say. This response suggests that approximately one in every five patrons borrow money to gamble.
Statement: '*I spend more than I can afford on gambling*'.
13,8 % of respondents agree with the statement, 10,3 % 'can't say' and 75,9 % disagree. This distribution correlates closely with the response to the above statement and presents the probable reason for borrowing money to gamble.
Statement: '*Gambling has given me pleasure and fun*'.
9,0 % of respondents disagree with the statement, a further 8,7 % 'can't say' and 82,3 % agree. This confirms that although the majority of patrons regard casino gambling as a leisure activity, a sizeable portion of patrons do not experience any pleasure from their gambling activities.
Statement: '*When I gamble I feel relaxed*'.
Only 76,8 % agree with this statement while 13,8 % disagree and 10,3 % 'can't say'. This distribution largely resembles that of the response to the financial and personal statements confirming that probably one in every five persons experience some degree of uneasiness regarding their gambling.
Statement: '*My gambling has stopped me working/studying efficiently*'.
5,2 % of the respondents agree with the statement while a further 7,8 % 'can't say'.
Statement: '*I have been for help with my gambling*'.
4,6 % agree with the statement and 10 % 'can't say'.
The above findings suggest that approximately one in every five respondents (approximately 20 %) experienced some or other problem with their gambling. Some of these problems are of a financial nature (spend more than can be afforded or borrow money to gamble) while others are personal (do not find gambling relaxing or fun). However, it is evident from the last two findings above that only a small percentage of gamblers can probably be regarded as 'at risk' players. The response to

the last two statements suggests that probably one in every 20 respondents (approximately 5 %) experienced serious problems. This percentage correlates with the 5,7 % of respondents that affirm that one of their family members currently have casino gambling-related problems (section 2.6.7). In a similar study conducted in 1996 in New South Wales (University of Western Sydney 1996:45) it was found that approximately 3,5 % of the population confirmed that their gambling is *not* problem-free. The report further states that '…in previous studies in Tasmania and Western Australia this percentage of possible 'at risk' players was larger, of the order of 6 % of the population'. A better understanding of the so-called negative experiences reported by regular gamblers is presented in the New South Wales study (University of Western Sydney 1996:47), which places negative experiences in the context of how gambling-related problems may arise for the individual.

'Firstly the personal experience of a gambler may change to include unrealistic expectations of winning and a style of gambling (such as chasing losses) and money management (e.g.. borrowing money to gamble) that is not adaptive. Motivation to gamble then may include not just the positive aspects of relaxation and excitement … but also escape or coping with depression and frustration. At this stage, control of gambling for the individual is difficult … and actual negative impacts may then occur impinging on family and friends, on work-related matters and even legal impacts such as the misappropriation of money to fund gambling'.

It should be stressed that the above provides only an approximation of the possible extent of casino gambling-related problems. The survey contains no questions to determine the severity of individual problems. This may range from a perceived problem by the respondent to a serious problem impacting negatively on aspects such as financial well-being, family and personal life and even the work situation. The responses also confirm a wide variety of individual experiences enjoyed by people during casino gambling. These may vary not only from one player to another but also from occasion to occasion for the same player.

Conclusion

The Mpumalanga community holds fairly divergent views on casino related issues: from finding casino gambling acceptable to an abhorrence thereof. Gaming trends were also found to vary: from actively participating in gaming related activities to abstaining from them. It would seem that the more negative views on casino gambling (finding it unacceptable and refraining from any participation) are more prevalent among the higher income groups.

A large majority of casino patrons regard gambling as an important leisure activity. It is also evident from the response that the winning motive is strongly prevalent among certain patrons and serves as a motivation for participation in gambling. Some responses suggest the prevalence of problem gambling to the order of approximately 5 to 6 % of patrons.

The above empirical evidence on the dynamics of the casino industry and especially the community's attitudes to and perceptions of casinos is indispensable for appropriate policy development.

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RESEARCH NOTES

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Gender Inequality: Still a Critical Issue in the Development of Rural KwaZulu-Natal

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Introduction

There is a two-way relationship between women's involvement and economic development, that is, as economic development takes place there is the likelihood that more women will become involved in economic and socio-political activities. On the other hand, women's involvement in economic and socio-political activities will enhance economic development opportunities. This paper critically examines the current economic and socio-political status of women in KwaZulu-Natal, the possible role of women in development, and policy gaps in promoting development of the region and in promoting women's role in development. It concludes that women's advancement will play a crucial role in the development of the province.

Theoretical Background

Theoretical paths in the field of women and development can be grouped into five categories: Women in Development (WID), Women and Development (WAD), and Gender and Development (GAD), Women, Environment and Sustainable Development (WED) and Development Alternatives with Women for New Era (DAWN). This section will elaborate on the basic structures of each of these approaches and offer some conceptual insights.

WID, while the oldest, is still the dominant and most popular perspective in this field. WID subscribes to the assumptions of modernisation theory. Its programmes generally stress western values and target individuals as the catalysts for social change (Visvanathan 1997:18). Modernisation theory depicts traditional societies as authoritarian and male-dominated and modern societies as democratic; thus it appears to show sensitivity to the oppression faced by women in less developed societies. Thereby, the WID calls for the full integration of women into development as workers and producers. It calls for women's inclusion into economic systems, through necessary legal and administrative changes. Strategies should be developed to minimize women's disadvantages in the productive sector. Researchers have identified five distinct WID approaches that reflect policy evolution: welfare, equity, anti-poverty, efficiency, and empowerment approaches. WID focused exclusively on productive aspects of women's work, ignoring or minimizing the reproductive aspects of women's lives.

WAD emerged from a critique of modernisation and WID theories as an application of dependency theory. It argues that women always have been a part of development and seeks to challenge the relationships between women and the development process. The feminist-liberal

proponents of WAD theories stressed the important recognition within Marxist theory of women's unpaid domestic work and reproductive services as critically important for capitalist employers.

GAD offers a holistic perspective looking at all aspects of women's lives. It questioned the basis of assigning specific gender roles to different sexes. GAD views development as a complex process involving the social, economic, political, and cultural betterment of individuals and of society itself (Young, 1997:52). It recognises women's role inside and outside the household. GAD focuses also on the social relations between women and men in the work place and other settings.

Taking women into consideration when initiating and planning development programs is a crucial issue if it is taken into account that women are closer to the environment than men (Agarwal, 1997:68). Sustainability of development depends on the sustainable use of the environment, hence women's role remains important in development. This forms the main argument of the fourth theory, WED. Women are involved in various ways with natural resources, in forestry, agriculture, energy and so on. Therefore women's role will remain important in developing strategies that produce development that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising future generations' ability to meet their's.

The latest theory/approach, DAWN, does not add much to the picture. It seems to be a combination of all other approaches. It takes a political perspective calling for a more inclusive-open approach to women's development and rejects the tendency to undervalue women's knowledge.

Participation of women whether in formal or informal employment will always play a crucial role in economic growth, as well as it supplements family income. In macroeconomic terms this will stimulate aggregate demand, via increased private consumption and investment. Most importantly, women should not be seen as passive recipients of development assistance, but be given an opportunity to take part in development.

Demographics of KwaZulu-Natal

KwaZuluNatal is the third province in South Africa with a larger proportion of females than male (53.1 %), following Northern Province (54%) and Eastern Cape (53.9%). This appears to be the trend for all the provinces except for Gauteng where females make only 49% of the population (SSA, 1996b: 4-5). Less developed regions/provinces of the country have larger females population proportions; many of them live in rural areas and are African women.

More women (63%) than men (60%) live in non-urban areas in KwaZulu-Natal (SSA, 1996a). About 98% of the province's female non-urban population are African women (SSA, 1995). Seventy three percent of the Africans of the province live in non-urban areas, of whom 54% are women. Less than 8% of the population of Indians, Coloureds and Whites live in non-urban areas.

Table 1. KwaZulu-Natal non-urban population distribution by gender, 1995 (000)

		Total	Men	Women
Total	Number	5 392	2 501	2 890
	Percentage of the total gender population	62%	60%	63%
Africans	Number	5 293	2 446	2 847

	Percentage of the total gender population	73%	71%	75%
Indians	Number	47	24	23
	Percentage of the total gender population	6%	6%	6%
Coloureds	Number	5	3	2
	Percentage of the total gender population	5%	6%	4%
Whites	Number	46	29	18
	Percentage of the total gender population	8%	9%	6%

Source: SSA, 1996a

The Economic Dimension

Economic activities in KwaZulu-Natal are centred on the Durban-Pinetown metropolis and Pietermaritzburg, with some significant concentration in the lower Umfolozi area (Richards Bay/Empangeni), Klip River district (Ladysmith-Mnambithi) and the Newcastle-Madadeni region (KwaZulu-Natal Marketing Initiative, 1996: 2). These activities tend to be controlled and performed mainly by men in urban areas, women having a minimal/negligible role to play.
The female unemployment rate (using the strict definition of unemployment) in 1995 was about 40% compared to 26% for men in the province (SSA, 1998). Employment is skewed against females, especially females living in non-urban areas and African females.
In KwaZulu-Natal about 43% of the total non-urban economically active population (EAP) are unemployed, 60% of whom are women. About 53% of the total non-urban economically active women in the province are unemployed, 99,7% of whom are African women. Unemployment distribution in the province is not only gender biased but is also racially biased. About 45% of the total non-urban economically active Africans in the province are unemployed; Whites and coloureds having a less than 1% non-urban unemployment rate, and only about 1% for non-urban Indians.

Table 2. KwaZulu-Natal non-urban unemployment[1] by gender and race, 1995 (000)

		Total	Men	Women
Total	Number	561	226	335
	Percentage of the total gender population	43%	34%	53%
Africans	Number	558	224	334
	Percentage of the total gender population	45%	36%	53%
Indians	Number	1	1	1
	Percentage of the total gender population	8%	4%	17%
Coloureds	Number	1	1	1

	Percentage of the total gender population	40%	40%	39%
Whites	Number	1	0	0
	Percentage of the total gender population	1%	1%	3%

Source: SSA, 1996a

The non-urban male-unemployment rate was only 34% in 1995 (SSA, 1996a). The distribution of women's unemployment is similar to that of the racial groups.

The Political Dimension

There is not only a need to stimulate economic growth, employment and income levels that is required for long-term sustainability, but there are also social and institutional factors that need to be addressed. Development in KwaZulu-Natal also has been hamstrung by the high rate of violence. The people that are most affected are poor rural communities, such as South Coast (e.g. Shobashobane, Matshisini, Margate, Mbumbulu, etc.), Natal Midlands and Northern Region (e.g. Richmond, Trustfeed, Embali and other places surrounding Pietermaritzburg) which at various stages were so-called *No-go-areas*, due to the high rate of violence. Hence, the organisation of such communities for their own development poses a major challenge.

Social Dimension

A discussion of the social dimension forms a part of the broad picture of rural development, in which women should be given fair consideration. This will cover issues of poverty and provision of basic social services in the province. The provision of basic needs services in KwaZulu-Natal not only appears to be inadequate but is also very skewed in favour of the small proportion of the total population living in urban areas with the main sufferers being rural women and youth. KwaZulu-Natal is rated the fourth poorest province after the Northern Province, Eastern Cape, and Mpumalanga[2]. Poverty figures for KwaZulu-Natal indicate that almost 63% of the population live in poverty, compared to 57% for South Africa (WEFA, 1999). Most of the poverty-stricken population are Africans in non-urban areas, which include rural and peri-urban areas. Women carry a heavier burden of poverty since they are the ones mainly responsible for house-keeping services for their families.

Although rural KwaZulu-Natal lacks the provision of a number of basic social services the focus of this paper is on education as the most important social need for women's development, since it impacts simultaneously all other social services. This does not undermine the importance of provision of other basic social services, like energy and electricity, telecommunication, health, water and sanitation, social security and welfare, and transport and roads, as highlighted in the RDP (ANC, 1994:31-52).

According to SSA (1998), there is insufficient provision of energy and electricity in KwaZulu-Natal, and about 53% of households that use wood as an energy source travel more than a kilometre to fetch it. Thus, these households spend a large proportion of their time in search of wood. As regard to telecommunications only 29% of households in KwaZulu-Natal have a telephone inside the dwelling[3]. About 32% of the households in KwaZulu-Natal have no access to

a telephone service at all. As regard to health services 66% of the households in non-urban KwaZulu-Natal travel at least five kilometers to reach the nearest medical service centre (SSA, 1998). Studies show that in most less developed countries a significant proportion of rural households have no access to quality health-care services at times of serious illness/injury (World Bank, 1994:17). As regard to water and sanitation, 19% and 74% of KwaZulu-Natal's urban and rural population, respectively, do not have an adequate water supply. About 40% and 94% of KwaZulu-Natal's urban and rural population, respectively, do not have adequate sanitation facilities (KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Alliance RDP Committee, 1994:3). As regard to social security and welfare in rural KwaZulu-Natal there are insufficient professional social workers servicing townships and rural communities, inadequate funding, extreme poverty, insufficient state subsidies, children's homes and state-subsidised day-care facilities, unequal access to pensions by the black community and inadequate provision of old-age homes, child abuse and child neglect, drug addiction and trafficking, and violence on women (within and out of marriage). As regard to transportation facilities, most of the rural access roads are heavily eroded in places, slippery and prone to flood damage. In general, there is limited access to certain areas, especially for emergency police, ambulance and delivery vehicles (May, 1994:19). The lack of these basic social services causes bottlenecks in the development of the province.

The level and nature of education has profound effects on the development of the economy and society. It improves human potential, with positive spillover effects for social and economic development. The fragmented, unequal and undemocratic nature of education and training systems in the past have had unfavourable effects in all parts of South Africa (ANC, 1994:58). In general, the levels of education amongst the total population in KwaZulu-Natal are very low. Only 7% of the total female population (9% of males) in the province have higher education. About 18% of females (12% of males) do not have any form of education. Only 13% of African women have gone as far as Grade 12, and only 5% have gone beyond that level (SSA, 1998).

Table3. Education level of KwaZulu-Natal residents aged 20 and older (percent)

Level	Male	Female
Higher	9	7
Std 10	21	18
Std 6–9	37	31
Std 4–5	10	12
Std 3	11	14
None	12	18

Source: SSA, 1998

Women in KwaZulu-Natal have less education than men. These statistics have serious implications for women living in rural KwaZulu-Natal, since they not only have insufficient educational facilities, but their education is also inferior. Further, the provision of basic social services in the province appears not only to be gender biased, but there is also racial and urban bias.

The Ecological Dimension

Ecologically, KwaZulu-Natal faces three major environmental issues, as is the case for the whole

South Africa. In the first place the country is experiencing a deterioration of environment. Not only is soil erosion being experienced, but also coal-burning power stations have made KwaZulu-Natal one of the most polluted areas in the world (Ngobese and Cock, 1995: 21). Secondly, KwaZulu-Natal has inadequate policies for environmental protection. The enforcement of environmental control measures is minimal, and also such control measures are extremely fragmented and under-resourced. Thirdly, current environmental measures lack mass support. This is because past ideas mainly identified overpopulation as the main factor responsible for deterioration of the environment and many conservation projects disregarded human needs, rights and dignity. 'For instance the establishment of many game reserves meant forced removal and social dislocation of the local people', Ngobese and Cock (1995:17). While the women and youth are the ones most likely to be affected, the traditional system does not fully recognize their role in decision-making forums and bodies. The decisions about environment are mainly decided and shaped by men, especial in rural traditional authorities.

Current Initiatives and Recommendations

Unlike in the past, the current government has indicated that rural development will be a major focus area in almost all development initiatives.

a. Current initiatives

As regards the economic dimension KwaZulu-Natal has initiated and implemented various programmes, e.g. the Community-Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP), promotion of small-scale, micro and medium enterprises (SMMEs), and Affirmative Action. These programmes strive to speed up short-term service delivery especially in rural areas where there is a lack of institutional capacity and poverty. Amongst other things, they were intended to increase the role of women and youth in various capicity-building, training programmes and other economic activities (Province of KwaZulu-Natal Department of Works, 1997:2).

As regards the political dimension, through various forums and meetings the province has tried to address the problem of political conflict and violence in the province. Leaders of various political parties in the province have on several occasions signed peace agreements.

As regards the social dimension, the RDP is the first national development strategy of the ANC-led government. One of the main objectives of the RDP was to meet the basic needs for all the citizens of the country (ANC, 1994:3). According to the RDP, living standards of the poor must be improved and the basic needs of all citizens must be satisfied. Thus, the focus of the RDP is to a large extent on rural development. This has the potential to bring economic, social and political stability to KwaZulu-Natal.

b. Recommendations and policy options

Many developmental-organizations have included gender issues in their agendas. For example, in March 1996 the United State Agency for International Development (USAID) adopted the Gender Plan of Action, which is a policy document set to (three main goals) to build commitment to consider gender issues as key development issues, to build capacity (or capability) to address gender in all Agency programs, and to build incentives for consideration of gender issues (USAID, 1999: 3-4).

Corner (2000) notes that women contribute to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies as workers in employment and the informal sector, as entrepreneurs and investors in business, and through their unpaid work. Women's participation in the labour force has been increasing and as from the 1980s they have been providing the large part of the new labour supply in both industrialized and developing economies, having provided about 80% in some APEC economies. Women-led businesses have been found to account for 23% to 36% of all businesses, and are expanding more rapidly than the business sector as a whole. Women's contribution becomes even larger when one considers that women in the labour force continue to be disadvantaged by gender stereotypes. Their restricted mobility and lack of access to credit, technology and information clearly limits women's productivity.

The circumstances and problems experienced by the women living in rural KwaZulu-Natal demand urgent attention in the form of policy and development action. A rural development strategy should seek out opportunities which will serve the interests of all stakeholders (including women and youth organisations). Without their joint commitment, the development effort cannot succeed. There is an urgent need for a well co-ordinated and integrated approach towards addressing rural problems and unlocking the development potentials of rural areas/regions.

On the political level the provincial government has the task of ensuring that the province is politically stable and violence free. The status of women in local government structures and decision-making structures must be improved. To achieve this the government has to involve all the concerned political parties and local communities in its policy formulation and decision-making.

The most important social need for women's development is education because it impacts simultaneously all other social services. Educating women does not only benefit them personally or individually but will also produce a variety of benefits for the whole society. These include increased economic productivity, improvements in health, delayed age of marriage, lower fertility, increased political participation, and generally more effective investments in the next generation. Education is an investment that stays with a woman throughout her life, is hers to use as she wishes, and cannot be taken away (Population Council; 2000). It is evident in Asian countries that there is a direct positive link between investment in primary education and rapid economic growth and poverty alleviation. Policy alternatives of getting girls to school could include: reducing direct costs (e.g. giving subsidies), reducing opportunity costs (e.g. introducing flexible school times), addressing safety and modesty concerns (e.g. bring schools near to girls villages) and changing families perceptions of investments (Population Council; 2000). On the part of government, policy alternatives could include: relocating resources within the education sector, expansion of the existing school system, and expanding overall resources on girls' education.

Conclusion

Rural KwaZulu-Natal women face a number of underdevelopment issues including a high level of unemployment, high poverty rate, low educational qualifications, inadequate provision of basic needs services and are limited in most decision and policy-making structures.

The study confirms that women advancement (through stimulation of the economic, social, political, and environmental dimensions of development) will play a crucial role in the future development of less developed regions or countries, in general. Amongst other things, advancing women will: reduce gender inequality, improve the lives of the people living in rural areas (especially women and youth), provide markets for both local factor inputs and locally produced goods and services, redistribute

national income not only between rich and poor but also between men and women, reverse rural-urban migration by providing employment opportunities in the rural areas, and in general stimulate the rural economy. This will depend on the appropriateness and timing of local and national government policy-actions.

Notes

1. Using the strict definition of unemployment.
2. Arranged in ascending order of their poverty figures.
3. Telephones are mainly available to whites (81%).

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Given increasing disquiet with neo-liberal rational actor approaches to economics and sociology, and the crisis of classical Marxism, there has been more interest over the past two decades in alternative approaches to socio-economics. Prominent amongst these has been regulation theory, an institutional and evolutionary approach, that explores the transformative role of social action in ensuring stability within the capitalist economy, and in bringing about restructuring in response to crisis (Jessop 2001). Regulationism assesses the stabilizing role of economic and 'extra-economic' social institutions in creating stability and predictability in accumulation (ibid.). To many writers sympathetic to the regulationist project, however, insufficient attention has been accorded to national variations; much contemporary writing has focused on the financialisation-led growth regime characteristic of Britain and the United States (ibid.; c.f. Grahl and Teague 2000). This has led to increasing interest being accorded to an emerging paradigm, business systems theory, a paradigm that draws extensively on the regulationist tradition.
Business systems theory has been most associated with the works of Richard Whitley, Professor of Organizational Sociology at the University of Manchester. In response to increasing interest in his (at times somewhat fragmented writings), Whitley has now consolidated his work in *Divergent Capitalisms*, which brings together many ideas associated with the business systems paradigm into a single volume. In the opening chapter, entitled 'Varieties of Capitalism', the author, drawing on earlier works, inter alia by Boyer and Hollingsworth, highlights the diversity in contemporary capitalist work organization both within and across national boundaries. However, he argues that most institutionalist approaches have hitherto focused on how organizational structures relate to dominant cognitive templates, and have accorded only limited attention to comparative systems of organizational co-ordination and control. Whitley goes on to identify the different forms of firm, and trends in flexibility in different national contexts.
The chapter lays the foundations for perhaps the strongest and most interesting chapter of the entire book, when the author outlines six different types of national business systems, each characterized by different roles of the state, different financial systems, varying forms of skill development and control, and differing relations of trust and authority. These systems are as follows:

- Compartamentalized (US/British model). Central characteristics include little role for the state, a capital market-based financial system, weak unions, limited emphasis on publicly-funded training, decentralized bargaining and low trust (other than in formal institutions.
- Fragmented (Hong Kong model). Again, little role for the state, a capital market characterized by risk sharing between banks, similarly weak unions and publicly funded training.
- State organized (Post-War South Korean model). Strong state role, highly regulated markets, credit based financial system, limited emphasis on state funded training, weak unions. Strong paternalist authority, but otherwise trust levels low.
- Collaborative (West European corporatist model). Here the state plays a considerable role; much attention is accorded to incorporating intermediary groupings, with regulated markets. Again, a credit based financial system, with a strong emphasis being placed on a public vocational training system. Bargaining is centralized with strong unions. The typical business environment is a collaborative one, with a high degree of trust in formal institutions.
- Co-ordinated industrial districts (e.g. post-war Italy or similar regionally-focused European business systems). In this system, local levels of government play a considerable regulatory role. There is some local bank risk sharing. Whilst bargaining is centralized, unions are relatively strong, and there is a well-developed public vocational training system. Levels of trust in formal institutions and paternalistic authority are variable, but the business environment again tends to be collaborative.
- Highly co-ordinated (e.g. post-war Japan). The state plays a central role in regulating markets and in co-ordinating and developing business activities. Again, there is a credit based financial system. There is a limited emphasis on vocational training, and some unions. Trust in paternalist authority is high, whilst the typical business environment is guided by state interventions. (pp.43-60).

This framework provides archetypal forms of national business system, modified forms of specific ones being dominant in all of the advanced societies today. Of course, a limitation of Whitley's model is a focus on Europe and Asia; there is little on what constitutes a typical African business system.

The following chapter explores the nature of differences between firms operating in different business systems. More specifically, the nature of corporate governance (both in terms of management decision-making, and goals and performance standards) and organizational capacities (degree of innovation, flexibility and employee contributions) will vary greatly between systemic contexts. Managerial autonomy may be constrained by business partners and employees in specific systems, but this may be compensated for by gains (inter alia, higher levels of productivity and trust) in other areas. Firms are likely to prioritize growth when dependence on the state is high and/or risk sharing with the state considerable. Strong public training systems are likely to enhance employee contributions to organizational capabilities owing to both a greater range of competencies, and greater opportunities for upward progression. In the end, the central lesson from this chapter is that neo-liberalism and a minimalist state is likely to exert a heavy price on the capabilities

of firms in key areas. Many of these themes are picked up and further elaborated on in the following chapter, which deals with the social structuring of work systems.

In Chapter 5, the author explores the impact of globalization. Whitley asserts that national business systems are deeply embedded, and are unlikely to radically change as a result of globalization; the latter is 'less significant in scale and consequences than many enthusiasts have claimed' (p. 135). The final chapters of this volume look at the specific characteristics and changes in the composition of business systems in Asia and the newly liberalized economies of Eastern Europe. Whilst of considerable interest to students of these regions, it would have been useful if these sections had been counter-balanced by a discussion of the challenges facing collaborative and compartamentalized business systems.

There is little doubt that this volume constitutes a major contribution to the literature; it provides an innovative way of understanding the play of institutions and the development of national varieties of capitalism. The major criticisms that can be levelled against this path-breaking volume are two-fold. Firstly, the business systems theoretical project remains partially incomplete; more needs to be done in filling in crucial gaps, particularly in understanding the role of capitalism in the developing world. Secondly, for a theoretical project rooted in the political economy tradition, it is remarkably short on questions of emancipatory politics; in what way can particular national varieties of business system be tamed, and made more responsive to the needs of the bulk of society?

Many of the themes contained in *Divergent Capitalisms* are picked up in *Governance at Work*, a volume co-edited by Richard Whitley and Peer Hull Kristensen. In the opening chapter, Kristensen asserts deliberate managerial actions (inter alia, in attempts to adopt flexible forms of work organization in response to global pressures) interact with the institutional conditioning of organizational behaviour, creating and reinforcing distinct national trajectories. Managerial action is not 'the simple imitation and import of foreign templates', but should be viewed in the context of national historical processes (p.41). When managers try and recast work organization, their actions will be inputted into a game between 'strategizing actors', producing both intended and unintended consequences (p. 41).

Chapters 2 to 6 look at distinct national governance systems in Europe. They provide valuable insights into many of the themes raised in the previous volume and further develop them. In assessing the Dutch case, Ad Van Iterson notes that Dutch firms have managed to cope relatively well with competing regulatory principles imposed by prevailing governments, and by large bureaucratic units competing on the world markets. However, in the end, the Dutch consensus is founded on boardroom hegemony aimed at the management of tensions on the shopfloor, but the manner in which the system works deserves much closer examination (p. 60). In the following chapter, Christel Lane examines the differences between the German and British cases. In both cases, societal effects seem to greatly outweigh the dominance effects of alternative paradigms (above all, Japan and the USA) on national practice. However, in Britain, institutional embeddedness is rather weaker, making the British system more susceptible to foreign influences. Elisabeth Campagnac and Graham Winch look at the social regulation of technical expertise in Britain and France. Distinct historical paths have facilitated the development of different social networks (p. 101). They contrast the French notion of corps with the

British one of profession, the former largely the product of state regulation and the latter of the market. Perhaps influenced more by its classical regulation antecedents than business systems theory, Glenn Morgan argues that pressures to privatize welfare reflect political will and bargaining, rather than rational action. However, work systems will be determined by the nature of state welfare; the question emerges as to the extent to which cheaper low-welfare systems will drive out high ones. In chapter 6, a case study of the Finish paper industry, Kari Lilja argues that even in countries that have a strong commitment to a developmental state and corporatism will be subject to some pressures to deregulation. However, this will not necessarily result in convergence, but new forms of national specificality.

The following chapters of this volume look at changing governance structures and the reorganization of governance systems within specific national contexts. Frank Mueller and Ray Loveridge look at the effects of MNC activity and global commodity chains on patterns of national practice. In the end, the predominant trends are contradictory. Institutional constraints (e.g. varying union strength) in different national contexts can threaten, yet be threatened by MNC pressures to co-ordinate activities; in certain sectors these pressures will be greater than others will. The following two chapters are case studies, of the experience of a Japanese multi-national in the UK, and of the transformation of regional governance in Baden-Wuertemburg in Germany. In the former chapter, Diana Sharpe notes that whilst practices were transplanted, the infrastructure that supported these practices (e.g. a commitment to secure employment) was not; this has led to a series of compromise solutions. In looking at Baden-Wurtemburg, Gerd Schienstock notes that the implementation of new production forms has been most uneven, reflecting the differing manner in which firms deal with a set of regional institutional constraints.

In the concluding chapter, Richard Whitley reiterates one of the central premises of business systems theory, namely that the control of work and workplace relations varies greatly between institutional contexts. Whilst there are pressures towards a single standardized form of work organization, the trend is less towards convergence than the redevelopment of specific forms of national practice. Reflecting its edited nature, this volume lacks the theoretical clarity of the preceding one. However, it provides valuable insights into national institutional trajectories, and represents an important contribution to the burgeoning literature on business systems theory.

Co-edited by one of the contributors to the previous volume, Christel Lane, together with Reinhard Bachmann, *Trust within and Between Organizations*, explores the nature of trust within and between organizations, and in particular national contexts. Although somewhat more eclectic, this volume again centres on the effects of specific institutional contexts on organizational dynamics and vice versa. An introductory section by Christel Lane outlines competing definitions of trust, and the effects of differing levels thereof, at both the macro- and micro-level within organizations. Chapter 1, by Jorg Sydow, underscores the importance of inter-organizational trust. Ironically, whilst the success of the currently fashionable network organization depends on high levels of trust, it also lacks the secure forms which will engender the latter. In the following chapter by Cynthia Hardy, Nelson Phillips and Tom Lawrence, the relationship between trust and power in inter-organizational relations is considered. Again, the nature of trust relations depends on specific institutional dynamics. This theoretically innovative chapter argues that whilst

relations within and between firms depend on both power and trust, a veil of the latter may conceal (or make more palatable) gross power inequalities. It makes a valuable addition to earlier literature on power relations within organization (e.g. Knights and Willmott 1985). Based on a survey of component suppliers in the automotive industry, conducted in the United States, Japan and Europe, Mari Sako explores the relationship between trust and performance, a relationship found to be positive. Sako argues that firms need to move beyond developing safeguards against the abuse of trust, to thinking about ways in which trust may be enhanced. However, he is rather vague as to how this may be achieved, reflecting this chapter's theoretical paucity, drawing on a body of literature that is variously dated and/or lightweight (e.g. Francis Fukuyama). This is to be regretted, as the basic findings underscore the effects of national institutional variations. A rather idiosyncratic chapter follows this, by Julia Liebeskind and Amalya Oliver, looking at the effects of trust relations within a specific area of applied scientific research, and assessing the effects of market pressures. The conclusions are very worthwhile; that the university as an independent sanctuary of independent research is under considerable threat. A pity that this is obscured under a mass of excess verbiage and overly complex diagrams.

Rather more rigorous and coherent is the subsequent chapter by Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson looking at the effects of variations of contract law within different national business system. They stress the point that the relationship between legal norms and economic outcomes is a highly complex one; reforms to the former may have unforseen consequences for the latter. In chapter 6, David Marsden looks at the effect of inter-firm institutions on trust within the employment relationship. Marsden notes that there is a fundamental contradiction in the employment relationship. A flexible relationship is only workable with a high degree of trust. However, co-operation based on trust is fragile given the 'prisoner's dilemma' – the possibility of selfish and opportunistic action by one party may precipitate similar action by the other. In the end, inter-firm conventions and rules may restrain a slide into low trust, and foster an environment in which high trust relations may develop (p. 199).

Chapter 7, by Horst Kern, explores the effects of the decline of background trust in the German case. Kern argues that this reflects the erosion of the plant community. Regrettably, the chapter is far to short, and marshals insufficient evidence to make a convincing case either way. Much more substantial is the following chapter, by John Humphrey, looking at trust and the transformation of supplier relations within Indian industry. Humphrey argues that firms operating in the developing world cannot hope to create the institutional framework that underpins trust networks in the advanced business systems manifest in countries such as Japan and Germany; rather trust relations have to be engendered in ways compatible with specific historical and national trajectories. A similarly weighty chapter by John Child looks at the nature and effects of trust in international strategic alliances, looking specifically at the case of Chinese joint ventures. The latter, Child suggests, are likely to be more successful if firms work through Chinese networks and long-term relationships. Conversely, low trust strategies may yield short-term gains, but are likely to be ultimately self-destructive. In chapter 10, Georg Brenkert looks at trust and morality in international business. Refreshingly, Brenkert explores the moral dimensions of trust; too often the need for trust is justified by the exigencies of long-term (as adverse to short-term) profitability. Yet, both firms and societies face very

real moral choices; what is socially good should not always have to be defended by profitability arguments. The final chapter, by Reinhard Bachmann, attempts to link up the different themes raised in this volume. Regrettably, this chapter is little more than a summary of preceding chapters.

The importance of all three volumes cannot be disputed. The varying consequences of specific national institutional configurations, and the effects of relations of ownership, state interventions, and trust networks is of central importance in understanding the nature of contemporary capitalism. Of the three volumes, *Divergent Capitalisms* is probably the most significant. Both a consolidation and an advance in theorising on business systems, it is likely to become a classic work in the body of sociological literature. *Governance at Work* provides a useful illumination of many of the trends and issues covered in *Divergent Capitalisms*. The somewhat more eclectic *Trust Within and Between Organizations* is marred by the varying quality of the contributions. However, it does represent an important step forward in thinking about the social causes and consequences of trust. The publication of all three volumes both reflects the current vitality of theorising in industrial sociology and highlights the need for further similarly ambitious endeavours.

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