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The Scholarly Journal in the Production and Dissemination of Knowledge on Africa: Exploring Some Issues for the Future

Introduction

The discourse in the social sciences and humanities in Africa has been rooted in the question of Africa; that is, the condition and relevance of its peoplesvis-d-vis themselves and the world. There is no denying that this discourse hasevolved with transformations in the conditions of its subject over the years.Neither would prizes be awarded for noting that the catalysts to such transfor-mations have been internal and external, local and global, and familiar and foreign. Expectedly, the thrusts of this discourse were and are still being anchored in those pivotal periods and pointers in the continent's history. Particularly in the twentieth century, we can cite colonialism, profound insertion in, and usurpation by, global capital, the independence struggles, the post-independence stateand its crises, cold war politics, military dictatorship, democratisationprocesses, structural adjustment and neo-liberal economic policies, theemerging civil society, human rights and gender studies.

Equally expected, the development of academic publishing in Africa has been inextricably linked to the varied and complex thrusts of African scholarly enquiry. Academic publishing has gathered, sieved and engraved the work ofresearchers, disseminating their products to the comers of the globe, and thus assuring them a place in knowledge production in a more accentuated informa-tion-driven world. From the CNN advert screaming 'you are what you know',to gigantic mergers of companies trying desperately to control all sectors of the media: publishing, television, cinema, radio and Internet - anything with text or images, harnessing the power of information and knowledge in a globalised world has never been so crucial. 'Globalisation itself is arming people with theinformation they need to give consent and, in some cases, the means to refuse it', observed Smith and Nairn (2000: 15-16).In the last three decades, questions of choice and relevance - of what to study, and by and for whom and how - have become more strident in the research and publishing of African social sciences and humanities. These questions have divided the discourse into blocs: structuralist, developmentalist,modernist, political economy versus poststructuralist, postmodernist, post-Fordist. This exploration, however, is not to vindicate or reiterate the ridiculousness of their constantly shifting and complex labels. Rather, the paper seeks to analyse the patterns in scholarly enquiry in the last two decades by assessing the focus of four multidisciplinary scholarly journals from 1980 to 1999. What does this pattern portend for African scholarly publishing in thenext millennium? In a context where the production and distribution of knowl-edge is even more skewed than the distribution of wealth among nations (Arunachalam 1999; Cetto 1999), we cannot afford to gloss over any factor that may undermine or promote African scholarship. Smith and Nairn (2000) point out that 'OECD[1] countries, with 19 percent of the world's population, account for 71 percent of world trade, 58 percent of foreign direct investment' (p. 8-9).Shocking, but hardly surprising. What is incredibly sad is the fact that OECD countries control 91 percent of all Internet users (Ibid.). Knowing the weight Internet carries today and is estimated to possess tomorrow, one has a right to be scared for the developing world.

The paper will argue that it is rather too restrictive to conclude that the growth of scholarly journal production in Africa in the twenty-first century will be assured only by exterminating incompetent editors and production staff, or by modernising obsolete and inadequate

infrastructure. Have African scholars in their contributions been restricted to generally accepted themes or theoretical constructs? Have they moved out of the accepted boundaries to posit new theoretical approaches? To what extent have they focussed their work on the key questions shaping Africa today? These questions have a role to play in the marketability of African researchers and themselves. They have an influence on the development of the scholarly publishing on the continent and on African published material as a whole. And much more, they have an effect on the legitimisation of African research and scholarship (Altbach 1998; Mkandawire1999; Zeleza 1998).

The paper has been divided into four major parts: 1) a brief description of the development and role of the scholarly journal; 2) an analysis of the medium in Africa today; 3) a description of methodology and the tools for gathering data for the study; and 4) an examination of the findings in relation to issues and trends in contemporary publishing.

In the beginning, there was academia...

Journals have been instrumental in the development of academic publishing inAfrica. The establishment and proliferation of universities and higher institutions in Africa from the latter half of the twentieth century influenced the development of scholarly journals on the continent. Today, there are 593 institutionsof higher learning in 46 countries in Africa (AAU 1999). The need to communicate the knowledge consumed and produced raised the question of a dissemination channel. In African scholarship, the chosen medium has been the journal.

Why the journal? Can it be related to the essence and role of the medium? As Christopher Tomlins (1998: 2), notes using the American Historical Society as an example, scholarly journals initially 'were created as mechanisms crucial to defining professional identity and to communicating the distinctive practices that would constitute it and thereby bring discipline, as itwere, to scholarly... disorder'. But the scholarly journal, he argues further, should not be limited to maintaining professionalisation and codes of ethics. In addition to being disseminators of authoritative scholarship, the scholarly journal 'exists to promote original scholarship, to accommodate scholarship in its variety, but also to influence its general direction and shape, to certify it asworthy of note and trust to whatever audience is reached, and to preserve it' (Tomlins 1998:3).

In African scholarship, with its umbilical attachment to western scholarship, journals were ascribed the task of doing all this and much more. In the words of Paul Tiyambe Zeieza, 'journals were founded - mostly in literature, history, political science, and development economics - to trace the teleological march of the once reviled "native" subjects to respected national citizens and their societies from underdevelopment to development' (1998:14). This added responsibility was crucial in not just the development of the academic publishing enterprise in Africa as a whole but also, as we shall touch on later, in the modalities and modes of operation of academic publishing, in this case journals.

The next question that we may ponder on is why the journal dominates, particularly in the arts and humanities, over other media. In the West, the demands of the natural sciences for speedy exchange of the most up-to-date information and data, which has been compounded by the enormous stress on who found what first, have made journals the most preferred choice of researchers in these fields. In the arts and humanities however the book is the superior choice because it can be leveraged in the promotion and tenure process (Hunter 1998) and because empirical knowledge does not have such an acute short life span of relevance (Tomlins 1998)[2].

In Africa, however, several historical factors have shaped the acceptance of journals differently. Given, as Zeleza rightly pointed out, 'the establishmentof scholarly joumals is largely a post independence phenomenon, spawned and sustained by the expanding

possibilities of university education, itself tethered to the dreams of nationalism and developmentalism' (1998: 14), the journal would become the preferred medium because publishing - particularly books and in the case of some parts of Africa, newspapers - in the early post independence era, was dominated by multinationals whose interests were far from concretising the dreams of nationalism and developmentalism of the newly independent states (Chakava 1989 and 1992; Bgoya 1996a). The truly indigenous publishing sector was stifled by multinationals for close to two decades of postcolonial Africa (Bgoya 1996b).

To African scholars from the burgeoning and growing institutions of higher learning, the journal was central to giving them a voice and an opportunity to realise their dreams, dreams that may be similar to those of their compatriots. The first set of scholarly journals in Africa were established and controlled during this period in the universities. And this remained very much so until the late 1970s and 1980s when the symbiotic collaborative relationship between academics and the state, which controlled and funded the universities, turned awry (Zeleza 1997; Moma 1991; Ake 1993). This rift came to the fore as the realities of nation building proved far more daunting than initially expected. Academics, social scientists in particular, began to question state research agendas and excesses of corruption, tribalism, and incompetence among members of the ruling elite (Zeleza 1997).

The ensuing repression and starvation of the academic community, with most of Africa strangled under military or one-party authoritarianism, led to the near disintegration of the educational system, igniting a panoply of problems from brain drain to empty lecture halls and libraries to loss of interest and time to pursuing qualitative research (Mamdani and Diouf 1994). However, the rift,accentuated by the economic crises of the late seventies and eighties, redrewthe contours of academic publishing, in particular journal publishing in Africa.

State disinvestment from education (higher education with the connivance of Bretton Woods Institutions, see Zeleza 1997) meant other actors other than universities had to surface as the producers and disseminators of research on Africa. The vacuum was filled by the proliferating non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other civil society actors.

Much as we can debate on the purpose and agenda of the involvement of NGOs in research in Africa, we should also note that some of these NGOs employed African academics, now retrenched or impoverished as 'consultants' or as members; or were founded by African academics themselves.

Hence, it was inevitable that from the late seventies scholarly publishing in Africa would be dominated by NGO research institutions. Today some of the outstanding academic journals on the continent were either established or are being supported through the efforts of regional and continental institutions.

Among these are included the *African Journal of Political Science* [Association of African Political Science (AAPS)], *Africa Development, African SociologicalReview, Afrika Zamani, and CODESRIA Bulletin* [Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA)], and the *Southern African Political Economy Monthly* [Southern African Political Economy Series Trust (SAPES)].

Challenges of Scholarly Journal Publishing in Africa

Jaygbay (1998) noted that there are over 400 scholarly journals published in 48 countries in Africa. Out of this number, he estimated based on a 1996 survey that nearly 200 of this figure cover the social sciences and humanities. Given the realities of scholarly journal production in Africa today, the number of active and regular (the differences in adjectives do matter) journals may be lower now. The African Periodicals Exhibit (APEX) catalogue for 1997 lists135 titles from 22 African countries. APEX is part of the African Journal Support and

Distribution Centre (AJSDC) managed by the African Academy of Sciences. The Apex 1999 catalogue lists 70 titles from 16 African countries - a sizeable drop. The sector shrinks more. Given the modalities of APEX3, figures released in the catalogue can be said to be a relatively accurate figure of active and regular journals on the continent today.

The 'volume one, number one' syndrome besets journal publishing in Africa. Why this is so has been documented in volumes and argued in countless forums - Zeleza (1997), (1998), Akin Aina (1994), Zeil (1998), Jaygbay(1997), Altbach and Teferra (1998) just to cite a few. They identified a set of specific challenges facing journal publishers and publishing as follows: a weakinstitutional base, financial difficulties, the level of editorial (in)competence, the quality of submissions from authors, and the development of marketing and distribution channels. In addition, they have also gone further by contextualizing these challenges faced by scholarly journals on the continent in the socioeconomic dynamics of publishing in Africa today.

Makotsi (1999) inan in-depth study on barriers to infra-African book trade in educational material in Southern Africa that covered twelve countries acknowledges that certain obstacles are no more there. For instance, foreign exchange restrictions are becoming less problematic and regional economic integration seems more promising. However, she argues further, other factors like cumbersome export procedures, a weak reading culture and poverty and literacy levels are still too daunting, and new worries brought about by globalisation demand more challenging ways of combating them.

It is interesting that, given the state of African publishing, in particulars scholarly publishing, knowledge of the problem, at least among publishers and scholars, is far from being a problem. This awareness has fuelled a much-needed passionate commitment to striving towards the growth of the industry. African publishers have weathered the storm in genuinely innovative ways. They have ganged up with co-publishers, partners and organisations with common goals, within Africa and outside, to find ways of surmounting the problems and promote the sector. There have been successes.

Some good quality award-winning books are being turned out, some are selling the world over etc. Yet, despite benefiting from initiatives like other sectors of publishing, journal publishing is yet to shake off its volume one, number one label. The specificity of scholarly journal publishing comes down to more than the intense demands for timeliness in production against a background of a weak technological infrastructure base, which is more acute in publishing than inother sectors. The North-South dichotomy in publishing is wide. It is a branch of publishing that is extremely dependent on its content, in astonishingly expansive ways. What is the content saying, written by whom and for whom, quoted whom and by whom etc? It is not surprising that the beauty, quality or effectiveness of this content shapes the processes and procedures of scholarly journal production the world over. Among these include peer review, editorial boards or some would say watchdogs, academic institutional anchors etc.

Much more than content determines the success of the journal. High quality manuscripts if published get cited more often, so the journal attracts more high quality manuscripts, gets cited in major indexing and citation database, which would also attract more manuscripts... What is surprising is that this core factor is not given much more prominence in discussions regarding the level of development of scholarly journal publishing in Africa.

Methodology

In the celebrated book *Manufacturing African Studies and Crises* (1997), Paul Tiyambe Zeleza raised numerous questions on scholship and knowledge pro-duction in the geopolitics of an uneven world. Equally ingenious and pertinent to our study is his brilliant attempt at mapping out 'the trends and shifts in theproduction of knowledge on Africa... [by examining]

the spatial and institutional locations of the leading Africanist academic productions in English and the national and gender identities of those who produce, categorise, disseminate, and safeguard this particular form of knowledge' (p.46).

Zeleza's findings of Africa and Africans' marginality have far-reaching implications for African research. Among other things it showed that journal production in Africa is linked to the status of African research and researchers within and outside Africa. A discussion of one invariably leads to an analysis of the other. More important still, Zeleza's interrogation also deliberately prods us to ask further questions. What do these journals publish? What fields disciplines or subjects get into print? Under what epistemological headings can we group such articles? What is the dominant language(s), etc?

In an attempt to explore some of these questions, we looked at the content of four multidisciplinary journals on Africa in the social sciences and humanities. These journals were chosen within certain criteria to maximise the potential of the results of our findings in relation to the research objectives, to tap areas ofcommon characteristics i.e. similarity, and to reduce elements or factors that could damage or unwittingly bias the finding. The criteria were as follows:

- An Africa-centred journal
- Multidisciplinary in editorial policy. To gauge a pattern of themes and disciplines, all articles submitted must in theory and practice have equal chance of selection. The chances of bias in a niche journal catering to a specific discipline will be much greater.
- Bilingual. Accept and publish articles in English and French, the two main languages currently dominating social sciences and humanities on Africa.
- Quarterly. Four issues in a given year.
- Outstanding and consistent enough to be cited in main bibliographic data-bases.
- All journals selected must be listed in one particular bibliography database. This is to ensure that margins of errors in the compilation of this database are relatively the same for all the journals. The shortcomings of the data-base, though not the fault of the researcher, are likely to prejudice particular journals if taken from different sources.
- All journals must have published articles within the focus period of the study (1980-1999).

Using the criteria, we selected *Africa Development* based in Dakar, Senegal; *Cahiers d'Etudes africaines*, in Paris, France; *Canadian Journal of African Studies* in Canada, and *Journal of Modern African Studies*, London, UK. The geographical location gives Africa (1), Europe (2) and North America (1). We selected the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences compiled byBIDS for the British Library of Political and Economic Science.

Secondly, we grouped the articles (no book reviews were included) from each journal into four periodical time frames (1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94 and1995-99)[4]. This periodical categorisation is an attempt to imitate contemporary research production, publication and dissemination mechanisms. On the average in the social sciences and humanities, it takes from two to three years to plan and conduct research work that is more likely to merit what most scholarly journals will regard as a contribution to a discourse. It also takes from a minimum of 18 months to two years for the results of that research work to be reviewed, revised and published.

The data from each set were analysed to determine (1) the pattern of the subject area and focus of the articles; (2) the proportion of African and non-African authorship; and (3) subject area and focus of African and non-African authorship. The components of the data were, title of article, nameof author(s), language, page numbers, publication year, volume and issue number, abstract (where provided), key words, and geographic descriptors.

We acknowledge that trying to determine patterns in a discipline as wide as the social sciences and humanities can be problematic. Areas of study are intricately linked and contain multiple

prongs. Articles on our list were no exception. For instance, one article on economic policy may be looking at how this policy is also reconstructing gender roles as well as influencing migration at the same time. And of course, these journals are multidisciplinary in editorial policy. However, excellence in any field entails specialisation and focus in a core discipline or subject. Yes, added advantage and richness if a researcher can criss-cross boundaries, but some boundaries are likely to be closer to the core than some others. Hence, some areas will be main themes and some areas will be sub-themes, peripheries or even anecdotes. Articles tackling issues common to a particular topic were grouped together, but were not allowed to disappear. A typical grouping is demography, migration, population growth and urbanisation under one umbrella. We believe data could be easily managed or classified under main area themes and pertinent for this research. Nevertheless, we also try to de-problematise the issue, by counting multiple-focussed articles under all the main areas they occur.

We will now analyse the preliminary results[5] of this research. We will endeavour to link this exploration briefly to the geopolitics of knowledge production on Africa in the last two decades and today. An analysis devoid of this factor risked being sterile. We will try to test the validity and substance of previous and current debates on the output of researchers on Africa. Secondly, such an analysis will be linear if not related to recent development in publishing and information dissemination in the world today.

Contemporary Issues in Knowledge Production and Dissemination on Africa and Publishing in an Information Age

The Marginality of African Researchers

Zeleza's 1997 study of five English-speaking Africanist journals in the social sciences between 1982 and 1992 shows that African authors simply do not get published in these journals compared to their counterparts in the North. The problem is more acute if Africa-based African authors are separated from non-Africa-based African authors. The study we conducted covered four journals between 1980 and 1999 from both English- and French-speaking countries. The same story still very much applies. Between 1980 and 1984, African authors published in the three non African-based journals in our study were as follows: *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* CEA (16 percent), *Canadian Journal of African Studies* CJAS (19 percent), and *Journal of Modem African Studies* JMAS (22 percdent).

Figures for 1995-1999 show an increase for all the journals: CEA (21 percent),CJAS[6] (30 percent) and JMAS[7] (26 percent). Very marginal compared with Africa Development (AD) that had 96 percent of African authors for the same period.

Despite the slight increase, there is a strong argument (as the huge number of scholars with rejection slips from these journals would want to make), that the premise on which these journals base their editorial selection decisions is questionable. 'Africa' features prominently in the title and focus of these journals,[8] yet scholars originating from the continent find it difficult to be published in them.

Journal editors the world over are wont to emphasise the sanctity of editorial selection and, from an author's point of view, deselection processes, a policy that rightly distinguishes it from just any other medium of publication. Peer review and editorial control are crucial to ensuring that scholarly publishing reflects and lives up to its appellation: scholarly. It is not journalism or creative writing, and strives to distance itself from any of the aforementioned genres.When we think of scholarly publishing, we think of 'standards' and authority. The OED defines the former as 'a definite level of excellence, attainment,wealth, or the like, or a definite degree of any quality viewed as a prescribed object of endeavour or as the measure of what is

adequate for some purpose'.

But can we also pepper this idealism with pinches of reality? Can we deconstruct and decontextualise publishing from its surroundings? Probably we may easily have done so in times past, when academia walled itself from mundanities like state repression or influence, or global capital and its intoxicating penchant for money-making. That the decision of what constitutes 'a definite level of excellence' 'can be undertaken in complete unbiased fairness, away from its historicism, still baffles some of us.

Undoubtedly, journal editors, peer reviewers and publishers are not yet Martians. Equally very credible, they harbour biases, passions, weakness as well brilliance and ingenuity. The choice of selection may be because the author quotes the 'right' sources, toes the 'right' line, or as banal as writes charming correspondence. It may not always be so that the number of articles from African authors are substandard, unimaginative, contain dated literature reviews and bibliography (which may not be due to laziness but to lack of access) (see Hargen 1988 ;Matochal 993 ; Mkandawire 1989,1996; Prah 1998; Zeleza 1997).

The African Scholarly Journal and Research Autonomy: A classic taleof unpraised prophets?

Thandika Mkandawire (1998) traces the genesis and evolution of the focus, leanings and preoccupations of research undertaken or promoted by African social science institutions, in this case, CODESRIA. Though he acknowledges that African research institutions had to contend with the forces of the historical condition of Africa and its people, they still strove for 'the creation of an autonomous space of research ...to reflect on the social development processes on thecontinent' (p. 13). He goes on further:

> One feature of the unequal relations we [African scholars] were involved in is that the ignorance about each would necessarily have to be asymmetric. While scholars in theNorth can afford not to know our scholarship, we cannot. They can afford to have anecdotal knowledge about us, we cannot. Indeed, as citation demonstrates, they can publish vast amounts of material without reference to our scholarship but we cannot (Ibid.).

It is interesting to note that *Africa Development*, one single CODESRIA journal, has published more African authors than all the combined three non-Africa-based journals in our study. It seems plausible that the focus of research by Africans may be different from others. Although we can not preclude that intellectual independence can be very relative under the baggage of research grants and funding limitations, in our study we found that there is indeed a marked difference. From 1990 to1994, articles focusing specifically on structural adjustment programmes constitute only about 1 percent in CEA, 3 percent in CJAS[9], 7 percent in JMAS and 18 percent in AD.

Within the same period, articles on education make up 0 percent in CEA, 3 percent in CJAS, less than 1 percent in JMAS and 11 percent in AD. We can see the level of focus given to a very crucial part of the development of African economies during that period.

From 1995 to 1999, articles falling into the discipline of Cultural Studies constitute 5 percent in AD, 6 percent in JMAS, 13 peercent in CJAS and 48 percent in CEA. It is noteworthy that out of the CEA devotion to the topic, African researchers made up 22 percent, more than the entire African authors of 21 percent for all the subject areas for that journal during the period. These results are illustrative of a marked division in focus. Whether the difference in areas of special interest includes novel and independent tools of analysis or methodology is an issue worth pursuing further. For now, we would link this alterity with current issues affecting

publishing today.

The Imminent Death of Journal Publishing, as We Know It

Current trends in publishing suggest that seismic transformations are ongoing and have taken place in the world of information production and dissemination.
It will be understandable if some of us start yawning at the mention of such a common concept now. But if we acknowledge that the Internet technology[10]came into popular use very recently (for some it has not, but that is another story), we should try to understand that it has left us spellbound. It has destabilised the way we think about communication, information, text, images, business, etc. 'Access to communications (in a real sense, to the future) is constricted by geography, gender, income and language' (Smith and Nairn2000: 43). Publishing with its bag of unusual peculiarities of course has not been left out. The Internet is being heralded as the greatest invention since Guttenberg. A look at some of the trends will be instructive.
1. Early this year, the horror fiction writer, Stephen King, released a novella, *Riding the Bullet*, exclusively on the Internet. Within the first one week, more than 500,000 fans downloaded the book for just $2.50. By the second week the code protecting the material from being pirated or read by those who have not paid had been broken.
2. In 1999, the Institute of Physics based in the UK and a formidable academic publisher with an incredibly wide range of successful print journals created the *New Journal of Physics*, completely online, i.e. electronic in all its procedures: manuscript submission, acknowledgement, peer review, revision editing, design. online. Authors that get published pay about 500 US dollars. Because downloading and accessing the journal is free, the journal site is one of the most successful sites with thousands of hits daily.
3. Tom Green recently in a forum[11], cited the following predictions by Mike Shatzkin: (a) most consumers will switch to an electronic format within two decades; (b) the expensive printed item will be vanquished by digital reading material; and (c) the first set of people to embrace electronic books will be professionals such as accountants, teachers and learners.
4. A group of Ohio University and college libraries struck a deal with ReedElsevier, the Anglo-Dutch conglomerate, 'to obtain electronic versions of more than 1000 of the most used research journals published by ReedElsevier, at an annual cost of $6.3 million. OhioLINK prices the cost of the same journals in print from, if subscribed to by all participating libraries, at $46 million'. (Reported in the newsletter, *OhioLINK*, October 1997, cited in Tomlins 1998: 12.)
Each of the trends poignantly captures what IT has done to publishing. The ramifications and implications of each example are far-reaching, if not colossal. Publishing on the Internet has evoked the images and symbolism of theWild Wild West with its trappings of senses of unlimited possibilities juxtaposed with apocalyptic doom. Karen Hunter (1998:6), describing electronic academic publishing, says:

> It is romantic, challenging and enticing to the adventurous. Opportunities call to both the individual and the corporate entrepreneur. There is territory to be grabbed and with the settlement of that territory, a chance to change the balance of power. It is also much more difficult and dangerous than might be anticipated at the start.

Journal publishing in the North or in the South or in Mars, if we get there, must be seen in a new light; management, production, subscription wise etc. Librarians, that crucial constituency for academic publishers, are become more and more incapable to pay for print journals, even if they are free gifts (Jenkins1996; Germain 1996). Journals must be online, free or paid for up front in aggregates. Journal publishers in Africa, already cash-strapped and famished, must

start thinking, and seriously too. They might be pulping their print journal issues in the next few years.

Successful scholarship will be further dependent on access to an incredibly gigantic array of literature on the particular discourse being researched on.Most projections, something becoming more impossible in the digital age though, estimate that the bulk of this literature will be online. A researcher without access to the literature will simply cease to exist, intellectually. The rate of online connectivity in Africa and the developing world is still way far behind others (Adam 1999). And when it is available it is controlled by conditions similar to book reading and literacy. Although there is a faint interest from the North to drastically reduce the Internet gap between the developed and the developing worlds (Fleury 1999), the projects are still rather young to judge their effectiveness and whether this interest can cope with the jet-like speed ofIT.

The concept of and relationship between author, publisher, and distributor have changed. The publishing industry is being made to rethink its traditional concept of sole effective and efficient purveyor of adding value to a text or piece of information (Mark Bide 2000)[12] Authors can be publisher and distributor, while the distributor can now go directly to the author.

One can say that the *New Journal of Physics* idea of providing knowledge(though quite debatable, you have to have access to a computer and telephone line) free generates exciting possibilities for researchers from the developingworld. Copyright (another sorry victim of IT, at least for now) would have blocked access to such material. But when authors have to pay to be published, there is also a kind of segregation of those who are allowed to have a voice. More so when in the West, the fee is likely to be paid for by the physicist's employer or regarded as an investment to recover when that big promotion or job arrives.

Conclusion

Academic publishing in Africa developed to offer an avenue for Africans to contribute their voices to the compendium of human voices, to be part of the richness of humanity and human endeavour. It evolved out of the understanding that we should not expect that others can and should be relied upon to make the utterance on our behalf. They must have to come from us. The book or journal in whatever medium it will be today or tomorrow will represent our voice. The book embodies what Walter Bgoya (1996a) describes as the 'house of the spirits' and the publisher 'the builder of the house of the spirits''.

Scholarship in Africa must think of carving and consolidating niches tosurvive. Autonomy of research and publication will ensure that there is a continued need, for example, for a librarian to stock our journal. Researchers can afford to ignore African researchers, especially if we are only hollow renditions or mimics of Western scholarship (Prah 1998). The reality is that no journal publisher in Africa today has the clout or the industry network of even small publishers in the North. For the near future, it is likely that it will continue to be more difficult, demanding and tasking to publish in Africa, compared with the North.

Regional co-operation may be a possibility. Latin American and Caribbean countries have paved the way in strategies to swim against the tide in a lopsided world. Knowing the difficulty of disseminating the result of scientific research produced in their countries to the developed world, a network of regional and national resource centres have set up the LATINDEX as a collection of scientific knowledge produced in these countries for interested researchers the world over to access. Its directory and web page provide information on 6,817 scientific journal titles from the region. An effective African directory will be of immense value.

But to accomplish and survive in a constantly tenuous world, strategic planning and cold facts may not be enough. We need a burning commitment to change our environment. In the words of Tade Akin Aina (1998):

> It seems that the time has come for us to reclaim our vision in our politics and economic and social life. Given the changing context, these voices [Africans] demand not only the recognition of the hard truths that have been part of our history and contemporary experience of nation building and social and economic development, but also the difficult challenges that we face in today's globalized world. All of these are of course based on our hope and collective self-confidence in our capacity as peoples and nations to confront difficulties, overcome crises and build a humane future (p.l).

Notes

1. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
2. However, some scholars in other parts of the world, e.g. the UK, may insist that this is an American peculiarity and journals exert a greater influence in the social sciences and humanities.
3. Not all journals published in Africa are listed, but most of the active ones are. AJSDC reviews the list yearly, sending renewal forms to publishers and editors. Any publisher in Africa that has received correspondences from AJSDC will testify to their persistence and resilience, they have a knack of bombarding publishers with renewals till they respond.
4. However, the database used did fall short of the time frame in specific periods e.g. gaps in certain issue numbers, for all of the journals in specific periods. We are trying to eliminate the error margin by matching the database with verifications from the physical copies of the journals. This tasking and laborious process is still ongoing.
5. The next stage of this research will involve another crucial variable like the gender of the authors and results of the data control.
6. Less data for 1999.
7. Less data for December 1999.
8. There is evidence from going through what has been published that some of the journals do accept articles not focusing specifically on Africa or 'African studies'. For instance CJAS has a list of articles with particular reference to Canada, e.g. on Quebec and CEA publishes articles on the Caribbean, though some may argue that this still falls within the range of African Studies of the Diaspora.
9. Less data for 1994.
10. A colleague of mine once mocked me for referring to the Internet as a technology. This mockery by the way took place in 1998. The argument is that if we don't referto the radio today as a technology, we better recognise that Internet today is like a radio set.
11. Discussions at a forum held at the International Centre for Publishing Studies, Oxford Brookes, England, 24 May 2000.
12. Notes from a lecture delivered by Mark Bide at the International Centre for Publishing Studies, Oxford Brookes, England, May 2000.

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Developing Mechanisms to Promote South-South Research in Science and Technology: the Case of the Southern African Development Community

Abstract:
The African continent has struggled to develop an indigenous agenda for science and technology research and development. Despite efforts since the 1960s, the results have been less than satisfactory. In the southern region, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has attempted to play a coordinating role for science and technology, but is widely regarded to have been unsuccessful in this venture. Although many countries in the SADC region have elevated the science and technology (S&T) function to Ministerial level, the linkages between S&T, government, industry and higher education are tenuous at best. There has been much talk of policy driven development, but little in the way of action. This paper will sketch the history of S&T development in the SADC region and in particular the interplay between the local agenda and that of the advanced industrial countries. It will highlight the difficulties of conducting research against imbalances in resources and expertise by considering an initiative of the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology that seeks to foster research cooperation between South Africa and the SADC region. The paper will explore the relations between and among state research institutions, higher education and industry in SADC and considers possibilities for local research co-operation.

Introduction

The return of South Africa to the community of nations has opened its borders and institutions to interaction with the African continent and beyond. Historically South Africa has been a magnetic pole for many of the peoples of Southern Africa, for the migrant workers who would work beneath the earth in the gold mines of Gauteng and for the migrant students who in many cases later came to inherit their homeland earth. The stream of mineworkers has slowed as the mines have closed, whereas the flow of students that was interrupted during the apartheid years has swelled, and is likely to surge as the consequences of an open immigration policy take effect. Within the Southern African Development Community (SADC), South Africa is arguably the state with the most advanced science and technology (S&T) capacity and industrial activity. Given historic antagonisms of the apartheid era this leadership position conveys a responsibility toward the SADC to exchange expertise in these areas, foster innovation and develop capacity amongst its neighbours. This responsibility is both altruistic and necessary, in that strong regional economies will be to mutual benefit. Currently South Africa's major international collaborators are with scientists in the European Union (40%) and the United States (29%), clinical medicine being the main arena. For Africa the figure is a mere 4%. It is imperative to shift this balance to enable meaningful South-South cooperation. Without such, noble ideas of the 'African Renaissance' will remain empty.

The South African Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (DACST), in support of the national system of innovation (NSI), launched two large multi-year programmes. These were the Innovation Fund, and the S & T Lead Programme. While the Innovation Fund seeks to promote domestic innovation partnerships that involve all players, the Lead Programme stretches abroad and involves only the domestic Science Councils. Their partners may be drawn from any region, and are mostly institutions in the North. Such developments must be seen in the context

of burgeoning bi-lateral science and technology agreements. In the five years after 1994 no fewer than 33 new agreements were in force or close to finalisation, of which one third were with African countries. Arguably this is a suite of thrusts that promote knowledge development and transfer, but the historical bias away from the SADC region remains.

DACST accordingly commissioned a project[1] intended to strengthen technological capability in the SADC member states through a framework for cooperation. A small team of researchers was commissioned to seek ways to give substance to the cooperation at project level. On the South African side the Science Councils would coordinate higher education and other partners as needed. To open the possibilities of accessing European Union funding, possible 1 + 2 models were also to be explored with SADC partner institutions. The project therefore had to determine the extent of SADC capacity to engage in common projects and establish the constraints that might hinder such work.

Science and Technology in SADC

Following the independence of Namibia in 1990 and the legalisation of the liberation movements of South Africa, the SADCC in 1992 through the Windhoek Declaration transformed itself into the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The founding nine states have since been joined by Namibia, Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, making up a bloc of States with population of around 185m, all essential natural resources and a GDP (1998) of USD 182bn. SADC includes some of the poorest countries on the globe with the widest intra-communal disparities.

In their efforts to build the modern state, the governments of SADC have established institutions of higher education and other S &T organs. Together these comprise around two hundred entities that support and promote research and development in S&T. By and large these institutions are staffed with highly qualified nationals many with higher degrees earned in North America, Western and Eastern Europe. A significant investment in high-level skill has been made. While there has been some brain drain out of SADC to the West, a significant number of scientists, engineers and technologists remain in SADC, including those who have entered state administration, in research and technology organisations and in higher education. A regional 'brain gain' is also evident, with migration to greener pastures a common feature, one that is likely to be pulled southward through the new open door policy of the Mbeki government.

At policy level a useful overview is that of Ogbu, Oyeyinka and Mlawa[2]. Their main argument is that technology drives development. 'African economies require deep technological revolutions to bring about rapid structural shifts … (within) an enabling macroeconomic environment and the ways that environment interacts with an effective technology policy' (ibid.5). They argue that technological capability is not an automatic outcome of capital accumulation and investment, but that successful technology transfer involves and requires time, skills of adaptation and continuous learning for which investment must be provided. Technological learning is not automatic and not necessarily expensive. But it must be managed and allowed for. Accordingly the consequences of a '… lack of capacity for domestic capital-goods and machinery production is a singular characteristic of underdevelopment. … SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa) is extremely weak, lacking the capacity to produce even the most basic tools for manufacturing … (and) maintain the systems'(ibid. 9). One of the additional factors that contribute to this weakness is the lack of, or impossibility for interaction among a network of firms. When there is no domestic capital-goods sector, linkages with firms cannot emerge.

Technological learning is limited and little technical change will occur. Turnkey projects generate forex (at least for a while), but the factory in a box does not stimulate local manufacturing, human resource development or R & D. Despite such turnkey projects the gap between the G- 8 countries and the rest widens. Accordingly what is argued for is a set of state-driven national systems of innovation that enable participation in the global knowledge economy.

Various studies[3][4][5] concur that critical obstacles to project implementation include poor physical infrastructure, lack of financial resources, inadequate management, planning and use of physical, financial and human resources, and weak or non-existent information systems.

A key policy instrument intended to promote regional cooperation is the *Protocol on Education and Training in the SADC.* In particular Article 8 of the Protocol lays out guidelines for cooperation in R & D. The protocol makes provision for higher education and R & D resource sharing, and recommends that within ten years all states should have their national S&T policy in place. This will serve as the basis for formulation of S&T Policy for SADC as a whole. Cooperation among the various R & D role players including the establishment of professional associations is urged, through which information might be exchanged and R&D quality enhanced. Overall there is a call for the promotion of mobility of researchers through relaxation of immigration regulations for the purposes of 'research, consultancy work and related pursuits' (ibid. 20). This might easily be interpreted as a device to promote elite activity.

Historically speaking, the S & T function in SADC, like gender, is a cross cutting activity, but is dealt with under human resource development, the function that is assigned to Swaziland. This had long been recognised as inadequate, and in May 1999 the SADC Secretariat declared S&T as a priority area and agreed to find means for the popularisation of S&T. The hanging question, not yet resolved, turns on the role that South Africa might play in this. As in other spheres of interaction, there are political sensitivities and fears of undue influence, as well as inter-State rivalries. As the interviewers were told on more than one occasion, so-called 'SADC' projects were often nothing more than national programmes marketed in the name of SADC. Strangely however, this did not appear to apply in the energy, transport and trade spheres.

A positive step taken by SADC was the establishment of a Gender Unit in the Secretariat. This followed the 1997 adoption of a policy framework for mainstreaming gender. A set of policies[6] has been published to serve as the basis for the work of this Unit. This is a timely move given the dominance of males in the R&D institutions of the SADC States.

In seeking to keep abreast with the impact of the unfolding knowledge society, the theme of the 1999 SADC Consultative Conference was Information Technology. Conference took a sanguine view of the benefits that a networked region might bring, echoing the World Bank Internet Report[7]: 'Countries which are able to seize the opportunities these technologies present will be able to leapfrog into the future, even though they lack a developed communications infrastructure today. In fact, countries with little existing infrastructure … can proceed directly to the use of wireless technologies and fibre' (14). A Southern African Information Society would be a natural environment enabling R & D cooperation across the region and with the rest of the world. South Africa has since emerged as a major African player in rolling out communications networks of various kinds, ranging from cellular telephony to pay television.

Role of the Science Councils

South Africa is the southernmost member of the SADC, which it joined in 1994 after the

inception of democracy and majority rule. It is the most developed economy in SADC, with a GDP of USD129bn, of which manufacturing is the major factor. The GNP/capita is USD 3200 but is marked with an exceptionally high Gini coefficient[8]. The country is rich in natural resources and self-sufficient in food, but like many developing countries is a net importer of technology.

The formulation of S&T policy and its coordination is the responsibility of the Ministry of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology. South Africa has chosen to conceptualise the broad functioning of its scientific organisations and institutions through the model of a national system of innovation (NSI). The NSI consists of the institutions and relationships among them as well as the policy and regulatory regime and infrastructure supporting their work.

Historically speaking the state-supported parts of the NSI operated largely in the interests of the minority through supporting industry and agri-business. Since the early 1960s a large military industrial complex was spawned, that is today able to compete on the world market. Most recently[9], urgency has been given to refocusing the national S & T agenda in support of biotechnology, for which a national strategy is to be developed by July 2001. Other parallel initiatives are underway to strengthen the country's human resources. These include the reform of higher education[10], the tabling of a human resource development strategy, the bolstering of school science and mathematics education[11], and a high level push to engage with the issues that globalisation and the knowledge economy are bringing. Changes in immigration policy will allow for a more tolerant flow of skilled personnel into the country, especially from Africa. This will apply both to students and professionals, a move whose broader consequences cannot be fully anticipated. This shift in policy has acquired great urgency, given the impact that HIV/AIDS is expected to have on the economy and society.

Across all sectors government spends in the order of USD 1bn. on R&D, or about 0,8% of GDP. Industry is a relatively poor investor in R & D. Of the nine science councils, six may be regarded as performers of R&D, namely the Agriculture Research Council (ARC), Council for Geosciences (CGS), CSIR, Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), Council for Mineral Technology (Mintek), and South Africa Bureau of Standards (SABS).

The ARC has projects with all SADC States through the Southern African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural Research. However only around 2% of the ARC budget is spent with co-operating countries, and probably as few as 5% of their staff are involved in this at any one time. The Council for Geosciences co-operates with all SADC countries and spends about 8% of its total budget on this. The work typically involves local geological surveys, departments of mines, and departments of hydrology.

The CSIR regards itself as a funnel that brings technologies from all over the world, adapts them to suit local conditions, and deploys them where needed, thus acting as a bridge to transfer these capabilities into Africa. The CSIR has a strategic focus on Africa and at present has interaction and collaborative projects with 19 countries in Africa. These include collaboration with institutions in all the SADC countries, albeit with varying levels of activity. The CSIR's largest involvement in the international arena is in the field of environmental impact assessment and natural resource management. Currently less than 10% of the CSIR income from countries outside South Africa arises from SADC projects.

At the time of the study the HSRC had no agreements at institutional level with any SADC state. Mintek's main interaction with SADC states is via commercial projects exercised in the private sector. Work of this nature is effected in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Much of this work is at the level of feasibility studies into mining, ore

processing, instrumentation and process control, and recovery of metals from slag.

The MRC has had a number of projects relating to malaria with Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Trauma research is carried out with Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, while infectious diseases, drug resistance and AIDS research is carried out with many of the SADC states. Collaborators are the various ministries of health, universities and some specialist institutions.

SABS has had commercial contact with many of the SADC states, and is also active in training towards common standards.

Mention must be made of the National Research Foundation (NRF) that is both a grantmaker and manager of national research facilities that include a cyclotron, observatories and a fisheries research centre. These national facilities are available to countries in the region for training and collaborative projects. At present scientists from Namibia, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia use the facility to train with observatory staff for extended periods (more than one month). Both the Southern African Large Telescope (SALT) and observatory are in the process of being established as African facilities. Grantholder-linked NRF bursaries have enabled other African students to study in South Africa. Ten percent of the total budget for these bursaries could be utilised for international students, with a strong contingent coming from other African countries. As to the future, the provisions of the SADC Education and Training Protocol for students from SADC countries, coupled with the availability of bursaries, could lead to greater utilisation of NRF facilities than in the past.

The activities of the science councils in the SADC states are wide ranging, from 'public goods' through to strictly commercial, as would be expected from their domestic mode of operation. In a previous study[12] the Science Councils were categorised according to the schema that indicates the extent to which the organisations are self-financing as opposed to operating on the Science Vote alone. The various Science Councils are plotted out with reference to their role as performers or agents and the extent to which they earn income as opposed to disbursing grants. The point of introducing this schema is that it helps demarcate the type of projects that Councils might tend to engage in. A performer that has a large earned income stream may tend to seek contracts of a commercial nature. On the other hand a performer that works more in the public goods domain is more likely to seek donor-funded projects.

A broad overview of S & T performance in SADC

A starting point for an analysis of S & T activity in SADC begins with some comparisons across the different states.

Unfortunately the problems of social instability and inadequate information gathering systems mean that figures are unreliable and can only be used for very broad comparisons.

The countries divide up into three main economic groupings:
1. Lower income (GNP/capita < $785): Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe
2. Lower middle income ($785 < GNP/capita < $1500) Namibia, Swaziland
3. Upper middle income ($3125 < GNP/capita < $9655) - Botswana, Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa.

Except for Seychelles, the other three countries are at the bottom end of this range.

Table 1: Some basic indicators

Country	GDP (USD) bn.	GNP/ Capita (USD)	Service: agric	Popu- lation (m)	Income status	Urban/ rural %	Adult Literacy %	H.E. (R&D) Inst	Phone lines/ 1000	NRDCB	ISI pubs	S&T policy
Angola	7,7	260	3 (oil)	12	Lower	32	40	2 (?)	5	No	11	No
Botswana	5,0	3310	15	2	Upper mid.	65	75	2 (4)	56	BOTEC	104	Yes
D.R. Congo	6,1	110	0,5	47	Lower	29	?	16(?)	1	No	49	No
Lesotho	0,95	680	4	2	Lower	26	80	2 (2)	11	MNR	14	No
Malawi	2,5	210	1,2	10	Lower	14	40	5 (5)	4	NRCM	106	Yes
Mauritius	4,4	3970	6,5	1	Upper mid.	41	83	3 (5)	195	MRC	31	1999
Mozambique	2,8	140	1,4	17	Lower	23	28	5 (10)	4	No	33	No
Namibia	3,3	2110	2	2	Lower mid.	38	78	2 (6)	58	MHEST &VT	43	Yes
Seychelles	0,5	6910	17	0,08	Upper mid.	56	88	0 (2)	196	No	7	No
South Africa	129	3210	13	41	Upper mid.	55	84	36 (30)	107	DACST	4739	Yes
Swaziland	1,3	1520	2	1,0	Lower mid.	33	77	2 (2)	24	No	83	No
Tanzania	6,9	210	0,6	31	Lower	26	72	7 (25)	3	COST-ECH	283	Yes
Zambia	3,9	370	3	9	Lower	44	75	3 (5)	9	NCSR	107	Yes
Zimbabwe	8,9	720	3	11	Lower	33	91	5 (10)	17	SIRDC	272	1999

Sources: World Bank (1997) *World Development Indicators;* SADC (1999) *SADC in the Next Millennium;* International Association of Universities (1999) *Guide to Higher Education in Africa* London: Macmillan Reference; ISI data are counts of SCI, SSCI and A&HCI for 1997.

Among the four most prosperous states Seychelles has the highest GNP/capita. The other three are at the lower end of the upper middle income range, the unusual case in this group being Botswana whose social composition is unusually homogeneous with a minute expatriate and settler population. Arguably in terms of GNP/capita, infrastructure and composition of GDP, the three settler 'islands' have most in common with each other.

South Africa and Botswana are members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Both countries in the lower middle income group are members of SACU, and have 'marched together'. The remaining member of SACU, Lesotho lies in the lower income group and is the country least endowed with agricultural potential or mineral resources. Until the completion of the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme, its main income derived from migrant labour remissions. As a water and energy exporter one may expect Lesotho's GDP to rise dramatically from 1998 onward.

Two members of the lower income group are the former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola, whose economies were largely destroyed during and after independence. The former Belgian colony of the Democratic Republic of Congo has since independence struggled to establish state infrastructure. This leaves the former British possessions of Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. All have a leading University, and in some cases, more than one. While

Tanzania and Malawi have predominantly agriculture-led economies, both Zambia and Zimbabwe have through their mining industries an associated manufacturing sector. In the latter case this sector developed strong self-reliance during the period of sanctions from 1965 to 1980. The literacy figures for Zimbabwe are apparently very high, but given the post independence commitment to basic education are probably correct.

Unfortunately the conventional indicators for S&T activity, government expenditure on R&D (GERD), number of scientists and engineers, and scientific output are largely unavailable for the SADC states. South Africa is credited with some 17000 scientists and engineers active in R&D, while for Malawi the figure in their S& T policy documents is around 400. Even such crude data are unavailable for most states. Figures for elsewhere in Africa are equally unreliable especially as the number of research-active scientists is hard to quantify. In Table 1 therefore a number of indicators and proxies serve to describe the infrastructure needed for the conduct of science and technology. The basic elements of national systems of innovation exist in a number of states, but the linkage with any industrial sector is tenuous.

Over the period 1992 – 1996 SA was ranked 27th in the world by citations of papers produced[13], being slightly behind Argentina and ahead of Hong Kong, Mexico and Brazil. No other African country ranked among the top 30 scientifically active nations. Within SADC, of those countries for whom data were available, South Africa in 1997 produced 4739 papers, Zimbabwe 272 and Tanzania 283. From the ISI data in Table 1 it may be calculated that South Africa accounts for 80% of the SADC output. According to FRD statistics[14], South Africa, within Africa as a whole contributed 37% of the output, ahead of Egypt and Nigeria. This confirms yet again that South Africa plays a special role in the SADC region. That was the very reason driving the original establishment of SADCC as a defensive mechanism.

In the case of South Africa it is known[15] that 75% of journal publications are produced by the university sector. It is also the case in many countries that much competent research remains in reports that are not translated into peer-reviewed articles. Such practice may explain why Mauritius has an apparently low publication score in spite of having a well-developed agricultural research sector.

Among the upper middle income countries, Mauritius and Botswana are currently making strides in reconfiguring their S&T systems toward national goals. Both have well-functioning economies and well-established universities.

The two lower middle income countries, Namibia and Swaziland have very small S&T systems and are heavily dependent upon expatriate researchers. However both have particular strengths that may be engaged with.

Among the lower income countries Zimbabwe, given its huge investment in human resource development, and the developments around the National University of Science and Technology, may be expected to achieve greater levels of scientific output over the next decade or so. Fundamentally, it would be inappropriate to slice up the states into those with whom cooperation should be effected on the grounds that the research infrastructure is already in place.

Through the project DACST sought to understand the potential for and constraints limiting cooperation in R&D with institutions in the SADC states, in other words a South-South cooperation. It is instructive to consider the findings of a previous study[16] commissioned to investigate the scope for targeted cooperation of South African R & D organs with institutions in the European Union, i.e. South-North. That study sought to identify world-class institutions and researchers in South Africa who could engage in collaboration with European Union peers with the aim of achieving added value outcomes and industrial spin-offs. The major findings of that

study were that such potential existed, though the main concern of those surveyed was 'lack of funding and high costs of research'. External contacts among the local researchers were found to be quite strong – of publications surveyed 19% had foreign co-authors. Most existing cooperation was with Germany, the United Kingdom and France.

Four areas of common interest between South Africa and the then Framework Programme IV where collaboration already existed and could have been extended were found to be in: biotechnology, agriculture and fisheries, biomedicine and health, and sustainable management of renewable natural resources. That study also recommended that in order to maximise participation in Framework Programme V some institutional learning on the South African side would be needed, including networking, conference attendance and to actually participate in projects. It was further suggested that comparative studies of countries 'in a similar position' (Israel, Hungary, Canada, Australia and Switzerland) should be effected.

Those findings have clear relevance to any framework for South-South cooperation at two levels. First in terms of understanding the constraints to project work between parties whose economic strengths are widely divergent, and secondly through pinpointing areas of world class research taking place in South Africa. It would be logical to hope that this research could be applied and extended in the SADC region.

How the SADC researchers see cooperation

It is difficult to present a uniform view of how previous experience with international S&T has transpired for the other SADC states. Some institutions that could form the basis for national systems of innovation are in place, but the impact of war; political instability, the imposition of structural adjustment policies and the disastrous falls in commodity prices mean the S&T systems in many states have all but collapsed. While the S&T institutions are today largely populated with nationals, many units are moribund with demoralised staff and ageing equipment. Funds for transport are limited and many scientists are performing largely administrative functions.

At the same time many of the lower and lower middle income countries have become dependent upon donors for the continued functioning of their S & T research systems. This raises the very real concern of who is in control of the S & T research agenda. Where relationships are so unbalanced, the existence of an official S & T policy in and of itself is no safeguard against usurpation of the research agenda.

On the other hand, some country economies have blossomed, S&T institutions have grown and are performing world class research and development. A network of SADC Centres of Excellence has been established, and are actively training a new generation of scientists and carrying out relevant research.

The concerns that scientists and administrators raise in regard to international cooperation must therefore be understood in the context of decline, dependence and loss of control. Broadly these concerns are:

1. In many countries the fear was expressed that donor-funded projects create well-resourced islands that lead to further fragmentation within institutions.

2. The imbalances of power had made some researchers feel as if 'we have moved from being hunter-gatherers to data gatherers' who performed basic tasks that would accrue to the benefit of academics in the North.

3. Researchers were concerned that donor technical assistance that was built into projects

consumed a disproportionate share of the funds, that this amounted to 'recycling of money to and from the North', and was frequently of a nature that could well have been performed by a local researcher.

4. The devaluation of local currencies and erosion of income of highly qualified scientists has led many to turn to consulting as a survival activity. That many donor projects did not recruit local consultants is thus a further source of concern and fuels distrust of motives.

5. At the level of country experience there was generally movement of researchers from North to South and students from South to North. This also made for a feeling of inequality, and was further exacerbated where projects were made to fit into the northern partner timetable.

6. It was claimed by many researchers that cooperation with external partners who had access to greater resources led to 'swamping' within projects, such that the local voice was all but lost.

7. Perhaps the greatest concern related to intellectual property rights. It was frequently alleged that external researchers had appropriated data or specimens. This theme was a constant background in discussions and has become an urgent issue in the age of biotechnology and genetic engineering.

8. There were claims that the absence of ethical regimes for experimentation laid the SADC states open to the unscrupulous testing of humans, animals and crops by foreign parties within their borders.

9. Scientists face the very real prospect of becoming de-skilled since they lack the necessary equipment and other resources to work in their fields of specialisation. Put simply, scientific human capital has a finite shelf life.

10. There were many forms of brain drain and brain gain in operation, with scientists moving within the region and out of the region.

11. Researchers in many states were frustrated that politicians had not grasped the importance of funding research and building S&T systems. They felt that leadership was only interested in activities with a high likelihood of delivering immediate results. There was a problem of managing expectations.

12. Fears of dominance frequently arose, directed toward the rich countries of the North, South Africa and even East Africa.

13. Some government departments felt a strong need to control research especially where this intruded on sensitive issues such as threatened first peoples.

14. A caution was frequently offered that individual researchers were prone to advocate narrow interests to attract funds toward their own areas or institutions.

15. Appropriate technology was to be encouraged; appropriation of technology would be resisted.

These concerns illustrate sensitivity toward matters such as power relations, self esteem, mobility and intellectual survival.

Framework

Traditional socio-economic data as presented in Table 1 do not capture the whole story, particularly as this relates to the knowledge industries. Measuring the number of main lines per 100 of population tells one something of what the telephone infrastructure looked like a decade ago, but in the age of cellular telephony this is quite misleading. Virtually all SADC countries now have a cellular network in their capital cities. In some cases there is now more than one

network provider and coverage extends to other major population centres as well. The top layers of government, industry and academe are in therefore in touch, mobile and independent of unreliable fixed line services. With the benefit of local wireless loop and the deployment of satellite channels for Internet access, researchers are now in contact with colleagues around the world.

Over the last five years universities and research institutes have to varying degrees become 'wired' and this trend can but accelerate. Such linkage has the potential to improve the sharing of information, broaden participation, and reduce isolation of researchers. While the Internet cannot substitute for direct hands-on experimentation, its deployment offers cost reductions and speed of data exchange that were unimaginable just a few years back. Infrastructure or not, provided a PC and phone line are in place, scientists can work together.

At one extreme one might argue that formal nation to nation bi-lateral agreements are needed. However the time and effort required to effect such agreements is an obstacle. Where such bi-laterals exist they may be used for setting up collaboration, but where they do not exist, other mechanisms must do.

At the other extreme might be a totally *laissez faire* approach that relies upon peer to peer or institution to institution networking. The argument would be that competent scientists know one another, will make contact and will get on with the job. Sadly, where the resources available to the different scientists are highly unequal, the emergent relationship may be flawed. Somewhere between the two is where funding is channelled through the appropriate national research and development co-ordinating bodies. Where such bodies do not exist the national university could assume the position of facilitator.

To the relations between individuals or nations must be added the purpose behind the relations and that brings one to the question of goals. All countries grapple with the problem of deciding where the self-interest of researchers both national and foreign ends and linkage to national interest begins.

With the above considerations in mind the following was proposed as a framework for cooperation:

1. Promotion of trans-national peer to peer interaction aligned with national goals and effected in cooperation with NRDCBs where such exist.

2. Concentration on activities that are squarely in the public goods domain. There are a number of reasons for this position that arise from direct historic relations as well as the general experience of the region. The primary goal must be to establish a relationship of trust with partner organisations. This may best be done through research where the fear of unilateral exploitation is kept to a minimum. By removing commercial gain from the equation along with its concomitant contractual aspects one goes some way toward this.

3. As the relationships mature and all parties become secure, more commercial benefit might be sought. Accordingly those agencies that are primarily seeking contractual work should at this stage do so outside the framework of the DACST SADC project.

4. Linkage with the productive sector must be a longer-term goal of the cooperation.

5. Well-defined projects that address immediate needs and fit national goals should be selected. Project identification could be based on goal directed needs, through an expression of interest, or where an existing project is recognised as having mutual benefit. Project plans should specify work breakdown structure; activity cost breakdown, intended deliverables, roles, responsibilities and the agreed mechanisms for decision-making and conflict resolution.

6. Where potential projects involve direct social impact it would be expected that stakeholder

consultation will be effected as early as possible.

7. Given the public goods orientation, charges for goods and services would normally be levied at cost.

8. Where feasible the projects should involve postgraduate student development.

9. Intellectual property rights arising from the project work will primarily be dealt with through joint publication. A memorandum of understanding (MoU) would normally suffice to protect pre-existing rights.

10. A Steering Committee should monitor the projects in terms of ethical compliance, and gender balance, and be responsible for formative and summative project evaluation. The evaluation criteria should be built into the project design at the outset.

In addition a list of possible areas for research cooperation was identified.

Immediate outcome

The framework proposed through this research was adopted in early 2000, with the decision taken that peer-to-peer collaboration would serve as the mechanism for collaboration. A public call for proposals was placed across six SADC states and elicited 83 immediate responses. This would seem to indicate an enthusiasm for collaboration.

The eight projects that were supported range across development of a nutraceutical supplement, investigation of nitrate contamination of groundwater, marine policy harmonization, ethno-veterinary studies, establishing a database on land-cover, a development geographic information system, the role of legumes in soil improvement, and lastly, studies on cross-border air pollution. On the South African side the players span CSIR, SABS, HSRC, ARC, UCT and Peninsula Technikon. On the SADC side the participants in the six countries include eleven parastatal agencies, five government departments and two SADC organs. Universities are notable by their absence, an explanation for which is yet to be forthcoming.

The 'Regional S & T Programme' is modest, with some $0,5m of funds awarded in the third quarter of 2000as a kick-off. The programme sits squarely in the public goods domain, where fees are low, since state subsidies operate.

Cross-country collaboration is complex, the more so where many parties are involved. Public funding demands public accountability, with the necessity for proper contracts and monitoring. At the time of writing the contracts had been signed, but no financial transfers had been effected. For the moment then the jury is out. The framework exists, the parties are willing, the funds are available, a start has been made.

But there is perhaps another subtlety at work here. The eight projects all sit close to the resource exploitation and management domain, and by their very nature do not interact with the local industrial base where competitive interest dominates.

This is in sharp contrast with the project set of the Lead Programme that includes ground-breaking work on vaccines for animal heartwater disease and tuberculosis, the development of superalloys, and novel extraction metallurgy. It may be the case that no southern partners exist for cooperation in these fields and that is why northern groups were chosen. However the fact remains that 'Lead is North'.

The project fields that were identified (Appendix I) as viable and essential for south-south collaboration included high technology areas such as biotechnology and the ICTs, but these are essentially absent from this first round of funding for south-south collaboration.

It will be important to ratchet up the level of high-tech projects in the next round in order to dispel any sense that south-south means low tech.

Notes

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Appendix I : Some possible projects and agents

Project area	*Science Council*
Agriculture and food security	
Crops: sweet potato, sugar	ARC, universities
Food technology	CSIR
Forestation	CSIR

Peri-urban agriculture	
Post harvest processing of crops	ARC
Soil management	ARC
Vermiculture/earthworms	
Water management	ARC
Environmental management	
Environmental impact	CSIR
Renewable energy (biogas)	CSIR
Zero Emissions Research Initiative	
Appropriate technology	
Cross border pollution	CSIR
Affordable shelter	CSIR
Effluent studies	Mintek
Marine/inland fisheries	
Marine biotechnology	
Fisheries	
Health	
Micro-nutrients	MRC
Weaning foods	CSIR
HIV/AIDs treatment, avoidance, education	MRC
Burn treatment	MRC
Tuberculosis treatment	MRC
Malaria prevention, diagnosis, treatment, management. (Also Bilharzia and other schistosomes.)	MRC
Medicinal plants (identification, sustainable propagation, processing)	CSIR
Biomedicine	MRC

Applied Science	
Biotechnology	CSIR
Remote sensing	CSIR, ARC
Forensic science	
Information and communication technologies including GIS and EMIS	CSIR
Geological mapping; GIS	CGS
Natural products research (e.g. Cassava as a feedstock for chemical industry)	CSIR
Policy research and social sciences	
Legal and policy work on intellectual property rights; information technology	
Social impact studies (e.g. Social Fabric of Mauritius)	HSRC
Development of common standards (commodity release legislation, seed quality standards, ethics governing biotechnology and animal experimentation)	ARC; SABS MRC
Capturing, strengthening and protecting indigenous knowledge	CSIR

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Mindless versus mindful sociology: Models of mind in sociology and the social sciences

Abstract
This article deals with the dominant model of mind implicit or explicit in many of the social sciences and sociology. Following the lead of evolutionary psychologists John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, this dominant theory of mind is referred to as the 'Standard Social Science Model'. This model is described and a short history of it provided. A brief explanation for its dominance is also offered. The paper argues that this model is now obsolete and that scientific progress in sociology and the social science is being hampered by adherence to it. The major shortcomings of the model are identified. An alternate model of mind, the 'Integrated Model', is offered as a scientifically sounder one that offers sociology and the social sciences a way out of the rut they are currently in. The main features of the Integrated Model are discussed and the paper concludes with the promise that the model holds for sociology and the social sciences if it is adopted.

Introduction

This paper is concerned with the model of mind typically implied in social research, analysis and theory. Following the lead of writers such as Tooby and Cosmides (1992) and Brown (1991), it argues that the time has come for social scientists to abandon the model of mind implicit or explicit in much of their work and to adopt a model that is more consistent with the state of knowledge in the various mind sciences. As the wordplay in the title suggests, a lot of sociology and social science may be seen as 'mindless' - in two senses. Firstly, they are mindless because the model of mind they employ is a variant of the *tabula rasa* model, i.e. the mind is assumed has little or no content. Secondly, because many sociologists and social scientist proudly practise their own brands of *disciplinary apartheid*, they are content to be mindless of developments in other related fields and disciplines. This is often methodologically justified by arguments against *reductionism* and in favour of explaining the social by the social.

As a string of critics since the early 1960s has pointed out (cf. Fox 1968 and Wrong 1961 as early examples), there is a lot wrong with the social sciences' 'mindless' model of mind, and with their stance vis-à-vis developments in the natural, biological and mind sciences. This model and methodological stance has seriously retarded the scientific development of the social sciences. The need to abandon it grows more urgent by the day if the social sciences are to get out of the rut in which they seem to be. This paper spells out some of the numerous inadequacies of the 'mindless' model and supports current calls to replace this with a more 'mindful' approach that is emerging from an integration of findings in the various mind sciences and evolutionary theory. This emerging model, in contrast to the mindless model, accepts that the mind is full of genetically derived content and structure. In addition, advocates of this model are mindful of the importance of striving to keep the model consistent with discoveries and theories across the full spectrum of the mind and related sciences.

The human mind is centrally implicated in all of social science. It is implicated in human action, consciousness and thought and in the societies and cultures that humans construct. This obvious and unavoidable fact has solicited a wide variety of responses. One approach has been to proceed without too much direct attention to the mind. This was the stance to which Levi-Strauss alluded thirty years ago when he asked an audience:

Is it language which influences culture? Is it culture which influences language?' But we have not been sufficiently aware of the fact that *both* language and culture are the products of activities which are basically similar. I am now referring to this uninvited guest which has been seated beside us during this conference and which is the *human mind*. (Levi-Strauss 1972:71)

Many varieties of macro social theory provide examples of such 'mindless' or 'absent mind' approaches. Such theories typically employ aggregated and abstract concepts such as 'class', 'system', 'structure', 'discourse', all of which are detached from direct links to statements about the human mind or individuals. In the minimal recourse they have to mind, such theories see it as a reflection of macro systems or structures. In crude varieties of Marxism, mind is determined by the economic infrastructure; in crude functionalism, the requisites of the social system shape the mind.

Another response has been to incorporate selective features of the mind into social theories without much concern for the features that are omitted. The best example of this form of theorising is provided by Rational Choice Theory. This theory is based on the idea of the mind with certain inherent but unexplained features such as consciousness, intentionality, utility orientation and rationality. Emotions, irrationality, and the unconscious play little or no part in the theory.

A third response has been to accept that the mind is implicated in everything that social scientists are concerned with. The challenge then is to theoretically integrate the mind and the social in a coherent and valid way. In order to do so, theorists must state what constitutes the mind, and how mind relates to the social/cultural. There are broadly four ways in which theorists have proceeded in this regard:

1. The mind is viewed as a supernatural 'given'. Culture and society are seen as expressions of a divinely or in some way supernaturally given force behind mind.

2. It is conceded that mind is something natural, but is regarded as more or less a blank slate. Culture and society are seen as the chief determinants of mind. This approach comes down the 'mindless' or 'Standard Social Social Model' of which the present paper is a critique.

3. The mind is natural and moreover is genetically endowed with structure and content. Culture and society are then seen as largely determined by mind. There is a sense in which structuralists of the school of Levi-Strauss could be said to come perilously close to this position, though the bulk of theories of this ilk are specimens of the kind of 'biological determinism' to which social scientists have quite rightly objected.

4. Finally, there is the position, shared in this paper, that argues that mind is natural, but while regarding it as genetically endowed with structure and content, allow for a variety of complex relations between mind and culture and society. Mind, society and culture are co-determinants of each other.

The first category above covers 'idealistic' models to which Hegelian philosophy could be argued to belong. The third category embraces 'nativist' and 'biological determinist' models familiar from much of 19th century psychology and pseudo-psychology. These two approaches to the problem of mind and society will receive no further attention here since they no longer feature as serious contenders in the mind sciences or the social sciences.

The second approach sketched above is still widely encountered in the social sciences. In fact, it is probably the prevailing orthodoxy. It can be encountered under many different guises, from

'social determinism', 'cultural determinism', 'the post-structuralist and Foucauldian linguistic turns', and perhaps most notably the current dominance of the 'social constructionist' perspective in much of contemporary anthropology and sociology.

These models are so widely encountered that the generic model of mind they represent is clearly the dominant model in the social sciences. Because of the dominance and wide diffusion of this generic model, writers such as John Tooby and Lena Cosmides (1992) and Stephen Pinker have dubbed it the 'Standard Social Science Model' (SSSM). In the discussion to follow I shall refer to this model simply as the 'Standard Model'. As will be argued, despite the prevalence of this model of mind (and its concomitant and largely negative views on the existence of a 'human nature'), there are many reasons why the time is coming for it to be abandoned.

The last category above covers theories of the mind/society/culture relation which constitute the main challenge to the 'Standard Model'. These theories put forward a variety of models, variously labelled 'epigenetic', 'interaction' and 'integrated' models. Some of the models implied or embedded in structuration theory and analytic dualism can also be included here (cf. Archer 2000). Tooby and Cosmides (1992) refer to their model as the 'Integrated Causal Model' (ICM). hey regard this model as coherent and valid in terms of cross-disciplinary theories and findings and advocate its adoption by the social sciences. In what follows, I shall refer to all models of mind constructed on integrative principles by the generic label of 'Integrated Model'. As will become clear, this Model is still largely work in progress because the mind sciences are at a comparatively early level of development. The integration of their theories and findings thus generate contending models.

The Standard Model

The history of the Standard Model is to a great extent the history of the social sciences themselves and their struggle for recognition, autonomy, and legitimacy. Paradoxically, while the Integrated Model now seems our best way forward, the Standard Model emerged as a reaction to precursors of the Integrated Model. These precursors regarded the mind as the cause of human action and explained actions in terms of mental entities such as beliefs and desires. Mind was, following Darwin, naturalistically explained as a product of evolution. While this explanation appealed to many, it also evoked much opposition. So much so that the early decades of the 20th century witnessed a growing disenchantment with evolutionary, rationalistic and nativistic theories of mind, culture and society. This disenchantment and the resulting challenges emerged particularly strongly in psychology, anthropology and sociology. It was a development fuelled not only by scientific difficulties with the then existing theories but also by the desire to improve people and societies coupled with strong opposition to the reactionary political uses to which Darwinian theories had been put.

In their attempts to establish psychology as a science, pioneers such as J. B. Watson and B. F. Skinner sought to link observable inputs with observable outputs and in this way avoid recourse to unobservables such as beliefs and desires. Their work led them to view the mind, whether of pigeons, rats or humans, as something of a general learning device, minimally structured but good at associating stimuli and responses. It was assumed that the mind was basically 'equipotential': any perceptible stimulus could, with equal ease, be associated with any other perceptible stimulus or with any response in an animal's repertoire.

Watson accepted that there was some variation inherent in the minds of infants but he regarded external influences as capable of overriding it. For him the exogenous factors were supreme.

This view is well expressed in his famous claim:

> Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them up in and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select - doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and, yes, even beggar-man and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors. (Watson 1930:104)

In anthropology, the work of Franz Boas was decisive in undermining 19th century 'Race Science' in which people and cultures were ranked in hierarchies of ability and levels of civilisation, with evolutionary explanations offered for these rankings. Boas accepted that all humans were biologically much the same, but he did not agree that similar cultural practices of different societies necessarily implied a common biological cause. In Durkheimian fashion he argued for explaining the cultural in terms of the cultural. He rejected the arguments for supposing that there were biologically evolved differences in the minds of the different 'races'. He was an early opponent of the very idea of race, arguing that there were no lines of descent binding existing human races into distinct hereditary types (c.f. Boas 1982 [1940] :276). Boas and his former students Alfred Kroeber and Robert Lowie established an influential school of American anthropology that came increasingly to espouse an extreme form of cultural determinism. Under their influence, empirical evidence was gathered that provided strong support for the thesis that mind and behaviour were socially and culturally determined. Margaret Mead's (1928) *Coming of Age in Samoa* is the classic and most famous example of this kind of empirical validation. Mead's and similar work contributed in large measure to the spread and endurance of the Standard Model, especially in feminist theorising. It also had a profound effect on early US sociology (Richards 1989). Many early recruits to sociology were originally destined for religious careers but while sociology seemed to have cured them of their religious beliefs, arguments regarding the social/cultural determinism of mind and behaviour sustained and intensified their zeal to work to improve individuals and societies.

The notion that human sociality required its own autonomous level of theoretical explanation owed much to the work of Boas and Emile Durkheim. Indeed it could be argued that in its current social constructionist phase, modern sociology and its fashionable adjunct of cultural studies are Durkheimian through and through. The victory over nativist theories of human nature – in academic social science if not in the wider world – was thus won quite early on in the 20th century. A clear example of the way in which Durkheim contributed to the Standard Model of mind is his discussion of the categories which thinking presupposes, categories such as time, space, class, number, cause, substance, etc. Following Kant, Durkheim accepted that these could not be explained empirically. They could also not simply be accepted as inexplicable, they had to be accounted for. Two options were open: an evolutionary explanation or a sociological explanation. Durkheim opted for the latter. He claimed: 'The first logical categories were social categories, the first classes of things were classes of men into which things were integrated. It was because men were grouped and thought of themselves in the form of groups, that in their ideas they grouped other things'. For Durkheim the fact that the categories are the product of social factors is evidenced by such facts that '... societies in Australia and North America where space is conceived in the form of an immense circle, because the camp has a circular form' (Durkheim 1976:11). Time for Durkheim can only be grasped, indeed only exists, through the round of social activities. 'A calendar expresses the rhythm of the collective activities, while at the same time its function is to assure their regularity' (p 10).

Following Durkheim, systematic and holistic thought is rooted in the perceived unity of society. He offers similar accounts for the origin and content of other categories and concepts. As his argument runs, the structures of human relations and society impose themselves on the human mind. The mind is furnished through this and expresses itself in these terms. The differences between societies explain the differences in mind between members of difference societies as well as the similarities in mind within societies.

Probably driven by his own success and the practical need to establish sociology as a discipline *sui generis*, Durkheim's sociology gradually became stronger sociology and weaker theory. Commenting on this evolution, Gehlke (1915:86) wrote, '... so far as the individual appears at all in Durkheim's later theory, he has become only a body; he is no longer a soul. His soul is the mind of society incarnated in his body. The social mind is all the mind that exists; and in this sense the social is the only real'. This comment provides a good summary of the essence of the Standard Model. This Model crystalized out of the confluence of ideas such as those flowing from Durkheimian sociology, Boasian anthroplogy and Watsonian behaviourism and was institutionalised as the dominant model in the social science by the late 1950s and early 1960s. It has been the working model in much of social science since then.

Its presence is clearly evident in contemporary theory where it can be discerned as the taken-for-granted model of mind in the influential line of social theorising that links structuralism, post-structuralism, feminism, social constructionism, textualism and postmodernism. These are all, to greater or lesser extent, 'mindless' in the manner previously noted. What unites them is an extreme *tabula rasa* view of mind. There is little or nothing that is inherent and what becomes inscribed is easily erased and replaced by new inscriptions (c.f. Archer 2000:19). Mind is a point of intersection of external networks and flows of information. The social, cultural and linguistic determination of mind (and hence self, identity and thought) is total and as fluid as the networks and flows of information. The essence of this model is aptly captured in Rorty's (1989:185) statement, 'Socialization ... goes all the way down'.

Key elements of the Standard Model

The Standard Model accepts the minimum of biological givens that are necessary to sustain its theoretical claims: humans are genetically endowed with a few basic drives – survival, food, comfort, sex, companionship, etc, – and a general capacity for learning. Consistent with this minimal innatism, Berger and Luckmann (1967:66) write: 'Man's instinctual organization may be described as underdeveloped, compared with that of the higher mammals. Man does have drives, of course. But these drives are highly unspecialized and undirected'. And, as for the capacity for learning: '... there is no human nature in the sense of a biologically fixed substratum determining the variability of socio-cultural formations. There is only human nature in the sense of anthropological constants (for example, world-openness and plasticity of instinctual structure) that delimit and permit man's socio-cultural formations. …While it is possible to say that man has a nature, it is more significant to say that man constructs his own nature, or simply, that man produces himself'. (Ibid. 1967:67)

Extreme empiricist versions of the Standard Model imply *tabula rasa* or bucket theories of mind. More sophisticated versions, those that have tried to accommodate the model to at least some findings from cognitive science, appreciate that to be capable of the many learning tasks that the mind is capable of, it must have a very complex structure. The simple structure of the *tabula rasa* has given way to the complex structure of a general purpose learning device that depends

on society and culture for its programming and contents (cf. Geertz 1973:44; Tooby and Cosmides 1992:29). The mind, according to this version of the Standard Model, has a great capacity for learning but has no significant innate biases or channels of information acquisition and development. It is equipotential. It will indifferently assimilate almost anything that is presented to it or that it encounters. It will do this in any order and at any time in development. This adds up to a mind that is highly plastic and programmable. What is largely responsible for furnishing and structuring the mind are inputs from the natural, social and cultural environments. Because, in terms of this model, so little of what humans think and do flows from the commencing mind, humans strictly speaking do not have a nature in the sense that other animals have. Humans are held historically and collectively to have constructed their own nature. Each generation has versions of this constructed nature imposed on it and in its own way adds to this construction process and participates in its reproduction.

In addition to its claim that the human mind is fundamentally a general learning device, the Standard Model also sees the human mind as everywhere basically the same. There are no biological ethnic or racial differences as regards the mind. Apart from differences due to circumstance, society and culture, at the collective level the mind is held to be the same everywhere. In other words, the Standard Model accepts the assumption of the *psychic unity of humankind.* While it seems correct in doing this, its weakness is, as will be indicated, that it can offer no explanation for this assumption and cannot promote it to a statement of fact as the Integrated Model attempts to do.

In terms of the Standard Model, the infant is born with a strong general capacity to learn but no innate guidance regarding what to learn. Its own learning is initially largely accidental and haphazard and would make little progress if it were not for the fact that various teaching agents are available to it. It is they who structure learning activities and provide the information the infant requires at each stage of its cognitive development. This relationship between the agents of socialisation and the infant is employed by the Standard Model to explain both the differences between individuals and the similarities between members of groups and cultures. The differences between groups and cultures are explained by their unique social and cultural histories.

Criticism of the Standard Model

As indicated above, the Standard Model emerged in a particular moral and political climate as well as a time when the main social sciences were establishing themselves globally as useful and legitimate disciplines with their own irreducible subject matter. The adoption of the Durkheimian methodological principle of explaining the social in terms of the social (or the Boasian *Omnis cultura ex cultura*) led to important and profound insights into the relations between macro phenomena and between society/culture and the individual/mind.

For a time, especially during the 1950s and 60s, behaviourism and cultural anthropology provided a steady stream of empirical findings that provided scientific support for the Standard Model. But alongside this support, the older but at that time eclipsed nativist model was beginning to stage a come-back in a new form and with its own emerging body of empirical evidence. The balance of support shifted in favour of the nativist model during the 1970s due in large part to the confluence of findings and theorising in such fields as biology, ethology, cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, neuro-science, and the new sciences of sociobiology, computers, information and artificial intelligence.

According to some commentators, the evidence and arguments against the Standard Model were so strong by the end of the 70s that it has become something of a puzzle to explain the longevity and continuing dominance of the Standard Model in the social sciences. This adherence to an outmoded, refuted model of mind runs counter to scientific method and expectation and merits serious treatment by the sociology of knowledge.

Prt of the explanation for the persistence of the Standard Model has no doubt to do with the affinity between this Model and Marxism and Feminism, two schools of thought that for theoretical and political reasons were strongly committed to environmental explanations of mind and strongly opposed to essentialism. The affinity between the Standard Model and the ideologies of the welfare state, socialism and communism also contributed to sustaining it.

The main explanation for its longevity, however, is probably the manner in which it was able to isolate itself by strong disciplinary boundaries from theories and empirical data emerging in the new disciplines mentioned in the previous paragraph. As Cosmides, Tooby and Barkow (1992:4) argue, for historical, methodological and political/practical reasons, the social sciences have in the main eschewed the scientific principle of cross-disciplinary consistency and conceptual integration. Persisting along the Durkheimian and Boasian tracks, the social sciences typically do not expect their practitioners to take stock of findings in other disciplines and reductionism is tabooed. Social science theories are consequently rarely evaluated on the grounds of conceptual integration and multidisciplinary and multilevel compatibility.

The cognitive isolation that the social sciences have fashioned for themselves has insulated the Standard Model from findings and arguments that, under normal scientific conditions, would have ensured that the model remained consistent with new knowledge. The upshot of this is that this model is so seriously flawed that it can be argued to be obsolete. Nothing less than a thorough Kuhnian scientific revolution is called for. It goes without saying that to go this route also requires that the social sciences ditch their unscientific proscriptions against reductionism, interdisciplinary consistency and conceptual integration. Theories that lean upon the Standard Model may well find themselves outflanked as a younger generation of social scientists increasingly borrow in uninhibited fashion from findings of the 'hard sciences'.

What then are the major and fatal flaws in the Standard Model? The following are among the main criticisms that have been levelled at it:

1. The Standard Model is 'oversocialised'. It recognises that humans are born with a capacity for culture (Geertz, 1973; Montagu 1968; Sahlins 1976). However, while the term 'capacity' can be read to imply both the capacity to acquire culture and the capacity to generate culture, the Standard Model typically only focuses on the former. This failure to deal adequately with humankind's culture-generating capacity underlies the many criticisms of Standard Model texts as advancing an 'oversocialised' conception of humankind (c.f. Wrong, 1961). At its worst, it portrays human beings as dupes or puppets of their social environment. The Standard Model of mind emerged in sociology as an answer to the Hobbesian question of social order. It held that because of the kind of minds they have, humans internalise social norms and conform to social expectations. This model of mind denies humans the very possibility of being anything but thoroughly socialised beings. In answering the Hobbesian question, it actually turns it into a non-question. Standard Model fails to recognise that humankind's perceptual and cognitive system implies a radical discontinuity between informational input and the sense that is made of this input, the gap that necessarily exists for humans between information and knowledge. Knowledge implies the transformation of the input into something that is meaningful for the individual; this is an operation of the mind, it is not given in the information, and cannot be

given as such. This means that humans are, and have to be, constitutionally creative in all learning that is more than the simple stimulus-response type.

2. The Standard Model's description of the infant mind and early learning is contradicted by empirical findings from child and developmental psychology. From the perspective of the Standard Model, infants are relatively passive learners, conditioned and shaped by things done to them. They are taught, instructed and socialised by various external agents. Almost nothing is attributed to the infant or its own activities. Little is written about resistance to learning or the creative use of what is offered in learning. The Standard Model's image is contradicted by compelling evidence that from birth the infant is an active, self directed and self-motivated learner. Infants are actively involved in the construction of their own representations (cf. Carey and Gelman 1991). The infant's spontaneous attention to external stimuli together with the selective and structured nature of its attention behaviour, implies more innateness of mind than the Standard Model allows. The infant has an innate ability to learn and its learning behaviour is so predictable, keen, persistent and patterned that it can be credited with having an 'instinct to learn' (cf. Fox 1975; Gould and Marler 1987; Marler 1991). This instinct is clearly manifest, for example, in early spontaneous exploratory, exercise and play behaviour as well as in the child's self initiated mimicry of adult behaviour. It is also manifest in the ease with which certain things are learnt – perhaps the most notable example being that of language – as opposed to the resistance shown to learning other things. The child is clearly not an equipotential learner equipped with a general learning mechanism.

3. The Standard Model fails the 'solvability' test. This test, as described by Tooby and Cosmides (1992:110), requires that the model convincingly account for the problems that humans routinely solve. These problems are of various sorts and their solutions equally various. They include such diverse problems as evading predators, avoiding incest, knowing what is nutritious and what is not, judging distance, determining quantity, learning language, knowing when infants require assistance, choosing an appropriate mate, avoiding being cuckolded, classifying things, and so on. The Standard Model fails the solvability test because it cannot account for the way in which these and other human problems are solved. At best it provides a partial account. This failure of the Standard Model was originally and most famously demonstrated with reference to the problem of language acquisition. The failure was first noted by Chomsky (1957) who studied children's language acquisition and discovered that all normal children learn to speak fluently even with minimal exposure to language or direct language instruction. He found that the linguistic inputs to which children were exposed were insufficient on their own to account for their language acquisition. This could only be accounted for if it was acknowledged that they had some innate learning device or algorithms that guided language learning. What Chomsky had discovered was a major problem in Standard Model accounts of learning. Subsequent research has revealed that this problem is not only confined to language learning, but is related to learning about a host of other things. These include the way a child learns the meaning of facial expression and how a child comes to attribute beliefs and intentions to other people. It is now increasingly being accepted that to adequately account for how humans learn and solve routine problems, innate guidance systems or constraints must be supposed to be present in the mind. Hence the mind must have more innate structure and content than is granted by the Standard Model.

4. The Standard Model fails the 'evolvability' test (c.f Tooby and Cosmides 1992:110). The Darwinian evolutionary paradigm has developed and survived to be the only contender able to offer a plausible explanation for the rich diversity of living forms (Dawkins 1986). It is therefore

to this paradigm that mind scientists must turn if they are to test their models of mind. For a model to be plausible, it must be possible for the mind it describes to have evolved in terms of the factors central to evolutionary theory – reproduction, inheritance, mutation and natural selection. The Standard Model implies that the innately richly filled and structured ape precursor to the human mind evolved into humankind's largely empty and unstructured mind. Those who have tried to test this proposition against the theory of evolution find that it fails. It is not plausible to suppose, as the Standard Model requires, that a large number of adapted and functional ape 'instincts' regarding such things as food preferences, health maintenance, predator identification and avoidance, self-defence, reproduction, sexual behaviour, infant-care, nest building, social interaction, communication, and so forth, have all been equally and totally eliminated from the human mind. The argument that humankind's increasing reliance on culture led to some sort of 'bursting', 'erosion' or 'erasing' of 'instincts' is unconvincing. It might, conceivably, have had this effect on some instincts, but on all, and all to the same extent? This is highly improbable. There is no reason to suppose that culture is not an augmentation to some 'instincts' and so has, in fact served to preserve these. Even if some 'instincts' were 'eroded' by increasing reliance on culture, it makes more sense in evolutionary terms to see some 'instincts' as more eroded than others, some might have 'burst', while others may have been retained fairly intact. It is also possible, as seems the case with language and social and cultural learning, that some new 'instincts' have been acquired since Homo separated from Pan. A further point worth making related to the 'evolvability' test is that the mind postulated by the Standard Model would have been selected 'against' not 'for' by natural selection. If we were indeed equipped with a mind as heavily dependent on socio-cultural programming as the Standard Model suggests, we would be easily exploited and misled as to what was truly in our own as opposed to our competitor's interests. Such a mind would have been quickly eliminated by minds with some intrinsic guidance as to what was in their best interest and able to detect and resist exploitation (cf. Pinker 1997:210).

The above constitute a brief and by no means complete set of the criticisms that have been levelled at the Standard Model. They make for a compelling case that social science can no longer maintain its insularity vis-à-vis the burgeoning fields that cluster around cognitive studies and evolutionary biology.

The Integrated Model

As the name of this model suggests, it is a conception developed from theoretical arguments and empirical findings from all disciplines that directly or indirectly study the mind or mind related matters. The central disciplines are evolutionary psychology, cognitive psychology, evolutionary biology, developmental psychology, neurobiology and artificial intelligence. Advocates of this model regard it as more valid than the Standard Model because it is the result of the continual attempt to develop an understanding of mind that is based on the integration of plausible theory and well-supported empirical findings. Proponents of the model accept that it is at an early stage of development. There is much that is controversial, and a great deal more that is still not known. Advocates of the Integrated Model accept that the mind is the product of biological evolution and, as a consequence, has to be explained in the same way that other biological organs are. According to this model, the mind consists of evolved mechanisms that are specialised for solving evolutionary long-enduring adaptive problems. It is postulated that these mechanisms have content-specialised representational formats and algorithms (Tooby and Cosmides,1992:34)

that generate the specific mental contents and structures that shape human social life and culture.

Whereas the standard model assumes a general capacity to learn and says little about the nature of this capacity, apart from asserting that it is general, the Integrated Model, regards this capacity as endogenously stimulated and structured by evolved mechanisms. Evolutionary reasoning suggests, given the imperative humans have to learn, that a human instinct to learn is part of humankind's genetic endowment. This postulated instinct has been confirmed by child and developmental psychology since the early 1970s. Today it is widely accepted that the human infant is born with a strong instinct to learn (c.f Fox 1975; Gould and Marler 1987; Marler 1991).

In place of the passive, equipotential infant of the Standard Model, the Integrated Model posits an active and constrained infant, one who not only receives and processes information, but one who actively seeks stimulation and poses question to its environment. The human child is a learner whose curiosity, exploration, repetition, play, practice, and actions generate information that make it to a significant degree self instructing, educating and socialising.

Evolutionary reasoning suggests that in all learning species, the newborn would be shaped and selected to pay particular attention to acquiring the knowledge that its species is most dependent on for survival. In the case of humans, a great deal of this knowledge has to be derived from other humans and from language and culture. It is therefore not surprising that infants seem to be born with a rich array of algorithms which boil down to instructions such as: 'Imitate and learn from the members of your species' and 'learn the language you hear around you'. Research confirms that babies are attentive to their caretakers, pay great attention to the human face and human actions, and devote a lot of attention to listening to and imitating vocal sounds and mastering language.

As was noted earlier, while both the Standard Model and the Integrated Model accept, in opposition to racist theories, that the minds of all humans are essentially the same, only the integrated model is able to '... offer the explanation for why the psychic unity of mankind is genuine and not just an ideological fiction...' (Tooby and Cosmides 1992:79). The integrated model is able to do this because of its incorporation of biology and evolutionary theory. The explanation begins with the fact that humans are complex outbreeding organisms capable of combining gametes from any healthy male or female from anywhere on earth to produce a normal human being. For this to be possible, evolution must have equipped the human genome with mechanisms which ensure that no matter what ovum and spermatozoon are combined, the offspring will have a fully functional and normal heart, lung, kidney, brain, etc., and develop in the environment it is placed in in the way that any other offspring would. It is no small irony, as Tooby and Cosmides (1992:79) wryly note, that while supporters of the Standard Model often accuse those partial to biological and evolutionary explanations of being conservative right-wingers who ascribe the differences there are between individuals, groups and classes to genetic differences, it is the latter who are able to offer the only sound explanation there is for the psychic unity of humankind.

The central idea in the Standard Model that the human mind is a general learning device is replaced in the Integrated Model with the claim that the mind consists of a number of discrete modules in addition to an integrating higher level cognitive system. It is argued that a general purpose problem solving mind might be able to solve a few problems speedily but could not do so across the full range of problems that routinely face humans, because these are too diverse. To do what it does, the mind must be packed with a variety of problem solving devices, each

designed to deal with particular problems or sets of problems.

The propagation of this claim is usually dated from the appearance of Jerry Fodor's book *The Modularity of Mind* published in 1983. In this book Fodor reasoned that if the mind were a general learning device it could not do the things we know it does. Without selecting and guiding systems, the mind would be slow and uneconomical. To survive, humans require both fast reactions and time consuming information gathering and processing. According to Fodor, the mind has systems to meet both these requirements. As he sees it, the mind is split into perceptual and cognitive systems. He regards the perceptual systems as modules. A module according to Fodor has the following characteristics: 1) Domain specificity, 2) Informational encapsulation, 3) Obligatory firing, 4) Fast Speed, 5) Shallow outputs, 6) Inaccessibility, 7) Characteristic ontogeny, 8) Dedicated neural architecture, 9) Characteristic pattern of breakdown (c.f. Fodor 1983; Segal 1996). The visual system provides a clear example of what Fodor means by a module. The various perceptual modules, in the Fodor model, provide input to the cognitive system, which is a combinatorial general processor. The one-way nature of the relationship between the cognitive system and the perceptual modules is illustrated by visual and other perceptual illusions. We know cognitively that we are subject to such illusions but this awareness does not enable us to correct the perceptual system or prevent us from continuing to perceive the illusions.

Fodor's modular conception of mind had been extremely influential and productive. It has been developed far beyond his original conception and in directions that he himself now finds unacceptable. An extreme and, to Fodor, unacceptable development of his ideas is the work by the evolutionary psychologists Tooby and Cosmides (1992). For Tooby and Cosmides the mind can only be adequately accounted for by viewing it as a product of biological evolution. On this view, the mind is like any other biological organ and has been selected and shaped to serve particular life and reproduction supporting functions. As an evolved and adapted organ, the nature of mind is best revealed if it is considered in terms of the environment in which it emerged and for which is it adapted. For evolutionary psychologists such as Tooby and Cosmides, the time from about 6 million years ago, when the evolutionary line leading to modern Homo sapiens branched from the one leading to modern Chimpanzees, is crucial for understand the mental attributes that made humans so unique.

Tooby and Cosmides argue that the human mind consists of a large number of mechanisms that assist humans to solve many of the important and enduring problems that they had to contend with during the past 6 million years of their evolution. By imaginatively placing humankind's ancestors in the kind of physical, ecological and social environment in which they evolved, Tooby and Cosmides (1992) have identified many of what they regard as among the most pressing and enduring problems that have challenged humankind. These include: the need to recognise objects, avoid predators, avoid incest, avoid teratogens when pregnant, repair nutritional deficiencies by dietary modification, judge distance, identify plant foods, capture animals, acquire grammar, attend to alarm cries, detect when their children needed assistance, be motivated to make that assistance, avoid contagious disease, acquire a lexicon, be motivated to nurse, select conspecifics as mates, select mates of the opposite sex, select mates of high reproductive value, induce potential mates to choose them, choose productive activities, balance when walking, avoid being bitten by venomous snakes, understand and make tools, avoid needlessly enraging others, interpret social situations correctly, help relatives, decide which foraging efforts have repaid the energy expenditure, perform anticipatory motion computation, inhibit one's mate from conceiving children by another, deter aggression, maintain friendships,

navigate, recognise faces, recognise emotions, cooperate, and make effective trade-offs among many of these activities.

In terms of orthodox evolutionary reasoning, which holds that form follows function, Tooby and Comides reason that genes and gene combinations which facilitated the solution of the above and other critical recurrent problems were favoured by natural selection. Natural selection processes accumulated and preserved these over time to generate the domain-specific cognitive mechanisms that Tooby and Cosmides hypothesise modern humans are equipped with. These domain-specific mechanisms have been shaped by particular problems and in their turn serve to help solve problems of the sort that shaped them. Empirical research to verify the existence of these postulate 'domain-specific mechanisms' has accelerated during the past few years and there now exists a considerable body of data to support the contention that human reasoning and problem solving in a number of domains is indeed supported by innate mechanisms. Many researchers refer to these as modules and extensive work has been done on a number of these modules. These include: the Language module, the Theory of Mind module, the Social Exchange module, the Mate Selection module, the Reproduction and Parenting module, the Biological Knowledge module and the Physical Knowledge module.

A somewhat different development of Fodor's modularity idea is found in the work of developmental psychologist Karmiloff-Smith (1992). For her, the conception of mind which seems most compatible with the legacy of her mentor Jean Piaget, her own and her colleagues' research, as well as the findings of contemporary developmental psychology, is one that combines elements of nativism and constructivism. She regards the nativism versus constructivism battles as unhelpful: '... I do not choose between these two epistemological stands, one arguing for predominantly built-in knowledge and the other for a minimum innate underpinning to subsequent domain-general learning. Rather, I submit that nativism and Piaget's constuctivism are complementary ... the ultimate theory of human cognition will encompass aspects of both'. For Karmiloff-Smith, human learning is innately constrained, i.e. there are innate biases and triggers to learning specific things but the learning itself is still heavily dependent on experience, both initiated by the child and by others agents and the environment. For her the mind is innately structured to become modularised in particular ways given the appropriate environments and learning opportunities but it is not initially modularised. The integrated nature of her conception of mind is captured in her words, '... one can attribute various innate predispositions to the human neonate without negating the roles of the physical and sociocultural environments and without jeopardizing the deep seated conviction that we are special – creative, cognitively flexible, and capable of conscious reflection, novel invention, and occasional inordinate stupidity' (Karmiloff-Smith 1992:1).

The synthesising work of such writers as Tooby and Cosmides (1992) Karmiloff-Smith (1992), Spelke (1991) and Gelman (1991), constitutes variants of the Integrated Model in the making. Their work is partial and still being developed but in seeking to integrate theory and data across disciplines vertically and horizontally, they are beginning to fill in the details of the emerging Integrated Model.

To summarise, this model accepts that the human mind is the product of a complex interplay of genetic endowment, natural/social/cultural environmental inputs and self-activity. According to the model, the mind is an evolved physical organ which has emerged and been shaped by evolutionary processes to perform a number of functions. The mind is genetically endowed with content and structure. It has functionally specialised mechanisms that contribute to the solution of particular adaptive problems. Among the latter are mechanisms for learning language, social

interaction and cultural acquisition. The mind initiates learning and is active in its own formation in the face of inputs which it generates or which emanate from the physical, social and cultural environment.

As was discussed in the first part of this paper, the social sciences have been developed on the basis of a faulty model of mind. This has led to the development of theories that are at odds with reality and has contributed to the ridicule that is increasingly heaped on the social sciences because of their lack of progress. Strongly linked as they are to a now defunct and scientifically discredited model of mind, the social sciences and sociology have much to gain from abandoning this model and adopting the Integrated Model. The following are some of the implications and gains that await sociology if the paradigm shift is made:

1. The conventional approach to socialisation will have to be abandoned. It is a caricature of the actual processes involved yet it continues to be taught to generation after generation of sociology students and is used as the easy explanation for all sorts of human behaviour, whether conformist or deviant. Conventional socialisation theory is overly cognitive and socially deterministic. The Integrated Model, with its inclusion of innate dispositions and processes as well as its recognition of individual autonomy and the unconscious together with an appreciation of the non-social nature of a great deal of learning, provides the required insights for the development of a sounder account of socialisation.

2. The Integrated Model of mind allows sociology to bury the erroneous and misleading proposition that humans have no nature but make their own nature. The Integrated Model makes it clear that like all living forms, humans have a nature and that this nature is the result of humankind's evolution. According to this model, humans have evolved to be a species that learns from its own experiences, its interactions with conspecifics and from information that is linguistically transmitted and stored. The nature of human nature is discernible in the many universals that characterise human societies and cultures. It is discernible in the ease with which people from different societies, cultures and even ages are able to understand each other. It is also discernible in the characteristic and modular way humans seek and process information and in the responses they exhibit to this information. A great deal of what counts for an animal's nature has to do with how its brain and nervous system are wired and with the information processing and module developing mechanisms it is genetically endowed with. This is equally true for humans. Our nature is discernible in the way in which our minds are structured and the ways in which they generate, seek and process information. After a long and unproductive period of denying that humans have a nature, it is time that sociology recognised that humans do indeed have one. Describing and understanding this nature will bring the social sciences into closer alignment with the natural sciences and so end once and for all the unproductive separation that exists between them.

3. The adoption by sociology of the Integrated Model will encourage the development of an evolutionary and paleo-sociology that will seek answers to the many questions which current sociology, based as it is on the Standard Model, leaves begging. Though it is obvious in terms of evolutionary theory that humans have evolved from a non-cultural to a cultural mode of existence, current sociology proceeds as if culture was immaculately conceived and is totally arbitrary. The cultural mode of existence is always assumed and attention devoted to the effects of culture and cultural change. Studies of primates and the great apes as well as hominids and humans will enable paleo-sociology to account for the origins and forms of the various social institutions and provide a sounder theory of culture than currently exists.

4. Elements of the Integrated Model have already called into question many sociological ideas based on the Standard Model in the fields of gender studies, family studies, sexuality and human reproduction. This is hardly surprising since these fields more than others have the greatest difficulty separating the biological from the social/cultural. Adopting the Integrated Model will contribute greatly to these fields of study and allow currently avoided or badly answered questions to be attended to, questions such as those regarding the origin and reasons for male domination, the ubiquity and strength of nepotism, the determinants of human sexuality and gender differences, etc.

5. The Integrated Model of mind will build on the considerable achievements of sociology but offers the theoretical correctives and cross-disciplinary connections that are currently missing. It will add the necessary evolutionary and biological dimensions that are needed if sociologists are to produce comprehensive and more valid theories for important social phenomena such as war, violence, crime, racism, ethnocentrism, domestic violence, child abuse, rape, drug addition, suicide, disease and illness, etc. The Integrated Model will encourage cross-disciplinary collaboration in accounting for and tackling complex human problems. It will also serve as a means to separate the wheat from the chaff in social theory and halt the ongoing proliferation of concepts and *isms*. It has been said that in sociology there are more approaches than arrivals. Through testing concepts and theories against the Integrated Model and against established findings and theories in other branches of science, sociology and the social sciences generally have a chance to have fewer approaches but more arrivals.

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Globalisation and Discontent: Project and Discourse

The Battle of Seattle will, in all probability, be seen as a turning point in world history. At the last major, international meeting of the millennium, and in a city that, better than any other, epitomised 'corporate control', the underdogs took on those who met to plan the progress ofglobalisation, and they won. This has inspired a new social movement with global aspirations, which, in the most recent protest, held in Genoa, mobilised some 250,000 people, about five times as many as Seattle. In an academic context, Robin Cohen has suggested that, at least within sociology, Seattle marked a shift from interest in globalisation as a phenomenon that treats people as objects, to a concern with understanding globalisation from below.[1] This essay attempts to make a contribution to this new field of enquiry.

Anti-Globalisation and Theory

Until Seattle, and in common with other sceptics, I treated globalisation as discourse, distinguishing it from the growing internationalisation of capital (Alexander, 1997). But for the protesters as, of course, for their foes inside the World Trade Organisation (WTO) gathering, globalisation is a political and socio-economic phenomenon with important practical implications. From a preliminary survey conducted by John Charlton (2000), it seems that the bulk, perhaps the majority, of the 60-80,000 demonstrators were trade unionists, concerned, in particular, with attacks on labour standards. Many others raised environmental issues (such as WTO rules hostile to the use of turtle-friendly fishing nets). A smaller number, and some of the delegates, were disturbed by the manner in which the WTO was riding roughshod over the interests of the world's poor. Whilst the protesters came from diverse backgrounds, Seattle was much more than a rallying point for single issues. To start with, and as so often happens in struggle, there was some sharing of concerns. One teamster, for example, carried a placard proclaiming 'Teamsters and turtles together at last,' and a semi-naked Lesbian Avenger announced: 'My nipples stand in solidarity with the steelworkers and Teamsters and all the labouring people.' More broadly, demonstrators were united in opposing the WTO, generally linking their action to a desire to counter the increasing power of those unelected and unaccountable bodies frequently labelled 'corporate capital' (Charlton, 2000:10, 16).
Trade union opinion tends to define globalisation in a similar fashion. For instance, in his address to the 2000 congress of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Bill Jordan, the organisation's general secretary, claimed: 'Globalisation . . . has seen the privatising of power. Massive concentrations of wealth are now in the hands of unaccountable people running multinationals' (Trade Union World, 2000: No. 2). Echoing this assessment, Willie Madisha, President of the Congress of South African Trade Unions, told South African trade unionists: 'globalisation ... worsens the inequitable distribution of power between the rich and the poor, and between the developed and developing countries' (Madisha 2000: 4). In an educational publication aimed at workers, the International Labour Resource and Information Group, based in Cape Town, had already fleshed out this approach, stating: 'For us globalisation is a process of restructuring the world economy. This restructuring process is a response to the crisis in the capitalist economic system which began in the early 1970s. The main purpose of this restructuring is to find new ways for business to maximise profits' (ILRIG, 1998: 7).

Some scholars also treat globalisation in this manner. For instance, Noam Chomsky (2000: 14) describes it as Phase Two of post-war capitalism. Dating its onset, once again, from the early 1970s, he argues that it was 'designed to unravel . . . [the] social democratic measures [of Phase 1]', adding that it 'is unabashedly corporate-led and designed in the interests of investors and lenders'. Doreen Massey, a geographer by training, told the 1998 World Congress of Sociology (1999: 7): 'What we are experiencing today is not some "globalization in general", but globalization in a highly particular form ... essentially neo-liberal globalization.... It is a project maintained by a powerful discourse produced in the North of the planet... a discourse of inevitability, which precisely serves to hide the agencies and the interests which are producing it.'

A strong thread links Massey and Madisha to the mass protests in Seattle, Genoa and elsewhere. This regards globalisation as hostile to the interests of the majority of humanity, as a product of a particular period in history, and as something that is stoppable. There is a disjuncture between this newer view of globalisation, and the older ones, whether these were ideological or sociological in form. At the heart of ideological theories of globalisation - the ones popular with politicians the world over - there is the notion that the process, reducing barriers to 'free trade', is inevitable and generally beneficial. Thus, one should work with globalising tendencies, rather than against them. This approach, however, had little appeal to the 30,000 who gathered outside the April 2000 summit of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), demanding: 'Break the Bank, Defund the Fund, Dump the Debt' (Bond, 2000).

As for sociological theories, anti-globalisation discourse does not so much reject them, as largely ignore them. By 'sociological theories' I have in mind the emphasis on time/space compression and increasing interconnectedness, particularly through the application of new information technologies (e.g.Giddens, 1991: 21; Castells, 2000: 5-6). The suggestion, of course, is not that Anthony Giddens and Manuel Castells, who have pioneered these ideas, are wrong, rather that the opponents of globalisation are focusing on a different problem (or, possibly, a different aspect of the same problem). Indeed, many, if not most, of the protesters have positively embraced the new technologies and even the dynamics of networking (so, at this level, Castells might take some comfort from events). Nevertheless, to the extent that sociological theories side-step the inherent contradictions within globalisation, they can provide grist for the politicians' mill. Thus, the British government recently published a 'white paper', Making Globalisation Work/or the World's Poor, in which globalisation was defined as 'the process' whereby 'the world's population becomes more and more connected' (DFID, 1999: 3).[2]

The older approaches to globalisation are also prone to another line of assault; one advanced by leading Africanists, who argue, in effect, 'What's new?' Such reasoning was frequently expressed at the 2001 conference of the South African Sociological Association, with some participants describing globalisation as a continuation of imperialism under another name. Francis Nyamnjoh provides a slightly different twist, arguing that 'globalisation' is the latest 'label' for the 'same basic process or mission' previously described as 'modernisation'. 'This mission,' he claims, 'is that of freeing the African of his natural and cultural Africanness, and inviting him or her to partake of the "standardised, routinised, streamlined and global" consumer culture.' He adds that 'granted the level of poverty in Africa, only an elite . . . qualify' (Nyamnjoh, 2000: 5; quoting Golding, 1994). Fred Cooper also notes similarities between modernisation and globalisation, adding a number of sharp historical points. International trade as a proportion of world GDP has only recently surpassed levels reached in 1913; intercontinental labour migration was more significant during the century before the First World War than it has been since;

and the anti-slavery movements of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were ransnational in form (Cooper, 2001: 194-6).[3]

On a continent where only a minority of the population has electricity, let alone Internet connections, it is difficult not to have considerable sympathy for the sceptics' case, which, in its essence, remains valid. Most international trade is still between the rich counties of Western Europe, North America and Japan, where less than 15 per cent of the world's population is located.[4] Also, whilst foreign exchange may be highly mobile, land and infrastructure are usually immobile, and even factories are costly to move (Harvey 1999: 420). Moreover, whilst there is deregulation in certain areas of economic life, elsewhere new regulations have been introduced and old ones are rigorously enforced.

Patents, copyrights, franchises, business secrets and tariffs shield major western corporations, and US and European Union agriculture is heavily protected (Moody 2000: 4-5). Further, whilst what Pierre Bourdieu calls the 'left hand' of the state, has been in decline, its 'right hand', that which tends to benefit big capital, remains strong (this is notably tme of western military might) (Budd 2000: 28). Finally, it is governments that are represented at the WTO and the IFIs, and it is governments that have implemented the various neo-liberal policies responsible forpromoting globalisation (e.g. Massey 2000: 1).

However, recent experience - mainly with post-graduate students in South Africa - has taught me that discussing the content of 'globalisation' is more effective than denying its existence as anything other than discourse. As Massey argues, it is also a project, and one with significant consequences.

Nyamnjoh, Cooper and others are correct in insisting upon continuities (see also Wallerstein, 2000), but there is also a strong sense in which the early to mid-1970s marked a break in the character of post-war capitalism (Chomsky's Phase Two). First, there are the economic changes that followed in the wake of the 1973 crisis: the freeing of exchange rates, the rapid and massive growth in foreign exchange turnover (mainly speculative), the sharp increase in exports from wealthy Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, and, from the mid-1980s, a marked rise in foreign direct investment. These have been widely discussed elsewhere (Ohmae, 1990; Hirst & Thompson, 1999; Held etal., 1999; Bairoch, 2000; Went, 2000). Secondly, the crucial shift to explicit neo-liberal government policies, which is considered in some detail below. Thirdly, increased use of new technologies, with important implications for working practices (see especially Moody, 1997), as well as non-industrial culture. Too much can be made, however, of the dynamic qualities of the technology itself, which requires broader, societal change to facilitate its application. But this is not the occasion to develop this argument.

There is also a fourth aspect, to which we now turn.

Politics and Inequality

What is missing from most accounts of globalisation is any attempt to integrate an analysis of the changing international balance of class forces. The main exception is Kim Moody's excellent Workers in a Lean World (1997). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, alongside, first, the faltering of the long post-Second World War boom, and then the sharp recession that occurred in 1973, there developed powerful working class movements. This phenomenon was particularly marked in western Europe. Here there was a French general strike in 1968, the largest in world history; an insurgent workers movement in Italy; the 1974 miners' strike in Britain, responsible for

toppling the Tory government; the 1975 revolutionary overthrow of the dictatorship in Portugal; and forceful mobilisations elsewhere, notably in Spain and Greece. But the upsurge in popular discontent was a world-wide process. One example was the 1973 strike-wave in the South African city of Durban, which gave birth to a new labour movement that would be central to the overthrow of apartheid. In the United States, in addition to the largest workers' movement since the immediate post-war years, the country's rulers also confronted militant mobilisations against racial and other forms of oppression, defeat in Vietnam (in 1973) and the Watergate scandal. This period came to an end for a number of reasons.

Sometimes, as in Chile in 1973, there was repression, but this was exceptional. Generally, increased unemployment undermined confidence, but this was not decisive. The key, at least in western Europe, was a desire for social peace and a series of agreements forged between labour leaders and centre-left governments. In Britain the accord was called the social contract, in Italy it was known as the historic compromise, and in Spain as the pact of Moncloa (see especially Harman, 1988).

For western workers, the relative social stability of the late 1970s witnessed some chiselling away of both living standards and organisational gains, but the hammer blows were still to come. In Britain, Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister in 1979, and the following year Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States. These two leaders were to play a pivotal role in shaping the politics of neo-liberalism, and, hence, the advance of globalisation. In 1981, Reagan demoralised US unions by sacking 11,000 striking air-traffic controllers. Organised labour in Britain took longer to break, but the defeat of a year-long miners strike in 1985 was a turning point. In 198 I.France had elected a socialist president, Francois Mitterand, but after the collapse of an initial attempt at old-fashioned Keynsianism, he was soon adopting Thatcherite policies. The following year, 1982, Germany elected the conservative Helmut Kohl as Chancellor. Throughout the west, social spending was cut and state-owned industries were privatised (and, as was to be the case more widely, this provided new opportunities for multinational companies). But this was just Stage One of the new world order.

Stage Two, implemented from the mid-1980s onwards, came with the internationalisation of neo-liberalism via the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Under the influence of Reagan, Kohl and Thatcher, the IFIs forced or encouraged one developing country after another to devalue currencies, reduce tariffs, slash state expenditure, and privatise state undertakings. In most of Africa, much of Latin America and parts of Asia, these policies - known collectively as 'structural adjustment' - were the means by which globalisation was put into practice. Part Three came, in 1989-91, with the upheavals in the USSR and Eastern Europe and the total and dramatic collapse of the old order. Here 'shock therapy' was introduced as the local variant of globalisation. We may now be undergoing a fourth stage. As the WTO and various regional blocs - especially the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement - further liberate the world's rulers from electoral politics, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is used to quell local disturbances. My main point is simple: globalisation is as much, if not more, about politics, as it is about economics. The present era of capitalism - which is how I understand globalisation emerged out of the political and economic crisis of the 1970s, and it has been driven forward by political initiatives aimed at enhancing the wealth and power of a small minority of humanity.

This characterisation is underlined when we consider the data on inequality, which reveal increasing divergence, both between and within countries. According to the World Bank (2000: 51): 'In 1960 per capita GDP in the richest 20 countries was 18 times that in the poorest 20

countries. By 1995 this gap had widened to 37 times'. Another study, which compared western Europe and its 'offshoots' in North America and Australasia with Africa and Asia, showed that the ratio between average income levels in the two 'regions' changed from eleven-to-one in 1950 to twelve-to-one in 1973, and then to sixteen-to-one in 1992 (Moody, 1997: 54). The process was uneven though, and according to Larry Elliot (1999: 16), whereas, in 1960, per capita incomes in Africa were three times higher than in Asia, 'now they are less than half as high.' The Asian Tigers witnessed declining inequality, at least until the 1997 crash, but elsewhere in east and south-east Asia, income inequalities have been increasing, and this is true, in particular, forthe world's most populous country, China (Leisink, 1999: 18). For most of sub-Saharan Africa, average real incomes are lower now than in 1970(UNDP, 1999:3 6), and in South Africa pay and earnings inequalities have expanded since the end of apartheid in 1994 (Budlender, 2000: 87). Most of Latin America has also experienced increased income inequality (Leisink, 1999: 18), and, according to Jay Mancur (2000: 84), the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organisation's Chair of Foreign Affairs, 'Mexican workers have lost 25 percent of their purchasing power since the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement.' Income inequality has grown particularly rapidly in eastern Europe and Russia, with the later recording a doubling of its Gini coefficient from 0.24 to 0.48 between 1987/8 and 1993/5. Even within the heart of the system, during the 1980s and early 1990s, only one out of 19 OECD countries showed some reduction in inequality, and that was slight. The deterioration was most pronounced in Sweden, the United Kingdom and United States (UNDP, 1999: 39, 37). According to Moody (1997: 188): 'The 80% of the total workforce in the US that hold working-class jobs saw their real average weekly earnings slip by 18% from 1973 through 1995.' One report showed that, over the two decades to 1999, the differential between payments made to average chief executive officers of major corporations and those made to average workers increased from 42 times to 419 times (Smith, 2000: 20).

Worldwide, between 1960 and 1995, the gap between the income of the wealthiest 20 per cent of the world's population and the poorest 20 per cent increased from 30:1 to 82:1 (Marfleet, 1998: 96). In the four years to 1998, the net worth of the world's richest 200 people more than doubled, to reach over $1 trillion, a figure so great that, if they all provided a yearly donation of just one per cent of their wealth, it would be possible to provide universal access to primary education. The combined assets of the top three - who included Bill Gates - were greater than the combined Gross National Product (GNP) of the 48 least developed countries (which provided a home for some 600 million people) (UNDP, 1999: 37, 39; Smith, 2000: 20).

The link between globalisation and growing inequality requires further investigation, but some factors can be suggested. In Africa, the decline in average incomes is clearly related to the broad failure of structural adjustment. Significantly, sub-Saharan Africa is 'deeply integrated in world trade', with an export-to-GDP ratio of 29 per cent in the 1990s, compared to only 15 per cent for Latin America (UNDP, 1999: 31). The decline of the state has had an especially harsh impact on poorer people across Africa, some of whom now find it impossible to pay for primary schooling which, in the past, was often free. This is especially significant because, with increasing demand for highly-skilled employees - related, in particular, to 'sped-up technological change' - education has become a more important factor in determining income, even in the United States (Tilly & Tilly, 1998: 213). Moreover, according to Chris and Charles Tilly, US manufacturing has responded to tougher competition by cutting costs, rather than improving quality, and this has meant holding down the wages of workers whilst increasing rewards for their managers. Finally, these authors emphasise that, at least in the United States - though the argument can, doubtless,

be generalised-increased inequality has been a consequence of a shift in the balance of bargaining power (Tilly & Tilly, 1998: 214-5). This shift is reflected in data for trade union density, which in most countries declined in the decade to 1995 (Alexander, 2001, appendix; also Leisink, 1999: 19).

Three 'Fault Lines'

Some years back, Immanuel Wallerstein (1993: 217) argued: 'The history of the world is one of a constant series of revolts against inequality'. The development of globalisation has certainly been marked by many such revolts. Three significant fault lines are now apparent. The first, exposed by Seattle, is that, since globalisation must be managed - because it is not just about unseen and mysterious 'market forces' - it is possible to demonise the managers (the process referred to as 'attribution' by some social movement theorists). The battle, and the media coverage it attracted, revealed to millions around the world that it is real people - with names and faces and committees - who are responsible for their unhappiness. If these people can make decisions that force workers into the poverty trap, or turtles into the fishing trap, they can also, if there is sufficient pressure, decide not to do so. Subsequent mobilisations - in Melbourne, Washington, Prague, Nice, Davos and Genoa-have shown the breadth of Seattle's impact, and the depth of anger against globalisation. A new movement has been bom. Like all movements it is cross-cut by divisions, and I will return to these. But, in addition to its general educational value, the movement has three other strengths. First, in contrast to the negative prognosis offered by Castells (e.g. 1997: 354), it shows that trade unions can still be a powerful force for progressive change. To coincide with Seattle, the International Longshore and Warehousemen's Union shut down every port on the west coast of the United States for a day (Bacon, 2000: 4), and at Nice, as in Seattle, the bulk of those who protested were mobilised by trade unions. Secondly, at least in Europe, North America and Australia, it is drawing a fresh, mainly young, wave of people into political activity (at Genoa, according to one report, the average age was 'perhaps 23') (Renton, 2001). Thirdly, and related to this, it is encouraging a new cosmopolitanism (see also Cohen & Rai, 2000:13-15). Whilst e-mail has been important, the very act of demonstrating has brought together activists from different countries and varied backgrounds. To quote a fragment from a rather hurried report on Nice (received by email):

> The anti-capitalist youth from Spain, Italy, France, Germany yes and Slovenia, Sardinia, Hungary, Poland, Greece et al - were up early too, having slept head-to-toe (two thousand of us) at the Convergence centre after a night of discussion and social chit-chat.... There were a thousand or so from ATTAC, the French-based campaign for tax on financial speculation. There were hundreds from the French Revolutionary Communist league (LCR) and similar numbers from the ISO [International Socialist Orgnaisation] groups mainly from the UK, Spain, Greece, France and Germany. Several hundred Basque nationalist and Spanish activists of the anarcho-syndicalist CGT (Matthieu, 2000).

The second fault line exists at the level of international trade-union solidarity. Of course, such solidarity is not a new phenomenon. For instance, Peter Waterman (1998a: 163) informs us that, in 1889, Australian workers sent striking dock workers in London a donation which, for the latter, amounted to three days pay. What is novel are new possibilities provided by globalisation. These exist, in particular, for two groups. First, increased levels of international trade provide

more leverage, potentially at least, for some transport workers, such as those employed on docks. In 1997, in an unprecedented show of solidarity, workers from over 100 ports around the world took action in sympathy with striking dockers from Liverpool in the United Kingdom (Moody, 1997: 9). The strikers had carefully built an international network of support using email, telephone calls and air travel, and publicised their strike by developing an internet site. Their ultimate defeat reflected the continuing weakness of the British labour movement.

A second group is those employed by multinational corporations, especially where, as in the auto industry, there is internationally-integrated production. In 1996, when 3,000 brake-parts workers employed by General Motors at Dayton, Ohio went on strike, within a few days their action led to 125,000 lay-offs across the United States, Canada and Mexico. The stoppage cost the company $45 million per day and was soon settled (Cliff, 2000: 24). The 1997 United Parcel Services (UPS) strike involved transport sector workers employed by a multinational company. In addition to the 185,000 US strikers who were directly involved, UPS employees in Italy and Spain struck in sympathy, and according to Mancur (2000: 87) the strike was settled the day after French transport workers threatened to close down UPS operations at Orly airport. Assuming that workers' organisation recovers from the defeats of the 1980s, and there are signs that such a revival is already underway in the United States and parts of western Europe, we can expect to see more examples of international solidarity.

So far, most of the evidence for the first fault line comes from the old, industrialised countries. This is where the managers ofglobalisation have their headquarters and prefer to meet, and this is also where opponents ofglobalisation have more resources for long-distance travel to such gatherings (even if it is by Greyhound bus, rather than plane). Newly industrialising countries provide more evidence of the second fault. For example, South African workers, who themselves benefited considerably from international solidarity during the apartheid years, have now begun to reciprocate, notably providing support to sacked Australian dock workers and on two occasions to arrested Swazi trade unionists (Lambert, 1998: 74; Bezuidenhout2000: 14; Limb, 2000). Nevertheless, given that trade and multinational production are concentrated at the core of the system, this second fault may continue to be more visible in the old countries.

The third fault line, however, is without doubt more pronounced in the periphery and semi-periphery. It is particularly in these countries, where protests against some aspect ofglobalisation - such as reduced living standards - merge with discontent about lack of democracy, producing mass unrest in the form of general strikes or huge riots. John Walton and David Seddon have written about a wave of 'austerity protests' that swept across the global South, mostly during the 1980s. They define these as 'large-scale collective actions including political demonstrations, general strikes, and riots, which are animated by grievances over state policies [related to structural adjustment]' (Walton & Seddon, 1994: 39; see also Auyero, 2001). In an analysis of the roots of the Seattle protest, Jackie Smith (2001: 4), traces international resistance against neo-liberal trade policies back to these austerity protests, thereby suggesting an interesting link between Southern and Northern mobilisations.[5]

At least in Africa, this unrest continued into the 1990s, though this was barely acknowledged in the international media and remains largely unanalysed in scholarly literature. Between 1989 and 1991, the countries affected included: Benin, Cameroon, Zaire, Malagasy, Algeria, Central African Republic, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Zambia, Niger, Nigeria, Togo, Mali and Sierra Leone. In the Malagasy capital of Antananarivo, a city of 800,000 people, a series of enormous marches culminated in one, in August 1991, that was half-a-million strong (forcing the calling of elections).

According to one assessment, the mobilisations often took inspiration from events in eastern Europe, and sometimes from the struggle in South Africa, but the main impetus was provided by adverse consequences of structural adjustment (Hester, 1994). Moody (1997: 14, 21) lists 17 countries affected by general and mass strikes between 1994 and 1997; significantly, only six were in western Europe or North America, while 11 were in Latin America, Asia or Africa (and one could add to his African list). During 2000, in Southern Africa alone there were general strikes in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Zambia (and one in Mozambique was cancelled after concessions had been secured).

Cases and Concerns

The example of Zimbabwe will be used to highlight some salient points about struggle around this third fault line. The country has a mixed economy, with about a third of the population living in urban areas. Structural adjustment, which was only introduced from 1990, benefited a few, but the majority, including a large element of the middle classes, suffered. In November l997, the Zimbabwe dollar lost 75 per cent of its value in a few hours, and from 2000, with the expropriation of white-owned farms, the economy has continued to collapse. Interviews, conducted in June 2000, revealed that workers were experiencing considerable hardship, including hunger, and as a consequence they wanted to see the removal of the present government, led by Robert Mugabe, as soon as possible (Alexander, 2000). They used the experience of Zambia, where President Kaunda was voted out of office in 1991, to show that peaceful change might be achieved; but they also used the 1998 overthow of Indonesia's President Suharto (1998) to justify an alternative scenario (one given added weight by more recent events in Serbia) (Socialist Worker, 2000). The present movement can be dated back to mass strikes by public sector workers in late 1996. These kicked the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the country's only labour federation, into life, and together with subsequent strikes, they boosted union membership (so that density is now in excess of 20 per cent of employed workers). Moody (1997: 14) describes how, generally, in the mid-1990s 'unions took on new roles: as champions of the interests of the interests of the working class as a whole'. This was true of the ZCTU, which went further, accepting responsibility for initiating the new multi-class Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the main opposition party. However, under the impact of economic crisis, the MDC now endorses neo-liberal policies, and divisions have opened up within the ZCTU (see Raftopoulos, 2000a & 2000b). Earlier this year a new leadership was elected that is critical of both the government and the MDC, but there are still factions that identify with Mugabe and with Morgan Tsvangirai, the federation's former general secretary, now President of the MDC (Gwisai, 2001).

If we compare South Africa to Zimbabwe, some differences are obvious. The former has an older and much more substantial economy (responsible, in 1998, for $130 billion out of Southern Africa's $160 billion output) (Bond, Miller & Ruiters, 2000: 1). In South Africa, the modern labour movement is a product of 1960s growth and 1970s crisis, and in the 1980s and early 1990s it gained confidence from its pivotal role in the overthrow of apartheid. Moreover, because of the relative strength of the country's economy and the impact of the anti-apartheid struggle, structural adjustment was largely delayed until 1996 (though some aspects ofneo-liberalism were present in the mid-1980s).

Also, adjustment was implemented by a governing party that had a formal alliance with the main union federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Nevertheless, there

are important similarities. Movements in other countries provided inspiration (notably, in the South African case, that of Poland's Solidamosc). Union membership was built through struggle, both industrial and political (and figures for union density are now among the highest in the world). COSATU was central to the fight for democracy, though, in the final stages, leadership was provided by the African National Congress (ANC). Finally, as in Zimbabwe, there are now important political arguments within the unions, with a minority favouring the formation of a workers' party, the 2000 COSATU congress voting to hold a 'Conference of the Left', and the federation's general secretary becoming increasingly outspoken in his criticism of the government (COSATU, 2000: 10; Vavi, 2001).

Broadening discussion to include one of the most successful newly industrialising countries,South Korea, again there are differences. The country's industrial expansion was more recent, and more dramatic than that of South Africa, and its modem labour movement can be dated to the 1980s, specifically a 1987 strike wave, rather than the 1970s. The period from 1987 to the elections in 1992 witnessed economic liberalisation in tandem with democratisation. By late 1996, the adverse effects ofglobalisation were being felt, and a new wave of strikes broke out and continued into 1997, the year of the Asian crisis. It would be interesting to know what inspiration, if any, Korean workers took from events in other countries. Was, for instance, the formation of a new federation, the Korea Trade Union Congress, influenced by the establishment of COSATU five years before? As for similarities, we can begin by noting that the unions played a critical role in the fight for democracy. Then, although the first democratic government was not sympathetic to labour, the government ofKim Dae Jung, elected in the wake of the crisis, has, like the ANC, engaged in tripartite decision making. Now, as in South Africa and Zimbabwe, there is a debate within the labour movement about politics, and as in South Africa the main question is whether or not to form a labour party (Moody, 1997; Song, 1999; Lambert, 1999; Callinicos, 1999; Jose, 2000).

The common features that emerge from this brief discussion are fivefold. First, new workers' movements have developed in response to the effects of globalisation. Secondly, the response has been political as well as economic, and, to a greater or lesser degree, has involved layers of people beyond the organised working class.[6] Thirdly, organisation and union membership have grown out of struggle. Fourthly, new movements have produced new debates about the way forward for working-class politics. Fifthly, mass movements are inspired by similar movements in other countries. Slightly modified, these five points could also be applied to resistance around fault lines one and two. The main problem would probably be around the second of the five points, since the first fault is largely political, and the second is chiefly economic; the political tends to involve a broader range of participants, but the economic tends to be deeper. The strength of struggles around fault line three is that they tend to move between, and can merge, economic and political concerns.

Some further attention should be given to the fourth of these points. It is probably the most controversial, and it is likely to become the most pressing for activists and labour leaders. Chris Harman (2000: 49) presents an important claim:

> Every successful protest goes through two phases. The first is when it bursts upon the world, taking its opponents by surprise and bringing joy to those who agree with its aims... it seems that the sheer momentum of the movement is bound to carry it forward from strength to strength. This draws its adherents together, and leads them to play down old differences of opinion and old arguments on tactics. But those against whom the protests are directed do not simply give up. ... At this point, arguments over tactics

necessarily arise within the movement, even among people who have sworn to forget old disputes in the interests of consensus.

He illustrates his claim using an incident described by Naomi Klein. During the April 2000 potests in Washington, demonstrators occupied road intersections near the headquarters of the IFIs. Their aim of disrupting the meeting was thwarted by having the delegates slipped in early. This produced an argument: some people wanted to prevent the delegates from leaving, and others felt that it would be better to join the official march. A gathering ofspokespeople agreed on a compromise: demonstrators could opt for either alternative. Klein comments:
'This was impeccably fair and democratic, but there was just one problem it made absolutely no sense.. .. If some intersections now opened up and other, rebel camp intersections stayed occupied, delegates on their way out of the meeting could just hang a right instead of left, and they would be home free. Which, of course, is precisely what happened'.
Harman comments that loose, network organisation has its weaknesses, and that these need to be addressed through some form of democratic decision making that is binding on those involved. The importance of this conclusion was underlined by events in Genoa, where the behaviour of a section of the protest, the Black Bloc, was widely criticised for placing other demonstrators in danger of injury. The need to develop democratic procedures and cohesive organisation is not a new problem, and it is one that might benefit from examining the past experience of other movements, including the labour movement.
Moody ends his book with a consideration of some of the most socially-aware union organisations, and concludes by making the case for 'international social-movement unionism' (ISMU). He explains:

> Central to this view of social-movement unionism are union democracy and leadership accountability, membership activation and involvement, commitment to union growth and recruitment, a vision and practice that reach beyond even an expanding union membership to other sectors and organizations of the working class. This view sees unions as taking an active, leading role in the struggles against international and domestic capital and their neoliberal allies (Moody, 1997: 290)

Defined in this way, one can see, both, that ISMU would advance the struggle against globalisation, and that, to some degree, it is already practised by trade unions in various parts of the world. Although Moody draws on examples from, for instance, Canada, his best model is provided by the larger of the new union movements in the South, especially COSATU. South Africa also provided evidence of SMU for an earlier advocate, Peter Waterman (1993), who, however, seems to have become more sanguine with age. He argues (1998b: 372):

> Brazil, South Africa, Korea and some other countries certainly went through a period of something that could be called 'social-movement unionism' - at least in the sense of significant labour/popular alliance. But this, regrettably, seems to have been a moment rather than a tendency. The workers and unions of these countries find themselves mired in much the same neo-liberal mud as those of the North, and the unions tend to find themselves increasingly deeply involved in webs of national industrial relations institutions.

Waterman makes a strong point, and it is a pity he does not pause to consider why he mistook a moment for a tendency.[7] Perhaps there is a clue in Rob Lambert's analysis of the main dynamic

propelling SMU in South Africa. 'Union leaders,' he says (1998: 73), 'became conscious that the apartheid state could not be brought to its knees through a narrow workplace focus, no matter how militant the focus might have been.'[8] That is, SMU had a clear political focus, the overthrow of apartheid, which provided unions with both the need for and the possibility of mobilising and developing alliances with wide social forces. In reality, the actions and organisations that developed were nearly always much broader than Moody's idealised working-class movement. This is true too of the MDC in Zimbabwe, and, so I understand, true also of similar movements for democracy in South Korea and other countries in east and south-east Asia. Herein lies the problem. Such a broad movement might hold together in struggles for democracy, though even then there can be explosive tensions, but class differences become more critical thereafter. In South Africa, COSATU's ally, the ANC, is now in government and implementing neoliberal policies. With most union leaders still backing the government, albeit with reservations, COSATU does not have the kind of oppositional political focus that enabled it to develop SMU in the 1980s. Perhaps, then, SMU, at least in South Africa, was a characteristic of a particular movement, a powerful one to be sure, but, nonetheless, a movement, and like all movements it went through its two stages.

Conclusions

The first conclusion is that the impact of globalisation is profoundly uneven.
This essay has considered just two key variables (though there are certainly others). These were the timing of the imposition of neo-liberal policies, and their implications for economic growth and decline. However, to see globalisation merely in terms of divergence would be mistaken, for there are also elements of convergence (or commonality). In particular, internationally, the experience has been one of rising inequality and an undermining of working-class organisation, though also one of resistance. It is important, however, and this takes us to the second conclusion, to recognise that unevenness - related to preceding histories, as well as globalisation - is likely to impact on the character of that resistance. We have suggested three models, though these are not intended to be exclusive. Of these, the first, international protests against the managers of globalisation, has been a northern experience, and the third, austerity protests and mass strikes, is largely southern. The second, international strike solidarity, has potential to cut across this divide, but is still underdeveloped.
The argument presented here suggests a number of major challenges for opponents of globalisation. In particular, whilst the various mass mobilisations have exposed major faults, they now need to be extend and connect such faulting. Spontaneity is a necessary but not sufficient basis for a successful challenge. There is, for example, a danger of northern protesters underestimating the importance of southern struggles against globalisation, and the converse is also true. On the ground, though, the problem is confronted in yet another form. How can we move from playing away (maybe in Genoa), to winning at home (perhaps in London)? Or, how do we counter neo-liberalism and defeat Mugabe? In answering such questions, those opposed to globalisation will need to learn from the managers of the process, and develop a unified project as well as a common discourse. It remains to be seen whether this can be achieved.

Notes

1. Cohen' s comment was made at the South African launch of his latest book (Cohen & Rai, 2000). For what may well become the seminal work in understanding globalisation from below see Burawoy et at. (2000). A detailed account of the collapse of the Seattle talks can be found in Fleshman (1999).

2. Whilst acknowledging that 'the market fundamentalism of the eighties and early nineties has been discredited,' the White Paper continues, in the same sentence and with only a comma separating the ideas: 'it is now widely accepted that efficient markets are indispensable for effective development.' The thrust of the argument is on the need for'effective systems of government... in developing countries.' A more serious analysis would highlight Britain's own role in encouraging the 'market fundamentalism' that increased poverty in Africa and, often, undermined effective government. Thabo Mbeki, the South African president, also argues the case for 'making globalisation work'. He told other African leaders (1999: 3): 'we have to activate our intelligentsia to become a valued partner in the struggle to interact with the process of globalisation in a manner that benefits our peoples and our continent.'

3. As with trade, so too with foreign direct investment (FDI). However, FDI is an inadequate indicator of the impact that foreign capitalists have on local capital formation. On the one hand, by 1997 mergers and acquisitions were responsible for 59% of all FDI (UNDP, 1999: 26). On the other, as Robert Ross explained to me, especially in the Far East, new factories have often been built as a consequence of out-sourcing production (i.e. trade rather than FDI). For Ross's own major contribution to debate on the subject, see Ross & Trachte, 1990. With regard to migration, many countries have introduced new restrictions and, according to official statistics, international migration has declined relative to total population (World Bank 1995: 52). However, these statistics do not allow for the high levels of undocumented migration that occur, especially, perhaps, in Africa.

4. By 1990 about three-quarters of world exports went to these 'triad' countries. There was a slight easing of this economic concentration in the 1990s, but only because of sharply increased investment in a few countries, notably China. Then, after the 1997 crisis, some East Asian countries experienced an outflow of capital (Hoogvelt 1997: 73,77; Hirst & Thompson 1999:69-76; UNDP 1999:41;Toukhy 1998: 473). Africa's experience, however, has been one of a sharp decline in the share of world exports, from 5.8% in 1980 to 2.1% in 1998 (UN Statistics Division, quoted in Fleshman, 1999).

5. Smith (2001: 5) also notes that at Seattle 'Southern activists and scholars were 30-40% of the panelists at the largest protest rallies and the People' s Assembly.'

6. Here I part company with Nyamnjoh (2000:23-8), who rejects the idea that there is such a thing as a working class in Africa (except, possibly, in South Africa). Perhaps this stems from the fact that his account largely ignores the continent-wide wave of resistance against globalisation. Missing such a dimension his account reaches a largely pessimistic conclusion.

7. Since, in an even more recent discussion, Waterman (2000: 8-9) has presented a programme for SMU, one wonders how committed he is to the 'moment rather than a tendency' idea.

8. Lambert - a South African labour activist turned Australian academic - has been involved in assisting the development of a Southern Initiative on Globalisation and Trade Union Rights,

known as SIGTUR, which has drawn together many of the leading trade union centres across the South. For a fascinating paper on SIGTUR see Lambert (2001).

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DEBATES

African Knowledge and Ideas and the African Information Society

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Introduction

Every region of the world has begun conceptualisation of its Information Age, as it would best fit into a globalising world. The goals are the same for each region - to carve new niches, as well as, empower its human communities, find more efficient production systems, and renew the natural resource pool simultaneously. If there is a current of doubt about the potential benefits of convergent information and communication technologies (IT) to Africa, that school has not imagined deep enough or been shown models of sustainable rural development, based on institutional networks, knowledge flow and human actualisation.

While some may point to the 'Digital Divide' regarding teledensity comparisons, the optimists have been contemplating the 'Digital Bridge'. The concept of a Digital Bridge indicates challenges and opportunities while that of the 'digital divide' quite often emphasises statistics without contemplating solutions.

The input into the bridge must be scientifically sound, since non-structural bridges, such as knowledge bridges, would not manifest their design flaws for prolonged periods. For example, it took almost four decades after Africa's political independence to realise that the previous development axiom, which attempted to supplant the environment and knowledge of the African with that which did not have any philosophical or structural grounding, needed replacement. On the other hand, flawed structural engineerings, such as the Tacoma Narrows Bridge in Washington State, USA, soon exhibit their failures and collapse not long after construction.

This note provides some of the author's concepts of the Digital Bridge, which would enable Africa to successfully deploy information societies among its peoples. Such a knowledge bridge would actualise the African - enable people to leam, solve problems, produce more efficiently and preserve and enrich natural systems, fostering peace, etc. At the core of Africa's crises is lack of modem knowledge and capital flows, which reach the majority of the populations. As Richard Rosecrance indicated, the tenets of the Virtual State are knowledge and capital flows.' The place for indigenous African knowledge and ideas in knowledge processing and management, facilitated by IT, in sustainable livelihoods programming for Africa has previously been established.2 Therefore, it is central that whatever tender would be accepted by those who provide the financial component for the construction of the digital bridge to link rural Africa with national, regional, and global knowledge centres, should contain mechanisms to determine significant hubs in the networks which facilitate the flow of knowledge into the heart of the majority's knowledge domain - indigenous knowledge.

Tenders and propositions to act on behalf of the African Information Society should contemplate the breadth of information needs, and the potential for the global development and financial institutions to make constructive contributions to building digital bridges among knowledge domains for development.

In designing the future Africa where knowledge enhances the actualisation of the majority, Africa should place its children central. If children of the advanced economies have the tools that will determine the wealth of nations in the present century while African children are deprived of them, what a future it would continue to be. Therefore the Digital Bridge should aim to begin the process of narrowing the gap in human development and environmental security by providing the full power of the tools for all children, regardless of space.

Information Brokerages

Clearly, there is a wide range of information needs: the need for better access to infrastructure, knowledge, networks, communities of practice, expertise, tools, and opportunities to build one's own knowledge, etc. Therefore, tele-centres or personal computers in Africa should be not about the conglomeration of gadgets but serve as information brokerages, related to knowledge processing, packaging and marketing (content development).

African intellectuals abroad have experienced the power of connectivity and some are among those who are designing the platform for the advanced world. There are also champions of connectivity within Africa itself. There are many African-initiated efforts, and African allies in many programmes, who share the view that they could begin to contribute their expertise to problem-solving in Africa, through digital networks, which would include their own indigenous institutions and families in rural Africa. These and other locally based efforts focus on urgent problems in Africa: how to develop productive tools for Africa's drought-prone environment and marginal agricultural lands, minimise the rapid rate of population growth, prevent scourges such as HIV/AIDS, provide career opportunities for the large number of its youth, etc. What these and other existing programmes need to be successful is access to state-of-the-art tools and to 'information markets'.

It could be concluded that much is now known about Africa's 'information needs'. Furthermore, there is no shortage of connectivity ideas and programmes to address these needs, many of those solutions coming from within Africa. Some groups have spent months, even years, identifying knowledge needs, major themes and participating networks - private technologists, development experts, donors, and poor countries with their rural communities and local.

Thus, there already exists a wide range of worthwhile programmes to close the information gap. We may analyse such programmes in the context of a Knowledge Bank, as the World Bank ontemplates - for example, an African Knowledge Bank. What would be required is to ensure that (a) communications content serve the needs of society, and (b) such programmes are not bereft of funds, as is currently the experience, where 'funding' is such a magical feeling.

African Knowledge Component of the African Knowledge Bank

Regarding content development, the concept of information brokerages was established earlier in this article. The question has often been posed 'how do we know what the information needs of rural communities are?' The opinion of this author is that honest and well-informed information and knowledge brokers would realise that most rural communities are not that removed from

modem civilisation. Most are aware of the lives of the people of the city except they cannot access such conditions. Modem or formal education has been available in many rural communities. Families and communities have seen their children through such schools, so they could be their gateway into modernity.

The major problem, however, has been disjunction between the knowledge bases offered by modem institutions (such as schools, clinics, research, industry, etc.) and that which actually serves the majority (indigenous knowledge, IK). Most modem institutions in Africa today continue to reflect the period of colonial knowledge domination over that of the indigenous communities. Consequently, both modem and indigenous knowledge institutions have suffered. The consequences have been reliance on unimproved knowledge by dependents of IK in occupational roles while modem institutions have suffered from very poor capacities. However, the progeny of rural communities who have had modem education and who constitute the human resources of modem institutions within their countries - as well as some residing in advanced economies and who constitute the labour force of some reputable institutions - could serve as natural guides, linking modem and indigenous knowledge.

Thus, the critical test for any information brokers regarding rural Africa development and communications would be their understanding and appreciation of both indigenous and modern knowledge. Having been bom in a rural African community alone would not entitle an individual to the role of knowledge broker on behalf of rural Africa, neither would presence in an advanced economy confer such honours. Suitability of the brokerage to the goals of communications for rural development in Africa - whether an individual or institution understands both types of knowledge - could be determined by reviewing track records, assessment of the person/institution by their verifiable actions and thoughts, e.g., projects, papers, networks, etc. A demonstrated ability to develop themes and networks in the subject area would also be key. Moreover, with indigenous knowledge, holism is required. Therefore, the demonstrated ability to consider the multiple factors determining development outcomes is essential. Furthermore, since one person cannot understand all of the many factors which influence 'development outcomes' to sufficient depth, it is necessary that the information broker demonstrate ability to create networks which reflect the multiple factors and reach into the depth of indigenous knowledge institutions.

Most important should be the realisation that inclusion ofIK institutions in global knowledge flows is primarily to enhance the quality of knowledge employed in occupational roles. Efforts should be made so as to mitigate the negative cultural impacts of the introduction of new media into rural Africa. This exercise should also not lead to another form of exploitation of poor people.

Capitalising the African Knowledge Bank

On the issue of concepts, programmes, and projects related to rural African connectivity that are bereft of start-up money, it could be suggested that the key 'knowledge gap' is actually a 'funding gap.' Multi-lateral development groups often may be too remotely conversant of the micro-environments that constitute the communities of interest, to develop the fine points for the grounding, an issue of local comparative advantage. Moreover, the Digital Bridge has to be grounded, and grounding should occur within the knowledge domain closest to the community to be reached (empowerment). Hence, instead of such institutions spreading into remote communities - an exercise they would not be effective in undertaking without the cooperation of

local institutions - they could provide their fiscal power and knowledge networks through local information brokerages. That way, the Information Society in Africa would begin to realise one of the expectations of the IT revolution - to create new jobs.

The major multi-lateral institutions could facilitate the construction of the digital bridge by redeploying their vast human resources and financial backbones to help meet the following 'knowledge needs':

(1) the need for financial support by worthwhile programmes which have already identified information/knowledge needs and developed approaches to serving them;

(2) the need for development of local 'global knowledge partnerships', to address local information needs;

(3) provide information/knowledge needs that cannot be met by nations, NGOs, and businesses. These institutions could mobilise funds, assemble the technology community regarding satellite availability and other tools, act as guarantors for venture capitalists, develop new tools to assess connectivity programmes, set policy guidelines on how the crushing Third World Debt could be transformed into knowledge credit, develop guidelines to draw investment capital into poor regions without disturbing fragile economies, suggest how transnational corporations could reinvest profit within the region of operation instead of siphoning profits out;

(4) help set numerical targets for activities in poor countries that can close the 'information gap', and develop new methods to monitor or evaluate programmes and facilitate the realisation of such goals;

(5) negotiate on behalf of the poor, for access to software, and encourage development of local manufacturing bases in developing countries;

(6) help identify what should NOT be done. For example, there is a mad rush to replicate e-commerce projects in poor countries where a few are setting new trends in copious consumerism, consuming more than they can generate locally, leading to crushing local currencies and deprivation felt most severely by the poor majority while depravity runs amok in high places. Such programmes do not take into account domestic market connectivity. Other areas in which these institutions could be effective are ensuring that communications content includes indigenous knowledge and application to modem challenges; providing information, which would change attitudes so that the ancestral knowledge, the basis of livelihoods of the majority, is not looked upon scornfully by others, including Africans who now have been educated 'out' of it. Staff of major development and funding agencies need to be educated to fully comprehend IK and its impact.

Notes

1. Rosecrance, Richard. 1999. The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century (Basic Books, New York, N.Y., 1999). In The Rise of the Virtual State, Richard Rosecrance described the evolution of 'Head Nations' and 'Body Nations'. The former produce intellectual outputs or knowledge products, invest in research and development and engage others (the Body Nations) in the translation into tangible products (manufacturing).

2. See, for example, (a) Afele, John Senyo C. 1999. 'Information and Communications Technologies, Rural Agriculture, and Twenty-first Century Africa'. In: Leper, A., Helbig, R., Rickert, U., and Schiefer, G. (eds.) Role and Potential of IT Systems and Communication Networks for International Development, pp 67-83. The Second European Conference of the

European Federation for Information Technology in Agriculture, Food and the Environment (EFITA) Proceedings. September 27-30, 1999. University of Bonn, Germany. (Possibly readable from http://www.dainet.de/efita99/or http://www.dainet.de/FIZ-AGRAR/efita99/.

(b) Afele, John C. 1999. 'Telehealth in Twenty-First Century Africa: African Knowledge and Ideas as Integral. Emerging Global Electronic Distance Learning' (EGEDL '99) International Workshop/Conference at the University of Tampere, Finland, August 9 to 13, 1999. http://www.uta.fi/EGEDL/outline/telehealthafrica.html.

(c) Afele, John C. April 2000. 'Towards an African Knowledge Bank'. Teaching in the Community College 2000 On-line Conference: A Virtual Odyssey, What's Ahead of New Technologies in Learning March 2000. http://www.kcc.hawaii.edu/org/tcon2k/homepg_aloha.html.

REVIEW ESSAY

Edwin N. Wilmsen and Patrick McAllister (Eds). *The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World of Power*. Chicago. University of Chicago Press.1996.

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This important and welcome book of essays represents one of the early fruits of South Africa's democratisation. To celebrate the end of the academic boycott and to liberate the study of ethnicity from its Apartheid and Freedom Struggle distortions and silences, an international conference on 'Ethnicity, Identity, and Nationalism' was held at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa, from 20-24 April 1993. The conference was attended by 173 scholars drawn from 24 countries. Seventy-three papers were presented and this book consists of the main theoretical contributions made at the conference.

The organisers of the conference and those responsible for this book are to be congratulated for their attempt to stimulate and update the study of ethnicity in South Africa. As has often been remarked, despite their significance as social phenomena, the study of ethnicity and ethnic identity has had a chequered history in South African scholarship. This state of affairs was such that at about the time of the conference Bekker (1993 :p. 1) was able to write, 'Astonishing though it may seem to most rank-and-file South Africans, there is little discussion on ethnicity in South Africa at the moment'. One of the main reasons for this is no doubt linked to the blatantly opportunistic way in which ethnicity was fabricated and manipulated by the apartheid state to divide and weaken opposition in South Africa and to implement its segregationist ideology. Those who challenged this ideology but wished to study ethnicity ran the danger of being used as apologists for government policy. To forestall this meant to limit the study of ethnicity to aspects that could not be used in this way, for example, to highlighting the variability of ethnicity and exposing the artificiality and opportunism underlying apartheid ideology's ethnic units. In either case, comprehensiveness and objectivity were compromised. Most oppositional scholars opted to stay out of the field. The few who did not have now to face the ignominy of admitting to the deliberate one-sidedness of their analyses and declaring their political motivations or having these scholastic improprieties exposed by others (cf. Boonzaier and Sharp 1988; Gordon and Spiegel 1993; Sharp 1997; Douglas 1997).

But institutionalised apartheid was not the only factor discouraging the study of ethnicity. Another was the anti-apartheid movements themselves. Through their nationalist and Africanist ideologies, the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress sought to promote a broad and inclusive South African nationalism. This orientation placed ethnicity in the category of social relations antithetical to liberation and hence something to be superseded.

Social science itself contributed to the neglect of the study of ethnicity. Rooted in the Enlightenment and modernist propositions of the sociological classics, much social theory inspired the view that forces such at the rise of nation states, industrialisation, the spread of capitalism and socialism, urbanisation, international travel and trade, mass migration, global communication, and so forth, would lead to the demise of ethnicity. As part of this tradition, the theoretical hegemony of Marxist theory over the past three decades, with its stress on class and material factors, had no space for ethnicity in its core conceptual schema and thus directed

attention away from the study of ethnicity.

But time has brought change. South Africa's democratisation and the apparent wide acceptance of inclusivist nationalist and Africanist values and ideas together with constitutionally based tolerance and protection of cultural differences, signal a new era for ethnicity in South Africa. These changes appear paradoxically to be weakening some forms of ethnicity while promoting other forms (for example. Sharp in the book under review highlights the ethnogenesis among the Namaqualand Khoikhoi and coloureds of the Western Cape). Such developments, coupled with the current crisis in social theory, make the present a good time for South African social scientist to begin to pay more attention to ethnicity. The Rhodes conference and this book provide a strong impetus in this direction.

An introduction written by Edwin Wilmsen (one of the editors) opens the book. Included here is the prolegomenon used to organise the conference and Wilmsen's comments on some of the conference papers. According to Wilmsen, '... the shape of the book is designed to pour readers through a funnel from the theorization of, through the operational on, to engagement with ethnic/identity premises; thus, it moves from the widest reflections on ethnicity to the still point of experience' (p.2). Not quite. The strength of the book is its conceptualising and theorising, its weakness is the absence of the voice of direct experience. Even contributors such as Tambiah and Ryan, whom Wilmsen sees as writing from the 'belly of the beast' (p. 15) because of their experiences in countries torn by ethnic strife, write at an academic and theoretical remove from this. Though both call for an anthropological approach which can tap the experiences of the people directly involved in ethnic conflict and violence, neither of them do this, or at least, do not present the fruits of such an approach in their essays.

Though rooted in directly observable phenomena, the term 'ethnicity' denotes something compound and abstract. The character of its denoted object as well as the varied meanings attached to the term make for ambiguity, overlapping, misunderstanding and, even, contradiction. As Pieterse (p.25) reminds us, the term is derived from the Greek word ethnos (nation) and ethnikos (non-Christian and non-Jewish nations; a word referring to Gentiles, heathens and pagans). Some ambiguity was thus inherent in the term from its inception and while ethnicity for most of this century was generally understood to refer to minority groups identified through, and bound by, common ties of descent, nationality, and culture, the term is now also used to describe dominant and subordinate groups. This universalising of the concept is contested and the contributors to this volume adopt different positions. For example, while Wilmsen maintains that 'dominant groups are never ethnicities' and that the white English-speaking populations of South Africa, the USA and elsewhere are not 'tribal ethenes' (p.4), Pieterse grants that 'ethnicity' is now also stretched to refer to the cultural politics of dominant groups, (p.25). For reasons dealt with in many essays in the book, the contemporary world is witnessing increasing ethnogenesis rather than the waning of ethnicity and, as oppressed and marginal people use ethnicity to build self-esteem and solidarity for social ends, there seems to be a corresponding ethnocisation in the ranks of dominant groups. These developments underline the growing need to pay more attention to ethnicity.

Since the book stands as a typical product of the engine room from which it emanates, a conference of established scholars communicating with their well initiated peers, it poses challenges for the uninitiated and the less well initiated reader. This is particularly the case as far as theories of ethnicity are concerned. The papers are written for readers familiar with existing theories and they proceed to do battle on that assumption. Theories are lumped together in the questionable 'primordialist/constructivist' dichotomy or the equally questionable

primordialist/constructivist/instrumentalist' trichotomy and found wanting. The most extreme critique is provided by Comaroff who regards the whole theory construction enterprise as misguided and self-defeating. He does not believe that ethnicity can be defined in the abstract and hence, '... there cannot be a theory of ethnicity ... per se, only a theory of history capable of elucidating the empowered production of difference and identity'. He drives home his argument by exposing the weaknesses of recent attempts at theory. Theories which attempt to synthesise primordialism and instrumentalism are dismissed as 'theoretical bricolage' which leave the suspect bedrock of essentialism intact (p. 165). Contructivism and instrumental ism fare no better and are dismissed as not even constituting theories.

The general sense of dissatisfaction with existing theories of ethnicity which emanates from these essays strikes me as somewhat self promoting and unfair. The state of theory in the field of ethnicity is not as parlous as many of these critics make out and its weaknesses are those of the social sciences in general because as Nash (1989:p.7) notes, '... the study of ethnicity is the attempt to study all of social science under that single rubric. The reason that ethnic studies have had no more than limited success ... results largely from overlooking this fact'. But advances have been made, some quite significant, and it seem to me that the general failure of essays in this book to fairly acknowledge these perpetuates the common perception that there has been no advance. Since theories of ethnicity are largely derivative (cf. Nash 1989:p.7), these theories benefit from advances in the theories from which they are derived. Some of the authors in this book seem not to appreciate this and continue to operate with crude prototypes and outmoded stereotypes of the theories they comment on. For example, rather than dignify primordialism or contructionism with the label 'theory', Wilmsen refers to them as 'insidious ideological discourses'. This, according to him, because the former, '... posits genetic variability to be an attribute not of individuals but of groups and thus to be unamenable to social intervention', while the latter, '... makes the makers of ethnicity out to be cultural fools, doomed to reproduce their world endlessly and mindlessly ...' (p.21). It is hard to tell from what contemporary theories of ethnicity Wilmsen extracts such crude claims and even harder to understand why a person who knows better would want to malign the state of theory in his field of study in this way. Since it is clear that he and most of the authors in this book have a distinct take on ethnicity he would for this reason want to distance himself from 'primordialist' theorists. Yet thinkers who are often viewed as such - not always with good reason - such as van den Berghe (1978;1981), Wallerstein (1979;1991), Moynihan (1994) and Smith (1991; 1992) - are hardly proponents of a 'species of biological racism' (p.21) as Wilmsen avers.

The mistake that is repeated in this book is that too many disparate works, dating from different times and of vastly different validity, are lumped together in the 'primordialist' and constructivist' categories and the criteria for such judgments are not consistently or rationally applied. It is revealing, for example, that Wilmsen does not regard Ryan, one of the contributors to his book as a 'primordialist' or a 'constructionist'. In his essay, Ryan describes universal psychological reactions to violent intercommunal conflict. These reactions are found in different intensities but 'they seem to exist whenever ethnic groups engage in violent conflict' (p. 144). One such universal reaction is the demonising of the 'other', something 'we may all be prone to in differing degrees' (p. 153). Ryan also notes the emotions that often underpin extreme ethnocentric feelings and how conflict produces memories which get transmitted from generation to generation (p. 159). These are all examples of elements of primordial and constructivist theory and yet they are not read by Wilmsen as such. It is interesting to note that labels such as 'primordial' and 'contructivist' are repudiated by some of those to whom they have been applied. Van den Berghe

has himself provided a critique of 'primordialism' and sees the 'primordialist/instrumentalist' debate as based on a 'simple-minded antimony' serving 'little purpose other than to help Ph D candidates organize their examination answers' (van den Berghe 1981:p.l8). He says of his book *The Ethnic Phenomenon* that it is intended to show that both positions are correct, though not in the way the protagonists envisage. In view of the above comments, it seems that it would advance the study of ethnicity considerably if these categories were abandoned or reserved only for those works which truly merit them. They hark back to the nature/nurture debate which social science transcended some time back.

The essays in this book pay particular attention to the fluid and protean nature of ethnicity and this is why they are so critical of theories which tend to suggest that ethnicity is something essentially eternal and unchanging. If anything unites these contributions, it is an acute awareness of the historical nature of ethnicity and the myriad forms that are assumed by phenomena under this rubric. The first essay in the book provides a comprehensive statement of this position. The essay is by Jan Nederveen Pieterse. In it he deals with the varieties of ethnic politics as these have emerged in the present and he explains why the contemporary wave of politics comes at a time when the era of the nation is past its peak. Pieterse sees in current ethnic struggles and the emergence of increased particularity both the repudiation of false notions of universalism such as those enunciated by modernists and Marxists and the possibility of a new universalism and he speculates about what might come after the present moment of fragmentation. He regards external and internal political developments as playing an important part in the genesis and shaping of ethnicity. For him, states and nations are more a cause of ethnicity than they are its product. Global trends such as post-nationalism, the retreat of the state, the global recession, post Cold War politics and democratisation together with such domestic trends as forced assimilation, ethnic discrimination, deliberate ethnic mobilisation, and the increasing use of ethnic discourse by elites and responsiveness of ethnic subalterns to this, are cited as some of the global and local factors accounting for the proliferation of ethnic politics in both its dominant and subaltern varieties. For Pieterse, the intensification ofethnicisation we are currently witnessing is an historical event that holds the promise of a better life. Contrary to those who view ethnicisation negatively, he suggests that this might be a progressive event in that it could lead to a world of tolerated 'hybridity, heterogeneity, difference' (p.43).

Emesto Laclau's essay is vintage inimitable Laclau. Dense, difficult, but rewarding. He approaches questions of ethnicity and identity via a consideration of universality and particularity and sees the current proliferation of ethnic particularities as resulting from the loss of hegemony ofuniversalistic discourses and regimes such as those of Enlightenment Reason, Colonialism, Soviet Imperialism, and Marxism. He views recent history as having led to the realisation that the chasm between the universal and the particular is unbridgeable. What was taken for the universal until recently was nothing more than a particular which had become dominant. Despite the events which led to it, and despite arguments in its favour, Laclau argues that the appeal to pure particularism offers no solution to contemporary problems and, as a political proposition, it is practically impossible and logically incoherent. Not all particularism can be permitted. Judgments will have to be made and these cannot be made in terms of particularistic principles, for then these would be those of one or other particularity. The judgments that have to be made can only be made in terms of some widely shared or universal principles. But what is the source of such principles now that God, Reason and Marx have been rejected? For Laclau the source of such principles lies in the concrete and particular (in the ideas of contending ethnicities, groups, classes, nations, etc.) and the best available mechanism for

identifying and reaching agreement on these principles at the moment is democracy. In this connection, Laclau writes (p.57), 'If democracy is possible, it is because the universal has no necessary body and no necessary content; differing groups, instead, compete among themselves to temporarily give their particularisms a function of universal representation'.

Aletta Norval titles her essay, 'Thinking Identities: Against a theory of ethnicity'. Clearly a member of the historical camp, she commences with a reference to Foucault and what he regards as the mistake scholars and theorists make when they impose their categories and principles of coherence onto past or very different societies. Taking Foucault's lead, she suggests that what primordialists take to be early forms and pre-cursors of modem ethnicity might have been nothing of the sort, they are simply imposing the present onto the past. With this opening she is able to challenge primordialist claims that modem ethnicity and nationalism derive from pre-modern forms and elements of ethnicity. In place of primordialism, she draws on Derrida's notion of a constitutive outside and Lacan's discourse on the production ofimaginaries to propose her alternative. Ethnicities and their associated identities are rooted in imaginary constructions, constructions which include the drawing of political frontiers and the conscious description of self and other. This process is not a process of pure subjectivism or of simple exclusion and inclusion, but takes place in a given context and force field. The complexity of this process is illustrated with reference to the construction of apartheid discourse. Considering post-apartheid South Africa, Norval argues that the ethnic identifications objectivated by apartheid will have to be recognised and contested politically.

They are now political realities and to imagine that ethnic identifications will easily fade away would spell political suicide for the left. Hence, she argues, the promotion of a democratic South Africa means that allowance will have to be made for ethnicity in its legitimate forms while curbing its reactionary potentials.

Norval advocates and sees as possible, an alternative between homogenising, unifying nationalism and divisive, destructive ethnicity of the Zulu and Afrikaner ethno-nationalistic form. For her, between the poles of apartheid and non-racialism lies the possibility of a tolerance of ethnic difference without absolutism or closure. She expresses this as follows, 'Insofar as non-racialism is engaged with continually, as a finite political project, it offers a space of identification in which we can live in the tension between the universal and the particular. This is the space proper to a radically democratic and plural post-aparheid South Africa' (p.69). This solution to South Africa's pluralism problem is reiterated and elaborated in her recently published book *Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse* (1996). In this she argues that South Africa's adoption of the imaginary of non-racialism offers the possibility of transcending the friend/foe social division of apartheid. What becomes possible is a new order of social division constituted by 'difference' rather than by 'otherness'. Non-racialism evokes respect for, and tolerance of, the difference of the other.

Though her emphasis on discourse and the imaginary could easily have led to a purely idealistic solution, Norval avoids this by keeping the material firmly in mind. She recognised that if the proposed radical pluralism is to have a future, the pluralisms of economic resources and power will have to be dealt with. Radical cultural and ethnic pluralism are only possible through a radical reduction in economic and political pluralism.

The next essay in the volume is by William Roseberry. Its main focus is on the problematical theorising of language and the social and on the utility of Gramsci's understanding of hegemony in the analysis of languages of contention such as those of class, ethnicity and nation. As regards language and the social, the collapsing of the social into language is rejected by Roseberry as is

the temporal ordering which sees language as somehow prior to and constitutive of the social. While recognising language as an indissoluble element of the social, he argues that the non-linguistic dimensions of the social, such as the material fields of social, economic, and political force, must be recognised as equally co-present and indissoluble. He sums this up by writing, 'the social is constituted in language, and language is constituted in the social' (p.75). This conclusion leads on to his discussion of hegemony which he maintains should not be understood as 'ideological consensus' as it so often is. He argues that for Gramsci hegemony was a more material and political concept, referring to the problematical, contested political process of domination and struggle against domination. What hegemony achieves is a shared discursive framework in which both dominant and subaltern participate to pursue their separate agendas. Since it is typically the state which formulates the encompassing discursive framework, contending groups have little alternative but to recognise and legitimise this framework through the use they make of it. But this framework is fragile and for this reason it is more accurate to consider it a necessary but always unfinished and unfinishable state project rather than as a final achievement. Contending languages of ethnicity, class, and nationalism prevent this achievement and imply a continual dynamic between common and contending discursive frameworks. As regards ethnic and national discourses, Roseberry views these as drawing on images of primordial associations and identifications in order to serve as languages of contention and opposition.

John Sharp begins his essay on 'Ethnogenesis and Ethnic Mobilization' with an example of the kind of ethnic discourse Roseberry alludes to: the discourse of primal unity and difference espoused by Max Gros-Lois, Grand Chief of the Hurons of Quebec, in his struggle against Canadian settler culture and settler domination. Sharp then considers the erratic responses of governments, media and academics to such discourses and highlights the dilemma faced by academics who, in deconstructing the primordial claims of ethnic groups, play into the hands of reactionaries and racists. Consistent with the arguments and evidence of the historical camp. Sharp notes that the use of primal unity arguments by indigenous minorities is a relatively new phenomenon triggered by threats to such minorities within particular countries and the influence of ethnic struggles internationally. Ethnogenesis in first world countries is linked, according to Sharp, to the move away from earlier assimilationist policies to policies which tolerate difference. A move which, for him, is tinged with paternalism since it is a clear sign of the unassailable position of dominance of the majority. Turning to consider contemporary ethnogenesis in South Africa, Sharp examines the case of the people in the Namaqualand reserves who have begun to assert an unbroken continuity of culture and identity between themselves and the pre-colonial Khoikoi and on the strength of this to advance their land claims. This move, according to Sharp, is not the result of a sudden rediscovery of ancestral roots, but a conscious strategy to use well known associations for economic and political ends. He makes clear that this strategy stems in part from political developments in South Africa and from informational exchanges with ethnic minorities similarly engaged elsewhere.

Other South African cases of ethnogenesis are considered by Sharp: contemporary Zulu and Afrikaner nationalism on the one hand and Black Consciousness and 'coloured' identity on the other. In concluding his essay Sharp attempts to make a case for accepting certain varieties of ethnogenesis while rejecting others on the basis of their implications for democracy. Thus he accepts the Black Consciousness movement, the nascent Khoikoi ethny of Namaqualand and 'coloured' ethnicity while rejecting Zulu and Afrikaner nationalism because the latter favour ethnic and racial separation. This line of argumentation is problematical as is the further criterion

Sharp introduces to sustain his acceptable/unacceptable ethnicity dichotomy. This further criterion is the extent to which different ethnic discourses are reflexive and appreciative of the fact that the past is an ambiguous resource. He considers Black Consciousness, Khoikoi and coloured ethnic discourse as satisfying this criteria while Zulu and Afrikaner nationalism do not. It is difficult to agree with him ere as it is not clear what the evidence for this judgment is. On the face of it it seems likely that each of these existing ethnicities or potential ethnicities exhibit some consciousness about the arbitrariness and ambiguities of their claims while also making primordialist and absolutist claims. Indeed. Sharp himself notes some of the latter in the Black Consciousness movement. It might be that reflexivity and a sense of ambiguity about the past and the heritage being claimed characterise emerging ethnicities more than established ethnicities but this seems insufficient ground to justify Sharp's distinctions. The fact that Sharp regards the Black Consciousness movement as an ethnic movement is also problematical and underlines the imprecise phenomenon that ethnicity is.

In their essay 'European concepts of nation building', Jan Blommaert and Jef Vershueren consider recent and current changes in Europe as these relate to ethnicity and nationalism. They note that from a Western perspective the economic collapse of Eastern Europe, the splintering of the former Soviet Union and the armed conflict in Yugoslavia, were all due to some extent to the suppression of legitimate ethnic claims and identities. As a contribution to understanding the West's responses to these events, and especially its lukewarm response to the bloodshed in Yugoslavia, the authors attempt to uncover and describe the ideology of the West in terms of which ethnicity and ethnic conflict are thought about and dealt with. They do this through a detailed study of the Belgian migrant debate. Using the method of linguistic pragmatics described by Levinson (1983), they surveyed Belgian mainstream discourse about migrants over a three year period. This method, it is claimed, allows research to penetrate below the level of explicit discourse to uncover what is implicit. It is a means to reach the deeper, largely unconscious layer of ideology which lies beneath thought and speech. What they found was that below an explicit discourse of anti-racism and tolerance of ethnic diversity lay a xenophobic ideology which they label homo^eneism. This ideology is characterised by antipathy towards fundamental forms of diversity and a hankering for the re-homogenisation of society. Its tolerance and openness is conditional on migrants honouring the existing legal system and behaving according to the basic norms of the majority. The differences that are tolerated relate to those things that do not disturb the established order. What this boils down to typically is a cosmetic tolerance of the art, music, dance, cuisine, and home language of the migrant group. Brief considerations of other Western countries lead the authors to conclude that the ideology ofhomogeneism is widely shared in the West and they suggest that this is a factor which helps explain the West's ready acceptance ofethnonationalism in Europe and its failure to act decisively in Yugoslavia. Western countries were restrained from acting because the events there were consistent with their underlying ideology ofhomogeneism. The countries of Eastern Europe were on the road to re-establishing the homogeneism unconsciously wished for by dominant groups in the West. This essay adds a new dimension to the understanding of ethnic relations in contemporary Europe and highlights anew the vexing and complex questions posed by migrants. While their essay presents a sustained criticism of the West's general hypocritical and discriminatory treatment of migrants, the authors offer no suggestions as to what the solutions are. They also provide no explanation for the shared homogeneism ideology which they claim underlies most main-stream Western discourse about migrants and ethnic minorities. If they are correct about the transnational nature of this ideology, it is certainly something which merits

further attention. It might be that they have uncovered something that is global and if that is so, it raises some very important theoretical questions. The much maligned and rejected primordialist perspective suggests that homogeneism might be a universal feature of human societies. Some evidence for this thesis comes from Robins (1997) who reports on the fear and mistrust of recent immigrants expressed by Namaqualanders. A spokesperson for residents of this remote part of South Africa articulated their version of 'homogeneism': 'The civics educate people that if a Black man or a White man wants to come and stay in Concordia, he's welcome. But he must just fall in with the norms within the community. That is basically what we want' (Robins 1997:p.36).

Stanley Tambiah's essay deals directly with the relation between ethnicity and nationalism in the contemporary world. According to him, the closing decades of the twentieth century are witnessing a struggle between two forms of nationalism. The challenge is to find a way of reconciling them. The first form, initially conceived and realised in Europe, is the nationalism of the nation-state with its central premise the demotion and/or elimination of the political significance of ethnicity. The second form, which has recently surfaced in many parts of the world, is ethnonationalism, the nationalism pursued by ethnic groups. Capitalising on the strengths of the nation-state, the nations of Europe imposed their form of the state on the territories they seized during the era of colonialism. This initiated the dialectic between nation-state and ethnonationalism which has now brought the state and state-nationalism in many parts of the world to a crisis. Tambiah briefly traces the salient moments in this dialectic in a number of third world countries. The first moment was 'decolonisation', which saw the birth of many new countries as 'nation-states'. The second moment was that of nation building. A moment which featured an emphasis on inclusive nationalism and concerted attempts to build a national consciousness and culture. The third moment, in which the world now finds itself, is characterised by the eruption of ethnic conflicts and demands by ethnic groups for self-determination, independence, and so forth. The state, previously looked to for unifying and even homogenising social diversity, is now looked to to arbitrate conflict and protect and preserve diversity. Tambiah notes four factors which have contributed to the state of crisis of the (third-world) nation-state in particular. They are: failure to deal with the language issue adequately; the creation through high birthrates and modern education of a mass of disaffected young people; mass internal migrations of people of different ethnicity; and the enduring significance of religion in politics and the public sphere. Ethnically conflictual as nation-states currently are, Tambiah reminds us that the establishment of ethnonational-states will not necessarily usher in peace and democracy. Even if they opt for electoral politics and representative government, such states will still contain ethnic minorities and the danger of discrimination will persist. It might even intensify.

Ryan's essay is concerned with the spiral of intensifying violence which ethnic conflict is often associated with when it enters a violent phase. Rather than the suffering and cost of the violence bringing the warring parties to their senses and facilitating a prompt resolution, such violence typically begets further and more extreme violence. Ethnic identities are more deeply etched and the cartography of ethnic belonging and exclusion more rigidly drawn.

Associated with these developments is the emergence of an uncompromising worldview in the ranks of the antagonists and a progressive collapse of rational politics. In seeking to enhance our understanding of these developments, Ryan looks briefly at some of the answers that have been provided. Among the processes and factors which play a key role in escalating ethnic conflict he identifies the following: militarisation: exaggerated ethnocentrism; physical separation and the

sharpening of territorial boundaries; psychological distancing (stereotyping, dehumanising, etc.); sanctification of own group and demonising of the 'other'; entrapment and overcommitment; economic underdevelopment; and a sense of cynicism and powerlessness.

Some of Ryan's observations are relevant to South Africa. They both help us understand where this country was headed and what now requires attention in order to reduce the potential for ethnic conflict and to secure democracy and economic development. What Ryan's essay does not assist in is understanding how South Africa escaped from the spiral of racial/ethnic violence it was in for most of this century. According to his model, violence should have kept intensifying until things literally blew apart. Despite this puzzle, the factors identified by Ryan provide a yardstick against which to measure the distance South Africa has pulled back from the brink of the great race war towards which it seemed headed. Though complacency would be dangerous, post-apartheid South Africa is now headed in a different direction in terms of most of Ryan's factors. Concerted efforts have been made to demilitarise South African society; the nation building agenda of the ruling elites and major political parties and their general acceptance by the bulk of the population appear to be diminishing ethnocentrism; while residential separation is still very marked and not much progress has been made here, micro-separation such as that imposed by petty apartheid is a thing of the past though its echo still lives on in the largely group specific audiences and participants in sport, religion, and entertainment; there are signs that psychological distancing is decreasing and its major forms such as racist and hate speech are now legally forbidden; sanctification and demonisation seem also on the wane as are tendencies to entrapment and overcommitment; free from military engagement and the wastes of the apartheid system the country is no longer in the same state of self-mposed underdevelopment as previously and there are good prospects for sustained economic growth; the success of the liberation struggle and achievement of democracy has no doubt reduced wide spread feelings of powerlessness and cynicism though there are indications that these debilitating mind sets are now affecting members of the previously privileged minority. To conclude this brief audit, Ryan's recommendations for overcoming ethnic conflict are widely discernible in South Africa: win-win thinking, acceptance of cultural diversity and tolerance of difference. Most of the foregoing portend well for the future.

In the last essay of the book, John Comaroff deals with the awkward questions raised by the intensification of ethnic and national struggles in the contemporary world and the failure of social science to predict this development or offer an adequate explanation for it. He notes that social science was not alone in getting this wrong. The media in the USA during the 1950s and 1960s propagated the illusion of the melting pot, post-war Britain anticipated absorbing its commonwealth subjects into a colour blind population, the USSR saw signs everywhere of the appearance of socialist man who would irrevocably resolve national and ethnic questions. Piling awkward question on awkward question, Comaroff asks why, if as is often recognised, numerous ethnicities and identities were the product of imperial and colonial invention, have these not been undone by decolonisation and postmodernism? Answers to these questions cannot be found in existing theory, according to Comaroff, since this theory is 'banal' and 'has changed little in the past decades, despite the fact that existing approaches have repeatedly been discredited' (p. 164). These damning judgments are supported by a brief critique of the dominant approaches to ethnicity to which reference was made at the beginning of this review. This is followed by a consideration of contemporary developments and their impact on ethnicity and nationalism. What Comaroff sees is a world in an epoch of revolution characterised by globalisation, the weakening of the nation-state, the rise of new politics of identity and a crises of representation in

the human sciences. He pays particular attention to those global forces - such as the information and communications revolution; the growth of trans-national institutions, movements and diasporas; the transnational division of labour; the integrated world commodity market; the transnational legal order; and the world wide commercial arbitration system - which are undermining the nation-state. The weakening of the state, Comaroff argues, has led to defensive responses from national governments and is responsible for the dramatic and widespread explosion of ethnic and identity politics so characteristic of the present. These developments which signal the emergence and growth of a global cultural order raise the questions about the future of cultural differences. In particular, as Comaroff phrases it, 'How much credence should we give the popular notion that a universalizing world capitalist culture is destroying local cultures everywhere?' (p. 173). Contra those who regard globalisation and localisation as opposite processes, Comaroff's view is that they are complementary sides of a single historical process. He sides with those who see local cultures as responding to globalising forces through their domestication and localisation. He argues that since there is no such thing as a universal symbol or image, all globally circulating symbols and images can only be appropriated through localisation and domestication. The line of reasoning being followed here, though dialectical, seems to credit the local with too much power and autonomy. This exaggeration of the power of the local seems to be a common Comaroff failing. Mafeje (1996:p.l6) recently made a similar criticism with regard to the claim made by the Comaroffs in their 1992 book. *Ethnography and rlie Historical Imagination*, to the effect that the subjects and objects of colonialism reciprocally shaped one another and mutually determined the contexts in which this was done. Mafeje retorts that if this is accurate then there would be no need for the decolonisation and deconstruction of colonial systems of thought and practice.

While it makes sense to consider globalisation and domestication as complementary processes, Comaroff's reluctance to view the globalisation process as dominant or to acknowledge that every localisation of the global changes the local spoils his argument. As he suggests, the contemporary animated politics of identity and the explosion ofcthnonationalisms are complementary local responses to globalisation. Thus, by his own admission, the local reacts and the global initiates. This implies an unequal relationship with globalisation providing the stimulus and direction of change even if the exact trajectory is open to local influence. It seems to me thus more valid and accurate to read the signs of the times as signaling increasing global homogeneity - the view that Comaroff rejects. Globalisation is a process that has been underway for hundreds of years but is accelerating at the moment and bringing ever more aspects of the local into its ambit. The force field between local and global increasingly favours the latter. Many global items are difficult to localised or resist except in trivial ways. Elites are increasingly transnational citizens and, since they play an important part in localising the global, as they become more global in consciousness, their localising of the global drifts towards global consensus. Furthermore, to hark back to McLuhan, the globalising world of commodities carries with it its own power of homogenisation, the medium is the message. As the world becomes more commodified and as people buy into the same technologies and products, people everywhere are increasingly receiving and responding to the same 'messages'. The local gloss put on this hardly matters. We have come a long way from the Samoans wearing alarm clocks for decoration or Britons planting biltong.

To end his essay, Comaroff offers an ideal type discussion of ethnonationalism, euronationalism (Tambiah's 'state-nationalism') and heteronationalism. He links each of these to the dominant accounts of ethnicity. Thus ethnonationalism is rationalised in primordialist terms,

euronationalism in constructivist terms and heteronationalism in neoprimordial instrumental terms. He sees South Africa's current complex political mosaic embodying all three nationalisms and forms of rationalisation. Conservative Afrikaners and Inkatha supporters are ethnonationalists, the core doctrine of the ANC is euronationalist though the party in power shows signs of moving in the heteronationalist direction. The National party, for all the years of apartheid clearly an ethnonationalist party, is now reconstituted as a herteronationalist party. If he is correct. South Africa is faced with potentially severe conflict because, on his view, euronationalism (state-nationalism) and ethnonationalism are ontologically opposed. Considered overall, Comaroff regards the current world wide increases in ethnic consciousness and the rise of ethnonationalism with misgiving. These seem destined to entrench rather than erase existing forms of disadvantage and disempowerment and make it difficult to mobilise on the basis of class, race, gender and generation. He ends by calling for defensible alternatives to the direction in which ethnic and national politics are moving, alternatives which for him require, '... situating ethnicity and nationalism in the broader context of the consciousness and claims of class, race, gender and generation' (p. 181) and being part of realpolitik.

Viewed as a whole, this is a thought provoking book which admirably illustrates the importance and challenging nature of the study of ethnicity and constitutes a significant contribution to contemporary debates on ethnicity and nationalism. Despite its considerable merit, the major weakness of the book, as was noted at the beginning of this review, is the uncritical and unscholarly way in which many of the authors dismiss in toto the claims ofsocio-biologists, primordialists, instrumentalists, constructionists, and so forth. While reading some of the essays this reviewer got the distinct impression that it was raining bathwater and babies. Some essays, Comaroff's in particular, suggested a deliberate attempt to be outrageously radical and provocative while also remaining timidly politically correct. It seems to me that ethnicity is a complex and overdetermined phenomenon the understanding of which requires insights from numerous sciences ranging from the biological through the psychological and social to the economic and historical. It also, if the travesty of Expose Analysis is to be avoided and the interests of knowledge served, requires the courage to be politically incorrect if this is what is needed. The stress on the fluid nature of ethnicity and the advocacy of approaching ethnicity historically which characterises this volume calls to mind the idiographic-nomothetic distinction of the last century with most of the contributors opting for the idiographic. The way forward now as it was then, is to go beyond this false and distorting antimony. To comprehend ethnicity requires understanding the relatively invariant, the recurrent and the ever-changing.

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BOOK REVIEW

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In a newspaper article in August 2000, I dismissed Kiraitu Murungi, the author of the text under review, as one of the most nuisance politician to recently appear in Kenya. Reading through the book under review, which is his autobiographical reflection on recent democratisation trends in Kenya, I notice just how hasty my dismissal was. The text is rich in detail about the internal dynamics of opposition politics in Kenya, details that could never be gleaned from the newspaper reports I used to pen the dismissal. However, there is no reason to recant my summary dismissal of Murungi and his recent politics. Rather, the text makes it clearer that opposition politics in particular and Kenyan politics in general has moved into greater morass of nuisance and selective blame, a direction that makes the struggle to institute fairness, justice and reasoned dialogue at the national level more difficult.

In the Mud of Politics is divided into eight chapters plus a preface authored by Prof. Peter Anyang Nyong'o. The book tackles the problems of Kenyan politics as seen by Kiraitu Murungi. Given that Murungi has been an able, active and formidable participant in the democratic struggles in Kenya, the text is written from an informed perspective and speaks to many of the problems Kenyans experienced and continue to experience. This review interprets Murungi's perspective as stemming from political society, albeit an opposition one. It recognises differences within political society; those in and those out of government and the nature of their struggles for power. It also recognises the differences between the political society in general and civil society. By adopting this interpretation, the review raises the questions of how these various realms operate, speak to and against each other in their struggle to connect with and win the support of a wider public that bears diverse ethnic, religious, racial, and, more importantly, political orientations and persuasions.

The orientations and persuasions of the wider public are crucial to the politics of democratic transition in Kenya and need to be used to critique the process and participants in the struggles. Ultimately, it is this public that installs members of the political society into power. They therefore form a crucial reference point for understanding the trials, travails and tribulations of democratisation in Kenya. The notion of 'politics of selective blame' is deployed to identify one reason why the Kenyan democratisation process stalled as the opposing groups and factions degenerated into reactive rather than proactive politics. The story Kiraitu Murungi tells approvingly speaks to such a politics of selective blame, this being a politics of vilification and unbridled regime demonisation, a politics of a particular instance in the changing global geopolitics that criminalises one regime or practice and vindicates the other. This politics is particularly biased and discriminatory. It expediently employs selected factors to push for the democratic agenda in Kenya, thereby driving invidious wedges between people and groups.

Murungi sets out his study with a one-chapter background on how he came to get involved into Kenyan politics. In very broad strokes, he jumps from Meru North where he was born in the heat of the colonial state of emergency and repression of Mau Mau to the authoritarian politics of the

Moi regime. Though he inadequately tries to make up in very few concluding pages (see pages 196-198), the unexplored gloss here is the connection between colonial autocracy, presidential authoritarianism in the Kenyatta era and worse forms of repression under the Moi regime. The authoritarianism of the Moi regime did not drop like manna from heaven, rather it was carefully created and nurtured through the post-independence construction of Kenyatta's presidential authoritarianism. This gloss is both telling and politically expedient. It is also a common strategy of writing among some recent analysts of the democratisation process in Kenya. Many of these analysts are closely associated with the battery of non-government organisations working to reform the state and achieve a society that respects human rights, allows for freedom of speech, press and movement. The contradiction lies in the need to achieve democracy, fairness and justice on an intellectual and political tradition built on selective blame.

Having glossed over a whole history of presidential authoritarianism before 1978, Murungi details in chapter two how arbitrary detentions and torture under Moi led him into self-imposed exile in the USA. This is followed with his involvement in the struggle for political pluralism and entry into parliament in chapters three to five. These chapters engage his experience as the Member of Parliament for South Imenti, the struggle for constitutional reform in 1997 and work as a parliamentarian. Murungi demonstrates his position as a fighter against rural poverty and the rights of the rural folk in Imenti through a critical review of the agricultural and human rights policies that have worked to further entrench poverty and maintain conditions inimical to the total human development of Kenyans.

In part II of the text, the author revisits the question of human rights arguing that it involves a total focus on the economic and social being of citizens. His focus is on the grassroots, seen largely as rural Kenya, a grassroots constituted largely by peasants, a nebulous category that Murungi fails to adequately characterise. With a specific focus on agricultural policy, the author articulates the plight of rural people in relation to state policies on coffee and tea marketing. The analysis of the plight of farmers is closely related to the question of participation in decision-making, freedom of expression and participation in electing their leaders at various levels.

Again, Murungi is keen to blame colonial policies for initiating such unresponsive policies and the Moi regime for perpetuating them. In chapter seven, Murungi discusses his views on the contentious issues of ethnicity and multi-party politics; land and ethnicity; on lawyers and politics, political defections in Kenya's politics of pluralism and the role of women in Kenyan politics. This is a highly opinionated chapter and likely to provoke some reasoned debate with the author.

Certainly, Murungi has a right to dismiss ethnic clashes as 'artificial creations' by a few self-centred politicians (p. 161), but this does not address the instances of historical injustice and poor social relations among communities living in the areas where such clashes were engineered. And though Murungi discusses ethnicity in relation to the land question (pp. 166-70), a more candid interpretation must analyse the way communities in Rift Valley and related areas co-exist. This will establish other sources of conflict apart from the economic one that Murungi succinctly describes. As David Ndii has correctly cautioned, pinpointing specific politicians as the inciters of ethnic violence 'does not explain why, in the absence of a perceived historical injustice for the politicians to exploit, the hordes of young men who perpetrate these heinous crimes are so readily gullible to every other opportunistic politician's ploys'.

Generally, the text is refreshingly frank and candid on many issues. Murungi's focus on agriculture clearly bears out his contribution as a fighter for the thousands of Kenyans who have borne the brunt of bad politics, mismanagement and authoritarianism under the Moi regime.

Murungi articulates his arguments against Kenyan politics designed around harambees, dismissing this approach as promoting a culture of dependency and handouts. He shows how parliamentarians have become crudely involved in this culture parading as democrats while remaining crude power brokers, political entrepreneurs and turncoats who believe in nothing but their personal egos. For Murungi, hard work and just returns are prerequisites if rural constituencies are to be developed. He argues that development should be a holistic initiative from bottom-up, not top-bottom. Murungi derides parliament as a 'house of shame' where rubber-stamping is rampant because the ruling party remains in control. He reproduces sections of his contributions in parliament on various issues covering pages 97-128. He dismisses both fellow politicians and political parties as inept, mediocre and visionless in his conclusion. Murungi maintains that the nature of the work of a parliamentarian does not allow him to remain steadfast as a critique of government. Overall, Murungi paints a pessimistic picture of Kenyan politics which raises a question of what options Kenyans have.

Murungi hardly views the challenges and failures of the democratisation process in Kenya as stemming from a combination of causes within and beyond the Moi/KANU government'. Where he does, these factors are not really explored in detail. Most of the text blames the stalled democratic initiatives on KANU's intransigence and Moi's authoritarianism. However, one would wish to broadly include the inherent unfairness, inequality and inequity of the global system, internal ethno-regional socio-economic differences, the obstinacy of the sitting KANU government, plus the dishonesty, greed and lack of vision and strategy in the opposition as an alternative government.

Murungi is more interested in blaming KANU for all the democratic ills, economic problems and social upheavals bedeviling Kenya. This marks out his perspective as stemming from an opposition political society that has adopted a political and intellectual strategy of 'selective blame' to unseat the Moi regime. Clearly, this strategy has not worked over the years. This raises questions about the appeal opposition political society commands over the wider voting public. What crops up when Murungi's perspective is identified with selective blame is the opposition's fixation on raw power, a fixation recently articulated by Murungi through the GEMA ethnic caucus, a grouping of ethnic bossmen/women from the related Kikuyu, Embu and Meru ethnic communities. Those involved believe that the only way to halt the problems afflicting Kenya is to get rid of Moi. Indeed, such fixation on raw power led opposition politicians to degenerate into 'Moi Must Go' sloganeering. Backed by no concrete strategy for power takeover, this sloganeering has convinced Murungi and others of the need to form ethnic forums and use ethnicity to remove Moi from power. Recently Murungi articulated this ridiculous thinking in both electronic and print media, the same ethnic canvassing that opposition politicians continually accuse Moi/KANU of adopting.

It must be remembered that political society depends for its success in assuming power on marshalling the support of the generality of citizens to whom they articulate an alternative and better program of human betterment than the incumbent. However, due to the abnormal fixation on raw power and sloganeering, all opposition groups in Kenya have not produced any better democratic and developmental program than the sitting KANU government. For a while, during the early multi-party days in 1990, the opposition groups rode on the wave of public hate for KANU. They squandered their chances by reproducing within their microcosms divisive and overtly undemocratic tendencies. Such tendencies have not marked them out as any different from the KANU government. Indeed, though the opposition parties have benefitted from the positive presence of articulate and better minded politicians like Peter Anyang Nyong'o and

Katama Mkangi, others still hang on the illusory thinking that the hate Kenyans nurture against KANU must remain the only reason for a power transfer in their favour. The nuisance of such thinking is that gone are the days when something became bad simply because it was owned, aligned or associated with KANU or Moi. The days of 'Moi Must Go' sloganeering are over and every party must distinguish itself through its vision, national agenda and pragmatic strategy for national betterment. Ironically, as is evident in this book, Murungi does not even attempt to put his vision for Imenti in the context of the national policies of his sponsoring party.

Nowhere is the assumption that KANU is bad and the opposition good better illustrated than in Murungi's discussion of political defections in chapter seven. Apart from erroneously assuming that defection only occurs from the opposition to KANU, the author also suggests that these occur only after inducement by KANU. Murungi derides those who defect as weak and unprincipled politicians who, for one reason or another, are easily swayed by such inducements because 'they were committed to themselves, and their personal advancement' (p. 179). While many of the defections in Kenya are clearly motivated by personal gains and inducement, there are certainly many exceptions. For instance, the changing nature of Raila Odinga's politics does not cohere to the conjectural pattern of inducement Murungi pens. A contributory factor to political defection in Kenya is the nature of opposition politics that rotates around sloganeering, the big man who bank rolls the party and ethnicity. The ethnic card was better illustrated by the 1997 Ngilu wave. It entailed a strategy of fielding ethnic bossmen/women in every province to prevent Moi from gaining the mandatory 25% of the votes in at least five provinces. Apparently, there was a perceived calculation to catapult Mwai Kibaki into a run-off with Moi, a calculation that hinged on the demographic strength of Kibaki's ethnicity, the Kikuyu. Other than hoping to get rid of Moi, this calculation lacked any other legitimate vision for the betterment of Kenya. Thus, even if Raila Odinga defected for personal gain, numerous other precipitating factors can be observed.

Further, it ought to be pointed out that the political opposition in Kenya today is a product of defections from KANU. Even if there are numerous well-meaning politicians within the contemporary opposition, it is also true that many like Mwai Kibaki are relics of KANU in the opposition diaspora. Some of them have reproduced within the opposition tendencies that they carried from KANU. Apart from Odinga's National Development Party, for instance, all the other opposition parties have been unwilling to hold internal elections for their top offices periodically and remain extremely intolerant to internal debate and dissent. Further, the same parties have treated with alacrity attempts by some politicians to defect from KANU. In so doing, these parties have demonstrated a willingness to overlook corruption records of potential defectors. Thus, some allegedly corrupt politicians like Cyrus Jirongo have been openly welcomed into the opposition fold while allegedly corrupt opposition politicians like Paul Muite continue to occupy important positions without recourse to the same rules used to admonish the sitting government. Consequently, the main problem for the voting Kenyan public is that this very political opposition continues to accuse the sitting government of corruption without distinguishing itself as a viable and credible alternative worth their trust.

That the political opposition in Kenya hopes to unseat a regime associated with numerous ills against the wider society is beyond doubt. But so far, they have been unable to effectively connect with the wider public whose votes they need to unseat KANU's monopoly of power. To connect with the wider voting public, a strategy of convincing Kenyans to vote out KANU needs to be adopted and it must transcend the kind of selective blame dotted throughout the text under review.

This alternative needs more rigorous attention than can be seen in this text. It must not only promise a better future, it has to identity the possible means of attaining this future. The challenge is evidently enormous, but anything other than a hypocritical mandate is a welcome start. The current opposition has been unable to produce such a winning strategy. It has allowed itself to become a reactive rather than proactive alternative. Murungi's text illustrates clearly the nature of opposition politics in Kenya whose basic principle is unbridled regime demonisation and a narrow focus on raw power. With these as the baseline focus of political opposition, the wider voting public does not feature in the immediate vision of this political society. For Murungi, the focus is Imenti South while for the various parties, including KANU, it is their respective ethno-regional bases. What is needed is a wider cross-ethnic appeal for the opposition through a well-articulated program of reform. As things stand now, Murungi's autobiography will remain a litany of complaints against KANU. Since KANU has a penchant for thoroughly letting Kenyans down, this autobiography will in the future contain encyclopedic data on the pitfalls of a KANU government. It does not have prospects for a chapter on an opposition government.

Finally, a methodological point. If Murungi can afford to extensively read and quote texts he used in writing this book, he must certainly include endnotes and page numbers. This is basic enough and the editors should have insisted on proper footnotes and a bibliography. Footnotes and bibliographies are not a preserve of academics.