Operation Vijiji and its Aftermath: 
Land Nationalisation, Villagisation and Disputes in Mbulu District, North-Western Tanzania, 1961–2006

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Abstract

The Tanzania rural transformation policy, which was done through the nationalisation of the major means of production, Operation Vijiji and legal reforms, was one of the greatest socio-economic experiments in Africa. Expected to bring development to the majority of rural Tanzanians, nationalisation and villagisation have generated considerable land disputes in Tanzania over the past four decades. Scholarship on the Tanzanian land question has focused mainly on the lack of people's involvement in decision making and ecological change as major causal factors of land disputes. The link between nationalisation, Operation Vijiji, legal reforms and land conflicts has not received much attention. This article argues that the high incidence of land disputes in Mbulu District in northern Tanzania could be attributed to the poor and hurried implementation of land nationalisation and Operation Vijiji.

Résumé

La politique de transformation rurale en Tanzanie, qui s’est traduite par la nationalisation des principaux moyens de production, l’Opération Vijiji, et par des réformes juridiques, a été l’une des plus grandes expériences socio-économiques en Afrique. La nationalisation et la villagisation, censées apporter le développement à la majorité des ruraux tanzaniens, ont dégénéré de nombreux conflits fonciers en Tanzanie au cours des quatre dernières décennies. Les études sur la question foncière en Tanzanie ont principalement porté sur l’absence de participation de la population à la prise de décisions et sur les changements écologiques, en tant que facteurs déterminants des conflits fonciers. Le lien entre nationalisation, Opération Vijiji, réformes juridiques et conflits fonciers n’a pas fait l’objet de beaucoup d’attention. Cet article

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affirme que le nombre élevé de conflits fonciers dans le district de Mbulu, dans le nord de la Tanzanie, pourrait être attribué à la mise en œuvre médiocre et trop rapide de la nationalisation des terres et à l’*Opération Vijiji*.

**Introduction**

Many land problems in postcolonial Africa are the result of colonial policies. Colonial states created inequalities and injustices in African land control and use, as well as the forceful transformation of peasants from subsistence agriculture to the cash crop economy (Moyo 2003; Elias 2014; Amanor 2007). Immediately after independence, African countries attempted to resolve land problems by redistribution, transfer, cost reduction or nationalisation of land (Viet 2011; Moyo 2003). The postcolonial government of Tanzania encouraged a freehold system and the nationalisation of all major means of production, including land. Julius Kambarage Nyerere, the president of the leading nationalist party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), justified land nationalisation in 1958, arguing:

> In a country like Tanganyika where Africans are poor and foreigners are rich, it is quite possible that within eighty or hundred years if the poor Africans were allowed to sell their land, all land in Tanganyika would belong to wealthy immigrants and the local people will be tenants. If we allow land to be sold like robes, within a short period of time there would only be a few Africans possessing land in Tanganyika and all the others would be tenants (Maina 1974; URT: Shivji Commission 1991).

After securing power in 1962, Nyerere’s government nationalised land and vested control over it in the president as the executive head of the government (Mtwale 2000; Shivji 2001; Kauzeni 1993). Nationalisation aimed at abolishing the capitalist land ownership system so as to reduce the gap between large and small landowners.

Despite the postcolonial Tanzanian government’s interventions in land matters through nationalisation, *Operation Vijiji*, land laws and policies as well as land dispute resolution mechanisms, land conflicts still persisted in the country. In examining the high incidence and persistence of land disputes in Mbulu, a northern Tanzanian district, this article argues that the Tanzanian government’s interventions, which started under the leadership of Nyerere, did not produce the much anticipated socio-economic transformation or close the gap between different categories of land owners in rural areas. Rather than being resolved, rural land problems have changed in their forms and magnitude over the last four decades. The article historicises and situates land conflicts in Mbulu within the context of rural transformation programmes in Tanzania and other postcolonial African countries.
Historical context of Mbulu District and the land question

Mbulu District is among the five districts of Manyara region in Northern Tanzania. Other districts are Hanang, Babati Rural, Babati Urban, Kiteto and Simanjiro. Before the 1995 general elections, Mbulu District was part of the Arusha region, together with eight other districts including Ngorongoro, Monduli, Arusha Town, Arumeru, Babati, Hanang, Kiteto and Simanjiro. In 1995, a new district named Karatu, which had been a division of Mbulu District, was established. This study covers the old Mbulu District, before Karatu acquired new status as a separate district. The dominant ethnic groups in Mbulu District were the Iraqw, who constituted the majority group, followed by Datoga and Hadzabe who were minority groups (Marmo 2014).

The Iraqw community of Mbulu District historically obtained land rights through three major processes namely: allocation, inheritance and clearing of virgin land. Land allocation was done by the traditional leaders called the Kahamuse. The Kahamuse were involved in the allocation of land to new immigrants and providing more land to families needing extra land. Land could also be transferred from one person to another. In Iraqw society, the rights of original land holders were very strong in the pre-colonial era. Land tenure was enjoyed by people who had formerly borrowed land from others, and usually, their occupancy remained undisturbed throughout their lives.

The Iraqw land tenure system changed over time. From the 1890s, it was undermined by the German colonial government (ibid. 349). Power over land allocation shifted from the Kahamuse to the colonial administrators (ibid.). The changes in the land tenure system continued during the British colonial period. Throughout the Iraqw populated areas, the most serious damage to the land was caused by overgrazing. Three major reasons contributed to overgrazing. First, there was a rapid increase in the number of livestock as a result of improvement in veterinary facilities, which lowered the death rate of livestock. Second, the Iraqw desired to own larger amounts of cattle for prestige. Third, the Iraqw culture of lending cattle enabled each household to have access to a good number of cattle. This led to overstocking, which was intensified during the 1940s. The Iraqw’s response to overstocking was two-fold; first, they moved with their stock to less overstocked areas, and second, they lent their livestock to people living in areas not experiencing overstocking. Such a process, however, did not reduce the pressure on the land. Communal grazing lands, which were ordinarily respected under customary law, were affected and in most cases many people were left with individual grazing land.
In the 1940s, the British colonial government introduced various modernisation campaigns in Mbulu District, which interfered with the allocation of both grazing and agricultural land. The Mbulu Development Plan (MDP) in 1948, for example, aimed at transforming rural societies from subsistence farming to commercial agriculture (Mpangala 2000). The MDP focused on various programmes, such as destocking, bush clearance and progressive farming (Raikes 1970). Bush clearance paved the way for the government’s resettlement policy in the newly cleared areas, which disrupted the old procedure of land allocation under customary tenure. The so-called progressive farms affected the distribution and utilisation of land by introducing a new form of land allocation under directives given by the colonial government (ibid.). Despite the new colonial land tenure system, the Iraqw still referred to the traditional boundaries allocated by the Kahamuse. However, given the reality of colonial power relations, the position of Kahamuse was weak regarding land matters. This marked the beginning of the transformation from the traditional land tenure system to the new colonial land tenure system.

The 1950s witnessed an increase in the population of Mbulu District (see Table 1). Some people started claiming land over which they originally had rights. For example, people in central Mbulu reclaimed land in Kainam, which had a different agricultural cycle from that of Mbulu. Catherine Boone noted that the pressure on land had become too high in Iraqwland by the 1950s, especially in south-western Mbulu, from which further out-migration was impossible (Boone 2001). As a result, there was a return-flow of children asking their parents for access to their original farmland. People started to make contact with others beyond their villages. Furthermore, individuals’ economic activities were not limited to their own villages. It was quite common in central Mbulu, for example, for a man to cultivate plots outside his own village, and some individuals even maintained fields in completely different areas. Some men living in central Mbulu had maize fields in eastern Mbulu. By the 1960s people of central Mbulu owned pieces of land in Karatu sub-district, which were over 70 kilometres away from Mbulu town. This partly disrupted the traditional tenure system because the original landowners were in a position to reclaim their rights and those who temporarily owned such land were forced to surrender it. However, disputes which arose from this process were easily settled by the Kahamuse. The foregoing discussion indicates that in the pre-colonial period the exploitation of land in the district was peaceful. It shows that the interventions carried out by the colonial government provided a foundation for land conflicts in subsequent periods.
Postcolonial state intervention: nationalisation and villagisation

Under Tanzania’s nationalisation programme, economic activities were grouped into three categories: those restricted inclusively to state ownership, those in which the state had a major share and controlling power, and those in which private firms could invest with or without state participation (Shivji 1994). Following the Arusha Declaration of 5 February 1967, and the passing of the nationalisation Act of 1971, Nyerere’s regime nationalised all banks and large industrial enterprises, including larger scale agricultural processing industries. Nationalisation adversely impacted land ownership and its utilisation. Reaction to nationalisation across the country was mixed. In Mbulu, some people supported the action, others opposed it. Poor peasants, who owned small pieces of land, supported the action. They expected to be given more land, and hoped that the gap between them and the large landowners would be reduced. On the other hand, the large landowners protested against nationalisation, on the grounds that their land would be confiscated without their consent (File: Basodawish Village 1974). This situation caused insecurity with regards to land ownership and control, particularly in the northern parts of Mbulu District. Small landowners started to grab land belonging to other people, on the grounds that land was national property, ‘ardhi ni maliya umma’.

Oral accounts indicate that land disputes in this period intensified. The local authorities under the Kahamuse did not cooperate with the government because their authority over land allocation and distribution was no longer recognised. Putting land into the hands of the central government and ignoring the role of traditional leaders jeopardized the indigenous right to own land. It planted the seeds of land disputes in different parts of the district.

Nationalisation was followed by Operation Vijiji, the compulsory resettlement of the people in planned villages, which took place between 1973 and 1976 (Lawi 2000). Operation Vijiji involved large-scale relocation of peasants and pastoralists into villages, in order to encourage communal life. To implement the relocation, the government took the initiative of selecting and demarcating sites where people would be re-located (URT: Shivji Commission, 1991). By the end of 1976, a larger part of the population in mainland Tanzania had been resettled in nucleated villages (Lawi 2000: 319). Operation Vijiji also involved land allocation without any formal procedures. This resulted in widespread confusion over the land tenure system in rural areas because the security of people’s customary rights had been threatened (Shivji 1994). The government did not delegate any power to the village authorities to control and allocate land and there were no clear guidelines on how to protect new owners who obtained land under Operation Vijiji.
In Mbulu District, *Operation Vijiji* was implemented by the District Operation Committee (DOC), which was given the mandate to distribute and allocate land to the villagers. The process was carried out in an oppressive fashion. People were brutally shifted from their former homesteads to new villages, even during the night. Dean McHenry and Goran Hyden noted that people were forced to move immediately by state security forces, including the police, army and militiamen (McHenry 1979; Hyden 1980). People were rounded up without being given notice and dumped into villages without time to prepare shelter for themselves (*ibid.* 211). They were often ill-treated, harassed and punished in the name of TANU, the ruling party. Those who refused to move to *Ujamaa* villages were portrayed as backward or individualists (Hyden 1980). Their land was confiscated and reallocated to new applicants. People left behind their farms, houses, crops, livestock and other property. They were given notice to surrender their land to the new applicants. The justification given by the village leaders in many parts of the district was that all land belonged to the state. Thus, it could be allocated and re-allocated to villagers.

Although the villagisation programme had good intentions, it ultimately failed. The decision to transfer people from their former areas to the newly designated villages did not involve local communities. Local communities in Mbulu District strongly opposed the programme because their old settlement patterns and attachment to resources had not been considered. In addition, the officials entrusted with land redistribution allocated it arbitrarily. After some time, those whose land had been confiscated discovered that the process was illegal and began to reclaim their land. The villages in Mbulu District most affected by the villagisation programme were Mbulumbulu, Kambi ya Simba, Rotia, Wheat Scheme, Qurus, Endamariek, Endabash and Getamok.

Between 1979 and 1980, when *Operation Vijiji* ended, former landowners whose land had been confiscated and re-allocated to new owners took their cases to court. They claimed the return of their land. Issa Shivji argues that the success of some of these claims alarmed official circles as it constituted a reversal of the villagisation programme (Shivji 1994). In some areas of Mbulu District a few original owners, specifically those in a strong financial position, succeeded in repossessing their land through court action. Some poor people failed to recover their land as they could not meet the legal costs accrued during the court cases. So they gave up their rights. This caused fear and frustration among the people who were given the right to own land through *Operation Vijiji.*

Another source of land disputes during *Operation Vijiji* in Mbulu District was embedded in the prerequisites for establishing a new development
village. One of the prerequisites was that a new village should comprise at least 250 households; failure to reach this meant they would be moved to a nearby village to fulfil that requirement (URT: Shivji Commission, 1991). This created three major problems. First, those who were shifted to nearby villages were mainly rejected because they were considered by the established residents as aliens. Second, the land which belonged to the people who were forcefully shifted to the nearby villages was later grabbed by others. This affected villages such as Lusittete, Upper Kitete and Slahhamo in Mbulumbulu Division. Third, the process of re-organising villages distorted traditionally established boundaries, and these disputes were complicated by the lack of proper procedures and fairness in the demarcation of village boundaries. There were discriminatory practices in which certain villages were given priority over others. Respondents from different villages stated that grazing land was the main cause of disputes. For example, the boundaries between Maretadu Juu and Qamtanana villages on the one hand, and Maretadu Chini and Labay villages on the other, led to unequal distribution of grazing and open land for cultivation.

In this connection, the boundaries established by the traditional authorities contradicted those established by the Village Operation Committee (VOC). In Gehandu ward, for example, the disputes between Titiwi and Qatesh villages was caused by the contradiction between the traditional boundaries established by Kahamuse and the new village boundaries created by the VOC. The centre of the disputes was Gurufa valley, which was formerly shared by both villages as grazing land. Similarly, the dispute between Harsha and Diyomat villages was over the Mbuga (the swamy area), which was used during the dry season as a grazing area by both villages before Operation Vijiji. This followed the fact that the demarcation established during Operation Vijiji alienated the people of Harsha from mbuga areas. The major problem here was that the VOCs had not involved the traditional authorities in the re-allocation of land. The setting of these boundaries was ordered by the district authority without considering the interests of the villagers and their traditional leaders. In some areas, for example, natural boundaries created in the pre-villagisation period, based on their ritual protection of the country and locally known as maso aya, were disturbed.

Many village boundaries established during Operation Vijiji were not demarcated scientifically. Boundary markers were improvised and involved such things as trees, ridges, rivers, planted sisal shoots and valleys. In some areas people even used graves or burial sites as markers, which were used to protect their land against invasion by other people. Initially, these
boundaries were respected since people were cautioned that *Operation Vijiji* was a government order, which could not be questioned. However, from the 1980s to the 1990s, land shortages led people to start questioning the boundaries and even to uproot boundary markers such as sisal plants. Even burial sites, which were respected by traditional Iraqw, were cultivated. This further intensified land disputes in Mbulu.

The creation of new boundaries affected the size and location of individual plots. Some people’s plots were sub-divided in such a way that part of their land was in one village and another part in a neighbouring village. Disputes emerged because the people affected were not given adequate and proper compensation. People were silenced on the pretext that the operation was a government order, and nobody could oppose it. Such problems were experienced in the creation of boundaries for Daudi, Bargish Antsi, Isale and Walama villages. Andrew Coulson, cited by McHenry, contends that *Operation Vijiji* was dominated by the interests of the bureaucrats who controlled its implementation (McHenry 1979: 213). Shivji and McHenry also argue that reliance on the party or state officials distorted the initial objectives and undermined the long-term success of *Operation Vijiji* (ibid.). For Benno Ndulu, however, the greatest problem of villagisation was the absence of political consciousness of both the village leaders and villagers, in that the latter always worked under pressure from above (ibid.). While the arguments of these scholars have much merit, it also needs to be pointed out that *Operation Vijiji* in Mbulu District was poorly organised. The programme did not consider socio-economic factors such as the size of families, the cultural values that connected people to their ancestors’ land, or the quality of the newly allocated land. Some people were given poor land while their fertile land was grabbed or reallocated to others. It is not surprising that some people started to go back to their original land as soon as they had the opportunity, ignoring the allocation by the government. Others grabbed open land reserved for grazing.

During *Operation Vijiji* the government insisted that those who were given land should develop it. Those who failed to do so had their land confiscated and redistributed to new applicants. For example, in the southern part of the district, people with large herds of cattle shifted with their livestock to look for more open land and left the plots they were given during *Operation Vijiji*. When they returned to their former land they found new owners and engaged in disputes with them. The government also assumed that the land allocated to each family would sustain their lives. However, in some parts of Karatu, people moved with their herds to unoccupied areas such as Laja, Barray and Murus because the three acres of land allocated to them were not
enough to sustain their livestock and cultivation. When migrating, they left
their plots to their relatives and friends under different agreements. Some
leased their plots for an unlimited time, others agreed to exchange their
land for crops, but others just left their plots to be freely used by others.\footnote{19}
However, with the increase in the value of land between the 1980s and
1990s, caused by what Kaijage and Tibajuka refer to as the new economic
opportunities engendered by economic liberalisation and crop marketing,
disputes emerged (Kaijage and Tibajuka 1996). People who had left started
re-claiming their land on which leasees had already established themselves.

The Tanzanian government’s plan to increase food production at village
level during \textit{Operation Vijiji} also became a source of dispute. Since the
project needed a substantial amount of land, village governments confiscated
people’s excess land with the intention of opening ‘Development Village
Farms’.\footnote{20} But by the mid-1990s, these development village farms had
collapsed in many parts of Mbulu District and the land remained idle.\footnote{21}
In response, the government began to re-allocate the land to new applicants
without considering the interests of the former owners whose land had been
confiscated by the village governments and used to open village farms. Many
of the original land owners filed court cases against their village leaders.

During \textit{Operation Vijiji} land disputes were also magnified by internal
contradictions between government organs in the provision of land rights.
The main contradictions were between village governments and Ward
Executive Officers (WEOs). The two organs worked together to deal
with land problems but contradictions emerged in decision making. For
example, the WEOs would supervise land allocation without involving the
village government,\footnote{22} and the village government would make decisions
concerning land matters without following instructions given at ward level.
In this confused situation, land matters remained in a state of flux for a long
time, and as a result people took matters into their own hands by grabbing
any open land, water points or forest reserves. In a nutshell, \textit{Operation Vijiji}
was conceived and implemented arbitrarily by government officials without
the consent of the local population. It also lacked proper scientific planning
and gave rise to confusion and frustration for Tanzanians, especially the
people of Mbulu.

\textbf{Legal reforms, judicial deficiencies and bad governance}

The Tanzanian government enacted a number of laws in the 1990s in an
attempt to resolve disputes and court cases challenging the land dispossession
during \textit{Operation Vijiji}. The Regulation of Land Tenure (Established Villages)
Act of 1992 abolished customary land rights, terminated the authority
of the ordinary court of law in land matters, and ended the proceedings pending in normal courts of law (Maina 1974: 30). In addition, the Act banned the enforcement of any court decision or decree in all land matters, and instead established tribunals with exclusive jurisdiction. However, the High Court ousted the Regulation of Land Tenure (Established Villages) Act of 1992 as an unconstitutional piece of legislation in 1994 (Coldham 1995). The abolition of customary land tenure in Mbulu District intensified land disputes. Many people owned their land under the customary land tenure system. They feared that they might be evicted since the customary system of land ownership was no longer viable. Furthermore, the 1992 Act instigated land disputes in the district because many land cases remained pending, on the grounds that the Act had withdrawn the jurisdiction of the courts to hear those cases. People with land cases in the courts were requested to wait until land tribunals were formed. It took almost a decade for land tribunals to be established and start functioning officially. By then, some people were already engaged in fights over rights to their land.

In response to the decision of the court concerning the Regulation of Land Tenure (Established Villages) Act of 1992 Act, two pieces of legislation were passed, the Land Act of 1999 and the Village Land Act of 1999. Among other things, this legislation vested the power to administer land issues in the Commissioner of Lands, who established elaborate procedures for the application, allocation and regulation of land, presumably to enhance transparency (Mtwale 2000). Section 5 of the 1999 Village Land Act vested the power of allocating land in the village assembly, to make land matters more transparent (Tenga and Mramba 2008). In Mbulu District, the law raised the consciousness of the people, who started to revive their old land cases that had been opened before the 1992 Act. These were the cases which were opened against the village leaders who had re-allocated people’s land to other people or for whatever use. Some people resorted to force to demand the return of their original land which had been taken during Operation Vijiji on the basis that they would be protected by the 1999 Village Land Act (Baker and Wallevik 1988; URT, Census 1988; Yanda et al. 2013). Others criticised some components of the Iraqw traditional land tenure system, such as the traditional land-leasing system and men’s dominance in land matters. Section 5 of the 1999 Village Land Act gave the right of occupancy to anyone who used land for over twelve years. This contradicted the Iraqw community’s customary law, in which people leased their land without limit. People reacted strongly to the changes by reclaiming land they had leased over twenty years ago, causing disputes between the original landowners and the new owners.
The 1999 Land Act also provided openness on land matters in the family. Iraqw men had historically sold land without involving their families. They sold land verbally by agreeing with the buyer without following legal procedures. With the establishment of the 1999 law, Iraqw women, who had not been historically allowed to inherit land from their parents, began to challenge men’s dominance in land-related matters. For example, land disputes took place between Harmi Gille and his wife in Daudi Division, and Fabian Tomas and his sister Devota Tomas in Gongali village.

Most of the cases in the primary courts remained land-related. Despite the fact that people could no longer bring to court cases to reclaim their land under the Regulation of Land Tenure (Established Villages) Act of 1992, they brought their land-related cases under other laws including criminal law. Such cases became a kind of metaphor for land disputes. These court cases mostly involved people who were in a strong financial position and who filed cases alleging criminal acts, such as the uprooting of crops, burning of houses; and threatening behaviour, including the use of weapons. Such cases in some instances ended in people losing their land.

In 2002, land tribunals were formed with the intention of reducing the long chain of bureaucratic procedures for hearing land cases. Many land cases started to be settled at ward, district and zonal levels. Ward tribunals performed a mediatory function of securing peace and harmony and were a competent court of law that determined land disputes arising from the Land Act. On the other hand, the District Land and Housing Tribunal dealt with appellate cases and had jurisdiction over matters coming from the Ward Tribunals. The expectation of the people was that land disputes that had existed for over four decades would soon be ended. Contrary to such expectations, land tribunals at ward, district and regional levels made decisions on land cases without relying on evidence obtained from the village level. In Mbulu District, members of the land tribunals did not visit the sites in dispute, but were rather influenced by corruption. Land tribunals at ward level sometimes undermined village government decisions. At the district level, decisions made by the ward land tribunals were also ignored, and poor people continued to lose their rights. The creation of land tribunals was a positive development because it brought services closer to the majority of the people who could not afford to pursue land cases in courts located far from their villages. However, the way in which land matters were handled revealed that the elders and the community in the areas in dispute were not involved in the decision making. The top-down approach, which characterised decision making by land tribunals, tended to instigate rather than resolve land disputes.
Moreover, it was observed that in Qaru village disputes had emerged between the youths of the ruling party *Umoja wa Vijana wa Chama cha Mapinduzi* (UVCCM) and other villagers. The land which originally belonged to the villagers was reallocated to UVCCM in 1978. The villagers reacted by claiming that the land given to UVCCM was the property of their grandfathers before *Operation Vijiji* and had been re-allocated to UVCCM without their consent. However, by the 1990s, this dispute had degenerated into a physical confrontation between the two sides because the procedure used to settle the disputes brought about a clash between the judiciary and the village government. In 1991 the villagers were given back their land through a court procedure, which recognised their customary land tenure. However, in 1994 UVCCM appealed against the decision, based on Section 22 of the Regulation of Land Tenure (Established Villages) Act of 1992, which recognised land allocations made during *Operation Vijiji*, thereby undermining the legitimacy of claims made on the basis of traditional land tenure.31 There is generally a contradiction between the Regulation of Land Tenure (Established Villages) Act of 1992 and the traditional land tenure system, which led to the land dispute in Qaru village.

The available evidence shows that there was abuse of power by government officials at various levels regarding land matters in Mbulu District. The leaders lacked accountability, efficiency and transparency. In most cases, they were directly or indirectly involved in land allocation as well as in the alienation of large tracts of land for their own interests. Village and ward leaders, who were given the mandate to allocate land, used their administrative position to grab people’s land for their own interests and allocate it to their families and friends.32 They protected people who obtained land illegally by allowing them to plant permanent crops to justify their ownership (URT: Shivji Commission 1991: 84). Village leaders also allocated land to people without documentation for future reference. Worse still, in areas where land allocation was documented, copies of documents were not given to the people concerned, and so land was easily confiscated due to a lack of evidence of ownership.33 Paradoxically, the same village leaders were the ones who were responsible for settling land disputes, and consequently, villagers found themselves in a quandary.

Corruption and favouritism among government officials played a major role in instigating land disputes. During the setting of village boundaries and the allocation of individual plots, village leaders were corrupted and so they failed to take measures against those who had grabbed other people’s land.34 The dominant forms of corruption in many parts of Mbulu District included bribery in form of money, cattle, goats, crops and beer.35
Corruption gave some people the opportunity to expand their land beyond their allocated boundaries, thereby causing dispute with their neighbours. Some village government officials deliberately violated some land allocation procedures in favour of one side. They isolated village land committees, cell leaders, councils of elders and neighbours during the allocation of land.\(^{36}\)

Some individuals in strong financial positions were able to influence the organs dealing with land matters so that the decision would favour them. Informants established that sometimes judgments were changed according to the amount of money given in the land cases concerned. One example is the dispute in 2000 between Qaru and Endabash villages over the village farm, in which rich farmers convinced the Endabash village government to allow them grab the land over which the Qaru village government had rights.\(^{37}\) In some areas, village leaders forced people to pay them money so that they would be given fertile pieces of land.

These practices led people to have a negative attitude towards village governments. The evidence found in Endabash and Kambi ya Faru villages show that, between 1980 and 1990, good fertile land was allocated according to a person’s economic position and his or her relationship with the village leaders.\(^{38}\) However, in most cases, the informants blamed leaders at different levels for being corrupt and deliberately infringing the rights of other land owners. Similarly, corruption became a serious problem in the courts in Mbulu District. In some places, magistrates were given pieces of land in the areas where they worked.\(^{39}\) Consequently, they favoured the people who gave them such land, or the leaders of such areas. Informants accused some village leaders of delaying resolution of land-related disputes for long periods, creating time for one of the contesting parties to legitimise the occupancy of the contested land by planting crops.\(^{40}\) Therefore, village leaders were accused of turning a deaf ear to issues relating to land disputes. Such problems were observed particularly at village level, where the voices of the poor and women were not heard.

Village leaders also lacked consistency in managing resources and resolving disputes over land. For example, in the 1990s, the Endabash and Kambi ya Faru villagers were competing for the utilisation of the land along the Endabash River. The village government prevented Endabash villagers from grazing on or cultivating the river bank, but when the same area was invaded by Kambi ya Faru villagers, the government remained silent. This gave rise to land disputes along the Endabash river bank.\(^{41}\) A similar situation was observed during the boundary disputes between Basodawish and Gongali villagers. The land between the borders of the two villages was formerly conserved to control soil erosion. When the problem of shortage
of land intensified, Gongali villagers invaded the area and the government was reluctant to take any measures. This led to the Basodawish villagers’ reaction of grabbing the same piece of land. This study observed that the governance system, particularly relating to land, was poor and this drove villagers to using shortcuts, including land grabbing, to obtain their rights.

Village leaders were also involved in the double allocation of land. This happened when there was a change in village leadership. The village government could allocate land according to its own interests but when a new village government came into power, those whose land had been wrongly allocated by the outgoing government could appeal to the new government, which had a mandate to re-allocate the land to the aggrieved party. Such cases were observed in Endabash and Gwandumehhi villages. In Gwandumehhi village, for instance, a piece of land which was allocated in the 1990s to Mrs Adam Kumbi was reallocated to Slaa Mighay in the 2000s. This caused Mrs Kumbi to file a case against Mighay and finally, Mrs Kumbi was granted rights over the land.

Under the Land Acquisition Act of 1967, the Tanzanian president had power to acquire land if it was required for any public purpose (Maina 1974: 254). Public purposes include government schemes, industrial sites, social services and housing or needs of people or groups of people who, in the opinion of the president, should be granted such land for agricultural development (ibid.). However, where land was acquired under this Act, compensation had to be paid to the people whose rights were lost. The evidence gathered by the 1992 Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters in different parts of Tanzania showed that the compulsory acquisition procedures stipulated in the Land Acquisition Act of 1967 were not being followed, particularly in rural areas (URT: Shivji Commission 1991). In many instances, such land was put into private hands, contrary to the apparent reasons for its acquisition. Similar results were observed by this study in Mbulu District, where compensation was not paid in respect to land taken during the establishment of various institutions, such as churches, schools and government offices.

There was no dialogue or consultation between the government and the people during the establishment and setting of the boundaries of those institutions. In Tumati village, for example, four acres were taken from the villagers to establish a school but the owners were not compensated. People developed negative attitudes towards the establishment of institutions. They feared that the expansion of those institutions would jeopardize their land rights and ownership. There was an intense land dispute between the Tatoga people and district officials during the establishment
of Dirim Primary School in 1971, when the district officials used the state’s coercive apparatus to evict a number of people from their land without compensating them. The Datoga, under the leadership of Gidibisiye, reacted to the district officials in different ways, including physical fights and uprooting of boundary markers. In connection, this study observed that the compensation of land created new problems in some parts of the district. First, the land used for compensation was not free as it had either been reserved for grazing or it belonged to individuals who had obtained it through customary procedures. Second, the whole process of compensation did not consider the quality of the land given to individuals, as some people were compensated with plots of poorer quality than their original land.

The evidence found in Kainam and Aicho villages clearly shows that there was a dispute between the leaders of churches on the one hand and villagers on the other between the 1990s and 2000s. During the establishment of these institutions, church leaders agreed to compensate the owners of the land, but the church leaders were not faithful in fulfilling their promises. The main reason was that the church leaders used the camouflage of the church to acquire land for their own private interests. Such a case happened in Kainam village, where the Roman Catholic Church was involved in a land dispute with Paulo Surumbu, who claimed to have been cheated by the church leaders. In this case, Surumbu had been promised a new piece of land as compensation, but no such land was given. This made Surumbu angry and he ended up invading the land the church had been given. In Aicho village there was a dispute between Tluway Akonay and the followers of the Lutheran Church because the setting of church boundaries had allegedly been arbitrarily carried out by village government officials and church leaders without involving either the land owner in question or the neighbouring community.

The evidence gathered by the Report of Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters (in the United Republic of Tanzania 1992) in different parts of the Tanzanian mainland shows that, from the late 1980s, liberalisation encouraged foreign investors to invest in land (ibid: 23). This process intensified the demand for land in different parts of Tanzania. Investors always communicated with government officials at regional and district levels, who in turn instructed village governments to allocate land to them. In Karatu, for example, the central government entered into an agreement with investors and allocated them land without consulting the people. In 1991, Prince Aga Khan was given twenty acres of land which belonged to Kilimamoja village. The land was requested from the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Village leaders were forced to allocate the land to the investor without consulting the people.
This allocation to the Aga Khan did not take into consideration the future requirements of the rural community for land. Also, those who invested in the tourism sector were allowed to build their hotels, camps and restaurants on land formerly used for grazing. The villagers had no way of defending such land because of the already established notion that grazing land is public land. Observations made in Ayalabe and Tloma villages show that an investor was given a piece of land in 2000, on condition that he would provide social services to the people of the said villages under the programme called *Ujirani Mwema* (good neighbourliness). However, up until 2011, the investor had not provided any service as agreed. Respondents reported that the investor was not offering such services because he had already bribed some government officials who were enjoying the benefits at the expense of the villagers. These benefits allegedly included the provision of temporary employment for their relatives, as well as cash.

In Oldeani ward, large tracts of land were owned by settlers of Asian origin. While settlers used that land for various agricultural activities, such as the production of coffee, wheat and horticulture, the surrounding villagers had an acute shortage of land. The villagers were allocated small pieces of land surrounding the settler’s plots, but some were allocated very steep land susceptible to soil erosion. The villagers felt aggrieved because the investors controlled the fertile land in the area, and those who attempted to reclaim it were arrested and jailed. This caused long-lasting grievances on the part of the local population against settlers of Asian origin in the area.

**Socio-cultural dimensions of land laws and disputes in Mbulu**

Apart from the Tanzanian government’s policies and programmes, elements of Iraqw society and culture contributed to land disputes. These included gender-related issues, the inheritance system and domestic violence. These elements of Iraqw community and culture failed to cope with the changes in land policy and laws. According to Iraqw culture, the last born had the right to inherit the larger share of his father’s land while the rest of the sons were given small shares or, if land was unavailable, allowed to be allocated land outside their father’s territory. The last born was favoured because he was responsible for taking care of the parents when they grew old. With the increase in population and the rise in people’s awareness of land laws, these land inheritance and allocation practices faced serious challenges. By the 1990s and 2000s, many Iraqw had started to challenge these practices and demand equality in land ownership and distribution of land to children. Also, since some parents were reluctant to distribute their land while still alive, after their death, their children started fighting over land.
Breakdown in family structures, which could be attributed to increasing alcoholism and unplanned marriages, also caused land problems among the Iraqw.\textsuperscript{60} This contributed to domestic violence. Men, who according to Iraqw tradition were the controllers of land, started to sell it without involving family members.\textsuperscript{61} Aggrieved women therefore started to claim the sold land, which created disputes with the buyers of the land, while transforming gender dynamics in the society.\textsuperscript{62} 

Polygamous marriages among the Iraqw also led to land-related disputes. As in many other communities in Tanzania, polygamy was regarded as a source of prestige and wealth in Iraqw society. Resources were allocated to the wives by the husband, who could also distribute land or livestock according to his own wish.\textsuperscript{63} Disputes emerged because a husband could direct a larger part of his land to be allocated to his junior wife without considering the number of children of his senior wife. He might also use his power to sell land belonging to his senior wife without involving her and without even informing the village government.\textsuperscript{64} In some instances, disputes emerged among wives after the death of their husbands due to unequal distribution of land when the husband was still alive.\textsuperscript{65} 

Gender-related issues also generated land disputes among the Iraqw. Frederick Kaijage and Anna Tibaijuka in their illustration of gender-based exclusion from land argue that, in patrilineal communities, about 80 per cent of total population disinherits their female children, on the grounds that they would be expected to marry into different clans and have children within those clans (Kaijage and Tibaijuka 1996). Even during Operation Vijiji, which was implemented in the name of socialism and egalitarianism, issues pertaining to land rights for women were handled in traditional ways. Among the Iraqw, men owned most of the resources and made most of the decisions over allocating land for the different crops grown by the family, renting land or hiring farm equipment. They believed that women’s rights over land were derived from their husband’s family once a woman gets married.\textsuperscript{66} Widows were denied land rights due to their gender. Traditionally, a widow with children had a right to access farmland but in practice her rights to own land among the Iraqw were secondary.\textsuperscript{67} Women with no children were denied the right to access land. Land belonging to a widow could be grabbed by her brother-in-law or by neighbours on the grounds that nobody could protect that land. Although land disputes caused by gender inequality were not so pronounced three decades after independence, they intensified between the 1990s and 2000s due to land shortages on the one hand, and women’s exposure to the changes in land laws and policies on the other.
The experience of the 1980s and 1990s shows that the majority of stakeholders had little knowledge of land laws and policies. Since their establishment, the organs dealing with land matters, such as the village, wards and division were not given instructions on how to handle land-related issues, such as allocation, selling, leasing and inheritance. Many decisions were taken based on past experience. The criteria used for selecting village land committees did not consider leadership skills; rather, members were just elected through the influence of village chairmen and Village Executive Officers (VEOs), while others obtained the position through bribing voters. At the ward levels, experience shows that the majority of WEOs, who mostly had a low level of education, ended up making wrong decisions, which gave rise to disputes over land.

The Iraqw people also had a habit of selling their land locally, without following proper procedures. For example, in the 1970s, land could be sold or exchanged on a friendship basis without any documentation. Some people who moved to other areas exchanged their original land for cattle, especially between the 1970s and 1980s when land was abundant in the southern part of the district. This did not create any problems during that period because land was not scarce. By the 1990s, the practice of normal land sales started to create problems because land had become scarce. Those who exchanged their land for cattle demanded more payment. But because the agreements had been entered into only verbally, there were no grounds for compensation.

The land problem was also aggravated between 1990 and 2000, because people did not adhere to land laws or other procedures when selling their land. Observation in the primary courts shows that, with the increasing value of land, the new landowners refused to return the land they had obtained from the original owners, and since the original owners had no documentary evidence to prove their right of ownership, they easily lost such land.

With the Iraqw expansion in the southern parts of Mbulu District, the Tatoga migrated further south, particularly to present day Hanang District to look for more open land. The Tatoga allowed the Iraqw to occupy their land on two major conditions; first, to preserve their burial sites, and second, to make annual contributions to the Tatoga, particularly during their annual ceremony known locally as *bung'e*, which took place at their burial sites. This was carried out smoothly in the pre-Operation Vijiji period, but from the 1980s disputes occurred between the two ethnic groups. This is because the Iraqw started violating conditions on the grounds that the agreement had not been documented. In some areas, some Iraqw had owned land for more than fifteen years and had rights of occupancy from the village governments.
Similar to other ethnic groups in Tanzania, the Iraqw believe that the larger the size of the family the greater its wealth potential. In this regard, factors which brought about population increase in the district included polygamy, the availability of food, especially maize, beans and millet, and the health services established in the district, which contributed to a reduction in mortality rates. The rapid increase of the population in turn led to the emergence of land disputes over grazing and agricultural land. This increase in the population continued to exist in the postcolonial period, as shown in Table 1, which shows the annual rates of increase as well as figures on population density.

Table 1: Population growth rate for Mbulu District 1948–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population growth</th>
<th>Annual growth rate</th>
<th>Density per km²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>72,528</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>90,288</td>
<td>2.2% (1948–57)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>167,500</td>
<td>5.9% (1957–67)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>193,775</td>
<td>5.7% (1967–78)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>268,129</td>
<td>3.2% (1978–88)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>348,117</td>
<td>3.7% (1988–95)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Under such demographic pressure the three acres allocated to each family during Operation Vijiji were patently inadequate. This caused tension among the people over the land in Mbulu. It would seem that the government did not foresee the phenomenal rise in the district’s population. Jonathan Baker and Hege Wallevik noted that population growth in the whole of Mbulu district in the 1980s was approximately 3.8 per cent per annum. In 1988, the growth rate indicated here was above the national average of 2.8 per cent per annum (Baker and Wallevik 1988; the United Republic of Tanzania, Census 1988; Yanda et al. 2013). Moreover, in the 2000s the district experienced tremendous growth in population due to the improvement in social services, low level use of contraceptives, good nutrition and immigration into the district (ibid.). This increase led to the expansion of agriculture into marginal areas. The result was the concentration of people on grazing land because the available amount of arable land could not sustain the existing number of households. Land for public facilities such as roads, conserved areas, sports fields and a water source was invaded by cultivators.
Land disputes were observed between livestock keepers and farmers in A/ri, Marang, and Dongobesh villages, where people grabbed grazing land and water sources.\(^73\)

**Conclusion**

The experience of Mbulu District under nationalisation, *Operation Vijiji* and legal reforms shows how rural transformation policies generated contestations over land resources. Tanzania’s nationalisation policy and *Operation Vijiji* which were expected to bring hope to local communities, resulted in anger and frustration among the local population. The policy and its implementation did not take into account customary ownership of land, individual land rights, and pressure from landless people who used nationalisation to grab the land from wealthier farmers. Rather than resolving land problems, nationalisation and *Operation Vijiji* escalated hatred among the rural population and exacerbated disputes in Mbulu District. While the villagisation programme had good intentions to further socio-economic transformation of the rural population, its implementation was disastrous. It was unplanned, lacking clear guidelines, financially handicapped, hurriedly done, and poorly managed by corrupt village officials. The collapse of the villagisation programme turned out to be a major failure on the part of the Tanzanian government. Many people returned to their old villages and engaged in disputes with the new owners of their land. Consequently, Mbulu District experienced high levels of land conflicts from 1976 to 1990.

The Tanzanian government did not directly address the weakness of nationalisation of land and *Operation Vijiji*; instead it embarked on legal land reforms. In 1992 it officially abolished customary land rights through the Regulation Land Tenure (Established Villages) Act. It followed the 1992 Act with the 1999 Land Act which gave power over land allocation and control to the village assembly, and the Land Disputes Court Act No. 2 of 2002, which shifted land cases from the court of law to land tribunals. The tribunals were established in different wards and districts with the expectation of bringing legal services closer to the community. Despite these legal reforms, Mbulu District continued to witness land disputes caused by contradictory land boundaries, violation of land laws, and lack of attention to the socio-cultural aspects of the Iraqw people, especially in relationship to land ownership, land transaction and land use. The operations of the various laws have also exposed the inefficiencies of government’s mechanisms in resolving land conflicts.
Notes

1. Interview with Onaay Sasiyo Guwangw village, 6 January 2012
2. Kahamuse (plural), Kahamusamo (singular)
3. ibid.
4. TNA: 305, Tanganyika Territory, District Book for Mbulu District, op. cit. p. 25.
5. Interview with Melkiadi Amma, Gwandumehhi village, 15 November 2011.
6. Interview with Fabiano Victoria, Sanu village, 9 November 2011
7. Interview with Joseph Uo, Endabash village, 20 December 2011.
8. Interview with Fabiano Victory, Sanu village, 13 November 2011.
10. Interview with Sabina Tahhani, Basodawish village, 19 December 2011
12. Interview with John Duwe, Upper Kitete village, 17 December 2011.
14. The Kahamuse were the Iraqw traditional leaders who were responsible for allocating
land to individuals.
17. Daudi Division Office, File: Ardhi, Tarafa ya Daudi Kijiji cha Moringa na Bargish
Antsi, Kijiji cha Wa/ama na Isale, 1993.
18. Interview with Melkiadi Matiya, Bashay village, 23 November 2011.
20. The people’s participation in the village farms was compulsory and punishment was
given to individuals who failed to do so.
   Interview with Damiano Gabriel (WEO), Haydom, 28 November 2011.
22. Interview with Melkiadi Matiya, Steven Quintine, of Bashay village,
   23 November 2011.
23. ibid.
24. The Office of Land Tribunals, Daudi Ward, Mwongozo wa Kuunda Mabaraza ya
25. Interview with John Paresso, Dongobesh Juu village, 22 November 2011.
26. Interview with Selina Ngoyai, Moringa village, 14 November 2011.
27. Daudi Division Office, File: Migogoro ya Ardhi kijiji cha Bargish, 1999, Gongali
   Village Office, File: Migogoro ya Ardhi kijiji cha Gongali, 2000; see also Gehandu
28. United republic of Tanzania: Jarida la Jinai, Endagikoti Primary Court, Kuingia Kwa
   Jinai, K/F299, Sura ya 16 K/A, 26-2-1993. See also URT: Primary Court Endagikot,
29. Interview with Joseпат Tarmo, Melkiadi Amma, Gwandumehhi village,
   13 November 2011.
30. Interview with Joel Getagno, Dongobesh village, 12 September 2011.
32. Interview with Lawrian Mariray, Bashay Village, 17 December 2011.
34. Endagikoti Division, File No.3, Ardhi, Migogoro ya Ardhi Kijiji cha Hare/abi, (Barua za Malalamiko), 2000.
35. Interview with Josepht Tarmo, Maraq village, 16 November 2011.
37. Interview with Emanuel Panga, Endabash village, 20 December 2011.
39. Interview with Melkiasi Amma, Gwandumehhi village, 15 November 2011.
40. Qaru Village Office, File: Migogoro ya Ardhi, Kijiji cha Qaru; Ripoti ya Uavamizi wa Maeneo ya Watu kwania ya Kuvuruga Ugawaji wa Operation Vijiji, 1974/75.
41. Interview with Hotay Nanaqi, Joseph Uo, Timoth Ka/ay, Julius Tarmo, and Emanuel Panga, Endabash Ward, 20 December 2011.
45. Interview with Zakaria War/e, Dongobesh village, 21 November 2011.
46. Interview with Steven Quintine, Bashay village-Mbulu, 23 November 2011.
49. Endagikoti Division Office, File: Ardhi No.3 of 2000, Conflict between the members Roman Catholic Church and Paulo Surumbu of Kainam Village.
52. Interviews with Richard Dawite Qaru village, 20 December 2011; Steven Qwaray, Ayalabe village, 15 December 2011.
53. Interview with Jamhuri Maganga and Amnay Tlatla/a, Oldeani village, 24 December 2011.
55. Interview with Amnaay Tlatla/a, Oldeani village, 23 December 2011.
56. TNA: 305, Notes on Land, Sheet No. 14 A, 1941.
57. Interview with Tahhanyi Dagharo, Moringa village, 12 November 2011.
58. Interview with Selina Ngoyai, Moringa village, 15 November 2011.
59. Interview with Melkiasi Amma Gwandumehhi village, 14 November 2011.
60. Interview with Damiano John, WEO, Haydom Ward, 28 November 2013.
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63. Interview with Finda Bura, Melkadi Amma, of Gwandumehhi village, 15 November 2011.
65. Interview with Teresia Qamara, Gongali village, 28 December 2011.
66. Interviews with Rejina Bura, Gongali village; Sophia Ammi, Ayalabe village, 14 December 2011.
67. Interviews with Teresia Bura, Maretadu Juu village, 29 November 2011; Juliana Basso, Endabash village, 20 December 2011.
68. Interview with Melkadi Matia, Bashay village, 23 November 2011.
69. Interview, with Tahhani Daqaro, Moringa village, 15 November 2011.
70. Interview with Damiano Gabriel, Hydom Ward, 28 November 2011.


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