



Religion, Economy and the Pre-colonial Dimensions of the Jos Conflict

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Abstract

Contrary to the popular view that the current Jos conflict is traceable to the effort of the Islamic leaders of the nineteenth century religious movement (jihad) to proselytise the people of the Jos Plateau, this article calls for the extension of the searchlight beyond religion. Using archival documents, oral interviews and secondary materials, it identifies the basis of the nineteenth century conflict between the local groups in the location of the present day Jos and the flag bearers of the Dan Fodio Jihad from the Bauchi Emirate not in religion, but in the latter's attempt to exploit and dominate the region and its people economically through slave raiding, *amana* (tribute paying) relationship and some other means using religion. The article argues that almost a century of pre-colonial resistance to the Dan Fodio Jihad in the Jos Plateau, particularly by the three ethnic groups at the location of the present day Jos, does not find explanation in the people's aversion to Islamic religion, but in the rejection of their economic exploitation by the flag bearers of the religious movement in the area.

Résumé

Contrairement à l'opinion populaire selon laquelle le conflit actuel dans la région de Jos a son origine dans l'effort des dirigeants islamiques du mouvement religieux du dix-neuvième siècle (jihad) visant à convertir le peuple du plateau de Jos, le présent article appelle à analyser la question au-delà de l'angle de la religion. À l'aide de documents d'archives, d'entrevues orales et de documents secondaires, l'article atteste que ce conflit du dix-neuvième siècle sur le territoire de l'actuel Jos entre les groupes locaux et les porte-drapeaux du Jihad de Dan Fodio originaires de l'émirat de Bauchi n'est pas d'origine religieuse, mais résulte de la tentative de ces derniers d'exploiter et de dominer économiquement la région et son peuple par l'esclavage, l'*amana* (paiement de tribut) et d'autres moyens en utilisant la religion. L'article soutient que près d'un siècle de résistance précoloniale au jihad de Dan Fodio dans le plateau de Jos, en particulier par les trois groupes ethniques sur le territoire de l'actuel Jos, ne trouve pas d'explication dans l'aversion du peuple à la religion islamique, mais dans le rejet de leur exploitation économique par les porte-drapeaux du mouvement religieux dans la région.

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Introduction

One of the cities that have become the epicentre of religious violence in Nigeria, particularly with re-democratisation of the country since 1999, is Jos. A colonial city established following the discovery of a large quantity of tin deposit in Dilimi River and its surroundings, Jos developed into the commercial emporium of central Nigeria accommodating all the major ethnic groups in the north and south regions of the country. With the name 'Home of Peace and Tourism', it was, in relation to other major cities of northern Nigeria known for a high level of insecurity, taken to be one of the safest parts of the north until recently.

The current Jos conflict is largely located in the struggle for the ownership of the city by the Berom, Afizere and the Anaguta, known as the indigenous group and the Hausa Fulani referred to as settlers. Although it dated back to the colonial and pre-colonial period, the creation of Jos North LGA out of the Jos LGA by the then military government of General Ibrahim Babangida in 1991, inaugurated a new chapter in the history of the conflict. The new local government did not only leave the bulk of the indigenous group in Jos South LGA less developed than the Jos North, the King of the Berom, generally referred to as the *Gbong Gwom Jos* (King of Jos), following this creation, found himself isolated from the bulk of his people. To remain in Jos North LGA dominated by the Hausa implied a loss of his power. To leave the heart of the city and his seat of government right from 1947 and follow his people to Jos South represented, by implication, a loss of Jos to the Hausa settlers. Hence, the struggle for the ownership of Jos assumed a violent political dimension manifesting at every opportunity of political re-arrangement. Standing on the indigeneship-settlers' clause enshrined in the Nigerian constitution, the indigenous group maintained that political positions in Jos were not to be occupied by the settlers. Hence, the appointment of a Hausa-Fulani, Alhaji Mato, as the chairman of the Caretaker Committee of Jos North Local Government in 1994 by the then Plateau State Military Government, produced the first violent clash between the two as protests and threats from the indigenous groups forestalled the handover to Mato (Dung 2005).

Such resistance to the Hausa Fulani's occupation of a top political position was sustained up to 2001 when it generated the first major clash in the city. Though it manifested as a religious clash between the Hausa-Fulani Muslims and the largely Christian indigenous group, at the basis of the September 2001 crisis in Jos was the appointment of Alhaji Usman Mohammad, a Hausa-Fulani, as the co-coordinator of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) in Jos North. The indigenous group decried the appointment through protest letters. Threats and counter-threats were issued by each party. From

the above, it was obvious that open conflict was imminent. The rough handling of a Berom lady, Rhoda, by a Muslim paramilitary group, which restricted movement along the Congo Russian Mosque during worship sparked off a clash that was already imminent. One consequence of the 2001 crisis was that it re-configured the city of Jos producing settlement along religious lines. This development further strengthened the role of religion in the conflict and explained the magnitude of destruction along religious lines in subsequent conflicts. The Jos and its environs became the epicentre of violent clashes often manifested as ethno-religious confrontations. The introduction of bombing into the conflict has added a new dimension to the conflict projecting it as part of the current terrorist agenda in Nigeria.

Though it became prominent in the twenty-first century, the Jos conflict, as noted earlier, is not a twenty-first century development. The conflict, according to Nwaka (2013), Usman (1994), dates back to the nineteenth century with the activities of the flag bearers of the Sokoto Jihad in the plateau and local resistance it generated. In its quest for labour particularly in the tin mines of the Jos area, the British colonial administration in Northern Nigeria added another dimension to the conflict upgrading it to a status of host-settler conflict (Mwadkwom 2001; Nnoli 1978; Dung 2005; and Nwaka 2014a). The politics of decolonisation, military rule, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), re-democratisation and religious extremism of the post-cold war period have all helped in reshaping the conflict further (Danfulani and Fwatshak 2002; Nwaka 2012; Mwadkwom 2001; Alozieuwa 2009; and Omotola 2006). Hence, the Jos conflict appears to be hydra-headed.

Some scholars have also paid attention to conflict management in Jos, particularly in the area of peace building (Nwaka 2014b; Gafwen 2011; Gaya-Best 2007; and Kwaja 2011). However, one unsettling development in the conflict in recent times is its gradual articulation to newer forms of twentieth century religious extremism, which has led scholars like Fwatshak (2006) to interpret it as a continuation of the nineteenth century Jihad. The study is not geared towards a repetition of the established scholarship, but rather the interrogation of the economic basis of the conflict before the colonial period by analysing the interplay of religion and economy in the attempt of the flag bearers of the Dan Fodio Jihad to conquer the Jos Plateau. The aim is to provide a historical basis for a further analysis of the nexus between the nineteenth century Jihad in the Jos Plateau and the present Jos conflict.

The Pre-colonial Peopling of the Jos Plateau

Jos city, the capital of the present day Plateau State, is located in the northern senatorial district of Plateau State.¹ It was under a larger enclave of Plateau and later Jos Plateau² in the pre-colonial and colonial times. Though not

known by the name 'Jos', the area that later became Jos was according to Plateau Indigenous Development Association Network (PIDAN 2010:14) inhabited by the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere (Jarawa) before the colonial period. Kudu (2001) attributed the peopling of the Jos Plateau before the colonial period to three main sources. These varied from autochthony to short and distant migrations. The migratory accounts seemed to be more common. In their work on various ethnic groups in the Plateau, Danfulani (1995) and Davies (1949) virtually agreed with Jonah Madugu (1996:2) who asserted that: 'virtually all the groups in the region have various traditions of origins pointing to the east.' Tracing the information of various groups on the Jos Plateau, Mangvwat (1984:4) identified four migratory phases: The first one (200 BC to 1000 AD) was called the pre-historic phase. The second (1100 to 1700 AD) was occasioned largely by a development in Kanem Bornu region especially with the establishment of the second Kanuri empire.³ He associated the third (1600 to 1800 AD) and fourth (1800 to 1907) migratory phases with Jukun-Kwararafa activities and the Sokoto Jihad.

Affirming Mangvwat's position, C. G Anes (1934), a colonial writer, earlier argued that the Berom came from the Middle Belt, probably Wukari owing to the rise of the Jukun empire, or perhaps, at a later date – all in the attempt to be freed from the yoke of Jukun. Still in line with Mangvwat's (1984) position, the Jarawa/Afizere, (of the Dere and the Zur) of northern Plateau, according to Abubakar (1980), migrated from Borno. A second version of the history of the Afizere claimed migration from Chawai in the present day Kaduna to Shere Hill in Jos⁴. All the accounts agree on Afizere's migration to the Jos Plateau before or during the nineteenth century. The Anaguta also has a history of migration prior to the nineteenth century as well as after the Jihad from Bauchi to Shere Hill where they settled near the Afizere.⁵

In spite of the dominance of migration accounts, there are pieces of evidence supporting the claims to autochthony. The Berom of Kabong, Kwogo and Vwang refer to the rock surrounding them as their cradle.⁶ The Anaguta, according to Bitrus (1985:2–9), also claim descent from an ancestor, Uga, who emerged from a cave called Akotom around the Shere Hill. Indeed, all the groups have narratives that claimed the ancestors originated from the location of the present day Jos. This claim is supported by archaeological evidence from York (1979) and James (1981), which placed the human occupation of the Jos Plateau at more than two thousand years, as the area formed part of the famous Nok culture. Although there is still much debate about the original owners of Nok culture, the material culture of the three ethnic groups in Jos and those of Nok have some striking similarities. It could, therefore, be argued that both the claims to autochthony and centuries

of migratory accounts point to the antiquity of most groups in Jos Plateau. Mwadkwom (2001:134) contends:

... the present conflicting myth of migration of the Berom to the Jos Plateau may not be unconnected with their long stay in the area, in the presence of which the story of where they migrated from is lost. Otherwise we may be forced to accept that they never migrated from anywhere and concurred to the claims by the Beron of Vwang and Kabong who pointed to the rocks surrounding them as their cradle from where internal migration took place to other villages of Berom land.

The migratory and the autochthonous accounts therefore provide a clearer picture of the inhabitants of Jos Plateau in general in the nineteenth century.

In addition to these three indigenous groups, the Hausa-Fulani was another group that was present in Jos before the colonial period. The Hausa (Habe) and Fulani (Fulbe) were two distinct groups before the Jihad of Uthman Dan Fodio in the early nineteenth century. Following the conquest of the Hausa by the flag bearers of the Sokoto Jihad, the latter imposed their political authority on the Habe rulers. However, while the Hausa lost the reins of power, their culture prevailed in the whole of Hausa land and some areas where the emirate rule was extended. The result was a quasi-fusion of the two groups, politically and culturally, in Nigeria. It was this relationship between the two groups that the political elites of northern Nigeria promoted to achieve their political ambitions, during and after the colonial period. The fact that the Hausa-Fulani are considered as one group in Nigeria today is relatively a recent development. This point was vividly portrayed by Bala Usman (1994:13) in the following words:

The notion of the 'Hausa-Fulani' with the primary sources of the history of the Emirate and Borno even in the 20th century is a ridiculous contradiction in terms. The Fulbe are Fulbe because they are not Habe. A Pollo cannot be a Kado! What we have are Hausawa, Kanawa, Zagezegi of varied antecedents and Fulbe (Fulani) of diverse backgrounds. But it suited the elites of foreign and local power-brokers and power-managers to promote the Hausa-Fulani and thus stereotype complex processes of community formation and nation building.

Re-echoing this point, Niki Toby in his report on the 2001 Jos crisis asserted:

The expression Hausa-Fulani is a double-barrel coinage of relatively recent history, a nomenclature aimed essentially at achieving political, economic and religious ambition and relevance. Hausa is a tribe. Fulani is a tribe. The expression Hausa/Fulani in our view does not have any historical, cultural and even ancestral meaning or relevance. There is no tribe in Nigeria called Hausa/Fulani and the expression has no background in the culture and sociology of the two distinct Nigeria tribes.⁷

However, for the purpose of this study, the Hausa-Fulani will be taken as one group *vis-à-vis* their relations with the Anaguta, Berom and Afizere of Jos Plateau in the nineteenth century. The presence of the Hausa-Fulani in the Jos Plateau area was largely a nineteenth century phenomenon that resulted from the Dan Fodio's Jihad. The Jihadists, however, did not conquer the whole of Jos Plateau; some parts of it were subdued by the Hausa-Fulani forces from Bauchi and Zaria emirates. There were some other areas where the Hausa traders and Fulani pastoralists settled following the failure of the Islamic movement to make inroad into the interior. Part of the outskirts of the Anaguta, as will be shown in the course of this discussion, was among the areas in this category.

Religion, Slave Raiding and the Development of Hostility

The Fulani Jihad of Uthman Dan Fodio swept Northern Nigeria within the first two decades of the nineteenth century. The mountainous nature of the Plateau constituted a challenge to easy penetration into the area, but the Jihad did extend to Bauchi and Zaria, leading to the establishment of two different emirates. Lying between two rapidly expanding emirates, the Plateau was constantly harassed from its eastern and western frontiers for most of the nineteenth century. The Bauchi Emirate under Yakubu was the most successful from the less mountainous eastern border of Plateau⁸. The eastern border of the Plateau was affected as early as 1820. Parts of the Buji and Jere districts were subdued by Yakubu forcing them to pay tribute to the Bauchi Emirate up till the late nineteenth century (Morrison 1982:143). The Gindiri district was also conquered by the Bauchi Emirate. Consequently, there was a flight of the non-Muslim inhabitants of settlements from the outskirts of the Plateau into the highlands of the Jos Plateau.

The Anaguta of the present day Jos was one of those groups that fled to the highlands of the Jos Plateau in order to avert the menace of the Bauchi Emirate.⁹ Together with the Afizere, they formed a military alliance to resist the forces of the Emirate. While the Emirate extorted tribute from conquered groups, those who provided stiff resistance in various ways were subjected to constant raids for captives, who were then enslaved¹⁰ (NAK 1915). Such raids appeared to be the basis of hostility between the unconquered Jos Plateau groups and the Bauchi Emirate in the early days of their encounter. A member of Heinrich Barth's expedition, Edward Vogel, who visited the Plateau in 1855 noted that the people of the area whom he referred to as 'cannibal races', had very little to do with the Muslim inhabitants (Vogel, cited in Tambo, 1979:102). Vogel in the above statement tried to emphasise that there was no co-operation or peaceful relation between the Muslim and the Plateau

groups and not necessarily that there was no contact. The hostile relationship between the two groups was captured by him in another context:

The country between Bautshi and Salia is entirely inhabited by heathens. ... The Sultan had the following system of catching slaves. He occupied with an imposing force the fields in the valley, driving all his horses in the then green harvest until the poor devils on the mountains surrendered for fear of starvation and sent down the number of boys requested by him, so he got marched off immediately to Sokoto for sale. (Vogel, cited in Tambo *ibid.*, p. 103)

Eleven years later, another explorer, Gerhard Rohlfs (cited in Tambo *ibid.*, pp. 103–104), after passing from Bauchi to Katah warned other visitors in the following words:

... do not venture too far from the city ... oh wanderer, or you may find an arrow in your breast. For the armed heathens do not distinguish the Christians from the Muslims, they know only the latter who steal their children and women and carry them into slavery. And when they so revenge themselves, who can blame them? Without support, without military leadership, without guns, they are too weak to fight an open war.

The Anaguta and the Afizere of Shere Hill were said to be victims of this raid, a development that later encouraged military alliance against the Fulani and their Hausa ally.¹¹ Morrison (1982) also mentioned the Berom (Du) military assistance to the Afizere of Shere Hill against the Bauchi raid around the 1840s. Available records showed that such raids for slaves continued till the eve of the colonial period (PIDAN 2010). In other words, rather than religion, slave raids for economic gain accounted largely for the hostility between the local groups in Jos and the Hausa-Fulani in the nineteenth century. Perhaps, the hostility would not have lasted for almost a century had religion been the sole or primary motivating factor for incursion into the Jos Plateau.

From Amana to Open Confrontation

In addition to slave raiding, another development that helps in understanding the interplay between religion and economy in the pre-colonial development of the Jos conflict is the *amana* relationship. *Amana* according to Last (1985:29) is a relationship between a Muslim state and non-Muslims in the state in which the latter accept the protection of the Islamic state with the right to practise their own religion by making some form of payment to the Islamic government. The financial contribution or payment is paid by able non-Muslim men in lieu of or in return for security and protection offered them. The *Amana* or *Dhimmah* (entrusted or protected) can be traced, as Bunza (2007) argued, to the Medina period of the foundation of Islam when

Prophet Mohammed entered into a peace treaty with Jews and Christians to co-exist in the fledgling Islamic state of Medina. Following this, Islamic leaders were enjoined to maintain justice and see to the welfare of both Muslims and non-Muslims in their states. In fact, such tax could only be collected from those who could afford to pay it. The Muslim prophet, Mohammed, in his last message before his death, was according to Ratif (1988) said to have enjoined his successor to take special interest in the care of the rights and privileges of non-Muslims within his state by not overburdening them beyond their limit. The *amana* was therefore supposed to be a means of ensuring peaceful co-existence between non-Muslims and an Islamic authority in an Islamic state.

Ordinarily, non-Muslims in Bauchi or Zaria Emirate were expected to pay the *amana*. However, it is disquieting how Jos Plateau groups like the Anaguta who, according to available records, were not conquered by the Bauchi Emirate entered into such relationship. According to the PIDAN (2010:4–5):

during all the jihad years of the early 19th century, the ethnic groups (Jos-plateau-particularly Anaguta, Berom and Afizere) were not subjugated under the Fulani Emirate rule. The advance of the jihadist forces were [sic] continuously repulsed by them until the jihadist had to skirt round the Plateau to move into other parts country.

However, the PIDAN (ibid, p. 4) referring to the cause of the Naraguta (Anaguta) war of 1873 stated:

The origin of the war is rooted in what could at best be described as the fight for independence by these indigenous ethnic groups. The whole saga started with the decision of the Anaguta to sever their *amana* (trust) relationship with the Bauchi Emirate.

Two points are discernible here. The first is that a number of Jos Plateau groups, including the groups that are the local inhabitants of the present day Jos, were under the Bauchi Emirate and so could enter into the *Amana* relationship. Where available records as stated earlier prove that this was unlikely to be the case, then the second position comes in, namely, that the Emirate contracted the *amana* relationship beyond its political influence.

The question is: why would the emir enter into such relationship beyond the confines of the Bauchi Emirate? Makar (1979) has argued that some emirs who bordered non-Muslim kingdoms offered them protection and in many instances embarked on war for the defence of their non-Muslim neighbours. For instance, between 1860 and 1870, the Muri Emirate fought a series of wars against the Tiv in protection of a non-Muslim kingdom of Jukun. Since there was no available evidence of such a protective offer to

the Jos Plateau groups by other emirates, it was not likely that the *amana* relationship between the Bauchi Emirate and the people was for protection against such external forces. On the other hand, pockets of evidence abound pointing to inter-group and inter-communal wars between and among various groups in Jos Plateau over hunting grounds, farmlands, women abduction, etc. (Mangwat 1984; Kudu 2001). It is possible that some of the groups may have secured the protection of the emirate against their neighbouring Jos Plateau groups? Such protection may require some form of relationship which may be expressed in *amana*.

The most plausible reason for the *amana* relationship seems to be the attitude of the later emirs towards non-Muslim groups. Trimingham (1976), Turaki (1982) Isichei (1977) are of the opinion that the earlier leaders of the Islamic Movement were more committed to the growth of Islam than the later ones. They argued that the religious favour of the Jihad waned after the death of Muhammed Bello in 1837. Henceforth, emirate rulers expanded and consolidated their grip on non-Muslim areas for economic interests. Lamenting on the attitude of the later flag bearers of the movement, Dauda (1995:14) asserted: 'Instead of using the state power for proselytization of the non-Muslim countries, the latter emirate leadership turned their cavalry power into instrument of slave raids of such communities for trade purposes.' Commenting on the state of the Islamic Jihad when it got to Plateau, Anes (1934:4) writes:

The religious aspect, which was its main one when its first standard was raised at distant Sokoto, was lost long before the followers of subsidiary standards reached the boundaries of the Province. ... The administrative energies seem to have been concerned mainly with the appointment and succession of chiefs and collection of tribute.

Trimingham (1976), Turaki (1982) and Isichei (1977) also demonstrated in their works the decline of the religious component of the emirate rule in central Nigeria, noting in particular the disappearance of justice, transparency and asceticism in pursuit of material aggrandizement. It is therefore possible that the *amana* relationship was entered into to extort the people thereby freeing them from slave raids. What the emirate could have got from acquired slaves, the people were made to pay as tribute (trust) through a mutual pact known as *amana*. *Amana* thus became a way of forestalling expeditions and attacks from the emirate forces by the groups in Jos Plateau that were yet to acquire the sophistication needed to repel, permanently, such raids.

This argument becomes stronger with the Bauchi account of the 1873 expeditions from the Bauchi Emirate against the Anaguta for daring to terminate the *amana* relation with the Islamic emirate. The combined forces of the

Anaguta, Afizere, Beron and their other neighbours, Ama and Buyi, repelled this expedition by a humiliating and crushing defeat of the latter's forces at the Dilimi Valley of Jos Plateau. This incidence was, according to the available document, reported by an eye witness, Abdul Waziri (from Bauchi), and recorded in 1915 by Mr O. P Landore, the then D.O. of Naraguta thus:

Ahmadu Sarkin Yaki (war lord) told his son to go up to Leme and follow Ciroman Bauchi dan Sarkin. We found him and his fighting men at Rijin, With him was his Ajiyan Bauchi, the Baraya, Magajin Bauchi, Garkuwan Bauchi and sons of Galadima and Madaki. From Rijin Mukur, then we went to Bargo, then to Toro, then to Tide and then to Naraguta. Thence we proceeded to Jos where close to the present site of the canteen, we were attacked by a large number of Naragutawa, Jos, Bukurawa, Jarawa, Bujiawa and Amo men. They beat us and were still separated in fight reaching Tide at night. The pagans turned from Rafin Jaki. The Bauchi was killed near Naraguta on the Buji road as he was fleeing. Forty-one (41) of us were killed, twelve (12) of our horses were captured. We captured eighteen (18) of their cattle. After this, we did not fight them again until the white men came ¹².

The readiness to do away with the contract, as depicted by the Anaguta, is a pointer to the fact that the *amana* relationship was an unwelcome one. Such relationship was, from the start, an unbalanced one, sustained perhaps, by fear and intimidation.

Following the failure of the Bauchi forces to subjugate their opponent, Hausa-Fulani forces camped at a border section of the Anaguta, which is today called Naraguta, using it as a base for further slave raiding in Anaguta and its other surrounding groups.¹³ Consequently, they moved further move away from Naraguta. Unable to make further conquests, the camp metamorphosed into a settler community of the Hausa traders and Fulani farmers. It became a fulcrum of their activities in the location of the present day Jos up to the arrival of the British in 1902 (Bingel 1978). Resumption of slave raiding after the failed attempt in 1873 to conquer the people supports a further claim that *amana* was probably used to forestall the raiding of communities that entered into such relationship with the Bauchi Emirate. Similarly, the establishment of a settler trading and farming community at the outskirts of Anaguta (Naraguta), after unsuccessful attempts to penetrate the enclave and its surroundings, further strengthened the economic motivation for the conquest.

In addition to slave raids and *amana*, other areas of conflict bordering on the economy abound. The Anaguta tradition recounted how Fulani cows were often captured for destroying their crops.¹⁴ Similarly, Bauchi traditions referred to the people of northern Jos as dangerous cattle raiders.¹⁵ Awugbade (cited in Mangywat 1984) equally observed in his research the hostilities

between the Fulani and the Jos Plateau groups arising from cattle theft by the latter. The stolen cattle were either slaughtered for consumption or herded into the native *muturu* breed of cattle. Such hostilities can be explained, among other things, from the destruction of the peoples' crops by the cattle. Thus, beyond the political class, the ordinary men and women of both groups were often in conflict as a result of their economic interests.

Conclusion

The Jos conflict is complex, and has produced various facets of interpretation. Its overwhelming manifestation as a conflict between Christians and Muslims has drawn the attention of many analysts who describe it as religious conflict. While its religious character should not be downplayed, it is equally important to understand the instrumental use of religion in the conflict. This article has demonstrated that such instrumental deployment of religion was part of the development of the conflict in the nineteenth century. While the founding fathers of the Jihad of the nineteenth century in Northern Nigeria raised a religious flag to spread what they were convinced was a divine mandate, some of their successors seemed to have derailed in the motivation for their mission. Economic interest appeared to be the fulcrum of Islamic expansion in the low and high lands of the Plateau, particularly the Jos Plateau, which is the focus of this study. Economic advancement encapsulated in religious garb met stiff resistance, breeding conflict between the 'evangeliser' and those to be evangelised. If the nineteenth century Jihad in the Jos Plateau was more of an economic Jihad, has the 'twenty-first century Jihad' turned different?

Notes

1. The name 'plateau' is derived from the bulk of the landmass of the area. It is sometimes called the central Nigerian highland. Its landscape is formed by a massive tableland ranging from 1,200 to 1,800 m above the sea level interspersed by rocks, valley and plain hills. The southern part of the plateau is composed largely of the lower part.
2. Jos Plateau corresponds to the present Map of Plateau State.
3. The crisis occasioned by the establishment of the Second Kanem Borno Empire brought about a wave of migration particularly by those who refused to be incorporated into the new Kanem polity.
4. Interview with D. Rwang, 74 years retired headmaster, 27th January 2012, Jenta, Jos.
5. Most of the groups in northern Jos claim migration from somewhere, but these were migrations from relatively short distant areas; see Isichei, 'Change in Anaguta Traditional Religion', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 34–57; NAK, SNP 10490 p/1915 'The Anaguta and Jarawa Tribes'; the Anaguta following the menace of the Bauchi Emirate moved to the highlands of Jos Plateau around 1820 and settled in a hill near the Afizere. Both farmed in a fertile valley known as Maza.

6. Interview with Du Dung Pam, 77 years old, a traditional chief, Tafawa Balewa Way, Jos on 4 December 2012.
7. Justice Niki Toby was the head of the Judiciary Commission of Enquiry set up by the Plateau State Government to investigate the September 2001 crisis in Jos. For details of his comment on the Hausa-Fulani, see Government White Paper on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Civil Disturbances in Jos and its Environs, 2001, p.4.
8. National Archives Kaduna (NAK) SNP 15/1ACC. No 39, Bauchi Province, Report for the Third Quarter of 1902. The location of the present day Jos was within the eastern Plateau during the period under review
9. Interview with Gyang Jeremiah Rwang, 72- year-old farmer from the Anaguta ethnic group, 12 November 2012, Naraguta, Jos. This was confirmed by Du Dung Pun as well.
10. NAK SNP 10490 /1915 The Anaguta and Jarawa Tribes.
11. Interview with Pwat David Pam, 53-year-old civil servant 14 November 2012, Jenta Apata, Jos.
12. NAK 53359/1915 Bauchi Province Persona memo of O. P. Lonsdale, D.O Naraguta, 1915.
13. Amana was a form of tribute that was often paid with slaves, cattle, other valuable goods and labour.
14. Interview with Pwat David. See also Isichei, 'Change in Anaguta Traditional Religion'.
15. Ibid.

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