The Political Economy of Transformation in Zimbabwe: Radicalisation, Structural Change and Resistance

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Introduction: Radicalisation, Structural Change and Reform

The dynamics of the world economic crises at the turn of this century have evoked a new generation of radicalisms across the globe, including the so-called Arab Spring. Notwithstanding their distinctive characteristics related to their varied specific conditions, radical movements have been innovative in confronting universal social and political challenges. Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), which officially began in 2000, is one such experience of radical reform which redressed settler-colonial land dispossession and racialised inequalities. Despite the resultant social and structural transformation, and the scope for a progressive development agenda and democratisation it represents, the land reform was widely dismissed as a case of African ‘despotism’, and subjected to ‘regime change’. This was not surprising given the pervasiveness of neoliberal triumphalism, and the persistent dominance of social theories that characterise the African experience with little regard for historical context and the evolving social facts on the ground.

Zimbabwe does not represent an ‘ideal type’ model of reform or one which deserves uncritical emulation. It is not a model of socialist revolution, for it did not result in one (Moyo and Yeros 2005, 2007a, 2011b). Nor can we teleologically foreclose the long-term socio-political character of the outcome. Rather, it represents one of the rare instances of political and economic radicalisation which resulted in a redistributive outcome due to innovative socio-political mobilisation processes, interventionist state reforms and ongoing resistance, notwithstanding its attendant social and political contradictions. Yet, little scholarly attention was paid to the political and economic origins of the social crisis that triggered the radicalisation (Moyo 2001; Moyo and Yeros 2005), and to the wider implications of the outcomes of the Zimbabwean reforms for the subcontinent (see Moyo and Yeros 2007a and b).

The roots of the radicalisation in Zimbabwe lie in persistent local and national resistances to the racially structured model of capitalist accumulation achieved through colonial conquest from 1890. Extensive social displacement and territorial segregation, the super-exploitation of local and regional labour, and discriminatory agrarian policies, had represented an extreme social injustice. This condition was not redressed by the decolonisation pact of Zimbabwe in 1980, while the neoliberal economic policies adopted from 1990 exacerbated the situation, which degenerated into social crisis (Moyo 2000). This, in turn, provoked labour protests and galvanised popular land occupations which fuelled the radical nationalist reforms which escalated from 1997 (see Moyo 2001).

Radicalisation in Zimbabwe entailed confrontation by an array of social forces (classes) with settler-colonial power structures, capital and imperialism. The process escalated through the contradictions of a revolutionary situation, including an internal reconfiguration of political mobilisation in the former settler colony, and against external sanctions and political destabilisation. It entailed experimentation with a new economic structure with a diversified set of external economic relationships and continued resistance through new forms of rural mobilisation, indigenisation initiatives and a foreign policy based on positive non-alignment. The anti-colonial land movement blended with contemporary resistance movements in the contemporary context of primitive accumulation, highlighting the centrality of the emancipatory dimensions of the agrarian question, rather than the economic concerns often associated with agrarian reform (see Moyo, Jha and Yeros 2013).

This experience represents an example of resistance emerging out of the social crises generated by neoliberalism within a small country of apparently limited geo-strategic importance, other than its integral value as a former settler-colonial beachhead of imperialism, endowed with extensive mineral resources. Zimbabwe has rowed against the current scramble for African land, mineral resources, energy and consumer markets, at a time of significant material changes at the world system-level. Indeed, new geo-strategic facts are being established on the ground, in relation to the rising involvement of ‘emerging powers’ in competition for resource control, as well as the re-militarisation of US strategy in Africa (see Moyo, Jha and Yeros 2012; and Yeros forthcoming). While progressive internal reforms invite aggressive external interventions and polarise politics, the experience shows that innovative national and regional responses can be mobilised effectively in their defence against Western aggression and monopoly finance capital. Foreign policy was effectively used to mobilise regional solidarity and support, capitalising on the room of manoeuvre created by the rise of China (Moyo and Yeros 2013).

Intellectual authority over the narrative on Zimbabwe’s land reform remains contested with regard to the causes, the nature and effects of the land reforms. Eurocentric perspectives, which rely on the ubiquitous organising concept of ‘neopatrimonialism’, in which the only relationship that exists in society is between rapacious black capitalists and their ethniciised client networks, held sway for a while (Moyo and Chambati 2013). Failing to understand the contradictions of Zimbabwe’s radicalisation, such ‘authorities’ only saw a ‘destructive party accumulation project’ (Raftopoulos 2010:706) and not the radicalisation of various forces, including the semi-proletariat and aspiring black bourgeoisie, against monopoly capital. Various intellectuals and the Western media took recourse to racialised discourses of ‘corruption’ and ‘orchestration’, and vilified the whole of the land movement (see Johnson 2009), alleging that only the political elites benefited from the reforms.
The fact that the outcome was extensively redistributive, despite the disproportionate gains of some elites and the retention of some large-scale foreign-owned agro-industrial estates and conservancies, was posited earlier on (e.g. Moyo and Yeros 2005; Moyo et al. 2009; Moyo 2010), but this is only recently being corroborated as a novel outcome (Scoones, et al. 2010; Matondi 2013; Hanlon et al. 2013). Although a full recovery of agricultural output to the 1990s levels (which ought not to be seen as ideal targets) is slowly coming to fruition, the reforms continue to face various internal and external political and economic constraints (Moyo and Nyoni 2013). However, agrarian relations have improved substantially, with agrarian labour relations having been diversified within the new land tenure relations (Chambati 2013) and the scope for smaller producers on some markets having been opened wide, as popular participation in and benefits from the wider agrarian economy grow (Moyo and Nyoni 2013).

Despite the emerging consensus on some of the basic outcomes, there remain important differences in our understanding of the political and socio-economic implications of the reform, and the policies required to progressively advance popular welfare. Neopatrimonial perspectives which obscure the structural power of monopolistic finance capital, because they reduce all social relations to localised and ethnicised categories of domination and resistance, continue to argue for further market liberalisation to counter state interventions. Liberal populist frameworks applaud the new livelihoods being realised as evidence of ‘autonomous peasant’ agency vis-à-vis the state (Scoones et al. 2010) obviating the need for enhanced interventions, and highlight the fact that some black farmers are doing as well as the previous white farmers without the privileges derived from state subsidies (Hanlon et al. 2013). Others persist in their belief that the return of private property relations will stimulate recovery (Matondi 2012), despite the limits imposed by the external squeeze on the economy.

The systemic role of monopoly capital and extroverted markets in shaping the emerging uneven accumulation trajectory and the absence of credit for food cropping, as the re-insertion of big capital into the new agrarian structure ensues, tends to be glossed over (Moyo 2011b; Moyo and Chambati 2013). The new market contradictions that have emerged from price repression inscribed in the growth of contract farming in the capitals from the East and West, as well as domestic white and black capital compete to capture the new landholders’ products, suggesting the need for renewed state interventionism. Yet, the importance of recent state interventions in favour of small and new producers is being occluded in emergent discourses which argue for competitiveness on world markets (despite their volatility), and decry the ‘evils’ of ‘dependence’ on state ‘subsidies’ (USAID 2012). Thus, accumulation from below remains constricted, and new forms of social differentiation increasingly polarise the benefits of the reform.

Four aspects of the results of research conducted on the FTLRP since 2000 by a range of scholars, under the rubric of the African Institute of Agrarian Studies (see Moyo and Chambati 2013), and their implications for reform elsewhere, are discussed namely:

- The coordinated mobilisation of a national land movement for land reform, beyond the erstwhile market and bureaucratic framework, through a multi-class, decentralised and anti-bureaucratic formation, united by radical nationalism;
- A process of structural reform that sought, as a matter of state policy, the accommodation of various social forces as concretised in a tri-modal outcome of land distribution, leading to competing modes of agrarian production;
- The re-configuration of agrarian markets through state intervention to sustain the recovery of production, despite the resurgence of social differentiation and competing accumulation strategies; and
- The emergence of new rural movements seeking progressive agrarian reforms and indigenous control of natural resources, in the recent context of the scramble for Africa resources.

**Historical context of the Fast Track Land Reform**

To understand the radicalisation of Zimbabwe after its neoliberal turn in the 1990s, the nature of capitalist agrarian accumulation and the character of the decolonisation pact must be clarified. Racial monopolistic control over land, water resources, farm subsidies, and public infrastructural investments had by 1930 established about 6000 white settlers on large-scale ‘commercial’ farms based on private property relations. Their accumulation trajectory derived from the super-exploitation of migrant labour from the reserves created at the expense of African peasantlands relegated to marginal lands (Amin 1972), and discriminatory agrarian markets and subsidies. From the 1950s, the accumulation trajectory was augmented by the creation of large-scale agro-industrial estates, also heavily subsidised by the state (Moyo 2010). By 1970, Zimbabwe’s bimodal landholding structure, based on the incomplete dispossession of peasant lands, had resulted not in creating ‘enclaves’, but a functional dualism which repressed labour and peasant farming. Farm output had shifted from peasant food production towards export commodities and urban markets, dominated by large farmers in alliance with state marketing boards and monopoly capital. This accumulation model was in crisis by 1975, following the oil crisis and the escalating liberation war.

Since decolonisation in Southern Africa was delayed in the 1960s, a combination of armed and political struggle led to military victories in the Lusophone territories, and negotiated transitions from 1980 in Zimbabwe, 1990 in Namibia, and 1994 in South Africa. An integrated, thirty-year regional conflict, involving the destabilisation of the region by the Apartheid regime in South Africa, saw aggression being used as a lever of negotiation, until the whole region succumbed to a generalised pact in the 1990s, at the close of the cold war (Moyo and Yeros 2013). This entailed peace, independence and majority rule, in return for property guarantees, and economic opening to monopoly and finance capital, such that decolonisation and neoliberalism coincided; the one being conditional on the other (ibid). The Anglo-American guarantors of the Zimbabwe negotiations promised financing for the proposed market-led land redistribution programme, but such support was limited (Moyo 1999).
The pact was always unstable, despite the defeat of previous plans which had sought to retain white political privileges indefinitely. In Zimbabwe, some in the nationalist movement led by the Patriotic Front parties (ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU), viewed the pact as a strategic objective-seeking piecemeal reforms, and eventually the growth of a black middle class, while others saw the pact as a tactical move, intended to consolidate political gains and prepare for the next phase of the struggle. For imperialism, it was a tactical retreat intended to cut its losses, and to use economic statecraft to regain its monopoly position. This contestation was never fully resolved as the diverse elements among the security forces and their political parties sought control of the military apparatus and as South African destabilisation seriously unsettled the balance. This fuelled the Matabeleland conflict from 1982 to 1987, while the generalisation of the pact to Namibia and South Africa, raised false hopes for a regional peace and development dividend.

In the 1980s, Zimbabwe had been hailed as a model of political transition for the settler societies of Southern Africa, whereby majority rule was conditioned on property guarantees. It was also lauded for enhancing food security, despite the prevalence of food insecurity among 30 per cent of its population (Moyo 1986), and it was considered a pilot project for market-led land reform despite its failures to redistribute adequate land (Moyo 1995). Although white political privileges were phased out, Zimbabwe remained a racially divided society, in which the defence of ‘human rights’ served mainly to protect white property and race-based privilege. Neocolonialism in Zimbabwe, not only relegated the majority population to a permanent process of semi-proletarianisation and super-exploitation, it also constricted the emergence of a black middle class with roots of its own in the economy. The structural violence inherent in this ‘post-white settler’ type of neocolonialism (Mandaza 1985) was never pacified by piecemeal reforms, and when the country entered structural adjustment, even the visible social gains of the prior decade were reversed (Yeros 2002).

From a longer historical perspective, the accumulation needs of the petty-bourgeoisie could not be realised as the new neoliberal conditions of the 1990s created obstacles to accumulation and entrenched racial differentiation. The petty-bourgeoisie was soon forced back into a popular, inter-class black alliance against the status quo dominated by settler and foreign capital. The process was also fuelled by the social crisis (wage repression, retrenchments, etc.) which generated greater labour militancy around 1995 and the escalation of scattered land occupations from 1996, reviving historic land movements (Moyo 2001). The sudden emergence of a political opposition backed by white farmers, capital, NGOs and western states, further entrenched the polarisation of land and electoral politics. Zimbabwe’s liberal model was thus unravelled as expropriatory land reforms took hold thereafter (Moyo 2001).

At the time Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform took off, a new wave of large-scale land and resource grabbing had been underway in Africa from the 1990s, especially in countries such as Mozambique and Zambia with land concentration and the privatisation of landed property creeping in, while the extroversion of agrarian production relations and markets persistently in the 1990s, creating obstacles to new ways of conceiving of land reform. The new wave of large-scale land and resource grabbing had been emerging in the 1990s in non-settler Africa, being overtaken by a wider process of large-scale land alienation led by foreign capital itself, often with domestic allies. This alienation is now installing a new ‘junker’ path in non-settler Africa, as the accumulation trajectory rapidly evolves beyond the structures inherited at independence in the 1960s.

The African agrarian question is increasingly focused on the social questions of exclusion, inequality, food insecurity and poverty, resulting from growing land dispossession, the super-exploitation of labour and unequal trade and financial flows (Moyo, Tsikata and Diop 2013). Demands for popular sovereignty over land, minerals, oil and natural resources, now referred to as ‘resource nationalism’, place the political dimension of land rights ahead of the agrarian question of reversing ‘backwardness’ through industrial development. The politics of land is most explosive where the inequalities fuse class with race, nationality and ethnic differences, as well as with the gender inequities derived from the pervasive patriarchal order. Indeed, while the nascent domestic petty bourgeoisie, in alliance with transnational capital and donors, is actively involved in the current land grabs, resistance to this process is a constant feature.

What makes Zimbabwe relatively unique or different now is that it has proposed new ways of deepening the transition to majority rule by means of radical land reform, and as happened elsewhere in Africa after decolonisation, through an ‘indigenisation and empowerment’ programme, focused on the mining sector. This has challenged the dominant neoliberal orthodoxy, ignited ‘resource nationalism’ to challenge Africa’s potential ‘recolonisation’, and raised expectations for far-reaching land reforms in other former settler colonies.

Radicalised Land Reform Movement: Decentralised, Anti-Bureaucratic Alliance

The land movement was initiated by popular rural and urban mobilisation under the leadership of liberation war veterans, against the immediate policy of the ruling party and the state. The nationalist leadership stepped in during 1997, when it risked losing its most critical social bases, the peasantry and the war veterans, given that the latter permeated the security forces of the state apparatus. Its purpose was to control and co-opt the land movement, as well as to open a political space for the expression of pent up land demands among layers of the population, including many land occupations which were not directly organised by war veterans. Most crucially, the state accommodated the interests of the aspiring black bourgeoisie through a bifurcated land redistribution programme, providing for both peasant and small-scale capitalist farming. It also spared from redistribution certain farms owned by foreign capital, the state, and public trusts, ostensibly to maintain some critical food supplies and agro-industrial capacity, while promising to indigenise the foreign capital (Moyo 2010).

From the beginning, streamlining the land movement was critical to the state. It created District Land Committees in all
the provinces, and supported the Committees of Seven on each farm, while diminishing the powers of local war veterans who were the vanguard of the land movement. In their place, civil servants, chiefs, and other war veterans, not connected directly to local struggles, were installed, thereby broadening and diluting the representation and class character of the land movement. Over the following years, gaining firm control over the movement was, however, made difficult by the war veterans’ decentralised and anti-bureaucratic character, whose agency was enabled by historic and organic roots of social mobilisation developed during the armed struggle, and their encouragement of pre-existing localised land occupation movements. This structure of the land movement is the first distinctive feature underlying the success of this mass mobilisation, unlike other representative organisations, including the formally constituted Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNWLVA). Unlike mass mobilisations elsewhere, in Zimbabwe, this decentralised structure was unified by the principle of radical nationalism.

The second distinctive characteristic of Zimbabwe’s radicalisation was the extensive rural-urban spread of the land movement, in terms of active membership and physical participation in the land occupations. The leadership of the land movement included local peasant leaders, local war veterans, spiritual leaders, some chiefs, and various working class activists, intellectuals, and political party leaders, in a cross-class alliance. Such local leaders played a vanguard role in galvanising the mobilisation of long-standing grievances over land and racial inequality. Political parties, farmers’ unions, trade unions, and NGOs had not only lacked sufficient interest or organic roots in the land question, they were also structurally incapable of bridging the rural-urban gap in the interest of mass mobilisation. The land movement incorporated urban elements into rural land occupations and promoted land occupations in urban areas for residential purposes. This overcame the occupational corporatism of trade unions and farmers’ unions, and the often divisive strategies of political parties, at a time when bureaucratic sclerosis and various sources of political polarisation had accentuated the rural-urban divide.

The ZCTU was eventually co-opted by foreign donors, together with a broad array of liberal, urban-based, middle-class, donor-dependent NGOs, including the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). By the time the ZCTU founded the Movement of Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999, the ‘pro-democracy’ forces had been completely overwhelmed by white-settler interests and foreign donors (see also Gwisai 2002). Black farmers’ unions representing the peasantry had also during the 1990s, distanced themselves from the land reform agenda (Skalnes 1995), as petty-bourgeois interests prevailed among their ranks, focusing their advocacy on access to state subsidies and price-setting. Although they did not expressly oppose the land reform, they were unable to mobilise a constituency interested in repossessing land. On the other hand, the white-settler Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU), in alliance with GAPWUZ (the farm workers’ trade union), mobilised both its membership and international public opinion against the land reform.

The relationship of the land movement to the nationalist leadership has posed conceptual difficulties since the ruling party, having succumbed to structural adjustment, changed course in the late 1990s towards a radical approach, while seeking to control the land movement. The ‘pro-democracy’ alliance, which claimed to be the vanguard of ‘progressive’ politics in Zimbabwe, sought credit for the ruling party’s opting for a radical land reform programme (Raftopoulos 2009), as if there was no real political or historical basis for such radicalisation. With the mounting evidence of extensive land redistribution challenging neopatrimonialist claims of ethnico-racial elite capture, there is now a veiled acknowledgment of the vanguard role of the land movement. This role is however rendered as a mere component, together with the MDC alliance, of a broader ‘passive revolution’, that has ‘remained largely under the control of the state’, and putatively one that has ‘largely politically marginalised the majority of the population’ (Raftopoulos 2010:707). Such an interpretation obscures the distinctive features of a rare mass mobilisation, involving a range of forces which confronted the white agrarian monopoly and the imperialist alliance as a whole, to the effect of broadening the social base of the economy.

Part of the conceptual difficulties facing those who have opposed the petty-bourgeoisie outright arises largely because some political elites gained more than others through the A2 scheme, Masuko (2012) and Sadomba (2012) have argued that black capital never really broke ranks with monopoly capital and that it acted solely on the latter’s behalf to control the land movement. Yet, the process of radicalisation integrated diverse class interests, including the petty-bourgeoisie and the semi-proletariat, against the white agrarian faction of monopoly capital. The breaking of ranks with monopoly capital is exemplified in the fact that the state redistributed over 5,000 properties, over and above the estimated 1,000 properties that were actually occupied by the land movement, and such acquisitions persisted beyond the immediate election contests (Moyo 2011a). While this radicalisation did not result in a socialist revolution, or in a generic ‘passive revolution’, the white agrarian establishment was essentially liquidated at farm level both economically and politically.

The role of the petty-bourgeoisie and the nationalist leadership, their use of the state, and their relationship with the movement can best be understood in terms of the character and function of the ‘radicalised state’. By 2000, the state underwent a peculiar transformation, through a suspension of its bureaucratic coherence (its ‘bureaucratism’), with many of its personnel mobilised in the interest of Fast Track Land Reform (Moyo and Yeros 2007a). The constitution of District Land Committees overrode local bureaucratic structures, but it also established fast-track procedures and new capacities for the expropriation and redistribution of land, while also reforming laws and amending the constitution to underpin the action and defend land occupiers against eviction. One may rightly fault the ruling party for streamlining the land movement and creating space for the petty-bourgeoisie, but it is not the case that it fulfilled a reactionary role, for it did not defend the status quo ante. Contrary formulations do not adequately recognise the existence of real intra-class conflict, between petty-bourgeois and monopoly capital, black and white elites, and among black elites.

This suggests that Zimbabwe’s radicalisation entailed another rare phenomenon of petty-bourgeois radicalism, shaped by pressures from the land movement, as well as by blatant
external political interventions and sanctions. That the petty-bourgeoisie also became an agent of change presents very difficult political questions, as previous African scholars have noted (Fanon 1967; Shivji 1976). However, there is a problem in attributing radicalisation solely to certain local-level war veterans, against all the rest who vied for land, although the land movement did coalesce varied streams of land occupiers. Instead of one ‘genuine’ category of radicalism, there are different radicalisms, each with its own class project.

Others who claim to stand aloof of the difficult political questions have deployed a liberal-populist ‘people versus state’ dichotomy, rendering the whole land and agrarian reform process solely as a consequence of the agency of the landless against an indifferent state at best, or a ‘commandist’ and ‘clientelist’ state, at worst (see Scoones et al. 2010; Hanlon et al. 2013). Class analyses that reach similar conclusions do so only by downplaying the radicalisation of the petty-bourgeoisie and treating it as if it never really broke ranks with monopoly capital.

It would be more correct to say that the nationalist leadership in recent years had come to represent mainly un-accommodated bourgeois interests, which indeed have liberation convictions of their own, but which are under the illusion that they can reform monopoly capitalism so as to sustain a ‘patriotic bourgeoisie’ into the future. This situation explains the current scattered pressures for ‘indigenisation’ programmes in strategic industries, as opposed to more collectivist solutions (Moyo and Yeros 2011b, Moyo 2011b). It also partly explains the violence that accompanied land reform, mainly off the farms, as the nationalist leadership was unable to commit ‘class suicide’ and submit itself to the evolving and expanding popular demands on the ground (Moyo and Yeros 2009, 2011b). The bifurcation of the Fast Track Land Reform, the strategy of indigenising agro-estates and other industries, and the recurrent violence are manifestations, not only of class conflict, but also of intra-class conflict between petty-bourgeois interests and monopoly capital.

A related weakness may be attributed to the war veteran movement which became ‘tactically sterile’, and paid dearly for this when the state’s Murambatsvina project assaulted urban settlements in 2005 (Sadomba 2013). An uninterrupted escalation of the revolutionary situation would have required that the land movement undergo organisational and ideological innovation founded in proletarian mobilisation and wider strategic concerns. Masuko (2013) argues that the land movement did go beyond the single-issue platform of land reclamation by promoting a plethora of associational forms that sprouted in the resettlement areas (see also Murisa 2013). While such associational forms are the kernel of progressive politics in the countryside, including their issue-focus on service provision by the state (agricultural inputs, social infrastructure, markets, credit, and subsidies), they are not articulated into a radical mass agrarian movement. This opportunity is dissipating, as the liberal ‘pro-democracy’ movement, comprising the donor-funded MDC, NGOs, and settler farmer elements, seek to mobilise such associations in service of a new market integration agenda.

The radicalised nationalist leadership could also be faulted for allowing other petty-bourgeois tendencies, since aspiring capitalists, lacking other means to bid for land, mobilised sub-national, ethno-regional claims to land ‘rights’ to exclude non-local competitors (Moyo 2011a). This tendency continues, and could escalate as land bidding is re-focused on the enlargement of existing landholdings at the expense of smallholders, and as bidding spreads to the redistribution of retained private and public agro-estates.

Such contradictions among the black petty-bourgeoisie could undermine its radical nationalist economic posture although these are essentially the ongoing tendencies of a class which remains profoundly insecure. Should the main ‘enemy’ come to be seen as ‘internal’ (including ‘ethno-regional’ or party political partisans), there could be regression to a neocolonial type of politics, malleable to foreign interests. Yet, this is not a foregone conclusion "or a perennial and decontextualised ‘ethnic’ possibility in African politics" but reflects shifting strategies of accumulation, subject to pressures from above and from below. The re-grouping of popular forces is all the more necessary given the new tendencies of class formation at the top and the changing strategies of monopoly finance capital.

Structural Reform, Renewed Developmentalism and Economic Nationalism

The land reform radically restructured land ownership, but it did not ‘oust capital’, which itself is now re-grouping (Moyo 2011b). Instead, a broadly based tri-modal agrarian structure has been instituted, consisting of peasant, small-scale capitalist and large-scale estate farms (which are being indigenised). There was a deliberate promotion of competing trajectories of accumulation, muddied through the mediation of contradictory land struggles and class interests, and combined resistances to the opposition to reform by capital and Western donors. This outcome suggests another distinctive characteristic of the radicalisation process.

This agrarian structure is based on differential landownership regimes (state-sanctioned usufruct permits, non-tradable leases, and freehold or state property, respectively); different forms of integration into markets; varied forms of labour relations and varied linkages to non-farm activities and assets. This, in turn, gives rise to different types of producers vying for different forms of labour mobilisation and competing accumulation strategies (Moyo 2011b, 2011c). This has unravelled the legacy of the settler-colonial ‘labour reserve’ structures, by amplifying the smallholder sector and incorporating a significant ‘merchant’ path, while retaining elements (albeit downsized) of the ‘junker’ and ‘state’ paths (see Moyo and Yeros 2005a). This has also restructured farm labour supplies and labour utilisation.

The diverse elements of this structure are not entirely unique to the continent, but their clear demarcation in state policy, and the dynamics by which they have been established, do make this case unique. Moreover, the reform brings Zimbabwe closer to the rest of Africa’s agrarian structures by breaking
up the large-scale farming established during the nineteenth-century, and broadening the small-scale capitalist sector, which had also been introduced by the colonial regime, while preserving some ‘strategic’ agro-industrial estates (Moyo 2011b).

The fundamental question is whether Zimbabwe will be able to sustain, via this tri-model structure, an introverted process of accumulation ‘from below’, given the tendencies and contradictions of this new agrarian structure, with regard to the new type of labour reserve that has emerged, incipient land markets, the persistence of the core agricultural exports and the re-insertion of finance capital through markets, credit and contracts. Moreover, the attendant processes of class formation and the contestations over accumulation and the policy regime, remain intrinsically fluid, given also the contradictions imposed by the extant sanctions regime.

For instance, one of the immediate consequences of Fast Track is the re-emergence of informal land rental markets between the ‘better performers’ and the ‘weaker’ ones, often between A2 and A1 farmers, respectively (Moyo et al. 2009). Both macroeconomic constraints and labour shortages, on both A1 and A2 farms, have contributed to this tendency. Land sharing is also common, although this often occurs among A1 farmers’ kinship networks, as well as between all resettled farmers and farm workers, gold-panners, and ‘squatters’ who have yet to be settled formally (Moyo et al. 2009). Such tendencies represent local class differentiation across all agro-ecological regions and heralds future conflicts over access to land and natural resources.

Although land tenure is generally seen to be secure, boundary and access disputes could intensify (Moyo 2013). One of the terrains of struggle that could intensify is the status of leasehold on A2 farms, which is being challenged by domestic and foreign elements which advocate the conversion of the leasehold on A2 farms, which is being challenged by domestic and foreign elements which advocate the conversion of the leasehold land rights into freehold tenures. In this case, small-scale capitalist farmers would find allies in private banks, which typically justify their refusal to finance resettle farmers on the supposed absence of ‘collateral’. Another terrain of struggle is the land tenure status of the remaining farm workers, some of whom have been re-inserted into labour-tenancy relations (Chambati 2013). Yet, state policy still remains committed to both leasehold tenure and the protection of farm workers against eviction from A2 lands.

Re-peasantisation and the break-up of the settler agrarian monopoly has diminished the labour reserve of the past and undermined the functioning of the colonial cheap-labour system. By 1999, half of this labour-force consisted of non-permanent, casual labour, reproducing itself precariously between the LSCF and the Communal Areas, on real farm wages which had collapsed to 24 per cent of the Poverty Datum Line. Super-exploitation was facilitated by a racialised, quasi-feudal labour-tenancy system, together with a patriarchal system of customary authority, which continued to undermine the bargaining power of the semi-proletariat as a whole (Moyo and Yeros 2005).

Land reform has absorbed surplus labour into petty-commodity production for own consumption and the market, and pried open access to natural resources and related land use values that previously were enclosed in the properties monopolised by white farmers (see also Chambati 2011). The immediate manifestation of this has been a shortage of labour, which has deprived especially the small-scale capitalist sector of the prior abundant workforce willing to work for wages below the cost of social reproduction.

That the labour reserve diminished and the bargaining power of labour altered does not, of course, mean that the labour reserve economy has been extinguished. The persistence of simple reproduction among smallholders and the reconstitution of the small- and large-scale capitalist sectors, under the weight of Western sanctions, continue to re-create the structural conditions of super-exploitation, even among the new self-exploited peasantry. Super-exploitation is further abetted by residual labour-tenancy on some new farms, as well as the exploitative intra-family and gender-based labour relations. Yet, the unravelling of racialised relations of personal dependence and the expansion of the smallholder sector has altered the balance of power among the three modes of farming. It is here that the new political struggle is now being fought.

State Interventionism, Indigenisation and New Developmentalism

Both small- and large-scale capitalist farmers have a structural interest in policy measures that will oblige small producers to work for wages below the cost of social reproduction. This interest would be reinforced should an export-oriented accumulation strategy predominate. But these two types of farmers are not identical, given that small-scale capitalist farmers, many with significant resource vulnerabilities, may also be co-opted by the state into production for domestic markets and industries. In fact, this objective has largely been their principal orientation to date. At the same time, smallholder farmers will themselves undergo differentiation, thereby adding to the labour pool. Yet, this may also be mitigated by inward-looking policy measures that both reinforce the conditions of smallholder production and induce the growth of cooperativism and rural industries capable of re-organising the labour process.

The political struggle between the three modes of farming and the attendant disputes over labour remain imbalanced and will be determined by a number of factors, including the character of state interventions against monopoly capital.

The dominant factor in shaping the accumulation trajectory is, however the structural power of monopoly capital, which opposed the radicalisation process and undermined progressive agrarian change by imposing severe limits on Zimbabwe’s economic recovery. From the beginning of the Fast Track, financial isolation and a capital strike had led to a severe shortage in the economy, leading the state towards an interventionist economic strategy, initially without a comprehensive plan to defend against sanctions (Moyo and Yeros 2007a). A plan emerged as the internal and external contradictions escalated, although the key constraint was how to finance the plan. This interventionism under contemporary neoliberalism is the fifth distinctive characteristic of the Zimbabwe model.

It entailed controls over prices, trade, capital, and agricultural markets, the monopolisation of grain purchases by the Grain Marketing Board, and the setting of food production targets,
as well as targeted subsidies to agriculture and industries, to bolster an erstwhile import substitution industrialisation. State-owned agro-estates, together with state interests in mining, banking, and other firms led this strategy, which includes the production of local agro-fuels against a rising fuel-import bill. An agricultural mechanisation policy sought to enhance motorised draught power, although the bulk of this was allocated to small- and large-scale capitalist farmers to compensate for the labour shortages that emerged (Moyo 2011a; Moyo and Nyoni 2013). State subsidies in electricity, fuel and transport facilities were also effected, albeit at low levels associated with the fiscal constraints. This plan reflected both the class bias of the state and its reaction to the generalised strike by private banks and, bilateral and multilateral donors.

Eventually, hyperinflation, political conflict and informalisation of economic activity compelled the state to attempt normalisation with international capital. It is through this process that the state ‘interrupted’ the momentum of the revolutionary situation, including the assault on urban land movements in 2005 to establish ‘order’ (Moyo and Yeros 2007a, 2009, 2011b). Indeed, the heterodox plan lacked the foresight to defend against the ensuing capital strike, which could have been better resisted by a policy of immediate nationalisation of banks and strategic industries. Thus, the state became susceptible to carrot-and-stick strategies by foreign capital, leading to its refusal to fully default on debt.

Normalisation has led to cooption back towards an extroverted strategy through various mechanisms (Moyo 2011a, 2011b). The land redistribution policy on agro-estates is essentially a comprador ‘indigenisation’ strategy, which enables black capitalists to become majority shareholders in agro-estates, thereby succumbing to the logic of plantation agriculture and its associated financial circuit. The expansion of outgrower contract farming, linked to a similar external financial circuits, locks small-scale capitalists into the agro-estates for the production of sugarcane for the European market (under the ACP-EU Lomé Convention). So do the tobacco and cotton contracts tied to Chinese and Western capital.

Dependence on external finance, inputs, and markets has exercised overriding power in tilting, once again, the internal balance between social classes, while Western sanctions against Zimbabwe, including those against the parastatals spearheading the economic recovery, reinforce this. The adoption in 2008, at the peak of hyperinflation, of a neoliberal policy on currency, ‘dollarisation’ capital, trade, and agricultural markets may have been a tactical retreat, but it entrenches the cooption.

Nonetheless, counter-tendencies suggest that the policy of normalisation has not totally extinguished the dirigisme of the state and the new black bourgeoisie, which is still acutely vulnerable to a monopolistic world market, and remains in conflict with international capital. The popular classes, from which the nationalist leadership must still claim legitimacy, are even more vulnerable. The state has not abandoned the ISI policy, or its intention to mediate pro-actively in favour of black capital and, secondarily the smallholder farmers. The Zimbabwean state persists with its policy of building national food self-sufficiency and to substitute for imported petrol by expanding the cultivation of sugarcane on agro-estates owned by the state and public trusts to produce ethanol for domestic transport, may have various local industrial spin-offs (Moyo 2011b). Such investments include via joint ventures with foreign capital, from the East, West, and South, under the ‘Look East Policy’ (LEP) inaugurated in 2004.

The class character of state power, the strategies of the black bourgeoisie, and the re-grouping of social forces are the three further factors that will co-determine the balance of forces, as suggested by the escalation of the indigenisation strategy beyond agriculture to secondary industries, banking, and mining. Generally, indigenisation is a multi-class strategy, whose class character has oscillated in accordance with the correlation of forces as the policy regime shifted.

In the 1980s, it shifted from a popular land reform policy to one geared towards the creation of a black bourgeoisie via affirmative action with respect to land and state commerce. The former continued throughout the 1990s, under structural adjustment, without much success, until its radicalisation during the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. Then, under the subsequent normalisation from 2005, the strategy shifted back to a bourgeois strategy, geared towards creating majority shareholding for black capitalists. Yet, a further elaboration of the policy from 2010 envisions joint ventures between state-owned enterprises and foreign firms. This policy is increasingly reflected in the mining sector (e.g. diamonds), which has enormous potential to fill foreign-exchange gaps.

Upon the discovery of massive diamond deposits, a struggle ensued, especially from 2007 onwards, for the control of the industry, against both small miners who entered the fray, as well as corporate capital of South African and Western origin. The strategy on diamonds, and the possibility of circumventing sanctions, led to a confrontation with foreign capital and small miners, and this entailed repression of the latter. In the event, the West, ostensibly in solidarity with the repressed small miners, resolved to broaden its sanctions tactics by invoking the ‘Kimberly Certification Process’, alleging these were ‘conflict diamonds’. When Zimbabwe won Kimberly certification, the United States unilaterally imposed sanctions on the diamond mining firms in partnership with mining parastatals.

Nonetheless, state policy on minerals seems to be stabilising and is positioning the state to reap future profits, via joint ventures looking both East and West. The accommodation of Chinese capital has been central to this strategy. Similarly, the expansion of platinum production by Western multinationals was compelled by the threat of losing concessions to the East. Meanwhile, high-ranking state personnel have positioned themselves in the state-owned Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation driving the joint ventures, which has undermined the legitimacy and transparency of the strategy.10

It is notable that the indigenisation policy has been elaborated, beyond the re-distribution of majority shareholding and joint ventures, towards a higher degree of social access, in the wake of popular agitation. This transformation involves the imposition of conditions on foreign firms to undertake investments in physical and social infrastructure, such as roads, schools, and clinics, as well as the allocation of shares
to ‘community and employee trusts’. The strategy reflects a renewed attempt, in response to more general criticisms of class bias, to broaden the benefits of indigenisation, especially of mining, to the rural areas. It also reflects the continued need of political elites (combining both ZANU-PF and MDC leaders) to respond to the reaction by capital, and to meet popular demands for state support in light of forthcoming elections.

Overall, these policies reflect the persistence of a specifically nationalist accumulation strategy promoted by black capitalists with connections to the state. For, despite having sunk roots of their own in the means of production, they remain vulnerable to both monopolistic forces and the need to maintain legitimacy vis-à-vis popular forces. Black capital continues to seek to consolidate its position by recourse to a pro-active state, against what it considers to be its main obstacle: Western monopoly capital.

**New Agrarian Movements: Rural Cooperativism and Democratisation?**

The sustainability of the current outcomes, and the potentials for further progressive reforms, will depend on the politics of the popular classes after land reform. While the larger farmers have been gravitating towards production for export markets (albeit still in minority numbers), the basic pillar of food sovereignty will remain the smallholder farmers, together with a significant portion of small-scale capitalists, who, for instance, dominate the rapid recovery of tobacco production. There has been a clear shift in the orientation of production towards food grains and pulses, to which the new land beneficiaries have dedicated 78 per cent of their cropped land. And, while national maize yields per hectare have suffered severe setbacks under conditions of drought, expensive inputs and sanctions, beneficiaries in wetter agro-ecological regions have performed much better (Moyo 2011c).

But the economic potential remains enormous, considering that land utilisation rates are already at 40 per cent < that is, the land utilisation level of the extroverted LSCF sector prior to Fast Track. But notable in this regard is that, on average, the A2 farmers with larger landholdings crop below 20 per cent of their land, while a few surpass the 50 per cent mark. In the absence of broad-based investments in infrastructure, fertiliser, and machinery due to credits supply constraints, fulfilment of the agricultural potential will be delayed. Furthermore, differentiation across class and regions will deepen, with adverse consequences for national cohesion and the weak rural movements. The emerging struggles over production, land access, tenure, and labour, as well as over the much-needed social services in general, require organised social forces capable of tilting the balance towards smallholders and farm workers (Moyo 2011c).

The most promising development is the emergence among 40 per cent of small producers of new local cooperative movements to pool labour, savings, and infrastructure, procure seeds and fertilisers, channel extension services, bid for producer prices, and negotiate labour contracts (Murisa 2012). Among the farm workers, there are group negotiations for access to land and improved conditions of work, although their poor representation by the national agricultural labour union (GAPWUZ), which has never been in favour of agrarian reform (Chambati 2013), is notable. Some of the farmer groups are orchestrated by state extension agents and private contract farming firms, while others are led by the war veteran groups. Yet others draw on kinship relations and existing former farming associations in the Communal Areas (see Murisa 2012).

De facto, the state has extended customary authority to resettlement areas, both as a cooptation tactic and a low-cost dispute-resolution mechanism, but the new constitution of 2013 limits their authority to Communal Areas. The state also co-opted chiefs through their inclusion into the A2 farming scheme and mechanisation, but it excluded chiefs from exercising real authority over A1 land permits and A2 leases. It has also maintained their subordination (in some power relations) to elected authorities in local government. Meanwhile, their cooptation into a new class position, where this has occurred, raises new questions regarding the trajectory of this institution, notwithstanding the ethno-regional structure of Fast Track having extended the kinship basis of customary authority. It has nonetheless been observed that beneficiaries from non-contiguous areas have not always embraced their new chiefs (Murisa 2012).

Rural cooperativism also holds the unique potential to transform gender relations and customary authority, to defend land rights and progressive agrarian change, as such, authority was the social and political pillar of historic super-exploitation, particularly of women. Fast Track Land Reform tripled the proportion of rural women holding land in their own right, yet women remain greatly under-represented (with below 20 per cent of all farm units). The land movement also opened political space for women, which was filled in mass numbers. Women however seldom held leadership positions in land committees and local farmer associations (see Murisa 2012). While new cooperativism is the most realistic vehicle for withering away the retrogressive patriarchal aspects of customary authority, there are class contradictions here too.

Quite critically, facing various agrarian demands from such organised groups and other influential actors, the state has remained interventionist since 2003. For instance, the state has also been active in supporting farmers’ groups via agricultural extension officers, contrary to suggestions that new farmers have not received state support (e.g. Scoones et al. 2010; Cliffe et al. 2011) or that they have been re-tribalised (Worby 2003). The various measures which show that the small producers have thrived because of rather than lack of state support include: the protection of land occupiers, despite allowing some evictions to occur; the expanded role of marketing boards; trade protection; some subsidies to agro-industry and farmers (credit, inputs and machinery) before and after dollarisation; the ban on GMOs; and so forth.

Overall, it is clear that intervention into this fluid field by a new social agent based on cooperative and democratic principles can further erode customary authority, empower women, integrate farm workers and smallholders into agro-industrial production units, and expand the potential for the formation of alliances among cooperative producers nationwide. Such agency may fulfil the aspirations for popular agrarian change which are necessary after Fast Track, but this should go much further than welfarist measure to create efficient worker-controlled cooperatives to sustain the
struggle against monopoly capitalism, and retain pressure on the reconfigured state.

These social dynamics may shape the future of rural and national politics, depending on the ability of rural cooperativism to deepen its scope and branch out to form wider political alliances. The resurrection of mass rural politics requires building up the new producer associations into an advanced, united, and autonomous cooperative movement of rural workers, capable, not only of obtaining *ad hoc* services, but also of dislocating the new black bourgeoisie from its political pedestal (Moyo and Yeros 2007a).

**Concluding Remarks: Lessons from Zimbabwe**

While the internal dynamics, including the class character of the land reform, the indigenisation strategy and ongoing social struggles will determine the ability of the state to sustain an inward-looking accumulation process and its legitimacy, the security context and the foreign policy have been crucial in creating the external conditions for sustaining the radical reform. In this context, despite Zimbabwe’s relative geopolitical insignificance, the re-radicalisation of land reform has challenged outright the controlled character of the transitions to majority rule in settler-colonial Africa. For this reason, it has been characterised as an ‘unusual and extraordinary threat’ to the USA (President George Bush 2002), and subjected to a host of sanctions and isolation.

It is only the new SADC security framework which, despite all its prevarications, is anchored in a mutual defence pact that has effectively prevented the militarisation of the Zimbabwe question (Moyo and Yeros 2011b). Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East’ Policy is ‘complementary, rather than [serving as] an alternative to engaging with the West’ (Patel and Chan 2006:182) as it has neither turned its back on Western capital, nor accepted investment from China and the rest of the East or South without conditions. The LEP was pursued as a method of circumventing Western sanctions, while pressuring the West back into investing in Zimbabwe, on conditions consistent with its indigenisation and empowerment policy. This outcome raises wider questions about the external conditions which enable or undermine radical reform, particularly the nature of relations with neighbouring states.

Furthermore, while Zimbabwe has particularities of its own, the structural and social sources of radical change are firmly rooted in most societies of the Global South (see Moyo and Yeros 2005a, 2011a). This is not to say that radical change depends on mere ‘will’, and that political resignation should be answered by naïve voluntarism. The correlation of forces in every situation should be assessed, with the intention of changing it, not preserving it. This also means that a clear understanding of the state apparatus and state power must be developed. A blanket anti-statist policy of ‘changing the world without taking power’, which remains so hegemonic among social movements, ought to be replaced by a strategy and tactics which seek to alter state power and unravel the state apparatus in the interest of the oppressed; i.e. towards radical agrarian reform.

For mass mobilisations to endure the countervailing forces that will inevitably align against them, they must take seriously the agrarian component of society. The objective should not be merely to accumulate forces for change, but also to initiate a longer-term process of structural change and national resistance, of which the agrarian question is a fundamental component. All societies in recent years that have entered a process of radicalisation have discovered that their food dependence and their domestic disjuncture between agriculture, industry, and energy are crucial sources of vulnerability. This potential weakness means that mass mobilisation must also take seriously the project of ‘re-peasantisation’ as an explicitly modern project, and as the only alternative in conquering autonomous development in the South (Amin 2012; Patnaik 2012).

The particular Zimbabwe experience suggests that redistributive land reform remains necessary to redress existing racial, social and spatial inequalities to advance socially inclusive agrarian societies and promote wider rural livelihoods, accommodating a diverse range of classes and ethno-regional entities, in the context of an innovative national development strategy. An African vision for agrarian change cannot be modelled around Eurocentric experiences of industrial transformation, which pretend to have arisen from a pacific evolution of economies of scale and a natural process of integration into the global neoliberal capitalist world based upon ´comparative advantage. This is neither a plausible nor feasible alternative. In countries such as South Africa and Namibia, what remains of the legacy of the Apartheid agrarian model is a deepening of class-race inequalities and the ongoing concentration of land ownership and capital, and social deprivation.

The challenges of broadly based agrarian transformation, in light of the uneven balance of forces require serious consideration, including more innovative state interventions that seek to promote a progressive accumulation trajectory, entailing new strategies of rural development. To prevent the persistent super-exploitation of wage labour and small producers in the context of globalised agrarian markets, the current weaknesses of small producer and market cooperatives will have to be addressed to counteract existing limited state agricultural protection and support. This requires both increased popular mobilisation and progressive reforms in the state.

**Notes**

1. The material in this speech was reworked from a chapter by Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros (2013): The Zimbabwe Model: Radicalisation, Reform and Resistance, In Moyo, Sam and W. Chambati (eds), The Land and Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe: Beyond White-Settler Capitalism, Dakar: CODESRIA (2013).

2. A merchant path consist of non-rural capital, including merchant capital, petty bourgeois elements, bureaucrats, military personnel and professionals who gain access to land. They farm on a smaller scale than capitalist farms but are integrated into export markets and global agro-industry.

3. The junker path, formerly of landlords turned capitalists, has its variants in the white settler societies of Southern Africa, and it operates in tandem with transactional capital.

4. Formally constituted and bureaucratised organs of political representation, such as political parties, farmers’ unions, trade
unions, and NGOs failed to mobilise a radical land movement (see Moyo 2001; Yeros 2002; Moyo and Yeros 2005b).

5. Some contemporary parallels include Bolivia and, to a lesser degree, Venezuela (see Moyo and Yeros 2011a).

6. By 1995, trade unions, led by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) had completely abandoned land reform as a political project (Yeros 2002). The ZCTU had tried away from the control of the state in the late 1980s, and articulated a critique of structural adjustment in the early 1990s, but it gravitated towards a political project of ‘good governance’ and ‘regime change’, promoted by foreign donors and international trade unions.

7. Something that the ‘chaos’ theorists have seen as the ‘destruction of the state’ (Hammar et al. 2003)

8. The immediate manifestation of such a tendency would be the escalation of factional politics both within the ruling party and within the MDC (see Moyo and Yeros 2007b).

9. Class analysis of the new Zimbabwe must come to grips with the tendencies and contradictions of this tri-modal structure, and avoid theories of ‘rentier economy’ (Davies 2005) or ‘crony capitalism’ (Bond 2009), or notions of ‘passive revolution’, which are based on nebulous assessments of the new class relations (e.g. Raftopoulos 2010).

10. For some ‘pro-democracy’ forces (e.g. Cross 2011), this critique has become opportunistic, calling for the nationalisation of black capital but not Western capital!

References


