

Editorial Note

The year 2019 began with reflections on the 15th CODESRIA General Assembly held in Dakar in December 2018 and explored in Issues Nos 1&2, 2019 of the *Bulletin*. This double issue of the *Bulletin* picks up where those reflection in the latter issue ended. It follows up on some of the debates discussed at the plenary and parallel sessions of the Assembly, which explored

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the gains and losses, opportunities, and challenges of globalisation for the continent under the theme "Africa and the Crisis of Globalisation".

The Assembly allowed the African social science community to indicate where to expend more intellectual energies in the decade, if only to avoid the pitfalls of the past. Three developments are critical to this and will shape the community's engagements.

> First, is the apparent disengagement and/or disintegration of liberal institutions that supported progressive causes in the developing countries coupled with an equally virulent rise of nationalism in the West. The second is the exit of the UK from the European Union which advertently or inadvertently has meant some dent on the character of Western capitalism. The third is China's aggressive entreaties to displace the West from developing countries under the guise of an ethical "Confucius Civilisation". Combined, these three developments signal that going forward, Africa is going to encounter and engage with globalisation under slightly different terms and contexts than



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in the past, when "Western culture" and its different facets constituted the main theatre and content of globalization.

The articles in this double issue of the *Bulletin* attest to the eagerness of a new generation of African academics on the continent to question globalisation and its promises. The focus is on globalising initiatives from the West or the East without ignoring the critical question of what it means for Africa's desire to develop, and what it will take to achieve the required momentum. Daniel Ngugi's and Vusi Gumede's articles address these concerns. Gumede's piece engages broadly with how development has been conceptualised and what would constitute suitable indicators of development on the continent, while Ngugi, basing his arguments on a reinterpretation of data, draws us to the corrosive

impacts of international and regional trade pacts on nascent manufacturing industries at the national level. This is important in the context of the African continental free trade area (AfCFTA) that came into force in May 2019 and the subsequent attempts by external forces to either shape the direction of the continental trade area to their benefit or cast doubts on its sustainability.

These articles implicitly suggest that the work of the African social science community to give intellectual depth and policy direction in AfCFTA is necessary. Demba Moussa Démbélé, for instance, discusses the fight for monetary autonomy within the countries of the CFA Franc monetary zone and suggests lessons on how best to move forward in attempts to establish the sovereignty of AfCFTA.



Note éditoriale

'année 2019 a commencé sur des réflexions de la 15^e Assemblée générale du CODESRIA, tenue à Dakar en décembre 2018, réflexions explorées dans les numéros 1&2, 2019 du *Bulletin du CODESRIA*. Le présent numéro double du *Bulletin* est sur la lancée de ce dernier. Il fait suite aux débats de sessions plénières et parallèles de l'Assemblée générale qui, sous le thème « L'Afrique et la crise de la mondialisation », explorait les gains, pertes, opportunités et défis de la mondialisation pour le continent.


L'Assemblée générale a permis à la communauté africaine de recherche en sciences sociales d'indiquer les domaines qui, au cours de la décennie, requerront plus d'énergie intellectuelle, ne serait-ce que pour éviter les pièges du passé. Trois évolutions sont essentielles à cela et façonneront les engagements de la communauté. Premièrement, il y a l'apparent(e) désengagement/désintégration des institutions libérales ayant soutenu des causes progressistes dans les pays en développement, couplé(e) à une montée tout aussi virulente du nationalisme en Occident. La seconde est la sortie du Royaume-Uni de l'Union européenne qui a, à dessein ou par inadvertance, porté un coup au capitalisme occidental. La troisième est la démarche agressive de la Chine, qui sous le couvert de « civilisation confucéenne » éthique, tente d'éloigner l'Occident des pays en développement Combinées, ces trois évolutions signalent qu'à l'avenir, l'Afrique abordera et s'engagera dans la mondialisation dans des termes et des contextes légèrement différents de ceux du passé, lorsque la « culture occidentale » et ses différentes facettes constituaient les principaux lieu et contenu de la mondialisation.

Les articles de ce numéro double du Bulletin témoignent de l'enthousiasme d'une nouvelle génération d'universitaires africains du continent à remettre en question la mondialisation et ses promesses. L'objectif est la mondialisation des initiatives de l'Ouest ou de l'Est sans ignorer l'importante question de ce que cela signifie pour le désir de développement de l'Afrique, et de ce qu'il faudra pour le réaliser. Les articles de Daniel Ngugi et Vusi Gumede répondent à ces préoccupations. De manière générale, l'article de Gumede aborde la conceptualisation du développement, et ce qui constituerait, sur le continent, des indicateurs appropriés de développement, tandis que Ngugi, fondant ses arguments sur une réinterprétation des données, nous alerte sur les effets corrosifs sur les industries manufacturières naissantes des accords commerciaux internationaux et régionaux au niveau national. Cela est important dans le contexte de la Zone de libre-échange continentale africaine (ZLECA) qui est entrée en vigueur en mai 2019, et des tentatives subséquentes forces extérieures pour orienter la zone de commerce continental à leur avantage ou mettre en doute sa durabilité.

Implicitement, ces articles suggèrent l'importance du travail de la communauté africaine des sciences sociales pour donner profondeur intellectuelle et orientation politique à la ZLECA. Demba Moussa Démbélé, par exemple, discute de la lutte pour l'autonomie monétaire au sein des pays de la zone monétaire du franc CFA, et suggère de meilleures approches dans les tentatives d'établissement de la souveraineté de la ZLECA.



Book Announcement Annonce d'un livre



ISBN: 978-2-86978-723-0

Pages: 320

The slave trade, the conquest of the Americas and the invasion of Africa have deeply transformed the relations between Europeans and other groups. The jump from difference to superiority and racial hierarchy was so swift that it led to the moral collapse of Europe and North America. By shifting the devaluation of so-called 'inferior' beings from non-Whites to non-Aryans, Nazism committed the unforgivable crime of bringing into the heart of the European world a ferocity up to then reserved for other continents. In this book, *White Ferocity: The Genocides of Non-Whites and Non-Aryans from 1492 to Date*, Plumelle-Uribe investigates and demonstrates, with harrowing evidence and analyses, how Europeans justified the destruction of other peoples as unavoidable based on the officially declared belief of others being inferior.

Rosa Amelia Plumelle-Uribe is a lawyer and essayist from Colombia living in France. Her historical revolutionary essays denounce white sovereignty, slave trafficking and massacres of indigenous peoples in Africa and the Americas. Towards the end of the 1970's, in Bogota, the capital of Colombia, she was part of a so-called "Black Culture" group.



The Dilemma of African Development: Making Policy Choices for Sub-Saharan Africa

The economic performance of Sub-Saharan countries is determined by external influences in many ways which affect politics, trade, policies, education, among other and sectors. This article focuses on the external influence on trade and polices, showing how they are interrelated and how they influence the economic performance of countries. Sub-Saharan Where demand and supply are freely left out to adjust themselves, the economy tends to correct itself and performance is enhanced. However, governments are also said to interfere with the 'invisible hand' of the economy running itself without much intervention. This is said to slow down growth rather than when demand and supply justify the right and appropriate market for an economy (Collier and Gunning 1999). Based on the Theory of International Trade, the advantages of trade where a country produces what it can with ease, and sells it to others that are less efficient in production are supposed to make countries use international trade to allow economic growth for all countries since they are endowed with different natural resources. This has not been implemented with the intention of economic development, but rather it is politics. Import-export restrictions hence control what countries are exporting and importing without the consideration of efficiency.

Daniel Ngugi Minot State University North Dakota/USA

When other motives are formed in the name of trade restrictions, then countries are likely to lose the benefits of trading with each other, thus increasing the costs of production of what would have been imported easily. There are some trade restrictions that do not improve the economic performance of African countries but instead stagnate trade development (Rodrik 1998).

In relation to this, there is a chain of reaction that is traced back to the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that affect the current policy making of governments in Africa today. SAPs are economic policies for developing countries that were promoted by the World Bank and the IMF from the early 1980s, and countries had to adopt them in order to secure loans for socio-economic development. Most countries today lack autonomy due to conditions that have been rooted in their economies emanating from SAPs. Most of the affected countries are those that were developing and needed foreign assistance/aid for growth and development. Conditions would be set by the aid or loan issuing institutions or countries for management purposes. This eventually created many restrictions on these countries, with resultant detrimental effects on economic development in Africa. According to Marc et al. (1995), economic deterioration emerged in the 1980s as a result of set objectives that were meant to alleviate poverty. Some of these interventions included SAPs. These challenges affected the poor and vulnerable more and hence set negative social development tones in these countries. Mkandawire and Soludo (1995), in their book Our Continent, our Future: African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment, clearly analyse the impact of structural adjustment policies and how they were meant to improve economic performance but ended up with more impoverished countries than before the reforms; their argument being that it was only Africans who would understand the economic challenges that existed and offer the solutions that are Africantailored, rather than foreign advice which left the continent with many problems.

SAPs represented much of the external influences that affect developing countries' economic performance. They are still affecting today's way of doing business due to their influence in the 1980s. African countries are now changing the sources of their importation due to global changes and external influences (Broadman 2007).

Africa's trade with Asia grew by 22 per cent during 2001-10 while trade with Europe grew by only 15 per cent. As an example of this trend, there has been more increase in trade activities between Kenya and Asian countries than between the USA and European countries. The demand for sugar being higher than the rate of production in the country has seen the commodity imported being from Brazil. Recently, the government changed that and is planning to import sugar from Uganda (a country with which Kenya shares membership in the East African Community). This is a decision that brought uproar from civil society, opposition parties and other stakeholders. Kenya has been importing sugar due to scarcity, as production in the country is far less than consumption. Various sugar producing factories in Kenya are hampered by challenges that render them inefficient. This leads to unfair competition from the imported sugar and also poor management of company resources (Owiye 1999). Therefore, the imported sugar at some point became cheaper than the local sugar, as Wanyande (2001) puts it, and Kenya could not supply sufficient sugar locally. With industries in the country requiring sugar for their manufacturing, Kenya has no choice but to have a temporary importation of the commodity, as companies are expected to regain their efficient production sooner or later. It is this importation of sugar that has brought uproar because the sugar farmers might become redundant when the imported sugar is cheaper than that produced locally. This is made even worse by the fact that local sugar companies, more often than not, bear the brunt of political interference and mismanagement of resources.

The dilemma revolves around the question of the importation of sugar from countries such as Brazil instead of empowering Kenyan farmers for local production, which takes time, to meet demand. The government started implementing strategies to support financially sugar companies in the country but this might take time to revert the sugar companies to sustainable levels of efficiency and production. the government Meanwhile, continued to import sugar in 2016 which was an anormaly in the eyes of some stakeholders in the sugar industry. It is the responsibility of the government to ensure that farmers have ease in production and their factories are efficient and preferably produce sufficient sugar locally. This leaves the government with difficult decision making in order to have efficient economic activities in line with the needs of the citizens.

Decision making may also be impacted by external influences. When there are decisions made for less developed countries, there seems to be an imbalance due to the relationship and interest of the countries. Large economies have higher economic power than less developed nations to shape the agendas and outcomes of their economies. Most less developed countries suffer from this type of suppression when they have no autonomy from the developed nations. This makes other countries influence decisions that are not suitable for the growth and development of a country. In most cases, the less developed countries in need of assistance have to obey or agree to the conditions set for them by external sources.

With the globalisation and integration of so many functions of the world, countries are supposed

to follow directives in order to be at par with global development. Financial liberalisation is meant to be of importance towards enhancing developing advancement in countries. There has been contention as to whether integration would bring good practices that support the development of good institutions with low levels of corruption, corporate governance, good transparency and good supervisory frameworks. Governments follow these international development programmes in order to improve their countries. These may not be directly involved in development. According Prasad et al. (2005) it becomes difficult to trace the impact of the external recommendation and the actual impact of growth and development.

In East Africa, Tanzania and Kenya were two of the countries that emphasised implementation of the adjustments (Mkandawire and Soludo 1995). In Kenya, for example, some of the conditions given by the Bretton Wood – institutions such as higher interest rates, liberalisation of foreign exchanges, deregulation, privatisation, flexible labour markets (wage flexibility), abolishing price controls and abolishing subsidies affected the manufacturing sector, small farmers, wages and conditions of working people, the delivery of social services, health and education spending, and poverty and inequality eradication budgets in the country. Their share of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell below expectation. hence the rate of industrialisation in relation to GDP per capita was low (ibid.). This led to difficulties in farmers' operations, particularly of sugar production in Western Kenya consequently leading to low production of sugar, hence the resultant importation of the same from other countries

Case Study: Sugar Importation in Kenya

Sugar importation in Kenya is justified due to high demand of the commodity compared to supply. Over the years, kenya has experienced deficits in local sugar production due to a number of factors, including the politics of sugarcane farming and its regulation and widespread inefficiency in the production and marketing process. But deficits are also occasioned artificially to facilitate importation of cheap Sugar to the local market. This brings about a deficit, a gap which has to be filled. This can only be done through importation as a short-term solution. Kenya imports Sugar duty free from the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), but recent years have seen Brazil emerge as an alternative source market for cheap sugar. It is the responsibility of the government to ensure the smooth running of the industries which use sugar as raw material; this is through sustenance of sugar availability from local companies and through importation too. However, there has been uproar from opposition parties since the government announced the importation of sugar from Uganda in 2016. It is also the responsibility of the government to ensure the steady supply of locally produced sugar through by boosting the farmers and factories that produce sugar. This is to allow development through the farmers who produce sugarcane and enhance value addition. hence maintaining their economic development in the regions where sugarcane is grown. The welfare of Kenyan citizens, particularly those involved in sugarcane farming, would improve if the government showed concern and improved the situation in the sugar sector. This has been seen in Kenya where the government has bailed out Mumias

Sugar Company, one of the largest sugar producing companies in the country. However, this was done in 2016, hence the real impact of the bailout would take some time to be felt. This called for importation before the companies in Kenya and farmers got ready for ultimate production. Eventually, the bailedout companies would be able to support demand through production and this is the objective of supporting farmers and sugar companies with such initiatives. Meanwhile, through International Trade Theory, the government has to continue with importation due to the demand that surpasses supply, and thus stabilise the industries that use sugar in the country.

Historically, for over a decade now, Kenya has been a heavy producer of sugar, but consumption has always been higher that production. There is an argument put forward by Chisanga et al. (2014) that countries such as Kenya and Tanzania should import sugar from the best producing countries in the region such as Zambia and South Africa. From the statistics put forward by Chisanga et al. (2014) this can be seen in Table 1 below.

The rate of sugar consumption in Kenya is higher than production. This

means that at any given time, there is demand for sugar in Kenya that needs to be met, therefore justifying the importation of sugar into the country to ensure industries and household consumers are catered for. From the information provided in Table 1, the domestic production and consumption ratio is less than one in the country while in Zambia and South Africa it is more than three. This shows that the latter two countries can export their sugar to Kenya.

In 2016, there were trade rows between Kenya and Uganda related to the importation of Sugar from Uganda to Kenya under the COMESA tariff-free trade rules of origin. An investigation was done and it was discovered that Uganda had surplus sugar which it would export to Kenya. This is described by the *Monitor* newspaper thus:

> The findings by the Kenyan team, which *Daily Monitor* has seen, shows, the country has been registering, on average a surplus of 36,000 metric tonnes (MT) of sugar since the year 2014/15. 'In the year 2014, Uganda's sugar production stood at 400,499.05MT and out of that, consumption was 342,325.14 MT. 84,603.3MT were exported leaving a balance of 26,429.29MT, 'Ms Nakakande said. She continued: 'In 2015,

	Kenya		South Africa		Tanzania		Zambia	
YEAR	Volume (tons)	Volume/ Domestic consumption	Volume (tons)	Volume/ Domestic consumption	Volume (tons)	Volume/ Domestic consumption	Volume (tons)	Volume/ Domestic consumption
2005	488997	0.70	2226869	1.76	229617	0.70	248222	2.01
2006	475670	0.66	2500504	1.88	263317	0.77	263451	2.43
2007	520404	0.70	2226853	1.65	192095	0.52	266347	2.23
2008	517667	0.69	2273499	1.67	265434	0.69	261713	1.84
2009	548207	0.72	2260244	1.58	279850	0.71	219444	1.53
2010	523652	0.68	2178450	1.45	263461	0.66	333304	2.27
2011	490210	0.63	1909236	1.23	304135	0.89	407326	2.48
2012	578615	0.72	1822488	1.08	262879	0.60	398694	2.35

 Table1: Domestic Consumption and Domestic Production of Sugar, 2005–12

Uganda produced 396,310.95MT of sugar while consumption stood at 329,896MT. And 49,810.55MT were exported leaving a balance of 16,604.4MT of sugar.' Out of the average surplus of 16,000MT, it was agreed that Uganda exports an average of 9000MT quarterly to the Kenvan market. According to the trade minister Amelia Kyambadde, the data collected by the verification mission clearly indicates that Uganda has surplus sugar, expunging all claims that Uganda is used as a conduit to export cheap sugar to Kenya. She said: 'The two countries have agreed to work closely to ensure good trade relations. Subsequent meetings will be held involving all players in the sugar sector' (Ismail Musa Ladu 2016).

Other African trade institutions such as the Common Market of East and South Africa (COMESA) support this sustenance and importation of products that have deficits in international trade. Citing the *East Africa* newspaper:

> Kenya has been pushed to open its market to more sugar from the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa in exchange for an extension to 2019 for the importation of duty-free sugar from outside the 19-member bloc. During the just concluded COMESA Summit in Antananarivo, Madagascar, members successfully negotiated for Kenya to allow more sugar to be imported from the region outside the country quotas during shortages. This quota allocation backdated to criterion was August 2016, giving COMESA members who produce sugar more unfettered access into the Kenyan market. The Summit also required Kenya to expedite the privatisation of sugar factories among other measures that improve the industry's competitiveness in order to end reliance on the COMESA safeguards. Kenya is now expected to give a scorecard on the status of

its sugar industry at the end of the safeguard. (Barigaba 2016)

Making economic decisions becomes difficult for a government when its intentions are perceived in different ways by stakeholders. When the government's intention is long-term, its short-term initiatives to allow smooth growth and development usually have challenges. This makes such governments vulnerable to local and external influences in order to avoid misunderstandings, hence a dilemma in decision making on policy development.

Summary and Conclusion

Developing countries have been under pressure when dealing with decision making for their growth and development. This is because they have internal and external influences that affect their decisions. Locally, opposition parties may be fronting their interests which may be different from those of the government. Production of primary commodities such as sugar may not be able to meet demand locally, and importation seems to be of disadvantage to local companies, farmers and the country at large. This makes decision making for the government difficult, thus affecting growth and development. Moreover, external influences also affect growth and development in developing countries. This is because external forces might have interests in these countries and thus control the way decisions are made in order to suit their own interests. In world institutions organisations, developed and countries have a greater chance of influencing decision making over their less developed and developing counterparts. This ultimately affects the way planning is done and the way decisions are made in those countries, resulting in sluggish development.

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
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Le franc CFA, la France et l'Afrique


Introduction

l'origine, le franc CFA signifiait franc des Colonies francaises d'Afrique. De nos jours, il a changé de signification. Pour les pays membres de la Banque centrale de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO), il a pris le nom de franc de la Communauté financière africaine. Pour les pays membres de la Banque centrale des États de l'Afrique centrale (BEAC), on l'appelle franc de la Coopération financière en Afrique centrale. Mais dans le code international ISO, le franc CFA n'existe pas. On le trouve sous les noms XOF (BCEAO) et XAF (BEAC).



La publication de notre livre¹, en septembre 2016, avait relancé le débat sur le franc CFA et l'avenir de la Zone franc. Mais ce débat ne date pas d'aujourd'hui, comme le montrent le livre publié par le CODESRIA en 2001 et surtout le fameux livre de Joseph Tchundiang Pouémi, publié il y a bientôt quarante ans². Comme le suggère le titre du livre, le débat sur le CFA est celui entre servitude et liberté. En effet, la monnaie est un problème souveraineté. fondamental de

Pays actuellement membres de la Zone franc en Afrique



Source : Banque de France, La Zone franc, note 127 : juillet 2010

N'est-ce pas Édouard Balladur, ancien Premier ministre français et architecte de la dévaluation de 1994, qui disait : « La monnaie n'est pas un sujet technique mais politique, qui touche à la souveraineté et à l'indépendance des Nations³ » ?

Et tout ce qui touche à la question de souveraineté d'un pays est éminemment politique. Voilà pourquoi le débat sur le franc CFA est avant tout politique. Ainsi, près de 60 ans après les « indépendances » formelles, 15 pays africains, dont 14 anciennes francaises. colonies continuent d'aliéner leur souveraineté et leur indépendance en utilisant une monnaie qui n'est pas la leur.

Comme le montre la carte, les pays utilisant le franc CFA forment une vaste zone géographique, allant de l'Afrique de l'Ouest à l'Afrique centrale. La plupart sont des producteurs de pétrole (Congo, Gabon, Guinée équatoriale, Tchad), situés dans le golfe de Guinée, où se trouveraient les plus grandes réserves de pétrole du continent. D'autres pays ont des produits stratégiques, comme l'uranium au Niger, exploité par la firme française AREVA.

Ces quelques chiffres montrent l'importance que ces pays revêtent pourlaFrance,tantéconomiquement que politiquement. C'est pourquoi elle continue à exercer sa tutelle sur ses ex-colonies et à mettre leurs économies au service de celle de la métropole.

Le franc CFA

Le franc des Colonies françaises d'Afrique (CFA) fut créé le 26 décembre 1945 par le gouvernement du général de Gaulle, au lendemain de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. L'objectif était de rétablir la souveraineté française sur l'ensemble de ses possessions africaines et de créer ainsi une zone protégée contre la concurrence étrangère. À partir de la fin des années 1950, les pays d'Afrique du Nord commencèrent à quitter la Zone franc, déclenchant ainsi le processus d'effritement de celleci, comme le montre le tableau ci-dessous.

À sa création, le franc CFA était un des instruments du pacte colonial, de même que les accords commerciaux. Selon Tchétché N'Guessan (2001:18-19),

> Le fondement originel de la Zone franc reste le pacte colonial... Le système des monnaies coloniales

procédait du même état d'esprit que celui ayant instauré les mécanismes commerciaux du pacte colonial : « Dans le pacte colonial, la colonie devient un moyen d'enrichir la métropole ainsi qu'un atout pour lui donner poids et prestige dans le concert des pays les plus forts. »

Après les « indépendances » formelles des années 1960, le pacte colonial s'est mué en pacte néocolonial. Autrement dit, les relations de domination sont restées

1945-1950	1950-1974	1975-1989	De 1990 à nos jours
	Afrique	le l'Ouest	-
	Création de l'UMOA		(UEMOA)
Dahomey (Bénin)	#	#	#
Haute-Volta (Burkina-Faso)	#	#	#
Côte d'Ivoire	#	#	#
Guinée Conakry	Sortie en 1960		
Mali	Sortie en 1962	Réintégration en 1984	#
Mauritanie	Sortie en 1973		
Niger	#	#	#
Sénégal	#	#	#
	Entrée du Togo en 1963	#	#
			Guinée-Bissau (Intégration 1997)
	Afrique	centrale	1
			(CEMAC)
Cameroun	#	#	#
République centrafricaine	#	#	#
République du Congo	#	#	#
Gabon	#	#	#
Tchad	#	#	#
		Intégration de la Guinée Équatoriale en 1985	#
	Afrique	australe	
Îles Comores	#	#	#
Madagascar	Sortie en 1973		
	Afrique	du Nord	
Algérie	Sortie en 1963		
Maroc	Sortie en 1957		
Tunisie	Sortie en 1958		

Tableau : Évolution de la Zone franc en Afrique

les mêmes, sauf que les nouveaux administrateurs des néocolonies sont des Africains, souvent choisis par la France ou bénéficiant de sa protection. Les économies africaines restent extraverties, c'està-dire tournées vers les besoins de l'ex-métropole.

Ainsi, le franc CFA et les accords commerciaux continuent de jouer le même rôle que pendant le pacte colonial. Cela permet aux entreprises françaises de jouir d'un quasi monopole dans l'accès aux ressources africaines et de la possibilité de rapatrier la totalité de leurs bénéfices vers la métropole.

Pourquoi le franc CFA est-il un instrument de servitude monétaire ?

Pour mieux comprendre le combat contre la servitude monétaire que constitue le franc CFA, il faut examiner les mécanismes de fonctionnement de la Zone franc. Celle-ci repose sur quatre piliers :

- 1. « Garantie » de convertibilité du franc CFA par la France.
- 2. Libre transférabilité entre les pays africains et la France. Mais pas entre les pays africains euxmêmes depuis la dévaluation de 1994.
- Taux de change fixe entre le franc CFA et le franc français (maintenant avec l'euro, depuis l'avènement de ce dernier en 1999).
- 4. Centralisation des réserves de change des pays africains à deux niveaux : au niveau des Banques centrales africaines (50 %) et au niveau du Trésor français (50 %) dans des comptes d'opérations ouverts au nom de ces Banques centrales.

Ces mécanismes de fonctionnement de la Zone franc constituent une

sorte de camisole de force pour les pays africains. En effet, ils ne peuvent prendre aucune décision sur le plan monétaire sans l'aval de la France. Celle-ci a des représentants au sein des conseils d'administration des Banques centrales et au sein des comités de politique monétaire (CPM).

Dans la zone BCEAO, c'est désormais le CPM qui définit la politique monétaire, à la place du Conseil des ministres de l'Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA). Le représentant français au sein du CPM a une voix délibérative, comme les représentants des pays africains, mais le président de la Commission de l'UEMOA n'a qu'une voix consultative !

En fait, le franc CFA n'est pas seulement un instrument de servitude monétaire, mais également un outil de contrôle économique et politique sur les pays africains.

Déconstruire les mythes du franc CFA

Malgré les mécanismes de fonctionnement ci-dessus, on fait croire aux Africains que le franc CFA est « bon » pour eux et peut contribuer à leur développement. Cette affirmation découle d'un certain nombre de mythes.

Le premier de ces mythes est que le franc CFA est une « monnaie africaine ». L'ex-ministre français de l'Économie et des Finances, Michel Sapin, l'avait réaffirmé lors de la réunion des ministres des pays membres de la Zone franc, en avril 2017 à Abidjan : « Le franc CFA, quel que soit son nom, est la monnaie des Africains... Ce n'est pas la monnaie de la France. C'est une monnaie qui a été construite par les Africains et pour les Africains, et qui est gérée, aujourd'hui, par les Africains⁴. »

Si c'est une « monnaie africaine », pourquoi le dire avec tant d'insistance ? Et pourquoi serait-ce un ministre français qui viendrait le rappeler aux Africains, chez eux, de surcroît ?

En réalité, le franc CFA n'est pas une monnaie africaine et ne l'a jamais été. En fait, comme le dit si bien Joseph Tchundjang Pouémi, déjà cité, « La France est le seul pays au monde à avoir réussi l'extraordinaire exploit de faire circuler sa monnaie, et rien que sa monnaie, dans des pays politiquement libres ».

Cette affirmation de Pouémi a été illustrée par la dévaluation de 1994, qui a été décidée par la France, avec le soutien du Fonds monétaire international (FMI), en dépit des objections des présidents et chefs de gouvernement africains.

Un autre mythe véhiculé par les partisans de la Zone franc et du franc CFA est qu'ils sont facteurs de « stabilité » pour les pays africains, une « stabilité » indispensable pour attirer les capitaux et stimuler la croissance. Mais « stabilité » au bénéfice de qui ? Sans aucun doute au bénéfice des entreprises françaises et européennes qui viennent piller les pays africains sans courir aucun risque de change et ont toute latitude pour transférer la totalité de leurs profits en France et dans les paradis fiscaux.

Dans la crise actuelle du capitalisme, et surtout de la zone euro, les pays africains du franc CFA constituent une véritable zone de rentabilité maximale des investissements et d'accès presque gratuit aux ressources naturelles à cause des mécanismes de fonctionnement de la Zone franc. Au nom de la « stabilité », on oblige les Banques centrales africaines poursuivre des à politiques monétaires restrictives qui étouffent leurs pays, surtout les petites et moyennes entreprises (PME) qui constituent le principal tissu industriel de ces pays. Donc, pour les pays africains, le franc CFA est un des principaux freins au développement économique et social. Ces pays ont les indicateurs de développement humain les plus faibles du monde, selon les classifications du Programme Nations des unies pour le développement (PNUD).

Parmi les 15 pays de la Zone franc, 11 sont classés comme « pays les moins avancés » (PMA) par les Nations unies.

La France et l'Afrique

À la lumière de ce qui précède, on comprend mieux pourquoi la France continue de resserrer sa tutelle sur ses ex-colonies. Cette tutelle permet à la France de :

- continuer à jouir du statut de « grande puissance » et parler au nom des pays africains au Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies;
- contrebalancer le poids de l'Allemagne en Europe et jouer ainsi comme « l'égal » de celleci sur l'échiquier européen.

Sans la domination des ex-colonies, la France aurait le même statut que la Grande-Bretagne, voire l'Italie.

L'Afrique : « avenir de la France » ?

Au-delà des ex-colonies, la France cherche à étendre son influence partout en Afrique. L'un de ces instruments est la francophonie, qui est une courroie de transmission de la langue et de la culture françaises. C'est ainsi que des ex-colonies portugaises (Angola, Guinée-Bissau, Mozambique), ou espagnoles (Guinée équatoriale), sont membres de la francophonie.

La France cherche à se servir de la francophonie pour tisser des liens économiques étroits avec les pays membres. D'où la création de ce qu'elle appelle la « francophonie économique ».

En fait, cette extension de la francophonie fait partie d'une stratégie globale dans laquelle l'Afrique détiendrait les solutions à la crise du capitalisme.

En octobre 2013, le Sénat français avait publié un rapport qui affirmait que l'Afrique était « l'avenir de la France⁵».

Tout récemment, le 28 août 2017, devant les ambassadeurs de son pays réunis à l'Élysée, le président français Emmanuel Macron a dit « qu'une bonne partie de l'avenir du monde se joue en Afrique ». C'est dans ce contexte qu'il a créé un Conseil présidentiel sur l'Afrique (CPA), une nouvelle version de la Françafrique !

Son prédécesseur François Hollande avait aussi créé une structure, appelée AfricaFrance, avec à sa tête Lionel Zinsou, le Franco-Béninois, éphémère Premier ministre de Yayi Boni et candidat à l'élection présidentielle du Bénin.

Zinsou était membre de l'équipe qui a produit le rapport Védrine, du nom de Monsieur Hubert Védrine, ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères de François Mitterrand dans les années 1980-1990. Ce rapport préconise l'extension de la Zone franc à d'autres pays africains. L'équipe qui a produit le rapport comprenait Hubert Védrine, Tidjane Thiam, Lionel Zinsou et Jean-Michel Severino, entre autres. Le projet avait été entériné par les chefs d'État africains et français, lors du Sommet « Paix et Sécurité » organisé à l'Élysée en décembre 2013.

Les opérations de la fondation AfricaFrance ont commencé en février 2015. Elle rassemble des États, des entreprises, des collectivités locales, des associations et des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche.

L'un des objectifs majeurs de la fondation AfricaFrance est la formation de jeunes leaders africains (Young Leader), appelés à perpétuer la domination de leurs pays par la France. En cela, la France copie sur les États-Unis, avec le projet YALI (Young African Leadership Initiative) lancé par le président Obama.

Ces projets visent à former de futurs dirigeants africains dont le rôle serait de protéger les intérêts économiques et stratégiques de l'impérialisme occidental contre ceux de leurs propres pays et de l'Afrique.

Cet intérêt de la France pour l'Afrique est largement partagé par l'Union européenne, qui cherche à imposer les accords de « libre-échange » dits accords de partenariat économique (APE).

Les États-Unis partagent également cet intérêt pour l'Afrique, ce qui explique le projet Africom dont le but est d'installer des bases militaires permanentes et des facilités sur le sol africain en vue de protéger les intérêts des multinationales US investissant dans le pétrole et le gaz, surtout dans la région du golfe de Guinée.

Le véritable objectif de la France, des États-Unis et de l'Union européenne est de mettre la main sur les immenses ressources du continent africain. Ce n'est pas la sécurité, encore moins le « développement » de l'Afrique qui les préoccupe. On le voit bien, avec tous les moyens employés pour fermer la route de l'Europe et des États-Unis aux jeunes Africains. Comme le dit si bien le professeur Samir Amin, les pays occidentaux « aiment » l'Afrique pour ses ressources, mais sans ses peuples !

Conclusion

Le débat sur le franc CFA ne date pas d'aujourd'hui.

Le franc CFA est un instrument de servitude et un des piliers du pacte néocolonial.

Le débat sur le franc CFA est celui entre servitude et souveraineté, non seulement monétaire, mais également économique.

Par le franc CFA, les accords commerciaux et la francophonie, la France cherche à étendre partout son influence sur le continent africain, présenté comme la solution à la crise du capitalisme.

L'offensive politique et économique est appuyée par une offensive militaire, illustrée par de multiples interventions et des bases militaires.

Le combat contre le franc CFA fait partie du combat pour la seconde indépendance de l'Afrique : l'indépendance économique.

C'est également un combat pour une véritable décolonisation des esprits.

C'est un combat à mener ici et maintenant. Il ne peut être différé.

Si ce n'est pas maintenant, QUAND ?

Si ce n'est pas nous, QUI ?

Notes

- 1. Sortir l'Afrique de la servitude monétaire. À qui profite le franc CFA ?, Paris, La Dispute, 2016.
- 2. L'avenir de la Zone franc. Perspectives africaines (dir. M. Kassé et H. Ben Hammouda), CODESRIA et Karthala, 2001; Joseph Tchundjang Pouémi, Monnaie, servitude et liberté : la répression monétaire de l'Afrique, Jeune Afrique, 1980. Il faut ajouter à cette liste la conférence internationale sur l'avenir de la Zone franc, organisée du 11 au 13 octobre 2012 à Dakar, par ARCADE et le CODESRIA, dont les actes sont publiés en version anglaise sous le titre « Wither the Franc Zone in Africa ? », disponible à la librairie du CODESRIA.
- 3. Le Monde, 9 février 1990.
- 4. Le Soleil, Dakar, 18 avril 2017, p. 9.
- 5. Sénat français, Rapport d'information 104, Paris, 29 octobre 2013

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Informal Entrepreneurship: Category of Governance or Practice of democracy?'

Introduction

have been on the lookout for research papers written by Africans reflecting on 'Informal Entrepreneurship'. My impression was that since the informal economy is enormous and pervasive in Africa (as well as of course in other countries in the developing world), African scholarship would be leading the charge in researching the dynamics of the informal economy. After all, it is the work of Keith Hart (1973) which highlighted informal employment dynamics from his anthropological studies in Nima, Ghana. In my considered view, Africa should be leading the scholarship on how its people operate and create alternative economic livelihoods. I must say with disappointment that my search for 'informal entrepreneurship' has led me to former Soviet Union countries and to researchers outside of Africa. The phrase 'informal entrepreneurship', it appears, has not yet caught the imagination of many African researchers who appear still stuck with 'informal sector' and 'informal economy' as their key concepts.

The implied questions in this article are both ontological and epistemological. If African governments are catching up with the policy discourse of 'small businesses' and 'entrepreneurship', where or whom are they looking at? Whom do they refer to as an **Robert Nyakuwa** Stellenbosch University Matieland/South Africa

'entrepreneur'? Is an entrepreneur in the African context those people with NGO-sponsored fancy laptops in places suffixed with 'hub' or the 40-year-old repairing shoes by the street corner who has provided that service consistently for the past ten years? In both public and academic discourses from Africa, those participating in the 'informal economy' are not described as entrepreneurs but rather disparagingly as 'traders', 'vendors', 'survivalist informals' who provide unfair competition to the 'formal' businesses. The label 'entrepreneur', it appears, is reserved for those that are in 'IT hubs' or from some seductively named foreign funded programme. The word 'entrepreneur' in Afri-ca does not fit where exactly entrepreneurship is alive and taking place: in the informal economies of Africa.

Note that I refer to 'informal economies' simply because there is no single informal economy in any African country; there economies, different are as people occupy different spaces doing different things, with different dynamics involved. Entrepreneurship in Africa is not dressed in suits and goggles but

in carts and football jerseys in different spaces, offices, streets, old buildings, disused buildings, and behind houses, to name only a few places. The Silicon Valley of Africa, it appears, is not about technology geeks and venture capitalists, but the daily struggles of creating alternative economic spaces, running away from the ambivalence, negligence and apathy of African governments, or in some cases hoping someone 'up there' can listen to the need for governments to realise they need to be sensitive when their citizens question the logic and legitimacy of the 'cut and paste' institutions they build, incongruent to the lived realities of their citizens.

In this article, I reflect on the interactions between the state and citizens within the informal economic space. Ι question whether it is ideal for development policies to look at informal spaces ungoverned spaces which as governments should regulate in the name of fulfilling governance mandates. Or alternatively, whether the pervasive nature of informality suggests there are spaces where the state, with its governance machinery, must choose not to interfere with as an act of widening the democratic space and choices for its citizens. Would the pervasive nature of the informal economic spaces be a true expression of economic democracy and participation by citizens?

'Informal Sector' as a Pejorative Term

Despite the informal economy contributing upwards of 60 per cent in employment creation and Gross Domestic Product of many African countries, the phrase 'Informal Sector', as used in policy and academic circles, has always carried the burden of being the inferior, substandard and undesirable part of the economy compared to the ideal 'tax paying' and 'developmental' formal sector. Herrle and Fokdal (2011) argue that the idea of informality itself has always been in proximity with poverty and the 'survival economy'. Samers (2005:875) argues that informality is imbued with 'exotic' 'mysterious' properties associated with 'minorities and immigrants'. Keith Hart himself, who is 'credited' with coming up with the phrase 'informal sector', in his own recent writings has either been referencing the 'informal sector' in quotation marks or totally distancing himself from the notion, preferring to refer to the 'informal economy' instead. His argument for doing this is that, as an anthropologist, his experience in Nima, Ghana was not a contest or comparison between those who worked in the formal against those in the informal 'sector', but was about how people lived 'out of the circumstances of their everyday lives' (Hart 2005: 8) and in other cases where those in the formal sphere would 'stabilize' their incomes out of supplementary activities in the informal economy. This reality showed that those who were deemed 'unemployed' were not really 'unemployed' as they had alternative sources of work and income. 'Accra's poor were not unemployed. They worked, often casually, for erratic and generally returns; but they low were definitely working.' He concludes:

'The informal economy was the self-organising energies of people excluded by the exigencies of state rule' (ibid.: 7-8).

In writings on informal economic activities by several African researchers, they unfortunately have reproduced the 'Logocentric thinking' (Derrida 1978) characte-rised by hierarchical binary thinking between oppositional concepts such as Formal (good/ideal) and Informal (bad/inferior). Below, I list some deficit-oriented expressions on the informal economy reproduced by researchers from various articles:

- illegal
- inefficient
- does not contribute to development
- job insecurity
- low productivity
- underpayment
- street economy
- · precarious jobs
- survivalist
- petty trading
- street vending and struggle/ street peddlers
- 'too much competition'
- 'lack of economic skills'
- 'black market/residual economy/ grey economy'.

It is the uncritical reproduction and use of these conceptions that are problematic. In a lot of cases, they are used simply to confirm and reproduce other logics, and do not question whether they correctly represent the realities of the people and contexts studied. The interchange between the use of 'informal sector' and 'informal economy' in a lot of these writings is another sign that African scholars are not critically engaging with such ideas and are yet more willing

to appropriate and reproduce them. If Keith Hart has been distancing himself from the reference to 'informal sector' since his writings in 1985, 'Popularity as a jargon word has not helped the informal economy/sector to acquire а measure of analytical precision' (Hart 1985: 55); 'I had no ambition to coin a concept, just to insert a particular vision of irregular economic activity' (Hart 2009), he further explains. According to him, 'the informal sector allowed academics and bureaucrats to incorporate the teeming street life of exotic cities into their abstract models without having to confront the specificity of what people were really up to' (Hart 2005:10). It is an embarrassment that African scholars continue to refer to their own reality as 'informal sector' in the face of such deep reflections and push back from someone who can be regarded as an important thinker and writer on informality.

Entrepreneurship as a Contested Idea

Rather than defining entrepreneurship, which after all seems to be an extremely problematic endeavour, we have adopted a discourse approach whereby language is seen not only as a way of sending messages but also as a way of constructing – or producing – the world of entrepreneurship (Gartner 1990: 28).

Entrepreneurs are seen as moderndav economic saviours and economic heroes. One does not need to go further than read daily newspapers where words like maverick, innovator, millionaire, flamboyant, visionary etc. are associated with entrepreneurs. Of interest is that the word entrepreneur is now myopically synonymous with the ideal type, positive attributes of life.

To open the entrepreneurship black box, it takes conceptually operating at a level beyond the functionalistic positivist approaches that created the concept. This is why postmodern writers resort to discourse analysis tools to argue that entrepreneur/entrepreneurship are concepts that celebrate Western, white male dominance against women, minorities and nonWestern civilisations. The most prolific writers on entrepreneurship are American researchers and it is argued that the concept retraces the conquering domination of the white male of the American sub-continent, and claims are awash in the political discourse of America having been born from 'entrepreneurial immigrant ancestors'. The entrepreneurship concept celebrates the heroism associated with this American capitalism (see Wellington and Zandvakili 2006; Ogbor 2000). This is also illustrated by sentiments expressed to an exclusively white audience in America in a video posted online by The Atlantic. The picture below shows a screenshot of part of the video:

Figure 1: Entrepreneurship Celebrating Western Whiteness



Source: Twitter, accessed 22 November 2016 (subtitles are original).

Following on the logocentric thinking notion, if entrepreneurship represents the positive and takes place in the formal economy, as argued, then the opposite of that would be whatever happens in the informal economy. An illustration of the implied conceptual opposites is given in Table 1.


Table 1: Entrepreneurship Binary Logic

Entrepreneurship Definitional Words	Informal Economy = Opposites	
innovation	routine, traditional	
creation	destruction	
risk taking	risk avoidance	
profit	non-profit	
strategic	ill-advised	
dynamic	static, passive	
development	decline	

Source: Adapted from Berglund and Johansson (2007:)

Whatever definition of entrepreneurship one may prefer, unless the entrepreneurship itself is called into question, the buzzwords used to describe it are always positive and imbued with ideals of 'goodness' to society and the economic wellbeing of countries. Contrast this with the deficit-orientation and proximity to poverty associated with informality highlighted above. I will not burden you with definitions of entrepreneurship, suffice to intimate you with some of the words associated with the concept.

Why informal entrepreneurship?



Evolution of the Concept of Informality

The concept of informality has gone through a process of evolution, from the beginning of industrialisation to the present. Usually the conceptual changes and thinking behind such evolution are totally ignored as researchers rush to appropriate buzz-words. However, a closer reading of this history shows an incremental intellectual evolution. In recent times, informality in the economic sphere is now being referred to as informal entrepreneurship. This comes after a realisation that formal and informal are not a question of black or white or mutually exclusive, but that the lived experiences of people show that people are placed differently along a continuum between the extreme poles of formal and informal. Differences between formal and informal economies must not be seen as 'sectors' or boxes but a flow with patches that have shades of grey.

There are different degrees of informality as there are differences in formality. Each time the government talks about 'deregulation', it simply means some degree of informality within the so-called formal economy. Somehow, in this logic, it seems acceptable for 'formal' enterprises to engage in informal practices, such as when cellphone companies use street traders to sell their airtime/data cards. They call this innovation. But the same street trader selling the airtime/data at a well thought out street corner with a significant flow of human and vehicular traffic - that is called precarious work! Informality as a practice is ubiquitous and exists in the formal economy, within bureaucracies, civil society, etc.

There is still a need to understand how informal entrepreneurs work and how they place themselves in particular economic spaces. As a researcher, I am disappointed that a lot of this kind of research and theorisation is happening in places such as Eastern and Western Europe – yet Africa has pervasive informality.

Informal Entrepreneurship and the State

When the informal is illegal, the obvious response is to crack down on rule-breakers; but the danger here is that such moves will be merely cosmetic – the biggest offenders will escape and the law will be made to appear an ass (Hart 2005: 16).

Most informal economic activities have simply been dismissed as illegal. However, I have not seen many research papers (as yet) from Africa that seek to establish the rationale of the entrepreneurs on how they operate and continue to operate informally. Without good research, academics are advising governments with strategies that will continue not to work. I would want to explore the idea that operating informally is a critique by citizens on the illegitimacy of state institutions and how the affairs of the state have been handled.

One of my respondents said to me 'We are punished for being good citizens'. The entrepreneur had formalised his business, employed an accountant to ensure tax compliance but the tax authorities kept coming to him that the business owed them money, including a 100 per cent charge as penalties. The entrepreneur decided to deformalise his business, after trying to operate formally for some years, hence his sentiments above.

This is a typical example where the incongruence of state institutions incentivises entrepreneurs to operate informally when they would rather be formalised. My respondents particularly did not like the attitudes shown to them by tax authorities. The authorities were bullies, know-it-alls, insensitive and very rude to the informal entrepreneurs that interacted with them.

In the policy discourse, there is much talk about improving laws and providing information packs and more training for entrepreneurs know the formalisation to processes. The same governments have not invested in the attitudes of those that interface with entrepreneurs, neither do they seek to reassure entrepreneurs of the moral necessity of continued tax compliance. The need to pay tax is taken for granted as a legal requirement, but does that make that particular law (or thinking behind the legislation) socially legitimate in the eyes of the entrepreneur? Do informal entrepreneurs have the right to question the legitimacy of tax laws, especially if the state is not at all involved in the process in which the entrepreneurs create and run their businesses? The right to impose taxes by the state has not really been put under scrutiny in the structure of the modern African state, and it is one notion which citizens are expected to accept without question.

The deformalisation of businesses is a phenomenon I am yet to see written about and suggested as a reality in particular contexts. The assumption is that once formalised, the story ends there, but reality is showing otherwise. Deformalisation is, in this case acts of protesting against terrible treatment and illegitimacy of state 'rules of the game'. Deformalising is a reverse process where businesses that were legally compliant become non-compliant in some legal respects, especially taxation. Informal entrepreneurs do not necessarily have the time, capacity and skills to lobby for change in policies but part of the continued perversity of informality is institutional incongruence and illegitimacy.

The assumption that all informal entrepreneurs do not pay taxes or contribute to the development of their countries is simply false. My study has shown that at different times or phases in the development of the enterprise, entrepreneurs comply with all tax obligations for various strategic reasons. However, the apathy and misuse of taxes by state institutions and politicians have also incentivised entrepreneurs to quietly protest by deformalising their businesses. In Zimbabwe for example, most stateowned vehicles used for personal business by officials do not pay for toll gates, even when they are not on state business. Such lack of honesty and responsibility at the individual politician or bureaucrat level is what entrepreneurs observe and loathe. Consciously or otherwise, they simply mirror such behaviour by withdrawing or not fulfilling all their tax obligations.

Informal entrepreneurs have wrongly been identified as poor and not well educated. The continued collapse of formal economies has pushed young graduates especially

into informality. The capacity to analyse policies and engage in sophisticated economic processes, such as IT-based transactions, is there. The state cannot assume that there are no consequences for all their elitist policies and Deformalisation misgovernance. of businesses is one of the ways entrepreneurs are protesting. James Scott (1985) illustrated the significance of the 'weapons of the weak'. Deformalisation should be seen as one such weapon.

My argument here is based on data that shows that the trajectory of formalisation does not flow only from informal to formal as is usually reasoned in a lot of research and policy papers. My study shows that informal entrepreneurs do strategically deformalise their businesses as well, and their reasons for doing so, according to my data, are a political protest. It is this protest mentality that allows them to rationalise the moral questions

against not paying taxes.

Reflections: Governance Versus Democracy

The suggestion that governments must come up with more and better policies to 'formalise' the informal is essentially that the informal economic space should be subject to governance by the state. The puzzle to this thinking is reflecting on why informality has been present in both developed and developing different countries in forms. Should informality be regulated in 'developing' communities and yet expect less or no regulation when it comes to 'developed' communities? For example, a lot of internet-based commerce is not regulated or is untaxed in developed countries, and this is a type of informality. The suggestion here is for us to think carefully about

whether more state laws in informal economic spaces unaccompanied by increased accountability and legitimacy of the state itself will result in a net good for society.

The informal economy is heterogenous and its pervasive nature shows the possibility of skills mixture and the presence of institutional intermediaries that can advise informal entrepreneurs on how to behave/react when certain legal changes are made. In some contexts, informal entrepreneurs are well informed about the various laws and policies and it is simply not true of all contexts that actors are not well informed. Statedriven formalisation becomes a rat race since formalisation alone is not the end of the story. Formalisation, in fact more specifically tax compliance, cannot be decoupled from the underlying morality, accountability and legitimacy of state institutions. The picture of what drives people to formalise their enterprises is more complicated and cannot be won by resort to legality alone. With moral ambiguity by state institutions, it becomes more difficult to convince protesting informal entrepreneurs to formalise, in other words to live within the law when the state itself abuses or expediently ignores the provisions of the same laws.

Conclusion

It may be easy to dismiss my arguments above as anarchist and that no country can run without law and order. Unfortunately, it is already happening, as arguments in this article are based on the lived reality of informal entrepreneurs. African governments cannot continue coming up with and sustaining illegitimate institutions and still not expect consequences from their actions or inactions. I have tried to argue that informal entrepreneurship can be seen as a 'weapon of the weak', a weapon of 'hidden dissent' by citizens. A closer look at different types of informal entrepreneurship shows that there are some informal entrepreneurs that are strategically deformalising their businesses largely against state institutional illegitimacy and opaque governance. Deformalising is a reverse process where businesses that were legally compliant, become non-compliant in some legal respects, especially taxation. I have argued that formalisation cannot be achieved by resort to legality when states conveniently ignore the same legal statutes.

The state cannot govern informal economies without improving on accountability, inclusion and legitimacy. As it already exists outside the law, the informal economy cannot be tamed by more laws but by appealing to morality and the greater good. Appealing to morality cannot be achieved by a state that is not sensitive to the democratic needs of sections of its citizens and accountable as to how taxes are used. The greater sentiment from informal entrepreneurs is that the state must not expect to 'reap where it didn't sow'.

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What is Development?

esphina Rukato concludes a review of a recent book L dealing with development in Africa with the following statement: 'It is hoped that further work is undertaken to further unpack development _ what is development – and propose comprehensively what should practically be done to advance effective development in Africa'. Many people are doing just that. Tony Binns, Kenneth Lynch and Etienne Nel (2017) recently edited The Routledge Handbook of African handbook Development. The contains some insightful chapters on the notion of development in the context of Africa. And there is also the book by Busani Mpofu and Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2019) Rethinking and Unthinking Development, Inequality and Poverty in Southern Africa. I also have a chapter in that book which has informed this piece.

The question of 'what is development?' has been in the minds of many for decades. I am among those who are continuously trying to unpack this question, more from the perspective of Africa. For instance, Rukato's (forthcoming) review referred to in the opening paragraph is of a book I have edited focusing on inclusive development in Africa. Rukato says:

> The book analyses Africa's development trajectory, highlighting the challenges of a

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continent negatively affected by ineffective development frameworks, weak leadership, ineffective governance and skewed and exploitative global dynamics. In some areas, the book offers possible strategies for overcoming these challenges.

Hugo Slim published an article titled 'What is development' in 1995. Much earlier, in 1974, Gunnar Myrdal had published an article with the same title. Slim (1995: 143) says that 'development is essentially about change: not just any change, but a definite improvement - a change for the better. At the same time, development is also about continuity'. Myrdal (1974: 735) argued that 'development must be understood as the movement upward of the entire social system, where there is circular causation between conditions and changes with cumulative effects'. Other important books on this complex subject are those by Amartya Sen and Claude Ake (1996), which view development as involving those that must benefit from development; something Julius Nyerere had said already in 1968:

For real development means growth of people. If real

development is to take place the people have to be involved.

There are also numerous blogs, opinion articles, book chapters and journal articles that present perspectives on what development is or is not. For instance, in a 2009 book edited by Mikko Perkiö, Marja-Liisa Swantz (2009: 35) concludes her chapter with a suggestion that 'we need to broaden our concept of development to take human and social development as the basic concept, even when studies of development deal with economic and technical advances'.

Scholars continue to wrestle with the idea and practice of "development" especially with regard to countries of the global South. Europe, as Kwesi Kwaa Prah (2006: 175) discusses, was concerned with the notion of development as 'part of the philosophical assumptions of the European Enlightenment', as an example. This Enlightenment – the age of reason – can be viewed as 'a pedagogical movement led by the philosophers to build a new scientifically ordered discourse of nature, authority, social existence and of virtually everything in the universe' (Lushaba 2006: 6). This is linked to the idea of modernity which has been critiqued by many on different grounds. Lwazi Lushaba (2006: 3), for instance, is of the view that 'Africa cannot possibly develop by modernizsing or becoming like the modern west'.

It is in this context that many argue that development cannot be equated to modernity – or rather modernity is not an appropriate form of development that Africa needs.

From the 1960s, Japan and the so-called Asian Tigers (Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea) grew rapidly in economic terms and in social in development resulting the idea of a developmental state. A developmental state is a state that is preoccupied with development and vigorously pursues development, working in tandem with other sectors of society. Post-independent Africa was understandably very preoccupied with development, and some argue that certain countries in Africa became developmental states in the 1980s before the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) decimated development in Africa.

However, as many have argued, it is not often clear what is referred to when talking of development in different contexts. Linked to that is what has influenced the conceptualisation of and approaches to development. In the handbook referred to above, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, for instance, discusses in detail the Truman and Bandung versions of development, and views development as 'partly a struggle to end dependency and broadly a re-humanising process after long years of denied humanity'.

How development should be pursued in Africa has been informed by conceptions of how other regions have pursued development. In short, development (or lack thereof) and/ or underdevelopment are normally viewed through Eurocentric lenses. It is also often forgotten that the so-called development of the West was based on the exploitation of the Third World, and Africa in particular, as Walter Rodney (1973) explained. To deal with the Eurocentric conception of development, hierarchies that characterise relations should be dismantled as decolonial scholars have been arguing. In addition, for Africa, African agency should be accentuated as Afrocentric scholars argue. African agency would greatly assist in ensuring the 'rehumanising process' that Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni talks about.

There is also a more fundamental issue: Is development similar to progress? Arguably, as Kwesi Kwaaa Prah (2006) demonstrates, the preoccupation of many countries and/or regions has historically been about progress. Prah (2006: 178) explains that 'in many African languages, the idea of progress is metaphorically interpreted as a notion of movement forward, or backwards to denote stagnation or retrogression'. Prah (2006) confirms that indeed in various indigenous African languages, using the examples of what the Ga, the Akan, the Xhosa, the Luo and the Senufo say when referring to progress, 'the idea of progress translates easily as development'.

The concept of development in Africa, which often hinges and is determined by the notion of 'good governance' and respect for human rights, has for years been exogenously imposed on African governments. As many others have argued, concepts such as civilisation, development, globalisation and democratisation are some of the buzzwords that have been used and perverted by the West to make the 'Other' aspire to be like them. Insightfully, Elísio Macamo deals with the issue of the correlation between development and democracy in a recent edition of CODESRIA Bulletin (Nos 1 & 2, 2017). The West uses the buzzwords

referred to as a barometer to judge other societies according to Western standards which are supposed to be the norm and yardstick for all societies, as the works of Marimba Ani and others demonstrate.

As many thinkers acknowledge, development is relative, and is also subjective. Yash Tandon (2015: 145) is of the view that 'a major challenge for the theoreticians of not only the global south but also of the marginalised peoples and sub-nationalists of the north is to provide an alternative definition of development'. Serge Latouche (1993:460) argues that 'development has been and still is the Westernization of the world' while Aram Ziai (2009:198) sees 'development [as] an empty signifier that can be filled with almost any content'.

Aram Ziai has also argued that the conceptof development has depoliticised Eurocentric and authoritarian implications – even arguing that the concept of development should be abandoned. This is linked to the notion of post-development which argues that development practice and the concept of development reflects Western hegemony, and that development projects and theories of development are not to the benefit of the developing world. Post-development thinking has, like development (or development theory), been critiqued for being not theoretically developed and for being uneven. Ziai (2013:126), for instance, makes a point that 'post-development has been widely criticised ... for homogenising development and neglecting its positive aspects, for romanticising local communities and legitimising oppressive traditions, and for being just as paternalistic as the chastised development experts'.

Coming to the discourses of/

development, Arturo on Escobar (1995: 53) submits that 'development is thus a very real historical formation, albeit articulated around an artificial (underdevelopment) construct and upon a certain materiality conditions baptised (the as underdevelopment), which must be conceptualised in different ways if the power of the development discourse is to be challenged or displaced'. Further, Escobar (1995: 104) argues that 'the discourse of development is not merely an ideology that has little to do with the real world nor is it an apparatus produced by those in power in order to hide another, more basic truth, namely, the crude reality of the dollar sign. The development discourse has crystallised in contribute practices that to regulating the everyday goings and comings of people in the Third World'; hence, Escobar's argument that when development is properly conceptualised it has been happening for a long time and driven by the people themselves from below.

Issa Shivji (2006), in the context of Africa, periodises development discourse into: 1) the age of developmentalism (the 1960s and 1970s); 2) Africa's lost decade (the 1980s); and 3) the 'age of globalisation' (which is ongoing). In the age of developmentalism. development was a process of class struggle. During Africa's lost decade, the 'neo-liberal package' (i.e. SAPs) reigned supreme. The 'age of globalisation' was accompanied by pan-Africanist resistance and the discourse sees no role for the (developmental) state. Thandika Mkandawire (2011:7), on the other hand, breaks down development discourse since World War II into two parts:

Almost from its very inception, the post-World War II development discourse has had two strands: the Truman version, for which development involved both geopolitical considerations and humanitarianism, and the 'Bandung Conference' version that saw development in terms of 'catching up', emancipation and 'the right to development'.

With regard to development theory, Ziai (2013:124-5) explains that 'development theory has two roots: nineteenth-century nineteenthevolutionism and century social technology. Evolutionism assumed that social change in societies proceeds according to a universal pattern while social technology claimed that social interventions based on expert knowledge (possessed by a privileged group that acts as a trustee for the common good) are necessary to achieve positive social change. Both roots can be found in twentieth-century development theory'. Prah (2006: 185), on the other hand, opines that 'Western post-2nd World War development theory can be historically identified and periodised as a three-phased phenomenology from the . . . hegemony of Modernisation theorists of the 1950s and 60s, the Dependencia and the Neo-marxian paradigms of the 60s and 70s, to IMF Adjustment packages of the late 70s and 80s. Today, neo-liberal paradigms hold sway'. It is worth highlighting that Modernisation theories were associated with functionalism, the 'idea [which] saw societies as harmonised and integrated systems' (Prah 2006).

Another important issue relates to the so-called 'Right to Development'. As Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo (2002:85) puts it, 'development should be guided and supported within the framework of rights as defined by

the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted by the Organization of the African Unity (OAU) in 1981. They include: political and civil rights; economic and social rights; and the rights of peoples. Peoples' rights include from discrimination, freedom oppression, and exploitation; and the right to self-determination, national and international peace and security and a satisfactory environment for economic and social development'. A new book by Seges Kamga (2018) goes into a lot of detail on relevant history and debates regarding the notion of the 'Right to Development'.

Essentially, Kamga (2018) as explains, soon after political independence in Africa, African countries acknowledged that development in Africa was affected by global inequities characterised by unfair trade rules, global postcolonial arrangements through various global institutions, etc. As a response, developing countries and African countries in particular gathered in the G77 and called for the establishment of the New International Order that would enable inclusive development. In 1967 in Algiers, Dudu Tiam, the then Minister of Foreign Affair of Senegal, made a statement that 'development is human right'. Kamga (2017) argues that the 'right to development' concept is a legal concept in the fight against poverty. It is a composite right made up of civil and political rights as well as socio-economic rights, all put together in the interest of human dignity. Arguably, the concept was introduced to academia by Keba M'baye (1972) in an inaugural lecture in Strasburg in France. In 1986, the declaration on the right to development was adopted by the United Nations. The right to development is now a recognised

human right, as Kamga indicates.

Although many argue that development is an entitlement (i.e. the right to development), many others reject the notion of right to development and argue that proponents of the right to development are making up a non-existing right. By and large, the controversy around the notion of the right to development is largely due to the fact that the international community is obliged under the discourse to provide development assistance as well as capacity to the developing world. It would indeed seem that the critical issue regarding the notion of the right to development has to do with why make development a right? Linked to this is the question of how different this approach is from the socio-economic rights approach. More fundamentally, should we not be problematising the notion of development more with the view of better understanding what kind of development Africa needs instead of declaring some amorphous development as a right?

Thandika Mkandawire is among those who hold the view that we have not fully understood what has constrained development, particularly economic and development in Africa. For the Mkandawire record. (2015)argues that attributing slow economic performance of African economies to neopatrimonialism as an example is problematic. As Mkandawire (2015:2) puts it, 'while neopatrimonialism can be used to describe different styles of exercising authority, idiosyncratic mannerisms of certain individual leaders. and social practices within states, the concept offers little analytical content and has no predictive value with respect to economic policy and performance'. Mkandawire (2015:3) describes 'neopatrimonialism [as] a marriage of tradition and modernity with an offspring whose hybridity generates a logic that has had devastating effects on African economies', and that it is factually incorrect that the African economy has not performed well as the neopatrimonialism logic suggests.

The issue should be: why economic development has not been fast enough? And the related question is: why has economic development not resulted in effective human development? As argued and shown in Gumede (2016;2018a; 2018b), human development in Africa remains very low. Looking at the period since 1980, as an example, Sub-Saharan Africa's Human Development Index (HDI) has remained comparatively too low, even compared to South Asia. Comparing Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, the point made above – that Africa remains behind other regions - is glaring. As argued elsewhere, the crisis of development in Africa is underpinned by the ideological and epistemological confusion and imposition that define the pursuit of development, justice and freedom. The pursuit of development has generally followed a pattern defined by the West in which a unilinear process is deemed sacrosanct.

As а project grounded in nationalism, African countries are expected to 'catch up' or achieve 'convergence' with the so-called developed countries, as Mkandawire (2011) has put it. This version of understanding development feeds into what Mkandawire (2011), discussed in Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni's 2012 Inaugural Professorial Lecture. calls the 'Truman Version of Developmentalism' where development is interpreted as the

Euro-American missionary task of developing the global South in general and Africa in particular. An uncritical acceptance of this definition of development has resulted in the subservience of the political elites in Africa to the subordination of 'politics as economics'. The demonisation of the state as an incapable agent of transformation gave way to the hegemony of the market as the more effective agent for the allocation of resources. The ascendance of neoliberal thought in development discourse has led to emphasis on the depoliticisation of development strategies, thus giving way to technocratic governance.

In conclusion, it is not surprising that Samir Amin (1990:67), for instance, argues for 'delinking'. According to him, in order for Third World countries to experience true development, they should 'delink' from the world capitalist system through adoption of new market strategies and values different from the so-called developed countries. Amin's hypothesis supposes that countries in the Third World can develop economically by changing approaches to production systems. It might very well be that we need to revisit ideas such as 'delinking' as we consider possibilities for true development to occur in Africa.

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
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Tributes

Pius Adesanmi: The Man Who Leaves and Lives

Death, captured in a box suspended in mid-air Slowly ascending to land on a rock too far to see. The phantom is bold Killing the scion of creativity and talent

A fallen branch

one of us can determine the frequency of death and predict the timing of its occurrence. You and I are slaves to the monster. Almighty death snatched away our precious jewel. Ikú d'óró, ikú sèkà. The death that cut Pius in his prime stings with sorrow. An irreplaceable man has gone. A silence descended upon me, a pregnant silence. I could not even recover to write this tribute, doing so only after request by friends and his family members. The sorrow is difficult to bear. The pain refuses to leave.

A branch has fallen Stricken down by Sango The god of thunder Stolen by death To appease Ògún, the god of iron Do you demand a sacrifice? Why not collect a chicken? Yes, death has violently collected an offering by violence A hawk sweeping the chicken off the ground Mother hen is powerless A sting of death that refused appeasement Orunmila, why do you look away?

No emissary to the forest

Toyin Falola

The University of Texas at Austin/USA

To prevent the Irókò from falling Killing the tallest tree in the jungle Şokotí, Alágbède Òrun Şokotí Şokotí forged and pounded metal, to create and destroy

Orphanage

It is my joy in life to find At every turning of the road The strong arm of a comrade kind To help me onward with my load.

And since I have no gold to give, And love alone must make amends, My only prayer is, while I live – God make me worthy of my friends.

Frank Dempster Sherman

We all are the bereaved. We are worthy of Adesanmi's friendship but he has turned us into orphans. Pius did not see himself as a spiritual father to any. In collecting a large number of followers, he did so to transform Africa. His name will always be associated with change. He became an influential scholar shaping the minds of thousands of people, creating models for others to follow. Very rapidly, his influence spread across the continent, as he spoke about the power of knowledge, spreading

words of comfort, addressing the relevance of resistance to power. He opened the way to a larger discourse on the limits of superstructure, while also creating a path to extensive reflections on the social and cultural formations of contemporary Africa. Focusing on quotidian lived experiences, he connected thousands of people with the bigger ambition of the application of modernity. Pius's energy and enthusiasm for everything that life had to offer was infectious and inspiring. Those who knew him would admire his strength, his passion, his resilience, his exuberance, and his adorably audacious character. I happen to be one of those. I always knew him as someone that could do anything - positive, creative, beautiful. He was fiercely proud of his heritage, and he would tell vivid stories of his childhood days in colourful, folkloric detail. I salute his immortal spirit and know that though he is with God now, his life force will be here on Earth with us forever.

Pius stood for something that is in short supply: he was a mentor to many people. He gave to others without asking for anything in return, thus generating a kind of moral authority. He had the power of conviction, the aura of incorruptibility. He spoke truth to power, unafraid of intimidation by those in power. He did not seek power, and was never beholden to it. He was a genuine human being. He believed in his words, and he did not utter them out of personal aggrandizement. He stood for what he knew to be true and just, and always. Like Amilcar Cabral, he saw the people as the core of nationalism, and he challenged them to stand up for their rights, to see themselves as having agency.

His death has thrown many into an orphanage. One orphan, Dr Samuel Oloruntoba, based in South Africa, wrote to me with tears in his eyes:

> I don't have a strong emotion to withstand this type of shock. At a point yesterday, I just lied down flat on the bare floor of my office to ask God how to cope with this. This has nothing to do with the plans that we had together but the void that has been left - on the ideals that he stood for, his mother, who served us pounded yam in their Ilorin home in July last year, his wife and daughter and the manner of the tragic death. I hit myself intermittently. Could I have seen a revelation and warned him not to go on this journey? I can't look at his pictures going around without feeling that a part of me is gone.

Ibrahim Odugbemi, one of his admirers, went into an agonising reflection:

The death of Oga Adesanmi makes me empathize with myself and all others of my species. We, these near-God beings created in God's image (Bible), sent to Earth as God's representatives (Qur'an), more than all other creatures, we have so many features of God - knowledge (of art, science, technology etc.), spirituality/faith (which is all that Angels have, and where they compete fiercely with us), free will (isn't God Aseyowun?). But we don't have the capacity to live forever in this world.

Dr Bode Ibironke of Rutgers University, an interlocutor, was seized with fear:

> The last time I saw Pius was in Michigan, at a conference organized by Ken Harrow. We were on the same panel. He made everyone laugh as he threaded together satirical narrative and theoretical arguments. His charm, his brilliance, his confidence, and his special skill in human connection made him so attractive. It was unthinkable to contemplate his disappearance. How could one not tremble? What sort of gift is life when it's never really our own?

As I reflect on the words of the orphans, I am reminded once again of the danger that death brings to the world:

Iku bola je! Iku bara je! Iku ge wa l'ododo eve! Kin ni ka ti wi? Kin ni ka ti so? Igi ta ni ka fi role, Igi da porogodo! Kin ni ka ti wi? Kin ni ka ti so? Igi to n ruwe lowo! Igi ti n gborojigo l'oju tebi, tara, tore! Kin ni ka ti wi? Kin ni ka ti so? Afi gbii lairoti? Afi bi ala! Afi oorun l'oju gbogbo wa! Mo sunkunsunkun; Oju mi o da mo. Oloriburuku n be nile; Iku sojoro; ko ri i. Kin ni ka ti wi? Kin ni ka ti so? *Ofo nla levii! E ba mi ke gbajare!*

Ka siju ka riran rere wo; Ebora da hiohio sile!

A committed thought

Death, I won't appeal to you to kill no more As you cannot be appeased Shameless death A thunder clap in a wild world

I called him Aburo Naija, the generic name that I give to everyone born after the country's independence in 1960. They are different from those of us, Egbon Naija (those born before 1960) with another kind of cultural nationalism. If I grew up in the age of blackboard and chalk, Aburo Naija grew up in the age of Facebook and Twitter, the age of rapid knowledge production, the age of CODESRIA and the African Union. If Egbon Naija is about face-to-face conversation, the oju loro wa in which you must see the person you are communicating with on a one-on-one basis, Aburo Naija is about participation in meetings and conferences where new theories emerge on a daily basis, and the world is connected by air travel.

What characterises Aburo Naija's way is the rapidity and dynamism of his movement back and forth between academic and public engagements. Those in the literary world are usually not found in the policy world, but Pius was adept in literature and politics, art and economics. His methodology does not see society as consisting of silos, understandable as autonomous parts and without context. Domination, he argued over and over again, resides in the kitchen as well as in the palace. His spirit of vigilance warns us about decadence, death, and risky exchanges in African societies. He alerted us, as well as keeping us alert, to the preservation of what is good in us as a people.

Pius understood the core of the capitalist system, set against the context of the rural background of his parentage. He became audacious, seeking the ways to transform the rural into the modern, and means to tame capitalism into one with a soul. He resided in the heart of the capitalist system but his mind and spirit are in the rural. He successfully created a community of language to capture the minds of his commune. His Umma became eager listeners, and they began to share a common understanding about the future of Africa. As his reputation became established, he also became a catalyst and innovator, driving ideas around the empowerment of youth to create emancipatory movements, resistance tools, and national liberation. He mastered the art of combining praxis with logos, the well of political criticism with theoretical debate, militant passion with sound intellectual substance.

Pius was а conscientious. meticulous scholar who graced his craft with wit, integrity, dedication and enthusiasm. He sought coherence and wholeness in both theory and empiricism. The world is greedy, Pius warned us too many times – politicians exploit citizens; rich countries exploit poor ones. Merging creative writings with creative politics, Pius operated at the margins of disciplines, demanding that scholars have a responsibility to the poor, and must confront the transformations of the peasants and their rural societies. I feel a sense of awe and gratitude for his solicitude and decency, for his opposition to injustice, his critical condemnation of politicians and their corruption and indiscretions. He had both human and intellectual qualities in abundance: when he wanted to, he could listen, obsessed with cordial fraternity.

Good morning, Mrs Muyiwa Adesanmi, Iya Tise

> 'The thief comes only to steal and kill and destroy; I came that they may have life, and have it more abundantly.' John 10.10.

Pius was already writing as if in retirement. God does not recall those who still have tasks to perform. God worked his prothesis in Pius. After all, people congratulate the potter and not the pot. Our people have the saying about the people ignoring the brave hunter who killed a leopard to admire the leopard. Pious Pius is the potter and the brave hunter.

I don't want to join others in the despondent song of Adieu. This is too depressing, too grave, rather cold. Instead, I want to bring his energy back to life, the very energy that he committed to you and me, the feat of bringing literature to serve and to shape policies and politics. Rise up, great one. Reincarnate in Kenya, as the Mwalimu. Let your spirit be reborn in others as great scholars. Rise up in references in books and as a reference point.

But is Pius dead? I know him to be alive. Ewo! I won't mourn without mitigation. I won't be sad as I live with the memory of his goodness, his art of living. Ó tì o (No way)! I won't be terrified by his permanent absence as I am grateful for his achievements. My spirit will not be desolated. Mi ò gbà (I refuse to accept the loss)! Africa's renewal is the marker of the presence of Pius – his death is an assurance of our self-renewal - renewal of devastated souls, the marker of peace, the deepest source of our hope. The nostalgia will not be about calamity, but about joy and happiness. Ayo ni tiwa (Ours is joy inexhaustible)!

I will always see him as alive, as I require no imagination to see his warmth and laughter, his embrace of me and others, his ever-positive words of encouragement. His history will always be with me, a history of a home that was defined to include me, you, and humanity.

Muyiwa, iyawo Pius, I have no words to console you and your child for the loss of your loved one. I can only say and assure you that the whole world shares your pain. Indeed, you are not only in my heart but in the hearts of the whole world at this moment and I pray God to give you the courage and fortitude to bear the loss. I would like you to accept the comforting wisdom of the Yoruba saying: Ka ku l'omode ko ye ni san ju ka dagba kama ladie iranna (It's more honorable to die young than to live to old age without being accorded a dignifying memorial service). As a I write, a great crowd of Nigerians are gathered in Abuja to keep vigil to honour your husband. And all over the world, your husband is being mourned. Therefore, it is too late for you to create a home of sorrow, as this would not be the true spirit of my brother. You cannot create a body of pain, as he gave you everlasting love. Your heart cannot keep anguish as my brother taught all of us joy. The exit of Pius should be replaced by the entry of Pious

He is with us: in his ideas, his contempt for hierarchy, his radical thoughts on the rejection of accepted ideas and poor reasoning. We will always remember him as an organiser. His foot soldiers on Facebook recognise, respect, and love him. Those in power will, of course, not miss him because of his criticisms of their incompetence and mismanagement. Our brother has left his heart behind, to go to a home. Whereever he may be now, I know that the doors and windows to his home are open, to you and me, they and us, we and they, the colours of the world. He looks, he gazes, he talks, he laughs, he reads, he listens, and all what our brother can see is hope in you, hope in us, hope in we, hope in them.

He is not dead. He cannot die. The tumult of life is different from the history of life. For a heart so large, in clouds and sun, rain and hurricane, our brother will always be here. His heart, large and compassionate, will continue to beat in your presence, in my presence, in our presence, in their presence. Pius lived a fulfilled life full of legacies that few can equal.

Pius, dream in peace with the ancients. Good night.



Afrika Zamani (ISSN 0850-3079), revue annuelle d'histoire africaine, est un périodique annuel publié par le CODESRIA pour le compte de l'Association des Historiens Africains. Consacrée à l'histoire de l'Afrique, la revue couvre toutes les périodes. Elle sollicite des articles portant sur l'analyse des processus historiques et la réflexion critique sur les approches méthodologiques et l'historiographie. Les langues des publication de la revue sont l'Anglais, l'Arabe, le Français et le Portugais.

Afrika Zamani (ISSN 0850-3079), annual journal of African history, is a yearly journal published by CODESRIA for the Association of African Historians. Devoted to the history of Africa, the journal covers all periods. It solicits articles that analyse historical processes, reflect critically on methodological approaches and historiography. Its languages of publication are English, Arabic, French and Portuguese.



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Olukoshi Adebayo serves at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) as Regional Director for Africa and West Asia. He holds a PhD in Politics from the University of Leeds. He has more than 35 years of experience in areas of international relations, governance, and human rights, both in the academic sector and intergovernmental institutions. Professor Olukoshi was a member of the African Union Assessment Panel and Chair of the Board of several think tanks, including the European Centre for Development Policy Management and the West African Civil Society Institute. He also previously served as Director of

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MARÉMA TOURÉ

(Epistemological, theoretical and cultural aspects of gender research in Africa), in *Présence Africaine* (2018), vol. 197, n° 1, p. 313-336.

Le Dr Marema Touré-Thiam est une sociologue sénégalaise. Elle est chef du secteur des sciences sociales et humaines (SHS) au Bureau de l'Unesco pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest. Le genre est son domaine d'intérêt. Elle a défendu l'une des premières thèses africaines sur le genre, en 1996, à l'Université Paris 1, Sorbonne. Une de ses récentes publications s'intitule « Aspects épistémologiques, théoriques et culturels de la recherche

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MAITSEO BOLAANE

She earned her Master's degree in African History at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London and her PhD at St Antony's College, University of Oxford. Née au Botswana, Maitseo Bolaane est professeure associée au Centre de recherche San de l'Université du Botswana. Auparavant, elle était chargée de cours principale au département d'histoire de la même université. Son domaine de spécialisation est l'histoire sociale et l'environnement africain, les liens entre nature et culture. Elle a publié sur les ressources et la gestion nationales basées sur la communauté, la politique des réserves de gibier, les écosystèmes et les moyens de subsistance dans les sites patrimoniaux, et les liens

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Professor Negash is a historian who, since 2005, has been at the College of Social Science, Addis Ababa University. He currently holds the position of Associate Professor and his research interests focus on the Ogaden Region and socio-economic aspects. He is the author of, among publications, other 'Colonial Legacy, State Interven-tion and Secessionism: Paradoxical National Identities of the Ogaden and Ishaq Clans in Ethiopia' in Society, State and Identity in African History (2008); 'Fundamental Causes of the Ethio-Somalia Conflicts and Wars' in Amharic published in a special

issue of *WITNESS* (2012); and 'Ethiopia's Elusive Quest for an Outlet to the Sea: The Case of Haud-Zeila Exchange' (Proceedings of the 18th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies) (2013). He is currently preparing a chapter with the title: 'Ambivalence in the Ogaden Secessionism: An Historical Overview of an Externally-propelled "Nationalist" Aspiration'.



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Le professeur Negash est historien qui, depuis 2005, enseigne au Collège des sciences sociales de l'Université d'Addis-Abeba. Il occupe actuellement le poste de professeur associé et ses travaux de recherche portent sur la région d'Ogaden et ses aspects socioéconomiques. Il est l'auteur, entre autres, de « Colonial Legacy, State Intervention and Secessionism: Paradoxical National Identities of the Ogaden and Ishaq Clans in Ethiopia » in Society, State and Identity in African History (2008); 'Fundamental Causes of the Ethio-Somalia Conflicts and Wars'; en

amharique publié dans le numéro spécial de *WITNESS* (2012) et « Ethiopia's Elusive Quest for an Outlet to the Sea: The Case of Haud-Zeila Exchange » (Actes de la 18e Conférence Internationale des études Ethiopienne) (2013). Il travaille actuellement sur un chapitre intitulé « Ambivalence in the Ogaden Secessionism : A Historical Overview of an Externally Propelled Nationalist Aspiration ».

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Le Dr Nansozi K. Muwanga est originaire d'Ouganda. Elle est titulaire d'un doctorat ès sciences politiques de l'Université de Toronto (Canada), d'un BA spécialisé en sciences politiques et d'une maîtrise en études régionales de la London University. Elle est également titulaire d'un diplôme post-troisième cycle en relations internationales et développement obtenu à l'Institut d'études sociales (ISS) de La Haye (Pays-Bas). Elle est chargée de cours principale au Département de sciences politiques d'administration publique et de l'Université de Makerere et coordinatrice du projet du PNUD sur l'État de droit et la démocratie

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Originaire de Gambie, Fatima Denton est directrice de l'Institut des ressources naturelles en Afrique de l'Université des Nations unies (Ghana). Avant de rejoindre l'UNU, Mme Denton a, à partir de 2012, travaillé en Éthiopie auprès de la Commission économique des Nations unies pour l'Afrique (UNECA), qui s'occupe principalement du capital naturel et de ses interactions avec le développement durable. Elle a notamment été directrice de la Division de gestion des ressources naturelles coordonnatrice et

Research Centre (IDRC), where she managed highimpact action research, including a major climate change adaptation research programme managing over 100 action research initiatives encompassing 40-plus projects across 33 countries in Africa. She has also worked as an energy scientist with the United Nations Environment Programme Risoe Centre (Denmark) and as an energy programme manager with Enda Tiers Monde (Senegal). du Centre africain pour les politiques climatiques. Auparavant, elle était directrice de programme au Centre de recherches pour le développement international (CRDI) basé au Canada, où elle a géré des recherches-actions à impact élevé, y compris un important programme de recherche sur l'adaptation aux changements climatiques, coordonnant plus de 100 initiatives de recherche-action regroupant plus de 40 projets dans 33 pays d'Afrique. Elle a également travaillé en tant que scientifique experte de l'énergie au Centre Risoe du Programme des Nations unies pour l'environnement (Danemark) et en tant que responsable du programme Énergie à Enda Tiers-Monde (Sénégal).

Professor Olonisakin is a Vice-President, Vice-Principal (International) and Professor of Security, Leadership and Development at King's College London. She is also an Extraordinary Professor at the University of Pretoria. She is the founder and former Director of the African Leadership Centre, an institution founded on the principle of Pan-Africanism to build the next generation of leaders and scholars on the African continent with core transformational values. Olonisakin was an Andrew Mellon Foundation distinguished scholar and a distinguished fellow of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. She also served



FUNMI OLONISAKIN

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DRISS KSIKES

he is currently in charge of media and culture research projects, in partnership with several laboratories in the Maghreb and the Mediterranean, and coordinator of the Fatéma Mernissi Chair. Increasing the number of projects with art, culture and debate in the heart of the city, he is co-founder of the Averroès Meetings in Rabat (2008–), Dabateatr citoyen (2009–2012), Collectif du Vivre Ensemble (2012–), Divan public (2014–), and the transnational cultural review and platform project, In's. He was literary curator of the Marrakech Art Biennale in 2014, Commissioner of the Night of the Philosophers in Rabat and Casablanca in 2017 and 2018, as he was referent playwright for the Arab world with Sundance Institute for the international laboratory of Marrakech in 2018. His main theatrical publications are: Pas de mémoire, mémoire de pas (1998), Le saint des incertains (2000), IL (2011), 180 degrès (2010), Le match (2011) et N'enterrez pas trop vite Big Brother (2013). This last piece was written as part of the Contemporary Arab Dramaturgy project, initiated by the Friche de la Belle de May, and for which he benefited from a scholarship and residence at la Chartreuse in Villeneuve-Lez-Avignon, France. He was selected in 2012 among the six best African playwrights by the National Studio Theatre in London. In 2017, he was nominated for the best francophone playwright award by the Theatre Commission of the Société des Auteurs et Compositeurs Dramatiques (SACD) for his Chuchotements et révélations.

Driss Ksikes est un marocain écrivain et chercheur. Il est professeur à HEM depuis 1996. Il est actuellement directeur d'Economia, centre de recherche de HEM, et directeur de la fondation HEM, depuis 2014. Professeur de méthodologie et de débat d'idées, il anime plusieurs ateliers d'écriture et contribue à plusieurs revues littéraires et critiques internationales. Critique littéraire et ancien rédacteur en chef du magazine *TelQuel* (2001– 2006), il est actuellement en charge de

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A native of South Africa, Cheryl Hendricks is the Executive Director of the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA). She was formerly a Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg and beforehand she dedicated eight years of service to the Institute for Security Studies, where she was a Senior Research Fellow in the Conflict Management and Peacebuilding Programme, and head of the Southern African Human Security Programme. She has also worked at the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Centre for Conflict Resolution and spent many years teaching in the Political Studies Department,



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University of the Western Cape. Professor Hendricks has worked with intergovernmental organisations (e.g. the AU, SADC, UN Women), research institutes (e.g. ISS, CODESRIA, Africa Leadership Centre - Nairobi) and civil society organisations (e.g. Club of Madrid and Africa Forum (former heads of state), SADC Gender Protocol Alliance, Isis Wicce). Prof. Hendricks has gathered substantive insights into conflict management, security, gender, governance and peacebuilding, consistently delivering extensive contributions to society by way of her institutional and academic citizenship and professional associations. Her widely published works and presentations include constructive views on Peace and Security in Africa, Women Peace and Security, Security Sector Reform and Governance, Regional Security Architectures, South African Engagement in Post-conflict Development, and on Decolonisation of Knowledge. Among other publications, she is the Guest editor with Naffet Keita of a special issue of Africa Development 42(3), 2017.

Originaire d'Afrique du Sud. Cheryl Hendricks est la directrice exécutive de l'Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA). Elle professeure de politique était et de relations internationales à l'université de Johannesburg mais avant cela, elle a travaillé pendant huit ans à l'Institute for Security Studies, où elle a été chercheure principale du Programme de gestion des conflits et de consolidation de la paix et chef du programme sur la sécurité humaine en Afrique australe. Elle a également travaillé enseigné pendant plusieurs et années au Département d'études politiques de l'Université de Western Cape. La professeure Hendricks a travaillé avec des organisations

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CODESRIA would like to express its gratitude to the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY), the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Open Society Foundations (OSFs), Oumou Dilly Foundation, Ford Foundation and the Government of Senegal for supporting its research, training and publication programmes.

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Ce bulletin trimestriel est distribué à titre gracieux à tous les instituts de recherche et facultés africaines. Il a pour objectif de stimuler la discussion, les échanges d'informations et d'encourager la coopération en matière de recherche. Les communications sur les questions théoriques, les rapports de conférences et séminaires, et les études récentes sont les bienvenus.