CODESRIA Bulletin

Numbers / Numéros 2, 2018 ISSN 0850 - 8712

Editorial

Early this year, Africa was embroiled in a debate about the description of the continent as 'shithole.' Around the same period, thousands of African 'dreamers' faced deportation and criminalisation in Israel, following government's decision to ask them to accept 3500USD and relocate to a third country, return to their home countries or face the threat of incarceration. This law was later suspended in April after protests, an international outcry and legal recourse in Israel. As this happened, in April, a scandal over the citizenship status of mainly Caribbean peoples broke in the UK that mimics similar developments in the US and Israel. This followed a change in immigration law in 2012 that framed the presence of the 'windrush' generation as illegal forcing them either to regularise their stay or be deported.

A few months after that, in May 2018, a 22 year 'illegal' immigrant from Mali, Mamoudou Gassama, won hearts around the world when an ama teur video of him scaling up the wall of a four storey Paris House to save a child dangling on the balcony went viral. The brave action earned him the nickname 'spiderman' as well as honorary citizenship, a certificate, a medal of valour and the promise of a job from the French President. In conferring the honour, President Emmanuel Macron argued that Gassama had demonstrated an exceptional act, heroism and will that is characteristic of the French and

In this issue / Dans ce numéro

This quaterly Bulletin is distributed free to all social research institutes and faculties in Africa to encourage research co-operation among African scholars. Interested individuals and institutions may also subscribe. Contributions on theoretical matters and reports on conferences and seminars are welcome.

therefore deserved urgently to be made French. Yet in 2014, Gassama's earlier attempts to reach Europe by crossing the Mediterranean into Italy failed following deportation. Ironically, as Gassama's 'extraordinary story' of conversion from 'illegal' immigrant to citizen was making headlines, the predicaments of transcontinental mobile Africans made news as the Aquarius, a ship carrying 629 African migrants rescued in the Mediterranean sea remained stranded at sea as it was denied docking by the newly elected Italian government.

Ultimately, there are parallels between these stories of immigration and the politics of representation that is at the core of CODESRIA's mandate. The question of the representation of Africa and Africans is of greater concern given the historical nature of the debate about the image of Africa within and outside Africa. We therefore feel compelled, on behalf of the diversity of African social science and humanities scholars, and indeed on behalf of all socially conscious Africans, to locate the thrust of this issue of *CODESRIA Bulletin* in the context of the prevailing debates about immigration, mobility and the questions of representation, knowledge and agency that emerge out of these debates. It has become clear that the issues being canvassed at the international level in relation to the location of Africans in the global order and their image across the world is less about Africans and more about the changing politics of the countries where the negative labelling of Africans occurs. It is these knowledge and identity issues that the papers in this issue of the *CODESRIA Bulletin* seek to capture.

The first article by Mamdani engages Michael Neocosmos' study *Thinking Freedom in Africa: Towards a Theory of Emancipatory Politics*. For Mamdani, Neocosmos' study is marred by a two-fold "theoretical lacunae": a "restriction of popular subjectivity to state interpellation" and a "false reduction of tradition to the state and power." Yusuf Bangura follows with a reflection on Sierra Leone's closely contested 2018 Presidential runoff elections; wherein he examines bipolar ethno-regional cleavages in Sierra Leone's electoral processes, and thus the (de)merits of a democratic system underpinned by parochial identity politics. Dennis Maseka examines the consequences of African higher education institutions' overdependence on Eurocentric epistemological paradigms and curricula not grounded in the continent's prevailing circumstances, challenges and aspirations.

Mlamuli N. Hlatshwayo and Kehdinga George Fomunyam's article examines the transmission of responsible citizenship and strategic governance in Africa through what they refer to as 'de-othering' the higher education sector. Felix Kwabena Donkor, Tantoh Bikwibili Henry, Eromose Ebhuoma and Sylvi Fullard's article addresses the trilemma of educational trade-offs on Africa's sustainable development initiatives. Paola Vargas Arana discusses the importance of Africa addressing its social conflicts by retrieving its traumatic past through the introduction of subjects focused on the history of slavery and slave trade in the African higher education curricula. Muhammed Bolaji addresses the current information explosion and the gradual erosion of originality and academic writing skills in higher education institutions in Africa. Andre Goodrich's article on decolonising the curriculum discusses how curricula produce dumping grounds and zones of exclusion for various disciplines. The Bulletin concludes with two articles on African cinema by Africanus Aveh that looks at the emergence of local language film production in Ghana while Okello Oculi engages with Ousmane Sembène's treatment of gender and women in film.

Godwin Murunga
Executive Secretary
and
Divine Fuh
Head of Publications and Dissemination

Éditorial

Au début de cette année, l'Afrique a été mêlée à un débat sur la description du continent comme « trou de merde ». Vers la même période, des milliers de « rêveurs » africains ont été expulsés et criminalisés en Israël, la suite à la décision du gouvernement de leur proposer d'accepter 3500 USD et de déménager dans un pays tiers, retourner dans leur pays d'origine ou être incarcérés. Cette mesure a ensuite été suspendue en avril à la suite de manifestations, d'un tollé international et de recours légaux en Israël. En avril, au Royaume-Uni, un scandale sur le statut de citoyen de Caribéens principalement imite des développements similaires aux États-Unis et en Israël. Cette évolution fait suite à une modification de la loi sur l'immigration, en 2012, qui déclarait illégale la présence de la « génération Windrush », l'obligeant à régulariser son séjour, ou être expulsée.

Quelques mois après, en mai 2018, Mamoudou Gassama, un immigrant « illégal » malien de 22 ans du Mali, a gagné les cœurs du monde entier lorsqu'une vidéo amateur le montrant gravissant la façade d'un immeuble parisien de quatre étages pour sauver un enfant suspendu au balcon est devenu viral. Cette action courageuse lui a valu le surnom de « Spiderman » ainsi que la citoyenneté honoraire, un certificat, une médaille de bravoure et la promesse d'un travail du président français. En conférant cet honneur, le président Emmanuel Macron a affirmé que Gassama avait fait un acte exceptionnel et démontré un héroïsme et une volonté caractéristiques des Français, et méritait donc de toute urgence d'être français. Pourtant, en 2014, les tentatives précédentes de Gassama d'atteindre l'Europe en traversant la Méditerranée ont échoué en Italie suite à son expulsion. Ironiquement, alors que « l'extraordinaire récit » de Gassama sur la reconversion d'immigré « illégal » en citoyen faisait les gros titres, les problèmes d'africains transcontinentaux faisaient la une, car l'Aquarius, un navire transportant 629 migrants africains sauvés en Méditerranée restait bloqué en mer, s'étant vu refuser l'accostage par le gouvernement italien nouvellement élu.

En fin de compte, il existe des parallèles entre ces histoires d'immigration et les politiques de représentation qui sont au cœur du mandat du CODESRIA. La question de la représentation de l'Afrique et des Africains est plus préoccupante compte tenu de la nature historique du débat, à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur de l'Afrique, sur l'image de l'Afrique. Nous nous sentons donc obligés, au nom de la diversité des chercheurs africains en sciences sociales et en sciences humaines, et même de tous les Africains socialement conscients, de situer le présent numéro du *Bulletin du CODESRIA* dans le contexte des débats en cours sur l'immigration, la mobilité et les questions de représentation, de connaissance et d'esprit d'entreprise qui émergent de ces débats. Il est devenu évident que les questions examinées, au niveau international, de la position des Africains dans l'ordre mondial et leur image à travers le monde ont moins à voir avec les Africains et davantage avec l'évolution des politiques des pays où existe cet étiquetage négatif. Ce sont ces connaissances et ces identités qu'abordent les articles de ce numéro du *Bulletin du CODESRIA*.

Le premier article par Mamdani fait appel à l'étude de Michael Neocosmos intitulée *Thinking Freedom in Africa: Towards a Theory of Emancipatory Politics*. Pour Mamdani, l'étude de Neocosmos est entachée d'un double « vide théorique » : une « restriction de la subjectivité populaire à l'interpellation d'État » et une « fausse réduction de la tradition à l'État et au pouvoir ». Yusuf Bangura poursuit par une réflexion sur le deuxième tour serré de l'élection présidentielle en Sierra Leone en 2018; dans laquelle il examine les clivages ethno-régionaux bipolaires dans les processus électoraux de la Sierra Leone et, partant, les (dé)mérites d'un esprit de clocher en politique. Dennis Maseka examine les conséquences de la dépendance excessive des établissements d'enseignement supérieur africains aux paradigmes épistémologiques et programmes d'enseignement euro-centriques qui ne sont pas fondés sur les circonstances, défis et aspirations du continent.

Dans leur article, Mlamuli N. Hlatshwayo et Kehdinga George Fomunyam examinent la transmission de la citoyenneté responsable et de la gouvernance stratégique en Afrique à travers ce qu'ils qualifient de « déstructuration » du secteur de l'enseignement supérieur. Felix Kwabena Donkor, Tantoh Bikwibili Henry, Eromose Ebhuoma et Sylvi Fullard traitent du « trilemme » des compromis en matière d'éducation entre les différentes initiatives de développement durable de l'Afrique. Paola Vargas Arana discute de l'importance pour l'Afrique de s'attaquer à ses conflits sociaux en retrouvant son passé traumatique et en introduisant des sujets sur l'histoire de l'esclavage et la traite des esclaves dans les programmes d'enseignement supérieur en Afrique. Muhammed Bolaji s'intéresse à l'explosion actuelle d'information et à l'érosion progressive de l'originalité et des compétences rédactionnelles dans les établissements d'enseignement supérieur en Afrique. L'article d'André Goodrich sur la décolonisation des programmes d'études explique comment les programmes produisent des dépotoirs et des zones d'exclusion pour diverses disciplines. Le *Bulletin* se termine par deux articles sur le cinéma africain par Africanus Aveh qui aborde l'émergence de la production de films en langues locales, pendant qu'Okello Oculi débat du traitement par Ousmane Sembène du genre et des femmes au cinéma.

Godwin Murunga

Secrétaire Exécutif

et

Divine Fuh

Directeur, Publications et Dissémination

From the Executive Secretary's Desk

The period leading to the publication of this issue of the Bulletin focused on preparing for the 15th CODESRIA General Assembly. The Assembly will take place from the 17th to 21st December 2018. It will focus on the theme *Africa and the Crisis of Globalisation*. Held in the Senegelese city of Dakar, it is expected that over 300 academics in the social sciences and humanities plus some policy actors and partners will attend.

The choice of theme for the Assembly was informed by a range of political economy questions the Council considers fundamental to its agenda. These questions also coincide with those on the agenda of a generality of African peoples globally. The current world is configured by a series of contradictory developments; chief among them is the persisting tension between the promise of, and outcomes from, globalisation. Not only has there been greater opening of opportunities, time and space compression and easier access to otherwise distant places, there has simultaneously also emerged higher levels of poverty unemployment and unemployability, the expansion in the gap between the rich and the poor, greater risk of disease and the devastating consequences for environment, to name but these few.

The choice of theme for the 15th General Assembly aimed to acknowledge this tension between promise and outcome but also underscore that, on balance, the world has promised opportunity but delivered mounting crisis to a majority of people, not least those in Africa. Unfortunately, the consequences of globalisation, especially those emanating from its free market neo-liberal logic are often dressed in up glowing catchy phrases like "Africa rising," phrases that mask the bleak realities and act as palliative to a condition that call for more thorough treatment.

The call for papers for the 15th General Assembly was issued early in the year and selection process commenced and will continue until September when the Scientific and Executive Committees take a final decision on participation in the Assembly. Closely tied to the preparations for the Assembly is a membership drive that aims to expand the number of paid up members of the Council. The amended charter and the new bye-laws mandate that only members in 'good standing' can participate in the critical governance process of the Council especially the election of the Executive Committee. As such, revitalising membership has been a given attention over the period.

Membership will be a critical part of the agenda of CODESRIA going forward. I refer specifically to members in 'good standing' as defined by the CODESRIA charter. Indeed, it bears reiterating that membership is key in order for the programmes to function well and remain relevant. While participation in our programmes is determined principally on a competitive basis, the need to maintain a core paid-up membership is urgent for CODESRIA.

Members in 'good standing' will gain immensely from the Council. First, membership guarantees a place in a network of African scholarship that has a distinguished track-record. Second, this network will open up avenues for engagement with scholarship at the pan-African level that, in itself, is important but also indispensable for visibility and voice at the global level. Third, CODESRIA membership has opened up access to scholarship world-wide for many African scholars. A recent SIDA commissioned Evaluation of the Council programmes noted that most African academics who have participated in CODESRIA programmes have registered remarkable success when they apply to other programmes. Finally, membership will confer special access to some CODESRIA research outputs and, as pointed out above, a right to participate in the election of the Executive Committee, the CODESRIA organ overseeing the affairs of the Council.

To facilitate the needs of members, the Council will enhance the speed at which we communicate

with members and will prioritise prompt response to membership concerns. This is an issue that has attracted numerous complaints from members and one that we are now prioritising. We want to ensure that channels of communication are open. The Executive Secretary is open to receiving direct communication on urgent matters members wish to raise for urgent attention.

In CODESRIA Bulletin nos 3-4, 2017, we mentioned outstanding audit issues that needed to addressed and committed to resolving them. The first half of the year focused on this question. The Secretariat has engaged all funding partners from a standpoint of transparency aiming to resolve those audit issues. The results have raised two related questions. The first is the need to replace the existing financial management system in the Council with a new, more modern, one. The second was the need to upscale the skillset among staff in order to ensure they are able to provide the best possible service to the Council and ensure efficiency in the delivery of services to the community. We plan that some of these issues will have been fully or partially addressed by the end of the year.

The Secretariat suffers a peculiar personnel challenge that will need to be addressed before we can guarantee efficient operations and be judicious in the use of resources in service of the core research mandate of the Council. First, the ratio of academically inclined to administratively inclined staff leans heavily in favour of the later. Second, the capacities and skill of staff has not been renewed for long. The focus is to address these two by ensuring a significant core of our staff balance intellectual and administrative responsibilities. But we aim to do this while also imagining what a new, more modern and efficiently run Secretariat ought, ultimately, to look like.

Godwin R. MURUNGA

Executive Secretary

Du bureau du secrétaire exécutif

La période précédant la publication de ce numéro du *Bulletin* a été consacrée à la préparation de la 15ème Assemblée générale du CODESRIA. L'Assemblée aura lieu du 17 au 21 décembre 2018 et portera sur le thème « *L'Afrique et la crise de la mondialisation* ». Tenue dans la ville sénégalaise de Dakar, plus de 300 chercheurs en sciences sociales et humaines, ainsi que des acteurs et partenaires politiques, devraient y participer.

Le choix du thème de l'Assemblée repose sur une série de questions d'économie politique que le Conseil considère comme fondamentales à son agenda. Ces questions en recoupent d'autres qui sont d'actualité pour nombre de peuples africain de par le monde. Le monde actuel est configuré par une série de développements contradictoires, le principal étant la tension persistante entre la promesse et les résultats de la mondialisation. Il existe maintenant plus d'opportunités ouvertes, une compression de l'espace et du temps, et un accès plus facile à des endroits autrefois éloignés, mais dans le même temps sont enregistrés des niveaux plus élevés de pauvreté, de chômage et de non-employabilité, l'élargissement du fossé entre riches et pauvres, un risque accru de maladie et les conséquences dévastatrices pour l'environnement, pour ne citer que cela.

Le choix du thème de la 15ème Assemblée générale est une reconnaissance de cette tension entre promesse et résultat, mais également une mise en évidence du fait que le monde avait promis des opportunités, mais a plutôt provoqué une crise grandissante pour une majorité de personnes, en particulier en Afrique. Malheureusement, les conséquences de la mondialisation, en particulier celles découlant de la logique néolibérale de la libre concurrence, sont souvent embellies de phrases accrocheuses et éclatantes telles que «*Africa Rising*», expressions qui masquent les sombres réalités et qui tentent de pallier à une situation qui appelle une analyse plus approfondie.

L'appel à communications pour la 15ème Assemblée générale a été lancé au début de l'année et le processus de sélection a commencé et se poursuivra jusqu'en septembre, lorsque les Comités scientifique et exécutif prendront une décision finale sur la participation. Une campagne d'adhésion visant à accroître le nombre de membres en règle du Conseil a été étroitement liée aux préparatifs de l'Assemblée. La Charte amendée et les nouveaux statuts prévoient que seuls les membres «en règle» peuvent participer aux processus essentiels de gouvernance du Conseil, en particulier l'élection du Comité exécutif. La revitalisation des adhésions a donc fait l'objet d'une attention particulière au cours de cette période.

L'adhésion sera un élément essentiel de l'agenda du CODESRIA. Je parle spécifiquement des membres «en règle» tels que définis par la Charte du CODESRIA. En effet, il convient de rappeler que la qualité de membre est essentielle au bon fonctionnement et à la pertinence des programmes. Bien que la participation à nos programmes soit principalement déterminée sur une base compétitive, le CODESRIA a un besoin urgent de conserver un noyau de membres en règle.

Les membres en règle bénéficient énormément au Conseil. Premièrement, l'adhésion garantit une place dans un réseau de chercheurs africains aux antécédents remarquables. Deuxièmement, ce réseau ouvre de nouvelles perspectives d'engagement dans la recherche au niveau panafricain, ce qui, en soi, est important mais également indispensable pour une visibilité et une voix au niveau mondial. Troisièmement, pour de nombreux chercheurs africains, l'adhésion au CODESRIA ouvre l'accès au savoir dans le monde entier. Une évaluation récente des programmes du Conseil commanditée par SIDA a révélé que la plupart des universitaires africains ayant participé aux programmes du CODESRIA réussissaient remarquablement lorsqu'ils s'adressaient à d'autres programmes. Enfin, les membres ont un accès privilégié à certains résultats de recherche du CODESRIA et, comme indiqué ci-dessus, au droit de

participer à l'élection du Comité exécutif, l'organe du CODESRIA chargé de superviser la gestion du Conseil.

Pour prendre en charge les besoins des membres, le Conseil accélérera les délais de communication avec les membres et privilégiera une réponse rapide à leurs préoccupations. C'est un problème qui a suscité de nombreuses plaintes de membres, et auquel nous accordons la priorité. Nous veillerons que les canaux de communication sont ouverts. Le Secrétaire exécutif est disposé à recevoir des communications directes sur des questions urgentes que des membres souhaiteraient porter à son attention.

Dans les numéros 3 et 4/2017 du *Bulletin* du CODESRIA, nous avons évoqué les problèmes en suspens émanant d'audit qu'il fallait et que nous nous étions engagés à résoudre. Le premier semestre a été consacré à cette question. Le Secrétariat a engagé tous les partenaires financiers dans une optique de transparence afin de résoudre ces problèmes d'audit. Les résultats ont soulevé deux questions connexes. La première est la nécessité de remplacer le système de gestion financière existant au Conseil par un nouveau, plus moderne. Deuxièmement, il est nécessaire d'améliorer les compétences du personnel afin qu'il fournisse le meilleur service possible au Conseil et soit plus efficace dans la fourniture de services à la communauté. Nous prévoyons que certaines de ces questions auront été entièrement ou partiellement résolues d'ici la fin de l'année.

Le Secrétariat est confronté à un problème singulier de ressources humaines qu'il faudra résoudre avant de pouvoir garantir des opérations efficaces et une utilisation judicieuse des ressources au service du mandat fondamental de recherche du Conseil. Premièrement, le ratio entre personnel académique et personnel administratif penche fortement en faveur du second. Deuxièmement, les capacités et les compétences du personnel n'ont pas été renouvelées depuis longtemps. L'accent est mis sur ces deux aspects en veillant à équilibrer nos responsabilités intellectuelles et administratives. Cependant, notre objectif est d'y arriver tout en imaginant un nouveau secrétariat, plus moderne et plus efficace.

Godwin R. MURUNGA

Secrétaire exécutif

Place, Interest and Political Agency: Some Questions for Michael Neocosmos

Mahmood Mamdani

Makerere Institute of Social Research, Uganda

Michael Neocosmos has written *Thinking Freedom in Africa* with "the understanding of political agency" as his "object." (Kindle Locations 334-336). This is more a political manifesto than it is a work of political analysis. At the very start of the journey, Neocosmos declares three imperatives which he says are necessary for a fuller understanding of political agency. The first is to move away from political economy: "… there is nothing in political economy, whether Marxist or otherwise, which enables us to think an emancipatory political practice beyond interest," why "Marxist politics have remained, along with liberal politics, overwhelmingly statist in their practice." [314-316]. Neocosmos calls on Africans to become "part of universal humanity rather than of the animal world of interests." [Kindle Locations 351-53] The second is to think out of context, which means to think and act both out of place and outside of culture: "this book begins from the subversion of place, ... All people are capable of thinking beyond their social place and [the] immediate. Starting from culture merely forces a concentration on identity, ethnicity, authenticity, race, darkness, natives, 'Africanity', periphery, 'coloniality', and so on – on difference and not on universal humanity. [Kindle Locations 342-346]" The third is to think subjectivity outside of identity politics: "The South African Left, the Tanzanian nationalists and the Zimbabwean landless have all fundamentally understood subjectivity as identity politics: class identity, national identity or whatever. [Kindle Locations 8632 – 8634]"[1]. The challenge is for people to think "beyond their objective social position and interests – beyond identity – simply because they are capable of reason." [Kindle Locations 12393 – 12400] The central problem is that "identities can only reproduce such places subjectively along with their accompanying hierarchy, thereby leaving a universal notion of emancipation (equality, freedom, justice, dignity) unthought and indeed unthinkable outside market-capitalist and state-democratic norms."[Kindle Locations 946-950] Neocosmos points to Reason as the way out of the identity trap: "People are able to think beyond their objective social position and interests – beyond identity – simply because they are capable of reason." [Kindle Locations 12393 – 12400]. This is Reason with a capital R, enlightenment Reason, Reason which opposes an acknowledgement of "difference" to an embrace of "universal humanity."

Neocosmos claims no originality in making these arguments. Indeed, at every step, he systematically and proudly references the French philosopher Alain Badiou, as in this instance: "A universal politics of emancipation … is not given by the existence of social movements; if it is to exist, such a politics must step out from its limitations of interest, from its confines of place. Any organisation doing so ceases to be a social movement in the strict sense and transcends place while remaining localised. We can call this process a singular process, to distinguish it from the usual notion of the particular (Badiou, 2004). This collective subject now overtakes its location while its politics have the potential to become universal (to produce a 'truth', in Badiou's terms); it thereby creates itself as a collective subject of politics. Such a process is referred to as subjectivation." [Kindle Locations 931-938]

This is Neocosmos in a didactic mode, translating the thought of the master, Alain Badiou. Neocosmos devotes as much effort and space in his book to an explication of Alain Badiou's work as he does to a critique of *Citizen and Subject*, a work that he claims is marred by a two-fold "theoretical lacunae": a "restriction of popular subjectivity to state interpellation" and a "false reduction of tradition to the state and power." The key problem, argues Neocosmos, is that "… for

him (i.e., Mahmood Mamdani), the mode of resistance in these cases was simply shaped by the mode of rule; no theoretical room is left for the recognition of subjective inventiveness, hence promoting a statist conception of politics." I shall look at these claims in the following order: first (a) custom and tradition and (b) social identity and politics, both in the construction of the indirect rule state, and then (c) militant nationalism and social movement politics as two attempts at a transformative politics.

Custom and Tradition

"In *Citizen and Subject*, "not only is tradition simply despotic, but it is manipulated by the state to create reactionary ethnic identities." (Kindle Locations 12229-12232, 6642-6651).

"Ethnicity and culture, even under colonial domination, were not as rigid as Mamdani makes out, nor indeed as the authorities hoped. There were, and are, regular contradictions within tradition and some of these are popular-democratic in nature." (Kindle Locations 12275-12277).

"The politics of tradition need to be transformed from within the domain of tradition itself, and not from outside in such a neo-colonial manner." (Kindle Locations 11825-11826)".

Citizen and Subject distinguishes between *custom* in the period before colonialism and its transformation into *customary law* in the colonial period. The argument is developed in several steps. *One*, whereas precolonial custom was part of society, informing its capacity to regulate internal tensions, it was harnessed under colonialism as "customary law." No longer a social force for self-regulation from within, it was turned into an instrument to keep society in check from above: "Customary law thus consolidated the non-customary power of customary chiefs." (Mamdani 1996: 122) *Two*, this did not mean that "custom" became rigid under colonialism: the official language of an authoritative and singular custom in the colonial period both masked a plurality of custom and concealed the fact of a civil war in rural society. That civil war was fueled by diverse and contradictory notions of custom; peasant movements claimed that particular chiefs had "subverted genuine custom."

Three, as Neocosmos notes: "The form of rule shaped the form of revolt against it. Indirect rule at one reinforced ethnically bound institutions of control and led to their explosion from within. Ethnicity (tribalism) thus came to be simultaneously the form of colonial control over natives and the form of revolt against it. It defined the parameters of both the Native Authority in charge of the local state apparatus and of resistance to it." (24)

Four, rather than provide a 'solution' to 'decentralized despo-tism' of indirect rule, peasant mobilization against Native Authorities turned into a problem: "Yet tribalism as revolt became the source of a profound dilemma because local populations were usually multi-ethnic Ethnicity, and at times religion, was reproduced as a problem inside every peasant movement. This is why it is not enough simply to separate tribal power organized from above from tribal revolt waged from below so that we may denounce the former and embrace the latter. The revolt from below needs to be problematized, for it carries the seeds of its own fragmentation and possible self-destruction." (24)

It is this fourth step that Neocosmos leaves out of his summary. The introductory chapter of *Citizen and Subject* goes on to weave all parts of the argument into a single proposition: "… every movement against decentralized despotism bore the institutional imprint of that mode of rule. Every movement of resistance was shaped by the very structure of power against which it rebelled. How it came to understand this historical fact, and the capacity it marshalled to transcend it, set the tone and course of the movement." (24)

I go on to devote an entire chapter to identify movements which took on this challenge more or less successfully, such as the Sungu-sungu in independent Tanzania, the Ruwenzururu in independent Uganda and the National Resistance Army (NRA) in the Luwero Triangle in Uganda from 1981-85: "Each example reinforces a common theme: the peasant community is internally divided and reproduced through internal struggles. For this reason, to focus exclusively on the dimension of tribalism as civil war and thereby to present a peasant movement as an unmitigated revolt from below against oppression from above is to indulge in mythmaking by presenting an aspect of reality as its totality. Each example highlights a particular combination of the variety of tensions – class, gender, age, and nationality – that make up the fabric of peasant communities." (Mamdani 1996: 186)

Two attempts at transformative politics: (a) State Nationalism:

"… when it came to forms of state, Nyerere's was perhaps the lesser evil, yet the complete absence of any discussion of alternative political thinking in Mamdani's

work makes it impossible to move subjectively beyond the limits of statism." (Kindle Locations 7363-7369).

"Mamdani's point conforms in all major respects to the state-nationalist argument, which has always seen ethnic divisions as threats to the nation-state in Africa. Nyerere's success in establishing national unity is extolled in this work. … There is no attempt in Mamdani's work, though, to think through the possibility of an alternative popular-democratic politics and its enabling of national unity without coercion. Whereas it could presumably be argued that such an alternative was never on the agenda, the limits of the nationalist thought of the time are not elucidated. (Kindle Locations 7742-7748)

The analysis in *Citizen and Subject* did not turn around one but two social divisions reproduced by colonial rule: inter-ethnic and rural-urban. My critique of nationalism, whether reformist or militant, was that each tried to reform one side of this legacy, with the result that its efforts were undercut by the reproduction of the other side. Nyerere was no exception. My point was neither to "extoll" Nyerere (as Neocosmos alleges) nor to dubunk him: "But for the opposition that must take stock of social fragmentation as its historical starting point, it makes more sense to appropriate critically the experience of militant nationalism of yesteryears than just to debunk it. The strength of that experience lay in its ability to link the urban and the rural – politically. Its Achilles' heel was the failure to ground the link in an ongoing process of democratic reform, one with a focus on reforming the bifurcated state inherited from colonialism. Once in power, nationalists pursued reform in both civil society and Native Authority, deracializing the former and detribalizing the latter. But they reformed each sphere separately, and they did so from above. As reform from above substituted administration for politics, a bifurcated reform strategy re-created the bifurcated state. That failure corrupted a hitherto political link between the rural and the urban into a coercive one, cutting the ground from under their own feet. The attempt to reform decentralized despotism, then, degenerated into a centralized despotism, the other and more unstable variant of the African state." (p. 300)

Nyerere, I argued in my Du Bois lectures, "needs to be understood foremost as a state-builder and not (as) a democrat or a social visionary." (*Define and Rule*, p. 124) To understand the rationale behind 'forced villagisation,' it would make sense to locate it as part of a coercive 'state-building' project than as a development of Ujamaa. At the same time, Nyerere was not just "the lesser evil" in a region marked by ethnic cleansing and extreme violence, as Neocosmos suggests; he held out the promise of equal citizenship in a region where citizenship had come to be differentiated along lines of race and ethnicity, identities politicized in the colonial period.

(b) Social Movements and the Politics of Subjectivity

"During this period, the most important studies of popular political subjectivity concerned social movements and were, in the best work, given a political inflection. Social movements were seen as the expression of popular political agency, 'the subjective factor in African development' (Mamdani *et al.,* 1993: 112), and regularly counterposed to NGOs, which were often visualised as the bearers of a neo-colonial culture of clientelism. Yet, in all this work, political agency was understood as a reflection of the objectively social, of the specific dimensions of the social division of labour. There was never any attempt to conceive subjectivity in terms of itself. [Neocosmos, Kindle Locations 708-712]."

What does Neocosmos mean by "politics as subjectivity" and "subjectivity in itself"? It is a politics unencumbered by interest and location – which he defines broadly to include *'race,' 'native', 'Africanity', 'coloniality'*. Emancipatory politics, he believes, must be the product of an imagination that rides high above any particularistic concern. Neocosmos draws a contrast "between a subjectivity founded on interests and one founded on principles; between a politics that thinks within state categories and assumptions and a politics that absents the state from thought." [kindle locations 9297-9300] So this is not even a politics that nationalists and Marxists defined as alliance-building or building a united front, since both acknowledged particular interests and identities as so many building blocks for an emancipatory politics.

The entire second half of *Citizen and Subject* is devoted to an exploration of social groups and social movements that rose to the colonial challenge, sometimes magnificently, seeking to craft an alternate vision and practice a broader politics of alliance-building. I devoted one chapter to rural peasant movements, and another to urban movements. At no point did these social forces repudiate 'interest' and 'identity' in favor of 'vision.' Rather, they sought to link the two. If we examine the

thought of individuals who shaped the consciousness of these social forces – individuals like Biko, Foster, Erwin – we arrive at the same conclusion. Biko did not repudiate 'race'; nor did Foster or Erwin repudiate 'class.' All imaginative and creative proponents of 'race' and 'class,' they imagined these identities more broadly and creatively than before, turning them into mobilizational vehicles equal to tapping a vast organizational potential. Biko in particular understood identity – race in this case – as historical and political rather than something permanent, to be negotiated rather than repudiated. Their example points to a politics very different from the debunking of 'interest' and 'identity' that Neocosmos would have us embrace in the name of 'vision.'

Migrants constituted an explosive social force in anti-colonial and anti- apartheid politics. They were the backbone of Industrial and Commercial Union in the 1920s and the force that animated the Durban strikes of 1973. Their example suggests a combination of interest and vision rather than the breach between the two that Neocosmos is looking for in his quest for a larger-than-interest endeavor in the name of humanity. Students were an important mobilizing force in places like South Africa and Ethiopia. Temporarily removed from the work place, suspended above the class structure and even social identities, students were particularly prone to thinking the 'universal' – in the process expanding notions of 'race' but without discarding these.

The South African Moment

"Nowhere in his book does Mamdani attempt to move beyond thinking in terms of statist solutions to investigate the possibility that there may be alternative popular solutions to what amounts after all to a major catastrophe for the people involved." [Kindle Locations 822-824] "Mamdani is primarily interested in analyzing the colonial origins of the political in Africa today, the way in which the state exercises its rule, rather than in thinking politics as subjective practice." [Kindle Locations 830-835] "Mamdani's work was concerned with thinking the political, not agency and subjectivity; in other words, not with thinking politics as such. … Mamdani's work has concentrated overwhelmingly on the state construction of ethnic identities, which he sees as structurally determined, while popular struggles are seen as reacting within that existing determination." [Kindle Locations 1253-1258]

In 2014, I was invited to discuss a presentation by Omar Bargouti of the Palestinian group BDS to an audience at Columbia University.[2] I built on my explorations in *Citizen and Subject* to define 'the South African moment,' that time when the anti-apartheid movement broke free of subjectivities nurtured by and under apartheid to produce an alternative politics: "The South African moment involved a triple shift. First was a shift from demanding an end to apartheid to providing an alternative to apartheid. Second was a shift from representing the oppressed, the Black people of South Africa, the majority, to representing the whole people. The third was the turn from resisting within the terms set by apartheid to redefining the very terms of how South Africa should be governed." (153) I underlined the strategic significance of both Durban 1973 and Soweto 1976, products of direct action by anti-apartheid students, white and black: "Both wings of the antiapartheid student movement, white and Black, reached out to mobilize wider sections of society against apartheid. Black consciousness students moved to the township, and white students to organize migrant workers in hostels on the fringe of townships. Out of this two-pronged initiative developed two wings of the labor movement, one based in migrant hostels, the other in the community (the township), the former drawing its intellectual vision from white students, the latter from Black students in townships." (158) Durban and Soweto marked a decisive break in old-style politics, not only the politics of groups mobilized along population lines etched in the apartheid census, but also the politics that drove the armed struggle. "Before Soweto, the resistance in South Africa developed within the framework set by apartheid. To understand this framework, one needs to look at the apartheid mode of governance. Apartheid divided the whole population into races: Africans, Indians, Coloureds (a 'mixed race' group), whites – many so-called population groups. In response, each population group organized separately, as a race: Africans as the African National Congress (ANC); Indians as the Natal Indian Congress, first organized by Gandhi; Coloureds as the Coloured Peoples Congress; and Whites as the Congress of Democrats. … This is how the mode of governance of apartheid became naturalized as the mode of resistance against it." (154) The text went on to identify "two major breaches in this mindset." I suggested that the initial impulse came from "the Freedom Charter, adopted by the Congress Alliance in 1955, and its ringing declaration: 'South Africa belongs to all those

who live in it.' … the ANC put forward a meaningful notion of democracy, not a democracy of only one racial group, not even of the majority against the minority, but a democracy for all." (155) But the real blow to apartheid power came with Black Consciousness: "Apartheid power had fragmented the subject population into so many groups, recorded separately in the census: Africans, Indians, Coloureds. The great historical achievement of BC was to pull the rug from under apartheid. Black, said Biko, is not a color, Black is an experience – if you are oppressed, you are Black!" (155) And then followed the umbrella politics of the United Democratic Front (UDF): "The South African moment was when important sections of the liberation camp redefined the enemy as not settlers but the settler state, not whites but white power. By doing so, they provided whites with an alternative-not a democracy for whites only, but a nonracial democracy." (157)

Defining the Problem but not the Solution

In one of his recent books, on the Darfur crisis in the Sudan, Mamdani (2009) rightly attacks the human rights discourse and politics of Western humanitarian solutions to the African crisis as necessarily providing a neo-colonial response to Africa's problems which hides an agenda of recolonisation. Yet his solution, although located in Africa, is to appeal to the African Union (AU), that vulgar simulacrum of pan-African unity, to resolve the problems of Sudan and, by extension, those of the continent as a whole, as it evidently has no direct interest in specific conflicts and can insist on political reconciliation. [Neocosmos, Kindle Locations 815-819]

Nowhere in his book does Mamdani attempt to move beyond thinking in terms of statist solutions to investigate the possibility that there may be alternative popular solutions to what amounts after all to a major catastrophe for the people involved. [Neocosmos, Kindle Locations 822-824]

Neocosmos seems less interested in defining the problem than in formulating a solution. There is reason behind this preference: problems are always particular; solutions often come as a generality, as a 'one size fits all' prescription. Think of how those preoccupied with a solution that will fit 'humanity' prefer to talk of human rights in their generality than to identify and analyze human wrongs in their particularity. Not interested in defining the problem, Neocosmos searches for a solution, not to any particular problem but to every or any problem. That is why he can afford to roam unanchored in any "interest," "locality" or "identity." When he feels generous, he assumes that others must also be animated by the same quest. Failing to find the "solution" in my book on Darfur, Neocosmos grasps at a conjunctural analysis of the African Union's intervention in *Saviors and Survivors* – and presumably the books dedication "to those who seek to make an independent African Union" (and not to the AU as is) – as the hint of a solution.

Humans are not Gods; we are located within history and locality. Even if we are to rise above these – which we must endeavor to – we have no choice but to begin where we are. On what ground can we stand if not location and history? Is to think from the standpoint of interest and location necessarily to be locked into state-defined categories, as Neocosmos claims is necessarily the case? A political perspective that lacks location and history, that claims to be from everywhere, is actually from nowhere. A critical engagement with militant nationalism over the past few decades has taught us to be wary of a onesided emphasis on any identity – 'tribe,' 'race,' 'nation,' all of which Neocosmos has displaced with 'humanity.' To return to that politics, that universalism, would be to forfeit the ground gained over the past few decades, one based on a sensitivity to *difference*. Failing to identify those extraordinary moments when particular interest connects with broad vison, Neocosmos loses any connection with the ground underneath.

Social movement politics was an attempt to go beyond a materialist understanding of interest and class – but without repudiating these – based on an acknowledgement of different histories, diverse intellectual and political traditions, and so on. At the same time, it was an attempt to negotiate difference, to forge a politics that did not ignore difference and identity, but at the same time did not treat them as unchangeable objects. Those who thought in terms of difference moved to a politics of pluralism, and developed a critical understanding of universalist politics as masking particular ambitions and missions, as in a 'civilizing mission'. From this point of view, 'race,' 'native', 'Africanity', 'coloniality' – all these were real though provisional and thus so many partial understandings of social experience; those like Biko combined a subjective understanding of it as real with a determined endeavor to sublate it. The problem was not thinking in terms of race, or nativity or Africanity or coloniality – as Neocosmos seems to think – but

being so locked into it that one is no longer able to think and act beyond it. In other words, the problem was not identity, but thinking in terms of an unchanging identity. No identity is permanent.

Alternately, we may ask: what location gives Neocosmos the luxury of thinking 'race,' 'native', 'Africanity', 'coloniality' as so many constraints only because thinking makes them so, thus constraints that can be dispensed with through a sheer act of will or imagination. In his lack of interest in a political thought and a political practice that connects interest with vison, Neocosmos betrays a quest more religious than political. No wonder, as he follows Badiou into the world of practice that seeks to transform the present – such as the brilliant Arab Spring – and, for the nth time, leans on the shoulders of Badiou and cites his text: "However brilliant and memorable the historical riots in the Arab World, they finally came up against universal problems of politics that had remained unresolved in the previous period ... at the core of which is ... that of organization." Alain Badiou, *Le Réveil de l'histoire*, 2011 (emphasis in original, translation modified) (Kindle Locations 6214-6218). Looking for a South African referent, he follows with a discussion of the politics of the umbrella movement, UDF (United Democratic Movement), that emerged in the heyday of the 1984-86 popular urban struggle in South Africa – which he sees as a South African version of the Arab Spring, with exactly the same defect: the absence of organization in a sea of spontaneity. UDF, he says, **"**was not a party organisation but a loose confederation of local political affiliates, which all adhered to some common principles and retained their organisational autonomy." And then laments that this particular feature, "the absence of a controlling 'party line'," which was the UDF's strong point also "turned out to be one of the reasons for its eventual demise, as it gave way, after being seriously weakened by state coercion, to the returning exiled party of the ANC." [Kindle Locations 3752 – 3756, 3834-3836). Not surprisingly, in a book dedicated to the embrace of spontaneity and the search for an all- embracing vision, Neocosmos has no room to discuss the organizational imperative; he recognizes it only when he crashes into it like a Rock of Gibralter.

The Turn to Badiou

The turn to Badiou feeds the search for solutions. Alternately borrowing from and directly citing Badiou, Neocosmos explains that this "process of absenting the state in thought can begin in politics, irrespective of whether the state exists as a set of institutions or not; this 'absenting of the state in thought' is central to a practice of politics that wishes to think an emancipatory future today. Badiou puts this idea as follows: 'What is the moment of freedom in politics? It is that when one distances oneself from the state' (Badiou, 1985: 166, my translation) or, again, 'Politics is about making politics exist, so that the state should no longer exist' (Badiou, 2013e: 115). (Kindle Locations 13414-13419). What does it mean to 'absent the state in thought … *whether the state exists as a state of institutions or not"*? Is it to not think the state or to think outside state categories? The difference, it seems to me, is produced in a series of steps: Neocosmos begins by detaching political analysis from political theory, then turns political theory from a comparative reflection to the pursuit of a singular ahistorical object, no longer political theory, but "Philosophy, in the abstract, a philosophy of Man."[33] He turns to Badiou for political philosophy, but without political analysis or political theory! To 'absent the state in thought' becomes an excuse for not thinking the state in practice.

When he does think the African state, it is as a generality: "The core problem with the National Liberation Struggle mode of politics was precisely that the struggle for freedom combined a struggle against the state as well as a struggle for a new state." [Kindle Locations 13477-13478] What is the alternative to thinking of solutions in the thick of the problem? There were two critiques of the postcolonial state in Africa. One was from the right, from a neoliberal perspective championed by the Washington Consensus and the human rights movement. It claimed to champion a critique of the state from the point of view of society, a sort of "absenteeing the state in thought," thinking the future outside the present. The CODESRIA social movement project of the late eighties, one for which Neocosmos has a surplus of praise, distanced itself from this kind of right- wing utopianism. We learnt a lesson from that experience: to move away from a one-sided critique of the postcolonial state, instead to think and theorize the relationship between state and society in historical contexts. It is this turn that Neocosmos shuns, because he considers it polluting: remaining "at the level of thinking a state form of nationalism". [Kindle Locations 3675 – 3682]

The leaning on Badiou – usually for support rather than illumination – points to a larger problem with Neocosmos' effort to produce political theory. If the problem, as Neocosmos seems to recognize, this time citing Fanon, is to pro-

duce new concept and categories, is the solution to import these from the outside, or is the challenge to theorize African historical and contemporary realities? Neocosmos writes, "the universality of humanity is thinkable from within African cultures," (Kindle Locations 13111-13114). Was this possibility ever in doubt without regard to any culture – not just African – except in the Enlightenment rendition of Reason? To give Neocosmos his due, let us ask: What does it mean to say that Africans think? I doubt it means what it literally says, for that would be too condescending; more likely, this is a claim that African thought can be folded within the parameters of Enlightenment universalism that claims to be a product of universal Reason. Though not condescending, this latter possibility suggests an inability to think the universal outside the limitations of Enlightenment thought.

Neocosmos has written a book more about Badiou than about the African experience he would like to theorize. Neocosmos is dedicated to summarizing Badiou, to introducing African scholars to Badiou. There have been translations before, of Marx and these days of Foucault. Neocosmos aims to give us a followup, with a new discovery. Endless quotations from Badiou betray the assumption that he is introducing a scholar unknown on this continent. He reads Badiou as a critic of structuralism in Europe, and looks to pinpoint structuralist thinking in Africa so he can translate Badiou and fashion out of it a weapon for the African terrain. At best, the knowledge Neocosmos offers is derivative.

As if anticipating this critique, Neocosmos writes: **"**Not that this book is 'about' Badiou's thought – it is not – rather, it is about Africans and the manner in which they have thought and currently think freedom." [Kindle Locations 385-386]**.** An intellectual history of African thought would be most welcome; but the reader will not find anything on African thought in this book. She will not even find a discussion of Badiou as a French or European philosopher. So dedicated a worshipper – rather than student – of Badiou is Neocosmos that we are introduced even to Mao through Badiou: *"*The people and the people alone are the makers of universal history. – Alain Badiou, *Le Réveil de l'histoire*, 2011 (my translation)." [Kindle Locations 1376-1378]

What, the reader may ask, is wrong with Badiou's thought, other than the identity of the author? Neocosmos says this in praise of Badiou: "until his work … thought was unrecognisable for what it was. This was precisely because politics was thought to be a simple or complex expression of the objective, so that it became reduced to the state, to power or to history. Subjectivity was always determined by something else: social location, social relations, power relations, agency or whatever. Badiou's philosophy is the only one I know of that enables us to think coherently a 'politics of militancy' (or politics as activism, as we would say in the Anglophone world). … Badiou has managed to do that in a completely original manner." [Kindle Locations 6477-6482]

Badiou's target is Althusserian structuralism, and possibly Foucault where the subject is "produced" by power so totally that the subject ceases to exist. In Badiou's alternative, at least as presented to us by Neocosmos, there is no link to the world outside, to the objective. My initial impulse on reading this was that if he was looking for thought unencumbered by the outside, the objective, he should have been reading religious thought. That he did not suggests that Neocosmos operates within a liberal thought world, one which is neatly divided between subject and object. There is no middle ground, as there is in much of religious thought.

I met Badiou at Columbia University last year. I had not read him, and still have not. But I listened to him lecture and then exchanged views at a smaller faculty dinner. In the lecture, Badiou made the claim that Neocosmos advances on his behalf, that Marx's universalism had failed and that we need a new universalism. I told him that the world has not produced one but several universalisms, from multiple vantage points. I cited Ibn Khaldun to the effect that no human subject is capable of producing universal thought, for all human beings are located somewhere. Only one power, God, can make that claim. No human can claim to write, or to speak, from everywhere and thus nowhere. So Ibn Khaldun concluded: when we encounter what we believe to be universal knowledge, we acclaim it as God. We may add that it is successive empires – and not God – that have made the claim to represent universal truth. I said to Badiou that the most we can hope for in the face of competing universalisms, is not a new universalism, but an inclusive pluralism.

I hope Neocosmos will address this question in his next book. If that book is to be from an African vantage point, he would do well to begin with an intellectual history of African thought, not as a claim to a stable formation but as an account of critical African encounters with received modern categories.

Elsewhere, I have offered some examples of intellectual labors – as in the work of historians at the University of Ibadan and Ahmado Bello University – that have gone into rethinking received categories of thought and formulating new categories adequate to understanding and valorizing particular histories and experiences. I am thinking of historical writing, such as that of the premodern or of ethnic identity, by historians from Kenneth Dike, Abdullahi Smith and Yusufu Bala Usman.[4] Rather than yet again import the latest mode of European thinking into Africa, in time-honored fashion, African scholars need to begin to decolonize thinking, not by avoiding winds of change from outside, but by engaging them critically.

The Utopian Search for a Blueprint

I have never thought that politics could be thought as a blueprint to be drawn up in the study of a professor, not even of a professor who does fieldwork or participates in social movements. I have always thought that the most that radical scholars can do is to understand the practice of real social movements as so many provisional responses to questions of the time. It is precisely from this perspective that I went about understanding the politics of peasant-based movements in Uganda (Ruwenzururu, NRM) and Tanzania (Sungusungu) and of students and migrant labor in South Africa (BC, 'workerist' and 'populist' unions). It was not accidental that the first collection of essays that we put together at MISR at the start of the doctoral program was titled "Getting the Question Right."

Here, then, is a point of difference between us. I do not look for solutions, to Neocosmos' dismay. I look to do two things: understand the problem and look to popular politics as a resource from which to understand elements of a 'solution.' Never have I believed that solutions can be hatched in the study of a professor! Neocosmos may think, and perhaps rightly so, that I lack a utopian streak which he seems to have in abundance. The cost of this utopianism is that he ends up building a Chinese Wall between "politics" and "agency," or what he calls "politics as such," throwing out of the window both interest and location (class, ethnicity, nation, gender, age) so as to let his imagination soar above all particularities in search of a universal. Failing to find that universal in real struggles in a real Africa, he turns to French philosophy for inspiration.

Neocosmos would like to be a philosopher, better still a French philosopher, one who soars above ground and above clouds, to think in world historical terms, unencumbered by facts or relations on the ground. To be an African intellectual, or a scholar in Africa, Neocosmos would have to walk on two legs, both as a scholar and as a public intellectual. We confronted this question when designing the curricular program at MISR: what should we teach? Should we reaffirm the original mission of the modern university, to produce a global intellectual who can be slotted in anywhere, or should our ambition be to produce a local sage? Our response, always provisional, was that we should endeavor to do both. The intellectual in the post-colonial world must learn to walk on two legs, to borrow Mao's metaphor. On the one hand, this person should aim to be a scholar who engages the world of scholarship globally. This meant we had no option but to teach social and political theory which is necessarily modern and largely Western, male and white – with names like Marx, Weber, Nietzsche, Freud, Foucault, and others punctuating that history. On the other hand, the same person should aim to be a public intellectual who engages with the society she lives in – aiming to theorize the encounter between different histories, traditional and modern, non-Western and Western, independent and colonial. This is the theory critical to our times. This dual task will necessarily produce its own tensions given time and place, but these tensions are likely to be productive.

Getting the Question Right: Universalism vs pluralism

One understanding we are likely to gain from this encounter is that we are not all asking the same question. Neocosmos' uncritical and worshipful turn to Badiou is grounded in the assumption that we are all asking more or less the same questions, with some of us being more 'advanced' theoretically. Theory travels, but we also know that theory produced in the West, including the epistemological critique developed by postcolonialism in the context of the Western academe, does not have the same critical purchase when transposed to the postcolonial world, just because the context here has different stakes, questions and power configurations. Rather than look for a single universal, even a new one, a replacement for what we may consider antiquated, we must embrace plurality. It is time to move away from gathering data here and processing it in Europe.

Notes

1. "The undamental problem of iden-tity studies from the perspective of emanci-pation is that political identities are necessarily derived from social location."
2. Mahmood Mamdani, "The South African Moment," *Apartheid Israel: The Politics of an Analogy*, ed by Jon Soske and Sean Jacobs, Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2015.
3. email, Suren Pillay, May 15, 2018
4. For a brief discussion, see, Mahmood Mamdani, Define and Rule, ch. 3.

The Humbling of the All People's Congress: Understanding Sierra Leone's March 2018 Presidential Run-off Election

Yusuf Bangura

Nyon, Switzerland

The March 31st presidential run-off election was an amazingly close race. Julius Maada Bio of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) emerged victorious with 51.8% of the votes, and his rival, Samura Kamara of the All People's Congress (APC), scored 48.2%. Only 92,235 votes separated them. A switch of 46,118 votes in the other direction would have produced a different result. No other election in Sierra Leone's history has been this close, except perhaps the 1967 election, which was conducted under a parliamentary system of government.

However, if one compares the vote shares of the two parties between 2012 and 2018 (57.8:37.4 and 51.8:48.2 respectively), this was a massive swing of 10.5 percentage points – close to the other big swing of 12.3 percentage points (70:45.4) against the SLPP in 2007. In most mature democracies, 10.5 percentage point swings would require at least two election cycles to overcome. The result is, therefore, a huge defeat for the APC and a great win for the SLPP.

How did the APC squander its 21 percentage point margin with the SLPP? And why did such a massive swing occur? The second question can be rephrased as 'Why did the APC lose the 2018 election?' This essay addresses these two questions.

A four-region swing

A bipolar ethno-regional cleavage underpins Sierra Leone's electoral politics. This bipolarity is based on the numerical dominance of the two largest ethnic groups, the Themneh and Mende, which are roughly equal in size, and constitute slightly more than 60% of the population. The Themneh are located in the North, which is very heterogeneous, and have a large presence in the Western Area. The Mende are largely found in the South and East, and dominate six out of the seven electoral districts[1,2]. Because of the North's ethnic heterogeneity, Northern-block voting, as opposed to ethnic group voting, historically informs voting behaviour in the region. In the South and East, however, with the exception of Kono district, Mende ethnic block voting seems to be the rule.

In the 1967 election, the population ratio between the North-Western Area and South-East was approximately 50:50. However, by 2004, this ratio had changed to 55:45 in favour of the North-Western Area. In 2015 the ratio had further changed to 56.5:43.5. However, the ratio of registered voters has been more lopsided since 2012 – it was 59.35:40.65 in 2012 and 60.5:39.5 in 2018[3]. The vote shares of the APC and SLPP in the last three elections reflected this ethno-regional divide. In 2012, for instance, the APC received 80% of its votes from the North and Western Area, while the SLPP received 76% of its votes from the South and East.

In an ethnically bifurcated electorate in which voting is largely ethnic, elections are often won by maximising votes in one's ethno-

regional stronghold, and making slight inroads in the ethno-regional stronghold of the opposing party. In the case of the APC, for instance, prior to 2018, the strategy was to maximise its votes in the North and Western Area and penetrate Kono district, which is the only non-Mende-speaking district in the East. For the SLPP, the strategy has been to maximise its votes in the South-East and make inroads in Kambia and Koinadugu, Northern districts with substantial minority group presence.

Ernest Koroma of the APC needed a four-region strategy[4] to avoid a run-off in 2012. He could not have won on the first ballot by relying only on the North, Western Area and Kono district. He needed the votes of all four regions to get to the 55% victory score. If he had relied only on the North and Western Area, he would have scored only 48.6% of the vote; adding Kono would have raised his share of the vote to 51.6%; his votes in Kailahun and Kenema would have raised his overall vote share to 54.5%. It was only when his Southern votes were added that he was able to cross the desired 55% that guaranteed him victory on the first ballot. However, because of the lopsided nature of the electorate in ethno-regional terms, Koroma could have won a second round ballot (which requires only 50%+1 votes) in 2012 with a three-region strategy by relying only the 51.6% of the votes he received from the North, Western Area and Kono district in the East.

The 2018 results indicate that because of the uneven distribution of registered voters in favour of the North-Western Area, Julius Maada Bio needed a four-region strategy to win the election in the second round of voting. Relying on the South and East would have given him only 34.85% of the votes and including the Western Area would have raised his vote share to 46.32%. It is only when his votes in the North are added that he is able to get to the 50%+1 mark. The interesting point about Bio's Northern votes is that reliance on only his votes in the districts with strong minority presence (Kambia, Koinadugu, Falaba and Karene) would have given him a mere 2.92 extra percentage points, which would have raised his overall vote share to 49.24%. He needed his votes in the predominantly Themneh-speaking districts of Port Loko, Tonkolili and Bombali (which gave him 2.57 extra percentage points) to get him across the victory line[5].

The SLPP's four-region strategy is superior to the APC's two-region strategy in the 2018 election, and vividly explains how the APC lost the election. The APC may have been lured into a false sense of security by assuming that the ethnically lopsided nature of the electorate in favour of its regional strongholds gives it the option to ignore the South and East and focus largely on the North and Western Area. And how else can one explain the sacking of Sam Sumana, an elected vice president from Kono, and the alienation of the Kono electorate? How does one explain the failure to choose a standard bearer or running mate from the South-East, even though a Southerner, Victor Foh, was vice president?

The choice of Samura Kamara, a Northerner, and Chernor Maju Bah, from the Western Area, as standard bearer and running mate respectively, may have sent a strong message to South-East voters that they did not matter in the calculations of the APC. Such views may have been buttressed by the perceived discrimination in public sector jobs and the government's failure to deliver on some key promises, such as a university for Kono district, and the slow progress in completing the road to Kailahun, which has not gone beyond Pendembu – which is still some distance from Kailahun[6]. The focus on the North and Western Area may explain why the APC opportunistically tried to change the constitutional rule that requires 55% of the votes to avoid a run-off, to a simple majority of 50%+1 in the last days of the last parliament without public debate. No party has ever won an election with a two-region strategy. The results do, indeed, indicate that even though both parties still draw most of their votes from their traditional ethno-regional strongholds, the APC has become much more regional than the SLPP. 89.2% of the APC's votes are from the North and Western Area, whereas the South and East account for 67.3% of the SLPP's votes.

The SLPP increased its vote share in every district, whereas the APC lost ground in all districts, including in Bombali where it obtained 90.7% of the votes. While this is incredibly high, it is still lower than the 93.2% that it received in 2012. Four factors account for the victory of the SLPP: the maximisation of its votes in the Mende-speaking districts of Kailahun, Kenema, Bo, Pujehun, Bonthe, and to some extent Moyamba, to stratospheric levels; the party's ability to tap into the anti-APC grievances in Kono, where it raised its vote share from 38% in 2012 to 72.6% in 2018; the rise in the party's vote share from 25% to 39.5% in the Western Area; and the moderate inroads the party made in the North, where it increased its vote share from 6% in 2012 to 17.8% in 2018. The SLPP's votes in the Mende-speaking districts were,

indeed, stratospheric – the party obtained 89% of the votes in those districts, with Bonthe, Pujehun and Kailahun each giving the party 90% or more of their votes.

The APC lost much ground in its traditional strongholds. For instance, whereas in 2012, it obtained 88% of the votes in the North, it only obtained 82% of the votes in 2018. The slide in the North is related to the challenge faced by the APC from the National Grand Coalition (NGC) and other small parties, which took 19.5% of the votes in the first round. The APC was only able to regain 67% of those votes in the run-off, but this was not enough to prevent the SLPP from winning.

The SLPP was competitive in Kambia (it received 30% of the votes), Falaba (42.7% of the votes), and Koinadugu (32% of the votes). Kambia had the lowest voter participation rate in the run-off, suggesting a lack of interest after the NGC, the party of a plurality of the voters, failed to make it to the run-off (only 65% voted as opposed to a national average of 81%). The APC's harassment of the NGC and smaller parties in the region would have made it difficult for the APC to win a higher percentage of these small party voters in the second round. Similarly, even though the APC obtained 72% of the votes in the Western Area in 2012, it received only 60.5% of the votes in 2018. It was heavily trounced in Kono, where its vote share dropped from 58% in 2012 to 27.4% in 2018 and it failed to defend the gains it made in the Mende-speaking districts in 2012. Its vote share declined from approximately 18% in 2012 to only 11% in 2018.

Debates on Sierra Leone's electoral politics have often focused on the phenomena of ethno-regional strongholds and swing districts to determine the winning chances of parties. The swing districts are assumed to be the Western Area and Kono, with the idea that these districts have changed winning parties a few times in our last five party competitive elections. The notion of swing districts gave rise to the view that no party can win an election without winning the Western Area or Freetown. The historical record indeed indicates that when the APC won the elections in 1967, 2007 and 2012, it also won the Western Area districts. Similarly, when the SLPP won the elections in 1996 and 2002, it was also victorious in the Western Area. The SLPP's victory in 2018 without winning Freetown or the Western Area indicates that the idea of swing districts is unhelpful in understanding electoral politics in Sierra Leone.

The concept of swing districts or swing states makes sense in US presidential elections where the winner is not elected by the popular vote but by an electoral college of voters representing the 50 states and Washington DC. Under this system, the delegate vote share per state is determined by the number of Senators and House respresentiatives for each state. A plurality of the popular votes in any district (apart from Maine and Nebraska) gives all the delegate votes of that district to the winner. It is logical, therefore, for American political scientists and commentators to focus on battle ground or swing states, which often determine the winner. The notion of swing or 'marginal' constituencies (in UK parlance) also makes sense in first-past-the-post parliamentary elections where a plurality of votes is needed in each constituency to determine winners.

However, where elections for the presidency are based on the popular vote, the appropriate focus should be on the percentage vote shares of parties in each district and vote swings between elections. This approach indicates that analysts should focus less on parties flipping electoral districts and more on parties' ability to improve vote shares. In other words, a party does not need to win a district in an opponent's stronghold to win an election. All it needs is to improve its vote share to a level that will get it to 55% or 50%+1 vote shares when the votes in all the 16 electoral districts are added. The APC and SLPP are still dominant in their respective ethno-regional strongholds of the North-Western Area and South-East. The only district that flipped in 2018 was Kono (and Kambia in the first round, which gave a plurality of its votes to the NGC). However, changes in vote shares in ethno-regional strongholds – and indeed all districts – are what accounted for the election outcome.

Why the APC lost

Why did the APC lose the election? Some of the reasons are embedded in the answers to the first question discussed above on how the party lost ground in all four regions. In this section, I highlight four important reasons. The first is the party's arrogant sense of invincibility, which is informed by its monopolisation of power for 24 years (1968-92) and the uneven ethno-regional distribution of voters. Its monopolisation of power from 1968-1992 is captured by the party's infamous mantra of having 99 tactics of winning elections. Furthermore, the ethnically uneven electoral distribution of voters led to a false belief that it will never lose elections because voting is largely

ethnic. These two factors created a dangerous, anti-democratic mindset of invincibility and fuelled the myth that 'the APC does not lose elections it organises'. It partly explains why the SLPP's base opted for a leader with a military background that ended the APC's rule in 1992. The logic of the SLPP's choice is that the APC cannot be removed by democratic means alone – an idea that is equally dangerous for democratic politics. Elections cannot perform their basic function of accountability and mandate renewal if they are predictable or based on who has superior methods to fight or rig the outcome.

After the announcement of the final result of the presidential election, I sent a WhatsApp message to friends saying 'the end of an era'. The historian, and my insightful WhasApp discussion partner, Ibrahim Abdullah, queried my use of the term 'era', since the APC's defeat will not signal a clear break from the past. However, the term very well signifies an important aspect of the evolution of our democratic politics: slaying the myth of APC's invincibility through democratic means, without military intervention or civil war. The APC attempted to discredit the top management of the National Electoral Commission (NEC), especially its chairman, N'fa Alie Conteh. It sought an injunction on the run-off and accused the international observers, especially those from the European Union, the Commonwealth headed by Ghana's ex-president John Mahama, and the British High Commissioner of orchestrating regime change.

Bio was forced to play rogue by calling for nation-wide protests if the elections were not held on their scheduled date of 27 March, and asserted that he would not recognise Koroma as a legitimate president after 27 March. Many were upset by this and references to his impulse for militaristic or insurrectionary interventions re-emerged. Sierra Leone has, however, changed in one significant respect, namely that voters are tired of instability, militarism, and war.

The international observers did a great job of diffusing the tension and the NEC Chief was resolute in defending the independence of his institution. The injunction was lifted, Bio's threats did not materialise, and the APC, in the words of Chairman Mao, turned out to be a 'paper tiger'. The humbling of the APC, in my view, is the single most important outcome of the 2018 elections. It removes the idea of invincibility and assumed right to govern indefinitely in our politics.

The APC's arrogant sense of invincibility gave rise to a second problem: the belief that it can govern without much respect for institutions or checks and balances. Its huge mandate in 2012 (a vote margin of 21 percentage points) and control of more than 60% of parliamentary seats provided it with a buffer to rule without much accountability. The party's disrespect for institutions includes the illegal firing of the elected vice president, Sam Sumana; selectively using the dual citizenship law to witch-hunt Kandeh Yumkella of the NGC, while simultaneously having a large number of ministers who are dual citizens; attempting at the 11th hour of the last parliament and in the middle of an election to change, without public debate, a constitutional rule that 55% votes are required to avoid a run-off in a presidential election; and elevating political parties over citizens' democratic choices in determining when presidents and vice presidents can remain in office.

With the Supreme Court's support, a party leader, who may not even contest elections in his party, is now more powerful than a president elected by millions of voters if they belong to the same party. The party's leader, Ernest Koroma, became all powerful and basked in the dubious title of Supreme Authority. He singlehandedly selected the party's standard bearer and running mate – a first in the comity of democratic nations and accepted the title of Life Chairman and Leader from the youth wing of the party – this was reminiscent of the bad governance days of 'life presidents' that ruined African countries in the 1970s.

The government spent a large sum of donor and state funds to review the country's constitution. However, it rejected most of the recommendations of the independent Constitutional Review Committee that was made up of representatives from all registered political parties and civil society organisations. The government also attempted to introduce changes that did not enjoy public support when the reviewers engaged the public before writing their report. The president became so confident of his assuned powers that he resorted to appointing individuals who served in independent institutions to political posts when they retired from office. Umu Hawa Tejan-Jalloh, the former Chief Justice, was sent to Ghana as ambassador and Christiana Thorpe, who supervised the 2012 elections that he won, was appointed as a deputy minister of education. Such actions might have signaled that there was reward for compliant heads of independent institutions when they left office. If heads of independent institutions want to serve governments after retirement, they should wait until the president whose tenure coincided with theirs is out of office.

The sense of invincibility and disrespect for institutions gave rise to a third problem, which was an inability to control the country's chronic corruption, despite platitudes of running Sierra Leone as a business and having zero tolerance for corruption. The government granted zero taxation to companies and duty waivers for imported goods, which only enriched mining companies and key government and party functionaries during the mining boom of 2012-13. Action Aid estimated that the state lost $224 million in 2012 on tax concessions to only five mining companies and a cement company. For more than 10 years, the government failed to act on the Auditor General's report, which contained numerous cases of misappropriated funds or expenditures that were not backed by proper documentation. It also failed to hold those who the Auditor General identified as responsible for the missing 14 million dollars meant to fight the Ebola virus disease accountable for their actions.

The scourge of corruption reared its ugly head at the State House during preparations for the annual Hajj pilgrimage in 2017. By March 2018 when the elections were held, officials at State House and other functionaries who pilfered pilgrims' payments had still not been charged by the Anti-Corruption Commission. Such chronic corruption encouraged a public service recruitment practice that was largely informed by party patronage and ethno-regional considerations.

The final grievance against the APC was its inability to transform the economy, improve the quality of education and health services, and lift living standards. Throughout the campaign, the APC touted road construction as its key selling point for mandate renewal. However, road construction, or infrastructure development, needs to be anchored in a jobs-generating growth strategy to improve wellbeing. Even if voters are provided with the best roads in the world, they will react negatively during elections if they do not have jobs, secure incomes and good social services. The APC failed to understand this logic throughout its 10 years in office. To compound the problem, the economy has been in dire straits since 2015, largely due to the collapse of global iron prices and the Ebola pandemic that halted many activities. Despite a moderate recovery in 2016 and 2017, the economy remains undiversified. Approximately 60% of youths do not have productive jobs, and 80% of them are in poverty despite the creation of multiple state organisations on youth affairs. Furthermore, inflation is approximately 20% and there is often a lag in the payment of salaries of some public sector employees (YB: common knowledge).

A combination of these grievances resulted in a protest vote to kick the APC out of power. Political scientist Jimmy Kandeh was the first to recognise the results as a protest vote against the APC on his lively Facebook page. He pinned down this protest vote to voting behaviour in Kono and the Western Area. The idea of a protest vote suggests that voters were more driven by an urge to throw the APC out of power than belief in the SLPP's manifesto or policies. After all, Bio only obtained 43.3% of the votes in the first round of elections.

The only distinctly vote-catching message of Bio's campaign was his promise of free education, which surely would have earned him votes. However, accusations of complicity in the extra-judicial killing of citizens and corruption when he was a top member of the National Provisional Ruling Council continued to dog his campaign. And even though his campaign was effective, it was difficult to recognise major policy promises that set it apart from other parties and were compelling enough to deliver victory. If anything, Kandeh Yumkella and the NGC were the breath of fresh air – they had a more compelling message on the economy, inclusion and governance.

However, the ethno-regional barriers proved resilient, and many voters who were tired of the APC calculated that Bio's SLPP stood a better chance than the other parties of getting rid of the APC. This protest vote was similar to what happened in 2007 when the electorate got tired of Ahmad Tejan-Kabbah's SLPP and voted for Koroma's APC, which did not advance anything substantively attractive in the campaign and struggled with its terrible history of violence, corruption, economic mismangement and repression when it governed between 1968 and 1992.

Let me return to the four-region swing that I highlighted as one of the factors responsible for the SLPP's victory to make the following point: even though the 2018 protest vote was intense in Kono and the Western Area, the defeat of the APC was a nation-wide or four-region protest, including in the Mende-speaking districts that gave 89% of their votes to the SLPP. The APC, to recall, lost votes in all four regions. The Mende-speaking districts gave 18% of their votes to the APC in 2012. Indeed, 149,021 voters in those districts voted APC in 2012. In 2018, only 11% or 90,346 voters did. What accounted for the 3.5

percentage point swing against the party or loss of almost 60,000 voters? I submit that ethnic factors were intertwined with the national protest wave against the APC to produce the stratospheric numbers for the SLPP in those districts.

The vote swing against the APC in the North was 3 percentage points (88% in 2012 to 82% in 2018). There, ethno-regionalism helped to reduce the impact of the protest wave against the APC. The Western Area vote swing against the APC was 5.8 percentage points (72% in 2012 to 60.5% in 2018). The biggest vote swing against the APC was a massive 15.3 percentage points in Kono. Indeed, if 46,118 of the 91,823 Kono people who voted for the SLPP had switched their votes to the APC, the latter would have won the election. In this sense, the Kono voters can rightly claim that they gave the presidency to Bio. In other words, the illegal sacking of the vice president, who hails from Kono, cost the APC the election.

Conclusion: prospects for democratic politics

The demolition of the myth of APC invincibility bodes well for Sierra Leone's democratic politics. No democracy is viable if one party believes it has a natural right to rule indefinitely. Since we seem to be stuck with the APC and SLPP, despite a clear alternative in the National Grand Coalition in 2018, the only way voters can ensure some kind change and hold parties to account is if they have a genuine chance of throwing incumbent parties out for poor performance. Party alternation in power may be a blunt instrument of accountability, but it is better than having single party dominance in the governance arena.

Koroma apologised to the nation in 2007 for the APC's 24 years of reckless governance, and promised to transform the party into what he called 'A New APC'. One of his greatest failures was his refusal to modernise his party. Modernisation would have required making the party more democratic, merit-driven, inclusive and not beholden to patronage networks. Instead, he encouraged a culture of sycophancy to become deeply entrenched in the party, allowed the party's non-democratic rule of selection to continue to determine how representatives are chosen, and became more powerful than the party itself.

Party members indulged him in his quest for total supremacy because of the misplaced belief that he was an asset in winning and retaining power. They even canvassed the public to give him a third term or an extended stay in office – moves that he refused to stamp out until public opposition forced his hand. A state-supported university was named after him and there was a reported initiative by the Central Bank to have his image on one of the countries' bank notes, even though such actions are totally wrong for a sitting president in a democracy.

The low point of this abuse of institutions was when he publicly stated that if he had wanted a third term, no one one would have stopped him. Not even the constitution? Rather than a new APC, the party elite's mind-set of domination remained the same as that of the old APC. The party needs a fundamental reform of its constitution, mind-set and practices if it is to win the confidence of voters in future elections.

The defeat of the APC holds promise for building a culture of autonomy in Sierra Leone's key election management institutions including the NEC, the police and the judiciary. The top leadership of NEC performed well in the second round of voting, and refused to yield to incumbent party intimidation. It still needs to clean house at the field level, where many of its officials collaborated with the two parties to rig the first round of elections. Amazingly, according to NEC's data, overvoting occurred in each of the 16 electoral districts in the first round, which suggests a widespread attempt to stifle the people's franchise. For institutions like the police and the judiciary, this second alternation of power between parties by democratic means teaches a crucial lesson that political parties do not have permanent tenure in government – the primary interest of officials of such institutions should be to serve the state and not the party in government.

What are the prospects for democratic politics in the current dispensation? Bio's SLPP government faces two kinds of constraints that can check the invincibility impulse and disrespect for institutions witnessed under Koroma's APC. The first is the very small vote margin the party enjoyed in the election. The next election cycle only needs a 1.8 percentage point swing against the SLPP to send it out of State House. As we have seen, that is only 45,118 votes. Voters' remorse in the North, Western Area or Kono for any number of reasons could be catastrophic for the party. This suggests that the party is likely to eschew the APC's arrogance of unchecked power if it seriously wants voters to give it a second term in office. The 2018 election has sent a strong message that no party can use undemocratic

methods to prolong its life. In other words, the leash the electorate has on the SLPP is very short.

The second constraint is the balance of power in parliament. The results indicate that the SLPP will not have a majority or emerge as the largest party in the legislative body. This is not the first time that a president's party will not have a majority in parliament. In 1996, Tejan-Kabbah's SLPP government had only 39.7% of the parliamentary seats – its alliance with the People's Democratic Party gave it a comfortable majority of 57%. In the new parliament, the APC will have a very small majority of 68 out of the 132 seats. This is the first time in our history that the governing party will not be the largest party in parliament – it may not be able, therefore, to provide the Speaker and Majority Leader and drive the law-making process[7]. The seat distribution indicates that Bio's government will not enjoy Koroma's freedom to do as he pleases without parliamentary contestation and bargaining. Key appointments, bills and the budget may have to be negotiated and not imposed or rushed through as in the previous parliament. Smaller parties like the NGC and the Coalition for Change will have the power to punch above their weight.

These constraints can, however, also produce negative outcomes or fail to discipline the government. Sierra Leone's history is marked by both hope and disaster – any analysis will need to recognise, therefore, both positive and negative outcomes. The possibility of gridlock of the type that often occurs in the US when Congress is not controlled by the president's party can be one outcome. This is likely to occur if the APC uses its majority power to block the president's intiatives because of executive actions that the party vehemently opposes. One likely area of contention is the replacement of people in top positions in the public sector that owed their loyalty to the APC. Bio's government will be under tremendous pressure from its base, especially the *Paopa* faction[8], to move swiftly on this issue – and they will point to the far-reaching changes in top level personnel when the APC came to power in 2007 as justification for their demands. Such struggles, if not properly managed, could provoke the government to govern in a non-accountable and confrontational way in order to demonstrate executive power.

A second problem is limitations on the bargaining process across parties for majority outcomes. In a situation where the governing party does not have a majority, such bargaining has one significant drawback: the lack of autonomy of individual members of parliament MPs in our parliamentary system. Articles 77 (k) and 77 (l) of the constitution state that an MP can lose his/her seat in parliament if he/she ceases to be a member of the party on whose ticket the election was won. The articles further state that the Speaker, in consultation with the leader of an MP's party, can cause the expulsion of that MP if he/she sits and votes with a party other than the one on whose ticket the election was won. This may limit the ability of the president to make deals with individual MPs without the backing of their party leaders. If the APC provides the Speaker and Majority Leader, the government will find it difficult to make deals with individual APC MPs without the consent of the APC leadership.

Experiences under Tejan-Kabbah's SLPP and Koroma's APC on this issue are not encouraging. In 1996, John Karefa-Smart of the United National People's Party (UNPP) accused his parliamentary party members of disloyalty and collusion with the SLPP government. He dismissed 80% of them, but the affected MPs joined hands with SLPP MPs to have Karefa-Smart suspended from parliament. This incident strained relations between the UNPP and the SLPP government, making it difficult for Karefa-Smart's faction of the UNPP to work with Tejan-Kabbah in opposing the military coup of 1997.

In the case of Koroma, even though he did not really need the votes of the SLPP in parliament, SLPP partisans accused him of interfering in the protracted struggles among SLPP MPs for control of the party's parliamentary agenda. The SLPP failed to hold the Koroma government to account in parliament.

Bio's government and opposition parliamentary parties should study these and other cases around the world and work out schemes that will lead to healthy cooperation for democratic politics and development.

Notes

1. The seven districts are Bo, Moyamba, Bonthe, Pujehun, Kenema, Kailahun and Kono, with the Mende language dominant in all except Kono where most people speak Kono.
2. There are non-Mende ethnic groups in the South and East, apart from the Kono. These are the Kissi, Sherbro and Vai, but most members speak Mende.
3. Data on registered voters and election results in this essay are from published data provided by the National Electoral Commission.
4. Sierra Leone is divided into four regions: South, East, North and Western Area. The Northern region

was split into two (North and North-West) before the 2018 elections. In this essay, North and North-West are treated as one region (North). A four-region strategy refers to efforts to maximise votes in all four regions (South, East, North and Western Area).

5. There is a large Themneh presence in the Kambia district, which it shares with the Soso, Madingo and Limba. There is also some Themneh presence in Karene, where the Limba are the largest group.
6. I thank Arthur Abraham, one of Sierra Leone's leading historians, for this information, which he communicated to me by email.
7. It is not clear what the status of the 14 paramount chiefs who were elected by non-popular vote will be in determining the leadership of the House.
8. Paopa is a Themneh word that has been incorporated into the lingua franca, Krio. When used with reference to Bio, it means he will rule whether his opponents like it or not.

Expanding the horizons of Transformation of Higher Education in Africa

Dennis Masaka

Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies Great Zimbabwe University Zimbabwe

Introduction

In Africa, education in general and higher education in particular remains fundamentally dominated by an epistemological paradigm that may not be relevant to the continent's prevailing circumstances, challenges and aspirations. The dominance of this knowledge paradigm has curiously survived the tide of "independence", though illusory, that has swept across Africa. In light of the persisting dominance of the West's epistemological paradigm over that of the indigenous people of Africa, there has been a call for the transformation of higher education in Africa. This translates to the fundamental change of the higher education curriculum and the institutional structures that sustains the present mono-focal nature of higher education curriculum. The purpose has been to create the necessary conditions for the co-existence of the once demeaned epistemological paradigm of the indigenous people of Africa and other paradigms.

I take such a measure as crucial in reversing the epistemic injustice that has been caused by the foisting of the West's epistemological paradigm to the contestable status of the only authentic paradigm that qualifies to inform the higher education curriculum in Africa. However, I have some reservations with its chances of success in rescuing Africa from problems that it is currently facing, particularly the problem of dependency. In light of limitations of transformation as presently understood in the sphere of higher education in Africa, I propose that the transformation agenda in Africa go beyond simply changing the higher education curriculum so that it is informed by diverse epistemological paradigms (Meneses, 2016: 9), including that of the indigenous people of Africa. This would allow a focus on transforming these knowledge paradigms so that they impart, in the learners creative and innovative agency that could help rescue African countries from the spectre of dependency on other geopolitical centres. The horizons of transformation of higher education in Africa ought to be expanded to include aligning it to the challenges and aspirations of the continent. In other words, transformed education ought to speak to the conditions of the continent with the idea of finding answers to them.

Transformation in Africa and its Pitfalls

The condition of the African continent, especially after partially emerging from the colonial past is such that any changes that are to be implemented in order to decolonise it ought to lead to a fundamental change to the *status quo*. This means that such changes ought to overturn the present condition of Africa such that the continent would take a new and emancipatory trajectory going forward. This trajectory would lead to the authentic liberation of the continent from the burden of dependency.

Yet, from my own observation, with respect to the curriculum, transformation in Africa has simply been projected as implying the change in the composition of the curriculum content so that it draws its content from diverse epistemological paradigms including that of the indigenous people of Africa. This has been touted as a worthy corrective to the exclusive dominance of the education curriculum in Africa by the Western epistemological paradigm.

It is worth noting that this change to the education curriculum in Africa has been resisted by those who felt that the foisting of the Western epistemological paradigm to the position of exclusive dominance of the education curriculum in Africa is necessary for reasons such as the maintenance of educational "standards" in Africa. The resistance to the transformation of the educational curriculum Africa is largely unconvincing. Basically, transformation is still an idea that is yet to be actualised in some African countries. Even in those African countries where those who are connected in some way to those who have created or sustained the dominance of the education curriculum by one epistemological paradigm have physically departed from positions of direct control of events, talk of authentic decolonisation is still somewhat largely lethargic. Nevertheless, my interest in this piece is not whether this noble idea has fully attained the results that it desires.

My interest lies with the futility of this exercise when one takes into consideration that Western education, at least as it has been introduced to this continent at the inception of colonial rule, has been considered as bereft of the creative and innovative qualities that would potentially empower learners to emancipate Africa from its dependency on other geopolitical centres such as the Western world. To my knowledge, transformation in Africa, thus far, seems to have been averse or somewhat unconcerned with the imperative to emerge from substantial dependency on other geopolitical centres to a position of significant self-determination in matters concern the continent and its circumstances. In my view, the transformation of the education curriculum that is simply motivated by the desire to overcome the dominance of the curriculum by one epistemological paradigm and instead diversify the paradigms from which the curriculum content is derived, may not deliver the authentic liberation of the African continent that is desired. There lies the pitfall of transformation as presently conceived in Africa.

Expanding the horizons of Transformation

In the light of the identified pitfall of transformation in Africa, I suggest that its horizons ought to be expanded so that it surpasses the mere broadening of the paradigms of knowledge from which the content of the curriculum is derived. The transformed curriculum ought to liberate the indigenous people of Africa from dependency on other geopolitical centres when it comes to finding solutions to the problems that the continent finds itself facing. In other words, the proposed transformation ought to make a practical difference to the prevailing circumstances in Africa by ensuring that it gives agency to the indigenous people of Africa so that they become the prime movers and instigators of the development agenda of the continent. I take this as necessary especially given the fact that the education that the colonised countries in Africa adopted at independence did not seem to reawaken the creative and innovative potential of the learners, but actually tended to prepare the dominated people for inferior roles in the development of their own countries. Herein resides the challenge with such an education. It cannot be entrusted to liberate the indigenous people of Africa from dependency which is largely associated with colonial education. It may need to be internally transformed, then, if it is to speak to the imperative for creative and innovative agency that is required for Africa to authentically emerge from the spectre of dependency. This is necessary to rid the continent of its tendency to suppress the creative and innovative potential of its recipients. Similarly, other knowledge paradigms that ought to inform the education curriculum, such as that of the indigenous people of Africa requires a construction in such a way that they are disposed to create and nurture the creative potential of the indigenous people of Africa so that they would take a lead in finding solutions to the problems and challenges that continent faces from time to time. The issue here is to find a lasting corrective to Africa's enduring problem of dependency.

Concluding Remarks

In this essay, I have argued that simply replacing an education curriculum that is dominated by the Western epistemological paradigm with one whose content is informed by diverse epistemological para-digms including that of the indigenous people of Africa may not necessarily deliver the authentic liberation that is intended. In my view, authentic liberation of the education curriculum in Africa ought to surpass acceptance of the reality

of the diversity of epistemological paradigms so that the knowledges that inform it are disposed towards awakening and nurturing the creative and innovative potential of the learners. The point emphasised here is that the dependency of African countries could possibly be reversed by way of ensuring that they actively take a lead in finding solutions to the problems and challenges that they face. The *end* of transformation of education in Africa, then, ought not to be defined by simply celebrating and accepting that diverse epistemo-logical paradigms ought to inform the transformed curriculum but should ensure that the knowledge imparted to the learners *works*. The curriculum should be able to suggest workable solutions to the problems and challenges that African countries are confronted with in present times.

References

Meneses, M. P. (2016), Beyond the Two Cultures Paradigm: The Humanities in the CODESRIA Project. In: *CODESRIA Bulletin,* Nos 3 & 4, pp. 7-10.

Othering the Higher Education Sector in Governance and Democratic Processes in Africa

Mlamuli N. Hlatshwayo

Curriculum and Education Studies, School of Education, University of KwaZulu-Natal South Africa

Kehdinga George Fomunyam

International Centre for Nonviolence (ICON), Durban University of Technology South Africa

Africa has made great strides in democracy and governance since the emergence of African Nationalism in the late 1930s. However, many African nations are still under dictatorial regimes, ravaged by poor management and bad governance and "state capture". While the reasons for the continuous increase of poverty in Africa are diverse, some (Amar & Zghidi, 2016) have attributed it to bad governance, others (Fomunyam, 2017) to poor democratic processes and better still others (Dabalen, Etang, Mungai, Wambile, & Wane, 2016) to the lack of or poor utilization of data on these issues in Africa. Whatever the difference in their reasons, they all agree that growth, poverty, development, security and respect for human rights can all be improved through better democratic processes and good governance. However, governing mechanisms and democratic processes in Africa have been stifled because of the othering of the higher education sector. Its voice has been othered, giving room for state capture, poor governance and dictatorship. The higher education sector or universities and research institutions have three core responsibilities or missions: teaching and learning, research and community engagement. This means that academics are not only verse with theoretical understandings of governance, governing mechanisms, and democratic processes, but also have a working knowledge of the society by reason of their community engagement, and the fact that they live in these communities. This paper therefore argues that by de-othering the higher education sector, room is created for strategic governance, enhanced democratic processes, responsible citizenry and human rights, both at the local and national or international level.

Almost 31 years have passed since the World Bank, in its report, *Financing Education in Developing Countries* recommended a sharp reduction in the number of higher education (henceforth, HE) institutions on the continent in the name of efficiency and the distribution of educational resources (Caffentzis, 2000). This recommendation was based on the flawed assumption that Africans were destined to remain unskilled, uncompetitive, and unemployable.

While the World Bank has moved beyond this notion of looking at African HE as an "unnecessary burden" on the fiscal possibilities of the continent, most government or politicians have not. They see the HE sector or the academics within the sector as a necessary evil that must constantly be kept under watch – the othering. There is need for the de-othering of the HE sector and the strengthening of the relationship between the and the developmental needs of African states regarding development, skills, and the theoretical and practical reflections around governance, citizenship and democracy.

There is a (rightful) suspicion and mistrust in the relationship between HE and the state in Africa, which has resulted in its othering. HE institutions in general and academics in particular, have always argued against the role of the state in being interventionist and undermining academic freedom and institutional autonomy. This steams from prior experiences in which the government sought to exercise extensive interference in the running of the HE institutions themselves, resulting in the universities being crippled and unable to offer critique, insight or reflection on the state, and its role in the international community. For instance, Aman Attieh , reports that since 1992, there has been an increase in serious violations of the freedom of speech and expression in Algeria in which the security forces, opposition parties and militant groups have sought to silence scholars and citizens as a whole (Teferra & Altbach, 2003). They further add that, the interventionist and at times authoritarian role of the state in HE was seen with the summary expulsion of over 40 university professors and lecturers from Addis Ababa University, in Ethiopia in the mid-1990s. This means HE in relation to the state should be understood beyond the domain of the market forces and the "employability" of the graduates, to critical questions such as the role of HE in producing a critical citizenry (or as wa Thiong'o terms it, "New Africans"), governance and democracy and its application in Africa (Wa Thiong'o, 1994).

The relationship between African states and HE dates back to the ancient history of the pyramids of Egypt, the obelisks of Ethiopia and the kingdom of Timbuktu (Teferra & Altbach, 2003; Teferra & Altbachl, 2004). The oldest university still in existence is Egypt's Al-Azhar (Teferra & Altbach, 2003), which was founded as a great seat of Islamic theological reflections and learning. Al-Azhar was particularly instrumental in the development of Islamic development society, which resulted in the institution conferring Islamic legitimacy on the state, and helping develop the social, moral and cultural spheres of Egypt (Al-Sayyid, 1993; Crecelius, 1966).

The power of HE to transform beyond the domains of the market forces and the "useful knowledge" of employability, as dictated by the neoliberal financial regimes need to be taken into consideration and given a voice to contribute to democratic processes and governance structures on the continent if the happenings on the continent as a whole are going to improve. This means that HE in Africa has always gone well beyond such narrow fiscal prisms and have sought to contribute to new ways of thinking and conceptualizing society. In other words, universities in Africa have not always being "adoring darlings" of western neoliberal-fiscal regimes and have sought to reimagine society in new and different ways, often in counter-hegemonic attempts. This has often entailed going against the state with consequences on the institutions and academics themselves. This can be seen particularly in two case studies – at the University of Fort Hare in South Africa and Makerere University in Uganda. Fort Hare University became an interesting social experiment in African Pan Africanism, in which leading intellectuals and freedom fighters such as Robert Mugabe, ZK Matthews, Govan Mbeki, Yusuf Lule, Oliver Tambo, Nelson Mandela, Seretse Khama, Kenneth Kaunda, Julius Nyerere and others[1], attended the institution and intellectually developed there through critical engagements with other thinkers in the institutions.

Although founded in 1878, University of Fort Hare under the Apartheid regime was one of the central academic pillars against the fight for social justice, inclusivity and multi-racialism in South Africa. The institution was at the forefront in producing a new breed of African intellectuals and freedom fighters, who were committed to crippling the colonial and Apartheid regimes and their Manichean allegoric[2] conceptions of social reality. Leading intellectuals in the university advanced Pan Africanism as an attempt to transcend the narrow ethnic borders imposed on African identities through colonials and Apartheid and called upon transnational commitment to decolonisation and freedom from Apartheid. The connection between knowledge, student activism and social justice was critical to the fight against colonialism and Apartheid, and the re-humanising of Blackness. The university being incorporated into the National Party's

(NP) education system in 1959/60,[3] resulted in the institution losing its excellence and multi-ethnic focus. This led to what could be termed, the "tribalisation" of the institution, in how it was forced to re-look at its admission policy and only accept "Xhosa-speakers".[4] This policy achieved multiple purposes – firstly, it reduced Fort Hare from being a multiracial and multi-ethnic HE institution of higher learning to a "Xhosa" or "Bantu" college, relegated to only serving exclusively the needs of the local community. Secondly, it used Fort Hare to reinforce the Apartheid social construction of Blackness through crude tribal identities in the production of "useful Bantus" who serve well the needs of the Apartheid regime. Thirdly, what this policy did was to silence Fort Hare as an institution and marginalise it to the periphery of HE, through crippling de-funding, while reallocating the much-needed funds and resources to historically white HE institutions. Thus, the de-othering of Fort Hare University in South Africa, will create the necessary room for strategic governance, enhanced democratic processes, responsible citizenry and human rights both locally and internationally that the institution once was before the Apartheid regime crippled it.

Makerere University similarly offers illuminating insight on the interesting relationship between HE, social development and governance. Makerere University was founded in 1922 by the colonial government as a vocational college (Mamdani, 2016). The University, together with Dar Es Salaam University in Tanzania, rose up to become the bastion of anti-colonial and anti-imperial nationalism on the continent. However, it was the highly contested debate that occurred between Ali Mazrui from Makerere University and Walter Rodney, from Dar Es Salaam University regarding the relationship between African public intellectuals and the then emerging postcolonial governments that were increasingly turning into one party states after the 1960s and 1970s (Mamdani, 2016, pp. 72-74), that led to the othering of this institution. Mazrui increasingly argued against left leaning intellectuals for "timidity" and "soft hands" (Mamdani, 2016, p. 73), in not being critical and oppositional to postcolonial African governments who were undermining democracy and good governance. Mazrui felt that African intellectuals betrayed their convictions on the importance for good governance and critical citizenry in embracing leaders such as Ghana's Nkwame Nkrumah, Tanzania's Julius Nyerere and others, who banned opposition parties and had begun undermining academic freedom in HE institutions. For Mazrui, the voice of African intellectuals in having the ability to hold the state accountable was very much in consolidating the democratic gains after colonialism. Rodney vehemently disagreed against Mazrui's criticism and suggested that African intellectuals should join the struggle in consolidating national independence against the enduring patterns of imperialism. While Mazrui was preoccupied with the "internal" good governance and social justice imperatives of the new states, Rodney was largely concerned about the "external" impending dangers of imperialism which had replaced the barrel of the gun with new financial regimes. These debates show that HE in Africa has always been deeply implicated in issues of governance, citizenship and the role of HE in developing the state.

De-othering the HE sector is important in ensuring that African states have access to resources, networks and well established theoretical approaches that will help navigate and negotiate some of the challenges that plague the continent. HE institutions in Africa has always reimagined governance, citizens and giving voice beyond the domain of the neoliberal market forces. As seen in the case with Fort Hare, Makerere and Dar Es Salaam Universities, HE institutions have been at the leading front of consolidating democracy and being critical reflection spaces. This paper therefore argued that by de-othering the higher education sector, room is created for strategic governance, enhanced democratic processes, responsible citizenry and human rights.

Notes

1. Please see http://www.ufh.ac.za/
2. The Manichean Allegory mode of thinking was introduced during the colonial period, beginning with the story of Ham, that sought to introduce "binary" and separation as a mode of ruling. In other words, white/black; superior/inferior, civilized/barbarians etc. The central idea behind this was the (mis)use of the bible as a legitimating tool for colonization.
3. Please see http://www.ufh.ac.za/
4. IsiXhosa is one of South Africa's 11 official languages and that it is a Bantu language spoken by Black South Africans.

References

Al-Sayyid, M. K. (1993). A Civil Society in Egypt? *The Middle East Journal, 47*(2), 228-242.

Amar, M. B., & Zghidi, N. (2016). The relationship between inclusive growth, inequality and poverty in Africa. *Theoretical and Applied Economics, 22*(2 (607), Summer), 117-126.

Attieh, A. (2003). Algeria. In D. Teferra and P.G. Altbach (Ed.), *African Higher Education: An International Reference Handbook* (pp. 151-161). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Caffentzis, G. (2000). The world bank and education in Africa. *A Thousand Flowers: Social struggles against structural adjustment in African Universities*, 3-18.

Crecelius, D. (1966). Al-Azhar in the revolution. *Middle East Journal, 20*(1), 31-49.

Dabalen, A., Etang, A., Mungai, R., Wambile, A., & Wane, W. (2016). Is Poverty in Africa Overestimated Because of Poor Data? In T. Besley (Ed.), *Contemporary Issues in Development Economics* (pp. 61-89). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Fomunyam, K. G. (2017). Theorizing democracy in Africa: the case of Mathew Takwi's People Be Not Fooled. In A. Amtaika (Ed.), *The Democratization of Africa: Dynamics and Trends*. Texas: Pan-African University Press.

Mamdani, M. (2016). Between the public intellectual and the scholar: Decolonization and some post-independence initiatives in African higher education. *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 17*(1), 68-83.

Teferra, D., & Altbach, P. G. (2003). African Higher Education: An International Reference Handbook.

Teferra, D., & Altbachl, P. G. (2004). African Higher Education: Challen-ges for the 21st century. *Higher Education, 47*(1), 21-50.

Wa Thiong'o, N. (1994). *Decolonising the mind: The politics of language in African literature*: East African Publishers.

Addressing the Trilemma of Educational Trade-offs on Africa's Terrain for Sustainable Development

Felix Kwabena Donkor
University of South Africa (UNISA) & University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

Tantoh Bikwibili Henry
University of South Africa (UNISA), South Africa

Eromose Ebhuoma
University of Johannesburg, South Africa

Sylvi Fullard[4]
University of Pretoria
South Africa

Introduction

In an increasingly globalised world, having individuals who are globally competitive is an asset (CODESRA, 2014; Fakwata, 2017). That is why the process of imparting or acquiring knowledge, skills, beliefs and values to develop the capacities of the individual to skilfully navigate the issues of life and contribute meaningfully to the society cannot be overemphasised (Tuning Africa, 2016). Moreover, intense debate surrounds the balance – "between the private benefits of a university degree (higher salaries and class mobility) versus the social benefits of an educated population (higher tax revenues, an engaged and informed citizenry), etc" (Higher Education Funding Panel, 2016). Furthermore, it is argued that, "all fee regimes are a Trilemma of Trade-offs: public (government) investment – enrolment – private costs. And the trade-offs are influenced by a combination of what different political groupings think the role of higher education is in that society and which constituencies' interests are dominant" (Higher Education Funding Panel, 2016). Nevertheless it is generally acknowledged that graduates often secure lucrative jobs; improve taxpaying numbers; enhance democratic participation; live relatively healthier lives; are less inclined to criminality; and exhibit heightened civic engagement. These attributes relate with the continent's development aspirations.

The creation of the African Union (AU) in 2002 was premised inter alia on the goal to foster "*an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in global arena*" inter alia (Source?). Furthermore the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the Agenda 2063 (The Africa We Want), are both blue prints that are being used to steer the continents sustainable transformation; envision an Africa that proactively engages the world economy as an equal partner along definitive terms of engagement (NEPAD, 2016). Such noble goals call for marshalling all the segments and resources of the continent to facilitate inclusive prosperity premised on shared values and a common destiny (NEPAD,

2016). One such vital sector is the educational sector.

From hieroglyphs and papyrus, through the Library of Alexandria in ancient Egypt to Timbuktu of the Songhai Empire, until recently, Africa has been a key player in the knowledge economy (History Magazine, 2001; Timbuctu, 2017). Egypt was the quintessence of innovation in recording, transferring and communication of knowledge whilst Timbuktu was the epitome of a global center for scholarship in the Songhay Empire (History Magazine, 2001; Timbuctu, 2017). It is noteworthy that those times of a globally competitive African higher education space coincided with equally robust African economies. However, many African universities do not have such luxury in contemporary times (Tuning Africa, 2016). This has come with implications on the quality of research and innovation coupled with graduate employability and entrepreneurship (Tuning Africa, 2016).

Although its role and significance on the knowledge production landscape has seen a chequered history in contemporary times, there are fascinating attempts to revive the global repute of the continent's scholarship and its place in the knowledge economy. This paper contributes to the debate on efforts by African institutions to modernise education on the continent to be more globally competitive. The study is premised on workshop participation, stakeholder interviews and literature review to realise its aims. The two workshops are South Africa/European Union (henceforth, EU) seminar on education and training at the Stellenbosch University, South Africa (May, 2017) and the 50th Anniversary of the Association of African Universities, Ghana (June, 2017). Between them the two events brought together approximately 500 practitioners to deliberate on reforming research and innovation to drive continental and international development (EUROPA, 2017; GUNI, 2017). This was coupled with the shifting role of the educational provider in addressing socio-economic challenges and its social responsibilities. The stimulating debates from these fora can be crystallized around three core thematic areas:

Funding: Funding was a common narrative at both fora in a bid to enhance affordability and quality education simultaneously. German higher education is largely gratis as it is considered a *public good* with 84% of funding attributed to government (i.e. 1.1% of Gross Domestic Product, henceforth GDP) (PWC, 2017). In the United States higher education system, which is considered as costly by global standards, the state provides 34% (0.9% of GDP). South Africa, which is the continent's economic powerhouse invests 0.75% of its GDP (PWC, 2017). The general dearth in educational funding translated into Africa accounted for only 0.06% of overall global expenditure in research and development. But recent agitations amongst the student community at the University of Cape Town, which morphed into the FeesMustFall (FMF) movement, has echoed in other parts of the continent and the globe on cost sharing and more sustainable funding models. Diverse models of institutional and student funding along the lines of differentiated funding and fees; to makes costs sharing between university education beneficiaries (mainly government and students) more effective are being explored. Expanding the reach of education across the social strata to ensure equity and facilitate inclusive development (University World News, 2016). This is another reason for providing grants and loans to marginalised groups. It helps avoid education becoming a preserve of the elite in society (EUROPA, 2017; GUNI, 2017). Some of the models discussed include the *access-equity-cost-sharing model* which posits reducing the financial hurdles to higher education while guaranteeing equity in cost sharing as per stakeholders capacity to pay (University World News, 2016). The *contextualised formula-funding model* sponsors universities based on individual socio-economic circumstance giving everyone a fair chance at good higher education. The *host-proprietor-university-user funding model* suggests the entire spectrum of stakeholders partake in the financing of tertiary education. This model assumes a blended approach to merge sponsorship across the community, university and the government (University World News, 2016). Universities are also undertaking their own initiatives to shore up the finances by providing services to meet the needs of their immediate communities. These included contracts to supply solar systems and other appropriate technologies, fortified nutrition foods, accommodation, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) support, waste recycling amongst others to as bottom up efforts to complement state efforts.

Teaching and learning: Phrases such as *africanization*, *decolonisation, transformation, co-creation* and *indigenous knowledge systems (IKS)* in education, have become rallying points on making curricu-

lum relevant to the African context (CHET, 2017; HSRC, 2017; Bergman & Westman, 2014). Innovative pedagogy employs these issues to enhance positive self-worth and identity as well as promote socioeconomic growth and sustainable development (HSRC, 2017). This makes it imperative to explore best practices in teaching, learning, assessment and blended learning to harness students' skills and innovation for society's benefit. This also concerns resourcing the teaching career to enhance competences and become more attractive (EUROPA, 2017).

Cooperation between higher education institutions and infrastructure: The Africa-led EU programme '*Tuning*' is helping to streamline the educational curricular across the continent (Tuning Africa, 2016). This is coupled with the HAQAA (Harmonisation of African Higher Education Quality Assurance and Accreditation) Initiative, to synergise quality assurance and accreditation system from the local to the Pan-African continental level (HAQAA, 2017). These are helping address the challenge of skills mismatch between graduates and the labour market by facilitating the redesign of university programmes to be better tuned to the prevailing socio-economic realities (Tuning Africa, 2016). Such collaboration can serve as vehicles for regional innovation eco-system and co-innovation to enhance graduate entrepreneurship, employment as well as sustainable development (EUROPA, 2017).

Conclusion

From the social justice perspective, enhanced education is a public good as the ensuing income and critical human resource benefits the entire society. Thus, education in Africa requires funding framework that guarantees its sustainability while simultaneously facilitating equitable access to ensure the continent's sustainable development. In addressing the trilemma of educational trade-offs on Africa's landscape, there is the need for a skilful/delicate balance between the associated interests to inform policy that adequately mobilises support for research and development. Such excellence in research and development is needed inter alia to accelerate sustainable development on the continent and the goals of Vision 2030 (the Africa We Want) simultaneously.

References

Bergman, U & Wetman, K. 2014. Co-creating curriculum in higher education: promoting democratic values and a multidimensional view on learning. International Journal for Academic Development. 21(1):28-40

CHE.2012. Sustainable Higher Education Funding and Fees in South Africa. https://www.chet.org.za/resources/sustainable-higher-education-funding-and-fees-south-africa accessed on 02.06.2017.

CODESRA. 2014. Research. http://www.codesria.org/spip.php?rubrique2. accessed on 04.05.2017.

EUROPA. 2017. EU-South Africa Policy Dialogue. https://ec.europa.eu/education/events/20170504-eu-south-africa-policy-dialogue_sk. accessed on 06.06.2017.

GUNI. 2017. The 6th GUNi report at the 50th Anniversary celebrations of the Association of African Universities (AAU). http://www.guninetwork.org/news/6th-guni-report-50th-anniversary-celebrations-association-african-universities-aau. Accessed on 09.03.2017.

HAQAA.2017. About the HAQAA Ini-tiative. https://haqaa.aau.org. Accessed on 09.03.2017.

Higher Education Funding Panel. 2016. Report Of The University Panel On Funding Model (S) For Higher Education In South Africa. https://www.wits.ac.za/media/wits-university/ news-and-events/images/ documents/ Higher%20Education%20Funding%20Panel _30%20June%202016.pdf. Accessed on 09.03.2017.

History Magazine. 2001. Survivor: The History of the Library. http://www.history-magazine.com/libraries.html. Accessed on 09.03.2017.

HSRC.2017. Local is lekker: Indigenous knowledge should be encouraged. http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/review/november-/local-is-lekker. Accessed on 09.03.2017.

Kakwata, F. 2017. The progressive Pentecostal conception of development within an African context of poverty. Stellenbosch Theological Journal. 3 (1): 1-25. http://dx.doi.org/10.17570/stj.2017.v3n1.a08.

NEPAD.2016. Towards Agenda 2063 – The Africa we want. http://www.nepad.org/content/towards-agenda-2063-%E2%80%93-africa-we-want. Accessed on 09.03.2017.

PWC. 2017. Funding of Public Higher Education Institutions in South Africa. https://www.pwc.co.za/en/publica-tions/funding-public-higher-education-institutions-sa.html. Accessed on 09.03.2017.

Tuning Africa. 2016. About Tuning Africa. http://tuningafrica.org/en/. Accessed on 09.03.2017.

UNESCO.2017. Timbuctu. http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/119. Accessed on 09.03.2017.

University World News. 2016. Innovative funding models can sustain higher education. http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20161021091456127 Accessed on 09.03.2017.

The Significance of Introducing Subjects on the History of Slavery and Slave Trade in African Higher Education Curricula[1]

Paola Vargas Arana[2]

Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)
Brazil

This article suggests the significance of introducing subjects on the history of slavery and slave trade in the African higher education curricula. The premise of this proposal is the belief that, in any society, social conflicts are partly long-term consequences of history. Retrieving traumatic pasts, therefore, is fundamental to overcoming some contemporary challenges. This is more urgent in Africa, as its continental history constitutes a palimpsest of human history. Nonetheless, until today, the debate on the lengthy history of slavery and slave trade are not explicit, and, in some contexts, they even constitute a taboo. As Jamaican intellectual, Anne Bailey stated,

> Here and on the other side of the Atlantic, in fact wherever people of African descent are to be found, there is a deafening silence on the subject of slavery and the Atlantic slave trade. All that remains are fragments which, like the scattered pieces of a broken vase, do not represent the whole. Under the silence are palpable sighs of regret, pain, sorrow, guilt, and shame (2006, p. 1).

For Bailey, in societies where oral narratives of the past are crucial, it is fundamental to resolve the silence regarding the centuries of slavery and slave trade that affected the African continent. In line with that ideology, we suggest that the introduction of subjects on slavery and of slave trade in higher education curricula is the appropriate step to handle this delicate topic, with the overall aim of reconciling Africa with that episode of its past. To accomplish this objective, historical approaches should explain the various sociological phenomena derived from past slavery in Africa, especially the shame among the descents of those who were enslaved, and the guilt or pride in the descendants of those who indulged in human trading or who incorporated slavery as a practice. Besides, reasoning and explanations should consider how deeply slavery and the slave trade transformed African social institutions, to the point that, during the nineteenth century, domestic slavery became associated with the most intimate rituals of African local leadership (Bailey, 2006).

Added to surpassing internal blockages of the Africa slavery past, historical curricula should also confront European paradigms imposed on African historical accounts: transatlantic slavery in Africa ended with the beginning of European colonialism, who justified their intervention on the immorality of the existing slavery in Africa. That argument omitted historical facts showing that the Europeans were the ones who stimulated and profited from most transatlantic modern human trafficking (Inikori, 1992; Rodney, 1982). Consequently, slave trade ended with a heavy moral burden on Africa, which impeded a meaningful liberation from that social practice in those regions where by that time was part of African indigenous way of life. Simultaneously, the Europeans introduced their educational system appointing slavery as a sign of barbarism, backwardness and ignorance, opposing it to the pretended civilized way of life promoted by colonialism.

This complex transition between the period of slavery and the imposition of colonial education may in part explain the omission of treating slave trade explicitly in African societies and from educational curricula in particular. As Mamdani analyzed,

> The main problem in the exercise that sought to decolonize curriculum was that its historical vision was limited to that of the colonial period. Ironically, those who criticized the colonial period came to share its time horizon. Studies in political economy treated pre-colonialism more as a point of departure than as an object of study (2008, p. 5)

thus, excluding slave trade long-term history as an integral part of African history.

Undoubtedly, such infamous institutions left strong sociological footprints in the continent, expressed tacitly or explicitly, for instance, in the social hierarchies of surnames, ethnicities, stereotypes, regional identifications or practices associated with former slaves or former enslavers. Those hierarchies need explanation by historical research, as well as open debates on educational contexts, since they have affected and continue to affect the healthy and egalitarian development of social relationships in Africa. Assié-Lumumba (2006, p. 82) explains with wariness the emergence of violence and secret societies even on African higher education campuses and adds that Tanzania's former president and pan-African thinker Julius Nyerere foresaw situations of the kind, since the international forces of former colonial powers would continue manipulating internal contradictions to destabilize African societies. In that sense, it would be relevant to confront the violence and segregation among students by disclosing the omitted roots of slavery in those current social divisions.

Accordingly, for the advancement of decolonization, it is a critical priority that Africa starts an open dialogue around slavery and the slave trade, breaking the taboo around this issue by propitiating dialogue on educational environment, attempting to curb the pain those memories might arouse. In this point, higher education plays a crucial role, for, as Mamdani asserted, higher education is the environment where leaders are engendered, where curricula is designed, and where ideas for a meaningful democracy are created (2008, p. 1).

In that sense, higher education may be the most suitable platform to carve slavery and slave trade subjects, as it is a realm conceived to create new reasoning on the issues that impede autonomous, self-determined, and peaceful "development" of African societies. Alongside, as higher education is also the framework to train teachers, treating slave trade and slavery subjects in its curricula would plant a seed that would spread the debate around these issues into other areas and levels of education and society. This can also multiply in the creation of didactic materials, in the recovery of oral memories, or in using cultural practices side-by-side with African local populations to catalyze the suffering, hatred, and self-destructiveness derived from slavery memories.

Therefore, inclusion of the subjects of slave trade and slavery in African higher education curricula can contribute "to create a new mind that is free of the seeds of self-destruction and that can use knowledge for the construction of a solid African society" (2006, p.123), as Assié-Lumumba suggests. It will also adhere to Agenda 2063, aspiration 4, of nurturing a "culture of peace and tolerance in Africa's children and youth through peace education" (AUC, 2015, p.6).

Finally, how may Africa introduce these subjects into its curricula? Here, is interesting to note the accomplishments of the African Diaspora in South America, in creating and applying legislations to transform traumatic memories and correct stereotypes through new educational trends. Since 1990 within the framework of new Political Constitutions, the Brazilian and Colombian African Diaspora compelled States to promulgate laws that introduce their histories into educational curricula. They argued that African Diaspora nurtured the shaping of these societies; hence, including their history would help to understand deep roots of what these societies are today. Brazilian Law 10.639 of 2003 and Colombian Law 70 of 1993 answered to these demands, enforcing the introduction of African and African descents subjects in all, private and public schools and universities, especially in the area of history.

In Brazil, a law passed in 2003 aroused multiple debates among teachers, educational authorities and the State regarding how to teach and who can teach African history to change effectively the framework of a Eurocentric curricula, which is largely ignorant of African history. Debates stimulated the promulgation of Law 11.645 of 2008, which actualized 2003 Law, putting as guideline the subject of African and African Diaspora agencies and responses to face slavery in America. Therefore, 2008 Law limited the scope of curricula trends, to avoid falling into Eurocentric visions of Africans merely as slaves, while stimulating representations of African descents as agents of their own history. Curricula renewal not only encouraged great academic production, didactic materials, conferences, children's stories, graduate research, and publications, but also started a transformation in the way African descents represent themselves and assume their role in Colombian and Brazilian societies. For instance, both societies started open debates about racism, which, until recently, constituted a taboo in daily conversations and in political agendas. It also aroused the recognition of slavery as an *indefeasible crime against humanity*[3], being the teaching of a critical history of African descents, a fundamental action to correct this crime.

Those Laws also fostered recognition of African descents contributions to those countries national cultures. In fact, many current researches highlight that the maintenance of African cultural roots were part of the historical Diaspora's answer against slavery. This finding attests with Amilcar Cabral assessment that

> If history allows us to know the nature and the causes of the imbalances and conflicts (economic, political and social) which characterize the evolution of a society; culture teaches us what have been the dynamic syntheses, structured and established by the mind of society for the solution of these conflicts, at each stage in the evolution of this same society in the quest for survival and progress (1974, p. 45).

Accordingly, the inclusion in curricula of the Diaspora responses against slavery in Brazil and Colom-bia has become a fertile ground to recognize and reinvigorate the African inherited cultural expressions which synthetize their historical responses against slavery. The invitation is that African higher education curricula joins this path.

Notes

1. I appreciate the valuable reading and editorial suggestions made by Dr. Lambed Tatah to the latest version of this article.
2. Paola Vargas Arana is a PhD. Candidate in Social History, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Brazil, supported by CNPq scholarship.
3. Regarding the debate on reparation for the crimes of modern slavery and slave trade, I wish to thank jurist Dr. Christianne Silva Vasconcellos who gave relevant insights for this text.

References

Assie-Lumumba, N'dri. (2006). Higher education in Africa: Crisis, reforms and transformation, Dakar, CODESRIA.

AUC. (2015). Agenda 2063, The Africa we want.

Bailey, Anne C. (2005). African voices of the Atlantic slave trade: Beyond the silence and the shame. Beacon Press.

Brazil. Law 11.645/2008 http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2007-2010/2008/lei/l11645.htm

Brazil. Law 10.639/2003 http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/2003/L10.639.htm

Cabral, Amilcar. (1974). National liberation and culture. Transition, (45), 12-17.

Colombia. Law 70/1993 http://www.mininterior.gov.co/la-institucion/normatividad/ley-70-de-1993

Inikori, Joseph E. (1992). The Atlantic Slave Trade: Effects on Economies, Societies and Peoples in Africa, the Americas, and Europe. Duke University Press.

Mamdani, Mahmood. (2008). Higher education, the state and the marketplace. Journal of Higher Education in Africa, 6(1), 1-10.

Rodney, Walter. (1982) History of the Upper Guinea Coast: 1545–1800, NYU Press.

The Emerging Erosion of Originality and Academic Writing Skills in Higher Education in Africa: The Boomerang Effects of Information Explosion

Mohammed Hadi Bolaji

University for Development Studies (UDS)
Ghana

"It is better to fail in originality than to succeed in imitation."

Herman Melville

"When you have wit of your own, it is a pleasure to credit other people for theirs."

Criss Jami,

Introduction

Since the beginning of the 21st century, higher institutions, all over the world have seen the democratization and commercialization of tertiary education which have resulted in massive classes. Paradoxically, the huge numbers and classes that should have attracted massive investments in a bid to neutralize the consequences of large classes are rather expressing dwindling government support, especially in the case of Africa. Whereas the huge classes have come with some institutional and pedagogical implications for teaching and learning, the quality of tertiary education in Africa has largely been compromised. One area in which the compromise of quality is noticeable, as this paper argues, is in the emerging erosion of originality and academic writing skills, resulting from the information explosion that

the world is expressing. This study relies on both secondary and primary data. The primary data are garnered from experiential observations as a teacher of academic writing, a reviewer, a supervisor and an examiner of students' projects, dissertations and theses.[1] Having examined the concepts of originality and writing skills, the centrality of research to higher institutions' life, the increases in enrolment with the attendant consequences on teaching and learning, and the attack on originality and academic writing skills, this article concludes that with this emerging erosion, the higher institutions in Africa are shirking their raison d'être which is to turn out critical and independent thinkers. To address this, lecturers, the institutions, the governments and supra-state organizations have unique roles to play in addressing the emerging erosion of originality and writing skills.

The Conceptualization of Originality and Writing Skills

There has not been a consensus between scholars, teachers and their students on what originality actual means. Many reasons may account for this. One reason is attributable to disciplinary differences and their specific demands of, and conventions on, originality. Also, different levels of study may also make different demands of originality. For instance, the standard of originality that a Ph.D. student is expected to demonstrate in his/her work will invariably be higher than the one expected from an undergraduate (The University of Melbourne n.d).

While originality is derived from the word original – "[which] has been present or existing from the beginning" – people now use both in contrasting manners to refer to something that is new or "novel, fresh, or unusual" (Krapež 2013: 945). One of the seminal explanations to the concept of originality or an original contribution to knowledge is Thomas Kuhn's (1970) concept of a paradigm shift. In explaining how knowledge increases, Kuhn stated that normal science, as a body of paradigms, reigns and then experiences instability resulting from "anomalous puzzles" that challenge the normal science (status quo). The responses to the "anomalous puzzles" constitute original contributions to normal science, thereby leading to paradigm shifts (1970). Some scholars also see originality "as using a new approach, method, or data, studying a new a topic and doing research in an understudied area, as well as producing new theories or findings" (Guetzkow, Lamont, and Mallard 2004: 191). Gleaned from the foregoing definitions, originality is broad and starts with the conception of research, its design and implementation to the research report writing. Nonetheless, the focus of this article is what we see in the research report writing.

Academic writing skills too, have not attracted a single definition. While some consensus can be achieved on the main components of academic writing skills, there are discipline specificities that are strictly safeguarded. Generally, academic writing skills are the stock-in-trade of academics, scholars, and students. They refer to a set of formal transferable skills that scholars and students demonstrate in academic write-ups, and in which they show a mastery of specific writing skills and conventions. The conventions may, include but are not limited to the following: a coherent structure with a logical and systemic presentation; a grammatically accurate and well-punctuated write-up, a reader-centered writing style with an appropriate tone, a well-referenced and up-to-date essay, and a well-argued and balanced write-up among others (UEfAP n.d). In exploring the advantages of effective writing, Watton, Collings, and Moon (2001:4), stated that "[r]eflective writing provides an opportunity for [one] to gain further insights from [one's] work through deeper reflection on [one's] experiences, and through further consideration of other perspectives from people and theory. Through reflection we can deepen the learning from [our] work." Also, students' writings "reflect students' ability to read critically, interpret, analyse and synthesise ideas as well as use writing as a discursive space for constructing social identities" (Pineteh 2013: 12). To underscore the significance of originality and academic writing skills to knowledge production, there is the need to examine the centrality of research in higher institutions.

The Centrality of Research to Higher Institutions' Life

Universities, and by extension, higher institutions perform three core activities. First, they teach by producing and disseminating specialized knowledge in various academic fields and engage students in transferable skills such as critical and analytical thinking, and research methods. Second, universities also conduct research works to respond to societal demands and crises. Third, having conducted research, they share their findings with their clientele and the larger society, and engage in community services in various forms such as outreach activities,

open days, consultations, and workshops. In all these trifocal activities, research is central to the universities' life in that it informs teaching and curriculum development such that academics have the chance to revise their notes in line with the new findings from their research works. Similarly, research also shapes the universities' engagements with their immediate communities and the world at large. When it comes to knowledge production, universities or higher institutions direct and shape the transition of their students from the rote learning they were accustomed to in the secondary schools to critical and independent learning, which is typical of university/ higher education. Therefore, research plays a crucial role in the assignments, group work, project works, theses and dissertation among others at both undergraduate and graduate levels.

The Increases in Enrolment and Pedagogical Implications for Higher Institutions

Starting from the 1970s, higher education in Africa has been experiencing some transformations. From these periods, higher education has seen democratization or massification that has resulted in massive increases in enrolment (Musisi and Muwanga 2003; Mohamedbhai 2008, 2014). In Ghana, for instance, whereas enrolment in the public universities in 1991/92 academic year was a little below 12,000 students by the 2003/2004 academic year it had quintupled. In the case of Nigeria, the enrolment grew exponentially with the number of higher institutions. With six universities in 1970, by 2006 Nigeria could boast of approximately 240 higher institutions with 1.5 million students (Materu 2006). Similar trends occurred in Ethiopia, Mozambique and Uganda, where enrolments in higher institutions starting from 2000 increased by more than ten-fold. By 2011, enrolments by more than five-fold in the same countries (Mohamedbhai 2014).

That these increases in enrolments, a global trend, have been taking place with disproportionate increases in funding, and in fact, with dwindling government support, has engendered the commercialization urges of many universities. Some universities in East and West Africa have introduced fee-paying courses to augment the partially government-subsidized courses, an initiative that means huge numbers and large classes for these universities to handle (The Guardian 2011). Furthermore, besides the distance education that many universities run, some universities have introduced what they call parallel courses, which lecturers teach in the evenings and at weekends for those whose professional commitment keep them busy during the weekdays. Moreover, some universities also mount what they call sandwich courses, which lecturers teach when their universities are expected to be in recess (Oketch 2016). In most cases, these initiatives mean that the same facilities and lecturers are recycled all year round resulting in overstretched facilities and lecturers (Musisi and Muwanga 2003; Mohamedbhai 2008, 2014).

Evidently, these transformations resulting from the democratization, the massification and the commercialization of higher education in Africa have primarily meant that quantity has replaced quality in the provision of higher education. The huge numbers that have invariably meant large classes have come with an extreme jeopardy in the quality of teaching and learning. In fact, according to Foley and Masingila's (2013: 267) studies, "[l]arge classes of between 300 and 1,000, and even more, at the undergraduate level are not uncommon in a number of [Sub-Sahara] countries."[2] Nonetheless, large classes are not much of a problem as Boughey (2015) notes if governments and other education stakeholders are willing and able to make huge investments in providing the state-of-the-art classrooms to accommodate the large numbers because with that most of the problems that are associated with the large classes would have been adequately addressed. On the contrary, starting from the point of delivery to both the formative and summative assessments of teaching and learning, the quality has primarily been compromised. It needs to be stressed that the challenges – ranging from the over-congested cathedral-like classrooms that are often poorly ventilated and ill-equipped to students' complaints of audibility difficulties and poor chalkboard visibility; from the inequality in teachers' distribution of attention that favours the front benchers to the limited students' participation; and from the lecturers' inability to capture the heterogeneity factors in the classroom to the lecturers' inability to ensure sustained students' interests in the lesson – overwhelm even the most experienced and smart lecturers (Machika, Bruin, & Albertyn 2014).

Due to the lack of adequate resources, many universities are unable to organize tutorials to augment and address some of the challenges that are wrought by

large classes. Besides the issues of large classes and contact with students, the content of delivery has also largely changed. A study that Mohamedbhai (2008) conducted in Ghana, revealed that the institutional requirement for a series of continuous assessment (CA) for a semester had been relaxed to just one continuous assessment (CA) per semester in response to the large classes. As a consequence to the teaching load, in many cases, the feedback from the continuous assessment are not timely for students' development and transformation.

The Attack on Originality and Academic Writing Skills

Given the centrality of research to universities' life and given the universities' role in transforming students to critical and independent thinkers as we stated earlier, originality and academic writing skills have been the worst casualties of the democratization, massification, and commercialization of higher education in Africa. The causality of originality and academic writing skills resulting from the "marginalization of writing from [the] mainstream curricula" (Archer 2010: 496 cited in Pineteh 2013:12) has come in various ways. First, as a coping strategy, many lecturers' preference for multiple choice questions for the ease of marking instead of essay questions may be understandable. Often, Questions Moderation Committee that performs the quality assurance role relaxes its insistence on setting essay questions although it is less debatable that essay questions invoke critical, analytical and writing skills, whereas the typical demand of multiple choice questions is recall (Mohamedbhai 2008). Second, at the levels of undergraduate courses in some universities in Ghana, students have the option of doing research projects leading to writing a dissertation or doing coursework in its stead. This paper contends that giving students the option to skip a vital area of developing critical mind compromises the fundamental role of universities. Also, some Masters' programmes are run not with the normal thesis/dissertation which requires some research and academic writing skills but with Term Papers which are more or less an advanced form of class essays. Additionally, in some cases where students who were admitted to a Master of Philosophy (MPhil) programme could not cope with the research and academic writing component, their degree was scaled down to a Master degree with a term paper. Consequently, many students, according to Mohamedbhai (2008: 35) are "graduating with little practice for undertaking research, critical analysis and writing." Meanwhile, at the level of the lecturers, too, the disproportionate emphasis on teaching does not only make research and publishing a quagmire for many, but also damages the research culture in higher education in many respects that are beyond the scope of this paper.

Besides the foregoing institutional and pedagogical responses to the phenomenon of the large classes that have mostly translated into the "marginalization" (Archer 2010: 496 cited in Pineteh 2013:12) of academic writing skills, the Open Access System, the incidence of predatory journals and the fact that some students put their dissertation/theses online offer the platforms of evidence for the increasing decline in originality and academic writing skills. That the information explosion resulting from the contemporary science and technology, which has made abundant information available at the touch of a button has created a boomerang effect of eroding originality and academic writing skills because "opportunities for cheating have exploded" (Singh and Remenyi 2016). Evidently, the Internet is playing a trilateral role of being the evidence, the catalyst and the checker for the nascent diminishing of originality and academic writing skills in higher education in Africa. This erosion manifests itself in many forms – but not limited to the most crucial ones – including referencing errors, structure and paragraphing difficulties, language and grammatical issues, literature review challenges, and the widespread misconduct of plagiarism among others in the essays submitted for assessment.

Students present written work that demonstrates many referencing errors that may result from ignorance or sloppiness or inappropriate orientation. It would appear that many students do not know that any evidence, except general knowledge specific to a context or a discipline, that is provided in an academic paper must be cited through one of the following methods namely, in-text reference, footnote, and endnotes.[3] Additionally, the core function, which structure and paragraphs perform in aiding readers' comprehension, is rarely seen in many assignments and essays that students submit these days. While the information may be vital, poor structure and presentation may render it unreadable. Moreover, the sorts of grammar with which students present their essays demonstrate that standards are

eroding. Another unsatisfactory spot in many students' write-ups, these days, is the literature review. The literature review has been reduced to a somewhat catalog of the previous works jammed together without the writers' evaluation. Literature reviews – which requires students' critical and analytical skills in doing a comparative evaluation of the relevant previous works – is more of an explanation than evaluation in many students' essay now. (Jesson & Lacey 2006). Therefore, the core pillars upon which a critical review is based – namely, citing as many previous works as possible, comparing and contrasting the works, critiquing the works, and finally connecting the previous works to what is being done now – are beginning to be absent in many students' reviews (Edith Cowan University n.d).

The most serious dimension of the emerging erosion of originality in higher institutions in Africa is plagiarism, which defeats the very purpose of research. Plagiarism, according to Rampolla, is "the act of taking the words, ideas, or research of another person and putting them forward without citation as if they were your own." (Rampolla 2004: 70). Nonetheless, the actually meaning of what constitutes adequate citation is problematic to many students as well as lecturers. In a study that Orim (2015) conducted in Nigeria, some lecturers were as confused as many students about the actual meaning of plagiarism, a situation that may not be different in other African countries.

While one may be tempted to suggest that plagiarism has come with the advent of the Internet and the Open Access System, plagiarism certainly predated the arrival of the Internet (Jaschik 2008). However, it can be said without the fear of contradiction that the Internet with the accompanied information explosion has made plagiarism a widespread academic misconduct among many students (Singh and Remenyi 2016). Many students are guilty of both "unintentional" and "deliberate" plagiarism. Whereas many students, as a result of poor citation skills, plagiarize other people's ideas inadvertently, the intentional practice of "cut and paste" of other people's ideas is now widespread (Rampolla 2004: 70) Some institutions are still grappling with whether a mere acknowledgment is sufficient for a substantial input by a statistical analyst with or without acknowledgement.

Toward Addressing the Emerging Erosion of Originality and Academic Writing Skills

That Africa is at the margin of knowledge production with its 1.1 to 1.4 percent share of world's knowledge production (Kariuki 2015; Zambakari 2011) and that the best university in the continent ranked 317th in the global ranking index in 2017 (Ghana News Agency 2017) signifies that the higher institutions in Africa must take the emerging erosion of originality and academic writing skills seriously. Addressing this emerging erosion of originality and writing skills will require concerted efforts at the levels of the lecturers, the institutions, the African governments and the supra-state cooperation.

Lecturers are at the center of knowledge production and the safeguard of its quality. Therefore, they have a critical role to play in enforcing originality and academic writing standards. If academic integrity is upheld, lecturers will put a premium on standard and original work and devise various ways to detect those who are violating the standards and engaging in plagiarism, even though the task of checking may be time-consuming. While this article does not downplay the organized ways in which a plagiarism software checks for plagiarism, in the absence of the software there are many things that lecturers can do. Getting the appropriate orientation about plagiarism whether through self-learning or formal training should be considered a key part of Continuing Professional Development (CPD) for lecturers, which will positively reflect in their teaching, research, and other allied activities.

While having a policy on plagiarism and research ethics may be considered a step in the right direction, the higher institutions in Africa should develop a positive attitude towards checking plagiarism so that they can go beyond the availability of policies to enforce and implement them. If the higher institutions accept predatory journals for promotion, it may be difficult for lecturers to take academic integrity seriously. Therefore, measures should be put in place to reject and report plagiarized works so that appropriate sanctions can be meted out to culprits. Also, the Quality Assurance Units (QAU) in the various higher institutions should be equipped to play a lead role in instituting and deepening quality assurance practices in teaching and learning. Through organizing workshops and training, the QAU can also play a central role in giving the right orientation towards avoiding plagiarism and upholding academic integrity.

It is noteworthy to state that the higher institutions in Africa should give an increasing support to research and create an appropriate research culture that privileges originality in their institutions. Also, it is essential to note that higher institutions have always thrived by teaching and research coinciding each other and, therefore, lecturer's workload should be balanced to respect the simultaneity of the two. Furthermore, when experienced academics collaborate in scholarly endeavors, mentorship can become a useful tool in teaching originality. African higher institutions should provide logistic support and facilities in checking "un-originality" (Krapež 2013), mediocrity, and plagiarism. Moreover, students' accessibility to the Internet and computers may mean that students can submit their assignments and project works in softcopies thereby making it easy for lecturers to check for plagiarism before they begin marking.

Addressing the issue of erosion of originality will require giving students the appropriate orientation on research and academic writing standards. Getting the tools for plagiarism detection or having a policy on plagiarism is not as important as educating students on the appropriate orientation for avoiding plagiarism. Also, that the majority of the senior secondary graduates come to the universities primarily ungrounded in writing skills as Sifuna and Sawamura (2010) note, means that there should be some remedial teaching to prepare them for university work.

As an important stakeholder, African governments should understand that quality education demands huge investments in human and infrastructure resources. The government embargo on employment in public sectors including tertiary institutions in Ghana and Nigeria while enrolments continue to increase will undoubtedly militate against producing quality education (Ibeh 2015; Andoh 2017). The African governments should support the creation of centers of excellence, language centers and scientific laboratories that are equipped with the state-of-the-art facilities. While critical observers have welcomed the Ghanaian government's initiative to establish a Tertiary Education Research Fund, they think that such a fund should be additional to the book and research allowance that the government pays to university and polytechnic lecturers annually.

Also, at the supra-state level, supranational organizations such as the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Develop-ment Community (SADC) among others can support African higher institutions in creating research centers of excellence and sponsoring exchange programmes among African universities. Moreover, the Association of African Universities (AAU) can play a significant role in addressing this erosion by capturing this in some of its projects that relate to training and exchange programmes. For its part, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) should continue to organize its annual Workshop for Scholarly Publishing for both Anglophone and Francophone countries that aims at providing training to young academics and those in their early careers. Given the practicality and usefulness of the training, the Council should source more funding to increase the number of the participants.[4]

Conclusion

The main motivation of this article has been to draw the attention of the stakeholders of higher institutions in Africa to how the increases in enrolments have restructured teaching and learning and how the information explosion – which the world is experiencing – is serving as the evidence, the catalyst and the checker of the emerging erosion of originality and academic writing skills. The article has pointed out that originality and academic writings are not only the stock-in-trade of academics and their students, but they are also the core of what higher institutions stand for. Viewed against the background that Africa contributes less than two percent to world production of knowledge, the consequences of emerging erosion of originality and academic writings may be dire. The lecturers, the higher institutions, the governments and supra-state organizations must play their part in addressing the problem.

Notes

1. Here, I refer to essays, assignments, project works, and dissertations among others at the undergraduate and at the Master's and MPhil levels.
2. It needs to be stated that the natural sciences attract comparatively low enrolments as compared to the social sciences and the humanities.
3. There are referencing styles that make specific demands of the writers. The American Psychological Association (APA) and the Modern Language Asso-ciation (MLA) Referencing Styles are the most popular in the social sciences.

4. I am grateful to CODESRIA for sponsoring my participation in the 2013 CODESRIA Workshop on Writing for Scholarly Publishing in Kampala, Uganda. Since then, I have actively been organising workshops for graduate students and academic staff at some tertiary institutions in Ghana.

References

Andoh, I. K. (2017, April 27). Lift embargo on non-academic staff appointment-TEWU, *Peace FM Online*. Retrieved from http://m.peacefmonline.com/pages/local/news/201704/313063.php

Boughey, C. (2015). Approaches to large-class teaching. *South African Journal Sciences*, 111(1/2), 1-2.

Edith Cowan University (n.d.). *Literature review: Academic tip sheet*. Retrieved from https://intranet.ecu.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/20621/literature_review.pdf

Foley, A. R., & Masingila, J. O. (2013). Building capacity: Challenges and opportunities in large class pedagogy (LCP) in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Higher Education*, 66, 265-281.

Ghana News Agency (2017, August 11). *Prof Yankah laments poor ranking of African universities on global index*, Retrieved from https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2017/August-11th/prof-yankah-laments-poor-ranking-of-african-universities-on-global-index.php

Guetzkow, J., Lamont, M., and Mallard, G. (2004). What is originality in the humanities and the social sciences? *American Sociological Review*, 69 (2), 190-212.

Ibeh, Nnenna (2015, May 18). *Doctors ask Jonathan to lift embargo on employment*, *Premium Times*. Retrieved from https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/183205-%E2%80%8Bdoctors-ask-jonathan-to-lift-embargo-on-employment.html

Jaschik, Scott (2008, April 3). Originality, imitation and plagiarism. *Inside Higher Education*, Retrieved from https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/04/03/writing

Jesson, J. & Lacey, F. (2006), How to do (or not to do) a critical literature review, *Pharmacy Education*, June 2006; 6 (2): 139–148.

Kariuki, T. (2015, October 25). Africa produces just 1.1% of global scientific knowledge - but change is coming. *The Guardian*, Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/oct/26/africa-produces-just-11-of-global-scientific-knowledge

Krapež, K. (2013, June). *The (Un)-originality of scientific papers – An analysis of professional quality standards*. Paper presented at the Conference on Knowledge Management and Innovation, 19-21 June, Zadar, Croatia. Retrieved from www.toknowpress.net/ISBN/978-961-6914-02-4/papers/ML13-342.pdf

Kuhn, T. (1970). *The structure of scientific revolutions*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Machika, P., Bruin, C. R., Albertyn, R. M. (2014). The student's experience of attending large classes in a South African higher education context. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 5(16), 375-380.

Materu, Peter (2007) Higher Education Quality Assurance in Sub-Saha-ran Africa Status, Challenges, Opportunities, and Promising Practices, World Bank, Working Paper, No 124.

Mohamedbhai, G. (2008). *The effects of massification on higher education in Africa.* Accra, Ghana: Association of African Universities.

Mohamedbhai, G. (2014). Massification in Higher Education Institutions in Africa: Causes, Consequences, and Responses. *International Journal of African Higher Education*, 1(1), 59-83.

Musisi, N. B., Muwanga, N. K. (2003). *Makerere University in transition, 1993-2000: Opportunities and challenges: Partnership in higher education in Africa*: Oxford: James Currey.

Myjoyonline.com, (2013, December 4). *POTAG to gov't: establish Research Fund but don't scrap book allowance.* Retrieved from http://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2013/December-4th/potag-to-govt-establish-research-fund-but-dont-scrap-book-allowance.php

Oketch, M. (2016). Financing higher education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some reflections and implications for sustainable development. *Higher Education*, 72 (4), 525–539.

Orim, S. (2015, June 12). Student plagiarism: Do we care? *University World News*, Retrieved from http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20150609151735677&query=writing+skills

Pineteh, E. A. (2013). The academic writing challenges of undergraduate students: A South African case study. *International Journal of Higher Education*, 3 (1), 12-22.

Rampolla, M. L. (2004). *A pocket guide to writing history*, 4th edition. New York – Boston: St Martin's Bedford Publishing.

Sifuna, D. N., and Sawamura, N. (2010). *Challenges of quality education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some key issues*, Retrieved from http://aadcice.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/e/publications/sosho4_1-01_02.pdf

Singh, S., and Remenyi, D. (2016). Plagiarism and ghostwriting: The rise in academic misconduct. *South African Journal of Science*, 112 (5/6), 1-7.

Stern, L. (2009). *What every student should know about avoiding plagiarism*. New York: Pearson Longman.

The Guardian (2011, September 9). *In Africa's universities, quantity threatens quality*,
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/sep/09/africa-university-funding-crisis

The University of Melbourne (n.d). *Developing originality: "It's all been said before"* Retrieved from http://services.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/471267/Developing_originality_Update_051112.pdf

UEfAP (n.d) Features of academic writing. Retrieved from http://www.uefap.com/writing/feature/featfram.htm

Watton, P., Collings, J., and Moon, J. (2001) *Reflective writing: Guidance notes for students*, Retrieved from http://www.exeter.ac.uk/fch/work-experience/reflective-writing-guidance.pdf

Zambakari, C. (2011, November 3), Africa and the poverty in knowledge production, *Pambazuka News*, Retrieved from https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/africa-and-poverty-knowledge-production

Decolonising the Curriculum

Andre Goodrich

North West University
South Africa

To begin with, I am not going to talk about decolonizing the curriculum. I am going to talk about decolonizing curricula, plural, because there are, after all, many. Also, I will add, not all of them are decolonizable in the same way, so I am going to talk about an approach rather than about a programme.

According to David Hamilton in 'Towards a Theory of Schooling', the first person to use curriculum to describe a programme of study was Petrus Ramus in 1576. Ramus was influential enough to have a short-lived branch of Philosphy, Ramism named after him. Interestingly for the local context, Hamilton points out that this very short lived branch of philosophy did, however, survive in Calvinist Theology well into the eighteenth century.

On the point of the intersection between Ramism and Calvinism, Hamilton draws an interesting connection. He argues that Ramus' use of the term spread through Europe along Calvinist circuits due to its compatibility with Calvin's idea of discipline. Because, for the followers of Calvin, well ordered institutions, like schools and churches were essential to the maintenance of Calvin's ideas and their influence.

Interestingly, here we have the first meeting of the two terms that, to this day, guide our organization of intellectual work and pedagogy at universities – discipline and curriculum.

Discipline and curriculum are therefore, from their earliest appearance used to organize institutions in service of extending and entrenching influence. And we can perhaps meditate on how contemporary secular universities continue to be steeped in the organizational principles of a 16th century Protestant agenda.

In my limited understanding of Calvinism, discipline is central because it guards the church against the corrupting influence of wickedness in a world where the church exists alongside the wicked. The curriculum as a Ramist idea fits this very well because it is there to guard against the contamination of students by the wrong sorts knowledge. This historical point resonates well with Harry Garuba's argument that the curriculum is a mode of cultural reproduction – it not only maintains a discipline, it preserves the character of that discipline by granting and withdrawing value from the objects in the discipline's domain of study.

I would add that this granting and withdrawing is visible through four mechanisms. Omission (as in "we will not teach African Philosophy"), institutional containment (as in "we will teach African philosophy in a separate course or in a department of African studies", leaving the thrust of the discipline untouched), intellectual containment (as in "we will teach African Philosophy by evaluating it from the perspective of our chosen European philosophical tradition" so that African philosophy becomes the curriculum's straw man), and finally; comouflage (we will teach those African philosophers and appoint black staff who are deemed good in terms of the discourse structuring an otherwise unchanged curriculum). There are likely other tricks too.

Here I want to point out that adding African philosophy into a department (attempting to overcome exclusion by omission) can easily amount to exclusion by containment in special courses or electives. Appointing a black philosopher to teach African Philosophy can easily do the same so that the curriculum continues to reproduce Africa from the perspective of the colonizer as Mamdani accused UCT of doing in his published debate with Martin Hall from whom he inherited an African Studies curriculum of this sort.

If one task of the curriculum is to discipline knowledge, to keep domains ordered and free from corruption, then decolonizing a curriculum requires replacing the principles of order and value that the curriculum serves, not simply shuffling content.

So, here is the understanding of curriculum I want to proceed with.

A curriculum is what determines the epistemic boundaries and reproductive horizons of a discipline. As a consequence a curriculum produces zones of exclusion into which are dumped all that is covered by a discipline's domain but from which it withdraws value. This curricular inevitability coincides well with what I consider to be a central feature of colonialism and of its newest neoliberal face.

Elsewhere I have argued that a central feature of colonialism is what I termed the territorial ontology. A binary world of extractable value and waste. Colonialist powers acquired an area through conquest and rapidly set about determining what sorts of value could be extracted, how to extract it and how to govern that extraction, including how to dispose of what was not valued, how to legitimise conquest, and how to reiterate of conquest. Colonialism was conquest and quantification, and to be sure, you cannot have quantification without conquest, or at least, without the violence of abstraction and alienation.

Within that context, be it ideologically or technically, science and the humanities in large measure grew to serve these violences of abstraction necessary to the extraction of value, to the legitimation of colonial rule, to the reiteration of conquest. Geology was concerned with soils and minerals, not for their beauty or their being, but for their prospects. Anthropology was concerned with people, but the discipline was often spent in service of rendering colonial populations governable such that they could be converted into labour. Witness Volkekunde at Afrikaans universities, which saw most of its graduates taken up in employment in the military or bantu administration where curriculated powers of abstraction were deployed in service of legitimizing separate development. Environmental science was likewise brought to bear on the management of the natural world in service of extractive economies first on Indian Ocean islands like Saint Helena and later in continental contexts like India and Southern Africa. In service of legitimation, Theologians like Totius argued for the biblical foundations of Apartheid.

Accompanied by each value defining abstraction, therefore was the concomitant production of waste, of that without value, and this inevitability of curriculum as a selection of what is worth knowing came to resemble the colonial judgement of what was worth keeping. Curricula may, then, be colonial inasmuch as elements of this valuation continue to exercise their effect in and through our classrooms. And this extends beyond the representational and identity politics that has trapped the discussion to date in the humanities.

We can discern the colonial character of a discipline much like archaeologists can discern the material culture of an extinct society – by going through its garbage. By examining the zones of exclusion that it has played a part in producing. And it is to these zones that we must look to compose an alternative system of valuing knowledge. I want to suggest that there are two categories of exclusion that we might look to in order to begin that composition work. The first is to be found on our campuses, the second, more important one is Mbembe's death worlds.

As with transgressions of Calvin's church discipline, transgressing the curriculum may result in excommunication. It is possible, for example to not be a 'real' archaeologist because you are less interested in excavating artifacts than you are in excavating the racial history of archaeology as a discipline. It is possible to not be 'real' architect because you are less interested in designing buildings than what you are in how designed spaces reproduce forms of inequality.

If you look closely and listen well on most university campuses you can find intellectual spaces populated by the excommunicated. More often than not these spaces are concentrations of interest in topics that challenge the discourses of curricula – on topics within disciplines' domain but historically excluded from them – African Studies; Gender Studies; Popular Culture; Queer Studies; Indigenous Knowledge Systems.

I want to put it to you, perhaps unkindly that these intellectual concentration camps in part serve a containment function to keep disciplines from having to grapple with their own uncomfortable histories and blind spots, and we should look here for reflexive resources needed to compose new curricula.

With these resources it is possible to look into the spaces Mbembe has described as death worlds and ask two questions. How have and do curricula participate in the unfolding of these worlds? And how do the people damned to live in these worlds manage to endure in and aspire from those spaces. Where the practices that are the foundation of their endurance and their aspiration fall within and across disciplinary lines, our curricula might by vastly improved and certainly decolonized by working to serve those aspirations and practices. So, to start, ask the following two simple questions: How does my curriculum, locally and in global terms, make waste of humans and non humans and what does my curriculum do to serve their refusal to be waste.

Emergence of Local Language Film Production in Ghana

Africanus Aveh

University of Ghana
Ghana

Film production in Ghana dates back to the colonial era, in 1946, when the Gold Coast Film Unit was established to make films in aid of governance. Educational films, documentaries and features were produced by the unit under Sean Graham, a British producer/director and his team of locally-trained pioneer filmmakers including Reynold Ofoe Fenuku, Samuel Aryeetey and Bob Okanta. Productions were aimed among others at creating awareness of one's civic responsibilities in paying taxes and maintaining good hygienic practices to promote public health care. One major production of the Gold Coast Film Unit was The Boy Kumasenu (1952). In this film, a young boy, Kumasenu, drifts from the village to the city of Accra and encounters problems. A gang he joins involves him among other social vices in robbery, alcohol and smoking. One of their robbery acts goes wrong and they are caught by the police. The film was meant to sensitise people to the dangers of the youth drifting from rural to urban areas. At the end of the film, Kumasenu escapes going to prison on condition that he is returned to the village to continue his life of fishing. This film uses local languages in some parts but with English voice-overs. Stylistically, the film is presented more like a documentary than a feature. Some scenes like coconut tree climbing, sea waves breaking on the sandy beach could best be described as "touristic".

After independence in 1957, the unit was restructured and renamed the Ghana Film Industry Corporation (GFIC), and continued operations, producing features and short newsreels that preceded full-length feature screenings in the state-owned cinema theatres. I argue that up until this point, cinema in Ghana had emerged as part of governance. President Nkrumah made sure that a camera crew followed him wherever he went and documented his activities, which served as materials for news reportage of his political endeavours both locally and internationally. GFIC was well equipped and the staff was trained in India and Eastern Europe through inter-government co-operations. After the military overthrow of the government in 1966, the corporation was tagged as a propaganda machinery of Nkrumah and was neglected by successive regimes until 1995 when it was sold to a Ghana-Malaysian consortium under the Divestiture Implementation Programme and renamed GAMA Films Company (see Aveh, 2010).

Films produced under GFIC were all in English, except for *I Told You So* (1970) which is in Fante, a local language. It features Lord Bob Cole and his Jaguar Jokers Concert Party theatre group. "Concert party" is the term used for itinerant popular theatre groups who toured the country, performing improvised melodramas in local languages mainly Twi (Akan), in the 60s and 70s. Their acts incorporated highlife musical performances, interspersed with stand-up comedy skits by their star comedian followed by the main drama (see Cole, 2001). In *I Told You So* (1970), Bob Cole plays the father whose caution to a daughter on the choice of a husband is ignored. In the end a rich stranger that the young lady falls in love with (with the tacit support of her mother and uncle) turns out to be a wanted criminal who gets arrested by the police at the climax of the wedding ceremony. The film highlights generational conflict arising out of differences in attitude towards the process of marriage. As a social drama devoid of the usual cinematic visual effects and dazzling stunts coupled with the use of a local language with several lessons for both the young and the old, the film drew large audiences to its screenings for many years. I argue that this success contributed to the emergence of "Kumawood" in Ghana several decades later.

As if cursed to lag behind, emerging film industries in some countries are struggling to define their identities by tagging Hollywood through coining names. Thus several "woods" are emerging, especially

in Africa. There is Nollywood in Nigeria, Riverwood in Kenya, Bongowood in Tanzania, and Ugawood in Uganda. In Ghana whereas the English language films produced by some filmmakers are labelled "Ghallywood", the Twi language films are identified as "Kumawood". It is interesting to note that both names originated as sole proprietorship business enterprise names before being adopted to cover an industry. This was without its controversies, however. (see Aveh 2014).

Independent film production in Ghana was spearheaded by Kwaw Ansah with his film *Love Brewed in an African Pot* (1980) ably supported by King Ampaw's *Kukurantumi Road to Accra* (1983) and *Juju* (also known as *Nana Akoto*) (1985). Ansah went on to release the award-winning *Heritage Africa* in 1988.[1] It must be noted that filmmaking during this period in Ghana was primarily undertaken with state support by GFIC and some international collaborations for some titles. Thus, with economic downturn in the early 1980s, dwindling state funding saw a near collapse of the industry as facilities became obsolete. This era ushered in the popular video film phenomenon where film enthusiasts using consumer home electronic products shot films cheaply on magnetic tape instead of celluloid (see Aveh 2014; Diawara 2010). This period saw the emergence of video cassette rental outlets and screening centres basically set up with an average-sized television monitor equipped with a VCR. Foreign movies dominated the screens, but local entrepreneurs began to establish production companies that produced local films. The video film phenomenon was dominated by people with little or no training in film production enthusiastically conceiving a story and putting together a cast for a movie shoot. Though replete with technical challenges, the productions were popular for several reasons, including the kind of English spoken which the average Ghanaian could grasp. It was when professional filmmakers embraced the video technology that the industry saw some improvement in the standard of production.

The coming of Kumawood at the turn of the millennium took the local production to a different level through featuring popular Concert Party stars; telling more local stories; using familiar neighbourhoods as shooting locations and above all using Twi which is widely understood across the country despite the multiplicity of ethnic groups with many indigenous languages. Sources of the stories for the films range from myths and legends in oral traditions to contemporary everyday occurrences making media headlines. The star system also contributed to the rise of Kumawood with names like Agya Koo (real name Kofi Adu), coming from the Concert Party tradition as an award-winning stand-up comedian. His jokes and antics make his films hilarious. He is ably supported by Akrobeto (real name Akwasi Boadi), Kyeiwaa (real name Rose Mensah), Kwaku Manu, Nana Ama McBrown and Lil Win (real name Kwadwo Nkansah). These are currently common household faces as they appear daily on the screens.

Kumawood, I argue, is not in competition with any other industry but within itself with producers jostling to outdo each other, racing to produce movies based on trending issues and headline stories in Ghanaian media. Publicity on upcoming productions is sometimes released before the cast and crew are assembled to go on location shoots. Some rivalry developed between Agya Koo and Lil Win when the latter became popular leading to the diminishing presence of the former. That is normal in the industry where new faces come to overshadow older ones until they eventually fade out. Viewers' debates centred on comparing performance styles of the two, especially in terms of displaying funny antics. Lil Win however added music and dance to his performances by featuring in music video releases by some popular artistes.

Kumawood's popularity has been boosted by controversies surrounding some of the releases. Whereas many of the film titles sound familiar because they are linked to trending issues and stories as already indicated, the contents of the movies have often no correlation at all to factual events.[2] Viewers are baited to buy the movies only to discover, to their disappointment, that the stories contained in there are not what were expected. Some politically-charged titles also led to conflicts with state security.[3]

The critical debates on Kumawood take place within academic and professional circles especially with reference to the handling of the cinematic technique. Kumawood's production process of seemingly not using written scripts has been trending in recent discussions.[4] It must be noted that Kumawood producers are generally seen on shooting sets and locations without full scripts. The key factor here is both directors' and actors' inability to read Twi as many people can speak the language but cannot write or read it. People who are very literate in Twi might also not have the performance skills and abilities required for a film role. There are very good Twi readers who present news in Twi on some local radio and television channels.

The inability to use written scripts means directors work out scenarios with actors as they improvise dialogues during shooting. This calls for a two-camera shooting style in order to get shot variations as re-takes of scenes from different angles or re-framing shots become difficult as actors repeating exchanges that they created on the spur of the moment become impossible. Some producers are unable to afford the extra expense and thus stick to one camera. Continuity lapses, jump cuts and boring long takes are very typical of Kumawood films as a result of their shooting style. Some clever directors have used cutaways in the films sometimes unrelated to the scene to cut into long takes. Except for some exaggerations, acting generally is good because performers do not struggle with the language in the dialogue delivery. Some characterisations come naturally as people are very familiar with the situations depicted. In some instances people are type-casted for roles they have become identified with over the years. Kumawood movies are mainly dialogue-driven due to the improvised scenarios worked out between performers as already discussed. Thus with little visual appeal in some films, non-Akan viewers find it a little difficult to appreciate what is happening on the screen. Some of the films are without subtitles and even where there are, just as already mentioned, lack of professional training tells on the subtitles which are replete with spelling errors and poor grammatical constructions, rendering the subtitles meaningless. Foreigners also see these films as shouting bouts since many scenes depict quarrels and arguments where people shout themselves hoarse. Trading of insults is commonplace which raises the question of suitability for minors who may pick up bad language. Some of the films have also denigrated traditional cultural practices in attempts to promote Christian beliefs. Some producers with the support of churches have used the filmic medium as extension of the pulpit for evangelising.

There are productions made in Twi, however, that do not exhibit the shortcomings typical of Kumawood films. Thus, they negate the often-generalised assertion that Ghanaian local language films are sub-standard. In 1991, Kofi Yirenkyi, a professionally-trained filmmaker produced *Sika Sunsum* in Twi. It tells the story of Agya Ntow, a greedy landlord who introduces his young wife Rose to Jimmy Cash as a niece in need of money for trading. He gets the money from Jimmy but does not take it kindly when Jimmy and Rose get close. Out of jealousy, Ntow poisons Jimmy to death and Rose is arrested as the prime suspect. The ghost of Jimmy torments Ntow until he confesses his crime and commits suicide in the end. This film made before the coming of Kumawood met the required standard and was well received.

In recent times, Deron Albright's *The Destiny of Lesser Animals* (2011) has been making waves at international film festivals since its release.[5] The film tells the story of Boniface Koomsin, an ex-Ghanaian police officer deported from the US a decade ago who is attempting to go back to the US and thus seeks help in acquiring a passport which gets stolen the very day he receives it from the agent. In attempt to track the thief, he solicits the help of a police officer called Oscar Darko. Their investigations take them to the criminal underworld where situations turn deadly. The film shot entirely in Akan (a mixture of Twi and Fante) has very interesting scenes with excellent cinematography, sound and editing. Though there are subtitles, one could still grasp what situations are depicted if there were none.

The difference between these films and that of a typical Kumawood film, I argue, is in the approach and the handling of the cinematic medium by the directors and the actors. The script for *The Destiny of Lesser Animals* (2011) was originally done in English by a Ghanaian writer (resident in US) who collaborated with an American director and a Ghanaian co-producer to make the film. A professional translator was used to translate the script into Twi and they used actors who were bilingual in English and Twi. Thus, they studied the original English script and the Twi version and worked out the transpositions with the director and producers. In this way, scenes could be shot and re-taken without any problems as scenarios were not worked out during the camera roll. To the Kumawood producers, this process requires extra production time and resources which they cannot afford due to low budgets.

Another recent example is *Chronicles of Odumkrom: The Headmaster* (2015) written and directed by the veteran filmmaker Ernest Abbeyquaye.[6] In this film about the struggle of one man to provide educational infrastructure for his community in the face of opposition from other well-meaning individuals, we are confronted with the stark realities of modern-day developmental challenges in Africa where politics become detrimental to the progress of a people instead of the opposite. Master Andoh aka Headmaster bent on rebuilding the collapsed school block in Odumkrom resorts to pawning his young daughter to servitude to a rich money lender in order to raise funds for the project. This film also does not exhibit those problematic

technical characteristics associated with Kumawood though it is in a local language. It has so far received positive reviews in the media after its premiere in Accra and appearance at international film festivals.[7] The subtitles are on point and so are the cinematography and the acting.

I argue that these examples defeat the assertion that local language films produced in Ghana are mediocre. The point be made that it is the producers without the requisite film training who do not see the need to engage professionals in the film production and thus go through the process in their own adopted way and produce substandard films. However, being satisfied with their sales returns, these producers have not been keen on improving the technical quality of their products. Their productions are screened on television channels daily; they are uploaded to YouTube and receive views which are great to them; the video discs are sold in traffic all over the places in Ghana and African communities in Europe and America. I argue that it is the popularity of Kumawood that drove local television stations to dub Indian telenovelas in Twi that has become the current trend in Ghana.[8] Some have argued that the growing popularity of these Twi-language foreign soaps on Ghanaian television caused the decreased patronage of locally produced movies. This assertion is so strong that calls have been made for the imposition of a ban on the telenovelas.

I do not support the argument because other factors affecting the film industry on the whole should be considered. Silverbird Cinema Cineplex operates two multi-screening theatres at the two big shopping malls in Accra. Even these screen mostly American films as management requirements are difficult to be met by local film producers. Thus producers have to task themselves with screening tours to several venues with hired mobile equipment. In addition is direct sale of video discs for home consumption but whose patronage has also dropped drastically. Ghana recently migrated to digital television transmission and thus increased accessibility to many channels offering a variety of programmes to viewers. It is my view also that Kumawood producers began losing their audience when they resorted to producing cheap imitations of Hollywood science fiction films. The special effects were poorly executed and the stories of aliens' invasion in the form of weird-looking robots did not click with audiences.

Though I still stand by earlier arguments raised about the negative effects of some issues in Ghanaian films generally[9], I see them as an important body of material worthy of support. These Kumawood films can best serve as cultural artefacts with the several traditional situations depicted. The films also serve as an important body of "visual literature" through the narratives. Perhaps as an alternative to publishing, these films tell our stories despite the technical challenges associated with the chosen medium. Improved craftsmanship through some kind of regular short-term professional training will help.

Kumawood is progressing despite the challenges. When they felt marginalised by film award organisers in Ghana, they instituted their own Kumawood Akoben Film Festival and Awards (KAFF) in 2011 to keep their morale up. One of the telecommunication giants in the country, MTN recently launched the Kumawood App to provide film content on mobile devices on the network.[10] This will expand the marketing of Kumawood films in addition to what is already done through screening on buses and upload to YouTube and sales of video discs in traffic and small stalls.

A possible major breakthrough for Kumawood would be to win an Oscar. Ghana was invited to submit an entry for 2018 foreign language category of The Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences Awards.[11] It was a herculean task for a 14-member committee engaged in a selection process for a Ghanaian production in a local language to meet the stringent guidelines established for the Oscars.[12] As predicted by critics, no production met the standards and as such none was selected. Perhaps with this window of opportunity to possibly place Ghana on the cinematic map of the world, a production could be put together to meet the required technical specifications for next year. With the coming into force of The Development and Classification of Film Act (2016) which is to establish the National Film Authority and administer a National Film Fund, the time is now for the film industry to be uplifted to compete strongly on the global screens, especially with its local language films which carry with it some form of unique national identifier. The technical challenges can be dealt with through improved training and support. Creativity abounds in the country and should be nurtured for national development.

Notes

1. The film won the grand prize Etalon Yennenga at the 1989 Pan-African Film and Television Festival of Ouagadougou (FESPACO), Burkina Faso.
2. See: https://www.pulse.com.gh/entertainment/movies/kumawood-and-their-crazy-movie-titles-id4071091.html Accessed 10/05/2017
3. One such occurrence was the seizure of a movie by state security after the

Cinematographic Board of Control has approved its release. See: http://vibeghana.com/2011/05/30/cinema-board-slams-govt-over-atta-mortuary-man%E2%80%99-movie-seizure/ accessed May 30, 2011.

4. See: https://www.newsghana.com. gh/ghanaian-local-movies-use-scripts/ accessed 10/05/2017 and http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/entertainment/No-scripts-for-local-language-films-fate-or-choice-300099 accessed 10/05/2017
5. See: http://www.destinyofles-seranimals.com
6. See: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt41-13796
7. See: https://www.graphic.com.gh/entertainment/showbiz-news/shake-speare-brewed-in-ghanaian-pot.html Accessed 11/05/2017
8. See: http://www.myjoyonline.com/entertainment/2016/October-19th/why-ghanaians-cant-get-enough-of-kumkum-bhagya-veera.php accessed 30/07/2017
9. See: Aveh, A, (2010), 'The rise of the video film industry and its projected social impact on Ghanaians', in Ernest N. Emenyonu (ed), *African Literature Today*, vol. 28, Woodbridge: James Currey, pp. 122–132.
10. See: http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHome-Page/entertainment/Kumawood-goes-high-tech-536782 accessed 11/05/2017
11. See: http://www.pulse.com.gh/movies/oscars-ghana-to-submit-film-for-2018-oscars-id6627857.html accessed 04/05/2017

12 See: http://www.graphic.com.gh/features/features/ghana-film-s-for-the-oscar-a-difficult-venture.html accessed 08/04/2017

Refer ences

Abbeyquaye, Ernest, (2015), *Chronicles of Odumkrom: The Headmaster*, Accra, Trumpet Africa Productions.

Adjesu, Egbert, (1970), *I Told You So*, Accra, Ghana Films Industry Corporation

Albright, Deron, (2011), *The Destiny of Lesser Animals,* Accra, Bright Noon Pictures.

Ampaw, King, (1983), *Kukurantumi Road to Accra,* Accra, Afro Movies Limited

Ampaw, King, (1985) *Juju* (*Nana Akoto*), Accra, Afro Movies Limited

Ansah, Kwaw, (1980), *Love Brewed in an African Pot,* Accra, Film Africa Limited.

Ansah, Kwaw, (1988), *Heritage Africa,* Accra, Film Africa Limited.

Aveh, Africanus, (2010), 'The rise of the video film industry and its projected social impact on Ghanaians', in Ernest N. Emenyonu (ed), *African Literature Today*, vol. 28, Woodbridge: James Currey, pp. 122–132.

Aveh, Africanus, (2014), 'The "Nigerianization" of Ghanaian eyes', *Journal of African Cinemas* 6: 1, pp. 99–112, doi: 10.1386/jac.6.1.99_1

Diawara, Manthia, (2010), *African Film: New Forms of Aesthetics and Politics*, Berlin: Prestel, pp. 162–74.

Graham, Sean, (1952), *The Boy Kumasenu,* Accra, Gold Coast Film Unit.

Yirenkyi, Kofi (1991), *Sika Sunsum,* Accra, Graceland Motion Pictures.

Sembene Meets Winnie Madikizela in After-Africa

Okell o Oculi

Africa Vision 525Initiative
Nigeria

Africa's world-renowned firm director, Sembene Ousmane of Senegal, must have welcomed Winnie Madikizela-Mandela with open arms and a deep puff of his tobacco pipe when she arrived with an exuberant scream into After-Africa. She loved him as the film-maker who celebrated the sensuous swagger of the Wolof woman as his camera consumed her from the back in the film "The Money Order".

He had contempt for "been-to-Paris" educated women, who pecked the earth in imitating walks of European women: seeing it as a mark of being "civilized" .She herself had made wearing a head-tie a mark of African womanhood following Ancient Egypt's Black African Pharaohs who used head-ties as tools for tapping blessings and powers from the Gods in the heavens. On 6th April 2018, Black women in South Africa adorned black dresses and colourful head-ties in proud celebration of "Mama Winnie".

In "The Money Order", a young educated nephew robs his illiterate uncle of money sent by a son who lives in France. He uses his knowledge of the postal system to claim the money and then defraud his uncle. It is indicative of Senegal's new rulers violating sacred values of filial obligation in Wolof society by robbing their uneducated countrymen with the barbarism of an alien individualism

and hedonism. Dr Brigalia Bam, a former schoolmate of Winnie remembers her as very soft spoken and luxuriously generous by sharing her little pocket money with any girl who was in need. Sisterhood was a cardinal value for her.

At a rally in Georgia near Bloemfontein, Julius Malema, Member of the Parliament of South Africa and leader of Economic Freedom Fighters party, told the crowd that the violent apartheid regime hated Winnie intensely and subjected her to relentless brutalities and humiliation because she was ever intervening to help victims of racism, poverty, illness and police violence. In the slums (or "shanties") and rural communities they called her "Mama of the Nation" because she was always there to help them.

A leader of the 1976 school boycott by pupils opposed to the policy of being taught in "Afrikaans" - the language of the Boers, recalls that in the terror of police bullets killing and wounding the children, the only voice they heard was that of Winnie Madikizela-Mandela shouting at the White policemen to stop killing her children. No male voice was heard. As the Financial Times newspaper is quoted to have said, Winnie was hit with all the raw brutalities unleashed by the racist regime while Mandela sat more comfortably in prison on Robben Island.

Sembene Ousmane also produced "Xhala" – a film which ended with beggars and invalids off the streets of Dakar spitting all-over the naked body of a top Senegalese official whose greed had blocked the economic growth of the country and intensified their impoverishment. "Xhala" is the Wolof word for an impotent man who cannot sexually consummate marriage with a new bride. As a film-maker who learnt his craft in communist Poland, Sembene was disgusted by rulers and businessmen of newly independent African countries who did not exhibit the bold creativity and inventiveness that produced the industrial revolution in Europe. Instead they call themselves "captains of industry" when, in fact, they were mere local sales agents for Euro-American and Asian industrialists and bankers. They were also impotent.

Winnie Madikizela-Mandela rebuked those leaders of the African National Congress (henceforth, ANC) – including her husband Nelson Mandela – who abandoned the bold policy of getting land back from white farmers "without compensation" and took economic income to the millions of landless Africans festering in shanties. The 'xhala-ridden' ANC leaders opted for the policy of "Black Economic Empowerment" – a code for ANC elites getting shares of white-owned local and foreign companies. They became millionaires and billionaires without spending entrepreneurial sweat of the white god-fathers; and ignoring the poor.

As a mark of their abandoning the route to ensuring employment for the millions of poor and newly educated youths, the black business elite moved residence away from the masses of the people to live in white residential areas. As those who adored her kept telling reporters of South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Winnie never moved out of living in Soweto because she loved to be close to poor people so that she would represent their raw and authentic interests.

In his film "Emittai", Sembene mocked the role of "patriarchy" in Wolof society by depicting the cowardice of men even at the risk of bringing mass starvation to their families. During Europe's First War (1914-18), French colonial authorities decided to expropriate cereal harvests from Senegal for feeding troops on the war front. In anticipation of this genocidal policy, women secretly hid cereal harvests in swamps. However, under intimidation by French officials the men squealed on the women – much to the heartless glee of French officials. Malema accused ANC leaders of preferring Jacob Zuma as Vice-President to Thabo Mbeki at the 1997 party conference for fear of Winnie becoming the next president of the country.

President F.W. De Klerk wrote in his autobiography about his shock at limited demands made by Mandela's team towards the transfer of power to the black majority. His team must have feared facing Winnie as ANC's negotiator. Thabo Mbeki's (former President of South Africa, 1999-2008) little contact with the township and rural people, could have made him resent her fearless hatred of white power, and her popularity.

May Sembene and Winnie make and inspire 'Films Africana'.

Leadership et gouvernance de l'enseignement supérieur dans le développement des industries créatives et culturelles au Kenya



Le rôle de l'enseignement supérieur dans l'établissement de structures et de procédures dans la société et dans l'industrie est clairement défini dans les discussions scientifiques. Le récit a récemment pris un nouvel élan au Kenya avec la reconnaissance du secteur de la création, un domaine dans lequel de nombreux jeunes sont impliqués, en tant que domaine ayant une incidence sur l'économie. En démêlant le lien entre l'enseignement supérieur et l'industrie, les auteurs se concentrent sur le leadership et la gouvernance dans l'enseignement supérieur et sur sa contribution attendue et perçue à la formation du secteur de la création. En analysant cinq cas, les auteurs interrogent les processus et les structures qui régissent l'enseignement et la pratique des sujets créatifs, en notant comment ceux-ci affectent l'industrie créative au Kenya.

Ce livre aborde les disciplines créatives du point de vue des étudiants, des chargés de cours et des administrateurs d'université. Les trois voix fournissent une vision équilibrée de ce qu'est l'enseignement supérieur des arts créatifs au Kenya. Les multiples auteurs du livre fournissent en outre un compte rendu équilibré du développement de ces disciplines dans l'enseignement supérieur et de leur croissance dans l'industrie. Les concepts clés ici sont le développement de l'industrie de la création et la manière dont l'enseignement supérieur devrait contribuer à la même chose.

Maîtriser le destin: Aborder le risque du point de vue de l'action sociale: études de cas du sud du Mozambique



Ce livre explique comment des situations extrêmes pouvant sembler avoir un potentiel destructeur peuvent réellement être utilisées pour produire des vies individuelles et sociales significatives. Il s'agit de «l'apprivoisement du destin». Cette notion signifie et rend compte de la capacité des individus et des communautés à reconstruire leur vie contre toute attente. Le livre est basé sur des études de cas qui s'appuient sur des idées théoriques issues de la sociologie des catastrophes. Il aborde certaines limites de la sociologie du risque, dont le principal est le rejet de la pertinence de la notion de risque pour l'étude des sociétés technologiquement non avancées. Le livre affirme que ce rejet a privé l'étude de la condition humaine d'un atout analytique important.

Elísio S. Macamo est professeur associé d'études africaines à l'Université de Bâle, en Suisse. Il est à la fois directeur du Centre d'études africaines et chef du département des sciences sociales à l'Université de Bâle: il est co-éditeur de la Revue sociologique africaine du CODESRIA et de la série de livres AEGIS-Brill sur les études africaines. Il est actuellement membre du conseil de l'Institut international africain (Londres), des conseils d'administration de l'Association suisse d'études africaines et de l'Association allemande d'études africaines.

CODESRIA Bulletin

Publications Team / Équipe de la Publication

Divine Fuh
Chifaou Amzat
Diama Bèye
Yves Eric Elouga
Sériane Ajavon
Daouda Thiam
Alpha Ousmane Dia

For contibutions and enquiries, please write to:

Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa
Avenue Cheikh Anta Diop X Canal IV
P.O. Box 3304, Dakar
CP 18524, Senegal
Tel: +221 33 825 98 22 / 23
Fax: +221 33 824 12 89

Email: codesria@codesria.sn / publications@codesria.sn
Web Site: www.codesria.org

Pour les contributions et informations, prière de s'adresser à :

Conseil pour le développement de la recherche en sciences sociales en Afrique
Avenue Cheikh Anta Diop x Canal IV
B.P. : 3304, Dakar,
CP 18524, Sénégal
Tél : +221 33 825 98 22 / 23
Fax : +221 33 824 12 89

Courriel : codesria@codesria.sn / publications@codesria.sn
Site web : www.codesria.org

The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) is an independent organisation whose principal objectives are to facilitate research, promote researchbased publishing and create multiple forums geared towards the exchange of views and information among African researchers. All these are aimed at reducing the fragmentation of research in the continent through the creation of thematic research networks that cut across linguistic and regional boundaries.

CODESRIA publishes Africa Development, the longest standing Africa based social science journal; Afrika Zamani, a journal of history; the African Sociological Review; the African Journal of International Affairs; Africa Review of Books and the Journal of Higher Education in Africa. The Council also co-publishes the Africa Media Review; Identity, Culture and Politics: An Afro-Asian Dialogue; The African Anthropologist, Journal of African Tranformation, Méthod(e)s: African Review of Social Sciences Methodology, and the Afro-Arab Selections for Social Sciences. The results of its research and other activities are also disseminated through its Working Paper Series, Green Book Series, Monograph Series, Book Series, Policy Briefs and the CODESRIA Bulletin. Select CODESRIA publications are also accessible online at www.codesria.org

CODESRIA would like to express its gratitude to the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY), the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), the Rockefeller Foundation, the Open Society Foundations (OSFs), Oumou Dilly Foundation, and the Government of Senegal for supporting its research, training and publication programmes.

CODESRIA

Ce bulletin trimestriel est distribué à titre gracieux à tous les instituts de recherche et facultés africaines. Il a pour objectif de stimuler la discussion, les échanges d'informations et d'encourager la coopération en matière de recherche. Les communications sur les questions théoriques, les rapports de conférences et séminaires, et les études récentes sont les bienvenus.