CODESRIA Bulletin

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Editorial

The theme for this edition of the CODESRIA Bulletin is curled from the thematic priorities of the 2017-2021 Strategic Plan. These are: 'Democratic processes, governance, citizenship and security in Africa' and 'Ecologies, Economies and Societies in Africa.' The Bulletin addresses two important sets of questions. The first focuses on how Africa, along with all the changes and transformations that define it today, is and should be governed. That includes issues of statehood, democratization, the rule of law and human rights, security and violence, transitional justice, and other attendant governance processes and mechanisms at local, national, regional and international levels. These continue to constitute some of the most important issues of concern in many African countries that, naturally, also orient the work of the Council. The second explores aspects of the Anthropocene in Africa, the forms it takes, its histories and trajectories and impact on a broad set of sectors including the continent's burgeoning economies. This theme provokes important questions related to land, food security and poverty that persistently dominate public debate and

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CODESRIA

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remain of global concern. Africa continues to be challenged by the contradictions and complexities of 'development', climate change and population growth, especially in cities. The evolving nature of rural and urban centres, particularly propelled by the growing purchasing power of new elites, coupled with the expanding wealth gap are redefining and creating new dynamics for cohabitation. Insecurity, uncertainty and undignified living constitute key challenges for a continent that continues to struggle with the global capitalist system.

Also in this issue / Toujours dans ce numéro

Lionel Zevounou starts with a critique of what he considers an exclusionary interdisciplinarity, as he argues that law is marginalised in Africa, and specifically CODESRIA's postcolonial critiques of thought systems and knowledge production. Munamato Chemhuru then continues with the debate begun in the previous issue of the bulletin on the contextual relevance of democracy in Africa, as he argues for a shift to adopting democratic governance frameworks grounded in African existential realities. Leah Junck examines community activism and organizing around neighborhood security on examples from South Africa while Sean Maliehe tackles the continent's relationship with human economy building on the case of mobile money in South Africa to explore people's entrepreneurial encounters with changing capital. Theresa Moyo critically examines the benefits from and equitable distribution of wealth from extractive industries, outlining how a different future can be realised from Africa's mineral wealth. Raphael Mulaha Kweyu's piece addresses climate change and resilience strategies by marginalised communities in Kenya, specifically addressing issues related to governance. Kellen Kiambiati and Anne Kariuki's contribution discusses strategies to deal with corruption through values based approaches that take on board local epistemologies while Edrine Wanyama, in the last piece in this collection, highlights the importance of variable geometry in enhancing economic growth in East Africa. The last group of contributions from Rokhaya Fall, Abdoullah CISSE, Kofi Anyidoho, Chambi Chachage, Biodun Jeyifo and Yusuf Bangura pay homage to colleagues who moved on in 2017.

Over the period covered by this issue of the CODESRIA Bulletin, we learned with devastation of the sudden and shocking death of colleagues whose prominent role in the affairs of the Council has been notable. Within the space of a few months in 2017, the CODESRIA community lost four colleagues: Aminata Diaw Cissé (died April 14 2017), Abubakar Momoh (died 29 May 2017), Francis Abiola Irele (died July 2 2017) and Abdul Raufu Mustapha (died 8 August 2017). In this issue of the Bulletin, we appreciate their contribution to wider struggles, celebrate their tenacity and combativeness and take note of their indelible contribution to the Panafrican knowledge project. Aminata Diaw was a laureate of CODESRIA's first Democratic Governance Institute in 1992 before she moved to build a university career as a feminist and philosopher in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Cheikh Anta Diop. Before her passing on, she served CODESRIA from 2010-2016 as Head of the Training, Grants and Fellowships (TGF) Programme. It is an interesting coincidence that Abubakar Momoh was also a laureate of the Democratic Governance Institute of 1996. As the CODESRIA tribute to Abdul Raufu Mustapha points out, he too was involved in the Democratic Governance Institute, having served as its Director in 2002. He later served as a member of the Scientific Committee (2009-2011) and, just before his death, was a member of the Internal Review Committee on CODESRIA's Intellectual Agenda. Abiola Irele, even though not a regular participant in CODESRIA activities, was strikingly present through his work

on 'Negritude' and Africa's intellectual response to the colonial condition, which formed a core part of the ideological foundations of the Council's mission. Thus, even though these intellectual giants have passed on, their intellectual contributions borne out of various intersections in the thought spaces provided by CODESRIA invite our honour through a critical engagement with their ideas.

As we honour the departed, the Council also welcomes the appointment a new Executive Secretary at the helm of the Council. On the 1st of June, Dr. Godwin Murunga, formerly at the Institute for Development Studies, University Nairobi and African Leadership Centre took over from Dr. Ebrima Sall as the 7th Executive Secretary of CODESRIA. This appointment is the sixth successful transition at the Council in its 44-year history. Godwin Murunga is also an alumni of the CODESRIA Democratic Governance Institute 1997, before going on to serve as one of the Council's youngest Executive Committee members from 2005 to 2011. His tenure thus represents a remarkable generational shift and transition. The agenda for the new leadership at the Council is properly framed in the note Prof. Dzodzi Tsikata, President of CODESRIA shared announcing the appointment of Dr. Godwin Murunga. Locating the agenda in the ongoing CODESRIA internal review process, the note focuses on reviewing and reforming systems, processes, and engagements with its constituencies and stakeholders, particularly policy communities. This agenda is one that should revitalise Council programming and find new ways of engaging the broader community that benefits from CODESRIA's work.

Godwin Murunga
Executive Secretary
and
Divine Fuh
Head of Publications and Dissemination

Éditorial

Le thème de cette édition du *Bulletin du CODESRIA* s'écarte des priorités thématiques du Plan stratégique 2017-2021 qui sont : «*Processus démocratiques, gouvernance, citoyenneté et sécurité en Afrique*» et «*Écologies, économies et sociétés en Afrique*». Le *Bulletin* aborde deux séries de questions importantes. La première est de déterminer comment l'Afrique, avec tous les changements et les transformations qui la définissent aujourd'hui, est et devrait être gouvernée. Le thème intègre les questions d'État au sens statutaire, la démocratisation, l'état de droit et les droits de l'homme, la sécurité et la violence, la justice transitionnelle, et autres processus et mécanismes de gouvernance aux niveaux local, national, régional et international. Ces questions constituent encore d'importantes préoccupations dans de nombreux pays africains et, naturellement, orientent également les travaux du Conseil. La seconde série de questions explore les aspects de l'Anthropocène en Afrique, ses formes, son histoire, ses trajectoires et son impact sur des secteurs variés, notamment les économies en plein essor du continent. Ce thème soulève d'importantes questions liées à la terre, à la sécurité alimentaire et à la pauvreté qui dominent de manière persistante le débat public et demeurent une préoccupation mondiale. L'Afrique est toujours confrontée aux contradictions et à la complexité du « développement », du changement climatique et de la croissance démographique, en particulier dans les villes. La nature évolutive des centres ruraux et urbains, tirée notamment par le pouvoir d'achat croissant de nouvelles élites, conjuguée à l'écart grandissant de richesse, redéfinit et crée une nouvelle dynamique de cohabitation. L'insécurité, l'incertitude et l'indignité des conditions de vie constituent des défis majeurs pour un continent qui continue à se débattre avec le système capitaliste mondial.

Lionel Zevounou commence par une critique de ce qu'il considère une interdisciplinarité d'exclusion, affirmant que le droit est marginalisé en Afrique, et plus particulièrement dans les critiques postcoloniales du CODESRIA sur les systèmes de pensée et la production de connaissances. Munamato Chemhuru poursuit le débat engagé dans le précédent numéro du *Bulletin* sur la pertinence contextuelle de la démocratie en Afrique, alors qu'il plaidait en faveur

d'un changement dans l'adoption de cadres de gouvernance démocratique fondés sur les réalités existentielles africaines. Leah Junck examine l'activisme communautaire et l'organisation autour de la sécurité de quartier à travers des exemples d'Afrique du Sud, tandis que Sean Maliehe aborde la relation entre le continent et l'économie humaine en s'appuyant sur le cas de l'argent mobile en Afrique du Sud pour explorer les rencontres entrepreneuriales de personnes avec un marché des capitaux en pleine mutations. Theresa Moyo examine de manière critique les avantages d'une répartition équitable des richesses issues de l'industrie extractive, arguant qu'un avenir différent est possible à partir des richesses minérales de l'Afrique. Raphael Mulaha Kweyu aborde les stratégies de changement climatique et de résilience des communautés marginalisées du Kenya, en ciblant plus particulièrement les questions liées à la gouvernance. La contribution de Kellen Kiambiati et Anne Kariuki discute des stratégies de lutte contre la corruption par des approches fondées sur des valeurs et qui prennent en charge les épistémologies locales, pendant que Edrine Wanyama, dans la dernière contribution, met en évidence l'importance de la géométrie variable pour une meilleures croissance économique en Afrique orientale. Le dernier groupe de contributions de Rokhaya Fall, Abdoullah Cissé, Kofi Anyidoho, Chambi Chachage, Biodun Jeyifo et Yusuf Bangura rend hommage aux collègues qui nous ont quittés en 2017.

Au cours de la période couverte par le présent numéro du *Bulletin du CODESRIA*, nous avons appris avec choc le décès soudain de collègues qui ont joué des rôles de premier plan dans la gestion du Conseil. En quelques mois en 2017, la communauté du CODESRIA a perdu quatre collègues: Aminata Diaw Cissé (décédée le 14 avril 2017), Abubakar Momoh(décédé le 29 mai 2017), Francis Abiola Irele (décédé le 2 juillet 2017) et Abdul Raufu Mustapha (décédé le 8 août 2017). Dans ce numéro du *Bulletin*, nous saluons leur contribution à des luttes plus larges, célébrons leur ténacité et leur combativité et prenons acte de leur contribution indélébile au projet panafricain de production de savoirs. Aminata Diaw a été lauréate de l'Institut sur la gouvernance démocratique du CODESRIA avant d'entreprendre une carrière universitaire en tant que féministe et philosophe au département de philosophie à l'Université Cheikh Anta Diop. Avant son décès, de 2010 à 2016, elle a été Administratrice principale du Programme Bourses, formation et subventions. C'est une coïncidence intéressante qu'Abubakar Momoh a également été lauréat de l'Institut de la gouvernance démocratique de 1996. Comme le souligne l'hommage du CODESRIA à Abdul Raufu Mustapha, lui aussi a participé au premier Institut de la gouvernance démocratique, avant d'être le directeur en de la session 2002. Il a ensuite servi en tant que membre du Comité scientifique (2009-2011) et, juste avant sa mort, comme membre du Comité d'évaluation de l'agenda intellectuel du CODESRIA. Abiola Irele, même s'il ne participait pas régulièrement aux activités du CODESRIA, était remarquablement présent à travers ses travaux sur la «négritude» et la réponse intellectuelle de l'Afrique à la situation coloniale, qui constituaient l'un des fondements idéologiques de la mission du Conseil. Ainsi, même si ces géants intellectuels ne sont plus, leurs contributions intellectuelles, issues des espaces de pensée fournis par le CODESRIA, forcent notre respect et nous sommes honorés de débattre, de manière critique, de leurs idées.

Alors que nous honorons nos morts, le Conseil salue également la nomination d'un nouveau Secrétaire exécutif à la tête du Conseil. Le 1er Juin, le Dr Godwin Murunga, auparavant à l'Institut d'études sur le développement, Université de Nairobi et *Center for African Leadership* a succédé au Dr Ebrima Sall en tant que 7ème Secrétaire exécutif du CODESRIA. Avec cette nomination, nous entamons une sixième transition réussie du Conseil en 44 ans d'histoire. Godwin Murunga est également un des anciens de l'Institut sur la gouvernance démocratique du CODESRIA ayant participé à la session de 1997, avant de servir comme l'un des plus jeunes membres du Comité exécutif du Conseil, de 2005 à 2011. Son arrivée représente donc un changement de générationnel et transitionnel remarquable. L'agenda de la nouvelle direction du Conseil est adéquatement défini dans la note partagée par le Professeur Dzodzi Tsikata, Présidente du CODESRIA annonçant la nomination du Dr. Godwin Murunga. Situant l'agenda dans le processus de consultation interne en cours au CODESRIA, la note aborde l'examen et la réforme des systèmes, des processus et engagements avec ses membres et ses parties prenantes, en particulier les communautés de décideurs. Cet agenda devrait revitaliser la vision programmatique du Conseil et lui permettre de trouver de nouvelles manières de faire participer la collectivité qui bénéficie du travail du CODESRIA.

Godwin Murunga
Secrétaire exécutif
et
Divine Fuh
Chef du programme Publication et Dissémination

From the Executive Secretary's Desk

It has been months since the departure of Dr. Ebrima Sall, the sixth Executive Secretary, from the service of CODESRIA. During this time, we have reflected in the Secretariat on the best way to steer the work of the Council following the transition. We have, in the process, also benefitted from messages from members of the community raising critical questions about our programming, quality of research output, communication and overall efficiency in service provision. It is for this reason that I wish to briefly outline the thinking that is taking shape in the Secretariat with a hope it will enable us to find a most suitable way to steer the Council.

The Council has over the last 45 years sought to support basic research in the Social Sciences and Humanities (SSH) with an eye to shaping public debate in and about Africa. In doing this, the Council has focused on supporting African academics in universities and research centres. The Council has, as a consequence, played a major role in sustaining this intellectual community. CODESRIA has committed to facilitate the community to conduct basic research and, through their outputs, shape public debate at a pan-African level.

In the last few years however, the need to pay specific attention to the reproduction of this community has become more urgent in order to respond, in more deliberate ways, to gaps in university postgraduate training. This is particularly the case with postgraduate training that currently produces graduates in mass but plays a limited role in sharpening their conceptual and methodological skill for advanced and high quality research outputs. The Council is better positioned to respond, in some measured ways, to the need for advanced training with an aim of creating Africa's best in the social sciences and humanities and projecting their scholarship to the world.

The idea therefore is to enhance the position of the Council in reproducing the next generation of African SSH scholars and scholarship. This will be achieved, first, by aligning our intellectual programmes to achieve internal coherence and efficiency and, second, by refocusing our dissemination strategy in a way that affirms the key messages from our research. Ultimately, CODESRIA must project a message that shapes public discourse, demonstrates the relevance of basic research outputs to experiences of ordinary peoples of Africa and shapes a future that intellectually affirms human dignity by speaking to our common humanity.

The work of the Council will therefore be aligned around four inter-related pillars including research and training, publications and documentation, dissemination and communication and lastly, administration and finance. For these pillars to have the coherence we seek and to deliver the outputs we desire, the Council will invest in personnel and renew equipment. We identify these pillars with the hope of working towards internal coherence.

There are some key challenges facing the Council that need to be addressed as a way of ensuring the proper functioning of the identified pillars and optimal operation of the programmes. First, the Council needs to revitalise systems of internal oversight in order to speed up its capacity to respond quickly to the needs of the community of scholarship. While the Council has documented and codified many of its processes and procedures, we are committing to greater diligence in following them. The aim is to direct all possible resources the Council raises strictly to the core mandate of the Council – research, training, publication, documentation and dissemination. Second, resolving outstanding management issues resulting from previous audits, enhancing or repairing relations with funding partners and developing new partnerships that will enable the Council to grow its support. Further, this will ensure that funds allocated are judiciously used for the purposes of growing the scientific achievements of the community. Finally up-scaling the Council into a paperless organisation and enhancing efficiency. This will be done by growing a system of information and data management that supports efficiency, guarantees transparency and reduces wastage.

Meantime, a number of initiatives that have not previously enjoyed the visibility they deserve will be given due attention. Five are particularly important. The first is a *senior scholars initiative*. The Council

will progressively invest more in senior African scholars. The desire to reproduce the next generation of African scholars and scholarship is best served by ensuring that mid-career academics have shoulders to stand on. The aim is to make sure there is inter-generational conversation that allows and enables continuity. The mark of success in building the next generation will be their capacity to produce good quality publications especially single-authored manuscripts. This investment is designed to achieve this goal.

The second is investing in *Reflections on Policy*. The demand for policy impact has become a box many research institutions feel compelled to tick. However, the tension between policy-driven research and research-driven policy persists. While there is no doubt that policy relevance is core to any academic undertaking, it is not clear if in fact we have a clear understanding of the policy process itself. It increasingly feels, sitting in the CODESRIA Secretariat, that many institutions seek policy impact without necessarily understanding the policy process. Yet policy impact ought to be understood as part of a process, not simply as an outcome. In order to ensure proper sequencing of the relationship between research and policy, the Council will invest in understanding the policy process and, in doing so, grow a shared interest in research and policy. This way, we hope to ensure continuous conversations with policy communities. The outcome should be a process of co-production of policy out of shared interest in pressing research questions. The aim is to ensure that issues of policy impact are problematized afresh to understand how impact emanates from a proper understanding of the policy process.

The third is prioritising gender and embracing feminist perspectives. Engendering social sciences has always been a priority of the Council. Indeed, the recent SIDA Evaluation of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan noted that in percentage terms, CODESRIA funded more female projects in proportion to applications from female scholars. However, the numbers are miniscule and the percentages hide more than they reveal. The Council will insist in up-scaling the number of female participant in its programmes through deliberate budging for female colleagues. The securing in the 2018 budget of MRI grants restricted to female scholars is one step in this direction.

The fourth is renewed focus on academic freedom. The Council was founded on the logic of securing academic freedom. Its founders and a critical number of its luminaries have been academics in exile. In 1995, the Council started an academic freedom programmes. This was both an academic as well as activist undertaking headed by a programme officer. While the Council has issued statements highlighting abuse of academic freedoms, this has not been effective in activist and intellectual terms. The Council will revitalise the programme and aim to up-scale it back to a key programme of the organisation.

The fifth is a focus on the Humanities. The Humanities have come up for special attention in the Council in recent times. Previously, the Council invested in the humanities without necessarily emphasising their distinctive contribution to knowledge. Thus, up to roughly 30 per cent of our work has been in the humanities. Not only did the Council initiate the CODESRIA African Humanities programme as a collaborative programme with University of Ghana-Legon, the Council also ran a series of conferences titled SOS African History and continues to support the journal of the Association of African Historians. These programmes either stalled or are under-performing and need to be revitalised. Discussions around the humanities have commenced and an outline of the pathway to their revitalisation is developing.

The above reflections aim to provide a pathway for consolidating performing programme at CODESRIA while revitalising others. It also touches on issues of administration and finance in order to find a way of getting the different component of the Council to achieve synergy. The task of the new leadership is to spearhead this process of consolidation and renewal with a focus on reproducing the next generation of African scholars and scholarship. It is also to restore confidence in existing partners and invite new ones to join in supporting the agenda of reproducing the next generation of African scholars and scholarship in the SSH.

Godwin R. MURUNGA
Executive Secretary

Du bureau du Secrétaire exécutif

Des mois ont passé depuis le départ du Dr Ibrahima Sall sixième secrétaire exécutif du CODESRIA. Au cours de cette période, le Secrétariat a réfléchi sur la meilleure manière de diriger le Conseil après la transition. Au cours du processus, nous avons également reçu des messages de membres de la communauté soulevant des questions cruciales sur notre programmation, la qualité des résultats de la recherche, la communication et l'efficacité globale de la fourniture de services. C'est pour cette raison que je souhaite exposer brièvement la réflexion qui se dessine au sein du Secrétariat, dans l'espoir que cela nous permettra de trouver le moyen le plus approprié de diriger le Conseil.

Au cours des 45 dernières années, le Conseil a soutenu la recherche fondamentale en sciences sociales et humaines (SSH) en vue de façonner le débat public en Afrique et sur l'Afrique. Ainsi, le Conseil s'est concentré sur le soutien aux universitaires africains dans les universités et les centres de recherche. En conséquence, le Conseil a joué un rôle majeur de soutien à cette communauté intellectuelle. CODESRIA s'engage à aider la communauté de recherche fondamentale et, à travers les résultats de leurs travaux, à façonner le débat public au niveau panafricain.

Au cours des dernières années cependant, une attention particulière à la reproduction de cette communauté est devenue plus urgente afin de répondre, de façon plus délibérée, à des lacunes dans la formation post universitaire. Ceci est particulièrement le cas avec la formation de troisième cycle qui actuellement produit en masse des diplômés, mais joue un rôle limité dans l'affûtage de leurs compétences conceptuelles et méthodologiques pour la production de recherches de haute qualité. Le Conseil est mieux placé pour répondre, de manière mesurée, au besoin de formation avancée afin de produire le meilleur de l'Afrique dans le domaine des sciences sociales et humaines et de projeter leurs recherches dans le monde.

L'idée est donc d'améliorer la position du Conseil en produisant la prochaine génération de chercheurs africains en sciences sociales et humaines. Nous y parviendrons, d'une part, en alignant nos programmes intellectuels sur la cohérence et l'efficacité internes et, d'autre part, en recentrant notre stratégie de diffusion d'une manière qui soutient les messages clés de notre recherche. En fin de compte, le CODESRIA doit diffuser un message qui façonne le discours public, démontre la pertinence des résultats de la recherche fondamentale pour les expériences des peuples africains ordinaires, et propose un avenir qui, intellectuellement, affirme la dignité humaine en parlant s'adressant à notre humanité commune.

Les travaux du Conseil s'articuleront donc autour de piliers interdépendants de recherche, de formation, de publication et documentation, de dissémination et communication et enfin, d'administration et finance. Pour que ces piliers aient la cohérence que nous recherchons et produisent les résultats souhaités, le Conseil investira dans le personnel et renouvellera le matériel. Nous identifions ces piliers afin d'atteindre la cohérence interne.

Le Conseil doit relever certains défis clefs pour assurer le bon fonctionnement des piliers identifiés et le fonctionnement optimal des programmes. Premièrement, le Conseil doit revitaliser les systèmes de contrôle interne afin d'accroître sa capacité à répondre rapidement aux besoins de la communauté universitaire. Alors que le Conseil a documenté et codifié plusieurs de ses processus et procédures, nous nous engageons à plus de diligence dans leur respect. L'objectif est de strictement allouer toutes les ressources du Conseil à son mandat fondamental: recherche, formation, publication, documentation et diffusion. Deuxièmement, il s'agit de résoudre les problèmes de gestion latents soulignés par les audits précédents, d'améliorer ou de rétablir les relations avec les partenaires financiers, et de développer de nouveaux partenariats qui permettront au Conseil d'accroître son soutien. De plus, cela garantira que les fonds alloués sont utilisés judicieusement à plus de réalisations scientifiques de la communauté. Et enfin, le Conseil se transformera en une organisation sans papier et plus efficace. Cela se fera par la mise en place d'un système d'information et de gestion de données qui contribue à l'efficacité, garantit la transparence et réduit le gaspillage.

Pendant ce temps, un certain nombre d'initiatives qui n'ont pas encore bénéficié de la visibilité qu'elles méritent recevront toute l'attention voulue. Cinq sont particulièrement importantes. La première est une Le

Conseil investira progressivement davantage dans les chercheurs africains confirmés. La reproduction de la prochaine génération d'universitaires africains est mieux prise en charge si l'on s'assure aux universitaires à mi-carrière les capacités nécessaires à les épauler. L'objectif est de faciliter la conversation entre générations qui permette et encourage la continuité. La capacité de produire des publications de qualité, en particulier des manuscrits à auteur unique, sera la marque du succès dans la construction de la prochaine génération d'universitaires. Cet investissement est conçu pour atteindre cet objectif.

La seconde consiste à investir dans les *Réflexions sur les politiques*. La demande d'impact sur les politiques est devenue une réalité pour de nombreux instituts de recherche. Cependant, la tension entre recherche axée sur les politiques et politique axée sur la recherche persiste. S'il ne fait aucun doute que la pertinence politique est au coeur de toute entreprise universitaire, il n'est pas clair que nous comprenions bien le processus politique lui-même. De plus en plus, vu du Secrétariat du CODESRIA, de nombreuses institutions recherchent l'impact politique sans nécessairement comprendre le processus politique. Cependant, l'impact sur les politiques doit être compris comme faisant partie d'un processus, et non simplement comme un résultat. Pour un bon séquençage de la relation entre recherche et politique, le Conseil investira dans la compréhension du processus politique et, ce faisant, développer un intérêt commun dans la recherche et la politique. De cette façon, nous espérons construire des conversations continues avec les communautés de décideurs. Le résultat devrait être un processus de coproduction de politique par intérêt commun pour des questions de recherche urgentes. L'objectif est de problématiser à nouveau les questions d'impact des politiques afin de comprendre comment l'impact part d'une bonne compréhension du processus politique.

La troisième est de donner la priorité au genre et d'adopter les perspectives féministes. La promotion du genre dans les sciences sociales a toujours été une priorité du Conseil. En effet, la récente évaluation du Plan stratégique 2012-2016 de SIDA a noté qu'en termes de pourcentage, le CODESRIA a financé plus de projets par des femmes proportionnellement aux demandes de financement de femmes universitaires. Cependant, les chiffres sont très bas et les pourcentages cachent plus qu'ils ne révèlent. Le Conseil insistera sur la mise à l'échelle du nombre de femmes participant à ses programmes par le biais d'une consolidation délibérée des collègues femmes. La sécurisation dans le budget 2018 de subventions MRI réservées aux femmes universitaires est un pas dans cette direction.

Le quatrième est un intérêt renouvelé pour les libertés académiques. Le Conseil a été fondé sur le principe de garantie de la liberté académique. Ses fondateurs et un grand nombre de ses sommités ont été des universitaires en exil. En 1995, le Conseil a lancé un programme sur les libertés académiques. C'était à la fois une entreprise universitaire et une entreprise militante dirigée par un administrateur de programme. Alors que le Conseil a publié des déclarations mettant en exergue les abus de libertés académiques, celles-ci se sont révélées peu efficaces sur le plan activiste et sur le plan intellectuel. Le Conseil revitalisera le programme et le transformera en un programme clé de l'organisation.

La cinquième est axée sur les sciences humaines. Ces derniers temps, les sciences humaines font l'objet d'une attention particulière du Conseil. Auparavant, le Conseil investissait dans les sciences humaines sans nécessairement insister sur leur contribution particulière à la production de connaissances. Ainsi, environ 30% de notre travail a été réalisé dans les sciences humaines. Le Conseil a non seulement, avec l'Université du Ghana-Legon, lancé le programme Humanités africaines en tant que programme collaboratif, mais il a également organisé une série de conférences intitulées *SOS African History* et continue de soutenir la revue de l'Association des historiens africains. Ces programmes sont soit bloqués, soit sous performants et doivent être revitalisés. Les discussions sur les sciences humaines ont commencé et un aperçu de la démarche de leur revitalisation est en cours d'élaboration.

Les réflexions ci-dessus visent à fournir une voie pour la consolidation et la performance programmatiques au CODESRIA. Elles abordent également des questions administratives et financières afin de réaliser la synergie des différentes composantes du Conseil. La tâche des nouveaux dirigeants est de mener à bien ce processus de consolidation et de renouvellement en insistant sur la production de la prochaine génération de chercheurs africains. Il s'agit également de rétablir la confiance avec les partenaires existants et d'inviter de nouveaux partenaires à soutenir le programme de production de la prochaine génération d'universitaires africains et de recherche en sciences humaines.

Godwin R. MURUNGA
Secrétaire exécutif

Processus démocratiques, gouvernance, citoyenneté et sécurité en Afrique

« L'Afrique dans le monde » et « le monde en Afrique » : jalons pour un programme de recherche pluridisciplinaire sur le droit

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L'affirmation pourrait paraître un brin provocante : le droit reste un parent pauvre des programmes de recherche développés par le CODESRIA ces dernières années[1]. Il y a plusieurs explications à cette observation. Celle qui nous apparaît la plus déterminante est liée à l'histoire même du CODESRIA. Les traditions méthodologiques qui dominent l'institution, qu'elles soient marxistes, néo-marxistes, postcolonialistes, ou autres, font peu cas de l'objet « droit » en tant que tel. On doit à la tradition marxiste en particulier, la proposition selon laquelle le droit ne serait que l'expression d'une superstructure reflétant les rapports économiques dominants dans la société. De leur côté, les approches postcoloniales ont peu investi la matière juridique, ce qui est à peine surprenant quand on sait qu'elles se sont généralement épanouies dans les départements d'humanité.

De fait, l'objet « droit africain » s'en est trouvé soit isolé par rapport aux autres sciences sociales quand il n'a pas purement et simplement été réinvesti par les universitaires du Nord. Il faudrait d'ailleurs pousser cette affirmation plus loin, en disant que l'analyse et la production des systèmes juridiques africains ont aussi été réinvesties – pour ce qui concerne en tout cas les aires géographiques anglophones et francophones – par les praticiens (cabinets d'avocats transnationaux, organisations internationales, ONG, etc.)[2], souvent au grand dam des universitaires africains, pour certains attirés dans le camp desdits praticiens eu égard aux faibles rémunérations et structures de recherche proposées par les universités de leurs pays respectifs. De cette configuration, il ressort que l'agenda de recherche développé ces dernières années sur le droit en « Afrique », a été dominé par les thématiques liées d'une part à la sécurité des investissements, à travers la mise en place d'instruments juridiques appropriés et, d'autre part, à la question du droit humanitaire et des droits de l'homme selon un modèle d'acculturation voire d'inculturation proposé en contrepartie des aides financières internationales.

La persistance d'une domination économique qui se serait substituée à celle coloniale constitue une proposition scientifique qu'il convient d'illustrer empiriquement par une analyse critique de la circulation des modèles juridiques mis en œuvre sur le continent. Les systèmes juridiques africains sont pour la plupart, déchirés entre un « droit d'exception » au service des entreprises et groupes multinationaux et le « droit quotidien », celui auquel est confronté le justiciable ordinaire, souvent livré à l'aléa d'une justice frappée par la corruption, l'arbitraire administratif ou le manque de moyens devenu chronique. Telle que présentée, cette observation peut apparaître légèrement grossière, on le concède. Il faut pouvoir l'affiner par la construction d'un objet retraçant la « généalogie » qui préside au niveau des États à la création de juridictions arbitrales, de contrats miniers ou d'ordres juridiques dérogatoires au droit commun – on pense par exemple à l'Organisation pour l'Harmonisation du Droit des Affaires en Afrique, OHADA –. Ce que semble aussi illustrer la domination néolibérale dans le domaine du droit, c'est bien l'effondrement du clivage Nord/Sud au sens d'un rapport exclusif dominant versus dominés. Les prétentions de la Chine, de certains pays du Golfe ou de l'Inde sur l'Afrique ouvrent à nouveaux frais le vieux débat porté par Samir Amin sur le concept de détérioration des termes de l'échange[3]. Pas plus que dans ses rapports avec le Nord, le continent africain n'échappe désormais au « diktat » imposé à partir des années 80 concernant la conditionnalité de l'aide au développement.

D'un point de vue juridique, en suivant les thèses de Ayoob, les systèmes juridiques africains présentent la particularité d'être en partie déliquescents de l'intérieur et relativement en phase avec l'ordre juridique international[4]. Cette réflexion n'est pas nouvelle : parmi les juristes du continent, elle a occupé une bonne partie des travaux d'Issa Shivji[5]. Plus que jamais, il devient nécessaire

d'établir un programme de recherche prenant pour objet la trajectoire des intermédiaires juristes qui, avant et après la colonisation, ont soutenu l'introduction de modèles juridiques dits «modernes». Derrière le discours du «modernisme» tenu après les indépendances, il y a sans doute nombre de jugements de valeur, de représentations, de contextes d'inculturation à travers l'enseignement juridique, qu'il convient de clarifier. L'Afrique francophone est un exemple parmi d'autres : en étendant le régime du personnel d'enseignement supérieur de la métropole aux universités et instituts d'outre-mer, l'article 2 du décret du 23 octobre 1953 portant statut particulier du personnel du cadre général de l'enseignement et de la jeunesse de la France d'outre-mer opère une extension du modèle universitaire de la métropole vers les colonies. Jusqu'aux années 1950 encore, les universitaires d'Indochine et d'Afrique francophone partagent avec ceux de la métropole la procédure d'inscription sur la liste d'aptitude du Comité consultatif des universités; ces mêmes universitaires participent encore au concours d'agrégation de droit et de médecine. De ces différentes observations, plusieurs questions émergent. En voici une, parmi de multiples : comment s'inscrit la création des universités ou centres universitaires dans le projet colonial ? Mieux encore : y a-t-il jamais eu après les indépendances un véritable projet politique émanant des États permettant de repenser les institutions universitaires du continent? La trajectoire intellectuelle des premiers universitaires africains mérite à ce titre d'être analysée : formés pour la plupart dans les ex-métropoles impériales, plusieurs ont exercé leurs savoirs dans les jeunes universités africaines après les indépendances. Il y a derrière cette question, un enjeu lié à la maîtrise de l'agenda universitaire initié depuis les indépendances. Autrement dit, dans quelle mesure la structure du champ académique africain francophone, anglophone ou lusophone s'est-elle jamais prêtée à une tentative de réappropriation du savoir juridique au regard des projets de recherche menés ou des réseaux d'expertise? Cette socio-histoire commune entre les universitaires du Nord et du Sud doit être prise au sérieux, dans l'étude de la socialisation des juristes africains après les indépendances. Un examen pluridisciplinaire mérite d'être entrepris sur les rôles, les liens et l'influence qui furent les leurs dans les réseaux de lutte et les mouvements anticoloniaux (négritude, marxisme, mouvements anti-impérialistes, Ligue des droits de l'homme, etc.) Inversement, il convient d'interroger les rapports de cette génération de juristes avec les premiers pouvoirs en place. Les écrits qui ont mis en lumière le rôle du droit et plus largement des juristes dans la légitimation du pouvoir sont connus. Et il convient désormais d'inscrire pleinement le rôle joué par ces juristes africains et/où métropolitains dans l'analyse foucaldienne classique du savoir/pouvoir au sein des États postcoloniaux.

Il nous paraît en ce sens utile que le CODESRIA rejoigne les réflexions élaborées en Afrique du Sud autour d'une « décolonisation » des universités et du savoir académique[6]. Il est fort à craindre que le cas sud-africain ne soit en réalité ni isolé, ni même exceptionnel. Cette question concerne l'ensemble de la communauté universitaire africaine située en Afrique ou dans la diaspora. Si plusieurs points de vue ont été exprimés, il convient de se garder du fantasme de la « table rase ». Décoloniser l'université et le savoir académique – si par là il faut entendre repenser radicalement le rôle de l'institution et de la production des savoirs universitaires en lien avec les besoins des sociétés africaines – nécessite une progression intellectuelle maîtrisée sur le long terme. Une telle maîtrise ne consiste pas selon nous, dans le remplacement pur et simple d'un personnel universitaire blanc par un personnel universitaire de couleur. Sans chercher à minimiser ce problème, il faut aller en profondeur en proposant une critique méthodique des principaux concepts issus des paradigmes dominants du Nord qui permettent de penser le concept de droit : positivisme, jusnaturalisme, pluralisme juridique, sociologie et anthropologie du droit. Une telle entreprise doit permettre d'identifier les formes d'eurocentrisme qui empêchent bien souvent de comprendre la spécificité du fonctionnement des systèmes juridiques africains. Celle que nous proposons de privilégier passe par un travail portant moins, dans un premier temps, sur des questions de méthodes que sur les moyens juridiques employés comme instruments de domination[7] juridico-économique (circulation de modèles constitutionnels, traités commerciaux, importation de modèles économiques par voie législative ou réglementaire, etc.) En d'autres termes, il importe de se livrer à un travail d'inventaire critique des formes et techniques juridiques dominantes des systèmes juridiques postcoloniaux.

Il s'agirait de comprendre empiriquement de quelle manière les systèmes juridiques africains sont restés poreux ou ont résisté à l'influence de modèles juridiques étrangers depuis les indépendances. La question du mimétisme institutionnel et de la circulation des modèles et concepts juridiques mérite une attention particulière, y compris s'agissant des concepts d'«État», de « démocratie », «

État de droit», « gouvernance », « public/privé » ou de « citoyenneté ». En somme, il faut pouvoir identifier qui détient le monopole si discret de l'écriture des normes qui composent les systèmes juridiques du continent. On précisera encore que ce travail d'inventaire ne doit nullement être pris pour un travail à charge, mais au contraire pour un impératif épistémique. Ainsi, pourrait-on formuler la première orientation de recherche de la manière suivante : comment, depuis les indépendances, se construisent les priorités de l'agenda universitaire africain dans le domaine juridique ? L'examen du financement de la recherche et/où de l'expertise, les modes de recrutement, la trajectoire des juristes, l'analyse du mode de production des normes sont autant de sujets qui entrent dans ce premier axe.

À cela, il conviendrait de proposer un axe de recherche ancré dans la philosophie politique. On s'y attardera moins, compte tenu de la limitation qui a été assignée à l'ensemble des auteurs de cette livraison. Sans doute serait-il fructueux de repenser la manière d'écrire les décisions de justice si l'on souhaite qu'elles soient considérées comme légitimes pour le public auquel elles se destinent. On veut dire par là en suivant les travaux de Souleymane Bachir N'diaye sur la Charte du Mandé[8], qu'il conviendrait de mobiliser l'imaginaire historique et culturel africain de telle sorte que les juges soient en mesure de produire sur la forme des décisions qui soient susceptibles d'être appropriées par «l'opinion publique africaine». Les travaux de Thaddeus Metz et d'autres initiés dans le champ de la philosophie morale vont dans le même sens : tenter de trouver une approche «africaine » à l'interprétation des énoncés produits par les juges dans le domaine des conflits agraires, de répartition des ressources ou de droits de l'homme[9]. Il s'agit là d'un défi qui touche autant la Commission africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples que la Cour du même nom ou les juridictions ordinaires des différents pays du continent. De cette manière, les controverses sur des procès en vue, tel le procès «Habré», seraient en mesure d'être vidées de leur contenu. Les critiques d'une justice dénoncée comme étant au «service de l'occident» ne doivent pas porter sur une remise en cause d'une certaine universalité des droits de l'homme, mais bien plutôt sur les possibilités de traduire cette universalité dans les idiomes et les représentations propres au continent. Dire une justice adaptée aux préoccupations du continent nécessite de ce point de vue, nous semble-t-il, une refondation intellectuelle prenant au sérieux tant sur le fond que sur la forme la rédaction des décisions de justice. Ce deuxième axe pourrait s'appeler : réconcilier les Africains avec leur justice.

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Notes

1. Ce qui ne veut certainement pas dire que des études ont été menées ces dernières années sur des questions juridiques. Voy. en ce sens : F. Kaudjhis Offoumou, *Les droits de la femme en Côte d'Ivoire*, Dakar, CODESRIA, 1996 ; B. de Sousa Santos, M. P. Meneses, Law and Justice in a Multicultural Society : The Case of Mozambique, Dakar, CODESRIA, 2006 ; B. Camara, *Évolution des systèmes fonciers au Mali : cas du bassin cotonnier de Mali sud (zone office Niger et région CMDT de Koutiala*), Dakar, CODESRIA, 2015.
2. S. Dezalay, « Les juristes en Afrique: entre trajectoires d'État, sillon d'empire et mondialisation », *Politique africaine*, vol. 138, n° 2, 2015, p. 5-23.
3. S. Amin, *Le développement inégal. Essai sur les formations sociales du capitalisme périphérique,* Paris, 1973, ed. de Minuit.
4. M. Ayoob, « Subaltern Realism : International Relations Theory Meets the Third World » in, S. Newman (dir.), *International Relation Theory and the Third World*, New York, Saint Martin Press, 1998, p. 31-54.
5. I.G. Shivji, *Accumulation in an African Periphery. A theoretical Framework*, Mkuki Na Nyota Publishers, 2009 ; I. G. Shiviji, G. Murunga, *Where is Uhuru ? Reflections on the Strugle for Democracy in Africa*, Fahamu/Pambazuka Press, 2009, p. 221-228.
6. Sur cette question en français qui n'épuise certainement pas le sujet mais en donne un aperçu clair : E. Wolff, « Décoloniser la philosophie. Autour des contestations universitaires en Afrique du Sud », *La vie des idées*, 28 oct. 2016 : http://www.laviedesidees.fr/Decoloniser-la-philosophie.html (consulté le 15 mai 2017) ; voy. aussi sans prétendre à l'exhaustivité : K. Prah, « Has Rhodes Fallen ? Decolonizing the Humanities in Africa and Constructing Intellectual Sovereignty », *ASSAF Inaugural Humanities Lecture, HSRC, Pretoria,* 20th October 2016, 22. p ; L. Le Grange, « Decolonising the University Curriculum », *South Africa Journal of Higher Education*, 2016, vol. 30, n°2, p. 1-12.
7. Rapporté au contexte juridique, le terme sera employé dans son sens wébérien compris comme un appareil « technique rationnel » : S. Breuer, « La domination rationnelle. À propos d'une catégorie de Max Weber », *Trivium Revue franco-allemande de sciences humaines et sociales*, n° 7/2010, (trad. A. Berlan), p. 1-36.
8. S. B. Diagne « Philosophie africaine et Charte africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples », Critique, vol.771-772, n° 8, 2011, p. 664-671.
9. D. Blichitz, T. Metz, O. Oyowe, *Jurisprudence in an African Context*, Oxford, Oxford University Press (South Africa), 2017.

The Place of Indigenous Methods of Governance in Post-colonial Africa

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Introduction

In this article, I seek to foster the quest for indigenous social, political and economic solutions to African social and political thinking. I argue that such solutions in the form of democracy and governance approaches that are germane to the African existential reality are more acceptable than alien forms of democracy and governance. I also seek to propose some indigenous models of democracy and governance for post-colonial Africa that are capable of accommodating and promoting intra-Africa and global conversations in these areas. If African indigenous models of democracy and governance are properly understood and implemented, they could help solving current social, political and economic problems facing the post-independent African state. These indigenous models of democracy and governance focus, and put strong emphasis on African values, traditions, insights and belief-systems that have often been neglected, suppressed and excluded, all of which can help foster Africa's development and democratic culture.

A Justification for Indigenous Models of Governance

The quest for indigenous methods of governance is based primarily on the supposition that knowledge in Africa ought not to be taken as a menu prepared from the outside and served in Africa. Generally, non-indigenous and non-African models of democracy and governance, such as liberal democracy, have often been taken as the measure for good governance and political accountability in Africa. Yet, western liberal democracy has actually exposed the inherently traditional African communitarian democracies to various liberalist philosophies that are alien to African traditions of governance.

Colonialism has had an impact on the suppression of African traditional models of democracy and governance. After the Berlin conference in 1884-5, colonial white settler governments invaded Africa and imposed their alien culture and systems of democracy and governance there. Because of this sad reality, Africa has neglected its own models of governance and democracy based on non-party consensual democracy and communitarian social arrangement, and in turn, the continent has adopted non-indigenous models.

Even now, there is a general misconception that traditional pre-colonial African societies were not democratic because of the exposure to Western style democracy and governance that continues to characterise post-colonial Africa.

On the contrary, we ought to consider the social, political, economic, scientific and architectural work and developments at Mapungubwe in the Limpopo province of South Africa. In addition, the Great Zimbabwe empire in Masvingo province of Zimbabwe and the educational legacies of ancient Egyptian civilisation and Tim-buktu in Mali are all testimony to the traditional models of democracy and governance through non-party and communitarian social and political arrangements. In view of these developments, one begins to wonder if African indigenous wisdom could be ignored in the quest for non-African models of western democracy and *good*[2] governance.

Also, the discourse of African models of democracy and governance have often been predicated mainly by the debate between Eurocentric and Afro-centric thinking on the contribution that social and political African epistemology and wisdom could make towards human civilisation.

This kind of skepticism with reference to African indigenous models of democracy and governance is only a political narrative that is perpetrated in Africa in order to justify the post-colonial African state under Western liberal democracy and governance. Consequently, indigenous models of democracy and governance in Africa fall victim to the *ego cogito* view that is characteristic of Western Eurocentric thinking and its attitude towards African wisdom. This kind of attitude has often led to the *universalist fallacy* and approach to knowledge in general and social and political thinking at large. This is the fallacy that Western 'civilization' and approaches are the only gateways to knowledge and reality.

African Indigenous Models of Democracy and Governance in Perspective

African indigenous models of democracy and governance ought to be understood as the kind of social and political systems that must be identified within certain social, cultural, traditional and political contexts. Such indigenous models of democracy and governance ought to be mainly based on the need to map out human social, political and economic salvation in light of methods and solutions that originate from and are relevant to the African existential context. As philosopher Dismas Alois Masolo stated, "there appears to be little disagreement that there is knowledge that is indigenous to Africa – that is, knowledge that is unique, traditional, or local, knowledge that exists within and develops around the specific conditions of the experiences of African peoples" (Masolo 2010:51-2). Similarly, social and political knowledge in Africa must also be understood within an African context and not necessarily rely on non-African models that originate from and are relevant to the Western world.

The quest for African indigenous models of democracy and governance should *not* be understood as an appeal to anachronism. Rather, the appeal to the indigenous models of democracy should be understood as being based on the use of knowledge that speaks to African challenges and concerns. Frances Owusu-Ansah and Gubela Mji argue, "knowledge or science, and its methods of investigation, cannot be divorced from a people's history, cultural context and worldview" (Owusu-Ansah and Mji 2013: 01). Similarly, methods of democracy, good governance and conflict resolution that are alien to Africa cannot meaningfully speak to the African context. This is why African indigenous methods of governance become relevant post-colonial African condition.

The quest for African indigenous models of democracy and governance is an Afrocentric project that seeks to revise African social and political value systems. In Western liberal democracy, the aspect of multi-party liberal democracy has, and continues to perpetrate political intolerance among political leaders and individuals belonging to different political parties and ideologies in Africa. Such political intolerance has often been characterised by smear campaigns and even violent political clashes between politicians and individuals belonging to different political party formations, and in some instances military overthrows of sitting governments in post-colonial Africa (see Mazrui 2016).

Such social and political problems, I argue, could be confronted through the need to revisit the African traditional political heritage in the form of African communitarian, non-party and consensual democracy. Some of the defining features of traditional models of democracy and governance are the emphasis on *rule of the community, by the community* and *for the community* as opposed to the Western-Lincolnian and liberalist view of democracy as rule of the people, by the people, and for the people. In the former understanding of democracy, there is a strong emphasis on the community which becomes the guarantor of various liberties of human persons. In the latter view, emphasis has, and continues to be on safeguarding individual human liberties, yet the emphasis is on the people. Also, traditional African models of democracy, through communal consensus, guarantees the participation of individuals in decision-making through various communal structures aimed at soliciting communitarian decisions, compromise and consensus on fundamental issues affecting the community.

Conclusion

If post-colonial Africa is to realise the dream of African renaissance as espoused by South African Statesman and former president (1999-2008), Thabo Mbeki, it should take the opportunity to revive and revitalise indigenous social and political value-systems that are found in African indigenous political thinking. Although it is clear that most of the African traditional frameworks that provided the basis for traditional systems of governance no longer exist today, it is not too late to reconsider indigenous models of democracy like those found in pre-colonial African traditional political heritage without neces-

sarily being anachronistic. Unless the post-colonial African state reverts to its indigenous traditional systems of governance, it will continue to experience the kind of problems that have characterised it in the period after the attainment of political independence. Some of these problems include, but are not limited to poverty, corruption, bad governance, dictatorships, election competition, multi-partyism and majoritarianism, disputed elections, vote-rigging, military governments, anarchy, wars, genocide and *coup d'états*. Although there may be some imperfections, the appeal to traditional systems of governance could be the starting point on which post-colonial Africa's quest for non-Western systems of governance could be built.

Notes

1. Munamato Chemhuru teaches Philosophy at Great Zimbabwe University. This paper was written during the time he was on sabbatical, pursuing a post-doctoral research fellowship with the University of Johannesburg's Department of Philosophy.
2. I have deliberately italicised this word in order to emphasise the irony with which I wish it to convey.

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Fenced off: Suspicion and the city as an exclusive space in post-Apartheid, suburban Cape Town

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On the 4th of September 2015, four uniformed members of the South African Police Service (SAPS) kicked a man who was lying on the pavement after he had dropped his pistol and was unarmed. Still, the police officers fatally shot him at close range[1]. The armed man was identified as a criminal suspect and had allegedly attempted a robbery. After he was defenceless on the ground with no considerable risk emanating from him in the presence of the police officers, the violence against the man took on a different meaning, hinting at the complex and embodied associations attached to danger and crime in South Africa. The incident is reminiscent of the bitter aftertastes souring public palates after a series of cases of police brutality in the recent past. During what has come to be known as the Marikana Massacre, 34 mine workers were shot dead by the SAPS on the 25-year anniversary of a nation-wide miner's strike in 2012. The dreadful event has become synonymous with the difficult relationships between civilians and the very institution that is meant to distribute a sense of security amongst them.

The pervasiveness of such incidents and memorability of consequent aftertastes also become evident in a report by the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (Ipid)[2], showing that 57 per cent of deaths resulting from police action are due to police brutality. Members of the SAPS were also found to have been involved in 51 rape incidents, 61 torture incidents, 66 corruption cases and 159 other criminal cases in 2017. New events of police brutality captured on camera can be found on Youtube under captions such as 'police brutality hits again'. It is clear that they cannot be interpreted as isolated occurrences. The SAPS reportedly being twice as deadly as their North American counterparts must also be interpreted against the fact that they are six times more likely to die

on duty in comparison. While this likelihood is noteworthy and may lead to more violent reactions in unwarranted cases to protect their own lives, it does not account for the reported cases of rape, torture and corruption in 2017.

A lack of faith in the ability of the state to offer protection to its citizens is evidenced in South Africa being the fourth largest private security industry in the world with a large part of it being consumer driven[3] and exceeding spending on both, the country's police and army[4]. Even though private security is a costly investment, security guards are only paid between R3000-5000 (approximately $145-360) per month. As this additional contribution to safety is often still not deemed to be sufficient, local Neighbourhood Watch groups consisting of ordinary citizens are not unusual, especially in the more affluent South African suburbs. All these responses to anxious fears about 'crime waves' in South Africa (Comaroff & Comaroff 2006), often believed to originate from the economically fragile outskirts of the cosy city cores (Seekings 1996), ought to stir questions of societal trust, spatial divisions and the ways in which suspicion is encountered on an individual and social level. Constructions of fear and danger play important roles in invoking support for harsh criminal justice strategies (Douglas 1992). Suspicion also becomes processed and embodied in specific ways that are as academically intriguing as they are socially challenging.

Neighbourhood Watch groups as spaces of agency

The trust in state institutions to protect that John Locke (1967) once described as essential for the sharing of a social space is corrupted in South Africa. Instead, suspicion and fear form a dangerous social symbiosis in that they create a deep-seated notion of instability and vulnerability. Formations of Neighbourhood Watch groups, often adding to private security personnel in protecting the wealthier urban spheres, constitutes one way in which perceived vulnerability manifests. Agency and confidence are fostered through strategies of security such as patrolling the streets and reporting back to neighbours about what is identified as 'suspicious behaviour'. Neighbourhood Watch groups provide an ample ethnographic context to interrogate how notions of being unsafe and vulnerable become embodied. In 2015, I spent ten months with the Neighbourhood Watch group in Observatory, a suburb south of the city centre of the colonial 'mother city' Cape Town and its signature mountain. The area is particular in that is considered to be bohemian and liberal. It was a 'grey area' during the legally segregating Apartheid years as it accommodated differently racially classified people. When private and supposedly 'high class' protection services were judged to have failed in their efforts to protect, alternative networks of security and trust were revived in Observatory. The local Neighbourhood Watch as an organisation emerged, seeking to decrease perceived vulnerability through strategic practices such as patrolling local streets. In the process of revival, the ideological foundations of the organisation were passionately discussed in meetings and via email and chat groups, with many wanting to move away from the common understanding of such groups as inherently conservative and racially dividing.

The responsibility to protect from those who commit crimes (and to penalise them) has ultimately been given to civilians. The case study revealed that neighbourhood formations, with the aim to combat crime, constitute spaces in which precarity, that is insufficient security of a person's physical well-being provided by the state and other societal structures (Butler 2016), is fuelled by a fear of crime while being negotiated through the idea of relationality (Butler 2012) and an increased notion of agency. In the process of re-claiming the local streets and via the different forums of social interaction for group members (chat groups, committee meetings and patrols), a particular idea of 'the suspect' or 'criminal other' (Brown 1995), seen as a constant threat to one's well-being, can be observed to impact embodied ways of moving through the communal space. It also manifests in performances (the role of 'the patroller' as a conceptual counterpart to the phantom 'suspect'), concrete protective strategies of navigating the area, and the spatial channelling of bodies that are conceptualised as not belonging. The effectively excluded are usually people of colour whose bodies have been weathered by poverty. As a social space, the Neighbourhood Watch groups offer a way for people to live through uncertainty by forging relationships of trust, based on the imagination of a particular kind of 'suspect' and the cultivation of suspicion.

Couch patrolling and recycling crime

Houses and communities are often equipped with various security technologies in suburban Cape Town. Private security guards are dotting the streets where people can afford to hire them. These strategic acts of fencing oneself off and the networking of communities in watching, finding

and penalising individuals classified by them as criminally 'suspicious' are drastic expressions of complicated societal relations that are intrinsically framed by feelings of social insecurity, vulnerability and a lack of trust. In the process, criminologies of the 'alien other', and representations of criminals as dangerous members of distinct racial and social groups who bear little resemblance to oneself (Garland 1996) mutate into an overpowering fear of crime (Pain 2008) and what I understand to be an ever present perceived 'air of violence'.

The air of violence becomes quite apparent when looking at the amount of money invested in fencing, wiring and equipping buildings, people and areas with appliances and accessories that are marketed as promoting safety (and that are largely taxed and thus highly profitable for the state when promoted and sold). However, security strategies do not always take the visible shape of security installations and Neighbourhood Watch patrollers in the streets with their bibs and two-way radios. In fact, while the Neighbourhood Watch in Observatory had a steadily increasing number of members at the time of my fieldwork, very few of them volunteered to patrol and actively watch the streets. More common was what one very active group member coined as 'couch patrolling', implying that many members merely rely on new media technologies such as WhatsApp[5] chat groups while only sharing observations made from their bedroom windows themselves.

Through a constant sharing of crime stories and pictures of 'suspects' on these media platforms, fear becomes continuously perpetuated and recycled, effectively playing into the, for some, highly profitable social trend of wrapping oneself in layers of security mechanisms. Discussions in the monthly Neighbourhood Watch meetings as well as in the online forums. I observed were lively and ideologically challenged the glossing over of poverty, race and crime. Nevertheless, recycled crime stories and snapshots of potential criminals reappearing via various channels also reaffirm the need for self-protection and group strength as a basis for the different Neighbourhood Watch members with conflicting opinions to relate to one another.

Cultivated suspicion

Neighbourhood Watch formations can be understood as urban renewal projects that return governance to the state (Jensen 2006). As a state ally, the groups co-produce a particular kind of social space. Fear and suspicion in this space features within different social platforms and does not only constitute something learned and performed, but also something affecting social relationships in different ways. Embodied suspicion has a considerable influence on communities, especially when readily and widely shared via communication technologies and through its visualisation in the form of pictures of 'suspects' that dominate local forums.

It is the intention of Neighbourhood Watch groups to dominate fears as a collective. However, the developing of strategies, as de Certeau (1984) notes, presumes control, is self-segregating and means setting oneself up as a barricaded insider. Using cultivated strategies and embodied and performed practices, patrolling the neighbourhood has a deep impact on what kinds of encounters become possible and on the degrees of humanness that become attributed to individuals. Increased agency and confidence produced through relationality offer tools in navigating fears of crime. While this becomes frequently intellectually challenged, the practice of patrolling (in whichever form), belonging to the Neighbourhood Watch group and therefore feeling a little safer precludes the domination of others and binary constructions of 'suspects' as potential perpetrators and the likely innocent.

Human realities are always fabricated, invented, imagined and constructed and cultures are made or even 'made up' (Conquergood 1989). Practices of watching the neighbourhood and the cultivation of suspicion involved in the process reveal the ambiguities and enigmas of everyday practices. Cultural fabrications like the 'suspect' and 'patroller' hold the promise of reimagining and refashioning the world. In the interest of developing policies that may transform South Africa and its engrained practices of keeping its variety of social spaces and cultural mélange apart from one another, these performances or embodied routines relating to trust and distrust should be looked at more closely in different local contexts and beyond.

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A Human Economy and Mobile Money in Africa: Lessons from South Africa

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Introduction

> 'Emergent world society is the new human universal – not an idea, but the fact of our shared occupation of the planet crying out for new principles of association' (Hart et al 2010: 2).

In January 2017, Oxfam International released a report on global inequality observing that: "Since 2015, the richest 1% has owned more wealth than the rest of the planet". Mapping a way forward, it advanced: "It's time to build a human economy that benefits everyone, not just the privileged few". A 'human economy' in their view would be one in which the state and corporations are held accountable and responsible to the people.[2] We share these sentiments at the Pretoria-based Human Economy programme but differ on the way forward. We begin with the people in the economies. We prioritise what they do for themselves and meanings they attach with the purpose of creating a more inclusive and plural universality.

The idea of the human economy came out of the 2009 World Social Forum in Brazil. The forum brought together academics and activists in a counter-movement against dominant Euro-America centred economic epistemologies and practices (Hart *et al* 2010). In 2010, Keith Hart, Jean-Louis Laville and Antonio David Cattani published a collection of essays with the intention to '… bring to the attention of English readers some currents of economic theory and practice that have flourished in non-Anglophone countries over the last two decades' which were dominant in France, Brazil, Hispanic America and Scandinavia (ibid: 2).

The human economy acknowledges that the economy is already 'human' and plural, but such a perspective is obscured by dominant ideologies of production, grand historical events and powerful forces persistently working against the people (Hart *et al* 2010; Hart and Sharp 2014). The human economy, however, is not just something that may be handed down to the people as Oxfam advances, or simply what people are doing on the ground. It is a dialectic of small-scale

humanism and big impersonal institutions – what people do is intricately connected to the big and impersonal world beyond their immediate reach (Hart *et al* 2010; Hart and Sharp 2014). In this sense, it is an analytical tool and approach towards understanding and learning from what people do through popular contestation and pragmatic collaboration with state bureaucracies, institutions and corporations.

Mobile money was launched in Kenya in 2007 by Safaricom (a subsidiary of Vodacom) as a Person-to-Person (P2P) money transfer system through their popular service and product, *M-pesa* – 'M' for mobile and 'pesa' for money in Swahili. Since then it has spread across the continent, and beyond, while *M-pesa* has been adopted in various countries. Therefore, it offers an ideal opportunity to explore what people do for themselves through selective partnerships with big corporations. In the last two decades, innovations in the Financial Technology (*FinTech*) industry and telecommunications have made significant strides into the financial system controlled by state bureaucracies and dominated by the banks. Digital monies such as cryptocurrencies, mobile money, and others, coming out of these industries have made the plurality of money and economies more apparent (Maurer 2015). Poor people in Africa cannot mine coins, however; but they can use mobile money.

The case of mobile money provides an ideal opportunity to make a case for a human economy. From informal money transfer methods (Brown 2010) and exclusive financial systems (Peebles 2014), mobile money transformed the movement of money across borders for the poor while the system has been developing into a mobile-based micro-financial system enabling saving, payments and insurance (GSMA 2016; Nyamnjoh and Brudvig 2016; Maurer 2015; Agar 2013; Quadir 2013).

The development of mobile money in various contexts is shaped by various social and historical conditions. This paper focuses South Africa (henceforth, SA). Since 2016, I have been studying the development of mobile money in southern Africa (Lesotho and SA) using historical and ethnographic methods. This piece presents more salient aspects of my on-going research in SA. I use Diepsloot, a township north of Johannesburg, as my ethnographic site and entry point. The government established Diepsloot as a transition camp in 1995 for black South Africans and immigrants. From approximately 15,000 in the 1990s, its population had reached approximately 350,000 by 2016. Its economy is built around small business with some people employed in other sectors of the economy (Harper 2011; Mahajan 2014). In immigrants' hubs such as Diepsloot, Sunnyside (Tshwane), and others, mobile money flourishes. In Diepsloot, individual stand-alone agents are predominately Zimbabweans connected to *Mukuru* and *Ecocash* mobile money corporations.

Mobile phones, people and finance in the 21st century

Ours is a digital world; and the African majority are inserting themselves through the mobile phone (Nyamnjoh and Brudvig 2016; Quadir 2013; Chiumbu 2012). The computer, internet connectivity, fixed landline and electricity remain an exclusive privilege of a few across the continent. The world's average internet access is 54.4%. Africa falls below average at approximately 35.2%.[3] The World Bank estimates that in sub-Saharan Africa, access to electricity only increased from 16% in 1990 to approximately 42.8% in 2016.[4]

In 1991, Finland developed the Global Systems for Mobiles (GSM) as a platform for universal mobile networks. In Africa, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) rolled out the system between 1998 and 2003 within a context of exclusive communication technologies and infrastructure (Agar 2013). Due to this, mobile phone networks grew by 5,000%, and by 2010, there were "more mobile phone subscribers than there were people …" in SA (ibid.: 67). By 2011, there were 445.6 million mobile phone users in the Middle East and Africa. In both regions, the statistics had reached approximately 745.1 million in 2018.[5] Agar argues that: "No longer [is a mobile phone] a status symbol – signifying privilege in the 1950s or wealth in the 1980s – but instead the universal accompaniment of young and old alike …" (2013:53). Nyamnjoh and Brudvig validate this point stating:

> ICTs have fundamentally changed the methods and extent to which mobile Africans and migrants across Africa sustain and extend social network, providing the grounds for greater autonomy of choice and action in navigating social exclusion, economic hardship and political marginalisation (2016:1).

Clearly, the mobile phone is a game changer in Africa. Its relevance continues to increase as it melts together the telecoms, financial corporations and non-financial actors into the movement of money within and across borders. They operate as 'mobile bank branches' that require less

costs, labour and infrastructure than conventional retail banking. Through miniaturisation, applications (Apps) and Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) sessions, people can transfer money, save, buy insurance and make payments.

State, Corporations and New Alliances

African countries attained independence after the Second World War within a shifting global economic paradigm. Prior to this, the global economic system was designed around self-regulating markets, the gold standard, the liberal state and the balance of power in the west (Polanyi 1944; Hart and Hann 2009). The system collapsed disastrously leading to the First and Second World Wars. The survival of the liberal economy under the stewardship of the United States, and the results of the post-war economic boom of the 1950s and 60s was achieved through a Keynesian combination of world markets and political control of the economy by leading industrial nations (Hart and Hann 2009: 4-8). Other countries of the 'east' opted for the socialist economy under the leadership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Accordingly, the state, summed as the developmental state, became the engine of economic development.

In the 1970s, the global economic boom of the post-WWII reconstruction years came to an end with ruinous effects on developing economies. From then on, the focus was more on rolling back the state to allow for a greater role to free enterprise dominated by corporations. As many developing countries were experiencing severe poverty in the 1980s, interest in business and the role of innovation, as the engine for development, was also renewed world-wide. This shift began in England and the US when United Kingdom's Prime Minister Margret Thatcher (1979-1990) and US President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), pushed for deregulation of their economies marking the second experimentation with neoliberalism. The 2008 crisis taught us that we cannot solely depend on the 'market'; we must no longer choose between the market and the state; capitalism (self-interest) or socialism (mutuality). Socialist experimentations exaggerated sharing while the neoliberal ethic, *homo economicus*, emphasised individualistic profit maximisation (Hart 2010: 1). Economies and economic motivations are plural; so is money and the institutions that it passes through (Maurer 2015; Laville 2010).

As an innovation, mobile money was made possible by several unconventional alliances. Traditionally, banks and selected corporations were uncontested financial actors; today, the telecoms and retailer have become significant actors allowing people to manage their finances. Financed by banks in respective countries, mobile money corporations set up a 'float' or 'trust account' connected to a network of agents that ranges from individual entrepreneurs to retail chain stores.[6] Through this system, money moves across as data that will be converted to cash on the receipt side. The easy flow of money across borders is facilitated through a complex set of systems and networks of various actors in the new financial 'eco-system', as Oranye aptly observes:

> If you look at South Africa, the reality is that not one person can fulfil everything … We, (banks), must work with everybody. Otherwise, how would banks service those customers? And, how would [mobile money companies] be able to provide financial services? You can't. It's not either, or. It's a symbiotic relationship … Just because banks aren't [that visible] in the mobile money space doesn't mean they are not part of the eco-system. Banks have always been there. You can't operate a mobile money service independent of banks.[7]

The 2015 FIC Act concessions

In attempts to emulate Kenya, Vodacom in SA launched *M-pesa* in partnership with Nedbank in August 2010 promising to sign 10 million subscribers within three years.[8] Around mid-2011, it had only registered approximately 100 000 users. The Vodacom Group's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at the time, Pieter Uys, admitted that *M-pesa* was struggling mainly because "SA is a little different to Kenya and Tanzania … The banking sector is much more developed."[9] In 2014, Vodacom revamped *M-pesa* with backing from Bidvest and Visa. They signed approximately 8000 individual agents around the country, improved self-service functionalities, introduced a voucher system to upload cash, and issued Visa Cards which had access to roughly 27 000 Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) and over 240 000 merchant outlets across the country.[10]

In November 2012, Mobile Telephone Network (MTN) launched *MTN Mobile Money* in partnership with 'take your money everywhere' or TYME Capital. It is a SA-based *FinTech* company which designs, builds and operates digital banking ecosystems.[11] TYME was established in June 2012 as one of the outcomes of the Deloitte

Consulting project funded by MTN. The project was aimed at finding innovative ways to transform the SA banking economy through mobile technologies. *Pick'nPay*, a retail chain store became its merchant outlet. It subsequently acquired *Boxer Superstores* to extend services to the people in the townships, areas predominantly created for the 'black' people during the apartheid period. For its part, *Pick'nPay* was attempting to compete effectively with Shoprite's popular *Money Market*. *MTN Mobile Money* took off impressively. From zero in 2012, Johannesburg had reached approximately two million subscribers within three years;[12] however, it suffered a similar fate to *M-pesa*. Vodacom pulled the plug on *M-pesa* in July 2016, and MTN on *MTN Mobile Money* in September 2017.[13]

Popular commentary, reflected in Mr Uys statement above, attributes the collapse of *M-pesa* and *MTN Mobile Money* to SA's robust banking sector. While that played a role, such an analysis is parochially nationalistic and excluded multitudes of immigrants in SA. With both mobile money products, potential subscribers had to be above 16 years of age, be a SA citizen, owned a mobile phone with a registered Subscriber Identification Module (SIM) card through the RICA process – the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act, which enforces all people in South Africa to register their mobile phone number using their proof of identity and residency.

In 2015, the government amended the 2001 Financial and Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) in line with the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) international efforts to combat money laundering, illicit money flows and to enhance transitional cooperation on information exchange.[14] The amendments pulled in migrants by relaxing money transfer requirements while increasing controls on possible illicit flows of money. The law made several restrictions on the amounts of money that a mobile money account can hold per month and how much money can be transferred or be used per day, and per month.[15]

The concessions paved a way for the creation of various mobile money brokering companies such as *Mukuru*, *MamaMoney*, *MoavaMoney*, *HelloPaisa*, *Eco-cash*, and others, to facilitate cross-border and domestic transfers of money.[16] Through the concessions, the state basically turned a blind eye on the legality and status of immigrants in SA; it prioritised corporate interests, revenue creation, population surveillance and data-mining. Through the FIC Act, mobile money companies are required to report periodic flows of money to the Reserve Bank, and make sure that they track any suspicious or illicit flows of money.

Therefore, evidence provided above also demonstrates that immigrants catalysed the development of mobile money in SA. And, through the FICA concessions, the state looked beyond the narrow economic nation-state paradigms to embrace wider transnational mobilities and flows of money. SA's modern economy emerged as a regional and global complex; and retains such a character. The discovery of minerals in southern Africa and the subsequent colonisation of the region asymmetrically pulled the 'black' Africans into the global capitalist economy from the latter years of the nineteenth century. The proletarianization process was set into a self-propelling mode by historical preconditions of conquest, subjugation, dispossession, violence, dominance and dismantling of Africans' pre-colonial autonomy (Feinstein 2005). Europeans' myths of racial supremacy justified exploitation, inhumane treatments of Africans and subsequent implementation of segregationist policies and laws that grouped 'blacks' in what came to be known as the homelands and townships (Wolpe 1972; Rodney 1973; Murray 1981).

From the late 1970s and 1980s, the regional mining complex began to decline and reached its lowest ebb in the 1990s. Retrenchment rates increased significantly as the newly independent SA government also prioritised its citizens. The implementation of the National Identity (ID) system, stringent immigration laws and RICA, following 1994 played a significant role towards this end. Despite these restrictions and controls, more immigrants flocked into SA in search of better opportunities and refuge, some doing so in contravention to state-defined legalities.

Conclusion

Using the case of mobile money in SA, this paper utilised the human economy approach to explore what people do as they selectively partner with big and impersonal entities to advance their economic interests. The mobile phone is indispensable to these new formations. Due to an array of factors, mobile money emerged in SA. Central to the development of mobile money in SA was the government's amendment of the 2001 FIC Act in 2015. The concessions that came with the revision of the act enabled immigrants to register with mobile money corporations to remit despite stringent state-defined forms of legalities.

The concessions were a great leveller of the tensions between politics that are often trapped in locality, while money and disgruntled people in conflict-ridden countries in the region, observe no colonial boundary. Less constrained movements of people, money and goods across the continent are pertinent to economic survival and advancement. What may appear as an internal contradiction in the revision of the FIC Act illuminates the typically concealed forms of bureaucratic behaviour and functionality, on the one hand, and the influences of dominant political and economic interest groups, on the other. The pragmatic interplay of these two categories does not observe the binary rhetoric of legality and illegality, formality and informality, personality and impersonality in civil procedures.

Notes

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The African Mining Vision: Imagining and Realizing New Futures from Africa's Mineral Wealth

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Introduction

The abundance of natural resources in Africa has been widely acknowledged (Yager, Bermúdez-Lugo, Mobbs, Newman, Taib and Wilburn, 2012). However, in many parts of the continent, while the minerals sector has contributed significantly to their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and exports, its benefits have not been distributed equitably to the population. Citing the experience of the Nordic countries, the Economic Commision for Africa (henceforth, ECA) argues that Africa's vast mineral resources can play a transformative role in the continent's development and argues that resource-based industrialisation is possible (ECA, 2011: xviii).

There is a persistent paradox that is evident in some countries which are renowned for the mineral reserves and yet are among the poorest performers in terms of human development. Notwithstanding some of the limitations of measures such as the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), these indicators can be used to demonstrate the anomaly. Evidence from the African Human Development Report of 2016 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2016), indicates that many of the mineral rich economies are performing poorly in terms of social and economic development.

For example, although countries such as Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, Zambia and Ghana, are well endowed with minerals (notably, diamonds, gold and copper) and are categorized in the Medium Human Development group of countries, their performance in terms of the IHDI are low (on average, between 0.3 and 0.43) even though their HDI is above 0.5. Zimbabwe is known to have large deposits of Platinum Group Metals (PGM) and diamonds but in 2016, it registered an IHDI of 0.38. Despite their vast diamond resources, the Congo Democratic Republic and Sierra Leone, had an IHDI of below 0.3. Although these are but a few examples, they illustrate *the urgency for a new vision and governance culture* towards the utilisation of the continent's mineral wealth.

Mining has also been associated with environmental damage, unjust and unfair terms for compensation and relocation of communities living in mining areas.

In response to this developmental failure, the African Union (AU) introduced the African Mining Vision (henceforth AMV) in order to assist countries to better utilise their mineral resources for inclusive and sustainable development. The fundamental question is that, given the continent's past failures, what will it take for countries to create new futures out of their vast mineral endowments?

Explaining the failure

Darimani (2009:13) blames weak African governments for the failure to translate mineral wealth into social, economic and human development. He argues that:

> …African governments have consistently made rules and policies that strongly favour the profitability of mining companies, with very limited attention to fundamental questions of equity, diversity, human rights, and ecological protection. Decisions are made or framed and operated essentially on a set of values that place corporate profits at the top of a hierarchy, and does not take into account crucial social, human rights and ecological norms.

Radical critics attribute the failure to the unequal power relations between capital and weak governance and institutions. Rugumamu (2005), cites Africa's 'perverse integration into the global capitalist system' as the root cause of the problem. He argues that "encounters between *structurally unequal economies*, *societies and institutions* have continuously shaped the continent's past and contemporary plight of exploitation". This view is also echoed by Bush (2017:1) in an interview with Amin. In that conversation, he explains how for Amin, the challenges facing Africa today reflect a historically-rooted and ongoing process of imperialist exploitation and plunder of the continent's resources.

The essence of these arguments is that political domination of African economies in the era of globalization is likely to perpetuate the exploitation and plunder of the continent's natural wealth, unless countries can find effective ways to reverse that historical pattern.

Harnessing Africa's mineral resources for new African futures

African Heads of State adopted the AMV in 2009. The vision is a 'transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of mineral resources to underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socio-economic development'. Its central objective is to integrate the minerals sector into broader socio-economic development and to create a win-win outcome for all stakeholders (ECA, 2011: xviii).

The big question is how the AMV can facilitate the creation of new futures based on the minerals sector. Samir Amin offers an alternative solution through what he terms as a 'delinking' strategy. This is a strategy which entails 'the subordination of external relations to the logic of internal development'…

> The challenge here is to establish, from existing struggles for social justice, the difference between 'reformist reforms' and change that advances a 'non-reformist' agenda. The latter would include generous social policies stressing decommodification, capital controls and inward-oriented industrialisation strategies allowing democratic control of finance and production…. (Goldiner, 2011).

'Delinking', however, poses a big challenge because of Africa's deficit in technology, specialist skills and the requisite capital that mineral exploration and extraction requires. This makes it necessary for countries to negotiate with investors who have such resources. To avoid the failures of the past, there is a need to negotiate agreements that ensure that optimal benefits from the mineral sector accrue to African people. An encouraging development is the government of Tanzania which has announced that it was going to renegotiate all its mining and energy agreements (Investment news, 2017) in order to ensure more benefit to its population. Following the argument by Amin as cited above, countries will have to avoid embarking on 'reformist reforms', that is, those that maintain the status quo. Rather, they should aim to advance 'non-reformist' type changes that fundamentally transform the power relations between investors and themselves. Achieving such a goal requires strengthening the capacity of African states to exert their autonomy and control over their mineral resources. A *'new generation'* of mining agreements must integrate more effectively, social and equity perspectives that guarantee greater benefits to the population. This requires an improvement in state capacity to *manage* the mineral sector in a transparent, accountable and efficient manner. Management in this case should not be interpreted to mean re-introduction of state-owned enterprises in the sector. Rather, it refers to institutional, policy and strategic frameworks that enable African countries to 'set the agenda' in terms of, for example, drafting legislative or regulatory mining frameworks that best protect and advance the interests of their people in the entire mineral value chain, from exploration, extraction and benefication. This is key for an inclusive and sustainable mineral sector.

Of central importance must be a shift from the dominant commodity production and export model towards more beneficiation/value addition. The AMV provides extensive proposals on how this can be achieved. African countries should seriously consider taking up the proposals that the vision has to offer and commit towards its implementation.

Conclusion and recommendations

The successful implementation of the AMV in creating new futures based on harnessing mineral resources will critically depend on some fundamental interventions by countries. Firstly, the building of a new generation of mineral governance frameworks and systems that enable African

countries to exert greater control and influence in the design or negotiation of mineral agreements. Secondly, the building and/or strengthening of the capacity of governments and other relevant actors within countries, to negotiate agreements on mineral resources that guarantee a more just and equitable distribution of benefits between host countries and investors, whether domestic or foreign. Thirdly, it also requires the establishment of more transparent and accountable systems, where governments have efficient mechanisms for the collection and utilization of mineral revenues for the benefit of national development. *Ultimately, it is about creating new forms of mineral governance that are characterized by accountability, transparency, ethical conduct and professionalism*. Since mining is largely a technology and capital intensive enterprise, it should be useful for countries to explore opportunities for partnerships in the context of South-South and South-North cooperation provided those partnerships are based on terms that advance African developmental goals.

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Cybersecurity in Africa: Understanding the Implications of the New Cyber-environment

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Introduction

The past 25 years have seen rapid globalization and major changes in the world; the Berlin Wall fell, Communism fell, and the Cold War ended; the USSR disintegrated, and challenges to state unity heightened. Globalization has facilitated rapid inter-connectedness, but with it, deterritorialization and decreased government control, since physical boundaries have diminished in utility. The internet, smartphones and apps have made communication instantaneous and more re-spatialized, further eroding government control. Overall, Information Technology (IT) is improving the lives of billions around the world and especially in Africa. It fosters greater information access, simplified communication, market information, medication access, easier banking etc. However, it has brought new challenges as governments attempt to cut off wholesale access to internet and information (e.g., DRC and Republic of Congo in 2015 and 2016). Government capacity to control and re/direct information to its advantage, or control their citizens' re/actions gets challenged, although provision of public and

administrative citizen services has improved. Further, the relationship between citizen and government has changed and expanded, as has the need for government responsiveness.

For Africa, IT has been a double-edged sword: more people are more connected, easily overcoming infrastructural challenges and using connectivity for everyday purposes. On the other hand, Africa suffers from insufficient physical IT infrastructure – fiber and data networks, net security, physical control of data, legislative and regulatory frameworks. Internet management policies and practices: security, cyber-security, data storage and internet governance have left Africa at the mercy of Western countries and corporations. These own and manage much of the infrastructure, content and proprietary rights to IT products and services used by African governments and their citizens. There is often insufficient, poor and often non-existent legal frameworks, coupled limited technical and technological expertise, meager data security, and critical data and servers often located abroad. The net effect of this is further challenges government control and more broadly, state sovereignty. Countries are left with no recourse in exposure to data breaches, hacks and loss of trade and proprietary information and criminal attacks. The goal of this brief research is to examine the opportunities and challenges procured by internet and information networks in Africa. It focuses on the cumulative effects that the cyber-environment has had on African countries, their governments and citizens, and the implications of dependency on national security, political, social and economic development.

Africa: A (Dis)connected Latecomer to the Cyber- environment

Statistics on Africa's level of connectedness to the global information super-highway show challenge and opportunity for diverse countries. Distribution of world Internet Users by regions in the second quarter of 2014 showed Africa lagging behind the rest of the world with an average 9.8 per cent connectivity rate, or 300 million internet users (World Internet Users 2014). Herein lies a paradox: while fixed landlines, satellite and fiber-optic cable connectivity is marginal, many Africans access the internet through their (smart) mobile phones. Unlike most western countries, Africa's telephony, fiber optic and satellite internet connection infrastructure is in its infancy. For example, the Communications Corporation of Kenya (CCK), in its 3rd Strategic Plan for the 2013/2018 period, launched on 29th November 2013, noted that "the telephony market segment continues to decline as the number of fixed lines dropped from 331,718 in 2002 to 262,761 in 2012" (2013: 14). Internet connectivity often uses the same phone infrastructure. Most houses are rarely built wired for connectivity, non-permanent residential dwellings further challenge installation of necessary infrastructure.

These constraints lead to higher levels of adaptation and use of alternative technologies including cyber-cafes and mobile phones. More than anywhere else except perhaps in Asia, information, communication and technology functions have led to some of the most rapid, highest levels of internet connectivity through mobile phones, with primarily pre-paid mobile phone subscription increasing from 87 million connected devices in 2005 million connected devices, while in 2018, there were "3.7 billion unique users" (Statista, 2018). In terms of internet access, "as of February 2017, mobile devices accounted for 49.7 percent of web page views worldwide" (Statista 2018). Rather interestingly, the highest percentage of the mobile internet traffic as a percentage of all web browsing, as of January 2018 came from devices in Kenya (83%) followed by Nigeria (81%), and the decidedly more populous India third (79%) (Statista, 2018). Internet connection through mobile phones have been rapid due to the minimal physical infrastructure that users require for connections, i.e. mobile phones.

Africa: Next frontier for Innovation?

Africa has been a harbinger of rather unique challenges, borne out of her history. Her internal developments during the age of exploration and empire-building for Europeans infused local technologies with those out of Africa. Encounters with the West changed social, political and economic systems, including communication; her colonization and subsequent independence continue to be influenced by the west. Challenges such as the lack of extensive physical infrastructure are a result of colonization and evident at independence. For example, at independence, there were "242 miles of bituminized roads in all of Malawi in 1964" (Kalinga 2012: 482); "at the time of independence [...] road mileage of Tanganyika was '20,464'" (*Africa Journal* 1972: 45), and "4,688 motor miles" in the Gold Coast (Bourret 1960: 30; Nungent 2004). The dearth of technical capacity

and trained professionals was similar: "in 1949, Kenya had only fifteen trained African doctors" (Baronov 2008: 118); the DRC had one trained doctor. Overcoming infrastructural challenges is ongoing, but reinventing the wheel is unnecessary. Rather than invest in fixed telephony in vast, rural areas, it is prudent to adopt technologies such as solar powered mobile phones and other appropriate, Africa-specific technologies.

Accelerating globalization has been a major factor in Africa's present and future. Despite limits of infrastructure and web connectivity, especially the speed and depth, African countries have quickly adopted different IT-based technologies to conditions peculiar to Africa. The adaptation and adoption have facilitated development of other newer technologies whose utility is specific to conditions in Africa and the Global South. Such products include Ushahidi, a crowd-mapping platform (Okolloh, 2009). Perhaps the best-known innovative hybrid product is Kenya's Mobile Money Platform, M-Pesa (launched by Safaricom in 2007). M-Pesa leverages mobile phones, banking services and triumph over sparse infrastructure to revolutionize access to financial services (Jack & Suri 2011). Such innovations have demonstrated possibilities that adopting newer technologies can portend, recalibrating societal, business, financial and physical infrastructure.

Yet, even as technology opens new pathways to socio-economic development, there are gaps – challenges even, in the integration of technology and legislation. For example, with the expansion of mobile money transfers, there is increased need for 'legislative and regulatory frameworks geared towards the increasing adoption and use of mobile money' (Nyaga 2014:270). This has become one of the major legislative prerogatives of the East African Community (EAC) members. Given that the regional association aims for economic and eventual political association and later integration, it is critical to harmonize legislation that governs ICT and its applications, policies and practices in the region, while taking into account regional challenges such as Somalia's violent non-state actor group, and the uses to which the group could put such facilities as money transfer.

Africa: New Applications for Technology

Kenya's M-Pesa has been an innovative application to technology, leading to a snowball effect: Safaricom (the parent company and proprietor of M-Pesa) recorded 4.1 billion transactions in 2015, worth Kshs. 15 billion per day and a total of Kshs. 5.1 trillion (equivalent of US$ 51 billion in 2018 exchange rates), with a total of 21 million customers (Ondieki, 2016). It has also led to a ripple effect in increasing the numbers of individuals accessing formal financial markets, since banks are also rushing to offer mobile money services where individuals can withdraw, deposit and easily transfer funds between family, friends, businesses and bank accounts, including doing business with the government through the e-government portal, e-Citizen (Ondieki 2016).

Everywhere in Africa, as Wall (2014) highlights, the application of mobile phone technologies (smartphones running apps), have led to recalibration of social, economic and even the management of pathologies and treatment. Some Africa-specific applications have included robot cops monitoring traffic in Kinshasa in the Demo-cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), smartphones transmitting images for quick medical diagnosis, particularly from remote areas, medication reminders and mobile payment systems making access to cash easy and instantaneous, yet secure. Other applications include seed accelerator and investment fund apps (Dropifi), cloud computing (angani) and south Africa's mellowcabs (electric Pedi-cabs) (Tech Republic 2015).

These changes have also portended greater access to and use of information, potentially altering the landscape of life in African countries. The implications surpass finances and health; in terms of improving democracy, access to information has provided new possibilities. Real-time information facilitates citizens holding government and officials accountable, promotes a level of transparency that can expose bad governance, corruption and unacceptable political behaviors persistent in government. Such scrutiny can rework the relationship between the state and its publics. Information access also allows citizens to make better, informed choices about the type of government they will elect.

Information: Access and Challenges to Governance

Access to information has the potential to significantly impact government and restructure politics and government/governance in the African context. Dahl, in his 1971 expanded criteria for democracy explicated in a table titled *Some Requirements for a Democracy*

among a Large Number of People, identifies 'alternative sources of information' as a key variable in all the three major criteria: formulating preferences, signifying preferences and having their preferences weighted equally in the conduct of government (1972: 3). Yet, for a continent with countries ethnically divided, access to information without some level of regulation and control, within the limits of free speech, can cause ethnically-driven conflict (e.g. 1994 Rwanda massacre).

IT outcomes such as globalization has been accompanied by parallel challenges: state fragility and state failure began with the explosion of the ICT revolution. In Africa, starting with Somalia in 1990, followed by Libya, Egypt (to some extent), DRC, Republic of Congo, now South Sudan, among others, the Weberian concept and function of the state has been challenged time and again, undercutting its functions; in Africa this produced new ungoverned spaces that attract terrorists, pirates and other violent non-state actors (Clunan & Trinkunas 2010). These ungoverned spaces have led to the rise of violent transnational actors with criminal agendas including piracy, terrorism and drug trafficking. These actors have leveraged the very functions and benefits of ICT – e.g. use of satellite phones by Somali pirates to demand ransom for hijacked ships – to lead to the growth of instability, and recruitment of terrorists. Terrorist activity has affected other neighboring states as was demonstrated by recent terrorist attacks by the Al-Shabaab terrorist group in Kenya and in Uganda (Anderson & McKnight, 2015).

Globalization has had an impact in changing the landscape of ICT globally, facilitating both positive and negative outcomes through transnational communication, transport and other aspects. Is the African state ready to confront the challenges, going forward, as the world becomes more globalized? How well prepared African countries are to deal with particularly changes and challenges to the state, which are often supported by unregulated violent non-state actors? How will the African state, still in its relative infancy, be affected by and transformed by ICT especially from the diffusion of authority?

ICT and the State: Conceptualizing Changes

The invention and miniaturization of the personal computer, coupled with communication facilitated by the internet, has changed many traditional concepts that defined and interacted with the state in its post-Westphalian history. Since the 1990s, even as the world changed, interactional terms such as security changed have reflected the cyber frontier – from security to cybersecurity, sovereignty to cyber-sovereignty. Some concepts have become more important even as they transform and adapt to the application of the computer networks to the state. Governance has been transformed and influenced into cyber-governance, one that contributes to global governance. Government has changed into cyber-government, where citizen services can be widely accessed on the internet, gradually diminishing citizens' direct interaction with bureaucrats, closing off avenues for corruption, endemic in large swathes of African countries (Magu, 2018).

Sovereignty traditionally implied control over space and a country's activities inside borders; today it has changed and is less about physical space and more about global shared norms. Citizens are increasingly considering themselves sovereign in the cyber and physical space, with allegiance permeating to cyber-citizenship rather than traditional states. States are challenged; the linear, top-to-bottom information models no longer suffice. States must be more responsive or face an Arab Spring.

Access to information has also altered relationships between individuals and governments and governance, especially globalizing governance. The recent hunting/killing of "Cecil", the lion by an American dentist, Walter James Palmer in July 2015 in Zimbabwe's Hwanghe National Park and the ensuing controversy illustrates the changing concepts of norms, of global governance, in this case wildlife preservation (Howard 2015). The more recent picture that went viral, of a Alan Kurdi lying dead on a beach sparked global *angst*, prompting individuals to become more involved in pressuring governments to act (Fehrenbach & Rodogno 2015). Citizens are increasingly becoming more global, and individual space is now a shared digital global space. The role of ICT on altering governments during the Arab Spring in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, and nearly Syria – per the Dahl criteria of citizens altering governments, demonstrates the power of ICT to propel challenges to the state, blending versions of digital citizenry, cyberdemocracy and cyber-governance with influence on traditional ideas and exercise of power.

A Review of the African State

Most African countries have the dubious distinction of coming into existence as a colonial project. Few of them existed in their current

shape/form before the 1960's, when they gained independence. Even at independence, they faced challenges alien to European and other countries, including pressures exerted by a combination of internal factors: ethnic division, poor infrastructure, underdevelopment, lack of trained manpower, poverty, ignorance, disease, and residual European control and a Cold War (Opondo 2018).

Godfrey Mwakikagile, renowned Tanzanian scholar, finds that some African leaders actively sabotaged the process of nation-building in their own, neighboring and continent-wide states. 'Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda of Malawi […] refused to attend OAU meetings because he saw them as useless' (2009:90) while 'Houphouet-Boigny...refused to attend meetings of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) claiming that he was afraid of flying' (2009:90) but flew annually to France. When newly independent Guinea opted out of the French Community, with Ivory Coast's leader Houphouet-Boigny's urging, "the French burned government files, severed communication links to the outside world and within the country itself, and cleaned out the treasury before leaving Guinea" (2006:91).

In their early independence years, African governments moved to consolidate nationhood, entrench central government rule and pursue socio-economic development. Over time, these unique pressures, compounded by newer challenges e.g. financing socio-economic development and infrastructure, trade and integration into the global markets, and their status as peripheral (as opposed to core) economies, continued to put pressure on the state. Most African countries rapidly moved in authoritarian directions with the spectrum of one party rule: from military rule to dictatorship. By 1990, only three African countries were classified as democracies: Senegal, Botswana and Gambia; others were facing unrelenting calls for multi-party democracy or low-to-high intensity conflicts (Magu 2016).

The end of the Cold War that also saw the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the hegemonic wars between the US and the USSR. Since there was one hegemon, the call for economic and governmental reforms intensified, backed by the US, its partners and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as conditions for aiding African countries. At the same time, in authoritarian states, the clamor for political reforms often led to governmental collapse, leading to fragile, failing and failed states such as Somalia (Source?).

Some of these conflicts have simmered long: Rotberg writes that "in 2013, hot conflicts of greater danger persist: in the eastern districts of the DRC; in Darfur and in two other southern provinces of the Sudan; in South Sudan... in Mauritania (against al-Qaeda of the Maghreb) ... in Mali... in Southern Somalia... across much of Nigeria from Boko Haram, the Movement to Emancipate the Niger Delta (MEND), and a host of others" (2013: 69). Prospects exist for socio-economic development, poverty eradication and transition from low to middle-income countries as Kenya has progressively done. Yet there remains perennial danger of descending into conflict. Rotberg argues that;

> anywhere an African polity does not fulfil the functions of a modern nation-state and discriminates against some of its own people; anywhere African leaders look after themselves, their lineages, and their kin rather than their entire citizenry; anywhere leaders appear to steal from their people; anywhere in Africa that is consumed by flamboyant corruption and criminality; anywhere in Africa dominated by greed without a social conscience; and anywhere lacking strong separation of powers and rule of law, plus a military subordinate to civilians - any of these locales is at prime risk of a countervailing popular reaction and cataclysmic civil conflict (2013:70).

Even with challenges faced by African countries in their short history, prospects for fulfilling the state's founding purpose, even with the expanded aims, abounds. Over time, there has emerged a "highly complex environment in which state action takes place" (Wegrich and Lodge 2014:283). Further, states by themselves cannot solve existing – and more novel – problems; states often play catch-up to markets and emerging international situations and actors. "The contemporary setting of governing makes hierarchical intervention ever more problematic as states increasingly rely on co-governing and internationalisation, such co-governing is not new, and administration has always been reliant on the acceptance of authority by citizens, firms, and other societal organizations" (Wegrich and Lodge 2014:283). Necessarily, African states, joining the global society only since the 1950s, have to adapt to these changes that continuously define them.

Non-State Actors (NSAs)

Since the dawn of human society and especially organization into states, a multiplicity of actors is

the norm. Reinalda 'recognizes three types of non-state actors: non-governmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and transnational corporations (TNCs)' (2011). Neubert articulates the same three primary classes of non-state actors, but identifies 'local, neo-traditional actors (who) combine elements of self-organisation ... with elements of a local level of authority, which may be in lieu of some state functions on this level. They may even draw their legitimacy from official or semi- official functions delegated by the state. [...] Most of these actors are restricted to a local or sub-national level. Additionally, all of them are somehow located outside the formal institutions of a modern liberal democracy' (2009: 41). The multiplicity of traditional actors was no less evident in Africa; at the end of the Cold War, a newly assertive non-state actor was beginning to come into focus.

Thomas, Kiser and Casebeer reco-gnize the newer category of non-state actor: one that contests legitimate authority in the state, i.e. the 'violent non-state actor' (VNSA). The VNSA's non-traditional arsenal involves 'donkey carts laden with rocket-propelled grenades, teenage girls wrapped in nails and explosives, and civilian airlines filled with fuel and travelers: these are the weapons found in the arsenal of today's most ubiquitous adversary - the violent non-state actor (VNSA)' (2005:2). In African countries, the increase in contestation of state authority often turns the neo-traditional actor into an instrument of the violent, non-state actor, for example, a militia group, based on their allegiance to and membership of the particular sub-national unit of the state.

While most non-state actors are pacific and make positive impacts – from providing 'public goods' that states are unable or unwilling to provide, to leveraging capacity and resources to meet various social and economic developmental needs, violent non-state actors generally do not. Non-state actors have increasingly adopted technology in order to further their activities, sometimes in support of, but more often in opposition to the state. Corrales and Westhoff argue that 'technology adoption depends on the characteristics of both the technology in question and the adopting unit. Regarding the former, the key factor is the content/utility of the technology, that is, whether the technology satisfies a particular need of the potential adopters (at the societal level) or the promoter (at the state level)' (2006:913). Thus, some technologies are easier for the state to control (e.g. TV), and others more difficult (the internet); as such, non-state actors seeking to cause subterfuge to the state are more likely to select this avenue to further their agenda.

Violent, non-state actors have evolved in their purposes and methods, just as technology has made quantum leaps. Baylis, Smith and Owens chronicle the evolution and use by the violent non-state actors (terrorists) of 'readily available means to permit small numbers of individuals to spread fear as widely as possible' (2014:360). Violent methods have adapted from assassinations and bombings, to more sophisticated tools and methods. Among factors increasing transnational terrorism was 'the expansion of commercial travel, the availability of televised news coverage, and broad political and ideological interests among extremists that intersected around a common cause' (2014:360). Eventually, these evolved to skyjackings, hijackings, mass-casualty events, including those discussed previously, such as the insurgency in Iraq after the US invasion in 2003.

One of the challenges to the modern state, especially its overall control – arises from NSAs, including Multi-National Companies (MNCs). MNCs are generally involved in economic development, Research and Development (R & D). Their activities especially in free-market economies, can fall outside of government purview, e.g. in developing new products. As independent entities, their activities, practices, research and information, for proprietary purposes, they can be secretive. They facilitate environments where:

> control of information of strategic significance may not be wholly in the hands of government. Many multinational corporations are involved both with research and development and with the production of critical components of weapons systems (computers for instance), and it is very difficult for governments of parent countries to be aware in sufficient detail of the operations of subsidiaries (Reynolds 1979:100).

Lack of governmental control and oversight often occurs due to economies of scale, requiring money-saving activities by outsourcing and offshoring of products and services. An example of breach of government data occurred as a result of the outsourcing of state bureaucratic functions to KeyPoint Government Solutions, a sub-contractor who was targeted in the June 2015 OPM data breach.

Still, the actions of MNCs are generally positive. However, non-state actors such as guerilla groups, splinter groups and terrorists are nefarious and seek to leverage the

use of systems and processes such as those developed by businesses to subvert the state. They rise for varied reasons 'such as the decline of governments' competence, the reduced level of satisfaction with or acceptance of value systems, the development of new loyalties across as well as within state frontiers, the availability or ease of manufacture of means of destruction, the swift global passage of information promoting emulative behaviour' (Reynolds 1979:100).

Africa has not been spared these VNSAs. From Boko Haram, which rather hypocritically suggests that western education is sin, but utilizes western education produced technology – such as YouTube – to post their messages, to Al-Shabaab, VNSAs are alive and well. The next section briefly looks at their challenges.

Non-State Actors and Cybercrime in Africa

While Africa remains one of the least technologically connected places – in terms of internet and telephone connectivity as discussed elsewhere in this research, Cassim (2011) notes that 'cybercrime is thriving on the African continent' in part due to 'lack of IT knowledge by the public and the absence of suitable legal frameworks to deal with cybercrime at national and regional levels' (2011). Cassim singles out South Africa, Botswana, Kenya, Uganda and Cameroon as having taken the lead in the introduction of cyber-legislation and developing partnerships to combat cyber-crime (2011).

On the criminal front, violent non-state actors such as the Al-Shabaab group, Nigeria's Boko Haram and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) have become adept at utilizing IT resources – including, for example, Facebook, twitter and YouTube to not only recruit, but also for propaganda purposes, such as posting videos of terrorist activity. The freedom of internet access renders it difficult, if not impossible, to control posting and access to such content and activity. In the absence of stringent control to access to information, such non-state actors are likely to continue challenging existing governments, using ICT to subvert government and coordinate terrorist attacks.

At a time when countries are moving to enact legislation that provides them with more resources to combat non-state actors who are using ICT avenues to recruit, coordinate and execute cybercrime and other crimes, the clamor for 'network neutrality, against surveillance legislation' (Hintz 2012:132) have gained traction. Perhaps this is a push against ongoing efforts for example in Canada, where 'lawful access' would allow law enforcement and state agencies to intercept and monitor online communication without judicial oversight' (2012:132); some of these practices are already ongoing in some countries, such as the United States.

Rethinking the Future

Globalization and its attendant consequences – or the end-products of globalization – have brooked significant changes not only in states, but in the relationships between states, states and their citizens, and individuals and other individuals within the state. Some of these changes have been positive and portend the promise for infrastructural development that can lead to social and economic development, better governance, a higher quality of democracy and better overall outcomes for their citizens. Notably, African countries have begun leading the efforts to solve their problem by focusing technology on confronting the challenges unique to them.

Of concern is the gap between the levels of understanding the new cyber-environment. be it cyber-security, cyber-governance, cyber-sovereignty, cyber-democracy and e-governance. As is the case in other countries in the world, the cyber-environment can be a veritable new frontier in inter-state conflicts; it can embarrass governments, compromise its functionaries and its systems, e.g. the allegations of Russian hacking of US elections in 2016, or the SONY hacking, the stealing of data from the US Government (SF86 security forms, Office of Personnel Management). Individuals, governments and private industry have much to be concerned about regarding privacy, and need to be proactive, rather than reactive, to confront possible future threats to their citizens, systems and infrastructure.

African countries have been slow to develop mechanisms and responses to the potential emerging threats to the African state, especially on the electronic frontier. While the low levels of internet connectivity may be a boon to African countries, since less of their infrastructure is connected to the World Wide Web, there is the potential that the dangers confronting the western world will confront Africa, which is less prepared legislatively and technologically. Additionally, Africa needs to work within the continent and globally, to foster innovation peculiar to itself, but also responses to threats posed by the cyber environment, in conjunction with other countries and regions.

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Can Devolution Assist Marginalized Kenyan Communities to Adapt to Climate Change?

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Climate change is one of the defining challenges of our time, and affects all areas of human life and well-being. Climate extremes are expected to affect billions of people; especially those residing in arid and semi-arid lands (henceforth, ASALs) (IPCC 2014). For instance, patterns of warming temperatures, changes in precipitation, and the rise of sea level are likely to affect water supply and the quality of water (IPCC 2014). Other effects include concomitant shocks such as malnutrition, pests and diseases, conflict and death. It is often believed that people with resilient livelihoods are often those who are able to respond to climate change (Adger et al 2007; Abdullah et al 2009). In the same vein, it is expected that the poorest and most marginalized groups are being adversely affected by the impact of climate change (Adger et al 2007; Abdullah et al 2009). Kenya presents a case where marginalized communities are faced with climate change impacts. This is a sub-Saharan African country characterized by socio-economic inequalities with close to half its population living below the poverty line (Fosu, 2015; Ravallion, 2017; Njoya & Seetaram, 2018). Majority of the poor in Kenya reside in low income urban settlements and rural ASALs where social and economic opportunities are limited making these groups to be considered generally non-resilient. It is hypothesized in this paper that a generally resilient community is climate change resilient.

To address the challenge of climate change, mitigation and adaptation mechanisms have been proposed by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2015). Mitigation in this context involves limiting atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations to levels that avoid dangerous climate change. Adaptation entails the adjustment of human and natural systems to actual or expected climate stimuli or their effects (IPCC 2014). In the twenty-first century, there is an increasing realization that poverty is closely linked to development and environment (McGray *et al* 2007). The poverty-environment development discourse has been instrumental in changing global focus exclusively on mitigation to a more balanced approach that recognizes adaptation, especially as it regards developing countries. However, adaptation is situated within existing poverty levels and income inequalities among communities that experience adverse effects of climate change. Communities that have been generally marginalized in terms of access to resources are considered to be more vulnerable to effects of

climate change (Adger *et al* 2007; Abdullah *et al*, 2009). Majority of these people reside in urban slums and ASALs. Being unable to respond to different shocks might act as obstacles for communities in ASALs to address climate change adaptation today and in the future.

One of the steps taken to address regional inequalities in development has been to change the way of governing a nation. To work towards sustainable development, the normative position to which a vast number of countries and civil society groups subscribe to has been to involve citizens in making decisions and participating in management at the local level (Madzwamuse 2010). However, this position seems o be better articulated in theory than in practice. A more pragmatic and radical way of ensuring that all citizenry does not feel marginalized in terms of access to a country's wealth has been the entrenchment of devolved systems of governance in the legislative processes (Lowndes & Gardner, 2016). Governance in this context implies politics, sharing of rights and responsibilities, and setting objectives and the policy agenda in developing a nation.

Devolution has been termed as a form of governance reform; a system meant to bring citizens, local groups and organizations into the policy and decision-making process (Kettl 2000). It is intended under devolution that all regions (e.g. administrative, geographical and social components) of a nation are represented in the decision-making processes that affect their wellbeing economically, socially and politically. In spirit, devolution is a mechanism that is intended to reduce inequalities and marginalization (e.g. ethnic, geographic and gender etc) among citizens.

Following the challenges of a unitary centralized governance system in Kenya, for example, the nation entered into a new constitutional dispensation (G.O.K 2010) that was meant to be progressive. The new constitution has been termed 'progressive' because it contains sections dedicated to human rights, citizen participation and devolution that were perceived to be lacking prior to when it was promulgated in 2010. Devolution in the Kenyan context was meant to decentralize power and resources as a way of dealing with past economic injustices. It is agreed among writers (e.g Miguel & Gugerty, 2005; Kanyinga 2006; Kiringai 2006; Oucho 2007); and within public parlance that centralization of governance had led to sections of Kenya growing at unprecedented rates as compared to marginalized areas such ASALs that had been neglected since the time Kenya got her independence from the British rule in 1963. Hitherto year 2010, development across Kenya was determined by Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 (G.O.K 1965), which favored agriculturally productive areas such as the central highlands against other areas. These 'productive' areas received more funding for infrastructural development as compared to other regions like ASALs. Under devolution, communities in different regions would elect their own governor, manage monetary resources allocated to them by the central government and generally decide on the direction they needed to take to uplift the livelihood of their people. It is expected that communities in geographically challenged terrains such as ASALs will greatly benefit from devolution.

The nexus between development, poverty and climate change has been drawn and well-illustrated in recent literature. Many scholars agree that marginalized groups are the most vulnerable to the effects of climate change and climate variability (extremes) (Agrawala et al, 2003; Casillas & Kammen, 2010; Turner et al, 2015; Sanderson et al, 2016) . It has been argued that by reducing marginalization and empowering groups to be generally resilient to any form of shocks, resilience to climate change will be achieved by all communities (Yamin et al, 2005). In Kenya, for a long time, communities residing in ASALs have been perceived to be economically marginalized and excluded from many central government initiated projects (Eriksen 2005). However, since the advent of devolution in 2010, different regions in Kenya have been mandated by the constitution to participate in the management and governance of local economies through their elected county leaders. Albeit, devolution has been touted to be experiencing some teething problems such as corruption and underfunding, it is perceived among scholars and general public that decentralised system of governance can help to solve economic injustices and hence reduce poverty and marginalization among the citizenry (Kibua & Mwabu, 2008; Mwenda 2010; Omolo 2010).

Devolution in Kenya offers hope to formerly marginalized groups through decentralization of resources and decision-making on key sectors that affect livelihoods. This is because the spirit and letter of devolution as encapsulated in the constitution is to ensure inclusion of Kenyan citizenry in decision making process that affect their livelihoods at local, regional and national levels. Thus, in climate change adaptation, there is a need for policy-makers in devolved

units (counties) to improve existing interventions by extending support such as water access to the marginalized locals and integrating the immediate needs of the local communities in their adaptation plans. However, to ensure success of climate adaptation strategies among the vulnerable, efforts at the county level should be buttressed by goodwill of political players in the national arena.

This article resonates with concerns that have been raised towards the Paris Agreement reached on 12 December 2015 and adopted by all 196 parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Of particular concern was the extent to which the agreement would be implemented at both global and local levels in a manner that respects ´the principles of justice, fairness and equity`. The contribution of this article in this respect is to explore how governance can be looped into discourse on effective adaptation mechanisms by countries affected the most by climate change.

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Preventing Corruption through Rules Based and Value Based Approaches

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Introduction

The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC) defines corruption as solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly by a public official or any other person of any goods of monetary value or other benefit such as a gift, favour or advantage for himself or herself. Further AUCPCC indicates that this acceptance is considered corruption if it aims at exchanging commission or omission in the performance of his or her functions. Corruption remains a key challenge to governance worldwide. It continues to undermine the legitimacy of democratic governance and human development to the extent that some commentators now call for it to be declared a crime against humanity. The Global Competitiveness Report (2012) ranks corruption as the leading problematic factor when doing business in Kenya with a significant percentage of 21.2 per cent of the respondents who participated in the global competitiveness survey indicating this. Corruption lowers compliance with construction, environmental, or other regulations, reduces the quality of government services and infrastructure, and increases budgetary pressures on government.

Integrity and Anti-Corruption Initiatives

Given the overarching influence of corruption on public life, the global community has identified integrity as a central aspect of work behaviour that impacts on organizational efficiency and effectiveness. It is the absence of this attribute among public officials that breeds corruption and unethical conduct leading to lack of efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and transparency in the management of public affairs. Consequently for organizations to be effective and efficient, mechanisms for enhancing accountability and injecting integrity in the management of public affairs ought to be established. This includes mechanisms for ensuring that persons vested with leadership responsibilities at various levels of management uphold and maintain integrity in institutional operations. The requirement for integrity among public officials is premised on the understanding that integrity and ethics in the modern workplace are a product of the minds of the public officials and the policies and practices they establish and uphold. In this regard, public officials especially those in key state offices significantly influence their organizational culture as they set the ethical standards for service delivery. This is what is popularly known as "Tone at the Top" by people in top strategic positions characterized by huge budgetary allocations. Their corrupt and unethical practices negatively impact on the management of public affairs.

Various countries have developed and implemented initiatives aimed at preventing and combating corruption. These initiatives have had diverse results based on the effectiveness of their implementation. For instance, Denmark, Finland and Sweden have consistently been ranked among the top ten countries perceived to record low levels of corruption by Transparency International (TI). These countries are reported to have effective law enforcement strategies and strong national integrity systems. Additionally, there is public participation and strong political will in confronting corruption practices. The effective anti-corruption initiatives in Denmark could further be attributed to, among other factors, the implementation of legal and judicial reforms through the Justice Partnership Programme (2010-2015). This programme has produced a number of results including but not limited to enhancing judicial reforms, implementation of key judicial instruments, reorganizing and strengthening judicial organs, and establishing the Justice Initiatives Facilitation Fund (JIFF). Denmark's anti-corruption story is also attributed to high levels of press freedom, publicly available

data and an independent judiciary. Many countries in the world have used their Constitutions and other laws to provide mechanisms for entrenching integrity in the management of public affairs with the ultimate goal of minimizing corruption. Notable examples are Argentina and El Salvador in Latin America; in Europe, the former East Germany, Bosnia and Poland have legislated on integrity in public service while in Africa; laws have been enacted to provide ethics and integrity. Ghana included 'integrity in leadership' as a critical component during the adoption of its new constitution in 1992. This also happened in post-apartheid South Africa (Lynch, 2008). Enactment or amendment of laws to provide integrity for public officials is primarily aimed at ensuring that public affairs are managed efficiently, effectively, transparently and responsively. Such laws and regulations are geared towards compelling holders of public office not to engage in practices that breach the very public trust vested in them to efficiently manage public affairs for the benefit of all citizens.

The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) is an international convention that provides mechanisms that member states should implement to inculcate integrity in the management of public affairs. At the regional level, African states enacted the African Union Convention on Combating and Preventing Corruption (AUCCPC) that obligates states parties to entrench integrity in the management of public affairs. Kenya, for example is a signatory to these two conventions. States parties are required to domesticate these two conventions, which set standards and enact both their substantive and institutional frameworks for the war against corruption. Among them are independent institutions and strong anti-corruption law enforcement agencies. In 2010, Kenyans enacted a new Constitution to, among other things, transform governance by setting very high standards of integrity for holders of public office. Prior to the enactment of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, corruption had been institutionalized and internalized in the public service leading to poor service delivery. It is against this background that Kenya entrenched integrity in the supreme law of the land so as to address corruption, mediocrity and unethical culture that continue to hamper effective service delivery.

Strategies and lessons learnt

A few lessons have been learnt which we can address using Kenya as an example. Enactment of enabling legislation is not a panacea to preventing and combating corruption. The promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 and enactment of many anti-corruption laws provide the framework for institutionalizing good governance, accountability, transparency, and integrity in the management of public and private life. Kenya's experimentation with the establishment of an institutional framework is a step in the right direction but it is more critical to mainstream good governance, integrity and ethics in the processes and functional areas within the Judiciary. Organizational culture is a key factor in enhancing or inhibiting change processes in an institution. State capture affects the policy, legislative and institutional frameworks by exploiting both formal and informal networks operations.

Conclusion

The war against corruption is on course. It is necessary to develop effective strategies that are commensurate with the emerging trends in the practice of corruption. African Governments and judiciary in general could leverage on existing opportunities to ensure that corruption does not prevent Africans from realizing the promise in their respective constitutions with respect to good governance and quality life for all.

In most of the African countires, the Constitution guarantees public participation provided through the Devolved or decentralized Government strategy. However this could be hampered by the absence of a framework that empowers and facilitates citizens to effectively participate in governance processes. Effective social transformation is only possible if corruption prevention and combating is addressed from both rules based and values based approaches to good governance.

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Implementation of the Principle of Variable Geometry as a Tool for Socio-economic Transformation in the East African Community

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Introduction

This paper looks at the principle of variable geometry and its impact on the integration of economic communities. Specific focus is put on the East African Community. The paper briefly outlines justifications for application of variable geometry. It further highlights the experiences of East Africa in implementing the principle including in trade and industry, mobility of labour and capital, non-tariff barriers, promotion of the tourism sector, improving the transport system, promoting accountability and monitoring the union among others.

The East African Community (henceforth, EAC) is made up of six Member States, that include Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have a common history and were the first members of the EAC. They signed and ratified the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC (henceforth, EAC Treaty). Burundi, Rwanda and South Sudan recently acceded to the Treaty. By acceding to the treaty, they became full members of the EAC. It is important to note that members of the EAC have membership obligations which include *inter alia*, financial contributions, social political commitments and trade and industry. The EAC is, therefore, expected to develop socially, economically and politically in a progressive manner.

Despite the common need for progressive development, some of the Member States were considered as delimiting the progressive development of the EAC. Therefore, the principle of variable geometry also known as "the coalition of the willing" which is also part of the operational principles of the EAC comes into play.

The principle of variable geometry is defined in article 7 (1) (e) and article 1 of the EAC Treaty as; meaning the principle of flexibility which allows for progression in co-operation among a sub-group of members in a larger integration scheme in a variety of areas and at different speeds. This definition has been confirmed in *the Matter of a Request by the Council of Ministers of the East African Community for an Advisory Opinion Application No. 1 of 2008* before the East African Court of Justice (henceforth, the EACJ).1 In this matter, was vrough by the Council of Ministers of the EAC in which they sought the opinion of the EACJ on the Application of the Principle of variable geometry as provided in the EAC Treaty and the application of the principle of variable geometry vis-à-vis the requirement for consensus in decision making.2

Why Variable Geometry

Variable geometry refers to the different/various processes of economic integration, proceeding at different speeds among groups of Members States within the same economic bloc. The value of this principle is usually the need for decision-making where consensus of the majority may delay the

process. The principle is important for inclusivity, particularly in light of many stakeholders, participation of all parties in decision-making, cooperation amongst the participants for amicable solutions, equal opportunities for input to the participating members and finding quick solutions to common problems without unnecessary delay.

Otherwise, where variable geometry does not exist, consensus becomes a great challenge thereby affecting decision making. It also presents cases of rigidity in determining consensus thereby leading to frustration and disruption of proposed strategies by majority States where they are not in support of them. In the absence of the variable geometry principle, there is usually a loss of usefulness of consensus building in economic communities, especially where Member States are very many and may as well lead to imposed courses of action by the majority on the other Member States.

The East African Community Experience

Following the decision in *Request by the Council of Ministers of the EAC for an Advisory Opinion* (as already named above), the EACJ was of the opinion, "…that the principle of variable geometry can comfortably apply, and was intended, to guide the integration process and we find no reason or possibility for it to conflict with the requirement for consensus in decision-making."[3] This opinion qualifies the justification for the application of the principle variable geometry and also presents certainty for implementation as there no opportunity for veto power by any given member State.[4]

Following the decision, there have been undertakings of social economic initiatives through the customs union, common market, monetary union and political federation that have the potential of transforming the lives of East Africans. For instance, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda have made strides including the customs union, regional investments, pro-active implementation of the common market, social infrastructural development and the removal of non-tariff barriers.[5] The time spent at ports doing clearance alongside reduction in costs of clearance have been reduced in Kenya meaning that trade moves faster between Kenya and Uganda and Kenya and Rwanda. These initiatives have not been inclusive of Tanzania and Burundi and South Sudan (South Sudan is the youngest member of the EAC) (Source?).

It is now common knowledge that a citizen from Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda can move to any of these countries without the requirement of a passport as long as he/she has a national identity card from any of the stated countries. He/she can stay in any of the countries for up to six months. This is not the case with the other three countries. All they need is a certificate of identity or interstate passes, which are issued by local immigration authorities at immigration control points.[7] Likewise unlike the recent developments, one did not need a yellow card vaccination certificate to enter Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda if they were East African.

To promote free movement of labour as well as provide equal opportunities to East Africans in the labour capital, an East African may not require a work permit while in the countries of Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda.[7] This also comes with opportunities to acquire land in the region and as well realise the right to establishment.

The tourism sector which brings a good deal of foreign exchange currency into the region will boom. This is because the arrangement between Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda makes it possible for a tourist to get a 90 days' tourist visa from any of the three countries and have access to any of the three countries without having to pay extra money. This means more jobs, more opportunities in the tourism sector and an increase in the number of tourists into the region.

The agreement on security in the region also creates an opportunity for easier and better identification, in addition to tracking and arresting potential criminals in trans-border crimes like human trafficking, terrorism and drug trafficking. The result is minimisation of social security threats, encouragement of businesses growth as well as prevention and control of money laundering and corruption within the region.

The principle also creates room for trading with other neighbouring States such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (henceforth, DRC). Kenya, can ably access DRC through Uganda or Rwanda. This creates good neighbourli-ness as well as partnership relations in trade and industry while at the same time widens the tax base for the countries within the region.

The coalition further creates wider room for accountability of the Member States for the decisions they make. Decision-making must be done with extra caution as a diverse population stands to be affected. A decision by one country potentially affects another, hence the need to weigh options as between costs and benefits. This in turn improves on service delivery in the region.

Uganda is a landlocked country and therefore spends excessive amounts of monies on import taxes.[8] Implementation of the principle will greatly reduce the tax burden that is borne by Uganda on an annual basis.[9] Hence, monies meant for import taxes in the EAC will be invested in social economic infrastructure for the betterment of the standards of living of Ugandans.

The coalition promotes labour mobility, capital mobility, establishes and harmonises fiscal policies and creates room for friendly business dealings and infra-structural development. This in turn promotes the monetary union which is purely dependent on the aforementioned factors. Consequently, with a successful monetary Union, there will be reduced costs of production and a stronger economy.[10] Further, Exchange risks will be eliminated and prices of goods and services will also be harmonised across the region.[11] Development will head towards balancing the underdeveloped regions to pick up towards development.[12] Though there are risks associated with a monetary union such as loss of monetary sovereignty and loss of direct control of States over monetary instruments, the benefits are more visible.

Transport systems will blossom as seen by the effort of Kenya and Uganda in implementing the standard gauge railway that will improve labour and capital mobility as well as improve the livelihood of East Africans leading to socio-economic development and transformation.

Communication costs have also been reduced in the region. For instance, roaming charges have been removed from the three countries while at the same time, costs of making phone calls across borders in the three States have been reduced by 20 per cent. Text messages, voice calls and data services have also reduced in costs. The impact of this initiative is the promotion of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), which is also part of access to information promotion in the region.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Variable geometry is critical for socio-economic transformation and creates room for advancement while leaving the other Member States the option of joining later without any major hardships. Though associated with some pitfalls, variable geometry is important for integration processes, the absence of which frustrates development within economic communities. Regional economic blocs should, therefore, progressively apply variable geometry for progressive development. The application of this principle should be such that other members can easily key into the development processes.

Notes

1. The Advisory Opinion, Application No. 1 of 2008 is available at http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/THE-ADVISORY-OPINION-NO-1.-1-OF-2008.pdf (accessed August 6, 2018).
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Introduction à la séance de Jakkaarlo en hommage à Aminata Diaw Cissé

Rokhaya Fall
Université Cheikh Anta Diop Dakar (UCAD)
Senegal

C'est pour moi un moment difficile, mais je m'en voudrais de faiblir au point de ne pas arriver à transmettre cette demande dont les deux concernées, au moment où elle était formulée, étaient loin de penser que c'est dans de telles circonstances qu'elle allait être satisfaite.

Il me faut cependant, après avoir remercié les artistes qui viennent de nous gratifier de cette superbe prestation (l'UCAD en fête, c'est aussi Aminata l'initiatrice) avant d'introduire cette séance de jakkaarlo, remercier l'UCAD pour avoir sacrifié à ce devoir de mémoire envers celle qui, toute sa vie durant n'a eu de cesse d'aller à la quête du savoir.

Universitaire, donc au cœur de l'institution du savoir, Aminata n'en était pas moins ouverte à l'environnement dans lequel se trouve celle-ci.

Elle savait que c'est à travers la production du savoir qu'une nation arrive à forger les compétences dont elle a besoin pour se développer.

Elle savait aussi que l'institution à laquelle elle appartenait n'était pas le seul lieu de production de ce savoir.

Elle savait que la trajectoire historique suivie par l'Afrique avait recouvert de sédiments certains lieux de production de ce savoir. Ce savoir assujetti, elle a cherché à l'appréhender (d'où la passion de la philosophe pour l'histoire) pour s'en imprégner et l'optimiser en le mettant en contact avec le savoir dit moderne. Il fallait dé-sédimenter les strates de ce savoir, le déconstruire sans le déstructurer pour arriver ainsi à la source de l'architecture de la pensée qui le soutend.

Le face à face mémorable entre le « Griot et le Philosophe », a été un jalon posé par cette intellectuelle dans son entreprise de déconstruction et de quête de sens.

Avant de commencer la soirée culturelle, je vous invite à revoir quelques extraits de cette soirée sublime organisée par celle à qui nous rendons hommage et qui avait été animée par le Professeur Mame Moussé Diagne et le virtuose du Xalam Samba Diabaré Samb.

Nous voudrions remercier encore une fois le Professeur Mame Moussé et tonton Samba Diabaré à qui nous rendons un hommage (yalnañu fi yag té wer).

Mesdames, Messieurs, je l'ai brossé dans mon propos de tout à l'heure, l'université est l'institution dont la mission première est la production du savoir. Cependant, pour que ce savoir puisse être au service de la société à laquelle il est destiné, il faut qu'il soit solidement adossé aux réalités vécues par les différentes composantes de cette société. Les femmes, partie intégrante de cette société ont participé à l'élaboration de cette connaissance qui structure le savoir, même si ce dernier est par la suite devenu un savoir sexué.

Aminata Diaw, militante du Savoir l'avait tellement bien compris que, pendant une dizaine d'années, grâce au projet *Women Writting Africa*, elle a, avec des collègues d'autres disciplines (dont Mme Mariétou Diongue et moi-même), recueilli des manuscrits et des textes oraux de femmes à travers l'Afrique et spécifiquement l'Afrique de l'ouest.

Le cheminement de certaines figures féminines a pu ainsi être suivi, aussi bien dans le domaine des récits de fondation de royaume, dans celui de l'esclavage, pour la période de la traite négrière, dans la lutte contre l'envahisseur colonial, au cours de la période coloniale elle-même, et pendant la lutte pour l'indépendance. A chaque période, les femmes ont eu leur part d'actions.

Ont alors émergé les figures de :

- **Yennenga,** symbole du refus de la société patriarcale. Elle offre au XVe siècle, une image

forte et positive aux femmes qui luttent pour faire entendre leurs aspirations. C'est elle qui est à l'origine de l'émergence du royaume Mossi.

- **Sira Bajal**, une figure féminine qui voyage du nord au sud de la Sénégambie et qui semble personnifier la figure politique au féminin. Chantée par le poète-président Léopold Sédar Senghor, Sira Bajal, Bajaan ou Bajaar, serait originaire du Bajaar[1] en milieu manding du Gaabu) et peut être considérée comme le prototype du mythe unificateur de l'espace sénégambien où elle est présentée comme une femme qui a été au cœur du pouvoir politique.

Esclavage, traite négrière et conquête coloniale, créent un contexte difficile dans cette Afrique des XVIIe / XVIIIe / XIXe siècles. Les femmes ont agi face à ces agressions de façon multiforme, même si c'est seulement la saga des hommes que l'histoire magnifie, reléguant l'action des femmes dans les méandres des mémoires d'où surgissent de temps à autres quelques réminiscences très atténuées permettant de dire : oui, les femmes aussi.

C'est dans ce contexte de traite négrière qu'émerge la grande figure de **Njinga Mbandi** connue sous le nom d'**Anne Nzinga**. Elle s'érige en leader de toute cette région de l'actuelle Angola et réussit à symboliser la figure politique régionale du XVIIe siècle de tout cet espace.

La geste Baoulé est à ranger dans ce registre de refus. Sous la direction **d'Abla Pokou,** un sous groupe Akan quitte le royaume Ashanti (dans l'actuel Ghana) pour aller fonder ce qui deviendra le royaume Baoulé de Côte d'Ivoire dans la première moitié du XVIIIe siècle participant ainsi à la restructuration spatiale de toute cette région, du fait de l'intensification de la traite négrière.

Les exemples de figures féminines font foison à travers l'Afrique. Par delà l'analyse de l'action de ces femmes qui exhume leur participation occultée à l'évolution historique de leur société, Il faut aussi retenir que ce projet, recentre sur l'Afrique, la production par les femmes africaines du savoir se rapportant à leur vie, et à leur histoire, sous forme de romans, poèmes, essais, chansons etc …

L'animation des séminaires du laboratoire Femmes, Société et Culture a permis de revisiter d'importants thèmes qui éclairent la trajectoire et le vécu des femmes africaines.

C'est en discutant du programme de ce laboratoire qu'Aminata me fit cette proposition : *Il faut que Laman vienne nous entretenir de la saga des femmes dans notre labo*.

Les vicissitudes de la vie n'ont pas permis la rencontre (elle a été détachée au Codesria et moi-même occupée à cette peau d'âne qu'est la thèse d'Etat).

C'est ce soir que la demande va être satisfaite car Laman va nous entretenir des femmes des terroirs wolof de la Sénégambie.

Ce soir, nous allons comprendre le cheminement de la princesse Yaasin Bubu, une femme au cœur de la tourmente du Kajoor pendant la guerre des marabouts au XVIIe siècle.

Ce soir, nous allons entendre tonner la voix d'une princesse du Bawol, Ngoné Latyr[2], fille du *Dammel-Teeñ* Latsukaabé (fin du 17è siècle). *Mon père* dit-elle *est malade, il ne peut se lever encore moins aller nulle part. Mais tout ce dont il disposait, comme protection magique, je le porterai*. *Je porterai ses gris gris et monterai sur son coursier personnel, je brandirai ses armes et m'en irai avec vous. Nous combattrons le roi du Trarza, nous le rencontrerons à Ngangaram.* En prenant la tête des armées de son père empêché, Ngoné Latyr a victorieusement défendu son pays contre l'invasion maure.

Ce soir, nous irons avec Laman au Jolof écouter Boury Jeleen Sarr Ndaw, encourager ses fils Latsamba, Tassé et Giran à reprendre le pouvoir confisqué par leur oncle Alboury Sarr Ndaw. Nous aurons aussi une pensée pour Anta Majigeen Ndiaye arrachée à son Jolof natal et qui s'est retrouvée d'abord à Cuba ensuite en Floride aux Amériques.

Ce soir, nous suivrons *Linger* Bigué Ngoné qui, au milieu du XVIII[è] siècle, n'a pas hésité à sillonner l'ensemble des royaumes *Wolof* de la Sénégambie, pour rechercher des alliances profitables à son fils, Maïssa Bigué, prétendant au trône du *Kajoor*.

Ce soir, nous sera contée la geste des femmes de Nder au Waalo, mais nous écouterons aussi la saga de Jeümbëët et Ndate Yallah deux princesses waalo waalo face aux velléités d'installation de la France.

Tout cet héritage nous sera rappelé, mais nous n'oublierons pas de chanter celles qui, par la sagesse de leur conduite nous ont donné ceux qui, jusqu'à présent, éclairent positivement le parcours parsemé d'embuches de notre Nation. Je veux nommer Sokhna Adama Aïssa, Mame Fa Wade Wélé et Mame Jaara Bousso.

Nous chanterons également ces milliers de femmes, illustres ou anonymes qui avec détermination,

se sont engagées dans les luttes pour l'indépendance, mais aussi celles qui, suivant les voies tracées par les pionnières continuent à faire entendre leurs voix pour que savoir et savoir faire des femmes soient pris en compte dans la construction commune de notre Nation.

Chère Collègue et chère sœur, tu avais voulu que Laman vienne parler devant le Laboratoire Femmes, Société et Culture, il le fait ce soir, mais ce sera devant tous les laboratoires de ton Université réunis pour te rendre Hommage. Et si aujourd'hui cette salle est pleine, c'est parce qu'au-delà de ton amour pour le savoir, tu as su entretenir avec tout un chacun une relation privilégiée qui te garde à jamais dans nos mémoires et nos cœurs.

Repose en Paix Aminata !

Notes

1. Le Bajaar, que le père Henry Gravrand considère comme le berceau des *gelwaar* fondateurs des royaumes du Siin et du Saalum, se trouve à l'Est du Gaabu, dans l'actuelle Guinée Bissau.
2. Ngoné Latyr est une princesse du *Bawol* de la fin du XVIIè siècle. Son action se situe à un moment où la famille *« Geej »* n'a pas encore solidement en main les rennes du pouvoir dans l'ensemble *Kajoor/Bawol*.

Hommage au Professeur Aminata Diaw Cissé

Abdoullah Cissé
Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar, Sénégal

Birago Diop a encore raison :

« Ceux qui sont morts ne sont jamais partis :
Ils sont dans l'Ombre qui s'éclaire
Et dans l'ombre qui s'épaissit.
Les Morts ne sont pas sous la Terre :
Ils sont dans l'Arbre qui frémit,
Ils sont dans le Bois qui gémit,
Ils sont dans l'Eau qui coule,
Ils sont dans l'Eau qui dort,
Ils sont dans la Case, ils sont dans la Foule (...)».

Je voudrais partager avec vous le message électronique que m'a adressé le 2 mars 2016 à 13:15, la philosophe Aminata Diaw en réponse à l'article que je venais de publier sur le référendum (« oui, non, pourquoi ? ») :

« *Le grand problème dans notre pays, dit-elle, c'est qu'on ne débat pas, et on ne débat pas parce qu'on ne s'écoute pas. Entre la doxa et la passion, ne peut surgir que de la turpitude. J'ai bien l'impression à écouter les uns et les autres que cette exigence de hauteur a déserté les esprits parce qu'on a oublié un simple mot qui nous aurait rappelé la finalité de tout ceci : POURQUOI ? Si beaucoup de ceux qui parlent avaient ce mot à l'esprit comme jusqu'à en faire une obsession, ils auraient compris que la démocratie n'est pas affaire de bien-pensant et de mal-pensant, avec d'un côté ceux qui ont raison et de l'autre ceux qui ont tort. Ils auraient compris la portée essentielle de l'écoute, ils auraient surtout saisi que la vitalité mais aussi la durabilité de notre démocratie ne peuvent se fonder que sur une éthique de l'intercompréhension. Comment avancer, derrière des dogmes déjà établis et vouloir prétendre à une validité universelle ? Comment pouvons-nous savoir ce que nous devons faire en tant que communauté s'il n'y a pas ce désir, voire cet impératif d'intercompréhension ? Nous avons oublié que le consensus n'est pas un rapport de force mais une construction. La passion nous a tellement aveuglés que nous avons oublié pourquoi tout ceci : consolider notre démocratie, fortifier notre République pour pouvoir avoir un legs. Il me semble que c'est cela notre responsabilité devant l'histoire : transmettre des institutions viables aux futures générations et leur laisser une culture démocratique exemplaire* ».

Chère Aminata,

Puisse ta mémoire à jamais être éclairée par l'affection respectueuse que nous te portons tous au regard de l'empreinte que tu as su subtilement imprimer dans notre inconscient et que nous renouvelons en célébrant l'anniversaire de ton retour au Silence de l'Eternité.

CODESRIA Tribute to the Abuja Memorial in Honour of Professor Abubakar Momoh

The news of the untimely passing on of Professor Abubakar Momoh came as a shock to the CODESRIA community. On behalf of the Executive Committee, CODESRIA's overall membership, and colleagues in the Secretariat in Dakar, we write to reiterate our deep shock and the sense of loss following this untimely departure on 29th May 2017. We join you in this memorial event to express our sadness but also to celebrate a life lived well and to its fullest.

Abu, as he was popularly known in our academic circles, left an indelible mark on the world of scholarship and activism. Our engagement with him goes back to at least 1996 when he attended the CODESRIA Democratic Governance Institute. During that Institute, which Prof. Issa Shivji directed, Abu distinguished himself as an able academic, formidable debater and team player. In a poem Prof. Shivji wrote at the end of the Institute, he recalled Abu's creative mind; his unmatched capacity to grasp and apply concepts and his combative intellectual style that disarmed as much as it illuminated.

Abu kept sustained intellectual interest in the youth question. He taught us to appreciate and understand context if we wanted our work to illuminate the experience of ordinary people. He did exactly this in his study of Area Boys. This is what makes his work on the youth and his faith in youth struggles not only genuine but also enduring.

Above everything else, Prof. Momoh lived what he wrote. He played a critical role in the faculty union, a role that was notable in Nigeria and beyond. He was also a capable defender of academic freedom and the responsibility of intellectuals. It is perhaps because of these engagements that he naturally extended his reflections on democratic struggles in Nigeria beyond the university to broader struggles in society. Abu was willing to give his life for these struggles. We all recall his experience in Ekiti in 2009 when he almost lost his life while performing the noble civic duty of observing elections.

Dzodzi Tsikata
President

Godwin Murunga
Executive Secretary

In CODESRIA, we celebrate Abu's sense of responsibility, his integrity and his willingness to support African institutions of knowledge production. Other than CODESRIA, Abu also played a critical role in the African Association of Political Science. Only two weeks before he passed on, Abu, in an email to the then incoming Executive Secretary of CODESRIA, emphasized that the appointment was "a generational challenge requiring the highest ethical, organisational and academic capacity you can build around a long existing tradition." He offered to help in whatever way noting that "Africa is a continent with a lot of emergencies... knowledge deficit and empowering ideas certainly need to be addressed. CODESRIA has a capacity to move us to the next layer in the 21st Century quest. I am happy to also share a few thoughts of mine with you on that... we must hurry if we must make a difference on the continent."

There is more we will say at an appropriate time to celebrate Abu's life and achievements and elevate his wealth of knowledge appropriately. For the time being, we join this memorial to share in the loss of a brother, a colleague, friend, husband, father and activist for social justice. Sincere condolences to Abu's family, particularly his mother, his wife Tawa and their children, and to the extended families he belonged to. We hope that the various institutions he belonged to and served will have the courage to join together again and again to celebrate his life. Most important, and on behalf of the African Social Science community, we take the opportunity to thank his family for donating him to us repeatedly and sharing his generous spirit with us on many occasions.

F. ABIOLA IRELE: In Memoriam

Kofi Anyidoho
University of Ghana
Legon, Ghana

"**Abiola Irele** is a philosopher, critic and theorist of literature, music and culture, an educator whose writing is remarkable for its elegance, ...[1]" The list of Abiola Irele's areas of accomplishment could have gone on. But above all, many of us remember him as the humanist who refuses to settle for a life measured in small gestures. The elegance noted above in his writing flows naturally from a life always boldly lived and in style, but with no traces of posturing, let alone minor symbolic gestures. See below the last email I received from Irele on December 27, 2016:

> Dear Kofi,
>
> Long time. I hope you had a good Christmas and that the new year
>
> will bring joy and fulfilment.
>
> I'm writing to ask if you'd be willing to contribute to a project I'm doing for Cambridge University Press. It involves the publication in five volumes of a series of studies on the evolution of African literature from the origins in orality to the present post-colonial and cosmopolitan orientation. I'm dedicating a volume to literature in the African languages, and would be very happy if you could contribute a chapter on the written literature in Ewe. This is a subject that I'm aware is very much in your territory and I hope you'll agree to take this on. Please let me hear from you on this as soon as possible.
>
> Very best wishes.
>
> Abiola

At the time I received this email, I was aware that Professor Irele had returned to the US from Kwara State University, mainly for health reasons. But he was not a man who would stop dreaming the future and dreaming it big and into practical details, even as he looked over his shoulder to the past. I smiled, as I recalled Hebert Aptheker's question to Dr. WEB Dubois, just before DuBois boarded his plane at the Kennedy Airport on his way to Accra, to begin the Encyclopeadia African Project: "How long do you think it will take for this project to be realized?" With a smile, "A hundred years." Great minds like DuBois and Irele understand that landmark intellectual projects may not be accomplished in any one individual's life time, but they often must be tackled by individual ready to bring on board others who can take them into the future.

It must have been this same sense of vision and mission, driven by a pathfinder spirit, that made it easy for him, at a time some thought he should have been thinking of a quiet, well-deserved retirement, to leave his very high profile position at Harvard University to return to Nigeria in the position of Provost for the Humanities, Management and Social Sciences at the newly established Kwara State University. Soon after he had settled into his new challenge, I had the privilege of visiting Kwara State as a guest artist, at Professor Irele's invitation, I was inspired by what I saw, how he was totally devoted to the pioneering task of playing a lead role in building a new and rapidly expanding university from the scratch, including presiding over the construction of new infrastructure but more importantly, laying a sound foundation for the academic structures and general intellectual direction. He spoke of and worked tirelessly for a research driven agenda in the humanities for the new university, with space and resources provided for the arts, especially the creative and performing arts. Another area of preoccupation for him was publications, so it was no surprise that he played a lead role establishing the journal *The Savannah Review* and was instrumental in working for the establishment of a press for the university, for which he eventually became director.

We must also speak of Abiola Irele's outstanding record as editor of various major anthologies of African Literatures and especially of *Research in African Literatures*, acknowledged as "the premier journal of African literary studies – a stimulating vehicle in English for research on the oral and written literatures of Africa." RAL was established in 1970 at the University of Texas, Austin and published by

the University of Texas Press.. After over twenty years under its founding editor Bernth Lindfors, by which time it had become the official journal of the African Literature Association, its publication was taken over by Indiana University Press and the editorial offices moved to Ohio State University, where Abiola Irele was a faculty member. Following the sudden death in quick succession of its next editors Richard Bjornson and Josaphat Kubayanda, it fell to Irele to take over editorial responsibilities for the journal, and at short notice. I recall that when the news went round at one of the Annual Meetings of the ALA, a few colleagues expressed some worry for the future of the journal. Not because they doubted Irele's competence, but they feared that he was probably too busy with so many things to devote the kind of focused attention the journal demanded. In no time at all, Irele took full control and gave the journal a new look and indeed higher prestige.

The field of African literary studies in particular and of African studies in general can easily boast of many outstanding scholars. Unfortunately, only a of these eminent scholars are generous enough in sharing their time, knowledge and influence on projects that provide mentorship to younger colleagues. Abiola Irele was one such eminent scholar and constant mentor. Tejumola Olaniyan of the University of Wisconsin-Madison says it all: Irele "was an accomplished scholar. For me in particular, his biggest accomplishment was a careful cultivation of junior scholars, he respected them, he would reach out to them. He challenged them because he took them seriously. He was welcoming, very open to juniors in the field. As an institutional builder in the field, he edited journals and anthologies."

He was always planning for programmes and projects under which others could benefit from his leadership role. One such project was a 1996 National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute awarded to The Ohio State University based on a proposal he developed with other colleagues, including Dr. Isaac Mowoe, Vice-President, under the theme "Literature and Modern Experience in Africa". The institute, hosted by the University of Ghana, was for the benefit of fellows, almost all of them younger scholars and teachers of African Literatures/Studies. Working closely with Irele and his team for those eight weeks as a local consultant was a particularly enriching intellectual experience for me personally. The many hours of travel across Ghana interspersed with even more hours of seminar sessions devoted to critical debate offered us all ample opportunity to appreciate the depth and breathe of Abiola Irele's knowledge and understanding of the complexities of the interconnections between African intellectual traditions and the wider world of European and other knowledge systems and traditions. It gave you a basis for appreciating Irele's constant return to the theme of modernity in many his literary and philosophical scholarship. And it offered you a rare opportunity to come to know Abiola Irele as a man whose personality is constantly bubbling with the joy of life even amidst our many challenges. He would recall with a hint of mischief, some of his adventures in his early career as a faculty member of the newly established Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana – Legon, an institute alive with optimism in those heady days of the independence dream. He always remembered to add how that phase of his career earned him his first wife.

On the occasion of his inaugural as the first Nigerian Professor of French at the University of Ibadan, Abiola Irele makes one of the most eloquently argued cases "In Praise of Alienation":

> The colonial experience was not an interlude in our history, a storm that broke upon us, causing damage here and there but leaving us the possibility, after its passing, to pick up the pieces. It marked a sea-change of the historical process in Africa; it effected a qualitative re-ordering of life. It has rendered the traditional way of life no longer a viable option for our continued existence and apprehension of the world.

We cannot but agree with Irele's view that the colonial experience was more than a passing storm, that the historical process it unleashed on the continent and her people cannot be wished away. We may query his claim that "the traditional way of life (is) no longer a viable option for our continued existence and apprehension of the world", especially given the fact that Africa has spent much of her time, energy, and resources trying to work her way into a productive existence not only after the manner of her colonizers, but by adopting wholesale, solutions that seem to have worked for her imperial masters. However, few scholars have made a more compelling and yet critical case for the need for African intellectual work to be grounded on a more open engagement with what has been called modernity and the post-modern in their many forms and disguises. We need such an understanding to fully appreciate Irele's early and still foremost work on Senghor and the Negritude intellectual and artistic tradition. And we need it also to come to terms with the case he makes for African philosophy, its proponents and critics in his Introduction to Paulin Houtounji's *African Philosophy: Myth and Reality* ….

It should not come to us a surprise that the Abiola Irele we have heard so often speak Yoruba with impeccable tonal inflexions and lilting rhythmic flows, is the same Irele we have head speak the French language with polished grace, is the very same Irele, native of Ora in Edo State, Nigeria, who first learned to speak Igbo, we would hear, on privileged occasions, compel a rowdy and slightly drunken crowd to sudden and absolute silence as his voice rises into the midnight air singing a classical Italian opera in the manner of the grand masters. And yet, as Odia Ofeimum reminds us. "Alone or in good company, Irele sang better than Tunde Nightingale, the highlife maestro, reminding all of us of the tale told by Wole Soyinka, one of the singers of that night of revels, of how, in their days of holding the night to ransom at Bobby Benson's Caban Bamboo in Lagos of the fifties, Irele would take over the night when it was time to welcome the dawn." And this is no ordinary clowning. Irele was holding out for our consideration and appreciation, the possibility of an Africa that has the capacity to reach out to the intellectual and cultural heritage of global civilization, embracing the finest in other traditions even us she offers in return some of the best in her own traditions.

Those of us who may have been bothered by aspects of the fundamental thrust of his arguments in his Inaugural at Ibadan "In Praise of Alienation" must find ample reassurance in the views and forceful arguments of a more mature and self-confident Irele in his "The African Scholar", delivered several years later as the Inaugural on his appointment as Professor of African Literature, French and Comparative Literature at The Ohio State University. As we put the two Inaugurals side=by-side, the twist of irony must not be lost on us: In the earlier one, Irele, fully grounded in his home soil, is reaching out, perhaps with a bit of yearning, to embrace the wealth of knowledge available out there in a world that is often disdainful of what Africa has to offer. In the latter case, here was Irele standing tall and dignified, assuring the wider world that there is indeed a wealth of knowledge embedded in African systems and traditions and practices that could bring fresh insights into the intellectual traditions of the global north, east and west, and that a new, reawakened African Scholar, is in the best, indeed privileged position to deliver this knowledge to his/her own credit and profit, and for the benefit of humanity at large.

Regrettably, Nigeria, Global Africa and the World at large, lost Chinua Achebe, the Master Storyteller only to be followed soon afterwards by Isidore Okpewho, another major voice in African Literature. And now, Abiola Irele, to whom also we must forever remain grateful for a life fully committed to an exemplary and path-breaking tradition in African scholarship in the human and social sciences.

Note

1. *abiolairele.blogspot.com/ [*Jun 29, 2010]

Fare Thee Well Champion of the African Imagination: F. Abiola Irele (1936-2017)*

"In its polemical stance, then, African discourse presents itself as a thorough-going deconstruction of the Western image of the Native, the Black, the African" – Abiola Irele on 'The African Imagination'

Chambi Chachage
African American Studies,
Harvard University, USA

The African literary community has lost one of its illustrious son, F. Abiola Irele. It is Harry Garuba who introduced me to his work when I was a student at the University of Cape Town (UCT). He asked us to unpack a quote from Irele's book on 'The African Imagination: Literature in Africa and the Black Diaspora.'

I did not understand it. But after reading its chapter on the '*Dimensions of African Discourse*' it became clear. The underlying message that proved to be Irele's lifelong mission is that the striking – and indeed primary – aspect of our discourse as Africans has been its "character as a movement of

contestation" (p. 68) Borrowing from Samora Machel, one may ask: *'Contra o Que?'* (Against What?)

For Irele, it has been against "the negativizing premises of Western racist ideology" (p. 69) He was writing in 2001, way before 'Black Lives Matter' reminded us that the 'West' has not yet become post-racial let alone post-racist. "In whatever accents African response has been given expression", he aptly noted then, "whether in an openly combative form or a discreetly pathetic one – with gradations in between – the discursive project has taken the form of an ongoing, principled dispute with the West over the terms of African/Black existence and, ultimately, being" (Ibid.)

My personal encounter with Irele had been brief, albeit profound. I first met him in a graduate summer school where he received harsh criticisms from some students for what appeared to them as an 'essentialist' stand on – and exposition of – the 'African/Black condition'. For him, the explanation was straightforward: They were invoking 'postmodernism' with its 'relativism' that borders 'absurdity'. With what is continuing to happen to the 'African/Black body' in the 'reactionary West', I wonder what they think now of Irele's take on the 'stark realities of the Black experience" (Ibid.)

Pan-Africanism is essential in this struggle. When he moved back to Ilorin in Nigeria to run the College of Humanities at Kwara State University as a Provost, he wrote: "Can you please send me the curriculum of your course on Pan African Thought? We want to see if we can use it as a model for a course on Panafricanism here at Kwara State in Nigeria." He was referring to a new course that the Mwalimu Nyerere Professorial Chair in Pan-African Studies had introduced at the University of Dar es Salaam in 2011. "Thanks", he promptly responded after receiving the course outline, "for your offer to help with our curriculum at Kwara State University."

He was as generous as he was grateful. "Glad to hear you're writing on Negritude and citing my work", he once wrote to me before poetically answering my otherwise simple question about his bio: "My year of birth is 1936, the month and day May 22."

Irele was not an essentialist. But he knew that the 'West' has been attempting to 'essentialize' us. Hence African Discourse, "though not by means uniform, univocal, or homogenous, is nonetheless coherent, centered as it is upon a dominant issue: our historic encounter with and continuing relationship to the West and the varied implications of our modern experience as it has been determined by this historical encounter" (p. 68).

His point is: The African Imagination needed an essentially unified discourse of resistance to articulate our "sense of historical grievances" (p. 69). Do we still need this now? Yes, indeed!

Note

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Egbon, Teacher and Mentor, Go Gracefully into the Night! For Abiola Irele (1936-2017)*

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Inclusive of all the members of his immediate family, there were ten of us at his bedside at the Beth Israel Hospital in Boston. It was Sunday, July 1, 2017 around 5:55 p.m. The doctors having earlier informed us that the end was near, a Roman Catholic "last rite" had been expeditiously arranged. It was conducted by a Nigerian priest. When Father Chris had gone through the first stage of the profoundly moving ceremony, he invited any of us who so desired to speak our farewell to him after which he, the priest, would bring the order or proceedings of the "last rites" to a close.

Members of the family went first, turn by turn. And then, we, friends of the family, each had her or his turn, each woman and man moving close

to the still warm and living body and addressing him as if he could hear us though, scientifically speaking, all cognition had gone from him. As I waited for my turn to say my last words to him, an incredible riot of thoughts and emotions raced through my mind, undergirded by an overwhelming sadness. He was still here, on this side of the great divide; but I, we, all knew that he was slipping away into the night of Time and Being. The work of mourning him had already begun.

I swear that even as I approached him to say my farewell, I had not yet chosen the words to say to him. Unlike him who, with his matchless rationalism and towering intellect, was a believer, I am not a believer, at least not in the sense of organized, formal religion. But at the very moment when I got to his side and laid my hand on his arm, the words came of their own. I felt, I *knew* that I was addressing his spirit, addressing Spirit itself which binds all of us, the living, the dead and the unborn, together. Both the real and the factitious, trivial line separating "believers" and "unbelievers" had vanished as I said the following words to him, simply:

"Egbon, we shall not forget you. I testify that you have left us a prodigious legacy, a bountiful bequest that will never perish. I testify that you crossed many borders, the you are the greatest border crosser of your generation. The innumerable borders that you crossed enabled me and other members of my generation that you inspired to do the same. In the course of those border crossings, you lived life to the fullest. You are now at another border. On behalf of all who are not present here, I ask you to go across this last of all borders gracefully. Go gently and courageously into the shade, Egbon".

Why did I suddenly have that intuition that in addressing his spirit I was also addressing *Spirit* itself? I do not know. But I have a conjecture: in moments of extreme, ineffable loss and sadness, intimations that we never ordinarily have come to us. We never really know how wide and deep a hold someone who has passed had on us until they're no longer here. I thought I had learnt this lesson with the passing of my mother in 1992, but there I was on Sunday, July 1, 2017, at that bewildering space of grief again. With that level and space of grief, all that Egbon had meant to me, all that members of my generation had deeply cherished in him was telescoped into one blinding flash of illumination or revelation. What was this revelation? Here it is: only he who contained so vast an accumulation of the profoundly enriching emanations of Spirit as Abiola Irele did could have been a teacher and mentor to so many and also could have been the exemplary and consummate border crosser that he was. Is this an extravagant claim produced by the rush of powerful, confounding emotions like loss, grief, mourning? I don't think so. At any rate, here are my thoughts on the matter, first gleaned at that numinous moment at his bedside just before his transition but now fleshed out several days after the initial moment of spiritual and cognitive eureka.

At the centre of Irele's work and accomplishments as a scholar, teacher and critic is Negritude. Indisputably, he is the world's greatest scholar on Negritude. He worked on all areas of modern and traditional African arts and humanities and of all the constitutive regions of Africa and its Diasporas. But Negritude is at the centre of it all. He started his career *with* and *on* it and at the end, he was still working tirelessly on it, revising previous work and planning new revaluations. He knew very well that Negritude had and still has many critics, many intellectual detractors, some of them the most brilliant scholars in the field for whom Irele had nothing but great respect. So why did he stick so tirelessly, so immovably from the defence, the promotion of Negritude, especially of Leopold Sedar Senghor and Aime Césaire?

It is no secret that both Senghor and Césaire are considered two of the greatest modern poets in the French language, just as everyone knows that the two men's Negritude was based on their love of the French language, culture and civilization. Though Césaire's Francophilia was more tempered, more critical than Senghor's, it was nonetheless as constitutive of his Negritude as Senghor's. We know that Francophilia is a subset of a passionate love affair with European civilization, perhaps the most presumptuous of all the subsets of Western culture. Like Senghor and Césaire, Irele was completely at ease with his Francophilia, his great love of Western culture and civilization, right from the Greek and Roman classics to the great books and men of modern European letters and thought. And music and wine and cinema and cuisine.

But then also, Irele was a passionate lover and connoisseur of the classics of traditional and modern African art, music, performance and verbal arts. In other words, his Negritude, perhaps unlike Senghor's and Césaire's, was based, not on an abstraction, but on lived expressions of a truly cosmopolitan personality. He applied for and won many prestigious awards and grants from the National

Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) in the U.S. to direct summer research and teaching programs in classic African linguistic and poetic traditions like the Zulu Izibongo and the Yoruba Ifa and Ijala. As much as delighted greatly in classical and contemporary European symphonic music, he had a passion for the masterpieces of Dun-dun and Bata drum idioms, old and contemporary hits of West African highlife music, and the trailblazing creations of the likes of Afropop stars Angelique Kidjo, Baba Mal and Yussouf N'dour.

Those who did not know at all, or knew very little of these "Negritude" expressions of Irele's life and work may find his unapologetic, indeed very passionate love affair with French language and culture in particular and Western civilization in general confounding, especially as this sometimes takes a quite extraordinary or indeed spectral quality. One memorable instance of this comes to my mind and I find it both strangely consoling and revealing. We were in a restaurant in a village in the Medoc, a wine region of France near Bordeaux. We were the guests of Alain Ricard who himself passed away last year. The food and the wines were excellent and the company in an agreeable and infectious state of discreet bacchanalia. In such circumstances, Irele usually gets possessed by the spirits of Ogun and Ayan or, if you like, of both Bacchus and Orpheus combined. Spontaneously, he broke into song, into a long, spellbinding rendition of the central aria of Gaetano Donizetti's "Lucia di Lammermoor". Everyone inside the restaurant stopped eating, mesmerized by Irele's flawless, mellifluous singing – in the Italian original of the opera. People walking by in the street outside the restaurant stopped in their tracks and came to the door and the windows wondering where this music, this voice was coming from. When Irele finished singing, the place erupted into spontaneous, wild and prolonged cheering. When the applause ended, one old man, apparently still in the grip of the performance he had just heard, asked no one in particular, "he was singing in Italian, wasn't he?" "Yes", someone answered. "Where is he from?", the old man continued. "Nigeria", Alain responded. Silence for a long while. Then the old man said, "only in the Medoc, only in the Medoc can you hear a Nigerian singing heavenly Italian opera!" I could have said to him, "no, not only in the Medoc but also in Ibadan, in Dakar, in Port of Spain, Trinidad".

You could say of Irele that he was one of kind. And indeed, I found myself involuntarily muttering these words to no one in particular as we all sat on that fateful day last Sunday as we waited for the doctors to tell us words we were terrified of hearing from them. You would be correct in saying that about Abiola Irele that he was one of a kind, but you wouldn't be cutting deep enough into the heart of the matter. I have said that I addressed my farewell, my last words, to his spirit and to Spirit itself. I admit that this smacks of a metaphysics of Being, but it is perfectly explicable in terms with which nearly everyone, "believers" and "unbelievers", can agree. Thus, Spirit here connotes the universal yearning and will to enlightenment, to liberating knowledge, to humanizing generosity, to genuine solicitude and fellowship between all women and men. Irele's spirit was completely at one with this universal Spirit.

It is constantly and quite correctly stated that Irele was at home in virtually all the disciplines of the arts, the humanities, the human sciences. His love of the great works of Western learning and civilization was absolutely unapologetic, was indeed as open as it was never flaunted. But he also had a consuming passion for the arts, the knowledge systems of Africa and other regions of the world. One of kind, yes. But more precisely, a prodigious containment of diverse expressions of Spirit. For those wondering why he chose Negritude as the pivot around which virtually all his work revolved, I suggest that this is one clue to explore.

I do not wish to end this tribute on a bitter, carping note. The trope of a "renaissance man" is often used for Irele's personality and scholarship. This isn't mistaken. All the same, it ought to be remembered that the great Western scholars, writers, artists and thinkers either from whom the trope was derived or to whom it is applied were/ are almost without exception, knowledgeable and versatile *only* in Western languages, traditions, and knowledge bases. But Spirit finds its habitation or location everywhere, the West and the Non-West, the North and the South. Abiola Irele's brand of Negritude, beyond Senghor's and Césaire's, is the most powerful reminder that we have of this liberating truth.

I have not suddenly and with the passing of Irele become a convert to Negritude. Or to the metaphysical and theological universe of "believers". We had our disagreements, our quarrels and I am not, in my grief at his passing, idealizing him. I am celebrating his life, his achievements, his example. One achievement or example leaves me in great awe and gratitude: more than any other mentor or, later colleague, Irele continuously and

unfailingly attracts new flocks of younger generations of scholars to his work, his interests, his perspectives and his projects. Thus, it is safe to declare: as time passes, the bands of mourners and celebrants will grow, Egbon. You will not be forgotten.

Go gracefully into the night, Egbon, mentor, teacher!

Note

* First Published in *the Nation Online* on July 8th 2017.

Statement on the passing on of Dr Abdul Raufu Mustapha, 1954-2017

It is with such extreme shock and sadness that we at CODESRIA have learned of the passing away of Dr Abdul Raufu Mustapha. Dr Mustapha was a Professor of African Politics at Oxford University in the United Kingdom. According to family sources, Dr Mustapha, 63, died today Tuesday, 8th August 2017 in London after months of a courageous battle against stomach cancer. His wife, Kate and two children, Asma'u and Seyi, survive him.

Dr Mustapha who hails from Ilorin, Kwara State studied Political Science at the Ahmadu Bello University Zaria before proceeding to Oxford University where he earned his doctorate and lectured until his death. His impressive body of work spanned critical issues such as the politics of rural societies in Africa, ethnicity and identity politics and the politics of democratisation in Africa. He was a consummate scholar, one whose intellectual engagements had a wide multi-disciplinary framework and whose towering presence in African academic networks was notable and worth emulating. He drew from a rich tradition of academic mentorship but he was himself also an admirable mentor to young academics. This is how we remember him at CODESRIA; his availability to young academics during major CODESRIA meetings was notable.

Dzodzi Tsikata
President

Godwin Murunga
Executive Secretary

Dr Mustapha made critical contributions to CODESRIA's work and growth. He was Director of the 2002 CODESRIA Governance Institute. From 2009 to 2011, he was a member of CODESRIA's Scientific Committee. More recently, he was a member of the internal review committee on CODESRIA's Intellectual Agenda whose report was submitted in July 2016. In December 2016, he participated in CODESRIA's strategic planning workshop that agreed its current 5-year research agenda. In that workshop, Dr Mustapha's sharp insights into the state of Africa's social sciences and its future in a changing global context were on full display and much appreciated. This was an intellectual at the height of his powers-clear, direct and with a full appreciation of the intellectual and political currents within the global knowledge production complex. None of us in this meeting had any inkling that this would be the last time we would have the privilege of Dr Mustafa's presence.

Though he has passed on, his rich intellectual legacy will remain relevant, widely discussed, cherished and avidly utilized. This is because Dr Mustapha's work captured the lived experiences of Africans in diverse ways. A good many of his publications have not only been conceptually rigorous and path-breaking, they have also proven to have a long shelf life.

As we mourn the passing on of our colleague and comrade, we will also continue to celebrate that he lived a life of integrity, excellence and promise. On behalf of the Executive Committee, the Executive Secretariat and on our own behalf, we extend the entire CODESRIA community's condolences to his partner, Dr Kate Meagher, their children and the larger family and thank them very much for sharing their son, husband and father with us. We at CODESRIA are privileged that he prioritized us.

May his soul rest in eternal peace!

Open, Perceptive and Public-Spirited: A Tribute to Abdul Raufu Mustapha (1954-2017)

Yusuf Bangura
Nyon, Switzerland

For the 37 years that I knew him, Abdul Raufu Mustapha, who departed this life on 8 August 2017, lived a life of courage, commitment and fulfilment. A versatile scholar and an internationalist, he had an incredibly open, perceptive and critical mind.

He prioritised the public interest, whether in terms of his persistent questioning of the failure of his country, Nigeria, to live up to its potential in most dimensions of development, or his engagement with scholars in other parts of the world in articulating an agenda of social change.

He was charming, kind and resolute – personality traits that were a product of his core values of fairness, inclusiveness, equality in all its dimensions, and contempt for corruption and authoritarian habits.

He always expressed his views clearly and boldly, and was not afraid to call out or challenge injustice, exclusion and oppression. He had a good sense of humour, especially when expressed in the popular Nigerian pidgin. His mother tongue was Yoruba, he spoke Hausa like a native speaker, and could hold a conversation in Igbo, having lived in Eastern Nigeria during part of his formative years.

Raufu, as he was known among friends and family, studied and taught political science at the Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) in Nigeria in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. He did his doctoral studies in the late 1980s at Oxford University in the United Kingdom, where he later taught for about 20 years, rising to the rank of Associate Professor.

His scholarship was inseparable from his personal values and critical engagement with politics in Nigeria, other parts of Africa, and the world at large. Four big themes informed this scholarship: equality and social transformation; ethnicity and the national question; substantive democracy; and religion and social cohesion.

Raufu thought deeply about the structures of domination that stifle the aspirations of ordinary people, leading to grossly unequal outcomes in the political economy. As a student and young lecturer at ABU, he was active in the struggles of the student movement, labour unions and the academic staff union of universities, which, in the 1980s, advocated an agenda of social transformation in addressing the problems of inequality, ethnic division and authoritarian rule.

Radical social thought and praxis, influenced by Marxist and dependency theories of development, was rife on Nigerian campuses, especially at ABU, and in sections of the wider society. In the 1979 elections, the People's Redemption Party, which spoke the language of the commoner, or *talakawa*, and was committed to radical social change, captured Northern Nigeria's two most important states, Kano and Kaduna.

A section of the radical-left at ABU joined the Kaduna State Governor's Office as advisers. However, it turned out to be a short-lived experience: unlike its Kano counterpart, the PRP in Kaduna did not control the State House of Assembly. The national ruling party, the National Party of Nigeria, which controlled the House, used its raw numbers power to impeach the governor, Balarabe Musa, after less than two years in office. The radical-left intellectuals were sent packing back to the ABU campus.

The PRP experience in Kaduna became a hotly debated subject among academics at ABU and elsewhere. Even though peasant farmers and other sections of the working poor voted for the party, they were not sufficiently organised or incorporated as active agents in the structures of the party.

One of the big questions at the time was why the impeachment of the popular governor on false charges was not resisted by the broad mass of the people. This led to another critical question: how effective can social transformation be carried out from Government House without mass mobilisation and building structural ties with the working poor?

Two years after the sacking of the governor, a major international conference was held, in 1983, at ABU on Marxist theory and African development, as part of many global initiatives to commemorate 100 years of Marx's death. Radical academics were by then divided between the returnees from Government House and their supporters, and those who remained on the campus and were critical of the Government House experiment.

Raufu, who belonged to the latter group, presented a thoughtful and incisive critique of the PRP experience entitled "Critical Notes on the National Question: Practical Politics and the People's Redemption Party". It was arguably the star paper at the conference, but it did not go down well with the

returnees, who dismissed Raufu's group as armchair theoreticians that did not want to dirty their hands in practical politics. The debate on the paper was passionate and vitriolic. Divisions within the radical scholarly community at ABU deepened irrevocably after that conference.

Raufu's decision to advance his understanding of peasant life and politics in his academic work may have been partly shaped by this early experience of the failed PRP experiment in Kaduna state. His DPhil thesis at Oxford focused on rural differentiation and politics, with field work conducted at Rogo, a rural settlement about 90 kilometres from Kano. I accompanied Raufu to this village a few times during his research and was impressed by the warm rapport he established with the rural folk. He felt very much at home in his surroundings.

With his knowledge on peasant differentiation, rural livelihoods, and research skills, Raufu was invited to contribute to a research project I coordinated in the early 1990s at the UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) on economic crisis, structural adjustment, and social change. He provided valuable insights on the project's core theme on multiple coping strategies, or the tendency of households to diversify sources of incomes as single activities prove insufficient to sustain livelihoods.

His research paper on the coping strategies of cocoa farmers at Alade in South West Nigeria showed that even though price liberalisation raised incomes and revived accumulation among all categories of farmers in the cocoa economy, prospects for sustainability could have been undermined by the continued fall in international prices and demand, escalating input costs, ageing trees and ecological problems.

Raufu's other big research interest was ethnicity and the national question. Given the multiple levels of polarisation in the country, ethnicity, federalism, and revenue sharing schemes constituted the bedrock of Nigerian political science. However, radical political economists tended to ignore or underplay their significance, focusing instead on the dynamics of wealth creation and impoverishment, the state's role in the economy, working class struggles, and popular or subaltern and middle class pressures for social change.

Raufu was among the few young scholars who broke ranks with this tendency, devoting much of his time in understanding ethnic cleavages and politics in their own right without sacrificing the class dimension of radical scholarship. He published in 1986 "The National Question and Radical Politics in Nigeria", as a contribution to a special issue on Nigeria in the *Review of African Political Economy*.

A number of important publications on ethnicity followed at the turn of the century, including his contributions to the UNRISD project on Ethnic Inequalities and Public Sector Governance, and the large programme on horizontal inequalities and conflict at the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) at Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford. In these publications, he demonstrated that Nigeria's power sharing institutions are bedevilled by sharp ethno-regional and vertical inequalities, which tend to affect the country's stability and development.

The 1990s was a period of widespread democratisation in Africa and other parts of the world. Nigeria itself has not always neatly followed the two key political trends on the continent: the first trend can be described as early democratisation in the run-up to independence, followed by long periods of miltary or one party rule from the mid-1960s to the end of the 1980s, and redemocratisation in the 1990s; and the second represented continuous single party dominant, or competitive, democratic politics, as exemplified by Botswana, Mauritius and, to some extent, Senegal. Nigeria's immediate post-independence democracy, like the first African trend, collapsed in the mid-1960s, but was resurrected in 1979, only for it to collapse again in 1983; the country then experienced the longest transition in Africa. It was a latecomer in the new African wave of democratic politics, even though it sent troops to Sierra Leone to restore a collapsed democracy in 1997; it finally transitioned to democracy in 1999, after an exceptionally brutal military dictatorship and manipulation of transition rules and schedules.

This history of democratic politics and oppressive military rule initially affected how sections of the radical-left related to the democracy project--prioritising popular struggles and people power and maintaining a sceptical stance on liberal democracy, which, it was believed, would not deliver real power to the working people or change living conditions substantially. Raufu and others embraced both the freedoms promised under liberal democracy and the need to demand substantive change that would improve the lives of the poor. He was fully involved in the broad civil and human rights campaigns to end General Abacha's dictatorial and brutal regime and restore the rights of expression, organisation and assembly, as well as the fundamental principle of free, fair and credible elections.

One of the low points of Abacha's dictatorship was the execution of the Ogoni nationalist and poet, Ken Saro Wiwa. Raufu's draft contribution to the orbituary jointly prepared with a group of prominent Nigerians on Saro Wiwa, published in the *Review of African Political Economy* in 1995, was revealing and speaks to

Raufu's abiding faith in the unity of Nigeria. Raufu recounted that in a conference on human rights in Lagos in 1993, he asked Saro Wiwa in a one-on-one meeting to respond to the widely held belief that his Ogoni struggle was separatist and detached from minority and civil rights struggles in the country. Saro Wiwa assured him that the Ogoni demand on self determination was a negotiating position, and insisted that the main problem was the refusal of the military junta to negotiate.

Raufu crowned his activism in democratic politics by publishing in 2010 a co-edited volume entitled *Turning Points in African Democracy*. This was a thoughtful, carefully structured and well written 11-country comparative historical study, with a brilliant introduction and conclusion, and a level of scholarship that demonstrated profound mastery of the literature on democratisation. It probed the changes that have occured in democratisation by focusing on the effects of a key turning point on the trajectory of political development in each of the 11 countries. It has been well received by academics working on the challenges of democracy in Africa.

In the last few years of his life, Raufu shifted his research attention and energy to the problems posed by radical Islamist sects in Northern Nigeria as Boko Haram wreaked havoc on that region's society and economy. He became highly productive during this period, creating a transnational Nigeria Research Network of scholars to study Muslim identities, Islamic movements and Muslim-Christian relations, with funding, after competitive bidding, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands. This culminated in two important edited volumes: *Sects and Social Disorder: Muslim Identities & Conflict in Northern Nigeria*, published in 2014; and *Creed and Grievance: Muslim-Christian Relations & Conflict Resolution in Northern Nigeria*, to be published in January 2018. *Sects and Social Disorder* throws light on intra-Muslim divisions, conflicts over interpretations of Islamic texts, and violence in pursuit of the «right Islamic path»; and concludes that the violence between Muslims and Christians cannot be resolved without tackling the divisions within the Islamic sects. One prominent US academic with profound knowledge of Northern Nigeria described it as "the unrivalled original source, easily the canonical collection".

Raufu was a versatile and consummate scholar, with diverse professional interests. In this tribute, I have tried to read him through the lens of four key themes. But the totality of his work transcended these themes. He co-published in 2008, *Gulliver's Troubles: Nigeria's Foreign Policy After the Cold War*; and edited *Conflicts and Security in West Africa* in 2013. He served on the Boards of journals, newspapers, and research centres, including the *Review of African Political Economy* in Sheffield, *Premium Times* in Abuja, and the Development Research and Projects Centre in Kano. He was a consultant to international policy think tanks; and participated actively in the work of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa in Dakar, serving as Director of the 2002 Governance Institute and as a member of the Scientific Committee between 2009 and 2011.

I will end this tribute by sharing some personal experiences I had with him in Nigeria. Raufu was the first person I bonded with when I first arrived at ABU as a young lecturer in 1980. He booked me into Kongo Conference Hotel at the Kongo area of Zaria, and we had a late lunch at Shagalinku restaurant, which specialised in jolof rice and lamb pepper soup, and became my favourite restaurant in Zaria. His favourite eatery was Mama Kudi, which we often visited at Sabon gari, to eat pounded yam, *eba* and *amala* with *egusi* soup and *okra* or *draw soup* (I quickly learned that draw soup in Yoruba is *obe-yoh*, which Raufu always ordered). Another favourite eating place where we often went in the evenings was an Igbo-owned bar along the Samaru road to eat *isi ewu* (goat head pepper soup).

Raufu invited me to spend a few days with him in Ilorin, in 1985, where I had the opportunity to meet his mother (deceased), father (now in his nineties) and members of his extended family. He taught me how to use the overcrowded *molue* buses in Lagos and to navigate my way around the city during a three-week visit we both made in 1985 to collect documents and conduct interviews with officials in various government agencies and industrial firms for a project on the politics of economic crisis and structural adjustment. During the Nigerian Political Science Association's annual conference at the University of Benin in 1984, he nominated me for the post of Vice President – a position which improved my interactions with colleagues in Nigeria's numerous campuses. It was at this conference that I presented the paper "Overcoming Some Basic Misconceptions of the Nigerian Economic Crisis", which later generated the Usman-Bangura debate on the Nigerian economic crisis.

Raufu was a very devoted family man. He is survived by his lovely wife, Kate Meagher, also with a DPhil from Oxford (where they both met) and an Associate Professor of development studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science; and two children, Asma'u and Seyi – graduates of University College London and Oxford respectively.

A great friend has passed on. May he rest in peace!



Genre et fondamentalismes
Gender and Fundamentalisms

À partir de quels moments, pour quelles raisons et de quelles manières, la religion et la culture, lorsqu'elles se lient au politique, peuvent-elles être à la fois sources et lieux d'expression des fondamentalismes ? Ce sont les questions centrales qui traversent ce livre. Ce qui est considéré ici, c'est « la religion » lorsqu'elle est idéologie qui fonde la culture et devient outil d'accès au pouvoir moral, au pouvoir social et surtout au pouvoir politique. Les messages culturels et religieux et leurs interprétations sous-tendent souvent les décisions, les lois et les programmes prises par le politique. Ils ont des effets directs sur la société, en général, et sur les femmes et les rapports de genre, en particulier. Les contributions à cet ouvrage analysent les diverses formes du fondamentalisme dans quelques pays africains, leurs contextes d'émergence et la manière dont elles (re)façonnent les identités et les rapports hommes/femmes. Ces fondamentalismes constituent des sources de préoccupations persistantes dans les débats de société, aussi bien des organisations féministes et féminines que des mondes académiques et politiques. Les manipulations des cultures et des religions se font de plus en plus politiques et finissent par occasionner des discriminations sociales, voire des violences physiques, morales et symboliques assurément insoutenables.

When, why and how can religion and culture be both sources and places of expression for fundamentalisms especially when they are connected to politics? Those are central questions raised throughout this book. What is at stake here is religion when it underpins culture and becomes a political tool to access moral and social power and particularly political power. Cultural and religious messages and their interpretations often underlie decisions, laws and programs made by politics. They have direct effect on society, in general, and on women and gender relations in particular. The various forms of fundamentalism in some African countries, the contexts of their emergence and the ways they (re)shape identities and relationships between men and women are also analysed in this book. These fundamentalisms are sources of persistent concerns in social debates, in feminist and feminine organizations as well as in academia and politics. The manipulations of cultures and religions are progressively political and consequently cause social discriminations, or even physical, moral and symbolic violence undoubtedly unsustainable.

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