

French Policy on Immigration and Co-Development in Light of the Dakar Speech

Should we honestly discuss, solely on the basis of President Sarkozy's speech delivered in Dakar on 26 July 2007, the serious sociopolitical, anthropo-philosophical and historic issues that are obvious in relations between France and contemporary Africa? This paper is an attempt to set aside, or at least to put into perspective the critique of cultural and identity essentialism which, apparently, underpins reactions to the Dakar speech. These reservations can be explained on two grounds. First, Sarkozy spoke in Dakar not as a scholar or even an essayist, which he is not, but as president of a state that built 'France-Afrique', whose operational norms and constraints continue to lie heavy on the imagination, and on French political practices and relations with Africa. Should the real theoretical focus not be on identifying and analysing the implications of the Dakar speech with regard to the policy he seeks to justify: immigration 'chosen and not endured' and the new (?) ideology of 'co-development', that is, mutual development? That is the focus of this paper. The second reason for our reservations regarding the criticism (albeit objective) levelled against the French president is that Nicolas Sarkozy relies rather on African writers, and on disputable ones, for that matter, such as Senghor, to the detriment of European or French researchers. This clearly shows that the time is ripe for a critical analysis of the culturalism of African writers who, while celebrating a weird and delirious *Homo africanus*, prop up day-old theorists like Sarkozy, which is more than he could ever have asked for. But that is another debate. What is the substance of the Dakar speech, and what gaps in his knowledge have African scholars and researchers highlighted so far?

It would be recalled that the French president, true to his offensive and even provocative style, after hurriedly pointing out that colonisation and the slave trade were historic crimes and errors, rejects repentance arguing that 'sons cannot be asked to atone for crimes committed by

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their fathers'. That is nothing new, since this simplistic refrain sung by the whole French political right all the way to the far right, is well known to Sarkozy and his peers, at least since the parliamentary debate on the positive role of French colonisation overseas and the 2005 crisis in the suburbs of Paris. This time, the faith in a Franco-French government ideology, both complex and unscrupulous in regard to French colonial policy, is accompanied by an attempt to theoretically justify African underdevelopment. However, the historical, cultural and ideological resources that the French president contributed towards the construction of his perception of the causes of underdevelopment in Black Africa were fraught with 'substantialism' and a revisiting of the fantasies that marked the dawn of the colonial era. And this leads fatally to the Sarkozian theory of the 'African', whose timeless soul is damned: *'the African tragedy'*, the French president asserts, *'is that the African is not sufficiently integrated in history. The African peasant [...] whose ideal is to live in harmony with nature, only knows the ever revolving wheel of time punctuated by the unending repetition of the same gestures and the same words. In this mindset whereby everything always starts afresh, there is neither room for the human adventure nor for the idea of progress. In such a universe where nature reigns supreme, the African remains immobile amid an unchanging order in which everything seems to be predetermined. Here human beings never take a leap into the future. It never dawns on them that they can get out of the humdrum repetitiveness and forge their destiny.'*

Since the Dakar speech, several scholars, Africans, humanists or Africanologists have reacted, each in their own way, to what can be objectively viewed as the

president's ignorance of the African reality, and worse still, his racial profiling of history and progress. From the scientific standpoint, this position smacks of total ignorance. The only African scholar the president refers to is Senghor, who Africanised and endorsed Eurocentric racism by developing a 'serene' Négritude, which holds that as a result of 'biologisation' and 'negrification' of the emotion, Africans can bring nothing more than the dance to world civilisation, while abstract activities are incumbent upon reason, which is Hellenic. The French president, by disinterring Senghor in Dakar, is relying on an author whose 'serene' Négritude played a 'philosophic' role in the promotion of essentialism in principle, which leads to the legitimisation of the indigene/civilised dichotomy. Apart from this reference to Senghor, whose poetic hotheadedness estranged him from the African reality, the French president displays total ignorance in the Dakar speech. He is totally ignorant of critical and theoretical masterpieces on African civilisation, novel political ideas and *sui generis* sociopolitical transactions published decades ago by both African and French researchers. Moreover, these works show to what extent new African perspectives are undoubtedly moulding and shaping a new sturdy breakaway form of modernity. I recently contributed to this critical interpretation of African civilisation by analysing the socio-genesis of clandestine immigration in Black Africa, a sociological study of which shows that it is not so much the relocation of what the French and Western elite have termed 'the world's misery'; it is one facet (yet to be adequately described) to the numerous counterattacks on the structural crisis affecting the African state whose hegemony is henceforth artificial, since public policy prerogatives have been displaced and entrusted to multilateral players.¹

Sarkozy's choice of words in the Dakar speech, therefore, shows to what extent the question of drawing up the balance sheet of colonisation has suddenly

become an imperative that is no longer in the interest of the supposed 'victims', but in the interest of the colonial administrators, since it is now pegged to political make-believe that is outdated and, what is more, is not a comprehensive assessment of colonisation. From the theoretical and semantic standpoints, the Dakar speech can be rightly criticised as a step backwards: in his 'frankness' and 'sincerity', Nicolas Sarkozy has let the cat out of the bag in broad daylight, revealing what had hitherto come under the province of classified secrets, that is, that in both form and substance, the intellectual arsenal that underpins France's African policy literally dates back to the end of the nineteenth century. This, therefore, is a policy that, for the sake of coherence, hinges on an obsolete intellectual heritage that is almost a century old, in spite of all the patching up. Nicolas Sarkozy's speech in Dakar shows how the 'new French elite', holed up in a frivolous and exotic vision of the continent, are pretending to shed light on realities that, like a nightmare, have always haunted them – race – the truth of which has always eluded them.²

Hence, we must discard such analysis of Sarkozy's mindset and symbolic policy to understand and situate the Dakar speech in the context of French politics. Against this backdrop, the issues raised in the Dakar speech are different: how does this intellectual armature, marked by prejudice, frivolity and ignorance, form part and parcel of what I would call the Sarkozian perspective proper, which has been unfolding since the eve of the French presidential campaign? In other words, how is it that, instead of calling for a new foundation, a new contract of mutual trust with Africans, the Dakar speech attempts to justify current thinking both with regard to immigration policy and co-development? It is important to understand how internal and domestic policy choices and practices, which today are marked by hardly symbolic acts of violence against African immigrants in France, make the Dakar speech a simple pace-setting speech. It should be pointed out that the Dakar speech is more than an episode in a political thriller – it is pragmatic and constitutes a milestone in Sarkozian Machiavellianism. To clearly understand it, we have to situate it in the chain of preceding structural government actions (establishment of a Ministry of Identity and Co-development, selective

immigration) and those that follow (expulsion quotas, DNA tests for foreigners applying to be reunited with their families, etc.). Further, the time lapse between the Dakar speech and the hardening of internal policy poses another problem. What if co-development itself became an instrumental concept, a trap, in such a context characterised by violence, ignorance towards African modernity, the sidelining of the people, clearing France's name and making Africans feel guilty?

Genetics and Repression of Illegal Immigrants

A Symbolic Political Tactic

In light of this question, the crux of the Dakar speech would be to understand immigration policy and co-development as the refracted prism of an ideology geared towards marginalisation that validates the political concept of an Africa and would make it a 'detached world'³ par excellence. This concept, which is as old as Western imperialism, is viewed, at least by the 'French elite', as the very essence of one form of the 'concept of the state'.⁴ This is how the French state fundamentally views itself, with the other – the Black continent, the foreigner and the strange continent – being relegated to the status of an 'outside world', a far-off land deserted by thought, money and development. The political impact of such a prism is cosmetic: it imposes itself on French citizens and Africans through various cultural channels (schools, the media, etc.) as the gospel truth. However, the first historic consequence of the imposition of this political fantasy is not in the underdevelopment of Africa, which indeed feeds and sustains the Elysian gloss; it is in another form of underdevelopment implied by the force of this fantasy: the narrowness of the horizon on which the Black continent's problems are viewed and objectively explained. The ingurgitation of this narrow prism through which Africa is viewed was and still is the basis for political and cultural representations, one of whose consequences in the metropolis is to have made the colonisation of Africa inevitable, at least from the viewpoint of the political elite. Another consequence is the paternalism and the superiority complex of successive French governments.

The French president's Dakar speech, read between the lines, is an endorsement of the presumption that identity differences are insurmountable and that human relations can only be relations between people viewed primarily as distinct and irreducible. The Dakar speech abandons traditional republican expectations to return, in fact, to this conservative presupposition, which serves as a theoretical and political postulate for the nationalist right. Back in France, at the very heart of national policy, one of the salient aspects of this determinist stand is Sarkozy's adoption of Jean-Marie Le Pen's nationalist right-wing position, which earned him practically all the votes on the far right and consequently led Sarkozy to create the unprecedented and controversial Ministry of National Identity. Abroad, this entails, as it does in the Dakar speech itself, a search, first and foremost, for an ahistorical African essence, even if it means denying the reality of the historicity and modernity of Sub-Saharan social attitudes. According to this essentialist political approach, if *Homo africanus* does not exist, he must be created. Sarkozy resorts to such blatant essentialisation of the Négritude that fetishises attitudes that Psychiatrist Frantz Fanon brilliantly interpreted as a fascicule of complexes linked to violence inflicted during the slave trade and the colonial era.⁵ This is a subtle attempt to secure 'African' backing and a parallel to the identity problems and essentialism that tax Sarkozy's own political thought.

Immigration Policy and Denial of Identity

Contrary to what some commentators and critics have observed, the Dakar speech is not a simple exercise in political fantasy wherein the denial of the African reality plays no political role. Such denial is an episode in the orchestration of a global categorisation. Thus, the serious lapses and bibliographic choices that impact on the French president's conceptualisation of his African policy tie in with his conservatism which, by politicising national identity, shows to what extent he perceives human beings as predetermined invariables. One can even talk of general determinism that also influences some of the major orientations of his internal policy. Geneticist Thomas Heams is right in his searing criticism of the Dakar speech, which he describes as

'the most racist official French government speech in a long time';⁶ he draws a parallel between the speech and Sarkozy's determinist ideas on paedophilia voiced during the French presidential campaign. The image of the African stuck in his peasant and ahistoric nature is very similar to that of the paedophile's genetic recidivist predisposition...

All this raises questions as to the ins and outs of French immigration policy. The fourth hardline measure adopted by Sarkozy, with the Minister of National Identity, Brice Hortefeux as band leader, was approved by the French National Assembly in the 24 October 2007 vote. The peculiarity in this hardline measure is the introduction of genetics into French general law, through a provision that has already blocked all possible legal channels for facilitating immigration. On the pretext of controlling the legality of parenthood, the DNA of foreign nationals whose papers are in order, 'integrated', so to speak, can now be obtained and stored in a country that is deeply opposed to the ethnic and racial profiling that facilitated the abhorrent administrative practices during the Second World War. It is worth noting that the initial policy that made DNA testing general and compulsory has been sufficiently disputed and even abandoned, thanks to amendments by a senate that is particularly averse to this legal provision. Thus, the provision adopted by the Assembly is purely symbolic, as DNA testing is now optional and limited to maternal parenthood and some cases of families resident in countries without a reliable civil status administration.

That notwithstanding, DNA testing is not a light matter. In principle, it is proof of discrimination: what can no longer be done to citizens over sixty years ago when Jews and other victims were deported and massacred using similar methods can now be done to foreigners without any scruples, even if it means weakening the contractual and purely cultural foundation of the immigration policy and, generally, French identity. It does not suffice to say that eleven other European countries are doing it: historically, France is the only Western country founded solely on the philosophical values and principles inherited from the Age of Enlightenment. Accordingly, there are no races, no ethnic groups – only human

beings with reasoning faculties. The essence of the much-vaunted French nationality is repugnant to ethnicity and race, which compels the French executive and legislature to steer clear of this pornography that is spreading in the other major European democracies (Germany, United Kingdom, etc.), where governments are peeping into people's privacy and biological nudity. It was introduced in Germany, on the basis of the racist underpinnings of the Bismarckian state, which was first and foremost Germanic, and in the United Kingdom because of its multicultural population, where ethnic origins can be a legitimate referent in general law. The introduction of DNA into the immigration problem is a transgression, a regression that the symbolic and anti-racist legal system of the post-Vichy period strongly reaffirmed.

However, this transgression has its Sarkozian dimension; it is used to justify a policy that keeps certain categories of humanity at bay – categories that are lagging behind in the modernity race, and who, on account of their pariah status, are forced to act like impostors. The introduction of DNA in the law somehow legitimises the symbolic lynching of people who have been denied the right of access to modernity. Here we are dealing with a policy of otherness which, in the case of Africans, translates into an immigration and co-development policy whose dimensions are taking shape and increasingly conforming to the myth of an Africa which has 'dropped out', as a recluse in its 'detached world'. How can we believe in this 'partnership between nations that are equal in terms of rights and duties', which Sarkozy refers to in the Dakar speech, at a time when this myth is so deeply ingrained in the French government's mindset?

This question arises at a time when Romania's entry into the European Union, whose nationals represent a third of the 25,000 annual expulsions from France, has increasingly led to reductions in the immigration quota, thereby closing the net around illegal African immigrants living in France. In this regard, one wonders whether the insignificant number of illegal immigrants whose immigration status is regularised, the rampant expulsions and numerous forms of violence targeting illegal immigrants are not (before and after the Dakar speech) examples of auto-

legitimation of this form of violence and symbolic exclusion by Sarkozy's choice of words and convictions on African identity. And, what if these illegal immigrants are equated, as we might expect from the concept of modernity, with those who are identified and oppressed because they do not have an identity? What if they assume the appearance of those whom Kevin Bales has described as secondary entities, disposable people doomed to be got rid of or ejected out of the modernity for which they have never been destined? DNA testing to ascertain the paternity of children in the process of family reunion is yet another ploy to further extend this symbolic repression to all foreigners from the South. It is now obvious that in France a genealogy of symbolic violence underpins and sustains the legislative measures aimed at limiting the rights and freedoms of people from regions that are disqualified by the president at a glance. This is a result of the reinvigoration of French internal political interests and representations on African immigration based on identity prejudices.

Co-development as an Instrument of Exploitation

All this ultimately raises another crucial and related question: can we still talk of co-development, which entails respect of common interests and social justice, especially with regard to mobile persons and the different ways in which people join the modernity bandwagon?

The Ins and Outs of a Franco-French Concept

To answer the question whether co-development is not an illusion in a context marked by deep-seated prejudices and powerful French internal political interests, it is important to consider the manner in which this concept has been fleshed out in the relevant government department: the Ministry of National Identity, Immigration, Integration and Co-development (MIINCOD). This ministry was created at the very inception of the Sarkozy/Fillon government. It is self-evident that in this thematic melting pot co-development is the least controversial concept, in light of the view that this ideological ministry is a tool for exploiting immigration. It is, nevertheless, a charged concept that has inherited the ideological representations of the postcolonial order.

Indeed, as regards France's African policy, co-development is a concept that replaces 'cooperation', which was in fashion from the African independence era to the 1990s. Extending the colonial hegemonic system and rekindling the old dream of the French empire, cooperation was used during the period in question to establish and maintain in power African governments that are inefficient in terms of democratisation, political and economic transparency. It also opened the door to the relocation of surplus French 'technical' manpower destined to play the lofty role of 'technical assistant' to remedy the shortage of executive staff in the new-born African states. France, by opting for 'stability' instead of supporting the growth of African societies, has set cooperation on the path of the obsolete Foccart network set up at the outset of the Fifth Republic.⁷ Cooperation has been worn out by its failures and irrelevance. In Africa, French cooperation came up against the ideology of 'good governance', which imposed structural adjustment programmes orchestrated by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in the 1980s. Thus, 'cooperation' ended up yielding to 'co-development', officially institutionalised when the left regained power in France in 1997. This concept introduced a symbolic innovation: the yearning for respect of African societies whose citizens would eventually offer alternative social technologies to development and express their specific needs in terms of quality and economic prospects. It was therefore important to support Africans instead of imposing on them external visions, as is self-evident in the Dakar speech. Co-development implies, in principle, equality between actors and values that 'co-develop'. Thus, it became a means of breaking the hegemonic predisposition evident in African reports of French technical assistance. France thus wanted to get rid of her cultural and political paternalism.

As recently as 1998, in an authoritative article on the subject, Christophe Daum reviewed that the approach of the French government was not only improper but ineffective.⁸ In his view, the relations that inspired that approach tended to protect the interests and supremacy of a patronising vision of the development of the immigrants' countries of origin, in defiance of the entire African socioeconomic reality. To be just, fair and

effective, the approach to the development of the countries of origin should be based on the testimony and priorities of immigrants themselves who know better than anyone else what is good and just, be it in terms of investments or economic policy choices. It would also be proper to analyse current development processes that bind the vision of African societies in ideological shackles that grow in the minds of decision-makers with no room for contributions from African social realities.

From this point of view, it cannot therefore be said that the evolution of the co-development concept has succeeded in suppressing the old state as employer/state as client dichotomy found in the centre/periphery relationship of subordination that France and Europe maintain with the former colonies, and which is epitomised by Sarkozy's so-called 'outspokenness' in Dakar.⁹ Co-development is struggling and straining to take stock of the social innovations that have accompanied the birth of an African social field.¹⁰ Although this can be explained by several factors, the gap between what African societies are and what they want, on the one hand, and the French vision, on the other, is attributable to the routine knowledge and bureaucratic reflexes of development assistance, which, by becoming a system in itself, serves the political ends of stabilising African governments rather than the needs of the social field that burst on to the political scene in the 1990s. By confining themselves to presidential palaces and protecting governments from their societies, the French presence and hegemony in Africa has confined co-development to a vision of patronising assistance. However, the critical dimension of this field indicates more clearly the national disenchantment in Black Africa. This shows that, since the dawn of political liberalisation in the 1990s, the logics and federation of the expectations of social actors, at the very least, ended up competing with the hegemonic policies and operations of state authorities that now reign over 'empty societies',¹¹ as Serge Latouche calls them. The whole problem with co-development apparently lies in its inability to rise above its jaundiced vision of Africa constructed as a stagnant pool by the so-called neo-paternalists whose voices still echo in the Dakar speech. Co-development has been slow in liberating

itself from its 'fetishisation' of bilateral cooperation in order to integrate in its structure, this dimension of sociological transformation of African societies' vision of their governments, themselves and their capacity to accept and interpret their own expectations.

France has abandoned cooperation and embraced co-development, but has probably kept the ideology, while continuing to view African societies as reservoirs of misery, people who elude modernity, and not at all as settings where political creativity and the social demands of the actors are clearly calling into question the absence of political innovation.

Co-development in Its Ministry

Can one expect any innovations from the MIINCOD in the area of mutual development? Nothing is less certain, particularly after the Dakar speech. And even if nobody can honestly regret the disappearance, under Sarkozy, of the 'Department of African Affairs' at the Elysée, several factors frustrate any dreams of a revolution in co-development or, in other words, in France's African policy. The fact of the matter is that the new French president has accepted this concept which he did not create, and even to take it in the state in which it is currently transformed and manipulated within the European Union. In fact, in France and elsewhere in Western Europe, co-development is only meaningful in a global strategy to combat illegal or underqualified immigration from poor countries. In Brussels, this concept clogs the entire European policy on immigration aimed at curbing the influx of underqualified immigrants (87%) into Europe. By protecting French internal policy interests and riding on this European consensus against the so-called 'misery' immigration, the MIINCOD can only shoulder with great difficulty any autonomous and innovative vision that would lend political weight to co-development. The 'new' vision of France's African policy is therefore not far-reaching enough and badly needs an impetus. Furthermore, it is confined to a real *realpolitik* straitjacket wherein there is no longer any question of helping Africa, out of generosity or repentance, to come out of the doldrums, but all is geared towards safeguarding immediate interests. Against the backdrop of the

Dakar speech, the MIINCOD will be tasked with abandoning the policy of fellow-feeling that runs across Franco-African relations, and instituting a policy that openly prioritises French internal interests. Further, such protection of national interests would corroborate the hexagonal character of the new French presidency observed during the presidential campaign, and which was fleshed out in the televised debate between Sarkozy and Royal. The wide range of issues of internal policy, such as purchasing power, environment, nuclear power, reforms and immigration, revealed a more 'super prime minister' and less international facet to the French head of state. The dimension of the five-year term and the requirement of movement fall in with this profile, and in the context of the oversized internal policy interests, the president loses his influence as a 'great friend and protector' of Africa in the way he reacts in his relations with the continent, depending on the sectors involved. For instance, the prioritisation of expulsion figures and the efficiency of house arrest mechanisms developed or imported into Africa will be the cement of Franco-African cooperation in coming years. France, the great France, seems to have thrown in the towel, in favour of its oversized internal policy.

The disproportionate extension of internal policy is very far-reaching. The relocation of co-development to the MIINCOD marks a turning point: the entry, whether voluntary or involuntary, of France into bilateral relations in its African policy. The unveiling of the era of bilateral relations is a real innovation by Sarkozy since this ministry is new in the Fifth Republic. The attachment of co-development to the MIINCOD indeed marks the end of an era. This is very significant because it appears to withdraw, for the first time, France's African policy from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or, in any case, reduces the influence of its Secretary of State for Cooperation. France's African policy therefore appears to be steered as a branch of internal policy, with MIINCOD actually becoming an 'ideological' poll of a split Ministry of Interior. This withdrawal is the direct effect of the rejection of (illegal) African emigration, by former Minister of Interior Sarkozy, now French president, which signals France's abandonment of the hegemonic role it has played in Africa. This African policy shift at the Elysée is a clear reflection of the

reality: Sarkozian co-development marks France's decline in Africa, under pressure from a combination of factors: African people's resentment of a xenophobic policy rid of its hang-ups, the dynamism of the Chinese who are competing with France in key sectors of 'technical cooperation', and, since Dakar, the calling into question of Africans' ability to take up the challenge of modernity. The imperative of meeting the demands of these new developments will entail shifts in the balance of power between the state and social actors. In this new era of strategic and prospective analysis, the Dakar speech comes across as a real tactical delay, as France's rivals have understood the political utility of respecting the demands of African societies.

In short, prior to the French president's speech in Dakar, the entry of co-development in government was not part of a strategy to achieve the objective of 'contacting African societies' and building France's policy with Sub-Saharan Africa on new foundations. It paves the way to providing a skeleton service and condoning routine knowledge and mechanisms for supporting governments, in line with the policy of relocation and European subcontracting of police surveillance of immigration. African governments thus constitute technical staging posts for European domestic policies. We can therefore expect that the French president, within the framework of the Mediterranean Union, will call for stricter routine checks and record-keeping. It is therefore obvious that the fight against migrating Africans will intensify, in spite of the avowed ambitions (research, trade, position of Turkey, which no one wants in the European Union, etc.) and the desire for a common future exhibited in the Dakar speech. To this end, more and more repatriation agreements will be signed to increase efficiency in repatriations, and visa requirements will be tightened coupled with much less diplomatic demands on African leaders who will have to step up surveillance at borders for fear of being sanctioned by cuts in whatever will be left of development assistance. France would thus be in conformity with an approach that has become the inevitable paradigm in EU/African relations.¹² The real challenge in co-development lies in the risk that African states will consider their emigrants as criminals, since the former

will be judged by their ability to keep their nationals confined to their homes. In this regard, only countries with policies that efficiently limit emigration will be labelled as 'friend of France', to the others' great displeasure. With co-development walking hand-in-hand with an immigration and national identity policy, we may well witness a widening of the gap between African societies and governments, and a hardening of dictatorships, amid the indifference of a France that is bent on guaranteeing the efficiency of steps taken by African states to serve its internal policy.

Notes

1. See 'Sans-papiers, figure du politique. Hégémonie au Cameroun, Etat et cultures nationales en Europe', PhD thesis in political science at Université Paris 8 (531pp.), defended on 22 June 2006, *magna cum laude*, by Ange Bergson Lendja Ngnemzué, under the supervision of Prof. Pierre Cours-Salies. The author studied Sociology, Anthropology, Psychology and Philosophy at Yaounde University before undertaking further studies at Université de Paris 8 (Sociology and Political Science) and at Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne (PhD thesis in Philosophy in the process of being completed).
2. See *ibid.*
3. For a detailed and well-thought-out introduction on African civilisation that takes into account several sociopolitical life settings, see the following: Georges Balandier (with Jean Coppans) 1985 *Sociologie des Brazzavilles noires* (Paris, Presses de FNSP, 2nd edn). See also Jean-François Bayart 1985 *L'Etat au Cameroun* (Paris, FNSP, 2nd edn); Jean-François Bayart 1989, *L'Etat en Afrique, la politique du ventre* (Paris, Fayard); Jean-François Bayart 1996 'L'Historicité de l'Etat importé', *Cahiers du CERI*, 15: 3-49; Jean-François Bayart, Béatrice Hibou and Stephen Ellis 1997 *La criminalisation de l'Etat en Afrique* (Bruxelles, Éditions Complexe); Jean-François Bayart 2004 *Le gouvernement du monde. Une critique politique de la globalisation* (Paris, Fayard). Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz 1999 *Africa Works, Disorder as Political Instrument* (Oxford, James Currey). Fabien Eboussi Boulaga 1993 *Les conférences nationales en Afrique, affaire à suivre* (Paris, Karthala); Fabien Eboussi Boulaga 1997 *La démocratie de transit au Cameroun* (Paris, L'Harmattan). Jean-Marc Ela 1983 *La ville en Afrique noire*

- (Paris, Karthala); Jean-Marc Ela 1990 *Quand l'Etat pénètre en brousse..., les ri-postes paysannes à la crise* (Paris, Karthala); Jean-Marc Ela 1994 *Afrique, l'irruption des pauvres. Société contre ingérence, pouvoir et argent* (Paris, L'Harmattan). Peter Geschiere 1995 *Sorcellerie et politique en Afrique, la viande des autres* (Paris, Karthala); Peter Geschiere 1999 'Le poids de l'histoire', in Christian Coulon and Denis-Constant Martin (eds), *Les Afriques politiques* (Paris, La découverte/textes à l'appui): 29–43. Serge Latouche 1998 *L'autre Afrique, entre don et marché* (Paris, Albin Michel); Serge Latouche 2003 *Décoloniser l'imaginaire. La Pensée créatrice contre l'économie de l'absurde* (Paris, Éditions Parangon). Charles-Henri Pradelles de Latour 1991 *L'ethnopsychanalyse en pays bamiléké* (Paris, E.P.E.L). Achille Mbembé 1988 *Afriques indociles. Christianisme, Etat et société en postcolonie* (Paris, Karthala); Achille Mbembé 2000 *De la postcolonie, essai sur l'imagination politique dans l'Afrique contemporaine* (Paris, Karthala). Célestin Monga 1994 *Anthropologie de la colère. Société civile et démocratie en Afrique Noire* (Paris, L'Harmattan). Luc Sindjoun 2002 *L'Etat ailleurs. Entre noyau dur et case vide* (Paris, Economica). Jean-Pierre Warnier 1993 *L'esprit d'entreprise au Cameroun* (Paris, Karthala).
4. Mbembé, 'Le président français...' in Mbembé 2000.
 5. *bid.*, and especially 'Du hors-monde'; 217–63.
 6. Abdelmalek Sayad understands 'pensée d'Etat' [concept of the state] as a concept whereby the presence of an immigrant is set up as 'presence in default or by default'. This 'concept of the state', which is a powerful instrument of political control and form of symbolic violence, is disseminated through various channels (schools, artistic expression, etc.), and 'reflects, through its own structures (*conceptual structures*) state structures, as inculcated by each individual, in the literal sense of the word, that is to say, incarnated' (Abdelmalek Sayad, 'L'immigration et la "pensée d'Etat"'. Réflexions sur la double peine', in Commission européenne 1996 *Sciences sociales. Délit d'immigration*. Bilingual French/English publication of the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (Luxembourg); 13–43, at p. 17 for excerpts cited.
 7. See Frantz Fanon, *Peau noire masques blancs* et *Les damnés de la terre*.
 8. Thomas Heams is a lecturer in Genetics in Paris, and author of the 2007 article 'L'homme africain... Retour sur le discours de Nicolas Sarkozy à Dakar le 26 juillet dernier', in *Libération*, Thursday 2 August, available on <http://www.liberation.fr/rebonds/discoursdesarkozyadakar/270247.FR.php>
 9. François-Xavier Verschave 2005 *De la Françafrique à la Mafrafrique* (Bruxelles, éd. Le Flibuste).
 10. Christophe Daum 1998 'Développement des pays d'origine et flux migratoires', *Hommes et migrations*, no. 1214 (juillet-août): 58–72.
 11. Bertrand Badie and Marie-Claude Smouts 1992 *Le retournement du monde, sociologie de la scène internationale* (Paris, Presses de la fondation nationale de science politique/Daloz).
 12. Using the Cameroonian example, political scientist Luc Sindjoun explains the concept of the 'social field': 'The social field, a concept which wards off the illusion of an independent civil and virgin society, free of all political corruption, pertains to a set of relations between actors influenced by a wide range of logics that transcend the political aspect. From an analytical standpoint, it is distinct from the political field of which it is purportedly a subject, and encompasses religious, economic and cultural dimensions, etc. The Cameroonian social field, understood as a system of concurrent and complementary relations between actors and groups for the promotion of their co-existence and mutual understanding, is analyzed through the dialectic of the conservative order and inventive disorder.' Luc Sindjoun 1996 'Le champ social camerounais: désordre inventif, mythes simplificateurs et stabilité hégémonique de l'Etat', in *Afrique politique*, no. 62 (juin): 57–67; quotation at p. 57.

Journal of Higher Education in Africa



ISSN 0851-7762

An interdisciplinary international journal of research and policy

The Journal of Higher Education in Africa (JHEA) publishes analysis, information, and critique on contemporary issues of higher education in the continent with special emphasis on research and policy matters. The JHEA accepts contributions in English and French from researchers, practitioners and policymakers.